An Appraisal of the Nature and Forms of Formalism in Philosophy of Mathematics

By

Kyrian A. OJONG, PhD & Edoh Sunday ODUM

Department of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy,
University of Calabar, Calabar-Nigeria Benue State University, Makurdi.
[email protected] [email protected]
Tel: +2348038996171. Tel: +234(0)8104030790.

Abstract
Formalism, along with logicism and intuitionism, constitutes the “classical” philosophical
programs for grounding mathematics; however, formalism is in many respects the least clearly
defined. While Logicism and intuitionism have crisply outlined programs by Gottlob Frege and
Jan Brouwer respectively, with the advantages and disadvantages of the programs, clearly
delineated, it is not the same for formalism. Here, answer to the question of what constitutes
formalism and what it stands for is hard to come by. This paper seeks to answer the question of
what constitutes the nature and form of formalism in the philosophy of mathematics; it also seeks
to undertake an appraisal of formalism. This paper found out that Gottlob Frege and Jan
Brouwer, who represents logicism and intuitionism respectively, ranks among the major critics
of Hilbert’s formalism. While this paper does not deride the rebuttals that have been brought
against formalism by Frege and Brouwer, this paper argues that their positions are both biased
and shrouded with the intent of pulling down one in a bid to elevate the other. The paper also
found out that Hilbert took the criticisms that have been brought against the formalist conception
of mathematics very seriously and reformulated some of his positions. This led to his later
acceptance of the idea that mathematicians starts with an intuitive notion of natural numbers in
his new mathematics (metamathematics). The conclusion that is reached in this paper are in two
front: one, the flaws of formalism notwithstanding, its influence on subsequent philosophizing
about mathematics is quite enormous; two, in any axiomatic system that is developed and
constructed formalistically, the possibility of deriving all the deductive consequences of the
chosen axioms easily and definitely is reasonably realistic.

Keywords: Formalism, Intuitionism, Logicism, Mathematics, Metamathematics

INTRODUCTION
1
While mathematics has been argued to be the queen of the sciences, 1 it remains to assert that the
philosophy of mathematics, properly situated can be said to belong to the sub-field of philosophy
known as the philosophy of infrastructure. Here, philosophy assumes the position of a second-
order discipline, and pries into the basic assumptions of other disciplines. Within the context of
mathematics, philosophy of mathematics is the branch of philosophy that is saddled with the
responsibility of understanding mathematics. It investigates the scope and limits of mathematics,
the subject matter of mathematics, the relationship between mathematics and other disciplines in
the sciences, the logic of mathematics and mathematical proofs amongst others. In this context,
“philosophy sheds light on what mathematics is about”.2 Philosophy of mathematics does the
problematization of mathematics, that is to say that it brings mathematics into question. 3 It is the
guiding and working philosophy of professional mathematicians and the philosophical attitude
towards the discipline of mathematics.

Discourses in philosophy of mathematics proceeds from three major schools and these include,
logicism, formalism and intuitionism. While logicism holds that that mathematics is reducible to
logic and that logical terms can be used to define mathematical objects; formalism holds that
mathematical statements are the consequences of the manipulation of symbols. For the
intuitionism is the idea that mathematics is the creation of the mind and that mathematical
statements are mental creations. This paper seeks to engage in a discourse on the nature and
forms of formalism. Hence, in what follows, the concept of formalism will be clarified and
operationalized in the context of the philosophy of mathematics in the first section. In the second
section, the discourse on the types and forms of formalism will ensure will the third section
advances a discourse on the critique of formalism as a school in the study of philosophy of
mathematic before the conclusion, which as one will expect, sums up the entirety of the
discourse in this paper is drawn.

Making Sense of the Concept of Formalism

1
Colyvan, M. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics. (Sydney: University of Sydney Press, 2011), 1.
2
Colyvan, M. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics, 2.
3
Risteski, I. B and Garcia, D.C “On what there is in Philosophy of Mathematics” In Discussion Filosofica. Vol. 9.
No. 12 (June 2008), 101.
2
As one of the three major schools in the study of the philosophy of mathematics; formalism
“takes mathematical notations and its manipulations to be the core business of mathematics”. 4
Formalism, along with logicism and intuitionism are the three classical philosophical programme
for grounding mathematics. In its purest form, Colyvan further avers that formalism is the thesis
that mathematics is nothing more than the manipulations of meaningless symbols. 5 To quote
Stewart Shapiro, “the various philosophies that goes by the name formalism pursues a claim that
the essence of mathematics is the manipulation of characters”. 6 He further argued that the list of
the characters and allowed rules all but exhaust what there is to say about a given branch of
mathematics. Hence, mathematics for the formalist does not go beyond typographical characters
and rules for manipulating them.7

The term ‘formalism’ according to Sinaceur may have at least three different meanings. First,
‘formalism’ can be understood as referring to a mathematical way of operating. A formalist way
of doing mathematics shows how one can get new and innovative results from the mere
inspection of symbolic expressions used or coined for mathematical entities or properties. In a
second sense, ‘formalism’ means a philosophical attitude, which seeks an answer not to the
question: how can one do mathematics in a general and very efficient way? But to the question:
how or on what to ground mathematical practice? The third and more specific sense of
‘formalism’ comes from Hilbert’s metamathematics, which combines logical analysis of
mathematical procedures with philosophical views on the foundations of mathematical practice.
This third sense is linked to Hilbert’s concern with formal systems of mathematical theories, to
his syntactic study of mathematical proof, and, notably, to his search for consistency proofs
which would secure the soundness of mathematical reasoning against the paradoxes of set theory
and would permit to avoid restrictions on classical logic.8 It is within the context of the third
meaning that formalism is considered synonymous with the works of Hilbert.

