UP Law BOC 2019-Poli-LMT
UP Law BOC 2019-Poli-LMT
LAW BOC
POLITICAL LAW
Q1: What is the binding nature of soft law?
A1: Soft law is not binding, as it does not fall into any of the categories of international law set forth
in Article 38, Chapter III of the 1946 Statute of the International Court of Justice. It is, however, an
expression of non-binding norms, principles, and practices that influence state behavior.
(Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association v. Duque III, G.R. No. 173034, [October 9, 2007])
In international practice, the “associated state” arrangement has usually been used as a transitional
device of former colonies on their way to full independence. (Province of North Cotabato v.
Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, G. R. Nos.
183591, 183752, 183893, 183951 & 183962, [October 14, 2008])
Q4: When does Congress' power of contempt expire? What is the effect of such expiration
on persons detained for contempt in the Senate?
A4: The power of contempt is co-terminus with the legislative inquiry being undertaken in the
Senate. The Senate's power of contempt expires upon the approval or disapproval of the report of
the Committee conducting the investigation or when the session of Congress is terminated.
The period of imprisonment under the inherent power of contempt by the Senate during inquiries in
aid of legislation should only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry under which the said
power is invoked.
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In other words, when a foreign power occupies a state and exercises the powers of government,
the political laws of the said state are deemed automatically suspended but the former
government automatically comes to life and will be in force and in effect again upon the re-
establishment of the former government. (Taylor, International Law, p. 615.)
Q9: What are the objective and subjective requirements under the reasonable
expectation of privacy test?
A9:
Subjective: that a person has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy;
Objective: that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.
Q11: Are aliens entitled to due process in deportation proceedings? What are the
processes that must be afforded to them?
A11: Yes, they are entitled to due process. Although a deportation proceeding is not in the nature
of a criminal action, it is considered a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting
the freedom and liberty of a person. Hence, the right of due process applies. The Rules of Court
on Criminal Procedure will be applicable in such proceedings.
The charge against an alien must specify the acts or omissions complained of which must be
stated in ordinary and concise language to enable a person of common understanding to know on
what ground he is intended to be deported and enable the CID to pronounce a proper judgment
Before any charge should be filed in the CID a preliminary investigation must be conducted to
determine if there is a sufficient cause to charge the respondent for deportation
Issuance of search warrants and warrants of arrest, arrests without warrant, service of warrants
must comply with the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
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Q12: The prosecutor has already found probable cause and has filed the corresponding
information. The informations was accompanied by certifications that theprosecutor
found prima facie cases against the accused. Is the judge already obliged to issue the
warrant of arrest?
A12: NO. The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it calls for the exercise
of judicial discretion on the part of the issuing magistrate. Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court which provides that the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause
before issuing a warrant or order of arrest. If on the face of the information the judge finds no
probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's certification and require the submission of the
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of a probable
cause. (Placer v. Villanueva)
Q14: What is Deliberative Process Privilege? What must be established to qualify for
protection under this privilege?
A14: The deliberative process privilege protects from disclosure documents reflecting advisory
opinions, recommendations and deliberations that are component parts of the process for
formulating governmental decisions and policies.
To qualify for protection under this privilege, the agency must show that the document is both
(1) predecisional and (2) deliberative.
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The Supreme Court may substitute its own estimate of value as gathered from the record submitted
to it, in cases where the only error of the commissioners (or concerned government instrumentality
doing the taking) is that they have applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them; or
that they have disregarded a clear preponderance of the evidence; or that they have used an
improper rule of assessment in arriving at the amount of award; provided always, that the evidence
be clear and convincing.
Q17: Q: When does custodial investigation start? What are the rights of the person under
custodial investigation?
A17: Custodial investigation starts when the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect. It involves any
questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner.This includes situations
in which an accused is merely invited for questioning
Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation
(a) Shall at all times be assisted by counsel.
(b) Shall be informed of his rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel, preferably of his own choice
(c) The custodial investigation report shall be reduced to writing by the investigating officer
(d) Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel or in
the latter's absence, upon a valid waiver
(e) Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, or under custodial investigation, shall be in writing and signed by such
person in the presence of his counsel; otherwise the waiver shall be null and void and of no
effect.
(f) Any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall be allowed visits
by or conferences with any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor or priest or
religious minister chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family or by his counsel,
or by any national non-governmental organization duly accredited by the Commission on
Human Rights of by any international non-governmental organization duly accredited by the
Office of the President.
