GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B.

BELGICA v. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
OCHOA
G.R. No. 208566

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

"Experience is the oracle of truth."[1]

- James Madison

Before the Court are consolidated petitions[2] taken under

Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail the
constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System. Due to the
complexity of the subject matter, the Court shall heretofore
discuss the system's conceptual underpinnings before
detailing the particulars of the constitutional challenge.

The Facts

I. Pork Barrel: General Concept.

"Pork Barrel" is political parlance of American-English origin.
[3] Historically, its usage may be traced to the degrading

ritual of rolling out a barrel stuffed with pork to a multitude

of black slaves who would cast their famished bodies into
the porcine feast to assuage their hunger with morsels
coming from the generosity of their well-fed master.[4] This
practice was later compared to the actions of American
legislators in trying to direct federal budgets in favor of their
districts.[5] While the advent of refrigeration has made the
actual pork barrel obsolete, it persists in reference to
political bills that "bring home the bacon" to a legislator's
district and constituents.[6] In a more technical sense, "Pork
Barrel" refers to an appropriation of government
spending meant for localized projects and secured
solely or primarily to bring money to a representative's
district.[7] Some scholars on the subject further use it to
refer to legislative control of local appropriations.[8]

In the Philippines, "Pork Barrel" has been commonly

referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of
the Legislature,[9] although, as will be later discussed, its
usage would evolve in reference to certain funds of the
Executive.

II. History of Congressional Pork Barrel in the Philippines.

A. Pre-Martial Law Era (1922-1972).

Act 3044,[10] or the Public Works Act of 1922, is
considered[11] as the earliest form of "Congressional Pork
Barrel" in the Philippines since the utilization of the funds
appropriated therein were subjected to post- enactment
legislator approval. Particularly, in the area of fund release,
Section 3[12] provides that the sums appropriated for
certain public works projects[13] "shall be distributed x x x
subject to the approval of a joint committee elected by
the Senate and the House of Representatives." "[T]he
committee from each House may [also] authorize one of its
members to approve the distribution made by the Secretary
of Commerce and Communications."[14] Also, in the area of
fund realignment, the same section provides that the said
secretary, "with the approval of said joint committee, or
of the authorized members thereof, may, for the
purposes of said distribution, transfer unexpended
portions of any item of appropriation under this Act to any
other item hereunder."

In 1950, it has been documented[15] that post-enactment

legislator participation broadened from the areas of fund
release and realignment to the area of project identification.
During that year, the mechanics of the public works act was
modified to the extent that the discretion of choosing
projects was transferred from the Secretary of Commerce
and Communications to legislators. "For the first time, the
law carried a list of projects selected by Members of
Congress, they 'being the representatives of the people,
either on their own account or by consultation with local
officials or civil leaders.'"[16] During this period, the pork
barrel process commenced with local government councils,
civil groups, and individuals appealing to Congressmen or
Senators for projects. Petitions that were accommodated
formed part of a legislator's allocation, and the amount each
legislator would eventually get is determined in a caucus
convened by the majority. The amount was then integrated
into the administration bill prepared by the Department of
Public Works and Communications. Thereafter, the Senate
and the House of Representatives added their own
provisions to the bill until it was signed into law by the
President the Public Works Act.[17] In the 1960's, however,
pork barrel legislation reportedly ceased in view of the
stalemate between the House of Representatives and the
Senate.[18]

B. Martial Law Era (1972-1986).

While the previous "Congressional Pork Barrel" was

apparently discontinued in 1972 after Martial Law was
declared, an era when "one man controlled the legislature,"
[19] the reprieve was only temporary. By 1982, the Batasang

Pambansa had already introduced a new item in the General

Appropriations Act (GAA) called the "Support for Local
Development Projects" (SLDP) under the article on
"National Aid to Local Government Units". Based on reports,
[20] it was under the SLDP that the practice of giving

lump-sum allocations to individual legislators began,

with each assemblyman receiving P500,000.00. Thereafter,
assemblymen would communicate their project
preferences to the Ministry of Budget and Management for
approval. Then, the said ministry would release the
allocation papers to the Ministry of Local Governments,
which would, in turn, issue the checks to the city or
municipal treasurers in the assemblyman's locality. It has
been further reported that "Congressional Pork Barrel"
projects under the SLDP also began to cover not only public
works projects, or so-called "hard projects", but also "soft
projects",[21] or non-public works projects such as those
which would fall under the categories of, among others,
education, health and livelihood.[22]

C. Post-Martial Law Era:

Corazon Cojuangco Aquino Administration (1986-
1992).

After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986 and the

restoration of Philippine democracy, "Congressional Pork
Barrel" was revived in the form of the "Mindanao
Development Fund" and the "Visayas Development
Fund" which were created with lump-sum appropriations of
P480 Million and P240 Million, respectively, for the funding
of development projects in the Mindanao and Visayas areas
in 1989. It has been documented[23] that the clamor raised
by the Senators and the Luzon legislators for a similar
funding, prompted the creation of the "Countrywide
Development Fund" (CDF) which was integrated into the
1990 GAA[24] with an initial funding of P2.3 Billion to cover
"small local infrastructure and other priority community
projects."

Under the GAAs for the years 1991 and 1992,[25] CDF
funds were, with the approval of the President, to be
released directly to the implementing agencies but "subject
to the submission of the required list of projects and
activities." Although the GAAs from 1990 to 1992 were
silent as to the amounts of allocations of the individual
legislators, as well as their participation in the identification
of projects, it has been reported[26] that by 1992,
Representatives were receiving P12.5 Million each in CDF
funds, while Senators were receiving P18 Million each,
without any limitation or qualification, and that they could
identify any kind of project, from hard or infrastructure
projects such as roads, bridges, and buildings to "soft
projects" such as textbooks, medicines, and scholarships.
[27]

D. Fidel Valdez Ramos (Ramos) Administration (1992-

1998).

The following year, or in 1993,[28] the GAA explicitly stated

that the release of CDF funds was to be made upon the
submission of the list of projects and activities
identified by, among others, individual legislators. For
the first time, the 1993 CDF Article included an allocation
for the Vice-President.[29] As such, Representatives were
allocated P12.5 Million each in CDF funds, Senators, P18
Million each, and the Vice- President, P20 Million.

In 1994,[30] 1995,[31] and 1996,[32] the GAAs contained the

same provisions on project identification and fund release
as found in the 1993 CDF Article. In addition, however, the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) was
directed to submit reports to the Senate Committee on
Finance and the House Committee on Appropriations on
the releases made from the funds.[33]

Under the 1997[34] CDF Article, Members of Congress and

the Vice- President, in consultation with the
implementing agency concerned, were directed to submit
to the DBM the list of 50% of projects to be funded from
their respective CDF allocations which shall be duly
endorsed by (a) the Senate President and the Chairman of
the Committee on Finance, in the case of the Senate, and
(b) the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
Chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, in the case
of the House of Representatives; while the list for the
remaining 50% was to be submitted within six (6) months
thereafter. The same article also stated that the project list,
which would be published by the DBM,[35] "shall be the
basis for the release of funds" and that "[n]o funds
appropriated herein shall be disbursed for projects not
included in the list herein required."

The following year, or in 1998,[36] the foregoing provisions

regarding the required lists and endorsements were
reproduced, except that the publication of the project list
was no longer required as the list itself sufficed for the
release of CDF Funds.

The CDF was not, however, the lone form of "Congressional

Pork Barrel" at that time. Other forms of "Congressional
Pork Barrel" were reportedly fashioned and inserted into the
GAA (called "Congressional Insertions" or "CIs") in order
to perpetuate the administration's political agenda.[37] It has
been articulated that since CIs "formed part and parcel of
the budgets of executive departments, they were not
easily identifiable and were thus harder to monitor."
Nonetheless, the lawmakers themselves as well as the
finance and budget officials of the implementing agencies,
as well as the DBM, purportedly knew about the insertions.
[38] Examples of these CIs are the Department of Education
(DepEd) School Building Fund, the Congressional Initiative
Allocations, the Public Works Fund, the El Niño Fund, and
the Poverty Alleviation Fund.[39] The allocations for the
School Building Fund, particularly, "shall be made upon
prior consultation with the representative of the
legislative district concerned."[40] Similarly, the
legislators had the power to direct how, where and when
these appropriations were to be spent.[41]

E. Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada) Administration

(1998-2001).

In 1999,[42] the CDF was removed in the GAA and replaced

by three (3) separate forms of CIs, namely, the "Food
Security Program Fund,"[43] the "Lingap Para Sa Mahihirap
Program Fund,"[44] and the "Rural/Urban Development
Infrastructure Program Fund,"[45] all of which contained a
special provision requiring "prior consultation" with the
Members of Congress for the release of the funds.

It was in the year 2000[46] that the "Priority Development

Assistance Fund" (PDAF) appeared in the GAA. The
requirement of "prior consultation with the respective
Representative of the District" before PDAF funds were
directly released to the implementing agency concerned
was explicitly stated in the 2000 PDAF Article. Moreover,
realignment of funds to any expense category was
expressly allowed, with the sole condition that no amount
shall be used to fund personal services and other personnel
benefits.[47] The succeeding PDAF provisions remained the
same in view of the re-enactment[48] of the 2000 GAA for
the year 2001.

F. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo) Administration

(2001-2010).

The 2002[49] PDAF Article was brief and straightforward as

it merely contained a single special provision ordering the
release of the funds directly to the implementing agency or
local government unit concerned, without further
qualifications. The following year, 2003,[50] the same single
provision was present, with simply an expansion of purpose
and express authority to realign. Nevertheless, the
provisions in the 2003 budgets of the Department of Public
Works and Highways[51] (DPWH) and the DepEd[52]
required prior consultation with Members of Congress
on the aspects of implementation delegation and project list
submission, respectively. In 2004, the 2003 GAA was re-
enacted.[53]

In 2005, [54] the PDAF Article provided that the PDAF shall
be used "to fund priority programs and projects under the
ten point agenda of the national government and shall be
released directly to the implementing agencies." It also
introduced the program menu concept,[55] which is
essentially a list of general programs and implementing
agencies from which a particular PDAF project may be
subsequently chosen by the identifying authority. The
2005 GAA was re-enacted[56] in 2006 and hence, operated
on the same bases. In similar regard, the program menu
concept was consistently integrated into the 2007,[57]
2008,[58] 2009,[59] and 2010[60] GAAs.

Textually, the PDAF Articles from 2002 to 2010 were silent

with respect to the specific amounts allocated for the
individual legislators, as well as their participation in the
proposal and identification of PDAF projects to be funded.
In contrast to the PDAF Articles, however, the provisions
under the DepEd School Building Program and the DPWH
budget, similar to its predecessors, explicitly required prior
consultation with the concerned Member of
Congress[61] anent certain aspects of project
implementation.

Significantly, it was during this era that provisions which

allowed formal participation of non-governmental
organizations (NGO) in the implementation of
government projects were introduced. In the Supplemental
Budget for 2006, with respect to the appropriation for
school buildings, NGOs were, by law, encouraged to
participate. For such purpose, the law stated that "the
amount of at least P250 Million of the P500 Million allotted
for the construction and completion of school buildings
shall be made available to NGOs including the Federation
of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry,
Inc. for its "Operation Barrio School" program[,] with
capability and proven track records in the construction of
public school buildings x x x."[62] The same allocation was
made available to NGOs in the 2007 and 2009 GAAs under
the DepEd Budget.[63] Also, it was in 2007 that the
Government Procurement Policy Board[64] (GPPB) issued
Resolution No. 12-2007 dated June 29, 2007 (GPPB
Resolution 12-2007), amending the implementing rules and
regulations[65] of RA 9184,[66] the Government Procurement
Reform Act, to include, as a form of negotiated
procurement,[67] the procedure whereby the Procuring
Entity[68] (the implementing agency) may enter into a
memorandum of agreement with an NGO, provided that
"an appropriation law or ordinance earmarks an amount to
be specifically contracted out to NGOs."[69]

G. Present Administration (2010-Present).

Differing from previous PDAF Articles but similar to the CDF

Articles, the 2011[70] PDAF Article included an express
statement on lump- sum amounts allocated for individual
legislators and the Vice-President: Representatives were
given P70 Million each, broken down into P40 Million for
"hard projects" and P30 Million for "soft projects"; while
P200 Million was given to each Senator as well as the Vice-
President, with a P100 Million allocation each for "hard" and
"soft projects." Likewise, a provision on realignment of
funds was included, but with the qualification that it may be
allowed only once. The same provision also allowed the
Secretaries of Education, Health, Social Welfare and
Development, Interior and Local Government, Environment
and Natural Resources, Energy, and Public Works and
Highways to realign PDAF Funds, with the further conditions
that: (a) realignment is within the same implementing unit
and same project category as the original project, for
infrastructure projects; (b) allotment released has not yet
been obligated for the original scope of work, and (c) the
request for realignment is with the concurrence of the
legislator concerned.[71]

In the 2012[72] and 2013[73] PDAF Articles, it is stated that

the "[i]dentification of projects and/or designation of
beneficiaries shall conform to the priority list, standard or
design prepared by each implementing agency [(priority list
requirement)] x x x." However, as practiced, it would still be
the individual legislator who would choose and identify the
project from the said priority list.[74]

Provisions on legislator allocations[75] as well as fund

realignment[76] were included in the 2012 and 2013 PDAF
Articles; but the allocation for the Vice-President, which
was pegged at P200 Million in the 2011 GAA, had been
deleted. In addition, the 2013 PDAF Article now allowed
LGUs to be identified as implementing agencies if they
have the technical capability to implement the projects.[77]
Legislators were also allowed to identify programs/projects,
except for assistance to indigent patients and scholarships,
outside of his legislative district provided that he secures
the written concurrence of the legislator of the intended
outside-district, endorsed by the Speaker of the House.[78]
Finally, any realignment of PDAF funds, modification and
revision of project identification, as well as requests for
release of funds, were all required to be favorably
endorsed by the House Committee on Appropriations
and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may
be.[79]

III. History of Presidential Pork Barrel in the Philippines.

While the term "Pork Barrel" has been typically associated

with lump- sum, discretionary funds of Members of
Congress, the present cases and the recent controversies
on the matter have, however, shown that the term's usage
has expanded to include certain funds of the President such
as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.

On the one hand, the Malampaya Funds was created as a

special fund under Section 8[80] of Presidential Decree No.
(PD) 910,[81] issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos
(Marcos) on March 22, 1976. In enacting the said law,
Marcos recognized the need to set up a special fund to help
intensify, strengthen, and consolidate government efforts
relating to the exploration, exploitation, and development of
indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth.[82]
Due to the energy-related activities of the government in
the Malampaya natural gas field in Palawan, or the
"Malampaya Deep Water Gas-to-Power Project",[83] the
special fund created under PD 910 has been currently
labeled as Malampaya Funds.

On the other hand the Presidential Social Fund was created

under Section 12, Title IV[84] of PD 1869,[85] or the Charter
of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR). PD 1869 was similarly issued by Marcos on July
11, 1983. More than two (2) years after, he amended PD
1869 and accordingly issued PD 1993 on October 31,
1985,[86] amending Section 1287 of the former law. As it
stands, the Presidential Social Fund has been described as
a special funding facility managed and administered by the
Presidential Management Staff through which the President
provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects
not funded under the regular budget. It is sourced from the
share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of
PAGCOR.88
IV. Controversies in the Philippines.

Over the decades, "pork" funds in the Philippines have

increased tremendously,[89] owing in no small part to
previous Presidents who reportedly used the "Pork Barrel"
in order to gain congressional support.[90] It was in 1996
when the first controversy surrounding the "Pork Barrel"
erupted. Former Marikina City Representative Romeo
Candazo (Candazo), then an anonymous source, "blew the
lid on the huge sums of government money that regularly
went into the pockets of legislators in the form of
kickbacks."[91] He said that ?the kickbacks were 'SOP'
(standard operating procedure) among legislators and
ranged from a low 19 percent to a high 52 percent of the
cost of each project, which could be anything from
dredging, rip rapping, asphalting, concreting, and
construction of school buildings."[92] "Other sources of
kickbacks that Candazo identified were public funds
intended for medicines and textbooks. A few days later, the
tale of the money trail became the banner story of the
[Philippine Daily] Inquirer issue of [August] 13, 1996,
accompanied by an illustration of a roasted pig."[93] "The
publication of the stories, including those about
congressional initiative allocations of certain lawmakers,
including P3.6 [B]illion for a [C]ongressman, sparked public
outrage."[94]
Thereafter, or in 2004, several concerned citizens sought
the nullification of the PDAF as enacted in the 2004 GAA for
being unconstitutional. Unfortunately, for lack of "any
pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in
the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of
unscrupulous Members of Congress," the petition was
dismissed.[95]

Recently, or in July of the present year, the National Bureau

of Investigation (NBI) began its probe into allegations that
"the government has been defrauded of some P10 Billion
over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the
pork barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies
for scores of ghost projects."[96] The investigation was
spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who
declared that JLN Corporation "JLN" standing for Janet Lim
Napoles (Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the
public coffers for "ghost projects" using no fewer than 20
dummy NGOs for an entire decade. While the NGOs were
supposedly the ultimate recipients of PDAF funds, the
whistle-blowers declared that the money was diverted into
Napoles' private accounts.[97] Thus, after its investigation
on the Napoles controversy, criminal complaints were filed
before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5)
lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for
Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be
charged in the complaints are some of the lawmakers'
chiefs-of-staff or representatives, the heads and other
officials of three (3) implementing agencies, and the several
presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.[98]

On August 16, 2013, the Commission on Audit (CoA)

released the results of a three-year audit investigation[99]
covering the use of legislators' PDAF from 2007 to 2009, or
during the last three (3) years of the Arroyo administration.
The purpose of the audit was to determine the propriety of
releases of funds under PDAF and the Various
Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP)[100] by the
DBM, the application of these funds and the implementation
of projects by the appropriate implementing agencies and
several government-owned-and-controlled corporations
(GOCCs).[101] The total releases covered by the audit
amounted to P8.374 Billion in PDAF and P32.664 Billion in
VILP, representing 58% and 32%, respectively, of the total
PDAF and VILP releases that were found to have been made
nationwide during the audit period.[102] Accordingly, the
CoA's findings contained in its Report No. 2012-03 (CoA
Report), entitled "Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF) and Various Infrastructures including Local Projects
(VILP)," were made public, the highlights of which are as
follows:[103]
Amounts released for projects identified by a
considerable number of legislators significantly
exceeded their respective allocations.
Amounts were released for projects outside of
legislative districts of sponsoring members of the
Lower House.
Total VILP releases for the period exceeded the total
amount appropriated under the 2007 to 2009 GAAs.
Infrastructure projects were constructed on private
lots without these having been turned over to the
government.
Significant amounts were released to [implementing
agencies] without the latter's endorsement and
without considering their mandated functions,
administrative and technical capabilities to
implement projects.
Implementation of most livelihood projects was not
undertaken by the [implementing agencies]
themselves but by [NGOs] endorsed by the
proponent legislators to which the Funds were
transferred. • The funds were transferred to the
NGOs in spite of the absence of any appropriation
law or ordinance.
Selection of the NGOs were not compliant with law
and regulations.
Eighty-Two (82) NGOs entrusted with
implementation of seven hundred seventy two (772)
 projects amount to [P]6.156 Billion were either
found questionable, or submitted
questionable/spurious documents, or failed to
liquidate in whole or in part their utilization of the
Funds.
Procurement by the NGOs, as well as some
implementing agencies, of goods and services
reportedly used in the projects were not compliant
with law.