4
Colyvan, M. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics, 4.
5
Colyvan, M. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics, 4.
6
Shapiro, S. Thinking about Mathematics: The Philosophy of Mathematics. (New York: Oxford University Press,
2000), 140.
7
Shapiro, S. Thinking about Mathematics: The Philosophy of Mathematics, 140.
8
Sinaceur, H. B. “Taski’s Practice and Philosophy: Between Formalism and Pragmaticism” Lindstrom, S. et’al
(Ed.) Logicism, Intuitionism and Formalism. (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2009), 355-356.
3
In the same vein, the school of formalism according to Ernest Snapper was created in about 1910
by the German mathematician, David Hilbert (1862-1943).9 While it is reasonable to credit the
systematic beginning of formalism to Hilbert, it remains to say, following from Frege’s critique
of the formalist in his Grundgestze in the 19th century that there exist some formalists even
before Hilbert. It must however be noted that, the modern concept of formalism, which include
finitary reasoning must be credited to Hilbert. In his contribution to the discourse on what
constitutes formalism, J. M. Bochenski averred that:

Formalism is thus, a method which consists in completely disregarding the

eidetic meaning of signs and operating with them on the basis of certain
transformation-rules concerned only with the written shape of the signs.
They are treated as though they were not signs but pieces in a game, which
can be combined and transposed in various ways. It has therefore been
said in jest that anyone who makes use of formalism does not know what
he is saying, nor whether what he is saying is true.10
Put differently, formalism is the viewpoint which maintains that human reason does not have at
its disposal exact images either of straight lines or of numbers larger than ten, for example, and
that therefore these mathematical entities do not have existence in our conception of nature any
more than in nature itself. It is true that from certain relations among mathematical entities,
which we assume as axioms, we deduce other relations according to fixed laws, in the conviction
that in this way we derive truths from truths by logical reasoning. But this non-mathematical
conviction of truth or legitimacy has no exactness whatever and is nothing but a vague sensation
of delight arising from the knowledge of the efficacy of the projection into nature of these
relations and laws of reasoning. For the formalist, therefore, mathematical exactness consists
merely in the method of developing the series of relations, and is independent of the significance
one might want to give to the relations or the entities which they relate. 11 And for the consistent
formalist these meaningless series of relations to which mathematics are reduced have
mathematical existence only when they have been represented in spoken or written language

9
Snapper, E “The Three Crisis in Mathematics: Logicism, Intuitionism and Formalism” in Mathematics Magazine.
Vol. 52., No. 4, (Sept. 1979), 212.
10
Bochenski, J.M The Methods of Contemporary Thought (Bern: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1965), 40.
11
Brouwer, L. E. “Intuitionism and formalism” in Paul Benacerraf (Ed.) Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected
Readings. Second Edition, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 78.
4
together with the mathematical-logical laws upon which their development depends, thus
forming what is called symbolic logic.12

It must however be noted that formalism as Shapiro argues has a better pedigree and
acceptability amongst mathematicians than amongst philosophers of mathematics. That
mathematicians have had occasion to introduce symbols which, at the time, seems to have no
clear interpretation is a statement of fact that is corroborated by history.13 To quote Shapiro,

The very names ‘negative numbers’, ‘irrational numbers’, ‘transcendental

numbers’, ‘imaginary numbers’, and ‘ideal point at affinity’ indicates
ambivalence. Fortunately, the profession of mathematics has had its share
of bold, imaginative souls, but it seems that some special folk provides the
names. Although the newly introduced ‘entities’ proved useful for
applications within mathematics and science, in their philosophical
moments some mathematicians did not know what to make of them. What
are imaginary numbers, really? A common response to such dilemmas is
to retreat to formalism.14
Deducible from the above discourse on the concept of formalism is that, it is one of the major
schools of thought in the philosophy of mathematics which was systematized in the works of
Hilbert. It is a method of studying mathematics or its foundations that completely disregards
signs and symbols while considering the manipulation of characters as the very essence of
mathematics.

Forms of Formalism

Various classifications of the school of the philosophy of mathematics that go by the name
formalism have been advanced. Stewart Shapiro in his book Thinking about Mathematics: The
Philosophy of Mathematics, distinguished term from game formalism. However, Alan Weir in
his article “Formalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics” gave the breakdown of the forms in
which formalism unveils itself to include game and term formalism, tractarian formalism
(relating to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus), formalism and the positivists, and nominalist
formalism. It is drawing from the above classifications that this paper engages in the discourse
on the forms of formalism.

12
Brouwer, L. E. “Intuitionism and formalism”, 79.
13
Shapiro, S. Thinking about Mathematics: The Philosophy of Mathematics, 141.
14
Shapiro, S. Thinking about Mathematics: The Philosophy of Mathematics, 141.
5
i. Term and Game Formalism

Term and game formalism according to Weir arose from the materials Frege works over.15 Term
formalism is the view that mathematics is about characters of symbols - the system of numerals
and other linguistics forms. Put differently, term formalists identify the entities of mathematics
with their names.16 For Weir, the term formalists views the expression of mathematics, arithmetic
for example, as meaningful, the singular term as referring, but as referring to symbols such as
themselves rather than numbers, construed as entities distinct from symbols.17 For the term
formalist, the complex number 8+2 is just the symbol 8+2. Hence, a thorough going term
formalist will identify the natural number 2 with the numeral 2. 18 It is following from the above
that Shapiro further argues that, for the term formalist, mathematics has a subject matter and
mathematical propositions are true or false. Term formalist proposes simple solution to
seemingly difficult metaphysical and epistemological problems within the context of
mathematics.19

Some of these problems and questions are what is mathematic about? What are these numbers,
sets etc? they are linguistic character and with regards to the question of what is mathematical
knowledge, the term formalists’ answer is that, it is knowledge of how the character are related
to each other and how they can be manipulated in mathematics. 20 These answers, as it were,
leaves more to be desired and opens up the trajectory of this version of formalism to criticisms.