Q18: What are the test to determine a valid delegation of legislative power?
A18: The delegation must satisfy the completeness and sufficient standard tests.
1. Completeness Test - a law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out, or to be implemented by the delegate. The law must be complete in all its terms
and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only
thing he will have to do is enforce it
2. Sufficient Standards Test - there is a sufficient standard when there are adequate guidelines
or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot. The standard must specify the limits of the delegate's authority,
announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which the law is to be
implemented (Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA)
• These tests are intended to prevent a total transfer of legislative authority and prevent
the
delegation from running riot (Vivas v. The Monetary Board)
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"The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason,
felony, and breach of the peace. be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions
of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate
therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place." (Article VI, Section 15.)
Meaning of "speech or debate therein"
Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official
functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress,
while the same is in session as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in
session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the
premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and
of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such at the time of the
performance of the acts in question. [Jimenez v. Cabangbang, GR No. L-15905, Aug 3, 1966]
In this case, Congress was not in session went the communication was made. Also, it is obvious
that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official
duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof.
Although the letter says that plaintiffs are under the control of the persons unnamed therein
alluded to as "planners", defendant, likewise, added that "it is of course possible" that plaintiffs
"are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge". Allegations of
hatred, contempt and attempt to dishonour are not consistent with the contents of the letter as it
explicitly states that they may be are unwitting tools of the planners and that they may have no
knowledge of the plan. [Id]
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Also, it violates the system of checks and balances. It deprives the president of his item-veto
power. As lump-sum appropriations, the actual projects under each congressman’s PDAF are
determined (by the congressman) only after the GAA is passed. It has a detrimental effect on
Congressional Oversight because legislators effectively intervene in project implementation.
(Belgica v Ochoa)
Q23: Is the DAP constitutional?
A23: NO. The transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the
President (and even the heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by the
Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such transfer or realignment should only
be made “within their respective offices”. Under the DAP, this was violated because funds
appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and other
non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also contemplate realignment of funds to an
existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the
Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned. Although some of
these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because they were
not provided for by the GAA. The DAP transfers are also not “savings” contrary to what was
being declared by the Executive. (Araullo v Aquino)
Q24: What are the tax exemptions on non-stock, nonprofit educational institutions?
A24: When a non-stock, nonprofit educational institution proves that it uses its revenues
actually,
directly, and exclusively for educational purposes, it shall be exempted from income tax, value-
added tax (VAT), and local business tax. On the other hand, when it also shows that it uses its
assets in the form of real property for educational purposes, it shall be exempted from real
property tax.
Q25: Who succeeds the presidency in case of death, permanent disability, removal from
office, or resignation of President AND Vice-President?
A25: Senate President or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
shall act as President until a President or Vice-President shall be elected and qualified.
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Q27: Does the appointment of a Bureau of Customs Chief require the consent of the
Commission on Appointments?
A27: No. The following are the groups of officers whom the president shall appoint under Sec.
16, Art. VII, of the 1987 Constitution:
1. the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and
other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
2. all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided
for by law;
3. those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
4. officers lower in rank 4 whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone
Of the four groups only the first require the consent of the Commission on Appointments
applying constitutional construction and a review of the intent of the Framers of the
Constitution. Since appointment in a bureau is not under those enumerated in the first group
then the consent of the Commission on Appointments is not required.
Q28: May the president appoint an Acting Secretary in the Department of Interior and
Local Government, while Congress is in session, without the consent of the Commission
on Appointments?
A28: Yes. Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments in an acting
capacity. Both of them are effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are
extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any
time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on
Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the
Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important
offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments
Q29: Who has jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions against elective local
officials?
A29: Jurisdiction is lodged with the following:
1. The President
All administrative complaints, duly verified, against elective local officials mentioned in
the preceding Section shall be acted upon by the President. The President, who may act
through the Executive Secretary, shall hereinafter be referred to as the Disciplining
Authority.(A.O. 23)
2. The Civil Service Commission
The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving
the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an
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amount exceeding thirty days’ salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or
dismissal from office. (E.O. 292, Book V, Title I, Sub. Title A, Chapter 7)
3. The Ombudsman
The Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and
appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies,
including Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only by
impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary. (R.A.6770)
Q31: What is the extent of the Judiciary's power of review when the President declares
Martial Law/Suspends the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus?
