Progress and Purpose:

A Developmental History
Of The
United States Marine Corps
1900- 1970

By

Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth J. Clifford, USMCR

HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20380
I 973

PCN 19000412400
 Library of Congress Card No. 73—600153

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,

Washington, D.C. 20402—Price: $1.75 GPO supply price
Stock Number 0855—00067
 FOREWORD

In this work the fighting record of the U.S. Marine Corps is not discussed but rather the inven-
tiveness of those Marines who pioneered the amphibious role that would be played by the Corps
in the 20th century.
Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth J. Clifford, the author, has been active in the Marine Corps
Reserve for many years and served on active duty as an infantry platoon leader in Korea. More
recently he has taken leave from his civilian pursuits of teaching social and political history at
St. John's University in Jamaica, New York, to serve two years at the Historical Division of
Headquarters Marine Corps and a year in Vietnam as an assistant to the Assistant Chief of Staff,
G—l, III Marine Amphibious Force. He has a PhD in American studies from the University of
London and is completing a book analyzing British and American amphibious (combined) oper-
ations, 1920— 1945.
This work is dedicated to the proposition that Marines, past, present, and future, are experts
in their craft, namely, amphibious warfare. However, amphibious warfare is a complex subject and
this book does not pretend to be the last and definitive work on 20th century development of
amphibious doctrine, tactics, equipment, and techniques. It should be considered an exploratory
work, one that invites further research and study. Comments on the text, including citation of
errors of both omission and commission, are solicited.

E. H. SIMMONS
Reviewed and approved: Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)
1 March 1973. Director of Marine Corps History and Museums

U'
 PREFACE

Marine Corps contributions to the development of doctrine, tactics, and techniques of am-
phibious warfare have been cited in various Marine Corps histories for at least the past 70 years. It
was the idea of Lieutenant General James M. Masters, Sr., then Commandant of Marine Corps
Schools, 1966—1968, to restate these contributions and to cite some other contributions such as the
doctrine of vertical envelopment and the use of helicopters in land warfare. My idea was to tell the
story of these contributions without using a chronology of Marine "firsts."
The book is generally divided into decades giving the status of the Marine Corps during the
particular decade, coupled with a brief introduction into the political and economic climate of the
times. This was of course important because it is those economic and political factors that directly
affected the military situation.
In researching for the story, three unique things became apparent. The first was that in 1932,
the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico chose to study a case history in disaster from World War I,
the Gallipoli-Dardanelles Campaign of 1915—16. Rear Admiral L.E.H. Maund, Royal Navy, might
have given the answer for Marine Corps Schools if it had been asked of them—Why study Gallipoli?
Admiral Maund said of Gallipoli, "It had imagination, it had the promise of great strategic gains;
while the reasons for its failure could easily be discerned and had to do with lack of technique,
material and belief in this form of warfare—shortcomings that could all be overcome." It is the
"shortcomings" that Marine planners had overcome by the commencement of World War II. The
second unique accomplishment that surfaced was that Marine Corps Schools had the first written
doctrine on landing operations before it had suitable landing boats to carry out the doctrine. In
like fashion, within 15 years after the "Tentative Landing Operations Manual" was published, the
Marine Corps Schools had the first written doctrine on helicopter operations before actually pos-
sessing a helicopter.
As a by-product of researching this book, I discovered and used quite extensively the General
Board Records of the United States Navy which apparently had seen little previous use by Marine
researchers. My profound thanks go to Dr. Dean C. Allard, Head of the Navy Operational Archives
Branch, Naval Historical Division and Mrs. Kathleen Lloyd who made these records available to me.
My major source of information came from Breckinridge Library, Marine Corps Educational Cen-
ter at Quantico. Mr. Dave Brown and Mrs. Lyvia Garsys of the library helped me through the maze
of files there. The Historical Amphibious File at the library is a gold mine for amphibious warfare
researchers and the cooperation of all personnel there is outstanding. The people at the libraries
of the Office of the Chief of Military History of the Army and of the Navy Department were most
helpful noting particularly Mr. W. Bart Greenwood and Mrs. Rita Halle of the Navy Library.
Getting closer to home, Mrs. Clara Miller and Mrs. Frances Rubright of the History and Museums
Division Library and Archives were exceptionally helpful. Sergeant Michael L. Gardiner and Lance
Corporal Isaac C. Moon, Jr., both had a hand in typing various versions of the manuscript, but the
lion's share of work on the final manuscript was done by Miss Kay P. Sue. The index was compiled
and prepared for publication by Miss Cynthia J. Nash. The maps and sketches were prepared by
Sergeants Kenneth 'W. White and Jerry L. Jakes. I am particularly indebted to Mr. Henry I. Shaw,
Jr., Chief Historian of the History and Museums Division at Headquarters Marine Corps and Profes-
sor William H. Russell of the United States Naval Academy. I doubt if Winston Churchill could have
gotten his works past their critical eyes without their strong recommendation and comments.
In any event—they were right in all instances.
Historical accuracy is my responsibility alone and the very few unsolicited grains of personal
V
opinion are mine also. A debt of gratitude goes to those officers who read my drafts and gave me
the benefit of their knowledge and invaluable experience. Unless otherwise noted, all illustrations
are official Department of Defense (Marine Corps) photographs.
Lastly, I would like to dedicate this book to the Amphibious Warfare Presentation Team killed
in the performance of their duty to their country and to their Corps in a plane crash in January
1968. In the final analysis, the members of the Presentation Team represented all Marines, past,
present, and future. They were about their duty, telling the story of what the Marine Corps/Navy
Team does best—conduct amphibious operations. As long as there are oceans and littoral areas of the
world, there will always be a need to know the workings that makeup the amphibious operation.

/<t

KENNETH J. CLIFFORD
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve

vi
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter Page
BACKGROUND—1900-1920—COMING OF AGE . 1

The Nature of the General Board 6

Advanced Base Force—The Reason for Existence 8
Advanced Base Force Comes of Age 15
"The World Must Be Safe for Democracy" 21

II. POSTWAR DISARMAMENT PERIOD 25

Evolution of a Staff 27
Duties and Missions 29
Maneuvers, Expeditions, Football, and Mail 30
Fleet Maneuvers—l922 31
Fleet Maneuvers—1923—l924 32
Aloha—Fleet Maneuvers—1925 35
Marine Corps Schools 36
Aviation—The Magnificent Men in Their Flying Machines 38

III. ECONOMY AND WITHDRAWAL 41

Marine Corps Schools of the Thirties 43
The Manual 46
The Contents 47
Boats, Lighters, and Amphibians 48
I—Landing Boats 48
Il—Lighters 52
Ill—Amphibians 53
Marine Aviation in the Thirties 58
The Genesis of Close Air Support 58

IV. THE DECADE OF THE FORTIES—THE WAR AND THE BOMB 61

War Plans 61
Refinement of Tactics and Techniques in Amphibious Operations During World
War Il—Naval Gunfire (NGF) 65
Close Air Support (CAS) 67
Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) 69
Trials and Adaptations—Marine Aviation 70
And Then Came the Bomb 71
Repeat of the 1930s 73
Phib—31 77

V. THE FIFTIES: MASSIVE RETALIATION, PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE,

AND NUCLEAR STALEMATE 79
Introduction 79
The Status of the Marine Corps in the 1950s 79
Korea—The Test 82
Optimum Organization and the Boards 84
Techniques and Hardware Development During the l950s 88
Research and Development (R&D) Cycle 91

vii
 VI. THE DECADE OF THE SIXTIES 95
Pacification in General, Civic Action in Particular 96
In Support Of 100
The Helicopter and Refinement of Tactical Mobility 103
High Mobility and the Fire Support Base 105
Research, Development, and Studies in the 1960s 107
The Decade to Come 109
Vertical/Short-Take-Off and Landing 112

APPENDICES
A— Notes 115
B— Bibliography 127
C— Glossary of Abbreviations 133
D— Commandants of the Marine Corps in the Twentieth Century 135
E— Commanders at Quantico 137
F— Outline of the development of the Landing Operations Manual 139
G— Students and instructors who were assigned to MCS during preparation of
Tentative Landing Operations Manual
H— List of participants in conference held at Quantico, Virginia, on 9 January
1934 for purpose of discussing Tentative Landing Operations Manual 143
I— Fleet Marine Force Organization and Composition Board Members 145
J— Citation to accompany the award of the Medal of Merit to Donald Roebling ... 147

INDEX 149

VIII
 CHAPTER I
BACKGROUND—1900-1920—COMING OF AGE

Mark Sullivan describes America on the

first day of the new century thus:
The American of 1900, reading his paper on
Monday morning, New Year's Day, or the Sunday
paper of the day before, or almost any paper dur-
ing the year, observed, with some uneasiness, that
the head-lines continued to occupy themselves, as
they had for a considerable time, with the Philip-
pines, Cuba, Porto Rico, Guam, Aguinaldo, the
Igorrotes; words which three years before had no
more meaning to him than to stir old memories of
something he had seen in his schoolboy biogra-
phies—you couldn't be confident how to pronounce
the names . . If the American, reading the papers
.

of New Year's Day, 1900, was more than commonly

reflective over the serious aspects of the news, it
was only partly because the sporting page and the
comic strip had not yet arrived to overbalance the
American newspaper on the side of the merely
diverting. It was due also to the presence in the
newspapers of that day and in the sermons of the
day before, of a spirit of solemnity, occasioned by
the coming of a new year and, as some said, a new
century.1
The United States population at the start
of this new century had an estimated 76,094,000
persons of whom there were nearly 39 million
males.2 Out of this then-vast population came
the little known U.S. Marine Corps of 5,240 Major General Charles Heywood, 9th Commandant
men and 174 officers including the Brigadier of the U.S. Marine Corps, 30 June 1891 to 2 October
General (later Major General) Commandant 1903. (USMC Photo #302066).
Charles Heywood.
There was little difference, in the minds of the Marines did not represent the Navy. The
the general public, between the Marine Corps Marines were quite separate.
and the Navy. The recent Spanish-American During the early years of the McKinley
War had been a "Naval War" and the sub- Administration, Colonel Theodore A. Bingham,
sequent events of occupation and the Philip- an Army Engineer, had the position of Com-
pine insurrection were an Army show. There missioner of Public Buildings and Grounds
were no Marine national heroes, such as the and acted as a kind of major-domo of the
Navy's "Hero of Manila Bay," Admiral George White House. Colonel Bingham had to select
Dewey, or the Army's "Rough Rider," Teddy the President's two military aides, traditionally
Roosevelt. The only group of people who per- representing the two branches of the service.
haps knew the difference between an officer There had been no objection to the first as-
of Marines and an officer of the Navy line was sistant, an able army artillery officer. The fatal
the Washington social crowd. When it came error was the choice of the Navy representa-
to proper representation at the 'White House, tive, Captain Charles L. McCawley. Captain
the Navy didn't hesitate to make clear that McCawley was an admirable young man, witty
I
2 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

Lieutenant Dion Williams and a detachment from the USS Baltimore saluting Admiral Dewey on his visit to
the Navy Yard, Cavite, Philippine Islands on 13 June 1898. (USMC Photo #4831).

and well-bred. The trouble was that he did Secretary of the Navy John D. Long got the
not belong to the Navy proper. He was a President's consent to augment the detail of
captain of Marines. Navy circles buzzed with aides with a naval officer. The grave crisis of
the news that officers of the line had been Washington society was resolved and the Navy's
passed over at the Executive Mansion. The feelings were saved.
Navy Department was boiling with resentment. Willis J. Abbot has written a history of the
To allay the fears of some of the Navy officials, Marine Corps entitled Soldiers of the Sea,
published in 1918. In the foreword of the book,
it was noted that "until now one could search
the public libraries almost in vain for works
pertaining to the U.S. Marine Corps, as such,
and Mr. Abbot has rendered a notable serv-
ice." The fact is that this statement was not

-- technically correct. There was in existence a

second edition (1903) of Major Richard S.
Collum's History of the United States Marine
Corps. Though it was not a runaway best
seller, it did provide, for those interested, the
story of the Marine Corps.
The Marines did get some notoriety of sorts
when the former Assistant Secretary of the
Navy, Theodore Roosevelt, in his last year as
President in 1908 caused the removal of
Marines from naval vessels. Efforts to remove
Marines from ships had been made by a group
of naval officers from 1890—94, led by the
Marine gun crew on board the USS Alliance in Marine Corps antagonist, Captain William F.
1888. (USMC Photo #515255). Fullam, USN. These early efforts were rejected
 BACKGROUND—1900-1920—COMING OF AGE 3

TL1

Group of officers, 1st Battalion of Marines (Huntington's), Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N.H. (Seavey's Island), in
September 1898. Left to right: Lieutenants Lewis C. Lucas; Clarence L. A. Ingate; Melville J. Shaw; Newt H. Hall;
and George C. Reid. (USMC Photo *515616).

by the Secretary of the Navy but were again The Navy Department countered this rumor
brought up in 1908. This time the pleas fell on by submitting a detailed statement to the
the sympathetic ears of the President who House Naval Affairs Committee. It was made
issued an Executive Order which defined the clear that "It is of the utmost importance that
duties of the U.S. \1arine Corps and specifically the Marine Corps remain absolutely under the
left out duty on board naval vessels. Not control of the Navy Department and all war
only were the Marines withdrawn from ships, plans thus far laid down provide for the close
but, to rub it in, the Wash ington Post, in a cooperation of the Marine Corps with the Navy,
feature article, declared that the Army was to afloat and ashore." The President of the
get the Marines by transfer to the Army infan- General Board, Admiral Dewey, in a letter
try. The newspaper stated: to the House Naval Affairs Committee, reiter-
Mr. Roosevelt had not only reached this conclu- ated the importance of Marines within the
sion, but has taken preliminary steps toward the Department of the Navy because of the need
practical development of the plan. He already
has conferred with officers of the general staff, and for an expeditionary force to assist the fleet
also with General Leonard Wood, who is known in seizing and holding advanced bases. His
to be close to him in military matters. General high regard for Marines stemmed back to his
Wood and the members of the general staff are Manila Bay victory when he asserted: "If there
formulating a scheme outlining the Presidential
ideas.6 had been 5,000. Marines under my command
4 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

THE WASHINGTON POST FEBRUARY 26, 1909

WILL SOMEBODY TELL THE MARINE JUST WHERE HE'S UAT

By DeMar.

Sketched reproduction of a cartoon dealing with the Marines on Navy ships controversy. (Taken from USMC
Photo #528702).

at Manila Bay, the city would have surrendered order not only affected the Navy and Marine
to me on May 1, 1898, and could have been Corps but touched on prerogatives of Congress.
properly garrisoned. The Filipinos would have The right to issue such an order without
received us with open arms, and there would special provision of law was assumed on the
have been no insurrection." 8 ground that the President as Commander in
It is interesting to note that this friend of Chief of the Army and Navy could dispose of
the Marine Corps, Admiral Dewey, was in favor the naval forces according to his judgment.
of the President's Executive Order 969, but In a vote two months later, the Senate would
for different reasons; none were sinister. He dispel this view.
said that "while the marines will no longer The controversy thus became a matter of
form parts of the crews of the ships, the navy
is to have the services of this fine corps for
principle involving Presidential powers vis-a-
the important and necessary duties laid down vis Congressional prerogatives. Some strong
in that order." Outwardly, it would appear Congressional leaders upheld the President
that it was a family fight between the Navy on the basis of separation of powers. Among
and the Marine Corps. But of course it was the Senate luminaries supporting the President
not. It became quite political because it in- were William E. Borah, Robert M. LaFollette,
volved the actions of the President of the and Henry Cabot Lodge.
United States and his use of the Executive The newspapers had to reorient the people
Order. The ramifications of the use of this who followed the controversy from November
 BACKGROUND—1900-1920—COMING OF AGE 5

1908 to March 1909. They had to identify ex- public was reminded of Marines like Major
actly what Marines were and what they did. Littleton W. T. Waller and places like Samar.
The public was learning, in popular news- The intricate matter of restoring Marines to
paper fashion, that the Marines had been in- naval vessels was resolved in March 1909.
volved in the "Naval War" with Spain, that Senator Eugene C. Hale, Chairman of the
Marines served on most naval vessels, including Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, tacked on
the Maine, and thus participated in all the to the Naval Appropriations Bill a proviso
naval battles of the war. They learned that that eight percent of the enlisted men on board
Marines were with Dewey at Manila Bay and battleships be Marines.'° Notwithstanding the
Sampson at Santiago. They learned that in spirited defense of the President's action, the
addition to Teddy Roosevelt's "Rough Riders," Senate, by a vote of 51 to 12, adopted the
there were Marines in Cuba who fought the amendment restoring the Marine Corps to the
Spaniards to capture Guantanamo Bay. They ships of the Navy. Those voting in the negative
further learned that in addition to the U.S. were all Republicans and members of the
Army in the Philippines and its occupation President's party, the majority party.1' In the
force, the Marines had, at the end of 1901, waning hours of his administration, in fact
over 2,000 men in the Philippines. They be- the day before he left office, President Roosevelt
came aware that Marines fought alongside of struck his colors, but only halfway. On 3
the Army against the insurrectionists. The March 1909, he issued orders restoring the

THE DAILY EVENING TELEGRAPH - PHILADELPHIA, TUESDAY, MARCH 30. 1909

TEDDY HEARS BY WIRELESS.BvARTN.E0.

TAFT PUTS MARINES BACK ON THE QUARTER DECK

Sketched reproduction of a cartoon dealing with the return of Marines to Navy ships. (Taken from USMC Photo
#528701).
6 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

l\'farines to ships, but placing them under the

orders of the captains of the vessels on which The Nature of the General Board
they were to serve.* The technicality was that "And doth not a meeting like this make amends"
under the old order of things Marines had had Thomas Moore (Irish Melodies)
specific duties. One of these was to maintain A general board has been made, of which
certain guns of the secondary battery. Now the the Admiral is president, and the function of
President's order placing them under the direc- which is to consider questions relating to the
tion of the ship's captain made it possible to efficient preparation of the fleet in case of war
assign the Marines any sort of duty on board and for the naval defense of the coast.
ship and conceivably remove them from all Thus the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. John D.
guns. Long, reported to the President in his annual
The General Board of the Navy could en- report in November 1900. This routine men-
vision difficulties arising out of this portion tion of the General Board could not possibly
of the order and consequently recommended to indicate the great ramifications that this board
the new Secretary of the Navy, George L. von would have on the defense structure of the
Meyer, and the new President, William nation, Navy, and Marine Corps in the succeed-
Howard Taft, that it be changed. So it was ing four decades. There was no question that
that on 26 March 1909, three weeks after Mr. the need for this type of board existed, the
Roosevelt had left office and sailed to Africa question was what role it should take—advisory
for a lion hunt, President Taft issued a mem- or executive in nature.
orandum from the White House: Prior to the Spanish American War, the
United States had no central advisory authority
Upon the recommendation of the General Board
it was decided at the Cabinet meeting today that for determining naval policy. During the war,
the amendments to the regulations adopted on S the Secretary of Navy appointed a Naval War
March in regard to the Marines should be revoked Board, sometimes called the Strategy Board, to
and the old regulations should be restored. collect military information, prepare strategic
plans, and generally advise him on strategy,
The Marine Corps and friends of the Marine policy, and the conduct of the war. The most
Corps on the Naval Appropriations Committee distinguished member of this board was Rear
had won out. Benjamin Standish Baker, a popu- Admiral Alfred T. Mahan. With the close of
lar correspondent for the Boston Transcript, the war, the War Board quietly went out of
had written: existence. The success with which this rudi-
it is common to hear officers both of the mentary general staff functioned tended to cry-
army and of the line of the navy admit that when stallize sentiment within the Navy for the
it comes to being in constant and effective touch establishment of a more permanent organiza-
with members of Congress, and thus securing de- tion of comparable character. The fact that
sired legislation and favors, the Marine Corps is
easily leader." after the war the Navy's increased responsibili-
ties extended to opposite sides of the globe
The point is that the controversy in 1908 was made careful planning by a body similar to
a blessing in disguise for the Marine Corps if a naval general staff an urgent necessity.
not Theodore Roosevelt. If the action of the One of the most progressive officers in the
President diminished for the time being the Navy, Captain Henry C. Taylor, urged the
duties of the Marine Corps by taking Marines Secretary of the Navy to approve a type of
off naval vessels, the resulting publicity re- general staff for the efficiency of the Navy.
minded the American public, including the Among Taylor's more influential supporters
Congress, that there was such an organization was Admiral Stephen B. Luce, the elder
called the Marine Corps which definitely stateman of the Navy, who was then living in
shared the tasks of defense of the United States retirement at Newport, Rhode Island.14 In
with the Army and Navy. addition, Taylor had the support of the cur-
rent hero, Admiral George Dewey, who was a
strong supporter of some sort of central au-
thority. Dewey argued that "we had been mak-
It should be recalled that inauguration day for the ing our appropriations without a proper re-
incoming President of the United States was 4 March
and that not until the 20th Amendment was ratified gard for their expenditures to the definite end
in 1953 was it changed to 20 January. of developing a fighting force as an efficient
 BACKGROUND— 1900-1920—COMING OF AGE 7

whole; 'e had been building ships without the most intelligent officers of the Navy. Until
regard to homogeneity '5 Perhaps it was his death in 1914, the President of the Board
the times and the fear of a Prussian-type gen- was Admiral Dewey. The great experience and
eral staff that had emerged in the Kaiser's Ger- continuity of the officers of the board would
many that frightened people. There were be hard to ignore, if one were inclined to do
misgivings in Congress and elsewhere by those so. However, most Secretaries of the Navy were
who feared that a full-fledged general staff, pleasant people who were politically rewarded
with powers of command, would usurp the and who wanted to do a good job, quietly.
authority of the civilian secretary. As a com- They certainly did not want to overshadow
promise, Secretary Long established the Gen- their Commander in Chief. In any event, Presi-
eral Board of the Navy with no executive func- dents such as Theodore Roosevelt, William
tions but merely with an advisory capacity. Howard Taft, and Woodrow Wilson would be
A major factor in the immediate acceptance somewhat of a challenge to overshadow.
of the board on the part of the rank and file The General Board, therefore, studied a
of the Navy and its prestige with the public problem, had hearings, and then submitted its
at large was the presidency of George Dewey, report to the Secretary of the Navy with rec-
Admiral of the Navy. His place in naval history ommendations. Rarely, if ever, during this
was already won; his character was above period, did the Secretary of the Navy fail to
reproach; his professional attainments were approve the General Board recommendations.
of the highest.'6 The other members of the With the very nature of the structure of the
board were the President of the Naval War Navy Department and the evolution of the
College, the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, powers of the General Board, it became ap-
and the Chief of the Office of Naval Intelli- parent that the Marine Corps could do very
gence. Others were ordered to serve with the little on its own without the approval of the
body as their assistance was desired." General Board. Considering the times, there
On 29 March 1900, Colonel George C. Reid, may not have .been anything inherently wrong
USMC, Adjutant and Inspector of the Marine with the situation.
Corps, was appointed by the Secretary of The Marine Corps did not suffer in any way
Navy as a member of the board.18 Thus the under this arrangement. On the contrary, the
Marine Corps initially had a member on the General Board in most matters consulted the
General Board. As its first order of business, Commandant when considering advanced base
Secretary Long ordered the new board to con- deployments, increases in personnel strength,
sider campaign plans for different war situa- and the like. The board, however, did make
tions in the Philippines and their vicinity. As its own decisions after hearing what the Com-
it turned out the main peacetime function of mandant had to say. It was a unilateral
the board would be that of making recom- decision—the General Board's. The board was
mendations for the annual shipbuilding pro- quite vigilant in matters that would endanger
gram. Along this line, a board member, Ad- the loss of the Marine Corps to the Army and
miral Henry C. Taylor, defined the board's was always favorably disposed to increasing
function: "Not to say what force we should the Marine Corps when this could be justified.
have but to prepare for war whatever force So it was, in the early years, that the all-power-
Congress should give us." 19 The General Board ful General Board through the person of the
of the Navy, while an advisory body to the Secretary of the Navy made decisions on de-
Secretary of Navy, became in reality the spokes- ployment, organization, training, strength, and
man for him. During the first 20 years of this location of facilities. It was fortunate that the
century there were four administrations and Marine Corps had a sympathetic General Board
eight Secretaries of the Navy. With the ex- of the Navy in the early years of this century.
ceptions of George von Meyer (1909—13) and The only way the board's decisions could be
Josephus Daniels (1913—21), the Navy's Secre- overridden was by the necessity of assigning
taries served on the average of two years. It Marines in emergency expeditionary service.
would be quite understandable that the Secre- A crisis in Cuba or Haiti, etc., predisposed
tary of the Navy would rely quite heavily that the Marine Corps would be needed. It
on the General Board. The board was made was the President and Secretary of State who
up of the most distinguished and, hopefully, made the decisions, the board simply and will-
8 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

and it would last four years.** On the one side,

some naval officers wanted to keep the Navy
line in exclusive control of landing operations.

I
Other naval officers simply believed that sea-
men were too busy for landing parties, that
they must concentrate on working the ship and
its guns. They could not be spared for landing
operations. The controversy focused attention
on the landing force issue and thoughtful men
concluded that the Marine Corps could fill the
bill. By the time of the Spanish-American War
those thoughtful men were vindicated when,
in the battle for Guantanamo in Cuba, a Ma-
rine battalion under Marine command had
seized the advanced base that conferred victory.
The Guantanamo precedent of successfully seiz-
ing advanced bases was strengthened by similar
experience in the Philippines and China.20 A
precedent of great value to the Marine Corps
was made and the evolutionary assignment of
the "assault mission" fell to the Marine Corps.
After bases were secured, the Marine Corps
Marines of the Advanced Base Brigade demonstrate would still be needed in defense and develop-
the operation of the Colt machine gun at Philadelphia ment of these bases. Its authority for this
in October 1913. (USMC Photo #517216). mission came from the General Board immedi-
ately after it was organized, April 1900.
At the first meeting of the General Board,
ingly assented. The Marine Corps wa ordered Colonel George C. Reid, member of the board,
and the Marine Corps responded. In these de- was requested to:
cisions the role of the General Board was put before it the number and organization
minimal. of a force of Marines sufficient to hold each of
three positions at Culebra in the West Indies,
Samana (in Santo Domingo), and Guantanamo in
Cuba; composition of this force as to infantry and
Advanced Base Force—The Reason artillery to maintain a position against cruisers
for Existence* or naval brigades landing to attack it.2'
If one were interested in ascertaining what In addition, the General Board recommended
specifically are the responsibilities of the Marine to the Secretary of Navy that:
Corps today, a reading of the National Security two transports of capacity sufficient to carry
Act of 1947, as amended, would give the ans- 500 marines each witb 2 months' commissary afl(I
wers. To use terms such as "responsibilities," Quartermaster Stores etc. be made ready in the
"missions," and "roles" when discussing the event of a naval compaign in Asiatic waters and
Marine Corps 70 years ago would be incorrect. that they be moved to an advance base near the
scene of hostilities.
The designation of elements of the Marine
Corps as the Advanced Base Force came about The General Board specifically recommended
not in order to assign a "responsibility" or a that the Marines would be "best adapted and
"mission" to the Corps, but rather to solve most available for immediate and sudden call
a controversy within the Navy Department. "for use in defending any advanced base.23
The controversy was over the question of to The Army's role was considered at this time,
whom should the assault mission be assigned, but:

There is inconsistency in the correspondence of the Professor William Russell covers this controversy
General Board, Secretary of Navy, and the CMC rela- eminently well in The Genesis of FMF Doctrine:
tive to the use of the term Advanced or Advance as 1789—1899," l'art 1, April 1951, Part II, May 1951, Part
it pertains to Bases, Forces, and the like. It is intended III, June 1951, and Part IV, July. 1951 in the Marine
that Advanced be used throughout this text. Corps Gazette v. 35, nos., 4, 5, 6. and 7.
BACKGROUNI)_19OO_192O_C011NG OF AGE 9
10 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

The board also recommended that the com-

panies composing such a battalion be kept
organized and maintained at their full strength,
ready, in all respects, for immediate service.26
/

1
The request by the General Board to the
Secretary of the Navy to direct the Marine Corps
to organize, train, and equip a unit to ac-
* complish a specific task was a first of its kind.
Colonel Reid, as member of the General Board
and the Brigadier General Commandant,
Charles Heywood, set about forming a fixed
defense battalion to fulfill the requirements set
by the Secretary of Navy. To build up the
battalion of four companies of approximately
104 men per company, Marines were trans-
ferred from Seavey's Island (Portsmouth, New
Hampshire), League Island (Philadelphia
Navy Yard), and Port Royal, South Carolina
(Parris Island, South Carolina) to the battalion.
The battalion was physically located in two
Marines of the Advanced Base Brigade practice as places, Newport, Rhode Island, and Annapolis,
winbling pedestal-mounted naval guns at Philadelphia Maryland. Instruction in the subjects outlined
in October 1913. (USMC Photo #516704). above began at these two posts by July 1902.
Before the sites of Newport and Annapolis
were chosen for this advanced base schooling,
in the opinion of the General Board the the Commandant was requested to comment
requirements of the naval establishment o{ the on the best site for such instruction. He said
United States include a military organization of that:
sufficient strength in numbers and efficiency, to en-
able the Navy to meet alt demands upon it for - - - of all the stations, Port Royal was the best
services within its own sphere of operations, with- station for such instruction as it is nearly stir-
out dependence upon the cooperation of the Army rounded by water—and being removed from the
for ti-oops and military supplies, for such a force pernicious influences of a large city, in consequence
of the Army may not always be available24 of which the men will be more apt to be interested
in this work 27
- -
-

With the "who" completed, the "how" and

"where" phase of the advanced base situation Future Marine Corps "boots," at what was
got underway. The General Board requested later to become Parris Island Recruit Depot,
the Secretary of Navy to direct the Brigadier would partly agree with the Commandant that
General Commandant to organize immediately it was indeed "removed from the pernicious in-
four companies of 104 enlisted men each, and fluences of a large city." Instruction in ad-
"have provided for such battalion and stored vanced base work was continued until Septem-
at Philadelphia, ready for instant use, a com- ber 1902 when the battalion, under the com-
plete equipment for expeditionary field serv- mand of Colonel Percival C. Pope, was
ice for such force." 25 The General Board fur- assembled at Norfolk, Virginia. In October,
ther recommended that officers and enlisted another company, under the command of
men of this battalion be thoroughly trained Captain Smedley D. Butler, joined the battalion
and instructed in the following areas: increasing its total strength to 19 officers and
522 enlisted men.ss The battalion sailed for
(a) The construction of field fortifications, gun Culebra in November on board the USS
emplacements, gun platforms and magazines;
(b) The transportation of guns of less than 8-inch Prairie where practical application was dem-
caliber from ship to point of emplacement and the onstrated in developing a plan for the defense
mounting of same; of that island. The Marines participated in ex-
(c) The construction and operating of field tele- tensive advanced base exercises with the fleet
graph and telephone lines, signal, searchlight and
range-finder stations; until January 1903. It was generally agreed
(d) The planting of mines, countermining and that Marines had done a good job in defending
the operating of torpeclos for harbor defense. Culebra. The next year, 1904, similar work in
 BACKGROUND—1900-1920—COMING OF AGE 11

the defense of Grande Island in Subic Bay, and Korean students. Flushed with victories
Philippines, was accomplished.29 over Russia, "the Japanese people were deeply
While there was no need to convince naval incensed by such measures. Their press re-
officials, the Russo-Japanese War furnished sponded immediately to the school board's
further evidence of the value of advanced bases, action with protests that ranged from rage to
particularly the Japanese naval advanced base hurt incredulity." 30 President Theodore Roose-
established in the Elliot Islands.* The occupa- velt, in February 1907, called San Francisco's
tion of the Elliot Islands was of inestimable entire school board, headed by:
value to Japan in operations against the Rus- a bassoon-playing mayor under indictment
sians. for graft, to come to the White House. The Presi-
The question of possible and probable ad- dent flusally broke the deadlock, but not until he
vanced base sites was under constant review waved his Big Stick and l)ared his big teeth. The
Californians were persuaded to repeal the offensive
by the General Board. All the war plans made school order anti to accept what came to be known
by the General Board required advanced bases as 'the Gentlemen's Agreement.' This secret under-
in addition to the permanent base, Guantanamo standing was worked out, during 1907—08, by an
in the Caribbean and the advanced base, exchange of diplomatic notes between Washington
and Tokyo. The Japanese, on their part, agreed
Grande Island, in the Philippines. The Marine to stop the flow of coolies to the mainland of the
Corps dictum, "it depends on the situation," United States by refusing to issue passports. The
was all too true in planning for advanced Californians, their fears largely allayed, henceforth
bases. The General Board felt that the pre- slept easier.'1
cise location, defense, and time of occupation It is interesting to note that during the period
would depend upon the circumstances of the of the American and Japanese war scare, the
particular campaign. International "flaps" did American Naval Attaché in Berlin reported to
tend to narrow speculation as to the site of the Navy Department:
possible future campaigns.
German opinion would undoubtedly favor
American relations with Japan in 1906 and the United States in a Japanese-American conflict.
1907 became strained when the San Francisco But he added the discomforting bit of intelligence
School Board decided to segregate Asians from that the British and German admiralties agreed
other students and designated a special "Orien- Japan would probably vin.'
tal Public School" for all Chinese, Japanese, In spite of the talk of war, the Navy, through
its spokesman Admiral Dewey, President of the
9The Elliot Island Group is located in the Gulf of
Korea of the Yellow Sea, approximately 60 miles north- General Board, stated "that he did not expect
east of Dairen and Port Arthur. serious trouble with Japan for a very long

— - ______t.wu,tu._.

Marines of the Advanced Base Brigade work with mobile searchlights in Philadelphia in October 1913. (USMC Photo
#516701).
12 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

STAFF AND CLASS, SCHOOL OF APPLICATION, ANNAPOLIS, MD., 1906.

Officersof the Staff, seated left to right: First Lieutenant W. G. Fay, Captain D. P. HaIl, Captain J. H. Russell, Major F. J. Moses,
Captain George C. Thorpe, Captain Harold C. Reisinger. Officers of the class, standing left to right: Second Lieutenants W. W.
Buckley, Julian P. Wilcox, Benjamin B. Gossett, H. B. Pratt, Bennet Puryear, Jr., Robert L. Denig, Logan Tucker, Henry S. Greene,
Randolph Coyle, C. F. B. Price, William C. Wise, Jr., Charles S. McReynolds.

Many future senior officers of the Marine Corps, including the 16th Commandant, John H. Russell, Jr., are included
in this portrait, (USMC Photo #514699).

time." Some other members of the General purpose of a naval advanced base. The Philip.
Board believed there was, in the realm of pine construction brought up the question of
possibility, a chance of future hostilities with the cooperation of the Army in such work.35
Japan. Consequently, in January 1907, the During the protracted consideration of the mat-
Army and Navy decided to undertake joint ter in 1908 and 1909, the strength of the Marine
studies along those lines for a possible war with Corps was materially increased by Congress "so
Japan. The studies were inaugurated at the that there was a sufficient force of Marines
suggestion of Major General J. Franklin Bell, to meet the probable demands of the Navy
the Army Chief of Staff. in this respect, and the cooperation of the
On a lower level, Marines were ordered to Army received no further considerations."
commence extensive construction of tempor- In 1907 and again in 1909, the General
ary defenses at Olongapo in the Philippines. Board urgently presented to the Navy Depart-
Twenty 6-inch, four 4.7-inch, four 4-inch, and ment the need for consolidating equipment
sixteen 6-pounder guns were mounted in 10 with regard to advanced bases. The Secretary
weeks. "The work amounted to the temporary of Navy approved the board recommenda-
defense of a permanent base for which per- tions that the materiel on the Atlantic coast
manent fortifications had not been pro- be assembled at Philadelphia and that for the
vided." The situation at Olongapo resulted advanced base outfits in the Pacific be as-
in some confusion as to the character and sembled at OIongapo. The Commandant of
 BACKGROUND—1900-1920—COMING OF AGE 13

the Marine Corps (CMC)* was given the re- communications. Instruction in Mobile Defense
sponsibility for the custody and care of all was to encompass construction of more or less
advanced base material. In addition, he was permanent field fortifications, obstacles and
to "take the necessary steps to instruct the demolitions, map reading, and field artillery.
officers and men under your command in the The Commandant made note that when
use of this material." studying field artillery, consideration would be
On 18 April 1910, Major General Comman- given to "the development and use of this arm
dant George F. Elliott submitted to the Secre- in connection with infantry and for both direct
tary of Navy a copy of the proposed course of and indirect fire." ' It is easy to look back and
instruction for an advanced base school to be put labels on things. But in the meaning of
established at New London, Connecticut. While the quotation above, the Commandant's in-
it was to be primarily an officers' school, 40 en- struction in a sense paved the way for the
listed men were assigned to the first class of in- concept of combined arms within the Marine
struction which began in July 1910. In addition Corps. In studying Mine Defense, all types of
to the advanced base school, two Marine officers mines, torpedoes, and obstructions were to be
were assigned to the Army School for Submarine considered. In examining General Considera-
Defenses at Fort Monroe, Virgina. This was nec- tions, the Commandant recommended a study
essary because the Navy had planned to use of the organization, supply, and movement of
Army mines, pending the acceptance of a new Marines assigned to advanced base work be
naval mine. In addition, two other Marine offi- made. He believed that other considerations
cers were detailed to attend the Army Signal involved the study of bases, their necessity and
School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, "in order use, and historical studies that would be use-
that they may acquire a complete knowledge of ful and applicable to advanced base work and
wireless telegraphy and the construction and the making and use of war plans. The text-
operation of field telegraph and telephone book material, where applicable, was supplied
lines." ° by the Navy and Army. As an example, the
In a memorandum to the prospective officer Navy's Bureau of Ordnance supplied the book
students of the Advanced Base School, the High Explosives and Mines and the Army do-
Commandant declared: nated Field Artillery Drill Regulations. The
The establishment of a school for the purpose of Marine Corps' Major Dion Williams contrib-
instructing and training marine officers along cer- uted an original booklet Instructions for the
tain well-defined lines of work, pertaining to the Reconnaissance of Bays, Harbors And Adja-
attack and defense of advanced bases, presupposes cent Country.* Practical work formed a large
a good working knowledge of the elementary pro-
fessional subjects and is in the nature of a post- part of the course involving assembling and
graduate course. dismounting of guns, construction of field
In order to obtain the best results, the instruc- works, and the like. The location of the school
tion in such a course must be both theoretical and at New London was not entirely suitable and
practical, systematic and progressive. The military the next year, 1911, the school was removed to
subjects covered in the defense of a base are many;
and, while theoretical instruction in these subjects Philadelphia.2 The school was successful al-
is essential, the training or practical work is none though interrupted during the subsequent
the less important. The subjects are so varied and years by calls to expeditionary service in Nic-
their scope so comprehensive that it is considered aragua, Cuba, and Mexico. The Commandant
a year should, if possible, be devoted to the course.
In general terms, the defense of an advanced had responsibility for maintenance, readiness,
base may be divided into and training of the Advanced Base Force.
(1) The Gun Defense Likewise, the General Board had the respon-
(2) The Mobile Defense sibility for continual study of the feasibility
(3) The Mine Defense of advanced base locations and the make up of
(4) General Governing Considerations 4°
advanced base outfits.
The Commandant envisioned the Gun De-
Late in 1909, as the General Board began
fense instruction to include naval ordnance; serious consideration of the advanced base
gunnery; explosives and projectiles; fortifica-
tions, as relating to defense of the guns; and *First published in 1905 by direction of the Presi-
dent of the Naval War College. A second revised edition
*Commandant of the Marine Corps has been used was published in 1917 by the Government Printing
throughout the text for uniformity, but the more com- Office under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy.
mon title prior to World War II was Major General Copy at Historical Division, Headquarters, U.S. Ma-
Commandant. rine Corps.
14 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

Army War College. While there he wrote a

study entitled, "Outfit Necessary for Seizure
and Fortifications of Positions by a Small Ex-
peditionary Force."
If the Marine and Navy contributions were
not enough, in the January—February 1911 is-
sue of the Journal of United States Artillery
±1 was an article by a "Colonel Martin—an Ex-
Confederate Officer" entitled "The Selec-
tion and Defense of Naval Bases." 48 This ar-
ticle was brought to the attention of Admiral
Dewey, President of the General Board. Ad-
miral Dewey wanted to know the true iden-
tity of "Colonel Martin" and wrote to the edi-
tor of the Journal accordingly. The Manager
and Editor of the Journal, Major T. W. Win-
ston, replied to the Admiral that the author
of the article was Captain R. E. Wyllie, Coast
Artillery Corps, presently stationed at Fort
Hancock, N.J.49 Major Winston explained that
Wyllie's assumption of the nom-de-plume was
I: . •_ •
merely to get an impersonal discussion of the
Marines preparing to embark at Philadelphia for du- merits of the arguments which he advanced.
ty in Nicaragua, August 1912. (USMC Photo #516235). Major Winston was elated to know that some-
one on the General Board read the Journal
problem, three men, destined to play an im- and offered to send a copy of the Journal
portant part in the evolution of the Ad- regularly with "our compliments." Two days
vanced Base Force, had written papers, several later, the Secretary of the General Board
weeks apart, that were ultimately forwarded wrote to say that he would be glad to be added
to the General Board, all dealing with ad- to the mailing list. It would seem that there
vanced bases. Major Dion Williams, who as was a pat-on-the-back for Captain Wyllie of
early as June 1902 had written an article about the Army, but not so. Admiral Dewey for-
the defense of naval stations while assigned warded the article to the Secretary of the Navy
to the Office of Naval Intelligence, submitted and said that:
a report dated 2 November 1909: "Report on in the opinion of the General Board, this
Men, Material & Drills Required for Estab- article is very ably written, and sets forth the
lishing a Naval Advance Base."" Commander writer's conception of the subject in an exceedingly
William L. Rodgers, USN, then the Naval clear and pleasant style. The views expressed by
"Col Martin" are not at all novel, however, and
War College representative at the Army War have often been expressed by naval officcrs in the
College, submitted a report dated 20 Novem- discussions by the general board and the Naval
ber 1909, entitled "Advanced Bases."" Major War College."
John H. Russell, a student at the Naval War Captain Wyllie would probably have agreed
College, submitted a study, "General Princi- in the dictum—you win some and lose somel
ples Governing the Selection and Establish- To round out the articles on the subject of
ment of Advanced Bases and the Composition the various aspects of advanced bases, Major
of an Advanced Base Outfit," and an addi- Henry C. Davis, wrote an article "Advance
tional concurrent report, "Additional Notes Base Training" for the March 1911 issue of the
on Field Work Construction for Advanced U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. Lieutenant
Bases." 46 Perhaps writing ability had nothing Colonel L. C. LUcas, wrote a report for the
to do with it, but in any event, this Major General Board entitled "Artillery Armament
Russell later became the 16th Commandant of Advanced Base Regiment," dated about 1
of the Marine Corps. Also about the same July 1913. Captain H. A. Knapp, USN, de-
time, Lieutenant Colonel Eli K. Cole, after livered a lecture and paper on the "Interna-
installing the advanced base material at Subic tional Law in its Relation to Advance Bases"
Bay in the Philippines, was ordered to the to the Naval War College on 29 May 1915. It
 BACKGROUND—l900-l920--COMING OF AGE 15

would seem that there was enough written on cept had developed of an organized fleet train
the subject of advanced bases at the time but consisting of auxiliaries, colliers, tankers, re-
there were many questions still unanswered. pair ships, water-distilling ships, supply ships,
The very basic question was "What number of destroyer tenders, and the like needed to serv-
men is sufficient for the defense of an ad- ice and supply a combat fleet at sea, inde-
vanced base?" Of the Marine writers, Lieu- pendent of a fixed shore base.
tenant Colonel Cole and Major Russell agreed In a prophetic note on things to come, the
that a regiment would be needed for the Major General Commandant stated that "in
proper defense of a base. Major Russell sug- view of the recent developments in aeronau-
gested that each company of the total 12 tics, adequate defenses against attacks by diri-
companies should have 150 men each, giving gibles or aeroplanes must be considered," 52
the three-battalion regiment 1,800 men. Major General Barnett believed that the forces as-
Williams' report differed somewhat as he en- signed to the defense could be divided into
visioned a proper defense based on two regi- two parts: the fixed defense regiment, which
ments of 1,300 \'1arines each, assembled at the installed and manned the guns and mines,
site of the advanced base outfit. With this and the mobile regiment which opposed land-
accomplished, the "force would be drilled in ings beyond th'e range of the fixed defense
all of the operations of establishing a base guns:
from the preparatory stage of map reading In case the enemy has once landed, retain them
to the actual firing of the guns at target prac- at such distance from the base, that the base it-
tice with towing targets." 51 It would be several self could not he reached by gun fire. In addition
years before the General Board would decide to the fixed defense and infantry forces there must
of necessity he searchlight detachments, an engi-
what would be the proper defense force. It neer company, signal company and field artillery.1'
would come closest to Major Williams' ideas.
The next item to be considered was the Advanced Base Force Comes of Age
terms in general use concerning advanced base
forces. In 1911, the Navy issued a general As previously mentioned, the question of
order which defined the temporary character the actual size of the Advanced Base Force
of the naval advanced base, and this definition was settled temporarily in 1913. The General
along with other terms were incorporated in Board recommended to the Secretary of Navy
the Navy Regulations in 1913. The Marine who agreed, that there be a fixed defense regi-
Corps understood these definitions, as inter- ment of 1,250 men assembled on the East
preted by 1\Iajor General Commandant Coast at Philadelphia and another at Mare
George Barnett, as follows: Island on the WestCoast. The Advanced Base
Advanced Basesmay be divided into two general equipment on Olongapo would l)e redistributed
classes—permanent and temporary. The permanent to Guam and Mare Island. The board also
advanced base is ordinarily defended by permanent recommended that:
fortifications and covers an extensive repair plant. two mobile defense regiments about 1,250
By 1914, an example of this type of advanced men each. may be required in war to reinforce the
base was Pearl Harbor. The temporary advanced fixed defense regiments, one on each coast—such
base is not ordinarily fortified until after the dec- organizations in peace are (lesirahle but not strictly
laration of war, but in view of the length of time necessary.'4
available the defense installe(l must, at the start
at any rate, be of temporary nature. Again, in In 1914, the recommendations of the Gen-
1914, examples of this type of advanced base were eral Board regarding sti'ersgth of fixed and
Olongapo and Guam. The temporary nature of an
advanced base involves three main elements: first, mobile defense regiments were reafhrmecl by
the best defense necessary to meet an attack by the Secretary of Navy. "The recommendations
gunfire from the sea: second, the use of mines and of the General Board concerning the size of
minefield guns, that would prevent the approach of the advanced base regiments are approved for
hostile craft in the vicinity of the train which the the present." The Major General Com-
base is covering: third, proper defense against at-
tacks by forces landing beyond the range of the mandant agreed to the advanced base site lo-
fixed defense guns, that attack the train from the cations. He said:
land side.
both stations are centrally located in regard
It should be noted at this point, that the use to other Posts of the Marine Corps. transportation
of the term "train" refers to "fleet train." facilities are satisfactory and supplies can be oh-
tamed in a minimum of time, and both are near
During the decade preceding 1914, the coil- Marine Corps Depots."
16 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

That the General Board had faith in the inch rapid fire guns; one battery of 3-inch
Marine Corps is reflected in a letter to the landing guns; two U.S. Army experimental
Secretary of Navy which stated that: 4.7-inch heavy field guns; one mine battery
judging from the excellent work of the
with 60 mines; one signal company; one en-
gineer company with the necessary equip-
•

Marine Corps under all conditions with which it

has been confronted for many years in the past ment, together with eight automatic rifles and
it is reasonable to believe that, with a proper Out- four 1-pounders.59
fit, it will be able to make good whatever circum-
stance require the establishment of an advance A young captain of Marines described the
base.1 stepped-up training taking place at the time:
The next logical step in the evolution of A new scheme of things was under way in the
the Advanced Base Force was :0 test the equip- Itarine Corps. A regiment had been designated as
ment and men to determine whether this or- an Advance Base Force. It was being trained to
ganization required any changes. The Gen- occupy a base jn advance of the arrival of the
fleet.
eral Board requested and the Secretary of Navy I found that the easy days in Philadelphia were
directed that exercises be heki in connection over. With drills and 4 hours a day schooling, we
with the Atlantic Fleet during the winter of didn't get out of the Yard until 4:30 in the after-
1913—14. More Marines became available in the noon. Then we had to study at night.
We had six companies. One was a field artillery,
summer of 1913 with the return of expedi- one had four 5-inch naval guns, one had four
tionary forces from Cuba.5 In addition, the 3-inch naval guns, one was engineers and machine
Advanced Base School was reopened at Phila- guns, one was mines and one was signals. I
delphia and the Regiment (Fixed De-
1st was put in command of the Sixth Company, to
fense) was stationed there for training. The handle the 3-inch naval guns. Hours every
- - -

day in the Yard we had to haul those 3-inch

regiment consisted of one battery of 5-inch naval guns around. We had to build a portable
rapid fire .40 caliber guns; one battery of 3- railroad. We had to dig pits. We had to build gun

/7
hi

Supplies are brought alongside the USS Prairie, frequent Marine troopship, loading at Philadelphia in 1913.
(USMC Photo #516234).
 BACKGROUND—1900-1920—COMING OF AGE 17

platforms. We had to mount the guns. And then,

when we had it all done, we had to tear the whole
business down and do it all over again. That kept
up until the first of January, l914.°
The Atlantic Fleet exercises in January 1914
were to become the first thoroughly planned
advanced base problem whereby the Marine
Corps would try out the advanced base mater-
ials. It became especially important that it be
successful, as far as Marine Corps participa-
tion was concerned, if not for any other
reason but to counteract a report given by
the Aide-for-Inspections. In March 1910, the
Secretary of Navy had charged th Marine
Corps to prepare for the care and custody
of advanced base material and to give instruc-
tion in the use of this equipment. In addi-
tion, he advised that the Naval Division of
Inspections would be charged with its inspec-
tion.61 It is with this wedge that the Marine
Rear Admiral William F. Fullam, vigorous opponent
Corps nemesis, Captain William F. Fullam, of the use of Marines for sea duty. (USN Photo
USN, reappeared on the scene. As Aide-for- #19—N —3646).
Inspections, Captain Fullam was all too happy
to give out the news of his findings upon his
inspection and report concerning the advanced uted these past failures to the Marine Corps
base outfit, personnel, and instruction at Phil- and categorically stated that it was the fault of
adelphia in 1913. His report was forwarded to Marine Corps organization. Never at a loss for
the General Board by the then Assistant Sec- words, Captain Fullam not only inspected the
retary of the Navy, Franklin D. Roosevelt, on problems but solved them. He believed the
2 May 1913. Marine Corps should have been broken into
Captain Fullam reported that the advanced permanent battalions to serve under their own
base outfit and its operations were a failure. colors. After reorganizing the Marine Corps,
He said no actual work was done except for Captain Fullam introduced in a disguised form
minor work at Culebra and Subic Bay and the argument that the Marines should be re-
that "from the point of real efficiency for moved from naval vessels:
war purposes, it may be said that practically It is plain that the work assigned to Marines on
nothing has been accomplished during the board battleships and cruising vessels of the Navy
past 13 years 62 Captain Fullam stated gives them no training or experience whatever
with mines, torpedoes, and other practical work,
that the Naval War College and the Advanced but this employment simply scatters them in such
Base School handled the problems of ad- manner that an effective and properly instructed
vanced bases academically with a few officers organization is impracticable. This fact is empha-
receiving elementary as distinguished from sized because it has been, and will continue to be,
the one most serious obstacle to that organization
practical instruction. In "painful contrast," and instruction which would make the Marine
he pointed out, the Italians had completely Corps most effective in time of war, and which
and promptly established an advanced base would at the same time secure homogeneity in our
outfit in Sicily in October 1911 in 48 hours. man-of-war crews and recognize that the bluejackets
This, hesaid, was an example of what could are in every way fitted for, and that the) should
he instructed in, every military duty on board
be done and ought to be done in advanced ship.'
base operations. He later admitted that he Major General Commandant William P.
purposely refrained from inviting special at- Biddle answered the charges of Captain Fullam
tention to the fact that the Italian force was in detail. Perhaps the most poignant reply from
apparently composed of naval officers and the CMC was that pertaining to the organiza-
sailors! Captain Fullam blamed what he called tion of the Marine Corps. He said:
the "past failures" on the material, personnel, -the subject of a proper organization of the
.

instruction, and lack of transports. He attrib- Marine Corps has received the careful study of
18 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970
commanding officer, being a division officer, will
have to be replaced by a line officer. The General
Board regrets the renewed agitation of the ques-
tion of removal of Marines from ships of the Navy
in which the strength of the Marine detachment
is sufficient to demand the presence of a Marine
officer, and it further believes that this action, if
persisted in, may eventually cause the loss of the
Marine Corps to the Navy and its absorption by
the Army."
Captain Fullam should have been awarded a
medal as the one most likely to wreck Navy-
Marine Corps relations. In spite of the Ful-
lams, or because of the Fullams, the Navy-
Marine Corps relationship survived and out of
it was forged the Navy.Marine Corps team of
today.
It was with this background, the Marine
Corps Advanced Base Force commenced the
Atlantic Fleet Exercises in January 1914. It
was going to defend thoroughly the advanced
base against invasion. The theories on paper
would now become the realities of a defense
of an invasion. Though not realized at the
time, the exercise was the forerunner of sev-
eral phases of what are known no* as amphib-
Major General William P. Biddle, 11th Commandant
of the Marine Corps, 3 February 1911 to 24 February ious operations. At no time was that term
1914. (USMC Photo #308435). used during the period being discussed. The
General Board specifically requested the Ma-
rine Corps to give practical instruction and
Marine officers of ability and experience and it is application to such items as:
believed by me and by them that the present sys-
tem of semipermanent companies, battalions and (I) Stowing material on transports;
regiments is much better suited to the requirements (2) Landing material from the transport to the
of the Marine Corps than would be the system by beach;
which officers and men were attached permanently (3) Transporting the material from the beach to
to one organization during their entire service.'4 the various sites;
(4) Preparation of battery sites and mounting of
The President of the General Board, in the the guns;
person of Admiral Dewey, carefully exam- (5) Establishment of fire control and observation
ined all of the proposals and criticisms of points;
Captain Fullam regarding the Marine Corps (6) Planting of mines;
and the Advanced Base Force. He carefully (7) Defense of mine fields;
read the replies to the criticism by Major (8) Establishment and use of searchlight sta
tions;
General Biddle. Without exception, including (9) Exercise with guns, including target practice;
the proposal to move the Advanced Base (10) Covering the site selected against attacks
School from Philadelphia to Pensacola, Cap- from the land, including transportation necessary
tain Fullam's proposals were logically and for supply and handling of material."
systematically disapproved by Admiral Dewey The Marine Corps phase of the exercise got
and the General Board. Admiral Dewey was under way when, on 3 January 1914, the First
particularly agitated with Fullam's attempt Advanced Base Regiment, a fixed defense regi-
to resurrect the argument concerning removal ment commanded by Colonel Charles G. Long,
of Marines from naval vessels, He said: sailed from the Philadelphia Navy Yard on the
the General Board does not believe that any transport Hancock. The Second Advanced Base
actual economy will result from the removal of Regiment, a mobile regiment of 27 officers
the Marines from the battleships and cruisers for,
as the Marines now are stationed at the battery commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John A.
and its accessories their places will have to be Lejeune, sailed from Pensacola, Florida on the
taken by an equal number of bluejackets. Their transport Prairie. 67 These two regiments be-
 BACKGROUND—1900-1920—COMING OF AGE 19

came the First Advanced Base Brigade under it all. It was one glorious "Fourth of July." Every-
the command of Colonel George Barnett and body was blazing away. And then the umpires
solemnly announced that the Island of Culebra was
arrived off Culebra on 10 January 1914. * impregnable, which I always thought was a damned
After the exercise Barnett, then Major Gen- lie.'9
eral Commandant reported to the Secretary
of Navy that: On board the USS Hancock at Pensacola,
Florida, the First Brigade Commander, Colo-
upon their arrival at Culebra the men, with
the advance base material, landed—guns were nel Barnett, was transmitting the "Report on
mounted and proper disposition was made of the Maneuvers and Operations." In the last para-
guns and material for the advance base defense graph of his letter, Colonel Barnett said "I
against an attack by the fleet, who landed forces have this day turned over command of the
from the ships. In 6 days time the guns were
all mounted and ready for firing and the island Brigade to Lieutenant Colonel John A. Le-
was declared in a state of war. From that time jeune, and I feel that in so doing I am
on affairs on shore were conducted as nearly as turning over to him a most efficient brigade." 70
possible as they would have been in case of real
war. Bombardments of the shore fortifications were In general, Colonel Barnett was praising
made, operations were conducted for the discovery the performance of the brigade—an efficient
of mine fields and attempts made to drag for the brigade. The brigade commander's analysis
mines. Searchlight tests were made, also tests for of the exercise had listed several minor fail-
plotting from the plotting stations of the mine
company. A night attack was made by a landing ings but did state that "one of the most serious
force from the fleet, which the umpires decided problems to be dealt with is the providing of
would have been unsuccessful in case of real war, proper transportation for supplies, guns and
under the conditions existing.'
ammunition, etc., on shore, and it is believed
In an unofficial version of the exercise, Cap- that a reasonable amount of motor tractors
tain Frederic M. Wise recalled: must be provided." 71 The Commander in
There was a peculiar situation on Culebra. It
had no land.locked harbor where we were going
to land, though at another part of the island you
can go through a cut and find a land-locked harbor
big enough to shelter the whole fleet. But at the
spot where we landed, with a heavy wind blowing
up every afternoon, all the material had to be
landed mornings. In the afternoon the sea was
too heavy. Lighters we had carried down on the
Hancock's deck were swung overboard. Those heavy
naval guns were hauled up from the holds, lowered
aboard the lighters, and towed ashore by launches.
They were skidded ashore, the portable railroad
was constructed up to the gun positions high on
the hills, gun.pits dug, platforms built, guns
mounted. Inside several days, the Island of Culebra
was fortified. Mine fields had been laid while we
were getting our batteries into position. Telephone
communications were established. An infantry regi-
ment had arrived with us. They dug rifle pits. We
were ready for the "enemy" fleet.
Ten days or 2 weeks after we had the island
fortified, all the preliminaries were completed, um-
pires appointed, all the maneuvers started. The
big ships of the fleet, which were supposed theo.
retically to have transports full of troops with them,
slipped up under cover of the night, and sent
landing parties of sailors and Marines ashore.
They were to capture the batteries and clear the
path for a big landing force. The umpires watched

*Ten days after his return to Washington in Feb-

ruary 1914, Colonel Barnett was appointed the 12th
Commandant. He became the first graduate of the
Naval Academy (Class of 1881) to become CMC, and
the first CMC to be appointed to a 4.year term, in Signal tower manned by Marines at Vera Cruz, 1914.
accordance with a law passed the previous year. (USMC Photo #517450).
20 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

S
p

;-• V .. -
Marines leaving for Vera Cruz, 23 April 1914. (USMC Photo #H—276--3).