To further buttress the above, Shapiro gave the example of the equation 0=0. In his analysis,
Shapiro argued that the term formalist cannot posit that the left part of the equation which is a
shape like an oval is identical with the right side which is also shaped like an oval. This is
because they are two different things separated by the equal sign. Rather, the term formalist
might take the equation to assert that those two hunks of ink have the same shapes. From this
perspective, the term formalist may also argue that mathematics is about types. The above

15
See Weir, Alan, "Formalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall
2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/formalism-
mathematics/>. Retrieved on the 20/01/2020. Web.
16
Shapiro, S. Thinking about Mathematics: The Philosophy of Mathematics, 142.
17
Weir, Alan, "Formalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics".
18
Shapiro, S. Thinking about Mathematics: The Philosophy of Mathematics, 142.
19
Shapiro, S. Thinking about Mathematics: The Philosophy of Mathematics, 142.
20
Shapiro, S. Thinking about Mathematics: The Philosophy of Mathematics, 142.
6
equation would thus, be a simple, straight forward instance of the law of identity and hence, the
equation can be taken to be type ‘0’ is identical with itself.21

It must be stated at this point that term formalism at its rudimentary form was advanced by two
mathematicians, Eduard Heine and Carl Johannes Thomae around the beginning of the 20 th
century. In this regard, Shapiro quotes Heine as asserting that he (Heine) gave the name numbers
to certain tangible signs, so that the existence of these numbers is thus unquestionable and also
quotes Thomae as claiming that the formal standpoint rids us of all metaphysical difficulties; this
is the advantage it affords us.22 Having accounted to a large extent, the substance of term
formalism, in the following paragraphs, this paper proceeds to a discourse on Game formalism.

The idea of game formalism can be traced to Carl Johannes Thomae. According to Karl
Podnieks, this can be traced to 1898 when Thomae stated that “the formal concept of number
does not ask, what are and what shall the number be, but it asks, what does one requires of
numbers in arithmetic. For the formal conception, arithmetic is a game with signs”. 23
Contributing to discourse on game formalism, Shapiro avers that game formalism views the
practice of mathematics to a game that is played with linguistic character. Using the example of
the chess game where one can use a pawn to capture one square forward on a diagonal, so in
arithmetic, one can write x=10 if one has previously gotten x=8+2.24 Corroborating the above,
Colyvan stressed that, the so-called game formalism is the view that mathematics is much like
chess. The pieces of a chess set do not represent anything; they are just meaningless pieces of
wood, metal, or whatever, defined by the rules that govern the legal moves that they can
participate in. The mathematical symbols are nothing more than pieces in a game and can be
manipulated according to the rules. So, for example, elementary calculus tells us that
d(ax2+bx+c)/dx = 2ax+b. This is taken by formalism to mean that the right-hand side of the
equation can be reached by a series of legal mathematical moves “from the left-hand side. As a
result of this, in future mathematical games” one is licensed to replace the symbols ‘d(ax 2 + bx +

21
Shapiro, S. Thinking about Mathematics: The Philosophy of Mathematics, 142.
22
Shapiro, S. Thinking about Mathematics: The Philosophy of Mathematics, 143.
23
Podnieks, K. “Fourteen Arguments in Favour of a Formalist Philosophy of Real Mathematics” in Baltic, J (Ed.)
Modern Computing Journal.Vol. 3, No. 1, (2015), 1.
24
Shapiro, S. Thinking about Mathematics: The Philosophy of Mathematics, 144.
7
c)/dx with the symbols ‘2ax + b’.25 Hence, one can argue that this version of formalism sees
mathematical formulas as having no meaning than the pieces on the chessboard.

For Karl Podniek, game formalism is the pure and extreme version of formalism because it is
taken to represent mathematics as a meaningless game with strings of symbols. 26 Game
formalism allows mathematician the latitude to postulate any axiom that makes, and explore the
consequences that can be derived from the axioms in question. The fact of making sense is quite
imperative here because in as much as mathematics has within itself, the element of gaming, the
game is obviously not a meaningless one.

The radical version of game formalism holds that the symbols of mathematics are meaningless
while the moderate version of game formalism agrees that the language of mathematics may
have some sort of meaning but with the caveat that such meanings are irrelevant to the practice
of mathematics. It must however be noted that the differential between the radical and the
moderate view stated above as Shapiro argues has little significance for the philosophy of
mathematics. The two versions seem to however agree on the lack of mathematical interpretation
for the typographical character of the branch of mathematics but against the two version of game
formalism, term formalist hold that mathematics is about terminology. On the other hand, it must
also be noted that just like term formalism, game formalism solves or sidesteps difficult
metaphysical and epistemological problem within mathematics.27

Term and game formalism are not without flaws. According Weir, Frege mercilessly exposed the
inadequacies of term and game formalism as put forward by Heine and Thomae. These
inadequacies include their confusion as they slip from term to game formalism, their inability to
set out an account of the syntax and the proof theory which is remotely adequate as an account of
mathematics with which they amongst others.28

ii. Tractarian Formalism

Ludwig Wittgenstein was a keen student of Frege’s work. In fact, it was Frege who directed him
to further his studies under Bertrand Russell. Following from this background, it feels safe to
25
Colyvan, M. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics, 4.
26
Podnieks, K. “Fourteen Arguments in Favour of a Formalist Philosophy of Real Mathematics”, 1.
27
Shapiro, S. Thinking about Mathematics: The Philosophy of Mathematics, 144-145.
28
See Weir Alan, "Formalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics".
8
think that he will have an aversion for and against formalism. This was however not to be as one
finds traces and elements of formalism in his Tractatus.29 According to Plebani, if Formalism is
the view that mathematics is not a science describing a domain of abstract or mental objects, but
just a rule governed manipulation of signs, then Wittgenstein is definitely a formalist, despite his
own view about this issue: when Wittgenstein denies to be a formalist, he does so just because he
has a very strange notion of formalism in mind. 30 For Wittgenstein in his rebuttal of Frege’s
criticism of formalism,

