0% found this document useful (0 votes)
41 views

EC 246: Decisions & Games

This document contains two problems from an assignment on decisions and games. Problem 1 asks to determine all Nash equilibria of an extended matching pennies game and whether the equilibria have distinct outcomes and payoffs. Problem 2 asks to find the unique Nash equilibrium of another extended matching pennies game and explain why no other equilibrium exists.

Uploaded by

Parmesh Gupta
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
0% found this document useful (0 votes)
41 views

EC 246: Decisions & Games

This document contains two problems from an assignment on decisions and games. Problem 1 asks to determine all Nash equilibria of an extended matching pennies game and whether the equilibria have distinct outcomes and payoffs. Problem 2 asks to find the unique Nash equilibrium of another extended matching pennies game and explain why no other equilibrium exists.

Uploaded by

Parmesh Gupta
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
You are on page 1/ 1

EC 246: Decisions & Games

Problem Set II

Problem 1: Consider the following “Extended Matching Pennies Game – 1” which is a


complete-information simultaneous-move game:
Column Player
Heads Tails Covered
Row Player Heads 10, 00 00, 10 06, 06
Tails 00, 10 10, 00 06, 06
. Covered 06, 06 06, 06 06, 06

Determine all (pure-strategy and mixed-strategy) Nash equilibria of the game. Do all the
Nash equilibria have distinct outcomes, or do some/all of them have the same outcomes?
Do all the Nash equilibria have distinct payoffs for the two players, or do some/all of them
have the same payoffs for the two players?

Problem 2: Consider the following “Extended Matching Pennies Game – 2” which is a


complete-information simultaneous-move game:
Column Player
Heads Tails
Row Player Heads 10, 00 00, 10
Tails 00, 10 10, 00
. Covered 06, 05 06, 07

There exists a unique Nash equilibrium of the game. Can you find it? What arguments will
you use to establish that there exists no other Nash equilibrium of this game?

You might also like