MODULE II- LITERAL AND PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION

1.1 Meaning and application of the Literal Rule – Ordinary and natural meaning,
application of rules of grammar.

There are certain general principles of interpretation which have been applied by
Courts from time to time.

Following are the three major rules of interpretation of statutes:

• Literal Rule of Interpretation.

• Golden Rule of Interpretation.
• Mischief Rule of Interpretation.

Meaning of the Rule of Literal Interpretation (Shruti)

• The Literal Rule, also known as the Plain-Meaning rule, is a type of statutory
construction, which dictates that statutes are to be interpreted using the
ordinary meaning of the language of the statute unless a statute explicitly
defines some of its terms otherwise.

• The words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning. No
single argument has more weight in statutory interpretation than the plain
meaning of the word.

• However, the words have certain elasticity of meaning but the general rule
remains that the judges regard themselves as bound by the words of the
statute when these words clearly govern the situation before the court.

• Intention of the Legislature: The object of all interpretation is to discover the

intention of the Parliament, but the intention of the Parliament must be
deduced from the language used.

• Natural understanding to majority people in ordinary parlance is important.

That is, Plain, ordinary, actual meaning, grammatical component also to be
taken care of.

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Ramavtar Budhaiprasad v. Assistant Sales Tax Officer AIR 1961 SC 1325:
• The Supreme court was faced with a question with the meaning of
“vegetable”, as it had occurred in the Section 6 of C. P. & Berar Sales Tax Act,
1947 read with Second schedule, as amended by Act of 1948.
• Petitioner: Trader of beetle leaves. As per Amendment in the Act, the item
‘vegetable’ was exempted from taxation, but he was taxed. He challenged
up the dictionary meaning of ‘vegetable’.
• The Court had to decide whether the word ‘vegetables’ included betel leaves
or not. The Supreme Court held that “being a word of everyday use it must
be construed in its popular sense”. It was therefore held that betel leaves
were excluded from its purview.

Pyarali K. Tejani Vs. Mahadeo Ramchandra Dange & Others [(1974) 1 SCC 167]

In Pyarali K. Tejani vs. Mahadeo Ramchandra Dange and others, the Supreme Court
considered the matter whether supari is an item of “food” within the meaning of
section 2(v) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (PFA Act, 1954). The Court
held that supari (betelnut) is an item of food within the meaning of section 2(v) of
the Act.

The SC refused to entertain the plea that flavoured supari does not come within
the purview of ‘food’. In food offenses strict liability is the rule. Nothing more than
actus reus is needed where regulation of private activity in vulnerable areas like
public health is intended. Social defence reasonably overpowers individual
freedom.

Facts:

Petitioner: Active partner of Gits Food Products India Ltd.

Charge framed against petitioner:
- Selling and retaining scented supari with saccharin and cyclamate that are
artificial sweeteners; i.e., Selling adulterated supari in contravention of
Section 7(i)(ii), Rule 47 of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.

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 - Therefore, committed an offence punishable u/s16(1)(a)(i) of Prevention
of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.
- Conviction was recorded u/s 7(1) read with S 16(1)(a)(i) of Prevention of
Food Adulteration Act, 1954 by JMFC.
- One writ petition and another criminal appeal were filed in HC
- The Writ Challenged Rules 44(g) & 47 of Prevention of Food Adulteration
Act as violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(f) &(g).
- “Food” – The word in conflict.
- The Act defines 'food' very widely as covering any article used as food and
every component which enters into it and even flavoring matter and
condiments.
- The SC refused to entertain the plea that flavoured supari does not come
within the purview of ‘food’.

Odisha Public Service Commission Vs. Roopashri Chowdhary [(2011) 8 SCC 108]

Impugned provision – Odisha Judicial Services Rules & OJS Rules, 2007 – Rule 24

Brief Facts and Procedural History

• The Orissa Public Service Commission [OPSC] published an advertisement

inviting applications from suitable candidates for the Orissa Judicial Service
Examination, 2009 for direct recruitment to fill up 77 posts of Civil Judges
(J.D).

• The respondent applied for the said post. She appeared in the Preliminary
Written Examination. Being successful in the Preliminary Written
Examination, she appeared in the Main Written Examination. The list of
successful candidates, who were eligible for interview, was published in
which respondent's name was not there. The respondent applied for her
marks in the Main Written Examination. She had received 337 out of 750
i.e.44.93% marks in aggregate and more than 33% of marks in each subject.

• The respondent moved the High Court with a petition that she should have
been called for the interview as the fraction of marks, i.e., 44.93%, secured

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 by her should have been rounded off to 45% & in that way she would have
fulfilled the criteria as per the Rules. The High Court allowed her appeal. The
matter was taken in appeal to the SC by OPSC.