A31: To determine the factual sufficiency of such declaration, the Supreme Court will have to
rely on the fact-finding capabilities of the Executive Department, which will have to open its
findings to the scrutiny of the Court. The determination of which among the Constitutionally
given military powers should be exercised in a given set of factual circumstances is a prerogative
of the President, and the Court may not substitute the President's judgment with its own.
(Lagman v. Medialdea)
When impugning the factual sufficiency of a declaration of martial law, the following requisites
must be followed:
1. Congress shall be made a party to the case
2. The President, who enjoys immunity from suit, cannot be made a party to the suit
3. The Petitioners cannot invoke the Court's expanded certiorari power under Art. VIII, Sec.
1, as the Court's jurisdiction under Art. VII, Sec. 18 is special and specific (Lagman v.
Pimentel III)
Q32: Can the Supreme Court compel Congress to convene in joint session to deliberate
on the validity of a proclamation of Martial Law?
A32: NO. The Congress is not constitutionally mandated to convene in joint session except to
vote jointly to revoke the President's declaration or suspension. By the language of Article VII,
Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution, the Congress is only required to vote jointly to revoke the
President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. (Padilla v. Congress)
Q33: Does a grant of absolute pardon automatically entitle a convicted public official to
resume public office which had been forfeited by reason of such conviction?
A33: Pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office necessarily relinquished
or forfeited by reason of the conviction although such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility
for appointment to that office [Monsanto v Factoran Jr. GR No. L-78239 (1989)]
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Q34: What powers does the President exercise with regard to foreign loans?
A34: Constantino v. Cuisia: The Constitution allocates to the President the exercise of the
foreign borrowing power “subject to such limitations as may be provided under law.”
Presidential prerogative may be exercised by the President’s alter ego, who in this case is the
Secretary of Finance. Full exercise must be allowed. The only restriction that the Constitution
provides, aside from the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, is that the loans must be
subject to limitations provided by law.
Q35: Can a Peace Treaty entered into by the Philippines with another State be
invalidated by the Supreme Court?
A35: No. The issue is a political question that is not subject to judicial inquiry. The Constitution
has entrusted to the Executive Department the conduct of foreign relations for the Philippines;
hence, the Court can not intere with nor question the wisdom behind acts that are within the
exclusive prerogative of the Executive.
Q37: What is the extent of the power of the COMELEC to settle intra-party disputes?
A37: The Court ruled in Kalaw v. Commission on Elections that the COMELEC’s powers and
functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, "include the ascertainment of the
identity of the political party and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts." The Court also
declared in Palmares v. Commission on Elections that the COMELEC’s power to register
political parties necessarily involved the determination of the persons who must act on its behalf.
Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case brought
before it, as an incident of its power to register political parties. [Atienza v. Comelec. G.R. No.
188920, February 16, 2010]
The COMELEC’s jurisdiction over intra-party disputes is limited. It does not have blanket
authority to resolve any and all controversies involving political parties. Political parties are
generally free to conduct their activities without interference from the state. The COMELEC
may intervene in disputes internal to a party only when necessary to the discharge of its
constitutional functions. [Id]
Q38: Because the country is in financial distress, the President issued an Administrative
Order. Section 1 of such AO “directs” LGUs to reduce their expenditures by 25 percent
while Section 4 withholds 10% of the LGUs’ IRA pending the assessment and evaluation
by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee. Are the two provisions
constitutional?
A38: Section 1 is constitutional while Section 4 is unconstitutional.
Section 4 of Article X of the Constitution confines the President’s power over local governments
to one of general supervision, excluding the power of control. It reads as follows:
“Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
governments, x x x”
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Section 4 is unconstitutional. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of
the shares of LGUs in the National internal revenue in accordance with Art. X Sec. 6 of the
Constitution. The Local Government Code Sec. 286(a) provides that the release shall be made
directly to the LGU concerned within five (5) days after every quarter of the year and “ shall not
be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for
whatever purpose.” [Id]
The withholding of 10% of the LGUs’ IRA pending the assessment and evaluation by the
Development Budget Coordinating Committee, pursuant to Section 4 of the AO, although
temporary, is equivalent to a holdback, which means “something held back or withheld, often
temporarily.” Such withholding clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law. The
“temporary” nature of the retention by the national government does not matter. Any retention is
prohibited. [Id]
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Ancestral domains comprise lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein and
includes ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually
owned whether alienable or not, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water,
mineral and other natural resources. They also include lands which may no longer be exclusively
occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and
traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or
shifting cultivators.
