ACTA PHILOSOPHICA, vol. 4 (1995), fasc. 2 -PAGG.

115-136

John of St. Thomas and Suárez

JOSÉ PEREIRA*

1. Baroque Theology1
The Baroque age, extending from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment, was
one of the most productive in the history of Catholic thought. It was an age with a
passion for system and synthesis. Theologians never seemed to weary of
contemplating the architectonic symmetry of the Catholic doctrinal structure, of
meditating, with an almost mystical intensity, on the elegant logic of the religion of
* Department of Theology, Fordham University, Rose Hill Campus, 441 East Fordham Road,
Bronx, N.Y. 10458, USA
1 Our quotations from John of St. Thomas and Suárez are taken from the following:
1. JOANNIS A SANCTO THOMA, O. P. Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus [henceforward CPT
], Beato Reiser O.S.B, Marietti, Taurino/Turin 1930-1937. 3 vol. Vol. 1, Ars Logica. Vol. 2,
Naturalis Philosophiae, partes I et III. Vol. 3, Naturalis philosophiae, pars IV.
2. JOANNIS A SANCTO THOMA, O. P. Cursus theologici [henceforth CT ], In Primam Partem
Divi Thomae commentarii, Solesmes Benedictines, Desclée, Paris, vol. 1, 1931; vol. 2,
1934.
3. R. P. FRANCISCI SUÁREZ E SOCIETATE JESU. Opera Omnia, Ludovicus Vives, Paris 1856,
vols. 1-26). Vol. 1, De Deo Uno et Trino. Tractatus Tertius. De Sanctissimo Trinitatis
Mysterio. Vols. 25-26, Disputationes Metaphysicae [henceforth DM ], quoted as follows:
DM : disputation : section : number. All the translations are mine.
Since the 1960s, Suarezian studies have been less prolific than previously, when they were
dominated by the great figures of Pedro Descoqs (from the 1920’s) and José Hellin (from
the 1940’s). Some idea of how extensive these studies were can be gauged from the Nota
Bibliografica of A. GN E M M I ’s Il fondamento metafisico. Analisi de strutture sulle
“Disputationes Metaphysicae” di F. Suárez, Vita e Pensiero, Milano 1969, pp. 337-351.
However, from the late sixties, Suarezian studies have still been continued by an impressive
roster of scholars, like José Aleu Benitez, Timothy J. Cronin, Jean-François Courtine,
Douglas P. Davis, John P. Doyle, Eleuterio Elorduy, Jorge J. E. Gracia, David M. Knight,
John D. Kronen, Carlos Noreña, Jeremiah Reedy, T. D. Sullivan, John L. Treloar and
Norman J. Wells. Many of these names appear in the special issue on Francisco Suárez
edited by Jorge Gracia for the American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, Summer 1991,
which augurs a revival of Suárez studies.

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the Logos. Systems were constructed from the writings of Scholastic theologians of
earlier times who are not known to have been system builders, or the systematic
possibilities of whose thought had not been further developed in medieval days.
Among these systems were Aegidianism, Anselmianism, Baconianism, Bernardism,
and Henricism. But the major Baroque theological schools were developments of the
three preeminent architectonic systems that had arisen in the age of classical
Scholasticism: Bonaventurianism, Thomism, and Scotism, Thomism being the most
influential, repeatedly recommended by the popes, like Urban V (Laudabilis Deus),
Pius V (Mirabilis Deus, 1567), Sixtus V (Triumphantis Jerusalem, 1588) and Paul V
(Splendidissimi, 1607). And the Thomist system was championed not only by the
Dominican order to which Thomas belonged, and by his fervent admirers like the
Discalced Carmelites, but by other orders too, like the Benedictines, Cistercians,
Mercedarians, Minorites; as well as by the seculars.
The Dominicans, of course, had long been dedicated to Thomism, and had
thinkers of surpassing genius. Among the 15th century Thomists were Cajetan
(Thomas de Vio, 1468-1534), reputed founder of classical Thomism; Franciscus
Sylvester Ferrariensis (1474-1528), elaborator of Aquinas’s polemics; Francisco de
Vitoria (c.1492-1546), initiator of international law; and Domingo de Soto (1494-
1560), creator of a variety of Thomism different from, and less succesful than,
Cajetan’s. The 16th century produced a race of Dominican giants like Melchior Cano
(1509-1560), inaugurator of Baroque Scholasticism, with its balance of positive and
speculative theology; Bartolomé de Medina (1528-1581), propounder of the ethical
theory of Probabilism; Domingo Bañez (1528-1604), protagonist of the theory of
physical predetermination; and the Doctor Profundus John of St. Thomas (João de
São Tomás/Ponçote/Poinsot, 1589-1644), the consummator of classical Thomist
systematics — the organization of a system embodied in the 24 Theses approved by
the Sacred Congregation of Studies in 1914. Classical Thomism was the normative
form of the system from the 16th century to the early 20th, but was challenged in the
mid-20th by newer modes of Thomism, which can be identified as the historical and
the transcendental.
While the Baroque Dominicans produced the consummate classical Thomist,
the Baroque Carmelites were responsible for the consummate classical Thomist opus,
in three divisions. First, a systematization of Thomist philosophy, the C u r s u s
Complutensis (1624-1625); second, a systematization of Thomist dogmatic theology,
in twelve volumes, the Cursus Theologicus Salmanticensis (1624-1712); and third, a
systematization of Thomist moral theology, in seven volumes, the Cursus Theologiae
Moralis (1665-1709). The principal theologians of this undertaking were Antonio de
la Madre de Dios (1583-1637), Domingo de Santa Teresa (1604-1659), and Juan de
la Anunciación (1633-1701), the latter, the Spanish John, almost equal in speculative
profundity to our Portuguese John. The productivity of these Baroque thinkers was
prodigious, never equalled before or since. As John of St. Thomas’s younger
contemporary, the great Portuguese orator António Vieira (1608-1697) said about
them, they seemed to write libraries rather than books, «que mais parece escreveram
livrarias, que livros»2.
2 A. VIEIRA, Desvelos de Xavier acordado. Sermão primeiro. Anjo, in Padre G. ALVES, Padre
António Vieira. Sermões , Lello & Irmão, Porto 1959. Tom. 13, p. 170.

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2. Francisco Suarez (1548-1617)

Towering above all these theologians and philosophers was the figure of the
Doctor Eximius (the Extraordinary or Uncommon Doctor), Francisco Suárez,
Europae atque adeo orbis universi magister, author of the most titanic theological
enterprise ever undertaken by any single individual. His published opera omnia —
which is not a collection of heterogeneous treatises and articles, but a unified
systematic and literary structure — consists of 14 books, printed in 26 volumes,
containing 4,212 sections, 22,365 chapters and nearly 15,000,000 words! The
philosophical aspect of this achievement is thus described, in part, by a modern
historian of philosophy, no friend of Suárez, and for whom Thomism was the
definitive Scholastic system:

«Suárez enjoys such a knowledge of medieval philosophy as to put to shame

any modern historian of medieval thought. On each and every question he
seems to know everybody and everything, and to read his book [the
Disputationes Metaphysicae, 1597] is like attending the Last Judgment of four
centuries of Christian speculation by a dispassionate judge»3.

