Populism and the Revival of Reform: Competing Political Narratives in the Philippines

Author(s): MARK R. THOMPSON

Source: Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 32, No. 1 (April 2010), pp. 1-28
Published by: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS)
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 32,No.1(2010),
AsiaVol.
Southeast
Contemporary pp.1-28 DOI:10.1355/cs32-la
©2010
ISEAS ISSN
0129-797X/ISSN1793-284X
print electronic

and the Revival of

Populism
Reform: Political
Competing
Narratives in the Philippines1

MARK R. THOMPSON

Thestrong showing inopinionpollsbySenatorBenigno Simeon"Noynoy"

Cojuangco-Aquino III sincehe enteredthe Philippine
presidential election
campaignin theautumnof2009suggests thatthelongdominant"rich-
versus-poor" politicalnarrative has beenchallenged byrenewedappeals
" ". Whilereformism was themajornarrative in the
for goodgovernance
oppositionstruggle against the Marcos dictatorship,it was eroded by
clientelism and anemicsocialreforms aftertherestorationofdemocracy.
Populismemerged as themosteffective electoraldiscoursein theearly
post-Marcos period,withJosephEjercitoEstradacomingto dominate
Philippine politicsbythelate1990s.Hisfriend andfellowactor-politician
FernandoPoe Jr.thenlauncheda majorcampaignforthepresidency
in 2004 afterEstradahad been deposed by an elitistuprising.The
incumbent President, GloriaMacapagal- Arroyo, brokethis
ruthlesslessly
actor-politician-based populist electoralconnection.Yet she reapedno
upper class praisefor this
neo-traditionalist"success".On the contrary,
thewidespreadcorruption and humanrightsviolations(includingthe
notoriousMaguindanaomassacre)thatinevitably resultsfromsuch
a strategy unintendedly set thestagefortherevivalof reformism. In
theface of Arroyo'sassault on it, thepopulistnarrativehad to be
reconstituted. Insteadof relyingon "moviestarpopulism"withfew
"commandvotes",Manuel
"Manny"BambaVillarJr.has builtperhaps
thestrongest politicalmachinery in thecurrent presidentialcampaign
his own wealth while an innovative " "
using employing formof applied
populisminvolving generous giftstopoorcontestants on widelyviewed
televisionshows.But despitethemetamorphosis ofpopulismand the

Mark R. Thompsonis Professor of Political Science at the University

of Erlangen-Nuremberg,Germany.

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2 MarkR. Thompson

revivalofreformism, structural
deep-seated problemsin thePhilippines
remain.Without majoreconomicredistribution,
theplightof thepoor
is likelyto underminethe success of eithera new "reformist" or
" "
populist president.

Keywords: populism,reform,
Philippines, narratives.
clientelism,

The announcement by actor-politician Joseph Ejercito Estrada in

October 2009 that he would run again forthe presidency in the May
2010 election (dubbed his "take two" candidacy) sent a collective
shiver through the Philippine political elite and business oligarchy.
Estrada had been deposed as President by an elite-led "people
power" coup in 2001. Accused of massive malfeasance in office,
Estrada was placed under house arrest,convicted and sentenced to
a long-termjail term for plunder in 2007. Following the granting
of an amnesty by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo a month later,
he quickly let it be known that he had no intention of abiding by
his promise not to seek the country's highest officeagain.2 Yet with
Estrada trailing far behind the front runners at the time of this
writing, it appears his "movie star populism" does not have the
same electoral appeal it once did.
Instead, anotherpresidential candidate, Senator Manuel "Manny"
Bamba Villar Jr., has adapted populism to a changing political
environment. Drawing on his own staggering wealth to finance
what is probably the campaign's most extensive political machinery,
he has developed what can be termed "applied populism" which
employs his "rags-to-riches"story as a metaphor for his vision of a
wealthy Philippines. Instead of appealing to voters based primarily
on his screen personality like Estrada, he offersimmediate financial
assistance to poor contestants on televisions shows hosted by his
actor allies.3
As a political narrative, "populism" had long proved so
powerful in the Philippine context that it could only be defeated
by hook or by crook. With his direct appeals to the poor (known
in the Philippines as the masa ), Estrada was only one of two
opposition Senators elected in 1987. In 1992, he easily won the
Vice-Presidency(elected separatelyin the Philippines). He was elected
President in 1998 by the widest margin of any candidate since the
fall of dictator Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1986. Estrada's fellow actor
and close friend, Fernando Poe Jr.(Ronald Allen Kelley Poe, best
known as "FPJ" or simply as "Da King") took up the populist fight

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Populismand theRevivalofReform 3

after Estrada was ousted by contesting the presidential election of

2004. Although outspent, out-organized and out-muscled (Arroyohas
proved to be a consummate master at "guns, goons, and gold") as
well as maligned by the mainstreammedia and loathed by the middle
and upper classes, Poe nearly won the election. The "Hello Garci"
scandal of 2005 revealed that Arroyo had been directly involved in
manipulation of the presidential polls a year earlier. This suggested
Poe had been cheated as had earlier challengers to the entrenched
elite order, such as the elected congressional representatives of the
Democratic Alliance - closely linked to the communist-influenced
Hukbalahap rebels - who were unseated in a powerplay by the
allies of President Manuel Roxas in 1946. 4 Philippine populism
was so strong that it could only be stopped, like the Huks, by
administration crooks.
By 2009, there were signs that the dominant political narrative
was shifting,however. The respected columnist and political scientist
Amando Doronila has recently suggested that:
thereis no signthatmasa [poormasses] politicsis goingto figure
decisivelyin the next few monthsbeforethe election ... This is
2009, not 1998, and the dynamicsof the 2010 electionare vastly
differentfromthoseof 1998. Masa politics,or therich-versus-poor
theme, not the name of the game in 2010.5
is
The sudden entry of the "reformist" Benigno Simeon "Noynoy"
Cojuangco-Aquino III into the presidential race afterthe (politically
fortuitous)death of his mother Corazon C. Aquino in August 2009
seemed to confirm this prediction. With his mother's mourners
becoming his supporters,Aquino took a clear lead in the presidential
opinion surveys when he entered the race in late 2009. His
candidacy - which stressed the restoration of good governance in
the country - was characterized as a political "game changer".6
Doronila appears to have exaggerated his point somewhat, however.
At the time of writing (based on pre-election surveys from January
2010), Villar has caught up with Aquino in the election polls.
These two leading candidates use competing "populist" and
"reformist" narratives in their presidential race which is to be
decided on 10 May 2010.
Changes in the character of populist appeals to the poor and
the return of elitist reformism in the Philippines may not seem
very surprising given the forces marshalled against populism. But
a brief look at Thailand after Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra
shows that this decline of populism in the Philippines was not

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4 MarkR. Thompson

inevitable. If anything, the attack launched by the royalist-backed

elite group in Thailand against Thaksin was even fiercerthan what
Philippine high society had hurled at Estrada and Poe. Afterupper
class-led "people power" protests against Thaksin, the Thai military
launched an overt coup against the populist leader in 2006. Despite
some clumsy attempts by the military at electoral manipulation,
support for Thaksin remained so solid that a newly created party
supporting him won a majority in an elected parliament.7 A
re-mobilized "uncivil society" unseated two pro-Thaksin Prime
Ministers in 2008 in a series of unlawful protests that included the
seizure of the country's international airport. A weakly legitimized
government led by Abhisit Vejjajiva hangs on through a fragile
coalition, fearing the day when it will have to face pro-Thaksin
forces in elections again. The populist "pathology" of Thai politics
remains unhealed.8
The continued dominance of populism in Thailand raises
the question of why there are competing political narratives in
the Philippines. The first part of this article offers a distinction
between "populism" and "reformism" as well as exploring their
relationship to "traditional" politics in the Philippines (which
includes "bossist" warlord violence). While reformismwas the major
narrativein the opposition struggleagainst the Marcos dictatorship,
it was eroded by traditionalism which allowed populism to emerge
as the most electorally effective discourse in the early post-
Marcos period. The following section examines how Arroyo was
able to tether movie star populism through clientelism, armed
intimidation,a clever media strategyand vote stealing. But charged
with corruption and coddling warlords, Arroyo's dramatic loss
of popularity was a foil used by reformists who rallied around
the son of Corazon C. Aquino after "Cory's" death had sparked
widespread mourning. Despite economic growth, consistently high
povertyrates (and growing levels of reported hunger) have provided
a strongbasis for continued (though evolving) populist appeals. The
importance of these two major political narratives in the upcoming
election raises the question considered in the conclusion: whether
either "reformists"or "populists" are likely to do much to help the
vast majority of Filipinos who remain poor.