Ancestral lands are lands held by the ICCs/IPs under the same conditions as ancestral domains
except that these are limited to lands and that these lands are not merely occupied and
possessed but are also utilized by the ICCs/IPs under claims of individual or traditional group
ownership. These lands include but are not limited to residential lots, rice terraces or paddies,
private forests, swidden farms and tree lots.
Section 2 of SEC-MC No. 8 goes beyond requiring a 60-40 ratio in favor of Filipino nationals in
the voting stocks; it moreover requires the 60-40 percentage ownership in the total number of
outstanding shares of stock, whether voting or not.
Further, for stocks to be deemed owned and held by Philippine citizens or Philippine nationals,
mere legal title is not enough to meet the required Filipino equity. Full beneficial ownership of the
stocks, coupled with appropriate voting rights is essential.
Q42: What are the due process requirements in student disciplinary proceedings?
A42: Due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and
hearings identical to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The
mínimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic
institutions were complied with:
1. the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation
against them;
2. that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance of
counsel, if desired;
3. they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
4. they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
5. the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official
designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
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The case of Lambino v. COMELEC provides two tests to determine whether a change is a
revision or an amendment:
1. Quantitative Test: so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the substantial
entirety of the Constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing
provisions. The court examines only the number of provisions affected and does not
consider the degree of the change.
2. Qualitative Test: whether the change will accomplish such far reaching changes in the
nature of our basic governmental plan. A change in the nature of [the] basic
governmental plan" includes "change in its fundamental framework or the fundamental
powers of its Branches." A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also
includes changes that "jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of
check and balances.
Q44: Which aspects of the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) were declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court?
A44: The DAP enabled the executive to realign funds from slow moving projects in the
executive department to priority projects. It also utilized funds which came from unprogrammed
funds of the General Appropriations Acts. However, certain aspects of the Program were
declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, such as:
1. The use of unreleased appropriations and withdrawn unobligated/unprogrammed funds
under the DAP were not savings, and the use of such appropriations are
unconstitutional.
o Savings refers to an excess in the funding of a project once completed and should
be declared at the end of fiscal year and not halfway thru the year.
2. Cross-border transfers are not allowed. Budget should only be aligned within a respective
branch of government
3. Funding programs that are not covered in the GAA.
4. Use of unprogrammed funds without certification of Treasurer.
However, the Court applied the Operative Fact Doctrine, holding that projects and acts performed
under the DAP should be upheld and recognized.
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The Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled that the Convention supersedes earlier rights and
agreements to the extent of any incompatibility. The Convention is comprehensive in setting out
the nature of the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf and the rights of other States
within those zones. China’s claim to historic rights is not compatible with these provisions. The
Tribunal concluded that China’s claim to historic rights to the living and non-living resources
within the ‘nine-dash line’ is incompatible with the Convention to the extent that it exceeds the
limits of China’s maritime zones as provided for by the Convention. Upon China’s accession to
the Convention and its entry into force, any historic rights that China may have had to the
living and non-living resources within the ‘nine-dash line’ were superseded, as a matter of law
and as between the Philippines and China, by the limits of the maritime zones provided for by
the Convention.
Q47: Is a statute adjusting the country's archipelagic baselines and classifying the
baseline regimes of nearby territories constitutional?
A47: Yes. Baseline laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III state parties to mark-out
specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or
contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones
and continental shelf. Thus, these laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III
States parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves.
In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime
space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights (Magallona v.
Ermita, G. R. No. 187167, [August 16, 2011], 671 PHIL 243-294)
As an incident of an arrest, the premises where the arrest was made can also be searched without a
search warrant. [Nolasco v. Pano. G.R. No. L-69803 October 8, 1985]
An arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically follows that the subsequent search was similarly
illegal. [People v. Aruta. G.R. No. 120915. April 3, 1998]
However, this doctrine was overruled in the case of Carpio-Morales v. CA, where the Court held
that there was no legal authority to sustain the condonation doctrine in this jurisdiction. However,
abandonment of the condonation doctrine should be prospective in application for the reason
that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall
form part of the legal system of the Philippines.
Q51: What is the difference between the void for vagueness doctrine and the
overbreadth doctrine?
