CHAPTER VII BASIC PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION SYNOPSIS INTENTION OF LEGISLATURE (tra legis and Sententia legis) EX VISCERIBUS ACTUS (Statute must be read as a whole in its context) Application of the principle of ex visceribus actus UT RES MAGIS VALEAT QAUAM PEREAT (it may rather become operative than null) Application of the principle of ut res magis valeat quam pereat CHAPTER SUMMARY Certain set of rules have been framed to govern the process of interpretation. If one judge takes only narrow meaning of the language of a statutory provision and other judge takes a broad meaning of the same, then the same law will mean differently to different persons. Therefore these principles are necessary to be observed though they are not enacted law. In fact, these rules have been formulated on the basis of the view taken by arious High Courts while passing a judgment Supreme Court of India and v: or pronouncement. ‘According to SALMOND, they are rough principles or guides. These rules, though well settled today, are liberal and flexible in nature but have guiding force behind them. An interpretation in disregard to these principles cannot survive in the eyes of law. (i) INTENTION OF LEGISLATURE - The Legislature enacts the law with a definite object in its mind. This is called "intention". The Legislature expects that the law enacted by it shall be understood by the courts in its true spirit and shall be administered in accordance with the intention with which the statute has been framed so as to advance the purpose of the statute. In Union of India v. Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd.,! it was held that all statutes have to be considered in light of the object and purport of the Act. It must be appreciated that the Legislature does not enact the law casually. There is always a reason and purpose behind every statute. There is always some aim sought to be achieved by an enactment. In order to express the aim, the Legislature uses the medium of writing. It gives certain 1, (2008) 7 SCC 502 : AIR 2008 SC 2286. (105 ) .106 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 4 i articular as; language in which certain words are employed pie Le This lengua y, set-up and sequence. It is this language which ile ‘making the law me is the expression of what Legislature thought a wage. It is presumed 4p, the Legislature opens its mind in form of aneoyed by the Legislature precise words and clear language has been em abiguous erivaie’ Wie’ express itself. But sometimes the words may be d specific, they themsely, the words of such language are clear, precise peas word is ambiguous i declare the intention of legislature. But when ony vas intended by ; i becomes necessary to ascertain what tion of ‘egislature is through fis eo Se te yetalature. Therefore, the legislative inten, must be primarily gathered from the language itself. 1 TINDAL, C.J., has effectively stated this Tule, are themselves precise and than to expound those words ussex Peerage case, Aomording to him, ‘tthe words of a statute unambiguous, then no more can be necessary in their natural and ordinary sense. ; In Union of India v. Kartick Chandra Mondal,? it was held that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. Language employed in a statute is determinative factor of the legislative intent. If the language of the enactment is clear and unambiguous, it would not be proper for the courts to add any words thereto and evolve some legislative intent, not found in the statute. In Raghunath Rai Bareja v. Punjab National Bank,? the Apex Court held that the language employed in the statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent. Presumption is that Legislature intended to say what it has said. Resort to legislative intent can be made only when the language employed by the Legislature is doubtful or ambiguous or leads to some absurdity. Where the language is clear, the intention of Legislature has to be gathered from the language used. In Nelson Motis v. Union of India,‘ words of a statute are clear, plain or una: meaning, the courts are bound to give looking into consequences thereof. _ In Shanker Raju v. Union of India,’ ‘kable and the interpretatio unless crucial omission or it was observed that when the mbiguous, i.e., they bear only one effect to that meaning, without it was held that a statute is mn thereof by Court should be t? secure that obj object clear direction makes that end unattainable. In Executive E; ngineer v, Sri A . ¥ relevancy of objets and van Seetaram Rice Mill, it was held that the consideration for ns i F the court 8 for enacting an Act is a relevant interpretation of while applying various principles statutes. Normally, the court would not go behind Cid } (840) U1 Cl & Fin 65 cy R 2010 SC 3455; 2 2 oon 2 eo S55 £2010 Sco 42, 4. AIR 1992 SC 1981, 5. 2011 (2) SCC 132. 8. (2011) (12) SCALE 243,BASIC PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION 107 obese eae Sy the Act. The discussion of a Standing Committee to a i b appropriate precept for tracing the legislative i may 0 intent put in given circumstances, it may be of some use to notice pnae discussion legislative i i i i isi ont ee intent that is reflected in the substantive provisions of the In Rasila S. Mehta v. Custodian, Nariman Bhavan, Mumbai,’ it was held that the objects and reasons of the Act are to be taken into consideration in interpreting the provisions of the statute. It is incumbent on the court to strive and interpret the statute as to protect and advance the object and purpose of the enactment. Any narrow or technical interpretation of the provisions would defeat the legislative policy. In Pallawi Resources Ltd. v. Protos Engineering Company Put. Ltd.,? it was held that it is a well-settled principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of the legislative intent. If the language of the enactment is clear and unambiguous, it would not be proper for the courts to add any words thereto and evolve some legislative intent, not found in the statute. In Satheedevi v. Prasanna,’ it was held that the first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislature must be found in the words used by the legislature itself. If the words used are capable of one construction, only then it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such hypothetical construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. Words used in the material provisions of the statute must be interpreted in their plain grammatical meaning and it is only when such words are capable of two constructions that the question of giving effect to the policy or object of the Act can legitimately arise. In Mohammed Shahabuddin v. State of Bihar,’ it was held that if a statutory provision is enacted by the legislature, which prescribes a condition at one place but not at some other place in the same provision, the only reasonable interpretation which can be resorted to by the courts is that such was the intention of the legislature and that the provision was consciously enacted in that manner. In such cases, it will be wrong to presume that such omission was inadvertent or that by incorporating the condition at one place in the provision the legislature also intended the condition to be applied at some other place in that provision. In Union of India v. Kartick Chandra Mondal,' it was held that the court read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. Language employed in a statute is determinative factor of the legislative intent. If the language of the enactment is clear and unambiguous, it would not be proper for the courts to add any words thereto 1. AIR 2011 SC 2122 : 2011 (6) SCC 220. 2. AIR 2010 SC 1969 : 2010 (5) SCC 196. 8. AIR 2010 SC 2777 : 20105) SCC 622. 4. 2010 (4) SCC 653. 