As for the "Presidential Pork Barrel", whistle-blowers alleged

that "[a]t least P900 Million from royalties in the operation
of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan province
intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a
dummy [NGO]."[104] According to incumbent CoA
Chairperson Maria Gracia Pulido Tan (CoA Chairperson), the
CoA is, as of this writing, in the process of preparing "one
consolidated report" on the Malampaya Funds.[105]

V. The Procedural Antecedents.

Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA

Report and the Napoles controversy, several petitions were
lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork
Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional. To recount, the
relevant procedural antecedents in these cases are as
follows:

On August 28, 2013, petitioner Samson S. Alcantara

(Alcantara), President of the Social Justice Society, filed a
Petition for Prohibition of even date under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court (Alcantara Petition), seeking that the "Pork
Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of
prohibition be issued permanently restraining respondents
Franklin M. Drilon and Feliciano S. Belmonte, Jr., in their
respective capacities as the incumbent Senate President
and Speaker of the House of Representatives, from further
taking any steps to enact legislation appropriating funds for
the "Pork Barrel System," in whatever form and by whatever
name it may be called, and from approving further releases
pursuant thereto.[106] The Alcantara Petition was docketed
as G.R. No. 208493.

On September 3, 2013, petitioners Greco Antonious Beda B.

Belgica, Jose L. Gonzalez, Reuben M. Abante, Quintin
Paredes San Diego (Belgica, et al.), and Jose M. Villegas, Jr.
(Villegas) filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and
Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction dated August 27, 2013 under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court (Belgica Petition), seeking that the
annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the
provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013
PDAF, and the Executive's lump-sum, discretionary funds,
such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social
Fund,[107] be declared unconstitutional and null and void for
being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they
pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents
Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., Florencio B. Abad (Secretary Abad)
and Rosalia V. De Leon, in their respective capacities as the
incumbent Executive Secretary, Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM), and
National Treasurer, or their agents, for them to immediately
cease any expenditure under the aforesaid funds. Further,
they pray that the Court order the foregoing respondents to
release to the CoA and to the public: (a) "the complete
schedule/list of legislators who have availed of their PDAF
and VILP from the years 2003 to 2013, specifying the use of
the funds, the project or activity and the recipient entities or
individuals, and all pertinent data thereto"; and (b) "the use
of the Executive's [lump-sum, discretionary] funds,
including the proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Fund[s]
[and] remittances from the [PAGCOR] x x x from 2003 to
2013, specifying the x x x project or activity and the
recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data
thereto."[108] Also, they pray for the "inclusion in budgetary
deliberations with the Congress of all presently off-budget,
[lump-sum], discretionary funds including, but not limited
to, proceeds from the Malampaya Fund[s] [and]
remittances from the [PAGCOR]."[109] The Belgica Petition
was docketed as G.R. No. 208566.[110]

Lastly, on September 5, 2013, petitioner Pedrito M.

Nepomuceno (Nepomuceno), filed a Petition dated August
23, 2012 (Nepomuceno Petition), seeking that the PDAF be
declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist order be
issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III
(President Aquino) and Secretary Abad from releasing such
funds to Members of Congress and, instead, allow their
release to fund priority projects identified and approved by
the Local Development Councils in consultation with the
executive departments, such as the DPWH, the Department
of Tourism, the Department of Health, the Department of
Transportation, and Communication and the National
Economic Development Authority.[111] The Nepomuceno
Petition was docketed as UDK-14951.[112]

On September 10, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of

even date (a) consolidating all cases; (b) requiring public
respondents to comment on the consolidated petitions; (c)
issuing a TRO (September 10, 2013 TRO) enjoining the
DBM, National Treasurer, the Executive Secretary, or any of
the persons acting under their authority from releasing (1)
the remaining PDAF allocated to Members of Congress
under the GAA of 2013, and (2) Malampaya Funds under the
phrase "for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910
but not for the purpose of "financ[ing] energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government" under the same provision; and (d) setting the
consolidated cases for Oral Arguments on October 8, 2013.

On September 23, 2013, the Office of the Solicitor General

(OSG) filed a Consolidated Comment (Comment) of even
date before the Court, seeking the lifting, or in the
alternative, the partial lifting with respect to educational and
medical assistance purposes, of the Court's September 10,
2013 TRO, and that the consolidated petitions be dismissed
for lack of merit.[113]

On September 24, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of

even date directing petitioners to reply to the Comment.

Petitioners, with the exception of Nepomuceno, filed their

respective replies to the Comment: (a) on September 30,
2013, Villegas filed a separate Reply dated September 27,
2013 (Villegas Reply); (b) on October 1, 2013, Belgica, et al.
filed a Reply dated September 30, 2013 (Belgica Reply); and
(c) on October 2, 2013, Alcantara filed a Reply dated
October 1, 2013.

On October 1, 2013, the Court issued an Advisory providing

for the guidelines to be observed by the parties for the Oral
Arguments scheduled on October 8, 2013. In view of the
technicality of the issues material to the present cases,
incumbent Solicitor General Francis H. Jardeleza (Solicitor
General) was directed to bring with him during the Oral
Arguments representative/s from the DBM and Congress
who would be able to competently and completely answer
questions related to, among others, the budgeting process
and its implementation. Further, the CoA Chairperson was
appointed as amicus curiae and thereby requested to
appear before the Court during the Oral Arguments.

On October 8 and 10, 2013, the Oral Arguments were

conducted. Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to
submit their respective memoranda within a period of seven
(7) days, or until October 17, 2013, which the parties
subsequently did.

The Issues Before the Court

Based on the pleadings, and as refined during the Oral

Arguments, the following are the main issues for the
Court's resolution:

I. Procedural Issues.

Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated

petitions involve an actual and justiciable controversy;
 (b) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are
matters of policy not subject to judicial review; (c)
petitioners have legal standing to sue; and (d) the
Court's Decision dated August 19, 1994 in G.R. Nos.
113105, 113174, 113766, and 113888, entitled "Philippine
Constitution Association v. Enriquez"[114] (Philconsa) and
Decision dated April 24, 2012 in G.R. No. 164987,
entitled "Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty v.
Secretary of Budget and Management"[115] (LAMP) bar
the re- litigation of the issue of constitutionality of the
"Pork Barrel System" under the principles of res judicata
and stare decisis.

II. Substantive Issues on the "Congressional Pork

Barrel."

Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other

Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are
unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles
of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b)
non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and
balances; (d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f)
local autonomy.

III. Substantive Issues on the "Presidential Pork Barrel."

 Whether or not the phrases (a) "and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President"
under Section 8 of PD 910,[116] relating to the Malampaya
Funds, and (b) "to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects and to finance the restoration of
damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as
may be directed and authorized by the Office of the
President of the Philippines" under Section 12 of PD
1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the
Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as
they constitute undue delegations of legislative power.

These main issues shall be resolved in the order that they

have been stated. In addition, the Court shall also tackle
certain ancillary issues as prompted by the present cases.

The Court's Ruling

The petitions are partly granted.

I. Procedural Issues.

The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no

question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court
unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for
judicial inquiry,[117] namely: (a) there must be an actual
case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the
standing to question the validity of the subject act or
issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.[118]
Of these requisites, case law states that the first two are the
most important[119] and, therefore, shall be discussed
forthwith.

A. Existence of an Actual Case or Controversy.

By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when

there is an actual case or controversy.[120] This is embodied
in Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which
pertinently states that "[j]udicial power includes the duty of
the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable x x x." Jurisprudence provides that an actual
case or controversy is one which "involves a conflict of legal
rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of
judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or
abstract difference or dispute."[121] In other words, "[t]here
must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be
interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law
and jurisprudence."[122] Related to the requirement of an
actual case or controversy is the requirement of "ripeness,"
meaning that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny
are already ripe for adjudication. "A question is ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct
adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is a
prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court may come into
the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of
an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of
the challenged action."[123] "Withal, courts will decline to
pass upon constitutional issues through advisory opinions,
bereft as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or
moot questions."[124]

Based on these principles, the Court finds that there exists

an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases.

The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly

satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the
constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System." Also, the
questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for
adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions
allowing for their utilization such as the 2013 GAA for the
PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as
amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund are
currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an
immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of
the unconstitutional use of these public funds.

As for the PDAF, the Court must dispel the notion that the
issues related thereto had been rendered moot and
academic by the reforms undertaken by respondents. A
case becomes moot when there is no more actual
controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can
be served in passing upon the merits.[125] Differing from this
description, the Court observes that respondents' proposed
line-item budgeting scheme would not terminate the
controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its
resolution since said reform is geared towards the 2014
budget, and not the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a
distinct subject matter, remains legally effective and
existing. Neither will the President's declaration that he had
already "abolished the PDAF" render the issues on PDAF
moot precisely because the Executive branch of
government has no constitutional authority to nullify or
annul its legal existence. By constitutional design, the
annulment or nullification of a law may be done either by
Congress, through the passage of a repealing law, or by the
Court, through a declaration of unconstitutionality.
Instructive on this point is the following exchange between
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Justice Carpio) and the
Solicitor General during the Oral Arguments:[126]
Justice Carpio: [T]he President has taken an oath to
faithfully execute the law,[127] correct?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.

Justice Carpio: And so the President cannot refuse to

implement the General Appropriations Act, correct?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: Well, that is our answer, Your

Honor. In the case, for example of the PDAF, the
President has a duty to execute the laws but in the
face of the outrage over PDAF, the President was saying,
"I am not sure that I will continue the release of the soft
projects," and that started, Your Honor. Now, whether or
not that … (interrupted)

Justice Carpio: Yeah. I will grant the President if there are

anomalies in the project, he has the power to stop the
releases in the meantime, to investigate, and that is
Section [38] of Chapter 5 of Book 6 of the Revised
Administrative Code[128] x x x. So at most the President
can suspend, now if the President believes that the PDAF
is unconstitutional, can he just refuse to implement it?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor, as we were

trying to say in the specific case of the PDAF because of
the CoA Report, because of the reported irregularities
and this Court can take judicial notice, even outside,
outside of the COA Report, you have the report of the
whistle-blowers, the President was just exercising
precisely the duty ….

xxxx

Justice Carpio: Yes, and that is correct. You've seen the

CoA Report, there are anomalies, you stop and
investigate, and prosecute, he has done that. But, does
that mean that PDAF has been repealed?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor x x x.

xxxx

Justice Carpio: So that PDAF can be legally abolished

only in two (2) cases. Congress passes a law to
repeal it, or this Court declares it unconstitutional,
correct?

Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.

Justice Carpio: The President has no power to legally

abolish PDAF. (Emphases supplied)
Even on the assumption of mootness, jurisprudence,
nevertheless, dictates that "the 'moot and academic'
principle is not a magical formula that can automatically
dissuade the Court in resolving a case." The Court will
decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave
violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional
character of the situation and the paramount public interest
is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised
requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is
capable of repetition yet evading review.[129]

The applicability of the first exception is clear from the

fundamental posture of petitioners they essentially allege
grave violations of the Constitution with respect to, inter
alia, the principles of separation of powers, non-delegability
of legislative power, checks and balances, accountability
and local autonomy.

The applicability of the second exception is also apparent

from the nature of the interests involved the
constitutionality of the very system within which significant
amounts of public funds have been and continue to be
utilized and expended undoubtedly presents a situation of
exceptional character as well as a matter of paramount
public interest. The present petitions, in fact, have been
lodged at a time when the system's flaws have never before
been magnified. To the Court's mind, the coalescence of
the CoA Report, the accounts of numerous whistle-blowers,
and the government's own recognition that reforms are
needed "to address the reported abuses of the PDAF"[130]
demonstrates a prima facie pattern of abuse which only
underscores the importance of the matter. It is also by this
finding that the Court finds petitioners' claims as not merely
theorized, speculative or hypothetical. Of note is the weight
accorded by the Court to the findings made by the CoA
which is the constitutionally-mandated audit arm of the
government. In Delos Santos v. CoA,[131] a recent case
wherein the Court upheld the CoA's disallowance of
irregularly disbursed PDAF funds, it was emphasized that:

[T]he CoA is endowed with enough latitude to

determine, prevent, and disallow irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable
expenditures of government funds. It is tasked to be
vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding the proper use
of the government's, and ultimately the people's,
property. The exercise of its general audit power is
among the constitutional mechanisms that gives life
to the check and balance system inherent in our form
of government.

[I]t is the general policy of the Court to sustain the

 decisions of administrative authorities, especially one
which is constitutionally-created, such as the CoA, not
only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of
powers but also for their presumed expertise in the
laws they are entrusted to enforce. Findings of
administrative agencies are accorded not only respect
but also finality when the decision and order are not
tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would
amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is only when the
CoA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a
petition questioning its rulings. x x x. (Emphases
supplied)

Thus, if only for the purpose of validating the existence

of an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases,
the Court deems the findings under the CoA Report to be
sufficient.

The Court also finds the third exception to be applicable

largely due to the practical need for a definitive ruling on the
system's constitutionality. As disclosed during the Oral
Arguments, the CoA Chairperson estimates that thousands
of notices of disallowances will be issued by her office in
connection with the findings made in the CoA Report. In this
relation, Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen
(Justice Leonen) pointed out that all of these would
eventually find their way to the courts.[132] Accordingly,
there is a compelling need to formulate controlling
principles relative to the issues raised herein in order to
guide the bench, the bar, and the public, not just for the
expeditious resolution of the anticipated disallowance
cases, but more importantly, so that the government may
be guided on how public funds should be utilized in
accordance with constitutional principles.

Finally, the application of the fourth exception is called for

by the recognition that the preparation and passage of the
national budget is, by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of
annual occurrence.[133] The relevance of the issues before
the Court does not cease with the passage of a "PDAF- free
budget for 2014."[134] The evolution of the "Pork Barrel
System," by its multifarious iterations throughout the course
of history, lends a semblance of truth to petitioners' claim
that "the same dog will just resurface wearing a different
collar."[135] In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,[136] the
government had already backtracked on a previous course
of action yet the Court used the "capable of repetition but
evading review" exception in order "[t]o prevent similar
questions from re-emerging."[137] The situation similarly
holds true to these cases. Indeed, the myriad of issues
underlying the manner in which certain public funds are
spent, if not resolved at this most opportune time, are
capable of repetition and hence, must not evade judicial
review.

B. Matters of Policy: the Political Question Doctrine.

The "limitation on the power of judicial review to actual

cases and controversies" carries the assurance that "the
courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other
branches of government."[138] Essentially, the foregoing
limitation is a restatement of the political question doctrine
which, under the classic formulation of Baker v. Carr,[139]
applies when there is found, among others, "a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department," "a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it" or
"the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion."
Cast against this light, respondents submit that the "[t]he
political branches are in the best position not only to
perform budget-related reforms but also to do them in
response to the specific demands of their constituents"
and, as such, "urge [the Court] not to impose a solution at
this stage."[140]

The Court must deny respondents' submission.

Suffice it to state that the issues raised before the Court do
not present political but legal questions which are within its
province to resolve. A political question refers to "those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided
by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure."[141] The intrinsic
constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an
issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political
branches of government but rather a legal one which
the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act
upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system along
constitutional lines is a task that the political branches of
government are incapable of rendering precisely because it
is an exercise of judicial power. More importantly, the
present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the
right to exercise judicial power but essentially makes it a
duty to proceed therewith. Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution cannot be any clearer: "The judicial power shall
be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law. [It] includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." In
Estrada v. Desierto,[142] the expanded concept of judicial
power under the 1987 Constitution and its effect on the
political question doctrine was explained as follows:[143]

To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed

the reach of the political question doctrine when it
expanded the power of judicial review of this court not
only to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable but also to
determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government. Heretofore, the
judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the
Constitution directed against the exercise of its
jurisdiction. With the new provision, however, courts are
given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do
to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new
provision did not just grant the Court power of doing
nothing. x x x (Emphases supplied)

It must also be borne in mind that "when the judiciary

mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not
assert any superiority over the other departments; does not
in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature [or the
executive], but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution."[144] To a great
extent, the Court is laudably cognizant of the reforms
undertaken by its co-equal branches of government. But it
is by constitutional force that the Court must faithfully
perform its duty. Ultimately, it is the Court's avowed
intention that a resolution of these cases would not arrest or
in any manner impede the endeavors of the two other
branches but, in fact, help ensure that the pillars of change
are erected on firm constitutional grounds. After all, it is in
the best interest of the people that each great branch of
government, within its own sphere, contributes its share
towards achieving a holistic and genuine solution to the
problems of society. For all these reasons, the Court cannot
heed respondents' plea for judicial restraint.

C. Locus Standi.

"The gist of the question of standing is whether a party

alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his
constitutional rights by the operation of statute or
ordinance, he has no standing."[145]

Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective

capacities as citizen-taxpayers and accordingly, assert that
they "dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National
Treasury."[146] Clearly, as taxpayers, they possess the
requisite standing to question the validity of the existing
"Pork Barrel System" under which the taxes they pay have
been and continue to be utilized. It is undeniable that
petitioners, as taxpayers, are bound to suffer from the
unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so rules.
Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there
is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that
public money is being deflected to any improper purpose,
or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of
an invalid or unconstitutional law,[147] as in these cases.

Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the

standing requirement given that the issues they have raised
may be classified as matters "of transcendental importance,
of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount
public interest."[148] The CoA Chairperson's statement
during the Oral Arguments that the present controversy
involves "not [merely] a systems failure" but a "complete
breakdown of controls"[149] amplifies, in addition to the
matters above-discussed, the seriousness of the issues
involved herein. Indeed, of greater import than the damage
caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the
mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the
enforcement of an invalid statute.[150] All told, petitioners
have sufficient locus standi to file the instant cases.

D. Res Judicata and Stare Decisis.

Res judicata (which means a "matter adjudged") and stare

decisisnon quieta et movere ([or simply, stare decisis]
which means "follow past precedents and do not disturb
what has been settled") are general procedural law
principles which both deal with the effects of previous but
factually similar dispositions to subsequent cases. For the
cases at bar, the Court examines the applicability of these
principles in relation to its prior rulings in Philconsa and
LAMP.

The focal point of res judicata is the judgment. The

principle states that a judgment on the merits in a previous
case rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction would
bind a subsequent case if, between the first and second
actions, there exists an identity of parties, of subject
matter, and of causes of action.[151] This required identity
is not, however, attendant hereto since Philconsa and
LAMP, respectively involved constitutional challenges
against the 1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article,
whereas the cases at bar call for a broader constitutional
scrutiny of the entire "Pork Barrel System." Also, the
ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based on a
procedural technicality and, thus, hardly a judgment on the
merits in that petitioners therein failed to present any
"convincing proof x x x showing that, indeed, there were
direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who
actually spend them according to their sole discretion" or
"pertinent evidentiary support [to demonstrate the] illegal
misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks [and] has become
a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress."
As such, the Court upheld, in view of the presumption of
constitutionality accorded to every law, the 2004 PDAF
Article, and saw "no need to review or reverse the standing
pronouncements in the said case." Hence, for the foregoing
reasons, the res judicata principle, insofar as the Philconsa
and LAMP cases are concerned, cannot apply.

On the other hand, the focal point of stare decisis is the

doctrine created. The principle, entrenched under Article
8[152] of the Civil Code, evokes the general rule that, for the
sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should
be doctrinally applied to those that follow if the facts are
substantially the same, even though the parties may be
different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that,
absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like
cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same
questions relating to the same event have been put forward
by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case
litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare
decisis is a bar to any attempt to re-litigate the same issue.
[153]

Philconsa was the first case where a constitutional

challenge against a Pork Barrel provision, i.e., the 1994 CDF
Article, was resolved by the Court. To properly understand
its context, petitioners' posturing was that "the power given
to the [M]embers of Congress to propose and identify
projects and activities to be funded by the [CDF] is an
encroachment by the legislature on executive power, since
said power in an appropriation act is in implementation of
the law" and that "the proposal and identification of the
projects do not involve the making of laws or the repeal and
amendment thereof, the only function given to the Congress
by the Constitution."[154] In deference to the foregoing
submissions, the Court reached the following main
conclusions: one, under the Constitution, the power of
appropriation, or the "power of the purse," belongs to
Congress; two, the power of appropriation carries with it the
power to specify the project or activity to be funded under
the appropriation law and it can be detailed and as broad as
Congress wants it to be; and, three, the proposals and
identifications made by Members of Congress are merely
recommendatory. At once, it is apparent that the Philconsa
resolution was a limited response to a separation of
powers problem, specifically on the propriety of
conferring post-enactment identification authority to
Members of Congress. On the contrary, the present cases
call for a more holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation
between the CDF and PDAF Articles with each other,
formative as they are of the entire "Pork Barrel System" as
well as (b) the intra-relation of post-enactment measures
contained within a particular CDF or PDAF Article, including
not only those related to the area of project identification
but also to the areas of fund release and realignment. The
complexity of the issues and the broader legal analyses
herein warranted may be, therefore, considered as a
powerful countervailing reason against a wholesale
application of the stare decisis principle.