But it is arguable that Suarezianism is the definitive Scholastic system. For if

such a system could have arisen only after most of the basic insights of
Scholasticism’s various schools — Augustinian, Thomist, Scotist and Nominalist —
had been created, developed and debated; if that system could only have originated in
a colossal intellect capable of viewing the tradition’s entire achievement in a single
optic, the only intellect, in other words, endowed with the ability to preside at
S c h o l a s t i c i s m ’s Last Judgment; if such an intellect had the requisite
dispassionateness to adjudicate between the School’s many doctrines, appreciate their
complex nuances, control their intricate detail, while discerning a comprehensively
simple structure behind them; and if that intellect was the intellect of Francisco
Suárez — then the system of Francisco Suárez is Scholasticism’s definitive system.
From the time of its inception, Thomism had come under attack: first from the
Augustinians, then from the Scotists, and later from the Nominalists. But the thinker
who presented the system its greatest challenge was undoubtedly Suárez himself. His
critique was effective enough for Thomism to undergo what may be called a process
of “Suarezianization” — the adoption of Suarezian tenets while retaining Thomist
v o c a b u l a r y, or else the retention of Thomist tenets but couched in Suarezian
language. (As late as 1956 an important Thomist, Cornelio Fabro, 1911-1995,
complained of l’intention assez commune à la néoscolastique de concilier les
positions maîtresses du thomisme avec la métaphysique suarézienne4). The first
example of this process is John of St. Thomas himself.
Suárez’s critique was directed, of course, against the classical Thomism of
3 E. GILSON, Being and Some Philosophers, Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, Toronto
1949, p. 99.
4 C. F ABRO, Actualité et originalité de l’“esse” thomiste, «Revue thomiste», 56 (1956), p.
483: «the intention, quite common in Neoscholasticism, of reconciling the major positions
of Thomism with Suarezian metaphysics».

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Cajetan, eminently represented in our time by Jacques Maritain (1882-1973). But, as

we noted above, since the time of the Uncommon Doctor at least two other
Thomisms have come into being, which have turned their backs on classical
Thomism and which claim to be more faithful than the Cajetanian system to the
Common Doctor’s thought — the historical Thomism of Etienne Gilson (1884-1978)
allegedly based on the texts of Thomas himself, without recourse to the
commentators; and transcendental Thomism, initiated by the Jesuit Joseph Maréchal
(1878-1944) which holds that the full meaning of Thomas’s teaching can only be
perceived if scrutinized through the spectacles of Kant5.
An example of the Suarezianization of Thomism is John of St. Thomas’s
abandonment of the commentarial method, such as had been followed by Cajetan and
by Suárez’s older contemporary Domingo Bañez (1528-1604); indeed, by his
younger colleague, Gabriel Vazquez (1549-1604). Before the time of Suárez, the
main lines of theological systematics had been outlined by John Damascene (c. 675-
749), articulated by Peter Lombard (c. 1100-1160) and modified and elaborated by
Aquinas. There was no equivalent structuring of philosophy; its teaching followed
the loose order of the Metaphysics and other works of Aristotle. Theology and
philosophy were generally expounded through commentaries on these masters’
works. Suárez himself had begun his career employing this method, when working
on the topic of the Incarnation, one that had been treated by Aquinas in the third part
of his Summa theologiae. In these early works, Suárez’s commentary on Thomas’s
text was followed by “disputations”, divided into “sections”, and subdivided into
numbers, arranged in Suárez’s own order, not that fixed by Aquinas. In lecturing on
the Incarnation, Suárez found that he had often to interrupt his theological discourse
to clarify its philosophical presuppositions. He then decided that theology would best
be served if all its philosophical assumptions were to be organized into one complete
and consistent work. This work was the Disputationes Metaphysicae (1597), the first
modern treatment of metaphysics not written as a commentary on Aristotle, where
the discipline is structured for the first time in an organic way. With it began the
definitive abandonment of the commentarial method by Baroque theologians,
including John of St. Thomas. But the systematics of Suárez differs from that of
John. Suárez imposes his own order on the entire work, on the principal and
subordinate themes, on their outlines and details. As for John of St. Thomas, the plan
of his total opus is an assemblage of the pertinent treatises (on logic, natural
philosophy and theology) of Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), Porphyry (c. 232-c. 304),
Petrus Hispanus/John XXI (c. 1210-1277) and Aquinas. This is particularly evident
in his Cursus theologicus, his masterwork, where he follows the order of the
questions of Aquinas’s Summa. However, after summarizing the Master’s questions,
he proceeds to express his own ideas in disputations, arranged in his own order and
not that of Aquinas. Thus the architectonics of Suárez may be described as macro-
systematic; that of John of St. Thomas as micro-systematic.
As a result of having written the Disputationes Metaphysicae according to his
own plan and of having expressed his own philosophical views in a systematic
manner and applied them methodically to his whole distinctive theology, the system
5 See G.A. MCCOOL, From Unity to Pluralism. The Internal Evolution of Thomism, Fordham
University Press, New York 1989.

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of Suárez becomes the only Scholastic system where the founder himself organized
the elements of its philosophical and theological aspects and integrated them into a
u n i t y. The founders of the other major Scholastic systems, Bonaventurianism,
Thomism and Scotism were able to elaborate only their theologies. They did not
articulate their philosophies as autonomous units; that task was brilliantly achieved
by their later followers.
It has become customary to call the great Thomists of the Renaissance and
Baroque periods “commentators”. It is demanded of them that they be faithful
interpreters of the mens Divi Thomae. But they deserve to be considered philosophers
in their own right, no differently from any modern philosopher. John of St. Thomas
himself is one of the great Thomists remarkable for their originality, for he was «the
first semiotician to systematize the foundations of a doctrine of signs»6, concerned
with the communication between man and God, man and man, and man and nature.
These Thomists may be considered commentators in the sense that Aquinas himself
is a commentator, for, among a total of sixty of his writings devoted to theology and
p h i l o s o p h y, forty are commentaries and only twenty independent works. The
“commentators” can also be thought of as Thomists in the sense that Aquinas is an
Aristotelian. They commented on Aquinas just as Aquinas commented on Aristotle,
but no one today would identify Aquinas merely as an Aristotelian commentator.

3. Suarezian Critique of Classical Thomism

It is now time to confront these two basically irreducible systems, the Suarezian
and the Thomist, the former a critique of the latter. For Suárez the basic principles of
Thomism are, at best, open to debate and are unnecessary to found a metaphysics, a
fact that makes the system, when not fallacious, superfluous. The rationale of
Suárez’s critique of classical Thomism is that it tends to reify concepts. Aquinas
himself condemns such reification in the following words:

«It is not however necessary that the things which are distinct according to the
intellect be so in reality, because the intellect does not apprehend things
according to the manner of things, but according to its own manner»7.

This asymmetry between mind and reality is explained by Suárez as follows.

Speaking of the mental distinction with an extramental basis (distinctio rationis cum
fundamento in re), he observes that such a distinction

«is made through inadequate concepts of the same thing. For though the same
thing is conceived by either of the two concepts, by neither is all that is in the
6 J. D EELY, Semiotic in the Thought of Jacques Maritain, «Recherches Sémiotiques», 6
(1986), no. 2, p. 112. For a more detailed characterization of this originality see the author’s
Tractatus de Signis. The Semiotic of John Poinsot, University of California, Berkeley 1985,
Editorial Afterword, especially pp. 491-514.
7 AQUINAS, Summa theologiae, pars 1, q. 50, art. 2: «Non est autem necessarium quod ea quae
distinguuntur secundum intellectum sint distincta in rebus; quia intellectus non apprehendit
res secundum modum rerum, sed secundum modum suum».

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thing conceived exactly, nor is its entire essence and its objective significance
exhausted, which (process) is often realized through conceiving that thing
through a relationship to various other things, or according to their manner —
and so such a distinction always has a basis in reality, but is formally said to
come about through inadequate concepts of the same thing. In this way we
distinguish justice from mercy in God, because we do not conceive the supreme
simplicity of God’s power as it is in itself and according to all its strength, but
we divide it by concepts in relation to various effects, of which that eminent
power is the origin; or else by an analogy to various powers which we discover
to be distinct in men, and which are found in a most eminent way in God’s
supremely simple power»8.

Reification seems to obtain in the Thomist principle of individuation, quantified

matter (materia signata quantitate). Nature is said not to include the note of
individuality in its essence; to become individual it requires to be “circumstantiated”,
John of St. Thomas claims, by quantified matter. Suárez, on the other hand, maintains
that

«Every singular substance needs no other principle of individuation besides its

own entity, or besides the intrinsic principles by which its entity is
constituted»9.