5. AIR 2010 SC 3455 : 2010 (2) SCC 42.108 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 7 i tatute. and evolve some legislative intent, not found in the ae vaeen 4 In Sri Jeyaram Educational Trust v- AG. Syed i or jf a a vias hei that a provision of a statute should have ‘2 be eating a oa anata . plain and straight, without adding, © oF e ards Only when such plain and straight ead Oe a aerate ing to the words on suc » le: , ity on norm certainty, or absurdity which were not obviously intended the Legislature or the Lawmaker, a court should open its interpretation tock-hit containing the settled rules of construction and interpretation, t, arrive at the true meaning of the provision. : he i ihar,? it was held that th d Shahabuddin v. State of Bihar, as he 1at the court cannet real anything into @ statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. Language employed in a statute is a determinative factor of the legislative intent. If the language of enactment is clear and unambiguous, it would not be proper for the courts to add any words thereto and evolve some legislative intent, not found in the statute. In Competition Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India Lid.; it was held that a statute is stated to be the edict of Legislature. It expresses the will of Legislature and the function of the Court is to interpret the document according to the intent of those who made it. In C. Venkatachalam v. Ajit Kumar C. Shah,‘ it was reiterated that while interpreting the statute, intention of legislature must be seen from words used and external measures should be resorted to when the language used is contradictory, ambiguous or leads to absurd meaning. In Grid Corporation of Orissa Ltd. v. Eastern Metals & Ferro Alloys,’ it was held that the golden rule of interpretation is that the words of a statute have to be read and understood in their natural, ordinary and popular sense. ____ In Municipal Committee, Hoshiarpur v. Punjab SEB,’ it was held that it is obligation of court to promote intention of legislature. In Supreme Paper Mills Ltd. v. Asst. Commissi i s . v. Asst. joner, Commercial Tox? Calcutta," It was held that the court cannot add anything into a statutor! provision, which is plain and unambiguous. Language employed in a statute Halt ae and indicates the legislative intent. If the language is cle" would no Proper for the court to add any W° thereto and evolve some legislative intent not found in the statute. . In Shanker Raju v. Union of Indi . 2 U India, it re the eer declares its intent in the acheme of oieageage i statute luty of the Court to give full effect to the same without scanning its |. AIR 2010 SC 671 : 2010 (4) SCC 653, M0102) BCC 61a. . 2010 (10) SCC 744, . (2011) 9 SCC 707. 2010 (8) SCALE 687. (2010) 13 SCC 216, . 2010 (3) SCALE 345, . 2011 (2) SCC 192, SPNSaeereBASIC PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION 109 wisdom or policy and without engraftin, i i i v I 0 ig, adding or implyin, this i is not congenial to or consistent with such express intent of legislatuce, neh In C. Venkatachalam vy. Ajitkumar C. Shah," it was held that the duty of courts is to dis islative i I accordingly. cern legislative intention and interpret the statutes In Principal Chief Conservator of Forest v. J.K. Johnson, it was held that when the language of the statutory provision is plain and clear, no external aid is required and th islative i i fhe language aes e legislative intention has to be gathered from In Shanker Raju v. Union of India’ i . a , » it was held that what the peel ier ie intended to be done or not. to be done can only be legitimately ascertained from what it has chosen to enact either in express words or by reasonable and necessary implication. In Kanwar Singh Saini v. High Court of Delhi,4 it was held that when an Act creates a right or obligation and enforces the performance thereof in a specified manner, "that performance cannot be enforced in any other manner." Thus, for enforcement of a right/obligation under a statute, the only remedy available to the person aggrieved is to get adjudication of rights under the said Act. In Pallawi Resources Ltd. v. Protos Engineering Company Pot. Ltd.,* it was held that if a statutory provision is enacted by the legislature in a certain manner, the only reasonable interpretation which can be resorted to by the courts is that such was the intention of the legislature and that the provision was consciously enacted in that manner. It is a well-settled principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of the legislative intent. In Special Land Acquisition Officer v. Karigowda,° it was held that the intention of the Legislature is an important factor in relation to interpretation of statutes. Statute law and the case law go side by side and quite often the relationship between them is supplementary. In other words, interpretation is guided by the spirit of the enactment. In Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading S.A.,". Supreme Court categorically stated the method of discovering the intention of Legislature. It held "the conventional way of interpreting a statute is to seek the intention of its makers. If a statutory provision is open to more than one interpretation then the court has to choose that interpretation which represents the true intention of the Legislature". It further held "if a language used is capable of bearing more than one construction, in selecting - 2011 (9) SCC 707. . 2011(12) SCALE 50. . 2011 (2) SCC 132. 2011 (10) SCALE 7265. AIR 2010 SC 1969 : 2010 (5) SCC 196. . ATR 2010 SC 2322 : 2010 (5) SCC 708. . (2002) 4 SCC 105 ; AIR 2002 SC 1432. negeeneINTERPRETATION OF STATUTES to the consequences, resulting fy regard must be had Pe onstruction that resulte a abaurdity or anomaly or whig 110 e meaning, au : oe ting the alternative constructions. ip, serious inconvenience, injustice, absurch’ 7 hardships sconeistency or uncertainty and friction in the system which the i ‘acted and preference should statute purports to regulate, has to be aaah sults". It further ie i to that construction which avoids 1 ‘Notwithstanding the conventional principle that ae a (of Judges is C expound and not to legislate, the courts have en er Mevity ps india art of interpretation and appraisal is imbuet i road choice that im Fi eas f dis i terpretation always implied a degree o! yn a e that t courts would adopt, particularly in areas such a8, constitutional adjudication 5 i ights" therefore, held dealing with social and diffuse rights’. Courts are 2 1 as “finishers, refiners and polishers of legislation which comes to them in a state requiring varying degrees of further processing. In Ombalika Das v. Hulisa Shaw,! it was held that where the language is plain and explicit and not admitting of any doubtful interpretation, the court cannot, by an assumed legislative intent, expand the meaning of an expression in a statute. In J.P. Bansal v. State of Rajasthan,’ it was held that where the language is clear, the intention of Legislature is to be gathered from the language used. In State y. Parmeshwaran Subramani,? it was held that where language of a statue is clear and unambiguous, there is no scope for the court to read something which was consciously omitted by the legislature. Intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the language used. : In CCE & Customs v. Punjab Fibres Ltd.,‘ it was held that legislative a must be determined on comparing other provisions of the same statute. In Southern Petrochemical Industries Co. Ltd. v. Electrici : ; D " . 4 tricity Inspector, it c= oH that the intention of Legislature must be gathered from the eaes ca poe statute at the first instance and only when such a rule an anomal i i ee lous situation, may the court take recourse 1 In Balram Kumawat v, Union of Indi Balrar . India,® the Apex Court held that the courts will reject that construction which will defeat the ae ‘intention the legislature a even though there may be some inexactitude in the langusé® . In Nathi Devi y, Radha Devi Gupta,” ion of court is to discover the true er was held that interpretativ? slative intent. In interpreting ' (2002) 4 SCC 539, » (2003) 5 SCC 134, - (2009) 9 SCC 729, |. (2008) 3 SCC 73, . (2007) § SCC 447, . (2003) 7 SCC 62g, . (2005) 2 SCC 271, MeepeneBASIC PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION i statute the court must, if the words are clear, plain, unambiguous reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, give ‘olthe words eh irrespective of the consequences. Those words must be expounded in their natural and ordinary sense. In such a case no question of construction of statute arises, for the Act speaks for itself. Literal interpretation should be given toa statute if ‘the Same does not lead to an absurdity. Even if there exists some ambiguity in the language or the same is capable of two interpretations, it is trite that the interpretation which serves the object and purport of the Act must be given effect to. In such a case the doctrine of purposive construction should be adopted. Courts are not concerned with the policy involved or that the results are injurious or otherwise, which may follow from giving effect to the language used. If the words used are capable of one construction only then it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. In considering whether there is ambiguity, the court must look at the statute as a whole and consider the appropriateness of the meaning in a particular context avoiding absurdity and inconsistencies or unreasonableness, which may render the statute unconstitutional. Moreover, effort should be made to give effect to each and every word used by the legislature. The courts always presume that the legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect. A construction