Gulfstream GV-Flight - Controls PDF
Gulfstream GV-Flight - Controls PDF
OPERATING MANUAL
FLIGHT CONTROLS
2A-27-10: General:
The flight controls system for the Gulfstream V is hydraulically powered, providing boost
to mechanical linkages to overcome aerodynamic forces associated with high speed
flight. Tandem type hydraulic actuators, receiving hydraulic fluid under pressure from two
independent systems (Left and Right hydraulic systems), are used to move the flight
control surfaces. Both hydraulic systems maintain a system pressure of 3000 psi. Loss of
system pressure by one hydraulic system has no effect on operation of the flight controls,
as the remaining system is capable of maintaining actuator load capacity. In the event of
total loss of hydraulic pressure in both hydraulic systems, the primary flight controls
revert to manual operation.
The flight controls are divided by function as follows (see Figure 2):
• Primary Flight Controls:
The primary flight controls consist of the ailerons, elevators and rudder.
• Secondary Flight Controls:
Secondary flight controls consist of flaps and spoilers.
• Trim Controls:
Trim controls consist of an aileron trim tab, horizontal stabilizer, two elevator trim
tabs and a trimmable rudder. The aileron and elevator trim tabs are mass
balanced to prevent control flutter.
The flight controls system is divided into the following subsystems:
• 2A-27-20: Pitch Flight Control System
• 2A-27-30: Yaw Flight Control System
• 2A-27-40: Roll Flight Control System
• 2A-27-50: Horizontal Stabilizer System
• 2A-27-60: Flaps System
• 2A-27-70: Spoiler System
• 2A-27-80: Gust Lock System
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the unlikely event of an immovable elevator, the elevator controls can be
separated by pulling an elevator disconnect handle, located on the cockpit center
pedestal. Once separated, the operable elevator system is identified and used to
fly the aircraft.
Two stall barrier systems are incorporated into the elevator control system to
prevent a stall by forcing the control columns forward when the crew fails to
respond either to visual indications or to stick shaker vibrations which precede an
impending stall. The stall barrier system is normally left on, but if it is
malfunctioning, the crew can turn the system off, using the STALL BARR switch,
located on the cockpit center pedestal. When a high angle of attack is attained, a
shaker trip point detector activates the control column shaker motors. When a
more severe angle of attack is attained, a pusher trip detector activates its
respective stall barrier pusher.
NOTE:
The control column force can be manually overcome
by pilot or copilot.
2. Description of Subsystems, Units and Components:
A. Automatic Hardover Prevention System:
The elevator actuator incorporates a hardover prevention system which
compares inputs and outputs. If inputs to, and outputs from, the actuator do
not agree, hydraulic pressure to the affected side of the actuator is shut off
and a message is prompted for display on the Crew Alerting System (CAS)
display. The elevators are still operative, but without benefit of the affected
side’s hydraulic boost. The hardover prevention system receives power
from the Left and Right Essential DC bus.
B. Elevator Control Separation System:
(See Figure 4.)
The elevator control systems are dual and separable. In the unlikely event
that a single elevator control system were to become jammed, an elevator
disconnect system provides the means to separate the left and right
elevators from each other. This is accomplished through the use of an
elevator disconnect system, located on the left side of the cockpit center
pedestal and labeled ELEV DISC on its protective cover.
The elevator disconnect system consists of the protective cover, the
elevator disconnect handle (labeled ELEV DISC) and a power assist trigger
(labeled LIFT). If a jammed elevator is detected, the protective cover is
raised and the ELEV DISC handle is pulled. With the handle fully extended,
the pilot’s and copilot’s control columns are separated in the cockpit. The
pilot controls the left elevator and the copilot controls the right elevator. The
immovable elevator side will remain immovable and the movable side is
now free to be used to control the aircraft. The Stall Barrier system remains
functional in this configuration.
If the red power assist trigger was NOT used to actuate the ELEV DISC
handle, the elevator disconnect system can be reset at the discretion of the
flight crew.
If the force required to pull the ELEV DISC handle is too great, the red
power assist trigger, located under the ELEV DISC handle, is pulled. This
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actuates a gas-spring cartridge, providing between 110 to 150 pounds of
controlled force to fully extend the handle and separate the elevator control
systems.
NOTE:
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switch must be simultaneously moved in the same direction. When
electric pitch trim reaches the nose up or nose down limit of
allowable travel, messages are prompted for display on CAS. The
type of messages depend upon whether or not the autopilot is
engaged.
D. Stall Barrier System:
(See Figure 3, Figure 4 and Figure 6.)