Ratio of the Decision by the SC

• The Supreme Court observed that bare reading of the OPSC rules, Rule 24,
would make it crystal clear that in order to qualify in the written examination
a candidate has to obtain a minimum of 33% marks in each of the papers and
not less than 45% of marks in the aggregate in all the written papers in the
Main examination. When emphasis is given in the Rules itself to the
minimum marks to be obtained making it clear that at least the said
minimum marks have to be obtained by the concerned candidate there
cannot be a question of relaxation or rounding off.

• The Court observed that there is no power provided in the statute/Rules

permitting any such rounding off or giving grace marks so as to bring up a
candidate to the minimum requirement. No such rounding off or relaxation
was permissible. The Rules are statutory in nature and no dilution or
amendment to such Rules is permissible or possible by adding some words
to the said statutory rules for giving the benefit of rounding off or relaxation.

Held

• The Supreme Court held that when the words of a statute are clear, plain or
unambiguous, i.e., they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, the
courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of
consequences, for the Act speaks for itself. There is no ambiguity in the
language of Rule 24 leading to two conclusions and allowing an
interpretation in favour of the respondent which would be different to what
was intended by the Statute. Therefore, no rounding off of the aggregate
marks is permitted in view of the clear and unambiguous language of Rule
24 of the Rules under consideration. The appeal was allowed.

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Hipperson Vs. Electoral Registration Officer, Newbury (1985)2 ALER 456
• The case pertains to the provisions of electoral registration in UK under
Representation of the People Act, 1983.
• Phrase in conflict: “Resident on the qualifying date”
• Ambiguity: “Resident”.
• The word “residence” has different meanings in different branches of the
law, but in general is distinguished from mere presence. In the electoral
context, the courts have agreed that residence connotes a considerable
degree of permanence.
• In Hipperson v Electoral Registration Officer for the District of Newbury, the
Court of Appeal dismissed objections to residence based on unlawful
occupation by the campaigning “Greenham Common women” of an area
outside an air base.
• The Court held that “to import considerations based on the standard of
accommodation into qualification for the franchise would be to put the clock
back to the days when the franchise depended on a property qualification
and is quite unwarranted by anything in the 1983 Act. It may be unusual to
make one's home in a tent, bender or vehicle, but we can see no reason in
law why it should be impossible. Section 5(2) of the 1983 Act may well have
an application which is limited to dwelling houses, but this only means that
circumstances which could not interrupt a person’s residence in a dwelling
house may interrupt his residence in a tent”.

Fox Vs. Stirk & Bristol Electoral Registration Officer; Rickett Vs. Cambridge
Electoral Registration Officer

In Fox v Stirk and Bristol Electoral Registration Officer, Ricketts v Cambridge City
Electoral Registration Officer, [1970] 2 QB 463, the Court of Appeal considered
whether certain students at Bristol and Cambridge Universities were resident and
entitled to be entered on the local electoral registers.

The Court referred to the Oxford English Dictionary definition of reside as “to dwell
permanently, or for a considerable time, to have one’s settled abode….”. The Court

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elaborated on this definition by stating that “some assumption of permanence,
some degree of continuity, some expectation of continuity, is a vital factor which
turns simple occupation into residence”.

The court held that the fact that the students were living and sleeping in their halls
of residence for at least half of the year was a sufficient degree of permanence to
be resident for registration purposes.

Tej Kiran Jain Vs. N. Sanjeeva Reddy [1970 SC 1573]

Brief Facts

• In this case, the followers of a religious leader (Shankaracharya of Goverdhan

Peeth) had filed a defamation suit against some Members of Parliament. The
defendants included a former Lok Sabha Speaker and the incumbent Union
Home Minister.
• The MPs had been informed about the religious leader’s conduct at a
religious conference (World Religious Conference, March 1969, Patna). The
seer had apparently stated that untouchability was compatible with
Hinduism and had walked out of a gathering when the national anthem was
played.
• The report had prompted some sharp and derisive comments by the
parliamentarians.