A51: A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as
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to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in 2 respects: (1) it violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to
avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. In contrast, the overbreadth doctrine
has to necessarily apply a facial type of invalidation in order to plot areas of protected speech,
inevitably almost always under situations not before the court, that are impermissibly swept by
the substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed
for being substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as applied to the
litigants.(Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, [August 8,
2017])
Q52: When is an election candidate, who has lost his Filipino citizenship, required to
have reacquired his former status as a natural-born citizen and be repatriated? What is
the effect of repatriation to one's citizenship?
A52: Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official must be:
• a citizen of the Philippines;
• a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province . . . where he intends to
be elected;
• a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election;
• able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
• In addition, "candidates for the position of governor . . . must be at least twenty-three
(23) years of age on election day.
From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time when
the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist of at least
one year's residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least 23 years of age
on election day).
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office, and
the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no
person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of
territory thereof. The aim or purpose of the citizenshp requirement would not be thwarted but
instead achieved by construing the citizenship qualification as applying to the time of
proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term. (Frivaldo v. COMELEC (1996))
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
(Bengzon III v. HRET(2001))
Q53: Does an impeachment proceeding bar a quo warranto proceeding based on the
rule against forum shopping?
A53: No, a pending impeachment proceeding does not bar the filing of a complaint for quo
warranto. In Republic vs. Sereno, the Court held that Quo Warranto and impeachment are
distinct in terms of jurisdiction, grounds, applicable rules, and limitation. The existence of the
other will not prevent the commencement of the other remedy. Hence, the rule against forum
shopping will not apply because of the difference in cause of action.
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Q54: Can the Court rule on whether or not Senate Impeachment Rules were followed?
A54: No. The question of whether or not Senate Impeachment Rules were followed is a political
question. (Corona vs. Senate)
Q55: What is the difference between the presidential communications privilege and the
deliberative process privilege?
A55: The presidential communications privilege covers communications, documents or other
materials that reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations and that the President
believes should remain confidential. It only applies to decision-making of the President. On the
other hand, the Deliberative process privilege covers Advisory opinions, recommendations and
deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are
formulated. It applies to decision-making of executive officials. (Neri v. Senate Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, G.R. No. 180643, [March 25, 2008])
Q57: Does the holding of Catholic Mass on government property violate the non-
establishment of religion clause?
A57: No. The holding of Catholic mass is not a case of establishment, but merely
accommodation. Accommodation is a recognition of the reality that some governmental
measures may not be imposed on a certain portion of the population for the reason that these
measures are contrary to their religious beliefs. As long as it can be shown that the exercise of the
right does not impair the public welfare, the attempt of the State to regulate or prohibit such
right would be an unconstitutional encroachment. (Re: Tony Q. Valenciano, A.M. No. 10-4-19-
SC (Resolution), [March 7, 2017])
Q58: What are the requisites for Congress to extend Martial Law?
A58:
1. Congress may only extend Martial Law upon the President's initiative
2. Grounded on achievement of public safety and to fight against rebellion
3. The extension is subject to review by the Supreme Court
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Q62: Give an instance wherein the Court held that the agreement between two states are
treaties under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)
A62: A loan agreement, coupled with an exchange of notes between two governments, constitutes
an executive agreement. The exchange of notes indicates that the two governments have reached
an understanding concerning Japanese loans to be extended to the Philippines and that these
loans were aimed at promoting our country’s economic stabilization and development efforts
[Abaya v. Ebdane, G.R. No. 167919 (2007), where the Court applied the definition of “treaty” in
the VCLT].
In contrast, the contract between North Luzon Railways Corporation (Northrail) and China
National Machinery & Equipment Corporation (CNMEG, the Chinese contractor) was not held
to be an executive agreement because (1) by the terms of the contract agreement, both
Northrail and CNMEG entered into the contract agreement as entities with personalities
distinct and separate from the Philippine and Chinese governments, respectively; and (2) the
contract agreement itself expressly stated that is to be governed by Philippine law, while as
defined in the VCLT, a treaty or an executive agreement is governed by international law [China
National Machinery & Equipment Corp. v. Sta. Maria, G.R. No. 185572 (2012)].
Garbage fee is not a tax. If the generating of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is
merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that
incidentally revenue is also obtained does not make the imposition a tax. “if the generating of
revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if
regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that incidentally revenue is also obtained does not
make the imposition a tax. The designation given by the municipal authorities does not decide
whether the imposition is properly a license tax or a license fee. The determining factors are the
purpose and effect of the imposition as may be apparent from the provisions of the ordinance.