The stall barrier system consists of stick shaker motors located on each
control column, a stick pusher actuator located in the tail compartment and
Angle of Attack (AOA) probes located on each side of the fuselage forward
section.
The stall barrier system can be deactivated by depressing the autopilot
disconnect switches (A/P DISC / BARR DISC) on either control wheel, or
by selecting the STALL BARR switch, located on the center console, to the
OFF position. When the stall barrier system is selected off, a message is
prompted for display on CAS.
NOTE:
The autopilot servo input to the elevator control
system is through a separate set of cables connected
to the elevator actuator. Servo inputs are introduced at
the actuator. The force generated by the stall barrier
system will overcome autopilot force.
(1) Stick Shaker Motor:
Two stick shaker motors are connected to the pilot and copilot
control columns. Upon activation, the motor provides a warning by
shaking the control column. The pilot’s stick shaker motor is
connected to the Left Essential DC bus through the SHAKER #1
circuit breaker and a relay activated by Data Acquisition Unit (DAU)
#1. The copilot’s stick shaker motor is connected to the Right Main
DC bus through SHAKER #2 circuit breaker and a relay activated by
DAU #2. If a failure is detected in either stick shaker, a message is
prompted for display on CAS.
(2) Stick Pusher Actuator:
The stick pusher actuator is controlled through two independent
electro-hydraulic valves. The left valve is controlled by either
channel of DAU #1 and Fault Warning Computer (FWC) #1, and the
right valve is controlled by either channel of the DAU #2 and FWC
#2, in order to eliminate single point failures. The #1 stick pusher
valve is connected to the Left Essential DC bus through the STALL
BARR VALVE #1 circuit breaker and the PUSH #1 relay. The #2
stick pusher valve is connected to the Right Main DC bus through
the STALL BARR VALVE #2 circuit breaker and the PUSH #2 relay.
The actuator is normally loaded in the retracted position. When the
stick pusher is activated, a message is prompted for display on
CAS, the solenoids are energized and the actuator extends.
Extension of the actuator provides mechanical force to push the
control column forward.
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The stall barrier system is constantly monitored for faults or failures.
If a fault or failure in the control column pusher is detected,
messages are prompted for display on CAS.
(3) Angle of Attack Probe:
Two heated Angle of Attack (AOA) probes provide aircraft AOA
information via the Aeronautical Radio Incorporated (ARINC) 429
databus to the DAUs. The left AOA probe provides information to
DAU #1 and the right AOA probe provides information to DAU #2.
AOA values are displayed on the Primary Flight Display (PFD).
The AOA system is constantly monitored for faults or failures. If a
probe heater failure occurs, or data transmitted by the probes to
their respective DAUs is in gross disagreement, messages are
prompted for display on CAS.
3. Controls and Indications:
(See Figure 3 through Figure 6.)
NOTE:
A full description of the Primary Flight Display can be
found in section 2B-02-00: Electronic Display System
Description. A full description of the FLIGHT
CONTROLS synoptic page can be found in section
2B-03-00: Engine Instruments and Crew Alerting
System Description.
A. Circuit Breakers (CBs):
The pitch flight controls system is protected by the following CBs:
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4. Limitations:
A. Stall Barrier / Stall Warning:
(1) Takeoff Requirements:
Both stall warning / stall barrier systems must be operative for
takeoff.
(2) Use of System:
Operative stall barrier systems must be ON during all flight
operations, unless required to be selected OFF for procedural
reasons. Refer to Section 05-13-50: Stall Barrier Malfunction, for
additional information.
B. Mach Trim / Electric Elevator Trim Inoperative Speed:
With both mach trim compensators inoperative, or electric elevator trim
inoperative, the maximum operating limit speed is 0.80 MT.
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2A-27-30: Yaw Flight Controls System:
1. General Description:
The purpose of the yaw flight controls system is to provide the crew with a means
of controlling aircraft movement about the vertical axis when aircraft speed allows
aerodynamic use of the rudder. The rudder is a manually and electrically
controlled, mechanically actuated, hydraulically boosted airfoil located on the
trailing edge of the vertical stabilizer. Total rudder travel is 22 degrees in either
direction. Rudder movement is depicted on the FLIGHT CONTROLS synoptic
page.
Movement of the aircraft around the yaw axis is accomplished by the movement
of the rudder pedals which transmit inputs through conventional mechanical
linkage (cables and bellcranks) to displace the rudder. A dual hydraulic actuator
boosts inputs to the rudder surface. The rudder can be operated without the
assistance of the hydraulic actuator. In the event of a loss of both normal hydraulic
systems, the Auxiliary Hydraulic (AUX) system can also supply power to the
rudder actuator in flight through the selection of the STBY RUD (Standby Rudder)
switch on the lower portion of the pilot’s flight panel.