In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was

actually riddled with inherent constitutional inconsistencies
which similarly countervail against a full resort to stare
decisis. As may be deduced from the main conclusions of
the case, Philconsa's fundamental premise in allowing
Members of Congress to propose and identify of projects
would be that the said identification authority is but an
aspect of the power of appropriation which has been
constitutionally lodged in Congress. From this premise, the
contradictions may be easily seen. If the authority to identify
projects is an aspect of appropriation and the power of
appropriation is a form of legislative power thereby lodged
in Congress, then it follows that: (a) it is Congress which
should exercise such authority, and not its individual
Members; (b) such authority must be exercised within the
prescribed procedure of law passage and, hence, should
not be exercised after the GAA has already been passed;
and (c) such authority, as embodied in the GAA, has the
force of law and, hence, cannot be merely recommendatory.
Justice Vitug's Concurring Opinion in the same case sums
up the Philconsa quandary in this wise: ?Neither would it be
objectionable for Congress, by law, to appropriate funds for
such specific projects as it may be minded; to give that
authority, however, to the individual members of Congress
in whatever guise, I am afraid, would be constitutionally
impermissible." As the Court now largely benefits from
hindsight and current findings on the matter, among others,
the CoA Report, the Court must partially abandon its
previous ruling in Philconsa insofar as it validated the
post-enactment identification authority of Members of
Congress on the guise that the same was merely
recommendatory. This postulate raises serious
constitutional inconsistencies which cannot be simply
excused on the ground that such mechanism is "imaginative
as it is innovative." Moreover, it must be pointed out that the
recent case of Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima[155]
(Abakada) has effectively overturned Philconsa's allowance
of post-enactment legislator participation in view of the
separation of powers principle. These constitutional
inconsistencies and the Abakada rule will be discussed in
greater detail in the ensuing section of this Decision.

As for LAMP, suffice it to restate that the said case was

dismissed on a procedural technicality and, hence, has not
set any controlling doctrine susceptible of current
application to the substantive issues in these cases. In fine,
stare decisis would not apply.

II. Substantive Issues.

A. Definition of Terms.

Before the Court proceeds to resolve the substantive issues

of these cases, it must first define the terms "Pork Barrel
System," "Congressional Pork Barrel," and "Presidential Pork
Barrel" as they are essential to the ensuing discourse.

Petitioners define the term "Pork Barrel System" as the

"collusion between the Legislative and Executive branches
of government to accumulate lump-sum public funds in
their offices with unchecked discretionary powers to
determine its distribution as political largesse."[156] They
assert that the following elements make up the Pork Barrel
System: (a) lump-sum funds are allocated through the
appropriations process to an individual officer; (b) the
officer is given sole and broad discretion in determining how
the funds will be used or expended; (c) the guidelines on
how to spend or use the funds in the appropriation are
either vague, overbroad or inexistent; and (d) projects
funded are intended to benefit a definite constituency in a
particular part of the country and to help the political
careers of the disbursing official by yielding rich patronage
benefits.[157] They further state that the Pork Barrel System
is comprised of two (2) kinds of discretionary public funds:
first, the Congressional (or Legislative) Pork Barrel, currently
known as the PDAF;[158] and, second, the Presidential (or
Executive) Pork Barrel, specifically, the Malampaya Funds
under PD 910 and the Presidential Social Fund under PD
1869, as amended by PD 1993.[159]

Considering petitioners' submission and in reference to its

local concept and legal history, the Court defines the Pork
Barrel System as the collective body of rules and
practices that govern the manner by which lump-sum,
discretionary funds, primarily intended for local
projects, are utilized through the respective
participations of the Legislative and Executive branches
of government, including its members. The Pork Barrel
System involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum discretionary
funds:

First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is

herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary
fund wherein legislators, either individually or
collectively organized into committees, are able to
effectively control certain aspects of the fund's
utilization through various post-enactment measures
and/or practices. In particular, petitioners consider the
PDAF, as it appears under the 2013 GAA, as Congressional
Pork Barrel since it is, inter alia, a post-enactment measure
that allows individual legislators to wield a collective power;
[160] and

Second, there is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is

herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary
fund which allows the President to determine the
manner of its utilization. For reasons earlier stated,[161] the
Court shall delimit the use of such term to refer only to the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.

With these definitions in mind, the Court shall now proceed

to discuss the substantive issues of these cases.

B. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork Barrel.

1. Separation of Powers.

a. Statement of Principle.

The principle of separation of powers refers to the

constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental powers
of government. In the celebrated words of Justice Laurel in
Angara v. Electoral Commission, [162] it means that the
"Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold
lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and
the judicial departments of the government."[163] To the
legislative branch of government, through Congress,[164]
belongs the power to make laws; to the executive branch of
government, through the President,[165] belongs the power
to enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of government,
through the Court,[166] belongs the power to interpret laws.
Because the three great powers have been, by
constitutional design, ordained in this respect, "[e]ach
department of the government has exclusive cognizance of
matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own
sphere."[167] Thus, "the legislature has no authority to
execute or construe the law, the executive has no authority
to make or construe the law, and the judiciary has no power
to make or execute the law."[168] The principle of separation
of powers and its concepts of autonomy and independence
stem from the notion that the powers of government must
be divided to avoid concentration of these powers in any
one branch; the division, it is hoped, would avoid any single
branch from lording its power over the other branches or
the citizenry.[169] To achieve this purpose, the divided power
must be wielded by co-equal branches of government that
are equally capable of independent action in exercising their
respective mandates. Lack of independence would result in
the inability of one branch of government to check the
arbitrary or self- interest assertions of another or others.
[170]

Broadly speaking, there is a violation of the separation of

powers principle when one branch of government unduly
encroaches on the domain of another. US Supreme Court
decisions instruct that the principle of separation of powers
may be violated in two (2) ways: firstly, "[o]ne branch may
interfere impermissibly with the other's performance of
its constitutionally assigned function";[171] and "
[a]lternatively, the doctrine may be violated when one
branch assumes a function that more properly is entrusted
to another."[172] In other words, there is a violation of the
principle when there is impermissible (a) interference with
and/or (b) assumption of another department's functions.

The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily

contained in the GAA, is indisputably a function both
constitutionally assigned and properly entrusted to the
Executive branch of government. In Guingona, Jr. v. Hon.
Carague[173] (Guingona, Jr.), the Court explained that the
phase of budget execution "covers the various operational
aspects of budgeting" and accordingly includes "the
evaluation of work and financial plans for individual
activities," the "regulation and release of funds" as well
as all "other related activities" that comprise the budget
execution cycle.[174] This is rooted in the principle that the
allocation of power in the three principal branches of
government is a grant of all powers inherent in them.[175]
Thus, unless the Constitution provides otherwise, the
Executive department should exclusively exercise all roles
and prerogatives which go into the implementation of the
national budget as provided under the GAA as well as any
other appropriation law.

In view of the foregoing, the Legislative branch of

government, much more any of its members, should not
cross over the field of implementing the national budget
since, as earlier stated, the same is properly the domain of
the Executive. Again, in Guingona, Jr., the Court stated that
"Congress enters the picture [when it] deliberates or acts
on the budget proposals of the President. Thereafter,
Congress, "in the exercise of its own judgment and wisdom,
formulates an appropriation act precisely following the
process established by the Constitution, which specifies
that no money may be paid from the Treasury except in
accordance with an appropriation made by law." Upon
approval and passage of the GAA, Congress' law-making
role necessarily comes to an end and from there the
Executive's role of implementing the national budget begins.
So as not to blur the constitutional boundaries between
them, Congress must "not concern itself with details for
implementation by the Executive."[176]

The foregoing cardinal postulates were definitively

enunciated in Abakada where the Court held that "[f]rom
the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of
law that empowers Congress or any of its members to
play any role in the implementation or enforcement of
the law violates the principle of separation of powers
and is thus unconstitutional."[177] It must be clarified,
however, that since the restriction only pertains to "any role
in the implementation or enforcement of the law," Congress
may still exercise its oversight function which is a
mechanism of checks and balances that the Constitution
itself allows. But it must be made clear that Congress' role
must be confined to mere oversight. Any post- enactment-
measure allowing legislator participation beyond oversight is
bereft of any constitutional basis and hence, tantamount to
impermissible interference and/or assumption of executive
functions. As the Court ruled in Abakada:[178]

[A]ny post-enactment congressional measure x x x

should be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In
particular, congressional oversight must be confined to
the following:

(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress' power of

 appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in
connection with it, its power to ask heads of
departments to appear before and be heard by either
of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their
departments and its power of confirmation; and

(2) investigation and monitoring of the

implementation of laws pursuant to the power of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.

Any action or step beyond that will undermine the

separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution.
(Emphases supplied)

b. Application.

In these cases, petitioners submit that the Congressional

Pork Barrel among others, the 2013 PDAF Article "wrecks
the assignment of responsibilities between the political
branches" as it is designed to allow individual legislators to
interfere "way past the time it should have ceased" or,
particularly, "after the GAA is passed."[179] They state that
the findings and recommendations in the CoA Report
provide ?an illustration of how absolute and definitive the
power of legislators wield over project implementation in
complete violation of the constitutional [principle of
separation of powers.]"[180] Further, they point out that the
Court in the Philconsa case only allowed the CDF to exist on
the condition that individual legislators limited their role to
recommending projects and not if they actually dictate their
implementation.[181]

For their part, respondents counter that the separations of

powers principle has not been violated since the President
maintains "ultimate authority to control the execution of the
GAA" and that he "retains the final discretion to reject" the
legislators' proposals.[182] They maintain that the Court, in
Philconsa, "upheld the constitutionality of the power of
members of Congress to propose and identify projects so
long as such proposal and identification are
recommendatory."[183] As such, they claim that "
[e]verything in the Special Provisions [of the 2013 PDAF
Article] follows the Philconsa framework, and hence,
remains constitutional."[184]

The Court rules in favor of petitioners.

As may be observed from its legal history, the defining

feature of all forms of Congressional Pork Barrel would be
the authority of legislators to participate in the post-
enactment phases of project implementation.

At its core, legislators may it be through project lists,[185]

prior consultations[186] or program menus[187] have been
consistently accorded post-enactment authority to identify
the projects they desire to be funded through various
Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Under the 2013 PDAF
Article, the statutory authority of legislators to identify
projects post- GAA may be construed from the import of
Special Provisions 1 to 3 as well as the second paragraph of
Special Provision 4. To elucidate, Special Provision 1
embodies the program menu feature which, as evinced from
past PDAF Articles, allows individual legislators to identify
PDAF projects for as long as the identified project falls
under a general program listed in the said menu. Relatedly,
Special Provision 2 provides that the implementing agencies
shall, within 90 days from the GAA is passed, submit to
Congress a more detailed priority list, standard or design
prepared and submitted by implementing agencies from
which the legislator may make his choice. The same
provision further authorizes legislators to identify PDAF
projects outside his district for as long as the representative
of the district concerned concurs in writing. Meanwhile,
Special Provision 3 clarifies that PDAF projects refer to
"projects to be identified by legislators"[188] and thereunder
provides the allocation limit for the total amount of projects
identified by each legislator. Finally, paragraph 2 of Special
Provision 4 requires that any modification and revision of
the project identification "shall be submitted to the House
Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on
Finance for favorable endorsement to the DBM or the
implementing agency, as the case may be." From the
foregoing special provisions, it cannot be seriously doubted
that legislators have been accorded post-enactment
authority to identify PDAF projects.

Aside from the area of project identification, legislators have

also been accorded post-enactment authority in the areas
of fund release and realignment. Under the 2013 PDAF
Article, the statutory authority of legislators to participate in
the area of fund release through congressional committees
is contained in Special Provision 5 which explicitly states
that "[a]ll request for release of funds shall be supported by
the documents prescribed under Special Provision No. 1 and
favorably endorsed by House Committee on Appropriations
and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be";
while their statutory authority to participate in the area of
fund realignment is contained in: first, paragraph 2,
Special Provision 4[189] which explicitly states, among
others, that "[a]ny realignment [of funds] shall be submitted
to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate
Committee on Finance for favorable endorsement to the
DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may be"; and,
second, paragraph 1, also of Special Provision 4 which
authorizes the "Secretaries of Agriculture, Education,
Energy, Interior and Local Government, Labor and
Employment, Public Works and Highways, Social Welfare
and Development and Trade and Industry[190] x x x to
approve realignment from one project/scope to another
within the allotment received from this Fund, subject to
[among others] (iii) the request is with the concurrence of
the legislator concerned."

Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the

areas of project identification, fund release and fund
realignment are not related to functions of congressional
oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or
assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget
execution. Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing, legislators
have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate
in as Guingona, Jr. puts it "the various operational aspects
of budgeting," including "the evaluation of work and
financial plans for individual activities" and the
"regulation and release of funds" in violation of the
separation of powers principle. The fundamental rule, as
categorically articulated in Abakada, cannot be overstated
from the moment the law becomes effective, any
provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its
members to play any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law violates the principle of
separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.[191]
That the said authority is treated as merely
recommendatory in nature does not alter its
unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition, to repeat,
covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of
the law. Towards this end, the Court must therefore
abandon its ruling in Philconsa which sanctioned the
conduct of legislator identification on the guise that the
same is merely recommendatory and, as such, respondents'
reliance on the same falters altogether.

Besides, it must be pointed out that respondents have

nonetheless failed to substantiate their position that the
identification authority of legislators is only of
recommendatory import. Quite the contrary, respondents
through the statements of the Solicitor General during the
Oral Arguments have admitted that the identification of the
legislator constitutes a mandatory requirement before his
PDAF can be tapped as a funding source, thereby
highlighting the indispensability of the said act to the entire
budget execution process:[192]

Justice Bernabe: Now, without the individual

legislator's identification of the project, can the PDAF
of the legislator be utilized?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor.

Justice Bernabe: It cannot?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: It cannot… (interrupted)

Justice Bernabe: So meaning you should have the
identification of the project by the individual
legislator?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.

xxxx

Justice Bernabe: In short, the act of identification is

mandatory?

Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor. In the

sense that if it is not done and then there is no
identification.

xxxx

Justice Bernabe: Now, would you know of specific

instances when a project was implemented without the
identification by the individual legislator?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: I do not know, Your Honor; I

do not think so but I have no specific examples. I would
doubt very much, Your Honor, because to implement,
there is a need [for] a SARO and the NCA. And the
SARO and the NCA are triggered by an identification
from the legislator.
 xxxx

Solictor General Jardeleza: What we mean by

mandatory, Your Honor, is we were replying to a
question, "How can a legislator make sure that he is able
to get PDAF Funds?" It is mandatory in the sense that he
must identify, in that sense, Your Honor. Otherwise, if he
does not identify, he cannot avail of the PDAF Funds and
his district would not be able to have PDAF Funds, only in
that sense, Your Honor. (Emphases supplied)

Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby

declares the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other
provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield
any form of post-enactment authority in the
implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated
to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of
powers principle and thus unconstitutional. Corollary
thereto, informal practices, through which legislators have
effectively intruded into the proper phases of budget
execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and,
hence, accorded the same unconstitutional treatment. That
such informal practices do exist and have, in fact, been
constantly observed throughout the years has not been
substantially disputed here. As pointed out by Chief Justice
Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice Sereno) during the
Oral Arguments of these cases:[193]

Chief Justice Sereno:

Now, from the responses of the representative of both,

the DBM and two (2) Houses of Congress, if we enforces
the initial thought that I have, after I had seen the extent
of this research made by my staff, that neither the
Executive nor Congress frontally faced the question of
constitutional compatibility of how they were engineering
the budget process. In fact, the words you have been
using, as the three lawyers [of the DBM, and both
Houses of Congress] has also been using is surprise;
surprised that all of these things are now surfacing. In
fact, I thought that what the 2013 PDAF provisions did
was to codify in one section all the past practice that
[had] been done since 1991. In a certain sense, we
should be thankful that they are all now in the PDAF
Special Provisions. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Ultimately, legislators cannot exercise powers which they do

not have, whether through formal measures written into the
law or informal practices institutionalized in government
agencies, else the Executive department be deprived of
what the Constitution has vested as its own.

2. Non-delegability of Legislative Power.

a. Statement of Principle.

As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle,[194]

legislative power shall be exclusively exercised by the body
to which the Constitution has conferred the same. In
particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
states that such power shall be vested in the Congress of
the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House
of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the
people by the provision on initiative and referendum.[195]
Based on this provision, it is clear that only Congress, acting
as a bicameral body, and the people, through the process of
initiative and referendum, may constitutionally wield
legislative power and no other. This premise embodies the
principle of non-delegability of legislative power, and the
only recognized exceptions thereto would be: (a) delegated
legislative power to local governments which, by
immemorial practice, are allowed to legislate on purely local
matters;[196] and (b) constitutionally-grafted exceptions
such as the authority of the President to, by law, exercise
powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy in times of war or other national emergency,
[197] or fix within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff
rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage
dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of
the national development program of the Government.[198]

Notably, the principle of non-delegability should not be

confused as a restriction to delegate rule-making
authority to implementing agencies for the limited purpose
of either filling up the details of the law for its enforcement
(supplementary rule-making) or ascertaining facts to
bring the law into actual operation (contingent rule-
making).[199] The conceptual treatment and limitations of
delegated rule-making were explained in the case of People
v. Maceren[200] as follows:

The grant of the rule-making power to administrative

agencies is a relaxation of the principle of separation
of powers and is an exception to the nondelegation of
legislative powers. Administrative regulations or
"subordinate legislation" calculated to promote the
public interest are necessary because of "the growing
complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the
subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased
difficulty of administering the law."
 xxxx

[Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that] [t]he

rule-making power must be confined to details for
regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into
effect the law as it has been enacted. The power
cannot be extended to amending or expanding the
statutory requirements or to embrace matters not
covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute
cannot be sanctioned. (Emphases supplied)

b. Application.

In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF
Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification
authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of
non-delegability since said legislators are effectively
allowed to individually exercise the power of
appropriation, which as settled in Philconsa is lodged in
Congress.[201] That the power to appropriate must be
exercised only through legislation is clear from Section
29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that:
"No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law." To understand
what constitutes an act of appropriation, the Court, in
Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor[202]
(Bengzon), held that the power of appropriation involves (a)
the setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public
revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Essentially, under the
2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal
lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how
much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or
beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As these
two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of
appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the
2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to
perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been
conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution
does not, however, allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of
non-delegability of legislative power, the Court hereby
declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of
Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar
legislative identification feature as herein discussed, as
unconstitutional.

3. Checks and Balances.

a. Statement of Principle; Item-Veto Power.

The fact that the three great powers of government are

intended to be kept separate and distinct does not mean
that they are absolutely unrestrained and independent of
each other. The Constitution has also provided for an
elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of
the government.[203]

A prime example of a constitutional check and balance

would be the President's power to veto an item written
into an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to
him by Congress for approval through a process known as
"bill presentment." The President's item-veto power is found
in Section 27(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which
reads as follows:

Sec. 27. x x x.

xxxx

(2) The President shall have the power to veto any

particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or
tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to
which he does not object.

The presentment of appropriation, revenue or tariff bills to

the President, wherein he may exercise his power of item-
veto, forms part of the "single, finely wrought and
exhaustively considered, procedures" for law-passage as
specified under the Constitution.[204] As stated in Abakada,
the final step in the law-making process is the "submission
[of the bill] to the President for approval. Once approved, it
takes effect as law after the required publication."[205]
Elaborating on the President's item-veto power and its
relevance as a check on the legislature, the Court, in
Bengzon, explained that:[206]

The former Organic Act and the present Constitution of

the Philippines make the Chief Executive an integral part
of the law-making power. His disapproval of a bill,
commonly known as a veto, is essentially a legislative
act. The questions presented to the mind of the Chief
Executive are precisely the same as those the legislature
must determine in passing a bill, except that his will be a
broader point of view.

The Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the

legislative department of the government, but in this
respect it is a grant of power to the executive
department. The Legislature has the affirmative power
to enact laws; the Chief Executive has the negative
power by the constitutional exercise of which he may
defeat the will of the Legislature. It follows that the
Chief Executive must find his authority in the
Constitution. But in exercising that authority he may not
be confined to rules of strict construction or hampered
by the unwise interference of the judiciary. The courts
 will indulge every intendment in favor of the
constitutionality of a veto [in the same manner] as they
will presume the constitutionality of an act as originally
passed by the Legislature. (Emphases supplied)

The justification for the President's item-veto power rests

on a variety of policy goals such as to prevent log-rolling
legislation,[207] impose fiscal restrictions on the legislature,
as well as to fortify the executive branch's role in the
budgetary process.[208] In Immigration and Naturalization
Service v. Chadha, the US Supreme Court characterized the
President's item-power as "a salutary check upon the
legislative body, calculated to guard the community against
the effects of factions, precipitancy, or of any impulse
unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to
influence a majority of that body"; phrased differently, it is
meant to "increase the chances in favor of the community
against the passing of bad laws, through haste,
inadvertence, or design."[209]

For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it

necessarily follows that there exists a proper "item"
which may be the object of the veto. An item, as defined
in the field of appropriations, pertains to "the particulars,
the details, the distinct and severable parts of the
appropriation or of the bill." In the case of Bengzon v.
Secretary of Justice of the Philippine Islands,[210] the US
Supreme Court characterized an item of appropriation as
follows:

An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item

which, in itself, is a specific appropriation of money,
not some general provision of law which happens to
be put into an appropriation bill. (Emphases supplied)

On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation

bill, to ensure that the President may be able to exercise
his power of item veto, must contain "specific
appropriations of money" and not only "general provisions"
which provide for parameters of appropriation.

Further, it is significant to point out that an item of

appropriation must be an item characterized by singular
correspondence meaning an allocation of a specified
singular amount for a specified singular purpose,
otherwise known as a "line-item."[211] This treatment not
only allows the item to be consistent with its definition as a
"specific appropriation of money" but also ensures that the
President may discernibly veto the same. Based on the
foregoing formulation, the existing Calamity Fund,
Contingent Fund and the Intelligence Fund, being
appropriations which state a specified amount for a specific
purpose, would then be considered as "line-item"
appropriations which are rightfully subject to item veto.
Likewise, it must be observed that an appropriation may be
validly apportioned into component percentages or
values; however, it is crucial that each percentage or
value must be allocated for its own corresponding
purpose for such component to be considered as a proper
line-item. Moreover, as Justice Carpio correctly pointed out,
a valid appropriation may even have several related
purposes that are by accounting and budgeting practice
considered as one purpose, e.g., MOOE (maintenance and
other operating expenses), in which case the related
purposes shall be deemed sufficiently specific for the
exercise of the President's item veto power. Finally, special
purpose funds and discretionary funds would equally
square with the constitutional mechanism of item-veto for
as long as they follow the rule on singular
correspondence as herein discussed. Anent special
purpose funds, it must be added that Section 25(4), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that the "'special
appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is
intended, and shall be supported by funds actually
available as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be
raised by a corresponding revenue proposal therein."
Meanwhile, with respect to discretionary funds, Section
25(6), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that said
funds "shall be disbursed only for public purposes to be
supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such
guidelines as may be prescribed by law."

In contrast, what beckons constitutional infirmity are

appropriations which merely provide for a singular lump-
sum amount to be tapped as a source of funding for
multiple purposes. Since such appropriation type
necessitates the further determination of both the actual
amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the
appropriation which must still be chosen from the multiple
purposes stated in the law, it cannot be said that the
appropriation law already indicates a "specific appropriation
of money" and hence, without a proper line-item which the
President may veto. As a practical result, the President
would then be faced with the predicament of either vetoing
the entire appropriation if he finds some of its purposes
wasteful or undesirable, or approving the entire
appropriation so as not to hinder some of its legitimate
purposes. Finally, it may not be amiss to state that such
arrangement also raises non-delegability issues considering
that the implementing authority would still have to
determine, again, both the actual amount to be expended
and the actual purpose of the appropriation. Since the
foregoing determinations constitute the integral aspects of
the power to appropriate, the implementing authority would,
in effect, be exercising legislative prerogatives in violation of
the principle of non-delegability.

b. Application.

In these cases, petitioners claim that "[i]n the current x x x

system where the PDAF is a lump-sum appropriation, the
legislator's identification of the projects after the passage of
the GAA denies the President the chance to veto that item
later on."[212] Accordingly, they submit that the "item veto
power of the President mandates that appropriations bills
adopt line-item budgeting" and that "Congress cannot
choose a mode of budgeting [which] effectively renders the
constitutionally-given power of the President useless."[213]

On the other hand, respondents maintain that the text of the

Constitution envisions a process which is intended to meet
the demands of a modernizing economy and, as such,
lump-sum appropriations are essential to financially address
situations which are barely foreseen when a GAA is
enacted. They argue that the decision of the Congress to
create some lump- sum appropriations is constitutionally
allowed and textually-grounded.[214]

The Court agrees with petitioners.

Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion

only appears as a collective allocation limit since the said
amount would be further divided among individual
legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum
allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively
appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As
these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators
only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law,
it necessarily means that the actual items of PDAF
appropriation would not have been written into the General
Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto
consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment
legislative identification budgeting system fosters the
creation of a "budget within a budget" which subverts the
prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently
impairs the President's power of item veto. As petitioners
aptly point out, the above- described system forces the
President to decide between (a) accepting the entire P24.79
Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects
of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with
his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the
detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.[215]

Moreover, even without its post-enactment legislative

identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain
constitutionally flawed since it would then operate as a
prohibited form of lump-sum appropriation as above-
characterized. In particular, the lump-sum amount of
P24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere funding source
allotted for multiple purposes of spending, i.e., scholarships,
medical missions, assistance to indigents, preservation of
historical materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc.
This setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves the
actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for
further determination and, therefore, does not readily
indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the
President's power of item veto.

In fact, on the accountability side, the same lump-sum

budgeting scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson relays,
"limit[ed] state auditors from obtaining relevant data and
information that would aid in more stringently auditing the
utilization of said Funds."[216] Accordingly, she recommends
the adoption of a "line by line budget or amount per
proposed program, activity or project, and per implementing
agency."[217]

Hence, in view of the reasons above-stated, the Court finds

the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all Congressional Pork
Barrel Laws of similar operation, to be unconstitutional. That
such budgeting system provides for a greater degree of
flexibility to account for future contingencies cannot be an
excuse to defeat what the Constitution requires. Clearly, the
first and essential truth of the matter is that unconstitutional
means do not justify even commendable ends.[218]
 c. Accountability.

Petitioners further relate that the system under which

various forms of Congressional Pork Barrel operate defies
public accountability as it renders Congress incapable of
checking itself or its Members. In particular, they point out
that the Congressional Pork Barrel "gives each legislator a
direct, financial interest in the smooth, speedy passing of
the yearly budget" which turns them "from fiscalizers" into
"financially-interested partners."[219] They also claim that
the system has an effect on re-election as "the PDAF excels
in self-perpetuation of elective officials." Finally, they add
that the "PDAF impairs the power of impeachment" as such
"funds are indeed quite useful, 'to well, accelerate the
decisions of senators.'"[220]

The Court agrees in part.

The aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987

Constitution, which states that "public office is a public
trust," is an overarching reminder that every instrumentality
of government should exercise their official functions only in
accordance with the principles of the Constitution which
embodies the parameters of the people's trust. The notion
of a public trust connotes accountability,[221] hence, the
various mechanisms in the Constitution which are designed
to exact accountability from public officers.
Among others, an accountability mechanism with which the
proper expenditure of public funds may be checked is the
power of congressional oversight. As mentioned in
Abakada,[222] congressional oversight may be performed
either through: (a) scrutiny based primarily on Congress'
power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted
in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments
to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on
any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of
confirmation;[223] or (b) investigation and monitoring of
the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.[224]

The Court agrees with petitioners that certain features

embedded in some forms of Congressional Pork Barrel,
among others the 2013 PDAF Article, has an effect on
congressional oversight. The fact that individual legislators
are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the
budget makes it difficult for them to become disinterested
"observers" when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring
the implementation of the appropriation law. To a certain
extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said
legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority,
would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they
themselves participate. Also, it must be pointed out that this
very same concept of post- enactment authorization runs
afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that:

Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of

Representatives may personally appear as counsel
before any court of justice or before the Electoral
Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative
bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be
interested financially in any contract with, or in any
franchise or special privilege granted by the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any government-
owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during
his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter
before any office of the Government for his pecuniary
benefit or where he may be called upon to act on
account of his office. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various

phases of project implementation a matter before another
office of government renders them susceptible to taking
undue advantage of their own office.

The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same

post- enactment authority and/or the individual legislator's
control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetuate
himself in office. Indeed, while the Congressional Pork
Barrel and a legislator's use thereof may be linked to this
area of interest, the use of his PDAF for re-election
purposes is a matter which must be analyzed based on
particular facts and on a case-to-case basis.

Finally, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the
close operational proximity between legislators and the
Executive department, through the former's post-
enactment participation, may affect the process of
impeachment, this matter largely borders on the domain of
politics and does not strictly concern the Pork Barrel
System's intrinsic constitutionality. As such, it is an improper
subject of judicial assessment.

In sum, insofar as its post-enactment features dilute

congressional oversight and violate Section 14, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution, thus impairing public accountability,
the 2013 PDAF Article and other forms of Congressional
Pork Barrel of similar nature are deemed as unconstitutional.

4. Political Dynasties.

One of the petitioners submits that the Pork Barrel System

enables politicians who are members of political dynasties
to accumulate funds to perpetuate themselves in power, in
contravention of Section 26, Article II of the 1987
Constitution[225] which states that:

Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to

opportunities for public service, and prohibit political
dynasties as may be defined by law. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

At the outset, suffice it to state that the foregoing provision

is considered as not self-executing due to the qualifying
phrase "as may be defined by law." In this respect, said
provision does not, by and of itself, provide a judicially
enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a
guideline for legislative or executive action.[226] Therefore,
since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes
the policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court
must defer from ruling on this issue.

In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on

this score to be largely speculative since it has not been
properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would
be able to propagate political dynasties.

5. Local Autonomy.

The State's policy on local autonomy is principally stated in

Section 25, Article II and Sections 2 and 3, Article X of the
1987 Constitution which read as follows:

ARTICLE II

Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local

governments.

ARTICLE X

Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall

enjoy local autonomy.

Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government

code which shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization with effective
mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate
among the different local government units their powers,
responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the
qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term,
salaries, powers and functions and duties of local
officials, and all other matters relating to the organization
and operation of the local units.
Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7160,[227] otherwise
known as the "Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC),
wherein the policy on local autonomy had been more
specifically explicated as follows:

Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. (a) It is hereby declared the

policy of the State that the territorial and political
subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and
meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain
their fullest development as self-reliant communities
and make them more effective partners in the
attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the
State shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization whereby local
government units shall be given more powers, authority,
responsibilities, and resources. The process of
decentralization shall proceed from the National
Government to the local government units.

xxxx

(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all

national agencies and offices to conduct periodic
consultations with appropriate local government
units, nongovernmental and people's organizations, and
 other concerned sectors of the community before any
project or program is implemented in their respective
jurisdictions. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

The above-quoted provisions of the Constitution and the

LGC reveal the policy of the State to empower local
government units (LGUs) to develop and ultimately, become
self-sustaining and effective contributors to the national
economy. As explained by the Court in Philippine Gamefowl
Commission v. Intermediate Appellate Court:[228]

This is as good an occasion as any to stress the

commitment of the Constitution to the policy of local
autonomy which is intended to provide the needed
impetus and encouragement to the development of
our local political subdivisions as "self-reliant
communities." In the words of Jefferson, ?Municipal
corporations are the small republics from which the
great one derives its strength." The vitalization of local
governments will enable their inhabitants to fully exploit
their resources and more important, imbue them with a
deepened sense of involvement in public affairs as
members of the body politic. This objective could be
blunted by undue interference by the national
government in purely local affairs which are best
 resolved by the officials and inhabitants of such
political units. The decision we reach today conforms
not only to the letter of the pertinent laws but also to the
spirit of the Constitution.[229] (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)

In the cases at bar, petitioners contend that the

Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the constitutional
principles on local autonomy since it allows district
representatives, who are national officers, to substitute their
judgments in utilizing public funds for local development.
[230]

The Court agrees with petitioners.

Philconsa described the 1994 CDF as an attempt "to make

equal the unequal" and that ?[i]t is also a recognition that
individual members of Congress, far more than the
President and their congressional colleagues, are likely to
be knowledgeable about the needs of their respective
constituents and the priority to be given each project."[231]
Drawing strength from this pronouncement, previous
legislators justified its existence by stating that ?the
relatively small projects implemented under [the
Congressional Pork Barrel] complement and link the
national development goals to the countryside and
grassroots as well as to depressed areas which are
overlooked by central agencies which are preoccupied with
mega-projects.[232] Similarly, in his August 23, 2013 speech
on the "abolition" of PDAF and budgetary reforms, President
Aquino mentioned that the Congressional Pork Barrel was
originally established for a worthy goal, which is to enable
the representatives to identify projects for communities that
the LGU concerned cannot afford.[233]

Notwithstanding these declarations, the Court, however,

finds an inherent defect in the system which actually belies
the avowed intention of "making equal the unequal." In
particular, the Court observes that the gauge of PDAF and
CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of
office, without taking into account the specific interests
and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents.
In this regard, the allocation/division limits are clearly not
based on genuine parameters of equality, wherein economic
or geographic indicators have been taken into
consideration. As a result, a district representative of a
highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of
funding as a district representative of a far-flung rural
province which would be relatively "underdeveloped"
compared to the former. To add, what rouses graver
scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List
Representatives and in some years, even the Vice-
President who do not represent any locality, receive funding
from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well. These certainly
are anathema to the Congressional Pork Barrel's original
intent which is "to make equal the unequal." Ultimately, the
PDAF and CDF had become personal funds under the
effective control of each legislator and given unto them on
the sole account of their office.

The Court also observes that this concept of legislator

control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the
functions of the various Local Development Councils (LDCs)
which are already legally mandated to "assist the
corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of
economic and social development, and coordinating
development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction."[234]
Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose
functions are essentially geared towards managing local
affairs,[235] their programs, policies and resolutions should
not be overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators,
who are national officers that have no law-making authority
except only when acting as a body. The undermining effect
on local autonomy caused by the post-enactment authority
conferred to the latter was succinctly put by petitioners in
the following wise:[236]

With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local

development council and initiate projects on his own,
 and even take sole credit for its execution. Indeed, this
type of personality-driven project identification has not
only contributed little to the overall development of the
district, but has even contributed to ?further weakening
infrastructure planning and coordination efforts of the
government."

Thus, insofar as individual legislators are authorized to

intervene in purely local matters and thereby subvert
genuine local autonomy, the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all
other similar forms of Congressional Pork Barrel is deemed
unconstitutional.

With this final issue on the Congressional Pork Barrel

resolved, the Court now turns to the substantive issues
involving the Presidential Pork Barrel.

C. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork Barrel.

1. Validity of Appropriation.

Petitioners preliminarily assail Section 8 of PD 910 and

Section 12 of PD1869 (now, amended by PD 1993), which
respectively provide for the Malampaya Funds and the
Presidential Social Fund, as invalid appropriations laws since
they do not have the "primary and specific" purpose of
authorizing the release of public funds from the National
Treasury. Petitioners submit that Section 8 of PD 910 is not
an appropriation law since the "primary and specific"
purpose of PD 910 is the creation of an Energy
Development Board and Section 8 thereof only created a
Special Fund incidental thereto.[237] In similar regard,
petitioners argue that Section 12 of PD 1869 is neither a
valid appropriations law since the allocation of the
Presidential Social Fund is merely incidental to the "primary
and specific" purpose of PD 1869 which is the amendment
of the Franchise and Powers of PAGCOR.[238] In view of the
foregoing, petitioners suppose that such funds are being
used without any valid law allowing for their proper
appropriation in violation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution which states that: "No money shall be
paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law."[239]

The Court disagrees.

"An appropriation made by law" under the contemplation of

Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution exists
when a provision of law (a) sets apart a determinate or
determinable[240] amount of money and (b) allocates the
same for a particular public purpose. These two minimum
designations of amount and purpose stem from the very
definition of the word "appropriation," which means "to allot,
assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or purpose,"
and hence, if written into the law, demonstrate that the
legislative intent to appropriate exists. As the
Constitution "does not provide or prescribe any particular
form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization
or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it
be 'made by law,'" an appropriation law may according to
Philconsa be "detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to
be" for as long as the intent to appropriate may be gleaned
from the same. As held in the case of Guingona, Jr.: [241]

[T]here is no provision in our Constitution that

provides or prescribes any particular form of words
or religious recitals in which an authorization or
appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that
it be "made by law," such as precisely the authorization
or appropriation under the questioned presidential
decrees. In other words, in terms of time horizons, an
appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past but
subsisting legislations) as well as expressly for the
current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the
present Congress), just as said appropriation may be
made in general as well as in specific terms. The
Congressional authorization may be embodied in annual
laws, such as a general appropriations act or in special
provisions of laws of general or special application which
appropriate public funds for specific public purposes,
 such as the questioned decrees. An appropriation
measure is sufficient if the legislative intention
clearly and certainly appears from the language
employed (In re Continuing Appropriations, 32 P.
272), whether in the past or in the present.
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Likewise, as ruled by the US Supreme Court in State of

Nevada v. La Grave:[242]

To constitute an appropriation there must be money

placed in a fund applicable to the designated purpose.
The word appropriate means to allot, assign, set
apart or apply to a particular use or purpose. An
appropriation in the sense of the constitution means the
setting apart a portion of the public funds for a public
purpose. No particular form of words is necessary for
the purpose, if the intention to appropriate is plainly
manifested. (Emphases supplied)

Thus, based on the foregoing, the Court cannot sustain the

argument that the appropriation must be the "primary and
specific" purpose of the law in order for a valid
appropriation law to exist. To reiterate, if a legal provision
designates a determinate or determinable amount of money
and allocates the same for a particular public purpose, then
the legislative intent to appropriate becomes apparent and,
hence, already sufficient to satisfy the requirement of an
"appropriation made by law" under contemplation of the
Constitution.

Section 8 of PD 910 pertinently provides:

Section 8. Appropriations. x x x

All fees, revenues and receipts of the Board from any

and all sources including receipts from service
contracts and agreements such as application and
processing fees, signature bonus, discovery bonus,
production bonus; all money collected from
concessionaires, representing unspent work obligations,
fines and penalties under the Petroleum Act of 1949; as
well as the government share representing royalties,
rentals, production share on service contracts and
similar payments on the exploration, development and
exploitation of energy resources, shall form part of a
Special Fund to be used to finance energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects
of the government and for such other purposes as
may be hereafter directed by the President.
(Emphases supplied)
Whereas Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993,
reads:

Sec. 12. Special Condition of Franchise. After deducting

five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%)
percent share of the Government in the aggregate
gross earnings of the Corporation from this
Franchise, or 60% if the aggregate gross earnings be
less than P150,000,000.00 shall be set aside and shall
accrue to the General Fund to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects and to finance
the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities
due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized
by the Office of the President of the Philippines.
(Emphases supplied)

Analyzing the legal text vis-à-vis the above-mentioned

principles, it may then be concluded that (a) Section 8 of PD
910, which creates a Special Fund comprised of "all fees,
revenues, and receipts of the [Energy Development] Board
from any and all sources" (a determinable amount) "to be
used to finance energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government and
for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" (a specified public purpose), and (b) Section 12
of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which similarly sets
aside, "[a]fter deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax,
the Fifty (50%) percent share of the Government in the
aggregate gross earnings of [PAGCOR], or 60%[,] if the
aggregate gross earnings be less than P150,000,000.00"
(also a determinable amount) "to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects and x x x the
restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to
calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office
of the President of the Philippines" (also a specified public
purpose), are legal appropriations under Section 29(1),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

In this relation, it is apropos to note that the 2013 PDAF

Article cannot be properly deemed as a legal appropriation
under the said constitutional provision precisely because, as
earlier stated, it contains post- enactment measures which
effectively create a system of intermediate appropriations.
These intermediate appropriations are the actual
appropriations meant for enforcement and since they are
made by individual legislators after the GAA is passed, they
occur outside the law. As such, the Court observes that the
real appropriation made under the 2013 PDAF Article is not
the P24.79 Billion allocated for the entire PDAF, but rather
the post-enactment determinations made by the individual
legislators which are, to repeat, occurrences outside of the
law. Irrefragably, the 2013 PDAF Article does not constitute
an "appropriation made by law" since it, in its truest sense,
only authorizes individual legislators to appropriate in
violation of the non-delegability principle as afore-
discussed.