which attributes redundancy to the legislature will not be accepted, except for compelling reasons such as obvious drafting errors. In V. Jagannadha Rao v. State of A.P., it was held that the intention of the Legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should be paid as to what has been said as also to what has not been said. As a consequence, a construction which requires for its support addition or substitution of words or which resorts to rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided. It is contrary to all rules of construction to read words into an Act unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. Similarly, it is wrong and dangerous to proceed by substituting some other words for words of the statute. In other words, there should be no attempt to substitute or paraphrase of general application. Attention should be confined to what is necessary for deciding a particular case. The court cannot reframe the legislation for the very good reason that it has no power to legislate. It is incumbent on the court to avoid the construction if reasonably permissible on the language which would render a part of the statute devoid of any meaning or application. In the interpretation of statutes, the courts always presume that the Legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have an effect. In Union of India v. Rajiv Kumar,’ it was observed that it is a well-settled principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision or rewrite a provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the Legislature. The language employed in a statute 1, (2001) 10 SCC 401 : AIR 2002 SC 77. 2. (2003) 6 SCC 516.2 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES aa inative factor of legislative inten, tutory provision is the determina’ : ff 7 ae eekere Words and phrases are symbols that stimulate mental Peferences to referents. The object of interpreting a ne te or any statu ision i in the intention of the Legis: e authori provision is to ascertain tl oF ane acy to be gathered tre it enacting it. The intention of the maker is p irate be peid to what ben ne 4 language used, which means that attention should’ 0° pel 7 said ae also to what has not been said. The question | not what may be supposed and has been intended, but what has been said. ithi i: i ia,’ i held that there j, In Mithilesh Singh v. Union of India,’ it was on presumption that Legislature inserted every part of the statute for a definite purpose and as such, rejection of words as being inapposite surplusage to be avoided. i i i held that where th In State of Jharkhand vy. Govind Singh,? it was e the language is clear, the intention of Legislature is to be gathered from the used. Attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said. In Prakash Kumar alias Prakash Bhutto v. State of Gujarat,’ it was held that the more stringent the law, the less is the discretion of the court. Stringent laws are made for the purpose of achieving its objectives. This being the intendment of the legislature the duty of the court is to see that the intention of the legislature is not frustrated. If there is any doubt or ambiguity in the statutes, the rule of purposive construction should be taken recourse to, to achieve the objectives. The intention of law makers is of prime importance and a statute must be construed and understood in the manner similar to that intent. According to SALMOND, it is the duty of courts to discover and act upon the true intention of Legislature and essence of law lies in its spirit. When more than one interpretation can be made of a statutory provision, court has to be very careful in choosing which one should sg: urvive and which one should fail. The intention of Legislature includes two as} ing and re pects, namely meaning an purpose. Generally the determining factor of intention is the language used by the Legislature in the statute, but when the language leads to ambiguity or absurdity, the purpose or the object of the statute may also be looked into. the aT used are clear, Precise and give out only one meanins: creel ae o to their P’ain meaning only, whatever hardship * the words used in the lange ain and grammatical meaning is give? © t e e language and inference as to intention of Legislatu® 4 and is universall st safe method of construing a provisio® ; 7 gap eee of enacting the eta What was in the mind of Legislature *BASIC PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION 113 meaning is termed as litra legis. In Chairman, Board of Mining Examination and Chief Ins; Mines v. Ramjee,’ the observation made by JUSTICE TYER is Mawes different. In his opinion, to be literal in meaning, is to see the skin and miss the soul. This means that if litra legis is strictly adhered to, then there is a likelihood of missing the real spirit lying behind the words of a provision. In other words, the expressions used by Legislature in the language of a provision may sometimes fail to disclose the true legislative intent and therefore it may become necessary to look for the real intention or spirit, piercing through the words. The whole idea is to discover the real intention of Legislature, which if not disclosed from the words or language used in a provision, may have to be found out by peeping through those words or the language. The real legislative intent lying behind the words is known as sententia legis. In Grasim Industries Ltd. v. Collector of Customs,” it was held that the elementary principle of interpreting any word while considering a statute is to gather the sententia legis of the Legislature. Wherever the language is clear the intention of the Legislature is to be gathered from the language used. While doing so, what has been said in the statute as also what has not been said has to be noted. The construction which requires for its support addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words has to be avoided. In State of Jharkhand v. Govind Singh,’ it has been held that statute is an edict of Legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting a statute is to gather the sententia legis of the Legislature. However, abundant precaution has to be taken while striving for sententia legis. The language should not be twisted or strained by the courts. The judges are not at liberty to add or to take away from or modify the letter of law simply because they believe that the true meaning or intention is not completely or correctly expressed by it. The court should not interpret a section in the light of their own prudence in order to do what it thinks is justice. The courts cannot write down what is expressly intended by the Legislature. The court has no power to destroy or defeat what is intended by Legislature by importing anything of their own. In Chief Justice of A.P. v. L.V.A. Dixitulu,‘ it was held that primary principle of interpretation is that a constitutional or statutory provision should be construed ‘according to intent of that that makes it’. Normally such intent is to be gathered from the language of provision. If language or the phraseology employed by the legislation is precise and plain and thus by itself proclaims the legislative intent in unequivocal terms, the same must be given effect to, regardless of consequences that may follow. But if the words used in the provision are imprecise, protean or evocative or can Teasonably bear meanings more than one, then rule of strict grammatical 1, AIR 1977 SC 965. 2. (2002) 4 SCC 297. 8, (2005) 10 SCC 437. 4, (1979) 2 SCC 34.INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 114 le to reach real legislative intent. In sud case, in order to ascertain the true meanings of ee eit en Phrase, 2 sare ed, itis legitimate for the court to go beyond Whe Nik atm! tonfing of the provision and to call in aid other well eee eee the ae Ut 7 such as legislative history, the basic scheme an f nh @ purpose of le ae a whole, each portion throwing light on the rest, Pitot a folie ation, the object sought to be achieved and the consequenin® eae w from the adoption of one in preference to other possible on a : Ay In Prakash Kumar alias Prakash Bhutto v. State of Gujarat, it wag held that the court cannot enlarge the scope of legislation or intention whey the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous. Narrow and pedantic construction may not always be given effect to. In State of Kerala v. Mathai Vergese,” it was held that the court cannot rewrite, recast or redesign a section. Keeping all these things in view, the courts may look for sententia legis. In Prakash Nath Khanna v. Commissioner of Income Tax, the Supreme Court observed that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of Legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent. The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of Legislature must be found in the words used by Legislature itself. The question is not what may be supposed and has been intended, but what has been said. 4 In Tata Consultancy Services v. State of A.P.,* the Apex Court held that the court cannot rewrite the provisions of law which clearly is the function of the legislature. . A good example of peeping through the words to discover sententia legis is seen in Sanjay v. Shankarappa.’ The High Court of Bombay was dealing with the construction of Section 23 (1) and (2) of Mamlatdar’s Court At Bom. 2 of 1906). The Section 23 (1) of the Act bars any appeal against the ecder| nessod by Mamlatdar under this Act and Section 23(2) gives powers t0 0) r to call for and examine the record of any suit under this Act The question was whether revision i i i because under this section evision lies under Section 23 (2) of this At Collector, as apparently shown by the languag® oe eae a Pn only on his own motion and on no other ground. Tend toa fe clear from the language used in Section 23 (1) that appe 7 jusiadintien ge eas appears that collector is vested with revision are given to Hey section 23 (2) in which he is given more or less powers this eee oe, High a ee Section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure. “ioe High ‘ourt is deprived of powers of superintende™ ed that intention of construction ceases to be sure guide Legislature while enacting this section is not that 1, (2005) 2 scc 2. (1986) 4 SCC 148, 3. (2004) 9 scc 686, 4. (2005) 1 SCC 308, 5, 1971 Mh LS 47g,BASIC PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION 15 Collector suo motu should call for and examine the records of any suit but may also call for on an application by a party to suit. It may thus be concluded that the intention of Legislature is most important factor for administering justice in accordance with law. If courts fail to derive the true intention, it could not only lead to miscarriage of justice but may also defeat the very purpose of the statute. The intention of Legislature must primarily be gathered from the language itself. If the words are clear and precise and give out only one meaning, their ordinary and natural meaning must be attributed to them. But if the words are ambiguous and capable of bearing more than one meaning thereby providing alternative constructions, then that construction should be upheld which removes absurdity and furthers the policy and purpose of the statute. (ii) EX VISCERIBUS ACTUS (Statute must be read as a whole in its context) The meaning of this maxim is that every part of the statute must be construed within the four corners of the Act. In other words, no provision should be interpreted in isolation. Wherever the language of a provision is ambiguous and open to alternative constructions due to uncertainty of meaning of the words used therein, the provision has to be read as a whole in its context. It is not permissible to omit any part of it and the construction of a section should be made of all parts together. The true reason behind this principle is that interpretation of one provision independent of others could lead to inconsistency amongst various parts of that section or amongst different sections. Further, the same word may mean one thing in one context and another in different context and hence same word used in different sections of a statute or used at different places in the same clause may bear different meaning. What meaning certain word carries, actually depends on the assembly of words in which that word has been placed and accordingly the meaning of the same word could be different when used at different places. For example the word "put" gives out different meanings in different association. In the language "He put his failure to lack of experience", the word "put" exhibits the meaning "laying blame on" but in the language "put price tag on the article" the same word "put" gives out the meaning "to write or to mark". Therefore in case of an ambiguity, it is necessary to read the provision as a whole taking reference from other sections and the context, to arrive at true meaning of a particular word. This Principle is represented by legal maxim "In civile est nisi tota lege perspecta una aliqua particula ejus proposita judkare vel respondere" which means that it is not proper to give judgment upon a single clause unless the whole law has been examined. Therefore, the construction is to be made of all the Parts together and not of one part only by itself. According to LORD DAVEY, every clause of the statute must be construed with reference to context and other clauses of the Act, so as to make 2 consistent enactment of the whole statute or series of statutes relating to the subject matter. LORD GREENE says that to ascertain the meaning of a clause in aINTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 116 at the whole statute, at what precedes and g, statute, the courts must ly at the clause itself. what succeeds and not merery ind that Legislature, while enacting the lay, It is also to be borne in mind errde and clear language to expreg, is presumed to have used precise tions to ensure that no ambiguit themselves and to have taken all precaul vovision, the language should be remains. Therefore, while construing & : to show an ambiguity therein, J, read as it is and it should not be straine teed with @ presumption that course of interpretation, the courts eae only one meaning and more words are clear, plain and precise, they | ‘i the language is unambiguous than one meaning is reasonably not possible, if the ambiguity arises, th and leads to one construction only. Even ee inciples of interpretation provision may be construed following the settl ee wi — " The necessity of reading the statute as 2 whole while construing any its provisions, ees been very nicely stressed in mate ORE je es Put. Ltd. v. Suresh Chand, observed that bs eee of a statute by another part of the same statute is most genuine and natural exposition of a statute. In Ramnarain v. State of U.P,’ 8.K. DAS, J., observed that the expressions used in an Act must take colour from the context in which they appear. In Kehar Singh v. State,? the Supreme Court observed that the words and sections like men do not have their full significance when standing alone because like men they are better understood by the company they keep. In Management of Dhenkanal Urban Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Bhubneshwar,' Orissa High Court held that when a court deals with two sub-sections of a section, it has to construe the two sub-sections as a whole, each portion throwing light to the rest. The two peered oe be read as a part of integral whole and as being interdepen . attempt should be made in i as to reconcile them and avoid repugnancy. anaes In Darshan Singh Balwant Singh v, State of Punjab, i that ant § a njab,> it was held that the words and phrases occurring in a statute are to be taken not in isola! wd detached manner dissociated from the context, but are to be read together construed in light of purpose and the object of the Act itself. In State of Maharashtra v. Marwanje i, ' injee F. Desai,’ the Supreme Cou observed eo the statute shall have to be considered in its eeirety ba Picking ae up of one ee from one particular provision and thereby analyzing 4 manner contrary to the statement of objects and reasons is neithe! . AIR 1978 SC 996. . AIR 1957 SC 18, . AIR 1988 SC 1883, 1998 Lab. IC 2577. . AIR 1953 SC 83, . (2002) 2 SCC 318: AIR 2002 SC 456. SeraeneBASIC PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION "7" In Special Reference No. 1 of 2002, In re (Gujarat Assembly Election Matter),' the contextual construction was explained as follows : "In providing key to the meaning of any word or expression the context in which it is said has significance. Colour and content emanating from context may permit sense being preferred to mere meaning depending on what is sought to be achieved and what is sought to be prevented by the legislative scheme surrounding the expression. It is a settled principle that in interpreting the statute the words used therein cannot be read in isolation. Their colour and content are derived from their context and, therefore, every word in a statute must be examined in its context. By the word ‘context’, it means in its widest sense as including not only other enacting provisions of the same statute but its preamble, the existing state of the law, other statutes in pari materia and the mischief which the statute intended to remedy. While making such interpretation, the roots of the past, the foliage of the present and the seeds of the future cannot be lost sight of. Judicial interpretation should not be imprisoned in verbalism and words lose their thrust when read in vacuo. Context