Entities, as exist outside the mind, are by themselves singular; they are not
universals reified or singularized. But, as John of St. Thomas points out, «the express
opinion of St. Thomas, in innumerable places, is that quantified matter is the first
principle of individuation»10.
What then is one to say about the fact that whatever is posited in reality is
singular? John responds:

«by this very fact, that it is posited in reality, it is not posited bare and
unconnected from every circumstance and state of incommunicability, but is
posited in combination with that state — and in this way it is turned into a
singular and individual entity, not by reason of its entity absolutely considered,
but as circumstantiated and incommunicable. Therefore it is one thing [to say]
that a nature posited in reality is singular, and another [to ask] by virtue of what
principle and basis it is singular and this particular thing. And although nature
by itself is indifferent to a plurality of individuals by a negative indifference [in
that it prescinds from, but does not exclude, individuals], nonetheless, this
indifference needs to be removed not by an essential principle, but by one
modificative of the essence. This is because the indifference referred to is only
8 SUÁREZ, DM 7: 1: 5. Vol. 25, p. 251.
9 Ibidem, 5: 6: 1. Vol. 25, p. 180: «omnem substantiam singularem, neque alio indigere
individuationis principio praeter suam entitatem, vel praeter principia intrinseca quibus eius
entitas constat».
10 JOHN OF ST THOMAS , CPT, Naturalis Philosophiae, pars 3, q. 9, art. 3. Vol. 2, p. 781:
«Expressa Divi Thomae sententia est innumeris locis materia quantitate signata esse
primum principium individuationis».

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of such a kind that the nature has to be modified and materialized by singularity
and individuation, and not further constituted in its essence»11.

A Suarezian critique would be to ask if that absolute nature, which is indifferent

to a plurality of individuals, is itself a singularity or an abstraction. If it is a
singularity, it is individual by itself and needs no further principle of individuation. If
it is an abstraction, it cannot, unless it be reified, be individuated by any modifier
really distinct from itself. Since it is an abstract concept, its modifier need only be an
added conceptual qualification. Thus, given the mind’s inability to grasp the rich
content of reality except through a plurality of concepts — an intramental plurality
that does not necessarily imply an extramental one — the intelligible content of the
same singular individual posited in reality can be conceived as constituted of two
conceptual integrants, one signifying its absolute or common nature and the other its
modifying incommunicability. Suárez himself has specifically addressed this
problem. The opinion that each entity is self-individuated does not, he observes, deny
that

«in that individual entity it is possible to distinguish the common nature from
the singular entity, and for this particular individual to add, over and above the
species, something conceptually distinct, which according to a metaphysical
consideration has the significance of an individual differentia. But the opinion
nevertheless adds... that the individual differentia does not, in the individual
substance itself, have any special principle, or basis, which in reality is distinct
from its entity. Therefore the opinion affirms that each entity, in this sense, is by
itself this principle of individuation»12.

A careful reading of John of St. Thomas’s passage, quoted above, nowhere

indicates that he is reifying absolute nature; rather he seems to be treating it,
Suarezian fashion, as a distinct conceptual integrant of a singular entity’s intelligible
content. Except with doctrines which he believes were clearly enunciated by
Thomas, and which he defends with unflinching loyalty, John is open to the influence
of Suárez, sometimes with unexpected results.
11 Ibidem, Vol. 2, p. 775: «quod hoc ipso, quod ponitur in re, non ponitur nuda et absoluta ab
omni circumstantia et statu incommunicabilitatis, sed cum illa [illo], et ita redditur unitas
singularis et individua, non ratione entitatis absolute sumptae, sed circumstantionatae et
incommunicabilis. Itaque aliud est quod natura posita in re est singularis, aliud ex quo
principio et radice habet, quod sit singularis et haec. Et licet natura secundum se sit
indifferens ad plura indifferentia negativa, tamen ista indifferentia tolli debet non per
principium essentiale, sed per modificativum essentiae, eo quod illa indifferentia solum est,
ut natura modificetur et materializaretur per singularitatem et individuationem, non autem ut
amplius quidditative constituetur».
12 SUÁREZ, DM 5: 6: 1. Vol. 25, p. 180: «Non enim negat haec opinio, in illa individua entitate
posse ratione distingui naturam communem ab entitate singulari, et hoc individuum addere
supra speciem aliquid ratione distinctum, quod secundum metaphysicam considerationem
habet rationem differentiae individualis [...] Sed tamen addit haec opinio [...] illam
differentiam individualem non habere in substantia individua speciale aliquod principium,
vel fundamentum quod sit in re distinctum ab eius entitate; ideoque in hoc sensu dicit
unamquamque entitatem per seipsam esse haec individuationis principium».

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4. Comparison of the Suarezian and Thomist Systems

Unexpected agreement between the Eximius and the Profundus is reached on
some basic principles of metaphysics. A discussion on these principles requires us to
briefly compare the forms they take in the Suarezian and Thomist systems.
The system of Suárez is basically different from classical Thomism. It is
founded on postulates also accepted by the latter; but Thomism adds other
assumptions of its own, to be presently considered, which it believes are
philosophically more profound that those it shares with Suárez. For his part,
however, the Eximius argues that the commonly shared postulates disprove the
special Thomist ones, or at least render them superfluous. In a strange way, John of
St. Thomas seems to sometimes agree with Suárez on this point.
Every metaphysical system discourses on the nature of being and inquires into
the ultimate a priori reason for its main categories or members, the phenomenal and
the transcendental — or, as Suárez and John of St. Thomas would have it, the created
and the uncreated (ens creatum et increatum). What a metaphysical system discovers
in answer to this inquiry becomes its unifying principle.
We shall begin with the Suarezian notion of being as such and then discuss the
a priori reason of its principal members13. As the Uncommon Doctor conceives it,
being has four notes: existentiality, unity, imperfect precision and the inequality of
dependence. The first note is e x i s t e n t i a l i t y, aptitudinal existence, or existence
absolutely speaking (whatever is outside causes and outside nothing), considered
with precision from whether it is actually exercised or not. Indeed, no one has
affirmed the equivalence of being and existence more forcefully than has the Doctor
Eximius:

«existentia ut existentia correspondet enti ut sic, estque de intrinseca ratione

eius, vel in actu vel in potentia, prout sumptum fuerit ens»14.

The second note is unity. “Being” is the content of

«one objective concept, adequate and immediate, which expressly signifies

neither substance nor accident, nor God nor creature, but all these in the manner
of a unity, that is to say, in so far as they are in some way similar and concur in
existing [...] This objective concept prescinds in its meaning from all its
particulars or members dividing being, even though they be entirely simple
entities»15.
13 For a masterly analysis of the Suarezian and Thomist notions of being and analogy, see
J. HELLIN, La analogia del ser y el conocimiento de Dios en Suárez, Editora Nacional,
Madrid 1947).
14 SUÁREZ, DM 50: 12: 15. Vol. 26, p. 969: «Existence, as existence, corresponds to being as
such, and belongs to its intrinsic significance, whether in act or in potency, depending on
how one considers being».
15 Ibidem, 2: 2: 8 & 15. Vol. 25, p. 72 & 75: «unum conceptum objectivum adaequatum et
immediatum, qui expresse non dicit substantiam neque accidens, nec Deum nec creaturam,
sed haec omnia per modum unius, scilicet quatenus sunt inter se aliquo modo similia et
conveniunt in essendo [...] hic conceptus obiectivus est secundum rationem praecisus ab

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The third note is imperfect precision. Just as what makes all beings similar to
one another is being, what differentiates them is also being, for «the notion of being
is transcendent, and intimately enclosed in all the particular and determinate types of
beings» («rationem entis esse transcendentem et intime inclusam in omnibus propriis
et determinatis rationibus entium» 16). The same concept of being, c o n f u s e d l y
considered “as such”, is what unites them; the same concept, more expressly focused
as “God”, “creature”, “substance”, “accident”, is what differentiates them. «The
contraction of the concept of being to its particular modes», notes Suárez

«is not to be understood in the manner of a composition, but only in the manner
of a more express conception (per modum expressioris conceptionis) of any
particular being contained under being, in such a way that either concept,
whether that of “being” or of “substance”, is simple and irresoluble into two
concepts, differing only in that one is more determined than the other»17.

