Jure of The Guilt or Innocence of The Accused in The Criminal
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Dondi AbacaJure of The Guilt or Innocence of The Accused in The Criminal
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Dondi AbacaFIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 215671, September 19, 2018
ALSONS DEVELOPMENT AND INVESTMENT
CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. THE HEIRS OF ROMEO D. CONFESOR
(ANGELITA, GERALDINE, ROMEO, JR., ROWENA, JULIANE, NICOLE,
AND RUBYANNE, ALL SURNAMED CONFESOR), AND THE HONORABLE
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, Refspondents.
In Abacan, Jr. v. Northwestern University, Inc.,33 We applied the principle of
prejudicial question even when there was no criminal case involved therein.
The cases involved were a case for nullification of election of directors before
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and a civil case for damages
and attachment before the RTC. We explained:
Technically, there would be no prejudicial question to speak of
in this case, if we are to consider the general rule that a
prejudicial question comes into play in a situation where a civil
action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in
the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before
the criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue
in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de
jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal
case. However, considering the rationale behind the
principle of prejudicial question, being to avoid two
conflicting decisions, prudence dictates that we apply the
principle underlying the doctrine to the case at bar.
xxxx
In the present case, the question of which between the Castro
and the Nicolas factions are the de jure board of directors of
NUI is lodged before the SEC. The complaint before the RTC of
Laoag meanwhile alleges that petitioners, together with their
co-defendants, comprised of the "Castro faction," wrongfully
withdrew the amount of P1.4 M from the account of NUI with
Metr obank. Moreover, whether or not Roy Nicolas ofthe "Nicolas
faction" is a duly elected member of the Board ofNUI and thus
with capacity to institute the herein complaint in behalf of the
NUI depends on the findings of the SEC in the case pending
before it. It would finally determine whether Castro, et
al. legally withdrew the subject amount from the bank and
whether Nicolas lawfully initiated the complaint in behalf of
herein respondent NUI It is petitioners' claim, and we agree,
that the presence or absence of their liability for allowing the
withdrawal of P1.4 M from the account of NUI with Metrobank in
favor of the "Castro faction" is reliant on the findings of the SEC
as to which of the two factions is the de jure board. Since the
determination of the SEC as to which of the two factions
is the de jure board of NUI is crucial to the resolution of
the case before the RTC, we find that the trial court should
suspend its proceedings until the SEC comes out with its
findings.34 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
The earlier case of Quiambao v. Hon. Osorio,35 also finds relevant application
in the case at bar. In Quiambao, the case before the court was an action for
forcible entry, where private respondents claimed to be the legitimate
possessors of the subject property and that petitioner therein, by force,
intimidation, strategy and stealth, entered into a portion thereof, placed
bamboo posts, and built a house thereon. By way of affirmative defense and
as a ground for the dismissal of the case, petitioner argued that the pendency
of an administrative case for cancellation of Agreement to Sell before the
Office of the Land Authority between the same parties and the same parcel of
land, wherein petitioner disputed private respondents' right of possession
over the said land by reason of the latter's default in paying the complete
purchase price thereof, is determinative of private respondents' right to eject
petitioner therefrom. Simply put, petitioner argued that the administrative
case poses a prejudicial question which bars the judicial action until its
termination.36
In the said case, the Court recognized the fact that the cases involved were
civil and administrative in character and thus, technically, there was no
prejudicial question to speak of. In ruling, however, the Court also took into
consideration the apparent intimate relation between the two cases in that,
the right of private respondents to eject petitioner from the subject property
depends primarily on the resolution of the issue of whether respondents, in
the first place, have the right to possess the said property, which was the
issue pending in the administrative case. Relevant portions of the Court's
decision in the said case are herein quoted:
The actions involved in the case at bar being respectively civil
and administrative in character, it is obvious that technically,
there is no prejudicial question to speak of. Equally apparent,
however, is the intimate correlation between said two [2]
proceedings, stemming from the fact that the right of private
respondents to eject petitioner from the disputed portion
depends primarily on the resolution of the pending
administrative case. For while it may be true that private
respondents had prior possession of the lot in question, at the
time of the institution of the ejectment case, such right of
possession had been terminated, or at the very least,
suspended by the cancellation by the Land Authority of the
Agreement to Sell executed in their favor. Whether or not
private respondents can continue to exercise their right of
possession is but a necessary, logical consequence of the issue
involved in the pending administrative case assailing the validity
of the cancellation of the Agreement to Sell and the subsequent
award of the disputed portion to petitioner. If the cancellation of
the Agreement to Sell and the subsequent award to petitioner
are voided, then private respondents would have every right to
eject petitioner from the disputed area. Otherwise, private
respondent's right of possession is lost and so would their right
to eject petitioner from said portion.
Faced with these distinct possibilities, the more prudent course
for the trial court to have taken is to hold the ejectment
proceedings in abeyance until after a determination of the
administrative case. Indeed, logic and pragmatism, if not
jurisprudence, dictate such move. To allow the parties to
undergo trial notwithstanding the possibility of petitioner's right
of possession being upheld in the pending administrative case is
to needlessly require not only the parties but the court as well
to expend time, effort and money in what may turn out to be a
sheer exercise in futility. x x x.37