Frege was right in this criticism (of formalism). Only he did not see the
other, justified side of formalism, that the symbols of mathematics,
although they are not signs, lack a meaning. For Frege the alternative was
this: either we deal with strokes of ink on paper or these strokes of ink are
signs of something and their meaning are what they go proxy for. The
game of chess shows that these alternatives are wrongly conceived?
Although it is not the wooden chessmen we are dealing with, these figures
do not go proxy for anything; they have no meaning in Frege’s sense.
There is still a third possibility; the signs can be used the way they are in
the game.31
This is to become the beginning of tractarian formalism. Quoting Wittgenstein from his
Tractatus, Weir avers that Wittgenstein argued that mathematics is a logical method and that the
propositions of mathematics are equations, and therefore pseudo-propositions. A proposition of
mathematics does not express a thought.32

What should be noted is that Wittgenstein attempts no theory of mathematics in the Tractatus
beyond arithmetic, a rather narrow fragment of arithmetic at that. The theory clearly shares the
anti-platonism of the game formalist. There are no numbers; arithmetic is to be construed as a
calculus in which one manipulates exponents or indices of operators. What is an operator?
Wittgenstein distinguishes operator terms from function terms but commentators have struggled
to explain what the distinction comes to.

Operators, however, are to be distinguished from functions in at least that aspect: genuine
iteration of operators; the sentential operators of propositional logic are a prime example is

29
Weir Alan, "Formalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics".
30
Matteo Plebani Reconsidering Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics. (N. d, Np.), 24.
31
McGuinness, B. F. (ed.) Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle: Conversations recorded by Friedrich Waismann,
trans. J. Schulte and B. F. McGuinness, (Blackwell, Oxford, 1979), 105.
32
Weir Alan, "Formalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics".
9
possible without supposing a change of sense or reference from one token to the other. What is
their meaning or referent then? Wittgenstein denies they have any referents; this is a
generalisation of his claim that the logical constants are not representatives. Peter Hylton argues
that Wittgenstein in the Tractatus has Russellian propositional functions in mind when he talks
of ‘functions’ and is at pains to distinguish operators from these “substantial” entities. Russellian
propositional functions are not the same as ordinary mathematical functions, the model for
Frege’s notion of function. Rather they are structured entities, structurally related to the
propositions which are their values; gappy states of affairs might be one way to think of them. 33
Operators, by contrast, do not stand for any such entity, they are not part nor any sort of
ingredients of propositions, they “leave no trace” in them.

The problem with Wittgenstein’s interpretation of formalism is that a formalist is not necessarily
committed to the view that mathematics consist in describing the features of some concrete
tokens, nor that it is about the structure of a system of types as in Hilbert’s conception of
metamathematics; instead, the conception of mathematics Wittgenstein endorses in this passage,
according to which mathematics is a rule governed sign game that can be aptly described by the
analogy with chess, is much in the spirit of traditional formalism. One can agree with Rodych,
that Wittgenstein’s third way is just a version of formalism. 34 So, we can label Wittgenstein a
quasi-formalist; if we are interested in showing the difference that exist between his position and
that of Hilbert.

Finally, there is a point of connection between Wittgenstein position and Hilbert’s formalism. It
is that the idea that mathematical sentence are rules of grammar, that they contribute in defining
the meaning of the concept involved in their formulation is reminiscent of (and a radicalization
of) Hilbert’s view of axioms as implicit definitions of primitive concept.35

iii. Formalism and the Positivists

Logical positivism is the result of combining the central aspects of the positivisms of Auguste
Comte and Ernst Mach with the meta-philosophical and methodological views of the analytic

33
Hylton, Peter, “Functions, Operations and Sense in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus”, in W.W. Tait (ed.), Early analytic
philosophy: Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein: essays in honor of Leonard Linsky, (Chicago: Open Court: 1997), 97–98.
34
Hylton, Peter, “Functions, Operations and Sense in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus”, 198.
35
Matteo Plebani Reconsidering Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics, 26.
10
movement, especially as understood by the ideal-language camp. In all its forms, positivism was
animated by the idealization of scientific knowledge as it was commonly understood from at
least the time of Newton through the early twentieth century. Consequently, at its core is a view
called scientism: the view that all knowledge is scientific knowledge. For James Fieser and
Samuel Stumpf, positivism involves both negative and positive components. On the negative
side it rejects the assumption that nature has some ultimate purpose, and it gives up any attempt
to discover either the “essence” or the secret causes of things. On the positive side it attempts to
study facts by observing the constant relations between things and by formulating the laws of
science simply as the laws of constant relations among various phenomena.36 It must be noted
that logical positivism as a school of philosophy was created by the Vienna circle philosophers.

