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Finals
Bill of Rights Cases
POLICE POWER

Southern Luzon Drug corp vs DSWD

FACTS:

The case at bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of
Appeals which dismissed the petition for prohibition filed by Southern Luzon Drug
Corporation (petitioner) against the Department of Social Welfare and Development , the
National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons (now National Council on Disability
Affairs or NCDA), the Department of Finance and the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(collectively, the respondents), which sought to prohibit the implementation of Section 4(a)
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9257, otherwise known as the "Expanded Senior Citizens Act of
2003" and Section 32 of R.A. No. 9442, which amends the "Magna Carta for Disabled
Persons," particularly the granting of 20% discount on the purchase of medicines by senior
citizens and persons with disability (PWD), respectively, and treating them as tax deduction.
which dismissed the petition for prohibition filed by Southern Luzon Drug Corporation
(petitioner) against the Department of Social Welfare and Development , the National
Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons (now National Council on Disability Affairs or
NCDA), the Department of Finance and the Bureau of: Internal Revenue (collectively, the
respondents), which sought to prohibit the implementation of Section 4(a) of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9257, otherwise known as the "Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003" and
Section 32 of R.A. No. 9442, which amends the "Magna Carta for Disabled Persons,"
particularly the granting of 20% discount on the purchase of medicines by senior citizens
and persons with disability (PWD),: respectively, and treating them as tax deduction due to
the reason that claiming it affects the profitability of their business.
The petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of drugstore operation in
the Philippines while the respondents are government' agencies, office and bureau tasked
to monitor compliance with R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442, promulgate implementing rules and
regulations for their effective implementation, as well as prosecute and revoke licenses of
erring establishments.

Issue:
WON the CA Seriously erred on a question of substance when it rules that the 20% sales
discount for senior citizens and pads is a valid exercise of police power

Held:
A tax deduction does not offer full reimbursement of the senior citizen discount. As such, it
would not meet the definition of just compensation.
Having said that, this raises the question of whether the State, in promoting the health and
welfare of a special group of citizens, can impose upon private establishments the burden of
partly subsidizing a government program.
The Court believes so. The Senior Citizens Act was enacted primarily to maximize the
contribution of senior citizens to nation-building, and to grant benefits and privileges to
them for their improvement and well-being as the State considers them an integral part of
our society. the law grants a twenty percent discount to senior citizens for medical and
dental services, and diagnostic and laboratory fees; admission fees charged by theaters,
concert halls, circuses, carnivals, and other similar places of culture, leisure and
amusement; fares for domestic land, air and sea travel; utilization of services in hotels and
similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers; and purchases of
medicines for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens. As a form of
reimbursement, the law provides that business establishments extending the twenty
percent discount to senior citizens may claim the discount as a tax deduction.
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The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent
domain, has general welfare for its object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition,
but has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to
meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response to
conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the greatest benefits. Accordingly, it has been
described as "the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it
does to all the great public needs." It is "[t]he power vested in the legislature by the
constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws,
statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution,
as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the
subjects of the same."
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property
rights must bow to the primacy of police power because proper rights, though sheltered by
due process, must yield to general welfare. The duty to care for the elderly and the disabled
lies not only upon the State, but also on the community and even private entities. As to the
State, the duty emanates from its role as parens patriae which holds it under obligation to
provide protection and look after the welfare of its people especially those who cannot tend
to themselves. Parens patriae means parent of his or her country, and refers to the State in
its role as "sovereign", or the State in its capacity as a provider of protection to those
unable to care for themselves. 33 In fulfilling this duty, the State may resort to the exercise
of its inherent powers: police power, eminent domain and power of taxation.
In Gerochi v. Department of Energy,34the Court passed upon one of the inherent powers of
the state, the police power, where it emphasized, thus:
[P]olice power is the power of the state to promote public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property. It is the most pervasive, the least limitable, and
the most demanding of the three fundamental powers of the State. The justification is found
in the Latin maxim salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme
law) and sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (so use your property as not to injure the
property of others). As an inherent attribute of sovereignty which virtually extends to all
public needs, police power grants a wide panoply of instruments through which the State, as
parens patriae, gives effect to a host of its regulatory powers. We have held that the power
to "regulate" means the power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control, with due
regard for the interests, first and foremost, of the public, then of the utility and of its
patrons. 35 (Citations omitted)
It is in the exercise of its police power that the Congress enacted R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442,
the laws mandating a 20% discount on purchases of medicines made by senior citizens and
PWDs. It is also in further exercise of this power that the legislature opted that the said
discount be claimed as tax deduction, rather than tax credit, by covered establishments.
The petitioner, however, claims that the change in the tax treatment of the discount is illegal
as it constitutes taking without just compensation. It even submitted financial statements
for the years 2006 and 2007 to support its claim of declining profits when the change in the
policy was implemented.
The Court is not swayed.
In the exercise of police power, "property rights of private individuals are subjected to
restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the
State."38 Even then, the State's claim of police power cannot be arbitrary or unreasonable.
After all, the overriding purpose of the exercise of the power is to promote general welfare,
public health and safety, among others. It is a measure, which by sheer necessity, the State
exercises, even to the point of interfering with personal liberties or property rights in order
to advance common good. To warrant such interference, two requisites must concur: (a) the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require
the interference of the! State; and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to
the: attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon
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individuals. In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence
of a lawful subject and a lawful method.39
The subjects of R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442, i.e., senior citizens and PWDs, are individuals
whose well-being is a recognized public duty. As a public duty, the responsibility for their
care devolves upon the concerted efforts of the State, the family and the community. In
Article XIII, Section 1 of the Constitution, the State is mandated to give highest priority to
the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human
dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by
equitably diffusing wealth and political power1 for the common good. The more apparent
manifestation of these social inequities is the unequal distribution or access to healthcare
services. To: abet in alleviating this concern, the State is committed to adopt an integrated!
and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make essential
goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost, with
priority for the needs of the underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children.
In the same manner, the family and the community have equally significant duties to
perform in reducing social inequality. The family as the basic social institution has the
foremost duty to care for its elderly members.41 On the other hand, the community, which
include the private sector, is recognized as an active partner of the State in pursuing greater
causes. The private sector, being recipients of the privilege to engage business in our land,
utilize our goods as well as the services of our people for proprietary purposes, it is only
fitting to expect their support in measures that contribute to common good. Moreover, their
right to own, establish and operate economic enterprises is always subject to the duty of the
State to promote distributive justice and to intervene when the common good so demands.
The Court also entertains no doubt on the legality of the method taken by the legislature to
implement the declared policies of the subject laws, that is, to impose discounts on the
medical services and purchases of senior citizens and PWDs and to treat the said discounts
as tax deduction rather than tax credit. The measure is fair and reasonable and no credible
proof was presented to prove the claim that it was confiscatory. To be considered
confiscatory, there must be taking of property without just compensation.

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS ) et al. vs.

HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of the City
of Manila
Facts
Ordinance No. 8027 enacted by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Manila reclassified
the area from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of
businesses disallowed to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six
months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated
in the area are the so-called “Pandacan Terminals” of the oil companies Caltex
(Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.
However, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a
memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil companies in which they agreed
that “the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and
practicable option.” In the MOU, the oil companies were required to remove 28
tanks starting with the LPG spheres and to commence work for the creation of
safety buffer and green zones surrounding the Pandacan Terminals. In exchange,
the City Mayor and the DOE will enable the oil companies to continuously operate
within the limited area resulting from joint operations and the scale down program.
The Sangguniang Panlungosod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97.
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Petitioners pray for a mandamus to be issued against Mayor Atienza to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 and order the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil
companies.
Issue
Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027
and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals.
Held:
The Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to
"enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city.">20 One of
these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to
enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian
or annulled by the courts.21 He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do
so. In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr., we stated the reason for this:
These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged
invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might
seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be
permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances
imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared
unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are
creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.
The question now is whether the MOU entered into by respondent with the oil
companies and the subsequent resolutions passed by the Sanggunian have made
the respondent’s duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 doubtful, unclear or uncertain.
This is also connected to the second issue raised by petitioners, that is, whether the
MOU and Resolution Nos. 97, s. 2002 and 13, s. 2003 of the Sanggunian can
amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027.
We need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the terms of the MOU were
inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and made it
binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until April
30, 2003. Thus, at present, there is nothing that legally hinders respondent from
enforcing Ordinance No. 8027.
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the Philippines, along with the rest of
the world, witnessed the horror of the September 11, 2001 attack on the Twin
Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. The objective of the ordinance is
to protect the residents of Manila from the catastrophic devastation that will surely
occur in case of a terrorist attack25 on the Pandacan Terminals. No reason exists
why such a protective measure should be delayed.
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Carlos Superdrug Corp vs DSWD

Facts:
FACTS:
Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating drugstores in the
Philippines.
Public respondents, on the other hand, include the DSWD, DOH, DOF, DOJ, and the
DILG, specifically tasked to monitor the drugstores’ compliance with the law;
promulgate the implementing rules and regulations for the effective implementation
of the law; and prosecute and revoke the licenses of erring drugstore
establishments.
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9257 otherwise known
as the “Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003.”
Sec. 4(a) of the Act states that The senior citizens shall be entitled to the following:
(a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to
the utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants
and recreation centers, and purchase of medicines in all establishments for the
exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens, including funeral and burial services
for the death of senior citizens;
Petitioners assert that Section 4(a) of the law is unconstitutional because it
constitutes deprivation of private property. Compelling drugstore owners and
establishments to grant the discount will result in a loss of profit and capital
because according to them drugstores impose a mark-up of only 5% to 10% on
branded medicines, and the law failed to provide a scheme whereby drugstores will
be justly compensated for the discount.
ISSUE:
WON RA 9257 is constitutional.
HELD:
YES. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of
eminent domain, has general welfare for its object. Police power is not capable of
an exact definition, but has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore
its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an
efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the
greatest benefits. Accordingly, it has been described as the most essential, insistent
and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs.
It is [t]he power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances,
either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall
judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of
the same.
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature,
property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights,
though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare.
Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted
considerably if on the mere plea of petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings
and capital, the questioned provision is invalidated. Moreover, in the absence of
evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect of the provision in question,
there is no basis for its nullification in view of the presumption of validity which
every law has in its favor.
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Given these, it is incorrect for petitioners to insist that the grant of the senior
citizen discount is unduly oppressive to their business, because petitioners have not
taken time to calculate correctly and come up with a financial report, so that they
have not been able to show properly whether or not the tax deduction scheme
really works greatly to their disadvantage.
In treating the discount as a tax deduction, petitioners insist that they will incur
losses. However,petitioner’s computation is clearly flawed.
For purposes of reimbursement, the law states that the cost of the discount shall be
deducted from gross income, the amount of income derived from all sources before
deducting allowable expenses, which will result in net income. Here, petitioners
tried to show a loss on a per transaction basis, which should not be the case. An
income statement, showing an accounting of petitioners sales, expenses, and net
profit (or loss) for a given period could have accurately reflected the effect of the
discount on their income. Absent any financial statement, petitioners cannot
substantiate their claim that they will be operating at a loss should they give the
discount. In addition, the computation was erroneously based on the assumption
that their customers consisted wholly of senior citizens. Lastly, the 32% tax rate is
to be imposed on income, not on the amount of the discount.
While the Constitution protects property rights, petitioners must accept the realities
of business and the State, in the exercise of police power, can intervene in the
operations of a business which may result in an impairment of property rights in the
process.

Manila Memorial Park vs DSWD

Facts:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 4 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7432,3
as amended by RA 9257,4 and the implementing rules and regulations issued by the
DSWD and DOF insofar as these allow business establishments to claim the 20%
discount given to senior citizens as a tax deduction.
Issue:
WON sec 4 of RA 9257 and its IRR, insofar as they provide that the 20% discount
to senior citizens may be claimed as a tax deduction by the private establishments,
are invalid and unconstitutional