Judgment

• Both the Delhi High Court and the Supreme Court ruled that these remarks
were immune from litigation as they were made during parliamentary
proceedings and hence covered under parliamentary privileges under Article
105 (2) of the Constitution.
PV Narasimha Rao v. State (CBI/ SPE) (1998) 4 SCC 626 [JMM Bribery Case]

Facts of the Case

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 • The petitioner PV Narasimha Rao was the Prime Minister of India between
1991 and 1996. He headed the Congress Party, which occupied the highest
number of seats in the Lok Sabha at the time but did not enjoy a simple
majority.
• In December 1992, the demolition of a mosque (Babri Masjid) at a disputed
site in Ayodhya by Hindu right-wing extremists had provoked communal
violence in several parts of the country. The Union Government faced
considerable criticism for its inability to prevent and control this violence.
• In this environment of distrust, a no-confidence motion was moved against
the Union Government and was put to vote. While 265 MPs voted for the
Government, 251 MPs voted against it.
• Subsequently, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) uncovered evidence
implicating the petitioner and some of his party colleagues for offering bribes
to MPs from two smaller parties, namely the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM)
and the Janata Dal Ajit Singh group (JDAS). This was allegedly done to procure
votes or to ensure abstentions during the no-confidence motion. Without
their cooperation, the government could have lost the motion.
• The CBI initiated proceedings and cognizance was taken by Special CBI Judge,
Delhi.
• Charge was framed against the bribe givers and bribe takers, u/s 120B of IPC
and u/ss. 7, 12 and 13 of Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA). Charge was
framed against PV Narasimha Rao for abetment of commission of offence
punishable u/s. 7 and 12 of the PCA.
• A petition was filed in Delhi High Court to quash the charges which was
dismissed.
• Appeal was filed in the Supreme Court which was heard by a Constitution
Bench consisting of 5 Judges.
Issues before the Supreme Court

1. Does Article 105(2) of the Constitution confer immunity on a member of

Parliament from being prosecuted in a criminal court for an offence involving
offer or acceptance of bribe?

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 2. Whether an MP is excluded from the operation of the Prevention of
Corruption Act (PCA), 1988, for the reason that:
a) He is not a person who can be regarded as a “public servant” as
defined in S. 2(c) of the Act and
b) He is not a person comprehended in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section
19(i) of the Act as there is no authority to grant sanction for his
prosecution for the offences mentioned u/s. 19 of the Act.
Judgment

• The SC in its majority view concluded that most of the legislators could not
be prosecuted since the alleged misconduct was closely connected to voting
inside the legislature and hence protected by Article 105(2). A distinction was
drawn between ‘bribe givers’ and ‘bribe takers’ to hold that ‘bribe givers’
could be prosecuted but those who accepted bribes and voted in the no-
confidence motion could not be proceeded against.
• The Court, however, by unanimous verdict held that an MP is a ‘public
servant’ for the purposes of Section 2 of the PCA. Further, in a majority
opinion it was held that MPs are liable for prosecution under the PCA even
with respect to offences where the sanction of an authority for the same is
required.

Ambiguity in PV Narasimha Rao case

• The provisions of Article 105(2) of the Constitution confer immunity on a

Member of Parliament from criminal prosecution only in respect of the
“freedom of speech” and the “right to give vote” by him in Parliament or any
committee thereof. The immunity or protection is available only in regard to
these parliamentary or official activities. Such immunity is not available for
any acts done in his private or personal capacity. The conduct of a Member
of Parliament involving the commission of offences of bribery and criminal
conspiracy having been done in personal capacity cannot, on any reasoning,
be held to be acts done in the discharge or purported discharge of his

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 parliamentary or official duty in Parliament. Taking of bribe is obviously a
criminal act.
• The phraseology of clause (2) of Article 105 makes a Member of Parliament
immune from any liability that may arise from any court proceedings in
respect of “anything said”, that is, “any speech made” or “any vote given” by
him in Parliament or any committee thereof. The expression "any vote given"
in clause (2) with which alone we are concerned in the JMM bribery case can,
in the ordinary grammatical sense, only mean casting of vote by a Member
acting independently, on merits, in a legitimate and bona fide manner
expected of a public servant of his rank, unaffected by any undue influence.
The giving of vote under the inducement of a bribe as opposed to acting
independently and on merits cannot, on any principle of interpretation, be
read into clause (2) for such a legislator by taking a bribe himself loses the
protective shield of the provision.
• Also, the clause has absolutely no application to any act of a Member
constituting an offence of bribery outside Parliament as to bar his liability for
criminal prosecution. The Constitution Bench in Tej Kiran Jain v. N. Sanjiva
Reddy interpreting the expression “in Parliament” appearing in clause (2) of
Article 105 as “during the sitting of Parliament” and “in the course of the
business of Parliament”, lends support.

