The politics of language policy in Myanmar: Imagining togetherness, practicing

difference?
Kyaw Yin Hlaing
Department of Political Science
National University of Singapore

Although Myanmar has been an independent state for over half a century, its 135
different national races and equally numerous dialects and languages renders language
the main continual source of problems for its incomplete and problem-ridden nation-
building process. Because successive post-colonial Myanmar governments based nation-
building projects on the culture and history of the ethnic majority, Burman, many ethnic
minority groups and observers have long accused the Burman-dominated post-colonial
governments, especially the Socialist and current military governments, of Burmanizing
the country’s entire population. The adoption of the Burman language as the country’s
official language by successive governments and the suspension of minority language
classes at pre-university public schools since the early 1970s were viewed by many the
government’s attempts to homogenize the population and establish a monolingual state.
Both scholars and minority nationalists have directly and indirectly suggested that the
Burman-dominated language policy only befitted the regime and the Bumans, whereas
ethnic minorities suffered from it.
While acknowledging the prevalence of Burman chauvinistic elements in the
national building discourse and activities undertaken by post-colonial Myanmar
governments, this paper intends to show that successive Myanmar governments did not
try to establish a monolingual state. Rather, Myanmar governments have usually allowed
ethnic minorities to undertake cultural activities including the freedom to speak and write
their own languages as long as those activities were not related to political attempts to
topple it or undermine its physical control of the country. This paper will also argue that
in order to understand the complexities of the politics of language in Myanmar, one ought
to pay more attention to the politics of interaction between officials from the center and
local areas rather than the politics within the nation-building process. During the Socialist
and current military periods, local officials responsible for promoting minority cultures

1
were not elected by local people but appointed by the central government. Those officials
were more interested in keeping their jobs than serving the minority peoples. Most of
them stayed away from minority cultural activities, for they did not want to be associated
with insurgent groups, which usually sought to promote minority cultures. It was the
conspicuous absence of local officials willing to stand up for the interests of ethnic
minorities that contributed to the suspension of ethnic minority language classes in the
country. This paper will also show that while the adoption of the Burman language as
official language helped opponents of the regime to communicate with each more
efficiently and facilitated the various ethnic groups’ imagined belief that they belonged to
a united Myanmar, the institution of Burmese did elicit some misunderstanding between
the government and ethnic minorities. This paper will conclude with a discussion on the
persisting problems within the language policies.
Before proceeding, it would indeed be prudent to clarify the usage of the terms:
Myanmar, Burma, Burman and Burmese. While Burman usually refers to the ethnic
majority “Bamar,” Burmese and Myanmar can be said to be the name of the ethnic
majority, the Burman language, the term representing all citizens of the country or the
name of the country. In order to avoid confusion, this paper will use Burman as the name
for ethnic majority, Burmese for the Burman language and Myanmar for the name of the
country and all its citizens.

Language and Nation Building in Myanmar: Historical Background

Myanmar’s present boundaries were only established after its annexation into the
British Empire. The British absorbed much of Myanmar’s frontier regions into its Empire
because it considered these many regions with tributary relations to the Myanmar kings
as part of colonial Myanmar. Although the British ruled Myanmar proper, the area
inhabited by the majority ethnic Burman, and the frontier areas, the regions inhabited by
ethnic minorities, under two separate administrative systems, the British colonial
administration adopted English as lingua franca throughout Myanmar Indigenous people,
however, were allowed to speak and study their respective languages. Christian
missionaries that came with the colonial administration also invented written languages
for Kachin, Chin, Lahu and a few other ethnic minorities in their attempt to facilitate their

2
missionary activities. However, where its administration was concerned, only those
acquainted with the language of the colonizers (i.e. English) understood the new
administrative system; in turn, these were the only individuals able to get a job in the
colonial administration. As a result, every farsighted family wanted to their children to
study English, so that they could at least read telegrams.
Although some royalists rebelled against the British for almost fifteen years after
it completely annexed Myanmar, language was never a political issue until Burmese
students at Rangoon University College were politically awoken by the 1920 university
act that adopted very strict and high admission standards, which included a high level of
English language proficiency. Since most Burmese could not meet the requirements of
the new university act, university students organized protests against the university
administration. Furthermore, student leaders and other nationalist leaders collaborated to
establish national colleges and schools that placed emphasis on the Myanmar language.
Although most national schools refusing the colonial government’s financial assistance
were closed down some three years later, the movement opened a new chapter for the
Burman language by providing educated Burmans with the inspiration to invent a new
literary style for the Burman language and to work for the introduction of an honors
program in Burmese literature at Rangoon University.
The politics of language reached its zenith when a group of politically conscious
and educated young people formed “Do Bama Asiayone” (DBA) (Our Bama
Association). The DBA noted in its first declaration:
“Bama pyi (the Bama country) is our country.
Bama literature is our literature.
Bama language is our language.
Love our country.
Praise our literature.
Respect our language.”1
Dubbing themselves thakin (Master), members of the DBA organized nationalist
and anti-colonial activities throughout the country. The organization became a major

1
Committee for the Compilation of the History of Do-Ba-Ma-Asyayone, Do-Ba-Ma-Asyayone Tha-Mai
(History of Our Bama Organization), Vol. 1 (Yangon: 1976, Sarpay Beikman), p. 127.

3
nationalist organization when more and more politically conscious young people
including independence hero, Aung San and other future leaders of the country joined its
ranks. Although the DBA initially attracted mostly Burmans, far-sighted DBA leaders
also tried to win the minds and hearts of ethnic and foreign minorities by noting an insult
directed at an indigenous person was tantamount to insulting the entire indigenous
population. DBA leaders were quoted as saying that if a Burman from Myitkyina (the
capital city of Kachin state) were insulted, Burmans from Yay and Tavoy (cities in Mon
State) would be insulted as well.
However, DBA leaders failed to convince most minority elites and nationalists
that their organization was a united entity of various ethnicities. It was because the
emergence of national consciousness was not confined to the Burmans. In fact, the
Karens formed the first organization bearing the name of an ethnic group. With the
introduction of modern education and the availability of books on politics, many ethnic
minorities also came to understand the power of nationalism. Probably due to the colonial
administration’s tradition of favoring ethnic minorities over Burmans, minority
nationalists based their nationalist discourses on anti-Burmese stories highlighting the
suffering of their ancestors under the rule of the Burmese kings instead of anti-
colonialism. Minority elites and nationalist leaders also appeared to believe that their
cooperation (or as the Burmese nationalists would say, collaboration) with the colonial
administration engendered the antipathy of Burmans, especially those engaging in the
struggle for independence. Minority elites and nationalists also seemed to hold the view
that they and their people would be discriminated by the government if Burmans were to
control the country again. Hence, it is unsurprising to find that when these minority elites
and nationalists sought more political rights for their peoples, they also openly noted in
the 1930s and 1940s that they wanted the British government to keep their areas apart
separate from Myanmar proper.
A major problem in DBA’s nationalist activities lay in the fact that apart from its
statement that the organization represented all indigenous groups, it failed to develop the
a strong, convincing and all-encompassing Myanmar identity. Although it called for the
improvement of the physical welfare of all indigenous groups, leading DBA members did
not promote the culture of ethnic and religious minorities. DBA’s nationalist discourses

4
continued to focus on promoting Buddhism and the Burman language even though it had
launched its campaign to mobilize ethnic minorities. Realizing this, many left-wing DBA
leaders dropped Buddhism from their discourses and tried to mobilize religious and
foreign minorities by appealing to their individual cultures and sensibilities. However,
many traditional nationalist leaders and Buddhist monks continue to place emphasis on
Buddhism and the Burmese language. Therefore, although it managed to recruit a
number of Mon, Rakhine, Chin, Pa O, Indian and Chinese, DBA was considered a
predominantly Burman organization throughout the colonial period. When Burman
nationalist leaders fought against the British with the help of the Japanese army in the
Second World War, many Karen, Kachin and Chin soldiers from the colonial army
maintained their loyalty to the British colonial administration by fighting the Burmese
nationalist army alongside British forces. However, when the British retreated to India,
many minority soldiers remained in Myanmar, thus amplifying the Burman distrust of
minority peoples. This distrust was further compounded when some members of the
Burman Nationalist Army killed a large number of Karen in a communal riot.
Therefore, when Burman nationalist leaders negotiated for the country’s
independence with the British government in London, Shan, Karin and Kayah did not
want to be a part of independent Myanmar. Many minority elites and nationalists begged
the British government in London to keep their areas under its rule (U Kyaw Win et. al.
1990: 52, 87). However, after a series of lengthy meetings with Burman nationalist leader
Aung San at Pinlong in Shan State, ethnic leaders agreed to be a part of independent
Myanmar on the condition that if they were unsatisfied with the Union, their regions
would be allowed to secede from the Union ten years after independence.
In the discussions leading up to the establishment of a constitution for an
independent Myanmar, language became a major political issue between Burman and
ethnic leaders once again. The first language-related issue encountered by these
constitution drafters was the matter of the official language (Maung Maung 1961: 204).
Not surprisingly, the Burman nationalists called for the institution of the Burman
language as the official language. The official language question, however, was easily
resolved as none of the minority groups took any serious issue with the Burman
nationalists. A Shan leader astutely noted that the minority leaders’ acceptance of