Held:
(Same as Carlos super drug corp)
Police power versus eminent domain.
Police power is the inherent power of the State to regulate or to restrain the use of
liberty and property for public welfare.
The only limitation is that the restriction imposed should be reasonable, not
oppressive.
In other words, to be a valid exercise of police power, it must have a lawful subject
or objective and a lawful method of accomplishing the goal.60
Under the police power of the State, "property rights of individuals may be
subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the
government."
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The State "may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and
occupations to promote the general welfare [as long as] the interference [is]
reasonable and not arbitrary."
Eminent domain, on the other hand, is the inherent power of the State to take or
appropriate private property for public use.
The Constitution, however, requires that private property shall not be taken without
due process of law and the payment of just compensation.64
Traditional distinctions exist between police power and eminent domain. In the
exercise of police power, a property right is impaired by regulation,65 or the use of
property is merely prohibited, regulated or restricted66 to promote public welfare. In
such cases, there is no compensable taking, hence, payment of just compensation
is not required. Examples of these regulations are property condemned for being
noxious or intended for noxious purposes (e.g., a building on the verge of collapse
to be demolished for public safety, or obscene materials to be destroyed in the
interest of public morals) as well as zoning ordinances prohibiting the use of
property for purposes injurious to the health, morals or safety of the community
(e.g., dividing a city’s territory into residential and industrial areas).
It has, thus, been observed that, in the exercise of police power (as distinguished
from eminent domain), although the regulation affects the right of ownership, none
of the bundle of rights which constitute ownership is appropriated for use by or for
the benefit of the public.
On the other hand, in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, property
interests are appropriated and applied to some public purpose which necessitates
the payment of just compensation therefor. Normally, the title to and possession of
the property are transferred to the expropriating authority. Examples include the
acquisition of lands for the construction of public highways as well as agricultural
lands acquired by the government under the agrarian reform law for redistribution
to qualified farmer beneficiaries. However, it is a settled rule that the acquisition of
title or total destruction of the property is not essential for "taking" under the power
of eminent domain to be present.
Examples of these include establishment of easements such as where the land
owner is perpetually deprived of his proprietary rights because of the hazards posed
by electric transmission lines constructed above his property71 or the compelled
interconnection of the telephone system between the government and a private
company.72
In these cases, although the private property owner is not divested of ownership or
possession, payment of just compensation is warranted because of the burden
placed on the property for the use or benefit of the public.
The 20% senior citizen discount is an exercise of police power.
It may not always be easy to determine whether a challenged governmental act is
an exercise of police power or eminent domain. The very nature of police power as
elastic and responsive to various social conditions73 as well as the evolving meaning
and scope of public use74 and just compensation75 in eminent domain evinces that
these are not static concepts. Because of the exigencies of rapidly changing times,
Congress may be compelled to adopt or experiment with different measures to
promote the general welfare which may not fall squarely within the traditionally
recognized categories of police power and eminent domain. The judicious approach,
therefore, is to look at the nature and effects of the challenged governmental act
and decide, on the basis thereof, whether the act is the exercise of police power or
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eminent domain. Thus, we now look at the nature and effects of the 20% discount
to determine if it constitutes an exercise of police power or eminent domain. The
20% discount is intended to improve the welfare of senior citizens who, at their
age, are less likely to be gainfully employed, more prone to illnesses and other
disabilities, and, thus, in need of subsidy in purchasing basic commodities. It may
not be amiss to mention also that the discount serves to honor senior citizens who
presumably spent the productive years of their lives on contributing to the
development and progress of the nation. This distinct cultural Filipino practice of
honoring the elderly is an integral part of this law. As to its nature and effects, the
20% discount is a regulation affecting the ability of private establishments to price
their products and services relative to a special class of individuals, senior citizens,
for which the Constitution affords preferential concern.76
In turn, this affects the amount of profits or income/gross sales that a private
establishment can derive from senior citizens. In other words, the subject
regulation affects the pricing, and, hence, the profitability of a private
establishment. However, it does not purport to appropriate or burden specific
properties, used in the operation or conduct of the business of private
establishments, for the use or benefit of the public, or senior citizens for that
matter, but merely regulates the pricing of goods and services relative to, and the
amount of profits or income/gross sales that such private establishments may
derive from, senior citizens. The subject regulation may be said to be similar to, but
with substantial distinctions from, price control or rate of return on investment
control laws which are traditionally regarded as police power measures.77
These laws generally regulate public utilities or industries/enterprises imbued with
public interest in order to protect consumers from exorbitant or unreasonable
pricing as well as temper corporate greed by controlling the rate of return on
investment of these corporations considering that they have a monopoly over the
goods or services that they provide to the general public. The subject regulation
differs therefrom in that (1) the discount does not prevent the establishments from
adjusting the level of prices of their goods and services, and (2) the discount does
not apply to all customers of a given establishment but only to the class of senior
citizens. Nonetheless, to the degree material to the resolution of this case, the 20%
discount may be properly viewed as belonging to the category of price regulatory
measures which affect the profitability of establishments subjected thereto. On its
face, therefore, the subject regulation is a police power measure. The obiter in
Central Luzon Drug Corporation,78 however, describes the 20% discount as an
exercise of the power of eminent domain and the tax credit, under the previous law,
equivalent to the amount of discount given as the just compensation therefor. The
reason is that (1) the discount would have formed part of the gross sales of the
establishment were it not for the law prescribing the 20% discount, and (2) the
permanent reduction in total revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding to the
taking of private property for public use or benefit. The flaw in this reasoning is in
its premise. It presupposes that the subject regulation, which impacts the pricing
and, hence, the profitability of a private establishment, automatically amounts to a
deprivation of property without due process of law. If this were so, then all price
and rate of return on investment control laws would have to be invalidated because
they impact, at some level, the regulated establishment’s profits or income/gross
sales, yet there is no provision for payment of just compensation. It would also
mean that government cannot set price or rate of return on investment limits,
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which reduce the profits or income/gross sales of private establishments, if no just
compensation is paid even if the measure is not confiscatory. The obiter is, thus, at
odds with the settled octrine that the State can employ police power measures to
regulate the pricing of goods and services, and, hence, the profitability of business
establishments in order to pursue legitimate State objectives for the common good,
provided that the regulation does not go too far as to amount to "taking."79
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,80 we recognized that— x x x a taking also could be
found if government regulation of the use of property went "too far." When
regulation reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an
exercise of eminent domain and compensation to support the act. While property
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized
as a taking. No formula or rule can be devised to answer the questions of what is
too far and when regulation becomes a taking. In Mahon, Justice Holmes
recognized that it was "a question of degree and therefore cannot be disposed of by
general propositions." On many other occasions as well, the U.S. Supreme Court
has said that the issue of when regulation constitutes a taking is a matter of
considering the facts in each case. The Court asks whether justice and fairness
require that the economic loss caused by public action must be compensated by the
government and thus borne by the public as a whole, or whether the loss should
remain concentrated on those few persons subject to the public action.81
The impact or effect of a regulation, such as the one under consideration, must,
thus, be determined on a case-to-case basis. Whether that line between permissible
regulation under police power and "taking" under eminent domain has been crossed
must, under the specific circumstances of this case, be subject to proof and the one
assailing the constitutionality of the regulation carries the heavy burden of proving
that the measure is unreasonable, oppressive or confiscatory. The time-honored
rule is that the burden of proving the unconstitutionality of a law rests upon the one
assailing it and "the burden becomes heavier when police power is at issue."82
The 20% senior citizen discount has not been shown to be unreasonable,
oppressive or confiscatory.

Drugstore Association of the Phil vs National Council on

Disability Affairs
Facts:
On March 24, 1992, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7277, entitled "An Act Providing for the
Rehabilitation, Self-Development and Self-Reliance of Disabled Persons and their
Integration into the Mainstream of Society and for Other Purposes," otherwise
known as the "Magna Carta for Disabled Persons," was passed into law. On April 30,
2007, Republic Act No. 94427 was enacted amending R.A. No. 7277. The Title of
R.A. No. 7277 was amended to read as "Magna Carta for Persons with Disability"
and all references on the law to "disabled persons" were amended to read as
"persons with disability" (PWD).8 Specifically, R.A. No. 9442 granted the PWDs a
twenty (20) percent discount on the purchase of medicine, and a tax deduction
scheme was adopted wherein covered establishments may deduct the discount
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granted from gross income based on the net cost of goods sold or services
rendered.On July 28, 2009, petitioners filed a Petition for Prohibition with
application for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction21 before the Court of Appeals to annul and enjoin the implementation of
the following laws:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

1) Section 32 of R.A. No. 7277 as amended by R.A. No. 9442;

2) Section 6, Rule IV of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9442;

3) NCDA A.O. No. 1;

4) DOF Revenue Regulation No. 1-2009;

5) DOH A.O. No. 2009-0011.

On July 26, 2010, the CA rendered a Decision upholding the constitutionality of R.A.
7277 as amended, as well as the assailed administrative issuances. However, the
CA suspended the effectivity of NCDA A.O. No. 1 pending proof of respondent
NCDA's compliance with filing of said administrative order with the Office of the
National Administrative Register (ONAR) and its publication in a newspaper of
general circulation.

Issue:
WON the mandated PWD discount is a valid exercise of police power

Held:
Police power is the power of the state to promote public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property. On the other hand, the power of eminent
domain is the inherent right of the state (and of those entities to which the power
has been lawfully delegated) to condemn private property to public use upon
payment of just compensation. In the exercise of police power, property rights of
private individuals are subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the
general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state.30 A legislative act based on the
police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. In
more familiar words, (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, should justify the interference of the state; and (b) the
means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. R.A. No. 7277 was enacted primarily to
anroblw

provide full support to the improvement of the total well-being of PWDs and their
integration into the mainstream of society. R.A. No. 9442 which amended R.A. No.
7277 grants incentives and benefits including a twenty percent (20%) discount to
PWDs in the purchase of medicines; fares for domestic air, sea and land travels
including public railways and skyways; recreation and amusement centers including
theaters, food chains and restaurants.the PWD mandatory discount on the purchase
of medicine is supported by a valid objective or purpose as aforementioned. It has a
valid subject considering that the concept of public use is no longer confined to the
traditional notion of use by the public, but held synonymous with public interest,
public benefit, public welfare, and public convenience. As in the case of senior
citizens,37 the discount privilege to which the PWDs are entitled is actually a benefit
enjoyed by the general public to which these citizens belong. The means employed
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in invoking the active participation of the private sector, in order to achieve the
purpose or objective of the law, is reasonably and directly related.38 Also, the
means employed to provide a fair, just and quality health care to PWDs are
reasonably related to its accomplishment, and are not oppressive, considering that
as a form of reimbursement, the discount extended to PWDs in the purchase of
medicine can be claimed by the establishments as allowable tax deductions
pursuant to Section 32 of R.A. No. 9442 as implemented in Section 4 of DOF
Revenue Regulations No. 1-2009. Otherwise stated, the discount reduces taxable
income upon which the tax liability of the establishments is computed.

Meralco vs Sps. Ramos

Facts:
MERALCO entered into a contract of service with the respondents agreeing to
supply the latter with electric power in their residence. On November 5, 1999,
MERALCO's service inspector inspected the respondents' electrical facilities and
found an outside connection attached to their electric meter. The service inspector
traced the connection, an illegal one, to the residence and appliances of Nieves.
Nieves was the only one present during the inspection and she was the one who
signed the Metering Facilities Inspection Report. Due to the discovery of the illegal
connection, the service inspector disconnected the respondents' electric services on
the same day. The inspection and disconnection were done without the knowledge
of the respondents as they were not at home and their house was closed at the
time. The respondents denied that they had been, using an illegal electrical
connection and they requested MERALCO to immediately reconnect their electric
services. Despite the respondents' request, MERALCO instead demanded from them
the payment of P179,231.70 as differential billing.
On December 20, 1999, the respondents filed a complaint for breach of contract
with preliminary mandatory injunction and damages against MERALCO before
the RTC, Branch 40, City of Manila. n a decision dated August 22, 2006, the RTC
ordered MERALCO to reconnect the respondents' electric service and awarded
damages

Issue:
whether MERALCO had the right to immediately disconnect the electric service of
the respondents upon discovery of an outside connection attached to their electric
meter.

Held:
The distribution of electricity is a basic necessity that is imbued with public interest.
Its provider is considered as a public utility subject to the strict regulation by the
State in the exercise of its police power. Failure to comply with these
regulations gives rise to the presumption of bad faith or abuse of right.9 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Nevertheless, the State also recognizes that electricity is the property of the service
provider. R.A. 7832 was enacted by Congress to afford electric service providers
multiple remedies to. protect themselves from electricity pilferage. These remedies
include the immediate disconnection of the electric service of an erring
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customer, criminal prosecution, and the imposition of surcharges.10 However, the
service provider must avail of any or all of these remedies within legal bounds, in
strict compliance with the requirements and/or conditions set forth by law.

Section 4(a) of R.A. 7832 provides that the discovery of an outside connection
attached on the electric meter shall constitute as prima facie evidence of illegal use
of electricity by the person who benefits from the illegal use if the discovery is
personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or a duly
authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB). With the
presence of such prima facie evidence, the electric service provider is within its
rights to immediately disconnect the electric service of the consumer after due
notice.

This Court has repeatedly stressed the significance of the presence of an authorized
government representative during an inspection of electric facilities. Additionally,
Section 6 of R.A. 7832 affords a private electric utility the right and authority to
immediately disconnect the electric service of a consumer who has been caught in
flagrante delicto doing any of the acts covered by Section 4(a). However, the law
clearly states that the disconnection may only be done after serving a written notice
or warning to the consumer.

To reiterate, R.A. 7832 has two requisites for an electric service provider to be
authorized to disconnect its customer's electric service on the basis of alleged
electricity pilferage: first, an officer of the law or an authorized ERB representative
must be present during the inspection of the electric facilities; and second, even if
there is prima facie evidence of illegal use of electricity and the customer is caught
in flagrante delicto committing the acts under Section 4(a), the customer must still
be given due notice prior to the disconnection.

MMDA vs Viron
Facts:
GMA declared Executive Order (E.O.) No. 179 operational, thereby creating the
MMDA in 2003. Due to traffic congestion, the MMDA recommended a plan to
“decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located along major Metro
Manila thoroughfares and providing more and convenient access to the mass
transport system.” The MMC gave a go signal for the project. Viron Transit, a bus
company assailed the move. They alleged that the MMDA didn’t have the power to
direct operators to abandon their terminals. In doing so they asked the court to
interpret the extent and scope of MMDA’s power under RA 7924. They also asked if
the MMDA law contravened the Public Service Act.
Another bus operator, Mencorp, prayed for a TRO for the implementation in a trial
court. In the Pre-Trial Order17 issued by the trial court, the issues were narrowed
down to whether 1) the MMDA’s power to regulate traffic in Metro Manila included
the power to direct provincial bus operators to abandon and close their duly
established and existing bus terminals in order to conduct business in a common
terminal; (2) the E.O. is consistent with the Public Service Act and the Constitution;
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and (3) provincial bus operators would be deprived of their real properties without
due process of law should they be required to use the common bus terminals. The
trial court sustained the constitutionality.
Both bus lines filed for a MFR in the trial court. It, on September 8, 2005, reversed
its Decision, this time holding that the E.O. was "an unreasonable exercise of police
power"; that the authority of the MMDA under Section (5)(e) of R.A. No. 7924 does
not include the power to order the closure of Viron’s and Mencorp’s existing bus
terminals; and that the E.O. is inconsistent with the provisions of the Public Service
Act.
MMDA filed a petition in the Supreme Court. Petitioners contend that there is no
justiciable controversy in the cases for declaratory relief as nothing in the body of
the E.O. mentions or orders the closure and elimination of bus terminals along the
major thoroughfares of Metro Manila. To them, Viron and Mencorp failed to produce
any letter or communication from the Executive Department apprising them of an
immediate plan to close down their bus terminals.
And petitioners maintain that the E.O. is only an administrative directive to
government agencies to coordinate with the MMDA and to make available for use
government property along EDSA and South Expressway corridors. They add that
the only relation created by the E.O. is that between the Chief Executive and the
implementing officials, but not between third persons.
Issue:
Whether or not E.O, 179 is constitutional.
Held
By designating the MMDA as implementing agency of the “Greater Manila Transport
System,” the President clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by
law, rendering E.O. 179 ultra vires. Executive Order 125, invoked by the MMDA,
was issued by former President Aquino in her exercise of legislative powers. This
executive order reorganized the Ministry (now Department) of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC), and defined its powers and functions. It mandated the
DOTC to be the primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating, implementing,
regulating and administrative entity to promote, develop and regulate networks of
transportation and communications. The grant of authority to the DOTC includes the
power to establish and administer comprehensive and integrated programs for
transportation and communications. Accordingly, it is the DOTC Secretary who is
authorized to issue such orders, rules, regulations and other issuances as may be
necessary to ensure the effective implementation of the law. The President may
also exercise the same power and authority to order the implementation of the
mass transport system project, which admittedly is one for transportation. Such
authority springs from the President‘s power of control over all executive
departments as well as for the faithful execution of the laws under the
Constitution. Thus, the President, although authorized to establish or cause the
implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority through the
instrumentality of the DOTC, which, by law, is the primary implementing and
administrative entity in the promotion, development and regulation of networks of
transportation. It is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish
and implement a project such as the mass transport system. By designating the
MMDA as implementing agency of the Project, the President clearly overstepped the
limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. 179 ultra vires. In the
absence of a specific grant of authority to it under R.A. 7924, MMDA cannot issue
14 POLITICAL LAW
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order for the closure of existing bus terminals Republic Act (R.A.) 7924 authorizes
the MMDA to perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the
process exercises regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-
wide services, including transport and traffic management. While traffic
decongestion has been recognized as a valid ground in the exercise of police power,
MMDA is not granted police power, let alone legislative power. Unlike the legislative
bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in R.A. 7924 that
empowers the MMDA or the Metro Manila Council to enact ordinances, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro
Manila. In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA
is devoid of authority to implement the Greater Manila Transport System as
envisioned by E.O. 179; hence, it could not have been validly designated by the
President to undertake the project. It follows that the MMDA cannot validly order
the elimination of respondents‘ terminals. Even assuming arguendo that police
power was delegated to the MMDA, its exercise of such power does not satisfy the
two sets of a valid police power measure: (1) the interest of the public generally, as
distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its exercise; and (2) the
means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In various cases, the Court has
recognized that traffic congestion is a public, not merely a private concern. Indeed,
the E.O. was issued due to the felt need to address the worsening traffic congestion
in Metro Manila which, the MMDA so determined, is caused by the increasing
volume of buses plying the major thoroughfares and the inefficient connectivity of
existing transport system. With the avowed objective of decongesting traffic in
Metro Manila the E.O. seeks to eliminate the bus terminals now located along major
Metro Manila thoroughfares and provide more convenient access to the mass
transport system to the commuting public through the provision of mass transport
terminal facilities. Common carriers with terminals along the major thoroughfares
of Metro Manila would thus be compelled to close down their existing bus terminals
and use the MMDA-designated common parking areas. The Court fails to see how
the prohibition against respondents‘ terminals can be considered a reasonable
necessity to ease traffic congestion in the metropolis. On the contrary, the
elimination of respondents‘ bus terminals brings forth the distinct possibility and the
equally harrowing reality of traffic congestion in the common parking areas, a case
of transference from one site to another. Moreover, an order for the closure of bus
terminals is not in line with the provisions of the Public Service Act. The
establishment, as well as the maintenance of vehicle parking areas or passenger
terminals, is generally considered a necessary service by provincial bus operators,
hence, the investments they have poured into the acquisition or lease of suitable
terminal sites.
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Due Process
Substantive due process
Tanada vs Tuvera
Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due process in demanding the
disclosure of a number of Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been
published as required by Law. The government argued that while publication was
necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise provided, as when the
decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon
approval. The court decided on April 24, 1985 in affirming the necessity for
publication of some of the decrees. The court ordered the respondents to publish in
the official gazette all unpublished Presidential Issuances which are of general force
and effect. The petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws
of general applicability and those which are not. The publication means complete
publication, and that publication must be made in the official gazette. In a comment
required by the solicitor general, he claimed first that the motion was a request for
an advisory opinion and therefore be dismissed. And on the clause “unless
otherwise provided” in Article 2 of the new civil code meant that the publication
required therein was not always imperative, that the publication when necessary,
did not have to be made in the official gazette.
Issue:
WON the publication of PDs is a requirement for the due process of clause
Held:
Yes. The clear object of sec 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 is to give the general
public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and
conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis
for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the
height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a
law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. The
publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for
fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the
people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other
presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons
such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the
assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public
nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of
law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs.
COMELEC 7:
“In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form
part of the law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law
demand that the Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate
and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people
may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.”