would quite often provide the key to the meaning of the word and the sense it should carry. Its setting would give colour to it and provide a clue to the intention of the Legislature in using it. A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged; it is the skin of living thought and may vary greatly in colour and coatent according to the circumstances and the time in which the same is used". In East India Hotels Ltd. v. Union of India, it was held that an Act is to be read as a whole, the different provisions have to be harmonized and the effect is to be given to all of them. In Grasim Industries Ltd. v. Collector of Customs,’ it was held that no words or expressions used in any statute can be said to be redundant or superfluous. In matters of interpretation one should not concentrate too much on one word and pay too little attention to other words. Every provision and every word must be looked at generally and in the context in which it is used and not in isolation. In Manik Lal Majumdar v. Gouranga Chundra Dey,‘ it was held that it is a well settled principle that the intention of the legislature must be found by reading the statute as a whole and in order to ascertain the meaning of a clause in a statute, the court must look at the whole statute, at what precedes and what succeeds and not merely the clause itself. The court must ascertain the intention of the legislature by directing its attention not merely to the clauses to be construed, but to the entire statute; it must compare the clause with the other parts of the law and the setting in which the clause to be interpreted occurs. 1, (2002) 8 SCC 237. 2. (2001) 1 SCC 284. 8. (2002) 4 SCC 297. 4. (2004) 12 SCC 448.INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 18 tate of AP,’ it was neld that no provision o, In V. Jagannadha Rao v. State of " fact, the statute has to word in a statute has to be read in isolation. olature. The intention of he oe a ple statute is an edict of the pee anguage Us ed which meang islature is pri marily to be gathered from i also to whi npn eh tir ps id. nsequence a constr jection of w me Ae ood or a ln cnn meaningless, has to be avoided. It is oon ay v0 os6arY to do so. Similarly, read words a a eT ae bs by substituting some ee for vrorde, "of the statute, In other words, tiers phen oe ould be sa w substitute or paraphrase of general application. Attention aan to what is necessary for deciding & particular case. Court held that th . a2 ul e] at the mawat v. Union of India,’ Supreme amuse Batra dete, should be construed with reference a vis-a-vis the other provisions 60 88 to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute relating to the subject-matter In Karnataka State Financial Corpn. Vv. N. Narasimahaiah,’ the Supreme Court reiterated that entire statute must be first read as a whole then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by In Subramanian Swamy v. Election Commission of India,* the Apex Court held that the statute has to be read as a whole. One particular provision, read in isolation could not be struck down as violative of Art. 14. In Prakash Kumar alias Prakash Bhutto v. State of Gujarat,’ it was held that by now it is well settled principle of law that no part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statues have to be fenatoee so that every word has a place and everything is in its place. It is te | that the statute or rules made there under should be read as & whole | pal provision should be construed with reference to the other pebtoe make provision consistent with the object sought to be In GE. India Tech ? Tas} it wan held thee nasty ee Private Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income to every word used in that tine ing a section one has to give weightas° In Balwant Si igh Si 8 statute, induding ve Jogdiah Singh," it was held that the provisions slative intent in mind, re to be given full effect, keeping : 7 r to ensure that the projected object ——— 1. 2001) 10 SCC 401 : AIR 2008 ac 1. 2 (2008) 7 sce 628. z . ‘ aaa ieee : AIR 2008 sc 1797. ame ee on + AIR 2009 sc no. . 201010) sce 29. . . AIR 20) ‘ 10 SC 3043 ; 2010 (8) sco 685.BASIC PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION 119 In Maharashtra Land Development Corporation v. State of. Maharashtra,’ it was held that every word and phrase of the Act is to be understood in its context and must be given significance so that they are not rendered redundant. In Zameer Ahmed Latifur Rehman Sheikh v. State of Maharashtra,? it was held that no provision or word in a statute is to be read in isolation. In fact, the statute has to be read as a whole and in ita entirety. In Pallawi Resources Ltd v. Protos Engineering Company Pot. Lid.,” it was held that a cardinal principle of statutory interpretation is that a provision in a statute must be read as a whole and not in isolation ignoring the other provisions of that statute. While dealing with a statutory instrument, one cannot be allowed to pick and choose. It will be grossly unjust if the Court allows a person to single out and avail the benefit of a provision from a chain of provisions which is favourable to him. In Offshore Holdings Put. Ltd. v. Bangalore Development Authority,* it was held that the statute should be construed with reference to the context and its provisions to make a consistent enactment, i.e. ex visceribus actus. In Indian Medical Association v. Union of India,’ it was held that one of the cardinal principles of interpretation is to look for the purpose that the Act seeks to achieve, and in this regard what is also crucial is the relationship of each clause or sub-clause to the other. The strict lexicographical arrangement of sub-clauses, one after the other, ought not to be taken to mean that the one following is of lesser importance. In H. Siddiqui v. Ramalingam,’ it was held that the provisions should be read in such a way as to require that the various particulars mentioned therein should be taken into consideration. In Executive Engineer v. Sri Seetaram Rice Mill,’ it was held that it is a settled cannon of interpretative jurisprudence that the statute should be read as a whole. In other words, its different provisions may have to be construed together to make consistent construction of the whole statute relating to the subject matter. A construction which will improve the workability of the statute, to be more effective and purposive, should be preferred to any other interpretation which may lead to undesirable results. In State of U. P. v. Hari Ram,* the Supreme Court held that the words and phrases occurring in the statute are to be taken not in an isolated or aoe manner but construed in the light of the purpose and object of the 201011) SCALE 675. AIR 2010 SC 2633 : 2010 (5) SCC 246. AIR 2010 SC 1969 : 2010 (5) SCC 196. 2011 (3) SCC 139. AIR 2011 SC 2365 : 2011 (7) SCC 179. AIR 2011 SC 1492 : 2011 (4) SCC 240. 2011 (12) SCALE 243, (2013) 4 SCC 280 : AIR 2013 SC 1793. pxessepeINTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 120 . Prakash Sharma,’ it was held that — ) itash Kumar v. Om Praka sect ; is to fe Seeeerated by reading all of its parts together and Court can neithe add nor subtract even a single word. An State of A.P. v. Mohd. Hussain,’ it was held that a section ig | : t0 be 2a i i -Becti are to be read in relation to in its entirety, and its sub sections . ae then and not disjunctively. Besides, text of a section has to be Tead ; i i t be separated f." f statute. A few sub-sections of a section canno p fr other sub-sestions, and read to convey something altogether different fro the theme underlying entire section. That is how a section is Tequired to by read purposively and meaningfully. i i i ingh, i held that th In Union of India y. Dileep Kumar Singh, it was Proviso does not travel beyond provision to which it is appended, golden Tule is to read the whole section inclusive of the proviso in such a manner that they mutually throw light on each other and result in harmonious construction Application of the Principle of ex visceribus actus : This principle has been applied in a number of cases. A study of a selected few would reveal how undesired results would have flown from the language of a provision, had the same not been construed in light of context or in light of other sectio1 In Union of India v. Mamta Anurag Sharma,‘ the respondent belonged to the IPS of West Bengal Cadre. She married to an IPS Officer of Andhra Pradesh Cadre. After marriage, she applied for getting herself transferred to Andhra Pradesh Cadre in view of transfer policy of the government but her application was not considered. She therefore moved the High Court of Andhra Pradesh by filing writ Petition, which was allowed. Therefore Present appeal was preferred befor Policy under which Andhra Pradesh Cadre, including its pi Court had not taken into consideratio In Chief General Manager (Telecom), NE Telecom Circle v. Rajend Chandra Bhattacharjee,* the office Memorandum dated 14.12.1983 provid that an officer who will serve in North Eastern region for a fixed aes shall be considered for further posting at a station of his choice. Undet 1, (2013) 11 SCC 451 : AIR 2013 SC 30. 