2. Undue Delegation.

On a related matter, petitioners contend that Section 8 of

PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power
since the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" gives the President
"unbridled discretion to determine for what purpose the
funds will be used."[243] Respondents, on the other hand,
urged the Court to apply the principle of ejusdem generis to
the same section and thus, construe the phrase "and for
such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" to refer only to other purposes related "to energy
resource development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government."[244]

The Court agrees with petitioners' submissions.

While the designation of a determinate or determinable

amount for a particular public purpose is sufficient for a
legal appropriation to exist, the appropriation law must
contain adequate legislative guidelines if the same law
delegates rule-making authority to the Executive[245] either
for the purpose of (a) filling up the details of the law for its
enforcement, known as supplementary rule-making, or (b)
ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation,
referred to as contingent rule-making.[246] There are two (2)
fundamental tests to ensure that the legislative guidelines
for delegated rule- making are indeed adequate. The first
test is called the "completeness test." Case law states that
a law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate. On
the other hand, the second test is called the "sufficient
standard test." Jurisprudence holds that a law lays down a
sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or
limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the
delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot.[247] To be sufficient, the standard must specify
the limits of the delegate's authority, announce the
legislative policy, and identify the conditions under which it
is to be implemented.[248]

In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with petitioners

that the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD
910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power
insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to
adequately determine the limits of the President's authority
with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds
may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the
President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for
any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows
him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the
purview of the law. That the subject phrase may be
confined only to "energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government"
under the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the
general word or phrase is to be construed to include or be
restricted to things akin to, resembling, or of the same kind
or class as those specifically mentioned,[249] is belied by
three (3) reasons: first, the phrase "energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government" states a singular and general class and
hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference of
specific things from which the general phrase "for such
other purposes" may be limited; second, the said phrase
also exhausts the class it represents, namely energy
development programs of the government;[250] and, third,
the Executive department has, in fact, used the Malampaya
Funds for non-energy related purposes under the subject
phrase, thereby contradicting respondents' own position
that it is limited only to "energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government."[251]
Thus, while Section 8 of PD 910 may have passed the
completeness test since the policy of energy development
is clearly deducible from its text, the phrase "and for such
other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" under the same provision of law should
nonetheless be stricken down as unconstitutional as it lies
independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the
delegating law. This notwithstanding, it must be
underscored that the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows
for the use of the Malampaya Funds "to finance energy
resource development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government," remains legally effective and
subsisting. Truth be told, the declared unconstitutionality of
the aforementioned phrase is but an assurance that the
Malampaya Funds would be used as it should be used only
in accordance with the avowed purpose and intention of PD
910.

As for the Presidential Social Fund, the Court takes judicial

notice of the fact that Section 12 of PD 1869 has already
been amended by PD 1993 which thus moots the parties'
submissions on the same.[252] Nevertheless, since the
amendatory provision may be readily examined under the
current parameters of discussion, the Court proceeds to
resolve its constitutionality.

Primarily, Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993,

indicates that the Presidential Social Fund may be used "to
[first,] finance the priority infrastructure development
projects and [second,] to finance the restoration of
damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may
be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of
the Philippines." The Court finds that while the second
indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the
President to spend the Presidential Social Fund only for
restoration purposes which arise from calamities, the first
indicated purpose, however, gives him carte blanche
authority to use the same fund for any infrastructure project
he may so determine as a "priority". Verily, the law does not
supply a definition of "priority infrastructure development
projects" and hence, leaves the President without any
guideline to construe the same. To note, the delimitation of
a project as one of "infrastructure" is too broad of a
classification since the said term could pertain to any kind
of facility. This may be deduced from its lexicographic
definition as follows: "[t]he underlying framework of a
system, [especially] public services and facilities (such as
highways, schools, bridges, sewers, and water-systems)
needed to support commerce as well as economic and
residential development."[253] In fine, the phrase "to finance
the priority infrastructure development projects" must be
stricken down as unconstitutional since similar to the
above- assailed provision under Section 8 of PD 910 it lies
independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the
delegating law. As they are severable, all other provisions of
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, remains
legally effective and subsisting.
D. Ancillary Prayers.

1. Petitioners' Prayer to be Furnished Lists and Detailed

Reports.

Aside from seeking the Court to declare the Pork Barrel

System unconstitutional as the Court did so in the context
of its pronouncements made in this Decision petitioners
equally pray that the Executive Secretary and/or the DBM
be ordered to release to the CoA and to the public: (a) "the
complete schedule/list of legislators who have availed of
their PDAF and VILP from the years 2003 to 2013,
specifying the use of the funds, the project or activity and
the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data
thereto" (PDAF Use Schedule/List);[254] and (b) "the use of
the Executive's [lump-sum, discretionary] funds, including
the proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Fund[s] [and]
remittances from the [PAGCOR] x x x from 2003 to 2013,
specifying the x x x project or activity and the recipient
entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto"[255]
(Presidential Pork Use Report). Petitioners' prayer is
grounded on Section 28, Article II and Section 7, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution which read as follows:

ARTICLE II
 Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by
law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full
public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest.

ARTICLE III

Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters

of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law.

The Court denies petitioners' submission.

Case law instructs that the proper remedy to invoke the

right to information is to file a petition for mandamus. As
explained in the case of Legaspi v. Civil Service
Commission:[256]

[W]hile the manner of examining public records may be

subject to reasonable regulation by the government
 agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the
information of public concern, and to afford access to
public records cannot be discretionary on the part of
said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be
made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies.
Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right may
be rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of
agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not being
discretionary, its performance may be compelled by a
writ of mandamus in a proper case.

But what is a proper case for Mandamus to issue? In the

case before Us, the public right to be enforced and the
concomitant duty of the State are unequivocably set
forth in the Constitution. The decisive question on the
propriety of the issuance of the writ of mandamus in
this case is, whether the information sought by the
petitioner is within the ambit of the constitutional
guarantee. (Emphases supplied)

Corollarily, in the case of Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr.[257]

(Valmonte), it has been clarified that the right to information
does not include the right to compel the preparation of
"lists, abstracts, summaries and the like." In the same case,
it was stressed that it is essential that the "applicant has a
well- defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing
demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to
perform the act required." Hence, without the foregoing
substantiations, the Court cannot grant a particular request
for information. The pertinent portions of Valmonte are
hereunder quoted:[258]

Although citizens are afforded the right to information

and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official
records," the Constitution does not accord them a
right to compel custodians of official records to
prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in
their desire to acquire information on matters of
public concern.

It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of

mandamus to issue that the applicant has a well-
defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing
demanded and that it is the imperative duty of
defendant to perform the act required. The
corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the
required act must be clear and specific [Lemi v. Valencia,
G.R. No. L-20768, November 29,1968,126 SCRA 203;
Ocampo v. Subido, G.R. No. L-28344, August 27, 1976,
72 SCRA 443.] The request of the petitioners fails to
meet this standard, there being no duty on the part
of respondent to prepare the list requested.
 (Emphases supplied)

In these cases, aside from the fact that none of the petitions
are in the nature of mandamus actions, the Court finds that
petitioners have failed to establish a "a well-defined, clear
and certain legal right" to be furnished by the Executive
Secretary and/or the DBM of their requested PDAF Use
Schedule/List and Presidential Pork Use Report. Neither did
petitioners assert any law or administrative issuance which
would form the bases of the latter's duty to furnish them
with the documents requested. While petitioners pray that
said information be equally released to the CoA, it must be
pointed out that the CoA has not been impleaded as a party
to these cases nor has it filed any petition before the Court
to be allowed access to or to compel the release of any
official document relevant to the conduct of its audit
investigations. While the Court recognizes that the
information requested is a matter of significant public
concern, however, if only to ensure that the parameters of
disclosure are properly foisted and so as not to unduly
hamper the equally important interests of the government, it
is constrained to deny petitioners' prayer on this score,
without prejudice to a proper mandamus case which they,
or even the CoA, may choose to pursue through a separate
petition.
It bears clarification that the Court's denial herein should
only cover petitioners' plea to be furnished with such
schedule/list and report and not in any way deny them, or
the general public, access to official documents which are
already existing and of public record. Subject to
reasonable regulation and absent any valid statutory
prohibition, access to these documents should not be
proscribed. Thus, in Valmonte, while the Court denied the
application for mandamus towards the preparation of the list
requested by petitioners therein, it nonetheless allowed
access to the documents sought for by the latter, subject,
however, to the custodian's reasonable regulations, viz.:[259]

In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the

documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS,
subject to reasonable regulations that the latter may
promulgate relating to the manner and hours of
examination, to the end that damage to or loss of the
records may be avoided, that undue interference with
the duties of the custodian of the records may be
prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to
inspect the records may be insured [Legaspi v. Civil
Service Commission, supra at p. 538, quoting Subido v.
Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387.] The petition, as to the second
and third alternative acts sought to be done by
petitioners, is meritorious.
 However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first
act sought by petitioners, i.e., "to furnish petitioners the
list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members
belonging to the UNIDO and PDP- Laban who were able
to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7
election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then
First Lady Imelda Marcos."

The Court, therefore, applies the same treatment here.

2. Petitioners' Prayer to Include Matters in

Congressional Deliberations.

Petitioners further seek that the Court "[order] the inclusion

in budgetary deliberations with the Congress of all
presently, off-budget, lump sum, discretionary funds
including but not limited to, proceeds from the x x x
Malampaya Fund, remittances from the [PAGCOR] and the
[PCSO] or the Executive's Social Funds[.]"[260]

Suffice it to state that the above-stated relief sought by

petitioners covers a matter which is generally left to the
prerogative of the political branches of government. Hence,
lest the Court itself overreach, it must equally deny their
prayer on this score.
3. Respondents' Prayer to Lift TRO; Consequential
Effects of Decision.

The final issue to be resolved stems from the interpretation

accorded by the DBM to the concept of released funds. In
response to the Court's September 10, 2013 TRO that
enjoined the release of the remaining PDAF allocated for the
year 2013, the DBM issued Circular Letter No. 2013-8 dated
September 27, 2013 (DBM Circular 2013-8) which
pertinently reads as follows:

3.0 Nonetheless, PDAF projects funded under the FY

2013 GAA, where a Special Allotment Release Order
(SARO) has been issued by the DBM and such SARO has
been obligated by the implementing agencies prior to
the issuance of the TRO, may continually be
implemented and disbursements thereto effected by the
agencies concerned.

Based on the text of the foregoing, the DBM authorized the

continued implementation and disbursement of PDAF funds
as long as they are: first, covered by a SARO; and, second,
that said SARO had been obligated by the implementing
agency concerned prior to the issuance of the Court's
September 10, 2013 TRO.

Petitioners take issue with the foregoing circular, arguing

that ?the issuance of the SARO does not yet involve the
release of funds under the PDAF, as release is only triggered
by the issuance of a Notice of Cash Allocation [(NCA)]."[261]
As such, PDAF disbursements, even if covered by an
obligated SARO, should remain enjoined.

For their part, respondents espouse that the subject TRO

only covers "unreleased and unobligated allotments." They
explain that once a SARO has been issued and obligated by
the implementing agency concerned, the PDAF funds
covered by the same are already "beyond the reach of the
TRO because they cannot be considered as 'remaining
PDAF.'" They conclude that this is a reasonable
interpretation of the TRO by the DBM.[262]

The Court agrees with petitioners in part.

At the outset, it must be observed that the issue of whether

or not the Court's September 10, 2013 TRO should be lifted
is a matter rendered moot by the present Decision. The
unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article as declared
herein has the consequential effect of converting the
temporary injunction into a permanent one. Hence, from
the promulgation of this Decision, the release of the
remaining PDAF funds for 2013, among others, is now
permanently enjoined.

The propriety of the DBM's interpretation of the concept of

"release" must, nevertheless, be resolved as it has a
practical impact on the execution of the current Decision. In
particular, the Court must resolve the issue of whether or
not PDAF funds covered by obligated SAROs, at the time
this Decision is promulgated, may still be disbursed
following the DBM's interpretation in DBM Circular 2013-8.

On this score, the Court agrees with petitioners' posturing

for the fundamental reason that funds covered by an
obligated SARO are yet to be "released" under legal
contemplation. A SARO, as defined by the DBM itself in its
website, is "[a]specific authority issued to identified
agencies to incur obligations not exceeding a given
amount during a specified period for the purpose indicated.
It shall cover expenditures the release of which is subject
to compliance with specific laws or regulations, or is
subject to separate approval or clearance by competent
authority."[263] Based on this definition, it may be gleaned
that a SARO only evinces the existence of an obligation and
not the directive to pay. Practically speaking, the SARO
does not have the direct and immediate effect of placing
public funds beyond the control of the disbursing authority.
In fact, a SARO may even be withdrawn under certain
circumstances which will prevent the actual release of
funds. On the other hand, the actual release of funds is
brought about by the issuance of the NCA,[264] which is
subsequent to the issuance of a SARO. As may be
determined from the statements of the DBM representative
during the Oral Arguments:[265]

Justice Bernabe: Is the notice of allocation issued

simultaneously with the SARO?

xxxx

Atty. Ruiz: It comes after. The SARO, Your Honor, is

only the go signal for the agencies to obligate or to
enter into commitments. The NCA, Your Honor, is
already the go signal to the treasury for us to be able
to pay or to liquidate the amounts obligated in the
SARO; so it comes after. x x x The NCA, Your Honor, is
the go signal for the MDS for the authorized
government-disbursing banks to, therefore, pay the
payees depending on the projects or projects covered by
the SARO and the NCA.

Justice Bernabe: Are there instances that SAROs are

cancelled or revoked?
 Atty. Ruiz: Your Honor, I would like to instead submit that
there are instances that the SAROs issued are
withdrawn by the DBM.

Justice Bernabe: They are withdrawn?

Atty. Ruiz: Yes, Your Honor x x x. (Emphases and

underscoring supplied)

Thus, unless an NCA has been issued, public funds should

not be treated as funds which have been "released." In this
respect, therefore, the disbursement of 2013 PDAF funds
which are only covered by obligated SAROs, and without
any corresponding NCAs issued, must, at the time of this
Decision's promulgation, be enjoined and consequently
reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general
fund. Verily, in view of the declared unconstitutionality of
the 2013 PDAF Article, the funds appropriated pursuant
thereto cannot be disbursed even though already obligated,
else the Court sanctions the dealing of funds coming from
an unconstitutional source.

This same pronouncement must be equally applied to (a)

the Malampaya Funds which have been obligated but not
released meaning, those merely covered by a SARO under
the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8
of PD 910; and (b) funds sourced from the Presidential
Social Fund under the phrase "to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects" pursuant to Section 12
of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which were altogether
declared by the Court as unconstitutional. However, these
funds should not be reverted to the general fund as afore-
stated but instead, respectively remain under the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund to be
utilized for their corresponding special purposes not
otherwise declared as unconstitutional.

E. Consequential Effects of Decision.

As a final point, it must be stressed that the Court's

pronouncement anent the unconstitutionality of (a) the
2013 PDAF Article and its Special Provisions, (b) all other
Congressional Pork Barrel provisions similar thereto, and (c)
the phrases (1) ?and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD
910, and (2) "to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects" under Section 12 of PD 1869, as
amended by PD 1993, must only be treated as prospective
in effect in view of the operative fact doctrine.

To explain, the operative fact doctrine exhorts the

recognition that until the judiciary, in an appropriate case,
declares the invalidity of a certain legislative or executive
act, such act is presumed constitutional and thus, entitled
to obedience and respect and should be properly enforced
and complied with. As explained in the recent case of
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power
Corporation,[266] the doctrine merely "reflect[s] awareness
that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental
organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative
or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have
elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review
that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to
deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if
there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such
adjudication."[267] "In the language of an American Supreme
Court decision: 'The actual existence of a statute, prior to
such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot
justly be ignored.'"[268]

For these reasons, this Decision should be heretofore

applied prospectively.

Conclusion

The Court renders this Decision to rectify an error which

has persisted in the chronicles of our history. In the final
analysis, the Court must strike down the Pork Barrel System
as unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in the
rules within which it operates. To recount, insofar as it has
allowed legislators to wield, in varying gradations, non-
oversight, post- enactment authority in vital areas of budget
execution, the system has violated the principle of
separation of powers; insofar as it has conferred unto
legislators the power of appropriation by giving them
personal, discretionary funds from which they are able to
fund specific projects which they themselves determine, it
has similarly violated the principle of non- delegability of
legislative power; insofar as it has created a system of
budgeting wherein items are not textualized into the
appropriations bill, it has flouted the prescribed procedure
of presentment and, in the process, denied the President
the power to veto items; insofar as it has diluted the
effectiveness of congressional oversight by giving
legislators a stake in the affairs of budget execution, an
aspect of governance which they may be called to monitor
and scrutinize, the system has equally impaired public
accountability; insofar as it has authorized legislators, who
are national officers, to intervene in affairs of purely local
nature, despite the existence of capable local institutions, it
has likewise subverted genuine local autonomy; and again,
insofar as it has conferred to the President the power to
appropriate funds intended by law for energy-related
purposes only to other purposes he may deem fit as well as
other public funds under the broad classification of "priority
infrastructure development projects," it has once more
transgressed the principle of non-delegability.

For as long as this nation adheres to the rule of law, any of

the multifarious unconstitutional methods and mechanisms
the Court has herein pointed out should never again be
adopted in any system of governance, by any name or form,
by any semblance or similarity, by any influence or effect.
Disconcerting as it is to think that a system so
constitutionally unsound has monumentally endured, the
Court urges the people and its co- stewards in government
to look forward with the optimism of change and the
awareness of the past. At a time of great civic unrest and
vociferous public debate, the Court fervently hopes that its
Decision today, while it may not purge all the wrongs of
society nor bring back what has been lost, guides this
nation to the path forged by the Constitution so that no one
may heretofore detract from its cause nor stray from its
course. After all, this is the Court's bounden duty and no
other's.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. In view

of the constitutional violations discussed in this Decision,
the Court hereby declares as UNCONSTITUTIONAL: (a)
the entire 2013 PDAF Article; (b) all legal provisions of past
and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the
previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the various
Congressional Insertions, which authorize/d legislators
whether individually or collectively organized into
committees to intervene, assume or participate in any of the
various post-enactment stages of the budget execution,
such as but not limited to the areas of project identification,
modification and revision of project identification, fund
release and/or fund realignment, unrelated to the power of
congressional oversight; (c) all legal provisions of past and
present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the
previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the various
Congressional Insertions, which confer/red personal, lump-
sum allocations to legislators from which they are able to
fund specific projects which they themselves determine; (d)
all informal practices of similar import and effect, which the
Court similarly deems to be acts of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
(e) the phrases (1) ?and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of
Presidential Decree No. 910 and (2) "to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of
Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1993, for both failing the sufficient standard test
in violation of the principle of non-delegability of legislative
power.