2. Description of Subsystems, Units and Components:
A. Automatic Hardover Prevention System:
Automatic hardover prevention is incorporated into the rudder boost
actuator. Switches monitor inputs to, and outputs from, the rudder actuator.
If the inputs and outputs disagree for 0.5 second or longer, hydraulic
pressure to the affected side of the actuator is shut off and a message is
displayed on the Crew Alerting System (CAS) display. The rudder is still
operative, but without benefit of the affected side’s hydraulic boost. The
rudder hardover prevention system receives power from the Right
Essential DC bus.
B. Redundant Hydraulic Power Sources:
Hydraulic power to the rudder actuator is normally provided by the L SYS
and R SYS. In addition, the AUX system can also supply power to the
rudder actuator in flight through the selection of the STBY RUD switch.
C. Automatic Overload Limiting System:
Force modulating valves within the rudder actuator provide protection of
the aircraft rudder against overload. Rudder surface movement is limited
by these valves when airspeeds increase airloads against the rudder.
When the hinge movement limit is reached, force-modulating valves shift,
reducing pressure to the limit actuator load output. This action causes a
logic-computed (blue RUDDER LIMIT) advisory message to be displayed
on CAS. Any further input force at the pedals cannot further displace the
rudder.
In addition to rudder limiting, hydraulic pressure to the rudder actuator is
monitored. Should a pressure differential between the L SYS and Right
Hydraulic System (R SYS) exceed 700-1000 psi, or a single summed
output pressure of less than 500 psi be detected, a blue SINGLE RUDDER
advisory message is displayed on CAS.
D. Standby Rudder System:
(See Figure 7.)
In the event of dual hydraulic system failure in flight, a Standby Rudder
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system can be activated. Selection of the STBY RUD switch, located on
the lower portion of the pilot’s flight panel, to ON activates the AUX pump.
AUX pressure opens a pilot-pressure operated valve to provide pressure to
the rudder actuator and a message is displayed on CAS. System operation
can be viewed on the HYDRAULICS synoptic page. Rudder operation will
be normal from the flight crew’s perspective until nose landing gear weight-
on-wheels is achieved, at which point AUX pressure is removed from the
actuator. The Yaw Damper system continues to function normally while the
Standby Rudder system is in operation.
E. Yaw Damper System:
(See Figure 7.)
A yaw damping channel is integrated within each of the two Flight
Guidance Computers (FGCs). Inputs received by the active FGC is cross-
checked and valid commands are transmitted to the rudder dual trim servo
for output to the rudder actuator. Detected faults prompt messages for
display on CAS. The yaw damper system is fail-operational in that should
one yaw damping channel (or FGC) fail, the remaining FGC can support
full system operation.
Both yaw damper channels are controlled using the YAW DAMP ENG/
DISENG switch, located on the lower portion of the pilot’s flight panel.
Power to the Yaw Damper system is provided by the Left Essential DC Bus
(YD 1) and Right Essential DC Bus (YD 2). When the ENG/DISENG switch
is selected to DISENG, the system is disengaged and a message is
displayed on CAS.
F. Rudder Trim System:
(See Figure 8.)
The Rudder Trim system allows fine position adjustment of the rudder to a
desired position. This is accomplished through a trim adjustment knob,
located on the cockpit center pedestal, to a maximum indicated 7.5
degrees left or right. There is no rudder trim tab on the rudder control
surface; mechanical trim inputs to the rudder actuator offset the entire
surface.
3. Controls and Indications:
(See Figure 7 and Figure 8.)
NOTE:
A full description of the FLIGHT CONTROLS and
HYDRAULICS synoptic pages can be found in section
2B-03-00: Engine Instruments and Crew Alerting
System Description.
A. Circuit Breakers (CBs):
The yaw flight controls system is protected by the following CBs:
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B. Crew Alerting System (CAS) Messages:
CAS messages associated with the yaw flight controls system are:
4. Limitations:
A. Yaw Damper Inoperative Speed:
(1) Above 10000 Feet:
The maximum speed is 260 KTS / 0.80 MT.
(2) Below 10000 Feet:
The maximum speed is 250 KCAS.
(3) Above 20000 Feet:
The minimum speed is 210 KTS.