5
Burmese as the official language lay in their understanding of the necessity and
practicality of having an official language through which all ethnic groups in the Union
are able to effectively communicate with one another (Interview, July 21, 2003). He also
noted that minority leaders accepted the replacement of English with Burmese partially
because most ordinary people in the ethnic minorities did not speak English and also
because Burmese was easier than English. A thakin, however, observed that some ethnic
leaders were very anxious to maintain English as the official language as it was a neutral
language. However, in spite of these sentiments, they did not block the institution of
Burmese as official language in part because they wanted to devote their resources to
other more important issues and also because they believed all ethnic groups should
know the language of the ethnic majority dominating the Union’s politics (Interview, July
11, 2003).
The second and more important language-related issue emerged from the question
as to which minority group should be granted statehood.2 Aung San suggested that any
ethnic group desirous of forming a separate state should possess, among other things, a
language totally different from Burmese (Maung Maung 1961: 167-170). Naturally, the
ethnic groups pushing for the formation of their own separate state accordingly placed
greater emphasis on the distinctiveness of their respective languages. For the reasons thus
laid out in the scope of this paper, the constitution initially granted statehood to only the
Shan and Kachin. The constitution, however, guaranteed the right of all citizens to
practice and promote their respective cultures and religions freely (Constitution of the
Union of Burma 1947).
All in all, the Union of Myanmar did not emerge out of any mutual trust and love
between the Burmans and ethnic minorities. Ethnic minorities joined the predominantly
Burman Union with the expectation that they would be considerably better off as a part of
the Union than they would be if they were independent from it. The central government,
on the other hand, wanted all citizens of Myanmar, regardless of ethnicity to use Burmese
as lingua franca. As for ethnic minorities, especially ethnic elites and nationalists,
keeping their own ethnic identity was more important than becoming Myanmar. This

2
The statehood is a federated state where an elected State Council enjoys some autonomy in administering
its territory.

6
fundamental difference between minority nationalist leaders and Burman political leaders
has had long-term impact on the nation-building process in post-colonial Myanmar.
Language Policy and Nation Building in Parliamentary Myanmar
The parliamentary government understood that unless it found a method to unify
all the ethnic groups and give them a cause to feel as if they belonged to the larger
predominantly Burman society, it would be extremely difficult to keep the newly
independent country together. Aware of the ethnic minorities’ growing nationalism, the
Burman-dominated AFPFL government promised that it would not seek national unity by
pressuring all of the country’s inhabitants to accept and endorse a common culture. Prime
Minister, U Nu, publicly declared that national unity would only emerge if the
government instituted a system that accommodated the cultural differences among
various ethnic groups and guaranteed the economic well being of all ethnic groups. U Nu
also attended ethnic cultural festivals in order to show his endorsement of different ethnic
cultures (Nu 1954: 1). In trying to encourage various ethnic groups to respect and value
each others’ cultures, U Nu was recorded to have said at a Mon cultural conference,
“Mon culture is not the sole concern of the Mons. It is also the concern of Burmans.
Likewise, the term Burman culture is not the monopoly of Burman; it is also the property
of the Mon people as well” (Nu 1954: 3). One might, therefore, argue that the AFPFL
government tried to, or at least claimed to, establish a unity in diversity.
The complex socio-political situation under which the AFPFL government
attempted to undertake nation-building activities should also be taken into consideration.
This is especially so given that a large majority of Burmans believed that independence
and a Burman-dominated government would alleviate and eliminate all their economic
and social difficulties. In addition to attempting to living up to these Burman
expectations, the government also had to deal with minority elites whose main fear was
that a Burman-dominated Union would marginalize their status as leaders of their
respective communities. Thus, the government found that it had to contend with minority
nationalists who were distrustful of the Burmans. When the government refused to grant
Union Statehood to Karen, the Karen National Defense Organization (KNDO) launched
an armed struggle against it, instigating the Karen battalions in the government Army to
join the KNDO’s fight against the government. Similarly, the Burmese Communist Party

7
(BCP) and some Kachin soldiers also went underground during this period. Following
these incidents, the remnants of the KMT forces entered Eastern Shan state with the
intention of using it as a stronghold against the communist government in China.
Given this tumultuous backdrop, it was indeed a daunting task for the government
to crackdown on ethnic insurgent movements and to drive out KMT forces. However, the
government was prudent enough to comprehend that the ethnic minorities’ distrust of
Burman political leaders and their methods of dealing with ethnic insurgent groups would
have serious impact on these groups perception of it. Therefore, when the government
took actions against minority insurgent groups, it tried as far as possible to ensure that it
did not antagonize those who were not involved in the movements. For instance, in order
not to provoke and alienate the Karens who did not joined the insurgent movement, U Nu
labeled the Karen insurgent movement as the illegal activity of recalcitrant citizens. U Nu
high praise of the Karens who did not turn against the government resulted in some
ethnic Burmans dubbing him ‘Karen Nu’ (Pu Ga Lay 1949: 111)) In spite of its attempts
to pacify the peoples of ethnicities in its wars against these numerous insurgent
movements, the government did not want to project itself as a “failed” state. Therefore,
while it attempted to appease the law-abiding Karen, it simultaneously sought to reassert
its control on the country by launching military operations against insurgent groups. Due
to the defections of several battalions, which undermined its armed strength and ability,
the military had little choice but to form militia groups to fight the insurgent groups and
the KMT. This arrangement was problematic because the militia mainly comprised
unemployed thugs and bullies who did not care about winning hearts and minds of
minority peoples. Many militia groups and government soldiers reportedly looted and
physically abused ethnic minorities they came across during military operations. As
retired Brig. General Aung Gyi remarked, the government blamed this misunderstanding
between Burmese soldiers and ethnic minorities on the soldiers’ lack of discipline and the
lack of a common language between the soldiers and ethnic minorities (interview, June
25, 2002). U Nu and some political leaders also reasoned that it would be easier to win
the hearts and minds of minorities if they were Buddhists. Senior military and political
leaders privately apologized to minority leaders for the abuses committed by government
soldiers and requested them to be patient while the government sought to discipline them

8
through trainings. The government also tried to promote the teaching and learning of the
Burman language and Buddhist missionary work in minority areas (Kyawt Kyawt 2002:
173-177).
Although the Buddhist missionary work was aimed chiefly at the minorities
practicing animalism, a large number of Christian minorities resented the government’s
actions. They felt that the government was seeking to marginalize non-Buddhist groups
by refusing to help them. The teaching of Burmese in minority areas did not, however,
cause any major resentment among minority communities, for ethnic groups with written
scripts of their own were allowed to teach their languages in pre-university level classes.
Also, ethnic minority were allowed to public books, newspapers and magazines freely.
There were reportedly more than ten minority language newspapers in circulation during
the parliamentary period. However, not all minority languages with written scripts were
taught at public schools in minority areas. Public schools in minority areas only taught
the languages of major ethnic groups such as Shan, Karen, Chin, Kayah and Mon.3 The
languages of smaller ethnic groups were taught only at Buddhist monasteries and
Christian churches. This was because some local state governments in minority areas
dominated by major ethnic groups did not care for the promotion of the cultures of
smaller groups. Therefore, politically conscious members of some smaller ethnic
minority groups resented the elites of the dominant ethnic groups in their areas. For
instance, the Red Shan group, which resides in Kachin State and speaks a Shan dialect,
resented the Kachin state government and Kachin leaders for paying insufficient attention
to the well being of non-Kachin groups residing in the state (interview, October 1, 2003).
Apart from that, some Pa O tribes in Shan state briefly rebelled against Sawbwas (Shan
traditional rulers) (Yaunghwe 1987: 114). However, most small ethnic groups were on
the whole too politically weak to turn against the dominance of their respective local
governments. In some areas where smaller ethnic groups outnumbered the dominant
ethnic groups, state governments did not require public schools to teach the language of

3
The language of a major ethnic group, Rakhine, was not taught separately as Rakhine uses the same
alphabets as Burmese.