.:
Horse-drawn 3-inch naval landing gun drill, Camp klliott, Panama Canal Zone, 1913. (USMC Photo #521516)..
 BACKGROU ND— 1900-1920—COMING OF AGE 21

Chief of the United States Atlantic Fleet, Rear during the war. The potential use of the force
Admiral Charles J. Badger, explained: in the Caribbean was always considered. The
the actual establishment of the Advanced General Board felt that one of the immediate
Base at Culebra this winter, the joint exercises held weaknesses was the poorly equipped bases in
with the fleet, and the gun and mine practices the Caribbean. The board felt:
held have been of great benefit to the personnel in a war with Germany the United States
of the Brigade. Unfortunately, the gun and mine may at some stage in the conflict find Germany on
practices were unavoidably hurried and the maxi- the offensive with her fleet at large and in a po-
mum benefit could not be derived therefrom. It is sition to operate in the Caribbean against the
strongly recommended that frequent opportunity Virgin Islands, Porto Rico, Cuba and ultimately
be given for extended Advance Base work of this the Panama Canal. To meet this offensive the
kind. . .
United States must have properly equipped bases
in the Caribbean. .
.

The now Major General Commandant and

former brigade commander, George Barnett, Again time and events in other parts of the
replied: world would directly affect the happenings
the experience gained in the exercise last
in the Caribbean. Events in Congress during
winter, I have no doubt that the outfit as furnished the summer of 1916 would change the Marine
can be standardized and cut down somewhat, as I Corps for the remainder of the decade, and
fullyappreciate the necessity of mobility which indeed for the remainder of its history.
can only result where the outfit furnished is as
small as possible, considering all the necessities of
the portions in use.7' "The World Must Be Safe
Unquestionably much valuable experience and for Democracy"
training was gained from the establishment of Woodrow Wilson, War Message,
the advanced base at Culebra in January 1914. 2 April 1917
Many of the mooted questions as to the num- The Naval Appropriation Bill which be-
ber of personnel and types of equipment were came law on 29 August 1916 ostensibly author-
settled. Specifically settled was the size of the ized the largest shipbuilding program ever
Advanced Base Force. Admiral Dewey wrote undertaken by the United States up to that
that the: time. The Marine Corps personnel bill that was
General Board therefore considers that two incorporated into the appropriation bill had
Marine Regiments, one fixed defense and one mo- increased the authorized number of enlisted
bile, of about 1,250 enlisted men each, regularly men by 5,000, from about 8,000 to over 13,000,
drilled in advanced base operations, is an adequate and the number of commissioned officers from
peace time provision to defend Culebra or any of 343 to 600. It also permitted the Marine Corps
the advanced base sites so far considered by the
General Board. This number is well within the to promote to brigadier general, Colonels Lit-
capacity of the peace complement of the Marine tieton W. T. Waller, Joseph H. Pendleton, Eli
Corps to furnish, and of the Navy to transport.74 K. Cole, and John A. Lejeune. An active re-
The Secretary of Navy, Josephus Daniels, cruitment campaign was instituted for enlisted
approved Admiral Dewey's and the General men, and numerous hours of examination for
Board's recommendation two weeks later. The
promotion of a great many officers and the
appointment of many second lieutenants
General Board had recommended that the ad- took place. Another aspect to be considered
vanced base exercises be held each year as a was the acquiring of new bases to train these
matter of routine training. History and events hoped-for new personnel. In quick order, San
would interfere with the training until the Diego was chosen by the House Naval Affairs
winter of 1922. The expeditionary role of the Committee as the site for the West Coast base.
Marine Corps was realized with the landing of The city of San Diego had donated a large
Marines at Vera Cruz in Mexico in April tract of land which was supplemented by the
1914, Haiti in 1915, Santo Domingo in 1916, government purchase of additional tracts.
and France in 1917. The decade of the 1920s Quantico, Virginia, became the East Coast
would see the resumption of advanced base base. It had all the area for field exercises,
training. and rifle and artillery ranges. The Commari-
The Advanced Base Force, while not des- dant "did not want a base within the limits of
tined to be actively committed during World an active navy yar(1 as the industrial and
War I, was kept intact, numerically at least, other Navy requirements paramount there
22 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

would probably crowd out the Marine Corps two years, the Marine Corps expanded and de-
activities." Expansion of the Marine Corps mobilized in record breaking numbers. The
became a fact. Over a period of approximately following figures illustrate these fluctuations:

Commissioned and Enlisted Total

Warrant Officers Men Marines

U.S. Declared War 6 April 1917 511 13,214 ' 13,725

30 June 1917 776 26,973 27,749
13 March 1918 1,389 38,629 40,018
30 June 1918 1,503 51,316 52,819
Armistice Day 11 November 1918 1,474 70,489 72,96S
Maximum Strength Peaked 11 December 1918 2,462 72,639 75,101
30 June 1919 2,270 46,564 48,834
30 June 1920 1,104 16,061 17,165

"Major Edwin N. McClellan, USMC, The United States Marine Corps in the World War, (Washington: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1920).
U.S. Department of Commerce, Historical Statistics of the United States—Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1960).
"Strength of the Navy, March 13, 1918," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 43, no. 5 (May 1918), P. 936.
These figures include USMC reserve personnel and female reservists.

Guidance of all this expansion within the nished security detachments and sea-going Ma-
Marine Corps became the responsibility of the rines for the Navy.78 The best summary of the
administrative staff departments and the As- actions of l\'Iarines in 'World 'War I, is still
sistant to the Commandant, Brigadier General McClellan's account. He observed that:
John A. Lejeune, and his small working group. Within 1year after the outbreak of war the
They supervised a more than five-fold expan- Marine Corps placed about as many enlisted men
sion of the Marine Corps. They dispatched in France as there were in the Marine Corps when
war was declared . Approximately 30,000 Ma-
two brigades to France, maintained an ad- . .

rines were sent overseas to join the American Ex-

vanced base force of brigade size, provided ex- peditionary Forces and 1,600 for naval duty ashore
peditionary forces in the Caribbean, and fur- During the war a great many additional Ma.

I
IT

Machine gun instruction at Marine Officers' School, Quantico, during World War I. (USMC Photo 2O447).
 BACKGROUND— 1900-1920—COMING OF AGE 23

rifle detachments were detailed to guard the radio World War I gave the Marine Corps exper-
stations, naval magazines, ammunition depots, ience in integrated staff work:
warehouses, cable stations and other naval activi-
ties, and the detachments already established were After a study of the British and French Army
largely augmented The Marine Corps, while
. Staffs, as developed through 3 years of combat
maintaining the Fourth Brigade of Marines a total experience, the Commanding General, AEF, adopted
of .258 officers and 8,211 enlisted men, that fought a system patterned upon the French staff . . . In
in eight battle operations suffering approximately turn the US. Army staff system became thoroughly
12,000 casualties, placed and maintained the Fifth familiar to Marines serving in the AEF. It was
Brigade of Marines of the same strength in France; employed by the 4th and 5th Marine Brigades, as
supplied the Commanding General of the Second they were organized under AEF tables of organi-
Army Division, and many officers on his staff; fur- zation. While brigades were the largest Marine units
nished a considerable number of officers to com- to serve in France, individual Marines learned the
mand Army units of the Second and other divisions, functioning of the staff at divisional level through
and for staff and detached duty throughout the assignments to Army Units. A Marine General com-
American Expeditionary Forces; participated in the manded the 2d Infantry Division, while other
naval aviation activities in France and in the Azores; Marines served on its staff from time to time. That
and during the period of the war succeeded in per- this staff system proved useful for Marine purposes
forming in a highly satisfactory manner the naval is attested to by the fact that Marine Corps staff
duties required of it, including the maintenance of development in the postwar period was based on
two brigades of prewar strength standing by to the staff of World War J9
protect the Mexican oil fields, and as an advanced
base force in Philadelphia; one in Cuba; one in Another aspect of Marine Corps experience
Santo Domingo and one in Haiti; administered and from World War I was in the aviation field.
officered the Haitian Gendarmerie and Guardia Na- The relatively new Marine Corps aviation
cional Dominicana; as well as providing efficient component, on the day the United States de-
1ariiie detachments for numerous navy yards and
naval Stations in the United States; and in the clared war against the Central Powers, 6 April
Virgin Islands; Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; Pearl 1917, consisted of four officers and 30 men, all
Harbor, Hawaiian Islands; Guam; Cavite and part of the complement of the Naval Air
Olongapo, P.!.; Managua, Nicaragua; Peking, China; Station, Pensacola, Florida.80 By the end of the
San Juan, P.R.; London, England; Cardiff, Wales; war, the total officer and enlisted strength ex-
Paris, France; and the Azores; and supplied many
officers and enlisted men for special and detached ceeded 2,400. The Marine Corps selected and
duty at home and abroad. trained its own pilots and mechanics. They

Planes of the 1st Marine Aviation Force at La Fresne, France, in 1918; on the left are DH—9As of "A" Squadron,
on the right is a DH—IB of "C" Squadron. (USMC Photo #529554).
24 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

flew just about all types of planes existing at any Marine ground forces. It was Major Alfred
the time, DeHaviland 4Bs, Curtiss JNs, etc. A. Cunningham, the first Marine aviator and
The 1st Marine Aeronautic Company, consist- the fifth naval aviator, who commented that
ing of 13 officers and 133 enlisted men, de- "the only excuse for aviation in aiy service is
ployed to Ponta Delgado, Azores, for anti- its usefulness in assisting the troops on the
submarine patrol operations in January 1918. ground to successfully carry out their opera-
With 18 seaplanes, it was the first fully trained tiOns." 82 Other times and other wars would
and equipped American aviation unit to go fully justify Marine aviation and what it could
overseas in World War J81 do in support of the Marines on the ground.
In July 1918, the First Aviation Force landed
in France. While waiting for their Dellaviland
DH—4Bs to arrive, the pilots did some moon-
lighting with the British and French. This Avi-
ation Force consisted of Squadrons A, B, C,
D, and Headquarters Company. It was organ-
ized to operate under the Navy as the Day
Wing of the Northern Bombing Group in
northern France. It operated in the Dunkirk
area against German submarines and their
bases at Ostend, Zeebrugge, and Bruges in
Belgium. Incidents of Marine aviators destroy-
ing a troop train and dropping food to be-
leaguered French troops were omtnendable
but isolated.
The war would not be won by Marine avia-
tion or any other aviation. The war was a land-
mass war—with great armies engaged, sup-
ported by artillery, and later tanks. Aviation, In France in 1918. Left to Right: Brigadier General
in its infancy, had to wait for another day. It Wendell C. Neville, commanding the 4th Brigade of
was ironic that, through no fault of their Marines; Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D.
Roosevelt; and Major General John A. Lejeune, com-
own, Marine aviators did not fly support for manding the 2d Division. (USMC Photo #529042).
 CHAPTER II
POSTWAR DISARMAMENT PERIOD

America's present need is not heroics but heal- congress of this kind ever to be held in the
ing; not nostrums but normalcy; not revolution Western Hemisphere:
but restoration;
. . not surgery but serenity.
.

Senator Warren C. Harding, 1920 Secretary Hughes, instead of mouthing the usual
platitudes at the opening session, threw a verbal
Normalcy, while difficult to define, was what bombshell by suggesting that the nations limit their
the American people wanted. The decade of naval weapons and scrap existing ships. He pro.
posed that the United States, Great Britain and
the twenties would usher in a new President, Japan junk a total of 66 ships amounting to 1.87
a new political party, and for the Marine Corps, million tons. Hughes stunned the audience with
a new Commandant. The American people re- this audacious proposal; hushed silence greeted him
jected the League of Nations and the Democra- while he read his proposals followed by wild ap-
plause at the conclusion of his address.1
tic Party. They wanted to leave the problems
that international relations brought and return "In less than 15 minutes, he destroyed 66
to the "normalcy" promised by the Republi- ships with a total tonnage of 1,878,043—more,
cans in the presidental election of 1920. Warren as one British reporter put it, 'than all the
G. Harding and his party won and, with this admirals of the world have sunk in a cycle of
popular support, disowned the League of Na- centuries.'" 2 Summarized, Secretary Hughes
tions. If the League was unpopular, disarma- proposed a 10 year "holiday" in capital ship
ment was not. Senator William E. Borah of construction; * scrapping specific ships which
Idaho introduced in December 1920, a month would result in a 5:5:3:1.7:1.7 ratio among
after Harding's election, a resolution that was the United States, Great Britain, Japan, Italy,
to become a joint congressional resolution, and France.**
which favored a tripartite disarmament con- The dramatic announcement vastly short-
ference. By June 1921, it passed the Senate ened the time of negotiation and helped as-
unanimously and the House by a vote of 332 sure the acceptance of the American propos-
to 4. Harding's Secretary of State, Charles als. "The reactions of the press and pulpit
Evans Hughes, made informal overtures to all over the world were tremendously enthus-
the governments of Britain, Japan, France, and iastic. If Hughes' address was intended as an
Italy in a note of 8 July 1921. He later broad- oblique bid for worldwide popular support,
ened this invitation to Belgium, China, Portu- it was outstandingly successful." The three
gal, and the Netherlands. The agenda was great powers most concerned, the United States,
also enlarged to include not only arms but Great Britain, and Japan, ultimately agreed
problems of the Far East in general. Although to the ratio formula but with compromises by
a great Asiatic power, Russia was not invited all. France and Italy had no problem agree-
to attend since the United States refused to ing to their ratios.
recognize the existence of the Soviets. All but Considering the time, the United States was
Japan promptly replied with polite enthusi- in the mood for massive cuts in the federal
asm. After a 2½-week delay, Japan acceded to budget. "Senators Henry Cabot Lodge and
the invitation to discuss naval disarmament,. Oscar W. Underwood bluntly informed
On 11 August 1921, Secretary Hughes issued *As defined at Washington, a capital ship was a
formal invitations to the nine select powers. warship. not an aircraft carrier, exceeding 10,000 tons
or carrying guns in excess of 8 inches in caliber.
Three months later on 12 November 1921, **The ratio 5:5:3:1.7:1.7 referred to the total tonnage
the conference met in Washington with all the allowed in capital ships as 500,000; 500,000; 300,000;
fanfare appropriate to the first international 175,000; and 175,000 tons.
25
26 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

Hughes that Congress, ever-conscious of the The major achievements of the Washing-
taxpayer, would not vote additional burdens ton conference were reflected in the adoption
in order to attain the costly and unnecessary of three closely interrelated treaties. The
honor of ruling the waves." ' Great Britain, United States, Great Britain, France, and
with a badly strained economy, welcomed a Japan agreed in the Four-Power-Treaty to re-
holiday in building. By 15 December 1921, Ja- spect one another's rights in their insular
pan consented to the Hughes ratio in spite of possessions in the Pacific and to consult to-
mass meetings in Tokyo and newspaper edito- gether should such rights be threatened. With
rials supporting demands for greater tonnage. the addition of Italy, these same nations con-
The alternative, for Japan as well as the other cluded the Five-Power-Treaty with its naval
powers, was a ruinous naval race. Japan's ratio and nonfortification clause. "The public
reward for her consent to the ratio was the accepted the Five-Power-Treaty, not as a tem-
controversial nonfortification clause to be in- porary naval arrangement at best, but as the
cluded in the treaty. final substitute for the irksome necessity of
America agreed not to fortify her Pacific naval expansion." S And finally, all those
islands, excepting Hawaii. The United States countries with interests in the Pacific joined
particularly agreed not to fortify the Philip- in the Nine-Power-Treaty in which they un-
pines, Guam, Wake, and the Aleutians. Great dertook to respect the sovereignty and inde-
Britain agreed not to fortify Hong Kong, Bor- pendence of China and to uphold the prin-
neo, the Solomons, and the Gilberts. Japan, in ciples of the Open Door policy. This then was
turn, agreed not to fortify Formosa or the the climate, the climate of disarmament and
former German possessions in the Pacific hopeful peace, that the United States embarked
north of the equator, which had been man- on in the decade of the twenties.
dated to her, notably the Marianas (less In America and elsewhere, it is a generally
Guam) and the Carolines. It would be an accepted sociological certainty that wars,
understatement to say that the nonfortification whether the world war variety or the unde-
clause was bitterly denounced by the Navy: clared Korean and Vietnam types, do affect
American naval authorities were shocked at the society at all levels. The essence of war trans-
agreement to forego the development of adequately forms, for good or bad, the social, political,
defended naval bases in Guam and the Philippines. economic, and military fabric of our nation.
To them it appeared that the United States was The twenties were no exception. Excluding
automatically foreswearing the possibility of suc- the military, the bibliography of the "Roaring
cessful fleet operations in Asiatic waters and in effect
underwriting Japanese naval supremacy in the Far Twenties" or "Jazz Age" reflected one of the
East. Subsequent history has of course largely sub- best documented decades of our history. The
stantiated this view.' military bibliography is sparse. Suffice it to
Professor Thomas A. Bailey, American his- say the public became less and less inter-
torian and writer, asserted: ested in war and anything related to it. The
Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover administrations
- far as naval limitation was concerned,
. as
pursued the policy of economy in the govern-
.

the non-fortification agreement was the crucial

compromise. Japan accepted a small naval ratio, ment. Obviously, this policy affected the mili-
but obtained greater security. Britain and America tary services. It curtailed the personnel strength,
consented to leave Certain of their insular posses- equipment, and general spending of the serv-
sions inadequately protected, but retained greater ices. For this period, it would seem that the
tonnage in capital ships.'
In the context of the times: military was in a retrenchment phase. Pos-
• . . there was a well founded Conviction Ofl the sibly so, but it did channel the Services into
part of the American delegation that it was bar- making do with what they had and preparing
gaining away an empty right, one that Congress for war with what they hoped to have. It
would probably either never exercise at all or else gave time to study the lessons of the Great
implement on too modest a scale to make any dif-
ference in event of war. After all, both Guam and War and to experiment.
the Philippines had already been American pos- In a rather paradoxical situation, the les-
sessions for 23 years without anything much being son of World War I that the Navy and the
done toward military and naval development. What Marine Corps chose to study was the greatest
real prospect was there of a change of American
policy? On the other hand, there was good reason military failure of modern times—Gallipoli.
to think Japan would fortify her island posses- For decades, Gallipoli would be the symbol of
sions, in the absence of a treaty prohibition.' the absurdity of endeavoring to land troops
 POSTWAR DISARMAMENT PERIOD 27

and supplies on a hostile shore. The Army Evolution of a Staff

would not give Gallipoli a second thought,
primarily because it was in the business of In June 1920, the last months of the Wilson
land-mass warfare and not that of seizing a Administration and Navy Secretary Josephus
beach. The Marine Corps, from the late twen- Daniels' tenure, Major General John A. Le-
ties up until World War II, would have as an jeune was appointed 13th Commandant of the
integral part of its schools' curriculum a defini- Marine Corps. He was to have a rather rare
tive study of Gallipoli and the how's and why's distinction of serving three Presidents as Com-
of its failures. mandant and could have been appointed for a
The Marine Corps would also experiment fourth term had he not chosen to retire in
with its own internal reorganization, schools 1929. Many problems faced the new Command-
system, and equipment. This decade would ant such as recruiting, officer promotions, and
become one of awareness. The most responsible internal reorganization of Headquarters. In
people in the Marine Corps became cognizant the area of recruitment, Congress and spe-
of the fact that it could not continue to dupli- cifically the House of Representatives, author-
cate the Army, as it did in World War I. ized certain personnel strength for the Ma-
The Marines, however, by their experience in rine Corps. In fiscal year 1920, the authorized
advanced base training and vast amount of strength for officers and men was 27,400. The
expeditionary service could work out a mis- House of Representatives, however, only ap-
sion that was, by its very nature, unique for propriated funds for 20,000 officers and men.
the Marine Corps. Similarly, today's authorized strength of the

HEADQUARTERS, U. S. MARINE CORPS, I DECEMBER 920

(Derived from HEADQUARTERS MEMORANDUM of above date)

Special cognizance
28 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

Marine Corps is 400,000 men as provided for possible for them to do so in the postwar
by the National Security Act of 1947 as Marine Corps. As a consequence, the Army
amended, but actually the appropriated funds staff system, familiar now to many senior Ma-
for the personnel strength for fiscal year 1971 rine officers with World War I experience,
was 237,100 men.9 In any event, the recruit- was adopted. It must not be assumed that Ma-
ment drive in the early years of the decade rine Corps officers were totally without staff
was a success and the appropriated strength experience. On the contrary, valuable staff
of the Marine Corps averaged about 20,000 experience, while not the functional variety
men for the remainder of the twenties. The evolved in World War I, was gained by Ma-
Commandant unsuccessfully asked Congress rine officers serving with the Haitian Gendar-
for legislation to change the method of officer merie and the Guardia Nacional of the Domini-
promotions for most years of his tenure as can Republic. In addition, officers serving with
Commandant. The system, with its inequities the Advanced Base Force and with the fleet
in the examinations adopted by the Marine gained valuable staff experience. It is inter-
Corps in 1892, did not keep pace with the esting to note that a look at the evolution of
Army and Navy systems of promotions of their the Officer Fitness Report reflects the emphasis
officers. The Marine Corps would have to wait placed on command and staff assignments.
9 or 10 more years before a "selection" method Prior to 1916, general comments were made
of officer promotion was authorized by Con- on record cards and in correspondence con-
gress. cerning officer qualifications. From about Oc-
In regards to internal reorganization of the tober 1916, the Adjutant and Inspector's Divi-
Headquarters, it was apparent to the Com- sion of Headquarters Marine Corps introduced
mandant and to other thinking Marine of- into the administrative system Navy-Marine
ficers that the Marine Corps could never return Corps (NMC) Form 652. This form was en-
to the pre-World War I years of operation. titled "Report on the Fitness of Officers of the
In those years, the Commandant plus three U.S. Marine Corps." The form would con-
or four of his aides could totally manage tinually change in subsequent years to add or
the operations of the Corps. It would be im- delete items deemed essential or nonessential

COMMANIING OFFICER ANI) STAFF, MARINE (ORI'S SCHOOLS, QCANTI('O. VA.. 1927-I92

..-.
. t tt to rht I,4,tt, n'it
..n-3 \V. I, iI.II(Il.
i i
\V. Iti 1. i. Na . .,t
g-i, 1 3. r W.
it It. fliflILp, 5Ij.r R. L. J,g, tij i it. it, t!I y, \Ttj.''
-

I
.1. 'i t. ,'I-ht):
II
1 .,\i-i tt, (1at.ir (t. }-t. t''i,i'.
III ', ,I!tI! .2i.,\ittiui, (tta,1t I'. It. iI.'t ,',
It'' [.I'. itr''
I.. t.-'_-.

Itii.' .\I,u'ie,' te.'' .1 I F!-t J.t-,,',-ii'u,l t. i', itt&tI.','Itt, I_,.tzt t. . '-, ,

-,.- i. I'i-t .t,ut,uint it. A. i'i... iit t,1,trte
-

- I' aster Clerk It. i5an.

Many of the general officers who led the Marine Corps in World War II and the Korean War (Geiger, Denig, Larsen,
Erskine, Hermle, Rockey, Nini,ner, Pollock) are included in this group. (USMC Photo #29442).
 POSTWAR DISARMAMENT PERIOD 29

to the Marine Corps. In the initial NMC form, In the field, the reorganization paralleling
among the many items under "Professional that of Headquarters took the form of a func-
Qualifications," there appeared "Advanced tionally organized executive staff, combined at
Base Work" and "Fleet Marine Officer." The the higher levels with a staff of technical ex-
latter item pertained to a senior Marine officer perts. The executive staff, according to a Ma-
assigned to the fleet as a staff and liaison of- rine Corps definition, was "that body of as-
ficer. In about April 1922, the NMC form was sistants to the Commanding General of a
revised again and this time "Advanced Base Force or Independent Brigade of Marines
Force" was deleted but "Force Marine Officer" which coordinates the work of the Adminis-
was added. Force Marine Officer referred to trative, Technical, and Supply Staffs, and of
duty with the Expeditionary Forces that was the Troops; and which composes and issues
quite familiar to all Marine officers of the the detailed orders by which the decisions of
twenties. The form also reflected new billets the Commanding General are communicated."
stemming from World War I such as "gas of- The tables of organization of 1922, which first
ficer," "machine-gun officer," and "Division provided for executive staffs in the Marine
Marine officer." In about October 1926, the Corps, specified that an independent brigade
fitness report was again updated to the form rated a staff made up of B—I, personnel; B—2,
which would be used until about September intelligence; B—3 operations and training; and
1935. It was essentially the same form but with B—4, supply. A brigade which was part of a
the addition of specific questions as to the fit- larger unit, however, used the World War I-
ness of an officer to command an organization type staff in which personnel and supply were
"appropriate to the next higher grade" such combined. Infantry regiments, as part of a bri-
as platoon, company, battalion, regiment, bri- gade, had a staff similar to that of an inde-
gade, or corresponding organization. pendent brigade except that the four num-
General Lejeune reorganized his Headquar- bered sections were designated R rather than
ters into a staff system which, in essence, is B. Independent infantry regiments had these
still in effect today. The Commandant, in a same staff positions as did independent in-
Marine Corps Order of 1 December 1920, reor- fantry battalions, but without the numerical
ganized the Headquarters staff as follows (see designations. Within a regiment, battalion
also Chart 1): staffs at first lacked a supply officer, but this
deficiency was remedied by 1925. By 1936,
The Planning Section was expanded into the
Division of Operations and Training, composed of however, the four section staff had been
Operations, Training, Materiel, Military Intelli- adopted for all ground units in the Marine
gence, and Aviation Sections . Although it
. . Corps from battalion through brigade level."
was not organized according to the numbered
system employed by major field commands, the
Division of Operations and Training, nevertheless Duties and Missions
was divided into functional subdivisions, encom-
passing operations, intelligence, training, and lo- In 1922, the Commandant wrote to the mem-
gistics, such as were found in the field-type staff. bers of the General Board recommending to
There was no personnel section, however and the
Aviation Section was an organization not found in them that the strength of the Marine Corps
the executive staff of major field commands. Staff should be determined by its peacetime duties
organization for the control of aviation matters was and wartime missions. He was endeavoring to
complicated by the fact that the officer in charge of point out that:
Marine Aviation served both the Commandant of
the Marine Corps and the Chief of Naval Opera- hereas the Conference on the Limitation
tions. As first organized in 1919, the Marine Avi- of Armament has restricted the immediate material
ation Section was directly under the control of the means (navies) for waging war on sea, there is no
Director of Naval Aviation in the Office of the restriction on the size of the mobile forces which
Chief of Naval Operations. The duties of the Ma- may he attached to, or be held in readiness for
rine Aviation Section included supervision of re- service with the Fleet. 12
cruiting, training, personnel, and logistical matters
pertaining to aviation. It would be pointed out that the Conference on the
By this organization, the Commandant also Limitation of Armament is synonymous with the
created the Personnel, Recruiting, and Educational Vashington Disarmament Conference and the Naval
Sections. Their function was to relieve the Corn- Disarmament Conference. Subsequent American history
inandant and his immediate aides of what had be- hooks use the names interchangeably. As a result of
come an unmanageable burden of routine ad- the Conference, initially held in Washington, nine sep-
ni inistration .'° arate treaties were drafted and signed.
30 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

The Commandant set forth the Marine Corps personnel and material to "maintain in readi-
duties and missions as follows: ness in the United States on the Pacific Coast
• .2. The duties which the Marine Corps is re-
•
and on the Atlantic Coast, the nuclei of such
quired to perform in time of peace are as follows: Marine Corps organizations as may be neces-
(a) As marine detachments on board the vessels sary to guarantee success in war to any naval
of the Fleet in full commission. expedition requiring a mobile land force.
(b) As guards for navy yards, naval stations, am- "iS The recommendations of General Le-
munition depots, naval prisons, etc., at home and - -

abroad. jeune of February 1922, in a routine memoran-

(c) As garrisons for Haiti, Santo Domingo, Vir- dum to the General Board, changed the
gin Islands, Guam, Peking, Managua, etc. tactical direction the Marine Corps would
(d) As a mobile force in training for use on ex- pursue in the succeeding decades. He envis-
peditionary duty abroad for the purpose of carry-
ing out the foreign policy of our Government, or for ioned a mobile force, a force in readiness, and
emergency use at home. a force capable of offensive operations. This
(e) As detachments necessary for the recruiting force would not be seizing an undefended or
service,for training recruits, and for adniinistra- uninhabited advanced naval base, On the con-
tive purposes.
3. The primary war mission of the Marine Corps trary, "offensive land operations against hos-
is to supply a mobile force to accompany the Fleet tile naval bases" would be the task facing the
for operations on shore in support of the Fleet: Marine Corps. In the final analysis, was this
This force should be of such size, organization, not the birth of the Fleet Marine Force as it
armament and equipment as may be required by is known today?
the plan of naval operations. Also it should be
further utilized in conjunction with Army opera-
tions on shore, when the active wival operations Maneuvers, Expeditions, Football,
reach such a stage as to permit its temporary de-
tachment fron1 the Navy. and Mail
4. (a) The secondary mission of the Marine
Corps in time of war is to continue the perform-
The Quantico Marine Base having been
ance of its peace time duties, as outlined in Para- greatly improved since its founding in 1917, be-
graph 2, immediately above.13 came the home for the Advanced Base Force
for the Atlantic Coast in 1920. By 1922, "the
As it turned out, the Marine Corps would discontinuance of the use of the term Ad-
not get the added men requested—that is from vanced Base Force as now applied to organiza-
the appropriated figure of 21,000 to 27,400, tions of the Marine Corps" was recommended
the authorized figure. By the end of the fiscal by the CMC.16 Finally in 1923, "the general
year 1922, the Marine Corps would balance term Marine Corps Expeditionary Forces shall
out to 21,233, losing 1,757 from the preceding be used to designate as a whole, those perma-
year. The Navy would balance out to 100,211, nently or provisionally organized units of the
losing 32,616 and the Army 148,763, losing Marine Corps which are available for overseas
81,962.14 The importance of the CMC Memo- service with the Fleet." 17 The old Advanced
randum in February 1922 was not the super- Base Force for the Atlantic Coast was accord-
ficial request for added personnel for the
ingly changed to the East Coast Expeditionary
Marine Corps, that would become a national Force. It was joined in 1925 by a West Coast
pastime for succeeding Commandants, it was counterpart. The West Coast Expeditionary
rather the terminology and basis for doctrine Force became a reality with the addition of
that would evolve from it. Marines from the 4th Marine Regiment re-
In discussing a possible war in the Pacific, cently returned from Santo Domingo.'8 Marines
the Commandant alluded to the fact that be- not involved in expeditionary service in Hon-
tween Honolulu and Manila, the United States duras, Nicaragua, Haiti, Santo Domingo, Cuba,
had no developed naval base. In a war, such a and Chifia were involved in less dangerous
base would be necessary. "The loss of Guam but just as strenuous work called maneuvers:
under this situation would be most serious and
its recapture would he necessary to the conduct The first of these maneuvers took place near the
sites of the Battle of the Wilderness. A reinforced
of successful naval operations in the Pacific." brigade with a considerable amount of heavy equip-
He pointed out that "the advantage of having ment, including 155 millimeter guns pulled by 10-
immediately available a mobile Marine Corps ton tractors, marched to that area from Quantico.
force adequate to conduct offensive land op- As part of its effort to obtain favorable publicity,
President Harding was induced to attend the
erations against hostile Naval Bases is appar- maneuvers. During the following summer (1922)
ent" He recommended that there he adequate similar field exercises, but on a larger scale, were
 POSTWAR DISARMAMENT PERIOD 31

staged at Gettysburg with a small army of about first such exercise took place from January to
4,000 marines, armed with all manner of equipment April 1922 when a Marine expeditionary de-
left over from the World War. They even had a pla-
toon of tanks. The Commandant of the Corps com- tachment under the command of Lieutenant
mented that the organization was a 'miniature Colonel Richard M. Cutts participated in ex-
army small but highly trained and powerfully ercises held at Guantanamo Bay and at Culebra.
armed.' President Harding again attended the These exercises were designed primarily to test
maneuvers. A bid for publicity was made by the the possibilities of landing the 155mm gun and
re-enactment of Pickett's famous charge in the
Battle of Gettysburg. During the following year accompanying 10-ton tractor from ship-to-
(1923) the Marines from Quantico went into the shore in small boats. The 9th Company, 10th
Shenandoah Valley for maneuvers. Together with Marines, consisting of three officers and 135 men
the corps of cadets from the Virginia Military In. with one 155mm and two 75mm field guns,
stitute, they re-enacted the Civil War battle of
New Market, in which battle the cadets of that one .10-ton and three 5-ton tractors, was landed
institution had formed part of the Confederate from the USS Florida at Guantanamo Bay.
forces. The summer maneuvers of 1924 were held "During the period at Guantanamo, close at-
in the vicinity of Sharpsburg, Maryland, with more tention was paid to the training of the gun's
than 3,000 Marines from Quantico and ended with
the spectacular reenactment of the Civil War bat- crews and special details, the hardening of the
tle of Antietam, carried Out as a modern attack. men, and testing out of all material, and com-
This time the reinforced brigade returned through munication." 21
Washington where it was reviewed by President In March, the company was reembarked in
Coolidge."
the Florida and taken to Culebra. The 35th
There was no question that the maneuvers Company, consisting of three officers and 100
were important. The Commandant felt that men, joined the force at Guantanamo and took
"these . . . maneuvers offered excellent op- part in the exercises at Culebra. Material was
portunities in respect to troop and staff train- again moved by small boats from ship-to-shore
ing and the testing of equipment and other at Culebra and three problems of attack and de-
material." 20 They also did no harm to the fense were worked out with the Control Force,
Marine Corps image with the American public. U.S. Atlantic Fleet. Lieutenant Colonel Cutts
Aside from the summer maneuvers, the Ma- commented that "it has been conclusively dem-
rine was involved with guarding the mails, onstrated that artillery up to and including
winning national rifle competitions, attempt- 155mm guns and 10-ton tractors can be trans-
ing but failing to build a 50,000-seat stadium ported by battleships and landed in ship's
at Quantico, sponsoring a nationally-known boats." 22
football team that after a good fight was Cutts, however, qualified his recommenda-
beaten by the University of Michigan in 1923— tion by pointing out that "all conditions must
26 to 6. The overwhelming importance of the be exceedingly favorable to obtain a successful
decade for the Marine Corps, however, was result at the land place; more favorable than
the experience gained, along with the Navy, can normally be expected." The favorable con-
from the fleet exercises held during the winters ditions referred to implied that there must
of 1922 and 1923 and the spring of 1925. normally be a calm sea and moderate surf.
These ideal conditions that would be rarely
Fleet Maneuvers—i 922 found in operations such as this did not make
If, as the CMC said, staff training and testing the task impossible. Colonel Cutts recom-
of equipment were important in the land ma- mended that a "lighter" be constructed for
neuvers held during the 1920s, then the prac- transporting heavy guns. "It should not be
tical and valuable experience gained in the self-propelled owing to increased weight en-
fleet maneuvers were of inestimable value to tailed, and the absolute necessity of ground-
the Marine Corps. It is this same period of ing." 23
trial, error, and sometimes disaster, that com- Four years later, Cutts would get to test a
pany and field grade officers obtained the troop and artillery lighter, however, it was not
knowledge that would be the key to the suc- self-propelled. In the summary of his report,
cessful operations of World War II. Most Colonel Cutts noted that what must have been
senior Marine commanders of the 40s, such as obvious to officers of the Marine Corps that "in
Holland M. Smith, Charles D. Barrett, Alexan- attempting to weigh carefully the advantages
der A. Vandegrift, etc., were participants in and disadvantages of both the attack and de-
the valuable fleet maneuvers of the l920s. The fense of a base, by far the greater stress has
82 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

come on the defense . It is hoped

some method and material may be developed
to solve the problem of the attack." 24 In as-
sessing the exercises of 1922, the Commandant
commented that "while the exercises of 1922
were defensive in their nature, they brought
out the difficulties of attack in landing opera-
tions against hostile opposition and the further
presumption that the Marine Corps should be
preparing for offensive landing operations in
addition to the defensive advanced base work.25

Fleet Maneuvers—1923—1924
In the winter maneuvers of December 1923
through February 1924, the CMC assigned an
expeditionary force of over 3,300 officers and
men under the command of Brigadier General
Eli K. Cole to Fleet Exercise No. IV. The fleet
exercisesunder the command of Admiral
Richard E. Coontz, Commander in Chief, U.S. Brigadier General Dion Williams, USMC. (USMC
Fleet, were conducted at Culebra and the Photo #529182).
Canal Zone. The force was divided approxi-
mately in half with 1,550 men with 6 155mm The remaining portion of the expeditionary
guns, 12 75mm guns, and 18 machine guns de- forces, totalling 1,750 Marines, were known as
fending Culebra against attack. This force was MCEF, U.S. Fleet, and under the command ol
known as Marine Corps Expeditionary Force General Cole. It comprised a hostile landing
(MCEF), Culebra, P.R. and under the com- force which effected landings in the Panama
mand of Colonel Dion Williams. The defense Canal Zone and at Culebra against Colonel
force at Culebra included engineers, gas and Williams' men. The MCEF, U.S. Fleet com-
signal troops, plus aviation, balloon service, prised the 5th Marine Regiment, a headquar-
and antiaircraft units and a light tank pla- ters company, radio service company, gas pla-
toon.26
toon, naval medical corps personnel, and four
Army liaison officers. To say the results of the
exercises were unsatisfactory would have to be
the understatement of the decade. Landing
on the wrong beach, boats being lost for a time,
insufficient naval bombardment, transport
poorly loaded, etc. were some of the criticisms
of what went wrong.27 It was expected that
many things would not go right. What was
important in the exercises of 1924 was the
experience of a large-scale landing and the many
recommendations to improve future landings.
If one transport was poorly loaded, the
freighter USS Sirius was not. The assignment
of a detachment of 25 Marines and one officer,
the forerunner of a combat cargo officer, made
cargo off-loading feasible. Colonel Williams re-
ported "that the loading and unloading of the
Sirius constituted one of the most valuable les-
sons of the maneuvers." 28 The 1924 exercises
were significant in that they demonstrated
Brigadier General Eli K. Cole, USMC. (USMC Photo great problems that were endemic in a ship-
#520349) to-shore landing at the time. They also pro-
 POSTWAR DISARMAMENT PERIOD 33

duced the beginning of serious experimenta-

tion with landing craft more suitable than the
standard ships' boats. Two types of boats were
tested, the first of which was a derivation of
the British 'beetle" boats first used by them at
Suvia Bay, Gallipoli in August 1915. The CMC
requested the CNO to have the one "fifty foot
(50') motor lighter, (Beetle boat), now
being built at Norfolk, Virginia, placed on
board the USS Henderson" 29 for testing during
the winter maneuvers. The Henderson, the
transport Chaumont, and the Sirius were the
other ships assigned to the MCEF.
General Cole assessed the value of the
"beetle boat," officially designated "Troop
Barge A," as follows:
We had with us a so-called "Beetle' capable of
carrying a 75mm gun and about 60 men, or 100
I
riflemen—this is a beginning, but the present de-
sign must be altered, if for no other reason than Unloading equipment of the Marine Corps Expedi-
that its stowage on board ship reduces the motor tionary Force at Culebra, Puerto Rico, January 1924.
sailers by two—i.e. one 50' and one 40', with land- (USMC Photo #516047).
ing capacity of 160 men. Some design must be
arrived at whereby a transport can carry boats for
at least 60 percent of the infantry force on board, permit their being towed by a minesweeper or a
with special provisions for artillery, transporta- destroyer at reduced speed. A design which will
tion, supplies, etc. These boats should be sea- give protection against machine gun fire and which
worthy enough to allow them to go 20 miles under provides for some machine gun fire from the boat
their own power, and if possible of a design to is desirable.°

_t' I

I!

Unloading a 75mm gun from a "Beetle" boat during fleet maneuvers at Culebra, Puerto Rico, in 1924. (USMC
Photo #515227).
34 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

attributed to Brigadier General Smedley D.

Butler. He had been designated to command
the MCEF but was replaced by Brigadier Gen-
eral Eli K. Cole on 14 December 1923. While
Butler was still concerned with the exercise,
he had corresponded with Walter Christie of
the Sun Shipbuilding Company of Chester,
Pennsylvania who had built an amphibious
tank in 1922. After successful tests on the Hud-
son River in New York and later tests on the
Potomac River, Christie asked the CMC to test
r his tank in the winter maneuvers of 1924. The
CMC accepted his offer and the Commander in
- Chief, U.S. Fleet, Admiral Robert E. Coontz,
gave authorization to the Commander, Scouting
Fleet, Vice Admiral Newton A. McCully, to
Christie amphibian tank, mounting a 75mm gun, is test the Christie Tank.32 General Butler asked
tested at the Culebra maneuvers in 1924. (USMC Photo Christie and Admiral McCully to keep the use
*523 115). of the tank a secret in order to surprise the
defenders of Culebra.33
The other boat tested during the winter The tests were conducted on the Christie
maneuvers of 1924 was the "Christie Tank." tank but no mention of it surprising the de-
Unlike the "beetle boat," this test was sched- fenders of Culebra was noted in the reports
uled to be a great surprise to Colonel Williams' after the exercises were over. The CMC noted
forces defending Culebra. Its appearance was to the Secretary of the Navy that "two special

—,

iv i I'
I

1Ien of the 5th Marine Regiment landing at Culebra, Puerto Rico, during fleet maneuvers, 1924. (USMC Photo #515293).
 POSTWAR DISARMAMENT PERIOD 35

types of boats for landing operations were During July 1926, a detachment of Marines
used experimentally with interesting, although under the command of Major Maurice E.
not decisive results." The Christie tank, Shearer was ordered to Hampton Roads, Vir-
while successful on rivers, proved unseaworthy. ginia to make tests of two 50-foot motor light-
"Even though never perfected, it was the ers, one for landing troops and the other for
earliest forerunner of the amphibian tractor landing artillery. Both lighters were built by
(LVT) which was to make such a remarkable the Navy. The detachment was broken into
record in World War II." two platoons, the infantry platoon from the
5th Regiment commanded by First Lieutenant
Charles Connette and a section of 155mm artil-
Aloha—Fleet Maneuvers— 1925 lery from the 10th Regiment commanded by
In April 1925, joint Army and Navy exer- First Lieutenant Melvin E. Fuller.39 The Motor
cises were held off the Hawaiian Islands. The Troop Lighter was a development from a pre-
number of Marines employed was a simulated vious design generally known as the "beetle
42,000-man landing force but in reality 1,500 barge" It was a "special purpose" lighter to
took part. An important factor was an experi- be used primarily for the landing of the first
ment with the landing force staff. The normal troop wave under fire. Smaller boats carrying
school activities in the Field Officers School at about 100 men were envisioned to be used to
Quantico were suspended in March and the carry the rest of the troops as soon as the
students and instructors all became members beach had been cleared. The motor troop
of the "Blue" MCEF (attacking force) of Ex- lighter being tested was 50-feet long and had
ercise #3. The group was commanded by Colo- about a 14-foot beam. It was propelled by two
nel Robert M. Dunlap, Commanding Officer of motors, and was armored against small arms
Marine Corps Schools. "The exercises ...
were fire. It had the capacity to carry machine guns
or 37mm guns for offensive power. The de-
completely successful from the standpoint of
the Marines. The plans worked to perfection signers had no special provisiOns for retraction
and the landing was accomplished." ° Colonel of this boat from the beach but "if the landing
Dunlap and his staff participated in a Navy is on a beach of such a nature as to permit
critique at the Marine Barracks, Pearl Harbor withdrawal they may be used in landing of
from 1 to 4 May. After his return to Quantico, subsequent waves, if not, they afford protected
another critique was held there on 1—5 June dressing stations, or even machine gun nests." 40
1925 emphasizing Marine problems. Recom- Lieutenant Connette made three different
mendations in the critique ranged from proper tests of the capacity of the boat. He had loaded
tactical organization to discarding canvas leg- as many as 126 men with light marching
gins. They pointed out the need for experi- packs but concluded that "it would not be
ments to develop a "boat suitable for landing practical to place so many men in the boat in
the first waves ashore on a defended coast any kind of rough sea." When tests were made
capable of being carried on transports and ca- in landing the boat, 100 men with heavy
pable of being turned out in quantity once marching packs were loaded on board at the
war is determined upon 38 naval base in Norfolk:
If there was a single unchanging thread in The boat proceeded under her own power to
all of the fleet exercises during the 1920s it Ocean View Beach, a distance of about four miles
was the constant recommendation that a "suit- where Jandings were made through a very light surf.
able boat' be developed to land the landing The boat was put up to the beach with her bow
about three feet clear of the water. The landing
forces. Marine participation in fleet exercises from boat was made, clearing the boat in two
was interrupted for the remainder of the de- minutes at first trial and about one and one half
cade due to renewed expeditionary commit- minutes at the second trial. Had the front hatch
ments in Nicaragua, Haiti, and China and the opening been larger the boat could have been un-
loaded in less than one minute. The boat left the
bandits' return to robbing the mails at home. beach very easily after being reloaded.1
It would not be until 1932 that the Marine
Corps would resume its participation in fleet The 50-foot lighter for landing artillery was
maneuvers. However, the intervening years designed primarily for a maximum effort of
would bring more experimentation with land- landing the 155mm gun and its tractor on any
ing lighters and see the development of a mis- stretch of good beach in a moderate surf. How-
sion. ever, a secondary purpose was considered in
36 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

duct of landing operations." This was in-

deed a milestone in the restatement of the
Marine Corps mission.