(4) Below 20000 Feet:
The minimum speed is in accordance with the following schedule
until ready to configure for approach and landing. VREF as presented
on the airspeed tape is the approach speed for landing in the current
flap setting.
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SYS and R SYS) at 3000 psi each. In the event of a single hydraulic system
failure, the actuators will remain powered by the operative hydraulic system.
2. Description of Subsystems, Units and Components:
A. Automatic Hardover Prevention:
Each aileron actuator incorporates a hardover prevention system which
compares inputs and outputs. If inputs to, and outputs from, either actuator
do not agree for over 0.5 second, hydraulic pressure from both hydraulic
systems to both actuators is shut off simultaneously and a message will be
displayed on the Crew Alerting System (CAS) display. The ailerons are still
operative, but without benefit of hydraulic boost. The hardover prevention
system receives power from the Left and Right Essential DC Bus.
B. Aileron Control Separation:
The aileron control systems are dual and separable. In the unlikely event
that a single aileron control system were to become jammed, an aileron
disconnect system provides the means to separate the left and right
ailerons from each other. This is accomplished through the use of an
aileron disconnect system, located on the right side of the cockpit center
pedestal and labeled AIL DISC on its protective cover.
The aileron disconnect system consists of the protective cover, the aileron
disconnect handle (labeled AIL DISC) and a power assist trigger (labeled
LIFT). If a jammed aileron is detected, the protective cover is raised and
the AIL DISC handle is pulled. With the handle fully extended, the pilot’s
and copilot’s control wheels are separated and the aileron systems are fully
isolated and independent – the pilot controls the left aileron and the copilot
controls the right aileron. The immovable aileron side will remain
immovable and the movable side is now free to be used to control the
aircraft. If the power assist trigger was NOT used to actuate the AIL DISC
handle, the aileron disconnect system can be reset at the discretion of the
flight crew.
If the force required to pull the AIL DISC handle is too great, the power
assist trigger, located under the AIL DISC handle, is pulled. This actuates a
gas-spring cartridge, providing between 110 to 150 pounds of controlled
force to fully extend the handle and separate the aileron control systems.
NOTE:
If the power assist trigger was used to actuate the AIL
DISC handle, the system cannot be reset without the
use of special tools.
C. Flight Spoiler Supplementation:
The outboard two spoilers on each wing act as flight spoilers in conjunction
with the ailerons to improve roll response of the aircraft. Their function as
supplements to the ailerons is fully automatic and transparent to the crew.
Spoiler travel will vary in accordance with the control wheel inputs up to a
maximum of 47(±3) degrees upward deflection. The spoilers are
hydraulically powered, normally by both L SYS and R SYS, but will function
normally with only one source of hydraulic pressure. The operation of flight
spoilers (as well as ground spoilers and speed brakes) can be inhibited
using the SPOILER CONTROL switch, located on the left side of the
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cockpit center pedestal. Selection of the switch to off causes a message to
be displayed on CAS.
D. Aileron Trim System:
(See Figure 9.)
(1) Aileron Trim Tab:
The aileron trim tab is a manually operated, mechanically actuated
airfoil located on the inboard trailing edge of the left aileron. The
aileron trim tab moves opposite to the left aileron (tab trailing edge
down, left aileron trailing edge up; tab trailing edge up; left aileron
trailing edge down) to control aircraft roll trim. It is mechanically
actuated by an aileron trim wheel which is located on the aft end of
the cockpit center pedestal. The range of travel for the aileron trim
tab is 15 degrees up or down.
(2) Aileron Trim Tab Actuator Heater:
The aileron trim tab actuator heater provides heat to prevent the trim
tab actuator from freezing. The heater provides heat until the
temperature rises to a threshold temperature, predetermined by the
manufacturer. The heater is controlled by the AIL TRIM HEAT circuit
breaker on the Right Electronic Equipment Rack (REER) and
receives power from the Right Main AC bus.
3. Controls and Indications:
(See Figure 9.)
NOTE:
A full description of the FLIGHT CONTROLS synoptic
page can be found in section 2B-03-00: Engine
Instruments and Crew Alerting System Description.
A. Circuit Breakers (CBs):
The Roll Flight Control system is protected by the following CBs:
4. Limitations:
There are no limitations established for the roll flight controls system at the time of
this revision.
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2A-27-50: Horizontal Stabilizer System:
1. General Description:
The purpose of the horizontal stabilizer system is to provide to the flight crew a
means of automatically or manually controlling the position and the movement of
the horizontal stabilizer. This movement is provided to counteract the pitch
moment associated with flap movement.