Comparison of Tej Kiran Jain case with PV Narasimha Rao case – Interpretation
of Article 105(2)

In Tej Kiran Jain v. N. Sanjeeva Reddy (1970) it was held that the Article confers
immunity inter alia in respect of ‘anything said … in Parliament’. The Court
observed that the word ‘anything’ is of the widest import and is equivalent to
‘everything’. The only limitation arises from the words ‘in Parliament’ which means
during the sitting of Parliament and in the course of the business of Parliament. The
Court said that they are concerned only with speeches in Lok Sabha. Once it was
proved that Parliament was sitting and its business was being transacted, anything
said during the course of that business was immune from proceedings in any court.
It is of the essence of parliamentary system of government that people’s
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representatives should be free to express themselves without fear of legal
circumstances. What they say is only subject to the discipline of the rules of
Parliament, the good sense of the Members and the control of proceedings by the
Speaker.

In PV Narasimha Rao v. State (1998), it was held by majority opinion (3:2) that while
bribe-givers (who are Members of Parliament) cannot invoke the immunity
conferred by clause (2) of Article 105, the bribe-takers (Members of Parliament)
can invoke that immunity if they have actually spoken or voted in the House
pursuant to the bribe taken by them. If, however, a Member of Parliament takes a
bribe for speaking or voting in the House in a particular manner but does not so
speak or vote, the immunity cannot be invoked by him. This conclusion was arrived
at on the construction of the words “in respect of” occurring in the said clause. The
learned judges held that the said words were of wide amplitude and therefore the
integral connection between the bribe taking and the vote in the House cannot be
dissected or separated.

Limitations of Literal Rule of Statutory Interpretation

There are situations when ordinary meaning or literal meaning leads to problems.
These may be due to defects of two types; Logical defect which constitutes of
ambiguity, inconsistency and incompleteness and the second type is absurdity or
irrationality.

1. Ambiguity: Ambiguity occurs where a term or an expression used in a statute

has not one but various meanings, and it is not clear which one particular
meaning it represents at which particular context or place. Also, the
ambiguity sometimes is “syntactic” which means the vagueness arises from
words like “or”, “and”, “all” and other such words. For example, if a
punishment for a certain crime is “fine or imprisonment or both”, the court
can imprison the accused or impose a fine or impose a fine as well as
imprison him.
2. Injustice: The words cannot be understood properly without the context in
which it is used. The strict adherence to this principle may cause injustice and

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 sometimes it might give results which are quite contrary to general intention
of the statute or common sense.
3. Incompleteness: means that there is some lacuna or omission in the statute
which prevents it from giving a complete idea, or it is logically incomplete. In
such cases it is the duty of the court to make up the defect by adding or
altering something, but the court is not allowed to do more than that.
4. Absurdity: Sometimes the court might ascertain a certain meaning to the
statute which was never the intention of the legislature. This is also one of
the problems of literal rule.
5. inconsistency with the purpose of the law and Not suitable for changing
times: With a change in policies and legislation, the statutes cannot still be
interpreted in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the words made long
ago.
6. Repugnancy with other parts of the statute.

In such cases literal interpretation fails.

1.2 Purposive Construction

Absurdity, inconsistency and redundancy in the meaning of law – Application of

the Golden Rule

There are 3 ways of tackling such situations by Mimansa Principles of

interpretation

1. The Linga principle (also called Lakshana artha): It means the suggestive
power of words or expressions. This principle can be illustrated by the
decision of the Supreme Court in U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Samiti v. Brij Kishore
(1988), where the words "landless person" were held to refer to landless
peasants only and not to landless businessmen.
2. The Vakya principle or Syntactical Arrangement: It includes adhayayahara
and anusanga, (supplying of missing words and expressions); upakarsha and
apakarsha, (transference of clauses up or down in the sentence).

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 3. The Prakarana rule/principle: Permits construction by referring to some
other text or order to make meaning clear.

The Golden Rule of Interpretation

The ‘golden rule’: If the application of words in their ordinary and grammatical
sense would be contradicted by the main purpose of the whole text of statute,
judges may exercise a ‘discretionary power’ to apply those words to give a
‘secondary meaning’ if that is appropriate. The rule is aimed to prevent a provision
from being abused, and rendered unintelligible with the whole statute.

“Expounding acts of parliament calls for a departure from literal meaning”

R. Vs. Court of Llyod: J. Mutill

In those circumstances where application of literal meaning leads to absurdity, you

can apply the Golden Rule and modify as per the intent of the legislature.

Caution: ‘Slight modification”

• The Golden rule, or British rule, is a form of statutory interpretation that

allows a judge to depart from a word's normal meaning in order to avoid an
absurd result.