GMA vs MTRCB
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Facts:
MTRCB issued an order of suspension against petitioner for airing "Muro Ami: The
Making" without first securing a permit from it as provided in Section 7 of PD
1986.3
The penalty of suspension was based on Memorandum Circular 98-17 dated
December 15, 19984 which provided for the penalties for exhibiting a program
without a valid permit from the MTRCB.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the suspension order and, at the same time,
informed MTRCB that Channel 27 had complied with the suspension order by going
off the air since midnight of January 11, 2000. It also filed a letter-protest which
was merely "noted" by the MTRCB thereby, in effect, denying both the motion for
reconsideration and letter-protest.
Petitioner then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari which was dismissed in the
now assailed June 18, 2001 decision. The January 7, 2000 suspension order issued
by MTRCB was affirmed in toto.
Issue:
whether Memorandum Circular No. 98-17 was enforceable and binding on petitioner
Held:
Memorandum Circular 98-17, which was the basis of the suspension order, was not
binding on petitioner. The Administrative Code of 1987, particularly Section 3
thereof, expressly requires each agency to file with the Office of the National
Administrative Register (ONAR) of the University of the Philippines Law Center three
certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Administrative issuances which are not
published or filed with the ONAR are ineffective and may not be enforced.9
Memorandum Circular No. 98-17, which provides for the penalties for the first,
second and third offenses for exhibiting programs without valid permit to exhibit,
has not been registered with the ONAR as of January 27, 2000.10 Hence, the same
is yet to be effective.11 It is thus unenforceable since it has not been filed in the
ONAR.12 Consequently, petitioner was not bound by said circular and should not
have been meted the sanction provided thereunder.

Knights of Rizal vs DMCI Homes

Facts:
DMCI Project Developers, Inc. (DMCI-PDI) acquired a 7,716.60-square meter lot in
the City of
Manila, located near Taft Avenue, Ermita for the construction of Torre de Manila
condominium project. DMCI-PDI secured its Barangay Clearance, Zoning Permit and
Building Permit. The City Council of Manila issued Resolution No. 121 enjoining the
Office of the Building Official to temporarily suspend the Building Permit of DMCI-
PDI for the reason that it would dwarf and ruin the line of sight of the Rizal Shrine
from the frontal Roxas Boulevard vantage point. Manila City Legal Officer Renato G.
Dela Cruz stated that there is no legal justification for the temporary suspension of
the Building Permit since the construction lies outside the Luneta Park and that the
area of subject property has neither been officially declared as an anthropological
area or heritage zone. National Historical Commission of the Philippines (NHCP)
shares the same view as well.
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In a letter to Mayor Joseph Ejercito Estrada, DMCI-PIDI President Alfredo R. Austria
sought clarification on its Zoning Permit. He stated that since the City Planning and
Development Office (CPDO) granted its Zoning Permit, DMCI-PDI continued with the
application for the Building Permit. Manila Zoning Board of Adjustments and
Appeals (MZBAA) issued Zoning Board Resolution recommending the approval of
DMCI-PDI's application for variance. The MZBAA noted that the Torre de Manila
project exceeds the prescribed maximum Percentage of Land Occupancy (PLO) and
Floor Area Ratio (FAR) as stipulated in Article V, Section 17 of City Ordinance No.
8119.
Later, the Knights of Rizal (KOR), a "civic, patriotic, cultural, nonpartisan, non-
sectarian and non-profit organization" created under Republic Act No. 646, filed a
Petition for Injunction seeking a temporary restraining order before the Supreme
Court, and later a permanent injunction, against the construction of DMCIPDI's
Torre de Manila condominium project which the court treated as petition for
mandamus. KOR argued that the subject matter is one of transcendental
importance and paramount public interest involving the desecration of the Rizal
Monument. The KOR asserts that Torre de Manila will dwarf all surrounding
buildings within a radius of two kilometers and forever ruin the sightline of the Rizal
Monument in Luneta Park. They also claims that the Torre de Manila project violates
the NHCP’s Guidelines on Monuments Honoring National Heroes, Illustrious Filipinos
and Other Personages, which state that historic monuments should assert a visual
"dominance" over its surroundings, as well as the country's commitment under the
International Charter for the Conservation and Restoration of Monuments and
Sites, otherwise known as the Venice Charter. Lastly, the KOR claims that the DMCI-
PDI's construction is in violation of the City of Manila's zoning ordinance.
DMCI-PDI argues that the KOR's petition should be dismissed on the ground that
the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over the action following the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts as it has not shown that it suffered an actual or threatened
injury as a result of the alleged illegal conduct of the City of Manila and that KOR
has no legal right.
On the other hand the City of Manila also asserts that the issuance and revocation
of a Building Permit undoubtedly fall under the category of a discretionary act or
duty performed by the proper officer in light of his meticulous appraisal and
evaluation of the pertinent supporting documents of the application in accordance
with the rules laid out under the National Building Code and Presidential Decree No.
1096, while the remedy of mandamus is available only to compel the performance
of a ministerial duty. The City of Manila maintains that the construction of the Torre
de Manila did not violate any existing law, since the edifice is around 789 meters
away from the line of sight of the Rizal Monument.
ISSUE:
Can the Court issue a writ of mandamus against the officials of the City of Manila to
stop the
construction of DMCI-PDI's Torre de Manila project?
RULING:
NO. Mandamus does not lie against the City of Manila.
The stoppage of the construction of a building in one's own property would violate
substantive due process. The Rules on Civil Procedure are clear that mandamus
only issues when there is a clear legal duty imposed upon the office or the officer
18 POLITICAL LAW
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sought to be compelled to perform an act, and when the party seeking mandamus
has a clear legal right to the performance of such act.
In the present case, nowhere is it found in Ordinance No. 8119 or in any law,
ordinance, or rule for that matter, that the construction of a building outside the
Rizal Park is prohibited if the building is within the background sightline or view of
the Rizal Monument. Thus, there is no legal duty on the part of the City of Manila
"to consider," in the words of the Dissenting Opinion, "the standards set under
Ordinance No. 8119" in relation to the applications of DMCI-PDI for the Torre de
Manila since under the ordinance these standards can never be applied outside
the boundaries of Rizal Park. While the Rizal Park has been declared a National
Historical Site, the area where Torre de Manila is being built is a privately-owned
property that is "not pap: of the Rizal Park that has been declared as a National
Heritage Site in 1095," and the Torre de Manila area is in fact "well-beyond" the
Rizal Park, according to NHCP Chairperson Dr. Maria Serena I. Diokno. 62 Neither
has the area of the Torre de Manila been designated as a "heritage zone, a cultural
property, a historical landmark or even a national treasure.
The power of the Court in mandamus petitions does not extend to direct the
exercise of judgment or discretion. During the Oral Arguments, it was established
that the granting of a variance is neither uncommon nor irregular. Current practice
has made granting of a variance the rule rather than the exception. Without further
proof that the MZBAA acted whimsically, capriciously, or arbitrarily in issuing said
resolution, the Court must take the approval of the MZBAA, and subsequent
ratification by the City Council of Manila, as the duly authorized exercise of
discretion by the city officials. The Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of
said officials who are in a better position to consider and weigh the same in the
light of the authority specifically vested in them by law. It is not for this Court to
dictate upon the other branches bf the government how their discretion must be
exercised so long as these branches do not commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Mayor Fernando vs St. Scholastica

Facts:
Respondent SSC is the owner of four (4) parcels of land measuring a total of
56,306.80 square meters, located in Marikina Heights and covered by Transfer
Certificate Title (TCT) No. 91537. The property is enclosed by a tall concrete
perimeter fence built some thirty (30) years ago. Abutting the fence along the West
Drive are buildings, facilities, and other improvements.On September 30, 1994, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Marikina City enacted Ordinance No. 192,4 entitled
"Regulating the Construction of Fences and Walls in the Municipality of Marikina."
On April 2, 2000, the City Government of Marikina sent a letter to the respondents
ordering them to demolish and replace the fence of their Marikina property to make
it 80% see-thru, and, at the same time, to move it back about six (6) meters to
provide parking space for vehicles to park.9 On April 26, 2000, the respondents
requested for an extension of time to comply with the directive.10 In response, the
petitioners, through then City Mayor Bayani F. Fernando, insisted on the
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enforcement of the subject ordinance. Not in conformity, the respondents filed a
petition for prohibition with an application for a writ of preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order before the Regional Trial Court, Marikina.
The respondents argued that the petitioners were acting in excess of jurisdiction in
enforcing Ordinance No. 192, asserting that such contravenes Section 1, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution. The respondents asserted that the implementation of the
ordinance on their property would be tantamount to an appropriation of property
without due process of law; and that the petitioners could only appropriate a
portion of their property through eminent domain. They also pointed out that the
goal of the provisions to deter lawless elements and criminality did not exist as the
solid concrete walls of the school had served as sufficient protection for many
years.12
The petitioners, on the other hand, countered that the ordinance was a valid
exercise of police power, by virtue of which, they could restrain property rights for
the protection of public safety, health, morals, or the promotion of public
convenience and general prosperity.

Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING
THAT CITY ORDINANCE NO. 192, SERIES OF 1994 IS NOT A VALID EXERCISE OF
POLICE POWER;
Held:
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the
enactment of an ordinance and to free it from the imputation of constitutional
infirmity, two tests have been used by the Court – the rational relationship test and
the strict scrutiny test:
We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis of equal
protection challenges. Using the rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are
upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental interest. Under
intermediate review, governmental interest is extensively examined and the
availability of less restrictive measures is considered. Applying strict scrutiny, the
focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial, governmental
interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest.27
Even without going to a discussion of the strict scrutiny test, Ordinance No. 192,
series of 1994 must be struck down for not being reasonably necessary to
accomplish the City’s purpose. More importantly, it is oppressive of private rights.
Under the rational relationship test, an ordinance must pass the following requisites
as discussed in Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Atienza, Jr.:
As with the State, local governments may be considered as having properly
exercised their police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require its exercise and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In
short, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method.
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police power measure shall be
struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights and a violation of the due
process clause.
The petitioners cannot justify the setback by arguing that the ownership of the
property will continue to remain with the respondents. It is a settled rule that
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neither the acquisition of title nor the total destruction of value is essential to
taking. In fact, it is usually in cases where the title remains with the private owner
that inquiry should be made to determine whether the impairment of a property is
merely regulated or amounts to a compensable taking.32 The Court is of the view
that the implementation of the setback requirement would be tantamount to a
taking of a total of 3,762.36 square meters of the respondents’ private property for
public use without just compensation, in contravention to the Constitution.
Anent the objectives of prevention of concealment of unlawful acts and "un-
neighborliness," it is obvious that providing for a parking area has no logical
connection to, and is not reasonably necessary for, the accomplishment of these
goals.
Regarding the beautification purpose of the setback requirement, it has long been
settled that the State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest
owners of the beneficial use of their property solely to preserve or enhance the
aesthetic appearance of the community.33 The Court, thus, finds Section 5 to be
unreasonable and oppressive as it will substantially divest the respondents of the
beneficial use of their property solely for aesthetic purposes. Accordingly, Section 5
of Ordinance No. 192 is invalid.
The petitioners, however, argue that the invalidity of Section 5 was properly cured
by Zoning Ordinance No. 303,34 Series of 2000, which classified the respondents’
property to be within an institutional zone, under which a five-meter setback has
been required.
The petitioners are mistaken. Ordinance No. 303, Series of 2000, has no bearing to
the case at hand.