Some of John of St. Thomas’s sentences, taken out of context, sound as though
they could have been written by Suárez himself:

«And these very modes contracting being, in so far as they signify entity, are
the concept of “being”; in so far as they signify the expression of modification
(expressionem modificationis), are diverse»18.

This unitary notion of being, for Suárez, is not univocal, because

«although according to its confused significance it is the same, just as it is one,

nonetheless it is not entirely the same, because it is not of itself entirely
uniform, this uniformity and identity being required by univocals in their
essential content»19.

The fourth note is the inequality of essential dependence, for the notion of being
is attributed unequally according to a set order: primarily to some categories of itself
(like substances, or God), and to others (like accidents or the creature), through
essential dependence on the former. For

«being, however abstractly and confusedly conceived, postulates this order by

omnibus particularibus seu membris dividentibus ens, etiamsi sint maxime simplices
entitates».
16 Ibidem, 28: 3: 21. Vol. 26, p. 21.
17 Ibidem, 2: 6: 7. Vol. 25, p. 101: «non esse intelligendum per modum compositionis, sed
solum per modum expressioris conceptionis alicuius entis contenti sub ente; ita ut uterque
conceptus, tam entis quam substantiae, verbi gratia, simplex sit, et irresolubilis in duos
conceptus, solumque differant, quia unus est magis determinatus quam alius».
18 JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, CPT., Ars Logica, pars 2, q. 13, art. 5. Vol. 1, p. 495: «Et istimet modi
contrahentes ens, quantum ad rationem entitatis, conceptis entis sunt, quantum ad
expressionem modificationis, diversi sunt».
19 SUÁREZ, DM 28: 3: 21. Vol. 26, p. 21: «sicut secundum confusam rationem sit eadem, sicut
est una, nihilominus non est omnino eadem, quia non est ex se omnino uniformis, quam
uniformitatem et identitatem requirunt univoca in ratione sua».

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itself, that it be applied primarily, and as it were completely, to God, and

through it descend to the others, not existing in them except by a relationship to
and dependence upon God. Therefore this being falls short of the meaning of a
univocal concept, for the univocal is of itself indifferent in such a manner that it
descends to its inferiors equally, and without the order or relationship of one
member to another»20.

Classical Thomist being, as described by John of St. Thomas21, differs from the
Suarezian primarily on the second note, unity. While Suarezian being may be
described as simpliciter (licet imperfecte) unum et secundum quid diversum, Thomist
being is simpliciter diversum et secundum quid unum. As John of St. Thomas
(speaking of a concept which in Suarezianism is termed the transcendental univocal)
puts it, the idea that

«this concept, which is one, imperfect and inadequate, so prescinds from its
inferiors that it remains in potency with regard to them and is contractible by
the addition of a differential concept — is deduced from the fact that it would
thus be univocal. For “animal” is univocal to all its species, because it is
conceived as actually one in such a way that it possesses the dividing
differences only in potency and is divided by their addition. Therefore the
analogical concept, which lacks that kind of unity, but has a unity only in a
certain sense, must not include the diversity of its inferiors only in potency; for
in this way it would remain simply one in actuality, which is what being
univocal means, and it would be multiple and diverse only in potentiality. In
order that the concept not remain simply one, it must actually include diversity,
even though it not actually explicate the diversity»22.

John of St. Thomas compares such a concept to that of a heap of sand seen from
a distance, which, he claims, actually represents all the particular grains of sand that
compose it, but not each grain explicitly. Here we also hit upon a basic difference in
conceiving univocity. The Thomist univocal is a concept that has a simple unity. The
Suarezian univocal is more complex: it is a simple unity, but applied to its inferiors
20 I b i d e m,
D M 28: 3: 17. Vol. 26, p. 19: «ipsum ens quantumvis abstracte et confuse
conceptum, ex vi sua postulat hunc ordinem, ut primo ac per se, et quasi complete competat
Deo, et per illam descendat ad reliqua, quibus non insit nisi cum habitudine et dependentia a
Deo; ergo in hoc deficit a ratione univoci, nam univocum ex se ita est indifferens, ut
aequaliter, et sine ullo ordine vel habitudine unius ad alterum, ad inferiora descendat; ergo
ens respectu Dei et creaturarum merito inter analoga comptatur».
21 Following the epoch-making treatise of CAJETAN , De nominum analogia (1498).
22 JOHN OF ST. T HOMAS, CPT, Ars Logica, pars 2, q. 13, art. 5. Vol. 1, p. 493: «ita praescindens
ab inferioribus, quod maneat in potentia ad illa et sit contrahibilis per additionem conceptus
differentialis, ex eo deducitur, quia sic esset conceptus univocus. Nam animal ideo est
univocum ad omnes species, quia concipitur ita unum in actu, quod differentias dividentes
solum habet in potentia et per earum additionem dividitur. Ergo analogum, quod talem
unitatem non habet, sed secundum quid, non debet solum in potentia includere diversitatem
inferiorum; sic enim in actu simpliciter maneret unum, quod est esse univocum, et solum in
potentia multiplex et diversum. Ut ergo non maneat simpliciter unum, actu debet includere
diversitatem, licet actu non explicet illam».

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i n d i ff e r e n t l y, without any relationship of dependence. It is of two sorts,

transcendental and universal. The transcendental univocal prescinds imperfectly from
its particulars or inferiors; that is, the same concept, in different modes, both unifies
and differentiates. “Being” is predicated of man and tiger, but to each independently
of the other (hence univocally); it is predicated of God and the creature also, to the
latter only dependently on the former (hence analogically). The universal univocal
prescinds perfectly from its inferiors; that is, the concept that unifies is distinct from
the concept that differentiates. “Animal” is predicated of man and tiger, to each
independently of the other; the former differentiated from the latter by rationality, a
differentia not included in “animal”. As for the Thomist being, simpliciter diversum
et secundum quid unum, it seems from the Suarezian viewpoint to be no different
from the Nominalist universal — which is but a collection of particulars. As the
Doctor Incomparabilis William of Ockham (c. 1290-c.1349) describes them,
universals, like the notion of “man”,

«precisely signify singular things [...] it must be conceded that this name
“man”, with equal priority signifies all particular men. It does not follow
therefore that this name “man” is equivocal, because though it signifies many
particulars with equal priority, nonetheless it signifies them by a single
ascription, and in signifying them subordinates them to one concept and not to
many, because of which that concept is univocally predicated of them»23.

Likewise, Thomist “being” actually represents all particular beings. As Suárez

sees it, a concept constituted of many distinct particulars is no different from many
distinct concepts, and their unity is a mere flatus vocis. The Thomists respond that
their being is distinguished from a Nominalist universal by the fact that while the
particulars of the latter are lumped together without any binding unity, the multiples
of the Thomist concept are united by proportionality. The relationship of the essence
of the creature to its existence is proportional to the relationship of the essence of the
Creator to His existence. Such reasoning, Suárez would argue, is fallacious. In
proportionality there need to be four terms, but in the example just given there are
only three. The essence and existence of the creature, which for Thomists are distinct
both conceptually and really, form two terms; the essence and existence of God, on
the other hand, are distinct only verbally, being totally convertible; their distinction,
which is not even conceptual, has no foundation in reality, so they constitute just one
term. Besides, the argument appears to be circular: analogy is a method that aids us
in knowing about God; all its notes must be determined before we have any
23 WILLIAM OF OCKHAM, Summa logicae, pars 1, cap. 17. Philotheus Boehner, Venerabilis
Inceptoris Guillelmi de Ockham Summa Logicae, Cura Instituti Franciscani Universitatis S.
Bonaventurae, N.Y. 1974, p. 60: «Dicendum est quod talia nomina significant praecise res
singulares. Unde hoc nomen “homo” nullam rem significat nisi illam quae est homo
singularis, et ideo numquam supponit pro substantia nisi quando supponit pro homine
particulari. Et ideo concedendum est quod hoc nomen “homo” aeque primo significat
omnes homines particulares, nec tamen sequitur quod hoc nomen “homo” sit vox
aequivoca, et hoc quia quamvis significet plura aeque primo, tamen unica impositione
significat illa et subordinatur in significando illa plura tantum uni conceptui et non pluribus,
propter quod univoce praedicatur de eis».