Accordingly, the Court's temporary injunction dated

September 10, 2013 is hereby declared to be PERMANENT.
Thus, the disbursement/release of the remaining PDAF
funds allocated for the year 2013, as well as for all previous
years, and the funds sourced from (1) the Malampaya Funds
under the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8
of Presidential Decree No. 910, and (2) the Presidential
Social Fund under the phrase ?to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects" pursuant to Section 12
of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1993, which are, at the time this
Decision is promulgated, not covered by Notice of Cash
Allocations (NCAs) but only by Special Allotment Release
Orders (SAROs), whether obligated or not, are hereby
ENJOINED. The remaining PDAF funds covered by this
permanent injunction shall not be disbursed/released but
instead reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the
general fund, while the funds under the Malampaya Funds
and the Presidential Social Fund shall remain therein to be
utilized for their respective special purposes not otherwise
declared as unconstitutional.

On the other hand, due to improper recourse and lack of

proper substantiation, the Court hereby DENIES petitioners'
prayer seeking that the Executive Secretary and/or the
Department of Budget and Management be ordered to
provide the public and the Commission on Audit complete
lists/schedules or detailed reports related to the availments
and utilization of the funds subject of these cases.
Petitioners' access to official documents already available
and of public record which are related to these funds must,
however, not be prohibited but merely subjected to the
custodian's reasonable regulations or any valid statutory
prohibition on the same. This denial is without prejudice to a
proper mandamus case which they or the Commission on
Audit may choose to pursue through a separate petition.

The Court also DENIES petitioners' prayer to order the

inclusion of the funds subject of these cases in the
budgetary deliberations of Congress as the same is a
matter left to the prerogative of the political branches of
government.

Finally, the Court hereby DIRECTS all prosecutorial organs

of the government to, within the bounds of reasonable
dispatch, investigate and accordingly prosecute all
government officials and/or private individuals for possible
criminal offenses related to the irregular, improper and/or
unlawful disbursement/utilization of all funds under the Pork
Barrel System.

This Decision is immediately executory but prospective in

effect.

SO ORDERED.
Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez,
Mendoza, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, see concurring opinion.
Velasco, Jr., J., no part.
Leonardo-De Castro, J., I concur and also join the
concurring opinion of Justice Carpio.
Brion, J., I join the opinion of Justice Carpio, subject to my
concurring & dissenting opinion.
Abad, J., I join the concurring opinion of J. A.T. Carpio.
Leonen, J., see concurring opinion.

* Dropped as a party per Memorandum dated October 17,

2013 filed by counsel for petitioners Atty. Alfredo B. Molo III,
et al. Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 388.

[1] The Federalist Papers, Federalist No. 20.

[2]Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), pp. 3-51; rollo (G.R. No.

208493), pp. 3-11; and rollo (G.R. No. 209251), pp. 2-8.

[3]"'[P]ork barrel spending,' a term that traces its origins

back to the era of slavery before the U.S. Civil War, when
slave owners occasionally would present a barrel of salt
pork as a gift to their slaves. In the modern usage, the term
refers to congressmen scrambling to set aside money for
pet projects in their districts." (Drudge, Michael W. "'Pork
Barrel' Spending Emerging as Presidential Campaign Issue,"
August 1, 2008 [visited October 17, 2013].)

[4]Bernas, Joaquin G., S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the

Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 2003 Edition, p.
786, citing Bernas, "From Pork Barrel to Bronze Caskets,"
Today, January 30, 1994.

[5]Heaser, Jason, "Pulled Pork: The Three Part Attack on

Non-Statutory Earmarks," Journal of Legislation, 35 J.
Legis. 32 (2009). (visited October 17, 2013).

[6]Nograles, Prospero C. and Lagman, Edcel C., House of

Representatives of the Philippines, "Understanding the
'Pork Barrel,'" p. 2. (visited October 17, 2013).

[7]
Chua, Yvonne T. and Cruz, Booma, B., "Pork is a Political,
Not A Developmental, Tool." [visited October 22, 2013].)
See also rollo (G.R. No. 208566), pp. 328-329.

[8] Morton, Jean, "What is a Pork Barrel?" Global Granary,

Lifestyle Magazine and Common Place Book Online:
Something for Everyone, August 19, 2013. (visited October
17, 2013).
[9]Jison, John Raymond, "What does the 'pork barrel' scam
suggest about the Philippine government?" International
Association for Political Science Students, September 10,
2013. (visited October 17, 2013). See also Llanes, Jonathan,
"Pork barrel Knowing the issue," Sunstar Baguio, October
23, 2013. (visited October 17, 2013).

[10]
Entitled "AN ACT MAKING APPROPRIATIONS FOR
PUBLIC WORKS," approved on March 10, 1922.

[11] "Act 3044, the first pork barrel appropriation,

essentially divided public works projects into two types. The
first type national and other buildings, roads and bridges in
provinces, and lighthouses, buoys and beacons, and
necessary mechanical equipment of lighthouses fell directly
under the jurisdiction of the director of public works, for
which his office received appropriations. The second group
police barracks, normal school and other public buildings,
and certain types of roads and bridges, artesian wells,
wharves, piers and other shore protection works, and cable,
telegraph, and telephone lines is the forerunner of the
infamous pork barrel.

Although the projects falling under the second type were to

be distributed at the discretion of the secretary of
commerce and communications, he needed prior
approval from a joint committee elected by the Senate
and House of Representatives. The nod of either the
joint committee or a committee member it had
authorized was also required before the commerce and
communications secretary could transfer unspent
portions of one item to another item." (Emphases
supplied) (Chua, Yvonne T. and Cruz, Booma, B., "Pork by
any name," VERA Files, August 23, 2013. [visited October
14, 2013]).

[12]Sec. 3. The sums appropriated in paragraphs (c), (g), (l),

and (s) of this Act shall be available for immediate
expenditure by the Director of Public Works, but those
appropriated in the other paragraphs shall be distributed in
the discretion of the Secretary of Commerce and
Communications, subject to the approval of a joint
committee elected by the Senate and the House of
Representatives. The committee from each House may
authorize one of its members to approve the distribution
made by the Secretary of Commerce and
Communications, who with the approval of said joint
committee, or of the authorized members thereof may,
for the purposes of said distribution, transfer unexpended
portions of any item of appropriation. (Emphases supplied)

[13]
Those Section 1 (c), (g), (l), and (s) of Act 3044 "shall be
available for immediate expenditure by the Director of Public
Works."
[14] Section 3, Act 3044.

[15]
Chua, Yvonne T. and Cruz, Booma, B., "Pork by any
name," VERA Files, August 23, 2013. (visited October 14,
2013).

[16] Id.

[17] Id.

[18] Id.

[19]Nograles, Prospero C. and Lagman, Edcel C., House of

Representatives of the Philippines, "Understanding the
'Pork Barrel,'" (visited October 17, 2013). 20 Chua, Yvonne T.
and Cruz, Booma, B., "Pork by any name," VERA Files,
August 23, 2013. (visited October 14, 2013).

[21] Id.

[22] Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and

Various Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP),
Special Audits Office Report No. 2012-03, August 14, 2013
(CoA Report), p. 2.

[23] Ilagan, Karol, "Data A Day; CIA, CDF, PDAF" Pork is pork
is pork," Moneypolitics, A Date Journalism Project for the
Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, August 1,
2013 (visited October 14, 2013).

[24] Republic Act No. (RA) 6831.

[25] Special Provision 1, Article XLIV, RA 7078 (1991 CDF

Article), and Special Provision 1, Article XLII (1992), RA 7180
(1992 CDF Article) are similarly worded as follows: Special
Provision 1. Use and Release of Funds. The amount herein
appropriated shall be used for infrastructure and other
priority projects and activities upon approval by the
President of the Philippines and shall be released directly to
the appropriate implementing agency [(x x x for 1991)],
subject to the submission of the required list of projects and
activities. (Emphases supplied)

[26]Chua, Yvonne T. and Cruz, Booma, B., "Pork by any

name," VERA Files, August 23, 2013. (visited October 14,
2013).

[27] Id.

[28]Special Provision 1, Article XXXVIII, RA 7645 (1993 CDF

Article) provides: Special Provision
 1. Use and Release of Funds. The amount herein
appropriated shall be used for infrastructure and other
priority projects and activities as proposed and
identified by officials concerned according to the
following allocations: Representatives, P12,500,000
each; Senators P18,000,000 each; Vice-President,
P20,000,000.

The fund shall be automatically released quarterly by

way of Advice of Allotment and Notice of Cash Allocation
directly to the assigned implementing agency not later
than five (5) days after the beginning of each quarter
upon submission of the list of projects and activities
by the officials concerned. (Emphases supplied)

[29] See Special Provision 1, 1993 CDF Article; id.

[30] Special Provision 1, Article XLI, RA 7663 (1994 CDF

Article) provides:

Special Provisions

1. Use and Release of Funds. The amount herein

appropriated shall be used for infrastructure, purchase
of ambulances and computers and other priority projects
 and activities, and credit facilities to qualified
beneficiaries as proposed and identified by officials
concerned according to the following allocations:
Representatives, P12,500,000 each; Senators
P18,000,000 each; Vice-President, P20,000,000;
PROVIDED, That, the said credit facilities shall be
constituted as a revolving fund to be administered by a
government financial institution (GFI) as a trust fund for
lending operations. Prior years releases to local
government units and national government agencies for
this purpose shall be turned over to the government
financial institution which shall be the sole administrator
of credit facilities released from this fund.

The fund shall be automatically released quarterly by

way of Advice of Allotments and Notice of Cash
Allocation directly to the assigned implementing agency
not later than five (5) days after the beginning of each
quarter upon submission of the list of projects and
activities by the officials concerned. (Emphases
supplied)

[31]Special Provision 1, Article XLII, RA 7845 (1995 CDF

Article) provides:
 Special Provisions

1. Use and Release of Funds. The amount herein

appropriated shall be used for infrastructure, purchase
of equipment and other priority projects and activities as
proposed and identified by officials concerned
according to the following allocations:
Representatives, P12,500,000 each; Senators
P18,000,000 each; Vice-President, P20,000,000.

The fund shall be automatically released semi-annually

by way of Advice of Allotment and Notice of Cash
Allocation directly to the designated implementing
agency not later than five (5) days after the beginning of
each semester upon submission of the list of projects
and activities by the officials concerned. (Emphases
supplied)

[32] Special Provision 1, Article XLII, RA 8174 (1996 CDF

Article) provides:

Special Provisions

1. Use and Release of Fund. The amount herein

appropriated shall be used for infrastructure, purchase
 of equipment and other priority projects and activities,
including current operating expenditures, except
creation of new plantilla positions, as proposed and
identified by officials concerned according to the
following allocations: Representatives, Twelve Million
Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P12,500,000) each;
Senators, Eighteen Million Pesos (P18,000,000) each;
Vice-President, Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000).

The Fund shall be released semi-annually by way of

Special Allotment Release Order and Notice of Cash
Allocation directly to the designated implementing
agency not later than thirty (30) days after the beginning
of each semester upon submission of the list of
projects and activities by the officials concerned.
(Emphases supplied)

[33] Special Provision 2 of the 1994 CDF Article, Special

Provision 2 of the 1995 CDF Article and Special Provision 2
of the 1996 CDF Article are similarly worded as follows:

2. Submission of [Quarterly (1994)/Semi-Annual

(1995 and 1996)] Reports. The Department of Budget
and Management shall submit within thirty (30) days
 after the end of each [quarter (1994)/semester (1995
and 1996)] a report to the House Committee on
Appropriations and the Senate Committee on
Finance on the releases made from this Fund. The
report shall include the listing of the projects,
locations, implementing agencies [stated (order of
committees interchanged in 1994 and 1996)]and the
endorsing officials. (Emphases supplied)

[34] Special Provision 2, Article XLII, RA 8250 (1997 CDF

Article) provides:

Special Provisions
xxxx

2. Publication of Countrywide Development Fund

Projects. Within thirty (30) days after the signing of this
Act into law, the Members of Congress and the Vice-
President shall, in consultation with the
implementing agency concerned, submit to the
Department of Budget and Management the list of
fifty percent (50%) of projects to be funded from the
allocation from the Countrywide Development Fund
which shall be duly endorsed by the Senate President
 and the Chairman of the Committee on Finance in the
case of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee
on Appropriations in the case of the House of
Representatives, and the remaining fifty percent
(50%) within six (6) months thereafter. The list shall
identify the specific projects, location, implementing
agencies, and target beneficiaries and shall be the
basis for the release of funds. The said list shall be
published in a newspaper of general circulation by the
Department of Budget and Management. No funds
appropriated herein shall be disbursed for projects
not included in the list herein required. (Emphases
supplied)

[35] See Special Provision 2, 1997 CDF Article; id.

[36] Special Provision 2, Article XLII, RA 8522 (1998 CDF

Article) provides:

Special Provisions
xxxx
2. Publication of Countrywide Development Fund
Projects. x x x PROVIDED, That said publication is not
 a requirement for the release of funds. x x x x
(Emphases supplied)

[37]Chua, Yvonne T. and Cruz, Booma, B., "Pork by any

name," VERA Files, August 23, 2013. (visited October 14,
2013).

[38] Id.

[39] Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), pp. 335-336, citing Parreño,

Earl, "Perils of Pork," Philippine Center for Investigative
Journalism, June 3-4, 1998. Available at

[40] Id.

[41] Id.

[42]
RA 8745 entitled "AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR
THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER
THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED NINETY NINE, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES."

[43]
Special Provision 1, Article XLII, Food Security Program
Fund, RA 8745 provides:
 Special Provision
1. Use and Release of Fund. The amount herein
authorized shall be used to support the Food Security
Program of the government, which shall include farm-to-
market roads, post harvest facilities and other
agricultural related infrastructures. Releases from this
fund shall be made directly to the implementing agency
subject to prior consultation with the Members of
Congress concerned. (Emphases supplied)

[44]Special Provision 1, Article XLIX, Lingap Para sa

Mahihirap Program Fund, RA 8745 provides:

Special Provision
1. Use and Release of Fund. The amount herein
appropriated for the Lingap Para sa Mahihirap Program
Fund shall be used exclusively to satisfy the minimum
basic needs of poor communities and disadvantaged
sectors: PROVIDED, That such amount shall be released
directly to the implementing agency upon prior
consultation with the Members of Congress concerned.
(Emphases supplied)

[45] Special Provision 1, Article L, Rural/Urban Development

Infrastructure Program Fund, RA 8745 provides: Special
Provision 1. Use and Release of Fund. The amount herein
authorized shall be used to fund infrastructure requirements
of the rural/urban areas which shall be released directly to
the implementing agency upon prior consultation with the
respective Members of Congress. (Emphases supplied)

[46] Special Provision 1, Article XLIX, RA 8760 (2000 PDAF

Article) provides:

Special Provision
1. Use and release of the Fund. The amount herein
appropriated shall be used to fund priority programs and
projects as indicated under Purpose 1: PROVIDED, That
such amount shall be released directly to the
implementing agency concerned upon prior
consultation with the respective Representative of
the District: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the herein
allocation may be realigned as necessary to any
expense category: PROVIDED, FINALLY, That no
amount shall be used to fund personal services and
other personal benefits. (Emphases supplied)

[47] See Special Provision 1, 2000 PDAF Article; id.

[48]Section 25 (7), Article VI, of the 1987 Philippine

Constitution (1987 Constitution) provides that "[i]f, by the
end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass
the general appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year,
the general appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year
shall be deemed reenacted and shall remain in force and
effect until the general appropriations bill is passed by the
Congress." (Emphasis supplied)

[49] Special Provision 1, Article L, RA 9162 (2002 PDAF

Article) provides:

1. Use and Release of the Fund. The amount herein

appropriated shall be used to fund priority programs and
projects or to fund counterpart for foreign-assisted
programs and projects: PROVIDED, That such amount
shall be released directly to the implementing agency or
Local Government Unit concerned. (Emphases supplied)

[50]Special Provision 1, Article XLVII, RA 9206, 2003 GAA

(2003 PDAF Article) provides:

Special Provision

1. Use and Release of the Fund. The amount herein

appropriated shall be used to fund priority programs and
projects or to fund the required counterpart for foreign-
assisted programs and projects: PROVIDED, That such
amount shall be released directly to the implementing
agency or Local Government Unit concerned: PROVIDED,
FURTHER, That the allocations authorized herein may be
realigned to any expense class, if deemed necessary:
PROVIDED, FURTHERMORE, That a maximum of ten
percent (10%) of the authorized allocations by district may
be used for the procurement of rice and other basic
commodities which shall be purchased from the National
Food Authority.

[51] Special Provision 1, Article XVIII, RA 9206 provides:

Special Provision No. 1 Restriction on the Delegation of

Project Implementation

The implementation of the projects funded herein shall not

be delegated to other agencies, except those projects to be
implemented by the Engineering Brigades of the AFP and
inter- department projects undertaken by other offices and
agencies including local government units with
demonstrated capability to actually implement the projects
by themselves upon consultation with the Members of
Congress concerned. In all cases the DPWH shall exercise
technical supervision over projects. (Emphasis supplied)

[52] Special Provision 3, Article XLII, RA 9206 provides:

Special Provision No. 3 Submission of the List of School
Buildings

Within 30 days after the signing of this Act into law, (DepEd)
after consultation with the representative of the
legislative district concerned, shall submit to DBM the list
of 50% of school buildings to be constructed every
municipality x x x. The list as submitted shall be the basis
for the release of funds. (Emphasis supplied)

[53] Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 557.

[54] Special Provision 1, Article L, RA 9336 (2005 PDAF

Article) provides: Special Provision(s)
1. Use and Release of the Fund. The amount appropriated
herein shall be used to fund priority programs and
projects under the ten point agenda of the national
government and shall be released directly to the
implementing agencies as indicated hereunder, to wit:

IMPLEMENTING
PARTICULARS PROGRAM/PROJECT
AGENCY
Purchase of IT DepEd/TESDA/
A. Education
Equipment CHED/SUCs/LGUs
TESDA/CHED/
Scholarship
SUCs/LGUs
 Assistance to Indigent
Patients Confined at
the DOH/Specialty
B. Health
Hospitals Under DOH Hospitals
Including Specialty
Hospitals
Assistance to Indigent
Patients at the
Hospitals LGUs
Devolved to LGUs and
RHUs
Insurance Premium Philhealth
C. Livelihood/ Small & Medium DTI/TLRC/DA/
CIDSS Enterprise/Livelihood CDA
Comprehensive
Integrated Delivery of DSWD
Social Services
D. Rural Barangay/Rural
DOE/NEA
Electrification Electrification
Construction of Water
E. Water Supply DPWH
System
Installation of
LGUs
Pipes/Pumps/Tanks
Specific Programs and
Projects to Address
F. Financial
the LGUs
Assistance
Pro-Poor Programs of
Government
Construction/Repair/
Rehabilitation of the
following:
Roads and
 Bridges/Flood
Control/School
G. Public Works buildings DPWH
Hospitals Health
Facilities/Public
Markets/Multi-
Purpose
Buildings/Multi-
Purpose
Pavements
Construction/Repair/
H. Irrigation Rehabilitation of DA-NIA
Irrigation Facilities
(Emphasis supplied)

[55] Id.

[56] Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 558.

[57] See Special Provision 1, Article XLVII, RA 9401.

[58] See Special Provision 1, Article XLVI, RA 9498.

[59] See Special Provision 1, Article XLIX, RA 9524.

[60] See Special Provision 1, Article XLVII, RA 9970.