According to Weir, Wittgenstein greatly influenced the Vienna Circle. The ‘official’ positivist
theory of mathematics, as it were, is not a formalist one. Mathematical theorems express truths,
albeit in a special way: true by virtue of meaning alone. The most influential positivist has been
Carnap, if one does not classify Quine as a positivist (but Quine’s views, in the 1930s at any rate,
were very close to Carnap’s, indeed arguably Quine remained truer to Carnap’s radical
empiricism than Carnap did). And one can certainly discern strong elements of formalism in
some of Carnap’s writings, for instance in Logische Syntax der Sprache (1937) and Empiricism,
Semantics, and Ontology (1956).37

As at the time of writing the Logical of Syntax of Language, Carnap’s philosophizing about
mathematics had a formalist element and there is a sense in which Carnap’s project in the
Logical of Syntax of Language was meant to satisfy the formalist conception of mathematics.
Laver corroborated the above when he averred that Carnap compared the demands of logicism
and formalism and evaluates how well the language of Logical of Syntax of Language satisfy
these demand, as Carnap see things, the main difference lies in the fact that the logicist is
concerned with the meaning of mathematical vocabulary while the formalist is not. 38 He further
stressed that the logicist holds that the logical foundation of mathematics has the task, not only of

36
Fieser, J and Stumpf, S. E Philosophy: A Historical Survey with Essential Readings (9th Edition). (New York:
McGraw Hill, 2015). 363.
37
Weir Alan, "Formalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics".
38
Laver, G. “Carnap’s Formalism and informal Rigour” Philosophia Mathematica. (Oxford: Oxford University
Press. 2006), 6.
11
setting up a calculus, but also, and preeminently, of giving account of the meaning of
mathematical symbols and sentences. This task can be said to have been achieved in the logicist
definition of mathematical symbols in terms of logical primitives and deriving mathematical
sentence from purely logical truths. On the other hand, the formalist constructs a calculus with
both logical and mathematical primitives. 39 It is in the context that one finds a sense in which
Carnap’s project in the Logical Syntax of Language is meant to satisfy the formalist.

In The Logical Syntax of Language, Carnap argued that the correct method in philosophy is to
engage in conceptual analysis conceived of as ‘logical syntax’, roughly speaking syntax proper
and proof theory. To address philosophical differences, one proposes regimenting the disputed
positions in formal languages or ‘frameworks’ which include a system of axioms and rules of
proof; given these, some sentences are ‘determinate’, are provable or refutable. These are the
analytic, and contradictory, sentences, relative to that framework.

How do we choose which system to adopt? Carnap’s Principle of Tolerance allows us to adopt
any system we wish. To quote him, “in logic, there are no morals. Everyone is at liberty to build
up his own logic, that is, his own form of language, as he wishes as far as special mathematical
calculi are concerned, the attitude which is tacitly shared by the majority of mathematicians”. 40
Any such calculus can count as a piece of mathematics, even an inconsistent one. By
downplaying or outright discarding semantic notions, we simply bypass traditional ontological
disputes concerning the nature of the entities mathematics is ‘about’. The only issue is the
pragmatic utility, or otherwise, of any given mathematical calculus.

The above, according to Weir, spells a number of concerns. These include the questions of how
Carnap can distinguish between empirical, scientific theories, and mathematical ones? Secondly,
if pragmatic utility is primarily a matter of empirical applications, how does the Carnapian
formalist know that a given calculus will conservatively extend empirical theory, how can this be
known without appeal to meaningful mathematical results? Carnap seems to anticipate these
questions and responded in the following lines:

39
Laver, G. “Carnap’s Formalism and informal Rigour”, 6.
40
Carnap, R. The Logical Syntax of Language. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1999), 53.
12
 The formalist view is right in holding that the construction of the system
can be effected purely formally, that is to say without reference to the
meaning of the symbols; … But the task which is thus, outlined is
certainly not fulfilled by the construction of a logico-mathematical
calculus alone. For this calculus does not contain… those sentences which
are concerned with the application of mathematics… For instance, the
sentence “in this room there are now two people present” cannot be
derived from the sentence “Charles and Peter are in this room now and no
one else” with the help of the logico-mathematical calculus alone, as it is
usually constructed by the formalists; but it can be derived with the help of
the logicist system, namely on the basis of Frege’s definition of ‘2’.41

Gödel’s incompleteness theorems pose very difficult problems for Carnap in this and other
regards. The first incompleteness theorem tells us that in any consistent formal theory whose
theorems are recursively enumerable and which entails a certain amount of arithmetic, there will
be an arithmetical sentence such that neither it nor its negation is provable. In Carnap’s
terminology, this seems to yield non-determinate sentences, which is a problem for him if we are
convinced that nonetheless some of these sentences are true; and indeed the key type of
sentences used to prove the incompleteness result. ‘Gödel sentences’ are in fact true in the
standard model of arithmetic if these sentences are constructed in an appropriate way (there are
different ways of doing this) from a theory itself true in that model.

Gödel himself wrote, but did not publish, a searching critique of Carnap’s position. 42 Gödel
focuses not on his first incompleteness theorem but on the corollary he drew in his second
theorem that, under a certain natural characterization of the property of consistency, a
characterization which can be given mathematically via his arithmetization of syntax, no formal
theory of the type Gödel considered could prove its own consistency. He argued that Carnap, in
order to make good his positivistic thesis that mathematical theorems are devoid of content,
needed to give a consistency proof for mathematical calculi in order to show that they do not
have empirical content, an abundance thereof indeed, by dint of entailing all empirical sentences.
This point, however, fails to appreciate the deep holism of Carnap’s 1937 position where the
distinction between analytic and synthetic is relative to the system in question, the ‘linguistic
framework’(this deep holism, of course, has the counter-intuitive consequence that there is no
framework-transcendent distinction between mathematics and empirical sciences).
41
Carnap, R. The Logical Syntax of Language, 326.
42
Weir Alan, "Formalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics".
13
According to Weir, Carnap, in fact, understood the import of Gödel’s theorems; he knew of the
results directly from Gödel, who indeed read drafts of the Logical Syntax. Despite this, he
displayed what looks like remarkable insouciance with respect to its implications for his position.
He acknowledged the need, in demonstrating consistency, to move to a stronger language, 43 and
freely helped himself to mathematical techniques which could in no sense be classed as finitary.