9
the dominant ethnic group, instead the public schools in these areas used Burmese as the
medium of instruction.4
Regardless of the government’s palpable promotion of the Burmese language, the
constitution also permitted the use of English in the country. As such, the government
allowed missionary schools where English was the medium of instruction to continue its
operations within the country. In fact, English remained a popular language in the
country. This was evident from the many English bureaucratic letters and memos.
Likewise, many Indian and westernized Burmese continued to write letters to government
officials in English. Many well-to-do Buddhist families, including those supporting the
promotion of Burmese, continued to send their children to missionary schools so as to
allow their children to master English. At universities, students could take their lessons in
either English or Burmese, but those who opted for classes where the medium of
instruction was English were considered smarter than those who took classes in Burmese.
A question of “How did the promotion of the Burmese language and the
government’s flexible language policy contribute to the creation of national
consciousness?” therefore arises from this situation. Many ethnic minorities welcomed
the teaching of Burmese in their respective areas, for proficiency in Burmese was
essential if they wanted to be succeed in their professional lives and in business. In fact,
the teaching of Burmese in minority areas allowed various ethnic groups to communicate
with each other and enabled them to conduct business transactions more efficiently. A
retired government official originally from Kachin state noted:
“I spoke only Shan until I started to study Burmese at school in the early
1950s. The village I grew up in was a multi-ethnic one. The residents of the
village included Shan, Kachin, Chinese and Burmese. Most people in the
village understood a little bit of each others’ languages. We tried to
communicate with each other through what little we knew of each other’s
languages. Of course, we often misunderstood each other. For important
matters, leaders from different ethnic communities talked to each other
through the people who knew both languages. When we were forced to study

4
For instance, public schools in the In-daw-gyi area of Kachin state did not offer Kachin language courses,
because almost two-thirds of its students were non-Kachin.

10
 Burmese at schools, we all came to master the language quite quickly. We
could then communicate with people from other ethnic groups more
efficiently. Also, the knowledge of Burmese enabled us to read newspapers
and books in Burmese. Not everybody liked to read books and newspapers in
the past, but with an education in Burmese, more and more people came to
read newspapers and books. As a result, more and more people came to
understand what was going on in the region and in the country” (Interview,
October 12, 2003)

A retired Burman schoolteacher who was posted to a village in southern Shan

state related a similar personal experience:
“It is very important to have a common language because we have so many
various ethnic groups residing in this country. When I first got to the village in
1952, I spoke very little Shan. Most of my students did not speak any
Burmese, let alone read it. At the beginning, I encountered many problems. I
did not understand their language or their ways. Likewise, they did not
understand my lessons or me. This communication barrier was so severe that
some parents did not want to send their children to schools. I tried to explain
to them that it was important for children to be in school. They did not
understand. Over time, my students came to learn Burmese and my Shan got
better. I came to understand them, their culture and their ways when I could
communicate with them. It would be very hard to establish an understanding
between different ethnic groups if we were not able to communicate with each
other through a common language” (June 9, 2003).

25 other ethnic minorities who grew up during the parliamentary period and 10
retired government officials who had worked in minority areas also confirmed that the
teaching of Burmese had helped various ethnic groups to better understand one another.
Regardless of such developments, the relations between the government and minority
elites and nationalists continued to deteriorate. The key reason for this lay in a
fundamental difference between minority leaders and Burman political leaders: Ethnic

11
minorities were more interested in gaining benefits for themselves and their people than
in preserving the Union, while Burman military and political leaders, on the other hand,
appeared to propagate the view that their primary duty was the preservation of the
Union.5 The major problem between ethnic minorities and the central government was
that the former wanted more political and economic rights and benefits from the Union
than the central government could dispense. A prominent Shan leader and the first
president of independent Myanmar, Sao Shwe Thaik even declared in parliament that if
he had known standardized education, health services and the economy in his state would
remain poor under the Burman-dominated government, he would not have signed the
Panglong Agreement (Parliamentary Proceedings (CN), II, xx1, 821). The Burmese
political leaders’ practice of dividing revenue for various ethnic regions according to the
size of the population did not endear them to the ethnic minorities or their leaders. Since
the majority of the population resided in the Myanmar proper, the budget allocated for
the Myanmar proper was always several times more than the budget for minority states.
Minority leaders began to question the rhetorical statement Aung San made in 1947 that
“if Burman gets one kyat, Shan will get one kyat as well.” For Burmese political leaders,
the statement meant that if the government allocated one kyat to a Burman, it would also
allocate one kyat to a Shan. However, some minority interpreted the statement as “if the
government allocated one kyat to the Burman community, it should also allocate one kyat
for the Shan community as well.” Furthermore, minority leaders also thought that since
minority areas were more underdeveloped than Myanmar proper, the central government
ought to invest more in the development of those areas. While the ethnicity minorities
were pressing of the developments of their regions, Burmans, too, wanted the
government to build more schools and roads in their areas. The central government,
however, did not possess the fiscal capacity to meet the demands of both the Burman and
ethnic minorities. Meanwhile, the central government’s attempt the strip the Shan
traditional rulers’ power as part of its project to modernize the country’s administrative

5
U Nu and many other Burmese political and military leaders, including leaders of opposition parties
frequently discussed the importance of keeping the Union together. They overtly and indirectly said that
under no circumstance would they allow the Union to disintegrate. This rationale later justified the
military’s seizure of the country in 1962; as will be discussed later, it took control of the country on the
pretext that the country was on the verge of collapse.

12
system (thus claimed by Burmese political leaders), further amplified the Shan elites’
discontent with the government.
The electoral politics, which further undercut the government’s ability to placate
minority elites and nationalist leaders, aggravated the already volatile relationship
between the government and the minority leaders. Since no political party would be able
to win majority seats in the parliament without the support of the majority of Buddhist
Burmans, major political parties, including the ruling ones, always placed emphasis on
winning in the constituencies in Myanmar proper. In so doing, political parties adopted
policies that would help them obtain the support of Burmans at the cost of the support of
ethnic minorities. In order to win the support of Buddhist monks and Buddhist Burmans,
Prime Minister U Nu promised to make Buddhism state religion if he won the elections.
When his party won the elections with the support of Buddhist Burman, U Nu had little
choice but to realize his promise if he did not want to deal with the mounting protests of
the monks. Instead, U Nu chose to keep his word and in so doing, upset the ethnic and
religious minorities (Kyaw Yin Hlaing 2003). Although U Nu tried to assuage the
situation by passing a law guaranteeing the rights of religious minorities, declaring
Buddhism state religion further enhanced the misunderstanding between minority leaders
and Burman political leaders, for the former, including Buddhist minorities, came to the
conclusion that the Burman-dominated central government was prepared to sacrifice the
welfare of ethnic minorities in its attempts to win the support of their own people. Apart
from attending minority peoples’ cultural festivals, most central state officials were rarely
involved in the promotion of minority cultures. In contrast, the central state officials
actively participated in the promotion of Burman culture and language. Although the
central state tried to improve their relations to the ethnic minorities by attempting to
modernize the Burman language, they could not remove the ethnic minorities’ view that
the central government was the government of the Burmans. A former Shan insurgent
leader was observed to have said,
“If the government wanted us to consider it our government, it had to take
care of us, it must be actively involved in the promotion of our culture and
languages. All post-colonial governments claimed that they wanted to help us
develop our regions and our cultures. The problem is that they never matched

13
 their words and their deeds. Ethnic minorities, therefore, always referred to
the central government as, Bamar a-soe-ya (the Burman government)”
(interview, June 9, 2003).

Indignant at the central government, many young Karen, Kayah, Rakhine, Mon, Pa O,
Palong and Kachin people went underground and fought against the central government
for the independence of their region.
Upset with the Burman-dominated central government, ethnic minority leaders
banded together in a bid to pressure the government into granting them more autonomy
and revenues. An interesting point here is that minority leaders of various ethnic groups
communicated with each other in Burmese. A former member of the Shan State Army
recalled:
“Most minority leaders in those days understood English but many of them
were not comfortable discussing political matters in English. So, Shan,
Kachin, Mon, Karen and Chin leaders communicated in Burmese. Since
Burmese was the official language, all minority leaders were forced to speak
it. I graduated from high school during the parliamentary days. I learned
Burmese at school. After I joined the underground movement, I had to deal
with members of BCP and KIA and we all talked to each other in Burmese”
(interview, June 7, 2003).