[61]
For instance, Special Provisions 2 and 3, Article XLIII, RA
9336 providing for the 2005 DepEd School Building
Program, and Special Provisions 1 and 16, Article XVIII, RA
9401 providing for the 2007 DPWH Regular Budget
respectively state:

2005 DepEd School Building Program Special Provision

No. 2 Allocation of School Buildings: The amount allotted
under Purpose 1 shall be apportioned as follows: (1) fifty
percent (50%) to be allocated pro-rata according to
each legislative districts student population x x x; (2)
forty percent (40%) to be allocated only among those
legislative districts with classroom shortages x x x; (3)
ten percent (10%) to be allocated in accordance x x x.
Special Provision No. 3 Submission of the List of School
Buildings: Within 30 days after the signing of this Act
into law, the DepEd after consultation with the
representative of the legislative districts concerned, shall
submit to DBM the list of fifty percent (50%) of school
buildings to be constructed in every municipality x x x.
The list as submitted shall be the basis for the release of
funds x x x. (Emphases supplied) 2007 DPWH Regular
Budget Special Provision No. 1 Restriction on Delegation
of Project Implementation: The implementation of the
project funded herein shall not be delegated to other
agencies, except those projects to be implemented by
the AFP Corps of Engineers, and inter-department
projects to be undertaken by other offices and agencies,
including local government units (LGUs) with
demonstrated capability to actually implement the
 project by themselves upon consultation with the
representative of the legislative district concerned x x x.
Special Provision No. 16 Realignment of Funds: The
Secretary of Public Works and Highways is authorized to
realign funds released from appropriations x x x from one
project/scope of work to another: PROVIDED, that x x x
(iii) the request is with the concurrence of the
legislator concerned x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

[62]
Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 559, citing Section 2.A of RA
9358, otherwise known as the "Supplemental Budget for
2006."

[63] Id. at 559-560.

[64] "As a primary aspect of the Philippine Government's

public procurement reform agenda, the Government
Procurement Policy Board (GPPB) was established by virtue
of Republic Act No. 9184 (R.A. 9184) as an independent
inter-agency body that is impartial, transparent and
effective, with private sector representation. As established
in Section 63 of R.A. 9184, the GPPB shall have the
following duties and responsibilities: 1. To protect national
interest in all matters affecting public procurement, having
due regard to the country's regional and international
obligations; 2. To formulate and amend public procurement
policies, rules and regulations, and amend, whenever
necessary, the implementing rules and regulations Part A
(IRR-A); 3. To prepare a generic procurement manual and
standard bidding forms for procurement; 4. To ensure the
proper implementation by the procuring entities of the Act,
its IRR-A and all other relevant rules and regulations
pertaining to public procurement; 5. To establish a
sustainable training program to develop the capacity of
Government procurement officers and employees, and to
ensure the conduct of regular procurement training
programs by the procuring entities; and 6. To conduct an
annual review of the effectiveness of the Act and
recommend any amendments thereto, as may be necessary.
x x x x" (visited October 23, 2013).

[65]Entitled "AMENDMENT OF SECTION 53 OF THE

IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS PART A OF
REPUBLIC ACT 9184 AND PRESCRIBING GUIDELINES ON
PARTICIPATION OF NON- GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT," approved
June 29, 2007.

[66] Entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE

MODERNIZATION, STANDARDIZATION AND REGULATION
OF THE PROCUREMENT ACTIVITIES OF THE
GOVERNMENT AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES."

[67] Sec. 48. Alternative Methods. - Subject to the prior

approval of the Head of the Procuring Entity or his duly
authorized representative, and whenever justified by the
conditions provided in this Act, the Procuring Entity may, in
order to promote economy and efficiency, resort to any of
the following alternative methods of Procurement:

xxxx

(e) Negotiated Procurement - a method of Procurement

that may be resorted under the extraordinary circumstances
provided for in Section 53 of this Act and other instances
that shall be specified in the IRR, whereby the Procuring
Entity directly negotiates a contract with a technically,
legally and financially capable supplier, contractor or
consultant. x x x x

[68] As defined in Section 5(o) of RA 9184, the term

"Procuring Entity" refers to any branch, department, office,
agency, or instrumentality of the government, including
state universities and colleges, government-owned and/or -
controlled corporations, government financial institutions,
and local government units procuring Goods, Consulting
Services and Infrastructure Projects.

[69]Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 564, citing GPPB Resolution

12-2007. 70 Special Provision 2, Article XLIV, RA 10147
(2011 PDAF Article) provides:
 2. Allocation of Funds. The total projects to be identified
by legislators and the Vice- President shall not exceed
the following amounts: a. Total of Seventy Million Pesos
(P70,000,000) broken down into Forty Million Pesos
(P40,000,000) for Infrastructure Projects and Thirty
Million Pesos (P30,000,000) for soft projects of
Congressional Districts or Party List Representatives; b.
Total of Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000)
broken down into One Hundred Million Pesos
(P100,000,000) for Infrastructure Projects and One
Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000) for soft projects
of Senators and the Vice President.

[71] See Special Provision 4, 2011 PDAF Article.

[72]Special Provision 2, Article XLIV, RA 10155 (2012 PDAF

Article) provides:

2. Project Identification. Identification of projects and/or

designation of beneficiaries shall conform to the priority
list, standard or design prepared by each implementing
agency. Furthermore, preference shall be given to
projects located in the 4th to 6th class municipalities or
indigents identified under the National Household
Targeting System for Poverty Reduction by the DSWD.
 For this purpose, the implementing agency shall
submit to Congress said priority list, standard or
design within ninety (90) days from effectivity of this
Act . (Emphasis supplied)

[73]RA 10352, passed and approved by Congress on

December 19, 2012 and signed into law by the President on
December 19, 2012. Special Provision 2, Article XLIV, RA
10352 (2013 PDAF Article) provides:

2. Project Identification. Identification of projects and/or

designation of beneficiaries shall conform to the priority
list, standard or design prepared by each implementing
agency: PROVIDED, That preference shall be given to
projects located in the 4th to 6th class municipalities or
indigents identified under the NHTS-PR by the DSWD.
For this purpose, the implementing agency shall
submit to Congress said priority list, standard or
design within ninety (90) days from effectivity of this
Act. (Emphasis supplied)

[74]The permissive treatment of the priority list requirement

in practice was revealed during the Oral Arguments (TSN,
October 10, 2013, p. 143):
 Justice Leonen: x x x In Section 2 [meaning, Special
Provision 2], it mentions priority list of implementing
agencies. Have the implementing agencies indeed
presented priority list to the Members of Congress
before disbursement? Solicitor General Jardeleza: My
understanding is, is not really, Your Honor. Justice
Leonen: So, in other words, the PDAF was expended
without the priority list requirements of the implementing
agencies? Solicitor General Jardeleza: That is so much in
the CoA Report, Your Honor.

[75]
See Special Provision 3 of the 2012 PDAF Article and
Special Provision 3 of the 2013 PDAF Article.

[76] Special Provision 6 of the 2012 PDAF Article provides:

6. Realignment of Funds. Realignment under this Fund may

only be allowed once. The Secretaries of Agriculture,
Education, Energy, Environment and Natural Resources,
Health, Interior and Local Government, Public Works and
Highways, and Social Welfare and Development are also
authorized to approve realignment from one project/scope
to another within the allotment received from this Fund,
subject to the following: (i) for infrastructure projects,
realignment is within the same implementing unit and same
project category as the original project; (ii) allotment
released has not yet been obligated for the original
project/scope of work; and (iii) request is with the
concurrence of the legislator concerned. The DBM must be
informed in writing of any realignment approved within five
(5) calendar days from its approval.

Special Provision 4 of the 2013 PDAF Article provides:

4. Realignment of Funds. Realignment under this Fund

may only be allowed once. The Secretaries of
Agriculture, Education, Energy, Interior and Local
Government, Labor and Employment, Public Works and
Highways, Social Welfare and Development and Trade
and Industry are also authorized to approve realignment
from one project/scope to another within the allotment
received from this Fund, subject to the following: (i) for
infrastructure projects, realignment is within the same
implementing unit and same project category as the
original project; (ii) allotment released has not yet been
obligated for the original project/scope of work; and (iii)
request is with the concurrence of the legislator
concerned. The DBM must be informed in writing of any
realignment approved within five (5) calendar days from
approval thereof: PROVIDED, That any realignment under
this Fund shall be limited within the same classification
of soft or hard programs/projects listed under Special
 Provision 1 hereof: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in case of
realignments, modifications and revisions of projects to
be implemented by LGUs, the LGU concerned shall
certify that the cash has not yet been disbursed and the
funds have been deposited back to the BTr.
Any realignment, modification and revision of the
project identification shall be submitted to the House
Committee on Appropriations and the Senate
Committee on Finance, for favorable endorsement to
the DBM or the implementing agency, as the case
may be. (Emphases supplied)

[77] Special Provision 1 of the 2013 PDAF Article provides:

Special Provision(s)

1. Use of Fund. The amount appropriated herein shall be

used to fund the following priority programs and projects to
be implemented by the corresponding agencies:

xxxx

PROVIDED, That this Fund shall not be used for the

payment of Personal Services expenditures: PROVIDED,
FURTHER, That all procurement shall comply with the
provisions of R.A. No. 9184 and its Revised Implementing
 Rules and Regulations: PROVIDED, FINALLY, That for
infrastructure projects, LGUs may only be identified
as implementing agencies if they have the technical
capability to implement the same. (Emphasis supplied)

[78] Special Provision 2 of the 2013 PDAF Article provides:

2. Project Identification. x x x.
xxxx
All programs/projects, except for assistance to indigent
patients and scholarships, identified by a member of the
House of Representatives outside of his/her legislative
district shall have the written concurrence of the
member of the House of Representatives of the recipient
or beneficiary legislative district, endorsed by the
Speaker of the House of Representatives.

[79]See Special Provision 4 of the 2013 PDAF Article; supra

note 76.

[80]Sec. 8. Appropriations. The sum of Five Million Pesos

out of any available funds from the National Treasury is
hereby appropriated and authorized to be released for the
organization of the Board and its initial operations.
Henceforth, funds sufficient to fully carry out the functions
and objectives of the Board shall be appropriated every
fiscal year in the General Appropriations Act. All fees,
revenues and receipts of the Board from any and all sources
including receipts from service contracts and agreements
such as application and processing fees, signature bonus,
discovery bonus, production bonus; all money collected
from concessionaires, representing unspent work
obligations, fines and penalties under the Petroleum Act of
1949; as well as the government share representing
royalties, rentals, production share on service contracts and
similar payments on the exploration, development and
exploitation of energy resources, shall form part of a
Special Fund to be used to finance energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects of
the government and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President. (Emphasis supplied)

[81]Entitled "CREATING AN ENERGY DEVELOPMENT

BOARD, DEFINING ITS POWERS AND FUNCTIONS,
PROVIDING FUNDS, THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES."

[82] See First Whereas Clause of PD 910.

[83] See (visited October 17, 2013).

[84] Sec. 12. Special Condition of Franchise. After deducting

five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent
share of the Government in the aggregate gross earnings of
the Corporation from this Franchise shall be immediately set
aside and allocated to fund the following infrastructure and
socio-civil projects within the Metropolitan Manila Area:

(a) Flood Control

(b) Sewerage and Sewage
(c) Nutritional Control
(d) Population Control
(e) Tulungan ng Bayan Centers
(f) Beautification
(g) Kilusang Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran (KKK) projects;
provided, that should the aggregate gross earning be
less than P150,000,000.00, the amount to be allocated
to fund the above- mentioned project shall be equivalent
to sixty (60%) percent of the aggregate gross earning.

In addition to the priority infrastructure and socio-civic

projects with the Metropolitan Manila specifically
enumerated above, the share of the Government in the
aggregate gross earnings derived by the Corporate from
this Franchise may also be appropriated and allocated to
fund and finance infrastructure and/or socio-civic projects
throughout the Philippines as may be directed and
authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines.

[85] Entitled "CONSOLIDATING AND AMENDING

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NOS. 1067-A, 1067-B, 1067-C,
1399 AND 1632, RELATIVE TO THE FRANCHISE AND
POWERS OF THE PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING
CORPORATION (PAGCOR)."

[86] Entitled "AMENDING SECTION TWELVE OF

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1869 - CONSOLIDATING AND
AMENDING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NOS. 1067-A, 1067-B,
1067-C, 1399 AND 1632, RELATIVE TO THE FRANCHISE
AND POWERS OF THE PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND
GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR)." While the parties have
confined their discussion to Section 12 of PD 1869, the
Court takes judicial notice of its amendment and perforce
deems it apt to resolve the constitutionality of the
amendatory provision.

[87]Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, now

reads: Sec. 12. Special Condition of Franchise. After
deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty
(50%) percent share of the government in the aggregate
gross earnings of the Corporation from this Franchise, or
60% if the aggregate gross earnings be less than
P150,000,000.00 shall immediately be set aside and shall
accrue to the General Fund to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects and to finance the
restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to
calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office
of the President of the Philippines.

[88] Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 301.

[89]
CDF/PDAF ALLOCATION FROM 1990 -2013.
1990…………… P2,300,000,000.00
1991…………… P 2,300,000,000.00
1992…………… P 2,480,000,000.00
1993…………… P 2,952,000,000.00
1994…………… P 2,977,000,000.00
1995…………… P 3,002,000,000.00
1996…………… P 3,014,500,000.00
1997…………… P 2,583,450,000.00
1998…………… P 2,324,250,000.00
1999…………… P 1,517,800,000.00 (Food Security Program
Fund)
…………… P 2,500,000,000.00 (Lingap Para Sa
Mahihirap Program Fund)
…………… P 5,458,277,000.00 (Rural/Urban
Development Infrastructure Program Fund)
2000…………… P 3,330,000,000.00
2001……………2000 GAA re-enacted
2002…………… P 5,677,500,000.00
2003…………… P 8,327,000,000.00
2004……………2003 GAA re-enacted
2005…………… P 6,100,000,000.00
2006…………… 2005 GAA re-enacted
2007…………… P 11,445,645,000.00
2008…………… P 7,892,500,000.00
2009…………… P 9,665,027,000.00
2010…………… P 10,861,211,000.00
2011…………… P 24,620,000,000.00
2012…………… P 24,890,000,000.00
2013…………… P 24,790,000,000.00

[90] "Pork as a tool for political patronage, however, can

extend as far as the executive branch. It is no accident, for
instance, that the release of the allocations often coincides
with the passage of a Palace- sponsored bill.

That pork funds have grown by leaps and bounds in the last
decade can be traced to presidents in need of Congress
support. The rise in pork was particularly notable during the
Ramos administration, when the president and House
Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr. used generous fund releases
to convince congressmen to support Malacañang-initiated
legislation. The Ramos era, in fact, became known as the
'golden age of pork.'

Through the years, though, congressmen have also taken

care to look after their very own. More often than not, pork-
barrel funds are funneled to projects in towns and cities
where the lawmakers' own relatives have been elected to
public office; thus, pork is a tool for building family power as
well. COA has come across many instances where pork-
funded projects ended up directly benefiting no less than
the lawmaker or his or her relatives." (CHUA, YVONNE T.
and CRUZ, BOOMA, "Pork is a Political, Not A
Developmental, Tool." [visited October 22, 2013].) 91 With
reports from Inquirer Research and Salaverria, Leila,
"Candazo, first whistle-blower on pork barrel scam, dies;
61," Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 20, 2013, (visited
October 21, 2013.)

[92] Id.

[93] Id.

[94] Id.

[95] Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) v.

Secretary of Budget and Management, G.R. No. 164987,
April 24, 2012, 670 SCRA 373, 387.

[96] Carvajal, Nancy, "NBI probes P10-B scam," Philippine

Daily Inquirer, July 12, 2013 (visited October 21, 2013).

[97] Id.
[98] See NBI Executive Summary. (visited October 22, 2013).

[99]
Pursuant to Office Order No. 2010-309 dated May 13,
2010.

[100] During the Oral Arguments, the CoA Chairperson

referred to the VILP as "the source of the so called HARD
project, hard portion x x x "under the title the Budget of the
DPWH." TSN, October 8, 2013, p. 69.

[101]These implementing agencies included the Department

of Agriculture, DPWH and the Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD). The GOCCs included
Technology and Livelihood Resource Center
(TLRC)/Technology Resource Center (TRC), National
Livelihood Development Corporation (NLDC), National
Agribusiness Corporation (NABCOR), and the Zamboanga
del Norte Agricultural College (ZNAC) Rubber Estate
Corporation (ZREC). CoA Chairperson's Memorandum. Rollo
(G.R. No. 208566), p. 546. See also CoA Report, p. 14.

[102] Id.

[103] Id. at 546-547.

[104] Carvajal, Nancy, "Malampaya fund lost P900M in JLN

racket", Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 16, 2013 (visited
October 21, 2013.)

[105] TSN, October 8, 2013, p. 119.

[106] Rollo (G.R. No. 208493), pp. 9 and 341.

[107]The Court observes that petitioners have not presented

sufficient averments on the "remittances from the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office" nor have defined the scope of
"the Executive's Lump Sum Discretionary Funds" (See rollo
[G.R. No. 208566], pp. 47-49) which appears to be too
broad and all- encompassing. Also, while Villegas filed a
Supplemental Petition dated October 1, 2013 (Supplemental
Petition, see rollo [G.R. No. 208566], pp. 213-220, and pp.
462-464) particularly presenting their arguments on the
Disbursement Acceleration Program, the same is the main
subject of G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155, 209164,
209260, 209287, 209442, 209517, and 209569 and thus,
must be properly resolved therein. Hence, for these
reasons, insofar as the Presidential Pork Barrel is
concerned, the Court is constrained not to delve on any
issue related to the above-mentioned funds and
consequently confine its discussion only with respect to the
issues pertaining to the Malampaya Funds and the
Presidential Social Fund.
[108] Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), pp. 48-49.

[109] Id. at 48.

[110]
To note, Villegas' Supplemental Petition was filed on
October 2, 2013.

[111]
Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 342; and rollo (G.R. No.
209251), pp. 6-7.

[112]
Re-docketed as G.R. No. 209251 upon Nepomuceno's
payment of docket fees on October 16, 2013 as reflected on
the Official Receipt No. 0079340. Rollo (G.R. No. 209251) p.
409.

[113] Rollo (G.R. No. 208566) p. 97.

[114]
G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766 & 113888, August 19,
1994, 235 SCRA 506.

[115] Supra note 95.

[116]
Entitled "CREATING AN ENERGY DEVELOPMENT
BOARD, DEFINING ITS POWERS AND FUNCTIONS,
PROVIDING FUNDS, THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES."
[117]
Joya v. Presidential Commission on Good Government,
G.R. No. 96541, August 24, 1993, 225 SCRA 568, 575.

[118]Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, G.R.

No. 192935, December 7, 2010, 637 SCRA 78, 148.

[119]
Joya v. Presidential Commission on Good Government,
supra note 117, at 575.

[120] Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v.

Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. Nos. 178552, 178554, 178581,
178890, 179157, and 179461, October 5, 2010, 632 SCRA
146, 175.

[121]Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the

Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral
Domain (GRP), G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951,
and 183962, October 14, 2008, 568 SCRA 402, 450.

[122] Id. at 450-451.

[123]Francisco, Jr. v. Toll Regulatory Board, G.R. No. 166910,

169917, 173630, and 183599, October 19, 2010, 633 SCRA
470, 493, citing Province of North Cotabato v. Government
of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral
Domain (GRP), G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951,
and 183962, October 14, 2008, 568 SCRA 402, 405.
[124] Id. at 492, citing Muskrat v. U.S., 219 U.S. 346 (1913).

[125]
Baldo, Jr. v. Commision on Elections, G.R. No. 176135,
June 16, 2009, 589 SCRA 306, 310.

[126] TSN, October 10, 2013, pp. 79-81.

[127] Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution reads:

Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the

executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

[128]Sec. 38. Suspension of Expenditure of Appropriations.

Except as otherwise provided in the General Appropriations
Act and whenever in his judgment the public interest so
requires, the President, upon notice to the head of office
concerned, is authorized to suspend or otherwise stop
further expenditure of funds allotted for any agency, or any
other expenditure authorized in the General Appropriations
Act, except for personal services appropriations used for
permanent officials and employees.
[129]
Mattel, Inc. v. Francisco, G.R. No. 166886, July 30,
2008, 560 SCRA 504, 514, citing Constantino v.
Sandiganbayan (First Division), G.R. Nos. 140656 and
154482, September 13, 2007, 533 SCRA 205, 219-220.

[130] Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 292.

[131] G.R. No. 198457, August 13, 2013.