2. (2014) 1 SCC 258 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 252, 8. (2015) 4 SCC 421. 4. 2001 III CLR 600 SC. 5. 1995 I CLR 626 SC.BASIC PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION 121 provision, the respondent claimed his posting at Agartala as his choice posting, but he was transferred to Dimapur. Respondent challenged the said transfer before Central Administrative Tribunal who quashed the impugned transfer order, hence this Appeal. When the provision relating to choice posting after completion of fixed tenure in North Eastern region was studied in light of the policy as a whole, it was observed that this provision was made applicable only for those persons who belonged to the region other than North Eastern region. It was admitted position that the respondent belonged to North East region, his home town was Agartala in the State of Tripura, he was originally appointed and posted in that region and for most part of his service, he was posted at Agartala. In view of these facts, the Supreme Court observed that respondent had no right to claim his posting at Agartala, In O.P. Singla v. Union of India,! Supreme Court construed the proviso to Rule 7 of Delhi Higher Judicial Services Rules, 1970, in the light of Rule 8 of these Rules. The Rule 7 deals with recruitment by promotion and direct recruitment. The proviso attached to this Rule says "provided that not more than one third of the substantive posts shall be filled by direct recruit". If the language of this proviso is examined in isolation, it does not provide a quota of direct recruits, instead imposes a maximum ceiling of one third of substantive posts that could be filled by direct recruitment process. This proviso was interpreted by Supreme Court taking help from Rule 8, which lays down that the seniority of direct recruitees vis-a-vis promotees shall be determined in order of rotation of vacancies reserved for both categories, i.e., direct recruitees and promotees, by Rule-7. Thus Rule 8 speaks of reservation of vacancies for both the categories as provided in Rule-7. In the light of Rule 8, it was held that proviso of Rule -7 truly says that one third of substantive posts must be reserved for direct recruits. In Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad v. P.N. Murthy,? Section 202 of Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act, 1955 grants exemption from property tax to those buildings and lands which are vesting in the Corporation. The language of this section suggests that all buildings and lands, the title of which is vested in corporation, are free from charge of property tax, whether its actual possession remains with Corporation or the possession is being enjoyed by some occupier. The question was whether the property of Corporation, in respect of which a hire-purchase agreement has been entered into and the possession has been given to the allottees, but the title of which has not passed to such allottees, stand exempted under Section 202. If Section 202 is read in isolation, it appears that such properties are also entitled to exemption, but when Section 202 of the Act is examined in the light of Section 204 of the Act, the Position changes. Section 204 provides that property tax shall be leviable from the occupier if he holds the premises ctly from Corporation. This section makes it clear that if the property is Secupied by some other person, such person shall be liable to pay property tax, even if the property remains vested in the Corporation. While deciding ‘e question as to whether property tax could be imposed on such properties 1, (1984) 4 SCC 450. 2. (1987) 1 SCC 568.122 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES studied both Sections 202 ang a der Section 202 was limiteg ession of which is vest di of the Corporation, the Supreme Court together and held that exemption granted un that property only, the title as well as the poss the Corporation. In Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras,’ the Supreme Court interpy, the word "sale" used in Madras General Sales Tax Re eee and held that the word was laying stress on the element of transfer o! ee by Way of sale and therefore if only a contract for sale has been entered into within Province of Madras, then it does not constitute the sale within the mean; of this term under the Act because actual transfer of property has not taken place. In view of this, sales-tax cannot be levied. In arriving at Such a conclusion, the Supreme Court referred to the title, preamble, definition and other provisions of the statute, as also subsequent amendments made in the statute. The Court observed that it is settled principle of construction that all constituent parts of the statute are taken together and each word, phrase or sentence is to be considered in the light of the general purpose of the Ac, itself. In Attar Singh v. Inder Kumar,’ the question before Supreme Court was relating to interpretation of Section 13 (a) (ii) of Punjab Rent Restriction Act, 1949, which provided that a landlord could obtain the possession of rented land if (a) he requires it for his own use (b) he is not occupying in the we ie sr he Purpose of ne boss any other such rented land and land without sufficient cause after commencement of this Act. The words "for his own use" mentioned in clause ey And a specify Seer aee or nature of use would entitle the landlord to session se Cap i lat de a ee isolation without having regard to other clauses, But the pocteinn revere it the light of clause (b) and (0. The oe ra jut the position reverses in ay are to be read together and in the | light of me het eal Si dl of what is provided in the use (b), the clause (a) was also restricted to the use of business. It may thus be concluded that while construing any provision of la, 1. AIR 1953 SC 274, 2. AIR 1967 SC 773,BASIC PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION 123 the words used in a provision are uncertain and imprecise and are capable of bearing more than one meaning, thereby leading to ambiguity in the language and possibility of alternative constructions, then such a conatruction should be preferred by which none of the provisions is turned inoperative. The spirit behind this principle is that the courts are not encouraged to scratch a law for sheer vagueness. The law is enacted by the Legislature with a definite object and specific purpose. For achieving such purpose. the law is to be administered in its true sense. ie., in accordance with the intention of Legislature. The intention of Legislature cannot be otherwise than to give effect to all the provisions of the statute for attainment of the object for which the law was enacted. In view of this, if the courts shall uphold such an interpretation by which any provision of law or the law itself is invalidated, then it will be adverse to the legislative intent. Moreover, making the law, amending it or repealing it, is the exclusive domain of Legislature and if by arriving at a particular interpretation, any Jaw or its provision is turned ineffective or futile, it amounts to rejection of law which is outside the jurisdiction of courts. True, that an enacted law can be abrogated by the court, but only on the ground of unconstitutionality. However, courts cannot be allowed to create any vagueness or unconstitutionality in a provision by construing it in a particular manner. The courts strongly lean against a construction which reduces the statute to futility. Such an approach has been expressed in a number of judgments. While pronouncing upon constitutionality of a statute, the courts ‘start with the presumption that there is nothing unconstitutional in the law and then proceed to examine it in the light of constitutional provisions. Thus there is a presumption in favour of constitutionality. FARWELL, J., has observed that unless the words are so absolutely senseless that nothing could be done with them, it will be binding to find some meaning and not to declare them void for uncertainty. LORD DENNING states that when a statute has some meaning or several meanings, the courts have to say what meaning the statute has to bear rather than reject it as a nullity. In the words of LORD DUNEDIN, "it is our duty to make what we can of statutes, knowing that they are meant to be operative and nothing short of impossibility should allow a judge to declare a statute unworkable." In K.P. Mohammed Salim v. C.LT.,\ the Apex Court reiterated the principle that a provision must be construed in such a manner so as to make it workable. In Sarabjit Rick Singh v. Union of India,? the Supreme Court observed that where the interpretation renders the statute unworkable, it must be abandoned. “ In Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam,’ the Supreme ‘ourt held that a statute or any enacting provision therein must be so 1. (2008) 11 SCC 573. 