3 retired members of Mon and Kachin insurgent movements revealed that they too
communicated with people from other insurgent groups in Burmese. Prior to the
declaration that rendered Burmese official language, many minority leaders only spoke
broken Burmese. However, when Burmese became the official language, all minority
leaders were forced to speak it and over time, they came to master the language.
The knowledge of Burmese also allowed politically conscious ethnic minorities to
better understand Burmese chauvinistic views and the problems inherent in the nation
building activities undertaken by the state. Although Burmese political leaders repeatedly
noted that all indigenous ethnic groups residing in Myanmar are blood relations, they
failed to define “Myanmarness” clearly. Many political leaders continued to use the

14
nationalist discourses developed by the Do Bama Asiayone (DBA) during the colonial
period. Since DBA’s nationalist discourses were based on anti-colonialism, they were
unsuitable means of unifying the country in the post-colonial period. A lot of ethnic
minorities who were on good terms with the colonial government viewed such discourses
as evidence of the Burman-dominated government’s hostility towards them. Even some
politicians who understood the sensitive situation within the nation-building process often
made comments and statements in their speeches (which were directed at the Burman
audience) that upset minority elites. As more and more ethnic minorities came to better
understand Burmese, the reckless chauvinistic statements uttered by Burmese political
leaders began to impact negatively on the minorities’ perception of the government. A
Mon community leader I interviewed told me that he felt,
“In their political speeches to the Burmans, many Burmese politicians liked to
talk about how ancient Burmese kings unified the country. The problem with
this is that many ethnic minorities also had access to newspapers. Many ethnic
minorities grew up learning that Burmese kings were patronizing and were
often very abusive towards their vessels. Burman leaders used anti-British
discourses to instigate nationalistic sentiments among Burmans. Likewise,
many minority leaders used anti-Burman discourses to instigate nationalism
among their respective ethnic groups. For minority nationalists, Burmans were
colonizers. Some minority leaders even used excerpts about Burman leaders’
chauvinistic statements from newspapers as evidence that Burmans do not
think much of us. The chauvinistic statements of Burman leaders offended
many young people who understood Burmese. That is why, a lot of minority
leaders who studied at Yangon and Mandalay universities in the 1950s and
early 1960s joined the armed struggle against the government” (interview,
October 23, 2003).

In general, most ordinary ethnic minorities stayed out of politics. All 25 Shan,
Mon, and Kachin interviewees who were between 60 and 72 years old noted that most
ordinary ethnic minorities just wanted to live peacefully. However, due to the abusive
manners of Burmese soldiers and militia groups in their areas, many ethnic minorities

15
came to see the central government as the colonizer of their regions. Even members of
smaller ethnic groups who had no quarrel with the dominant ethnic groups in their
respective regions were disgusted with the soldiers of the central government. A 65 year
Pa O recalled:
“Shan police and Shan Sawbwa never looted our property but a lot of Burman
solders were really barbaric. We could not support the government that sent
such barbaric people to our region” (June 10, 2003).

In 1961, minority leaders impatient with the central government had a meeting to
collectively pressure the government to establish a true federal state. They also threatened
to secede from the Union if the government did not comply with the demands. Before
minority leaders and Burman political leaders could reach an agreement, however, the
military seized control of the country, claiming that it did so to prevent the disintegration
of the Union.
In sum, declaring Burmese official state language by the Burman-dominated
government proved to be a double-edge sword. While it allowed the government to
communicate with minority peoples, the knowledge of Burmese permitted minority
peoples to better understand the low opinion many Burman political leaders and
traditional nationalists had of them. Furthermore, the Burman-dominated government
failed to develop a new nationalist discourse that would appeal to both the Burman
majority and minority ethnic groups. In so doing, the government failed to meet demands
and expectation of minority people; this, in turn, led many minority leaders to use
Burmese as a means in organizing anti-government activities.

Language and Nation-Building in the Socialist Period

As a regime that came to power claming to prevent the disintegration of the
Union, leaders of the Revolutionary Council (RC) repeatedly emphasized the importance
of the national unity and promised to institute a system that would serve the interests of
all citizens of the country. A few months after it took control of the country, the RC
formed the Myanmar Socialist Program party (BSPP) and announced that it would try to
establish a socialist system called the “Burmese Way to Socialism”. The RC’s language

16
policies proved to be more anti-colonial than its predecessor’s; while it maintained
Burmese as the official language, the RC tried to do away with the use of English at the
state level. Within two years of seizing power, the RC closed down all missionary
schools and announced its plan to make Burmese the only medium of instruction in all
university and pre-university classes, except English language classes. The RC also
planned to invent new Burmese-alphabet based scripts for languages that previously used
Roman scripts. Although the latter plan was never implemented, Burmese became the
only medium of instruction in most university and pre-university classes by the end of
1970. However, the RC limited the teaching of minority languages only up to the second
standard. The RC, however, publicly announced that minority groups could develop and
promote their respective culture freely as long as their cultural activities did not
negatively affect the national unity and the RC’s socialist projects. The RC also tried to
better understand the cultures of minority people by commissioning scholars and officials
from the Ministry of Culture to conduct research minority cultures. The Ministry of
Culture also opened cultural museums for minority peoples’ cultural artifacts at the
capitals of minority states so as to promote and conserve these minorities’ cultures (Daw
Mya Oo 2003: 71). The curators of the museums at minority capitals must not only be
members of the dominant ethnic groups whose names the state bore but also speakers of
their respective ethnic languages. In 1965, the Socialist government also established the
Academy for Development of National Races to train teachers and socialist cadres for
minority areas. The academy’s trainees were recruited from among the residents of
minority areas.
Although it did not allow any political parties except the BSPP to exist, the RC
claimed that its party and state apparatuses guaranteed the political rights of all citizens.
According the new constitution passed in 1974, all citizens could run in the elections at
various levels of the state apparatus such as the Council of State, state/division6 people’s
council, township people’s council and ward/village people’s council. The 1974
constitution also granted statehood to all seven major ethnic groups. Ward to
state/division level administrative units also came to be staffed with the people elected by

6
State and Division are similar administrative units. The term, state, is used for minority areas and division
for the Myanmar proper. Since 1962, Myanmar has seven states and seven divisions.

17
the residents of the regions. After the first elections in 1974, the RC replaced itself with
the Council of State, which comprised of representatives of all major ethnic groups in the
country.
Despite its rigorous nation building activities, foreign observers of Burmese
ethnic politics and minority nationalists accused the BSPP of “Burmanizing” the entire
population. Many scholars and journalists claim, “adherence to a minority cultural
tradition is treated as tantamount to subversion of the nation and is branded as a mark of
group inferiority within the nation” (Lehman 1967). Some scholars, however, argue that
the government only allowed ethnic minorities to practice their cultures if their practices
were in line with the Burmese Way to Socialism. Some scholars, journalists and political
activists viewed the promotion of Burmese language and literature and the suspension of
minority languages in public schools as evidence of the socialist government’s attempt to
Burmanize the entire population.
In reality, however, the government cannot be said to be systematically forbidding
ethnic minorities the practice of their respective customs and cultures. All ethnic groups
were allowed to promote and develop their own cultures. The Socialist government was
not against the idea of ethnic minorities possessing multi-ethnic identity. In many
minority areas, ethnic minorities were also allowed to resolve legal problems including
rape, divorce and inheritance according to their respective customary laws and practices
(interview, October 21, 2003). Ethnic minorities enjoyed more cultural freedom than
most scholars and minority nationalists suggest. As a matter of fact, traditional cultural
activities of minority groups did not have to be in line with the Burmese Way to
Socialism; as long as their traditional activities did not challenge the authority of the
government, minorities were allowed to organize cultural activities freely.
The problems of teaching minority languages were also more complex than many
scholars and ethnic nationalists intimated. The 1966 Education Act required public
schools in minority areas to teach minority languages up to second grade. The Ministry of
Education published textbooks for Mon, Shan, Po Karen, Scot Karen, Chin and Kachin
languages. The ethnic communities that wanted to teach their languages beyond the
second standard were allowed to use classrooms in public schools before or after regular
school hours. It was indeed true that some schools in minority areas came to suspend the