Marine Corps Schools

"Education has for its object the formation of
character"
—Herbert Spencer

Formal military education of officers in the

Marine Corps only goes back to 1891 when
the School of Application was founded for
newly commissioned officers. The initial loca-
tion of the school was at the Marine Barracks
in Washington but subsequently it moved to
Annapolis, Port Royal, Norfolk, and finally to
Quantico in April 1917. By 1920, and after
Series "E" light tank of the 3d Brigade being loaded
going through several name changes, the
on board ship at Tienisin, China, in September 1928. school was known as the Marine Officers'
(USMC Photo #528193), School. By July 1922, it had three separate
courses in session—the field officers course, the
company officers course, and the basic course.
using the lighter for landing troops, equip- For the first time, all courses or, as it evolved,
ment, and ammunition, "thus securing distri- all schools, were located at Quantico. The Ba-
bution at beach head, and avoiding congestion sic School would subsequently be moved to
at landings which are possible only for ships' Philadelphia in 1923 but would return to
boats," 42 The lighter was not self-propelled and Quantico during World War II.
had to be towed by another boat: The curriculum of all of the schools at
Quantico, commonly called Marine Corps
It had to be beached stern-to and the gun or Schools (MCS) during the 1920s, was natu-
vehicle unloaded over a stern ramp. Retracting
was easy but the single disadvantage was that the rally Army oriented. This orientation was by
lighter could not be worked in and beached until design, organized as such, because of the recent
the beach had been secured. experiences in World War I. In addition, all
In 1927, the Joint Board of the Army and texts, with the exception of Advanced Base
Navy* recognized the history, experience, and writings, used by MCS were written by the
affinity for Marine Corps in landing operations Army. Army orientation continued throughout
and assigned as a general function the responsi- the education of Marine officers in that many
bility to "provide and maintain forces for land senior Marine officers attended the Army War
operations in support of the fleet for the initial College or the Command and Staff College of
seizure of advanced bases and for such limited the Army.
auxiliary land operations as are essential to the The Army's schools were excellent but by
prosecution of the naval campaign." The re- their nature patterned for the organization
port further established that "the Marines training, equipment, and mission of the Army.
because of the constant association with naval The knowledge gained from the Army schools
units will be given special training in the con- could only serve as good experience to the
individual officer and perhaps give him new
*As a result of command experiences in the Spanish
ideas as to how to improve his own organiza-
American War, which showed the need for a better tion, etc. The Marine-Army graduate return-
U.S. military organization to handle preparation of ing to his battalion, regiment, or some staff
joint war plans, the conduct of joint training, and duty, found an organization, different in num-
control of joint operations, the Joint Army-Navy Board ber, equipment, and mission. Mission was the
was established in 1903. This body was responsible
for advising the civilian secretaries on major policies key. What was the mission of the Marine
affecting the two armed services, It was superseded by Corps? Marines in the past had had a great
the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization after May 1942. diversity of jobs. They had been part of a
 POSTWAR DISARMAMENT PERIOD 37

land mass war, had seized and defended small

islands, fought bandits abroad, had governed
whole countries, and had guarded the mails.
In addition, the new decade of the twenties
brought the further improvement of the air-
plane, tank, and radio. How would these new
developments be utilized in the spectrum of
possible missions? How could a school prepare
officers to meet the challenges of carrying Out
any of the above mentioned tasks? The an-
swer came not by a single, simple order but by
an evolutionary process. War plans, prepared
under the Joint Board of the Army and Navy,
provided the impetus of the evolutionary proc-
ess that ultimately restated the landing opera-
tions mission that was the responsibility of the
Marine Corps.
With this task in mind, the Marine Corps
Schools would have to develop a course of
study of their own. The traditional Army Brigadier General Samuel M. Harrington, USMC.
courses could not give them the answer, they (USMC Photo #25101).
were not geared for it. One such original work
was the study of the technique of small wars.
A vast amount of uncorrelated information
had accumulated through the years, but no at- book entitled Small Wars Operations was
tempt had been made to consolidate it into a published for use within the MCS. In 1940, a
form which could be used in passing on this revised and corrected version of small wars
information to other officers. In 1922, Major was published for the Marine Corps by the
Samuel M. Harrington, while a student of the Government Printing Office for general use,
Field Officers Course, undertook a comprehen- entitled the Small Wars Manual.
sive study of small wars. As a result, he pre- The curriculum at MCS began to change.
pared a definitive treatise entitled, "The Strat- As a result of the report of Colonel Robert H.
Dunlap, Commanding Officer of MCS, concern-
egy and Tactics of Small Wars." * After
Harrington left Quantico, Colonel Ben H. ing the Fleet Exercises of 1925, the CMC
Fuller, Commanding Officer of MCS, requested directed that the subject of Overseas Expedi-
Major Harrington to send him copies of his tions and Ship-to-Shore Operations be devel-
work on small wars "in order to build up a oped and made an important feature of the
course strictly [patterned for] Marine Corps tactical course in both the Field and Company
Officers' Schools.47 By 1926, tactics studies em-
work 46

Colonel Fuller had Harrington's work in- phasized Marine Corps activity in conjunction
corporated into the school's curriculum. This with the fleet and landing operations. The fol-
publication presented certain principles of
lowing subjects became part of the MCS reg-
landing operations, the seizure of cities, and ular curriculum: 48
operations in the field, as they applied to small (a) The strategy of the Pacific Ocean
(b) Expeditionary forces
wars. It constituted the first consolidated anal- (c) Naval considerations for an overseas expedi-
ysis of small wars available for study. Since tion
small wars continued to be an immediate con- Embarking and loading troops and supplies
(d)
cern of the Marine Corps, Major Harrington's Hydrographic and meteorological study
(e)
Tactical principles of securing a beachhead
(f)
work was the basis for more detailed writing Landing places (configuration, terrain, and
(g)
on the subject later. In 1935, a "Restricted" naval artillery support)
(h) Naval gunfire
* Major Harrington had published two articles en- (i) Beach parties
titled, "The Strategy and Tactics of Small Wars," Ma- (j) Shore parties
rine Corps Gazette, v, 6, No. 4 (December 1921) and (k) Waves
v. 7, No. 1 (March 1922). These articles were a con- (I) Naval provisions for disembarkation
densed version of his definitive treatise. (m) Disembarkation
38 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

(n) Boats of the Atlantic"; Commander Raymond A.

(o) Night landings Spruance, "Naval Intelligence"; Rear Admiral
(p) Command and liaison Frank H. Schofield, "The Strategy of the Pa-
(q) Exercise and debarkation
(r) Consolidation and exploration cific"; and Commander Howard M. Lammers,
(s) Withdrawal "Naval Gunfire in Support of a Landing."
The above subjects of instruction, with re- During the academic year 1928—29, the
spect to landing operations, totaled 49 hours schools were crippled by depletion of the staff
as compared to five hours in 1925. The increased
of instructors, most of whom were sent to Nic-
part the MCS would play in the development aragua. However, this did not result in a de-
of landing operations was reflected in the crease in the emphasis on landing operations
instructions.50
schedule for the academic year 1927—28. A By 1930, the MCS had become the center for
complete revision and expansion of the courses
the development of techniques in landing op-
tripled the emphasis on landing operations. erations. It would be at MCS, in the succeeding
MCS added a touch of sophistication with the decade, that the experience, theory, and find-
addition of Army and Navy Officers as instruc- ings would be incorporated into a functional
tors or visiting lecturers. Army officers per- manual of doctrine.
sented topics with respect to their own special-
ties. Naval officers quite definitely added their
talents to the climate whereby landing opera- Aviation—The Magnificent Men in
tions would be made. Some of the lectures Their Flying Machines
were presented by Captain Ralph M. Griswold,
"United States Fleet Operations and the Naval If ground Marines were making strides in
Staff"; Captain Dudley W. Knox, "The Strategy landing operations during the l920s, the air
Marines were making strides in tactics and
techniques in aerial warfare. We have seen
that through no fault of their own, Marine
aviators did not support Marine ground troops
during World War I. However, Marine air
made up for it after the war. Marine aviation
under the command of Major Thomas C.
Turner was the only U.S. military air service
that actually saw combat during the period be-
tween World War I and World War II. Marine
air served in Santo Domingo from February
1919 until July 1924, in Haiti from March 1919
to August 1934, and in Nicaragua from 1927
to 1933. Throughout those years, Marine pilots
were not only experiencing combat but were
also contributing radically new tactics to both
ground and air warfare.5' During this period of
the twenties, Marine planes and pilots were
sent to the Pacific for the first time when they
were assigned to Guam. In April 1927, ele-
ments of three squadrons were shipped to
Tientsin, China in support of the MCEF sent
there. There was no combat action in China—
it was centered in Latin America, It was in
Santo Domingo in 1919 that Lieutenant Law-
son H. M. Sanderson first experimented with
— ii dive-bombing.
Sanderson found that he could hit a target
The Commandant, Major General John A. Lejeune, more often by pointing his plane toward the
Senator Edward C. Hale, Chairman of the Committee target and releasing his bomb from a make-
on Naval A flairs, and Brigadier General Eli K. Cole,
at Quantico's airfield on 25 March 1925. (USMC Photo shift rack after diving to a low level (about
#515907). 250 feet) at an angle of about 45°—the angle
 POSTWAR DISARMAMENT PERIOD 39

which came to be known as glide bombing in tion. The Commanding Officer of the School of
World War 11.52 Aerial Observation located at Quantico had
In February 1927, Major Ross E. Rowell, requested the Brigade Commander, MCEF to
commanding officer of a unit of 6 DHs and 81 direct cooperation of the Fifth Regiment with
men, was directed to support the 5th Marines the Observers School in an air-ground com-
that had been dispatched to Nicaragua a month munication problem. He considered the prac-
earlier. Rowell had further experimented with tice essential in rounding out the aerial ob-
dive-bombing and made it mandatory in server for work with the infantry. In addition
training his pilots. Dive-bombing became a to their normal duties with expeditionary
standing operating procedure in Rowell's unit forces, Marine aviators participated in national
and a first for Marine air. Other services and air races, aerial surveys, night flying, exhibi-
other countries used dive-bombing developed tion flying, and other flight training.
in their own way. "Most senior Marine aviators By 1930, Marine Corps aviation was firmly
doubt that any individual can claim credit for entrenched in two major installations and
trying to hit his target by aiming his plane at three overseas bases located as follows:
it." Also in the late twenties, Major Edwin
Aircraft Squadrons, East Coast Expeditionary
H. Brainard, who succeeded Turner as Officer- Force, Marine Barracks, Quantico
in-Charge of Marine Aviation, managed to ob- Aircraft Squadrons, West Coast Expeditionary
tain the first plane the Marines ever had which Force, Naval Air Station, San Diego
was built to transport cargo, the three-engine Detachments with 2d Brigade, Managua, Nicaragua
Detachments with 1st Brigade, Port-au-Prince, Haiti
Fokker transport. In 1927, Brainard himself Detachments with Naval Station, Guam, Mariana
delivered the Fokker to Nicaragua for use. Islands
After two other Fokkers arrived, Marine cargo
operations made military history in flights
made and pounds of freight carried.5 In an-
other first of sorts, a Marine patrol• pinned
down by Nicaraguan bandits spotted several
Marine planes. The patrol laid out on the
ground panels of cloth indicating the direction
and range of the enemy and asked for an air
attack. The subsequent bombing and strafing
attack became the first known instance of an
air attack being directed by ground troops.'5
This tactic became a fundamental element of
close air support later on.
An early Marine transport p/one, the Fokker TA—2,
At home, in July 1926, Marine aviation was gaining altitude over Lake Managua, Nicaragua, on 9
preparing for its second class of aerial observa- April 1930. (USMC Photo #530022).
40 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

Lieutenant Christian F. Sc/iilt and his crew standing in front of a DT—2 torpedo bomber at New York in October
/925. Lieutenant Schilt was awarded the Medal of Honor for actions in Nicaragua in 1928. (USMC Photo #515971).
 CHAPTER III
ECONOMY AND WITHDRAWAL

The whole decade of the 1930s was a period and 1932, General Motors dropped in price
that tested the American Republic as America from $73 to $8 per share and United States
underwent the hardships of the Great Depres. Steel from $262 to $22; the general average
sion during the administrations of Presidents was down 90 percent. The Gross National
Herbert Hoover and Franklin D. Roosevelt. Product dropped from $104 billion in 1929 to
The Republican era ended with the defeat of $59 billion in 1932.
Hoover for reelection in 1932 and the start of A historian of the era, Professor William E.
the Roosevelt Democratic era in March 1933. Leuchtenburg, stated that:
The Great Depression was caused in part by by 1932, the unemployed numbered upward
the market crash that began after Labor Day of thirteen million. Many lived in the primitive
1929 with the heaviest selling on "Black conditions of a preindustrial society stricken by
Thursday," October 24th. Two weeks after famine. In the coal fields of West Virginia and
Kentucky, evicted families shivered in tents in
Black Thursday the average price of all com- midwinter; children went barefoot. In Los Angeles,
mon stocks was off 40 percent. Between 1929 people whose gas and electricity had been turned

Major General Ben H. Fuller, 15th Commandant of Major General John H. Russell, Jr., 16th Commandant
the Marine Corps, 9 July 1930 to 28 February 1934. of the Marine Corps, i March 1934 to 30 November
(USMC Photo #308343). 1936. (USMC Photo #H—6252).
41
42 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970
off were reduced to cooking over wood fires in The historian Charles A. Beard possibly
back lots . At least a million, perhaps as many summed up American sentiment in 1935 when
as two millions were wandering the country in a
fruitless quest for work or adventure or just a he wrote:
sense of movement.1 We tried once to right European wrongs, to
The unemployed in America during a 10- make the world safe for democracy. Even in the
rosiest view the experiment was not a great suc
year period ranged from 1.6 million or 3 per- cess . [Isolation] may be no better, for aught
. .

cent of the labor force in 1929 to 12.8 million anyone actually knows. But we nearly burnt our
or 25 percent of the labor force in 1933. By house down with one experiment; so it seems not
1939, unemployment dropped by 3 million to wholly irrational to try another line.'
9.5 million or 17 percent of the labor force. To In view of the international uncertainties of
add to the economic woes, labor unrest pro- the 1930s the Beardian logic was difficult to
duced in 1937 the worst strike year in the pe- refute.
riod between the stock market crash and the President Roosevelt continued the with-
end of World War II. The depression hung drawal policy even in Latin America. He did
like a pall over the entire country and the so not because we were disillusioned with the
world. South Americans, but because he dedicated the
When Franklin D. Roosevelt became Presi- nation to "the policy of the good neighbor."
dent in 1933, his energies were concentrated on The American historian George Harmon
domestic economic issues. On the international Knoles said that "Americans werç not in an
scene, however, the picture was equally con- imperialistic, aggressive mood in the 1920s and
fused and threatening and, of course, he had to 1930s. The United States henceforth expected
conduct the foreign relations of the United to treat the nations of the world and partic-
States along with the domestic policies of the ularly of the Western Hemisphere as good
"New Deal." Fast moving events in Europe neighbors; that is to say, a policy of noninter-
and Asia became the stepping stones to World ference in the private affairs of those states, yet
War II. Adolph Hitler was appointed Chan- standing ready to be helpful." Secretary of
cellor of Germany a month or so before Roose- State Cordell Hull at a meeting of the Seventh
velt became President. The militarists had Pan-American Conference at Montevideo, Uru-
tightened their hold upon Japan and the guay in December 1933, proposed in the
Japanese war lords began to encroach upon Convention on the Rights and Duties of
North China. In a hope of new Russian- States, under Article 8, that "no state has the
American trade and the promise from the So- right to intervene in the internal or external
viets not to interfere in the domestic affairs affairs of another." In effect, America was re-
of the United States, Roosevelt granted diplo- nouncing the right of intervention in the
matic recognition to the Soviet Union in No- Western Hemisphere. The United States soon
vember of 1933. had an opportunity to match words with deeds.
Americans in the meantime had become dis- In May 1934, the United States abrogated the
illusioned and resentful of the European Platt Amendment, which had granted America
powers who had reneged on the World War I the right to intervene in Cuba since the early
debts. "Isolationists were convinced that the part of the century. By 15 August 1934, the
United States should have little traffic with 826-man 1st Marine Brigade in Haiti under
those faithless foreigners; the experience with the command of Brigadier General Louis McC.
the debts strengthened the tendencies toward Little sailed for home thus ending the long
economic nationalism and isolationism." 2 period of American intervention in Latin
America's fear of becoming involved in an- America.6
other European war was reflected in the legis- With the end of intervention abroad and
lation of the middle 1930s. Strong isolationist the problem of domestic unemployment reach-
sentiment was apparent in the Johnson Debt ing its peak at 12.8 million persons, the middle
Default Act of April 1934, which prohibited part of the decade of the thirties became most
loans to foreign governments that had de- trying for all of the armed services. The Navy
faulted on their obligations to the United Department had received an appropriation
States. The passage of the Neutrality Acts of of only $309 million for fiscal year 1935. Out
1935, 1936, and 1937 were designed to prevent of this figure, the Marine Corps of 17,248
incidents that might lead to war. officers and men, received a little over $21
 ECONOMY AND WITHDRAWAL 43

million.1 The Marine Corps figure included Marine Corps Schools of the Thirties
everything, from pay to general expenditures,
which meant clothing, fuel, and the like. A Rear Admiral L. E. H. Maund, Royal Navy,
low budget for the armed forces, who were when speaking of the Gallipoli-Dardanelles
after all preparing for future wars, seemed Campaign, stated: "It had imagination, it had
reasonable enough to the average person. The the promise of great strategic gains; while the
war fought in the thirties by Americans against reasons for its failure could easily be discerned
starvation and unemployment was by far more and had to do with lack of technique, material
real to the average American than any fu- and belief in this form of warfare; shortcom-
ture enemy. ings that could all be overcome." 10 So it was
All service budgets were scrutinized again at MCS that formalized instruction in landing
and again. The Navy Department had already operations continued into the crucial decade
undergone an agonizing time because of Cut of the thirties. A development of a mature
backs resulting from the naval disarmanent doctrine of landing operations had been made.
treaties of the 1920s. The Marine Corps' turn The basis was the realization at the policy-
came during 1931 and 1932 in the form of an making level that an assault of defended
examination of its organization and establish- beaches was feasible and that, indeed, future
ment. The General Board of the Navy under- wars would demand the execution of such
took a year-long study to determine the need operations. Concurrently, as relaxation of ten-
for, and size of, the Marine Corps in war and sion in China and Nicaragua gradually re-
peace. The board examined every aspect of leased Marines in substantial numbers, the
the Marine Corps, reviewing its history, mis- various elements of the developmental process
sions, aviation, and its place in the war plans began to complement each other.11 The MCS
of the nation. The CMC, Major General Ben began to devote a major effort to the study
H. Fuller, answered fully all questions of the of landing operations and by the end of 1939,
General Board. The pivotal question basically out of a total of 1,092 hours of instruction,
was to show the necessity for an appropriated 455 hours or 42 percent pertained to some
strength of 21,000 men. It had been feared by aspects of landing operations.12
the Marine Corps that the statutory peacetime Brigadier General Randolph C. Berkeley be-
strength of 27,400 would be reduced. This came the first general officer to command the
reduction was opposed by the Chief of Naval Marine Corps Schools in August 1930. Under
Operations (CNO)* in his review of the Gen- General Berkeley's tenure, great strides were
eral Board report to the Secretary of the taken to resolve many problems concerning
Navy. He stated that the "present authorized landing operations. It was in 1931, a banner
strength of 27,400 should be continued as the year for MCS, that a special committee from
legally authorized peacetime strength in order the Field Officers School, under the direction
to allow expansion to this number without of Colonel Charles F. B. Price, started work on
the necessity of legislation during a period of a tentative text for "Marine Corps Landing
strained relations." 8 Operations." Other members of the committee,
The Marine Corps survived the examination who were also instructors at the Field Officers
and the Secretary of Navy, Charles F. Adams, School, were Majors Charles D. Barrett and
approved the report of the General Board and Lyle H. Miller.13 In April 1931, Price asked
the CNO's comment on 2 March 1933, which General Berkeley to assign Barrett and Miller
kept the statutory peace strength of the Marine full-time to the preliminary work of preparing
Corps at 27,400. While the appropriated the tentative text. Price stated that "the most
strength of the Marine Corps remained at important part of the preliminary work will
21,000 during the decade, the actual average be rather extensive practical experiments to
yearly strength was approximately 17,700 determine the capacity for personnel and
men .° equipment of all of the various types of boats
*The CNO office was created in May 1915. It was a in use in the Navy which might be employed
Continuation of the office of Aide-for-Operations
founded in 1909. The CNO is charged with the opera- in actual operations." 14 General Berkeley con-
tions of the fleet and with the preparation and readi- curred and appointed a board to "develop
ness of plans for its use in war. It was quite natural and write the text for Landing Operations and
that the CNO would comment on the strength of the
Marine Corps inasmuch as it would affect the Marine Small Wars." 15 In addition to appointing
strength for the fleet. Barrett and Miller, Berkeley added Major
44 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

Pedro A. del Valle and Lieutenant Walter C. its Senior and Junior Classes. In addition to
Ansel, USN.'° The board became known as the the Marine Corps Schools, Miller was a graduate
Landing Operations Text Board. of two schools of the Army, Fort Leavenworth
The CMC realized the importance of a School of the Line and General Staff and the
naval officer as member of the Landing Opera- Army War College.19 He consequently brought
tions Text Board as he "doubtless will be in a great amount of service school experience
a position to obtain informally naval thought with him. With the encouragement of Gen-
on questions of naval doctrine which may eral Breckinridge, Miller not only disagreed
arise Concurrent with this board, with the manner in which the school was run
other boards such as the Experimental Land- but the content and subject matter of many of
ing Lighters Board and a Curriculum Board the courses. He challenged the entire structure
were all doing yeoman work at MCS. As a upon which the education of Marine officers
result of the Curriculum Board's recommenda- was based.2°
tions, a considerably revised schedule was The first drastic action came when all the
worked out for the following school year, 1932. courses developed by the Army schools were
Greater emphasis was placed on landing op- discarded. These courses, and accompanying
erations, despite the fact that the scheduled problems, had long been the basis for the cir-
number of hours already assigned to these riculum, but in order to make the problems
courses had been increasing steadily. Another work, the Army Tables of Organization had to
recommendation of the board was to have MCS be used. Instructors were directed to rewrite
instruct and solve problems on the basis of all their material and gear it to Marine Corps
Marine Corps organization and material.18 Tables of Organization and Equipment.
The changes that took place in the instruc- The changes at MCS were duly noted by
tion and curriculum at MCS from 1931 to the CMC when he summarized this small re-
1933 undoubtedly affected the Landing Oper- volution in his annual report to the Secretary
ations Text Board of 1931. By 1933, there was of the Navy in 1933.21 Some of the changes he
no publication completed or printed from the noted were:
work of this board on a landing operations (a) School problems are now based on Marine
text, The board's work was, however, the first Corps units and equipment.
effort to develop a modern landing doctrine and
it provided a basis for the initial landing man-
ual published a year later. Some of the work
accomplished by the board, and used later in
the 1934 manual, was studies on units of meas-
urement for computing cargo requirements for
military equipment, establishment of standard
boat capacities for landing operations based
on specific data, and whole chapters on signals,
engineering, boats, air support, and artillery.
In April 1932, Brigadier General James C.
Breckinridge succeeded General Berkeley as
Commandant, Marine Corps Schools (CMCS).
General Breckinridge, no stranger to MCS,
having previously served as CMCS from 1929
to 1930, encouraged the changes taking place.
In July of 1932, Lieutenant Colonel Ellis Bell
Miller joined MCS as assistant to General
Breckinridge. In two years, Breckinridge and
Miller brought MCS to the forefront not only
as the training center for Marine officers
but as the intellectual/academic center
for the Marine Corps. Miller reported into
MCS from the Naval War College where, after
completing the Senior Course, he had remained Major General James C. Breckinridge, USMC. (USMC
to be an instructor in strategy and tactics in Photo #521272).
 ECONOMY AND WITHDRAWAL 45

(b) Certain personnel were designated to prepare doomed to failure lackinga proper Naval Ad-
text books and pamphlets to cover fields of service vanced Base Force operated by the Marine Ex-
for which no Marine texts existed. peditionary Force . . . and the establishment of
(c) Support by naval gunfire and other naval the fact that this necessary base force cannot be
agencies was developed in greater detail, and a created by the Marine Corps alone; it requires
closer relationship with the Naval War College the active assistance of the Navy Department nec-
was maintained. essitating appropriations and constructive action.24
(d) More effort was placed on the development Colonel Miller replied that "it was becom-
of comprehensive courses on landing operations ing clear that a complete reorganization and
and small wars.
In addition to the curriculum changes, the reequipment of forces was necessary to carry
content of a course in the study of landing out Marine Corps missions in support of the
operations was revised. The Dardanelles-Gal- fleet." 25 In an article in March 1931, Lieuten-
lipoli Campaign formed an important part of ant Commander E. W. Broadbent, USN, who
the background in research on this subject. was one of the first naval officers to serve at
During the academic year 1932—1933, each stu- MCS (1926—28) stated:
dent was issued a copy of the British official It is the mission of the Marine Corps to support
the fleet. But likewise it will be the mission of
history of the Gallipoli Campaign. This book, some part of the fleet to support the Marine Corps
Military Operations, Gallipoli, being the landing force. When two forces of different arms
latest and most accurate publication on have a mutual task, there must he mutual under-
the subject, was used as a source book. The standing, common thought, study, preparation, and
training. With these, if the time ever comes when
Gallipoli Course was organized "to acquaint the Navy needs more and better bases, the Navy
the students with the Gallipoli Campaign; to and the Marines can take and hold them.2'
train them in military research; and to provide In August 1933, Major General John H.
the Schools and through them the Marine Russell, Assistant to the Commandant, sug-
Corps with the material of value on a campaign gested to the CMC the discontinuation of the
which is in many respects of the type we are old "expeditionary force" and the creation in
expected to be experts in." 22 its stead of a new body to be called either the
Concurrent with the Gallipoli studies, the Fleet Base Defense Force or the Fleet Marine
students from the Field OfficersSchool at MCS, Force. The Fleet Marine Force, or FMF, as it
in conjunction with the Naval War College, was to be called, was an old idea of General
worked together on what had come to be called Russell's and he crystallized his ideas, 1\'Iiller's,
the Advanced Base Problem. The Advanced Cutts', Myers', and many others when he in-
Base Problem series, 10 in all, started during sisted that "this force should be included in
the school year 1931—1932. Each year a theore- the fleet organization as an integral part there-
tical problem of defending or seizing a base of, subject to the orders, for tactical employ-
in a given area was considered by both groups ment, of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S.
of students. The Pacific area was the predomi- Fleet." After approval by the CMC and the
nant choice of areas for such problems as appropriate authorities of the Navy Depart-
evidenced by problems dealing with Duman- ment, the Secretary of the Navy, Claude A.
quilas in the Philippines, Truk, Palau Islands, Swanson, signed General Order No. 241 on 7
Guam, Saipan, and Tinian.23 The Advanced December 1933 designating the FMF from the
Base Problems afforded the Marine Corps "force of marines maintained by the Major
Schools a chance to present its solutions at the General Commandant in a state of readiness
Naval War College and most importantly, the for operations with the Fleet." 28 The FMF
problems awakened an understanding of the replaced the East Coast and West Coast Ex-
imporance of the establishment of organized peditionary Forces and the Commanding Gen-
fleet landing units. eral, FMF and his staff were initially stationed
Colonel Richard 1\'l. Cutts, on the staff of at Quantico.29 This force provided the Navy
the Naval War College, had written to Colonel with a "type-force" of reinforced infantry with
Miller at MCS and Major General John T. the specific mission of executing landing opera-
Myers, Assistant to the Commandant, propos- tions.
ing that a Marine base force be placed in the As significant as was the creation of this force,
operating forces of the fleet: the fleet did not yet possess the capability of
-. .
a fleet unit, with as much consideration
. as
actually seizing bases and thus projecting it-
given to it by the Navy as other fleet types, such
as cruisers, destroyers, or carriers . . . establish- selfacross the oceans. The FMF needed a
ment of the fact that naval overseas operations are basic doctrine to guide its training, and the
46 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

fleet elements which were to he involved in On 9 January 1934, officers from the FMF,
landing operations required guidance as to how HQMC, and Quantico participated in a con-
they would perform their tasks in concert with ference with respect to the outline. The outline
the landing force. Between 1919 and 1933, the was based on experience, both personal and
Joint Army-Navy Board had promulgated sev- that culled from reports of landing operations,
eral manuals prescribing methods for Army experimentation, and the evolution of instruc-
and Navy cooperation in joint overseas ex- tion and problems at the MCS. Some 70 officers
peditions. The latest was published in 1933.° from lieutenants to brigadier generals, including
The directives contained in the manual were four Navy officers and one Army officer,
concerned with the techniques and agencies for attended the meeting. Following the conference,
cooperation and with the respective functions the manual was divided into various parts and
of each service in the conduct of joint opera- responsibility for writing these parts was as-
tions. But a manual of landing operations was signed to various committees. The bulk of the
still lacking. By late 1933, plans to work on a manual was grouped under three general areas:
landing manual by MCS were interrupted by (1) Tactics, which included landing anti de-
the mobilization of the 7th Marines for Cuban fense of bases, prefaced by a general discus-
duty and the consequent drain on personnel. sion of landing operations and the purpose of
The CMCS recommended to the CMC that the manual. The committee chairman was Ma-
all classes be discontinued at the schools and jor John Marston and subcommittee members,
that students and staff alike devote all time Major DeWitt Peck and Major Charles J. Mil-
and effort towards the production of a landing ler. (2) Staff functions, logistics, and plans
operations manual. The Commandant agreed and orders. Committee chairman, Major Harold
and, on 30 October 1933, directed the CMCS L. Parsons and subcommittee members, Majors
to prepare a manual on landing operations Wilbur Thing, Samuel A. Woods, and Thomas
as expeditiously as possible and to commence E. Thrasher; and (3) Training; chairman of
work not later than 15 November. Classes were committee, Lieutenant Colonel Calhoun An-
discontinued on 14 November and the staff crum. In addition, separate parts on naval
and students began work on the manual.31 and aviation activities were prepared by Lieu-
tenant Commander Clifford G. Richardson,
The Manual USN, Chairman of the Naval Committee, and
How the finished product—the manual—was Captain Harold D. Campbell, Chairman of the
written and the multiple changes in title it Aviation Committee.32 On 28 March 1934,
went through is in itself a story almost as inter- committees that had been at work in earnest
esting as the contents. submitted to the CMC the first parts of the
Students F. instructors wrote out chronologically manual. By 13 June 1934, the remaining chap-
itemized lists of the things to be done from the in. ters were submitted.
ception of a landing operation to the tactical com- The sequence of development of the manual
pletion of a landing operation. was as follows:
a * * * *
A committee of nine was appointed to consider Tentative Manual for Landing Operations of
the itemized lists and draw up a consolidated list 1934 was used at MCS during the 1934—35 school
embracing all recommendations and to group year in mimeograph format; it was not given
them under headings. Each member of the com- outside distribuiion.
a a a * *
mittee of nine formulated his own list, based on
the results of his study of all lists submitted. By July 1934, the title was changed to Manual
a a a a a for Naval Overseas Operations and published by
A committee of five then studied and further the Navy Department.
* a * a a
consolidated the lists from the committee of nine
which resulted in a rough outline for the contents 15 May 1935, a board headed by Lieutenant
of the manual. Colonel Charles D. Barrett was formed for revision
a a a of the 1934 edition of the manual.a
The prophetic nature of the rough outline was *General Alfred H. Noble considers Barrett (later a
dramatically exemplified by an examination of the major general) to have been an outstanding original
six elements into which the landing operation was thinker who almost singlehandedly wrote two-thirds of
subdivided: (I) Command relationships, (2) Naval the Tentative Manual based on the mass of uncoordi-
gunfire support, (3) Aerial support, (4) Ship-to. nated material assembled at the time. "He [Barrett]
shore movements, (5) Securing the beachhead, and was the man ho put pencil to paper" Cen Alfred
(6) Logistics. These functions, together with com- H. Noble ltr to Director, MC. History, dated 3 April
munications, fornied the basis to a greater or 1971 (Historical Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine
lesser degree of amphibious doctrine today. Corps).
 ECONOMY AND WITHDRAWAL 47

* * * * *
Change #3 was issued in August 1943, based
on further experiences in the Solomons and in
North Africa. It was used during the remaining
part of World War II.

The Contents
Command relationships as described in the
Tentative Manual dealt with the organiza-
tion of the landing force as well as with com-
mand procedures. It was here that the inherent
naval character of the landing operation was
defined. The force was to be commanded by
a Navy flag officer. The task force would have
two main components: the landing force,
made up of Fleet Marine Force units, and the
Major Charles D. Barrett, USMC. (USMC Photo naval support groups consisting of the Fire
#519539). Support Group, the Air Group, the Covering
Group, and the Transport Group. The specific
* * * *
*
responsibilities of the various commanders dur-
9 July 1935, a revised manual with photographs,
better sketches, etc., approved by the CNO on ing all phases of the operations were enumer-
25 May 1935, was distributed by the CMC through- ated and the principle of parallelism of com-
Out the Marine Corps, Navy, and outside agencies mand, subject to the overall authority of the
'ith a Restricted" classification. This 1935 edition amphibious force commander, was defined.
became the first widely-distributed Tentative Land- With these arrangements one of the major
ing Operations Manual.83
* * * * * causes of the Gallipoli disaster was overcome.
On 15 June 1936, a board headed by Lieutenant Finally, it insured that naval forces would or-
Colonel Keller E. Rockey, along with Lieutenant ganize so as to be responsive to the needs of
Colonels Archie F. Howard and Alfred H. Noble, the landing force.35
was convened to revise the 1935 edition of the The Tentative Manual recognized that a
manual.
* * * * * landing force in the assault followed the same
On 26 May 1937, the CMC sent to the CNO the pattern as conventional offensive action but it
report of the board on revisions. also recognized the fact that the over-the-water
* * * * *
A revised manual was issued, but not for general movements of troops complicated the problem
distribution, on 21 June 1937 under the new title, of fire support. In developing a solution to
Landing Operations Doctrine, U.S. Navy 1937. this problem, an effort was macic to adapt
a a * * a naval guns to missions normally performed by
On 15 May 1938, a board headed by Lieutenant field artillery. The problems of fire direction,
Colonel Allen H. Turnage was convened to make the nature of projectiles, magazine capacity, and
revisions on the 1937 edition of the manual. Other
members of the board were Lieutenant Colonel the muzzle velocities and trajectories of weap-
Alfred H. Noble, Captain Francis M. McAlister, ons were all considered, and a sound doctrine
and Quartermaster Clerk Percy J. Uhlinger. for the effective delivery of naval gunfire was
a * * * *
developed.
On 25 November 1938, CMC authorized destruc-
tion of the 1935 manual, technically the Landing As a result of the many problems associated
Operations Doctrine of 1937, with the issuance of with the delivery of naval gunfire in close
Fleet Training Publication (FTP) #167, also known support of assault troops, the writers of the
as the Landing Operations Doctrine, U.S. Navy Tentative Manual explored the possibility of
193 334
employing aircraft for this purpose. As a result,
* a * * *
In May 1941, Change #1 to FTP #167 was is- the initial doctrine for close air support
sued based on experiences of the Fleet Landing evolved. This doctrine provided for both
Exercises and material developments up until 1941. visual and photographic reconnaissance, air de-
This edition \ras the guide for the Guadalcanal fense, and airborne fire support during •the
landings in August 1942. final run of landing craft to the beach. This
* * * * *
Change #2 to FTP #167 was issued 6 days before doctrine will be discussed in the succeeding
Guadalcanal, on August 1942.
1 chapter.
48 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

To no one's surprise, the part that had the Boats, Lighters, and Amphibians
greatest impact on the art of landing opera-
tions was the ship-to-shore movement. The Along with developments in doctrine and
manual recognized that the ship-to-shore move- technique there was a corresponding demand
ment embraces the most critical phase of the for specialized equipment to make the landing
landing operation and that it was more than a operation effective. In 1933, the CMC estab-
simple ferrying operation. The text provided lished a Marine Corps Equipment Board com-
a technique for the waterborne deployment of posed of 11 members who served on an addi-
the landing force for battle in accordance with tional duty basis. The primary assigned duty
the principles of fire and movement. For secur- of the board was to recommend the types of
ing the beachhead the manual defined the equipment best suited to the needs of the
techniques which would permit the landing Marine Corps. The Marine Corps was a "user"
force to survive during the period between sole rather than a "developer" of equipment at
reliance on seaborne fire support and the land- this time. By 1937, the board, gaining momen-
ing of its own artillery. It spelled out in detail turn and importance in pressing the Navy
the procedures for establishing communications Department to buy and develop landing boats,
promptly between echelons ashore and those expanded to 20 officers assigned on a full-
time basis.
afloat, and it addressed itself realistically to the
complex problems of supply and services re- The bureau within the Navy Department
quired by the landing force. responsible for designing, producing, and pay-
In the field of logistics, the Tentative Manual ing for all ships and boats was the Bureau of
emphasized the overriding importance of tail- Construction and Repair, later renamed
oring all loading to the requirements of the Bureau of Ships in 1940. This bureau was
landing force; the ships would be loaded in a of course struggling to make maximum use
manner which would respond precisely to the of the little money the Navy had in the 1930s.
tactical needs of the landing forces as they The development of landing boats was the
assaulted the hostile shore. The practice of least important item on its agenda. Tenacity
stowing as much materiel into a ship as it and persistence on the part of the Marine
would hold had to be replaced by a technique Corps plus a few sympathetic naval officers
that gave careful consideration to the require- in Construction and Repair had to be the
ments of the troops on the beach. Recognizing primary reason for the success of the develop.
this requirement and the related requirement ment of landing craft prior to United States
for standardizing procedure for embarkation entry into World War II.
of the landing force, the Marine Corps de- The problems to be solved in procuring
veloped and included in the manual instruc- special landing craft needed in landing opera-
tions on embarkation. These instructions in- tions fell into three categories: (I) Landing
cluded the preparation of embarkation forms, boats—used as carriers of troops from ship-
loading plans, and set forth the technique of to-shore; (2) Lighters—used to carry tanks and
combat unit loading of assault ships. trucks; and then finally (3) Amphibians—as
The theory contained in the manual was thought of in the 1930s as a fire support
specifically tested in the annual fleet training weapon only, that is, an amphibious tank. By
exercises from 1935 through 1941, conducted January 1937, the importance of obtaining
at Culebra, Vieques, the island of San Clemente suitable landing craft became apparent when
near San Diego, and in 1941 at New River, the Secretary of Navy established a "Depart-
North Carolina. These exercises refined landing ment Continuing Board for the Development
force staff work, stimulated the evolution of of Landing Boats for Training Operations."
landing craft and radio equipment, under- The board membership included representa-
scored the need for improved gunfire and air tives of the CNO, CMC, Bureau of Construc-
support doctrine, and gave practical experience tion and Repair, and Bureau of Ordnance.3
to the forces involved.36
The Tentative Landing Operations Manual, I—Landing Boats
initially published in 1934, is perhaps the most In an effort to explore the suitability of
important contribution to military science the existing commercial craft for landing opera-
Marine Corps had made to date in the 20th tions, the Navy, at the request of the Marine
century; certainly it is one of the landmarks Corps, agreed to test a variety of small boats
in its history. in consonance with available funds. In 1935,
 ECONOMY AND WITHDRAWAL 49

D ,8MA •P13IUpapH,4
Experimental surf boats lined up at Hampton Roads, Va., on 2 May 1938. (USNAS, Hampton Roads Photo #5773).

bids were advertised by the Bureau of Con- was the beginning of a long and unsuccessful
struction and Repair with specific details as effort by the Bureau to develop a satisfactory
to weight and length of the boats desired. The landing craft The 'Bureau Boat' in various
bureau had in mind the available deck space, forms showed up regularly at Fleet Landing
handling facilities, and davit strength of the exercises from 1939 through 1941, but efforts
ships of the 1935 Navy. Undoubtedly, these to get the 'bugs' out of its design were aban-
specifications hampered some bidders as only doned in 1940." Along with the "Bureau
nine replies were received by the Navy. Out Boats" that were being tested until 1940, experi-
of these nine, five boats were accepted by the ments were carried out utilizing standard Navy
Bureau and the Marine Corps Equipment ships' boats. The standard boats, designed for
Board for testing at Cape May, New Jersey, other purposes, also proved unsuitable for
in the summer of 1936. The boats were not
superior to conventional boats, although they
included some improved features and would
consequently be tested again in May of 1938 at
Hampton Roads, Virginia. Four of the five
boats tested were modified fishing boats used
by Atlantic Coast fishermen for many years
and named after the ports from which they
came, Bay Head, Red Bank, Freeport, and
Philadelphia. The fifth boat, a metal surf boat,
was a separate commercial entry. In the May
1938 tests, none of the boats was satisfactory.
The following winter, during fleet exercises
at Culebra, three of the five boats, Bay Head,
Red Bank, and Freeport, were again tested.
"The modified fishing craft still had serious
drawbacks. Owing to their exposed rudders
and propellers they tended to dig in when
retracting. They were so high forward that
Marines debarking had to drop 10 feet from
the bow to the beach. They were, moreover,
all unsuitable for lowering and hoisting."
In the light of the drawbacks revealed by tests,
the "Bureau of Construction and Repair Red Bank surf boat taking on board 18 Marines it
undertook the construction of a boat embodying had landed during trials in May 1938. (USNAS, Hamp-
all the best features of the fishing craft. This ton Roads Photo #5762).
50 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

sible for landing craft development in the

Bureau of Construction and Repair, wrote to
Higgins inviting him to visit the Navy De-
partment for further discussion of his boat.
Higgins visited McDowell in Washington
shortly thereafter and spent one week working
with him on redesigning the Eureka boat.
Higgins was soon given a proprietary contract
to deliver one boat, which he did within 30
days, to Norfolk. In the spring of 1938, Mc-
Dowell and other members of the Continuing
Board went to Hampton Roads and tested the
Eureka boat. Everybody was pleased with the
way it performed. The Eureka made its first
maneuver appearance at Fleet Exercise 5 in
1939 where it competed against several bureau
boats and the by-now venerable fishing craft.
Again it surpassed all the tests but the Com-
mander Atlantic Squadron recommended that
the Training Squadron of the Atlantic Fleet,
a counterpart of the Continuing Board, give
further tests to the Eureka boat.4'
These tests did produce good results and by
Philadelphia surf boat landing 18 Marines during 1940 money for naval procurement was begin-
May 1938. (USNAS Hampton Roads Photo #5758). ning to be more plentiful. By about September,
transports and converted merchant ships re-
beaching operations. They lacked speed and placed warships as troop carriers in landing
maneuverability and were extremely difficult exercises. These ships were equipped with
to handle in the surf. davits capable of handling 36-foot boats and
In 1937, Andrew Higgins, a New Orleans as the Eureka of 36-foot length "had twice
boat builder, reentered the picture of solving the capacity of the 30-footer then in service
the problem of a suitable landing boat. Hig- and could make the same speed without an
gins reentered because he had previously en- increase in horsepower, the Navy decided to
deavored to interest the Navy and the Marine adopt the larger as standard." 42
Corps in the Eureka boat that he invented in After many years, the Navy and particularly
1926. He had visited Quantico in 1934 to in-
terest the Equipment Board in the Eureka
boat, but with little or no money left in the S
Bureau of Construction and Repair nothing —
definite could be accomplished at the time.
In the 1935 bidding for test boats, Higgins de-
clined to submit a bid to the bureau. In
October of 1936, Higgins wrote to the Navy
offering his Eureka as a troop landing craft.
The Eureka was a boat of promising design. It
had a special shallow draft for the use of ,,.,
trappers and oil drillers along the lower Mis-
sissippi and Gulf Coast. It had a tunnel stern
to protect the propeller and a special type of
bow, called by Higgins a "spoonbill," which
enabled it to run well up on low banks and
beaches and retract easily.40
Timing was again poor and the Navy, was
unable to purchase the boat. In 1937, Com-
mander Ralph S. McDowell, who was respon- Higgins boat, 1937. (USMC Photo #526331).
 ECONOMY AND WITHDRAWAL 51

Re-embarking in a Eureka landing boat during joint Army.Marine exercises at New River, N.C., in July 1941.
(USMC Photo #529125).

the Marine Corps had the landing craft that The next month, May 1941, Brigadier Gen-
they wanted. The only existing drawback of eral Charles Barrett, Director of Plans and
the 1940 Eureka was the difficulty in unload- Policies at Headquarters, sent Linert to New
ing troops and supplies from the fairly high Orleans to see how Higgins was coming along
sides. On another visit to Quantico in April with the prototype Eureka. Linsert tested the
1941, Higgins was shown a picture of a Jap- Eureka boat with a ramp on Lake Ponchartrain.
anese landing craft with a ramp in the bow by Tests were also made with a truck and with
Major Ernest E. Linsert, Secretary to the 36 Higgins' employees running on and off to
Equipment Board.* Linsert and Brigadier simulate embarkation and unloading of troops.
General Emile P. ]\Eoses, President of the Linsert also inspected a 45-foot steel lighter
Equipment Board, asked Higgins to determine with a ramp bow that had been originally
the possibility of installing a ramp in the bow built for the Colombian government for cus-
of his 36-foot Eureka. Higgins was quite en- tom duties. A bulldozer was carried in the
thusiastic and agreed to make a prototype, lighter and of course the possibilities of using
converting a standard Eureka into a ramp this type of craft as a tank lighter became
bow at his own expense. immediately apparent. Linsert reported to
*The Japanese landing boat with ramp, shown Lin- General Barrett that both Higgins' boats were
sert, was part of a group of photographs that were quite acceptable.43
enclosures to a report prepared by then First Lieu- On the recommendation of the Navy De-
tenant Victor H. Krulak, Assistant R—2, 4th Marines
in 1937 entitled, 'Report on Japanese Assault Landing partment Continuing Board, a special board of
Operations, Shanghai Area 1937." Lieutenant Krulak's Marine Corps and Bureau of Ships officers
report stated that "during the landing operations the was appointed to conduct official acceptance
Japanese forces were seen to employ a large number of
boat types." Of one type, I.anding Boat Type A" (see tests. With General Moses as senior member,
photograph), Krulak observed "these boats are the only the board carried out the tests during the first
ones of the entire group which were obviously de- week in June. The ramp bow craft passed with
signed to negotiate, surf and shallow beach landings:" flying colors. Thus was born the precursor of
Krulak Report (Historical Amphibious File, Breckin-
ridge Library, Quantico. Va.). the LCVP (Landing Craft Vehicle, Personnel).
52 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

11

-s——

a.

—i. —.- --
_1L. .
—-

Japanese ramp landing boat Type "A", photographed in Shanghai harbor by 1st Lieutenant Victor H. Krulak,
USMC, in 1937. (Photo courtesy of Lieutenant General V. H. Krulak).

Il—Lighters The advantage of the 50-foot lighter, however,

The design of tank lighter
a successful was the fact that it had two parallel hinged
proved as difficult a process as did the develop. ramps in the stern and it could be beached
ment of the personnel landing craft. As men- successfully stern-to.
tioned in the previous chapter, a 50-foot lighter In 1935, at Quantico, a plan evolved to use
for landing artillery was tested in 1926. While a standard 50-foot motor launch for landing
it would be used during the intervening years, light vehicles and artillery with the help of a
the lighters were not satisfactory to the Navy readymade rig, called Boat Rig A. In the 1935
or Marines because they were not self-pro- fleet exercises at Culebra, the motor launch
pelled and had to be towed by another boat. and rig was tested. It proved so top heavy
that it nearly capsized in a moderate swell.
The experience was accordingly written off."
The importance of the the size of lighters
varied with the tank size and weight at the
time. In three separate years, 1935, 1939, and
1941, the modification of existing lighters had
to be considered with the adoption of dif-
ferent size tanks. In 1935, the Marmon-I-Ier-
rington Tank, a 9,500-pound model, could be
carried by a 38-foot lighter. A 38-foot lighter
was built at the request of the CMC and de-
- .,—',--.. — livered for testing in the fleet exercises in 1938.
The lighter was self-propelled and had suf-
ficient speed. Another lighter, built by the
ç: Navy, was a 40-foot type used in FLEX 5 in
the winter of 1938—1939. This lighter was
' -.- I equally successful. Both the 38- and 40-foot
Forty-five foot artillery lighter (Artillery Lighter
lighters were proved suitable for landing tanks
"B") unloading a 5-ton tractor at Quantico in 1935. and motor vehicles. By 1939, the Marine Corps
Troop Barge "A" is shown in the background. had given up on the Marmon-Harrington
 ECONOMY AND WITHDRAWAL 53

tank and began testing the Army's 15-ton tank.