2. (2008) 2 SCC 417. 8. AIR 1990 SC 123.INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 124 ; ve and operative. However if statute j wholly intractable and absolute, dvoid for vagueness. y it effective ar construed as to na ite language is absolutely vague an meeningless, the statute could be declared eld that tv. Union of India, it was he! a ia statute m ea Kumane noble instrument. The courts will Teject tha be construed as a wo +n jntention of the Legislature construction which will defeat the plain in used. Reducing though there may be some inexactitude in the Een a ducing the legislation futility shall be avoided and in a case WI a ein en Hoa a the Legislature cannot be given effect to, the courts woul a4 The older construction for the purpose of bringing about an effective resi it € courts, when rule of purposive construction is gaining momentum, s ‘ould be very reluctant to hold that Parliament has achieved nothing by the language it used when it is tolerably plain what it seeks to achieve. In Sankar Ram & Co. v. Kasi Naicker,? the Supreme Court observed that there exists a presumption that there is a legislative intent that every part of the statute should have effect. It is a cardinal rule of construction that normally no word or provision should be considered redundant or superfluous in interpreting the provisions of a statute. In the field of interpretation of statutes, the courts always presume that the Legislature inserted every part thereof with a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect. It may not be correct to say that a word or words used in a statute are either unnecessary or without any purpose to serve, unless there are compelling reasons to say so looking to the scheme of the statute and having regard to the object and purpose sought to be achieved by it. In Swami Atmananda vy. Sri Ramkrishna Tapovanam: it was held that a statute, as is well known, must be read in such a manner so as to give effect to the provisions thereof. It must be read reasonably, A statute must be construed in such a manner s0 as to make it workable. In Prazash Kumar alias Prakash Bhutto v. State of Gujarat,‘ it we held that Courts should avoid a . z the legislation to futility. construction which would reduce In Executive Engineer v. Sri See; i +778 it is a settled cannon of interpretative jane pe twas held tate read as a whole. In other words, its different provisions y have to construed together to make consistent constructi f oe Je statul? relating to the subject matter. A construction aie the it ve workability of the statute, to be more effective ed will ould be preferred to any other interpretation which may lead a eerie results. In Sulochana Chandrakant Galande . fit was held that the court has to construe tho Pune ae ata wa 1, (2003) 7 SCC 628. 2, (2003) 11 SCC 699. 8. (2005) 10 SCC 51. 4. (2005) 2 SCC 409. 5. 2011 (12) SCALE 243. 6. AIR 2010 SC 2692 : 2010 (8) SCC 467.BASIC PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION 125 which makes the provisions workable advancing the purpose and object or enactment o the Statute. In Bhakra Beas Management Board v. Krishan Kumar Vij,’ it was held that a statute is designed to be workable and interpretation thereof by court should be to secure that object unless crucial omission or clear direction makes that end unattainable. A statute/enacting provision must be so construed as to make it effective and operative. Any such construction which reduces the statute to a futility has to be avoided In Girnar Traders v, State of Maharashtra,’ it was held that the courts normally would make every effort to save the legislation and resolve the conflict/repugnancy, if any, rather than invalidating the statute. In Maharashtra Land Development Corporation v. State of Maharashtra, it was held that every word and phrase of the Act is to be understood in its context and must be given significance so that they are not rendered redundant. In Balwant Singh v. Jagdish Singh,‘ it was held that the Court should not give such an interpretation to provisions which would render the provisions ineffective or odious. In Union of India v. Alok Kumar,’ it was held that when the rules and regulations have been framed dealing with different aspects of the service of the employees, the Court would attempt to make a harmonious construction and try to save the provision, not strike it down rendering the provision ineffective. Court would normally adopt an interpretation which is in line with the purpose of such regulation. In Union of India v. R. Vasudeva Murthy,® it was held that the Court must lean against a construction which reduces a statute to a nullity. In Girnar Traders v. State of Maharashtra,’ it was held that a statute should be construed so as to make it effective and operative on the principle expressed in the maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat. In State of Gujarat v. R.A. Mehta,® the Apex Court held that a statute must be construed in such a manner so as to make it workable. The construction given by the court must promote the object of the statute and serve the purpose for which it has been enacted and not efface its very purpose. The maxim Ut res magis valeat quam pereat i.e. it is better for a thing to have effect than for it to be made void. In Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases, it was held |. AIR 2010 SC 334: - 2011 (3) SCC 1. 2010 (11) SCALE 675. . AIR 2010 SC 3043 : 2010 (8) SCC 685. j. AIR 2010 SC 2735 : 2010(5) SCC 349. AIR 2010 SC 2879 : 2010 (9) SCC 30. . 2011 (3) SCC 1. . (2013) 3 SCC 1: AIR 2013 SC 693. . (2014) 2 SCC 62 : AIR 2014 SC 448. : 2010 (8) SCC 701. Sereerenrnr= 126 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES that a court of law would interpret a provision cae peal help iy sustaining the validity of the law by applying | ae au easonail construction rather than applying @ Corns ination, make the provision unsustainable and ultra vires the Co: In Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse,’ the Supreme Court heig when there is a possibility of two constructions, the oe eee effect that construction which will be responsible for ot ° construct 7 system for which the statute has een ent . 4 whieh would reduce the legislation to a futility should be ean aa courts roy is to understand the purpose of law in society and to help the law achieve i purpose. It is the duty of the court to determine proper relationship between subjective and objective purposes of law. at, Application of the Principle of ut res magis valeat quam Pereat Application of this principle can be seen in following case laws :_ In Avtar Singh v. State of Punjab,’ Section 39 of Electricity Act, 1919 Provided that ant eneuaed found guilty under this section must be punishej under Section 379 of Indian Penal Code. Section 50 of this Act Provided the Procedure. The appellant was convicted for theft of electricity under Section 39 and the respondent proceeded against him under Section 379 of IPC. The appellant contended that he could not be convicted under Section 39 as the procedure for conviction as required by Section 56 was not followed, The respondent contended that punishment under Section 379 of IPC has to be imposed in accordance with the Provisions of Section 39. The Supreme Court, applying this principle, held that the offence is against the Electricity Act and not against IPC, hence Section 50 must have been followed. It may be noted that had following the procedure for convict Ac and in result, Section 50 woul le. In M. Pentiah y, Veeramalla; the . pa Muddala,® the matter before Supreme Court was relating to the Hyderabad District Municipalities Acs - y this Act, an earlier Act was Tepealed. In Section 320, it w# provided that various i - Provisions of the repealed An winich were constituted under i hall continue ti ime the committees are constitute » Mall continue till the time e committees hold their fa meet the provisions of this Act and such tion laid down in Section 50 of Electricity ld have become ineffective, inoperative and ti “ibey meet. In repealed Act, Sey ction 320 of the new Act, the term ap ee but in view of the langusé® if al committees ‘ . 