Competing Political Narratives

Narratives are an ancient literary genre. The Old Testament,
Chinese chronicles and Greek epics are but a few examples of a

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Populismand theRevivalofReform 5

phenomenon that have described civilizations over millennia. As a

recent addition to the methodology of the social sciences, however,
narrative analysis has engendered disputes typical of the discipline
about exactly what such an application should involve. Narratives
examined can be biographical or those "told" by a group, openly
expressed or "hidden", personal or overtly political, contemporary
or "historicized", with the "story telling" involved analysed from a
psychological, policy, ideological, or subaltern perspective, among
others.9 It is beyond the scope of this article to enter into these
debates. Rather,the analysis here is limited to a focus on narratives
used by politicians in the context of electoral democracy in the
Philippines. The major claim is that politicians offer competing
"populist", "rich-versus-poor" and "reformist","good governance"
narratives in the struggle for voter support.
Such a notion of political narratives does not fiteasily into the
patron-client/elite-politicsparadigm in the Philippines.10 According
to this long dominant view, elite politics in the Philippines is said
to be characterized primarilyby patron-clientties and patronage, but
also by outrightvote buying and electoral violence ("bossism"). In
this context,Julio Teehankee has adopted the useful term "command
votes" - blocks of votes in a candidate's bailiwick (baluarte) that
are "gathered and delivered through traditional networks such as
political machines".11 Usually this is done by traditional politicians
offeringmaterial rewards and otherfavours,but sometimes it involves
warlords intimidating or even killing opponents. The November
2009 massacre of a group of fifty-sevenpoliticians' relatives, Non-
Government Organization (NGO) activists, lawyers and journalists
by a rival clan for the "crime" of tryingto register an opposition
candidate for an upcoming election in Maguindanao province
in Mindanao is but an extreme example of this phenomenon of
"command voting".12
Teehankee argues that there is another kind of electoral appeal
available to politicians in the Philippines which, following the
literature on political marketing,he terms "market votes".13 These
votes are soughtthroughmedia-based national appeals to voters,rather
than dyadic local ties. The key to candidates winning support in
this electoral "market" is constructingan effective"image". This is
best accomplished throughfavourable media reports and advertising
offensives (primarily in television and radio). The argument here is
that two such "images" are the result of key "narratives" frequently
used by candidates in recent Philippine politics, "populism" and
"reformism".14

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6 MarkR. Thompson

Despite being an inexact, slippery and impressionistic political

narrative, one common feature of "populism" is that "the people"
- simple but good - are contrasted with the elite - privileged
and greedy.15This does not mean, however, that "populism" actually
involves the rule of the people. Leading "populist" politicians in
the Philippines have been elites, albeit "black sheep" in terms of
social habitus in the Bourdieuian sense. Like "neo-" or "business"
populists in Peru (Fujimori) or Thailand (Thaksin), but unlike
leftistpopulists such as in Venezuela (Chavez) or Bolivia (Morales),
Philippine populists have been pro-capitalist.16 Estrada and Poe
made perfunctoryalliances with the leading left-wingactivists, but
their more importantallies were their business cronies. Estrada did
not undertake any significanteconomic redistributionpolicies, but
rather carried forward much of the neo-liberal programme of his
predecessor, Fidel Ramos. Estrada and Poe did not rely on organized
labour for support, but on the large "informal sector" of the urban
poor and marginalized rural population.
Populism involves media-carried appeals by leaders in the form
of promises to help the common tao (people) at the expense of the
elite. As discussed above, populism can be usefully distinguished
from "clientelism" which involves ties between national leaders
and voters via local leaders who "harvest" votes through material
incentives or violent threatsin theirbailiwicks. In practice, populism
and clientelism overlap, with a successful politician mixing image
politics with some political machinery.17 However, politicians
employing a "populist" narrative rely primarily on their media-
transported image while "clientelist" ones will depend more on
dyadic networks.
Eva-LottaE. Hedman has demonstratedhow "movie star"populism
emerged in the Philippines. She argues that the "visualized lingua
franca" of Tagalog filmsunderwent a dramatic transformationtowards
social realism in the 1960s.18"Proletarian potboilers" starringEstrada
or his friend (and even more famous actor) "FPJ" as downtrodden
heroes fightingfor their rights against corrupt elites drew a vast
"masa" (the masses of the poor) audience that could later be
solicited for votes. The "familiar stories" portrayed in these films
were "already known, whether as 'social condition' or as individual
destiny".19They drew on a "familiar trope in Philippine society and
cinema - that of the outlaw/criminal/rebel".20 Through a "dialectic
of recognitionand appropriation,Estrada or 'Erap', thus appears as if
he knows, or could know, 'the real people who lived, labored, and
sufferednearby,round the corner'".21Estrada effortlesslytransferred

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Populismand theRevivalofReform 7

his image as an outsider and fighterfor the poor in his movies to

the political stage. His nickname, "Erap", the 1960s slang inversion
of "pare" (friend), was the basis of his campaign slogan {"Erap
para sa mahirap'' "Erap for the poor") as he claimed to befriend
the friendless poor.
Like populism, reformistappeals are media/image-based; but
the character of its narrative is different.If populists ask for the
votes of the poor based on the promise "I will help you", reformists
seek support because "I am (morally) good". Populists claim to
champion the poor; reformistspromise to govern honestly in their
name. Both decry corruption that characterizes clientelist politics,
but for differentreasons. The populist narrative portrayscorruption
as maintaining an unjust elite rule that oppresses the poor. For
reformists,corruption undermines government efficiencyand thus
economic development that would benefit all, particularly the poor.
Populists make "class appeals", while reformistsappeal to voters
across class lines with calls for "good governance". While populists
fightagainst long odds to defeat entrenched elites, reformistsshow
through personal sacrifice at the hands of corrupt officialsthat they
are worthy of public trust.
Like urban reformersin the United States in the early twentieth
century, Philippine reformistshave claimed to act in the interest
of the nation, disregarding class differences.22They also stress the
importance of education in uplifting the poor.23 These similarities
are not coincidental, as nearly fiftyyears of US colonial rule in
the Philippines led not only to the imposition of an American-style
system of government,but also to the development of a political
culture in a "colonial democracy" that in many ways mirrored
that of the imperialist power.24One side of Philippine politics was
modelled on the most immoral aspects of American machine politics
(the famous pre-martial law, nationalist Senator Claro M. Recto
spoke of finding "our models, which we have already surpassed,
in those American political machines, with their Tweed, Hagues,
Pendergasts, and Huey Longs").25 Yet another side drew of the
tradition of US urban reformism,denouncing corruption and calling
for good governance. In so doing, the opposition could appeal to
- to the awa (pity)
deep-seated Philippine cultural traditionsas well
and damay (empathy) of the electorate. Such emotions are "socially
and culturally encoded" and associated with the pasyon (Christ's
passion) in Philippine folk religion as well as with the death of
national hero Jose Rizal as a martyr of Spanish colonial rule, as
historian Reynaldo Ileto has shown.26If anti-governmentcandidates

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8 MarkR. Thompson

were imprisoned or even murdered by the ruling party or clan (as

for example Benigno S. Aquino Jr. was in 1983), the opposition
could point to such sacrifices as part of a narrative dramatizing the
need for political redemption.
Moralist appeals for reform were at the centre of Ramon
Magsaysay's successful presidential campaign in 1953 and of the
opposition Liberal Party's electoral effortin the senatorial polls of
1971.27Corazon C. Aquino's campaign scriptin the "snap" presidential
election campaign in 1986 against the authoritarianincumbentMarcos
was paradigmatically reformist.Her husband's "martyrdom"at the
hands of the Marcos regime had aroused strong popular emotions
and led to nearly two-and-a-halfyears of mass-based urban protest.
Besides standing accused of murdering its leading opponent, the
Marcos regime was charged with pushing corruption to levels
censurable even by the lax standards of pre-martial law politics.
Framed as the "Filipina Maria" (after the "Marian celebration"
commemoratingthe 2,000th anniversary of the birth of the Virgin
Mary in 1985), Aquino's campaign drew huge crowds around the
country and was covered by the alternative media. She promised
little more than "honesty, sincerity,simplicity and religious faith"
and asked Filipinos to join her in a "crusade for truth, justice
and freedom".28 Marcos understood the damage Aquino's moral
attacks were causing, and complained she had portrayed him as a
"combination of Darth Vader, Machiavelli, Nero, Stalin, Pol Pot, and
maybe even Satan himself".29
Despite his overwhelming advantage in "guns, goons and gold",
Marcos had to steal the election outright by rigging the actual
vote count as his attempt to manipulate the polls in advance had
failed, sparking the "people power" uprising that overthrew him
in February 1986. 30 Once in power, however, Aquino found reform
easier to promise than implement. Several corruption scandals
and a massacre of farmers protesting for land reform eroded her
administration'scredibility.It was also rocked by nine coup attempts
launched by dissatisfied factions in the military (one of which she
had earlier protected through the "people power" uprising she
inspired). The return of clientelist politics badly damaged the
credibility of the reformist narrative. Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet
suggested that "the ballooning hopes inflated by the heady people-
power atmosphere of 1986 have since been punctured by political
machines, personalistic factionalism, patron-client ties, old-elite
family prominence, vote buying, ballot tampering, and violence in
the 1988, 1990, and 1992 elections".31 Though the presidency of