Test to apply Golden Rule: Testing literal meaning and evaluate whether the
practical outcome lead to absurdity/ inconsistent/repugnancy

• This rule may be applied in two ways:

(a) It is applied where there is some ambiguity or absurdity in the words
themselves. For example, imagine there may be a sign saying “Do not
use lifts in case of fire.” Under the literal interpretation of this sign,
people must never use the lifts, in case there is a fire. However, this
would be an absurd result, as the intention of the person who made
the sign is obviously to prevent people from using the lifts only if there
is currently a fire nearby.
(b) The second use of the golden rule is to avoid a result that is obnoxious
to principles of public policy, even where words have only one

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 meaning. For example, when the facts of a case are that a son
murdered his mother and committed suicide. The courts were
required to rule on who then inherited the estate, the mother's family,
or the son's descendants. There was never a question of the son
profiting from his crime, but as the outcome would have been binding
on lower courts in the future, the court decided in favour of the
mother's family.

Cases:

Lee Vs. Knapp [1967] 2QB 444

Impugned provision: S. 77(1) of Road Traffic Act, 1960

Section 77(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1960 requires the driver of a motor vehicle to
‘stop’ after an accident. The court said that the word ‘stop’ properly required the
driver to ‘stop’ the vehicle and ‘remain where he has stopped for a period of time’.
The requirement of ‘stop’ should provide a sufficient and reasonable time for the
driver to do so, but there is no requirement of ‘immediate stop’ in the statute.

Indeed, it would be an absurd result if the law required the driver to stop
immediately without considering the circumstances, such as the state of the traffic
at the time of the stopping. In a wider sense, the second situation will be to avoid
a contradiction with public policy, even if there is only one meaning to the word.

State of Punjab Vs. Q.J. Begum AIR 1963 SC 1604

Impugned Provision: Section 18 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

Section 18: Application for reference in case of award passed by collector for
acquisition of land. Anybody aggrieved may make application for reference.

“Provided if party was present before collector while award was given OR 6 weeks
from notice of award OR 6 months from date of award.”

• Date of Award: 25th October, 1953: Lady was not present during
announcement of award nor was served notice.

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 • She directly received compensation that was @ Rs 96 /acre while market rate
was @Rs 600/ acre.
• She was naturally aggrieved
• She filed an application in the court of Sub-Judge, Gurgaon, who discharged
the reference
• Revision petition was filed in Punjab &Haryana HC,
• Reverted back to Sub-Judge, who then condoned the delay and heard on
merit.
• State of Punjab – feeling aggrieved filed a SLP at SC claiming that limitation
period was ignored.
• SC Held: the petitioners though they had come to know of the award earlier
did not know the essential contents of the award till July 22, 1955, therefore,
the period of six months contemplated in the second part of cl. (b) of s. 18
would commence from that date and the application for reference was
within time.

Municipal Board, Pushkar Vs. State Transport Authority, Rajasthan, 1965 SC

Facts of the case:

- The Municipal Board of Pushkar passed a resolution on May 24, 1948, for
the shifting of the bus stand on the sacred lake to another site near the Police
Station to provide other facilities for the pilgrims.
- The Regional Transport Authority by a resolution dated December 3/4, 1959,
accepted the suggestion and issued a public notification to that effect on
June 28, 1960.
- Long before the notification, two residents of Pushkar moved the State
Transport Authority under s. 64A of the Motor Vehicles Act for revision of
the decision of the Regional Transport Authority in December, 1959,
changing the bus stand but that application was rejected on February 18,
1960.
- Another petition for the revision of the same orders under the same section
was moved by certain bus operators on April 13, 1960.

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 - The State Transport Authority on January 6, 1961, allowed that application,
reversed the decision of the Regional 'Transport Authority of December 31,
1959, and directed that the old bus stand should continue.
- The Municipal Board moved the High Court under Art. 226 of the
Constitution against this order of State Transport Authority.
- The High Court rejected the application.
- The Board appealed to this Court by special leave.
- Its case was that the order of the Regional Transport Authority changing
the bus stand was made under S. 76 of the, Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and,
therefore, was not open to revision, that the revision application was
barred by limitation
- Held: that it was well settled that equitable considerations have no place in
interpreting provision of limitation and their strict grammatical meaning has
to be adhered to. The expression "date of the order" in the first proviso to
s. 64A of the Act, therefore, could not mean the date of the knowledge of
the order. That the date of notification must be the date of order.
- SC rejected the appellant’s contention as Section 76 had nothing to do with
the fixation or alteration of a bus stand. Although the word bus stand' had
not been defined in the Act, it was clear that a bus stand meant a place
where bus services commenced or terminated. Section 76, properly
construed, dealt with the determination of parking places. That is the order
was open to revision.