Mosqueda vs Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters

Facts:
Mayor Rodrigo Duterte approved the ordinance on February 9, 2007.3 The
ordinance took effect on March 23, 2007 after its publication in the newspaper
Mindanao Pioneer.4 Pursuant to Section 5 of the ordinance, the ban against aerial
spraying would be strictly enforced three months thereafter. The Pilipino Banana
Growers and Exporters Association, Inc. (PBGEA) and two of its members, namely:
Davao Fruits Corporation and Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation
(PBGEA, et al.), filed their petition in the RTC to challenge the constitutionality of
the ordinance, and to seek the issuance of provisional reliefs through a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction.5 They alleged that the
ordinance exemplified the unreasonable exercise of police power; violated the equal
protection clause; amounted to· the confiscation of property without due process of
law; and lacked publication pursuant to Section 5116 ofRepublic Act No. 7160. On
May 8, 2007, the residents living within and adjacent to the banana plantations in
Davao City led by Wilfredo Mosqueda,7 joined by other residents of Davao City,8
(Mosqueda, et al.) submitted their Motion for Leave to Intervene and Opposition to
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the Issuance of a Preliminary Injunction.9 The RTC granted their motion on June 4,
2007.
Issue:
WON there is unreasonable exercise of police power in enacting the ordinance
Held:
The petitioners' assertion of its authority to enact Ordinance No. 0309-07 is upheld.
To be considered as a valid police power measure, an ordinance must pass a two-
pronged test: the formal (i.e., whether the ordinance is enacted within the
corporate powers of the local government unit, and whether it is passed in
accordance with the procedure prescribed by law); and the substantive (i.e.,
involving inherent merit, like the conformity of the ordinance with the limitations
under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements offairness
and reason, and its consistency with public policy).100 · ·
The formalities in enacting an ordinance are laid down in Section 53101 and Section
54102 of The Local Government Code. These provisions require the ordinance to be
passed by the majority of the members of the sanggunian concerned, and to be
presented to the mayor for approval. With no issues regarding quorum during its
deliberation having been raised, and with its approval of by City Mayor Duterte not
being disputed, we see no reason to strike down Ordinance No. 0309-07 for non-
compliance with the formal requisites under the Local Go
The corporate powers of the local government unit confer the basic authority to
enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful
businesses and occupations in order to promote the general welfare.103 Such
legislative powers spring from the delegation thereof by Congress through either
the Local Government Code or a special law. The General Welfare Clause in Section
16 of the Local Government Code embodies the legislative grant that enables the
local government unit to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects
of its creation, and to promote and maintain local autonomy.104 Section 16 reads:
103
Sec. 16. General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall exercise the powers
expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers
necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and
those which are essential to the promotion of the general Within their
re.spective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support
among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health
and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and
support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological
capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice,
promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and
preserve the comfort and convenience oftheir inhabitants.
Section 16 comprehends two branches of delegated powers, namely: the general
legislative power and the police power proper. General legislative power refers to
the power delegated by Congress to the local legislative body, or the Sangguniang
Panlungsod in the case of Davao City,105 to enable the local legislative body to
enact ordinances and make regulations. This power is limited in that the enacted
ordinances must not be repugnant to law, and the power must be exercised to
effectuate and discharge the powers and duties legally conferred to the local
legislative body. The police power proper, on the other hand,. authorizes the local
government unit to enact ordinances necessary and proper for the health and
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safety, prosperity, morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the local
government unit and its constituents, and for the protection of their property.

In terms of the right of the citizens to health and to a balanced and healthful
ecology, the local government unit takes its cue from Section 15 and Section 16,
Article II of the 1987 Constitution. Following the provisions of the Local Government
Code and the Constitution, the acts of the local government unit designed to ensure
the health and lives of its constituents and to promote a balanced and healthful
ecology are well within the corporate powers vested in the local government unit.
Accordingly, the Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City is vested with the requisite
authority to enact an ordinance that seeks to protect the health and well-being of
its constituents.
With or without the ban against aerial spraying, the health and safety of plantation
workers are secured by existing state policies, rules and regulations implemented
by the FPA, among others, which the respondents are lawfully bound to comply
with. The respondents even manifested their strict compliance with these rules,
including those in the UN-FAO Guidelines on Good Practice for Aerial Application of
Pesticides (Rome 2001). We should note that the Rome 2001 guidelines require the
pesticide applicators to observe the standards provided therein the health
and safety of plantation workers. As such, there cannot be any imbalance between
the right to health of the residents vis-a-vis the workers even if a ban will be
imposed against aerial spraying and the consequent adoption of other modes
ofpesticide treatment.
Furthermore, the constitutional right to health and maintaining environmental
integrity are privileges that do not only advance the interests of a group of
individuals. The benefits of protecting human health and the environment transcend
geographical locations and even generations. This is the essence of Sections 15 and
16, Article II of the Constitution. In Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.107 we declared that the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology under Section 16 is an issue of
transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. It is under this
milieu that the questioned ordinance should be appreciated.
Advancing the interests of the residents who are vulnerable to the alleged health
risks due to their exposure to pesticide drift justifies the motivation behind the
enactment of the ordinance. The City of Davao has the authority to enact pieces of
legislation that will promote the general welfare, specifically the health of its
constituents. Such authority should not be construed, however, as· a valid license
for the City· of Davao to enact any ordinance it deems fit to discharge its mandate.
A thin but well-defined line separates authority to enact legislations from the
method of accomplishing the same.

Procedural Due Process

Nestle Philippines vs PuedanFACTS:

Facts:
On July 6, 2012, the respondents filed a complaint against the petitioner for illegal
dismissal and demanding for separation pay, nominal damages and attorney’s fees.
The respondents alleged that Ocho de Setiembre Inc. (ODSI) and Nestle Philippines
Inc. (NPI) hired them to sell various products of NPI in the assigned covered area.
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After sometime, the respondents demanded that they be considered regular
employees of NPI but they were directed to sign contracts of employment with
ODSI instead. However, the respondents refused to comply with such directives
resulting from their dismissal from their position. The contention of the respondents
is that ODSI is a labor-only contractor and, thus, they should be deemed regular
employees of NPI and there was no just or authorized cause for their dismissal. The
ODSI averred that it is a company engaged in the business of buying, selling,
distributing, and marketing of goods and commodities of every kind and it enters
into all kinds of contracts for the acquisition thereof. According to ODSI the
respondents were hired as its employees to execute the Distributorship Agreement
with the NPI. Unfortunately, the business relationship between the NPI and ODSI
turned sour and eventually NPI downsized its marketing and promotional support
from ODSI and termination of the Distributorship Agreement. Meanwhile, ODSI
argues with the respondents that they were not dismissed but merely on floating
status. However, the NPI did not file any position paper or appear in the scheduled
conferences.

The Labor Arbiter concluded that all the impleaded respondents therein (i.e.
including NPI) should be held liable for the payment of nominal damages plus
attorney’s fees.

The aggrieved respondents appealed to National Labor Relation Commission

(NLRC) and the NLRC reversed and set aside the Labor Arbiter ruling. The NLRC
ordered ODSI and NPI to pay each of the respondents and entitled to separation
pay and to nominal damages. The respondents moved for a partial reconsideration
arguing since it was ODSI that closed down operations and not the NPI, therefore
NPI should reinstate them. However, the NLRC denied the motion.

Moreover, the NPI was dissatisfied hence filed a petition for certiorari before
the Court of Appeals (CA) which the CA affirmed the NLRC ruling.
Issue:
WON NPI was accorded due process by the tribunals a quo
Held:
The observance of fairness in the conduct of any investigation is at the very heart
of procedural due process. The essence of due process is to be heard, and, as
applied to administrative proceedings, this means a fair and reasonable opportunity
to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due
process in its strict judicial sense, for in the former a formal or trial-type hearing is
not always necessary, and technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied.
Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations
require a trial-type proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of
the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In
administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity
for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the
minimum requirements of due process. The essence of due process is simply to
be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to
explain ones side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action
or ruling complained of.41 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
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In this case, NPI essentially claims that it was deprived of its right to due process
when it was not notified of the proceedings before the LA and did not receive copies
and issuances from the other parties and the LA, respectively.42 However, as
correctly pointed out by the CA, NPI was furnished via courier of a copy of the
amended complaint filed by the respondents against it as shown by LBC Receipt No.
125158910840.43 It is also apparent that NPI was also furnished with the
respondents' Position Paper, Reply, and Rejoinder.44 Verily, NPI was indeed accorded
due process, but as the LA mentioned, the former chose not to file any position
paper or appear in the scheduled conferences

Republic vs Sereno
FACTS:
From 1986 to 2006, Sereno served as a member of the faculty of the University of
the Philippines-College of Law. While being employed at the UP Law, or from
October 2003 to 2006, Sereno was concurrently employed as legal counsel of the
Republic in two international arbitrations known as the PIATCO cases, and a Deputy
Commissioner of the Commissioner on Human Rights.
The Human Resources Development Office of UP (UP HRDO) certified that there was
no record on Sereno’s file of any permission to engage in limited practice of
profession. Moreover, out of her 20 years of employment, only nine (9) Statement
of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) were on the records of UP HRDO. In a
manifestation, she attached a copy of a tenth SALN, which she supposedly sourced
from the “filing cabinets” or “drawers of UP”. The Ombudsman likewise had no
record of any SALN filed by Sereno. The JBC has certified to the existence of one
SALN. In sum, for 20 years of service, 11 SALNs were recovered.
On August 2010, Sereno was appointed as Associate Justice. On 2012, the position
of Chief Justice was declared vacant, and the JBC directed the applicants to submit
documents, among which are “all previous SALNs up to December 31, 2011” for
those in the government and “SALN as of December 31, 2011” for those from the
private sector. The JBC announcement further provided that “applicants with
incomplete or out-of-date documentary requirements will not be interviewed or
considered for nomination.” Sereno expressed in a letter to JBC that since she
resigned from UP Law on 2006 and became a private practitioner, she was treated
as coming from the private sector and only submitted three (3) SALNs or her SALNs
from the time she became an Associate Justice. Sereno likewise added that
“considering that most of her government records in the academe are more than 15
years old, it is reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve all of those files,” and
that the clearance issued by UP HRDO and CSC should be taken in her favor. There
was no record that the letter was deliberated upon. Despite this, on a report to the
JBC, Sereno was said to have “complete requirements.” On August 2012, Sereno
was appointed Chief Justice.
On August 2017, an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon against
Sereno, alleging that Sereno failed to make truthful declarations in her SALNs. The
House of Representatives proceeded to hear the case for determination of probable
cause, and it was said that Justice Peralta, the chairman of the JBC then, was not
made aware of the incomplete SALNs of Sereno. Other findings were made: such as
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pieces of jewelry amounting to P15,000, that were not declared on her 1990 SALN,
but was declared in prior years’ and subsequent years’ SALNs, failure of her
husband to sign one SALN, execution of the 1998 SALN only in 2003
On February 2018, Atty. Eligio Mallari wrote to the OSG, requesting that the latter,
in representation of the Republic, initiate a quo warranto proceeding against
Sereno. The OSG, invoking the Court’s original jurisdiction under Section 5(1),
Article VIII of the Constitution in relation to the special civil action under Rule 66,
the Republic, through the OSG filed the petition for the issuance of the
extraordinary writ of quo warranto to declare as void Sereno’s appointment as CJ of
the SC and to oust and altogether exclude Sereno therefrom. [yourlawyersays]
Capistrano, Sen. De Lima, Sen. Trillianes, et. al., intervened. Sereno then filed a
Motion for Inhibition against AJ Bersamin, Peralta, Jardeleza, Tijam, and Leonardo-
De Castro, imputing actual bias for having testified against her on the impeachment
hearing before the House of Representatives.
Issue:
Whether Sereno, who is an impeachable officer, can be the respondent in a quo
warranto proceeding, i.e., whether the only way to remove an impeachable officer
is impeachment.
Held:
Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed or
invalidly elected impeachable official may be removed from office.
The language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not foreclose a quo
warranto action against impeachable officers: “Section 2. The President, the Vice-
President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on
impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.” The
provision uses the permissive term “may” which denote discretion and cannot be
construed as having a mandatory effect, indicative of a mere possibility, an
opportunity, or an option. In American jurisprudence, it has been held that “the
express provision for removal by impeachment ought not to be taken as a tacit
prohibition of removal by other methods when there are other adequate reasons to
account for this express provision.”
The principle in case law is that during their incumbency, impeachable officers
cannot be criminally prosecuted for an offense that carries with it the penalty of
removal, and if they are required to be members of the Philippine Bar to qualify for
their positions, they cannot be charged with disbarment. The proscription does not
extend to actions assailing the public officer’s title or right to the office he or she
occupies. Even the PET Rules expressly provide for the remedy of either an election
protest or a petition for quo warranto to question the eligibility of the President and
the Vice-President, both of whom are impeachable officers.
Further, that the enumeration of “impeachable offenses” is made absolute, that is,
only those enumerated offenses are treated as grounds for impeachment, is not
equivalent to saying that the enumeration likewise purport to be a complete
statement of the causes of removal from office. If other causes of removal are
available, then other modes of ouster can likewise be availed. To subscribe to the
view that appointments or election of impeachable officers are outside judicial
review is to cleanse their appointments or election of any possible defect pertaining
to the Constitutionally-prescribed qualifications which cannot otherwise be raised in
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an impeachment proceeding. To hold otherwise is to allow an absurd situation
where the appointment of an impeachable officer cannot be questioned even when,
for instance, he or she has been determined to be of foreign nationality or, in offices
where Bar membership is a qualification, when he or she fraudulently represented
to be a member of the Bar.

Borlingan vs BDO
Facts:
In 1976, Eliseo Borlongan, Jr. and his wife Carmelita, acquired a real property
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title. In 2012, they went to the Registry of Deeds
of Pasig City to obtain a copy of the TCT in preparation for a prospective sale of the
subject property. To their surprise, the title contained an annotation that the
property covered thereby was the subject of an execution sale in a Civil Case
pending before Branch 134 of Makati RTC. Petitioner immediately procured a copy
of the records and found out that respondent Banco de Oro (BDO), formerly
Equitable PCI Bank, filed a complaint for sum of money against Tancho Corporation,
the principal debtor of loan obligations obtained from the bank. Likewise impleaded
were several persons, including Carmelita, who supposedly signed four (4) security
agreements totaling ₱13, 500,000 to guarantee the obligations of Tancho
Corporation.
On July 2, 2003, the Makati RTC issued an Order directing the service of summons
to all the defendants at the business address of Tancho Corporation and IT appears
that respondent BDO already foreclosed the said Fumakilla Compound as early as
August 21, 2000, following Tancho Corporation's failure to pay its obligation. BDO
already consolidated its ownership of the property on November 16, 2001. On July
31, 2003, the process server filed an Officer's Return stating that summons
remained unserved as the "defendants are no longer holding office at [Fumakilla
Compound]."

After the single attempt at personal service on Carmelita and her co-defendants,
BDO moved for leave to serve the summons by publication and the RTC granted the
motion. BDO filed an ex-parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Attachment
against the defendants, including Carmelita. During the hearing on the motion, BDO
submitted a copy of the title of the subject property. The Makati RTC thereafter
granted BDO's motion and a Writ of Attachment was issued against the defendants
effectively attaching the subject property on behalf of BDO.

On December 20, 2005, BDO filed an ex-parte motion praying, among others, that
the summons and the complaint be served against Carmelita at the subject
property. The Makati RTC granted the motion. On February 9, 2006, the Sheriff filed
a return stating that no actual personal service was made as Carmelita "is no longer
residing at the given address and the said address is for 'rent,' as per information
gathered from the security guard on duty." BDO filed a manifestation stating that it
had complied with the October 28, 2003 Order of the Makati RTC having caused the
publication of the alias summons and the complaint in People's Taliba on May 15,
2006. Thereafter, upon BDO's motion, the Makati RTC declared the defendants
including Carmelita, in default. BDO soon after proceeded to present its evidence
ex-parte. On November 29, 2007, the Makati RTC rendered a Decision holding the
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defendants liable to pay BDO ₱32,543,856.33 plus 12% interest per annum from
the time of the filing of the complaint until fully paid and attorney's fees.