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Populismand theRevivalofReform 9

Fidel V. Ramos is generally credited with making greater progress

in implementingreformsthan Aquino's, particularlyin the economic
sphere, the narrative was wearing thin. Corruption scandals
reoccurred with depressing regularity and the initial impact of
economic liberalization did little to improve the lot of 90 per cent
of Filipino households which opinion surveys in the post-Marcos
era have consistently classified as belonging to the lower classes
(see below). Sensing this, opponents of Joseph Estrada, by then
the rising star of Philippine politics, turned to clientelism to try
to block his ascent.
All the patron-client networks, bosses' bailiwicks, and the
oligarch's wealth were not enough to stop the Estrada juggernaut
in the 1998 presidential elections, however. His leading opponent,
a classic "clientelist", "command-vote" politician, the Speaker
of the House, Jose de Venecia Jr.,was soundly defeated. Estrada
circumvented clientelist networks. Vote canvassers found themselves
"outflanked" by a popular film star who had direct appeal to the
voters as the defender of the poor. Although the Estrada camp did
have some political machinery,media appeals to the voters were the
dominant elements in the campaign.32 Increasing urbanization and
the spread of the popular media made it easier to appeal directly
to voters. Political advertising had become the most importantform
of campaigning.33
Given Estrada's mass appeal in 1998, what has changed just a little
over a decade later? Socio-economically very little. Populism cannot
be "read off" the social map of a country,but without favourable
"terrain" populists have little chance of electoral success. Despite a
decade of relatively high growth under the Arroyo administration (a
point which will be taken up at the end of this article), by some
accounts socio-economic inequality actually worsened between the
beginning of the Estrada and the end of the Arroyo administrations
while self-ratedpoverty only improved marginally. Market/opinion
researchers use a proxy measure, based on housing, to estimate
income. Housing is a veryuseful indirect measure, with the luxurious
villas of the rich contrastingsharply with the dilapidated shanties
of the poor. Based on two studies by differentsurvey organizations,
the "A, B, C" categories of upper and middle class Filipinos shrank
to below 10 per cent of the population between 1998 and 2007,
while the percentage of the poorer "D" and "E" categories increased
to over 90 per cent.34In terms of self-ratedpoverty (Filipinos who
consider themselves poor), quarterly Social Weather Station surveys
show it worsened during Arroyo's first three years in office to

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10 MarkR. Thompson

66 per cent (up from56 per cent at the end of Estrada's presidency).
It then "improved" to 46 per cent of the population who considered
themselves poor. But by 2007 - even before the impact of the
worldwide economic crisis was felt- it had worsened again (to 53 per
cent), raising it back up nearly to the levels under the Estrada
administration. More worryingly still, reports of hunger in the
population have risen froma low of 7.7 per cent under Estrada to a
high of 19 per cent under Arroyo,with nearly 5 per cent reporting
"extreme hunger".35In short, the "materialist" basis in the Marxist
sense for populist appeals remains strong in the Philippines.

Defeating "Movie Star Populism"

If the economic conditions for the rise of populism remain ripe in
the Philippines, why could "movie star populism" (as embodied by
Estrada and Poe's presidential campaigns) be defeated? One argument
will be discounted here, although it remains widespread in the
Philippine media and fills the "coffee-tablebook" literature about
the overthrow of Estrada. It is the claim that Estrada discredited
himself and populist politics generally through his "immoral"
behaviour. Estrada's "excesses" are well known (and reasonably
well documented) but not unusual in Philippine politics (with, for
example, the Arroyo administrationmatching Estrada peso for peso
in the huge illegal gambling industry which was the ostensible
reason forEstrada's downfall). Estrada may have discredited himself
in the eyes of the upper and middle classes, but he did not lose
his base of support among the poor.36Arroyo was nearly overthrown
in a kind of poor people's "people power" revenge in May 2001
(known as "Edsa Tres"). Claims that these pro-Estrada crowds were
"manipulated" by "unscrupulous" politicians ring hollow given
the degree of manipulation behind the elitist "Edsa Dos".37 Despite
Estrada's corruption conviction, his ratings among the poor long
remained solid.38
Viewed in terms of image politics, Arroyo was "at sea" during
much of her first(truncated) term in office.At firstshe tried to act
like a reformist,in the tradition of " Tita Cory" (Corazon Aquino as
the nation's caring aunt).39As part of this effort,she also tried to
have herself dubbed "Ate Glo" (the doting elder sister) or "Zna ng
Bayan" (mother of the nation) by the media.40 Yet none of these
image makeovers worked because popular belief in her commitment
to reform was undermined through scandal. Arroyo's educational
credentials and technocratic style were an additional hindrance to

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Populismand theRevivalofReform 11

her attemptto establish a convincing narrative.Focus interviewswith

poor Filipino voters have shown that while "they value educational
qualifications, they are also suspicious about those with superior
education" as they fear such politicians are more likely to be able
to manipulate them.41Such "image problems" as a reformistappear
to have contributed to Arroyo's initial decision in late 2002 not to
seek re-election.
When Arroyo changed her mind and decided in October 2003 to
run forre-election as President, she threw offall reformisttrappings
and focused on the advantages of incumbency. She was the first
sitting President to seek a second term since 1969 (when Marcos
"won" by cheating,spending and violence). Arroyo'selectoral strategy
could not rely on clientelism alone, however, as the weakness of
"machine" politics in the post-Marcos Philippines vis-a-vis populists
suggests. She again faced an actor-politician as an opponent for the
Presidency. Her rival was "the cinematic Pinoy cowboy", Fernando
Poe, Jr. As with Estrada, his (even more numerous) fans became
his voters.42Not surprisingly,Poe led Arroyo decisively in early
opinion polls.
Arroyo refused to surrender to the realm of "star appeal". One
of her cleverest campaign moves was choosing Noli de Castro,
a famous television news announcer, as her Vice-Presidential
candidate. With popularity ratings that matched Poe's, de Castro's
folksystump speeches helped compensate for her overly intellectual
campaign rhetoric. While de Castro did not provide Arroyo with a
compelling populist narrative, it at least helped deflect Poe's own
movie star-based appeals to the poor. She also launched a blizzard
of nationwide television and radio "public service" advertisements
during the campaign by public agencies effusively thanking the
President. She also made sure that "FPJ's" image suffered in the
media, though her opponent managed to antagonize many a middle
class journalist on his own.
An Arroyoadministrationinsider (anonymityrequested) told this
author of another clever stratagemthat many of her opponents long
suspected. The Arroyo administration "encouraged" former police
chief Panfilo Lacson, to run for President as well, although he had
once been a close ally of Estrada. Lacson had won the gratitude
of wealthy Chinese for breaking up kidnapping gangs that were
preying on this ethnic minority in the Philippines.43 Thus Lacson
(who had once been a leading opponent of Arroyo) not only split
the opposition vote with Poe but also cut into what might have
been a helpful source of funding.

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12 MarkR. Thompson

Like Marcos in his controversial re-election campaign in 1969,

Arroyo cut out the political middle men, funnelling government
patronage funds directly to barangay captains and mayors. With
Poe strongin Luzon, she concentrated her patronage on the Visayas,
where she claimed a local connection based on her mother's side
of the family. As Carl Lande has shown, clientelism works best
when directed at regions thoughtto be favoured by a candidate who
comes fromthat area or is seen to have special ties to it.44Besides
allocating state patronage, she also drew heavily on contributionsby
wealthy ethnic Chinese (" taipans "). It was apparent that Arroyo did
not just have a decisive advantage in traditionalpolitics, "guns, goons
and gold"; she had also mastered the "three Cs" of iieo-traditional
politics, "cinema, Chinese and corruption".45
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) performedmiserably
during the election: failing in an effortto automate voting that
was dogged by allegations of corruption, leaving countless eligible
"
voters' names offvoting lists and engaging in dagdag-bawas" (vote-
padding and vote-shaving).In a devastatingcritique, a formerAquino
administrationofficial,whose husband had played a major part in the
pollwatching effortagainst Marcos, argued that "if Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo is deluged with complaints about the Comelec leadership
and suspicions of their incompetence or their partisanship, she
only has herself to blame. She appointed them in the firstplace."46
The 140 plus election deaths was higher than in the previous two
Presidential elections combined (and greater than that during the
notorious 1969 election).47Dubbed the "world's slowest election", it
took over six weeks for Arroyo to finally be proclaimed the winner
over the objections of an opposition outraged at being repeatedly
blocked from scrutinizing dubious ballots.48
AlthoughArroyosoon became an embarrassmentto the Philippine
elite, she had done their dirtywork. She had broken the "electoral
connection" between populist politicians and poor voters. She did this
by amassing patronage frompublic and private sources, recentralizing
clientelist networks, and directing funds to regions seen favourable
to her. She also countered Poe's media-based populist appeals and
managed to leave scratches on his iconic image. When this was
not enough, she tolerated armed intimidation and directed electoral
manipulation, allowing her to "trounce" Poe in the election by over
a million votes. Although by 2007 her popularity had plunged, her
clientelist networks,warlord allies and electoral manipulators were
still strong enough to win a majority of seats in the lower house
of Congress - a victory of "command" over "market" votes. Arroyo

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Populismand theRevivalofReform 13

practised (neo-) traditionalpolitics more effectivelythan any Filipino

leader since Marcos.