Even if it is not considered a tax, it is still invalid. It must still be reasonably commensurate to the
cost of providing the garbage service. To pass judicial scrutiny, a regulatory fee must not produce
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revenue in excess of the cost of the regulation because such fee will be construed as an illegal tax
when the revenue generated by the regulation exceeds the cost of the regulation.
The authority of a municipality or city to impose fees is limited to the collection and transport of
nonrecyclable and special wastes and for the disposal of these into the sanitary landfill.
Barangays, on the other hand, have the authority to impose fees for the collection and
segregation of biodegradable, compostable and reusable wastes from households, commerce,
other sources of domestic wastes, and for the use of barangay Materials Recovery Facility
(MRFs).
Furthermore, even if the ordinance is considered to refer only to non recyclable and special
wastes, it will still be invalid if the Court finds that the rates charged by the ordinance are unjust
and inequitable. (Ferrer v Bautista)
Q65: Differentiate the suspension found in RA 3019 and Article VI of the Constitution
A65: The suspension contemplated in the Constitution is different from the suspension
prescribed in the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019). The former is punitive in
nature while the latter is preventive. [Defensor-Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 118364,
(1995)].
Q66: What are the sources of International Law according to Section 38 of the ICJ
Statute?
A66:
1. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly
recognized by the contesting states;
2. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
3. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
4. subject to the provisions of Article 59, [.e. that only the parties bound by the decision in
any particular case,] judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of
law.
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Q68: Differentiate quasi- judicial from quasi- legislative rule-making power in terms of
requirements of notice and hearing.
A68:
Quasi-legislative - Where an agency fixes rates which are meant to apply to all enterprises of a
given kind throughout the country; prior notice and hearing are NOT a requirement of due
process.
Quasi-judicial - Where the rates imposed apply exclusively to a particular party, predicated upon a
finding of fact; prior notice and hearing are essential to the validity
Q69: W/N the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar
thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles
of/constitutional provisions on (1) separation of powers (YES) (2) non--delegability of
legislative power (YES) (3) checks and balances (YES) (4) accountability(YES)
A69:
1. The 2013 PDAF Article which allows lany form of post-enactment authority by
legislators in the implementation or enforcement of the budget violates separation of
powers principle and is unconstitutional. Upon approval and passage of the GAA,
Congress‘ law-making role ends and from there the Executive‘s role of implementing the
national budget begins. Congress must "not concern it self with details for implementation
by the Executive."
2. The 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post--enactment identification authority to
individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said they are effectively
allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which – as settled in Philconsa
– is lodged in Congress.
3. The amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit since it would
be further divided among individual legislators who would then receive personal lump--
sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds
based on their own discretion. This fosters the creation of a budget within a budget" which
subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the
President‘s power of item veto. 4. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be
tainted as said legislators would be checking on activities in which they themselves
participate. This post-- enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.
Q70: RA 10660 created two more divisions of the Sandiganbayan with three Justices
each, thereby resulting in six vacant positions. The JBC submitted to President Aquino
six shortlists contained in six separate letters. President Aquino issued the appointment
papers for the six new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices which disregarded the
clustering of nominees done by the JBC. Petitioners contend that President Aquino
could only choose one nominee from each of the six separate shortlists submitted by the
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JBC for each specific vacancy, and no other; and any appointment made in deviation of
this procedure is a violation of the Constitution. Decide
A70:
NO. President Aquino validly exercised his discretionary power to appoint members of the
Judiciary when he disregarded the clustering of nominees into six separate shortlists for the
vacancies for the 6 vacancies in the Sandiganbayan. President Aquino merely maintained
the well-established practice, consistent with the paramount Presidential constitutional
prerogative, to appoint the six new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices from the 37 qualified
nominees, as if embodied in one JBC list. The power to recommend of the JBC cannot be
used to restrict or limit the President's power to appoint as the latter's prerogative to
choose someone whom he/she considers worth appointing to the vacancy in the Judiciary
is still paramount. As long as the President appoints someone nominated by the JBC, the
appointment is valid.
Q71: Absent any administrative action taken by the Court, may the Ombudsman have
jurisdiction over a Judge of the RTC?
A72:
No.the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court’s
power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the
doctrine of separation of powers. [Maceda v. Vasquez (1993)]
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