Carnap’s relaxed attitude stems from his abandonment of the search for epistemological
foundations. If one hopes to secure our knowledge of mathematics by appeal to a formalist
interpretation then the search for a consistency proof of the type Hilbert sought, makes sense and
one will look for a vindication of mathematics as a whole from within a limited fragment with
respect to which our knowledge seems hard to impugn. But Carnap, perhaps as a result of
Gödel’s deep theorems, seems to have abandoned that goal and thought that the principle of
tolerance absolved him of any such need. One can stipulate what one likes, including stronger
axiom systems from which one can prove the consistency of a weaker theory. This does not give
any firmer grounds for believing or accepting the weaker theory, but one does not need such
grounds anyway.44

Few, nowadays, look for Cartesian certitude in mathematics, so Carnap’s position here may seem
reasonable. It is not so clear, however, that he has resolved the problem of applicability. Even if
a conservative extension result can only be given in a more powerful system, we need the result
to be a truth with contents, not just a string of symbols we can derive from some system, if we
are to have reassurance that a particular calculus we are about to use in designing bridges or
computers will be pragmatically useful. And if the Carnapian grants that the result is a truth with
content, we can ask what, according to this formalistic position, constitutes that truth. Carnap, to
be sure, was motivated by a horror of becoming embroiled in metaphysical disputation. But if his
standpoint is emptied not only of epistemological ambition but is so deflationistic as to say little
more than that metamathematical techniques can be applied to formalisations of mathematical
and scientific theories then it is also emptied of all philosophical interest and ceases to make an
intervention in the debates in philosophy of mathematics.45

43
Weir Alan, "Formalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics".
44
Weir Alan, "Formalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics".
45
Weir Alan, "Formalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics".
14
The vestige of formalism lies in the fact that “Carnap takes ‘correctness’ to be determined by
rules which govern a system and not to consist, for example, in correspondence with a realm of
facts independent of the system of rules”.46 And he thinks this approach dissolves ontological
worries and frees us from any obligation to explain how finite, flesh-and-blood creatures like
ourselves could come to have detailed knowledge of this independent realm of facts, this domain
of configurations of abstract, non-temporal, non-causal objects and properties, a realm exposed
by Carnap as a metaphysical illusion. One strong disanalogy with formalism is that Carnap takes
this line with all areas of discourse, not just mathematics.

iv. Norminalist Formalism

Norminalism, just like logicism relates to realism, and intuitionism relates to conceptualism, is
closely related to formalism. Nominalism as Snapper argues is the philosophy which claims that
abstract entities have no existence of any kind, neither outside the human mind nor as mental
construction within the human mind. Abstract entities are mere vocal utterances or written
lines.47 Drawing from the Latin derivation, nominalis which means names, abstract entities are
mere names. It must be noted that just as the formalist and nominalist avoid abstract entities and
their usage, nominalist formalist will do the same.

W. V. O. Quine famously rejected the positivist’s doctrine of truth in virtue of meaning and the
quasi-logicist conception of mathematics as a body of analytic truths (and, partly as a result, also
rejected his mentor Carnap’s internal/external distinction). Quine, in conjunction with Nelson
Goodman, produced instead what amounts to a formalist manifesto. His formalist phase does not
seem to have lasted very long: he later settled on a form of mathematical platonism,
downplaying, if not largely ignoring, his relatively youthful flirtation with ‘nominalism’. But
while it lasted, he and Goodman greatly advanced the discussion of formalism by tackling head-
on the questions which other formalists shirked or ignored. Goodman and Quine’s “Steps
towards a constructive nominalism” sets forth an uncompromising game formalism:

The gains which seem to have accrued to natural science from the use of
mathematical formulas do not imply that these formulas are true
statements. No one, not even the hardiest pragmatist, is likely to regard the
46
Weir Alan, "Formalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics".
47
Snapper, E “The Three Crisis in Mathematics: Logicism, Intuitionism and Formalism”, 215.
15
 beads of an abacus as true; and our position is that the formulas of
platonistic mathematics are, like the beads of an abacus, convenient
computational aids which need involve no question of truth.48

They regard the sentences of mathematics merely as strings of marks without meaning so that
“such intelligibility as mathematics possesses derives from the syntactical or metamathematical
rules governing those marks”.49 Commendably, Goodman and Quine do not shy away from the
metatheory problem, the difficulty that syntax and metamathematics itself seems as ontologically
rich and committed to abstract objects as arithmetic. On the contrary, they face it squarely and
attempt to make do entirely with an ontology of concrete objects, finitely many such objects in
fact. (However, they do assume fairly powerful mereological principles, essentially universal
composition: they assume that any fusion of objects however scattered or diffuse, is also an
object in good standing).

With much ingenuity they try to develop a syntax which will treat mathematical expressions as
concrete objects as actual strings of physical marks and give concrete surrogates for notions such
as ‘formula’, ‘axiom’ and ‘proof’ as platonistically defined. However, they do not address the
issue of the application of mathematics, construed in this concrete, formalistic fashion. In
addition to the applicability problem, one finds a crucial problem with the brand of formalism as
developed by Goodman and Quine. This problem borders on the fact that it is not clear that they
are entitled to the general claims they make about syntax, construed as a theory about certain
concrete marks and fusions of marks. Thus, when arguing that their definition of formula in
terms of ‘quasi-formula’ gives us the results we want, they aver that “by requiring also the next
more complex alternative denials in (x) to be alternative denials of quasi-formulas, the definition
guarantees these also will be formulas in the intuitively intended sense; and so on, to (x) itself”.50

A Critique of Formalism in Philosophy of Mathematics

48
Goodman, N and Quine, W. V., ‘Steps towards a Constructive Nominalism’, Journal of Symbolic Logic, 12,
(1947), 122.
49
Goodman, N and Quine, W. V., ‘Steps towards a Constructive Nominalism’, 111.
50
Goodman, N and Quine, W. V., ‘Steps towards a Constructive Nominalism’, 116.
16
It is a truism that there is “no philosophy that is so watertight as not to leave some loopholes”. 51
In the same vein, Peter Bodunrin avers that “the greatest compliment you can pay a philosopher
and any scholar for that matter is to criticize his work”. 52 It is in consonance with the above this
section attempts a critique of the doctrines of the formalist school of the philosophy of
mathematics.