ReformistRevival
The Filipino urban elite had largely turned a blind eye to Arroyo's
electoral excesses in 2004 fearing the return of Estrada-style
populism if Poe had won. The National Movement forFree Elections
(NAMFREL), an NGO once well-respected forits election monitoring,
seemed more interested in Arroyo's re-election than safeguarding
the ballot.49 But when wiretapped conversations between Arroyo
and COMELEC commissioner Virgilio Garcillano ("Garci") about
committing election fraud in Mindanao surfaced in the media in
2005, this elite support evaporated.50Although Arroyo apologized on
television for a lapse in judgement, she was unable to defuse the
anger generated by the "Hello Garci" scandal. The mass resignation
of ten cabinet level officials and many of her top advisors left her
looking very vulnerable.
Yet Arroyo was able to rebuffattemptsto impeach her (with her
safe majorities in Congress) and crush several feeble "people power
coup" efforts(the biggest of which was in February 2006 on the
20th anniversary of the original "people power" uprising). She not
only generously rewarded her loyal generals, but allowed them to
hunt down legal Leftists(including journalists) through extrajudicial
killings, with reportedly more than 900 left-wing activists killed
since she came to power in 2001. 51Matters seemed to grow graver,
however, as she was engulfed by ever worsening scandals (one,
embarrassingly,involving her husband, son, and brother-in-lawwho
were accused of having links to illegal gambling lords, the same
offence used to justify Estrada's ouster). Polls show Arroyo to be
the most unpopular post-Marcos President.52Yet Arroyo's enemies
seemed powerless against her.
Some observers have suggested that Filipinos suffered from
"people power fatigue".53Yet in the Philippines, protestors alone,
of whom there have been plenty during the Arroyo administration,
have never been enough for "people power" to succeed. Rather,
people power has also required some form of military intervention
and the Catholic Church hierarchies' moral guardianship backed by
big business to bring down a government. With the top military
brass bought off by Arroyo, the Catholic Church on the defensive
afterthe death of Manila Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin and a major

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14 MarkR. Thompson

sex scandal, and business opposition restrainedby economic growth,

potential allies for an opposition insurrection were absent.
The failure of insurrectionism meant that the opposition to
Arroyo began to focus on the May 2010 election. The problem, as
has been the case in all post-Marcos elections, was the plethora of
candidates. With Estrada back in the political arena (thanks to a
clever "divide-and-conquer" pardon by Arroyo) and several Senators
maneouvering over presidential bids, there was no clear frontrunner
and certainly no candidate who could capture the still widespread
anti-Arroyosentiment.
That appeared to change with the death of Cory Aquino in
August 2009. The "outpouring of grief' for Aquino surprised many
observers and even, it is claimed, the Aquino family itself.54This
mourning was soon transformed into political capital for Cory
Aquino's son "Noynoy". As one observer has written:
Since that greatoutpouringduringCory's funeral,people have
been insistingthat Sen. Noynoy Cojuangco Aquino step into
the shoes of his illustriousparents.There are persistentvoices
sayinghe should run forthe presidency... These calls may be
just passing sentimentalism,fallout fromthe revivalistfrenzy
that exploded afterCory died ... Or the calls we now hear
intermittentlycould as well snowball. There is something
about the Aquino franchise that evokes magic. In a season
that sees our people craving for a leader they could fully
trust,the revivalismcould take hold ... We have, once again,
fallen into another emotional episode where our people
distrustthose seen as too sophisticated or too shrewd. They
yearn for a leadershipwhose simplicityis anchored on strong
morality.55
By becoming a foil for the "moral" Aquino family,Arroyo had set
the stage for the revival of reformism.Though still early days in
the presidential campaign as of this writing,the high level support
registeredfor his candidacy in the firstpolls afterhis declaration of
candidacy forthe presidency on 9 September 2009 suggests that such
a "revivalist frenzy"centred around his "sincerity" and promises of
honest government has indeed taken hold of the Philippine body
politic. Conrado de Quiros captured this Arroyo-as-foil-for-Aquino
sentiment well:
But the "Noynoyphenomenon"is not just about euphoria.It is
Or a newfoundunwillingnessto tolerate
also abouttyrannyphobia.
tyrannythatburstits banks with the death of Corazon Aquino.
The outpouringof love forCorazon Aquino is matchedonly by

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Populismand theRevivalofReform 15

the outpouringof hate for Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.Why has

Noynoybecome phenomenal?Simple: Because he is the opposite
of Gloria. Or is seen as so. In the same way that Corywas the
opposite of Marcos and Obama was the opposite of Bush.56
It is perhaps surprisingthat in a countrythat has one of the world's
most developed, and critical, discourses on political nepotism
undermining democratic norms, it turns out that Filipinos also
appear to believe that there are such things as "good" dynasties.
Amando Doronila argues that the "groundswell of support forAquino
following the death of his mother,President Cory Aquino, flows from
the public service record of his mother and his father,the martyred
formerSen. Benigno Aquino whose honesty and transparencyappear
to have been accepted by the Filipino public."57 One can easily
raise objections to this view, particularly about Benigno Aquino,
"Nonoy's" father,whose political record included charges of murder
and other grave misdeeds.58Even (saint) "Cory's" administrationwas
tainted by corruptioncharges. This was perhaps most embarrassingin
regards to the Philippine Commission on Good Government (PCGG)
which was meant to go after Marcos's "ill-gotten" wealth but was
instead accused of making illicit gains of its own.59 Most menacing
were the accusations that dogged Aquino's brother,Jose ("Peping")
Cojuangco Jr.,who may again be poised to play a major role in
Noynoy's campaign. The accusations have done nothing to dampen
enthusiasm for Noynoy's presidential ambitions, who convincingly
plays the role of the loyal and honest son, solicitous brother,with a
"beautifulbut quiet, well mannered and self-effacing Like
girlfriend".60
his mother,his lack of impressive political accomplishments - his
"blank-slatedness" - is seen as an asset rather than a drawback.
Aquino and his runningmate - another famous dynast, Manuel
"Mar" Araneta-Roxas II, who abandoned his own presidential bid
as an act of "sacrifice" to the reformistcause - seem to set to
run a classic "reformist" campaign. It will be based around the
Liberal Party which is an old, famous, but relatively small party
that has claimed a certain "progressive" ideological orientationwhile
providing political shelter for plenty of unsavoury politicians in the
post-Marcos era.61 Several major NGOs and People's Organizations
(POs) have affiliatedwith the campaign under the auspices of the
Left (but non-communist) Akbayan party,which has entered into an
officialalliance with the Liberal Party of Aquino and Roxas. Several
prominent "progressive" politicians have become closely involved
in this campaign.