Deria Vs. General Council of British Shipping, 1986 1 WLR 1207

Impugned Provisions: Section 8 of Race Relations Act, 1976 & Sec 4 (1) (c)

- The claimant alleged race discrimination by an employment agency against

when he applied for work on a British registered ship, which was not an
establishment in Great Britain at the relevant time.
- Statute was made not to apply in race-discriminatory manner by reading the
words ‘the employee does his work wholly outside Great Britain’ in Section
8(1) of the Race Relations Act, 1976 as ‘the employee does or is to do his
work wholly outside Great Britain’

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Regina Vs. Bentham [UK HL 2005]

Can a person who has his hand inside a zipped-up jacket, forcing the material out
so as to give the impression that he has a gun, be held to have in his possession an
imitation firearm within the meaning of section 17(2) of the Firearms Act 1968?

- Bentham charged with robbery, misleading the people and of possession of

imitation of fire arms.
- “Anything which has an appearance of fire arms”
- Interpretation to be done: “imitation of fire arms”
- Intent of legislature: perspective from victim’s state of mind.
- Bentham was convicted by the lower court
- It was argued before the judge that on these facts the appellant did not have
in his possession an imitation firearm,
- the lower court rejected saying that “Of course, an unadorned finger cannot
have the appearance of being a firearm. But any piece of cloth which was
puckered or gathered in such a way that could, to the eye of a terrified
person, look like being a firearm is another matter entirely… ”
- This appeal was against the charge of being in possession of an imitation
firearm during the course of a robbery u/s 17(2) of the Firearms Act 1968.
- On appeal the Lords quashed the conviction u/s 17(2) of the Firearms Act
1968.
- Parliament might have created an offence of falsely pretending to have a
firearm (although not an imitation firearm). But it has not done so. And the
appellant was not accused of falsely pretending to have a firearm but of
possessing an imitation firearm.
- both the lower courts attached importance to the impression made on the
victim, a matter irrelevant to possession.

Rules of statutory construction have a valuable role when the meaning of a

statutory provision is doubtful, but none where, as here, the meaning is plain.
Purposive construction cannot be relied on to create an offence which Parliament
has not created.

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Analysis of the Heydon’s Case and application of the Mischief Rule

The Mischief Rule of Interpretation

• The Mischief Rule is a certain rule that judges can apply in statutory
interpretation in order to discover Parliament’s intention. Originating from a
16th century case (Heydon’s case) in the United Kingdom, its main aim is to
determine the “mischief and defect” that the statute in question has set out
to remedy, and what ruling would effectively implement this remedy. The
rules laid down in this case are also known as Purposive Construction or
Mischief Rule.
• Mischief Rule hold: “That interpretation should be upheld which suppresses
the mischief which is pro privato commodo (for private convenience), and
advances the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of
the Act, pro bono publico (For the public good).”
• The mischief rule is more flexible than the golden or literal rule

The mischief Rule of Interpretation was evolved in Heydon’s case (1584).

The Mischief Rule involves an examination of the formal law in an attempt to
deduce Parliament’s intention. There are four points to consider:
The questions asked by the Barons/Lords to know the intent of the legislature:
(1) What was the common law before the making of the act?
(2) What was the “mischief and defect” for which the common law did
not provide any remedy?
(3) What remedy the parliament has resolved and appointed to cure the
disease of Common Wealth?
(4) What is the true reason of the remedy?
Advantages of the Mischief Rule are: It closes any opportunity of evading a rule or
law and allows the law to develop and adapt to the changing needs.

Heydon’s case (1584) 3 Co Rep 7a 7b

Interpretation of the word ‘estate’

Facts of the case:

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 - Ottery College, a religious college, gave a tenancy in a manor also
called Ottery to a man Ware and his son.
- The tenancy was established by copyhold. Ware and his son held their
copyhold for their lives, subject to the will of the lord and the custom of the
manor.
- Later, the college leased the same parcel to another man, named Heydon,
for a period of eighty years in return for rents equal to the traditional rent
for the components of the parcel.
- Less than a year after the parcel had been leased to Heydon, Parliament
enacted the Suppression of Religious Houses Act, 1535 (Act of Dissolution).
- The statute had the effect of dissolving many religious colleges,
including Ottery College, which lost its lands and rents to Henry VIII.
- However, a provision in the Act kept in force, for a term of life, any grants
that had been made more than a year before the enactment of the statute.
- Attorney General of Henry VIII, as an intruder claiming damages, files a case
against Heyden under Statute 31 of the Act of Dissolution,
- Heyden’s contention: Word “estate” should mean only free hold estate and
not copyhold estate.

The Court of Exchequer found that the grant to the Wares was protected by the
relevant provision of the Act of Dissolution, but that the lease to Heydon was void.