The horizontal stabilizer pivots to change angle of incidence as flaps are extended
or retracted. The horizontal stabilizer actuator, located in the vertical stabilizer, is
electrically controlled and actuated to position the horizontal stabilizer. In addition,
the horizontal stabilizer may be used to provide pitch trim in the Emergency
Stabilizer (EMER STAB) mode.
Horizontal stabilizer position is displayed on the Primary Flight Display (PFD) and
the FLIGHT CONTROLS synoptic page.
2. Description of Subsystems, Units and Components:
A. Flap/Horizontal Stabilizer Control Unit (FCU):
The Flap/Horizontal Stabilizer Control Unit (FCU), located in the Baggage
Compartment Electronic Equipment Rack, performs control and system
health functions of the Flap/Stabilizer systems. It contains two independent
control channels: Channel A and Channel B. Each channel communicates
with the other by comparing inputs to the two horizontal stabilizer actuator
AC motors (one per channel) and outputs from the horizontal stabilizer
position resolver (one output per channel). A malfunctioning channel will be
inhibited and the remaining operating channel will continue to control the
flaps and stabilizer.
The FCU provides system protection by completing operational status tests
with Built-In-Test (BIT) and functional fault monitoring. The FCU performs
the tests and monitoring and communicates the data on the Aeronautical
Radio Incorporated (ARINC 429) data bus to the Crew Alerting System
(CAS) through the Fault Warning Computer (FWC) and to the Maintenance
Data Acquisition Unit (MDAU). The FCU accepts input information on the
ARINC 429 for computed airspeed and Weight-On-Wheels (WOW).
B. Horizontal Stabilizer Actuator:
The Horizontal Stabilizer Actuator (HSA) is a electrically powered ballscrew
actuator that normally moves in coordination with the flap position. The
HSA is driven by two AC electric motors controlled by the two channels of
the FCU. The HSA can also be used as a means of adjusting pitch trim in
the Emergency Stabilizer (EMER STAB) mode. The HSA is mounted inside
the upper forward section of the vertical stabilizer.
C. Emergency Stabilizer (EMER STAB) Switch:
(See Figure 11.)
The EMER STAB switch, located on the cockpit center pedestal, allows the
flight crew to enable the Emergency Stabilizer (EMER STAB) mode by
selection of the switch to ARM. In the EMER STAB mode, the horizontal
stabilizer can be trimmed to any position (within the limits of the HSA) to
help counteract excessive control forces in the unlikely event of a jammed
elevator or loss of both hydraulic systems by providing additional pitch trim
and control capability. Once in the EMER STAB mode, the stabilizer can be
positioned anywhere between +1.50° to -4.60°, regardless of flap position.
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This is accomplished through the use of the electric pitch trim switch
located on each control wheel. While in the EMER STAB mode, a message
is displayed on CAS.
3. Controls and Indications:
(See Figure 10 and Figure 11.)
NOTE:
4. Limitations:
There are no limitations established for the horizontal stabilizer system at the time
of this revision.
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mechanical system that extends and retracts the flaps.
Flap position is displayed on the Primary Flight Display (PFD) and the FLIGHT
CONTROLS synoptic page.
2. Description of Subsystems, Units and Components:
A. Flap Control Handle:
(See Figure 12.)
The flap control handle provides the electrical command to the Flap/
Horizontal Stabilizer Control Unit (FCU) for required flap position. The flap
handle mechanically positions a dual Rotary Variable Differential
Transformer (RVDT) for flap control. Power for the RVDT comes from the
FCU. The flap control handle is located on the right side of center pedestal
and is labeled FLAP. The flaps can be placed in four positions: UP (0°),
10°, T/O APP (20°) and DOWN (39°).
B. Flap/Horizontal Stabilizer Control Unit:
(See Figure 10.)
The Flap/Horizontal Stabilizer Control Unit (FCU), located in the Baggage
Compartment Electronic Equipment Rack, performs control and system
health functions of the Flap/Stabilizer systems. It contains two independent
control channels: Channel A and Channel B. Each channel communicates
with the other by comparing FLAP handle RVDT position and left and right
flap resolver position to generate signals that drive the enable, extend or
retract solenoids of the Power Drive Unit (PDU). A malfunctioning channel
will be inhibited and the remaining operating channel will continue to
control the flaps and stabilizer.
To compensate for pitch trim changes during flap operation, the FCU also
monitors the horizontal stabilizer position information from the Horizontal
Stabilizer Actuator (HSA) resolver and generates signals that drive the HSA
AC motor assembly.