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knowledge of Him. But we cannot know what analogy is unless we already have
prior knowledge of what the relationship is of God’s essence to His existence.
But what does Aquinas himself say about analogy? Gilson tells us that

«His texts on the notion of analogy are relatively few, and in each case they are
so restrained that we cannot but wonder why the notion has taken on such an
importance in the eyes of his commentators»24.

5. Suarezian Features of John of St. Thomas’s Thought

It is now time to examine whether the reaction of John of St. Thomas to the
ideas of Suárez was not just negative or cautionary, but positive as well. In response,
it may be said that John of St. Thomas, if one may so put it, is the most Suarezian of
Thomists, and it would be interesting to investigate just how many of the Jesuit’s
ideas the Dominican made his own. At least two such ideas can be indicated, the first
mainly philosophical and the second philosophical with clear theological
implications. First, that the basic principle of Thomism, the limitation of act by
potency, is not necessary to found a philosophical system; and second, that the nature
of God is best defined not as subsistent being, but as subsistent intelligence.
The discussion of “being as such”, engaged in above, leads us now to consider
the main divisions of being, which for Suárez are “being by essence” (ens a se) and
“being by participation” (ens ab alio). God, the Creator, is being by essence, and the
creature is being by total participation of essence and existence with reference to the
C r e a t o r 2 5 . In other words, the creature’s essence is positiva seu radicalis
dependentia. Suárez categorically declares:

«Principio igitur supponendum est (id quod est certum apud omnes) ens creatum,
quatenus tale est, essentialiter includere dependentiam a primo et increato ente.
Quia haec est prima ratio distinguens ens creatum ab increato [...]»26.

Indeed, continues the Uncommon Doctor,

«absolute est de essentia Dei, ut habeat plenum dominium omnium creatorum

entium, vel actu, vel potestate, ita ut si velit illa producere, non possit extra
suum dominium illa constituere»27.
24 E. GILSON, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, part 1, ch. 5, sect. 2, Random
House, New York 1956, p. 105.
25 For a summary exposition of the system of Suárez see the following works of J. HELLIN,
Nociones de la potencia y del acto, y sus mutuas relaciones, según Suárez, «Las Ciencias»,
17-1 (1952), pp. 91-92; and his Theologia Naturalis, Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos,
Madrid 1950, pp. 890-896.
26 SUÁREZ, DM 31: 14: 2 & 4. Vol. 26, p. 308: «In the very first place, therefore, it has to be
postulated (something that is accepted as certain by all) that created being, in so far as it is
such, essentially includes dependence on the first and uncreated being. Because this is the
primary reason that distinguishes created being from the uncreated [...]».
27 Ibidem: «It absolutely belongs to the essence of God, that He have full dominion over all

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From the concept “being by essence” are derived, a priori, all the predicates
characteristic of God: infinity, unicity, immutability, imitability in effects — the latter
predicate being the a priori reason for the possibility itself of “being by
participation.” From the latter concept, in turn, are derived, a priori, all the predicates
that characterize the creature, which are: contingence, dependence in conservation
and activity, finiteness, potentiality by itself and in combination with act, the
multiplication of beings into species and into individuals within each species,
univocal similarities of genus and species, and the analogical similarities between
substances and accidents, and also between the Creator and creature. In this way the
absolute simplicity and unity of “being by essence” is the a priori reason for the
infinite variety and multiplicity of “being by participation”. The concept of “being by
essence” is thus the unifying principle of Suarezianism; it defines the basis of what,
to Suárez’s mind, constitutes the simple and comprehensive structure behind the
various modes of Scholasticism.
Classical Thomism accepts these postulates but (as we noted) judges its own
principles to be philosophically more profound. The most basic of these principles, in
its most abstract form, can be stated thus: a category or being which does not include
limitation in its concept acquires that limitation by the adjection of a really distinct
category or being. One mode of this adjection is what is known as “reception”. Thus
actuality, or act, of itself signifies only perfection and does not connote limitation; to
be limited, it has to be received into a really distinct potency, one that signifies such a
limitation, as having a capacity for only a certain measure of perfection and no more,
«sicut liquor in vase ad eius mensuram se accomodat»28 as John of St. Thomas has
it. Another mode of the adjection is what, as we have seen, he calls
“circumstantiation”, which individuates nature by quantified matter.
The unlimitedness of act (or existence) and its limitation by reception into a
really distinct potency (or essence) is classical Thomism’s foundational tenet 29.
When unlimited by reception into this potency, act is Pure Act and is God Himself.
All His predicates, like infinity and others, derive a priori from this fundamental
illimitation. When limited by reception into that potency, act is impure or mixed, and
constitutes the creature: this limitation is the a priori reason for the predicates of the
creature alluded to above.
From Suárez’s standpoint, this postulate reifies concepts and can be critiqued
thus: is the act or existence that is limited by reception a concept in the mind or a
reality independent of the mind? If it is a concept, it cannot, unless reified, be
received into anything really distinct; if, as a concept, it needs to be limited, it merely
requires an added conceptual modifier. If, on the other hand, this act or existence is
an extramental reality, is it illimitable or limitable? If it is illimitable, then nothing,
created beings, either in actuality or in power, so that if He were to wish to produce them,
He could not establish them outside His dominion».
28 JOHN OF ST. T HOMAS, CT, disp. 7, artic. unicus, n. 2. Vol. 1, p. 547: «as the liquor in the
vase accomodates itself to its measure».
29 This is the second of the famous 24 Theses of classical Thomism, approved by the Sacred
Congregation of Studies on 27 July 1914: «Actus, utpote perfectio, non limitatur, nisi per
potentiam, quae est capacitas perfectionis. Proinde in quo ordine actus est purus, in eodem
non nisi illimitatus et unicus existit; ubi vero finitus et multiplex, in veram incidit cum
potentia compositionem».

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by definition, can limit it, for illimitation will be intrinsic to its nature. Reception into
something else does not change the nature of the received thing; a lion does not
become a mouse if “received” into a pot. If this act or existence is limitable, it is
already by that fact limited, since it lacks the perfection of illimitability or infinity.
Undeterred by such arguments, our ever faithful Thomist argues that just as
reception implies finitude, irreception implies infinity:

«because if existence be not received (non sit recepta) into any nature or form
from which it is distinguished, it does not have limitation by reason of a
receiving subject, since it lacks that subject... therefore if existence is incapable
of being received (irreceptibilis), it needs to be infinite in every way [...] But an
existence that is not received (irrecepta)is given in God [...] because He is Pure
Act in every manner of being, devoid of all potentiality and materiality.
Therefore such a form is in every way infinite»30.

It needs to be noted here that John, surreptitiously, jumps from an existence that
“is not received”, irrecepta, to one that “cannot be received”, irreceptibilis. For an
existence that is not received can either be limited, unlimited, or illimitable. If it is
already limited, the Thomist principle of limitation will be superfluous, and of course
not serve to prove God’s infinity. If the existence is unlimited, but capable of
limitation by reception, the Thomist principle will be acceptable, but will apply only
to the creature, not to God, whose existence is not only not limited or received, but
also not capable of being limited or received. For John to show that the unlimited
existence is God’s, he will have to show that it is not only i rre c e p t a but also
irreceptibilis. He nowhere proves this, however, but only assumes it to be the case,
and so evidently begs the question. A further objection to John’s position is presented
by Vazquez, one of the many great Baroque Jesuits, who is of the same mind as
Suárez on this point. Vazquez objects that essence is not distinct from existence, so if
essence is not received into anything, neither is existence31. Suárez adds that

«in order that a being be finite, it is enough that it be received from another
being in such and such a measure of perfection, although properly speaking it
may not be received into any passive potency. And similarly the created essence
can be limited by its intrinsic differentia, although it may not be related to
existence in the manner of a receptive potency»32.