Following the discovery of the sale of their property, Eliseo executed an affidavit of
adverse claim and filed a Complaint for Annulment of Surety Agreements, Notice of
Levy on Attachment, Auction Sale and Other Documents with the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City alleging in his Complaint that the subject property is a family
home that belongs to the conjugal partnership of gains he established with his wife.
He further averred that the alleged surety agreements upon which the attachment
of the property was anchored were signed by his wife without his consent and did
not redound to benefit their family. Thus, he prayed that the surety agreements and
all other documents and processes, including the ensuing attachment, levy and
execution sale, based thereon be nullified.

BDO filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, asserting that the Pasig RTC has no
jurisdiction to hear Eliseo's complaint and the complaint failed to state a cause of
action. The Pasig RTC dismissed the case citing lack of jurisdiction and held that it
could not pass upon matters already brought before the RTC Makati and, citing
Spouses Ching v.Court of Appeals, the husband of a judgment debtor is not a
stranger to a case who can file a separate and independent action to determine the
validity of the levy and sale of a property.

On a motion for reconsideration filed by Eliseo, the Pasig RTC reinstated the case
with qualification. Relying on Buado v. Court of Appeals, the Pasig RTC held that
since majority of Eliseo's causes of action were premised on a claim that the
obligation contracted by his wife has not redounded to their family, and, thus, the
levy on their property was illegal, his filing of a separate action is not an
encroachment on the jurisdiction of the Makati RTC, which ordered the attachment
and execution in the first place. The Pasig RTC clarified, however, that it cannot
annul the surety agreements supposedly signed by Carmelita since Eliseo was not a
party to those agreements and the validity and efficacy of these contracts had
already been decided by the Makati RTC. Both Eliseo and BDO referred the Pasig
RTC's Decision to the Court of Appeals (CA).

Eliseo moved for, but was denied, reconsideration by the appellate court. Hence, he
elevated the matter to the SC via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, docketed as G.R. No. 218540. The Court issued a Resolution
denying Eliseo's petition. Meanwhile, on an ex-parte omnibus motion filed by BDO,
the Makati RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of Possession and the issuance of a
new TCT covering the subject property in favor of the respondent bank. Arguing
that the Makati RTC had not acquired jurisdiction over her person as the service of
the summons and the other processes of the court was defective, Carmelita filed a
Petition for Annulment of Judgment (With Urgent Prayer for Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction) which was denied by the
appellate court. Aggrieved, Carmelita interposed a motion for the reconsideration of
the CA's November 12, 2014 Resolution but was again denied. Thus, on April 27,
2015, Carmelita filed a Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 217617 ascribing
to the appellate court the commission of serious reversible errors. Hence, Carmelita
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interposed a Motion for Reconsideration urging the Court to take a second hard look
at the facts of the case and reconsider its stance.

Considering that both cases originated from the same facts and involved
interrelated issues, on January 25, 2016, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No.
218540 with G.R. No. 217617.
Issue:
whether or not the CA erred in refusing to issue a TRO and/or WPI stopping the
consolidation of BDO's ownership over the subject property.

Held:
it is clear that a writ of preliminary injunction is warranted where there is a showing
that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is
to be directed violate an established right. Otherwise stated, for a court to decide
on the propriety of issuing a TRO and/or a WPI, it must only inquire into the
existence of two things: (1) a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected;
and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.

The appellate court's error is readily apparent given the stark existence of the
grounds for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

On the first ground, petitioner has a clear and unmistakable right that must be
protected. This right is not just her proprietary rights over the subject property but
her constitutionally protected right to due process before she can be deprived
of her property. No less than Section 1 of the Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution
mandates that: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process

of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws, (emphasis
supplied)
In its classic formulation, due process means that any person with interest to the
thing in litigation must be notified and given an opportunity to defend that
interest.8 Thus, as the essence of due process lies in the reasonable opportunity to
be heard and to submit any evidence the defendant may have in support of her
defense, she must be properly served the summons of the court. In other
words, the service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of due
process9 and compliance with the rules regarding the service of the summons is as
much an issue of due process as it is of jurisdiction.10 Unfortunately, as will be
discussed, it would seem that the Constitutional right of the petitioner to be
properly served the summons and be notified has been disregarded by the officers
of the trial court.

At this very juncture, the existence of the second ground for the issuance of a TRO
and/or WPI is self-evident. Without a TRO and/or WPI enjoining the respondent
bank from continuing in the possession and consolidating the ownership of the
subject property, petitioner's right to be afforded due process will unceasingly
be violated.

It need not be stressed that a continuous violation of constitutional rights is by

itself a grave and irreparable injury that this or any court cannot plausibly tolerate.
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Without a doubt, the appellate court should have acted intrepidly and issued the
TRO and/or WPI posthaste to protect the constitutional rights of petitioner, as it is
duty-bound to do.

Life, Liberty 9pursuit of happiness), property rights

Republic vs Cagandahan
Facts:
The respondent’s petition was granted by the RTC on January 12, 2005. The
following facts were presented by the respondent to the RTC:
(a) She was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as female in the
Certificate of Live birth.
(b) While growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics because of
CAH, which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and
female characteristics.
(c) Respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the
Department of Psychiatry, UP-PGH and the latter issued a medical certificate. Such
document testified respondent’s claim.
Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal of
the abovementioned ruling had been filed.
Issue:
The issue raised in this petition is:
(1) Whether or not the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the
birth certificate of respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on
the ground of her medical condition knows as CAH, and her name from “Jennifer” to
“Jeff”, under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.
Held:
(1) No. The trial court did not err in ordering the correction of entries in the birth
certificate of respondent. The court considered the unique circumstance in this
case where nature had taken its course.

“As for respondent's change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a
change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in
the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow. The trial
court's grant of respondent's change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change
of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that
respondent's change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit
in respondent's change of name. Such a change will conform with the change of the
entry in his birth certificate from female to male.”
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Judicial standards of review

PBM Employees org vs PBM
Facts:
Philippine Blooming Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass
demonstration in front of Malacañang to express their grievances against the
alleged abuses of the Pasig Police.

After learning about the planned mass demonstration, Philippine Blooming Mills
Inc., called for a meeting with the leaders of the PBMEO. During the meeting, the
planned demonstration was confirmed by the union. But it was stressed out that the
demonstration was not a strike against the company but was in fact an exercise of
the laborers' inalienable constitutional right to freedom of expression, freedom of
speech and freedom for petition for redress of grievances.

The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt the
normal course of their business which may result in the loss of revenue. This was
backed up with the threat of the possibility that the workers would lose their jobs if
they pushed through with the rally.

A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal that while
the workers may be allowed to participate, those from the 1st and regular shifts
should not absent themselves to participate, otherwise, they would be dismissed.
Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the rally took place and the officers of the
PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a violation of the ‘No Strike and No Lockout’
clause of their Collective Bargaining Agreement.

The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers of the PBMEO
were found guilty of bargaining in bad faith. Their motion for reconsideration was
subsequently denied by the Court of Industrial Relations for being filed two days
late.
Issue:Whether Civil and Political Rights is treated with the same weight as Property
Rights
Held: No, While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of
human rights over property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are
“delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society” and the
“threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual
application of sanctions,” they “need breathing space to survive,” permitting
government regulation only “with narrow specificity.” Property and property rights
can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If human rights
are extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt
to limit the power of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the
tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs —
political, economic or otherwise. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free
expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the
preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such priority
“gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions

White Light vs City of Manila

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Facts:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law Manila City
Ordinance No. 7774 entitled “An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission,
Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns,
Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of
Manila” (the Ordinance).” The ordinance sanctions any person or corporation who
will allow the admission and charging of room rates for less than 12 hours or the
renting of rooms more than twice a day.
The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC), and Sta.
Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC), who own and operate several
hotels and motels in Metro Manila, filed a motion to intervene and to admit
attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the ordinance will affect their
business interests as operators. The respondents, in turn, alleged that the
ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power.
RTC declared Ordinance No. 7774 null and void as it “strikes at the personal liberty
of the individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by the Constitution.” Reference
was made to the provisions of the Constitution encouraging private enterprises and
the incentive to needed investment, as well as the right to operate economic
enterprises. Finally, from the observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinance
sought to dissuade could nonetheless be consummated by simply paying for a 12-
hour stay,
When elevated to CA, the respondents asserted that the ordinance is a valid
exercise of police power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government
Code which confers on cities the power to regulate the establishment, operation
and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension
houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides
and transports. Also, they contended that under Art III Sec 18 of Revised Manila
Charter, they have the power to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and
proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity and the
promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience and general
welfare of the city and its inhabitants and to fix penalties for the violation of
ordinances.
Petitioners argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates
the right to privacy and freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police
power; and it is unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.
CA, in turn, reversed the decision of RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the
ordinance. First, it held that the ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the
freedom of movement, as it only penalizes the owners or operators of
establishments that admit individuals for short time stays. Second, the virtually
limitless reach of police power is only constrained by having a lawful object
obtained through a lawful method. The lawful objective of the ordinance is satisfied
since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a lawful method since the
establishments are still allowed to operate. Third, the adverse effect on the
establishments is justified by the well-being of its constituents in general.
Hence, the petitioners appeared before the SC.
Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power of the State.
Held:
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No. Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be considered as a valid exercise of police power,
and as such, it is unconstitutional.
The facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of Manila v Laguio
Jr ruling, but the 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations
Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila. The common thread that runs
through those decisions and the case at bar goes beyond the singularity of the
localities covered under the respective ordinances. All three ordinances were
enacted with a view of regulating public morals including particular illicit activity in
transient lodging establishments. This could be described as the middle case,
wherein there is no wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the services offered by
these establishments have been severely restricted. At its core, this is another case
about the extent to which the State can intrude into and regulate the lives of its
citizens
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including
City of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within
the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according to
the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive
requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must
not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not
prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public
policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and distinct business practices,
namely wash rate admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day. The
ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the police power as conferred on local
government units by the Local Government Code through such implements as the
general welfare clause.
Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its
corresponding right to protect itself and its people. Police power has been used as
justification for numerous and varied actions by the State.
The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the
covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals,
by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police
power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all
means for their achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution.
SC contended that if they were to take the myopic view that an ordinance should be
analyzed strictly as to its effect only on the petitioners at bar, then it would seem
that the only restraint imposed by the law that they were capacitated to act upon is
the injury to property sustained by the petitioners. Yet, they also recognized the
capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional rights of their patrons
– those persons who would be deprived of availing short time access or wash-up
rates to the lodging establishments in question. The rights at stake herein fell
within the same fundamental rights to liberty. Liberty as guaranteed by the
Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include “the right to exist and the
right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed
into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is
deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been
endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the
common welfare,
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Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right must be recognized and the
invasion of it should be justified by a compelling state interest. Jurisprudence
accorded recognition to the right to privacy independently of its identification with
liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. Governmental
powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.
An ordinance which prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a
product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional
requisite for the legitimacy of the ordinance as a police power measure. It must
appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means must be
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More
importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure
and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of
protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down
as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights.
The behavior which the ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and
could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive
measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through
active police work would be more effective in easing the situation. So would the
strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug
use. These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the
petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that the
ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate without
any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and
prostitutes can in fact collect “wash rates” from their clientele by charging their
customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments.
SC reiterated that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent
that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public
welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly intruding
into the lives of its citizens. However well¬-intentioned the ordinance may be, it is
in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments
as well as their patrons. The ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the
businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons
without sufficient justification. The ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting
out a room more than twice a day with immorality without accommodating
innocuous intentions.

Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators vs City Mayor

Facts:
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The petitioners filed a petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 for being
violative of the due process clause, contending that said ordinance is not only
arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also vague, indefinite and uncertain, and
likewise allege the invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self-
incrimination.

Ordinance No. 4760 has the following provisions:

1. Refraining from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer unless it fills out
a prescribed form in the lobby in open view;
2. prohibiting admission o less than 18 years old;
3. usurious increase of license fee to P4,500 and 6,000 o 150% and 200%
respectively (tax issue also);
4. making unlawful lease or rent more than twice every 24 hours; and
5. cancellation of license for subsequent violation.
The lower court ruled in favor of the petitioners. Hence, the appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not Ord 4760 is against the due process clause.
Held:
The mantle of protection associated with the due process guaranty does not cover
petitioners. This particular manifestation of a police power measure being
specifically aimed to safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation of
nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To
hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power
which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least
limitable of powers,4 extending as it does "to all the great public needs."5 It would
be, to paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state
if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to promote
public health, public morals, public safety and the genera welfare.6 Negatively put,
police power is "that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to
prohibit all that is hurt full to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.7
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to
minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note of the
Councilor Herminio Astorga included as annex to the stipulation of facts, speaks of
the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila
traceable in great part to the existence of motels, which "provide a necessary
atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal
haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers." The challenged ordinance then proposes to
check the clandestine harboring of transients and guests of these establishments by
requiring these transients and guests to fill up a registration form, prepared for the
purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by introducing several
other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the
registration of transients and guests." Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees
was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose
other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city
government." It would appear therefore that the stipulation of facts, far from
sustaining any attack against the validity of the ordinance, argues eloquently for it.
On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local, primarily
rest the exercise of the police power, which, it cannot be too often emphasized, is
the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good
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order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due
process, equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties however,
the exercise of such police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property
of any person is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police power may
be considered as either capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of
due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guaranty may call
for correction by the courts

City of Manila vs Judge Laguio

Facts:
The private respondent, Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTOC) is a
corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels, and lodgin
houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel
although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel.

March 30, 1993 - City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim approved an ordinance enacted which
prohibited certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where
women are used as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the
community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral
welfare of the community. The Ordinance also provided that in case of violation and
conviction, the premises of the erring establishment shall be closed and padlocked
permanently.

June 28, 1993 - MTOC filed a Petition with the lower court, praying that the
Ordinance, insofar as it included motels and inns as among its prohibited
establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional for several reasons but
mainly because it is not a valid exercise of police power and it constitutes a denial
of equal protection under the law.

Judge Laguio ruled for the petitioners. The case was elevated to the Supreme
Court.

ISSUES:

W/N the City of Manila validly exercised police power

W/N there was a denial of equal protection under the law

HELD:

The Ordinance infringes the due process clause since the requisites for a valid
exercise of police power are not met. The prohibition of the enumerated
establishments will not per se protect and promote the social and moral welfare of
the community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills fo prostitution,
adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual diseases in Manila. It is
baseless and insupportable to bring within that classification sauna parlors,
massage parlors, karaoke bars, night clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques,
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cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns. These are lawful pursuits which are not per
se offensive to the moral welfare of the community.

Sexual immorality, being a human frailty, may take place in the most innocent
places.... Every house, building, park, curb, street, or even vehicles for that matter
will not be exempt from the prohibition. Simply because there are no "pure" places
where there are impure men.

The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails to address the core issues of
morality. Try as the Ordinance may to shape morality, it should not foster the
illusion that it can make a moral man out of it because immorality is not a thing, a
building or establishment; it is in the hearts of men.

The Ordinance violates equal protection clause and is repugnant to general laws; it
is ultra vires. The Local Government Code merely empowers local government units
to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof.

All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights adn
impairs personal privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes
statutes; it is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently
detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And
not to be forgotten, the City Council unde the Code had no power to enact the
Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires null and void.