The Navy accordingly produced a new 45-foot
lighter capable of carrying one Army or two
Marmon-Harrington tanks.*
The lighter was tested in FLEX 6 in the
winter of 1940. It proved adequate during the
exercises. Subsequent doubt arose as to the
seaworthiness of this lighter in another exercise
when one of the lighters sank after an Army
tank shifted to one side in a moderate sea.
The next year, in May of 1941, the Navy Con-
tinuing Board turned again to Higgins of
New Orleans. Higgins had on hand a 45-foot
boat and was asked to convert the boat to a
tank lighter. In a short time he made the con-
verted tank lighter available to the Navy for
examination**
During the summer of 1941, the 45-foot
Higgins lighter was tested during exercises at
New River, North Carolina. Concurrent with
these happenings, the Bureau of Ships had Andrew J. Higgins, New Orleans boat-builder, with
built a 47-foot lighter which was used in the Sergeant Pearla McKinney at Camp Lejeune in Oc-
tober 1943. (USMC Photo #500883).
fleet exercises at Culebra in 1941. Major Gen-
eral Holland M. Smith, the landing force com- isting tank lighter contracts were changed to
mander, reported after the exercises that: "the provide 50-foot lighters in lieu of the 45-foot
Bureau type lighters are heavy, slow, difficult Higgins and 47-foot Bureau types still to be
to control, difficult to retract from the beach built. Both Higgins and the Bureau produced
and equipped with an unpredictable power designs of 50-foot craft. Before any deliveries
plant." By the fall of 1941, the tank lighter could be made President Roosevelt, at a White
program had again changed direction with the House Conference on 4 April 1942, directed
introduction of the newly developed Army 30- the procurement of 600 additional 50-foot tank
ton medium Sherman tank. The 45-foot light- lighters by 1 September for the North African
ers, Bureau of Ships or Higgins, could not do operation." 46
the job for the new 30-ton tank. The Secretary Tests of the Bureau of Ships' lighter and
of Navy directed the Bureau of Ships to remedy the Higgins' lighter were held near Norfolk
this deficiency. "Accordingly, in December ex- in May 1942 with 30 tons of cement blocks
Major John Kaluf, Secretary to Equipment Board in each lighter.47 The Army sent observers to
in 1938, recalls when the futility of the Marmon- the test inasmuch as the initial projected use
Herrington tank was pretty well demonstrated, the of the winning lighter would be in an Army
Equipment Board requested the procurement of an operation. General Smith reported that the Hig-
Army 15-ton tank for try-out purposes. Brigadier Gen-
eral Holland M. Smith, Director of Operations & gins entry proved vastly superior as everybody
Training, HQMC, told me to stop asking for such who knew the two boats predicted. In fact
heavy items as a 15-ton tank and confine yourself the Navy lighters failed to complete the tests.
strictly to the 5-ton limit. He said that the Navy Gen- As a result of these overall tests, the Bureau
eral Board had told him in no uncertain terms that of Ships notified all yards making their model
the Navy was never going to lift more than 5 tons."
(The Navy's insistence on a 5-ton limit, at the time, to shift to the Higgins design. Thus the Hig-
had to do with the boom capacity on board Navy gins 50-footer became the standard tank lighter
ships.) Col John Kaluf ltr to the Director, M.C. His- of the Navy, the prototype of the LCM
tory, dated 19 January 1971 (Historical Division, Head- (Landing Craft, Mechanized).
quarters, US. Marine Corps).
**The Commandant stated "Higgins was first ap- Ill—Amphibians
proached in the matter of converting the 45-foot boat
into a tank lighter on May 27 [l941J and the tank The United States' first modern experience
lighter was ready for test yesterday 5 June [1941]. This in amphibians, that vehicle that can operate
man is certainly a wonder." MajGen T: Holcomb memo on land and water, was the Christie Tank*
to Adm H. Stark, dated 6 June 1941, File A—llI—JCW
(Record Group 80, National Archives). *See Chapter II.
54 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

tion. These may be land tanks or amphibious

tanks."
Ironically, the predecessor of the modern
amphibian tractor was designed as a nonmili-
tary vehicle for the rescue of downed aviators
and hurricane victims in the Florida Ever-
glades. The developer of the craft was Donald
Roebling, son of financier John A. Roebling
and grandson of Colonel Washington Roebling,
builder of the famous Brooklyn Bridge. It was
John A. Roebling who, after hearing about
and witnessing several devastating hurricanes,
became aware that while he could not do
anything about the hurricanes, he perhaps
could help victims of such calamities. The
victims, many of whom were in the other-
wise impenetrable reaches of the Okeechobee
region, needed help. John A. Roebling agreed
to finance the project to build a vehicle that
in his words, "would bridge the gap between
where a boat grounded and a car flooded
out." His son Donald became the dev.eloper and
the father ultimately spent $118,000 for two
Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith in October amphibious tractors.
1914. (USMC Photo #38219). In designing such a vehicle, Donald Roebling
felt that two things were absolutely essential,
After tests had found the Christie Tank unsea- buoyancy and one means of propulsion for
worthy off Culebra in 1924, it was subsequently both land and water. For buoyancy the vehicle
rejected as a military vehicle. It was never had to be constructed as light as possible and
purchased by the U.S. Government and plans weight would be of prime concern. In the early
of the particular test model were sold to l930s, aluminum was a comparatively new
Japan. product and Roebling believed that this materi-
Great Britain, already credited with the de- al would be the key to the weight problem. In
velopment of the tank to the extent that it combination with the weight problem was the
could be used on the battlefield, also developed problem of locomotion on both land and water.
the first amphibious combat vehicle, the Me- Roebling believed that the paddle-tread track
dium D Tank. This tank was completed after principle, similar to early paddle-wheel steam-
the 1918 armistice. The intention of the British ships, could be made to work.* Roebling, along
was to give a tank sufficient characteristics to with members of his technical staff, Earl De
get across a body of water, yet at the same Bolt, Warren Cottrell, and S. A. Williams,
time retain, as far as possible, the perform- started to build the Alligator. The first ve-
ance of the land tank. This characteristic of hicle, completed in 1935, was 24 feet long and
British design progressed with land tank de- weighed 14,350 pounds and was powered by
velopment and shows that the British had no a 92-horsepower Chrysler industrial engine**
interest in true amphibian vehicles but pre- The performance of the first vehicle was a
ferrecl flotation devices for land tanks.48 disappointment, because while it achieved 25
The United States and particularly the mph on land it slowed to a speed of only 2.3
Marine Corps, in the early l930s, concluded
1t was this paddle-tread principle that Roebling had
that tanks, if landed close to the early assault patented in 1938. He turned over his patent, #2138207,
waves, would prove valuable in the assault to the government for universal use and without fee
and even justify less artillery strength. The during World War II.
Tentative Landing Manual of 1934 pointed **The first model was immediately made available
out that "the difficulties of transport and move- to the U.S. Coast Guard and American Red Cross for
rescue work. There is nothing to indicate that either
ment from ship-to-shore indicate that only agency accepted it at the time, perhaps because of the
light tanks can be used in the landing opera- initial performance of the vehicle.
 ECONOMY AND WITHDRAWAL 55

picture and short story in the 4 October 1937

edition of Life magazine that would excite the
Marine Corps' interest in an amphibious tank.
Rear Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, Commander,
Battleships, Battle Force, U.S. Fleet, showed
Major General Louis McCarty Little, then com-
manding the Fleet Marine Force, the Life
magazine article with pictures of the strange
vehicle. General Little was quick to grasp its
potentialities and sent the article to the Com-
mandant, Major General Thomas Holcomb.
Holcomb in turn, passed it along to the Equip-
Donald Roebling's original 1935 Alligator. (Photo ment Board at Quantico.5° The board, headed
courtesy of Sun Photos, Clearwater Sun, Clearwater, by Brigadier General Frederic L. Bradman,
Fla.). dispatched Major John Kaluf, Secretary to the
Board, to Clearwater to see the vehicle per-
mph when run in water. Such performance in- form and to consult with Roebling. Kaluf
dicated that the conventional straight tractor recalls that "Roebling had a vehicle fully opera-
cleats set straight across the tracks were ex- tional at the time and put it through every
tremely inefficient for water propulsion. The kind of test that I could dream up. I took
first model was rebuilt and completed in April about 400 feet of 16mm movie film which I
1936. The cleats of the tracks were changed to brought back with me. The Board liked what
a diagonal setting across the chains to push they saw and gave it a very favorable boost." 51
the water out from the sides, weight was re- In May 1938, the Commandant cited this
duced by 2,240 pounds, and a new 85-horse- opinion in recommending to the Navy that
power Ford V8 engine was installed. After test- "steps be taken to procure a pilot model of
ing, the vehicle's land speed was reduced to 18 this type of amphibious boat for further tests
mph but more important, water speed was more under service conditions and during Fleet
than doubled to 5.45 mph.49 Landing Exercise No. 5." Both the Continuing
A second modification in September 1936 Board and the Bureau of Construction and Re-
reduced the weight by 310 more pounds and pair endorsed the recommendation unfavor-
land and water speed slightly increased. The ably on the grounds of economy. Funds were
third modification, completed in 1937, resulted so limited at this time that the few dollars
in the most significant changes of all. The available were being spent on the development
length of the vehicle was decreased by four of landing boats.52
feet with corresponding decrease in track
length and weight and a new track was in-
stalled. The new track was the highlight of
the 1937 model. All tractors had used bogie
and idler wheels, necessary appurtenances
which normally supported the track and kept
it moving properly. Roebling had not partic-
ularly liked this arrangement. He designed
a chain with built-in roller bearings, with a
smooth steel channel around the track contour
for the rollers to ride on while supporting the
weight of the vehicle. He replaced idler wheels
with idler blocks and replaced straight cleats
with curved cleats. The result of these changes
was an increase in maneuverability and water a
speed. The water speed of this model was 8.6
mph while the land speed remained at 18 to 20 1937 Alligator model undergoing tests at Clearwater,
mph. The vehicle was reduced by 3,100 pounds Fla. Major John Kaluf, Secretary to the Equipment
and now weighed 8,700 pounds. Board, was the Marine observer. (Photo courtesy of
It was this 1937 model that appeared with Sun Photos, Clearwater Sun, Clearwater, Fla.).
56 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

Again the Marine Corps persisted and again ary and February 1941, the last such FLEX
the few sympathetic naval officers at the bureau before World War II, Captain Victor H.
came through with a small appropriation to Krulak of the 1st Marine Brigade staff with
have Roebling start work on a model to be two other members of his test crew, Sergeant
used by the military as an amphibian tractor. Clarence H. Raper and Corporal Walter L.
Three months earlier, in October 1939, Gen- Gibson, put the "alligator" through various
eral Moses, President of the Equipment Board, tests. Lieutenant General Krulak recalls that
visited Roebling at his shop in Clearwater, he went on board the USS Wyoming to request
Florida and persuaded Roebling to design a Major General Holland M. Smith to ask Ad-
model for such use.53 By January 1940, Roebling miral Ernest J. King, Commander, Atlantic
had completed the new design and in May, Fleet, who was visiting Culebra, if he wouldn't
the new amphibious tractor was completed. like to ride in the "alligator." Admiral King
This model, built from the ground up, in- said he was pressed for time but yes, he
corporated all of the experience gained from would go for a short ride. General Krulak
the previous work including a further weight recounts the following:
reduction to 7,700 pounds. The vehicle was Admiral King came aboard and no one else
20 feet long, 8 feet wide, and had a maximum volunteered to come and he didn't ask anyone
climbable grade of a 55 degree slope. Its water else. It was just the Admiral, an aide, Raper,
speed was between 8 and 10 mph and in the Gibson, and I in the "alligator." We cruised about
open sea, or when landing on a beach through a little bit and I said, "Now let me show you
what it can do on this coral, Admiral." He looked
surf, the 1940 "alligator" was more seaworthy at his wristwatch and said, "I don't have very
than a normal boat of comparable size. It long." "I said, "it will just be a minute." I was just
would not sink, even with its 7,000-pound cargo going to show him how we go right over the coral
compartment full of water; nor would it but we didn't. The track broke and we were in
capsize in a dive into deep water off a 6-foot %'ater about 4 feet deep. We weren't going to get
off the coral and no boat could get to us. We were
seawall. This new model was powered by a about 50 yards from the beach, so he climbed
95 hp Mercury V8 engine. Two vertical hand over the side of the boat with his aide, waded
levers between the driver's knees controlled the ashore and was picked tip in a vehicle and taken
steering clutches, and without cargo, the ve- to the town of Dewey and went about his business.
My impression was that I don't think the Ad-
hicle drew less than three feet of water. miral ever forgot the "alligator."'
With more money in sight, the Bureau of
Ships contracted with Roebling to build one The "alligator" measured up in every re-
other vehicle of the same general design of the spect with two exceptions. Its aluminum con-
May 1940 model but powered with a 120 hp struction was not considered rugged enough for
Lincoln-Zephyr engine. On 26 and 27 August hard military use and the track would not en-
1940, Brigadier General Moses, with a party dure the abrasive effect of sand and salt water.58
of Marine and Navy officers from the Bureau of The tractor was so impressive in every other
Ships, inspected the model being built. The respect, however, that the Navy negotiated a
inspection was highly satisfactory and afforded contract with Roebling to redesign the tractor
an opportunity to make minor adjustments to include military characteristics with all steel
and modifications in the construction within construction in place of aluminum.* Roebling
the terms of the contract.55 After the model called on the Food Machinery Corporation
was completed and given a final testing at (FMC) for help in redesigning the "alliga-
Clearwater about the 14th of October, it was tor." The corporation had plants in nearby
delivered to Quantico the first week in Dunedin and Lakeland and had made com-
November. ponents for Roebling's earlier models. Mr.
Under the watchful eye of the CMC and a James M. Hait, then Chief Engineer of the
large party of high ranking officers of the Army Peerless Division, organized an engineering
and Navy, the October model travelled 29 mph group to redesign the "alligator." Using all
on land and 9.72 mph in water. The Quantico steel construction and changing from riveting
demonstration was successful but had its bad *On 29 August 1940, the M.C. Equipment Board rec-
spots, including the model being bogged down ommended to the Bureau of Ships that future amphi-
in the Chopawamsic Creek. Further tests were bian tractors be of welded steel construction. Presi-
scheduled. dent, M.C. Equipment Board hr dated 8 October 1940
(Box 2, Record Group 65A—4939, Federal Records Cen-
During Fleet ExercisesNumber 7, in Janu- ter, Suitland, Md.).
 ECONOMY AND WITHDRAWAL 57

to welding, considered by Hait to be essential his shop doors and gate posts on the grounds
to the main design, two prototypes were built were only 10 feet wide.*
in the Riverside, California plant of FMC.59 In order to observe and report on the con-
The Navy awarded FMC a contract for an struction of the LVTs, Major George W.
official design and further development of the McHenry was appointed Resident Inspector of
"alligator," now officially dubbed LVT (Land- Naval Material at the Food Machinery Cor-
ing Vehicle Tracked) (1). FMC was also poration plant at Dunedin, Florida in Febru-
awarded a contract for 200 more LVTs and ary 1941.61 To work on and train in operating
the first one came off the assembly line in the new LVTs scheduled to come off the as-
July 1941. sembly line, an Amphibian Tractor Detach-
ment was organized 2 May 1941 at Dunedin,
By the end of World War II, 15,654 LVTs Florida with Major William W. Davies as com-
were built. FMC's three plants in Lakeland, manding officer. Four other officers and 33 en-
Florida and Riverside and San Jose, California listed men made up the detachment. This
built 11,251 LVTs. Borg-Warner Corporation detachment served as a nucleus for training
of Kalamazoo, Michigan, St. Louis Car Com- men in LVT operation. After training, officers
pany of St. Louis, Missouri, and Graham- and men were then assigned to the newly
Paige Motors Corporation of Detroit, Michi- organized letter companies of the 1st Amphib-
gan built the remaining 4,4Ø36O ian Tractor Battalion. By 16 February 1942,
As an anecdote to the building of the first the battalion was complete with four com-
1,225 LVT (1)s, it was asked of Donald Roebi- panies, including an Headquarters and Service
ing why all the Roebling alligators were built Company, and was part of the 1st Marine
Division.62
exactly 9 feet, 10 inches wide. Roebling gave,
while not a scientific answer, a humorous *lt should be noted that after the war, President
reply when he said that the first military model Harry Truman presented the Medal for Merit to
Donald Roebling for his outstanding services to the
was built in his own shop on his estate. The United States. (See Appendix H for citation). Robert
model produced was 9'lO" wide simply because L. Longstreet, Clearwater News, 27 March 1Q47.

pi
LVT(1)s being tested by the Marine detachment at Dunedin, Fla., on 18 September 1941. (USMC Photo *5295O6).
58 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

April 1936, it became a division under a Direc-

tor of Aviation. The director of the new divi-
sion served as an adviser to the Commandant
:i on all aviation matters and as a liaison officer
between the Marine Corps and the Navy's
Bureau of Aeronautics. Unlike the ground
units of the Marine Corps which drew their
equipment from both the Army and Navy, in
addition to supplying much of their own, Ma-
I rine aviation depended solely on the Navy
for its aircraft and all other aviation gear.66
By 1939, FMF ground forces were organized
in two units, the 1st Brigade based on the east
coast at Quantico and the 2d Brigade based
on the west coast at San Diego. Each brigade
had the support of a Marine aircraft group
An experimental observation aircraft, the Pitcairn of corresponding numerical designation. In ad-
OP—i autogiro, at Quantico on 14 November 1932. dition, FMF aviation further boasted a scout-
(USMC Photo #514902). ing squadron (VMS—3) based in the Virgin
Islands.66 By the end of the decade, the au-
thorized strength of Marine Aviation, FMF, was
Marine Aviation in the Thirties 124 officers, 15 warrant officers, 56 aviation
Marine aviators in the early thirties were cadets, and 1,120 enlisted men.67
busy racing and testing aircraft. Captain
Arthur H. Page and Lieutenant Vernon M.
Guymon set a record for sustained blind flight, The Genesis of Close Air Support
flying from Omaha to Washington, D.C., in As the Marine Corps developed the various
July 1930. Captain Page, piloting an 02U from techniques contributing to a smooth landing
a sealed, hooded cockpit, flew the instrument operation, it had to give more consideration
flight of about 1,000 miles. Captain Page, who to the means of providing early fire support
earlier in the year won the Curtiss Marine Tro- for landing troops. In the absence of the artil-
phy Race, an annual event for service seaplanes, lery support available in conventional land
died in a crash in September of 1930. He was warfare, the 11arine Corps evolved the unique
the only military entrant in a race for the technique of close air support (CAS). The
Thompson Trophy at Chicago.83 In another term "close air support" referred to the attack
part of the world, Major Francis P. Mulcahy of ground objectives located close to friendly
and other Marine aviators in November 1932 units. By its very nature, Marine Corps avia-
had tested a strange rotary.wing machine, called tion had long specialized in the development
the Pitcairn autogiro which was designated the of techniques for this type of support for
OP—i. Mulcahy reported that the autogiro's ground forces. This had always been the prin-
chief value in expeditionary duty was in "in- cipal reason for the existence of Marine Corps
specting small fields recommended by ground aviation as a separate branch of naval avia-
troops as landing areas, evacuating medical tion. The development started shortly after
sitting cases, and ferrying of important person. World War I when various Marine aviators
nel." 04 Technically, lack of weight-lifting
pursued with vigor any proposed technique
capabilities and high gas consumption where which would enable them to deliver bombs on
two of the major shortcomings of the OP—I of
1932.
a ground target with an acceptable degree of
Organizational changes brought on by the reliability and accuracy. Marine Corps parti-
creation of the FMF in December 1933 raised cipation in "small wars" in various foreign
the importance of Marine aviation. In 1935, countries from Haiti to China provided in-
the Aviation Section at Headquarters, Marine valuable experience in supporting small
Corps was separated from the Division of ground units under difficult conditions of ter-
Operations and Training and became an rain and climate. These experiences were con-
independent section under the CMC. On 1 solidated and reduced to written form in the
 ECONOMY AND WITHDRAWAL 59

1934 edition of the Tentative Landing Manual lean thirties, they were found to be less adaptable
and subsequent editions.68 for close coordination with ground troops than
the slower, .open cockpit planes which supported
The manual considered the vulnerable con- the patrol actions of Nicaragua. In Nicaragua the
centrations of troops in transports, landing aviator in his open cockpit could idle his throttle
boats, and on the beach and called for a three- so as to locate an enemy machine gun by its sound,
to-one numerical superiority over the enemy but in the maneuvers of 1940 pilots flashing by
in their enclosed cockpits found it difficult to see
in the air. In the 1938 edition, FTP—167, the what was going on below or even to differentiate
ratio was increased to four-to-one, primarily between friendly and "enemy" hills. In Nicaragua,
to wipe the enemy air threat out of the skies the Marine flier was most often an ex-infantryman,
and secondarily to shatter the enemy's beach- but 10 years later many of the new Navy-trained
head defense and to cut off his reinforce- Marine aviators were fresh from college and knew
little about ground tactics. The lack of a real
ments.69 More important, emphasis was placed enemy to look for, identify, and to shoot at
on the direct assistance aviation could give hindered attempts at precision, especially since air-
the troops such as guiding the landing boats ground radio was not yet as reliable as the old
to the beach, laying smoke screens, and provid- slow but sure system where pilots read code mes-
sages from cloth panels laid on the ground or
ing reconnaissance and spotting for naval gun- swooped down with weighted lines to snatch mes-
fire and artillery. The kernel of CAS lay in sages suspended between two poles.
the importance of rendering direct fire support The main key to development of close air sup-
port lay in reliable communications to permit
to the landing force until the artillery was quick liaison and complete understanding between
ashore and ready to fire. the pilot and the frontline commander. Part of
After the landing, the challenge became that the solution lay in more exercises in air-ground
of applying the fire power of Marine air to coordination with emphasis on standardized and
simplified air-ground communications and maps.7°
destroy specific enemy frontline positions with-
Out endangering nearby friendly troops. Re- By the end of the decade, the CMC noted
finement of this skilled technique as we know in his annual report to the Secretary of Navy
it today was slow because of many factors. that "air-ground training between aviation and
An excellent analysis of this refinement of ground troops has been conducted whenever
techniques is contained in Volume I, History possible." Also as a step in the right direction,
of USMC Operations in World War II: an aviator was assigned as an air liaison of-
ficer to the 1st Marine Brigade Staff in 1939.
There was so much for pilots to learn about Thereafter, the billet became permanent. With
rapidly developing military aviation that close air the theory of employing aircraft in tactical
support had to take its place in the busy training
syllabus after such basic drill as aerial tactics, air support of troops well understood, and air-
to air gunnery, strafing, bombing, navigation, car- ground exercises conducted whenever possible,
rier landings, and communications and constant the method of exercising control of supporting
study of the latest in engineering, aerodynamics, aircraft, particularly large numbers of aircraft,
and flight safety.
Also, whenever newer, faster, and higher flying would have to be left to the next decade and
airplanes trickled into the Marine Corps in the the initial engagements of World War II.
 CHAPTER IV
THE DECADE OF THE FORTIES—THE WAR AND THE BOMB

The 1940s produced the most destructive Training and Service) Act which called for
war in history and by the middle of the decade the registration of all men aged 21—35. By the
had given birth to the atomic age. With the end of the year, the President established the
fall of France in June 1940 and the Battle of Office of Production Management under Wil-
Britain about to begin, President Franklin D. liam S. Knudsen to coordinate defense pro-
Roosevelt announced his policy of endeavor- duction. In 1941, Congress passed the Lend-
ing to save Britain and at the same time pre- Lease Act, which empowered the President to
pared America for a national emergency. In provide defense equipment to countries whose
a speech to the graduating class of the Univer- security was vital to the defense of the United
sity of Virginia on 10 June 1940, he announced: States. During the war, lend-lea€e aid totaled
some $51 billion.
En our American unity, we will pursue two In the Far East, a Japanese imperial con-
obvious and simultaneous courses; we will extend
to the opponents of force the material resources ference, in the summer of 1941, decided on
of this nation; and, at the same time, we will expansion southward even if it meant war with
harness and speed up the use of those resources the United States and Great Britain. Three
in order that we ourselves in the Americas may weeks later, the Japanese occupied southern
have equipment and training equal to the task
of any emergency and every defense.1 French Indo-China. America, two days later,
declared economic warfare on Japan by freez-
On 14 June 1940, the elate that the Germans ing all Japanese assets in the United States
occupied Paris, the President signed a naval and stopped all trading with Japan. Diplo-
expansion bill that had been under discussion matically, the remaining months of 1941 were
for months. In effect, it gave the Navy the concerned with talks between Japan and the
green light to build a "two-ocean" Navy. By United States about resuming trade and the
the end of the fiscal year Federal expenditures American demand for Japan to get out of
for the Army and Navy rose from $1.8 billion China and Indo-China.
for the fiscal year 1940 to $6.3 billion for the The day after the attack on Pearl Harbor,
fiscal year 1941. the United States declared war on Japan and
On 15 June 1940, the President appointed three days later, Germany and Italy declared
a group of eminent civilian scientists to a new war on the United States.
National Defense Research Committee. Van-
nevar Bush, president of the Carnegie Institu-
tion of Washington, was the chairman. From War Plans
this committee stemmed most of the scientific
research done for the armed forces during the The organization of our government is par-
war.* By September 1940, Congress established ticularly well adapted to effective preparation
the first peacetime compulsory military service for and conduct of war, yet history shows that,
program with the Burke-Wadsworth (Selective due to failure to give adequate consideration
to this subject during peace, war has always
*An excellent history and analysis of the story of found us unprepared, and our conduct of war
the National Defense Research Committee and other has been both uneconomical and inefficient.2
research and (Ievelopment agencies during the war is The United States, as all sovereign nations
contained in Chapter XIX of the Administration of before her, made plans for war with potential
the Navy Department in World War II by Rear Ad-
miral Julius A. Furer published in 1959. enemies and their allies. America, a late-
61
62 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

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 THE DECADE OF THE FORTIES—THE WAR AND THE BOMB 63

HEADQUARTERS, U. S. MARINE CORPS, I AUGUST 1941

starter in the business of foreign wars, began Prior to World War II, war plans derived
making such plans only after it became a their titles from the code name of the prob-
nation with colonies; that is, after the Spanish- able enemy, and because Japan was designated
American War. The group in the military ORANGE, the plan dealing with a conflict
services responsible for framing the war plans with Japan was called ORANGE Plan.3 After
of the United States was the Joint Army and 1907, and the war scare with Japan (see
Navy Board. The board, founded in 1903, in- Chapter I), the plan most likely to be used be-
itially had a membership of eight; four Army came the ORANGE Plan. It provided the
and four Navy officers.* The Marine Corps was strategic concept and missions to be followed
never represented on the Joint Board and in the event of war with Japan. Each of the
would have to wait until after World War II services developed its own plan to guide its
to be represented on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. operations in an emergency, and field and fleet
It should be noted, however, that the CMC commanders drew up the plans to carry out
or his representative, particularly during World these operations. Many changes in concept
War 11, was always a close adviser to the of the ORANGE Plan took place in the In-
senior naval officer on the Joint Board, in tervening years because of changes in the in-
matters concerning the Marine Corps. ternational scene.
*After reorganization in 1919, the board consisted
Before World War I, the broad concept was
of six members, the Army Chief of Staff and the CNO, that the Army was to defend the Philippines
their deputies, and the Chiefs of the War Plans Di- until the fleet could carry reinforcements across
visions of each of the services. Kent Roberts Greenfleld, the Pacific. Naval strategists realized that before
ed., Command Decisions (Washington: Office of the
Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, a relief expedition could be dispatched to the
1960), p. 13. Philippines, Japan certainly would have seized
64 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

Guam, thus depriving the United States of its Ellis was assigned to the then newly formed
only fleet anchorage between Pearl Harbor Division of Operations and Training at Head-
and Manila Bay. The Navy conjectured that quarters Marine Corps. Having previously writ-
either Guam would have to be retaken or some ten a significant article on Advanced Base
other site occupied as a coaling and repair Operations, Ellis wrote another study called
station. After World War I, the ORANGE Plan
took on new dimensions when Japan gained Lieutenant in December 1901. He attended the Naval
control over the former German possessions in War College as a captain from 1911—1912, after which he
the Marshalls, Carolines, and Marianas. The remained on the staff of the college. While on the stall,
Philippines were more vulnerable than before he wrote a significant paper entitled 'Naval Bases;
Location, Resources, Denial of Bases, Security of Ad-
and Guam now was ringed by Japanese out- vanced Bases' in 1913. It was accepted and 1)uhlished
posts. The Joint Board again had to review in 1921, the same year as his Advanced Base Operations
and revise the ORANGE Plan series. in Micronesia." He served in Fiance (luring \\'orld War
The Marine Corps' claim for an important I and received a Navy Cross for his services with the 4th
Brigade. After a short tour at HQMC lie was granted a
role in an ORANGE war came in their con- leave of absence from the Marine Corps in 1922. He
tributory plan to the Navy's ORANGE Plan. traveled to the Philippines, Japan, and finally to the
The plan, called 712D—Operatioii Plan, was Caroline Islands. The State Department notified the
the work of Major Earl H. El1is. In 1921, CMC that Ellis had die(1 at l'arao, Caroline Islands, on
12 May 1923. It is with historical certitude to say that
*Earl H. Ellis, also known as Pctc, was born in Luka, Ellis had seen, while in the Caroline Islands. what the
Kansas, in 1880. After graduation from high school. he world would ultimately know h' WW II. that the
enlisted in the Marine Corps and served about a year apanese illegally fortified the mandated islands contrary
before being commissioned from the ranks as a 2d to the League of Nations instructions.
 THE DECADE OF THE FORTIES-THE WAR AND THE BOMB 65

As a result of these studies, landing opera-

tions doctrine evolved, landing techniques
were refined, and new types of landing craft
were tested. There was no novelty or far-
sightedness in that Ellis had foreseen a war
with Japan, that fact was quite common
among the planners and leaders of the times.
What was far-sightedness on his part was in
the unique contribution of his plan which
lay in the detailed guidelines on the tactics
and techniques employed in seizing an island
base. With newer and better equipment, the
tactics and techniques employed during World
War II were little different than what Ellis
had envisioned.

Refinement of Tactics and Techniques

in Amphibious Operations
Lieutenant Colonel Earl H. Ellis, author in 1921 of
Operation Plan 712, "Advanced Base Operations in During World War II
Micronesia." (USMC Photo #307257).
Naval Gunfire (NGF)*
'Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia, During World War II, many additions, de-
1921." It was this study that the CMC, John A. letions, and variations in general were made
Lejeune, approved and accepted, in total, as on the proven existing tactics and techniques
712D—Operation Plan.4 involved in amphibious operations** Per-
Ellis' plan concentrated on one segment of haps the greatest improvements occurred in
a war against ORANGE, that of seizing a base naval gunfire, close air support, and artillery
that would be urgently needed by the Navy fire. Certainly the best coordination of the
as a coaling or repair station. The objective three occurred during the war with the ad-
Ellis had in mind was that of the Marshall Is- vent of the Fire Support Coordination Cen-
lands. He outlined the tactics to be used ter (FSCC). In the area of naval gunfire, the
against islands within the Marshall group such Tentative Landing Operations Manual rec-
as Eniwetok, Wotje, and Maloelap. Although ognized the danger inherent in NGF support
his theories were limited by the equipment in conjunction with movement of troops
then available, he made several sound recom- ashore. A rudimentary doctrine evolved by
mendations, urging among other things that the late 1930s, and bombardment experimen-
troops fighting ashore have at their disposal tation was conducted on training ranges at
the on-call fire of supporting warships. Con-
sidering the times, Ellis' plan marked a com- *Within the Marine Corps today, as a kind of a
tongue-in-cheek truism, a person might be described
plete break with tradition. No longer would as the 'duty expert" in such-and-such a field. Using
Marines be used primarily to defend advanced this term in retrospect, the "duty expert" in the naval
bases; instead, they would seize these bases gunfire area was Colonel Donald M. Weller. See his
from the enemy.5 two articles in the U.S. Naval institute Proceedings of
August and September 1954, 'Salvo-splash!, the De-
Aside from the important contribution and velopment of Naval Gunfire Support in World War II."
originality in Ellis' plan, the value of the writ- **"Amphibious operations' were words evolved dur-
ing lay in the fact that it was truly a first-step ing the early part of the decade of the l940s. The
approach to the problems of landing opera- meaning was not new but otilv the use of the words
tions. Marine Corps and Navy officers of the Amphibious operations were synonymous with landing
operations, a term used during the preceding 50 years.
1920s and l930s elaborated on Ellis' concept The term, amphibious, started to be used in fleet
of seizing a base, as evidenced by the Advanced training publications during the late l930s. By 1940,
Base Problems worked on and discussed by the U.S. Atlantic Fleet used it in a report to describe
MCS and the Naval War College. Otherkey training of Army and Navy forces. By june 1942, the
Navy added to the Fleet Training Division (Op—22) an
Pacific islands were subsequently studied as 'amphibious warfare section" (F—45). By the end of the
potential battlefields. war, it was quite a familiar term.
66 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

Culebra and San Clemente Islands. These

bombardments were adjusted by shore fire con-
trol parties composed entirely of Navy per-
sonnel. Navy personnel were quite familiar
with their ship's firing and no harm could
come from shelling an island as long as troops
were not involved. However, the same peo-
ple were wholly unfamiliar with the tactical
maneuvers of the troops they would be sup-
porting in an actual operation. By 1941, the
tempo of the development of NGF was ac-
celerated. Shore bombardment exercises began
to be conducted on a scheduled basis. The
shore fire control party was reorganized as a
landing force unit with a Marine artillery
spotter and a Marine radio crew and a Navy
officer serving in a liaison capacity. These
shore fire control parties, as well as air spot- General Thomas E. Holcomb, 17th Commandant of
ters from potential fire support ships, received the Marine Corps, 1 December 1936 to 31 December
special training in Quantico and at a newly 1943. (USMC Photo #12444A).
acquired bombardment range at Bloodsworth
Island in the Chesapeake Bay.° realized that strong defensive fortifications
By August 1942, naval gunfire support was would be encountered, The plan of gunfire
utilized in actual combat in the landing on support for the assault of Tarawa Atoll called
Guadalcanal. There was, however, no initial for 75 minutes of the heaviest naval support
hostile resistance to that landing. When plan- ever delivered up to that time. Even so, al-
fling for the Gilbert Islands began, it was though many enemy troops were neutralized,
the majority of the defensive installations
were still effective.* The lessons learned at
Tarawa marked a turning point in the con-
cept and execution of naval gunfire support.
As a result, Marine Corps planners developed
a concept for deliberate destruction of in-
dividual targets as opposed to general neutral-
ization. This concept proved its value through-
) out the remainder of World War II.
The Marine Corps continued to press for
improvements in gunfire support. At the re-
quest of the Marine Corps and with concur-
rence of the• Navy, 20 LSMs, Landing Ships
Medium, were converted into LSM(R)s,
(Landing Ships, Medium (Rocket)). The LSM
was developed as a tank carrier and was 203
feet long with a beam of 34 feet. It could
carry either five M4 medium tanks, or six
Landing Vehicles, Tracked (LVTs). The
*The commanding officer of the transport group
which landed the Marines at Tarawa recalled stating
his doubts of the efficacy of naval gunfire at Tarawa.
He had witnessed a similar bombing and bombard-
ment of Gavutu Island in the Solomons where he said
the results had been most disappointing. RAdm Herbert
B. Knowles lEr to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G—3,
General Alexander A. Vandegrift, 18th Commandant Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, dated 1September
of the Marine Corps, 1 January 1944 to 31 December 1962, as quoted in Shaw, Nalty, and Turnbladh, Cen-
1947. (USMC Photo #306429). tral Pacific Drive, p. 36.
 THE DECADE OF THE FORTIES-THE WAR AND THE BOMB 67

LSM, when converted to the LSM(R), was Attack by aircraft of hostile ground targets which
are at such close range to friendly front lines as
equipped in late 1944 and early 1945 with to require detailed integration of each air mission
from 10 to as many as 105 rocket launchers and with the fire and movement of ground forces in
one 5-inch/38 caliber dual-purpose gun.7 The order to insure safety, prevent interference with
LSM(R) was essentially an area suppressive fire other elements of the combined arms and permit
prompt exploitation of the shock, casualty, and
ship used to support amphibious operations. neutralization effect of the air attack.'°
These relatively inexpensive and simple ships
provided the capability of delivering large The major problem initially of carrying out
volumes of fire in short periods of time. the intentions of the CAS definition was the
Another support ship, a converted Landing lack of communications between the front
Craft, Infantry (Large) (LCI (L)) and dubbed lines and the support aircraft. CAS at Guadal-
Landing Craft, Infantry (Mortar) (LCI (M)) canal was rendered by Navy carrier planes sup-
was used extensively at Iwo Jima and later in porting the landing. Later, Army and Marine
the Okinawa campaign. At Iwo Jima, LCI (M)s pilots operating from Henderson Field gave
provided "direct support on call and harassing support to the troops. The difficulty was that
fire to break up enemy counter-attacks. With the line of communication extended from the
their shallow draft they could work close in- front line to the headquarters at Henderson
shore on the flanks and often were in a position Field to the aircraft. Pilots were given the
to shoot up gullies against enemy targets that target before takeoff. In many cases they
were not visible to the Marines." 8 During the walked up to the front lines and visually
first week on Iwo Jima, 30 LCI (M) s were as- checked the target. This system might be one
signed, but owing to breakdowns not all were of the forerunners of the Tactical Air Control
available at the same time. Party consisting of a Marine aviator and com-
munications personnel.* Prior o the Bou-
gainville operation, a close air support school
was organized under the direction of the 3d
Division Air Officer and was attended by of-
ficers from each infantry regiment and battal-
ion headquarters.
Based on Guadalcanal experience, three
main objectives were sought in air support
studies conducted by the 3d Division. These
were: improved means of target designation,
exploration of the precise effect of bombs and
fusings of various types, and the determina-
tion of safety margins necessary for protection
of our own troops. The employment of varied
colored smoke for target designation was
studied as a means of decreasing the effective-
A LSM(R) fires its rockets at enemy targets in the
ness of the enemy's previous attempts to con-
Kerama Retto off Okinawa in late March 1945. (USIV fuse our target designation with white smoke.
Photo #474951). During the instruction, air liaison party per-
sonnel were given intensive training in the
use of field communication equipment and
Close Air Support (CAS) in air-ground communication procedure.
In the years prior to the war, the mission When the 3d Division went ashore at Bou-
of Marine aviation, as directed by the General gainville, its subordinate units included
Board, was: trained air liaison parties which could advise
Marine aviation is to be equipped, organized, *Brigadier General Edward C. Dyer suggests that
and trained primarily for the support of the FMF an even earlier forerunner of the Tactical Air Control
in landing operations and in the support of troop Party was the use of panels by front line troops and
activities in the field; and secondarily as replace- the system of dropping and picking up written mes-
ment squadrons of carrier based naval aircraft sages such as was done on Culebra in 1939. BGen
Edward C. Dyer ltr to the Director, MC. History,
Out of the general definition the fine points dated 10 August 1970 (Historical Division, Headquar-
of CAS were defined as: ters, U.S. Marine Corps.)
68 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

the ground commander in matters of air sup- contemplating using direct communication be-
port, transmit requests for such support, and tween its Air Liaison Parties (ALPs) and the
assume tactical direction of any aircraft as- planes in the direction of a mission. MAG--24
signed.'1 thought otherwise, so further emphasis was
The Bougainville operation in November placed on training its own Air Liaison Parties.
1943 marked a long stride in the evolution of McCutcheon said that ". the Group did
. .

the part aircraft were to play in the support intend to have good control of its aircraft
of the amphibious advance. The techniques when engaged in close support, and if (Air
of CAS were perfected throughout the war. Force) Air Liaison Parties were not to be
They paid greater dividends as the island- permitted to give that control then the Group
hopping program went on but there remained would send out its own personnel to give it." '
the inherent danger; bombing friendlies. So it was that MAG—24 furnished its own
There were instances of pilot error resulting ALPs. It was further determined that the
in strafing and bombing our own troops and policy would be control of the aircraft by the
this of course did not improve the ground front line ALP on his own front using direct
troops' confidence in GAS. However, the de- communication. In this way the ALP talked
cision to employ GAS, while recognizing the the support pilots to the target without going
calculated risk, rested with the commander through a distant control1er. This was possi
of the troops concerned.1' The ultimate doc- ble in the Philippines operation because air
trine of GAS that the Marine Corps evolved units were supporting no more than one divi-
by the end of the war was based on two sion at a time. This was not the case on
major techniques used in two major cam- Okinawa. Inasmuch as five divisions were in-
paigns—the Philippines and Okinawa. volved on Okinawa, four in line simultane-
In October 1944, Marine pilots from MAG— ously, a closer,' coordinated control of aircraft
24, at Bougainville, were given a mission to was necessary.
support an Army corps in the Philippines. A The aerial support of ground operations
GAS school was set up under the direction of was handled through a smoothly functioning
Lieutenant Colonel Keith B. McCutcheon. system of coordinating agencies. The break-
The 37th Army Division was in the area and clown was as follows:
joint training problems were scheduled with Air Liaison Parties from the Joint Assault Signal
them and MAG—24. McCutcheon noted: Companies (JASCOs) were attached to each of the
four divisions.
All pilots had the opportunity to observe a ter- * * *
rain problem conducted by an infantry battalion
simulating an attack on a Japanese pillbox instal- Requests for air suppos-t by the ALPs were
lation. To these problems the Group added planes made to one of the three l.anding Force Air Sup-
in close support with their own Air Liaison Parties port Control Units (LAFASCU5) all commanded
on the ground. Live bombs were not dropped, by Colonel Vernon E. Mcgee. Colonel Mcgee,
but the infantry actually fired, everything in the physically located at Tenth Army Headquarters in
book.13 LAFASCU—3, coordinated the work of LAFASCU—1
and LAFASCU—2 which handled the air support
What came out of the school was the prin- requests of the III Amphibious Corps and XXIV
ciple that Marine aviators adopted and which Corps respectively.
* * * *
was later adopted by Army Air and Navy that: Colonel Mcgee, in reality LAFASCU-3, screened
Close Air Support is an additional weapon to he all requests for air support of the ground troops
employed only at the discretion of the ground corn- and relayed all orders direct to 'Iactical Air Force
mander. He may employ it against targets that (TAF), Tenth Army. Out of its allocation of planes,
cannot be reached by other weapons or in con- TAF responded accordingly. Because of the Jap-
junction with the ground weapons in a coordinated anese Kamikaze attacks (lirCCtCd against naval units
attack. It should be immediately available and
should be carried out with deliberation and ac- *Lieutenant General Keith B. McCutcheon stated, in
curacy and in coordination with other assigned a letter to the Director of Marine Corps history, that
units.'3 'The ALPS that we used (in the Philippines) were the
true forerunners of TACPS. We also had a van motintecl
At various conferences prior to the Luzon radio that we farmed out to division CPs when it was
operation and MAG—24's support of the 1st necessary, and it was the forerunner of the I)ASC. 'I'he
Cavalry Division's sweep toward Manila, the main contribution that we made in the Philippines,
however, was to break the ban on having controllers
Fifth Air Force, Southwest Pacific Area, with in the front lines talk directly to aircraft and actually
the Navy concurring, stated that it was not control the strikes." (HRS, HD, IIQMC)
 THE DECADE OF THE FORTIES-THE WAR AND THE BOMB 69

USS Idaho firing in support of landing operations at Okinawa on i April 1945. (USMC Photo #116412).

off Okinawa, "operational control of aircraft in the then naval gunfire or support aircraft might
Ryukyus remained with the Navy until the area be able to do so. Iwo Jima was an example
was secured." °
of successful coordination of supporting arms.
By the end of the war a system of control It was at Iwo Jima that the first Marine
evolved which attempted to incorporate the FSCC was established. Colonel John S. Letcher
flexibility of the Philippine system with the was selected by Major General Harry Schmidt,
coordination of the Okinawa system. The re- V Amphibious Corps commander, to coordi-
quest for air support would go direct to a nate all supporting arms ashore. Colonel
center called the Tactical Air Direction Cen- Letcher was, in addition, commander of the
ter. Intermediate echelons would monitor the 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group, namely
request, indicating their approval by silence. two 155mm howitzer battalions constituting
When air support was approved, it would be the corps artillery. Colonel Letcher, who set
controlled by the Forward Air Controller up the FSCC in a tent, was in continuous
whenever the tactical situation permitted. This communication, afloat and ashore, with liai-
introduced the flexibility of the Philippine son officers assigned to each of the three divi-
system without sacrifice of safety to the sional artillery regiments. Always at his elbow
ground troops or interference with the overall was a representative of the naval gunfire officer
tactical situation. of the V Amphibious Corps, Lieutenant Colo-
nel Donald l\I. Weller, and a liaison officer
Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) from the Landing Force Air Support Control
Standard artillery tactics and doctrine Unit, headed by Letcher's senior, Colonel Ver-
proved sound throughout the war. On differ- non F. Megee. Both Megee and Weller had staff
ent islands some organic weapons were inade- separate and distinct from Letcher's and the
quate for the task of destroying the type of FSCC functioned as a clearing house of re-
emplacements encountered. On Iwo Jima, the quests for close support coming in from the
105mm and 75mm howitzers of the divisional field. Letcher, giving orders only to corps ar-
artillery battalions were completely unsuited tillery, along with the air and naval gunfire
for the work of destroying many of the impos- liaison officers, screened and integrated these
ing Japanese fortifications. Even the much requests, and Megee and Weller as the rank-
heavier 155mm shells of corps units required ing corps air and naval gunfire officers for-
10 to 12 hits, all in the same place, to inflict warded them in the status of requests to the
major damage.17 All was not lost, however, in implementing agencies afloat.1s This arrange-
the ultimate destruction of those targets on ment was in effect a safeguard against unwar-
Iwo Jima. If artillery could not do the job, ranted duplication of fires and against impos-
70 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

sible demands being made on any given arm. chusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard,
In practice, it functioned extremely well. then went to Camp Lejeune, North Carolina
The essential elements of the FSCC were or Ward Island, Corpus Christi, Texas. Enlisted
used in the Okinawa operation. The Tenth radar technicians were trained at Fort Mon-
Army utilized a Target Information Center mouth, New Jersey, by the Army. Officers
(TIC). At each staff level down to the bat- attended the air warning school at Orlando,
talion, the artillery officer acted as the target Florida and commenced training at NAS, St.
coordinator for infantry support. Working in Simon's Island, Georgia.h1
close conjunction with the NGF and air liai- The Marine Corps considered training with
son officers, the TIC collated intelligence parachute troops and gliders. Marine Corps
regarding enemy defenses. It allocated fire mis- paratroopers made their first demonstration
sions to the support elements whose capabili- jumps at Lakehurst, New jersey, 29 Decem-
ties promised the most effective results. The ber 1940. It was during fiscal year 1941, that
"system stood the test of combat without the Marine Corps was authorized to organize
major difficulties and drew unanimous praise two parachute battalions. A parachute train-
from the divisions using it." 19 ing school was established in 1941 on the
West Coast near Santee, in the San Diego area,
and named Cam Gillespie in May 1942. These
Trials and Adaptations—Marine courses lasted six weeks. By April 1943, there
Aviation were sufficient parachute troops available, ap-
In addition to improvements in NGF, CAS, proximately 3,000 men, to meet the operational
and artillery support, the Marine Corps adapted requirements. However, because of the terrain
from the European war experience certain of the Pacific Islands, and the lack of sufficient
training thought usable in the Pacific. The lift capabilities, parachute units were disbanded
first Marine Night Fighter Squadron, VMF on 10 December 1943.22
(N)—531, was commissioned 16 November 1942 In a similar vein, the Marine Corps organized
at Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS), Cherry a barrage balloon training school at Parris
Point, with Colonel Frank H. Schwable com- Island on 12 june 1941. Facilities were set up
manding. By 17 June 1943, the squadron had in September 1941 at New River (Camp Ie-
six combat aircraft. Marine night fighters op- jeune), North Carolina. The purpose was to
erated for the first time during the Bougain- train barrage balloon units with defense bat-
yule campaign and supplied the experience talions in base defense operations Of six bar-
on which subsequent training was based. Pi- rage balloon squadrons (designated ZM squad-
lots were given intensive training in intercep- rons) four remained in the United States to
tion of and firing at an airborne target at guard Navy yards and bases, two went overseas,
night. The Marine Corps sent officers to Great one to Tillagi and the other to New Caledonia.
Britain in February 1943 where they studied It was learned that the l)alloon barrages crc-
the technique employed by the British in con- ateci as great a hazard to friendly aircraft as to
trol of interception. They worked with the enemy planes. Their mission was to protect
Royal Air Force and attended a Fighter Di- the artillery of the defense battalion to which
rector school at Stanmore, England. What they they were assigned, but it was found that the
learned was brought back to the United States 90mm antiaircraft guns proved more effective.
where night fighter training was given greater The barrage balloon organization was al)afl-
emphasis. Marine Night Fighter Squadron 531, (toned 15 December l943.2
the original unit, went to Eagle Mountain Another type o. training was in the use of
Lake, Texas, in April 1944, but by that time six gliders. A study by the Bureau of Aeronautics
more night fighter squadrons had been organ- in june 1941 of towed gliders for the purpose
ized in the Marine Corps.20 of transporting personnel and equipment cul-
In addition, Marine Aviation set up an air minated in the organization of a Marine Corps
warning program and commissioned at Cherry Glider Detachment on 6 January 1942 at
Point, on 1 July 1943, Marine Air Warning Parris Island for primary and advanced train-
Group I undei the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing. iiig. The bureau was responsible for the pro-
Subsequently, Air Warning Squadron was 1 curement of glider equipment, while the Ma-
commissioned as the first of 19 such units. Of- rifle Corps was responsible for training the
ficers were trained in radar at the Massa- personnel required to operate gliders as-
 THE DECADE OF THE FORTIES—THE WAR AND THE BOMB 71

signed for troop-carrying purposes. In order that our probable future enemy will be in pos-
to administer the program, the CMC author- session of this weapon, it is my opinion that a
ized the Division of Aviation in July 1942, to complete review and study of our concept of am-
phibious operations will have to be made. It is
organize a glider-paratroop unit, and had as quite evident that a small number of atomic
officer-in-charge, Major John Wehie. By Decem- bombs could destroy an expeditionary force as now
ber 1942, there were 240 Marines taking train- organized, embarked and landed. Such a force
ing. Glider bases were constructed at Eagle might not fare so badly on the high seas, if prop-
erly dispersed—It is my opinion that future am-
Mountain Lake, Texas, and Edenton, North phibious operations will be undertaken by much
Carolina in the summer and fall of 1942 and smaller expeditionary forces, which will be highly
training got under way at Eagle Mountain Lake trained and lightly equipped, and transported by
in the spring of 1943. Again, after much air or submarine, and movement accomplished
with a greater degree of surprise and speed than
thought about the type of terrain in the Pacific has ever been heretofore visualized. Or that large
and the potential drain on pilot resources, the forces must be dispersed over a much wider front
glider program was abandoned 24 June 1943 than used in past operations. With an enemy in
when Marine Corps Glider Group 71 was dis- possession of atomic bombs, I cannot visualize
another landing such as was executed at Normandy
banded and its personnel transferred to the or Okinawa. It is trusted that Marine Corps
3d Aircraft Wing. A total of 207 gliders were Headquarters will consider this a very serious and
on order but none was delivered.24 urgent matter and will use its most competent of-
ficers in finding a solution to develop the tech-
nique of conducting amphibious operations in
And Then Came the Bomb the atomic age."
Only 13 days after receiving this grim warn-
The atomic bomb ended the war and ushered ing, the CMC appointed a special board headed
in the atomic age. Much information and mis- by Major General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., As-
information and legend came as a result of the sistant Commandant of the Marine Corps and
survey of the damage at Hiroshima and Naga- two other members, Major General Field
saki. In order to get the facts, the government Harris, Director of Aviation and Brigadier
set up a series of tests, under the cognizance General Oliver P. Smith, Commandant of the
of the Navy, called Operation CROSSROADS Marine Corps Schools. The task of the Special
in the summer of 1946. The place was Bi- Board was to take up the matter of amphibi-
kini Lagoon in the western Marshalls. Two ous warfare in the atomic age.26 As it hap.
atomic bombs, one in the air, the other under- pened a decade or more before, and will un-
water, were exploded in the midst of a fleet doubtedly happen in the future, the Marine
of obsolescent warships used as targets. The Corps Schools were called upon again to help
results of the tests indicated that enough dam- arrive at a solution. This Special Board ap-
age was done to drastically alter the World pointed a Secretariat, to conduct the actual
War II techniques of amphibious warfare. research into probable effects of atomic explo-
Certain responsible military leaders were
sion on future amphibious operations. The
quoted as saying that it would be impossible Secretariat consisted of Colonel 1\Ierrill B.
to conduct an amphibious assault in a nil- Twining, Colonel Edward C. Dyer, and Lieu-
clear war. It is important to note that the tenant Colonel Clair W. Shisler.
Navy and Marine Corps, from the outset, be- The problems confronting the ]\larine Corps
lieved that the atomic weapon had had no in conducting amphibious assaults in the face
significant effect upon amphibious doctrine of atomic attack were exceedingly complex.
but it did, of course, affect techniques and The Navy believed, and the Marine Corps
equipment. agreed, that naval air and surface warfare
The senior Marine officer at the tests, Lieu- could be conducted in an atomic attack with
tenant General Roy S. Geiger, Commanding increased dispersion of the fleet. However, the
General, FT\IF Pacific, wrote to the CIIC three immediate problem for the FMF would be that
weeks after the tests what must be considered dispersion would not provide increased pro-
a truly historic document of the Marine Corps. the landing force. On the con-
His deep concern was reflected in the impres- tection for
sions he conveyed in his letter as follows: trary, the landing force, as in the past, had
to concentrate in strength at the point of
tinder the assumption that atomic bombs can be landing or risk the consequences of depleted
produced in large quantities, that thcv can l)e used
i'i mass attacks against an enemy objective, and firepower aggravated by insurmoun table dif-
72 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

ficulties of control and communications. Dis- board felt that the speed of the helicopter of-
persion, which was necessary to the fleet, like- fered a practical means of overcoming the
wise deprived the amphibious attack of its effects of dispersion while likewise reducing
greatest characteristic—the ability to strike exposure to atomic attack. In addition, it pos-
swiftly and in overwhelming force. General sessed many of the advantages of the airborne
Alexander A. Vandegrift, the CMC, advised attack with few attendant disadvantages. Under
the Special Board that in surmounting cer- the method visualized, helicopters would be
tain requirements revolutionary measures might carried by transport carriers with additional
be required. He stated that "details are neither maclimes carried by transports and LSTs. The
expected nor desirable at this time, but general board felt that personnel could be landed in
principles must be determined in order to orient proper formation on the flank or rear of the
the effort of the Marine Corps away from the hostile position and that palletized supplies
last war and toward the next." 21 could be landed in or near dumps without
further handling. Helicopters of the future
The Shepherd Board's precept directed it to could be constructed to carry larger loads; they
study:
could he made faster and ultimately less vul-
(1) Employment of helicopters for ship.to.shore
movement, nerable than landing craft. The board con-
(2) Damage effects of the explosion of an atomic cluded that "the speed of the helicopters ren-
bomb, and, ders the degree of transport dispersion at sea
(3) Special equipment for amphibious operations.28 a matter of no disadvantage and likewise in-
troduces a time space factor in landing that
Within number (3) above, special equipment will avoid presenting at any one time a re-
for amphibious operations, the board consid- munerative atomic target." 30
ered airborne landings, submarine landings, The board believed that the helicopter
large flying boats, and helicopters. amphibious assault technique capitalized on
On 16 December 1946, the Special Board the inherent characteristics of the vehicle with
submitted to the CMC the findings of their a view of providing the landing force with
study. The Special Board stated: those precious ingredients, "speed," "flexibil-
ity," and "dispersion." The report also in-
The atomic bomb now prohibits the heavy con- cluded a proposed program for the use of
centrations of ships and landing craft heretofore
used in amphibious operations. The answer lies helicopters by the Marine Corps. The board
in a wide dispersion of our attack force, a rapid recommended the following: (1) that an ex-
concentration of our landing force by means other perimental squadron should he organized and
than small boats or amphibians and thereafter equipped with 12 helicopters of the first avail-
maintaining close contact with the enemy. Air-
borne operations by landplane transport, by para- able type; (2) that a study of techniques,
chute or by glider are not suitable for Marine tactics, logistics, and other phases of ship-
Corps employment . . Submarine transports will
. to-shore movement by helicopters be made to
he useful but to a limited extent. The develop- include military requirements for future heli-
ment of a combination of large flying boats and
helicopters will overcome the limitations of a purely copter design.31
airborne method, keep the enterprise a purely Within three days, the Commandant con-
naval one, and permit its rapid exploitation and curreci in the hoard's conclusions and for-
support from widely dispersed and more econom- warded th report to Brigadier General Oliver
ical surface vessels.'9
P. Smith, CMCS, directing him to implement
The report, in studying airborne landings, the developmental program outlined in the
submarine landings, large flying boats, and report.32 The CMC directed the MCS to under-
helicopters, indicated that while all
of the take "an imme(liate study of the employment
courses of action had some elements of ad- of helicopters in an amphibious operation,"
vantage, all had marked disadvantages. It
was obvious, even at this early date, that the equipped men in seats. Howard Hughes, millionaire
aircraft designer, was building a prototype eight-
board had more faith in the helicopter. The motored transport seaplane, which was designed to
second choice was the large seaplane.* The carry a 44-ton tank as part of its payload of 120,000
poumis. Clamshell doors and a landing ramp could be
*At the time, the seaplane in the immediate future added to the design. The Special Board did not seem
was the Martin "Mars" with an empty weight of very optimistic about the outlook for either the Hughes
75,000 pounds and a cargo and fuel load of 63,000 or Martin seaplane being delivered in adequate num-
pounds. It was to have a troop.carrying capacity of 133 bers "within the next live years."
 THE DECADE OF THE FORTIES-THE WAR AND THE BOMB 73

- _rS -
t rn.-

USS Thetis Bay (CVEA—1) with helicopters on deck preparing to ferry troops to attack positions during opera-
tion SKi JUMP (January 1957) at Camp Pendleton, Calif. (USMC Photo #11352474).

and to submit: "a. A tentative doctrine for not have to be suspended at MCS during
helicopter employment, and b. The military 1947 to write the new doctrine for helicop-
requirements of a helicopter specifically de- ters. The Committee to do the work was of-
signed for ship-to-shore movement of troops ficially called the Committee of the Academic
and cargo." In the same letter, MCS was di- Board (referring to the Academic Board of
rected to further study the employment of the Educational Center of MCS). This Com-
transport seaplanes in amphibious operations. mittee, headed by Colonel Robert E. Hoga-
As a last bit of guidance, the CMC stated: boom, was assisted by the Secretariat that re-
As a concurrent problem it is obvious that opera- searched for the Special Board, Colonels
tions using such air-vehicles may well require a Twining, Dyer, Shisler, and (later added to
complete revision of Tables of Organization as well the Secretariat) Lieutenant Colonel Samuel
as prescribed equipment. If it is found that re- R. Shaw.*
vision or reduction in the size of organizations or
changes in the types of amounts of arms, equip- Unlike other boards that would bear the
ment, and supplies are necessary, recommenda- name of the chairman, the Committee of the
tions to that effect should be includecL3'
*presumably because any work done at MCS is a
team effort, official reports covering tactical and doctrinal
Repeat of the 1930s work are signed only by the chairman of a committee
or the CMCS even though a dozen men might have
Unlike 1933, and the writing of the Tenta- contributed. This method may be commendable but it
tive Landing Operations Manual, classes did plays havoc with historical records.
74 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