A plethora of criticisms have been advanced against formalism. However, the German
philosopher and mathematician, who also systematized logicism and contributed to the
development of quantification theory, Gottlob Frege, is the most ardent and effective critic of
formalism. In his Foundations of Arithmetic, more specifically section 92-103 which is titled
“other numbers”, Frege took a swipe on the thinkers who introduced new numbers as a way of
providing solutions to equations which are hitherto and previously insoluble. In this regard,
Frege was unimpressed and argued that introducing new signs as is done in formalism to do new
things is inadmissible since they could be introduced to perform contradictory functions.53

In a follow up to the above, Frege, while contrasting the formalist position with his logicist
position criticized the formalist definition of numbers as either circular in presupposing the
consistency of what is defined, which supposes the sign’s signify something after all, or else as
impotent to secure the truth of the propositions that formal manipulations are supposed to
underwrite.54 In this sense, one can assert that Frege shows that the formalists are superficial in
their attitude since as it is clear, they did not offer a formal theory of positive integers.

There are however, two main objections that Frege set out against formalism. The first is the
problem of its applicability. To quote Weir, “if mathematics is just a calculus in which we
shuffle unintepreted symbols, then why has it been applied so successfully and in so many ways,
to so many different things, ordinary physical objects, sub-atomic objects, fields, properties, and
indeed, from one part of mathematics?” .55 In the same vein, Shapiro asserts the game formalist

51
Okoro, Chiedozie “Rationalism and Empiricism as Theories of Cognition” in Okoro, Chiedozie (Ed.) Essays in
Epistemology and Philosophy of History: A Exercise on the Critique of Cognition. (Nigeria: Soladem Printers
Limited, 2008), 51.
52
Bodunrin, Peter (ed), Philosophy and Africa: Trends and Perspectives. (Ile-Ife: University of Ife Press, 1985), xv
53
Simons, Peter, ‘Formalism’ in Andrew D. Irvine (ed.), Philosophy of Mathematics, (Amsterdam: North Holland,
2009), 5.
54
Simons, Peter, ‘Formalism’ in Andrew D. Irvine (ed.), Philosophy of Mathematics, 6.
55
See Weir Alan, "Formalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics".
17
is left with a daunting problem, why are the mathematical games so useful in the sciences
considering the fact that mathematics is the queen of all sciences? Why should one think that the
meaningless games of mathematics should have an application? It is a truism that it does have
application and hence, the need to explain these applications. This also goes within the context of
the application of mathematics within mathematics and brings to the fore, the question of why is
the game of complex analysis useful in the game of real analysis or arithmetic? This is all the
more troubling and problematic for someone who is a game formalist or is sympathetic to game
formalism or formalism in general.56

Frege’s response is that it is applicability and applicability alone that elevates mathematics from
a game to a science. To quote Frege with regards to his criticism of game formalism,

An arithmetic without thought as its content will also be without

possibility of application. Why can no application be made of a
configuration of chess pieces? Obviously, because it expresses no thought.
If it did so and every chess move conforming to the rules corresponded to
a transition from one thought to another, applications of chess would also
be conceivable. Why can arithmetic equations be applied? Only because
they express thoughts. How could we possibly apply an equation which
expressed nothing and was nothing more than a group of figures, to be
transformed into another group of figures in accordance with certain rules?
It is applicability alone which elevates arithmetic from a game to the rank
of a science.57
The second objection is hinged on the problem of metatheory. The problem this raises for the
formalist is that, metatheory is itself a substantial piece of mathematics, ostensibly committed to
an infinite realm of object which are not, on the face of it, concrete. Tokens of the expressions of
the object language game calculus may be finite-ink marks and the likes; but since there are
infinitely many expressions, theorem and proofs, these themselves must be taken to be abstract
types. At best, the formalist can achieve no more than a reduction in commitment from the
transfinite realms of some mathematical theories.58

Brouwer contributed to discourse on the critique of Hilbert’s formalism. Having taken formalism
as antithetical to his intuitionism, he averred that the formalist conception recognizes no other
56
Shapiro, S. Thinking about Mathematics: The Philosophy of Mathematics, 146.
57
Frege, G. Begriffsschrift. “Begriffsschrift: Selections (Preface and Part I).” In M. Beaney, ed., The Frege Reader.
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1879), 146.
58
Weir Alan, "Formalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics".
18
mathematics than the mathematical language and it considers it essential to draw up definitions
and axiom and to deduce from these other propositions by means of logical principles which are
also explicitly formulated beforehand.59 In his critique of formalism, Bouwer argued that “the
formalist purported foundations of mathematical laws on the axiomatic method are nothing but
mere linguistic explanations, devoid of content, which, as such, do not really explain anything”. 60
Bouwer further rejected formalism not just as a mathematical way but as a philosophy or more
accurately as mathematical project to solve philosophical problem. 61 It must be noted that this
rejection is in favour of his intuitionism and that is why he made no distinction between
formalism and logicism (the other two schools in the study of the philosophy of mathematics)
mentioning Russell, Cantor, Dedekind, Zermelo amongst others as formalist. It must also be
noted that one of the difference between Bouwer and Hilbert is the fact that Hilbert denied a
foundational status to intuition which is the basis of Bouwer’s intuitionism.