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16 MarkR. Thompson

The question remains though whether progressives with a

"pro-poor" agenda will have much impact on the campaign, much
less policies adopted should Noynoy win the election. In a recent
conversation, one high ranking member of the campaign (anonymity
requested) admitted to the author that neither Aquino nor Roxas
supported "asset redistribution"(be it land or other forms).Another
high ranking campaign staff member who spoke to this writer
disagreed, however, asserting Aquino's openness to social reform
was demonstratedby the candidate's effortsto encourage his family
to divest itself of the notorious Hacienda Luisita and have its lands
redistributedas part of the country'slong-running(but only modestly
successful) land reform programme. In this regard, a thoughtful
article by Ben Reid based on the recent experience of activist
alliances with governmentsis of particular interest.Reid argues that
NGOs and POs which "crossed over" to work in governmentin the
post-Marcos Philippines were often "double crossed" by politicians
with other aims. Reid argues that "well-intentioned NGO personnel
who previously adopted a critical stance toward neo-clientelism
ultimately become absorbed by these relations".62 In a survey of
the non-communistLeft's political activism since the fall of Marcos,
Nathan Gilbert Quimpo speaks of only "initial, albeit very modest,
gains" and of civil society's "limited usefulness" in "deepening of
democracy in post-authoritariandeveloping states". Based on these
difficulties,he calls for a "more judicious alliance policy" by the
Left in the future.63

The Metamorphosis of Populism

The two most recent polls available as this article was being
completed (fromJanuary2010) showed Aquino in a statistical tie for
the upcoming May 2010 presidential race with "Manny" Villar. As
noted earlier, the latter has used a "rags-to-riches"narrative to try
to counter Aquino's reformistappeals.64 As reportedlythe country's
richest politician, over the last three years he has poured massive
resources into building what is probably the country's strongest
political machine.65Villar has apparently absorbed two key lessons
about recent political developments in the Philippines. The firstis
that traditional political machinery alone is not sufficientto win
elections. In 1998, Estrada could not be stopped by politicians
seen as too "traditional" in their emphasis on gathering votes
through clientelist ties. The other extreme to avoid is to rely
almost exclusively on movie star-based populist appeals as the

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Populismand theRevivalofReform 17

Poe campaign did in 2004, leaving it vulnerable in terms of a

sufficientnumber of "command votes" needed to offsetthe Arroyo
administration's "neo-traditional" strategy,as discussed above. This
led Villar to adopt a hybrid campaign strategywhich combines a
strong political machine flanked by populist appeals. He has won
the endorsement of some of the Philippines leading " trapos" (short
for "traditional politicians" but also the Tagalog for "dirty rag"),
including the De Venecia political dynasty.66One political analyst
has claimed Villar is currentlyoutspending Aquino by a margin of
ten to one.67In addition, however, Villar has adapted populism to a
changing political environment. Instead of literally relying on "star
appeals" as Estrada and Poe did - who mobilized their fan base
for political ends - Villar has developed a new narrative style that
can be termed "applied populism". It involves sponsoring noontime
television shows watched daily by millions of poor Filipinos. Nikko
Dizon of the Philippine Daily Inquirer has writtenabout the impact
of this novel campaign technique:
AmongVillar's celebrityendorsersare hosts of noontimeshows
- Michael V. from"Eat Bulaga" aired on GMA 7 and Willie
Revillame of ABS-CBN's "Wowowee" ... Hinged on Villar's
antipoverty advocacy,"Stop My Hirap" [poverty]aimed rightat
the gut of the hungrymasses ... The mechanics of the contest
[aired in "Eat Bulaga!"], which ends its two-and-a-half-week run
today,or two days beforethe formalelection campaignbegins,
are simple: Audience memberswrite on orange sheets of paper
what they would do if they win P25,000 ... At the end of the
segment,the storyof a poor,struggling citizen is aired,recalling
Villar'sown rags-to-riches tale. The candidate'simage and slogan,
" and perseverance]is flashedon
Sipag at Tiyaga"[industriousness
screen.An industryinsidertold the Inquirerthatdependingon a
segment'sconcept,a portionbuy such as "Stop My Hirap" could
cost fromP700,000to Pi millionper episode [$15,000to $21,500].
The amount did not include the prizes given away and the
talentfees of hosts ... Villar,whose net worthreportedlytotals
P25 billionaccordingto ForbesMagazine,has changedthepolitical
landscape ...68
In this sense Villar has "virtually" merged traditional politics and
populist appeals. Material incentives are offered in medial form,
symbolizinghis populist project of helping the poor. Poor contestants
on television shows represent the poor majority of voters whom
Villar promises to help. His televised generosity as a candidate is
a foretasteof his promised benevolence as the next President.

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18 MarkR. Thompson

Villar - a one-time shrimp vendor who grew up in modest

circumstances to become a real estate billionaire - has used his
humble originsto develop an anti-elitistdiscourse typical of populism.
He has directed such attacks at Aquino who he has also tried to
tie to Arroyo in terms of (in)competence and dynasticism. As two
Philippine journalists report:
Villarscoffedat whathe describedas "self-righteous"and "elitist"
groupsthathave recentlygatheredaroundAquino to imposeanew
their will on the Filipino people. "These elitist groups think
theyare the only ones who can run this country.They had their
chance; it's timesomebodyfromthe masses tookthe lead," Villar,
the country'srichestlawmakersaid ... He describedthe arrogance
of the rich assumingthe role of the country'smoral guardians
... Villarnoted thatthe Aquino and Arroyoadministrations were
both installed by "people power" revolutions."We have never
used competence as a basis for voting for our president;it's
always about popularityand pedigree.Does one have to be the
son of Cory (Aquino) or the daughterof Dadong (Macapagal) to
be the presidentof this country?Whatabout the son of a shrimp
vendor?"he asked. "As faras I know,we are a democracyand
not a monarchy."69

Conclusion: Political Narratives and Socio-economic Realities

With their competing reformistand populist narratives,Aquino and
Villar will probably be the two leading candidates in the May 2010
presidential election. Recent surveys of reasons Filipinos gave for
choosing a candidate suggest that reformism and populism both
run deep in the veins of public opinion.70But will either candidate
actually be able to change the lives of Filipinos, the vast majority
of whom remain poor (many of them desperately so)?
To turn to Aquino first, it is legitimate to ask whether an
Aquino administrationII will bring real "reform"to the Philippines
that, it is promised, will foster economic development and thus
improve the lives of the poor. Given the recent political history of
the Philippines, the question itself seems misplaced. No Philippine
presidency, even Corazon Aquino's, was notably free of corruption.
There is little reason to believe that one led by her son will be
any different,given the major role his relatives and other traditional
political allies are likely to play from behind the scenes. But even
if his administration proves somewhat "cleaner" than usual, it is
unclear whether this would lead to substantially higher economic
growth.

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Populismand theRevivalofReform 19

Unlike in Thailand, populism in the Philippines has not involved

much actual economic redistribution. Interestingly,the experience
of Thailand under Thaksin shows that some measures aimed at
poverty reduction, such as low cost health care, actually do help
relieve the sufferingof the poor.71Given that the pro-poor rhetoric
of the previous "populist" Estrada governmentwas largely window
dressing, a certain amount of skepticism is justified in regards to its
current incarnation. In particular, the strong "traditional political"
orientation of Villar's campaign, his reliance on noontime television
celebrities to spread his appeal as well as charges linking him with
a major scandal (the so-called C-5 affair)hint that Villar's pro-poor
orientation may also prove to be largely "for show".72
Arroyo's presidency has, at least from a macroeconomic stand-
point, been a success, however loath her opponents are to admit it.73
Despite corruption in her administration- and of course there are
only perceptions not actual measures of its extent - this apparently
did little harm to the country economically. The real failure of the
Arroyoadministrationwas its inabilityto reduce income inequality,as
discussed above. Given the apparent lack of genuine social reformist
commitmentof either the Aquino or Villar campaigns, there is only
a limited chance of improvement on this fronteither.
Without a major industrialization drive, such as that happened
in South Korea in the 1960s, there seems little prospect of creating
a large middle class and thus raising the incomes of most Filipinos.
A discussion of the currenttroubles of the Thai economy - which
is much more industrialized than the Philippines and about
twice as rich from a per capita standpoint - is enlightening.74
Thailand and, to a lesser extent, the Philippines have successfully
diversified economically, no longer relying on agriculture as their
chief base of output. In the Philippines, one can point to the past
success of the electronics assembly sector and the current success
of Business Process Outsourcing (which in the Philippines primarily
revolves around call centres) as examples of such successful
diversification. Of course, the Philippines has also benefited from
massive remittances by its Overseas Foreign Workers (OFWs). But
Thailand, and more so the Philippines, have failed to deepen their
industrialization drive. They are not strong in major capital goods/
high technology sectors, with no "world beating" companies in
these categories that use local inputs and technological capacities.
The chief obstacle to progress in this regard is the lack of innovation
by major domestic companies. This in turn is hampered by
problems with "human capital" formation,particularly in regard to