- The ruling was based on an important discussion of the relationship of a

statute to the pre-existing common law.
- The court concluded that the purpose of the statute was to cure a mischief
resulting from a defect in the common law.
- Therefore, the court concluded, the remedy of the statute was limited to
curing that defect. Judges are supposed to interpret statutes by seeking the
true intent of the makers of the Act, which is presumed to be pro bono
publico, or intent for the public good.

Smith Vs. Hughes [1960] 1 WLR 830

Impugned legislature: Sec 1(1) Street Offences Act, 1959: “It is an offence to solicit
in a street for purpose of prostitution”
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The defendants were prostitutes who had been charged under the Street Offences
Act 1959 which made it an offence to solicit in a public place. The prostitutes were
offering to have sex with an exchange for money from private premises in windows
or on balconies so could be seen by the public.

Held: The court applied the mischief rule holding that the activities of the
defendants were within the mischief Act.

- It is a penal statute and has to be interpreted strictly.

- Intention of the legislature: Not to be harassed while using street.

Rule of Harmonious Construction

‘Samanjasya’: to create a balance.

Application: When there is a conflict between two or more statutes or two or more
parts of a statute then the rule of harmonious construction needs to be adopted.

The important aspects of this principle of harmonious construction are:

1. The courts must avoid a head on clash of seemingly contradicting provisions

and they must construe the contradictory provisions so as to harmonize
them.
2. The provision of one section cannot be used to defeat the provision
contained in another unless the court, despite all its effort, is unable to find
a way to reconcile their differences.
3. When it is impossible to completely reconcile the differences in
contradictory provisions, the courts must interpret them in such as way so
that effect is given to both the provisions as much as possible.

Step 1: Apply both the provisions in light of the scheme of the Act.

Step 2: try and give effect to both and identify the area of conflict.

Step 3: Identify the wider from the narrower w.r.t, the area of conflict.

Step 4: Subtract the ambit of the narrower provisions from the wider provisions.

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The resultant gives the harmonious construction to both the provisions.

Shri Venkataramen Devarn Vs. State of Mysore 1958 AIR 255

- Temple in the name of the deity belongs to upper brahmin caste

- Trustees managed the temple and did not allow Harijans to enter.
- Madras Temple Entry Authorization Act, 1947 Sec 3(1) allowed all castes to
enter or worship in any Hindu temple.
- Trustees challenged this Act and on rejection appealed to HC.
- HC held: Trustees can regulate few entry policies but there was no
declaration.
- Trustees appealed in SC. They claimed that their temple is a religious
denomination under Article 26 of the Constitution and asked for a
declaration to restrict entry of other people.
- “or throwing open the gates of the Hindu religious institutions of the public
character to all classes of Hindus”. That is, giving a right to all Hindus to enter
provided that the temple must be of public character.
- The SC held that the managers can manage everything except entry to the
temple.

All India Young Lawyers Association Vs. State of Kerala, on 28 September, 2018

Facts:

- The Sabarimala temple is one of Kerala’s most famous temples and it is

dedicated to the worship of Lord Ayyappa, who is worshipped as a ‘Naishtika
Bramhachari’ or a celibate for life.
- Therefore, as per a notification by the Devaswom Board that manages the
temple, women belonging to the menstruating age are not permitted to
enter the temple.
- The Sabarimala temple is managed by the Travancore Devaswom Board.
- The centuries-old restriction that restricts women of menstruating age from
temple entry had been challenged now and then.

1991: Kerala High Court upheld an age-old restriction on women of a certain age-
group entering Sabarimala temple.
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2008: Kerala’s LDF government filed an affidavit supporting a PIL filed by women
lawyers questioning the ban on the entry of women in Sabarimala

2016: The India Young Lawyers Association filed a PIL with the Supreme Court,
contending that Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship
(Authorisation of Entry) Rules 1965 that states “Women who are not by custom
and usage allowed to enter a place of public worship shall not be entitled to enter
or offer worship in any place of public worship” violates constitutional guarantees
of equality, non-discrimination and religious freedom.

November 2016: Kerala’s Left Front government favoured the entry of women of
all age groups filing an affidavit to the effect.

28 September, 2018: The hon’ble Supreme Court of India, by a 4:1verdict, granted

women, of all age groups, entry into Kerala’s Sabarimala temple, breaking the
temple’s age-old tradition of restricting menstruating women from entering its
premises.