The FCU provides system protection by completing operational status tests
with Built-In-Test (BIT) and functional fault monitoring. The FCU performs
the tests and monitoring and communicates the data on the Aeronautical
Radio Incorporated (ARINC 429) data bus to the Crew Alerting System
(CAS) through the Fault Warning Computer (FWC) and to the Maintenance
Data Acquisition Unit (MDAU). The FCU accepts input information on the
ARINC 429 for computed airspeed and Weight-On-Wheels (WOW).
C. Power Drive Unit:
The Power Drive Unit (PDU) provides the interface between the FCU,
hydraulic power source and mechanical drive units of the flap actuation
system. Check valves located in the supply line fittings of the control valve
module isolate the Left Hydraulic System (L SYS) and Auxiliary Hydraulic
System (AUX) sources (including PTU) to the hydraulic motor. Pilot
solenoid valves are electrically energized to port hydraulic pressure to
open and close the enable/shutoff spool valve and to control hydraulic
motor direction for extension or retraction of the flaps. The PDU is located
at the forward area of the main landing gear wheel wells.
D. Flap Drive Torque Tubes:
The flap drive torque tubes transmit power from the PDU to the mechanical
flap actuators. The torque tube drive line set consists of seven torque shaft
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assemblies for each wing flap. Each wing flap torque tube drive line set is
connected to the PDU and extends outboard along the rear beam of the
wing to the inboard and outboard ball screw actuators.
E. Flap Actuators:
The purpose of the flap actuators is to convert rotary input torque to linear
output motion and force to extend or retract the flap assemblies. The
actuator contains a worm and wheel gear set to translate the torque tube
rotation into linear motion. A force limiter protects the aircraft structure from
PDU torque if a flap roller or track jam occurs. The force limiter is
bi-directional and is self resetting by reversing the direction of rotation.
F. Flap Resolvers (Position Feedback Transducer):
The flap resolvers provide flap position feedback to the FCU. The resolvers
are continuously monitored by the FCU channels. The resolvers are
electromechanical devices; each resolver receives electrical inputs to the
stator and mechanical inputs (rotational) inputs to the rotor. A resolver is
located on each outboard flap actuator.
3. Controls and Indications:
(See Figure 12.)
NOTE:
A full description of the Primary Flight Display can be
found in section 2B-02-00: Electronic Display System
Description. A full description of the FLIGHT
CONTROLS synoptic page can be found in section
2B-03-00: Engine Instruments and Crew Alerting
System Description.
A. Circuit Breakers (CBs):
The flaps system is protected by the following CBs:
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4. Limitations:
A. Use Of Flaps In Icing Conditions:
Use of flaps in icing conditions is restricted to takeoff, approach and
landing only.
B. Use Of Flaps While Holding In Icing Conditions:
Holding in icing conditions is limited to 0° (UP) flaps only.
C. Flap Extension Altitudes:
(1) Maximum operating altitude for extending landing flaps (39°/
DOWN), or flying with landing flaps extended is 20000 ft MSL.
(2) Maximum operating altitude for extending flaps to 10° or 20°, or
flying with flaps extended to 10° or 20° is 25000 ft MSL.
D. Flaps Extended Speeds (VFE /MFE):
(1) Takeoff (10°): 250 KCAS / 0.60 MT
(2) T/O APP (20°): 220 KCAS / 0.60 MT
(3) DOWN (39°):
(a) 165 KCAS / 0.60 MT — SN 501 through 553 without ASC
19A or ASC 73A
(b) 170 KCAS / 0.60 MT — SN 554 and subs, SN 501 through
553 with ASC 19A or ASC 73A
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actuators convert hydraulic pressure to a linear mechanical force to position the
spoilers.
2. Description of Subsystems, Units and Components:
A. Flight Spoiler Control System:
The flight spoiler control system assists the ailerons in spoiling lift. As the
ailerons are deployed upward, the outboard two (inboard and outboard
flight spoiler) panels are also deployed on the up-aileron side, up to a
maximum of 47 (±3) degrees corresponding to full up-aileron travel of 11
degrees.
NOTE:
With the control wheel turned fully in one direction and
flight spoilers fully extended on the up-aileron side, the
opposite wing flight spoilers may deploy slightly. This
condition is acceptable.
If the SPOILER CONTROL switch, located on the cockpit center pedestal,
is selected to OFF, hydraulic pressure is inhibited and the flight spoilers will
be inoperative.