Equal protection
People vs Hernandez
Fact: That on or about March 15, 1945, and for some time before the said date
and continuously thereafter, until the present time, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, and the place which they had chosen as the nerve center of all their
rebellious activities in the different parts of the Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring, confederating and cooperating with each other, as well as with the
thirty-one (31) defendants charged in Criminal Cases of the Court of First Instance
of Manila (decided May 11, 1951) and also with others whose whereabouts and
identities are still unknown, the said accused and their other co-conspirators, being
then high ranking officers and/or members of, or otherwise affiliated with the
Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.), which is now actively engaged in an
armed rebellion against the Government of the Philippines thru act theretofore
committed and planned to be further committed in Manila and other places in the
Philippines. That during the period of time and under the same circumstances
herein-above indicated the said accused in the above-entitled case, conspiring
among themselves and with several others as aforesaid, willfully, unlawfully and
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feloniously organized, established, led and/or maintained the Congress of Labor
Organizations (CLO), formerly known as the Committee on Labor Organizations
(CLO), with central offices in Manila and chapters and affiliated or associated labor
unions and other “mass organizations” in different places in the Philippines, as an
active agency, organ, and instrumentality of the Communist Party of the Philippines
(P.K.P.) and as such agency, organ, and instrumentality, to fully cooperate in, and
synchronize its activities — as the CLO thus organized, established, led and/or
maintained by the herein accused and their co-conspirators, has in fact fully
cooperated in and synchronized its activities with the activities of the “Hukbong
Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan” (H.M.B.) and other organs, agencies, and instrumentalities
of the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.), to thereby assure, facilitate, and
effect the complete and permanent success of the above-mentioned armed
rebellion against the Government of the Philippines.

Held:
The role of the judicial department under the Constitution is, however, —
clear — to settle justiceable controversies by the application of the law. And
the latter must be enforced as it is — with all its flaws and defects, not
affecting its validity — not as the judges would have it. In other words, the
courts must apply the policy of the State as set forth in its laws, regardless of
the wisdom thereof.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.

and GMA NETWORK, INC., petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
respondent.
[G.R. No. 132922. April 21, 1998]

FACTS:

Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc.

(TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting
companies. They are suing as citizens, taxpayers and registered voters. It was
declared to be without legal standing to sue in this case as, among other reasons, it
was not able to show that it was to suffer from actual or threatened injury as a
result of the subject law. Other petitioner, GMA Network, Inc., appears to have the
requisite standing to bring this constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates radio
and television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the enforcement of
Sec. 92 of B.P Blg. 881 requiring radio and television broadcast companies to
provide free air time to the COMELEC for the use of candidates for campaign and
other political purposes. Petitioners challenge the validity of Sec. 92 on the ground
(1) that it takes property without due process of law and without just
compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal
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protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the
COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of communication or
information during the period of election. Petitioner claims that it suffered losses
running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in connection with the
1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to suffer
even more should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioners claim that the
primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time
to advertisers and to require these stations to provide free air time is to authorize
unjust taking of private property. According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost
P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time for one hour each day and, in this year’s
elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELEC’s requirement that it
provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for COMELEC Time.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast
companies the equal protection of the laws.
(2) Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property without
due process of law and without just compensation.

RULING:

Petitioner’s argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether radio or by

television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be
allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast that there are
frequencies to assign. Radio and television broadcasting companies, which are
given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they
transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary
privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of the privilege may reasonably be
burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service. In
granting the privilege to operate broadcast stations and supervising radio and
television stations, the state spends considerable public funds in licensing and
supervising them.
The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to
provide free air time as against newspapers and magazines which require payment
of just compensation for the print space they may provide is likewise without merit.
Regulation of the broadcast industry requires spending of public funds which it does
not do in the case of print media. To require the broadcast industry to provide free
air time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry gets.
As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private
property is taken by the requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC.
The use of property bears a social function and is subject to the state’s duty to
intervene for the common good. Broadcast media can find their just and highest
reward in the fact that whatever altruistic service they may render in connection
with the holding of elections is for that common good.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition is dismissed.
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Garcia vs Drilon
Facts:
FACTS:
Rosalie Jaype-Garcia filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor children for a
Temporary Protection Order against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia pursuant to R.A.
9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and
economic violence as a result of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner, with
threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support. The
husband now, assails the constitutionality of RA 9262 as being violative of the equal
protection clause.
ISSUE:
Whether there is a violation of equal protection clause.
HELD:
R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should
be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. R.A. 9262
is based on a valid classification as shall hereinafter be discussed and, as such, did
not violate the equal protection clause by favoring women over men as victims of
violence and abuse to whom the State extends its protection.
There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the husband
or father as the culprit. As defined above, VAWC may likewise be committed
“against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship.” Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word “person” who has or had
a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses even lesbian
relationships.
R.A. 9262 is based on a valid classification as such, did not violate the equal
protection clause by favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to
whom the State extends its protection. The unequal power relationship between
women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of
violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for
real differences justifying the classification under the law. As Justice McIntyre
succinctly states, “the accommodation of differences … is the essence of true
equality.”

Eminent Domain
Republic vs Vda De Castelvi
Facts:
In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), entered
into a lease agreement over a land in Pampanga with Castellvi on a year-to-year
basis. When Castellvi gave notice to terminate the lease in 1956, the AFP refused
because of the permanent installations and other facilities worth almost
P500,000.00 that were erected and already established on the property. She then
instituted an ejectment proceeding against the AFP. In 1959, however, the republic
commenced the expropriation proceedings for the land in question.
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Issue: Whether or not the compensation should be determined as of 1947 or 1959.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the taking should not be reckoned as of 1947, and
that just compensation should not be determined on the basis of the value of the
property that year .

The requisites for taking are:

1. The expropriator must enter a private property;
2. The entry must be for more than a momentary period;
3. It must be under warrant or color of authorities;
4. The property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally appropriated
or injuriously affected; and
5. The utilization of the property for public use must be such a way as to oust the
owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.

Only requisites 1, 3 and 4 are present. It is clear, therefore, that the “taking” of
Castellvi’s property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have
taken place in 1947 when the republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee
thereof.

Requisite number 2 is not present according to the Supreme Court, “momentary”

when applied to possession or occupancy of real property should be construed to
mean “a limited period” -- not indefinite or permanent. The aforecited lease
contract was for a period of one year, renewable from year to year. The entry on the
property, under the lease, is temporary, and considered transitory. The fact that the
Republic, through AFP, constructed some installations of a permanent nature does
not alter the fact that the entry into the lant was transitory, or intended to last a
year, although renewable from year to year by consent of the owner of the land. By
express provision of the lease agreement the republic, as lessee, undertook to
return the premises in substantially the same condition as at the time the property
was first occupied by the AFP. It is claimed that the intention of the lessee was to
occupy the land permanently, as may be inferred from the construction of
permanent improvements. But this “intention” cannot prevail over the clear and
express terms of the lease contract.

The 5th requirement is also lacking. In the instant case the entry of the Republic
into the property and its utilization of the same for public use did not oust Castellvi
and deprive her of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. Cstellvi remained as
owner, and was continuously recognized as owner by the Republic, as shown by the
renewal of the lease contract from year to year, and by the provision in the lease
contract whereby the Republic undertook to return the property to Castellvi when
the lease was terminated. Neither was Castellvi deprived of all the beneficial
enjoyment of the property, because the Republic was bound to pay, and had been
paing, Castellvi the agreed monthly rentals until the time when it filed the
complaint for eminent domain on June 26, 1959.
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It is clear, therefore, that the “taking” of Castellvi’s property for purposes of
eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the
Republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee thereof, and that the just
compensation to be paid for the Castellvi’s property should not be determined on
the basis of the value of the property as of that year. The lower court did not
commit an error when it held that the “taking” of the property under expropriation
commenced with the filing of the complaint in this case.

Under Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, “just compensation” is to be

determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. The Supreme Court has
ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with
the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to
the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.

Deprivation of Use
Republic vs Sps Llamas
FACTS:

On April 23, 1990, the Department of Public Works and Highways initiated an action
for expropriation for the widening of Dr. A. Santos Ave, which also known as Sucat
Road. This action was brought against 26 defendants, none of whom are
respondents in this case.

On November 2, 1993, the Commissioners appointed by the Regional Trial Court in

the expropriation case submitted a resolution recommending that just
compensation for the expropriated areas be set to P12, 000.00 per square meter.

Llamas spouses filed "Most Urgent and Respectful Motion for Leave to be Allowed
Intervention as Defendants-Intervenors-Oppositors" on January 27, 1994. They
also filed their Answer-in-Intervention on March 21, 1994. After which, on August
2, 1994, they filed a "Most Urgent Motion for the Issuance of an Order Directing the
Immediate Payment of 40% of Zonal Value of Expropriated Land and
Improvements."

After years of not obtaining a favorable ruling, the Llamas Spouses filed a "Motion
for Issuance of an Order to Pay and/or Writ of Execution dated May 14, 2002. In
this Motion, the Llamas Spouses faulted the Department of Public Works and
Highways for what was supposedly its deliberate failure to comply with the Regional
Trial Court's previous Orders and even with its own undertaking to facilitate the
payment of just compensation to the Llamas Spouses.

Department of Public Works and Highways and the Llamas Spouses had an
understanding that the resolution of the latter's claims required the submission of:
(1) certified true copies of the TCTs covering the lots; and (2) certified true copies
of the tax declarations, tax clearances, and tax receipts over the lots. But, due to
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their continued failure to comply with their undertaking, the Department of Public
Works and Highways did not pay them.

On October 8, 2007, the Regional Trial Court issued the Order directing the
payment to the Llamas Spouses of just compensation at P12,000.00 per square
meter for 41 square meters for the lot covered by TCT No. 217267. It denied
payment for areas covered by TCT No. 179165 and noted that these were
subdivision road lots, which the Llamas Spouses "no longer owned" and which
"belonged to the community for whom they were made." In the Order dated May
19, 2008, the Regional Trial Court denied the Llamas Spouses' Motion for
Reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether just compensation must be paid to respondents Francisco and Carmelita

Llamas for the subdivision road lots covered by TCT No. 179165.

HELD:

The Department of Public Works and Highways insists that the road lots are not
compensable since they have "already been withdrawn from the commerce of
man." It relies chiefly on this Court's 1991 Decision in White Plains Association, Inc.
v. Legaspi, which pertained to "the widening of the Katipunan Road in the White
Plains Subdivision in Quezon City.”More specifically, in the 1991 White Plains
Decision that shows a compulsion for subdivision owners to set aside open spaces
for public use, such as roads, and for which they need not be compensated by
Subdivision owners are mandated to set aside such open spaces before their
proposed subdivision plans may be approved by the government authorities, and
that such open spaces shall be devoted exclusively for the use of the general public
and the subdivision owner need not be compensated for the same. A subdivision
owner must comply with such requirement before the subdivision plan is approved
and the authority to sell is issued.

On the other hand, in its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals set aside the
Regional Trial Court's Orders and required the Department of Public Works and
Highways to similarly compensate the Llamas Spouses for the two (2) road lots at
P12, 000.00 per square meter.

The Court of Appeals correctly stated that a "positive act" must first be made by the
"owner-developer before the city or municipality can acquire dominion over the
subdivision roads." As there is no such thing as an automatic cession to
government of subdivision road lots, an actual transfer must first be effected by the
subdivision owner: "subdivision streets belonged to the owner until donated to the
government or until expropriated upon payment of just compensation." Stated
otherwise, "the local government should first acquire them by donation, purchase,
or expropriation, if they are to be utilized as a public road."
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Delineated roads and streets, whether part of a subdivision or segregated for public
use, remain private and will remain as such until conveyed to the government by
donation or through expropriation proceedings. An owner may not be forced to
donate his or her property even if it has been delineated as road lots because that
would partake of an illegal taking. He or she may even choose to retain said
properties.

Respondents have not made any positive act enabling the City Government of
Parañaque to acquire dominion over the disputed road lots. Therefore, they retain
their private character. Accordingly, just compensation must be paid to respondents
as the government takes the road lots in the course of a road widening project.

Private Property
Zamboanga Del Norte vs City of Zamboanga
Facts:
Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of Zamboanga used to
be the provincial capital of the then Zamboanga Province. On October 12, 1936,
Commonwealth Act 39 was approved converting the Municipality of Zamboanga into
Zamboanga City. Sec. 50 of the Act also provided that “Buildings and properties
which the province shall abandon upon the transfer of the capital to another place
will be acquired and paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by the
Auditor General.”
Such properties include lots of capitol site, schools, hospitals, leprosarium, high
school playgrounds, burleighs, and hydro-electric sites.
On June 6, 1952, Republic Act 711 was approved dividing the province of
Zamboanga into two (2): Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur. As to how
the assets and obligations of the old province were to be divided between the two
new ones, Sec. 6 of that law provided “Upon the approval of this Act, the funds,
assets and other properties and the obligations of the province of Zamboanga shall
be divided equitably between the Province of Zamboanga del Norte and the
Province of Zamboanga del Sur by the President of the Philippines, upon the
recommendation of the Auditor General.”
However, on June 17, 1961, Republic Act 3039 was approved amending Sec. 50 of
Commonwealth Act 39 by providing that, “All buildings, properties and assets
belonging to the former province of Zamboanga and located within the City of
Zamboanga are hereby transferred, free of charge, in favor of the said City of
Zamboanga.”
This constrained Zamboanga del Norte to file on March 5, 1962, a complaint against
defendants-appellants Zamboanga City; that, among others, Republic Act 3039 be
declared unconstitutional for depriving Zamboanga del Norte of property without
due process and just compensation.
Lower court declared RA 3039 unconstitutional as it deprives Zamboanga del Norte
of its private properties.
Hence the appeal.
Issue:
Whether RA 3039 is unconstitutional on the grounds that it deprives Zamboanga del
Norte of its private properties.
44 POLITICAL LAW
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Held:
No. RA 3039 is valid. The properties petitioned by Zamboanga del Norte is a public
property.
The validity of the law ultimately depends on the nature of the 50 lots and buildings
thereon in question. For, the matter involved here is the extent of legislative control
over the properties of a municipal corporation, of which a province is one. The
principle itself is simple: If the property is owned by the municipality (meaning
municipal corporation) in its public and governmental capacity, the property is
public and Congress has absolute control over it. But if the property is owned in its
private or proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute
control. The municipality cannot be deprived of it without due process and payment
of just compensation.
The capacity in which the property is held is, however, dependent on the use to
which it is intended and devoted. Now, which of two norms, i.e., that of the Civil
Code or that obtaining under the law of Municipal Corporations, must be used in
classifying the properties in question?