18
teaching of minority languages in1960s. However, many schools in several minority
areas continued to teach minority languages until early 1980s. The Ministry of Education
published textbooks for Kachin language courses until early 1970s, for Shan and Po and
Scot Karen language courses until mid-1970s, Chin language courses until late 1970s and
Mon language course until early 1980s. 10 government officials and 8 businessmen who
went to primary school in Shan state in the early 1970s said that they studied Shan
language at schools. A retired administrative official from Shan state also confirmed
Shan language was taught at schools in Shan state until the mid 1970s (interview,
October 25, 2003). Some college students from Chin and Mon states also remarked that
some schools in their respective villages taught their respective minority languages until
mid 1980s. 3 Mon tutors from Yangon University said that they studied the Mon
language for four years in primary schools in their respective villages in the early 1980s
(interview, October 22, 2003). They also remembered taking Mon language exams held
by their respective township people’s councils. One of them also remembered being
conferred a certificate for passing the exam. The Academy for the Development of
National Races also taught courses on the cultures of minority races and minority
languages. Unlike public schools, the Academy never stopped requiring its trainees to
study a minority language other than their own languages and Burmese.
Given these diametrically opposed facts then, the questions that ought to be posed
here are: “Why was the Socialist government accused of Burmanizing the ethnic
minorities?”, “Why did some schools stop teaching minority languages when others
continued to teach them?” The answers for both questions lie in the complexities of the
political system and the way in which the socialist government functioned. A retired
senior BSPP official noted that some senior socialist government officials expected that
the Burmese Way to Socialism would help the government achieve national unification
by encouraging all ethnic groups to transcend their ethnic nationalistic sentiments (July
19, 2003). However, because the government was more willing to work with the people
who would endorse the Burmese Way to Socialism, the system had no place for ethnic
nationalists. As a result, the attempts at peace negotiations between the socialist
government and insurgent groups in 1963 failed. The chauvinistic statements made by
senior central state officials further compounded this situation. BSPP chairman, U Ne

19
Win, publicly stated that Burmans would have to help their backward minority brothers
and sisters improve their living standards and the level of culture so that these other
cultures will be comparable to that of the Burmans. In reality, however, apart from
making people from Naga7 tribes wear pants, especially when they attended the Union
Day festival in Yangon, the socialist government did not forcibly change or eliminate any
of their cultural practices. However, like its predecessor, the socialist government did not
define “Myanmarness” clearly and referred to the Burman cultural elements when
promoting the Union of Myanmar. Infuriated by the political system and the way senior
government officials engaged in nation-building activities, minority nationalists,
especially insurgent leaders, began to develop anti-government discourses, which
inevitably accused the government of Burmanizing the entire population.
In theory, the socialist government was supposed to function under collective
leadership. In practice, however, most of the state’s power was concentrated in the hands
of Party Chairman Ne Win. Like Chairman Mao of China, chairman Ne Win, known to
the general public as num-ber-one-gyi (big number one) or a-foe-gyi (big old man), had
the power to appoint and dismiss at his own discretion, state and party officials at all
levels of administration as well as to steer the state in the direction he wanted. Although
there were initially some officials who were genuinely interested in establishing a
socialist system in the country, by early 1970s, only those who were willing to please Ne
Win remained in important positions. In other words, by the early 1970s, most senior
government positions were filled with those who were more anxious in securing and
maximizing their self-interest than serving the interests of the public. In order to keep
their jobs, many senior officials came to practice three mas – ma-loke (not doing any
work), ma-shote (not getting involved in any complication) ma-pyoke (not getting
dismissed) as guiding principles in performing their duties. These senior officials, in turn,
appointed their loyal followers following the three ma principles to positions in the
division/state and township level administrative units. As noted above, although local
administrative units were theoretically supposed to be staffed with people elected by the
public, the elections, in practice, were merely ceremonial and most candidates nominated
by senior government officials always won the elections. Since they owed their jobs to

7
Traditionally, people from the Naga tribe rarely covered their private parts.

20
senior government officials, most local state officials were more interested in impressing
their patrons than serving the interests of the public (Kyaw Yin Hlainga 2003: 35-36).
While local state officials were supposed to help ordinary public to meet their
basic needs and preserve and promote local cultures, most self-interested central and
local state officials were unwilling to deal with controversial issues even if these deeds
would benefit the public, as they feared involvement in any complications. In the late
1960s, a group of Shan university students tried to promote new Shan scripts and
vocabularies invented by some Shan nationalists. Since the old Shan scripts were much
closer to Burmese scripts, young educated Shan associated the invention of the new Shan
with the Shan nationalist movement. However, based on their suspicions that the
promoters of the new Shan scripts were linked to the Shan insurgents, the then members
of the Shan State Council refused to accept the new Shan scripts. When some Shan
language teachers started speculating whether they should teach new Shan at public
schools, the Shan state council decided to suspend the teaching of Shan language at
public schools under their jurisdiction.
Some schools in Mon, Kachin, and Karen states stopped teaching minority
languages when they could no longer find teachers capable of teaching both minority
languages and other courses. This was because the socialist government, unlike its
parliamentary predecessor, did not provide its Ministry of Education with a means of
allocating budget for public schools in minority areas to hire minority language teachers.
The Ministry expected primary school teachers at the minority areas to follow the
example of the teachers in Myanmar proper and to teach all subjects. The People’s
Councils were responsible for helping schools to hire qualified teachers, however, local
state officials at many places, simply suspended minority language classes instead of
locating and hiring qualified teachers. A retired schoolteacher from Shan state noted that
the State Councils at minority areas ought to have sent more people to the Academy for
the Development of National Races to train as teachers because most of the Academy’s
graduates wanted to become party cadres rather than teachers (interview, July 29, 2003).
The state people’s council also did not make sufficient effort to recruit teachers who
could teach minority language and other academic courses. When they saw the
suspension of minority languages in other schools, many teachers capable of teaching

21
minority languages called for the teaching of minority languages to be suspended as well
(interview, October 2, 2003). This was because they did not want to handle the heavy
workload of teaching more classes than they could manage. In some places, local
authorities and teachers decided to suspend minority language classes, because students
were unable to handle the workload. According to a former socialist government official,
the irresponsibility of socialist government officials was the main reason for the
suspension of the teaching of minority languages at public schools in minority areas.
Some minority leaders, however, asked senior government officials to resume the
teaching of minority languages in minority areas. A Shan ex-socialist government official
recalled that he once asked an official from the Ministry of Education whether it was
possible to reintroduce the teaching of minority languages (interview, July 28, 2003). The
official simply responded that U Ne Win did not like the idea. Leaders of the Mon
cultural association in Yangon also asked a fellow Mon national, Brig. Gen. Tin Oo,
powerful Assistant General Secretary of the BSPP, if he could ask the Ministry of
Education to resume the teaching of Mon language at public schools in Mon state.
Although Brig. Gen. Tin Oo promised to fulfill the wish of Mon leaders, he was fired
before he could talk to the Minister of Education. Mon association leaders then turned to
U Sein Lwin, the senior official who succeeded Brig. Gen Tin Oo, in the hope that he
would work for the resumption of the teaching of Mon at public schools in Mon state. U
Sein Lwin believed that requiring students in Mon state to study Mon would result in
them lagging behind students from other states, for Mon is a very difficult language.
Thus, he asked Mon Cultural Association leaders to organize Mon language classes on
their own. Nobody really knew why U Sein Lwin did not talk to the Minister of
Education on behalf of the Mon cultural leaders (interview, October 2, 2003). However,
his action could not be used as an instance of the Burman-dominated government’s
attempts to Burmanize the ethnic minorities, for U Sein Lwin was a Mon national.
Many minority nationalists thought that it was U Ne Win who wanted the
suspension of the teaching of minority languages at public schools in minority areas. If
the central government and U Ne Win wanted to suspend the teaching of minority
languages in public schools, the suspension of all languages would take place at the same
time. A retired senior government official noted that many senior government officials

22
often gave “U Ne Win does not like it” answer whenever they did not want to deal with
an issue raised by the public. 3 retired education ministry officials did not recall receiving
any orders suspending the teaching of minority languages. In reality, U Ne Win asked
officials from the Ministries of Education and Culture to develop Burmese-Ethnic
minority language dictionaries to foster better understanding between Burmans and
ethnic minorities in 1981 (The Speeches of the BSPP Chairman 1985: 39-48). However,
due to its limited human resources and technical capacity, the Ministry of Culture has yet
to implement Ne Win’s instruction. However, developing Burmese-ethnic minority
language dictionaries remains on the list of future projects the Ministry of Culture wishes
to undertake.
The fact is, the 1966 Education Law allowing public schools in minority areas to
teach minority languages up to second grade was never suspended. That is why many
public schools in minority areas continued to teach minority languages until early 1980s.
It appears that the teaching of minority languages at public schools in minority areas
continued as long as local state officials were willing to work for it. The teaching of
minority languages could sometimes be problematic, for insurgent groups and ethnic
nationalists hostile to the socialist government also tried to promote their languages or
their own brand of their languages on their own. Local state officials who did not want to
be implicated with any socio-political complications were not dedicated to promoting the
teaching of minority languages in minority areas. A retired socialist government official
confirmed the widespread notion that minority areas blessed with some righteous
officials willing to promote local culture and customs tended to teach minority languages
for longer periods of time than in places where the officials did not have much interest in
preserving and promoting local culture and customs. As I have discussed elsewhere, by
the beginning of 1980s, the officials left in the various levels of the Socialist government
were predominantly those who chiefly abided by the three ma principles (Kyaw Yin
Hlainga 2003: 42). This, then, would account for the striking coincidence that during this
period, most public schools in minority areas stopped teaching minority languages as
well.
However, it should be noted that it is specious to assume that the teaching of
minority languages was suspended throughout the country. Buddhist monasteries and