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20 MarkR. Thompson

education (which most observers agree is in a disastrous state in

the Philippines).
Given the limited prospects for moving up the developmental
ladder quickly, the appropriate question seems not whether reform
can "succeed" in the Philippines but rather what its inevitable
"failure" will mean fromthe standpoint of the vast majorityof poor
Filipinos. However "clean" governmentbecomes, they will remain
impoverished.
Another "populist" President who fails to undertake significant
social policies (which Villar has not even promised in his platform
as Thaksin once had) is unlikely to do much for the 90 per cent
of Filipinos in the lower class "D" and "E" categories discussed
above who will continue to sufferfromchronic problems of housing,
employment, health care, education, etc.
"Clientelism" or "command voting" suffers from the problem
of corruption (the Arroyo administration's multiple scandals) and
political violence (epitomized by the Maguindanao massacre), which
is part and parcel of such a system. Plunging national popularity of
the incumbent due to malfeasance-in-officecharges is a patternthat
ArthurAlan Shantz had already noted in late pre-martiallaw politics.75
This in turn sets the stage for the resurrectionof reformism,which
makes direct "moral appeals" to the poor based not on the claim "I
will help you" but ratherthat "I will be good" once in office.Such
cross-class appeals can overcome massive clientelist disadvantages,
as Cory Aquino's 1986 presidential campaign demonstrated.Her son,
Benigno Aquino III, is likely to face a much more even political
playing field in terms of patronage resources. His campaign will
thus be more hybridic, consisting of local clientelist networks and
moralizing reformistrhetoric.
Similarly,Villar has combined "applied populism" (on noontime
television shows) with even strongerpolitical machinery.This enables
him to avoid being labelled a "traditional politician" while at the
same time evade the danger of being destroyed by "neo-traditional"
politics as happened to Poe's 2004 presidential campaign at the
hands of a ruthless incumbent.
Whichever narrative combination proves to be the winner in
the 2010 Philippine presidential elections, the appeal of either a
new "reformist"or "populist" President may prove short lived. If
past experience is any guide, neither narrative can be expected to
be the basis for a sustained effortto improve the lot of the poor
who will long represent the overwhelming majorityof voters in the
Philippines.

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Populismand theRevivalofReform 21

NOTES
1 Gratitude is owedto JulioC. Teehankee forsuggesting thephrase"competing
narratives". Earlierversionsof this paper were presentedat De La Salle
University on 17 September 2009and at thepanel"ThePoliticsofChangein
thePhilippines" in theInternational Symposium "Designing Governance for
CivilSociety", KeioUniversity CenterofGovernance forCivilSociety(CGCS),
Tokyo, 22-23November 2009.AtDe La Salle University, I wouldliketo thank
EricC. Batalla,Francisco A. Magnoand JulioC. Teehankee fororganizing the
talkand offering helpfulcomments. At Keio,thanksare due to YukoKasuya
and NathanQuimpofortheirkind invitationand the participants at the
conference fortheirfeedback. I wouldalso liketo thankthetwoanonymous
reviewers.
2 On 20 January 2010,nineyearsto thedayafterprotests removed Estradafrom
office,thePhilippine Commission on Elections(COMELEC)ruledthatEstrada
could runforpresident againalthough the Constitution is ambiguous about
whether theban on re-election is absoluteor onlyappliesto theincumbent.
The poll bodies'SecondDivisionruledagainstpetitions to disqualifyEstrada
with"populist" reasoning - "thebetterpolicyapproachis to let thepeople
decidewho will be thenextPresident. For on politicalquestions, thecourt
mayerr,but the sovereign peoplewill not."Editorial,"Passingthe Buck",
Philippine DailyInquirer, 21 January 2010.
3 Villarhas adoptedorange as his campaign colour,longEstrada's trademark, to
emphasize its populist hue. Philipp Tabeza, "Estrada hits Villarforimitating
campaign color",Philippine DailyInquirer, 30 November 2009.
4 Poe died in December 2004ofa heartattack.ThishelpedArroyo survivethe
election-cheating scandalas theprobable winnerwas no longeraliveto claim
his electoral rights.
5 Amando Doronila, "Estrada is damaged goods",Philippine DailyInquirer,27May
2009.
6 AlexMagno, "Gamechanger 1-5",Philippine Star,20,29August and3,5 September
2009.
7 AndrewWalkerand NicholasFarrelly, "New Mandala'sSteppingStonesto
a Coup", New Mandala,2 December2008 <http://rspas.anu.edu.au/rmap/
newmandala/2008/1 2/02/new-mandala-stepping-stones-to-a-coup/>.
8 MichaelMontesano, "Contextualing the PattayaSummitDebacle:FourApril
Days,FourThai Pathologies", Contemporary Southeast Asia 31, no. 2 (2009):
217-48. Besides usingreformist rhetoric, the Abhisitgovernment is also
attempting to strengthen its"votecanvassing networks" basedon itsnewfound
alliesin northern Thailand(defectors from theThaksincamp),though, as recent
by-election losses suggest, withonlylimitedsuccess.A recentPh.D. thesis
offersan extensive analysisofThaivotecanvassing. See Anyarat Chattharakul,
"Networks of Vote-Canvassers in Thai Elections:Informal Powerand Money
Politics",Ph.D.thesis,LeedsUniversity, 2007.
9 Catherine K. Riessmann, Narrative Analysis(London:Sage, 1993); Lewis P.
Hinchman and SandraK. Hinchman, eds.,Memory, Identity and Community:
The Idea of Narrative in theHumanSciences(Albany, NY: StateUniversity
ofNewYorkPress,1997);DonaldE. Polkinghorne, Narrative Knowing and the

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22 MarkR. Thompson

HumanSciences(Albany, NY: StateUniversity ofNewYorkPress,1988);Prue

Chamberlayne, JoannaBornat,and TomWengraf, The Turnto Biographical
Methodin SocialScience(London:Routledge, 2000);Don McAdams, Ruthellen
andAmiaLieblich,
Josselson, eds.,Turns in theRoad:Narrative Studiesin Lives
in Transition (Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association, 2001);
S. Shenhav,"Narrativizing Politics: On the 'Historization'of Political
Narratives", paper presentedat the AnnualMeetingof the International
Communication Association, NewYork,25 May2009<http://www.allacadmic.
com/meta/pl3675_index.html>; JohnBeverley,"Testimonio, Subalternity,
and Narrative Authority", in Handbookof QualitativeResearch,2nd ed.,
editedby NormanK. Denzinand YvoannaS. Lincoln(London:Sage,2000),
pp. 555-66.
10 Fora recent reviewoftheliterature whichusesthecloselyrelatedcategories of
"patron-client"and "elite-politics",
see Chapter One ofNathanGilbert Quimpo,
ContestedDemocracy and theLeftin thePhilippines Marcos(QuezonCity:
after
Ateneode ManilaUniversity Press,2008).
11 JulioC. Teehankee, "Image,Issues,and Machinery: PresidentialCampaigns
in Post-1986Philippines",paper presentedat "DesigningGovernance for
CivilSociety", Keio University CenterofGovernance forCivilSociety,Tokyo,
22-23November 2009.
12 FranciscoLaraJr., quotedin "PoliticalEntrepreneurs", PhilippineDailyInquirer,
28 November 2009 has arguedthatpoliticalfamilieslike the Ampatuans,
charged withcarrying outtheMaguindanao massacre, arepartofa newbreed
of warlords whose"powersdependupontheircontrolof a vast,illegaland
shadoweconomy and an ever-growing slice of [national government] internal
revenueallotments" fuelling"a violentaddictionto politicaloffice". Warlord
politicianshave longmurdered theirpoliticalopponents in thePhilippines,
twowell-known examplesbeingthegruesome killingofMoisesPadillaat the
handsof an armedgangin theemployof theLacsonclan in 1951 and the
assassinationof EvelioJavier by thePacificador clan in Antiquein 1986.Of
course,themurder of BenignoS. AquinoJr.by agentsof theMarcosregime
afterbeingforcedoffa planethathad brought himbackfrompoliticalexile
despitethepresenceof numerous foreign journalists and supporterswas the
mostnotorious case in recent Philippine history ofthekillingofone'spolitical
opponent beforehe couldpose an electoral threat.
13 Teehankee, "Image, Issues,and Machinery", op. cit.
14 Another important narrative,which can be termed has offered
"structuralist",
a Maoist-influenced view of Philippinepoliticsand society.But whilethe
Communist Partyof thePhilippines (CPP) has used thisnarrative to justify
armedstruggle byitsmilitary wing,theNewPeople'sArmy(NPA),ithasnever
becomewell established in electoralpolitics,withthevacuumbeingfilledby
a vaguelyclass-based "populist" narrative.Eva-Lotta Hedman,"TheSpectreof
Populismin Philippine Politicsand Society:Artista, Masa,Eraption!" South
East Asia Research9 (2001):5-44 (herep. 36). Also see thearticlesin The
Revolution Falters:The Leftin thePhilippine Politicsafter1986,editedby
PatricioN. Abinales(Ithaca:CornellUniversity SoutheastAsia Program Series
15, 1998) and KathleenWeekley, The Communist Partyof thePhilippines,
1968-1993: A StoryofIts Theory and Practice(QuezonCity:University ofthe
PhilippinesPress,2001).