Mactan-Cebu Intl Airport Authority vs CA

Facts:
On April 16, 1952, the Republic, represented by the CAA, filed an expropriation
proceeding to the CFI of Cebu on several parcels of land in Lahug, Cebu City, which
included Lot 941, for the expansion and improvement of Lahug Airport.
In 1953, appellee Chiongbian purchased Lot 941 from its original owner, the original
defendant in the expropriation case. Subsequently, a TCT was issued in her name
Then in 1961, judgment was rendered in the expropriation case in favor of the
Republic which was made to pay Chiongbian an amount for Lot 941. Chiongbian
did not appeal therefrom.Thereafter, absolute title to Lot 941 was transferred to the
Republic under a TCT.
Then, in 1990, Republic Act No. 6958 was passed by Congress creating the Mactan-
Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) to which the assets of the Lahug
Airport was transferred. Lot 941 was then transferred in the name of MCIAA under
a TCT.
In 1995, Chiongbian filed a complaint for reconveyance of Lot 941 with the RTC of
Cebu, alleging, that sometime in 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC)
ventured to expand the Cebu Lahug Airport. As a consequence, it sought to acquire
by expropriation or negotiated sale several parcels of lands adjoining the Lahug
Airport, one of which was Lot 941 owned by Chiongbian. Since she and other
landowners could not agree with the NAC’s offer for the compensation of their
lands, a suit for eminent domain was instituted, before the then CFI of Cebu against
45 landowners, including Chiongbian, entitled “Republic of the Philippine vs.
Damian Ouano, et al.” It was finally decided in favor of the Republic of the
Philippines.
Some of the defendants-landowners appealed the decision to the CA which
rendered a modified judgment allowing them to repurchase their expropriated
properties. Chiongbian, on the other hand, did not appeal and instead, accepted
the compensation for Lot 941 upon the assurance of the NAC that she or her heirs
45 POLITICAL LAW
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would be given the right of reconveyance for the same price once the land would no
longer be used as (sic) airport.[by an alleged written agreement]
Consequently, the TCT of Chiongbian was cancelled and a TCT was issued in the
name of the Republic. Then, with the creation of the MCIAA, it was cancelled and a
TCT was issued in its name.
However, no expansion of the Lahug Airport was undertaken by MCIAA and its
predecessors-in-interest. Thus, the purpose for which Lot 941 was taken ceased to
exist.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the respondent Chiongbian and MCIAA was
ordered to restore to plaintiff the possession and ownership of the property
denominated as Lot No. 941 upon reimbursement of the expropriation price paid to
plaintiff. The RD is therefore ordered to effect the Transfer of the Certificate Title
from the defendant to the plaintiff.
MCIAA appealed the decision to the CA which affirmed the RTC decision. MR was
denied hence this petition.

Issue:
whether the abandonment of the public use for which Lot No. 941 was expropriated
entitles CHIONGBIAN to reacquire it.

Held:
When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either by
the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights
in the land, and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a
different use, without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any
reversion to the former owner.

MCIA vs Lozada
Facts:
Subject of this case is Lot No. 88-SWO-25042 (Lot No. 88), with an area of 1,017
square meters, more or less, located in Lahug, Cebu City. Its original owner was
Anastacio Deiparine when the same was subject to expropriation proceedings,
initiated by the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), represented by the then Civil
Aeronautics Administration (CAA), for the expansion and improvement of the Lahug
Airport. The case was filed with the then Court of First Instance of Cebu. As early as
1947, the lots were already occupied by the U.S. Army. They were turned over to
the Surplus Property Commission, the Bureau of Aeronautics, the National Airport
Corporation and then to the CAA.
During the pendency of the expropriation proceedings, respondent Bernardo L.
Lozada, Sr. acquired Lot No. 88 from Deiparine. Consequently, Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 9045 was issued in Lozada’s name.
On December 29, 1961, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the Republic
and ordered the latter to pay Lozada the fair market value of Lot No. 88, adjudged
at ₱3.00 per square meter, with consequential damages by way of legal interest
46 POLITICAL LAW
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computed from November 16, 1947—the time when the lot was first occupied by
the airport. Lozada received the amount of ₱3,018.00 by way of payment.
The affected landowners appealed. Pending appeal, the Air Transportation Office
(ATO), formerly CAA, proposed a compromise settlement whereby the owners of
the lots affected by the expropriation proceedings would either not appeal or
withdraw their respective appeals in consideration of a commitment that the
expropriated lots would be resold at the price they were expropriated in the event
that the ATO would abandon the Lahug Airport, pursuant to an established policy
involving similar cases. Because of this promise, Lozada did not pursue his appeal.
Thereafter, Lot No. 88 was transferred and registered in the name of the Republic
under TCT No. 25057.
The projected improvement and expansion plan of the old Lahug Airport, however,
was not pursued.
Lozada, with the other landowners, contacted then CAA Director Vicente Rivera, Jr.,
requesting to repurchase the lots, as per previous agreement. The CAA replied that
there might still be a need for the Lahug Airport to be used as an emergency DC-3
airport. It reiterated, however, the assurance that "should this Office dispose and
resell the properties which may be found to be no longer necessary as an airport,
then the policy of this Office is to give priority to the former owners subject to the
approval of the President."
On November 29, 1989, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued a Memorandum to
the Department of Transportation, directing the transfer of general aviation
operations of the Lahug Airport to the Mactan International Airport before the end
of 1990 and, upon such transfer, the closure of the Lahug Airport.
From the date of the institution of the expropriation proceedings up to the present,
the public purpose of the said expropriation (expansion of the airport) was never
actually initiated, realized, or implemented. Instead, the old airport was converted
into a commercial complex. Lot No. 88 became the site of a jail known as Bagong
Buhay Rehabilitation Complex, while a portion thereof was occupied by squatters.3
The old airport was converted into what is now known as the Ayala I.T. Park, a
commercial area.1avvphi1
Thus, on June 4, 1996, petitioners initiated a complaint for the recovery of
possession and reconveyance of ownership of Lot No. 88.
Issue:
WON the effect of the abandonment of intended use gives the private owner the
right to reacquisition
Held:
Yes. Petitioners cite, in support of this position, Fery v. Municipality of Cabanatuan,7
which declared that the Government acquires only such rights in expropriated
parcels of land as may be allowed by the character of its title over the properties—
If x x x land is expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that when
that purpose is ended or abandoned the property shall return to its former owner,
then, of course, when the purpose is terminated or abandoned the former owner
reacquires the property so expropriated. If x x x land is expropriated for a public
street and the expropriation is granted upon condition that the city can only use it
for a public street, then, of course, when the city abandons its use as a public
street, it returns to the former owner, unless there is some statutory provision to
the contrary. x x x. If, upon the contrary, however, the decree of expropriation gives
to the entity a fee simple title, then, of course, the land becomes the absolute
47 POLITICAL LAW
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property of the expropriator, whether it be the State, a province, or municipality,
and in that case the non-user does not have the effect of defeating the title
acquired by the expropriation proceedings. x x x.
When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either by
the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no right
in the land, and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a
different use, without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any
reversion to the former owner. x x x.8
In light of these premises, we now expressly hold that the taking of private
property, consequent to the Government’s exercise of its power of eminent domain,
is always subject to the condition that the property be devoted to the specific public
purpose for which it was taken. Corollarily, if this particular purpose or intent is not
initiated or not at all pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the former
owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of the property, subject to the
return of the amount of just compensation received. In such a case, the exercise of
the power of eminent domain has become improper for lack of the required factual
justification.

JUST COMPENSATION
NAPOCOR vs Sps. Chiong
Facts:
Petitioner is a government owned and controlled corporation, created and existing
pursuant to Republic Act No. 6395,3 as amended, for the purpose of undertaking
the development of hydroelectric power, the production of electrical power from any
source, particularly by constructing, operating, and maintaining power plants,
auxiliary plants, dams, reservoirs, pipes, mains, transmission lines, power stations,
and similar works to tap the power generated from any river, creek, lake, spring, or
waterfall in the country and supplying such power to the inhabitants thereof. In
order to carry out said purposes, NPC is authorized to exercise the power of
eminent domain.NPC filed a complaint for eminent domain with the RTC of Iba,
Zambales. It sought the acquisition of an easement of right-of-way and certain
portions of agricultural lands owned by Igmedio and Liwayway Chiong and the Heirs
of Agrifina4 Angeles, as represented by Francisco Mercurio, to be used in its
Northwestern Luzon Transmission Line Project. The complaint, which was docketed
as Civil Case No. 1442-I, prayed for the issuance of a writ of possession and an
order of expropriation, the appointment of three (3) commissioners to determine
the just compensation, and to adjudge NPC as having a lawful right to enter, take,
and acquire an easement of right-of-way over portions of the properties owned by
herein respondents.
In their answer, the Heirs of Agrifina Angeles did not dispute the purpose of NPC in
instituting the expropriation proceedings. However, they pointed out that NPC had
already entered and taken possession of a portion of their realty with an area of
4,000 square meters, more or less (Lot "A") and wanted to occupy another 4,000
48 POLITICAL LAW
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square meters of the adjacent property (Lot "B"). Respondents averred that the fair
market value for both properties was ₱1,100.00 per square meter or a total of
₱8,800,000.00 and prayed that the trial court direct NPC to pay them said amount.
On March 31, 1998, NPC filed an ex parte motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession, which the trial court granted.
At the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed that the controversy would be limited
to determining the actual land area taken by NPC and the just compensation to be
paid by petitioner.
On September 28, 1999, the trial court appointed as commissioners, Atty. Henry P.
Alog, Atty. Regalado Castillo, and Ms. Roselyn B. Regadio, Legal Researcher of the
trial court, to determine the fair market value of the land, as well as the total area
taken by NPC from respondents.
Issue:
WON NPC should be required to pay full market value as just compensation despite
the fact that the petitioner was only acquiring an easement of right of way
Held:
Petitioner averred in its complaint in Civil Case No. 1442-I, that it sought to acquire
"an easement of right-of-way" over portions of the properties owned by
respondents, for a total of 10,950 square meters.20 However, a perusal of its
complaint shows that petitioner also stated that it would erect structures for its
transmission lines on portions of the expropriated property. In other words, the
expropriation was not to be limited for the purpose of "easement of right-of-way."
In fact, in their Answer, the Heirs of Agrifina Angeles, alleged that petitioner had
actually occupied an area of 4,000 square meters wherein it constructed structures
for its transmission lines and was seeking to occupy another 4,000 square meters.21
Petitioner failed to controvert this material allegation. Justifiably, the market value
of these 4,000 square meters allegedly occupied by the petitioner has became the
very crux of the present case.
In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, the general rule is that the just
compensation to which the owner of condemned property is entitled to is the
market value.22 Market value is "that sum of money which a person desirous but not
compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as
a price to be given and received therefor."23 The aforementioned rule, however, is
modified where only a part of a certain property is expropriated. In such a case the
owner is not restricted to compensation for the portion actually taken. In addition
to the market value of the portion taken, he is also entitled to recover for the
consequential damage, if any, to the remaining part of the property. At the same
time, from the total compensation must be deducted the value of the consequential
benefits.

EPZA vs Dulay
Facts:
The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where the Mactan
Export Processing Zone Authority in Cebu(EPZA) is to be construed. PR San Antonio
Development Corp, in which these lands are registered under, claimed that the
lands were expropriated to the government without them reaching the agreement
as to the compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay then issued an order for the
49 POLITICAL LAW
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appointment of the commissioners to determine the just compensation. It was later
fond out that the payment of the government to San Antonio would be P15 per
square meter, which was objected to by the latter contending that under PD 1533,
the basis of just compensation shall be fair and accede to the fair market value
declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, or by the
assessor, whichever is lower. Such objection and the subsequent MR were denied
and hearing was set for the reception of the commissioner’s report. EPZA then filed
this petition for certiorari and mandamus enjoying from further hearing the case
Issue:
WON the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in PD
1533 is unconstitutional.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just
compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.

The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible

encroachment to judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the courts inutile in a
matter in which under the Constitution is reserved to it for financial determination.
The valuation in the decree may only serve as guiding principle or one of the factors
in determining just compensation, but it may not substitute the court’s own
judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount.
The determination of just compensation is a judicial function. The executive
department or the legislature may make the initial determination but when a party
claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the private party may
not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or
executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the
court’s findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the
justness of the decreed

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE GREGORIO G. PINEDA,
Facts:
Facts:

Petitioner Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) is a domestic corporation duly

organized and existing under the laws of Philippines. Respondent Honorable Judge
Gregorio G. Pineda is impleaded in his official capacity as the presiding judge of the
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal, Branch XXI, Pasig, Metro
Manila. While private respondents Teofilo Arayon, Sr., Gil de Guzman, Lucito
Santiago and Teresa Bautista are owners in fee simple of the expropriated property
situated at Malaya, Pililla, Rizal.

On October 29, 1974, a complaint for eminent domain was filed by petitioner
MERALCO against forty-two (42) defendants with the Court of First Instance (now
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Regional Trial Court) of Rizal, Branch XXII, Pasig, Metro Manila. The complaint
alleges that for the purpose of constructing a 230 KV Transmission line from Barrio
Malaya to Tower No. 220 at Pililla, Rizal, petitioner needs portions of the land of the
private respondents consisting of an aggregate area of 237,321 square meters.
Despite petitioner's offers to pay compensation and attempts to negotiate with the
respondents', the parties failed to reach an agreement.

The petitioner strongly maintains that the respondent court's act of determining
and ordering the payment of just compensation to private respondents without
formal presentation of evidence by the parties on the reasonable value of the
property constitutes a flagrant violation of petitioner's constitutional right to due
process. It stressed that respondent court ignored the procedure laid down by the
law in determining just compensation because it formulated an opinion of its own as
to the value of the land in question without allowing the Board of Commissioners to
hold hearings for the reception of evidence.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent court can dispense with the assistance of a Board of
Commissioners in an expropriation proceeding and determine for itself the just
compensation.

Ruling:

Respondent judge, in the case at bar, arrived at the valuation of P40.00

per square meter on a property declared for real estate tax purposes at P2.50 per
hectare on the basis of a "Joint Venture Agreement on Subdivision and Housing
Projects" executed by A.B.A Homes and private respondents on June 1, 1972. This
agreement was merely attached to the motion to withdraw from petitioner's
deposit. Respondent judge arrived at the amount of just compensation on its own,
without the proper reception of evidence before the Board of Commissioners.
Private respondents as landowners have not proved by competent evidence the
value of their respective properties at a proper hearing. Likewise, petitioner has not
been given the opportunity to rebut any evidence that would have been presented
by private respondents. In an expropriation case such as this one where the
principal issue is the determination of just compensation, a trial before the
Commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on the
issue of just compensation. Contrary to the submission of private respondents, the
appointment of at least three (3) competent persons as commissioners to ascertain
just compensation for the property sought to be taken is a mandatory requirement
in expropriation cases. While it is true that the findings of commissioners may be
disregarded and the court may substitute its own estimate of the value, the latter
may only do so for valid reasons, i.e., where the Commissioners have applied illegal
principles to the evidence submitted to them or where they have disregarded a
clear preponderance of evidence, or where the amount allowed is either grossly
inadequate or excessive (Manila Railroad Company v. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286).
Thus, trial with the aid of the commissioners is a substantial right that may not be
done away with capriciously or for no reason at all. Moreover, in such instances,
where the report of the commissioners may be disregarded, the trial court may
51 POLITICAL LAW
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make its own estimate of value from competent evidence that may be gathered
from the record. The aforesaid joint venture agreement relied upon by the
respondent judge, in the absence of any other proof of valuation of said properties,
is incompetent to determine just compensation.