Academic Board simply became known as the Missions

Helicopter Board. Colonel Hogaboom would 1. Develop techniques and tactics in connection
with the movement of assault troops in amphibious
indeed head another board in 1957 that would operations.
be called the Hogaboom Board and would 2. Evaluate a small helicopter as replacement for
reshape the FMF. the present fixed-wing observation (OY) aircraft in
Within three months of the CMC directive gunfire spotting, observation, and liaison missions
of 19 December 1946, the Helicopter Board in connection with amphibious operations.
Tasks
submitted a report entitled "Military Require- 1. Develop a doctrine for the aviation tactics
ments of Helicopter for Ship-to-Shore Move- and technique in the employment of the helicopter
ment of Troops and Cargo." 84 in amphibious operations.
The report envisioned a helicopter with a 2. Assist the Marine Corps Schools in the de-
velopment of a doctrine covering the tactics and
seating space for a minimum of 15 and a techniques of the employment of helicopters in
maximum of 20 infantrymen "suitably armed amphibious operations.
and equipped to initiate combat." The re- - 3. Study the operation and maintenance of as-
signed aircraft.
port did not set its sights on a helicopter car- 4. Develop the flight proficiency of pilots and
rying more than 20 men as "a capacity in air crewmen.
excess of twenty (20) men is not desirable in 5. Develop and maintain the technical proficiency
an assault helicopter since the craft will un- of mechanics.
6. Submit recommendations for tables of organi-
doubtedly be extremely vulnerable." When zation, equipment allowances, and related data for
the committee initially outlined the problem, future helicopter squadrons.as
it appeared to be realistic in view of the times: Colonel Clayton C. Jerome, Commanding
On the premise that the helicopter offers a valu- Officer of Marine Corps Air Station, Quantico,
able means of accelerating and dispersing the welcomed the new HMX—l squadron with
ship-to-shore movement, it is recognized that com- instructions that it was to get the pick of per-
plete replacement of all existing ship-to-shore
conveyances may at some future date be desirable.
sonnel and the best facilities of the station.
Under such conditions it would appear necessary The first commanding officer of HMX—l was
that there be designed a relatively small type heli- Colonel Edward C. Dyer, former member of
copter for transportation of assault troops, as well the Secretariat of the Helicopter Board. While
as a large type helicopter capable of lifting all waiting for helicopters, Colonel Dyer ar-
divisional loads. However, examination of current ranged to have the eight officers that were
technical developments indicates that the latter
type may not be practical for some time to come.
assigned to the squadron sent to the naval
Accordingly, it is considered more realistic to ap- experimental helicopter squadron, VX—S, at
proach the problem in increments, establishing the Naval Air Station, Lakehurst, New Jersey,
initially the characteristics for a purely assault con- to obtain some flight training. Among the few
veyance. . .
experienced instructor pilots at Lakehurst was
In general terms, the report briefly dis- a Marine, Major Armond H. DeLalio, "who is
cussed the payload, range, speed, armor, etc., recognized as the pioneer helicopter pilot of
desirable for the 15—20-man helicopter.
the Marine Corps. He had taken part from
the beginning in the Navy's helicopter pro-
However, it was the 1930s again, doctrine be- gram; and as operations officer of VX—3 in
ing evolved first and then the equipment to 1947, he provided training for Dyer's officers
fit the doctrine. in Navy helicopters At Colonel Dyer's
In view of the recommendation of the Shep- request, Major DeLalio was subsequently as-
herd Board of December 1946, the CMC re- signed to HMX—l as operations officer in early
quested the Secretary of the Navy through 1948.
the CNO to activate an experimental heli- The year 1948 was a good year for HMX—l.
copter squadron (HMX). This squadron, In February it received its first two helicop-
HMX—l, was placed under operational and. ters, both HO3S—1, Sikorsky-built with a 450-
administrative control of the CMC via the horsepower Wasp engine. Though listed as
Commanding Officer of the Marine Corps a four-place craft, it could actually lift only
Air Station at Quantico who was designated two combat-equipped men in addition to the
to furnish logistic support for pilot, or two casualties on external litters.
•The CMC assigned missions and tasks to The maximum load, including gas, pilot and
HMX—1 as follows: passengers or cargo, was 1,180 pounds; the
 THE DECADE OF THE FORTIES—THE WAR AND THE BOMB 75

a total of five HO3S—ls to participate in Op-

eration PACKARD II. This operation was
the second amphibious command post exercise
held jointly by Navy and Marine forces to
simulate a ship-to-shore assault landing against
an enemy defending the beaches. This time,
the beach was not at Culebra but at Onslow
Beach, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.
The following objectives were assigned to
HMX—l during the PACKARD II exercise:
To take a positive step forward in the develop-
ment program by making an actual landing of
troops by carrier-based helicopters;
To gain experience in operating helicopters on
Sikorsky HO3S—1 observation-utility helicopters at board an aircraft carrier and experience in heli-
Quantico's air station in May 1948. (USMC Photo copter landing operations upon which a sound
t256O5). doctrine for these operations could be written;
To gain individual and collective experience for
operating radius, 80 miles; and the maximum pilots, aircraft crews, and other squadron personnel
so that more extensive operations could be under-
speed at sea level, 103 miles per hour.4° taken in the future;
While not the large prototype theoretical To determine probable military requirements for
helicopters discussed in doctrinal writings, the landing force helicopters of the future.
HO3S—l proved invaluable for training the Colonel Dyer and his squadron reported to
pilots for better models to come. As in the Captain R. E. Dixon, USN, commanding the
thirties, when Roebling and Higgins were en- CVE (escort aircraft carrier) USS Palau. In
couraged to manufacture their craft for mili- the exercise, HMX—1 was to simulate landing
tary needs, so, too, did Marine officers, namely one regimental combat team. During the ac-
Colonels Dyer and Twining, encourage Sikor- tual landing, a total of 66 men and con-
sky, Piasecki, and Bell to design for the needs siderable communications equipment were
of the Marine Corps.* transported to the beach by helicopter. A total
Paradoxically at HMX—1, the first mission, of 35 flights were made between the ship and
in addition to training purposes, occurred the landing zone.43 For the entire operation,
when a helicopter was used to "determine the a total of 28.6 hours were flown and a total
best route for a salvage party to remove a of 103 carrier landings and take-offs were
'Weasel' (Amphibious Jeep) that had become made.
mired in a nearby creek." 41 Foremost among the conclusions arrived at
By 1 May 1948, the squadron had enough by the HMX—1 report was the need for a
personnel, 12 officers and 32 enlisted men, plus larger helicopter. Change the name of the
*Igor Sikorsky, Russian-born, American aeronautical equipment and it would sound like the con-
engineer, builder, inventor, and founder of the Sikor- cluding remarks in the fleet landing exercises
sky Aviation Corporation and Engineering Manager of of the l930s, "a better landing boat is
Sikorsky Aircraft Division of United Aircraft Corpora-
tion. Holder of many honorary degrees, awards, and needed." The report went on to say "if troops
honors, Sikorsky retired in 1957 but acted as con- are to be landed expeditiously and in battle
sultant and adviser to United Aircraft until his death formation the time consumed and the move-
in 1972. ment of the very few troops transported in
Frank N. Piasecki, American-born aeronautical en- this operation served to point up the fact
gineer, builder, inventor, and founder of the Piasecki
Helicopter Corporation and Piasecki Aircraft Corpora- that a transport helicopter carrying at least
tion. Piasecki was president of his corporation and eight passengers is urgently required." In an
director of the Crown Cork International Corporation. entirely optimistic vein, the report con-
Lawrence D. Bell, American-born aeronautical engi- cluded:
neer, builder, and designer. General Manager of the
Glenn L. Martin Corporation, he later became vice-presi- No unsurmountable obstacles, either theoretical
dent in charge of sales for Consolidated Aircraft Com- or actual, were developed or experienced that might
pany and later organized the Bell Aircraft Corporation. prevent the future operation of mass landings of
During World War H, Bell Corporation manufactured troops by helicopters. The operation was entirely
the P—39 Air Cobra fighter. Bell entered the helicopter successful in that its limited objectives were reached.
field during 1943, specializing in light utility machines. No attempt, however, was made to fully exploit the
76 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

capabilities of rotary wing aircraft. Much remains the pilots who trained at Lakehurst had been
to be done in the future and these operations must given their first 15 hours of flight instruction
continue to be thought of as experimental and in this light aircraft.45
developmental .
The great event of the year was the ar-
After PACKARD II, HMX—l provided rival at HMX—1 of the first HRP—1. It was
aerial demonstrations and transportation to the largest helicopter in operation at that
various groups, both military and civilian. In time. The HRP—1 was a Piasecki-built, 10-
addition, experiments were made with an passenger helicopter, powered by a 600-horse-
aerial public address system for directing traf- power engine driving twin rotors. The maxi-
fic, troop movements, or rescue work. High- mum speed at sea level was 100 miles per
speed wire laying was successfully tested in hour and 75 miles per hour represented the
conjunction with the Marine Corps Equipment cruising speed. It had a cargo space about
Board, which had been evaluating various dis-
14-feet long and 5-feet wide with a cargo
pensers under all climatic conditions. By
l1oist of 400 pounds capacity and a cable
August of 1948, two new arrivals sparked the
interest at HMX. The first Bell helicopter length of 100 feet. Because oF its elongated
was flown to HMX—1 from Lakehurst, New and curved configuration, the HRP—1 was
Jersey. It was a three-place craft powered by nicknamed the "flying banana." By the end
a 178-horsepower motor. Dubbed the HTL—2, of the year, four more HRP—ls were delivered
it was suitable for reconnaissance, artillery to Quantico where flight indoctrination train-
spotting, or aerial photography. No familiar- ing continued both for pilots and crews. This
ization flying was necessary for this model as preliminary stage was followed by an inten-

:.,..'.

HRP—ls spotted on the flight deck of the USS Palau ready to load troops and equipment in June 1950. (US\
Phofri #707741).
 THE DECADE OF THE FORTIES—THE WAR AND THE BOMB 77

sive program of testing tactics and techniques related to the employment of such conveyances in
for landing assault troops in an amphibious the conduct of amphibious operations. It is the pur-
operation.46 pose of this pamphlet to explore the various aspects
of helicopter employment, discerning the manner
in which the characteristics of the vehicles can be
best exploited to enhance the effectiveness of the
Phib-S 1 amphibious attack, and providing thereby the basis
The evolution of a set of principles governing for a body of doctrine governing helicopter landing
helicopter employment cannot await the perfection operations.4°
of the craft itself, but must proceed concurrently Phib-31 contained the following sections:
with that development.47
Introduction, Organization and Command,
As if following a script written a generation Tactical Considerations, Embarkation, the
before, the MCS had prepared a tentative doc- Ship-to-Shore Movement, Fire Support, Lo-
trine on the employment of helicopters be- gistics, Communications, and Characteristics
fore there was any appreciable amount of of HRP—1 and HO3S—1. Much of the spade-
helicopters in the world. The Army's air mo- work had already been done in amphibious
bile divisions can only be the outgrowth of manuals of prehelicopter days, and the basic
what the Marine planners of 1948 envisioned— principles governing the conventional amphib-
a Marine helicopter, wing composed of 240 ious attack were still generally applicable.
aircraft, "each capable of carrying a payload While the limitations of rotary-wing aircraft
of fifteen (15) fully armed troops or four thou- were apparent at the time, Phib-31 took into
sand (4,000) pounds of cargo." There were account the potential advantages:
not at that time as many as 240 helicopters The ability of the helicopter to rise and descend
in the entire world. The planners at MCS vertically, to hover, and to move rapidly at varying
envisioned a "simultaneous lift of one RCT altitudes all qualify it admirably as a supplement
(regimental combat team), helicopter borne." or substitute for the slower, more inflexible craft
They continued that "where helicopters are now employed in the ship-to-shore movement.
of lesser capacity the numbers of helicopters Furthermore, its ability to circumvent powerful
beach defenses, and to land assault forces accurately
in helicopter units should be increased as and in any desired altitude, on tactical localities
necessary to provide for maintaining the tacti- farther inland, endow helicopter operations with
cal integrity of troop organizations." 48 many of the desirable characteristics of the con-
The tentative doctrine for helicopters, in ventional airborne attack while avoiding the un-
desirable dispersal of forces which often accom-
mimeograph instructional form, was revised panies such operations. The helicopter furthermore.
after PACKARD II in May 1948. Revisions when transported to the scene of operations in air-
were made in consonance with operations at craft carriers, makes operations possible at ranges
HMX—1 and finally with the arrival of the which have not yet been achieved by the existing
conventional carriers.'0
first HRP—l machines.
In November 1948, a 52-page booklet was The MCS doctrinal work on the employ-
published by MCS entitled "Amphibious Op- ment of helicopters came full-circle with the
erations—Employment of Helicopters (Tenta- publication of Phib-31. The helicopter with
tive)." As the 31st in a series of manuals on its nicknames of "whirlybird," "flyinging wind-
amphibious operations, the production was mill," "eggbeater," "flying banana," and the
usually referred to as Phib31.* The booklet like, was certainly here to stay. What re-
was initially classified "Confidential" and ap- mained was how the military services would
proved for instructional purposes in MCS.
use this new and improving craft. The Ma-
rine Corps, seeing the vast possibilities in the
The purpose of Phib-31 was contained in the craft, would have it fully and rapidly devel-
preface: oped, as it was fully committed to new tech-
The advent of the troop carrying helicopter and niques of amphibious warfare. In these early
its establishment as standard equipment within the years, the Navy and Coast Guard attitude to-
Marine Corps gives rise to a variety of questions ward their helicopter programs was more of
progression rather than expansion. The Army
'Phi b—31 was written by then Colonels Victor H. was primarily interested in the helicopter for
Kruiak and Edward C. Dyer. Krulak recalls that "we had
so little to go on, no data; just conviction." LtGen V.H. its logistical possibilities, envisioning it as a
Krulak hr to Director, M.C. History, dated 3 August 1970 successor to the truck. The Air Force looked
(Historical Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps). at the helicopter chiefly as an air-rescue craft.
78 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

By the end of the decade, the Marine Corps tions in techniques of wire laying, evacuation
experimented with the helicopter in cold of casualties, and flying crane lifts of 75mm
weather operations off Newfoundland and at pack howitzers before the 81st Congress and
the other extreme, tested it under tropical President Harry S. Truman at Quantico. The
conditions off the coast of Puerto Rico in the amphibious doctrine and boat development
Atlantic Fleet Exercise in 1949. On the other in the late thirties just prior to World War
side of the world, in Tsingtao, China, a Ma- II was similar to the helicopter employment
rine captain, Wallace D. Blatt, flew an doctrine and development of various craft
HO3S—1 helicopter as a rescue aircraft during prior to the Korean War. The Marine heli-
the American withdrawal from China in Feb- copter program was overtaken by the Korean
ruary 1949. In May 1949, HMX—1 partici- War by June 1950. It was only 30 months
pated in PACKARD III, off Onslow Beach, since HMX—l was activated and the time in
and among its new techniques it deployed an which to evaluate the capabilities of a new
HTL—2 helicopter from a Landing Ship Tank type of aircraft was short. In Korea a good
(LST) for spotting operations. HMX—1 sub- deal would depend on the experience of
sequently recommended that "the operation of HMX—l and the doctrinal conclusions of the
small helicopters from LST's be further pur- MCS since it was a truism of history that no
sued by the operating forces of the fleet." In new weapon is any better than the doctrines
May and June 1949, HMX—1 gave demonstra- and techniques behind it.53
 CHAPTER V
THE FIFTIES: MASSIVE RETALIATION, PEACEFUL
COEXISTENCE, AND NUCLEAR STALEMATE

Introduction
The fifties, beginning with a conflict in government. By the 1960s, we would be
Korea, saw the end to the fighting and sign- destined to fight in a proxy war, the uncon-
ing a truce in July 1953. At the time, it ventional war of the guerrilla.
looked as if the United States had fought
the last "conventional" war. We were in the The Status of the Marine Corps in
midst of the Cold War and well advanced
into the nuclear age. The new Republican the 1950s
Administration was in office about a year The Marine Corps came of age, as it were,
when Mr. John Foster Dulles, th Secretary of when in June 1952, Public Law 416, 82d
State, announced in January 1954 the new Congress, was passed giving the Marine
national defense policy based on "massive Corps, for the first time in its history, a voice
retaliation." As in any decade, the foreign in the highest military councils in those mat-
relations of the United States were guided ters that directly concerned it.
by the strength of the military posture. Our To go back several years, in 1947 Congress
military strength in the mid-50s looked good enacted the National Security Act which set up
as far as nuclear stockpiles were concerned, a new organization for national defense. This
and by the end of the decade we were busy act created a National Military Establishment
catching-up with the Russians on perfecting consisting of three executive or military depart-
intercontinental ballistic missiles. ments of cabinet level and the Joint Chiefs of
Military planners, taking into account Staff (JCS), all under the "general direction,
United States defense policies, had to con- authority and control" of a Secretary of De-
sider a nuclear solution to the next war. But fense, who was given a small staff to help him
as the decade came to a close, it was believed provide policy guidance and high-level coordi-
that Russia and the United States had so in- nation for the separate departments in his
creased their capacity to destroy each other charge. The basic act did not clarify the spe-
that nuclear or total war was completely out- cific roles and missions of the different services.
side the realm of rational policy. A policy of As an example, the Air Force philosophy, sim-
"Peaceful Coexistence" became fashionable. ple in theory but difficult in practice, had the
Nuclear "stalemate" replaced nuclear "supe- view that everything that flies should be under
riority" as the principal deterrent to total con- Air Force control. Obviously, Marine and
flict. In place of total war, the Communists Navy air thought otherwise. In order to correct
chose the tactic of using war by proxy, war "overlapping" in the basic law, President Harry
by satellite, war by threat and subversion. S. Truman issued Executive Order 9877 en-
In the 1950s, the United States met the war titled "Functions of the Armed Forces," spell-
by threat with the Formosa Resolution in ing out specific roles and missions. Again dif-
1955 and the landings in Lebanon in 1958. At ferent interpretations of the basic law and the
the Inter-American Conference in Caracas in executive order varied, which led to the Key
1954, we met the threat of subversion in West Conference in March 1948. At this con-
Guatemala by a multilateral anti-Communist ference, Secretary of Defense Forrestal met
resolution and support for an anti-Communist with his top civilian and military aides to in-
79
80 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

NORTh
KOREA

JA4N

uTh
KOREA

YEUOW
SEA

c2
 THE FIFTIES 81

terpret and adjust the roles and missions of

the services to conform to the legislative re-
quirements of the National Security Act, This
conference resulted in agreement on a docu-
ment designed to define more specifically, and
to amplify, the basic functions assigned in law.
On 21 April 1948, the President revoked
Executive Order 9877 and directed the Secre-
tary of Defense to issue the statement of func-
tions agreed to at Key West. This the Secretary
did in a directive entitled "Functions of the
Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff,"
also referred to as the Key West Agreements
and by the short title "Functions Paper." In
another major change to the basic law, the Na-
tional Security Act Amendment of 1949 was
passed establishing the Department of Defense
as an executive department, and creating a
deputy and three assistant secretaries. The De-
partments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force
were reduced in status to "military depart-
ments," whose Secretaries no longer enjoyed General Clifton B. Cates, 19th Commandant of the
cabinet status or statutory membership in the Marine Corps, 1 January 1948 to 31 December 1951.
(USMC Photo #A42546).
National Security Council.
Public Law 416 of the 82d Congress, en-
acted 28 June 1952, specifically applied to the tablished a different chain of command run-
composition and missions of the Marine Corps. ning from the President to the Secretary of
It provided: Defense through the JCS to the commanders of
unified and specified commands.3 The "Func-
(1) The strength of the Marine Corps should be
not less than three combat divisions and three air tions Paper," still intact from 1948, was revised
wings. in 1953 and on 31 December 1958 it was pro-
(2) The Commandant of the Marine Corps should mulgated as Department of Defense Directive
have co-equal status with members of the Joint No. 5100.1, subject: "Functions of the Depart-
Chiefs of Staff in matters of direct concern to the ment of Defense and Its Major Components."
Marine Corps.' The contents of this directive have since been
The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CMC are included in Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2,
furnished with an agenda listing the items to "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)" of
be discussed before each meeting. If there are November 1959.
items on the agenda of direct concern to the In 1953, the Secretary of the Navy approved
Marine Corps, the CMC attends the meeting and issued two General Orders, Numbers 5 and
and participates as a co-equal member. In the 19, that directly affected the Marine Corps.
first year after the passage of the law, the CMC These orders changed the position of the Ma-
had attended 84 meetings of the Joint Chiefs rine Corps within the Department of the Navy,
to deliberate upon 175 items of direct concern elevating the Commandant to a position com-
to the Marine Corps.2 Aside from the CMC, parable to the Chief of Naval Operations. The
Marine officers for the first time began serving changes gave further recognition to the fact that
on committees of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or- there were Marine Corps forces other than those
ganization such as the Joint Strategic Plans assigned to the Operating Forces and Shore
Committee and Joint Logistics Plans Commit- Establishment of the Navy. In addition, the
tee. authority of the Naval District Commandants
Other changes in the National Security Act as it pertained to the Marine Corps became
were the Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953 limited. Control responsibilities previously ex-
and the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. ercised by the District Commandants were
These changes gave greater authority to the given to commanders of Marine Corps forces
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and es- within the district and to the CMC.
82 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

complete the squadron, there were eight OY—2

planes, fixed-wing, with eight officers and 43
enlisted men. Under the command of Major
Vincent J. Gottschalk, VMO—6 sailed for Korea
on 14 July under the operational control of the
brigade and the administrative and logistical
control of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.5
The mission of VMO squadrons had been
stated in 1949 as the conduct of "tactical air
reconnaissance, artillery spotting and other
- flight operations within the capabilities of as-
signed aircraft in support of ground units." 6
The definition left plenty of room for the
helicopters to show what they could do under
combat conditions. The first demonstration
came on the very first morning in Korea, when
General Craig and his aides utilized the rotary-
Naval gunfire sup port from the 16-inch guns of the wing aircraft not only for reconnaissance but
USS Missouri firing on North Korean positions at Chong
Jin in October 1950. (USN Photo #421049). also for locating assembly areas and directing
troop movements. During the most critical
phase of the Chosin operation, the helicopters
The 1\Iarine Corps fared well in the 1950s, provided the only liaison between isolated
coming into its own and truly becoming a commands. Wirelaying by air was first em-
partner on the defense team. ployed by VMO—6 during the second battle of
the Naktong River Bulge, in September 1950.
Korea—The Test
A month after the Korean truce of 27 July
1953, General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., CMC
stated:
It is not the Navy Yard Guards or the Ships'
Detachments or the State Department Security
Forces that give us our fundamental strength. These
are all fine and useful elements of our Corps, but
realistically it is the ability to go into combat with
Th
our ground and air elements on short notice; to do
what is required when it is required, that gives us
our real strength.4

General Shepherd had in mind Korea, where

in such a test the Marines on short notice acti-
vated the 1st Provisional Brigade on 7 July
1950 under the command of Brigadier Gen-
eral Edward A. Craig. Exactly one week later,
the ground element, a reinforced regimental
combat team (RCT), sailed from San Diego to
the Far East. The air component, commanded
by Brigadier General Thomas J. Cushman, con-
sisted of three fighter squadrons and an observa-
tion squadron of Marine Aircraft Group (MAG)
33, 1st 1\'Iarine Aircraft Wing. Included in this
air strength was the first helicopter unit in his-
tory to be trained and organized for combat
duty, the 7 officers, 30 enlisted men, and 4
General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., 20th Commandant
HO3S—1 aircraft of the rotary-wing unit of of the Marine Corps, 1 janualy 1952 to 31 1)ccewlu'r
Marine Observation Squadron (VMO) 6. To 1955 (USMC Photo #A46471).
 THE FIFTIES 83

vertical envelopment was only in effect 59 days

when HMR—l61 transported 224 fully equipped
Marines and 17,772 pounds of cargo from the
reserve area to the main line of resistance.
—4 This was the first helicopter lift of a combat
unit in history. On 11 November 1951, in
Operation SWITCH, HMR—l 61 transported
nearly 2,000 troops in 12 HRSs in 262 flights in
an overall time of 10 hours (95.6 hours of
flight time).9
In Operation HAYLIFT IL from 23 to 27
February 1953, HMR—l61 set an all time cargo-
carrying record when it lifted over a million
and a half pounds of cargo to supply com-
pletely two regiments with daily requirements
for a five-day period. This task represented a
Hospital Ship Repose used for the evacuation of the total of 1,633 lifts and 583.4 flying hours for the
wounded at Inchon Harbor, Korea, 1952. The platform
where helicopters landed is shown. (USMC Photo operations. Other tasks that became routine in-
#A134641). cluded ammunition resupply from the ammu-
nition supply point to the front line, and a
The value of the helicopter for the evacua- complete lift of a 4.5-inch rocket battery with
tion of the wounded became immediately ap- personnel and rockets from one firing point to
parent and VMO—6 did its job well. A wounded another. In July 1952, HMR—l61 answered the
Marine could be transported from the front call from the Army to evacuate 1,172 Army
line to a hospital ship, perhaps 20 miles away, troops cut off by heavy rains in the Chunchon
within 30 minutes. The United States Hospital area of western Korea.'°
Ship (USHS) Consolation was outfitted with Speaking in the same vein, about saving
a helicopter loading platform in July 1951 and lives, two other innovations came out of the
eventually all hospital ships had such landing Korean War, the thermal boot and the
platforms. VMO—6 was joined on 31 August armored vest. A limited test of body armor
1951 by Marine Transport Helicopter Squad. was made during the late months of World
ron 161 (HMR—161) with its 15 new 10-place War II but tests were discontinued after the
HRS—ls. This was the first such helicopter war had ended. The Marine Corps, through the
squadron in history. While evacuation of the Field Medical Service School at Camp Lejeune,
wounded was a secondary mission for both North Carolina, had renewed the development
VMO—6 and HMR—16l, the importance of this of a lightweight plastic body armor. It was a
mission lay in the fact that nearly 10,000
wounded Marines were evacuated by helicop-
ter, 7,067 of whom were flown out by VMO—6
and another 2,748 by HMR—161.
The first step toward using the helicopter in
the mission most closely envisioned by Marine
Corps planners, that of transporting troops and
supplies in support of ground operations, was
accomplished on 13 September 1951. In op-
eration WINDMILL I, HMR—l6l carried out
the first Marine mass helicopter combat resup-
ply operation in history in a one day's lift of
supplies in the Soyang River vicinity. A total
of 28 flights was executed in overall time of
2½ hours (total flight time of 14.1 hours)
to transport 18,848 pounds of equipment and
74 Marines a distance of seven miles.8
Marine Corps General Order No. 85, of 15 Marine helicopter (Bell HTL) lands on the Repose.
February 1951, proclaiming the doctrine of (USMC Photo #A163539).
84 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

available and foot frostbite was virtually elim-

inated. In a rather bizarre side effect, the
thermal boot was found to afford some protec-
tion against land mines, perhaps because of its
cumbersome shape and weight.13

Optimum Organization and the Boards

As we have seen from Chapter IV, the guid-
ing doctrinal publication for the tactical em-
ployment of helicopters was Phib-31, Amp/ti-
bious Operations—Employment of Helicopters
(Tentative), prepared by MCS and used
throughout the Korean War. In spite of the
war, however, in December 1952, the Navy and
MCS began publication of a related series, the
An HRS—Sikorsky helicopter from the 1st MAW Navy's Naval Warfare Publication (NWP—22)
lands on Hospital Ship Repose. (USMC Photo and the Marine Corps' Landing Force Man-
#A163539). uals (LFMs) and Landing Force Bulletins
(LFB5). These publications replaced the Cur-
sleeveless jacket with zipper front and water rent Tactical Orders and Doctrine, U.S. Fleet
resistant green cloth with armor consisting of series (USFs), and included the doctrines and
ballistic nylon and curved plates, similar to techniques for the execution of the helicopter-
fiberglass. The vest weighed 73/4 pounds and borne amphibious assault based on Phib-31 of
provided protection for the wearer against 1948.
missiles of a velocity of 1,200 feet-per-second or In February of 1953, a major original doc-
less.h1 trinal contribution was made by the Marine
By 30 January 1952, 500 of the armored vests Corps with the publication of Landing Force
had arrived in the 1st Marine Division for Bulletin 2, Interim Doctrine for the Conduct
testing. The vests became a satisfactory and of Tactical Atomic Warfare. This document
desirable item of equipment. By July 1953, the presented a concise and mature approach to
division had received its authorized quota of the conduct of operations wherein atomic mu-
24,000 vests. Since 70 percent of all battle nitions are employed. At the time of its pub-
casualties came from wounds in the chest, back, lication, this paper was the only doctrinal
or abdomen, the vests prevented many wounds source of its kind promulgated by any of the
to those parts of the body with resultant lives armed forces. Other important LFBs published
saved and a l)OOSt in morale. By the end of the in the 1950s were LFB No. 17, Concept of
war, the armored vest or "flak jacket" was Future Amphibious Operations and LFB No.
joined by another piece by body ak-mor to pro- 24, Helicopter Operations.
tect the lower torso. This lower torso body Concurrent with the publishing of LFMs
armor resembled drawers and weighed about and LFBs at MCS, the Marine Corps was in-
3 pounds. It was worn as a supplementary volved with study boards. The boards, ap-
item with the armored vest.12 pointed by the CMC, met either at Quantico or
If the thermal or vapor-barrier boot did not Headquarters Marine Corps to study current
save lives, it certainly saved Marines from problems and to make recommendlations ac-
frostbite from the cold and gave comfort to cordingly. At all times, the boards, regardless
those who wore them. In the first winter of the of what they studied, had to keep in mind the
war in 1950, inadequate footgear and the short- major concepts of the time, namely, the "new"
comings of shoepacs, the existing winter gear, concept of amphibious operations—dispersion
caused serious frostbite cases. The dark days of of ships and possible tactical employment of
the Chosin Reservoir and the move to the sea atomic weapons—and the doctrine of vertical
(lid not lend themselves to men stopping and envelopment. To meet such concepts most of
changing socks in order to prevent frostbite, the boards during the 1950s concerned them-
even if they had dry socks. By the second win- selves with organization and structure of a
ter, thermal or "mickey-mouse" boots were lighter and faster Marine Corps. Some ex-
 THE FIFTIES 85

amples of these boards and their range of firm Marine Corps theories and to provide a
studies were: sound footing for projected efforts.""
Report of Board to Study and Make Recommen-
By the end of the fiscal year 1955—56, MCTU
dations on Air-Ground and Aviation Matters (Harris #1 had completed testing 33 projects. Some
Board), headed by Major General Field Harris, of these focused on such weighty problems as
August 1951. the determination of what echelon of com-
Report of Board to Review the Basic Organiza- mand should possess the capability of surface-
tional Structure of the Fleet Marine Force, Ground to-surface delivery of atomic weapons. Primar-
(Wornham Board), headed by Major General
Thomas A. Wornham, April 1952. ily, solving the problems endemic to battalions
Report of Board to Review Aviation Organization and smaller units was emphasized by MCTU
in Order to Achieve Personnel Economy (Condon #1. During 1956 and until 30 June 1957, when
Board), headed by Brigadier General John P. Con- the unit was disbanded, MCTU #1 completed
don, February 1953. 27 additional projects. The variety of tests and
Report of Board to Review Headquarters Organi-
zation of Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic for Tactical reports submitted by MCTU #1 ranged from
and Administrative Purposes (Hogaboom Board), determining size of a TACC controlling GAS
headed by Major General Robert E. Hogaboom, to the distance helicopters should be from en-
June 1953. emy atomic weapons.
Report of Board to Study Characteristics of Fleet The unit participated with other Fleet Ma-
Marine Force Ground and Air Units (Snedeker rine Force, Pacific (FMFPac) units with the
Board), headed by Brigadier General Edward W.
Snedeker, October 1953. use of the USS Thetis Bay.'6 The Thetis Bay
Report of Board to Study the Composition and was the first of a series of ships converted to
Functions of Marine Corps Aviation (Smith Board), serve as transports for helicopter landing
headed by Colonel John L. Smith, February 1955. teams. The Navy, again endeavoring to meet
In addition, the Commandant issued indi- the needs of the Marine Corps, recommis-
vidual directives and reports on matters point- sioned the old escort-carrier in 1956, which
ing to organization and doctrine for the future became the first assault helicopter transport,
years of the Corps. Included in this category LPH-1.
were CMC letters, with subjects as follows: In 1956, the CMC appointed a study board,
Air-Ground Relations, July 1954
The Marine Air-Ground Task Force Concept,
November 1954
Provisional Force Service Regiment, February
1955
Concept for Logistic Support of the Landing
Force, August 1955
Employment of Marine Corps Aviation, January
1956

Recommendations from whatever source had

to be tested in the field. The CMC accordingly
authorized the activation of Marine Corps
Test Unit No. 1 (MCTU #1) in the summer
of 1954, under the command of Colonel Ed-
ward N. Rydalch.14 Its organization was equiv-
alent to a reinforced infantry battalion, ex-
pressly for the purpose of developing tactics
and techniques in support of the conduct of
tactical atomic warfare. The principal high-
light of the first year of operations was the
participation in Exercise DESERT
unit's
ROCK VI, conducted at the Atomic Proving
Ground in Nevada, in February 1955. The
Marine 3d Provisional Atomic Exercise Bri-
gade, comprising MCTU #1 and Marine avia-
tion elements, was involved in the exercise. General Randolph McC. Pate, 21st Commandant of
The CMC reported that "despite the inevita- the Marine Corps, 1 January 1956 to 31 December
ble artificialities, the exercise served to con- 1959. (USMC Photo #A402599).
86 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

Marines turn their backs to ground zero during rehearsal for Operation DESERT ROCK VI, at Yucca Flats, Nev.,
1955. (USMC Photo #A327428).

whose recommendations a year later would the Commandant of the Marine Corps for the
change the basic structure of the FMF for the optimum organization, composition and equip-
next several decades. The board that convened ping of the Fleet Marine Force in order to
at the MCS on 4 June 1956 had as its presi- best perform its mission." 17
dent, Major General Robert E. Hogaboom. The Hogaboom Board in its deliberations
The board was instructed to "conduct a thor- had to keep in mind what the Navy and Ma-
ough and comprehensive study of the Fleet rine Corps viewed as a proper approach to
Marine Force and make recommendations to the "new" concept of amphibious warfare.
Concisely, the concept was as follows:
The assault is initiated by landing troops by
helicopter to the rear and on the flanks of the
desired landing beaches, These troops, supported by
naval gunfire and air, then proceed to clear Out the
enemy defenses and seize the beaches from the rear.
The beaches are then rapidly cleared of obstacles
and prepared to receive landing craft and landing
ships. The helicopters are subsequently used to
provide tactical mobility for the troops ashore and
to supply the widely dispersed tactical troop units.ls
There were those in the Navy who believed
that:
At some time in the distant future it may be
possible to build vertical rising and landing air-
craft of sufficient speed, endurance and cargo capa-
city to make landings entirely by these craft. They
would also, of course, have to be small enough to
be transported in and operated from the decks of
ships.1'

Whatever the means for future ship-to-shore

movement, whether it be helicopter or landing
boats, the Navy felt that Navy ships would
have to bring that means within range of the
beaches.
Atomic blast of Operation DESERT ROCK VI.
There were those people in the Marine
(USMC Photo #A327288). Corps who also believed that all movement
 THE FIFTIES 87

from ship-to-shore would be by helicopter in

the "foreseeable future." The Hogaboom
Board disagreed with this view. The board re-
ported that it was working on problem areas
in most cases that did not extend beyond
"five to six years and in no area beyond about
ten years." The "all" movement was not in
that range of time. The board cautioned the
"all" movement thinkers that the "all heli-
copter assault" should not become the "all
helicopter concept." It said it believed this to
be invalid and that it should be corrected im-
mediately. In very simple terms the board laid
to rest the "all helicopter concept":
The Board believes that this line of thinking has
perhaps obscured the continuing importance of
crossing the beach operations in our modern con-
cept. We believe that for the foreseeable future a
substantial portion of the men and material re-
quired in effecting a lodgement on a hostile shore
must still cross the beach in a "conventional"
fashion. This is not in our opinion inconsistent
with the 'all helicopter assault" concept, or with
the requirement for the projection of seapower
ashore without the necessity of direct assault on the
shoreline. Reduced to its simplest terms the Board
visualized an operation wherein the flexibility of
the helicopter-borne assault forces would be ex- Major General Robert E. Hogaboom, president of the
ploited to uncover and secure the beaches and to board that restructured the Fleet Marine Force in 1956.
seize critical areas which will be required to enable (USMC Photo #A401975).
us to phase in the additional means to maintain
the momentum of the assault and secure the objec- of the current T/Os reflects substantially what
tive area. The Board considers that helicopters will the board recommended in 1957.22
be employed initially to displace the assault ele- After much study and comparison of the
ments of the landing force from ships at sea to pentomic structure of the
attack positions ashore from which they can seize then-projected
the critical terrain features. In subsequent opera- Army's division, the board maintained the in-
tions ashore helicopters will be employed to maneu- tegrity of the triangular structure of the Marine
ver disengaged units into attack positions from division at the regimental level—three regi-
which they can launch an attack against critical ments consisting of three four-company bat-
objectives at a decisive time.2°
The Hogaboom report was forwarded to all talions. Other major changes, recommended by
major commands within the Marine Corps "for the board and subsequently adopted by the
information." But the CMC stated that it was Marine Corps, were:
approved for "purposes of staff planning at 1. Tank battalion taken out of the division
this headquarters." 21 The value of the board (then under the 'L" Series T/O) and placed in
report was that it had taken a thorough and Force Troops.
2. Ontos battalion added.*
objective look at existing doctrine and con- 3. Reconnaissance battalion added, replacing re-
cepts and in many cases, such as the employ- connaissance company.
ment of Marine aviation, affirmed that they 4. Service regiment replaced by a service batta-
were basically sound. Other concepts such as lion.
5. Shore party battalion deleted and shore party
the "all helicopter assault" and the "Marine- function incorporated into service battalion.
Air-Ground Task Force" were given approval 6. Engineer battalion changed to a pioneer bat-
but more definition and clarification of some talion with reduced personnel and equipment.**
aspects of both was needed. The board's rec- 7. Hospital company deleted from medical bat.
ommendations for the change in structure of
the ground forces of the FMF and in particular *Ontos battalion is listed as antitank battalion irs
1970 T/O.
the division were, with few exceptions, ac- **Narne rechanged to engineer battalion as shown in
cepted in total by the Marine Corps. A review current T/O.
88 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970
talion and a fourth collecting and clearing com- the problem of constructing an expeditionary
pany added. airfield, long enough to land a jet plane, re-
8. Infantry and artillery regimental headquarters
become purely tactical in function. fuel it, and to have it take-off, all within the
9. Infantry regimental 4.2-inch mortar company, early stages of the operation. The rather suc-
antitank company, and battalion weapons com- cessful conclusion to this problem, which indi-
panies were all deleted. cated the development programs had paid full
10. A fourth rifle company added to the infantry dividends, was installed at Chu Lai in the
battalion.
11. The artillery regiment reorganized and re- Republic of Vietnam in 1965.25 The 15 odd
armed. years of hard work at the Development Center
12. A communication intelligence company added in developing and refining such a solution lies
to division headquarters battalion.2' in a concept called "Short Airfield for Tactical
The board reported the following: Support" or SATS. The concept envisions the
rapid establishment of hastily constructed or
The Marine division has been lightened con- rehabilitated airstrips from which tactical air-
siderably by personnel reductions in headquarters, craft can be operated through the use of
supply, maintenance, and other supporting ele-
ments and by equipment reductions in tanks, artil- launch and arrest equipment. The SATS today
lery, motor transport, heavy engineer equipment is a kind of a shorebased carrier deck. The
and heavy maintenance equipment. The resulting deck, AM—2 matting, however, is aluminum and
division is air transportable—and its assault ele- air transportable and the basic runway measures
ments are helicopter transportable. It is a well-
balanced fighting entity capable or effective ground about 2,000 feet by 72 feet. Many elements
assault operations under conditions of either con- make up the SATS including a CE—2 catapult,
ventional or nuclear warfare. For sustained opera- a shore-based expeditionary catapult powered
tions, this division requires additional external by a J—79 turbo jet engine; an arresting gear
support. This support is furnished by Force Troop called the MK—5 MOREST, a relatively heavy
units, the numbers of which are based on the re-
quirement to support at least one Division/Wing (74,000 lbs.) arresting system operating on the
task force in each Fleet Marine Force.24 hydraulic ram principle; a Fresnel Lens Optical
Landing System, consisting of a self-contained
Techniques and Hardware source light system that provides glide slope
Development During the 1950s information to the pilot which enables him to
make a precise landing into SATS arresting
The list of projects investigated, tested, and gear; and TACAN, Tactical Air Navigation
completed by various agencies, internal and System, composed of airborne and ground
external to the Marine Corps, ran into hun- equipment operating at ultra high frequencies
dreds of items during the decade. The range which provide pilots with continuous range
included successful development of lightweight and bearing information.
radio relay communication equipment to the Formal test evaluation of the concept with
issuance of a new ration, "Meal, 25-in-I, Land- selected equipment was directed in 1958 with
ing Force." In addition, work on dehydrated the establishment of Project 51—58—01 at
foods was being conducted. While the average MCDC. The first airfield test under this project
Marine who ate at the battalion messhall would was conducted at the I\[arine Corps Air Sta-
probably find it hard to believe, a pilot pro- tion, Beaufort, South Carolina in 1959.20 The
gram, instituted by Food Service Demonstra- first operational test of a complete expedi-
tion Teams and the various Cooks and Bakers tionary jet airstrip was made in March 1960
Schools, attempted to indoctrinate Food Serv- during Exercise BLUE STAR. This test was
ice Personnel in newly developed methods of conducted in an amphibious assault environ-
preparing and servicing dehydrated foods. ment on Taiwan by elements of the 3d Marine
One of the major problems confronting the Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. A
Marine Corps in perfecting its new tactical 3,400 foot by 36 foot airstrip with all-weather
doctrine was that of providing operating facil- air conti-ol and complete aircraft servicing fa-
ities for aircraft ashore in the objective area, cilities was established on the site of an
early in an amphibious operation. The con- abandoned Japanese fighter strip within 70
struction of long concrete or asphalt runways hours of the commencement of beach unload-
for jet aircraft was virtually impossible in a ing; One hundred and eighty Mai-ine engi-
landing operation. To eliminate the need for neers resurfaced the BLUE STAR runway
such runways, research was begun in 1954 on with aluminum matting. It was again tested on
 THE FIFTIES 89

Vieques Island during February 1961. At that aircraft.29 The MPQ—14 was evaluated by the
time the airfield was constructed, in the main, Marine Corps and the Fifth Air Force against
on an old airstrip with a portion of it on an two other radar types, the MPQ—2 and MSQ—1
unprepared surface. The length of the airfield in tests called "PINPOINT ABLE." Even with
was reduced from the one tested on BLUE some mechanical difficulty experienced with
STAR to only 2,150 feet.2 Short Expeditionary the radar bombing, "it soon became apparent
Landing Fields (SELF5), consisting of a SATS that the accuracy (bomb cluster dispersion) of
minus the expeditionary catapult, were estab- the MPQ—14 was greater than that of either the
lished at Quantico and Bogue Field, North MPQ—2 or the MSQ—1." ° The MPQ—14 was
Carolina. In 1964, SATS was established along sufficiently reliable to permit bomb drops with-
the southern coast of Spain during Operation in one mile of friendly lines. By the middle of
STEEL-PIKE I. The use of it during STEEL- summer 1952, the Marines had obtained Fifth
PIKE was a great success. In only ½ days the Air Force permission to use the MPQ—14 in a
SATS field was fully operational and ready to close support role. By the start of the truce in
receive an F8 Crusader squadron as it flew in July 1953, properly trained controllers and
from the United States. "Nothing was used technicians made up Marine Air Support Ra-
from the land. All matting and all control in- dar Team One (MASRT—1), who operated
stallations and fuel farm were landed over the the MPQ—14 on a 24-hour basis. Operations of
beach." 28 MASRT—1 demonstrated impressively that the
The problem of attacking ground targets Marine Corps had, the capability to provide
without visual reference by the aircraft crews sustained direct air support to frontline troops
was solved with the introduction at the end of under all conditions of weather and darkness
World War II of radar-controlled bombing in the target area. The development of the
equipment. With little refinement this equip- Marine MPQ—l4 has proven to be a most sig-
ment was introduced into the Korean War in nificant step forward in tactical aviation.
the summer of 1951 by the U.S. Air Force In the field of logistics, the concept of "con-
using the MPQ—2 radar.* Based on a concept tinuous flow" of supplies across the beach
oriented towards deep support of troops in ex- was developed in order to eliminate the
tended land campaigns, the Air Force system buildup of large and vulnerable beach sup-
made use of 20-ton vans to house its ground ply dumps. The refinement of this concept
components. Thus, the MPQ—2s used by the provided for the rapid delivery of ammuni-
Air Force in 1951 were primarily for strategic tion, fuel, and other supplies directly to Ma-
long-range bombing as opposed to tactical rine air and ground units deep inland. As
bombing. had happened many times before, the con-
It was during this time, 1951, that the Ma- cept led directly to implementing techniques
rine Corps was developing a radar bombing and related equipment. One of the techniques
system, to be used tactically and sDecifically formulated was that of fuel handling in
designed for amphibious operations. The Ma- amphibious operations.
rine system, called the MPQ_14, was built un- In September 1954, a report of .a test of
(icr the direction of Major Marion C. Dalby fuel handling was submitted to the CMC by
at the Naval Air Materiel Test Center, Point the Development Center, culminating efforts
Mugu, California. The MPQ—l4 reached the in this area since 1950. The objective of the
combat area of Korea in July of 1951 for eval- project was: "To provide the Marine Corps
uation. The unit was designed so that the with a suitable amphibious assault bulk fuel
largest piece could be put into a one-ton handling system for receiving, transferring,
trailer. Major ground items included a gen- storing and dispensing bulk liquid fuels dur-
erator power supply, a tracking radar, and a ing the initial phases of an amphibious opera-
computer; the last essential component, an au- tion." Small prototypes were tested and used
tomatic bombing control, was mounted in the successfully 1)0th ifl Korea and the United
States.32 A year later, now called the expedi-
*The letters MPQ indicate the type of installation. tionary bulk fuel handling system, it was
M—rnobile ground installation, the kind of electronic again tested successfully by a 1\{arine aircraft
equipment, P—radar, and finally, its purpose, Q—in- group at Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico.33 The
tended for a combination of purposes. In this case, the
number 2 indicates the model numher in the develop- system, a versatile, self-contained, portable,
ment of the equipment. and readily installed complex, was capable of
90 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

receiving, storing, and dispensing motor, avi- with the Army in 1958 for the development
ation, diesel, or jet fuel in quantities well of "Lacrosse," a field artillery guided missile.
over 300,000 gallons. The tank farms were The "Lacrosse" missile was first conceived in
essentially composed of collapsible 10,000- 1947 by the Marine Corps but was dropped.
gallon capacity, rubber, pillow-like tanks with When the project was reactivated, the initial
pumps and accessory equipment. Known to- development work was carried Out under Ma-
day as the Amphibious Assault Fuel System rine Corps and Bureau of Ordnance sponsor-
(AAFS), it has become one of the many ship.'4 As is the case in many such develop-
items which permits the execution of "con- mental projects, the eventual decision was made
tinuous flow" of supplies. not to purchase the missile.
The Marine Corps continued to support To round-out the decade, the CMC reported
to the Secretary of the Navy in 1959 that "the
selected research and development efforts of Marine Corps is closely monitoring the develop-
other military services by serving on appropri- ment of hydrofoils, ground effect devices and
ate program and project steering and coordi- planing hulls that can be used in the develop-
nation agencies and contributing funds to ment of high speed amphibious vehicles." "'
joint projects. Interest in various items ranged Within the next two years, the Marine
from the smallest sensing devices to the Corps built prototype developmental hydrofoil
guided missile programs of the HAWK and

-. :
models, the LVHX—l and the LVHX—2, a plan.
RED EYE. For the direct support of ground ing hull, LVW—1, and an air lubricated hull
combat forces, a joint project was established model, ARCK-..1, to ascertain their capabil-

- I

-a

Bulk Fuel Farm at Chu Lai, 1965. (USMC Photo #4184696).