Here Suárez clearly describes the two principles of limitation, which are termed
the “objective” and the “subjective”. In objective limitation, an entity is limited
30 JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, CT disp. 7, artic. unicus, n. 3. Vol. 1, pp. 547-548: «quia existentia si
non sit recepta in aliqua natura vel forma a qua distinguatur, non habet limitari ratione
subiecti recipientis, quia caret illo [...] ergo si [existentia] est irreceptibilis, debet esse ex
omni parte infinita [...] Sed in Deo datur existentia irrecepta [...] quia est actus purus in toto
genere entis, omni potentialitate et materialitate carens. Ergo talis forma est ex omni parte
infinita».
31 G. VAZQUEZ, Commentaria et disputationes in Primam Partem Sancti Thomae, in q. 7, disp.
25, c. 2.
32 SUÁREZ, DM 30: 2: 19. Vol 26, p. 70.

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because, as a caused object, it receives a determinate perfection and no other from its
cause; in subjective limitation, an entity, unlimited in its essence, is limited by being
received into a subject that has a capacity for only so much perfection and no more.
John’s reply to Vazquez and Suárez is significant, for he evidently concedes that the
basic tenet of classical Thomism is debatable — a strange admission on the part of
the system’s major architect:

«To that which Father Vazquez adds, I deny that existence is not distinguished
from created essence, as has sufficiently been proved above. However, since
this has to do with the opinion of some, and since the infinity of God must not
be proved dependently upon any opinion, I add that in the opinion that does not
distinguish existence from actual essence, the argument of St. Thomas still
holds. Because though existence is entitatively the same as subsistent nature,
still, the operation of proceeding from another being through production is
dependently realized by the action of that other, and hence accidently applies to
the produced thing — so the latter is received objectively [as a caused object]
and participatively, although not subjectively [in a subject]. However, when
Being itself is subsistent in such a manner that, neither in its entity nor in the
operation of its procession from or production by another, does it possess being
that is received, or one that accidentally pertains to it subjectively or objectively
— such a being lacks all limitation, because in no way is it received, not even
objectively. All this is clear from a sign: as such a being will not have in itself
any received operation or accident. Indeed if it will not depend objectively on
another for its production, neither will it depend on it for any perfection or
operation. Hence by this very fact that a form is existence itself, it is optimally
proved to be infinite, because it is not received, either subjectively or
objectively — though according to St. Thomas it cannot be maintained that
something be received objectively, without it being distinct in essence and
received subjectively too»33.

Suárez formulates the same argument, but more concisely:

33 JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, CT disp. 7, art. unicus, n. 7 : «Ad id quod addit Pater Vazquez negatur
existentiam non distingui ab essentia creata, ut superius satis probatum est. Sed quia hoc in
opinione aliquorum versatur, et infinitas Dei non debet probari dependenter ab aliqua
opinione: addo quod in opinione non distinguente existentiam ab essentia actuali, adhuc
urget ratio Divi Thomae: quia licet existentia entitative sit idem cum natura subsistente,
tamen illud exercitium procedendi ab alio per productionem, dependenter habetur ab actione
alterius, et sic accidentaliter convenit ipsi rei productae: et sic est receptum obiective et
participative, licet non subiective. At vero cum ipsum esse est subsistens taliter quod neque
quoad suam entitatem neque quoad suum esse exercitium processionis et productionis ab
alio, habet esse receptum, et accidentaliter conveniens tam subiective quam obiective, tale
esse caret omni limitatione, quia nullo modo recipitur etiam obiective. Quod patet a signo:
quia tale esse non habebit operationem vel aliquod accidens in se receptum. Si enim in suo
produci non dependet obiective ab alio, neque in aliqua perfectione vel operatione
dependebit. Quare hoc ipso quod forma aliqua est ipsum esse, optime probatur esse
infinitum, quia non est esse receptum neque subiective neque obiective: licet apud Divum
Thomam non stet aliquod esse recipi obiective, quin etiam sit distinctum ab essentia et
recipiatur subiective».

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«because existence by essence [or what is existent by virtue of its essence] does
not have anything which can limit it. But participated being can be limited
either by the will of the one who gives so much perfection and no more, or by
the capacity of the recipient, whether that capacity be understood in the manner
of a passive potency, or only in the manner of an objective potency, or of non-
contradiction. However, in the primal being, which is existent of itself, no
principle or rationale of limitation can be understood, because just as it has no
cause of its existence, in the same way there can be no limitation in it, either on
part of the giver, or from any other principle»34.

It would therefore seem to follow that, since, as Suárez contends, the entire
system of metaphysics can be deduced from the two postulates of God’s entitative
independence and the creature’s entitative dependence, principles which are beyond
debate and admitted as such by the Thomists also, and since the specifically Thomist
principle of the limitation of act by potency or of existence by essence is debatable,
that principle is superfluous for basing a solid metaphysics and can conceivably be
abandoned.

6. Concord of The Two Doctors: on the Divine Nature and the Trinity
Be that as it may, on another, related, topic, the two Doctors, the Uncommon
and the Profound, are unequivocally in agreement — on what constitutes the essence
and nature of God, in so far as it can be expressed through imperfect human
concepts. It is usual to find Scholastics, especially Thomists, saying that it is
“increate entity” ( entitas incre a t a) or “subsistent being itself” ( ipsum esse
subsistens). Suárez agrees, but goes on to affirm that in a more precise sense the
essence or nature of God is subsistent intellection itself ( ipsamet intellectio
subsistens), which he characterizes as «veluti ultimum essentiale constitutivum
divinae naturae»35, the ultimate essential constituent, so to speak, of the nature of the
deity.
The Thomist position is thus stated by Aquinas:

«God’s essence is therefore His existence. Now Moses was taught this sublime
truth by the Lord [...] when the Lord showed him that His proper name is “Who
Is.” Now any name is intended to signify the nature or essence of something.
Hence it remains that the divine existence itself is God’s essence or nature»36.

Suárez formulates his own view in these words:

34 Ibidem, DM 30: 2: 22. Vol. 26, p. 71.

35 Ibidem, DM 30: 15: 15. Vol. 26, p. 174.
36 AQUINAS , Summa Contra Gentiles, lib. 1,
cap. 22: «Dei igitur essentia est suum esse. Hanc
autem sublimem veritatem Moyses a Domino est doctus [...] ostendens [Dominus] suum
proprium nomen esse “Qui est”. Quodlibet autem nomen est institutum ad significandum
naturam seu essentiam alicuius rei: unde relinquitur quod ipsum divinum esse est sua
essentia vel natura».

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«[God] has the intellectual life by essence and not by participation. To have by
essence is nothing else but to have the intellectual life itself in the manner of
pure and ultimate actuality without any efficiency or causality. And this is
nothing else but that the divine essence is intellectual, not in the manner of
intellectual principle or basis, but as subsistent intellection itself. But the
intellection and knowledge of God are most formally the same: therefore actual
knowledge by essence is so to speak the ultimate essential constitutive form of
the divine nature. And so, conceiving as we do any intellectual nature in a
twofold manner, either because it has an intrinsic relationship to intellection, or
because it is intellection itself, we conceive of created intellectual nature in the
former manner.... But the divine nature is intellectual in the latter manner,
because this mode is characteristic of God, that is to say, because He is the most
pure and abstract [i.e. abstracted from matter] intellection itself. Therefore, in
this way, God’s knowledge most formally constitutes and as it were specifies
His essence»37.