Prior to the determination of just compensation, the property owners may rightfully
demand to withdraw from the deposit made by the condemnor in eminent domain
proceedings. Upon an award of a smaller amount by the court, the property owners
are subject to a judgment for the excess or upon the award of a larger sum, they
are entitled to a judgment for the amount awarded by the court. Thus, when the
respondent court granted in the Orders dated December 4, 1981 and December 21,
1981 the motions of private respondents for withdrawal of certain sums from the
deposit of petitioner, without prejudice to the just compensation that may be
proved in the final adjudication of the case, it committed no error.

Records, specifically Meralco's deed of sale dated October 30, 1979, in favor of
Napocor show that the latter agreed to purchase the parcels of land already
acquired by Meralco, the rights, interests and easements over those parcels of land
which are the subject of the expropriation proceedings under Civil Case No. 20269,
(Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXII), as well as those parcels of land
occupied by Meralco by virtue of grant of easements of right-of-way (see Rollo, pp.
341-342). Thus, Meralco had already ceded and in fact lost all its rights and
interests over the aforesaid parcels of land in favor of Napocor. In addition, the
same contract reveals that the Napocor was previously advised and actually has
knowledge of the pending litigation and proceedings against Meralco (see Rollo, pp.
342-343). Hence, We find the contention of the petitioner tenable. It is therefore
proper for the lower court to either implead the Napocor in substitution of the
petitioner or at the very least implead the former as party plaintiff.

All premises considered, this Court is convinced that the respondent judge's act of
determining and ordering the payment of just compensation without the assistance
of a Board of Commissioners is a flagrant violation of petitioner's constitutional right
to due process and is a gross violation of the mandated rule established by the
Revised Rules of Court.

Genuine Necessity of Taking

Filstream International vs CA
Facts:
Filstream filed ejectment suit before MTC against occupants on the grounds of
termination of contact and non-payment of rentals. MTC decided in favor of
Filstream. This was appealed in RTC and CA and both upheld existing decision.
During the pendency of ejectment proceedings, City of Manila approved Ordinance
7813 authorizing Mayor Lim to initiate the acquisition by negotiation, expropriation,
purchase, or other legal means certain parcels of land that covers properties of
Filstream. City of Manila filed complaint for eminent domain to expropriate
Filstream properties. Filstream filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for eminent
domain as well as a motion to quash the writ of possession on the ground of no
52 POLITICAL LAW
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valid cause of action, the petition does not satisfy the requirements of public use
and maneuver to circumvent the ejectment suit, violation of the constitutional
guarantee against non-impairment, price offered was too low violating just
compensation. RTC denied the petition and declared the property condemned in
favor of City of Manila.
Issue: Whether or not Filstream was deprived of due process on the ground of
non-compliance with priority in expropriation?
Decision: There is no dispute as to the existence of a final and executory judgment
in favor of petitioner Filstream ordering the ejectment of private respondents from
the properties.
The City of Manila has an undeniable right to exercise its power of eminent domain
within its jurisdiction specifically in pursuit of its urban land reform and housing
program.
Very clear from the provisions are the limitations with respect to the order of
priority in acquiring private lands and in resorting to expropriation proceedings as a
means to acquire the same. Private lands rank last in the order of priority for
purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein, expropriation proceedings are to
be resorted to only when the other modes of acquisition have been exhausted.
Compliance with these conditions must be deemed mandatory because these are
the only safeguards in securing the right of owners of private property to due
process when their property is expropriated for public use.
RA 7279 Uran Development Housing Act of 1992
Sec. 9. Priorities in the acquisition of Land. — Lands for socialized housing shall be
acquired in the following order:
(a) Those owned by the Government or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or
agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries;
(b) Alienable lands of the public domain;
(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;
(d) Those within the declared Areas for Priority Development, Zonal Improvement
sites, and Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program sites which have not yet
been acquired;
(e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISS sites which have
not yet been acquired; and
(f) Privately-owned lands.
Where on-site development is found more practicable and advantageous to the
beneficiaries, the priorities mentioned in this section shall not apply. The local
government units shall give budgetary priority to on-site development of
government lands.

Taxation
License Fees vs Tax
Physical therapy vs Ong
Facts:
Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 3659 regulating the operations of
massage clinics in Manila penalizing and enforcing permit fee for its operation.
Petitioner appealed for the dismissal of the ordinance. They contend that City of
Manila is without authority to regulate the operation of massagists and the
53 POLITICAL LAW
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operation of massage clinics and that the fee is unreasonable and unconscionable.
Trial court dismissed the petition.
Issue: Whether or not license fee enforced by the Municipal Board is valid?
Decision: Decision affirmed. The end sought to be attained in the Ordinance is to
prevent the commission of immorality and the practice of prostitution in an
establishment masquerading as a massage clinic where the operators thereof offer
to massage or manipulate superficial parts of the bodies of customers for hygienic
and aesthetic purposes. The permit fee is made payable by the operator of a
massage clinic who may not be a massagist himself. Compared to permit fees
required in other operations, P100.00 may appear to be too large and rather
unreasonable. Manila Municipal Board considered the practice of hygienic and
aesthetic massage not as a useful and beneficial occupation which will promote and
is conducive to public morals, and consequently, imposed the said permit fee for its
regulation.

Right against unreasonable searches and seizures

People vs Andre Martin
Fact:
In 1987, the appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a
friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Appellant filled up the contract necessary for the
transaction, writing therein his name, passport number, the date of shipment and
the name and address of the consignee, namely, “WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II,
8052 Zurich, Switzerland” Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could
examine and inspect the packages. Appellant, however, refused, assuring her that
the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend
in Zurich. In view of appellant’s representation, Anita Reyes no longer insisted on
inspecting the packages. Before delivery of appellant’s box to the Bureau of
Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita
(Reyes), following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final
inspection. When he opened appellant’s box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His
curiousity aroused, He made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and
took several grams of the contents thereof. Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter
reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory examination of the
samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper. He brought the letter and a
sample of appellant’s shipment to the Narcotics Section of the NBI and informed the
them that the rest of the shipment was still in his office. Therefore, Job Reyes and
three NBI agents, and a photographer, went to the Reyes’ office at Ermita. The
package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job Reyes. He
discovered that the package contained bricks or cake-like dried marijuana leaves.
The package which allegedly contained tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned
out that dried marijuana leaves were neatly stocked underneath the cigars. The NBI
agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents thereof,
after signing a “Receipt” acknowledging custody of the said effects . Thereafter, an
Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known
as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
54 POLITICAL LAW
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Issue: Whether the search and seizure committed by the private individual
inviolate the constitutional right of the accused against unlawful searches and
seizures?

Held: No, The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and

seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the
government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus,
it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against
arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. Corolarilly, alleged
violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be invoked against the
State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. To
agree with appellant that an act of a private individual in violation of the Bill of
Rights should also be construed as an act of the State would result in serious legal
complications and an absurd interpretation of the constitution. That the Bill of
Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of
private individuals finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission. True, the liberties guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land
must always be subject to protection.

Warrantless arrest
Umil vs Ramos
Facts:
On 1 February 1988, military agents were dispatched to the St. Agnes
Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential information
which was received by their office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA member)
who had been admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot wound. That the
wounded man in the said hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows"
who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31
January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before a road hump along
Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. The wounded man's name was
listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two (22)
years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Binan, Laguna however it
was disclosed later that the true name of the wounded man was Rolando
Dural. In view of this verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to the
Regional Medical Servicesof the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While
confined thereat, he was positively identified by the eyewitnesses as the one
who murdered the 2 CAPCOM mobile patrols.

Issue: Whether or Not Rolando was lawfully arrested.

Held:
Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an outlawed
subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the
arrest without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was
committing as offense when arrested. The crimes rebellion, subversion,
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conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses
committed in furtherance therefore in connection therewith constitute direct
assaults against the state and are in the nature of continuing crimes.

Fugitive in Justice
Time of Arrest

Go vs CA

Facts:
Rolito Go while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street, nearly bumped
Eldon Maguan’s car. Go alighted from his car, shot Maguan and left the scene. A
security guard at a nearby restaurant was able to take down petitioner’s car plate
number. The police arrived shortly thereafter at the scene of the shooting. A
manhunt ensued.
Six days after, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to
verify news reports that he was being hunted by the police; he was accompanied by
two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained him. An eyewitness to the shooting,
who was at the police station at that time, positively identified petitioner as the
gunman.
Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the case to the lower court, setting and
commencing trial without preliminary investigation. Prosecutor reasons that the
petitioner has waived his right to preliminary investigation as bail has been posted
and that such situation, that petitioner has been arrested without a warrant
lawfully, falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule 112 of The 1985 Rules
of Criminal Procedure which provides for the rules and procedure pertaining to
situations of lawful warrantless arrests.
Petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without warrant because he
went to the police station six (6) days after the shooting which he had allegedly
perpetrated. Thus, petitioner argues, the crime had not been “just committed” at
the time that he was arrested. Moreover, none of the police officers who arrested
him had been an eyewitness to the shooting of Maguan and accordingly none had
the “personal knowledge” required for the lawfulness of a warrantless arrest. Since
there had been no lawful warrantless arrest, Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court which establishes the only exception to the right to preliminary investigation,
could not apply in respect of petitioner.
Issue/s:
Whether or not a lawful warrantless arrest had been effected by the San Juan
Police in respect of petitioner Go;
Whether petitioner had effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation
Held:
1. No. The Court does not believe that the warrantless “arrest” or detention of
petitioner in the instant case falls within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides as follows:
“Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person;
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
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(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall
be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.”
Petitioner’s “arrest” took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The
“arresting” officers obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a),
at the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the “arrest” effected
six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected “when [the
shooting had] in fact just been committed” within the meaning of Section 5 (b).
Moreover, none of the “arresting” officers had any “personal knowledge” of facts
indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information
upon which the police acted had been derived from statements made by alleged
eyewitnesses to the shooting — one stated that petitioner was the gunman;
another was able to take down the alleged gunman’s car’s plate number which
turned out to be registered in petitioner’s wife’s name. That information did not,
however, constitute “personal knowledge.”
It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of
petitioner within the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113.

People vs Enrile
Facts:
A buy-bust team was dispatched to entrap appellant Rogelio Abugatal, a plan made
on the strength of a trio given by a police informer. After witnessing the exchange,
2 policemen approached appellant and placed him under arrest, at the same time
confiscating the wrapped object he gave the poseur-buyer. Upon prodding,
appellant Abugatal led the police to the house of his co-accused Enrile where he
identified the latter as the source of the marijuana. Appellant Enrile was frisked and
the mark money was found inside his front pocket.
Issue:
WON Enrile’s warrantless arrest and search was justified.
Held:
No. The policemen who later arrested Enrile at his house had personal knowledge
that he was the source of the marijuan. The discovery of the marked money on him
did not mean he was caught in the act of selling marijuana. The marked money was
not prohibited per se. Even if it were, that fact alone would not retroactively
validate the warrantless search and seizure.
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Warrantless search
People vs Johnson
Leila Johnson was frisked at the gate at NAIA departure area. The lady frisker felt
something hard on Leila’s abdominal area, which Leila claimed to be a spacial
girdle. Disbelieving this Olivia reported this to her superior who instructed her to
inspect her further. Leila was then directed to remove the object. She had 3 plastic
packs of shabu weighing over 580 grams total. Her passport ticket, luggage, and
other personal effects were seize and picture taken of her. She was convicted in the
RTC for violating sec 16 of RA 6425
Doctrine:
Passengers attemptig to board an aircraft routinely pass thromughmetal detectors;
their cary-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray
scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects,
physical searches are conducted to determine what objects are. There is little
question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the
gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations
associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport
public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are
subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such
would be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that
ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizure do not
apply to routine airport procedures.

Saluday vs People
FACTS:
Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was flagged down by Task Force Davao of the
Philippine Army at a checkpoint to check the presence of contraband, illegal
firearms or explosives and suspicious individuals. A bag, small but too heavy for its
size, belonging to the Petitioner, Marcelo G. Saluday, was found by SCAA Junbert
M. Buco (Buco). Petitioner was arrested for failure to produce authority to carry
firearms and explosives.
In an inquest conducted, the Prosecutor of Davao City found probable cause for
violation of PD 1866 for carrying firearms, explosives and ammunition.
1. Whether the search was illegal.
RULING:
On the issue on the illegality of the search, the Supreme Court disagrees with the
Petitioner. Section 2, Article III of the Constitution applies only to unreasonable
searches or seizures.
The prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure emanates from one’s right to
privacy. When a person displays an expectation of privacy, which the society is
ready to recognize as reasonable, the State cannot violate a person’s right against
unreasonable search or seizure (Katz vs. United States). In addition, one’s
expectation of privacy to be reasonable, it must counter the safety and welfare of
the people.
The Supreme Court did not agree to the Petitioner’s position that his failure to
object to the search cannot be construed as an implied waiver. Constitutional
immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right that can
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be waived. However, the waiver should be voluntary, clear, specific and intelligently
given, absent any duress or coercion.

Terry vs Ohio

Brief Fact Summary. The Petitioner, John W. Terry (the “Petitioner”), was stopped
and searched by an officer after the officer observed the Petitioner seemingly casing
a store for a potential robbery. The officer approached the Petitioner for questioning
and decided to search him first.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. An officer may perform a search for weapons without a
warrant, even without probable cause, when the officer reasonably believes that the
person may be armed and dangerous.

Facts. The officer noticed the Petitioner talking with another individual on a street corner while
repeatedly walking up and down the same street. The men would periodically peer into a store
window and then talk some more. The men also spoke to a third man whom they eventually
followed up the street. The officer believed that the Petitioner and the other men were “casing” a
store for a potential robbery. The officer decided to approach the men for questioning, and given
the nature of the behavior the officer decided to perform a quick search of the men before
questioning. A quick frisking of the Petitioner produced a concealed weapon and the Petitioner
was charged with carrying a concealed weapon.

Issue. Whether a search for weapons without probable cause for arrest is an unreasonable
search under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (“Constitution”)?
Held. The Supreme Court of the United States (“Supreme Court”) held that it is a reasonable
search when an officer performs a quick seizure and a limited search for weapons on a person
that the officer reasonably believes could be armed. A typical beat officer would be unduly
burdened by being prohibited from searching individuals that the officer suspects to be armed.

Dissent. Justice William Douglas (“J. Douglas”) dissented, reasoning that the majority’s holding
would grant powers to officers to authorize a search and seizure that even a magistrate would
not possess.

Concurrence.
Justice John Harlan (“J. Harlan”) agreed with the majority, but he emphasized an additional
necessity of the reasonableness of the stop to investigate the crime.
Justice Byron White (“J. White”) agreed with the majority, but he emphasized that the particular
facts of the case, that there was suspicion of a violent act, merit the forcible stop and frisk.

Discussion. The facts of the case are important to understand the Supreme Court’s willingness
to allow the search. The suspicious activity was a violent crime, armed robbery, and if the
officer’s suspicions were correct then he would be in a dangerous position to approach the men
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for questioning without searching them. The officer also did not detain the men for a long period
of time to constitute an arrest without probable cause.