3 years w, licable be# were to remain functional til] RansaiSEae first meeti®é + AIR 20 2. AIR 1965 Sc 666, 14 SC 869, 8. AIR 1961 so 1107, DeBASIC PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION 127 of the committees under the new Act. Section 16 (i) provided that every eral election shall be held by the Collector within a period of three months before expiry of the term of the office of committee members. In view of the situation that (a) committees under the old Act were permitted to continue under the new Act till such time the new committee holds its first meeting, having no regard to the term of 3 years provided under Section 34 of the old Act and (b) Section 16 (i) confers the power upon the Collector to hold election within three month’s period before expiry of term, it can be seen that no date of expiry of term of such committees exists because it is subject to holding of first meeting of new committee and at the same time, the Collector’s power of holding general election is confined to three months prior to expiry of term. Thus, in this particular matter, in the absence of any fixed date of expiry of term, the date "three months prior to expiry of term" cannot be ascertained and as such, the Collector cannot act in accordance with Section 16 (i). It was argued that in view of the language of Section 16 (i), the Collector’s power are limited by second part of the section prescribing a period and therefore Collector has no power to hold first general elections under the new Act. SUBBARAO, J., observed that if the interpretation, as contended, is accepted it would Jead to indefinite continuance of committees constituted under the old Act and the new Act would become a dead letter and the obvious intention of Legislature would be defeated. Hence it was held that provisions of Section 16 (i) are inapplicable to the first election after the new Act came into force. The Collector was declared to be empowered to hold first general elections and the restriction "within three months before the expiry of term" was held to be inapplicable in case of first general elections, though such restriction shall be given effect to in subsequent elections.INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 128 CHAPTER SUMMARY is governed by certain set of rules, The, i tation is tl F The process ited ded but have been rie High Conn’ othe prineiples are rhe Supreme Court of India eae Tough principles or gate view taken by cement, They are | ive in passing @ ae Se aiarega rd to these principles cannot survive jp the yet an interpret eyes of law. - enacts the law wi Legislature enacts With 9 Ky CSTE Cee agisiature opens its mind iD fori oe of certain definite object in it the legislative intent must be primarily gai ered from language and hence if the words of a statute are themselves precise the language itself: If the ly one meaning, the court should adopt thei, 7 7 I ; peaambigvonsiene Cie eke ae and effectuate them witho wrdin: nd grammatical sense eff > thout Tooking ints consequences thereof. The primary principle of interpretation ig isi onstrued according to the intent of lay ete tae eee elie Legislature is precise and plain, then the legislative ‘intent is declared by the language itself which must be given effect to, regardless of consequences that may follow. But if the words used in the provision are imprecise and reasonably susceptible to. several meanings, then strict grammatical construction may mislead the discovery of true intention. In such a case the court may go beyond the literal confines and may call in aid the legislative history, the basic scheme and framework of the statute as a whole, the purpose of legislation, the object sought to be achieved and the consequences that may follow from the adoption of one in preference to other possible interpretation, However, the court cannot read i peaning only, whatever hardship +18 called literal constrncte or litra legis. This 8 it ig f law and is univer also argued that to be too literal means to see the ie od of missing the reall Ta legis ig Strictly adhered to, then thet? ay commen ex reRsions used by Lean underlying the words of a provisie? may jometimes fail to diselo ¥ Legislature in the language of rrovisi® . ve to see bey 0 Tue legisla: oe 1 's called sententig vega yo he words discover ryantent Therefore the (7, b ‘Or sententia legis, Te abundant Pre tne legislative eae ile a ‘Parts. Nothing shoule 9 enguage should mar eae to be taken vel SF Be modified. "The ai be added or scratched out tie lever of cannot write out, The le sly down what is expresBASIC PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION 129 intended by the Legislature. The court has no power to destroy or defeat what is intended by Legislature by importing anything of their own. (i) Ex visceribus actus (Statute must be read as a whole in its context).—The meaning of this maxim is that every part of the statute must be construed within the four corners of the Act, No provision should be interpreted in isolation. If alternative constructions are possible due to uncertainty of words, the Provision has to be read as a whole in its context. Every clause of the statute must be construed with reference to context and other clauses of the Act, so as to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute. It is not permissible to omit any part. Construction of a section should be made of all parts together. Two sub-sections of a section must be construed as'a whole, each portion throwing light to the rest. The reason behind this principle is that if @ provision is interpreted independent of others, it could lead to inconsistency amongst various parts of that section or amongst different sections-Further, the same word may mean one thing in one context and another in different context and hence same word used in different sections of a statute or used at different places in the same clause may bear different meaning. The expressions used in an Act take colour from the context in which they appear. Therefore meaning of a word actually depends on the assembly of words in which that word has been placed because the words and sections like men do not have their full significance when standing alone because like men they are better understood by the company they keep. While construing a provision, the language should be read as it is. The statute must be read as a whole and every section, sub-section or clause must be interpreted with reference to the context and other clauses of the Act. In order to ascertain the meaning of a clause in a statute, the courts must look at the whole statute, at what precedes and at what succeeds and not merely at the clause itself. Since every word used in the language is presumed to have been inserted with a specific Purpose, no word can be said to be redundant or superfluous. No word should be ignored or discarded and each word must be iven effect to. The courts must proceed with a presumption that words are clear, plain and precise and bear only one meaning and the language is free from ambiguity and reasonably open to one construction only. Even then, if the ambiguity arises, the Provision may be construed following the settled principles of interpretation, (iii) Ut res magis valeat qauam pereat (It may rather become operative than null).—The meaning of this maxim is that the language of the provision must be so interpreted that the law does not become a dead letter. No provision or statute should be reduced to futilit Particular construction to it. Whenever the then such a c hich none of the Provisions is turned ineffective. A statute or any enacting provision therein must be so construed . The law is enacted by the Legislature pecific purpose and the same shall be frustrated ‘ e law is turned to nullity. The courts should reject such an interpretation by which the law or any provision thereof is invalidated since “amounts to abrogation of law which is outaide the jurisdiction of courts. ItSs 130 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES is only the Legislature which is competent to make law, ag it dn, Tepeal it. Therefore courts strongly lean against a construction. ty r. = Uces the statute to futility. While pronouncing upon constitution ity 0! oe th courts start with the presumption that there 18 er itutional ; the law and then proceed to examine it in the lig ar ste Stitution, provisions. Thus there is a presumption in favour of constitu oe No word or provision should be considered redundant or superfluous whi, interpreting the provisions of a statute. Courts always presume that the Legislature has inserted every part with a purpose and the legislative inten, is that every part of the statute should have effect. It may not be correct t, say that a word or words used in a statute are either unnecessary or withoy, any purpose to serve, unless there are compelling reasons to say so looking to the scheme of the statute and having regard to the object and purpog sought to be achieved by it. QQ