 THE 'FIFTIES 91

ities to fulfill its high speed amphibian sup- tal or demonstration purposes. This includes
port vehicle requirements. It also purchased the construction and testing of experimental
experimental models of ground effects ma- models or devices. Service Test is the test of a
chines or air cushion vehicles for the ship- specifically developed item—material, equip-
to-shore movement of troops, vehicles and ment, system, or device—under service or sim-
supplies." 36 ulated service conditions in order to deter-
mine as accurately as possible its operational
Research and Development (R&D) characteristics or performance and its utility
Cycle in military operations.38
Today the R&D process takes in the fore-
In addressing a general officers' meeting in going definitions and many more. The Ma-
1953, General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., CMC, rine Corps' first step in the process was the
stated: establishment of the Marine Corps Equipment
I consider it appropriate to recall to your atten- Board (MCEB) in 1933 (See Chapter III).
tion the words of the National Security Act of 1947, This was the first organized attempt to have
as amended which say, "It shall be the duty of the a group from within the Corps recommend
Marine Corps to develop those phases of amphib-
ious operations which pertain to the tactics, tech- the type of equipment best suited to the
nique and equipment employed by landing forces." needs of the Marine Corps. The develop-
These words are a serious charge to the Marine ment and testing of the equipment recom-
Corps. They admit of no interpretation. They make mended could be made by any agency so
it our duty to take the lead in landing force designated by the CMC, whether it be civil-
development. True enough, they require us to co-
ordinate with other services, but there is no question ians, such as Donald Roebling or Andrew
as to who is responsible to the Congress in the last Higgins, or government, such as the Navy De-
analysis. To me that means that the Marine Corps partment Continuing Board foi the Develop-
Development Center is our primary developmental ment of Landing Boats. Marine Corps repre-
agency."
sentatives were members of this board.
General Shepherd's words of 1953 are es- After the Roebling "Alligator" was adopted
sentially true today. The Marine Corps' devel- for military use, inspection and contract fol-
opment is primarily done at Quantico, where low-up were performed by the Inspector of
the Development Center is now part of Naval Material with the assistance of Marine
MCDEC, Marine Corps Development and Corps offcers. Marine Corps liaison officers
Education Command. were assigned to the Bureau of Ships in order
The R&D process, let alone the term, was to provide Corps influence in the develop-
unheard of in the Marine Corps prior to ment.39 During World War II, a Marine Corps
World War I. In developing the proper bal- liaison officer was assigned to the Army
ance for an advanced base force, the Marine Ordnance Department in 1942. The liaison
Corps had doctrinal experience. The 1920s officer represented the Marine Corps in the
and 1930s produced the doctrine for the formulation of policies and procedures affect-
whole spectrum of amphibious operations in ing procurement, allocations, and the supply
the publication of the Landing Operations of ordnance material. However, one of the
Manual. Tactics, techniques, and equipment, most helpful and profitable duties occurred
particularly at the turn of the century, were when he received ordnance information con-
by the nature of the times, completely of cerning the development of new material or
Army origin. Aside from uniforms and per- modifications to existing materiel of interest
sonal equipment, field equipment changed to the Marine Corps.4°
very little. It was in the 1930s and 1940s that During World War II, 65 percent of the
the "Marine" tactics, techniques, and equip- supplies and material used by the Corps for
ment development came into their own. ground troops was obtained from the Army.
Before tracing Marine Corps involvement "Included were 85 percent of all ordnance
in the R&D process, definitions are in order. items, 75 percent of all food, and 5 percent of
Research is theoretical analysis, exploration, all engineer equipment." 41 Of the remaining
and experimentation directed toward the in- figures, the "Navy contributed five percent,
crease of knowledge. Development is the ex- the Marine Corps manufactured five percent,
tension of the investigative findings and the- principally clothing, and the remaining 25
42
ories into practical application for experimen- percent was purchased on the open market."
92 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

A substantial amount of signal gear came from By order of the CMC, a board of general
the Army but the Bureau of Ships procured officers met at Quantico on 10 July 1950, with
all electronic equipment for the Marine Lieutenant General LeRoy P. Hunt as Presi-
Corps.3 Aviation clothing and personal equip- dent. The Hunt Board recommended
ment were acquired through regular Marine the establishment of a "Landing Force Develop-
Corps channels. All aviation materiel, includ- ment Center" to be located at Quantico. 'Fhe
ing ground equipment, was developed and board further recommended that a Tactics and
supplied by the Navy through the Bureau of Techniques Board be established and com-
Aeronautics. bined with the Equipment Board into the
Also during World War II, the Division of Landing Force Evaluation Group. The newly
Plans and Policies of HQMC guided the con- created group should have the responsibility
tinuous studies of new types of equipment of studying, analyzing, and evaluating recom-
made available within the Navy and Army and mendations proposed by the Education and
made recommendations concerning equipment Development Centers in the field of amphibi-
which should be adopted by the Marine Corps. ous development. The board also recommended
In addition, it had cognizance over the follow- that the Commandant Marine Corps Schools
ing: be designated "Coordinator, Marine Corps
1. All inventions submitted to the Marine Corps Landing Force Development Activities" (MC-
for consideration LFDA).47 These recommendations were ap-
2. Maintenance of liaison with the Marine Corps proved by the CMC and were implemented
Equipment Board by two letters of August and October 1950.
3. Selection of representatives for committees
such as To further implement the coordinating as-
—Army Ordnance Technical Committee pect of MCLFDC, the Joint Landing Force
—Naval Liaison Committee on Naval Re- Board for the armed services was established
search by DOD at MCS to speed interservice agree-
—Navy Department Continuing Board for ment on amphibious landing techniques. The
Development of Landing Boats.
Joint Board, headed by Lieutenant General
After World War II, a separate R&D Section Franklin A. Hart, considered mutual problems
was formed within the Division of Plans and of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air
Policies, This section, which constituted the Force in the landing force field.48 The Joint
first organizational component that formally Landing Force Board lasted until 1 February
recognized the R&D program in the Corps, 1955 when it was disbanded by the Joint Chiefs
was responsible for all research and develop- of Staff. The board, then at Camp Lejeune,
ment activities. In 1947, the Congress, through North Carolina, had been responsible for four
the passage of the National Security Act, gave joint service agreement reports and had pub-
the Marine Corps direct responsibility for am- lished two joint landing force manuals. The
phibious development. Marine Corps Development Center at Quan-
Section 206, (c)—"It shall be the duty of the tico took over the joint aspects of amphibious
Marine Corps to develop, in coordination with the problems.4
Army and the Air Force, those phases of amphibious In March 1952, the responsibilities for re-
operations which pertain to the tactics, technique
and equipment employed by landing forces." search and development within the Marine
Corps were revised.50 The Division of Plans
For all practical purposes, the law merely and Policies was abolished and a general staff
declared and recognized certain functions organization was instituted at Headquarters
which the Marine Corps had been doing for Marine Corps. In this HQMC reorganization
the past several decades. The immediate prob- the R&D Section became a branch of the G—4
lem, after the law was passed, was the lack of Division. While not part of but akin to the
a coordinating agency functioning under the R&D process, a Marine Corps Advanced Re-
CMC to carry out the law. Colonel Merrill B. search Group (ARG) was established at
Twining, Executive Director of the Marine Quantico. The first group, consisting of 10
Corps Board at Quantico, stated: colonels, was given the mission of conducting
There is serious need for standardization; there advanced study and original research with
is need for providing specifically for a means of respect to problems affecting the Marine Corps.
Army and Air Force participation and a means
must be provided for the Commandant to exercise The group was under the direct supervision
an authority imposed by law.° of the Director of the Education Center at
 THE DECADE OF THE SIXTIES 93

Quantico.51 The group's course of study and Chief of Staff (Research and Development)
research usually lasted 10 months whereupon DC/S (R&D) was created. However, the R&D
its recommendations would be submitted to Branch in G—4 (AO4E) continued to function
the CMC. Many recommendations and result- until 1961 but was responsive to the new DC/S
ant changes were made through acceptance of (R&D). In 1961 all AO4E personnel were trans-
their studies. As an example, the Advanced ferred to the Office of the DC/S (R&D). The
Research Group of 1955—1956 was given the primary mission assigned to the deputy was to
task of determining the adequacy with which assist the Chief of Staff in the direction, coordi-
the Marine Corps was fulfilling its statutory nation, and supervision of HQMC staff activities
responsibility for landing force development, in R&D. He was also to direct and supervise
and steps which should be taken to achieve the formulation and maintenance of Marine
improvement. The ARG concluded that the Corps R&D plans and programs. Further, DC/S
Marine Corps research and development or- (R&D) represented the CMC on all depart-
ganization required improvements. The ARG mental and interdepartmental committees,
stated that the R&D program be given "high boards, and groups which were concerned with
level direction, coordination and supervision" policy making and overall coordination in the
to all of its plans and programs.52 The G—4 field of R&D. Aviation research and develop-
Division, with so many other duties, could ment, though monitored by the Marine Corps,
not adequately handle the tremendous task was primarily performed through Navy activ-
of R&D. ities. The Marine Corps ended the decade of
As a result of the research group's recom- the 1950s squarely involved in the maze of
mendations, in 1956 the office of the Deputy what was called the R&D process.
 CHAPTER VI
THE DECADE OF THE SIXTIES
There is one resource of the Marine Corps that Americans. Looking back, the violence at home
has always been fully developed: the individual seemed to have commenced with the assassina-
Marine. What made a good Marine during the
Revolutionary War still makes a good Marine. A tion of President John F. Kennedy in Novem-
competent, loyal, highly motivated Marine is an ber 1963. Subsequent unrelated violence in the
asset far exceeding in value all the developments of cities and on. college campuses tested the basic
a technological age.1 fiber of American social and political institu-
General Oliver P. Smith, tions.
USMC (Retired)
In spite of the violence, not because of it,
The decade of the 1960s began with the legislative history was made in the decade.
oldest President of the United States being The 1964 session of Congress enacted more
succeeded by the youngest. By the end of the domestic reform legislation than any session
decade, two other Presidents had served. The since 1935, the climactic year of New Deal
sixties will have to he remembered for the vio- laws.2 Before the decade passed into history,
lence at home and abroad experienced by Americans, through the Congress, produced

General David M. Shoup, 22d Commandant of the General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., 23d Commandant of
Marine Corps, 1 January 1960 to 31 December 1963. the Marine Corps, 1 Janiaiy 1964 to 31 December 1967.
(USMC Photo #A408673). (USMC Photo #A415346).
95
96 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

the strongest civil rights act in American his- volved in pacification. The definition of the
tory, the most aid to education, and medi- term, as approved by the Military Assistance
care, and began the "unconditional war on Command, Vietnam (MACV), is as follows:
poverty."
Pacification is the military, political, economic,
On the international scene, America faced and social process of establishing or reestablishing
crises with Cuba, the Dominican Republic, local government responsive to and involving the
North Korea, and North Vietnam. It was, how- participation of the people. It includes the provision
ever, the Vietnam War, the longest in Ameri- of sustained, credible territorial security, the de-
ca's history, that dominated the 1960s. As in struction of the enemy's underground government,
the assertion or reassertion of political control and
every other war, the Marine Corps was called involvement of the people in government, and the
upon to play its role; it played it well. The initiation of economic and social activity capable of
Marine Corps' contribution to the peak self-sustenance and expansion. The economic ele-
strength of United States forces in Vietnam of ment of pacification includes the opening of roads
543,400 men (31 December 1969) was 81,800 and waterways and the maintenance of lines of
communication important to economic and military
men.3 By 30 June 1971, most Marines having activity.4
been deployed to Okinawa, Japan, Hawaii,
and Camp Pendleton, the number left in Viet- The Marine Corps' role in pacification took
nam was a little over 500 men. This figure the name of civic action. Civic action is that
represented advisOry, communications, and em- segment of the overall effort of pacification
bassy personnel. that utilizes the local or military population.
The Vietnam War will probably rank on Civic action is defined as follows:
the level of World War II as the most written The use of preponderantly indigenous military
about and documented war in American his- forces on projects useful to the local population at
tory. Certainly, television brought the war more all levels in such fields as education, training, public
quickly into America's thoughts than the news- works, agriculture, transportation, communications,
reels of World War II and Korea. health, sanitation, and others contributing to eco-
nomic and social development, which would also
There is a myriad of material that could be sen'e to improve the standing of the military forces
discussed regarding the Marine Corps and with the population.'
Vietnam. Two major areas, however, are
covered in this chapter, one of peace, that is the To reiterate, the involvement in civic action
participation of Marines in pacification, more by the Marine Corps was not new. The Marines
specifically civic action. The other area is the of the l960s retrod the paths other Marines
refinement of tactical mobility, and use of had journeyed from 1915 th1'ough 1933 in
the fire support base. Neither of these areas Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and the Dominican
were new to the Marine Corps, only to this Republic. The experiences as reflected in the
generation of Marines. Past pacification experi- Small Wars Manual may be summed up in
ences were incorporated in the Small Wars the following two quotations from the man-
Manual published in 1940 (see Chapter II). ual:
Tactical mobility, in the form of helicopter- The motive in small wars is not material dc-
borne forces, is the fruition of post-World War struction. It is usually a project dealing with the
II Marine thinkers. The Marine Corps en- social, economic, and political development of the
people.'
visioned the use of helicopters to carry regi- * * S * *
mental landing teams before any of the
The purpose should always be to restore normal
military services, including the' Marine Corps, government or give the people a better government
had a working helicoper (see Chapter IV). than the)' had before, and to establish peace, order,
and security on as permanent a basis as practi-
cable—In so doing, one should endeavor to make
Pacification in General, Civic Action self-sufficient native agencies responsible for these
in Particular matters.'
Pacification, as a concept, successfully car- Experience gained and recorded in a man-
ried out, could well become a milestone of the ual written 25 years before can only be a ref-
Vietnam War. Within the etymological essence erence for the new generation. A new chapter,
of the word pacification is the meaning of not only of military action but of civic action,
peace. What better way could Americans in was begun on 8 March 1965 with the landing
Vietnam be remembered than having been in- of the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade at
 THE DECADE OF THE SIXTIES 97

I CORPS
THAILAND
LAOS

. c

'N

( II CORPS

CAMBODIA
j
1

HI CORPS

SOUTH VIETNAM
98 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

result was a loud plea for soap and other mate-

rials. By June 1965 the Commander in Chief,
Pacific, Admiral Ulysses S. Grant Sharp, noti-
fied the Commanding General of III Marine
Amphibious Force (III MAF), then Major
General Lewis W. Walt, that supplies of all
.,— kinds would be available for use by the Marine
Corps civic action groups through Project
HANDCLASP. Project HANDCLASP, an of-
r ficial Navy program since 1962, was part of the
Navy's people-to-people effort and overseas
community relations program. Individuals and
organizations within the United States donated
material to the naval service and shipped it to
warehouses at San Diego for further delivery
by the Navy overseas on a space available
School house built with the help of the 7th Marines' basis. Within six months, 63,000 pounds of mis-
civic action program at Chu Lai, March 1967. (USMC cellaneous basic commodities were shipped to
Photo #A369955). III MAF.
As the civic action program matured, other
needs and problem areas became evident. Re-
Da Nang, Republic of Vietnam.*, Limited ini- quests for commodity support often could not
tially to the local defense of the fast-growing be filled due to the lack of certain needed
air base at Da Nang, Marine civic action con- items and the uncertain arrival'time of mate-
sisted primarily of spontaneous acts of com- rials being shipped on a space available basis.
miseration and charity by individual Marines This situation often resulted in embarrassing
toward a small population. As the military situ- delays, and tended to erode the overall effect
ation improved, more use of organic resources of the program. As though in answer to this
was made. Civic action projects were oriented problem, the Marine Corps Reserve concluded
toward medical assistance, repair of existing an agreement with CARE (Cooperative for
roads and facilities, and minor new construc- American Relief Everywhere) whereby the
tion projects. The doctors soon discovered that USMCR would solicit money for support of
many of the superficial ills of the people, the III MAF civic action program and CARE
such as rashes and sores, could be cured by would act as the custodian of the fund. On
simply keeping the infested areas clean. The the 13th of September 1965, this program was
officially launched by the CMC. The program
immediately proved successful, and III MAF
was provided with one of the most flexible
and useful civic action tools in its inventory.9
Of the many programs implemented by the
USMCR/CARE project, two were most success-

I.i ful:
1. MEDCAP (Medical Civic Action Program)—In
addition to giving medical help to the people in
the local hamlets, MEDGAP trained GVN (Govern-
ment of Vietnam) medical personnel and trained
rural health workers. On-the-job training was given

*Three years earlier, April 1962, Marine military

action was begun when a squadron of UH—34 helicopters
landed at Soc Trang in the Delta. The squadron was
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 362 (HMM—•362)
Staff Sergeant Thad Jones and Lance Corporal Robert commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Archie J. Clapp.
Brogan of 4th Marines Civic Affairs Team give show. LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon, Marine Aviation in
ers 10 Vietnamese Children during MEDCAP visit, 14 Vietnam 1962—1970," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,
June 1967. (USMC Photo #AJ88734). v. 97, no. 819 (May 1971), p. 124.
 THE DECADE OF THE SIXTIES 99

to volunteers who offered to assist the MEDCAP

teams, and in this way the local people were en-
couraged to contribute to the welfare of their own
Community.
2. School Building Program—Tn the spring of
1966, III MAF developed an effective classroom
building Construction program. Local hamlets were
required to provide a site for the classroom, a
teacher, and people to provide self-help labor for
Construction. III MAF agreed to provide in return,
Construction materials, technical advice, and equip-
ment for clearing and grading the site. The
USMCR/CARE Civic Action Fund proved to be
invaluable in support of this program by providing
a ready means for acquiring special hardware items
not available through other sources.1°
The presence of a number of U.S. civilian
agencies in I Corps was known to the Marines
since March 1965, though interrelationships
had not been developed at that time.* The
mutual need for coordination and cooperation
immediately became apparent when the civic
action program began. The civilian agencies
possessed commodities but lacked the man-
power to provide an effective system of distri-
bution and control. The Marines were in daily
contact with the civil populace located in and General Lewis W. Walt, Commanding General, 111
adjacent to the areas which they controlled Marine Amphibious Force, 1965—67. (USMC Photo
militarily, but they needed commodities for use #A416364).
in the civic action program. The largest civil-
ian organization in I Corps in regard to availa- Corps. The council, as such, had no directive
ble commodities were the U.S. Agency for authority or funds but through its senior mem-
International Development (USAID), the Co- bership had access to the sum total of the
operative for American Relief Everywhere available authority and resources. The mission
(CARE), and Catholic Relief Services. USAID of this council was to monitor progress of the
representation in I Corps consisted of a regional GVN Revolutionary Development (RD) Pro-
office located in Da Nang, and a provincial gram* and to provide a ready forum for fre-
office located in the capital city of each of the quent discussion of attendant problems.'2 To
five provinces. CARE and CRS each had one underscore the importance of the I Corps
representative for the entire corps area, both JCC, General Walt designated Brigadier Gen-
located in Da Nang." erals Keith B. McCutcheon and Melvin D.
The need for a means to insure continuous Henderson to sit on the council to ensure the
coordination and cooperation among the vari- best possible support in assisting the govern-
ous agencies and organizations which shared ment of Vietnam in the execution of its rural
an interest in winning the willing support of construction program."
the people for the GVN resulted in formation By the end of the summer of 1965, the III
of the I Corps Joint Coordinating Council MAF had developed the framework of the
(JCC) in August 1965. This council's mem- organization which was to conduct its civic
bership included senior representatives of all action program. A fifth general staff section
major U.S. and GVN organizations and agen- was created which was called the G—5 Section.
cies, both military and civilian, located in I This section was assigned the staff responsi-
*For military purposes, the Republic of Vietnam was bility for the conduct of civil affairs which
divided into four corps tactical zones. In July 1970, Corps
Tactical Zones were redesignated Military Regions, i.e., *The Revolutionary Development Program was the
Military Region I (MR—I). At this point, I Corps will Vietnamese effort in pacification. With RD cadres in the
be used. I Corps comprised the five northernmost prov- hamlets, it was hoped that the RD program would foster
inces of South Vietnam, Quang Tn, Thua Thien, Quang wide public construction anti social development at all
Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai. levels.
 100 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

I -, -t —— I sonnel and ARVN (Army, Republic of Viet-

nam) forces in an effort to destroy the Viet
I .i -
Cong influence in selected hamlets and restore
government influence. Essentially, the opera-
tion consisted of a Marine unit moving into
position early in the morning around a ham-
let and establishing a cordon to prevent the
escape of any Viet Cong. At first light, ARVN
troops and political cadres of the GVN entered
the area and moved all the civilians to a
predesignated collection point where the
people were fed, given medical aid, counted,
identified,given propaganda lectures and
drama presentations, and shown movies. While
this segment of the operation was going on,
ARVN troops thoroughly searched the hamlet
Vietnamese listen to a speaker during a county fair for hidden tunnels, food, ammunition, and
being held by Company "G", 2d Battalion, 7th Marines
at Phu Le Village near Chu Lai. (USMC Photo weapons. Militarily, it was simply a cordon-
#A189710). and-search operation and there was nothing
new in that. General Lewis W. Walt stated
included civic action. The 3d Marine Division that what was new about the COUNTY FAIR
followed suit and established a G—5 Section. Operations was "such things as the explanation
Regiments and battalions appointed civil af- offered the people, the food and medical atten-
fairs officers, either as a primary or an addi- tion provided, shelter from the sun and/or the
tional duty assignment. This organization fa- rain, and decent regard for the community as
cilitated the development of effective individuals and families it worked well
. . .

techniques for distribution of civic action com- for us."5

modities, for dissemination of civic action in- Possibly as a result of the success of the
formation, and for collection of data for use Marine COUNTY FAIR, the Army in I Corps
in evaluating the effectiveness of the program. started a similar program a year later calling it
To bring the generalities of civic action HAMLET FESTIVAL. Regardless of what it
down to a statistical example for the reader, was called, it proved to be highly successful.
the following material contributions made by (2) GOLDEN FLEECE Operations. in
1\Iarines in the short period from J\Larch to August 1965, a rather simple request from a
December 1965 is shown below: village chief to the Commanding Officer of
Persons given medical treatment 199,631 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, Lieutenant Colonel
Pounds of food distributed 142,756 Verle E. Ludwig, whose battalion controlled
Pounds of soap distributed 46,53514
a sector of four villages and numerous hamlets
in the Hoa yang District of I Corps, produced
In Support Of one of the most successful and lasting opera-
In endeavoring to achieve the peaceful ends tions. The opportunity came when some of
of civic action, new types of military activity in the village chiefs wanted to know if the Marines
support of the Revolutionary Development would help them protect their rice crop from
Program and the Civic Action Program envol- the Viet Cong tax. The chain of events was
ved. Three such actions, COUNTY FAIR, ideal. The peasants needed assistance and had
GOLDEN FLEECE, and the establishment of requested it through their government leader.
the Combined Action Force, were among the The Marine Corps got an opportunity to sup-
more successful Marine efforts within country. port a representative of the local government
(1) COUNTY FAIR Operations.—Initially and to fulfill ,a basic need of a large number
started by the 9th Marines in August 1965 in of people. Lieutenant Colonel Ludwig's efforts
the Da Nang area to find the local guerrillas, at coordination, and demonstrations of Marine
COUNTY FAIR Operations involved coordi- Corps superiority over the Viet Cong, fused
nated psychological warfare and combat power. with the basic needs. of a terrorized and par-
These operations combined Marine Corps per- tially starved population.'°
 THE DECADE OF THE SIXTIES 101

'\ *1
Ui

Ul

4I

•
•;JJv
4

5th Marines help the Vietnamese gather their rice clop in GOLDEN FLEECE Operations, October 1966. USMC
Photo #A369634).

The challenge was met by the battalion corn- tin for the construction of dry buildings in
mander by covering the area with guards and safe areas.ls The simplicity and total value of
patrols and keeping mobile forces in reserve GOLDEN FLEECE Operations became SOP
throughout the harvest season. He worked (Standing Operating Procedure) throughout
with the district chief to provide safe storage III MAF.
for the harvested grain and worked Out a (3) Combined Action Force (CAF).—The
system of credit by which each family could
draw their rice as they needed it, to eat or to CAF was one of the most successful and re-
sell.17 Patrols were sent into the nearby hills warding experiences Marines encountered dur-
to locate and if possible return rice already ing their tour in Vietnam. The primary pur-
confiscated and hidden by the Viet Cong. pose of the CAF was to "I) to enhance village
The success of GOLDEN FLEECE in the and hamlet security by the conduct of inte-
Hoa yang District resulted in the populace of grated military operations with the Popular
I Corps requesting Marines to protect their Force, and 2) to increase the ability of the
crops at the two harvest times each year. The villagers to sustain an(l defend themselves by
GVN responded to requests with local guard participating in and encouraging projects con-
forces and communal transportation from the tributing to the people's well-being and their
fields to safe storage. Tue Agency for Inter- identification with the national government." 19
national Development provided cement and Starting with a contribution of four Marine
102 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

rifle squads in 1965, by March 1970, there were armament and inadequate knowledge of the
2,000 Marines and Navy corpsmen, along with local situation, foredoomed the PAT forces to
about 3,000 Popular Force (PF) soldiers in- failure.21
volved in the Combined Action Force. In August 1965, the Marine Corps combined
By way of background, between 1959 and two elements, namely, not relocating the popu-
1961, the RVN government began to relocate lation and utilizing the local forces now called
the rural population into peasant-constructed Popular Forces. They added to these elements
rural towns called agrovilles in an effort to another ingredient, the U.S. Marine. There
protect them against the growing insurgency was no question that if the people were in-
threat. For many reasons the program did not secure, all of the other efforts within the
work, but primarily because the rural popula- pacification framework would fail. In the Hue/
tion resented the forced relocation and the Phu Bai area, the Marine Corps with the co-
local defense forces were incapable of respond- operation of several village chiefs formed a
ing effectively to the Viet Cong hit-and-run joint force to meet the problem of local
tactics. The agrovilles were abandoned in 1961. security. Both the Marines and the Vietnamese
From 1961 to 1963, the Strategic Hamlet theory knew the limitations of Popular Forces but
was tried out by the Army. The elements were wanted to. place local security on Vietnamese
the same as the agrovilles, forced relocation shoulders. Several village chiefs agreed to al-
with self-defense forces inadequately armed low four Popular Force platoons to work
and poorly trained. The ARVN endeavored directly with four Marine rifle squads. The
to strengthen the defense forces and give resultant force was called a Joint Action Com-
genuine security to the Strategic Hamlets but pany and was commanded by Lieutenant Paul
had other missions to perform.2° The Strategic R. Ek of Company I, 3d Battalion, 4th Ma-
Hamlet concept was also abandoned. rines.22
In the spring of 1965, the GVN government The Marines in the Joint Action Company
opened, a political cadre training center whose trained the Popular Forces in small unit tactics,
graduates were organized into Political Action marksmanship, and improved fire support and
Teams (PAT). Aside from the political ac- served as the nucleus for patrols and ambushes
tivity, a 30-man PAT was assigned to the de- throughout the village area assigned to each
fense of a hamlet or village. The people were platoon. The joint platoons also conducted
not relocated but allowed to stay in their own vigorous civic action programs in support of
village. Again for a variety of reasons, this the local governing officials. The program em-
concept failed. There was no immediate and phasized self-help by the peasants in the civic
direct liaison with the ARVN and/or U.S. action projects while the joint platoons pro-
forces in the area. Their isolation from the vided security. The integration of Marines into
other forces in the area, coupled with their light Popular Force platoons succeeded from the
beginning.
Basic to the success of the Combined Action
.fr Companies (CACO), the subsequent name for
4; the former Joint Action Companies, or CAP,
Combined Action Platoons, was the fact that
the PFs, being local residents, provided knowl-
edge of the area, rapport with the people, and
improved access to information about the
enemy. The PFs had the motivation that was
inherent in the defense of one's own home.
Although the PF comprised the lowest paid
and least trained element of the Vietnamese
military, their value was inestimable.23
By 1967, the Combined Action Program cx-
1anded throughout I Corps. It was necessary
to appoint a CAP Director at the III MAF
A Marine and Popular Forces of Combined Action level, who operated under the general staff
Group 4 check the IDs of villagers where E'iet Cong cognizance of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G—3,
ac/jon zeus located. (USiVIC Photo #A191951). and who discharged administrative control
 THE DECADE OF THE SIXTIES 103

over the program but without operational available in the tJnited States. In the Combined
command. By October 1967, the number of Action concept, the Marine Corps has developed
CAPS necessitated an intermediate level of su- a tool with capabilities that are unique among the
services and with a potential far wider than its
pervision, and so the Combined Action Group present application. However, it is not in line with
(CAG) was activated. In January 1970, the Marine traditions to rest on one's laurels—and it is
Combined Action Force (CAF) was formed especially important in today's rapidly changing
and had control of all 114 CAPs dispersed world to reassess and perfect our instruments con-
tinually in order to meet the demands both of today
throughout the populated coastal lowlands of and the future with maximum effectiveness.2'
all five provinces in I Corps. Although the
basic element of the CAF was the CAP, con-
trolling and coordinating headquarters existed The Helicopter and Refinement
at the district, province, and corps levels. The of Tactical Mobility
114 CAPs were organized into 19 CACOs which
in turn were organized into four CAGs. Gen- In mid-1971, revisions being prepared for
erally speaking CAG headquarters corres- the series of Fleet Marine Force Manuals
(FMFM) published by MCDEC reflected the
ponded with and were located close to province importance of tactical mobility when applying
headquarters. The CACO commander and
CAG commander were counterparts to the combat power to the immediate battlefield.
district and province chiefs, respectively. Corps
What will be stressed in the revisions will be a
level coordination was effected throtigh close reminder to the commander that he will have
liaison between the Commanding Officer, CAF greater means of obtaining higher mobility as
and the Deputy Commander for I Corps.24 additional equipment is added to the Marine
'With the stepped-up redeployment of Mar- Corps inventory. The ability to move infantry
ines from Vietnam in 1970, the CAF was de- and maneuver direct support artillery units
activated on 21 September 1970 leaving only rapidly will provide the commander greater
the 2d Combined Action Group functioning flexibility and depth on the battlefield.
under III I\IAF. The last Commanding Officer Vietnam experience is replete with ex-
of the CAF, Colonel Ralph F. Estey, summed amples of successful use of helicopter-borne
up the CAF by stating that "it had played a movements. General Keith B. McCutcheon
unique and unparalleled role in combat opera-
tions supporting the pacification effort in the
Republic of Vietnam. The neutralization of
7,785 enemy demonstrated the aggressive, tena-
cious, and courageous character of this force
which never numbered more than 2,100
Marines and Navy personnel and 3,000 Popular
Forces at any one time." 25
Colonel Estey pointed out the positive statis-
tics of the contribution of the CAF since its
beginning in 1965, that the number of Medical
Civic Action Program visits throughout I Corps
approached nearly two million and that by
1970 the population protected by CAPs num-
bered over 425,000.
That the Combined Action Program worked,
and worked well, in Vietnam did not preclude
thefact that the program could have been
improved. Definitive studies by the Marine
Corps and private research groups will sift out
the flaws and analyze what was done. Quoting
from one research group writing in December
1969:
The Combined Action Program is doing an ex- Lieutenant General Keith B. McCutcheon, aviation
cellent job in Vietnam, far more excellent, in fact. pioneer and Commanding General, III Marine Amphi-
than we were led to expect by what reports are bious Force, 1970. (USMC Photo #A700390).
 104 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

•1' a-
A Mzrine ground crewman guides a UH—34D helicopter to a landing in a small jungle clearing in Vietnam. (USMC
Photo #A329571).

stated: "Vietnam was certainly a helicopter war models would have been considered obsolescent
for U.S. forces. It is difficult to envisage how but imperative need deemed otherwise. In
we would have fought there without them." 27 addition to having troop carrying helicopters
The Marine Corps' faith and vision in in 1962, the 1st l\IAW had, by 1965, the Ull—
utilizing the helicopter as a means to achieve 1E. While the Marine Corps experimented
high mobility in warfare was evidenced as early with armed helicopters as early as 1950, it (lid
as 1946 and borne out in MCS publication of not pursue an active program inasmuch as the
Phi b—31, Amphibious Operations—Employment greatest need was for a helicopter to carry men
of Helicopters—Tentative in 1948. (See Chap- and material. General McCutcheon recalls that
ter IV of this book). Subsequent years the Marine Corps:
of study and development by the Marine Corps sought to procure a light helicopter which
pioneered the use of helicopters in ground war- could perform a myriad of tasks, including the role
fare in Korea. The Marine Corps pursued the of gunship. This program was a long time in
materializing, but it finally resulted in the UH—
development of aircraft that would provide lE . . One gunship version of the Marine lill—1E
.

the helicopter lift to execute the ship-to-shore was armed with a nose turret which could be dc-
movement in an amphibious operation. By the vatccl, depressed and swung left and right. In addi-
time of Vietnam involvement in 1962, the tion, weight permitting, it could mount left and
right fixed, forward-firing machine guns, or 2.75-
Marine Corps had squadrons equipped with inch rocket pods. A .30 caliber machine gun could
UH—34s and CH—37s. In any other time, 1)0th also be installed in each of the two side doors.
 THE DECADE OF THE SIXTIES 105

The helo gunship proved to be indispensable. It

was more immediately available than jets, more
maneuverable, and it could work close-in with
transport helicopters. . . .The AH—1G Cobra was not
available for Marine use until 1969. The gunship
was accepted with enthusiasm by the pilots, per-
formed well in a fire suppression role and was
maintained at a rather high rate of availability.2
Happy times for the 1st MAW came when the
transition from UH—34s to CH—46s began in
March 1966. It was not until 1969, however,
that all UH—34s were withdrawn. CH—37s did
yeomen service in Vietnam from 1965 to the
arrival of the CH—53 in January 1967.

Another combat helicopter (CH—53A). (USMC Photo

#A412902).

ting for the landing zone to helilif ted rubber-

tired tractors. The concept had expanded dur-
ing the war to all parts of South Vietnam,
depriving the enemy of staging areas and in-
filtration routes. It allowed the infantry to
move throughout the I Corps area while retain-
ing the protective fires of friendly artillery.
Perhaps a forerunner of the FSB technique,
as developed by 1968 with its extensive use of
helicopters, was a major operation that occurred
during Operation HARVEST MOON in De-
Combat helicopter (CH—46) used by Marines in Viet- cember 1965. The UH—34s of MAG—36 and
nam. (USMC Photo #A140869). MAG—16 flew over 9,230 sorties and lifted
12,177 passengers and 638 tons of cargo during
High Mobility and the Fire Support Base the 12-day operation. A helicopter staging area
was established at a logistic support area (LSA)
At the end of the first year in Vietnam, 1965, located half-way between Chu Lai and Da
Marine transport helicopters were lifting an Nang on Route 1. After the initial insertion
average of 40,000 passengers and over 2,000 of three Marine battalions into the area of
tons of cargo a month while operating from operations on 11 and 12 December, the heli-
their main bases at Ky Ha and Marble Moun- copters made 60 other lifts of platoon-sized
tain in I Corps. Five years later, Marine heli- and even larger forces. Brigadier General
copters were lifting more than 70,000 passen- Jonas Platt, the task force commander of the
gers and 5,000 tons of cargo in a month. Part operation, states that for the first time in com-
of this increase was attributed to the increased bat, 105mm howitzers from Chu Lai and Da
use of the CH—53 in troop lifts.29 Another Nang were helilifted into the battle area. Gen-
reason for the increase was the extensive use eral Platt also noted that 4.2-inch mortars
of Fire Support Bases (FSB). A simple defi- were helilifted in the area of operations and
nition of a FSB is a "rapidly constructed utilized in a leap-frog manner.3'
artillery position defended by a minimum of By mid-1968, all III MAF forces went from
infantry. The infantry and tactical elements a static defense to a mobile offense posture.
operate within the protective fan of the ar- Major General Raymond Davis' 3d Marine Di-
tillery FSB. The FSB themselves offer over- vision fanned out in wide arcs penetrating
lapping artillery support to each other and and establishing a presence in areas the enemy
protection for several landing zones." 30 Con- had once considered havens. Throughout the
struction of the fire support base was a com- remaining months of 1968, 3d Division Marines
plex job that included everything from mat- ranged the length and breadth of western
106 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

Fire Support Base of the 3d Marine Division near the Rock Pile in January 1969. (USMC Photo #A192512).

Quang Tn Province in I Corps, employing An excellent account, including the fine

heliborne infantry and mobile fire support work accomplished by the 1st MAW during
bases to keep the enemy constantly off stride. DEWEY CANYON, is extracted from an article
By the end of the year the enemy, by and large, on the history of Marine aviation in Vietnam
pulled back his major units, unwilling and by General McCutcheon.*
to a large extent unable to risk further de- On 21 January 1969, a team was formed
struction at the hands of this maneuver and of representatives of the 1st MAW and 3d
firepower. Within a year, the 3d Marine Divi- Marine Division. Infantry, engineer, helicop-
sion had pursued its checkerboard concept to ter, and observation aircraft specialists were
the extent of carving out more than 140 FSBs included. The team was responsible to the over-
from the jungled terrain in northern I Corps. all ground commander for landing zone and
If there can be a classic example of the mobile fire support base selection and preparation and
concept operation, it would have to be Opera- coordination of the helicopter assaulL Early
tion DEWEY CANYON, conducted in and on D-Day the initial landing zones (LZs) were
around the Da Krong Valley from 22 January
to 18 March 1969. DEWEY CANYON was a * Another fine account of Operation DEWEY CAN-
multi-battalion operation involving the 9th YON, written by a lieutenant and platoon leader is
First Lieutenant Gordon M. Davis, "Dewey Canyon—All
Marines and two battalions of the Vietnamese Weather Classic," Marine Corps Gazette, V. 53, no. 7
1st Army Division. (July 1969), p. 33.
 THE DECADE OF THE SIXTIES 107

prepared by fixed-wing air strikes (made suit- copter hoist, or an external load could be drop-
able for helicopter landing by bombing and ped to the troops on the ground.
strafing to reduce the threat of opposition to a The 22d of February saw the lead element
minimum) and elements of the 2d Battalion, of the 3d Battalion gain the crest of Tiger
9th Marines, landed at 0800. In the rapid build- Mountain. In a few days it became FSB Turn-
up that followed, CH-46s, under the control age.
of the division direct air support center and The 24th found the 1st Battalion in posses-
under the protective umbrella of gunships and sion of the enemy's headquarters at Tam Boi.
observation aircraft, brought 1,544 Marines and The 2d Battalion took control of the ridgeline
46 tons of cargo into two LZs. By the evening overlooking Route 922, where it crosses from
of 24 January, a battery of 105mm howitzers Vietnam into Laos. The 27th marked the first
from the 2d Battalion, 12th Marines and the time a TPQ—10 had ever been emplaced and
command post of the 9th Marines were in place operated from a FSB. One was placed on Cun-
on one of these landing zones, which became ningham and remained there for 17 days, con-
known as Razor. The following day, three trolling 72 air strikes, 10 A—6 beacon drops, and
companies of the 3d Battalion were helilifted 3 emergency paradrops. The 18th of March
onto i ridgeline further forward, known as Co marked the finaj day of operation of DEWEY
Ka Va. It would soon be developed into FSB CANYON. On this day virtually the entire
Cunningham, named for the first Marine avia- resources of the 1st MAW were committed.
tor. In a few more days, elements of the 2d Over 350 tons of cargo and 1,400 Marines were
Battalion from FSB Riley pushed down the helilifted out of Turnage and Tam Boi without
ridgeline to establish another FSB (Dallas) to a casualty. These were the last two bases to be
guard the western approach to the area from vacated. Gunships and jets flew close cover
Laos. To the east, the two Vietnamese batta- and close air support. Perhaps the most not-
lions were lifted into two other bases. They able accomplishment of the operation was that
would secure the left flank and cut-off the only one helicopter was lost in spite of the ad-
enemy escape route to the east. verse weather and terrain and the efforts of a
About the 1st of February, the "crachin" stubborn, well-trained, and professional enemy
season really began to make itself felt. This is to counter the operation. Lieutenant General
a period when low clouds and drizzle cover Richard G. Stilwell, U.S. Army, commander
the mountain tops in northern I Corps and of all U.S. ground forces in the northern two
obscure visibility in the valleys. On 4 February, provinces of I Corps under the Commanding
a company of the 3d Battalion moved into and General, III MAF, summed it up in a few
occupied what was to become the last FSB words when he said, "Dewey Canyon deserves
for the coming infantry advance. Erskine was some space in American military history by
to be its name. Marine helicopters continually sole reason of audacity, guts, and team play.
worked out of the Combat Support Base Van- I cannot applaud too highly the airmen of the
degrift carrying essential supplies of ammuni- 1st lIAW in a variety of roles." 32
tion, rations, and water to the various bases.
On the return trips they carried wounded back Research, Development, and Studies
to aid stations. Often the weather precluded
access to the area except by flying on instru- in the 1960s
ments. Under such conditions, over 40 pallets of Research and development has been acknowl-
critically needed supplies were dropped by KC— edged as being a major force in our nation's
130 transports and CH—46 helicopters, under impressive economic growth since World War
control of the TPQ—10 at Vandegrift. When II. The Marine Corps' portion of R&D comes
artillery was in place on both Cunningham and out of the Navy's Research, Development, Test
Erskine, the 9th 1\Iarines began moving on foot & Evaluation Objectives and Budget. The
from their bases into the Da Krong Valley with Marine Corps' R&D figure ranges from $35
battalions on line. Their objective was Tiger to $40 million dollars per. year. The figure is
Mountain and the ridgeline that ran west from misleading, however, because the value of R&D
it. As they advanced, landing zones were carved done by the other services and of interest to
out of the jungle with 2,000 pound bombs or, the r\Earine Corps encompasses expenditures ap-
as a minimum, sufficient space was created so proximating $600 million." The significant con-
that a medevac could be performed by heji- tribution of other services to Marine Corps
108 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

R&D is almost entirely in the execution phase must develop a cost-effectiveness study capabil-
of hardware development, including test and ity which would assist the Headquarters in
evaluation. They make very little contribution participating more effectively in the Depart-
to Marine Corps concepts, plans, doctrine, and ment of Defense Programming System and in
tactics. The Marine Corps has to do nearly complying with Secretary of Navy Directives.
alone whatever there is to be done in structural It recommended the establishment of a Studies
and doctrinal development and in the deter- Office and a Headquarters Study Group under
mination of its materiel requirements. This the direction of DC/S (R&D). The study was
situation is not without its pluses, however, approved and a Studies Group, Marine Corps
since development of, refinements to, and new Operations Analysis Group (MCOAG) was
tactical deployments of the Marine Corps Air- formed in the newly designated DC/S (Re-
Ground Team make it unique in benefits and search, Development, and Studies).84 The DC/S
capability and its concept demands undivided (RD&S) acting for the CMC provides research,
attention. development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E)
Studies performed during the 1950s indicated requirements within the Marine Corps.
that the Corps needed operations researchf RDT&E is characterized by progression from
analysis capabilities. An operations research the general to the specific or from concept
or operations analysis capability was first in- to reality. As the initial step, a long-range con-
troduced into the Marine Corps in March 1957 cept is prepared which portrays the world as
with the appointment of a civilian analyst it is expected to appear 20 years in the future.
(civil service) to HQMC. Within a year this Based upon this long-range projection, the
capability was augmented with the addition Marine Corps Long-Range Plan (MLRP) is
of a CNO Operations Evaluation Group (OEG) created to describe the operational, organiza-
representative to the Headquarters. This pro- tional, and material concepts which the Marine
vided the Headquarters with a two-man opera- Corps needs to achieve in order to carry out
tions analysis effort for the next four years— the roles and missions which are projected for
a minimal operations analysis capability pri- it in this long-range future. The Marine Corps
marily directed toward improving the efficiency Mid-Range Objectives Plan (MMROP) is
of man-machine systems especially in tactical created against the background of the MLRP.
problems or field exercises. One of the team's It translates the long-range plan into more
first efforts was directed to evaluations of the definitive goals which must be accomplished
vertical envelopment assault capabilities as ex- 10 years in the future to provide for an orderly
emplified by LANTPHIBEX—58 and the progression from the present towards the long-
BRIGADELEX series of 1959—1960. In 1958 range concept of Marine Corps combat forces.
the l\Earine Corps commenced a program to Both of these documents, the MLRP and the
train a number of officers in operations analysis MMROP, serve as guides for the identification
at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Mon- and establishment of RDT&E objectives, for the
terey, California. In 1962 the OEG billet at determination of the RDT&E Program as well
HQMC was moved to MCLFD at Quantico and as the Studies Program, and for the execution
with two other analysts an operations analysis of implementing actions to achieve future
unit was formed as a sub-element of the OEG. goals.35 Both plans support the JCS' Joint
To implement future goals, a Landing Force Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) which in
War Game Group was established at Quantico turn supports U.S. national objectives.
in 1961 in order to "develop objective method- Within the R&D process of the Marine Corps,
ology for the war gaming of amphibious opera- there are two unique features that complement
tions." The group in conducting war games the duties of DC/S (RD&S). While he works
"acts" out the landing force aspects of amphib- on a close and continuing basis with all gen-
ious operations. It simulates a military opera- eral staff officers, he has a special relationship
tion using rules, data, and procedures designed with the Deputy Chief of Staff (Air) and As-
to depict an actual or assumed real life situa- sistant Chief of Staff, G—4. The Deputy Chief
tion. of Staff (Air) in Headquarters Marine Corps
In June 1964, DC/S (R&D) prepared a has, in addition to his responsibilities to the
staff study entitled "HQMC Capability to Sup- Ci\IC, a responsibility to the Deputy Chief of
port Programming, Planning, Budgeting and Naval Operations (Air). He is concurrently
Appraising." This study concluded that HQMC DC/S (Air) in HQMC and Assistant Deputy
 THE DECADE OF THE SIXTIES 109

Chief of Naval operations (Air) for Marine to "anticipate the command" in order to retain our
Aviation in the office of the CNO. Air develop- position of professional excellence.38
ments in the Department of the Navy are co-
ordinated Navy/Marine efforts whenever it is The Decade To Come
possible. The Secretary of Navy requires the
CMC to "provide Marine Corps RDT&E re- Officially, the policy and objectives of the
quirements in aircraft and related equipment Marine Corps during the next 10 years is
to CNO." 36 The Marine Corps monitors avia- contained within the Marine Corps Mid-Range
tion research and development hut it is per- Objectives Plan (MMROP). What will be dis-
formed and funded by the Navy. The AC/S. cussed here is the reaffirmation of one doctrine,
G—4 is responsible for the materiel planning the Marine-Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF)
and requirement effort. In addition, he manages and the discussion of a possible variant emanat-
the execution of the majority of the ground ing out of the Vertical/Short Takeoff and
R&D efforts. It must be remembered that DC/S Landing concept.
(RD&S) coordinates the R&D effort but does not The MAGTF is simply a task organization
task the execution of development projects. The tailored to accomplish a specific mission or
CMC has in effect selected the AC, G—4 to missions. Composition of the MAGTF many
execute ground materiel development. vary considerably, but will normally include
On 1 January 1968, MCS was redesignated a command element, ground combat element,
the Marine Corps Development and Education an aviation combat element, and a combat serv-
Command (MCDEC). The Marine Corps Land- ice support element. It is in general a close
ing Force Development Center subsequently integration of air and ground power formed
became the Development Center, Marine Corps for combat operations, training exercises, and
Development and Education Command. The deployments.
Commanding General, MCDEC is designated The MAGTF doctrine is over 25 years old.
by the CMC as his field representative for all re- It is noted in this chapter because of its func-
search and development activities. He has a tion in the decade of the l960s and its im-
total of 22 permanently assigned liaison plementation in Vietnam. The concept stems
from a long period of development based
officers located at major armed forces develop- upon and influenced by the advent of great
ment centers throughout the United States to tactical mobility (helicopters) and fire power
aid him in keeping abreast of developments and atomic weapons). It is after all the old "force-
tests at their respective locations. Close liaison in-readiness" concept of ground combat units
is maintained with the Canadian Army and supported by air. Since the introduction of
the British Royal Marines.37 air power into 20th century warfare, the Marine
Throughout testing and development, in- Corps, from the beginning, had considered
formation concerning new equipment and ideas aviation resources as complementing the ground
is given by the Development Center to students forces for the highly flexible team that would
of the MCDEC's various schools and the stu- ensue. There was never a question that "aerial
dents provide their experience and knowledge support" was an integral part of the amphibious
in study efforts for the centers. In speaking operation as evidenced by it being a major
of all efforts supporting the R&D program, chapter in the 1935 "Tentative Landing Opera-
whether it be from analysis groups, MCDEC tions Manual" (see Chapter III).
students or liaison officers, Major General Louis In the post-World War II period, the new
Metzger, while DC/S (RD&S) in 1968, stated: ingredients of helicopters and atomic weapons
The aim or objective of our R&D effort
introduced the dispersion theory as one of the
is to
design and prepare the Marine Corps of the future answers to atomic warfare and consequently
to carry out its assigned roles and missions as the control and composition of forces had to be
amphibious force in readiness of the United States reconsidered. Examining all of the factors, the
and, additionally, to meet the broad mandate of Commandant in 1955 reaffirmed, in Landing
"such other functions as the President may direct." Force Bulletin No. 17, the simple maxim that,
We must be able to carry out assigned functions with or without nuclear weapons, the most
whenever and wherever we are called upon to do so,
and must be capable of a flexible and rapid re- effective employment of the FMF is in the
sponse to the wide spectrum of possible operations. form of an integral military organization em-
In brief, we must violate the old drill maxim not phasizing both air and ground elements re-
 110 A DEVELOPMENTAL HIST'ORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

headquarters and the communications and serv-

ice facilities required for its support.
The Ground Combat Element is constructed
around a combat infantry unit with appro-
priate combat support and combat service sup-
port units. So too with the Aviation Combat
Element. This element includes those aviation
commands, including air control agencies, com-
bat, combat support, and combat service sup-
port units, required by the situation. Normally
both fixed-wing attack and helicopter aviation
facilities are included in the aviation combat
element of a MAGTF. The other component
is the Combat Service Support Element which
of course supports both the ground combat
element and the aviation combat element.
In the evaluation of the MAGTF, it was
envisioned, in 1953, that the MAGTF would
be composed only of elements combining a
division and wing such as the 2d MAGTF,
composed of Headquarters, 2d MAGTF,
2d Marine Division, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing,
and Force Troops then commanded by Lieuten-
ant General Oliver P. Smith who was Com-
General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., 24th Commandant manding General, FMFLant. As a result the
of the Marine Corps, i January 1968 to 31 December LANTAGLEX in April 1954 was one of the
1971. (USMC Photo *A415547). first division/wing level amphibious exercises
of the 2d MAGTF. In subsequent years, how-
ever, LANTRAEXES were held which con-
sponsive to a single Marine commander This sidered that a MAGTF was only comprised of
organization can be structured to meet any- an infantry regiment and a MAG.
thing from a show-of-force situation to a major Influential in changing the makeup of the
conflict. What must be remembered is that MAGTF were the changing concepts of future
the MAGTF is a task organization tailored to amphibious operations as contained in the
accomplish a specific mission. The current
Advanced Research Group Reports and Land-
Marine Corps Order 3120.3A39 points out that ing Force Bulletin No. 17. Summarized below
the composition of MAGTF may vary con- are some of the high-points of the evolutionary
siderably but will normally include the follow- process of the MAGTF of today:
ing major components:
1954—Advanced Research Group 1953—54—Con-
A Command Element sidered landing force aspects of future (within next
A Ground Combat Element 10 years). In essence, the report recommended the
An Aviation Combat Element all" helicopter concept based only on fighting a
A Combat Service Support Element, including Navy nuclear war.
Support Elements.
1955—Advanced Research Group 1954—55—With a
At the present time, the FMF can task organize revised concept and an 'all helicopter assault" con-
three types of MAGTF: cept in mind, this group tempered its recommen-
dation with the real possibility of fighting a non-
Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) nuclear war.
Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB)
Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) 1955—Landing Force Bulletin No. 17—Promul-
gated a concept which envisaged the employment.
Before discussing the MAU, MAB, and MAF, with or without nuclear support, of integrated
let us look at the major components of a Marine landing forces of ground and supporting air
MAGTF. The Command Element is simply components, organized, trained, and equipped to
that commander appointed normally from exploit the speed and flexibility of the helicopter,
for the projection of seapower deep ashore at any
sources outside the major elements of the task point on the world littoral without the necessity
force. He will have a separate air-ground of direct assault on the intervening shoreline.
 THE DECADE OF THE SIXTIES Ill

r:: ..J

Marine air-ground team concept acted out at Marine Corps Air School, Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, T.H. by the 1st
Provisional Marine Air-Ground Task Force. (USMC Photo #A290042).