This new definition of the divine nature aids Suárez in resolving a problem of
crucial importance in Trinitarian theology, one which Eastern Orthodox and many
Latin theologians maintain is insoluble 38. According to this theology the divine
nature, by virtue of its unlimited fecundity, needs to communicate itself, since bonum
est diffusivum sui. Such a communication cannot necessarily be to anything ad extra,
since, with respect to all that is not God, the divine being is entirely unnecessitated or
free. Necessity for God exists only within the latitude of His deity. The
communication thus can only be ad intra. Communication entails multiplicity, for
there has to be at least one communicator and one to whom something is
communicated. But communication in God cannot multiply the deity itself, which is
a single omniperfect absolute. The communication can thus only be relational, as
multiple relations do not impair the unity of an absolute. There are in fact three such
(subsistent) relations in the deity, the Persons of the Trinity; one communicator and
two communicated relations. Since these communications are those of an
intelligential being, and as such a being has intellect and will, with the latter
consequent on the former, two communications can be postulated, those of the
37 S UÁREZ, DM 30: 15: 15. Vol. 26, p. 174: «[Deus] habet illam vitam intellectualem per
essentiam, et non per participationem; habere autem per essentiam, non est aliud quam
habere ipsam intellectualem [vitam] per modum puri et ultimi actus absque ulla effectione
vel causalitate. At hoc non est aliud quam quod divina essentia sit intellectualis, non per
modum principii aut radicis intellectualis, sed ut ipsamet intellectio subsistens; sed
intellectio et scientia Dei idem formalissime sunt; ergo actualis scientia per essentiam est
veluti ultimum essentiale constitutivum divinae naturae. Itaque, cum dupliciter concipiatur a
nobis quod aliqua natura sit intellectualis, scilicet, quia habet intrinsecam habitudinem ad
intelligere, vel quia est ipsum intelligere, priori modo concipimus naturam creatam esse
intellectualem [...] Divina vero natura est intellectualis posteriori modo, quia est proprius
eius, scilicet, quia est ipsum intelligere purissimum et abstractissimum. Sic igitur scire Dei
formalissime constituit et quasi specificat eius essentiam».
38 JOHN DAMASCENE, De fide orthodoxa, I: 8, PG 94: 824A: «We have learnt through faith that
there is a difference between begetting and proceeding, but faith tells us nothing about the
nature of that difference». See also ADAM OF ST. V ICTOR, Sequentia XI de S. Trinitate, PL
196: 1459: «Quid sit gigni, quid processus, me nescire sum professus».

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intellect and the will. The former communication expresses itself in the logos,
concept, or word, and the latter in love.
Scholastic theology calls the process whereby a communication in God is
realized a “procession”, and declares that the procession of the intellect is the origin
of the second Person, the Son, Logos or Word; and that the procession of the will is
the origin of the third Person, the Holy Spirit or Love. The entire divine nature is
communicated to both Son and Holy Spirit, the communicator of the first procession
being the Father, and of the second the Father conjointly with the Son. Since they
share the same divine nature as the Father, both Son and Holy Spirit proceed from
Him in total similitude. What then differentiates the Son from the Holy Spirit? Why
is only the second Person and not the third called a Son: a son being defined as a
living being proceeding substantially from another living being in its similitude? This
is the problem that Eastern Orthodox theologians declare is a mystery.
Suárez replies that that while both the Son and the Holy Spirit do in fact
proceed from the Father in the similitude of nature, the intent or formal terminus of
the procession of the Son is to communicate the divine nature as nature, and since the
divine nature is subsistent intellection, the Son, who is that intellection in its
relational or hypostatic mode, is recipient of the similitude to the Father in a formal
sense. But the intent or formal terminus of the procession of the Holy Spirit is to
communicate, not the divine nature as such, but the divine love of the Father and the
Son; hence the Holy Spirit does not by intent proceed in similitude of nature, and is
therefore not a Son. Still, since love is identical with nature in God, the divine nature
is communicated to the Spirit through its identity with divine love. As Suárez himself
states it, the Word alone is produced

«ex vi intellectionis paternae, ut sic, et non Spiritus Sanctus. Nam inde imprimis
i n f e ro, communicari Verbo ex vi processionis suae divinam essentiam, ut
primario constitutam in esse talis essentiae et naturae, Spiritui Sancto autem
non ita communicari ex vi processionis, sed quatenus per identitatem in amore
includitur»39.

John entirely agrees with this view. He further clarifies a problem not examined
by Suárez: how God’s essence or nature can be described as both ipsum esse
subsistens (or essentia increata)and ipsum intelligere subsistens. In reply, John
distinguishes between a transcendent essence and a specific one; both exactly
characterize a being, but the latter more precisely than the former. Thus the specific
essence of man is “rational animality”, which distinguishes him from any other
being; but his transcendent essence, which describes him no less exactly, is “created
being”, though the latter notion is applicable to all other creaturely things also. A
similar distinction can be applied to God: ens increatum is His transcendent essence
and intellectio subsistens His quasi-specific one. In John’s words:
39 SUÁREZ ,De Sanctissimo Trinitatis Mysterio, lib. 11, c. 5, n. 16. Vol. 1, p. 789: «[the Word
alone is produced] by power of the Paternal [=of the Father] intellection as such, and not the
Holy Spirit. Hence I infer from this, firstly, that the divine essence, by virtue of the
procession itself, is communicated to the Word as primarily constituted in the being of such
an essence or nature; but that to the Holy Spirit it is not communicated in this way by virtue
of the procession, but only in so far as it is included through identity in love».

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«Because “being or substance, existent of itself”, in so far as it conveys the

significance of Pure Act, is found in every attribute or Person, and in all that is
divine — no less than “created being”, or “being by another”, is found in all
that is created. Therefore this concept of “being existent of itself” cannot
differentiate in God what is nature, from what is attribute, person, or operation.
It only differentiates what is generically divine from what is created, and so
distinguishes between transcendent and transcendent, namely between created
being as such and uncreated being as such, not between divine nature, as nature,
and the [divine] attributes40».

What then constitutes divine nature as such? John (who is no master stylist)
answers with a verbose syllogism. Its main lineaments are as follows:

«Major: that has to be the formal constitutive of divine nature, which is the
primary and intrinsic principle of a proper operation and which is primarily
applicable to God [...]
Minor: but the operation proper to God is intellection (intelligere) [...] and it is
primary, because the operation of the will presupposes intellection itself, since it
is regulated and guided by it [...]
C o n c l u s i o n: therefore it is necessary that the divine nature be formally
constituted by [...] intellection (intellectualitatem) [...]»41.

The major is the definition of nature itself, applied to God. The minor is clear,
because the divine intellect is «supremely spiritual and removed from potentiality
and imperfection, and is the first [operation], because the operation of the will
presupposes intellection, since it is regulated and directed by the latter»42.
Like Suárez, John maintains that the Son formally proceeds as intellection,
«because He proceeds as the similitude of the object known by the intelligence and
existing in the same nature, since in God intelligence and being are one and the
same»43. As formally proceeding in the Father’s similitude, He can be properly
identified as the Son. As for the Holy Spirit, He

«formally proceeds as love who is identified with the divine nature, and yet
does not proceed as a Son, nor by generation, because, formally speaking, He
40 JOHN OF ST.THOMAS, CT, disp. 16, art. 2, n. 9. Vol. 2, p. 338: «Quia esse a se seu substantia
a se, ut dicit rationem actus puri, invenitur in omni attributo et Persona et in omni eo quod
divinum est, non minus quam ens creatum, seu ens ab alio, in omni eo quod creatum est;
ergo non potest iste conceptus entis a se discernere in Deo id quod natura est, ab eo quod
attributum est vel Persona vel operatio: sed solum discernit id quod divinum est in genere,
ab eo quod est creatum: et ita distinguit inter transcendens et transcendens, scilicet inter ens
creatum ut sic et ens increatum ut sic, non inter naturam divinam, ut natura, et proprietates».
41 Ibidem, CT disp. 16, art. 2, n. 19. Vol. 2, p. 341: «illud debet esse formale constitutivum
naturae divinae, quod est per se principium operationis et per se primo conveniens Deo [...]
sed propria operatio divina est intelligere [...] ergo oportet quod natura divina constituetur
formaliter per [...] intellectualitatem [...]».
42 Ibidem, «maxime spiritualis et segregata a potentialitate et imperfectione; et est prima, quia
operatio voluntatis supponit ipsum intelligere, siquidem ab eo regulatur et dirigitur».
43 Ibidem, disp. 16, art. 2, n. 14. Vol. 2, p. 339.