B. Ground Spoiler Control System:
The ground spoiler control system provides a method for full and automatic
deployment of all spoiler panels upon aircraft touchdown in order to reduce
lift and increase braking effectiveness on the ground. Also, if takeoff is
aborted, the system provides for automatic deployment of all spoiler
panels. The system is electrically controlled and hydraulically powered.
(1) Operational Logic:
With the GND SPLR switch selected to ARMED, the ground spoiler
control system will extend all six spoiler panels in unison to 55 (±4)
degrees when the following parameters are satisfied:
• L ESS DC bus available to provide power for LMLG WOW.
• R ESS DC bus available to provide power for RMLG WOW
and electrical control for spoilers.
• L SYS (or AUX or PTU) hydraulic pressure available to
provide servo pressure for spoiler control.
• L SYS (or R SYS) hydraulic pressure available to provide
operational pressure to extend spoilers.
• Both power levers retarded to IDLE.
• SPOILER CONTROL switch selected to ON.
• LMLG and RMLG WOW in GROUND mode
OR:
At wheel spinup greater than 47 knots when:
• Flaps position is greater than 22° OR:
• Flaps position is less than 22° and GND SPLR FLAP
OVERRIDE is selected to ON.
(2) NO GND SPLRS Lights:
(See Figure 14.)
OPERATING MANUAL
There are two NO GND SPLRS lights located on the windshield
center post. They are illuminated under the following conditions:
• Operational logic parameters are satisfied
• GND SPLR switch selected to ARMED
• Left wing, right wing, or left and right wing ground spoilers did
not deploy
The purpose of the lights is to advise the flight crew that any or all
ground spoilers did not deploy following touchdown, so that the
speed brakes may be extended as a precautionary measure. When
the NO GND SPLRS lights are activated, the MASTER WARN lights
on the pilot’s and copilot’s glareshield are illuminated and a three-
chime aural warning tone also sounds.
(3) GND SPOILER Warning Message:
The ground spoiler system is monitored by a warning circuit that will
detect certain in-flight and on-ground malfunctions within the ground
spoiler system. A red GND SPOILER warning message will be
displayed on the Crew Alerting System (CAS) should any of the
following events occur in the configuration given:
(a) In flight:
• One or both ground spoilers not fully retracted with
SPEED BRAKE handle in RETRACT detent.
• One or both solenoid-operated hydraulic control
valves electrically energized.
• One or both Weight-On-Wheels (WOW) relays in the
GROUND mode.
• One or both power lever ground idle relays energized.
• Ground spoiler pressure switch senses hydraulic
pressure.
(b) One the ground, ground spoilers not armed:
• One or both ground spoilers not fully retracted with
SPEED BRAKE handle in RETRACT detent.
• One or both solenoid-operated hydraulic control
valves electrically energized.
• One or both power lever ground idle relays energized.
• Ground spoiler pressure switch senses hydraulic
pressure.
(c) On the ground, ground spoilers armed, either power lever not
in ground idle detent:
• One or both solenoid-operated hydraulic control
valves electrically energized.
• One or both power lever ground idle relays energized.
• Ground spoiler pressure switch senses hydraulic
pressure.
• One or both ground spoilers not fully retracted.
(4) GND SPLR TEST Switch:
OPERATING MANUAL
(See Figure 14.)
The purpose of the GND SPLR TEST switch is to operationally test
the warning circuitry of the ground spoiler system. When depressed
and held, the following actions occur:
• The NO GND SPLRS lights are illuminated
• The MASTER WARN lights are illuminated and a three-chime
aural warning tone sounds
• A red GND SPOILER warning message is displayed on CAS
• The IN TEST legend on the GND SPLR TEST switch is
illuminated blue
NOTE:
The ground spoilers do not deploy during this test.
(5) GPWS/GND SPLR FLAP ORIDE Switch:
(See Figure 13.)
The purpose of the GPWS/GND SPLR FLAP ORIDE switch is to
override the necessity of flaps being extended greater than 22° to
enable automatic ground spoiler deployment at wheel spin-up. All
other parameters must still be satisfied. In addition, selection to ON
inhibits the GPWS voice alarm “TOO LOW, FLAPS”.
C. Speed Brake Control System:
(See Figure 13.)
The Speed Brake Control system provides a method for manual selection
of deployment of all six spoiler panels in flight to slow the aircraft airspeed
and increase the descent rate.
The speed brakes are manually controlled and hydraulically powered. With
hydraulic pressure available, the speed brake control system deploys all
spoiler panels to 30 (±1 degree for inboard panel, ±4 degrees for two
outboard panels) degrees when the SPEED BRAKE handle in the center
pedestal is placed in EXTEND detent. With speed brakes extended,
rotation of the control wheel in either direction will further extend the
outboard two (inboard and outboard flight spoiler) panels on the side of the
raised aileron, up to a maximum of 55 (±4) degrees. These panels will
return to their original extended position when the control wheel is returned
to neutral.