1958—LANTPHIBEX 58—The first major test of Ground Task Forces in Future Amphibious Oper-
the vertical envelopment concept was successfully ations. This is a broad conceptual statement on
conducted at OnSlow Beach, N.C., with the entire employment of a MAGTF.
2d Marine Division involved in an assault landing. 1970—MCO 3l20.3A, dated 18 August 1970, sub-
The vertical assault was conducted from three pect—The Organization of MAGTF. This order is
carriers (USS Tarawa, CVS—40; the USS Valley the current doctrinal guide on the structure of the
Forge, CVS—45; and the USS Forrestal, CVA—59) by MAGTF.
helicopters of MAG—26 commanded by Colonel
Keith B. McCutcheon. The structure of the types of MAGTF as
1959—60—BRIGADELEXES—The vertical envelop- contained in the current order is outlined
ment concept was perfected through a series of below:
brigade vertical envelopment exercises conducted by Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU)—The MAU, nor-
elements of the 2d Marine Division and MAG—26 at mally commended by a colonel is employed to per-
Vieques, P.R., and Onslow Beach using the USS
Boxer as the new LPH—4. The USS Princeton form combat operations in a relatively limited
scope. The ground element is normally a battalion
(LPH—5) was similarly employed in West Coast landing team (BLT) and the aviation element is
exercises.
normally a composite helicopter squadron. How-
1960—CMC promulgated a letter, dated 31 May ever, the aviation unit may consist of an attack
1960, describing air-ground task force command squadron, a helicopter squadron, and elements of an
relationships and structures. observation squadron. The combat service support
l962—CMC promulgated MCO 3340.3, dated 20 element of the MAU is formed primarily from
April 1962, subject—Employment of Marine Air- division, wing, and force troops including the Force
112 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

Service Regiment (FSR). Detachments from Navy believes that it has the answer to the need
combat serivce support resources may be added. in the British-built Hawker-Siddeley Aviation
Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB)—The MAB, Corporation jet aircraft called the Harrier. The
normally commanded by a brigadier general, is Harrier is a single seat, single fan jet aircraft
capable of conducting air-ground amphibious powered by a Rolls Royce Bristol Pegasus 10
assault operations in low- and mid-conflict environ-
ments. The ground element of the MAE is normally engine of 21,500 pounds thrust. By utilizing
equivalent to a regimental combat team (RCT). four rotatable exhaust nozzles, enough thrust
The air element is usually a MAG with varied is available to have the jet operate like a heli-
aviation capabilities. The combat service support copter.
element includes significant resources from force
troops, including the FSR, division and wing com-
bat service support Units, and the Navy support
units. The present Marine Corps Division/Wing
Team has the capability to deploy two MABS for
separate missions should unusual circumstances re-
quire such flexibility.
Marine Amphibious Force (MAF)_Formerly des-
ignated Marine Expeditionary Force. This designa-
tion was changed in the early period of the
Vietnam war in deference to Vietnamese uneasiness
to the term "expeditionary." The MAF, largest of
the Marine air-ground task forces, may be formed
with many variations in task organization structure.
The MAF is commanded by either a major general
or a lieutenant general, depending on its size and
mission. It is capable of conducting a wide range
of amphibious assault operations and sustained
operations ashore. It can be tailored for any inten- - g___
sity of combat and to any geographic environment.
The ground element of a MAF is Usually a rein-
forced division. The aviation combat element is
usually an aircraft wing organized to conduct all Vertical/Short Take-off and Landing Aircraft (Hawk.
types of tactical air operations. The combat service er-Siddeley A V—BA "Harrier") used by Marines. (Photo
support element of a MAF can be a single entity or courtesy of Naval Air Test Center, Naval Air Station,
can be composed of a logistic support element and Patuxent River, Md.)
an engineer support element. The MAF may in-
clude an organic MAB or MAU as a separate
element in order to conduct air-ground operations The United Kingdom had been experiment-
sufficiently in space or time from other MAF ing with a V/STOL aircraft called the P—1127.
elements. With substantial improvements to the P—I 127,
The MAGTF worked well in the past and then called the Kestrel, a successful flight oc-
particularly in the immediate past, Vietnam. curred 21 October 1960. By 1968, the P—l127
The doctrinal experience of the MAGTF, an Kestrel, now Harrier, was in the process of
being adopted by the Royal Air Force. At the
experience not shared by any of the Armed same time, in mid—1968, Lieutenant Colonel
Forces, demonstrates great flexibility in task John J\'Ietzko, then Head, RD&S Section, Air
organization and satisfies generally any opera. Weapons Systems Branch of Headquarters
tion requirement. Marine Corps, requested the Marine Corps to
take a hard look at the new improved Harrier.
Vertical/Short Take-Off and Landing "Recognizing the value of such an aircraft
for the Marine Corps, Major General Keith B.
V/STOL has, in one form or another, in- McCutcheon, Deputy Chief of Staff (Air) di-
terested the Marine Corps for over 25 years. rected efforts to obtain approval for two pilots
The Marine Corps' introduction and develop- to participate in a short flight evaluation of
ment of the helicopter into military operations the Harrier." 40
after World War II only pointed out the need Colonel Thomas H. Miller and Lieutenant
for increasing the possibilities to extend V/ Colonel Clarence M. Baker departed for the
STOL capabilities into high performance, tac- United Kingdom in September 1968 and com-
tical fixed-wing aircraft. The Marine Corps pleted flight evaluation tests by October. After
 THE DECADE OF THE SIXTIES 113

20 sorties which involved all flight modes of the ing it to fire Sidewinder missiles, established
Harrier's operational capabilities, Colonel Mil- the first Harrier squadron, VMA—513, at Marine
ler stated: Corps Air Station, Beaufort, South Carolina.
In addition to the unique take-off and landing By mid—1971, VMA—513 had the first five AV—
capabilities afforded by the vectored thrust concept 8A Harriers and the potential to add whole
used by the Harrier, there are several inflight
maneuvering advantages. For instasce, during glide
chapters to Marine tactical air doctrine.
bombing runs the nozzles can be moved to the In 1965, the then Commandant of the Ma-
reverse thrust position to provide unprecedented rine Corps, General Wallace M. Greene, Jr.,
speed control in the dive. Another advantage is the in discussing the Long Range Marine Corps
ability to rapidly reduce speed and increase turn Concept (addressing the period 1975—1985 time
rate (luring air-to-air combat maneuvering.4'
period), envisioned the value of Marine Air-
Colonel Miller pointed out that an unpre- Ground teams and V/STOL as follows:
cedented potential in the advantages of the
Harrier could lead to a complete overhaul in The primary amphibious assault capability of
aircraft tactics and procedures. the landing force will consist of fully V/STOL-
mobile Marine air-ground teams, launched and sup-
In 1969, the Defense Department approved ported from mission designed amphibious shipping,
the Marine Corps request to purchase an initial under all conditions of weather and visibility. This
increment of 12 Harriers during Fiscal Year will be complemented by a surface assault capability
1970 with another 18 authorized (luring Fiscal utilizing high speed! surface craft, either water or
air cushion borne able to project troops, equip-
Year 1971,12 The Marine Corps designated the ment, and supplies onto the beach beyond the high
Harrier as AV—8A, and after testing and modify- water line43
 APPENDIX A
NOTES

Chapter I
l Mark Sullivan, Our Times: The United States, 1900— 21 General Board memo, dated 29 May 1915 (Record
1920, v. I (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920), pp. Group 408, OAB, NHD).
4, 11—12. 22 Adm George Dewey ltr to Secretary of the Navy,
2 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, dated 6 October 1900 (Record Group 127, National
Historical Statistics of the United States—Colonial Times Archives).
to 1957 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960), "Ibid.
p. 8, hereafter U.S. Bureau of Census, Historical Statistics. 24 Adm George Dewey ltr to Secretary of the Navy,
Margaret Leech, In the Days of McKinley (New York: dated 1 November 1900, ibid.
Harper & Brothers, 1959), p. 468. 20 RAdm A.S. Crowninshield ltr to Secretary of the
Willis J. Abbot, Soldiers of the Sea: The Story of the Navy, dated 1 November 1901 (Record Group 127,
United States Marine Corps (New York: Dodd, Mead and National Archives).
Company, 1918). "Ibid.
'Executive Order No. 969, dated 12 November 1908 27 Brigadier General Commandant endorsement of 15
(Record Group 432, Operational Archives Branch, Navy November 1901 to General Board ltr, dated 1 November
History Division, Navy Department (hereafter OAB, 1901 (Record Group 408, OAB, NHD).
NHD)). 28 Annual R! of CMC, 1903, p. 26.
6 Washington Post, 4 December 1908. "General Board memo, dated 15 May 1915 (Record
Group 408, OAB, NHD).
'Washington Times, 15 January 1909. 3° William Reynolds Braisted, The United States Navy
'Adm George Dewey ltr to Chairman, Subcommittee in the Pacific, 1897—1909, (Austin: University of Texas
of the Naval Committee, House of Representatives, dated Press, 1958), p. 192, hereafter Braisted, U.S. Navy in the
14 January 1909 (Record Group 408, GAB, NHD). Pacific.
'Ibid. "Thomas A. Bailey, The American Pageant: A History
10 Washington Herald, 27 March 1909. of the Republic, . II (Boston: D.C. Heath & Company,
11 Washington Star, 17 February 1909. 1966), p. 648.
12 Baltimore Sun, 27 March 1909. 3° As quoted in Braisted, U.S. Navy in the Pacific, p.
"Boston Transcript, 2 December 1908. 198.
14RAdm Albert Gleaves, USN, Life and Letters of Rear "Ibid., p. 199.
Admiral Stephen B. Luce, U.S. Navy (New York: G.P. ' General Board memo, dated 29 May 1915 (Record
Putnam's Sons, 1925), p. 238. Group 408, OAB, NHD).
12 U.S. Navy, General Order No. 544, dated 13 March "Joint Committee of Officers of the Army and Navy,
1900 (Record Group 408, OAB, NHD). Army War College, rpt to General Board, dated 7 April
1908 (Record Group 408, OAB, NHD).
10 jarvis Butler, "The General Board of the Navy," 3° General Board ltr to Secretary of the Navy, dated
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v.56, no. 8 (August 30 December 1909 (Record Group 408, OAB, NHD).
1930), I- 702. "General Board ltr to Secretary of the Navy, dated
U.S. Navy Department, Annual Reports of the Navy 19 February 1910 (Record Group 408, OAB, NHD).
Department for the Year 1904 (Washington: Government Secretary of the Navy hr to CMC, dated 24 March
Printing Office, 1904), p. 469. 1910 (Serial 16721—39, USMC General Correspondence,
"Annual Report of the Brigadier-General Common. 1904—1912. Record Group 127, National Archives).
dan! of the United States Marine Corps to the Secretary "CMC hr to Secretary of the Navy, dated 18 April
of the Navy, 1900 (\'ashington: Government Printing 1910, bc. cit.
Office, 1900), p. 49, hereafter Annual Rt of CMC with Major General Commandant ltr to Assistant Secre-
appropriate year. tary of the Navy, dated 18 April 1910 (Record Group
10 As quoted in Dotiald W. Mitchell, History of the 432, OAB, NHD).
Modern .-lmeriean Navy, from 1883 through Pearl Har- 41 Ibid.
bor (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946), p. 30. "Major General Commandant memo to Secretary of
'° William Russell, The Genesis of Fleet Marine the Navy, dated 8 December 1914 (Recordl Group 432.
Force Doctrine: 1879—1899,' pt. IV, Marine Corps Gazette, OAB. NHD).
v. 35, no. 7 (July 1951), p 59. Capt Dion Williams, USMC, 'The Defense of Our

115
116 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

New Naval Stations," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, "General Board ltr to Secretary of the Navy, dated
v. XXVIII, no. 2 (June 1902), PP. 181—194. 21 July 1913 (Record Group 432, OAB, NHD).
RAdm R.P. Rodgers, USN, ltr to General Board, a General Board Itr to Secretary of the Navy, dated
dated 10 December 1909 (Record Group 408, OAB, 19 August 1913 (Record Group 432, OAB, NHD).
NHD). "Major General Commandant ltr to Secretary of the
"Ibid., dated 26 November 1909. Navy, enclosure F, dated 8 September 1913 (Record
a Ibid., dated 10 December 1909. Group 432, OAB, NHD).
President, Naval War College ltr to General Board, "Major General Commandant memo to Secretary of
dated 27 April 1908, w/ Army War College rpt enclosed the Navy, dated 8 December 1914 (Record Group 432,
(Serial 146, Record Group 408, OAB, NHD). OAB, NHD).
"Journal of the U.S. Artillery (Fort Monroe, Va.), v. "Wise, op. cit., pp. 120—121.
35, no. 1(1911). '° Col George Barnett, "Report on Maneuvers and
Maj T.W. Winston, CAC, ltr to Adm George Dewey, Operations," to Major General Commandant, dated 15
dated 26 April 1911 (Record Group 408, OAB, NHD). February 1914 (Record Group 432, OAB, NHD).
'° General Board ltr to Secretary of the Navy, dated Major General Commandant memo to Secretary of
26 April 1911 (Record Group 408, OAB, NHD). the Navy, dated 8 December 1914 (Record Group 432,
Maj Dion Williams, 'Report on Men, Material and OAB, NHD).
Drills Required for Establishing a Naval Advance Base," "U.S. Atlantic Fleet, USS Arkansas, Flagship, "Report
MS., Office of Naval Intelligence (Record Group 408, on Operations of Advance Base Expedition. Culebra,
OAB, NHD). WI., Jan-Feb 1914," dated 15 April 1914 (Record Group
Major General Commandant memo to Secretary of
432. OAB, NHD).
the Navy, dated 8 December 1914 (Record Group 432,
OAB, NHD).
Major General Commandant, 4th endorsement of
Ibid. "Supplemental Report, Brigade Commander, Advanced
'° General Board Itr to Secretary of the Navy, dated Base Expedition, Culebra, Jan-Feb 1914," dated 23 April
13 November 1913 (Record Group 432, OAB, NHD). 1914 (Record Group 432, OAB, NHD).
Ibid., dated 30 January 1914. "Ibid., 3d endorsement.
Major General Commandant memo to Secretary of "General Board ltr to Secretary of the Navy, dated
the Navy, dated 8 December 1914, op. cit. 3 April 1917 (Record Group 408, OAB, NHD).
"General Board ltr to Secretary of the Navy, dated '° MajGen John A. Lejeune, Reminiscenses of a Marine
21 July 1913 (Record Group 432, OAB, NHD). (Philadelphia: Dorrance and Company, 1930), p. 229.
a Maj Frank E. Evans, "The Marines Have Landed," "ibid., p. 230.
Marine Corps Gazette, v. 2, no. 3 (September 1917), p. "Kenneth W. Condit and Maj John H. Johnstone,
219. A Brief History of Marine Corps Staff Organization
Major General Commandant memo to Secretary of (Washington: Historical Branch, G—3 Division, Head-
the Navy, dated 8 December 1914, op. cit. qtlarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1963), p. 10. Hereafter
a Col Frederick Ma)' Wise, A Marine Tells It To You
Historical Branch, G—3 Division, Headquarters, U.S.
(New York: J.H. Sears & Company, Inc., 1929), p. 119. Marine Corps will he cited as HistBr, G—3, HQMC.
Secretary of the Navy itt to CMC, dated 24 March '°Condit and Johnstone, op. cit., pp 10—Il.
1910 (Serial 16721—39, USMC General Correspondence,
1904—1912, Record Group 127, National Archives).
'Maj Alfred A. Cunningham, "Value of Aviation to
" Aide for Inspections memo to Secretary of the Navy, the Marine Corps," Marine Corps Gazette, v. 5, no. 3
dated May 1913 (Record Group 432, OAB, NHD).
I
(September 1920), p. 223.
"ibid. Maj Harvey D. Bradshaw, "Marine Corps Aviation:
Major General Commandant ltr to Secretary of the Cunningham to Chu Lai," U.S. Naval Institute Pro.
Navy, dated 7 July 1913 (Serial 10190, Record Group ceedings, v. 92, no. 11 (November 1966), p. 109.
432, OAB, NHD). Cunningham, op. cit., p. 222.
 Chapter II
George Harmon Knoles, The New United States: A Va., Basic Plan of Winter Maneuvers for the U.S. Fleet,
History Since 1896 (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Win- 1924, dated December 1923 (Box 23, Accession No.
1

ston, Inc., 1960), p. 229, hereafter Knowles, New United 62A—2059, Record Group 127, Washington National
States. Records Center (WNRC), Suitland, Md.).
2
As quoted in Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic His- 2TBGen Eli K. Cole rpt to CMC, dated 15 February
tory of the American People (New York: Appleton- 1924, Subject: "Concerning Operations at Isla Margarita
Century Crofts, Inc., 1958), p. 640, hereafter Bailey, (Fort Randolph) Canal Zone, Jan 16—18, 1924," bc. cit.
Diplomatic History. Col Dion Williams rpt to CMC, dated 24 March 1924,
E.B. Potter, ed., Seapower: A Naval History (Engle- Subject: Report of Operations, MCEF, Culebra, P.R., p. 3
wood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1960), p. 581. (Box 24, bc. cit.).
Bailey, Diplomatic History, p. 641. CMC ltr to Chief of Naval Operations, dated 18
Potter, op. cit., p. 481. December 1923, Subject: Motor Lighter (Beetle Boat) for
Bailey, Diplomatic History, p. 642.
6
Winter Maneuvers (Box 23, bc cit.).
Potter, op. cit., pp. 48 1—482. '° BGen Eli K. Cole, Headquarters, MCEF, Culebra,
0
Norman A. Graebner, ed., An Uncertain Tradition: P.R. rpt, dated 5 February 1924, Subject: "Reports and
American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century Comments on Landing Operations, Blue Force, Culebra,"
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1941),
p. 141.
Summary of Military Personnel Strength of the Mili-
'
p. 10, bc cit.
CMC ltr to BGen E.K. Cole, dated 14 December 1923,
Subject: Appointment as Commanding General, MCEF
tary Budget for FY 1971 (Fiscal Division, HQMC). (Biographical File, Historical Reference Branch, His-
10
Condit and Johnstone, op. cit., pp. 11—12. torical Division, HQMC (hereafter HRB, HD, HQMC)).
11
ibid., pp. 13—14. '2CMC ltr to Commanding General, Quantico, Va.,
12CMC memo to General Board, dated 11 February dated 7 December 1923, Subject: Christie Tank—Test of
1922, Subject: Future Policy for the Marine Corps as and Use of in Culebra during Winter Maneuvers (Box
Influenced by the Conference on Limitation of Arma- 23, Accession No. 62A—2059, Record Group 127, WNRC,
ment (Record Group 432, OAB, NHD).
"Ibid.
14
Bureau of Census, Historical Statistics, p.
'
Suitland, Md.).
BGen S.D. Butler ltrs to Walter Christie and VAdm
U.S. N.A. McCully, USN, dated II December 1923, bc. cit.
736. Annual Rpt of CMC, 1924, p. 668.
"CMC memo to General Board, dated 11 February '5Jeter A. Isely and Philip A. Crowl, The U.S. Marines
1922, op. cit. and Amphibious War (Princeton: Princeton University
'
16
Ibid.
RQMC ltr, dated 5 November 1923 (Historical
Press, 1951), p. 31, hereafter Isely and Crowl, Amphibious
War.
Division (HD), HQMC). '°Annual Rt of CMC, 1925, pp. 11—12.
10Annual Rpt of CMC, 1925, p. 17. Col R.M. Dunlap rpt, Subject: "Recommendations
° LtCol Clyde H. Metcalf, A History of the United Based on Report of Critique on Joint Army & Navy
Stales Marine Corps (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, Problem No. 3 by Officers of Marine Corps Schools, June
1939), p. 527. 1 to 5, 1925," undated (Box 23, Accession No. 62A—2059,
o Navy Department, Annual Reports of the Navy
U.S. Record Group 127, WNRC, Suitland, Md.).
Department for the Fiscal Year 1922 (Washington: '°Ibid.
Government Printing Office, 1923), p. 822. '° Marine Barracks, Quantico, Va. Special Order 181,
Commanding Officer, Expeditionary Detachment, dated 3 July 1926 (Box 1, Accession No. 65A—6573,
USMC rpt to Major General Commandant, dated 20 July Record Group 127, WNRC, Suitland, Md.).
1922, Subject: 'Report on Expedition to Guantanamo '°Col Richard M. Cutts memo to CMC, dated 17
and Culebra, Operating with Control Force, U.S. Atlantic June 1926, Subject: "Information Relative to Designed
Fleet, January 9, 1922 to April 25, 1922," p. 2 (General Operating Condition and Tests of 50' Motor Troops
Files, Breckinridge Library, Quantico, Va.). Lighter and 50' Lighter for Landing Artillery" (Box 23,
'
22
Ibid., p. 7.
Ibid., pp. 8—9.
bc. cit.).
41
lstLt Charles Connette ltr to Commanding Officer,
24
ibid., p. 48. Fifth Regiment, dated 20 July 1927, Subject: Report of
25
CMC memo to Secretary of the Navy, enclosure F,
dated 8 September 1931, Subject: Examination of the '
Tests of Infantry Landing Barge, bc. cit.
Cutts memo, op. cit.
Organization and Establishment of the USMC (Record °' LtGen K.E. Rockey ltr to Assistant Chief of Staff,
Group 432, OAB, NHD). G—3 Division, dated 21 June 1957 (Historical Reference
26
Headquarters, MCEF, Marine Barracks, Quantico, Section (HRS), HD, HQMC). General Rockey (then

117
118 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970
captain) had been one of four observers sent by the CMC 50Ibid.
to report on the tests of the artillery lighter (Special 51
Elizabeth L. Tierney and Rowland P. Gill, A Brief
Order 181, dated 3 July 1926, Marine Barracks, Quantico, History of Marine Corps Aviation (Washington: HistBr,
Va.). G—3, HQMC, 1969), p. 2, hereafter Tierney and Gill,
[U.S.] Joint Board, Joint Action of the Army r Navy Marine Corps Aviation.
(Washington, 1927), p. 3, para. vii, ii (a). Robert Sherrod, History of Marine Corps Aviation in
Ibid., p. 12, para. VI, 8 (b). World War if (Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1952),
Col Ben H. Fuller hr to Maj S.M. Harrington, dated
16 October 1922 (Box 23, Accession No. 62A—2059, Record p. 23.
Group 127, WNRC, Suitland, Md.). Ibid., p. 25.
Headquarters Bulletin, USMC, dated 10 March 1926, 54Ibid., p.27.
p. 5, bc. cit. Officer-in-Charge, School of Aerial Observation hr to
Research Section, MCS, memo, to Academic Section, Brigade Commander, MCEF, Quantico, Va., dated 28
MCS, dated 16 September 1949 (Breckinridge Library, September 1926, Subject: Air-Ground Communications
Quantico, Va.). Problem (Box I, Accession No. 65A—6573, Record Group
40Ibid., p. c—2. 127, WNRC, Suitland, Md.).
 Chapter III
1 William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and 23 Advanced Base Problem Files (Breckinridge Library,
the New Deal, 1932—1940 (New York: Harper Torch. Quantico, Va.).
books, Harper & Row, 1963), pp. 1—2. 24
Col Richard M. Cutts ltr to Col LB. Miller, dated
2
Knoles, New United States, p. 444. 23 September 1932 (Box 1, Accession No. 65A—4939,
As quoted in John E. Wiltz, From Isolation to War, Record Group 127, WNRC, Suitland, Md.).
1931—1941 (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, " Research Section memo, op. cit.
1968), p. 17. ° LCdr E.W. Broadbent, USN, "The Fleet and the
Knoles, New United States, p. 446. Marines," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 57, no. 3
5Julius W. Pratt, A History of United States Foreign (March 1931), p. 372.
Policy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960), 27
MajGen John H. Russell, "The Birth of the Fleet
p. 146. Marine Force," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 72,
U.S. Fleet Base Force, USS Argonne, Flagship, no. 1 (January 1946), p. 79.
Operational Order 22—34, dated 12 July 1934 (Box 2, 20General Order No. 241, dated 7 December 1933
Accession No. 65A—4939, Record Group 127, WNRC, (HRS, HD, HQMC).
Suitland, Md.). Marine Corps Order No. 66, dated 3 December 1933,
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, bc. cit.
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1936 (Washing- 20
[U.S.] Joint Board, Joint Overseas Expeditions
ton: Government Printing Office, 1936), pp. 149, 172. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1933).
Chief of Naval Operations ltr to Secretary of the Frances, "History of Marine Corps Schools."
Navy, dated 2 March 1933, Subject: Examination of
Organization and Establishment of the USMC (File MCS, Proceedings of Conference, 9 January 1934
Op—13/PS, KK/A3—l (310624), Record Group 432, OAB, (Correspondence File 1520—30—120, Record Group 127,
NHD). National Archives; HAF No. 41, Breckinridge Library,
°tbid. Quantico, Va.).
10RAdm L.E.H. Maund, RN, "The Development of CMC ltr, w/ enclosed manual, dated 9 July 1935,
Landing Craft," Journal of the Royal United Service Subject: Tentative Landing Operations Manual (Serial
institution, v. XC, no. 558 (May 1945), pp. 212—217. AO—89—tgl, File 2275—1—10, Breckinridge Library, Quan-
CMC rpt to Assistant Secretary of the Navy, dated tico, Va.).
7 April 1959, Subject: "The Evolution of Modern Am- Chief, War Plans Section ltr to Division of Opera.
phibious Warfare" (Historical Amphibious File (HAF), tions and Training, dated 21 June 1937 (Box 3, Accession
Breckinridge Library, Quantico, Va.). No. 65A—4939, Record Group 127, WNRC, Suitland,
12
Research Section, MCS, memo to Academic Section, Md.).
MCS, dated 16 September 1949 (Breckinridge Library, Research Section memo, dated 16 September 1949,
Quantico, Va.). o/. cit.
Col C.F.B. Price memo to Gen Berkeley, dated 2 Ibid.
March 1931 (HAF No. 43, Breckinridge Library, Quan- RAdm Julius A. Furer, USN (Ret.), Administration
tico, Va.). of the Navy Department in World War II (Washington:
14
Col C.F.B. Price ltr to Commandant, MCS, dated 17 Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 591.
April 1931, bc. cit. 00
Commanding General, 1st Marine Brigade, Fleet
MCS memo, dated 3 June 1931, bc. cit. Exercise 4 rpt, dated 12 March 1938; BGen V.H. Krulak
Commandant, MCS, ltr to Major General Corn.
16
ltr, w/ attached comments, to Head, HistBr, G—3,
mandant, dated 5 October 1931, bc. cit. HQMC, dated 1 February 1957 (HRS, HD, HQMC).
Major General Commandant ltr to Commandant,
13 " LtCol Frank 0. Hough, Maj Verle E. Ludwig, and
MCS, dated 20 October 1931 (Serial 1520—30—100, Henry I. Shaw, Jr., History of U.S. Marine Corps
AO—l55-cel, bc. cit.) Operations in World War II, v. I—Pearl Harbor to
Anthony A. Frances, "History of the Marine Corps Guadalcanal (Washington: HistBr, G—3, HQMC, 1958),
Schools," MS., MCS, December 1945 (Breckinridge hereafter Hcugh, Ludwig, and Shaw, Pearl Harbor to
Library, Quantico, Va.), hereafter Frances, "History of Cuadalcanal.
Marine Corps Schools." ibid., p. 24.
° Ellis B. Miller, Officer Records (HQMC).
70
41
Capt Ralph S. McDowell, USN, interview by HistBi,
Frances, "History of Marine Corps Schools.' G—3, HQMC, dated 19 June 1957 (Accession No.
21Annual Rpt of CMC, 1933, pp. 11—13. 65A—5l96, Record Group 127, WNRC, Suitland, Md.).
MCS Instruction Memo No. 10, 1933 (Accession No. "Chief of Naval Operations ltr to Chief, Bureau of
62A—6573, Record Group 127, WNRC, Suitland, Md.). Ships, dated 23 September 1940 (2455—130—60, HQMC

119
120 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

Files). Cited in Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, Pearl Harbor °° President, MC. Equipment Board hr to Major
to Guadalcanal, p. 28. General Commandant, dated 8 October 1940, Subject:
LtCoI E.E. Linsert interview by HistBr, G—3, HQMC, Development Project List for Period 1 April 1940 to 30
dated 3 June 1957 (Accession No. 65A—5196, Record September 1940 (Box 2, Accession No. 65A—4939, Record
Group 127, WNRC, Suitland, Md.). Group 127, WNRC, Suitlanci, Md.).
Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, Pearl Harbor to Guadal. °° Krulak Comments.

canal, p. 29. °°
LtGen Victor H. Krulak interview by Historical
° Gen Holland M. Smith and Percy Finch, Coral and Division, dated 15 june 1970 (Oral History Collection,
Brass (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949), p. 92. HD, HQMC).
°° Krulak
Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, Pearl Harbor to Guadal. Comments.
canal, p. 31. °°James M. Hait, Chairman of the Board, Food
LtGen V.H. Krulak ltr to Director, M.C. History, Machinery Corp. interview by author, dated 24 June
dated 3 August 1970 (Developmental History Comment 1969, San Jose, California.
File, Archives, HRS, HD, HQMC), hereafter Krulak
Comments. '
°°
Lee McFarland, Ordnance Division.Material, ibid.
Muster Rolls, Unassigned Units, dated February
'° Borg.Warner Corp., 'Research, Investigation 1941 (HRS, HD, HQMC).
Experimentation in the Field of Amphibian Vehicles for 62
Muster Rolls, Amphibian Tractor Detachment,
USMC, Contract #66245," Final Rpt, dated 1957 (Inger. Dunedin, Fla., dated May 1941, ibid.
soil Kalamazoo Division, Kalamazoo, Mich.), hereafter Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air) and Chief,
B-W Rpt. Bureau of Weapons, United States Naval Aviation,
4 Ibid., p. 46. 1 91 0—60, NAVWEPS 00—80P—l (Washington: Department
°°
Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, Pearl Harbor to Guadal. of the Navy, 1960), p. 66.
canal, p. 32.
64
Ibid., p. 69.
Col John Kaluf hr to Director, M.C. History, dated °°Tierney and Gill, Marine Corps Aviation, p. 4.
19 January 1971 (Developmental History Comment File, Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, Pearl Harbor to Guadal-
v.II, Archives, HRS, HD, HQMC), hereafter Kaluf canal, p. 47.
Comments. °°
Major General Commandant rpt to Secretary of the
CMC Itr to Senior Member, Navy Department Navy, 15 August 1939, Subject: "Annual report of the
Continuing Board for Development of Landing Boats, condition and service of the U.S. Marine Corps, fiscal
dated 18 May 1938 (Accession No. 65A—4939, Record year ending 30 June 1939."
Group 127, WNRC, Suitland, Md.). °°
CMC rpt to Assistant Secretary of the Navy, dated
° MajGen E.P. Moses hr to Assistant Chief of Staff, 7 April 1959, op. cit.
G—3 Division, HQMC, dated 11 April 1957 (HRS, HD, ° Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, Pearl Harbor to Guadal.
HQMC). canal, p. 17.
°4B.W Rpt, pp. 47-48. °°Ibid,p. 18.
 Chapter IV

Samuel I. Rosenman, comp., The Public Papers and 10 Major Charles S. Nichols, Jr. and Henry I. Shaw, Jr.,
Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, v. 9—War and Aid Okinawa: Victory in the Pacific (Washington: HistBr,
to Democracies (New York: Macmillan Company, 1941). G—3, HQMC, 1955), p. 264.
p. 264. "LtCol Whitman S. Bartley, Iwo Jima: Amphibious
Capt W.S. Pye, "Joint Army and Navy
USN, Epic (Washington: HistBr, G—3, HQMC, 1954), p. 206.
Operations—Part I," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. Isely and Crowl, Amphibious War, p. 503.
50, no. 12 (December 1924), p. 1967. 19
Nichols and Shaw, op. cit., p. 270.
Division of Operations and Training, HQMC (Box 2, 29
U.S. Navy, Bureau of Aeronautics, World EVar II
Accession No. 65A—4939, Record Group 127, WNRC, Administrative History, v. XX—Marine Corps Aviation
Suitland, Md.). (Washington, 1957), pp. 91—92, hereafter BuAer Admin
'Maj Earl H. Ellis, 712D-Operation Plan approved by Hist.
Major General Commandant, dated 23 July 1921 (HAF 21BuAer Admin Hist, v. XX, p. 98.
No. 165, Breckinridge Library, Quantico, Va.). Maj John H. Johnstone, United States Marine Corps
Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Bernard C. Nalty, and Edwin T. Parachute Units (Washington: HistBr, G—3, HQMC
Turnbladh, History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in 1962), p. 7.
World War II, v. Ill—Central Pacific Drive (Washington: "BuAer Admin Hist, v. XX, p. 99.
HistBr, G—3, HQMC, 1966), pp. 4—5, hereafter Shaw,
21
Ibid., p. 100.
Nalty, and Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive.
23
LtGen Roy S. Geiger ltr to CMC, dated 21 August
o
CMC rpt to Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1946 (Serial 0265—46, Box 11, Accession No. 14051, Record
dated 7 April 1959, Subject: "The Evolution of Modern Group 127, WNRC, Suitland, Md.).
Amphibious Warfare" (HAF, Breckinridge Library, a CMC ltr to Chairman, Special Board, dated 13
Quantico, Va.). September 1946 (Serial 03A25646, bc. cit.).
Office of Naval Research, U.S. Navy Department,
27
As quoted in LtGen James P. Berkeley, "The
"The History of United States Naval Research and Modern Concept of Vertical Envelopment," Naval
Devclopment in World War II," MS. Historical Staff Engineers Journal, v. 77, no. 3 (June 1965), pp. 367—376,
Study, University of Pittsburgh (Navy Department hereafter Berkeley, "Vertical Envelopment."
Library, Washington, D.C.), p. 294.
29
CMC hr to Chairman, Special Board, dated 13
°
Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval September 1946, op. cit.
Operations in World War II, v. XIV—Victory in the 29
Chairman, Special Board rpt, w/ enclosures A.E, to
Pacific, 1945 (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1960), CMC, dated 16 December 1946 (HAF, Breckinridge
p. 63. Library, Quantico, Va.), hereafter SpecBrd Rpt.
'U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Aviation, General, 30
SpecBrd Rpt, enclosure C, p 7.
1940 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1940), p. '1lbid., p. 11.
CMC ltr to Commandant, MCS, dated 19 December
'°CMC ltr to Senior Member of the Board to 1946, Subject: Study of Helicopters and Large Seaplanes
Re-Examine the Adequacy of the Present Concept of in Amphibious Warfare, with Special Board Report as
Missions and Functions of the Marine Corps, dated 11 enclosure (Serial 008A3546, HAF, Breckinridge Library,
October 1945, Subject: U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey- Quantico, Va.).
Japan (Serial MC—558459, Marine Barracks, Quantico, Ibid.
Va.). It should be noted that this letter and enclosures Commandant, MCS ltr to CMC, w/ enclosure, dated
svere reprinted as a report by a board headed by Colonel 10 March 1947 (Serial 001120, bc. cit.).
Merrill B. Twining. The board's report was entitled "An Ibid., p. 2.
Evaluation of Air Operations Affecting the U.S. Marine '°!bid., p.1.
Corps in World War II," hereafter Twining Board 32
Chief of Naval Operations dispatch to CMC, dated
Report. November 1947 (Serial 221351Z, bc. cit.).
'
11
Twining Board Report, p. 111—27.
Maj WE. Sullivan, Jr., "History and Development of
CMC ltr to Commanding Officer, MC. Air Station,
Quantico, Va., dated 3 December 1947 (Serial 007A33547
Close Air Support," Marine Corps Gazette, v. 40, no. 11 and DA—0022470 (bc. cit.).
(November 1956), p. 20. Lynn Montross, Cavalry of the Sky: The Story oJ
"LtCol Keith B. McCutcheon, "Close Air Support U.S. Marine Combat Helicopters (New York: Harper &
SOP," Marine Corps Gazette, v. 29, no. 8 (August 1945), Brothers, 1954), p• 80, hereafter Montross, Cavalry of the
'
p. 48.
Maj Charles \V. Boggs, Jr., Marine Aviation in the
Sky. It should be noted that Mr. Montross was a
historian, Head of the Korean History Unit of the
Philippines (Washington: HD, HQMC, 1951), p. 61. Historical Branch of the U.S. Marine Corps, at the time
05
McCutcheon, op. cit. he wrote this work. The book, published nearly 20 years

121
122 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970
ago, is still the most readable work on the subject of 4° HMX—1 SqnHist, p. 8.
Marines and helicopters. This portion of the chapter on Montross, Cavalry 0/the Sky, p. 91.
the development of doctrine and early history of the MCS, "Amphibious Operations—Employment of Heli-
helicopter is primarily based on Mr. Montross' book. copters (Tentative)," NAVMC—4544, No. 31 in a Series on
Original sources were checked but all leads to these Amphibious Operations, 1948 (HAF No. 243, Breckin.
sources came from the Montross book. ridge Library, Quantico, Va.), p. 1, hereafter Phib—31.
4°
HMX—l Squadron History, 1 December 1947—31 MCS, Junior Course, "The Employment of Helicop.
December 1949 (Box 2, Accession No, 64A—3731, Record ters in the Amphibious Attack," [1947] (Brcckinridge
Group 127, WNRC, Suitland, Md.), p. 1, hereafter Library, Quantico, Va.).
HMX—1 SqnHist. 4° Phi b—31, preface.
HMX—1 SqnHist, p. 1. 4°tbid.
HMX—1 rpt on Operation PACKARD II, Amphibious
Command Post Exercise, 10—26 May 1948 (Box 2, Montross, Cavalry of the Sky, p. 97.
Accession No. 64A—3731, Record Group 127, WNRC, HMX—1 rpt on Operation PACKARD III, 18—24 May
Suitland, Md.), pp. 1—1, 1—2). 1949 (Box 2, Accession No. 64A—3731, Record Group 127,
'3lbid., p. 111—7. WNRC, Suitland, Md.), p. VI—!.
Ibid., p. V—2. 4°
Montross, Cavalry of the Sky, p. 108.
 Chapter V

1 MCS 1—9, Organization of the U.S. Marine Corps "Ibid.

(MCDEC, MCS, Quantico, Va., July 1967), p. 12. "Berkeley, "Vertical Envelopment," p. 375.
Report of General Officers' Conference, HQMC, dated "Meid and Yingling, "Operations in West Korea,"
21 August 1953 (Breckinridge Library, Quantico, Va.), op. cit.
p. 1, hereafter Rpt of General Officers, 1953. '° Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Korean War,
MCS 1—9, op. cit. U.S. Pacific Fleet Operations, Chapter lO—"Fleet Marine
Rpt of General Officers, 1953, p. 1. Force-Air," Interim Evaluation Report No. 4, 1 January
Montross, Cavalry of the Sky, pp. 109—110. 1952—30 June 1952 (Archives, HRS, HD, HQMC), p. 10—
Lynn Montross, "Flying Windmills in Korea," Marine 85.
Corps Gazette, v. 37, no. 9 (September 1953), p. 20. "MC. Landing Force and Development Center Project
'LtCoI Pat Meid and Maj James M. Yingling, "U.S. No. T—727, Subject: Fuel Handling in Amphibious
Marine Operations in Korea, 1950—1953", v. V—"Opera- Operations (Breckinridge Library, Quantico, Va.).
tions in West Korea," MS. (HD, HQMC), unpaged. "Annual Rt of CMC, 1954, p. V—4.
'Thid. M.C. Equipment Board-M.C. Development Center,
'ibid. Status Report, dated April 1956 (Breckinridge Library,
'
'°lbid.
Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Korean War,
Quantico, Va.).
"Annual Rt of CMC, 1957, pp. 63—64.
U.S. Pacific Fleet Operations, Chapter 9—"Fleet Marine "Annual Rpt of CMC, 1959, p. 11.
Force-Ground," Interim Evaluation Report No. 4, 1
"Deputy Chief of Staff (RD&S) memo to Director,
January 1952—30 june 1952 (Archives, HRS, HD, M.C. History, dated 25 November 1970 (HD, HQMC).
HQMC).
12
Rpt of General Officers, 1953, p. 109. "Rpt of General Officers, 1953, Shepherd address.
"Marine Corps Order 3900.1A, dated 14 November
'
"U.S. Pacific Fleet, Korean War, Chapter 9, op. cit.
MC. Test Unit #1, Unit Diary, dated 2 September 1956, Subject: Marine Corps Research, Development, and
Testing.
1954 (HD, HQMC).
"Annual Rt of CMC, 1955, p. 9. "U.S. Department of the Navy, Office of Naval
"Annual Rt of CMC, 1957, pp. 61—62. Research, A Study of the Marine Corps R & D Pro gram—
"CMC ltr to Commanding General, Fleet Marine Final Report, Volumes Ii through VIII, pp. 11:19:42—43,
Force, Atlantic; Commanding General, Fleet Marine under ONR Contract Authority Identification No. NR
Force, Pacific; Commandant, MCS, dated 30 April 1956, 259—068/1—37—67 (Code 463), July 1967, hereafter Office
Subject: Fleet Marine Force Organization and Com- of Naval Research, M.C. Research & Development.
position Board (Serial AO3A—cec, VE 23.2.N121312/l, "Ibid.
Archives, HRS, HD, HQMC). 41
RAdns Julius Augustus Furer, USN, Administration
"Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Fleet Operations of the Navy Department in World War ii (Washington:
& Readiness) memo to Chief of Naval Operations, dated Office of Naval History, 1959), p. 587.
21 September 1955 (Serial OP—343/at, TAB 29, VE
23.2.N1213112/2, Archives, HRS, HD, HQMC). "Office of Naval Research, M.C. Research & Develop-
"Ibid.. mnent, p. 11—20.
"CMC cover ltr to Distribution List, w/ Hogaboom "Capt L. S. Howeth, USN (Ret.), History of Corn.
Rpt enclosed, dated 7 January 1957 (Serial AD 2513—reg, munications-Electronics in the United States Navy
VE 23.2.Nl213l2/l, Archives, HRS, HD, HQMC), (Washington: Bureau of Ships and Office of Naval
hereafter enclosure will be cited as Hogaboom Rpt. History, 1963), pp. 434—435).
"Hogaboom Rpt, Section E, Pt. 11—14.
"Table of Organization No. M—1990, revised No. 1,
'Ibid., p. 435.
"Office of Naval Research, M.C. Research & Develop-
dated 11 July 1963, Subject: Marine Division, Fleet mnent, p. 11—20.
Marine Force. "Col MB. Twining memo to Executive Director,
"Hogaboon Rt, Section B, pt. V11—3. Marine Corps Board, dated 1 February 1950, Subject:
"ibid., Pt. 111—2. Study on Coordination of Amphibious Development
"LtGen William K. Jones ltr to Director, M.C. Activities (Breckinridge Library, Quantico, Va.).
History, dated 4 February 1971 (Developmental History "Board of General Officers, Findings and Recom-
Comment File, v. II, Archives, HRS, HD, HQMC), mendations, dated 18 july 1950, Subject: Program for
hereafter Jones Comments. Coordination aiid Integration of Marine Corps De-
"U.S. Marine Corps, Division of Information, A Brief velopmental Activities (Serial 007Dl9950, Breckinridgc
History of SATS (Washington: Division of Information, Library, Quantico, Va.).
HQMC, 1965). U.S. Department of Defense, Office of l'ublic

123
124 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970
Information, Release No. 1287—51, dated 27 September "Office of Naval Research, M.C. Research & Develop.
1951 (Breckinridge Library, Quantico, Va.). nent. p. 11—22.
'9Annual Rt of CMC, 1955, p. 15. DC/S (RD&-S) memo to Director, M.C. History, dated
50Marine Corps General Order No. 107, dated 11 25 November 1970, Subject: Draft Manuscript, "Develop-
March 1952. mental History of the United States Marine Corps, 1900—
"General Officers Conference, HQMC, 21 August 1970" (Developmental History Comment File, v. I
1953 (Breckinridge Library, Quantico, Va.). Archives, HRS, HD, HQMC).
 Chapter VI
1 Gen Oliver P. Smith ltr to Director, M.C. History, August 1969. Captain Parker had been platoon leader of
dated 21 September 1970 (Developmental History Com- 1/3/4.
ment File, v. I, Archives, HRS, HD, HQMC). 23
FMFPac, Operations of U.S. Marine Forces, Vietnam,
Dumas Malone and Basil Rauch, American and pp. 35—39; W.R. Corson, "Marine Combined Action Pro-
World Leaaership, 1940—1965 (New York: Appleton- gram in Vietnam" (Subject File: "Combined Action Pro-
Century-Crofts Publishers, 1965), p. 285. gram," HRS, HD, HQMC).
Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Sec- 24Ibid.
retary of Defense (Comptroller), Selected Manpower 27
Col Ralph F. Estey interview by author of 21 Sep-
Statistics (Washington: Department of Defense, OASD tember 1970.
(Comptroller) Directorate for Information Operations, 20
Bruce C. Allnutt, Marine Combined Action Capabili-
1972), p. 58. ties: The Vietnam Experience (McLean, Va.: Human
4LtCoI DL. Evans, Civil Affairs Branch, G—3, HQMC, Sciences Research Inc., 1969), p. 67.
February 1970. 27
LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation in
joint Chiefs of Staff, Dictionary of United States
1
Vietnam, 1962—1970," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,
Military Terms for Joint Usage, JCS Pub. 1 (Washing. v. 97, no. 819 (May 1971), pp. 122—155, hereafter Mc-
Lon: JCS, 1 August 1968). Cutcheon, "Marine Aviation."
°
U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual, United 23Ibid., pp. 145—146.
States Marine Corps, 1940 (Washington: Government 20lbid.
Printing Office, 1940), Section III, 1—11, p. 18. 20
Maj Robert V. Nicoli, "Fire Support Base Develop-
Ibid., Section III, 1—17, p. 32. ment," Marine Corps Gazette, v. 53, no. 9 (September
Capt Russel H. Stolfi, U.S. Marine Corps Civic Action 1969), p. 38.
Effort in Vietnam, March 1965 to March 1966 (Washing. jack Shulimson, "U.S. Marine Operations in Viet-
ton: HistBr, G—3, HQMC), p. 73. nam, july—December 1965," MS (Secret) (HD, HQMC),
LtCol D.L. Evans, jr., "USMC Civil Affairs in Viet- p. 4:44. Information used is unclassified.
nam, a Philosophical History," Marine Corps Gazette, 32
McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation," pp. 149—152.
v. 52, no. 3 (March 1968), p. 23. Office of Naval Research, M.C. Research & Develop-
10Ibid., p. 24. ment, p. 31.
11
Ibid., p. 22. 34Ibid.
12Ibid 88
Marine Corps Order 3900.3B, dated 26 August 1969,
'
78
Stolfi, op. cit., p. 36.
Capt William D. Parker, U.S. Marine Corps Civil
Subject: Marine Corps Research, Development, Test, and
Evaluation.
Affairs in I Corps, Republic of South Vietnam, April '° Office
of Naval Research, M.C. Research 6- Develop.
1966 to April 1967 (Washington: HD, HQMC, 1970), p. inent, p. 31.
12. 'TM.C. Development and Education Center pamphlet,
n Gen Lewis W. Walt, Strange War, Strange Strategy, 1971 (HD, HQMC).
A General's Report on Vietnam (New York: Funk and 18Chief of Staff memo, w/ enclosed book, to Distribu-
Wagnalls, 1970), p. 39. tion List, dated 15 July 1968, Subject: "Symposium
10
Stolfi, op. cit., pp. 37—38. Book, 1968 General Officers Symposium" (Secret)
Ibid., p. 52.
17
(Archives, HRS, HD, HQMC). Information used is un-
'
10Ibid., p. 53.
Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, Operations of U.S.
U.S.
classified.
Marine Corps Order 3120.3A, dated 18 August 1970,
Marine Forces, Vietnam, Overview and Index (Fleet Subject: "The Organization of Marine Air-Ground Task
Marine Force, Pacific), pp. 36—37, hereafter FMFPac, Forces."
Operations of U.S. Marine Forces, Vietnam. ° Col Thomas H. Miller, "Flying the Harrier," Marine
20
Cornelius D. Sullivan, George Fielding Eliot, Gordon
D. Gayle, and William R. Corson, The Vietnam War:
I Is Conduct and Higher Direction (Washington: The
'
Corps Gazette, v. 54, no. 5 (May 1969), p. 24.
ibid., p. 27.
42
"Congressional Action on FY 71 Major Weapons
Center for Strategic Studies, Georgetown University, Programs," Armed Forces Journal, v. 108, no. II (Feb.
1968), pp. 86—87. ruary 1971), pp. 30—31.
21Ibid., p. 88. Gen Wallace M. Greene, Jr., "A Long Range Marine
Capt William D. Parker interview by author of Corps Concept," dated 9 june 1965 (HD, HQMC).

125
 APPENDIX B

Bibliography

A Note about Sources a must for any writer-researcher in the field of amphibi.
ous warfare. The third source most worthy of mention
is contained in the "Monographs, Reports, Letters, and
For this writer, and as is generally the case, the pri- Memoranda" list. Some of the reports on landing exer-
mary source material for the hook is the most valuable. cises, particularly during the fleet exercises of the 1920s,
The titles of record sources listed below are self- are already contained in the HAF. However, miscellane-
explanatory. There arc, however, three particular sources ous reports and memoranda were found in the Records
worthy of special mention. Within the Naval History of the U.S. Marine Corps (Record Group 127) at the
l)ivision Operational Archives, there is a complete record National Archives and the General Correspondence files
of the correspondence of the General Board of the Navy. o Marine Corps Schools (Accession No. 62A—6573).
Record Groups 432, pertaining to the Marine Corps in The list of secondary sources of books and magazine
general, and 408, pertaining to advanced bases, overlap articles is not exhaustive but rather selective for the
by the nature of their contents. General Board corres- range of this book. The value of secondary sources to
pondence was most important inasmuch as it was little the writer is that they give him an appreciation of other
used by previous Marine Corps writers and researchers. viewpoints and approaches in telling a story.
With only a cursory glance at these records, the reader Suffice it to say, the critical comments by the re-
will become aware of the Marine Corps' position in its viewers of the draft manuscript were of supreme im-
relationship to the Department of the Navy during the portance. Most of the reviewers had participated in
first 45 years of this century. Another source is the nearly all of the period of Marine Corps history dis.
Historical Amphibious File (HAF) at Breckinridge Li- cussed. Their personal experiences in a specific exercise
brary. Containing nearly 1,000 documents, the 1-IAF en- or development of doctrine of weapon cannot be under-
compasses material from original doctrinal reports to estimated. Their valuable comments bolster the dictum
personal reports, observations, and letters. The HAF is that there is no substitute for personal experience.

PRIMARY SOURCES
Private Papers Marine Corps Photographic Centers, Washington Navy
Yard and Marine Corps Base, Quantico, Va.
John A. Lejeune—Library of Congress and Marine Corps
Museum Marine Corps Development and Education Center,
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WNRC) James Carson Breckinridge Library—
Navy Department Historical Amphibious File
Naval History Division—Operational Archives Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
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Corps Gazette, v. 37, no. 9 (September 1953). Lieutenant General Edward A. Craig, USMC (Ret.)
Maj Robert V. Nicoli. "Fire Support Base Development," Professor Philip A. Crowl, University of Nebraska
Marine Corps Gazette, v. 53, no. 9 (September 1969). Brigadier General Gale T. Cummings, USMC (Ret.)
Professor William A. Darden, U.S. Naval Academy
Raymond G. O'Connor. 'Naval Strategy in the 20th General Raymond G. Davis, USMC
Century," Naval War College Review, v. 21, no. 6 Lieutenant General Pedro A. del Valle, USMC (Ret.)
(February 1961). Brigadier General Edward C. Dyer, USMC (Ret.)
Capt W.S. Pye, USN. 'Joint Army and Navy Operations— Major General Paul J. Fontana, USMC
Part I," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 50, no. Lieutenant Colonel James L. Fowler, USMCR
12 (December 1924). Brigadier General Gordon D. Gayle, USMC (Ret.)
MajGen John H. Russell. "A Plea for a Mission and Colonel George C. Hamner, USMC (Ret.)
Doctrine," Marine Corps Gazette, v. 1, no. 6 (June Colonel Archibald Hanna, USMCR (Ret.)
1916). Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr., USMC (Ret.)
'The Birth of the Fleet Marine Force," U.S. Naval Brigadier General Frederick P. Henderson, USMC (Ret.)
Institute Proceedings, v. 72, no. 1 (January 1946). General Robert E. Hogaboom, USMC (Ret.)
William H. Russell. "The Genesis of Fleet Marine Force Major General Louis R. Jones, USMC (Ret.)
Doctrine: 1879—1899," Marine Corps Gazette, v. 35, Lieutenant General William K. Jones, USMC
nos. 4—7, 11 (April-July 1955; November 1955). Colonel John Kaluf, USMC (Ret.)
Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, USMC (Ret.)
Gen Holland M. Smith. "Development of Amphibious Lieutenant General Robert B. Luckey, USMC (Ret.)
Tactics in the U.S. Navy," Marine Corps Gazette, Brigadier General Arthur T. Mason, USMC (Ret.)
v. 32, nos. 6—10 (June-October 1948). Lieutenant General Keith B. McCutcheon, USMC
MajGen Paul R. Tyler. "The Marine Corps and Lee McFarland, Food Machinery Corporation
Amphibious Lift," Naval Engineers Journal, v. 77, Lieutenant General John C. McQueen, USMC (Ret.)
no. 3 (June 1965). Major General Louis Metzger, USMC
Capt Dion Williams. "The Defense of Our New Naval Lieutenant General Herman Nickerson, Jr., USMC (Ret.)
Stations," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, V. Colonel Franklin B. Nihart, USMC (Ret.)
XXVIII, no. 2 (June 1902). General Alfred H. Noble, USMC (Ret.)
Major General DeWitt Peck, USMC (Ret.)
Newspapers Major Thomas P. Redden, Jr., USMCR
Lieutenant Colonel Theophil P. Riegert, USMC
Baltimore Sun, 27 March 1908 Major General William W. Rogers, USMC (Ret.)
Boston Transcript, 2 December 1908 Professor William H. Russell, U.S. Naval Academy
Clearwater News, 27 March 1947 Major General Michael P. Ryan, USMC
The New York Times, 1 June 1969 Colonel Edward N. Rydalch, USMC (Ret.)
Washington Herald, 27 March 1909 Brigadier General Ronald D. Salmon, USMC (Ret.)
Washington Post, 4 December 1908 Colonel John A. Saxten, USMC (Ret.)
Washington Star, 17 February 1909 Professor Robert Seager II, Washington College
Washington Times, 15 January 1909 General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., USMC (Ret.)
Lieutenant General Merwin H. Silverthorn, USMC (Ret.)
REVIEWERS OF DRAFT MANUSCRIPT Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC
General Oliver P. Smith, USMC (Ret.)
Major General Norman J. Anderson; USMC Lieutenant General Edward W. Snedeker, USMC (Ret.)
Lieutenant General James P. Berkeley, USMC (Ret.) General Gerald C. Thomas, USMC (Ret.)
Brigadier General William N. Best, USMC (Ret.) Lieutenant Colonel Wilcomb E. Washburn, USMCR
Lieutenant General Thomas E. Bourke, USMC (Ret.) Major General Frank D. Wier, USMC (Ret.)
Lieutenant General Alpha L. Bowser, USMC (Ret.) Colonel Herbert H. Williamson, USMC (Ret.)
Major Lance J. Burton, USA Colonel Roger Willock, USMCR (Ret.)
Lieutenant Colonel Thomas M. Burton, USA Lieutenant General Louis E. Woods, USMC (Ret.)
Colonel Eugene F.C. Collier, USMC (Ret.) Lieutenant General Thomas A. Wornham, USMC (Ret.)
 APPENDIX C

Glossary of Abbreviations

AC/S Assistant Chief of Staff FMC Food Machinery Corporation

Adm Admiral FMF Fleet Marine Force
AEF American Expeditionary Force FMFLant Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic
AKA Attack Cargo Ship FMFPac Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
ALO Air Liaison Officer FSCC Fire Support Coordination Center
ALP Air Liaison Party FSR Force Service Regiment
Amphib CPX Amphibious Command Post FTP Fleet Training Publication
Exercise FY Fiscal Year
AO Aerial Observer C—B C—S Division (Assistant Chief of
ARG Advanced Research Group Staff, Operations and Training)
ARG/SLF Amphibious Ready Group/Special C—4 G—4 Division (Assistant Chief of
Landing Force Staff, Logistics)
ARVN Army, Republic of Vietnam GO General Order
ASRT Air Support Radar Team GVN Government of Vietnam
AWC Army War College HAF Historical Amphibious File
BASIC Battlefield Area Surveillance Hdqtrs Headquarters
Communication HistBr Historical Branch
BGen Brigadier General HD Historical Division
BLT Battalion Landing Team HMM Marine Medium Helicopter
Bu Bureau Squadron
B-W Borg-Warner (Corporation) HMX Marine Experimental Helicopter
CAC Combined Action Company Squadron
CAP Combined Action Platoon HQMC Headquarters Marine Corps
Capt Captain HRP—l Rescuer (Flying Banana),
CARE Cooperative for American Relief transport helicopter
Everywhere manufactured by Piasecki
CAS Close Air Support HRB Historical Reference Branch
Cdr Commander HRS Historical Reference Section
CC Commanding General HRS—l Observation helicopter,
CH—46D Sea Knight, medium transport manufactured by Sikorsky
helicopter manufactured by HTL—2 Training helicopter, manufactured
Boeing-Vertol by Bell
CH—53D Sea Stallion, heavy transport JASCO Joint Assault Signal Company
helicopter manufactured by JCC Joint Coordinating Council
Sikorsky JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
CMC Commandant of the Marine Corps LFASCU Landing Force Air Support
CMCS Commandant of Marine Corps Control Unit
Schools LANTAGLEX Atlantic-Air Ground Landing
CNA Center for Naval Analyses Exercise
CNO Chief of Naval Operations LCdr Lieutenant Commander
CO Commanding Officer LCM Landing Craft, Mechanized
Col Colonel LCVP Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel
CICR (Bureau of) Construction and LFB Landing Force Bulletin
Repair LFM Landing Force Manual
CRS Catholic Relief Services LHA Amphibious Assault Ship
CVE Escort Carrier (Multi-Purpose)
DASC Direct Air Support Center LPD Amphibious Transport, Dock
DCNO Deputy Chief of Naval Operations LPH Amphibious Assault Ship
DC/S Deputy Chief of Staff (Helicopter Transport)
DOD Department of Defense LSD Dock Landing Ship
ECEF East Coast Expeditionary Force LSM Landing Ship, Medium
FAC Forward Air Controller LST Landing Ship, Tank

133
134 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

LtCol Lieutenant Colonel Op(s) Operation(s)

LtGen Lieutenant General O&T Operations and Training
ltr letter OV—IOA Bronco, light armed
LVT Landing Vehicle Tracked reconnaissance aircraft
LVTP Landing Vehicle Tracked, manufactured by North
Personnel American
MAB Marine Amphibious Brigade PacFlt Pacific Fleet
MACV Military Assistant Command, PAT Political Action Team
Vietnam QM Quartermaster
MAF Marine Amphibious Force RAdm Rear Admiral
MAG Marine Aircraft Group RLT Regimental Landing Team
MAGTF Marine Air-Ground Task Force RD Revolutionary Development
Maj Major R-D Research and Development
MPQ—l4/TP Mobile Ground Multi-Purpose RD&S Research, Development, and
Radar Studies
MAU Marine Amphibious Unit RDT&E Research, Development, Test, and
MAW Marine Aircraft Wing Evaluation
MBT Main Battle Tank Regt Regiment
MCB Marine Corps Base Rev Revised
MCDC Marine Corps Development Center rpt Report
MCDEC Marine Corps Development and RVN Republic of \'ietnam
Education Command SATS Short Airfield for Tactical Support
MCEB Marine Corps Expeditionary SecNav Secretary of the Navy
Brigade SID Seismic Intrusion Detector
MCEC Marine Corps Education Center SOP Standing Operating Procedure
MCEF Marine Corps Expeditionary Force Sqdn Squadron
MCLFDA Marine Corps Landing Force STATE Simplified Tactical Approach
Development Activities Terminal
MCLFDC Marine Corps Landing Force TACC Tactical Air Command Center
Development Center TAF Tactical Air Force
MCM Marine Corps Manual TAOC Tactical Air Operations Center
MCO Marine Corps Order TDCC Tactical Data Communications
MCOAG Marine Corps Operations Analysis Central
Group T/E Table of Equipment
MCS Marine Corps Schools TIC Target Information Center
MCTU Marine Corps Test Unit TIP! Tactical Information Processing
MEDCAP Medical Civic Action Program Interpretation Systems
MLRP Marine Corps Long-Range Plan T/O Table of Organization
MMROP Marine Corps Mid-Range UH—IE Utility Helicopter, manufactured
Objectives Plan by Bell
MOREST Mobile Aircraft Arresting System UH—IG Hucv Cobra, helicopter gunship
MS. Manuscript manufactured by Bell
MTDS Marine Tactical Data System USA United States Army
NAVMCO Navy-Marine Corps Order UNAAF Unified Action Armed Forces
NCO Noncommissioned Officer USAID U.S. Agency for International
NDRC National Defense Research Development
Committee I'SFs United States Fleet series
NGF Naval Gunfire USHS United States Hospital Ship
NHD Naval History Division USMC United States Marine Corps
NOA Naval Operational Archives IJSN United States Navy
NVA North Vietnamese Army USS Umuited States Ship
NWC Naval War College v. volume
NWP Naval War Publication \'Adm Vice Admiral
OAB Operational Archives Branch \'C Viet Cong
OCMH Office of the Chief of Military 'MO Marine Observation Squadron
History V/STOI. Vertical, Short Take-Off and
OIC Officer in Charge Landing
ON! Office of Naval Intelligence WCEF West Coast Expeditionary Force
ONR Office of Naval Research WNRC Washington National Records
Op0 Operation Order Center
 APPENDIX D