23
Christian Churches continued to offer minority language courses soon after public
schools stopped offering them. People from some minority villages collectively hired
language teachers to teach their children how to read and write their mother tongues.
Moreover, public schools in Chin state, Palong and other remote areas continued to use
their mother tongues as the mediums of instruction. Many people from such areas only
learned how to speak Burmese properly when they went to college in major cities. In city
areas, however, younger members of the ethnic minorities came to lose interest in
learning how to read and write their own mother tongues as there was no incentive for
them to do so. This disinterest in the study of their languages led to the suspension of
teaching of minority languages in many monasteries in several minority areas. A Mon
lecturer from Yangon University surmised that Mons in Mon state who could speak Mon
only made up approximately 50% of the population and only about 20% knew how to
write in Mon (interview, October 2, 2003). A retired Shan politician also noted that only
Shan people living in remote areas took the trouble of learning to write Shan (July 28,
2003). Both the Mon lecturer and retired Shan politician were united in their observations
that young people from their respective states were more familiar with Burman history
than their own ethnic histories. As will be discussed in some detail later, in contrast to
those who grew up in the parliamentary period, these young ethnic minorities tend to
associate themselves with the country more than their ethnic. It is worth noting at this
juncture that most young ethnic Christian minorities continued to study the reading and
writing of their mother tongues because their churches encourage them to read bible in
their own languages. Apparently, the socialist regime was insecure in its own legitimacy.
It was intolerant of any challenges to its rule. When it suspected that private minority
language classes had become venues for anti-government activists to get together or that
these classes were birthplaces for anti-government activists, the government closed down
these language courses and arrested the teachers (interview, October 15, 2003).
For ethnic nationalists, the central and local government organs were part of the
same authoritarian state. Regardless of the true reason behind the cessation of minority
language classes, the ethnic nationalists strongly believed that the government was
responsible for the public schools’ suspension of minority languages classes.
Furthermore, they also resented the government for not rendering any assistance to them.

24
Minority nationalist leaders blamed the government for the illiteracy of the large majority
of young ethnic minorities living in cities and its surrounding areas in their own
languages. Schools opened in the insurgent areas, often referred to as “liberated areas” by
insurgent groups and “black areas” by the government, taught most courses in minority
languages. In those schools, Burmese was taught only as a foreign language. Insurgent
leaders and teachers from those schools also tried to instill anti-Burmese sentiments into
the minds of their young ethnic minority students by emphasizing the brutalities of
Burmese kings and soldiers in their history lessons. An NGO activist currently running
teachers’ training courses for ethnic minorities in Chiang Mai attests to this:
“Most ethnic minorities growing up in liberated areas were taught to view
Burmans in a negative light. This is more so given the fact that most of them
grew up experiencing the attacks of government forces. This explains why
most of them only speak their own languages and are not fluent in Burmese.
They have associated Burmans with danger and the military forces attacking
them, as such, whenever they heard that Burmans were coming, they would
run away. The paradoxical thing is, though, most minority leaders need to
speak Burmese so as to enable them to directly communicate with other
minority leaders” (interview, June 7, 2003).

Although it never stopped developing anti-colonial discourses, the socialist

government’s policy towards the English language changed when one of U Ne Win’s
daughters did not get into the Royal Medical School in England because of her poor
English. The Socialist government came to re-emphasize the English language as the
language of modernization and re-introduced English as a major medium of instruction
both in high schools and universities. However, contrary to appearances, English had
never ceased to be a popular language throughout the socialist period. The young people
in Myanmar, like many other young people in poor countries in the 1980s were extremely
keen on getting jobs in foreign countries, to do so, they needed to have some working
knowledge of English. Some of Myanmar’s most eligible males in the 1980s were sailors
working on foreign shipping lines and young people aspiring to be sailors tried to study
English at private tuition classes. The reintroduction of English as a medium of

25
instruction at various levels of public schools did not helped young Burmese to improve
their English because many lecturers at various educational levels were trained in
Burmese and were ill-equipped to teach courses in English. Although the government re-
introduce English as a medium of instruction in the classroom as part of its modernization
of the education system, people viewed the poor state of English proficiency among
young people as evidence of the socialist government’s failure to modernize the country.
All in all, the socialist government did not have a clear plan to Burmanize the
entire population. In fact, some of the top ten most powerful socialist government
officials are not Burmans for the BSPP’s powerful Assistant Secretary, Tin Oo and the
penultimate president of the socialist regime, Sein Lwin were Mons. The government’s
major problem was its officials’ failure to represent the interests of both the majority
Burmans and the ethnic minorities. These government officials were mainly interested in
either maintaining their jobs or getting promotion. As noted, the teaching of minority
languages were suspended largely because the absence of state officials willing to work
for the interests of minority peoples. Even in the face of lack of the state officials’
support, the socialist government generally allowed minority groups to promote their
languages and cultures freely as long as they did not challenge its rule. Therefore, one
may argue that during the socialist period, minority groups enjoyed a great deal of
cultural freedom but little political freedom.

Language and Nation-Building in the SPDC period

The State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), which was initially known as
the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), took control of the government
in late 1988 by claiming to prevent the disintegration of the Union of Myanmar. The
military government initially announced its intention to hold multiparty democratic
elections so as to hand over power to the winning party. However, after the 1990 election,
it refused to hand over power to the winning party, the National League for Democracy
(NLD). The junta then claimed that the Union would disintegrate if the government left
or broke down. That is, the junta tried to justify its continued rule by reinventing itself as
the indispensable Unifier of the country. In so doing, the junta sought to crush supporters

26
of neo-colonialists (whom it called ‘axe-handles’) and other destructive elements by
rallying public support to its side. Like its predecessor, the junta considered all its
opponents as “axe-handles” injurious to the Union. Upon its immediate seizure of power
in the country, political opposition and insurgents group were the military’s major
opponents. However, in time, the military leaders came to view the major opposition
party, the NLD, as a more dangerous element than the ethnic insurgent groups, for the
former wanted to take its place. Therefore, the junta began to make ceasefire with
insurgent groups in order to consolidate its position vis-à-vis the NLD in 1989. Its
attempts were moderately successful for by the close of 1997, it has made ceasefire
agreements with 17 insurgent groups. While trying to make ceasefire agreements with
insurgent groups, the junta began to promote the idea that Myanmar was a multi-ethnic
state with 135 different races and over 100 different languages. Some observers and
minority nationalists concluded that the government promoted such ideas to undermine
the unity between different minority groups and to perpetuate Burman dominance.
Language also played a crucial role in the junta’s “union-rescuing” activities.
Among its attempts to preserve the unity of the Union was to keep Burmese as the
official language. Due to the previous efforts to its predecessors, the junta did not have to
work very hard to promote the teaching of Burmese in minority areas. Most young people
and those in their 50s grew up in the socialist period and the present military period and
spoke Burmese as fluently as Burmans. These people did not have much incentive to
study their own languages because it would not help them get any employment. Thus,
many of them are fluent in Burmese. The junta used Burmese as a means of transmitting
its propagandas. The junta’s propagandas were designed to undermine its opponents and
to convince the public, both the majority Burmans and ethnic minorities that their lives
would be better off only under the military rule. Senior military officials and the
government controlled media repeatedly noted that if the public did not cooperate with
the military government and lacked union spirit, they would be responsible for
Myanmar’s absorption into any of the other foreign powers surrounding it. The military
government also used anti-colonial discourses in demonizing the NLD and its leader.
Because NLD leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was married to a British academic, Dr
Michael Aris, the government media attacked her as a person who diluted the purity of