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Populismand theRevivalofReform 23

15 Margaret Canovan, "TrustthePeople!Populism andtheTwoFacesofDemocracy",

PoliticalStudies47 (1999):2-16;Paul A. Taggart, Populism(Buckingham, UK:
Open University Press,2000);Hans-Jiirgen Puhle,"Wasist Populismus?" in
Populismus undAufklarung, editedby HelmutDubiel(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp,
1986),pp. 12-32.
16 KennethM. Roberts, "Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populismin
LatinAmerica: The Peruvian Case",WorldPolitics48 (October 1995):82-116;
KurtWeyland, "Neopopulism and Neoliberalism in LatinAmerica: Unexpected
Studiesin Comparative
Affinities", International Development 31 (1996):3-31;
PasukPhongpaichit andChrisBaker, "'Business Populism' in Thailand",
Journal
ofDemocracy 16, no. 2 (April2005):58-77.
17 Teehankee, "Image,Issues,and Machinery", op. cit.
18 Hedman,"TheSpectreofPopulismin Philippine Politics",op cit.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 This and thenextparagraph drawon MarkR. Thompson, The Anti-Marcos
Struggle:PersonalisticRuleand Democratic Transition in thePhilippines (New
Haven,CT: Yale University Press,1995),pp. 29-32 and 144-46.
23 Thepersistence ofthis"education-optimism" in thePhilippines was underlined
whenEfrenPenaflorida was namedCNN's"herooftheyear"forhis campaign
to improve educationin his homeprovinceof Cavite(justsouthof Manila).
He and his fellowvolunteers used pushcarts to bringeducational materialsto
slumchildren as partof an "itinerant literacymovement" in orderto "ween
themawayfrom theviceand violenceofthestreets". "Pushcart to greatness",
Philippine DailyInquirer, 29 November 2009.The editorialist continues in a
veintypicalofthereformist narrative:"Penaflorida and theotherCNNheroes
are an inspiringlot.Theyembodythehopethateverypersonhas forchange
and reform amidgovernment neglectand incompetence. Theyshowthatall
meaningful changestartsfromwithin.As Penaflorida toldtheCNNaudience,
'You are thechangethatyou dream,as I am the changethatI dream,and
wearethechange
collectively, thatthisworldneedstobe.'"ButPenaflorida's own
"hero'swelcome" in thePhilippines after winning theawardwas overshadowed
bytheMaguindanao massacre, an indication ofthepersistence ofviolentelite
politicsdespitethebestefforts ofreformists.
24 The evocativephrase"colonialdemocracy" was coinedby RubyParedesin
Philippine ColonialDemocracy, editedby RubyParedes(QuezonCity:Ateneo
de ManilaUniversity Press,1989).Stanley Karnow's account,
journalistic In Our
Image:America's Empirein thePhilippines (NewYork:RandomHouse,1989)
emphasizes American influence,andPhilippine imitation ofbothdesirable and
undesirable aspectsofUS politicalculture.
25 QuotedinTeodoro M.Locsin, "Judgment Day",Philippines FreePress,10November
1951,p. 3.
26 ReynaldoClemenaIleto,Pasyonand Revolution: PopularMovements in the
Philippines,1840-1910(QuezonCity:Ateneode ManilaUniversity Press,1979);
ReynaldoC. Ileto,"The Past in thePresentCrisis",in The Philippines after
Marcos, editedbyR.J.MayandFrancisco Nemenzo (London: Croom Helm,1985).

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24 MarkR. Thompson

27 Eva-LottaHedman,In the Name of Civil Society:FromFree Election

Movements toPeoplePowerin thePhilippines (Honolulu: University ofHawaii,
2006); MarkR. Thompson,"Coryand 'the Guy':Reformist Politicsin the
Philippines", UFSI Reports, no. 16 (Indianapolis: UniversitiesField Services,
1988-89).
28 ThesetwoquotesarecitedfromLucyKomisar, CorazonAquino:TheStoryof
a Revolution (NewYork,NY: GeorgeBraziller, 1987),p. 78.
29 Citedin SandraBurton, Impossible Dream:The Marcoses,theAquinos,and
theUnfinished Revolution (NewYork,NY: Warner Books,1989),p. 312.
30 On the generalsignificance of stolenelections,whichinvolvethe actual
falsification(or plain disregard) of the votecount,in sparking "democratic
revolutions", see PhilippKuntzand MarkR. Thompson, "MorethantheFinal
Straw:StolenElectionsas Revolutionary Triggers", Comparative Politics41,
no. 3 (ADril2009):253-72.
31 Benedict J.TriaKerkvliet, "Contested Meanings ofElectionsin thePhilippines",
in The Politics of Electionsin SoutheastAsia, edited by R.H. Taylor
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,1995),p. 160. But reformism
retained enoughcachein Philippine politicsto remainthedominant narrative
in the1992presidential election, withthetwocandidates withthestrongest
reformist imagefinishing first(FidelV. Ramos)and second(MiriamDefensor
Santiago),withmostof the remaining sevencandidatesrelyingprimarily,
or almostentirely on machine-based "command votes",includingthe most
powerful machine politician at the time, then House SpeakerRamonMitra,
who finished a distantfourth. Teekhankee, "Images,Issues,and Machinery",
op. cit.
32 IsabeloT. Crisostomo, President JosephEjercito Estrada(QuezonCity:J.Kriz,
1999).
33 AnaMariaTabunda, CarmelaS. Fonbuena, and AriesRufo,SellingCandidates:
PoliticalAdvertising in the2007Senatorial Election(Manila:KonradAdenauer
Stiftung, 2007); GlendaM. Gloria,Ana MariaL. Tabunda,and CarmelaS.
Fonbuena,Spin and Sell: How PoliticalAdvertisements Shaped the 2004
Elections (Manila:KonradAdenauer Stiftung,2004).
34 PulseAsia,"MediaRelease", 7 April2007<www.inquirer.net/verbatim/pulseasia-
04302007. pdf>;MariaCynthiaRose BanzonBautista,"PeoplePower2: The
Revenge oftheEliteon theMasses?"in Between Fires:FifteenPerspectives on
theEstradaCrisis,editedby AmandoDoronila(PasigCity:AnvilPublishing,
2001).MaharMangahas offers a slightly
moreoptimistic view:"Discounting its
seasonality,Philippine GNPhas beenrisingsteadilyin thepasttwodecades.
But,sincePhilippine poverty has notbeenfalling steadily,onecan see thatthe
relationshipbetween GNPandpoverty is notat all close.But... I can concede
thatsteadyeconomicgrowtheventually lowerspoverty." MaharMangahas,
"Social Climate:Studypoverty morethanGNP",PhilippineDailyInquirer,
22 August2009.
35 Social Weather Stations,socialweatherindicators, tables"Self-rated poverty:
who are 'mahirap '
households (poor)"and "Degreeof hungerin households,
Philippines" <http://www.sws.org.ph/>.
36 Notethesenseofoutrage in manyoftheessaysin Between Fires,op. cit.

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Populismand theRevivalofReform 25

37 Carl Lande,"The Returnof 'People Power'in the Philippines", Journalof

Democracy 12, no. 2 (2001):88-102.
38 Teehankee, "Image,Issues,and Machinery", op cit. Although Villarhas also
been linkedto a corruption scandal,his populistnarrative retainsa strong
appealto Philippine voters.
39 MarkR. Thompson, "Presidentas and People Powerin Comparative Asian
Perspective",Philippine PoliticalScienceJournal 28, no. 51 (2007):1-32.
40 SheilaCoronel,"TheProblem withGMAI",I Report: TheInvestigative Reporting
Magazine,April-June 2003,p. 18.
41 SheilaS. Coroneland YvonneT. Chua,"The poorvoteis a thinking vote",
PhilippineCenterforInvestigative Journalism,26 April2004 <http://pcij.org/
stories/the-poor-vote-is-a-thinking-vote/>.
42 UroQ. de la Cruz,"TheMythofAngPanday(theBlacksmith)", I Report:The
Journalism
Investigative Magazine,October-December 2002,pp. 3-8; Isagani
De CastroJr.,"Fernando Poe Jr.:Unqualified or underestimated?" Newsbreak,
5 January2004.
43 LiraDalangin-Fernandez, "Lacson:Poe shouldgivein for'practical reasons'",
PhilippineDailyInquirer, 21 April2004.
44 CarlC. Lande,Post-Marcos A Geographical
Politics: andStatisticalAnalysisofthe
1992Presidential Election(Singapore:Institute
ofSoutheast AsianStudies, 1993).
45 Thisphasewassuggested tomebythehistorian Alfred McCoy, attheUniversity
ofWisconsin-Madison in February 2001.
46 SolitaCollas-Monsod, "Signsof unholydesigns",PhilippineDailyInquirer,
14 May2004.
47 Paul D. Hutchcroft and JoelRocamora, "Facedwithdemocratic The
deficit",
Standard[HongKong],3 June2004.
48 Max Soliven,"FinancialTimes:Vote-counting in RP is a nationaldisgrace",
PhilippineStar,15 June2004.
49 Paul Hutchcroft, "The ArroyoImbroglio in the Philippines", The Journal of
Democracy 19, no. 1 (2008):141-55.
50 The potentially fatalconsequences of votemanipulation weremadeapparent
by the November 2009 Maguindanao massacre.President Arroyohad close
linkswiththeoffending Ampatuan clanwhomshehad helpedto fight Muslim
secessionistsand who wereaccusedof helpingherstealthe 2004 election.
Conradode Quiros,"Causeand effect", Philippine DailyInquirer, 1 December
2009;Editorial,"Arroyo legacystainedwithblood",Philippine DailyInquirer,
3 December 2009.
51 AgenceFrance-Presse, "EU to helpRP tackleextrajudicial Philippine
killings",
DailyInquirer,9 October2009 <www.inquirer.net>.
52 MaharMangahas, "Socialclimate:The popularity ofCoryAquino",Philippine
DailyInquirer, 11 July2009.
53 PatricioN. Abinalesand D. DonnaJ.Amorosa, "The Withering of Philippine
Democracy", Current History (2006):290-95.
54 Raul Rodrigo, Paalam Cory:An ARS-CRNCommemorative Special (Manila:
ABS-CBN, 2009).