Hilbert however took the criticisms of Bouwer seriously and published a series of articles to
respond to him. In these articles, as Sinaceur argues, Hilbert introduced a new mathematics,
namely, metamathematics, and developed technically and philosophically, his famous finitistic
program where he incorporated what he referred to as the constructivity principle and some other
intuistic insight in a more systematic and radical manner. To quote Sinaceur:

He considered that one must have something primitive and irreducible to

begin with. He then changed his mind about intuition and logic and
accepted to give intuition a basic role in the formal treatment. From 1922
onwards, he gave up Frege’s and Dedekind’s idea to provide for arithmetic
a foundation that would be independent of all intuition and experience and
he claimed that as a condition for the use of logical inference and the
performance of logical operations, something must already be given to our
faculty of representation, certain extra-logical concrete objects that are
intuitively present as immediate experience prior to all thought.62
What can be deduced from the above is that, Hilbert admittedly agreed that mathematicians start
with an intuitive notion of number and confirmed Bouwer’s account of formalism and went
further after understanding insights as physical perception and formalism as mechanistic
operating with some signs, formulas and arrays. The latter are indeed, according to his new point
59
Sinaceur, H. B. “Taski’s Practice and Philosophy: Between Formalism and Pragmaticism”, 358.
60
Sinaceur, H. B. “Taski’s Practice and Philosophy: Between Formalism and Pragmaticism”, 359.
61
Sinaceur, H. B. “Taski’s Practice and Philosophy: Between Formalism and Pragmaticism”, 359-360.
62
Sinaceur, H. B. “Taski’s Practice and Philosophy: Between Formalism and Pragmaticism”, 364.
19
of view, the concrete and surveyable objects of metamathematics which according to Hilbert is
the continual theory of formalized proof.63 The leading idea in this theory of proof, according to
Johann Von Neumann is that even if the statements of classical mathematics should turn out to
be false as to content, nevertheless, classical mathematics involves an internally closed procedure
which operates according to fixed rules known to all mathematicians and which consist basically
in constructing successively certain combinations of primitive symbols which are considered
“correct” or “proved”.64

In his contribution to discourse on the critique of formalism, Stefan Kahrs avers that formalism
has been criticized as being hypocritical, as lacking history and as being dogmatic. 65 Regarding
its lack of history, Imre Lakatos showed that “formalism disconnect the history of mathematics,
since, according to the formalist concept of mathematics, there is no history of mathematics
proper”.66 While this criticism is both arguable and unfair, it remains to argue that Lakatos
conceives the formalist as a soul that is irredeemably lost. Regarding the conception of
formalism as being dogmatic, Lakatos held formalism to be the latest dogmatic philosophy in
mathematics. This argument stems from the outright misunderstanding and misconception of
formalism- this is because as Stefan argues, formalism is skeptical philosophy and is not a
dogmatic philosophy. In fact, it has it background and foundation in the mistrust and lack of faith
in the capabilities of human beings.67

The problem with formalism (logicism and intuitionism inclusive) according to Ulrich Majer is
that, “they are biased and essentially incomplete”. 68 One of the reasons for their being accused of
biases is that one position (any of the three schools of mathematics) is formulated to be more
agreeable and accepted than the other. For Majer, the dogma of the three schools of the
philosophy of mathematics is “essentially incomplete because there was, and still exist besides
Frege’s Logicism, Brouwer’s Intuitionism and Hilbert’s Formalism at least one further position,
namely Husserl’s phenomenological approach to the foundations of arithmetic which is also
63
Sinaceur, H. B. “Taski’s Practice and Philosophy: Between Formalism and Pragmaticism”, 365
64
Neumann, J. V “The Formalist Foundations of Mathematics” in Paul Benacerraf (Ed.) Philosophy of
Mathematics: Selected Readings. Second Edition, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 61-62.
65
Stefan Kahrs “A Formalist’s Perspective of Mathematics” (N.P. N.P, 1999), 10.
66
See Imre Lakatos quoted in Stefan Kahrs “A Formalist’s Perspective of Mathematics”, 10.
67
Stefan Kahrs “A Formalist’s Perspective of Mathematics”, 11.
68
Majer, U. “Husserl Between Frege’s Logicism and Hilbert’s Formalism” The Basic International Yearbook of
Cognition, Logic and Communication (Vol. 4) 200 years of Analytic Philosophy, (August 2009), 1.
20
philosophically interesting”.69 Considering formalism within the context of the big threes which
Snapper calls the three crisis of mathematics, the question of where they lead us to or leaves us
comes to mind. For Snapper Formalism and the other schools leaves us without a firm
foundation for mathematics. He further stressed that “after Gödel’s paper appeared in 1931,
mathematicians on the whole threw up their hands in frustration and turned away from the
philosophy of mathematics”.70 The above notwithstanding, the influence exacted by these
schools has remained strong since they have given us “much new and beautiful mathematics”.71

Conclusion

In the preceding paragraphs, attempts have been made to account for the concept of formalism
and the various strands that it unveils itself. This discourse proceeded from a preliminary
discourse on the concept of formalism through a discourse on the forms of formalism, to a
critique of formalism. What is to be noted is that formalism is one of the schools in philosophy
of mathematics, and it presupposes and precludes the fact that mathematics is reduced to nothing
other than the manipulations of meaningless symbols. Again, the most part of the forms of
formalism discussed in this article are attempts to justify the use of the formalist method in the
study of mathematic. The conclusion that is here reached is that the flaws of formalism
notwithstanding, in any axiomatic system that is developed and constructed formalistically, the
possibility of clearly and effortlessly deriving all the deductive consequences of the chosen
axioms is very high.

69
Majer, U. “Husserl Between Frege’s Logicism and Hilbert’s Formalism”, 1.
70
Snapper, E “The Three Crisis in Mathematics: Logicism, Intuitionism and Formalism”, 216.
71
Snapper, E “The Three Crisis in Mathematics: Logicism, Intuitionism and Formalism”, 216.
21
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