27
the Burman race. This, by inference, implied that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is injurious to
the preservation of the Union.
In 1998, the junta’s Ministry of Education introduced the National Education
Promotion Program requiring students in pre-universities to take a compulsory course on
Union Spirit which, as defined by the junta, referred to people of all ethnicities and
religions feeling that they belong to Myanmar so much so that they would live and work
together for the preservation of the union (Union Spirit, 2001: 213-4). Under the auspices
of this program, some portions of school history books were rewritten and other sections
were deleted. Sections describing wars between the Burmese and the minority kings,
especially the Mon kings, was re-interpreted as wars between Burmese and Mon feudal
lords. Its traditional reading as wars between the Burmese and Mon peoples was
obliterated. The junta appeared to understand that the rhetoric alone would not change the
minds of the people. It tried to substantiate its words with deeds by carrying out
development programs throughout the country. In the government’s attempts to instill
Union Spirit, it undertook many developmental and educational programs. The junta
planned to invest 17708 million kyats in the development of border areas and the
education system between 1993 and 2006 (Kyawt Kyawt Khine 2003). Indeed, the junta
did build more roads, bridges and schools in both minority areas and Myanmar proper
than any of its predecessors. The junta made certain that the public was aware of all the
development programs it undertook by publishing news articles about them on a near
daily basis. Likewise, it assigned the newly created department of public relations to
organize exhibitions about the government’s developmental activities. Needless to say,
the media and government agencies used Burmese to convey government propaganda to
the public.
Regardless of its vigorous infrastructural developmental programs, the junta took
a leaf from its predecessors in leaving be the promotion of minority cultures. Like the
socialist government, it permitted both indigenous and foreign minority groups to freely
promote the teaching and studying of their own languages. Ethnic minorities were further
impelled to promote their own languages when the junta held the national convention in
1992 to draft a new constitution. Referring to the language requirement for statehood
proposed by Aung San in 1947, many ethnic groups tired to emphasize the uniqueness of

28
their languages when they presented their causes at the convention (Proposals Submitted
at the National Convention 1993). Since then, some minority groups have tried to revive
their languages. For instance, the rare use of the Kachin state’s Red Shan written
language culminated in the ignorance of many Red Shan in the existence of their written
language. Given the trend in promulgating ethnic languages, it was certainly no
coincidence that a Red Shan cultural association wrote the history of Red Shan in its own
language in the early 1990s (interview, October 12, 2003). Although the National
Convention has been stalled since 1996, minority political parties have continued to
promote their languages in a more aggressive manner than they did in the 1970s and
1980s (interviews, June 2003-October 2003).
In 1998, however, the junta’s National Education Promotion Program dropped the
teaching of minority languages at pre-university level classes. In explaining the reason
for the cessation of minority language classes at pre-university level public schools, an
official from the Ministry of Education said that the existence of many different ethnic
minority groups with their own dialects and languages in each minority state and their
constant pressures on the government to introduce their language classes at public
schools in their respective areas have led to much problems. The official also noted that
public schools in minority areas lacked the capacity to teach the mother tongues of all the
peoples residing within their jurisdiction. Therefore, the official claimed that the
government decided to let the minority groups organize their ethnic minority language
classes on their own. Thus, the local communities of many minority areas hired language
teachers to teach their students the written aspects of their languages. Schools run by the
ceasefire insurgent groups also offered minority language courses (Thein Lwin 2000).
This phenomenon was not merely restricted to the ethnic villages, for, in Yangon too,
there were Minority Cultural Associations, especially, Mon and Shan Associations
offering courses in their languages. Also, university students could organize minority
language courses at their universities so long as they obtained permission from their
respective registrars to have a room for that purpose (interview, October 12, 2003). But
since 1996, after the government closure of the universities for about three years, student
associations had become less active and accordingly stopped organizing language classes
(interview, October 29, 2003). However, while the Department of Myanmar Language

29
and Literature at various public universities did not stop teaching Mon language in their
honors classes, the University of the Development of National Races (upgraded from the
Academy) continued to require its trainees to take a minority language course other than
their own and Burmese.
Regardless of its efforts, the military government remained very unpopular and
was continually criticized by the opposition and minority groups for Burmanising the
entire population. The government’s unpopularity could be attributed to its
highhandedness in dealing with the political opposition, corruption, mismanagement of
the economy and refusal to institute a democratic government swiftly. The government
was not the only beneficiary from the widespread usage of the Burmese language within
the country. The predominance of Burmese made it easier for opposition groups to
continue their dissemination of anti-government propaganda throughout the country; this
usage of Burmese as a subversive anti-government tool had its roots in the socialist
period. For instance, with the exception of the inhabitants of a few remote areas, Daw
Aung San Suu Kyi and other NLD leaders were able to communicate to ethnic minorities
without deploying any interpreter while touring their areas. Also, many people from
minority areas could read anti-government literature distributed by opposition groups and
learn about the developments which the government wanted to cover up from the
Burmese language programs from BBC, VOA and RFA radio broadcasts. I interviewed
many people from over 40 ethnic minorities, and these people in their 50s and 60s, all
recalled seeing people listening to the Burmese language programs on the BBC and VOA
broadcasts in the 1950s and 1960s in their native places. However, they all added that
with the advent of the 1990s, many people living in minority areas have come be regular
listeners of Burmese language programs on foreign radio broadcasts. They all noted that
one of the reasons for the present number of ethnic minorities listening to radio
broadcasts in Burmese language is that, unlike in the 1950s, most ethnic minorities these
days speak, read and write Burmese as well as Burmans. Political opposition groups and
foreign radio stations served as alternative sources of information and their anti-military
discourses always undermined the anti-colonialist and NLD discourses of the
government.

30
 For all its enthusiastic promotion of Union Spirit, the military government, like its
socialist predecessor, did not have a clear definition of Myanmarness other than the fact
that Myanmar represented all the ethnic groups in the country. Similar to the
parliamentary and socialist periods, there were a lot of overlaps between the
Myanmarness and Burmanness. Most cultural activities undertaken by the junta under the
label of promoting Myanmar culture focused mainly on Burman culture. Furthermore,
although the government rewrote its interpretation of the historical wars between the
Burmese and Mon kings, public school history textbooks continued to emphasize the
roles of the Burmese kings who attempted to unify the country. To make matters worse,
some senior military officers often expressed their desire to emulate the “mighty ancient
Myanmar kings” in reunifying the government. As noted in the previous section, many
ethnic nationalists resented the teaching of such historical lessons. Ethnic nationalists also
resented the fact that the government did not provide any assistance to the teaching of
minority languages. The fact that the government discriminated against Christian (and
Muslim) civil servants also undermined its attempt to win the support of minority people.
Not surprisingly, ethnic nationalists responded by developing anti-government discourses
and disseminating them through the foreign media and the internet.

The government’s intolerance of the opposition also engendered much

misunderstanding of its language policy. Whenever it made reference to the
disintegration of Union Spirit, the government was often indirectly referring to its
toppling by forces opposed to it being the means of national solidarity. As such, any
group suspected of preaching anti-government sentiments were therefore labelled as
factions working for the disintegration of the union. In teaching their own language, these
ethnic minority groups also promoted ethnic nationalism and were occasionally critical of
the government. When the government got wind of this “marked opposition”, it moved to
close these schools. For instance, in 1994 and 1998, the government closed down some
Mon schools run by the New Mon State Party. Mon nationalists and foreign observers
often claim that these schools were closed because they taught their own ethnic
languages. They have failed to observe that their criticisms were not fully justified for
when these schools in ethnic regions were closed down, the Mon Cultural Association in
Yangon, Departments of Myanmar Language and Literature continued to offer courses on

31
the Mon language. The government was not bothered with the teaching of ethnic
languages, but rather, it feared the potential political threat in the teaching of these ethnic
cultures. The government proceeded to close down these schools mainly because of its
fear that those schools might be the birth place of anti-government activists. But when it
was proven after some meetings with the Mon leaders that language was the only thing
taught to its students, the government permitted the Mon schools to reopen.
The absence of the government support for minority languages and cultures and
the promotion of Burmese language did contribute to the decline of minority languages
and culture. I conducted a survey of some 300 people from the various minority groups
and I discovered that 100% of them were better acquainted with Burmese history than
their own ethnic histories. While all of them have read novels in Burmese, less than 5%
had read literature in their own languages regularly. 80% of the participants said that their
best friends were Burmese. 85% said they only listen to either Burmese or English songs,
whereas all the respondents informed me that they listen to Burmese songs, adding that
their favourite songs are in Burmese. Only 10% regularly listened to songs in their own
languages. While almost 35% of them could speak their own languages, only 20% knew
how to write in them. But all of them could read and write Burmese very well.
Furthermore, they tended to associate themselves with the country, for 75% of the
respondents answered that they would defend the country if a foreign country invaded it.
It is also interesting to note that only 20% supported independence for their own state
even though they are unanimous in their antipathy for the government and their desire for
a new democratic one, they all wanted to remain in the Union. But, they did also express
a desire for their own federal autonomous states. So, we are able to bear witness to the
success of the government’s education programme in teaching the peoples of Myanmar to
be almost united in their loyalty to the country. This societal impact caused by these
ethnic peoples education where Burmese was the medium of instruction and knowledge
of Burmese history was the norm, have impacted the people in their perception of the
nation. When asked as to where their loyalties lay, with the government or the country,
none of them stated the government.
The minorities who grew up in the so-called “liberated” areas controlled by
insurgent groups went through a different socialization process. Since they studied