NOTE:
The two outboard (inboard and outboard flight spoiler)
panels on each wing may deploy 2 to 3 degrees less
than the inboard (ground spoiler) panel when the
speed brakes are extended. This is due to flight spoiler
breakout delay, and is normal.
If the SPOILER CONTROL switch is selected to OFF, hydraulic pressure is
inhibited and the speed brakes will be inoperative.
OPERATING MANUAL
D. Spoiler Hydraulic Actuation System:
(See Figure 13.)
A flight spoiler actuator and ground spoiler actuator are installed in each
wing. Both actuators are tandem actuators that receive hydraulic pressure
for operation from L SYS and R SYS. Should there be a loss of one
hydraulic system, the remaining system will continue to provide operational
pressure.
The ground spoiler actuators also require hydraulic control pressure,
normally provided from L SYS. In the event both L SYS engine driven
pumps fail, the PTU and AUX pumps can be used to provide control
pressure.
Hydraulic pressure to all flight and ground spoiler actuators can be
inhibited through the use of the SPOILER CONTROL switch located on the
cockpit center pedestal. When selected to OFF, operation of flight spoilers,
ground spoilers and speed brakes is inhibited.
E. Spoiler Position Sensing and Indication System:
The spoiler position sensing and indication system provides indication of
spoiler position to Data Acquisition Units (DAUs) #1 and #2 and the
Maintenance Data Acquisition Unit (MDAU). This is accomplished through
the use of spoiler position resolvers installed on each wing. Flight spoiler,
ground spoiler and speed brake movement is visually depicted on the
FLIGHT CONTROLS synoptic page.
3. Controls and Indications:
(See Figure 13 and Figure 14.)
NOTE:
A full description of the FLIGHT CONTROLS synoptic
page can be found in section 2B-03-00: Engine
Instruments and Crew Alerting System Description.
A. Circuit Breakers (CBs):
The spoiler system is protected by the following CBs:
OPERATING MANUAL
B. Crew Alerting System (CAS) Messages:
CAS messages associated with the spoiler system are:
4. Limitations:
A. Flight Manual Limitations:
(1) Use of Speed Brakes:
Speed brakes are not approved for extension with flaps at 39°
(DOWN) or with landing gear extended in flight.
(2) Automatic Ground Spoilers:
Takeoff is permitted with automatic ground spoilers inoperative
provided anti-skid is operative, 20° flaps are used, and the cowl and
wing anti-ice systems are not used.
If a touch-and-go landing is to be performed, the GND SPLR switch
must be OFF and manual spoiler landing distances must be taken
into account.
OPERATING MANUAL
2A-27-00
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May 22/01
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OPERATING MANUAL
2A-27-00
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OPERATING MANUAL
2A-27-80: Gust Lock System:
1. General Description:
The gust lock system for the Gulfstream V provides a means for the flight crew to
manually protect the unpowered flight control surfaces from movement by wind
gusts while the aircraft is on the ground.
The gust lock system is a mechanical ground safety system that neither affects
the flight performance of the aircraft nor receives any flight loads. The ailerons,
elevators and rudder are locked against gust loads, by mechanical latches and a
hook operated by the GUST LOCK handle located on the cockpit center pedestal.
2. Description of Subsystems, Units and Components:
A. Surface Lock System:
A single T-shaped handle, located on the right side of the cockpit center
pedestal and labeled GUST LOCK, controls the gust lock system. A spring
loaded trigger is located in the arm of the GUST LOCK handle to prevent
inadvertent actuation. Raising and engaging the GUST LOCK handle
actuates conventional mechanical components (cables, pushrods and
mechanical latches). This locks the ailerons and rudder in the neutral
position and the elevator in the trailing edge down position.
B. Mechanical Power Lever Interlock:
A mechanical interlock is incorporated in the GUST LOCK handle
mechanism which restricts power lever movement to six percent above
ground idle with the gust lock engaged. Force applied to advance one or
both power levers simultaneously cannot override the interlock.
3. Controls and Indications:
(See Figure 15.)
4. Limitations:
A. Flight Manual Limitations:
There are no limitations for the gust lock system at the time of this revision.
B. Additional Limitations:
The gust lock is only effective in protecting the flight controls in wind gusts
up to 60 knots.
CAUTION
OPERATING MANUAL