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26 MarkR. Thompson
55 Magno,"GameChanger", op. cit.
56 Conradode Quiros,"The 'Noynoy'phenomenon", Philippine DailyInquirer ,
1 October2009.
57 AmandoDoronila,"Transparency is now the defining issue in campaign",
PhilippineDailyInquirer, 16 September 2009.An editorial in thePhilippine
DailyInquirer decriedrampant dynasticism in Philippine politicsandreminded
readersthattherehas been no enablinglegislation(by primarily dynastic
on a constitutional
legislators!) banon dynasties forthepasttwenty-three years.
"Dynastic Republic", PhilippineDailyInquirer, 16 December 2009.
58 ThesechargesweredetailedduringBenignoS. AquinoJr.'strialunderthe
Marcosmartial law regime. See Chapter Threein Thompson, TheAnti-Marcos
Struggle,op. cit.
59 JamesClad,"Tainted watchdog", Far EasternEconomicReview,17 September
1987.
60 IndayEsspina-Varona, "The RisingSon",Philippines Graphic20, no. 16 (21
September 2009):17-21.
61 Fora moreoptimistic view,see JulioC. Teehankee, "Citizen-PartyLinkages in
thePhilippines: Failureto Connect?" in Reforming thePhilippine PartySystem:
Ideas and Initiatives,Debatesand Dynamics (Manila:Friedrich EbertStiftung,
2009).
62 BenReid,"Development NGOs,Semiclientelism andtheStateinthePhilippines:
From'Crossover' to DoubleCrossed", Kasarinlan 23, no. 1 (2008):4-42.
63 Contested and the in the
Quimpo, Democracy Left Philippines, op. cit.,pp. 126,
158.
64 VeronicaUy, "Villarties Aquino in presidential polls", PhilippineDaily
3 February
Inquirer, 2010.Withhis old-style moviestarpopulism, Estradawas
bothAquinoandVillarwithpollsshowing
trailing he hadapproximately 15 per
centof votersupport. The meager5 per centbackingforpro-administration
candidate,GilbertTeodoro,who, interestingly, is Aquino'scousin,shows
thehopelessness of the pro-administration cause in such an atmosphere of
reformistrevivalism and populisttransformation. Eventherecentflooding in
MetroManilaand vicinity as well as in northern Luzoncausedby typhoons
Ketsana(Ondoy)and Parmain late September-October 2009,whichkilledat
least 500 people and affected up to fivemillionothers,does not seemto
have helpedTeodoro'scandidacy.See "Wadingin the muckis forTeodoro
a double-edged sword",Philippine DailyInquirer, 1 October2009.Although
Teodoro'sprofile was raisedin leadingthereliefefforts, it becamea "poisoned
chalice"giventhedifficulties in thegovernment-led disasterreliefefforts. It
also emphasized theneed for"reform" of government giventhewidespread
beliefthatextent ofthedisaster couldbe blamedon thefailings oftheArroyo
administration.
65 ChristineAvendano and Gil C. Cabacungan Jr.,"Election: Goodvs. evil?Rich
vs. poor?"Philippine DailyInquiry, 14 September 2009.
66 LiraDelingin-Femandez, "De Veneciaurgessalonsto backVillar",Philippine
DailyInquirer, 30 September 2009.
67 RamonCasiplequotedinNikkoDizon,"Villar money rulesnoontime TVshows",
PhilippineDailyInquirer, 6 February 2010.

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Populismand theRevivalofReform 27

68 rulesnoontime TV",op. cit.Theshowname"EatBulagal "

Dizon,"Villarmoney
is derivedfrom"eat", which is both a reference to the show airing at lunch
timeand a transliteration of "it",a game-slang in Tagalogfor"lost"(in the
" " in
game),and fromtheTagalogword Bulaga whichis close to "surprise"
English (but its closest is
equivalent "peek-a-boo").
69 Avendano and Gil C. Cabacungan Jr.,"Election: Goodvs. evil?Richvs. poor?",
op. cit.
70 In a December 2009PulseAsiapollaskingFilipinos whattheirmajorreasonwas
forsupporting a majorpresidential candidate, a plurality, 27 percent(25 per
centand 33 percentoftheD andE incomeclasses,thetwolowestcategories,
respectively) said,"caresforpoor",a populistcode phrase.Only21 percent
(22 percentand 17 percentofD and E) gave"notcorrupt/clean record"as
theirmainreasonforchoosinga candidate.Butanother12 percent(13 per
centand 10 percentofD and E) said theywouldvotefora "goodperson".
Notbeingcorrupt andbeing"good"arecatchphrasesofreformism and shows
thereis also a strong basisformaking appealsto votersbasedon theclaimed
highmoralcharacter ofthecandidate. I amgrateful to an anonymous referee for
pointing outthesesurveyresults.See <http://pulseasia.com.ph/pulseasia/story.
asp?ID=702>.
71 Kannika Damrongplasit andGlennA. Melnick, "EarlyResults from Thailand's 30
BahtHealthReform: Something to SmileAbout", HealthAffairs 28,no.3 (2009):
457-66.Although stillhighlyelitistin approach, theThaksinadministration
engagedin at leastsome"genuine" populism, as opposedto thedisappointing
recordof socialreform underEstrada.
72 Villarhas beenaccusedbya Senatecommittee ordoublefunding theC-5road
extension project. Testimony was heardthatVillarinserted an additional P200
to the C-5 projectin the 2008 nationalbudgeton top of the P200 million
alreadyallotted.He was also accusedof masterminding thediversion of the
originalrouteof theC-5 extension, whichwould connectthe SouthLuzon
Superhighway to theCoastalRoad in ParanaqueCity,in orderto construct a
Paranaque-Las Pinasroadlink.The realigned roadpassedthrough subdivision
lands ownedby Villar'sreal estatefirms, increasing theirmarket value.Fel
V. Maragay, "Villartauntsaccuserson C-5 scandal",ManilaStandardToday,
2 November 2009.
73 In a recentcoverstory, the magazineBizNewsAsia, no. 19 (2009),"GMA's
Legacy:Economy, Infra, Integration", madea persuasive case forthesuccessof
Arroyo's economic record. In eightyears,from 2001-08,theeconomy expanded
one-and-a-half times,from$74 to $185 billion.The country enjoyedthirty-
threeconsecutive quarters of growth, the longestsustainedexpansionin its
modernhistory. An averageGDP growthrate of 4.6 per cent duringher
administration beatsEstrada (2.8percent),Ramos(3.7percent),Aquino(3.6per
cent)and Marcos(3.8 percent).Inflation (at an averageof 5.6 percent)was
also lowestunderArroyo. Per capitagrowth (figuring in theover2 percent
population growth) was 2.65 per cent over these years. In thequarter century
before thatit averaged only0.2 percent.The market valueoflistedcompanies
rose fromP2 trillionin 2001 to P7 trillionin 2007. Arroyomade major
infrastructure investments in roadnetworks, seaports, airports, powerplants,
information technology andcommunication networks. ThePhilippines is finally
virtually fullyelectrified and wirelessconnected, withcellphonenetworks

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28 MarkR. Thompson

reaching98 percentofthearchipelago (with80 percentofFilipinoshaving

cellphones).
74 RichardF. Doner,ThePoliticsof UnevenDevelopment: Thailand'sEconomic
Growth in Comparative (Cambridge,
Perspective UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,
2009).
75 Arthur AlanShantz,PoliticalParties:TheChanging Foundations
ofPhilippine
Democracy (Ph.D.dissertation,
UniversityofMichigan,1972).

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