32
Burmese in their schools as a second language, they assumed that they need not master it,
as such, many of them do not know how to speak, read and write Burmese very well.
They hated Burmans and considered Burmese as the language of the enemy. This could
be attributed to their association of the Burmese language with the brutality and violence
of the “invading” Burmese armies attacking them. I spoke to 5 students from the Karen
area and they told me that roughly 40% of their compatriots did not know any Burmese,
while the rest did know some Burmese. My other sources, an ex-Karen solider, informed
me that about half the Karen population in the “so-called liberated area” could speak
Burmese and the other half could not; however, he added that those who spoke Burmese
fluently accounted for less than 5% of the population in that area.
In spite of these figures, it is interesting to note that these various ethnic insurgent
groups use Burmese as a common medium of negotiation. At Mesot, at the Thai-
Myanmar border, the multi-ethnic front of the National Council for the Union of
Myanmar (NCUB), which consists of Burmese, Shan, Karen, Kachin, Rakhine and other
ethnic groups, uses Burmese as its chief mode of communication. Regardless of their
present use of Burmese in their discussions or planning their anti-govt activities, many of
these ethnic nationalists and anti-Burmese government activists want to institute English
as the official language when Myanmar becomes a democracy. However, this plan of
theirs to render English the official language is problematic because most of these ethnic
nationalists and anti-Burmese government activists speak better Burmese than English.
The 5 Karen students I talked to shared the thoughts of their leaders when they expressed
their keenness for the institution of English as democratic Myanmar’s official language.
Their desire to institute English as the official language stems from their belief that
English, being is a neutral language will disenable any one group to dominate politically
or socially. Their rationale is that if Burmese remains the national language the ethnic
Burmans would continue to have the upper hand in politics and all other sectors in
society.
Ironically, in spite of its anti-colonial stance, the government has placed a great
deal of emphasis on the importance of English. In efforts similar to the last few years of
the socialist period, most departments at all universities use English as a medium of
instruction. However, in effecting this change, the government, like its predecessor, failed

33
to consider that most of its university teachers were trained in Burmese and were thus
unqualified to teach in English. The students, who were not well versed in the language
themselves, usually resorted to plagiarism in their term papers and thesis. Other students
wrote their theses in Burmese before getting someone to translate their work into English.
Despite these negative effects, the government persisted in its promotion of English and
its various government sponsored civil society organisations such as the Union Solidarity
and Development Association (USDA) opened English language classes for its members.
The government, however, set new standards for the Romanisation of place
names within the country in 1989. This came when the name of the country in English,
Myanmar, was renamed Myanmar. The English names of several Burmese cities also
reverted to their Burmese names, Rangoon was now Yangon and Moulmein was now
Mawlamying. Street names in Myanmar were also affected by this change. While this
“renaming” project has been dubbed by some members of the opposition and the
international community as the military government’s method of Burmanizing the
country, the truth is, this name changing or name reversion carried out by the government
hardly affected the locals because locals had always referred to these places in their
Burmese names. This name changing of locations was meant to affect the international
community as a part of the government’s anti-colonial nation-building process. Thus, this
is not the government’s method of Burmanising the society.
All in all, it can be surmised that the junta carried out nation building, or rather
union-rescuing, activities as a part of its attempt to justify its continued rule of the
country. It used the official language as a means of conveying its intent and propagandas.
However, the military government is similar to the socialist government in the fact that it
does not enjoy sole right over the use of languages as a propaganda tool. Opposition
groups also made use of the official language to disseminate anti-government discourses
throughout the country. Like in its socialist predecessors, the junta allowed minority
groups to promote their languages and cultures freely as long as they did not challenge its
rule. However, due to its failure to support the promotion of minority cultures, the junta,
as was its predecessor, was accused of Burmanizing the entire population.
Conclusion

34
 Having established that politics of language is a complicated issue, we ought to
return to the basic understanding of all the ethnic groups in Myanmar that a common
language does facilitate communication between different peoples. Successive
governments claimed that they instituted Burmese as the official language for the sake of
establish better communication amongst various ethnic groups and through it, mutual
understanding. They also claimed that being an independent country, it is only natural
that Burma uses one of its native languages as the official language rather than a foreign
language like English. Since the majority of the people are ethnic Burmans, the selection
and implementation of Burmese as the official language seemed a natural choice. Until
recently most ethnic nationalists did not see the implementation of Burmese as official
language as a slight on the other languages and culture in the Union. However, they
resented successive Myanmar governments for not sufficiently supporting their
respective languages and cultures. There is a fundamental difference between ethnic
nationalists and Barman political leaders when the matter of language politics and nation
building or Union building comes up. Ethnic elites and nationalists believe that the Union
should only last as long as it benefited them, whereas the Burman political leaders appear
to be very obsessed with ancient Burmese history and their grandiose thoughts of
unifying the country.

Apart from its belief of itself as the chief unifier of the country, post-colonial
Myanmar governments have neither a clear union building discourse nor a clear
definition of Myanmarness. Furthermore, whenever they claimed that something was
done for the sake of nation building, it was usually a deployed as a priority to keep
themselves in power. In order to do that, they often used the official language as a
propaganda tool. Furthermore, because of they were not popularly elected governments,
the socialist and current military governments had to organize popular activities so as to
legitimize itself. One way in which the government sought to do that was its emphasis on
Burman culture. One of the main reasons for its promotion of Burman culture and
language was its need to pacify and gain the support of the majority Burman populace.
Despite its promotion of the Burmese language and culture, it should be borne in mind
that the government does not have a well thought out Burmanization program. Although

35
it is true that the government did not actively seek to promote minority cultures and
languages, this oversight was more due to ignorant irresponsibility than governmental
policy. However, the ethnic elites and nationalists consider the socialist and current
military governments’ actions unacceptable and that the words of the Burman political
leaders were nothing more than empty rhetoric. Amongst these ethnic elites and
nationalists were certain factions who believed that their territories ought to be
independent from the Union, as such, these ethnic nationalist and activists have formed
insurgency groups to rebel against the Burman dominated military government.

In spite of the ensuing ethnic insurgencies against the government, most ordinary
people within the ethnic minorities are concerned with their day-to-day survival than
secession. Moreover, these ordinary minority peoples are able to live together in relative
peace and harmony and they have generally very little prejudice against each other. All
ethnic states and divisions are actually multi-ethnic in composition and outlook and the
peoples of these various ethnic states move freely in and out of each others’ regions. For
instance, there is a multitude of ethnic groups living and working together in Yangon,
Mandalay, and other ethnic minority states. Thanks to the government’s establishment of
Burmese as official language, people from various ethnic groups were able to
communicate better with one another and share each other’s grievances. Beyond the
fighting between the ethnic insurgent movements and the predominantly Burman military
forces, there is, in actuality, very little communal riots in Burma. In fact, there are only
two examples of recent ethnic clashes, that between the Mon and Karen insurgent groups
and that between the Kachin and Red Shan in Kachin State. In fact, there have not been
any major racial riots between Burmans and other minority groups since independence.
Given the abilities of the common peoples of most ethnicities to live together in peace, it
is unsurprising to fin that inter-racial marriages are very common. Furthermore, many
minority peoples usually have Burman best friends. This shows that the Burmese
language is a crucial factor in helping these various ethnic groups to feel as though they
are all fellow citizens belonging to the same country. Further evidence of this can be
deduced from the above cited survey where over 75% of the 300 ethnic minority peoples
interviewed claimed that they would defend the country if another foreign nation,

36
including Thai invaded Burma. While these 300 individuals might not be representative
of the entire ethnic minority population, it does display a trend within the ethnic minority
communities to be loyal to the country to which they belong and call home.
With the exception of the first 20 years of the socialist period, successive
Myanmar governments viewed English as a language of modernization. The current
military government is actively trying to promote it. However, the present educational
system is too weak to aid people in mastering the language. For the public, English is a
language that could help them get good jobs both within and without the country.
However, only well-do-to people have access to expensive privateEnglish language
classes.
Due to their antipathy for the Burmans, many minority activists based in Thailand
are keen to make English the official language of democratic Burma. While they believe
in the necessity of linguistic centralization, they have no desire to be “linguistically
subdued and culturally incorporated”. This is extremely apparent in the present where
many politically conscious and motivated minority nationalists have publicly stated that
their languages need to be resalvaged. The NLD and other large political parties want to
maintain Burmese as the official language. Given this situation, it is not preposterous to
assume that the language policy making will be a controversial political issue for
whoever comes to power in the future.

37
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