Commandants of the Marine Corps in the Twentieth Century

Major General Charles Heywood 1891—1903 Lieutenant General Thomas Holcomb 1936—1943
Major General George F. Elliott 1903—1910 General Alexander A. Vandegrift 1944—1947
Major General William P. Biddle 1911—1914
General Clifton B. Cates 1948—1951
General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr. 1952—1955
Major General George Barnett 1914—1920
General Randolph McC. Pate 1956—1959
Major General John A. Lejeune 1920—1929 General David M. Shoup 1960—1963
Major General Wendell C. Neville 1929—1930 General Wallace M. Greene, Jr. 1964—1967
Major General Ben H. Fuller 1930—1934 General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr. 1968—1971
Major General John H. Russell, Jr. 1934—1936 General Robert E. Cushman, Jr. 1972—

135
 APPENDIX E

Commanders at Quantico

Commanders, Marine Barracks, Quantico, Virginia

Maj Chandler Campbell 14 May 1917—24 May 1917
Maj Julius S. Turrill 25 May 1917— 8 Jun 1917
Col Albertus W. Catlin 13 Jun 1917—26 Sep 1917
BGen John A. Lejeune 27 Sep 1917—23 May 1918
Col Smedley D. Butler 24 May 1918—20 Jun 1918
BGen Charles A. Doyen 21 Jun 1918— 5 Oct 1918
BGen Albertus W. Catlin 6 Oct 1918—11 Nov 1918
Col Dion Williams 12 Nov 1918—14 Nov 1918
BGen John T. Myers 15 Nov 1918—26 Oct 1919
MajGen John A. Lejeune 27 Oct 1919—29 Jun 1920
BGen Smedley D. Butler 30 Jun 1920— 4 Jan 1924
Col Ben H. Fuller 4 Jan 1924—10 Jan 1924
Col Charles S. Hill 11 Jan 1924—26 Feb 1924
BGen Dion Williams 27 Feb 1924—12 Aug 1924
MajGen Eli K. Cole 13 Aug 1924— 2 Jun 1927
MajGen Wendell C. Neville 3 Jun 1927—11 Dec 1928
BGen Harry Lee 12 Dec 1928—30 Jan 1929
MajGen Wendell C. Neville 31 Jan 1929— 4 Mar 1929
BGen Harry Lee 5 Mar 1929—23 Apr 1929
BGen Smedley D. Butler 24 Apr 1929—30 Sep 1931
BGen Randolph C. Berkeley 1 Oct 1931— 7 Nov 1931
Col James J. Meade 8 Nov 1931—27 Nov 1931
LtCol Andrew B. Drum 28 Nov 1931—30 Nov 1931
BGen John H. Russell 1 Dec 1931—29 Jan 1933
BGen James C. Breckinridge 30 Jan 1933—28 Feb 1933
BGen Harry Lee 1 Mar 1933—13 May 1935
Col Henry M. Manney, Jr. 14 May 1935—19 May 1935
BGen Thomas Holcomb 20 May 1935—17 Jun 1935
BGen Charles H. Lyman 18 Jun 1935—23 Jun 1937
MajGen James C. Breckinridge 24 Jun 1937—24 Sep 1939
MajGen Louis McC. Little 25 Sep 1939—31 Jan 1942
Muster Rolls do not show a commanding officer or commanding general for. the period 1 Feb 1942 to 2
Oct 1942. BGen Samuel M. Harrington is shown as CMCS. BGen julian C. Smith is shown as Commanding General,
TTC.
MajGen Philip H. Torrey 2 Oct 1942—31 May 1946
MajGen Clifton B. Cates 1 Jun 1946—30 Dec 1947
BGen Oliver P. Smith 31 Dec 1947— 4 Apr 1948
MajGen Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr .. 26 Apr 1948—31 May 1948

Commandants, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia

MajGen Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr.
MajGen Franklin A. Hart
-- ... 1 Jun 1948—16 Jun 1950
1 Jul 1950—22 Feb 1951
LtGen Franklin A. Hart .._ 23 Feb 1951—31 Dec 1951
LtGen Clifton B. Cates ... 1 Jan 1952—30 Jun 1954
LtGen Gerald C. Thomas 1 Jul 1954—31 Dec 1955
LtGen Edwin A. Pollock 1 Jan 1956—22 Jul 1956
LtGen Merrill B. Twining 13 Sep 1956—30 Oct 1959

137
138 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970
LtGen Edward W. Snedeker 31 Oct 1959—30 Jun 1963
LtGen Frederick L. Wieseman 1 Jul 1963—30 Jun 1966
LtGen James M. Masters, Sr. 1 Jul 1966—31 Dec 1967

Commanding Generals, Marine Corps Development and

Education Command, Quantico. Virginia
LtGen James M. Masters, Sr. 1 Jan 1968—30 Jun 1968
LtCen Lewis J. Fields 1 Jul 1968—30 Jun 1970
LtGen Raymond G. Davis 1 Jul 1970—11 Mar 1971
LtGen William G. Thrash 12 Mar 1971—30 Jun 1972
LtGen Robert P. Keller 1 Jul 1972—
 APPENDIX F

Outline of the Development of the Landing Operations Manual*

1921—OPlan 712—Advanced Base Operations in Micro- based on all levels of command, from the attack force
nesia—Major Earl H. Ellis. down through the force, division, brigade, regiment, and
1925—Major S.M. Harrington—compiled study of small battalion.
wars entitled The Strategy and Tactics of Small Wars." Instructors at MCS were directed to rewrite all their
This publication presented certain principles of landing material and gear it to the Corps' T/O and T/E.
operations as they applied to small wars. Only 5 percent Instruction material in pamphlet form was written, but
of instruction at MCS concerned itself with landing not a single manual.
operations of any kind. During the remainder of 1931 and 1932 this writing
1926—By this year instruction in landing operations and other revolutionary measures, although modified
increased to 49 hours and increased thereafter. considerably before they were adopted, had a far.
1927—l928--MCS completely revised and expanded reaching effect upon the schools. The CMC summarized
courses on landing operations. this small revolution in his annual report to SecNav for
Early l927—MCS recommended establishment of an the FY ending 30 June 1933:
advanced course for the study of expeditionary opera- Problems were based on Marine Corps units and
tions pertaining to USMC. CMC approved but owing to equipment.
lack of personnel, course not established. Certain personnel were designated to prepare text
Early 1929—CMC directed that in September 1929 a books and pamphlets to cover fields of service for
class of four field officers be assembled at the MCS for which no Marine texts existed. Support by naval
study and preparation of plans for small wars and gunfire and other naval agencies was developed in
expeditions. In July, however, the CMC found that no greater detail, and a closer relationship with the
officers were available and thereby disapproved of the NWC was maintained. More effort was placed on the
establishment of this class. development of comprehensive courses on landing
1930—Map problems of Oahu, Southern California, operations and small wars.
etc.,were now changed to be included as landing Recommendations of a special board on naval
operations and coordination with the Naval War College gunfire in support of landings were the basis of
had begun. NWC assumed that when an advanced base future experimental firings conducted by the Navy.
was to be seized it would be seized by Marines. Units of measurement for computing cargo re-
No detailed consideration of the seizure had been quirements for military equipment.
given. A system of cargo measurements and classification
At the MCS it had been assumed that the Marines in of equipment to facilitate the determination of cargo
effecting a landing would be supported by naval gunfire. requirements and the loading of a ship to meet
The Field Officers Course general problem was to solve tactical requirements.
the occupation and defense of a naval base. This Preparation of reference data sheets.
problem was presented to the Field Officers Course by Establishment of standard boat capacities for
NWC in advance so that the solution of the schools landing operations based on specific data.
could be forwarded to the NWC in time for incorpora- 1933—The Gallipoli operation had formed an impor-
tion in the naval problem when discussed by the classes tant part of the background in research on landing
there. operations. Early in 1933, each student was issued a copy
1931—A banner year for MCS. A special board was of the British official history of the Gallipoli Campaign.
appointed in 1931 for the express purpose of critically The hook, being the latest and most accurate publication
examining the entire curriculum of the schools. Classes on the subject, was used as a source book.
continued to meet in their normal manner while the The Gallipoli Course was organized, 3 March to 5
board prepared its recommendations for changes and April 1933, to acquaint the students with the Gallipoli
improvements. Campaign, to train them in military research, and to
In 1931, a considerably revised schedule was adopted provide the schools and through them the Marine Corps
for the following school year (1932). Instruction based on with material of value on a campaign which was in
material of the Command and General Staff School at many respects of the type that the Marine Corps was
Fort Benning was discarded or revised to conform with expected to be expert in.
Marine Corps organization and material. Instruction was Between 1919 and 1933, the Joint Army-Navy Board
had promulgated several manuals prescribing methods
*War Plans Section, Division of O&T, HQMC (Box 3, for Army and Navy cooperation in joint overseas
Accession No. 65A—4939, WNRC, Suitland, Md.). expeditions. ("Joint Army and Navy Action in Coast

I 89
140 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970
Defense") ("Joint Action of the Army and Navy"—23 prefaced by a general discussion of landing operations
April 1927) ("Joint Overseas Expeditions"—l2 January and the purpose of the manual; (2) Staff Functions,
1933) Logistics, and Plans and Orders; and (3) Training. In
The 1933 pamphlet's purpose was to "present a set of addition, separate sections were assigned on naval
general principles for the planning and conduct of joint activities and aviation, plus the usual appendices at-
overseas expeditions in order to insure the most effective tendant to such a manual.
cooperation and coordination between Army and Navy 28Mar34—Committees that had been at work in earnest
forces participating therein," The directives contained in submitted to the CMC the first parts of the manual.
the manual were concerned with the techniques and l3Jun34—Last chapters submitted to CMC. For the
agencies for cooperation and with the respective functions school year (1934—35) the "Tentative Manual for Landing
of each service in the conduct of joint operations. But a Operations" was used at MCS for all theoretical
manual on landing operations (that is, how to do it) was instruction in landing operations. This 1934 edition was
still lacking. in mimeograph format.
29Sep33—CMC recommended that all classes be dis- Jul34—Title changed to "Manual for Naval Overseas
continued and that students and staff alike devote all Operations" and published by Navy Department.
time and effort towards the production of a landing l5May35—Board for Revision of Manual was convened
operations manual. at MCS headed by Lieutenant Colonel Charles D.
300ct33—CMCS received a directive from CMC to Barrett.
prepare a manual on landing operations as expeditiously 9Jul35—A revised manual with photographs, better
as possible and to commence work not later than 15 sketches, etc., was approved by the CNO 25 May 1935
November. and distributed by the CMC throughout the Marine
l4Nov33—Classes were discontinued and the staff and Corps, Navy, and outside agencies with a "Restricted"
students commenced work on the manual. classification. This 1935 edition became the first widely
How it was done: distributed, official publication of the Tentative Landing
a. Instructors/students wrote Out a chronological, item- Operations Manual.
ized list of the things to be done from the inception to l5Jun36—A board headed by Lieutenant Colonel
the tactical completion of a landing operation. Keller E. Rockey (including Lieutenant Colonels Archie
b. Committee of nine was appointed to consider these F. Howard and Alfred H. Noble) was convened to revise
papers and to draw up a consolidated list embracing all the Tentative Landing Operations Manual.
recommendations and to group them under headings. 26May37—CMC sent to CNO report of Board on Re-
Each member of the committee formulated his own list vision of Tentative Landing Operations Manual.
based on the results of his study of all papers submitted. 21Jun37—Complete with revisions, the Tentative Land.
c. Each of these lists was in turn studied by another ing Operations Manual was issued under the technically
committee of five, who further consolidated the recom- correct new title of Landing Operations Doctrine, U.S.
mendations and produced a rough outline for the Navy, 1937. (This edition does not seem to have had a
manual. general distribution.)
9Jan34—Officers from FMF, HQMC, and Quantico l5May38—A Marine Corps board for revision of Land-
participated in a conference with respect to the outline. ing Operations Doctrine, U.S. Navy, 1937, was convened
The outline/manual was based on experience, both to make recommendations for new printing of the man-
personal and that culled from reports of landing ual for FY 1939. Heading the board 'as Lieutenant
operations, experimentation, and the evolution of Colonel Alfred H. Noble, with Captain Francis M.
instruction and problems at the MCS. Some 70 officers McAlister, and Quartermaster Clerk Percy H. Uhlinger
from lieutenants to brigadier generals attended the (A&I), also recorder of original board).
meeting—including four Navy officers and one Army 25Nov38—CMC authorizes destruction of Tentative
officer. Landing Operations Manual. This manual, the 1935
Following the conference, the manual was divided into version, and the technically correct edition entitled
six subsections and responsibility for writing those Landing Operations Doctrine, U.S. Navy, 1937 were sup-
sections was assigned to various committees. The bulk of erseded by the issuance of the Fleet Training Publica-
the manual was grouped under three general headings: tion (FTP) #167. FTP #167 was also known as Landing
(1) Tactics, whih included landing and defense of bases, Doctrine, U.S. Navy, 1938.
 APPENDIX G

Students and Instructors Who Were Assigned to MCS During

Preparation of Tentative Landing Operations Manual—
November 1933 through May 1934*

BGen James C. Breckinridge CMCS

Col Ellis B. Miller ACMCS
Col Edward W. Banker Student (Joined Jan34)
LtCol Calhoun (N) Ancrum Student
LtCol Lauren S. Willis Student
Maj Cecil S. Baker Instructor (Joined Apr34)
Maj David S. Barry, Jr. Student
Maj Robert Blake Instructor
Maj Henry M. Butler Student
Maj Woolman G. Emory Instructor (Joined Apr34)
Maj Louis E. Fagan, Jr. Student
Maj George C. Hamner Director of Correspondence Class
Maj Earl H. Jenkins Instructor (Joined Apr34)
Maj Roy D. Lowell Student
Maj John Marston Director, First Year Class
Maj Charles J. Miller Chief of Section F—3
Maj Harold L. Parsons Director, Second Year Class
Maj Roger W. Peard Student
Maj DeWitt Peck Instructor
Maj Harold C. Pierce Student
Maj Lowry B. Stephenson Instructor (Joined May 34)
Maj Thad T. Taylor Student
Maj Wilbur Thing Student
Maj Thomas E. Thrasher, Jr. Chief of Section F—I, •F—2
Maj Samuel A. Woods, Jr. Instructor
Capt Edward L. Burwell, Jr. Student
Capt Eugene F.C. Collier Instructor
Capt Ralph W. Culpepper Student
Capt Gale T. Cummings Instructor
Capt Thomas B. Gale Instructor
Capt Alexander Galt Instructor Uoined May 34)
Capt Charles C. Gill Instructor
Capt John Kaluf Instructor (Joined Feb34)
Capt Robert M. Montague Officer in Charge Reproduction
Capt Stewart B. O'Neill Student (Joined Jan34)
Capt Albert W. Paul Instructor
Capt Edward S. Shaw Student
Capt Norman E. True Student
lstLt Samuel S. Ballentine Student (Joined May34)
lstLt William 0. Brice Student
lstLt Pierson E. Conradt Student
lstLt William H. Doyle Student
lstLt Roy M. Gulick Student
lstLt Ernest E. Linsert Student
lstLt Louis E. Marie Instructor
lstLt Arthur T. Mason Instructor

Muster Roll of Officers and Enlisted Men, Marine Corps Schools Detachment, Marine Barracks, Quantico, Va.,
1 November 1933 to 31 May 1934 (HRS, HD, HQMC).

141
142 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

lstLt Vernon E. Megee Instructor

lstLt John C. McQueen Instructor
lstLt Lyman G. Miller Student
lstLt Edwin A. Pollock Instructor
lstLt Frank D. Weir Student
lstLt Walter W. Wensinger Instructor
 APPENDIX H

List of Participants in Conference Held at Quantico, Virginia on

9 January 1934 for Purpose of Discussing Tentative Landing
Operations Manual*

Conference convened at 0900. Maj Roy D. Lowell

Maj John Marston
Present: Maj Charles J. Miller
From Headquarters, Marine Corps, Washington, D.C. Maj Harold L. Parsons
LtCol Bennet Puryear, Jr. Maj Roger W. Peard
Maj Charles D. Barrett Maj DeWitt Peck
Maj Roy S. Geiger Maj Harold C. Pierce
Maj Ralph J. Mitchell Maj Thad T. Taylor
Maj Allen B. Turnage Maj Wilbur Thing
Maj LeRoy P. Hunt Maj Thomas E. Thrasher, Jr.
Maj Harry E. Pickett Map Samuel A. Woods, Jr.
Capt Thomas E. Bourke Capt Edward L. Burwell
Capt Francis F. Mulcahy Capt Eugene F.C. Collier
From Fleet Marine Force, Quantico, Va. Capt Ralph W. Culpepper
BGen Charles H. Lyman Capt Gale T. Cummings
LtCol Robert L. Denig Capt Thomas B. Gale
Maj Harold S. Fassett Capt Charles C. Gill
Maj Leander A. Clapp Capt Robert M. Montague
Maj Alexander A. Vandegrift Capt Albert W. Paul
Maj Lloyd L. Leech Capt Edward S. Shaw
Capt Henry D. Linscott Capt Norman E. True
Capt Bernard Lutel lstLt William 0. Brice
From Post Headquarters lstLt Pierson E. Conredt
LtCol Philip H. Torrey lstLt William H. Doyle
Maj Earl I. Buse lstLt Roy M. Gulick
Capt Chaplain G. Hicks lstLt Ernest E. Linsert
From Marine Corps Schools lstLt Louis E. Marie
BGen James C. Breckinridge lstLt Arthur T. Mason
Col Ellis B. Miller lstLt Vernon E. Megee
LtCol Calhoun Ancrum lstLt John C. McQueen
Maj David S. Barry, Jr. lstLt Lyman C. Miller
Maj Robert Blake lstLt Edwin A. Pollack
Maj Henry M. Butler lstLt Frank D. Weir
Maj Louis E. Fagan, Jr. lstLt. Walter \V. Wensinger
Maj George C. Hamner LCdr Thomas V. Cooper, USN
LCdr Clifford G. Richardson, USN
Lt Harold E. McCarthy, USN
'Correspondence File 1520—30—120 (Record Group 127, Lt Joseph H. Seyfried, USN
National Archives). lstLt John H. Stadler, USA

143
 APPENDIX I

Fleet Marine Force Organization and Composition Board

(Hogaboom Board) Members(*)

MajGen Robert E. Hogaboom—President Col William K. Jones

BGen Ronald D. Salmon Col Allan Sutter
Col Cliff Atkinson, Jr. Col David W. Stonecliffe
Col Frederick P. Henderson Col Odell M. Conoley
Col Henry H. Crockett Col William R. Campbell
Col Norman J. Anderson Col Herbert H. Wil1iar.son
Col Keith B. McCutcheon
Col Bruce T. Hemphill
CMC ltr to CG's FMFLant, FMFPac, dtd 30 April Col Lewis W. Walt
1956, AO3A—cec, 03C9756. Maj Frank R. Young—Recorder

145
 APPENDIX J

Citation to Accompany the Award of The Medal of Merit to

Donald Roebling

DONALD ROEBLING, for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services to the
United States. Mr. Roebling conceived, developed, and perfected an amphibian vehicle capable of traversing both land
and water, presented it to the Government of the United States and released it for manufacture without compensation.
Conceived originally in December 1934, for humanitarian purposes as-a means of carrying emergency supplies to inun-
dated and isolated areas in Florida during the hurricane seasons, and completed after 5 years of intensive research, tire-
less effort, and tremendous personal expense, his fourth model, the "Roebling Alligator" is the forerunner of all am-
phibian tractors constructed for the Navy, the Marines, the Army, and Lend-Lease. The Roebling Amphibian Tractor
contributed to the success of our armed forces in Africa, and in addition, rendered valuable service during landings on
the Pacific Ocean Islands, and with its unique ability to negotiate surf and beach terrain, moved supplies and equip-
ment to otherwise inaccessible locations, broke trails through the jungle and formed pontoons for temporary bridges
permitting the passage of troops. Mr. Roebling's unselfish devotion to the perfecting of an effective war weapon, re-
leased without thought of benefit to himself, was a vital and inspiring contribution to the defense of his country.

/S/ HARRY TRUMAN

THE WHITE HOUSE
December 18, 1946.

147
 INDEX

Abbott, Willis J. 2 Assistant Chief of Staff, C—S 66

Adams, Charles F. 43 Assistant Chief of Staff, G—4 109
'Additional Notes on Field Work Construction for Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air) 109
Advanced Bases" 14 Assistant R—2 51
Adjutant and Inspector's Division 28 Assistant Secretary of the Navy 2, 17
Adjutant and Inspector of the Marine Corps 7 Assistant to the Commandant 22
Administration of the Navy Department in World War Atlantic Coast 12, 30, 49
1161 Atlantic Fleet 16—17
Advanced base 21, 36 Atlantic Fleet Exercises 18, 78
Advanced base operations 64 Atomic Proving Ground, 85
"Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia, 1921" 64—65 Aviation Section 29, 58
Advanced base problems 45, 65 Azores 23—24
"Advanced Bases" 14
Advanced Base School 13, 16, 18 Badger, RAdni Charles J. 21
"Advance Base Training" 14 Bailey, Professor Thomas A. 26
Advanced base work 29 Baker, Benjamin Standish 6
Advanced Research Group 93 Baker, LtCol Clarence M. 113
Agency for International Development 101 Barnett, Col George 19, 21; MajGen, 15
Aguinaldo I Barrett, Maj Charles D. 31, 43; LtCol, 46; BGen, 51
Aide-for-Operations 43 Battle of Britain 61
Air Force, United States 68, 77, 79, 89, 92 Battle of Gettysburg 31
Air Group 47 Battle of the Wilderness 30
Air Liaison Parties (ALPS) 68 Bay Head 49
Air Weapons Systems Branch 112 Beard, Charles A. 42
Aleutians 26 Beaufort 88, 113
Alligator 54,91 Beetle boat 33
America 1,26, 41—42, 61, 96 Belgium 24—25
American Republic 41 Bell Aircraft Corporation 75
American Expeditionary Forces 22—23 Bell, MajGen J, Franklin 12, 75
Amphibious Assault Fuel System 90 Bell, Lawrence D. 75
"Amphibious Operations—Employment of Helicopters Berkeley, B1'.en Randolph C. 43—44
(Tentative)" 77 Biddle, MajGen William P. 17—18
Ancrum, LtCol Calhoun 46 Bikini Lagoon 71
Annapolis 10, 36 Bingham, Col Theodore A. 1
Ansel, Lt Walter C. 44 "Black Thursday" 41
Antietam 31 Blatt, Capt Wallace D. 78
Armistice Day 22 Bloodsworth Island 66
Army, United States 5, 8, 10, 12—13, 18, 27—28, 30, 32, Boat Rig A 52
35—38, 44, 46, 53, 58, 61, 63, 65, 67—68, 70, 77, 83, 90—92, Bogue Field 89
102, 108 Borah, Senator William E. 4, 25
Units Borg-Warner Corporation 57
Tenth Army 68-69 Borneo 26
XXIV Corps 68 Boston Transcript 6
1st Cavalry Division 68 Bougainville 67—68, 70
2d Infantry Division 23 Boxer 111
37th Infantry Division 68 Bradman, BGen Frederic L. 55
Army Chief of Staff 12, 63 Brainard, Maj Edwin H. 39
Army Command and Staff College 36 Breckinridge, BGen James C. 44
Army Ordnance Department 91 Breckinridge Library 51
Army, Republic of Vietnam 100 British Royal Marines 109
Army School for Submarine Defenses 13 Broadbent, LtCdr E. W. 45
Army Signal School 13 Brooklyn Bridge 54
Army Tables of Organization 44 Bruges 24
Army War College 14, 36, 44 'Bureau Boat' 49
"Artillery Armament of Advanced Base Regiment" 14 Bureau of Aeronautics 58, 70, 92
Asia 42 Bureau of Construction and Repair 48—50

149
150 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

Bureau of Navigation 7 Coolidge, President Calvin 26, 31

Bureau of Ordnance 19, 48 Coontz, Adm Richard E. 32, 34
Bureau of Ships 48, 53, 56, 91 Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere (CARE) 98—
Burke-Wadsworth (Selective Training and Service) Act 61 99
Bush, Vannevar 61 Corps Tactical Zones 99
Butler, Capt Smedley D. 11; BGen, 34 Corpus Christi 70
Cottrell, Warren 54
Cabinet 6 COUNTY FAIR 100
California 57, 89, 108 Covering Group 47
Campbell, Capt Harold D. 46 Craig, BGen Edward A. 82
Camp Gillespie 70 Cuba 1,5, 7—8, 13, 16, 21, 23, 30, 42,96
Camp Lejeune 70, 75, 83, 92 Culebra 8, 11, 17, 19, 21, 31—32, 34, 48—49, 52, 54, 66—67,
Camp Pendleton 96 75
Canadian Army 109 Cunningham, Maj Alfred 24
Canal Zone 32 Curriculum Board '44
Cape May 49 Curtiss JNs 24
Caracas 79 Curtiss Marine Trophy Race 58
Cardiff 23 Cushman, BGen Thomas J. 82
Caribbean 11,21—22 Cutts, LtCol Richard M. 31; Col, 45
Carnegie Institution 61
Caroline Islands 26, 64 Dairen 11
Catholic Relief Services 99 Da Krong Valley 106—107
Cavite 23 Dalby, Maj MarionC. 89
Central Pacific Drive 66 Da Nang 98—100, 105
Central Powers 23 Daniels, Josephus 7, 21,27
Chauinont 33 Davies, Maj William W. 57
Cherry Point 70 Davis, 1st Lt Gordon M. 106
Chesapeake Island 66 Davis, Maj Henry C. 14
Chester 34 Davis, MajGen Raymond C. 105
Chicago 58 Day Wing 24
Chief of Naval Operations 29, 33, 43, 48, 63, 74, 81, 108— DeBolt, Earl 54
109 DeHaviland 4Bs 24
Chief of the United States Atlantic Fleet 21 DeLalio, Maj Armond H. 74
China 8, 23, 25—26, 30, 35, 38, 43, 58, 61, 78 Delta 98
Chopawamsic Creek 56 del Valle, Pedro A. 44
Chosin Reservoir 84 Democratic era 41
Christie tank 34—35, 53 Democratic Party 25
Christie, Walter 34 Department of Defense 113
Chrysler industrial engine 54 Department of the Air Force 81
Chu Lai 88, 99, 105 Department of the Army 63, 81
Chunchon 83 Department of the Navy 81
Civil War 31 Deputy Chief of Staff (Air) 109, 113
Clapp, LtCol Archie J. 98 Detroit 57
Clearwater 55—56 Development of Naval Gunfire Support 65
Clearwater News 57 Dewey, Adm George 1,3,5—7, 11, 14, 18,21
Coast Artillery Corps 14 "Dewey Canyon—All Weather Classic" 106
Coast Guard 77 Director, Marine Corps History 67—68, 77
Co Ka Va 107 Director of Operations & Training 53
Cold War 79 Director of the Crown Cork International Corporation 75
Cole, LtCol Eli K. 14—15; Col, 21; BGen, 32—34 Division of Aviation 71
Collum, Maj Richard S. 2 Division of Operations and Training 29, 58, 64
Combat Support Base Vandegrift 107 Division of Plans and Policies 92
Combined Action Force 100 Dixon, Capt R. E. 75
Commandant of the Marine Corps 8, 10, 13, 25, 27—33, Dominican Republic 28, 96
43—46, 48, 52—53, 63, 65, 72—74, 81, 85—87, 89—91, 93, 113 Dong Ha 99
Command Decisions 63 Dulles, Mr. John Foster 79
Commander in Chief 7 Dunedin 56—57
Commissioner of Public Buildings and Grounds I Dunkirk 24
Communists 79 Dunlap, Col Robert M. 35, 37
Condon Board 85 Dyer, Col Edward G. 71, 73—75, 77; BGen, 67
Conclon, BGen John P. 85
Conference on the Limitation of Armament 29 Eagle Mountain Lake 70—71
Congress 6—7, 12, 21, 26—28, 61, 78—79, 81, 91—92,95 East Coast 15, 21
Connecticut 13 Edenton 71
Connette, 1st Lt Charles 35 Educational Section 29
Consolation 83 Ek, Lt Paul R. 102
Consolidated Aircraft Company 75 Elliott, BGen George F. 13
 INDEX 151

Elliott Islands 11 Gallipoli Campaign 26—27, 43, 45, 47

Ellis, Maj Earl H. 64—65; LtCol, 64 Gavutu Island 66
England 23, 70 Geiger, LtGen Roy S. 71
Eniwetok 65 General Board of the Navy 5—8, 10—12, 14—16, 18, 21,
Equipment Board 50—51, 53, 55—56 29—30, 43, 53, 67
Estey. Col Ralph F. 103 General Governing Considerations 13
Eureka Boat 50 General Motors 41
Europe 42 General Order No. 241, 45
Everglades 54 "General Principles Governing the Selection and Estab-
Executive Mansion 2 lishment of Advanced Bases and the Composition of
Exercise BLUE STAR 88 an Advanced Base Outfit" 14
Exercise DESERT ROCK VI 85 "Gentlemen's Agreement" 11
Expeditionary Forces 29 Georgia 70
Experimental Landing Lighters Board 44 Germany 7,21,42, 61
Gettysburg 31
Far East 25, 61, 82 Gibson, Cpl Walter L. 56
Federal Records Center 56 Gilbert Islands 26, 66
Field and Company Officers' Schools 37 Glenn L. Martin Corporation 75
Field Artillery Drill Regulations 13 GOLDEN FLEECE 100-101
Field Medical Service School 83 Gottschalk, Maj Vincent J. 82
Field Officers Course 37 Government Printing Office 37
Field Officers School 35, 43, 45 Graham-Paige Motors Corporation 57
Fifth Air Force 89 Grande Island 11
Fire Support Bases 105 Great Britain 25—26, 54, 61
Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) 65 Great Depression 41
Fire Support Group 47 Great War 26
I Corps Joint Coordinating Council 99 Greene, Gen Wallace M., Jr. 113
Five.Power Treaty 26 Greenfield, Kent Roberts 63
Fleet Exercise No. IV 82 Griswold, Capt Ralph M. 38
Fleet Marine Force (See also Marine Corps, U. S.) 30, 45, Guadalcanal 47, 66—67
47, 86, 88 Guam 1, 15, 23, 26, 30, 38, 45, 64
Fleet Marine Force Manuals 103 Guantanarno Bay 5,8, 11,23, 31
Fleet Marine Officer 29 Guardia Nacional Dominicana 23, 28
Fleet Training Division 65 Guatemala 79
FLEX 5 52 Gulf Coast 50
FLEX 6 53 Gulf of Korea 11
Florida 18—19. 23, 54, 56—57, 70 Gun Defense 13
Florida 31 Guymon, Lt Vernon M. 58
Fokker transport 39
Food Machinery Corporation 56 Hait, Mr. James M. 56
Food Service Demonstration Teams 88 Haiti 7, 21, 23, 30, 35, 39, 42. 58, 96
Force Marine Officer 29 Haitian Gendarmerie 23, 28
Ford V8 engine 55 Hale, Senator Eugene C. 5
Formosa 26 HAMLET FESTIVAL 100
Formosa Resolution 79 Hampton Roads 35, 49
Forrestal, James D. (Secretary of Defense) 79, 111 Hancock 18
Fort Hancock 14 Harding, Senator Warren G25—26, 30—31
Fort Leavenworth 13 Harrier 112—113
Fort Leavenworth School of the Line and General Staff Harrington, Maj Samuel M. 37
44 Harris Board 85
Fort Monmouth 70 Harris, MajGen Field 71, 85
Fort Monroe 13 Hart, LtGen Franklin A. 92
Forward Air Controller 69 Harvard 70
Four-Power Treaty 26 Hawaii 26, 96
France 21—26, 61, 64 Hawaiian Islands 23, 35
Freeport 49 Hawker-Siddeley Aviation Corporation 112
Headquarters Marine Corps 28—29, 51, 53, 58, 64, 66—67,
French Indo-China 61
77, 84, 92, 108—109, 112
Fresnel Lens Optical Landing System 88
Helicopter Board 74
Fullam, Capt William F. 2, 17—18 Henderson 33
Fuller, Col Ben H. 37; MajGen, 43 Henderson Field 67
Fuller, 1st Lt Melvin E. 35 Henderson, BGen Melvin D. 99
"Functions of the Armed Forces" 79 Heywood, BGen Charles 1, 10
"Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Higgins, Andrew 50—51, 53, 75,91
Staff" 81 High Explosives and Mines 13
"Functions Paper" 81 Hiroshima 71
Furer, RAdm Julius A. 61 Historical Amphibious File 51
152 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

Historical Division 53, 67, 77 LaFollette, Robert M. 4

History of the United States Marine Corps 2 Lakehurst 70, 74, 76
History of USMC Operations in World War II 59 Lakeland 56—57
Hitler, Adolph 42 Lake Ponchatrain 51
Hoa yang District 100—101 Lammers, Cdr Howard M. 38
Hogaboom Board 85—87 Landing Boat Type "A" 51
Hogaboom, Col Robert E. 73—74; MajGen 85—86 Landing Exercise No. 5 55
Holcomb, MajGen Thomas 55 Landing Force Bulletin No. 17 110—111
Honduras 30 Landing Force Manuals 84
Hong Kong 26 Landing Force War Game Group 108
Honolulu 30 Landing Operations Doctrine, U. S. Navy, 1937 47
Hoover, President Herbert 26, 41 Landing Operations Manual 91
House Naval Affairs Committee 3, 21 Landing Operations Text Board 44
House of Representatives 25, 27 Laos 107
Howard, LtCol Archie F. 47 Latin America 38, 42
Hudson River 34 League Island 10
Hue-Phu Bai area 99, 102 League of Nations 25, 64
Hughes, Charles Evans 25—26 Lebanon 79
Hughes, Howard 72 Lejeune, LtCol John A. 18—19; Col, 21; BGen, 22;
Hull, Cordell 42 MajGen, 29—30, 65
Hunt Board 92 Lend-Lease Act 61
Hunt, LtGen LeRoy P. 92 Letcher, Col John S. 69
Leuchtenburg, Professor William E. 41
Idaho 25 Life Magazine 55
Igorrotes 1 Lincoln-Zephyr engine 56
Indo-China 61 Linsert, Maj Ernest E. 51
Instructions for the Reconnaissance of Bays, Harbors and Little, BGen Louis McC. 42; MajGen. 55
Adjacent Country 13 Lodge, Senator Henry Cabot 4, 25
Inter-American Conference 79 London 23
"International Law in its Relation to Advance Bases" 14 Long, Col Charles G. 18
Italy 25—26, 61 Long, Secretary of the Navy John D. 2, 6—7
Iwo Jima 67, 69 Longstreet, Robert L. 57
Los Angeles 41
Japan 11—12, 25—26, 42,54,61,63—65,96 Lucas, LtCol L. C. 14
"Jazz Age" 26 Luce, Adm Stephen B. 6
Jerome, Col Clayton C. 74 Ludwig, LtCol Verle E. 100
Johnson Debt Default Act 42 Luka 64
Joint ArmyNavy Board 36, 46, 63 Luzon 68
Joint Board 36—37, 64, 92
Joint Chiefs of Staff 36, 63, 79, 92 Mahan, RAdm Alfred T. 6
Joint Logistics Plans Committee 81 Maine 5
Joint Strategic Plans Committee 81 Maloelap 65
Journal of United States Artillery 14 Managua 23, 30, 39
Manila 30, 68
Kaiser 7 Manila Bay 3, 5, 64
Kalamazoo 57 Manual for Naval Overseas Operations 46
Kalbius, RAdm Edward C. 55 Marble Mountain 105
Kaluf, Maj John 53, 55 Mare Island 15
Kamikaze attacks 68 Mariana Islands 26, 39, 64
Kansas 13, 64 "Marine-Air-Ground Task Force" 87
Kennedy, President John F. 95 Marine Amphibious Brigade 110, 112
Kentucky 41 Marine Amphibious Force 110, 112
Marine Amphibious Unit 110, 112
Kestrel 112
"Marine Aviation in Vietnam 1962—1970" 98
Key West 81
Marine Barracks, Pearl Harbor 35
Key West Conference 79
Marine Barracks, Quantico 39
King, Adm Ernest J. 56 Marine Barracks, Washington 36
Knapp, Capt H. A. 14
Marine Corps, United States 1—2, 4—6, 8, 10—13, 15—18,
Knoles, George Harmon 42 21—22, 25—30, 32, 39, 42—45, 47—48, 50—52, 54—56, 58—59,
Knowles, RAdm Herbert B. 66 63—66, 68, 70—71, 75, 77, 79, 81—83, 85—93, 95—98, 100,
Knox, Capt Dudley W. 38 102, 104, 107—109, 112—1 13
Knudsen, William S. 61 Air Units
Korea 79, 82—83, 89, 96, 104 1st Marine Aircraft Wing 82, 88
Korean War 78, 84, 89 2d Marine Aircraft Wing 110
Krulak Report 51 3d Marine Aircraft Wing 70—71
Krulak, 1st Lt Victor H. 51; Capt, 56; Col, 77 1st Aviation Force 24
Ky Ha 105 Marine Aircraft Group 33 82
 INDEX 153

Marine Air Warning Group 1 70 McClellan, LtCol Edward N. 22

Marine Corps Glider Group 71 McCully, VAdm Newton A. 34
Northern Bombing Group 24 McCutcheon, LtCol Keith B. 68; Col, 111; BGen, 99;
Air Warning Squadron 1 70 MajGen, 113; LtGen, 68, 98; Gen, 103—104
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 362 98 McDowell, Cdr Ralph 5. 50
Marine Night Fighter Squadron 531 70 McHenry, Maj George W. 57
Marine Observation Squadron 6 82 McKinley Administration 1
Marine Transport Helicopter Squadron 161 83 Medal for Merit 57
Marine Corps Glider Detachment 70 Medical Civic Action Program 98, 103
1st Marine Aeronautic Company 24 Medium D Tank 54
Squadron A 24 Megee, Col Vernon E. 68—69
Squadron B 24 Mercury V8 engine 56
Squadron C 24 Metzger, MajGen Louis 109
Squadron D 24 Metzko, LtCol John 112
Ground Units Mexico 13, 21
Advanced Base Force 8, 15—16, 18, 21, 28, 30 Michigan 57
East Coast Expeditionary Force 30, 39, 45 Military Assistance Command, Vietnam 96
Expeditionary Force 32, 112 Military Intelligence Section 29
Fleet Base Defense Force 45 "Military Requirements of Helicopter for Ship-to-Shore
West Coast Expeditionary Force 30, 39, 45 Movement of Troops and Cargo" 74
III Amphibious Corps 68 Miller, Maj Charles J. 46
III Amphibious Force 98—99 Miller, LtCol Ellis Bell 44—45
V Amphibious Corps 69 Miller, Maj Lyle H. 43
1st Marine Division 84 Miller, Col Thomas H. 113
2d Marine Division 110—111 Mine Defense 13
3d Marine Division 67, 88, 100, 105—106 Mississippi 50
1st Advanced Base Brigade 19 Missouri 57
1st Marine Brigade 39, 42, 56, 58—59 Mobile Defense 13
1st Provisional Brigade 82 Monterey 108
2d Marine Brigade 39, 58 Montevideo 42
4th Marine Brigade 23 Moore, Thomas 6
5th Marine Brigade 23 Moses, BGen Emile P. 51, 56
9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade 96 Motor Troop Lighter 35
1st Advanced Base Regiment 18 Mulcahy, Maj Francis P. 58
1st Marine Regiment 16 Myers, MajGen John T. 45
5th Marine Regiment 32, 35, 39
4th Marine Regiment 30 Nagasaki 71
4th Marines 102 Naktong River Bulge 82
9th Marines 100, 106 National Archives 53
1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion 57 National Defense Research Committee 6!
1st Provisional Field Artillery Group 69 National Military Establishment 79
2d Combined Action Group 103 National Security Council 81
Joint Action Company 102 Naval Air Materiel Test Center 89
Joint Assault Signal Companies 68 Naval Air Station, San Diego 39
6th Company 16 Naval Appropriations Bill 5, 21
35th Company 31 Naval Appropriations Committee 6
Landing Force Air Support Control Units 68—69 'Naval Bases; Location, Resources, Denial of Bases,
Marine Corps Air Station 70, 88, 113 Security of Advanced Bases" 64
Marine Corps Development and Education Command 91, Naval Disarmament Conference 29
109 Naval Division of Inspections 17
Marine Corps Development Center 91 "Naval Gunfire in Support of a Landing" 38
Marine Corps Equipment Board 48—49, 56, 76, 91 "Naval Intelligence" 38
Marine Corps Gazette 8, 37, 106 Naval Station, Guam 39
"Marine Corps Landing Operations" 43 Naval War Board 6
Marine Corps Reserve 98 Naval War College 7, 14, 17, 44—45, 64—65
Marine Corps Schools 35, 37, 43, 71, 74, 92 "Naval War" with Spain 5
Marine Officer's School 36 Navy, United States 1—2, 5, 10, 12—13, 15, 21—22, 26, 28,
Marmon-Herringron tank 52—53 30—31, 35—38, 43, 46—47, 49—50, 52—53, 57, 61, 63—69, 71.
Marshall Islands 64—65, 71 75, 77, 79, 85—86, 92—93, 98, 102, 108
Marston, Maj John 46 Navy Cross 64
Martin "Mars" 72 Navy Department 2—3, 8, 12, 42—43, 45, 48, 51
Maryland 31, 56 Navy Regulations 15
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 70 National Security Act of 1947 8, 28, 79, 81, 91—92
Materiel Section 29 Netherlands 25
Maund, RAdrn L. E. H. 43 Neutrality Acts of 1935, 1936 and 193742
McAlister, Capt Francis M. 47 Nevada 85
McCawley, Capt Charles L. 1 New Caledonia 70
154 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

New Deal 42, 95 Peerless Division 56

Newfoundland 78 Peking 23, 30
New Hampshire 10 Pendleton, Col Joseph H. 21
New Jersey 14, 49, 70, 74, 76 Pennsylvania 34
New London 13 Pensacola 18—19, 23
New Market 31 Personnel Section 29
New Orleans 50—51, 53 Philadelphia 10, 12—13, 15—18, 23, 36, 49
Newport 6, 10 Philadelphia Navy Yard 10, 18
New River 48, 53, 70 Philippines 1, 5,7—8, 11—12, 14, 26, 45, 63—64, 68—69
New York 34 Piasecki Aircraft Corporation 75
Nicaragua 13, 23, 30, 35, 38—39, 43, 59, 96 Piasecki, Frank N. 75—76
Nine-Power Treaty 26 Piasecki Helicopter Corporation 75
Noble, LtCol Alfred H. 47 Planning Section 29
Norfolk 11,33,35—36,50 Platt Amendment 42
Normandy 71 Platt, BGen Jonas 105
North Africa 47 Point Mugu 89
North Carolina 48,53,70-71,75,83,89,92, 111 Political Action Teams 102
North China 42 Ponta Delgado 24
North Korea 96 Pope, Col Percival C. 11
North Vietnam 96 Port Arthur 11
Port-au-Prince 39
Observers School 39 Port Royal 10, 36
Ocean View Beach 35 Portsmouth 10
Office of Naval Intelligence 7, 14 Portugal 25
Office of Production Managements 61 Potomac River 34
Office of the Chief of Military History 63 Prairie 11, 19
Officer Fitness Report 28 President of the General Board 14
Officer-in-Charge of Marine Aviation 39 President of the United States 6, 25, 27, 95
Okeechobee region 54 Presidential Executive Order 969 4
Okinawa 67—71, 96 Price, Col Charles F. B. 43
Olongapo 12, 15, 23 Princeton 111
Omaha 58 Project HANDCLASP 98
Onslow Beach 75, 78, 111 "Professional Qualifications" 29
Open Door policy 26 Public Law 416, 79
Operation CROSSROADS 71 Puerto Rico 1,21, 78, 89, 111
Operation DEWEY CANYON 106-107
Operation HAYLIFT 83 Quang Tn Province 106
Operation HARVEST MOON 105 Quantico 21, 30—91, 35—37, 39, 45—46, 50—52, 55—56, 58,
Operation PACKARD II 75—77 66, 74, 76, 78, 84, 89, 91—92, 108
Operation PACKARD III 78 Raper, Sgt Clarence H. 56
Operation STEEL-PIKE I 89 Recruiting Section 29
Operation SWITCH 83 Red Bank 49
Operation WINDMILL 83 Reid, Col George C. 7—8, 10
Operations Section 29 "Report on Japanese Assault Landing Operations Shang-
ORANGE plan 63-64 hai Area 1937" 51
Oriental Public School 11 "Report on Maneuvers and Operations" 19
Orlando 70 "Report on Men, Material & Drills Required for
Ostend 24 Establishing a Naval Advance Base" 14
"Outfit Necessary for Seizure and Fortifications of "Report on the Fitness of Officers of the U. S. Marine
Positions by a Small Expeditionary Force" 14 Corps" 28
Overseas Expeditions 37 Republican Administration 79
Republican era 41
Pacific 12, 26, 30, 37—38, 45, 63, 65, 70—71, 85,98
Pacific Coast 30 Republicans 5, 25
Pacific Islands 70 Republic of Vietnam 88, 98—99, 103
Page, Capt Arthur H. 58 Revolutionary Development Program 99—100
Palau 75 Revolutionary War 95
Palau Islands 45 Rhode Island 6, 10
Panama Canal 21 Richardson, LCdr Clifford G. 46
Parao 64 Riverside 57
Paris 23, 61 "Roaring Twenties" 26
Parris Island 10, 70 Rockey, LtCol Keller E. 47
Parris Island Recruit Depot II Rodgers, Cdr William L. 14
Parsons, Maj Harold L. 46 Roebling, Donald 54—57, 75, 91
"Peaceful Coexistence" 79 Roebling, John A. 54
Pearl Harbor 15, 23, 61, 64 Roebling, Col Washington 54
Peck, Maj DeWitt 46 Rolls Royce Bristol Pegasus 103, 112
 INDEX 155

Roosevelt, Franklin D., Assistant Secretary of the Navy Snedeker Board 85

17; President of the United States, 41—42, 53, 61 Snedeker, BGen Edward W. 85
Roosevelt Roads 89 Soc Trang 98
Roosevelt, President Theodore 1—2, 5—7, 11 Soldiers 0/the Sea 2
"Rough Riders" 5 Solomon Islands 26, 47, 66
Rowell, Maj Ross E. 39 South Carolina 10, 88, 113
Royal Air Force 70, 112 South Vietnam 99, 105
Royal Navy 43 Southwest Pacific Area 68
Russell, Maj John H. 14—15; MajGen, 45 Soviets 25, 42
Russell, Professor William 8 Soviet Union 42
Russia 11, 25, 79 Soyang River 83
Russians79 Spaniards 5
Russo-Japanese War 11 Spanish-American War 1, 6, 8, 36, 63
Rydalch, Col Edward N. 85 Spencer, Herbert 36
Ryukyus 69 Spruance, Cdr Raymond A. 38
Stanmore, England 70
St. Louis 57 Stark, Adm H. 53
St. Louis Car Company 57 State Department 64
St. Simon's Island 70 State Department Security Force 82
Saipan 45 Stilwell, LtGen Richard G. 107
Samana 8 Strategic Hamlet theory 102
Samar 5 Strategy Board 6
Sampson 5 Subic Bay 11, 14, 17
San Clemente Islands 48, 66 Suitland 56
Sanderson, Lt Lawson H. M. 38 Sullivan, Mark 1
San Diego 21, 48, 58, 70, 82, 98 Sun Shipbuilding Company 34
San Francisco School Board 11 Suvla Bay 33
San Jose 57 Swanson, Claude A. 45
San Juan 23
Santee 70 Tables of Organization 73
Santiago 5 Tables of Organization and Equipment 44
Santo Domingo 8, 21, 23, 30, 38 Tactical Air Control Party 67
Schmidt, MajGen Harry 69 Tactical Air Direction Center 69
Schofield, RAdm Frank H. 38 Tactical Air Navigation System 88
School of Aerial Observation 39 Taft, President William H. 6—7
School of Application 36 Tam Boi 107
Schwable, Col Frank H. 70 Tarawa 111
Seavey's Island 10 Tarawa Atoll 66
Secretary of Defense 79, 81 Target Information Center 70
Secretary of the Navy 6, 8, 10, 12—13, 15—17, 19, 21, 34, Taylor, Capt Henry C. 6; Adm, 7
43-44,48, 53, 59, 81, 90, 108—109 Tentative Landing Operation Manual 47—48, 54, 59,
Secretary of State 25, 42, 79 65, 73
Senate 25 Texas 70—7 1
Senate Committee on Naval Affairs 5 "The Genesis of FMF Doctrine: 1789—1899" 8
Senior Naval Officer 63 "The Selection and Defense of Naval Bases" 14
Seventh Pan-American Conference 42 "The Strategy and Tactics of Small Wars" 37
Sharp, Adm Ulysses S. Grant 98 "The Strategy of the Atlantic" 38
Sharpsburg 31 "The Strategy of the Pacific" 38
Shaw, LtCol Samuel R. 72 Thetis Bay 85
Shearer, Maj Maurice E. 35 Thing, Maj Wilbur 46
Shenandoah Valley 31 Thompson Trophy 58
Shepherd Board 72, 74 Thrasher, Maj Thomas E. 46
Shepherd. MajGen Lemuel C., Jr. 71; Gen, 82,91 Tientsin 38
Ship-to-Shore Operations 37 Tiger Mountain 107
Shisler, LtCol Clair W. 71; Col, 73 Tinian 45
Short Airfield for Tactical Support" 88 Tokyo 11,26
Sicily 17
Training Section 28
Sikorsky Aviation Corporation 75
Sikorsky Aircraft Division 75 Transport Group 47
Sikorsky, Igor 75 Troop Barge A 33
Sirius 32—33 Truk 45
Small Wars Manual 37, 96 Truman, President Harry S 57, 78—79
'Small Wars Operations" 37 Tsingtao 78
Smith, BGen Holland M. 53; MajGen, 31, 53, 56 Tulagi 70
Smith Board 85 Turnage, LtCol Allen H. 47
Smith, Col John L. 85 Turnbladh 66
Smith, BGen Oliver P. 71—72; Gen, 95, 110 Turner, Maj Thomas C. 38—39
156 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

20th Admendent 6 Waller, Maj Littleton W. T. 5; Col, 21

Twining, Col Merrill B. 71, 73, 75,92 Walt, MajGen Lewis W. 98; Gen, 99—100
Ward Island 70
Uhlinger, Quartermaster Clerk Percy J. 47 Washington, D. C. 25—26, 29, 31, 50, 58, 61, 63
Underwood, Senator Oscar W. 25 Washington Disarmament Conference 29
United Aircraft Corporation 75 Washington Post 3
United Kingdom 112—113 'Weasel' (Amphibious Jeep) 75
United States 1, 25—26, 42, 48, 53—54, 57, 61, 64, 70, Wehie, Maj John 71
89, 95—96, 98, 103 Weller, LtCoI Donald M. 69; Col, 65
U. S. Agency for International Development 99 West Coast 15, 21, 30, 70
U. S. Atlantic Fleet 65 Western Hemisphere 25, 42
"United States Fleet Operations and the Naval Staff" 38 West Indies 8
United States Government 54 West Virginia 41
United States Hospital Ship 83 White House 1,6, 11
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings 14, 65, 98 White House Conference 53
U. S. Naval Postgraduate School 108 Williams, Maj Dion 13—15; Col, 32, 34
United States Steel 41 Williams, S. A. 54
University of Michigan 31 Wilson Administration 27
University of Virginia 61 Wilson, President Woodrow 7, 21
Uruguay 42 Winston, Maj T. W. 14
Valley Forge 111 Wise, Capt Frederic M. 19
Vandegrift, Gen Alexander A. 31, 72 Wood, Gen Leonard 3
Vera Cruz 21 Woods, Maj Samuel A. 46
Vieques Island 48, 89, 111 World War I 21—24, 26—29, 31, 38, 42, 58, 63—64, 91
Viet Cong 100—102 World War II 27, 31, 35—36, 38, 42, 47—48, 56—57, 59,
Vietnam 26, 96, 99, 103—105, 112 63—66, 71, 75, 78, 83, 89, 91—92, 96, 107, 110, 112
Vietnamese 1st Army Division 106 Wornham Board 85
Vietnam War 96 Wornham, MajGen Thomas 85
Virginia 11, 13,21,33,35,49,51 Wotje 65
Virginia Military Institute 31 Wyllie, Capt R. E. 14
Virgin Islands 21, 23, 30, 58 Wyoming 56
von Meyer, Secretary of the Navy George L. 6—7
Yellow Sea 11
Wake 26
Wales 23 Zeebrugge 24

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1978 0—500-449