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proceeds only according to the communication of impulse and love, though,

through identity, He receives the communication of nature also»44.

If the reasoning of Suárez and John of St. Thomas on this point is correct, then
it demonstrates both the harmony of Scholastic philosophy with theology, and the
falsity of the dichotomy between the God of the philosophers and the God of
Christianity. For, as Suárez declares, in the opening lines of his great work, the
Disputationes Metaphysicae:

«Divina et supernaturalis theologia, quamquam divino lumine principiisque a

Deo revelatis nitatur, quia vero humano discursu et ratiocinatione perficitur,
veritatibus etiam naturae lumine notis iuvatur, eisque ad suos discursus
perficiendos, et divinas veritates illustrandas, tamquam ministris et quasi
instrumentis utitur»45.

7. Conclusion
In sum, it may be observed that in reacting to Suarezianism and to its critique of
the classical Thomist system, John of St. Thomas is sometimes unyielding, and at
other times accomodating and even concordant. In these cases he either retains or
qualifies the classical Thomist tenets, and also either employs the reified Thomist
language or the non-reified Suarezian one. He is unyielding when he retains Thomist
ideas and language — as when he propounds the Thomist concept of being, the real
distinction between essence and existence, and the limitation of act by its reception
into a really distinct potency. He is accomodating when he retains Thomist ideas but
expresses them in Suarezian language, as in the matter of the contraction of being to
its particulars or inferiors, and in that of the individuation of nature by quantified
matter. He is concordant when he adopts both Suarezian ideas and language, as in the
characterization of the divine nature as subsistent intellection rather than as
subsistent being; as well as in the partial abandonment of the commentarial method
of literary expression for one that is more organic and distinctive of each individual
author.
John of St. Thomas’s agreement or disagreement with Suárez can thus be
subsumed under the following five headings, which will be discussed summarily in
turn:
1. Supplantation of the commentarial method by the author’s own
2. The unity of being and its contraction to its particulars
44 Ibidem, p. 340: «formaliter procedit ut amor qui identificatur cum natura divina, et tamen
non procedit ut Filius, nec per generationem, quia procedit solum secundum
communicationem impulsus et amoris formaliter, identice autem accepit communicationem
naturae».
45 S UÁR E Z , D M, proemium. Vol. 25, p. 1: «Although divine and supernatural theology
depends upon the divine light and on the principles revealed by God, since in fact it is
completed by human discourse and reasoning, it is also aided by the truths known to the
light of nature; and it employs them as ministers and (as it were) intruments to develop its
discourses and to clarify the divine truths themselves».

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3. The limitation of act by its reception into potency

4. The individuation of nature by quantified matter
5. The nature of God as subsistent intellection
First, the supplantation of the commentarial method by the author’s own. Early
in his career, Suárez abandoned the commentarial method current in his time and
adopted one where the overall architectonic organization of his treatises as well as
the elaboration of the details are his own. Inspired by Suárez, John of St. Thomas,
like many others of his generation, gave up writing formal commentaries. John’s
architectonics, on the other hand, is formed of the assemblage of the classical
structures of Aristotle, Porphyry, Petrus Hispanus and Aquinas, but the organization
of the details within each of these structures is his own. Thus Suárez can be described
as macro-systematic, and John, micro-systematic.
Second, the unity of being and its contraction to its particulars. For classical
Thomism being is simpliciter diversum et secundum quid unum; it is a multiple
concept that includes its particulars (like God and creature, substance and accident)
actually, though not explicitly, particulars that are unified by proportional similarity.
Contraction takes place by the explication of these particulars severally, by a process,
from less to more explicit, which may be described as maior explicatio. Suarezian
being, on the other hand, is simpliciter (licet imperfecte) unum et secundum quid
diversum. It is a unitary concept that includes its particulars potentially, particulars
that coalesce in a confused unitary concept only in so far as they signify concurrence
in existence. Contraction takes place by a sharper focusing or determination of this
confused concept, in a process, from confusion to expression, which may be termed
maior expre s s i o. In describing the concept of being, John firmly holds to the
simpliciter diversum, but in explaining its contraction to the particulars, he uses
language more appropriate to the maior expressio than to the maior explicatio — an
instance of his being Thomist in idea and Suarezian in language.
Third, the limitation of act by its reception into potency. From both the
Suarezian and the Thomist viewpoints, in theory at least, there are two modes of
limitation, the subjective and the objective. Subjective limitation is foundational to
Thomism. Act by itself is unlimited in perfection; it becomes limited to a determinate
perfection by being received, as in a subject, into a potency that has the capacity for
that determinate perfection and no other. In the reifying Thomist manner, act and
potency are really distinct. John of St. Thomas uncompromisingly adheres to the
Thomist principle (judged to be false by Suárez), and expounds it in reified Thomist
language. Yet he does not consider the principle to be indispensable for
demonstrating a basic truth of Thomist (and Scholastic) philosophy, God’s infinity.
He agrees that this infinity can well be proved by the principle of objective limitation
(basic to the Suarezian system), whereby an entity or object is limited by virtue of its
dependence on a cause, whose activity endows it with a determinate perfection and
no other. Be that as it may, both Doctors agree that, whether demonstrable or not, the
principle of subjective limitation, on which the majestic Thomist system is raised, is
metaphysically dispensable and redundant. In this John clearly parts company from
those classical Thomists who declare that the subjective limitation principle is a
necessary one.
Fourth, the individuation of nature by quantified matter. This principle lands
Thomism in some difficulties. It does not apply to spiritual substances, such as angels

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(who are said to be individuated by their species), but only to material beings, when
it sounds tautologous (that beings having matter are individuated by matter). Still,
every being thus individuated has two aspects: absolute or common nature, which
does not include the note of individuality in its essence, and the individuating
principle itself, the quantified matter, which circumstantiates the absolute nature and
renders it incommunicable. In the reifying Thomist mannner, the nature and the
quantified matter are really distinct; for Suárez they are two conceptually distinct
integrants of an individual reality that in this regard is indivisible. John accepts the
quantified matter principle without reserve, but describes it in non-reifying Suarezian
terms.
Fifth, and last, the nature of God as subsistent intellection, whereby God is
defined not by the broadest and most indeterminate of perfections, being, or esse
(ipsum esse subsistens), but by the intensest and sublimest of them, sapient
consciousness or intellectio (ipsamet intellectio subsistens). This idea, advanced by
Suárez, is unreservedly adopted by John of St. Thomas, who harmonizes the two
definitions, when he declares that ipsum esse subsistens characterizes the divine
nature broadly and transcendentally, and ipsamet intellectio subsistens more narrowly
and as it were specifically. (The latter definition explains why the first divine
procession, that of the Son, is generation, and not the second procession, that of the
Holy Spirit.) In describing God more through the notion of intellect than through that
of being our two Scholastics anticipate some modern thinkers, for whom God’s
essence is “pure understanding” 46; these thinkers reflect modern philosophy’s
tendency to affirm the primacy of thought over being and to start with knowledge
and terminate with being. It must not be forgotten that Suárez and John of St.
Thomas were the contemporaries of the founder of modern philosophy, Descartes
(1596-1650), the Jesuit being 48 years his senior and the Dominican seven. In
contrast to modern philosophy, the Scholastic starts with being and terminates with
knowledge. Accordingly, for the two Doctors, the Uncommon and the Profound,
God’s intellection is not, so to speak, a cognitive nebulosity ungrounded in the primal
reality of being, but is the very consummation of God’s basic essence as subsistent
being; it is, in the words of Suárez, the ultimum essentiale constitutivum divinae
naturae.

46 «For Lonergan the metaphysical essence of God is not ipsum esse subsistens, as Aquinas
says, but rather “pure understanding”, not being but mind». J.M. DE TORRE, Transcendental
Thomism and the Encyclical Veritatis Spendor, «Fellowship of Catholic Scholars
Newsletter», April 1995, p. 24.

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