[132] TSN, October 10, 2013, p. 134.

[133] Section 22, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution

provides:

Sec. 22. The President shall submit to the Congress

within thirty days from the opening of every regular
session, as the basis of the general appropriations bill, a
budget of expenditures and sources of financing,
including receipts from existing and proposed revenue
measures.

[134] Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 294.

[135] Id. at 5.
[136] G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004, 421 SCRA 656.

[137] Id. at 665.

[138]See Francisco, Jr. v. Toll Regulatory Board, supra note

123, at 492.

[139] 369 US 186 82, S. Ct. 691, L. Ed. 2d. 663 [1962].

[140] Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), pp. 295-296.

[141]
Tañada v. Cuenco, 100 Phil. 1101 (1957) unreported
case.

[142] 406 Phil. 1 (2001).

[143] Id. at 42-43.

[144]Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158

(1936).

[145]
La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Sec. Ramos,
465 Phil. 860, 890 (2004).

[146] Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 349.

[147] Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Honorable Vicente Q.

Roxas, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, RTC of Quezon
City, Branch 227, G.R. No. 125509, January 31, 2007, 513
SCRA 457, 470.

[148]Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board,

G.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008, 570 SCRA 410, 421.

[149] TSN, October 8, 2013, pp. 184-185.

[150] People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 89 (1937).

[151]
See Lanuza v. CA, G.R. No. 131394, March 28, 2005,
454 SCRA 54, 61-62.

[152]ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the

laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system
of the Philippines.

[153] Chinese Young Men's Christian Association of the

Philippine Islands v. Remington Steel Corporation, G.R. No.
159422, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA 180, 197-198.

[154] Philconsa v. Enriquez, supra note 114, at 522.

[155] G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008, 562 SCRA 251.

[156] Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 325.

[157] Id. 158 Id. at 329.

[159] Id. at 339.

[160] Id. at 338.

[161] See note 107.

[162] Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra note 144, at 139.

[163] Id. at 157.

[164] Section 1, Article VI, 1987 Constitution.

[165] Section 1, Article VII, 1987 Constitution.

[166] Section 1, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution.

[167] Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra note 144, at 156.

[168]Government of the Philippine Islands v. Springer, 277

U.S. 189, 203 (1928).

[169]

, A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC, July 31, 2012, 678 SCRA 1, 9-10,

citing Carl Baar, Separate But Subservient: Court Budgeting
In The American States 149-52 (1975), cited in Jeffrey
Jackson, Judicial Independence, Adequate Court Funding,
and Inherent Judicial Powers, 52 Md. L. Rev. 217 (1993).

[170]
Id. at 10, citing Jeffrey Jackson, Judicial Independence,
Adequate Court Funding, and Inherent Judicial Powers, 52
Md. L. Rev. 217 (1993).

[171]See Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433

U.S. 425, 441-446 and 451-452 (1977) and United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), cited in Justice Powell's
concurring opinion in Immigration and Naturalization Service
v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).

[172]See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 343 U.S.

579, 587 (1952), Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S.
189, 203 (1928) cited in Justice Powell's concurring opinion
in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919 (1983).

[173] 273 Phil. 443 (1991).

[174] Id. at 461. "3. Budget Execution. Tasked on the

Executive, the third phase of the budget process covers the
various operational aspects of budgeting. The
establishment of obligation authority ceilings, the evaluation
of work and financial plans for individual activities, the
continuing review of government fiscal position, the
regulation of funds releases, the implementation of cash
payment schedules, and other related activities comprise
this phase of the budget cycle."

[175]
Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, supra
note 118, at 158.

[176] Guingona, Jr. v. Carague, supra note 173, at 460-461.

[177]
Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima, supra note 155, at
294-296.

[178] Id. at 287.

[179] Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 179.

[180] Id. at 29.

[181] Id. at 24.

[182] Id. at 86.

[183] Id. at 308.

[184] Id.
[185]
See CDF Articles for the years 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994,
1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998.

[186] See PDAF Article for the year 2000 which was re-
enacted in 2001. See also the following 1999 CIAs: "Food
Security Program Fund," the "Lingap Para Sa Mahihirap
Program Fund," and the "Rural/Urban Development
Infrastructure Program Fund." See further the 1997 DepEd
School Building Fund.

[187]
See PDAF Article for the years 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008,
2009, 2010, 2011, and 2013.

[188]Also, in Section 2.1 of DBM Circular No. 547 dated

January 18, 2013 (DBM Circular 547-13), or the "Guidelines
on the Release of Funds Chargeable Against the Priority
Development Assistance Fund for FY 2013," it is explicitly
stated that the "PDAF shall be used to fund priority
programs and projects identified by the Legislators from
the Project Menu." (Emphasis supplied)

[189] To note, Special Provision 4 cannot as respondents

submit refer to realignment of projects since the same
provision subjects the realignment to the condition that the
"allotment released has not yet been obligated for the
original project/scope of work". The foregoing proviso
should be read as a textual reference to the savings
requirement stated under Section 25(5), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution which pertinently provides that " x x x the
President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may,
by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from savings
in other items of their respective appropriations. In addition,
Sections 4.2.3, 4.2.4 and 4.3.3 of DBM Circular 547-13, the
implementing rules of the 2013 PDAF Article, respectively
require that: (a) "the allotment is still valid or has not yet
lapsed"; (b) "[r]equests for realignment of unobligated
allotment as of December 31, 2012 treated as continuing
appropriations in FY 2013 shall be submitted to the DBM not
later than June 30, 2013"; and (c) requests for realignment
shall be supported with, among others, a "[c]ertification of
availability of funds." As the letter of the law and the
guidelines related thereto evoke the legal concept of
savings, Special Provision 4 must be construed to be a
provision on realignment of PDAF funds, which would
necessarily but only incidentally include the projects for
which the funds have been allotted to. To construe it
otherwise would effectively allow PDAF funds to be
realigned outside the ambit of the foregoing provision,
thereby sanctioning a constitutional aberration.

[190] Aside from the sharing of the executive's realignment

authority with legislators in violation of the separation of
powers principle, it must be pointed out that Special
Provision 4, insofar as it confers fund realignment authority
to department secretaries, is already unconstitutional by
itself. As recently held in Nazareth v. Villar (Nazareth), G.R.
No. 188635, January 29, 2013, 689 SCRA 385, 403-404,
Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, limiting
the authority to augment, is "strictly but reasonably
construed as exclusive" in favor of the high officials
named therein. As such, the authority to realign funds
allocated to the implementing agencies is exclusively vested
in the President, viz.:

It bears emphasizing that the exception in favor of

the high officials named in Section 25(5), Article VI
of the Constitution limiting the authority to transfer
savings only to augment another item in the GAA is
strictly but reasonably construed as exclusive. As the
Court has expounded in Lokin, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections:

When the statute itself enumerates the exceptions to

the application of the general rule, the exceptions are
strictly but reasonably construed. The exceptions
extend only as far as their language fairly warrants, and
all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general
 provision rather than the exceptions. Where the general
rule is established by a statute with exceptions, none but
the enacting authority can curtail the former. Not even
the courts may add to the latter by implication, and it is a
rule that an express exception excludes all others,
although it is always proper in determining the
applicability of the rule to inquire whether, in a particular
case, it accords with reason and justice.

The appropriate and natural office of the exception is to

exempt something from the scope of the general words
of a statute, which is otherwise within the scope and
meaning of such general words. Consequently, the
existence of an exception in a statute clarifies the
intent that the statute shall apply to all cases not
excepted. Exceptions are subject to the rule of strict
construction; hence, any doubt will be resolved in favor
of the general provision and against the exception.
Indeed, the liberal construction of a statute will seem to
require in many circumstances that the exception, by
which the operation of the statute is limited or abridged,
should receive a restricted construction. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)

The cogence of the Nazareth dictum is not enfeebled by an

invocation of the doctrine of qualified political agency
(otherwise known as the ?alter ego doctrine") for the bare
reason that the same is not applicable when the
Constitution itself requires the President himself to act
on a particular matter, such as that instructed under
Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution. As held in the
landmark case of Villena v. Secretary of Interior (67 Phil. 451
[1987]), constitutional imprimatur is precisely one of the
exceptions to the application of the alter ego doctrine, viz.:

After serious reflection, we have decided to sustain the

contention of the government in this case on the board
proposition, albeit not suggested, that under the
presidential type of government which we have adopted
and considering the departmental organization
established and continued in force by paragraph 1,
section 12, Article VII, of our Constitution, all executive
and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Department, the heads of the various
executive departments are assistants and agents of the
Chief Executive, and except in cases where the Chief
Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to
act in person or the exigencies of the situation
demand that he act personally, the multifarious
executive and administrative functions of the Chief
Executive are performed by and through the executive
 departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular
course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the
acts of the Chief Executive. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

[191]
Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima, supra note 155, at
294-296.

[192] TSN, October 10, 2013, pp. 16, 17, 18, and 23.

[193] TSN, October 10, 2013, pp. 72-73.

[194]Aside from its conceptual origins related to the

separation of powers principle, Corwin, in his commentary
on Constitution of the United States made the following
observations:

At least three distinct ideas have contributed to the

development of the principle that legislative power
cannot be delegated. One is the doctrine of separation
of powers: Why go to the trouble of separating the three
powers of government if they can straightway remerge
on their own motion? The second is the concept of due
process of law, which precludes the transfer of
regulatory functions to private persons. Lastly, there is
the maxim of agency "Delegata potestas non potest
delegari," which John Locke borrowed and formulated
as a dogma of political science . . . Chief Justice Taft
offered the following explanation of the origin and
limitations of this idea as a postulate of constitutional
law: "The well-known maxim 'delegata potestas non
potest delefari,' applicable to the law of agency in the
general common law, is well understood and has had
wider application in the construction of our Federal and
State Constitutions than it has in private law . . . The
Federal and State Constitutions than it has in private law
. . . The Federal Constitution and State Constitutions of
this country divide the governmental power into three
branches . . . In carrying out that constitutional division . .
. it is a breach of the National fundamental law if
Congress gives up its legislative power and transfers it to
the President, or to the Judicial branch, or if by law it
attempts to invest itself or its members with either
executive power of judicial power. This is not to say that
the three branches are not co-ordinate parts of one
government and that each in the field of its duties may
not invoke government and that each in the field of its
duties may not invoke the action of the two other
branches in so far as the action invoked shall not be an
 assumption of the constitutional field of action of
another branch. In determining what it may do in seeking
assistance from another branch, the extent and
character of that assistance must be fixed according to
common sense and the inherent necessities of the
governmental coordination. (Emphases supplied) 195
Section 1, Article VI, 1987 Constitution.

[196]See Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660,

702 (1919).

[197] See Section 23(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

[198] See Section 28(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

[199] Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima, supra note 155, at

288.

[200] 169 Phil. 437, 447-448 (1977).

[201]Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, supra

note 114, at 522.

[202] Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor, 62

Phil. 912, 916 (1936).
[203] Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra note 144, at
156.

[204] Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima, supra note 155, at

287.

[205] Id. at 292.

[206]Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor,

supra note 202, at 916-917.

[207] "Log-rolling legislation refers to the process in which

several provisions supported by an individual legislator or
minority of legislators are combined into a single piece of
legislation supported by a majority of legislators on a quid
pro quo basis: no one provision may command majority
support, but the total package will." See Rollo (G.R. No.
208566), p. 420, citing Briffault, Richard, "The Item Veto in
State Courts," 66 Temp. L. Rev. 1171, 1177 (1993).

[208]
Passarello, Nicholas, "The Item Veto and the Threat of
Appropriations Bundling in Alaska," 30 Alaska Law Review
128 (2013), citing Black's Law Dictionary 1700 (9th ed.
2009). (visited October 23, 2013).

[209]Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462

U.S. 919 (1983).
[210] 299 U.S. 410 (1937).

[211]To note, in Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr. (G.R. No. 87636,

November 19, 1990, 191 SCRA 452, 465), citing
Commonwealth v. Dodson (11 S.E., 2d 120, 176 Va. 281), the
Court defined an item of appropriation as "an indivisible
sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose." In this
relation, Justice Carpio astutely explained that an "item" is
indivisible because the amount cannot be divided for any
purpose other than the specific purpose stated in the item.

[212] Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 421.

[213] Id.

[214] Id. at 316.

[215] Id. at 421.

[216] Id. at 566.

[217] Id. at 567.

[218]"It cannot be denied that most government actions are

inspired with noble intentions, all geared towards the
betterment of the nation and its people. But then again, it is
important to remember this ethical principle: 'The end does
not justify the means.' No matter how noble and worthy of
admiration the purpose of an act, but if the means to be
employed in accomplishing it is simply irreconcilable with
constitutional parameters, then it cannot still be allowed.
The Court cannot just turn a blind eye and simply let it pass.
It will continue to uphold the Constitution and its enshrined
principles. "The Constitution must ever remain supreme. All
must bow to the mandate of this law. Expediency must not
be allowed to sap its strength nor greed for power debase
its rectitude.'" (Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of
2010, supra note 118, 177; citations omitted)

[219] Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 406.

[220] Id. at 407.

[221]
Bernas, Joaquin G., S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 2003 Edition, p.
1108.

[222] Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima, supra note 155.

[223] See Section 22, Article VI, 1987 Constitution.

[224] See Section 21, Article VI, 1987 Constitution.

[225] Rollo (G.R. No. 208493), p. 9.

[226]
See Pamatong v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
161872, April 13, 2004, 427 SCRA 96, 100-101.

[227]
Entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991."

[228] 230 Phil. 379, 387-388 (1986).

[229] Id. 230 Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), pp. 95-96.

[231] Philconsa v. Enriquez, supra note 114, at 523.

[232]Nograles, Prospero C. and Lagman, Edcel C., House of

Representatives of the Philippines, "Understanding the
'Pork Barrel,'" (visited October 17, 2013).

[233] (visited October 22, 2013).

[234] Section 106 of the LGC provides:

Sec. 106. Local Development Councils. (a) Each local

government unit shall have a comprehensive multi-
sectoral development plan to be initiated by its
development council and approved by its sanggunian.
 For this purpose, the development council at the
provincial, city, municipal, or barangal level, shall assist
the corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of
economic and social development, and coordinating
development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction.

[235] See Section 109 of the LGC.

[236] Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 423.

[237] Id. at 427.

[238] Id. at 439-440.

[239] Id. at 434 and 441.

[240]See Guingona, Jr. v. Carague, supra note 173, where

the Court upheld the constitutionality of certain automatic
appropriation laws for debt servicing although said laws did
not readily indicate the exact amounts to be paid
considering that "the amounts nevertheless are made
certain by the legislative parameters provided in the
decrees"; hence, "[t]he Executive is not of unlimited
discretion as to the amounts to be disbursed for debt
servicing." To note, such laws vary in great degree with the
way the 2013 PDAF Article works considering that: (a)
individual legislators and not the executive make the
determinations; (b) the choice of both the amount and the
project are to be subsequently made after the law is passed
and upon the sole discretion of the legislator, unlike in
Guingona, Jr. where the amount to be appropriated is
dictated by the contingency external to the discretion of the
disbursing authority; and (c) in Guingona, Jr. there is no
effective control of the funds since as long as the
contingency arises money shall be automatically
appropriated therefor, hence what is left is merely law
execution and not legislative discretion.

[241] Id. at 462.

[242] 23 Nev. 25 (1895).

[243] Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 438.

[244] Id. at 300.

[245]The project identifications made by the Executive

should always be in the nature of law enforcement and,
hence, for the sole purpose of enforcing an existing
appropriation law. In relation thereto, it may exercise its rule-
making authority to greater particularize the guidelines for
such identifications which, in all cases, should not go
beyond what the delegating law provides. Also, in all cases,
the Executive's identification or rule-making authority,
insofar as the field of appropriations is concerned, may only
arise if there is a valid appropriation law under the
parameters as above-discussed.

[246] Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima, supra note 155.

[247]See Bernas, Joaquin G., S.J., The 1987 Constitution of

the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 2009
Edition, pp. 686-687, citing Pelaez v. Auditor General, 15
SCRA 569, 576-577 (1965).

[248] Id. at 277.

[249]
§ 438 Ejusdem Generis ("of the same kind"); specific
words; 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 438.

[250]Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 437, citing § 438 Ejusdem

Generis ("of the same kind"); specific words; 82 C.J.S.
Statutes § 438.

[251]
Based on a July 5, 2011 posting in the government's
website ; attached as Annex "A" to the Petitioners'
Memorandum), the Malampaya Funds were also used for
non-energy related projects, to wit:
 The rest of the 98.73 percent or P19.39 billion was
released for non-energy related projects: 1) in 2006, P1
billion for the Armed Forces Modernization Fund; 2) in
2008, P4 billion for the Department of Agriculture; 3) in
2009, a total of P14.39 billion to various agencies,
including: P7.07 billion for the Department of Public
Works and Highways; P2.14 billion for the Philippine
National Police; P1.82 billion for [the Department of
Agriculture]; P1.4 billion for the National Housing
Authority; and P900 million for the Department of
Agrarian Reform.

[252] For academic purposes, the Court expresses its

disagreement with petitioners' argument that the previous
version of Section 12 of PD 1869 constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power since it allows the President
to broadly determine the purpose of the Presidential Social
Fund's use and perforce must be declared unconstitutional.
Quite the contrary, the 1st paragraph of the said provision
clearly indicates that the Presidential Social Fund shall be
used to finance specified types of priority infrastructure and
socio-civic projects, namely, Flood Control, Sewerage and
Sewage, Nutritional Control, Population Control, Tulungan
ng Bayan Centers, Beautification and Kilusang Kabuhayan at
Kaunlaran (KKK) projects located within the Metropolitan
Manila area. However, with regard to the stated
geographical-operational limitation, the 2nd paragraph of
the same provision nevertheless allows the Presidential
Social Fund to finance "priority infrastructure and socio-
civic projects throughout the Philippines as may be directed
and authorized by the Office of the President of the
Philippines." It must, however, be qualified that the 2nd
paragraph should not be construed to mean that the Office
of the President may direct and authorize the use of the
Presidential Social Fund to any kind of infrastructure and
socio-civic project throughout the Philippines. Pursuant to
the maxim of noscitur a sociis, (meaning, that a word or
phrase's "correct construction may be made clear and
specific by considering the company of words in which it is
founded or with which it is associated"; see Chavez v.
Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012,
676 SCRA 579, 598-599) the 2nd paragraph should be
construed only as an expansion of the geographical-
operational limitation stated in the 1st paragraph of the
same provision and not a grant of carte blanche authority to
the President to veer away from the project types specified
thereunder. In other words, what the 2nd paragraph merely
allows is the use of the Presidential Social Fund for Flood
Control, Sewerage and Sewage, Nutritional Control,
Population Control, Tulungan ng Bayan Centers,
Beautification and Kilusang Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran (KKK)
projects even though the same would be located outside
the Metropolitan Manila area. To deem it otherwise would be
tantamount to unduly expanding the rule-making authority
of the President in violation of the sufficient standard test
and, ultimately, the principle of non-delegability of
legislative power.

[253] Black's Law Dictionary (7th Ed., 1999), p. 784.

[254] Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), pp. 48-49.

[255] Id.

[256] 234 Phil. 521, 533-534 (1987).

[257] 252 Phil. 264 (1989).

[258] Id. at 279.

[259] Id. at 278.

[260] Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 463.

[261] Id. at 459-462.

[262] Id. at 304-305.

[263] (visited November 4, 2013).

[264] Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA). Cash authority issued

by the DBM to central, regional and provincial offices and
operating units through the authorized government
servicing banks of the MDS,* to cover the cash
requirements of the agencies.
* MDS stands for Modified Disbursement Scheme. It is a

procedure whereby disbursements by NG agencies

chargeable against the account of the Treasurer of the
Philippines are effected through GSBs.**
** GSB stands for Government Servicing Banks. (Id.)

[265] TSN, October 10, 2013, pp. 35-36.

[266]Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power

Corporation, G.R. No. 187485, October 8, 2013, citing
Serrano de Agbayani v. Philippine National Bank, 148 Phil.
443, 447-448 (1971).

[267] Id.

[268] Id.