The five-judge bench, headed by then CJI Dipak Misra with Justices RF Nariman, AM
Khanwilkar, DY Chandrachud and Indu Malhotra pronounced the verdict. (4:1, J.
Indu Malhotra – dissenting opinion)

The issues raised in this case were:

1. The rule that disallows women from entering temples for the sake of custom was
challenged so as to prove that it violates Articles 14 and 15(3) of the Constitution
on the grounds of sex.

2. Whether the practice constitutes an ‘essential religious practice’ under Article

25?

3. Whether a religious institution could assert its claim to do so under the right to
manage its own affairs in the matters of religion?

4. Whether the exclusionary practice based on a biological factor exclusive to the

female gender amounts to ‘discrimination’?

5. Whether Sabarimala temple had a denominational character?

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Arguments Advanced:

Senior counsel Indira Jaisingh: Prohibiting entry of women from 10 to 50 amounts

to untouchability: “The sole basis of restriction is menstruation of women. To keep
away menstruating women is a form of untouchability”. Her arguments supporting
women’s entry was centred around Article 17 of the Constitution of India.

Senior Advocate Mr. Raju Ramachandran (amicus curiae): His submission was that
women’s right to enter the temple comes from Article 25(2) of the Constitution and
that a restriction on women’s entry is also invasive of a woman’s right to privacy as
it amounts to making a disclosure that she is no longer menstruating.

Analysis of the judgement:

- Religion has morphed into different configurations in modern societies and

hence we need more holistic approaches to comprehend its complexities.
- The rationality of any religion or a particular ritual is mostly determined and
propagated by the male leaders and members in the group.
- In order to perpetuate their domination, they tend to devise customs, often
by the irresponsible interpretation of traditional texts, which consequently
results in the subordination of women.
- One should not forget that if it were not for the judiciary’s activism, the rigid
societal structures would have still clawed on to the unbending orthodoxy.
- Justice Malhotra sets a dangerous precedent by stating that courts should
not delve into the rationality of religious practices.

On 2 January 2019, two women under the age of 50 finally entered the shrine for
the first time since the Supreme Court verdict, after attempts by many others failed
due to protests by devotees

Sirsilk India Ltd. Vs. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh (1964) AIR 160 2 SCR 448

Industrial Dispute - Award sent to Government by the Tribunal- Settlement

between parties thereafter - Government, must publish the Award - Conflict

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between Award and settlement - Resolution of-Industrial disputes Act, 1947 (14 of
1947) ss. 2 (p),17,18, 19.

Impugned provision:

Section 17(1) of Industrial Dispute Act: Govt shall publish every award given by the
Labour Tribunal within 20 days of the receipt

Section 18(b) of Industrial Dispute Act: The award becomes final upon publication

Section 18(1): Settlement between the employer and employee shall be binding on
both the parties of the agreement.

Facts: Industrial disputes having arisen between the appellants and their workmen
the disputes were referred for adjudication.

After the Tribunal forwarded their Awards to the Government the parties came to
settlement.

Thereafter letters were sent to the Government requesting them to withhold the
publication of the Awards.

The Government replied that under s. 17 of the Act it was mandatory for the
Government to publish the Awards and they could not withhold publication.

Thereupon, writ petitions were filed before the High Court under Art. 226 of the
Constitution praying that the Government might be directed to withhold the
publication.

HC held the same decision saying that Sec 17 is a mandatory provision.

The main contentions in the appeal: The provisions of s. 17 were not mandatory
but were only directory and even if they were mandatory some via media had to
be found in view of the conflict that would arise between an award published
under s. 17 (1) and a settlement which was binding under s. 18 (1) and therefore

23
where there was a settlement which was binding under s. 18 (1), it would be open
to the Government not to publish the award.

Held: it is clear on a reading of s. 17 and s. 17A together that the intention behind
s. 17 (1) is that a duty is cast on Government to publish the award within thirty days
of its receipt and the provision for its publication is mandatory and not merely
directory.

When an agreement has been arrived at between the parties, it becomes a

settlement as per the definition under s. 2 (p) and s. 18 (1) lays down that such a
Settlement shall be binding on all the parties to it.

If a situation like the one in the present case arises which may lead to a conflict
between a settlement under s. 18 (1) and an award binding under s. 18 (3) on
publication, the only solution is to withhold the award from publication.

This would not in any way affect the mandatory nature of the provisions in s. 17 (1)
for the Government would ordinarily have to publish the award but for the special
situation arising in such cases.

Any further dispute related to settlement later on may be taken up separately.

Area of conflict: Finality

Sec 17: Broader provision

Sec 18 narrower provision

G. P. Singh, a legal expert, says, 4th Step is to be followed where there is a conflict.
(Step 4: Subtract the ambit of the narrower provisions from the wider provisions)

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