G.R. No.

L-11633             January 31, 1961 administratrix admitted the first claim but opposed the second, on
the ground that, since this obligation was payable in ten equal
INTESTATE ESTATE OF FRANCISCO UBAT, deceased. JOSE yearly installments, all the unpaid installments, except the one that
L. SORIANO, petitioner-appellee,  fell due on October 7, 1945, had already prescribed. In it order
vs. dated March 1, 1956, the court approved the first claim; and, as to
ATANASIA UBAT DE MONTES, ET AL., oppositors-appellees. the second, only the sum of P55.23, representing the tenth
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, claimant-appellant. installment, was allowed, plus 8% in interest and P100.00 as
attorney's fees. From this order the bank has appealed.
Vega and Quitain for petitioner-appellee.
Ramon B. de los Reyes and Gregorio D. Batiller for oppositors- The promissory note executed on October 8, 1936, that formed the
appellants. basis of the second claim filed by the appellant bank in part reads
as follows:
PARAS, C.J.:
On or before the 7th day of October, 1946, for value
On October 7, 1936, Eduardo Ubat obtained a loan of P400.00, received I promise to pay to the order of the Philippine
evidenced by a promissory note, from the Philippine National Bank National Bank, at its office in Manila, Philippine Islands, the
and, as security for payment, mortgaged his land covered by OCT- sum o FOUR HUNDRED ONLY pesos (P400.00) with
No. 561. He died after having paid three installments, and his only interest thereon compounded semi-annually, at the rate of
son, Francisco Ubat, inherited the mortgaged property. On eight per cent (8%) per annum from date hereof until paid
September 18, 1946, Francisco Ubat borrowed P400.00 from the and with interest at the same rate on annual installments
Philippine National Bank, executing a chattel mortgage on the overdue and unpaid. Payment of the principal and the
standing crops of his land covered by OCT-3231. Francisco Ubat corresponding interest shall be mad in ten equal annual
died on September 25, 1954, when the unpaid balance of his installments of P59.61 each in accordance with the
indebtedness was P82.00. The children instituted a proceeding for following schedule of amortization.
the summary settlement of his estate wherein the bank filed its
claim. Believing that the matter called for an intestate case, the The appellee construes this obligation assumed by the deceased
court dismissed said summary proceeding, and the claim of the Eduardo Ubat as divisible, and because its payment was stipulated
bank was therefore not given due course. On July 9, 1955, Jose L. to be in ten equal yearly installments, it results that, according to
Soriano, a creditor of Francisco Ubat, filed an intestate proceeding the appellee, on October 7, 1939 when the fourth installment had
in the Court of First Instance of Davao, wherein two parcels of land become due and payable the prescriptive period of ten years
were alleged to be owned by the deceased Francisco Ubat, commenced to run as t said installment, and that, following a
namely, the land covered by OCT No. 561 in the name of Eduardo similar computation as to the other installment, only the tenth
Ubat and that covered by OCT No. 3231 in the name of Francisco installment of P59.61, which fell due on October 7, 1945, was
Ubat. Atanasia Ubat de Montes, daughter of Francisco, was recoverable when the present claim was filed on September 26,
appoint administratrix. The bank filed two claims, the first refering 1955.
to the indebtedness of Francisco Ubat in the amount of P82.00,
with interest, plus P100.00 as attorneys fee and the second We agree with appellee's construction. It is to be observed that the
referring to the account of Eduardo Ubat in the sum of P310.37, or note provides that "payment of the principal and the corresponding
the unpaid installments due i 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943, 1944 interest shall be made in ten equal annual installments of P59.61
and 1945, with interest plus P200.00 as attorney's fees. The each"; and this stipulation is couched in mandatory tenor,
deducible from the use of the unequivocal terms "shall be made", not paid, in the absence, as in this case, of any agreement on the
thereby making it an absolute duty (not merely an optional benefit) part of the bank that it was waiving the acceleration clause. We
on the part of the debtor to pay such installments yearly. In other need not resort to American authorities, since under article 1150 of
words, each installment, if not paid, gave rise to a separate cause the Civil Code, the prescriptive period for all kinds of actions shall
of action, which might be the subject matter of suit by the bank. be counted from the day the action may be brought. There is no
The statute of limitations consequently began to run, as to each pretense herein that the bank ever had waived its right to sue for
unpaid installment, from the date the bank could sue the debtor the entire obligation under the acceleration clause or for any
therefor, because, under Article 1150 of the Civil Code, "the time unpaid installment and gave corresponding notice thereof to the
for the prescription for all kinds of actions, when there is no special debtor, such that the latter would be sure that no action could yet
provision which ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the day be filed against him Even the citation from 54 C.J.S., p. 90, invoked
they may be brought." While the promissory note was payable "on by the bank in its favor, acknowledges that "there is authority to the
or before the 7th day of October, 1946", this period was limited by contrary."
the particular provision requiring (not merely allowing) payment in
"ten equal annual installments'. Under the law, the prescriptive However, we have to sustain the bank's contention with respect to
period starts from the time when the creditor may file an action, not the suspensive effect of the Moratorium Law on the unpaid account
rom the time he wishes to do so. in question, namely, that the claim for the installments beginning
with the sixth (which fell due on October 7, 1942) has been filed
It is urged for the bank that the parties could not have intended a within the ten-year prescriptive period. The appellee, seemingly
divisible obligation because no fixed date was agreed upon for the agreeing to the applicability of the debt moratorium, observes that
payment of each installment. This overlooks the fact that the debtor the sixth installment has already prescribed because it matured on
was bound to pay the installments in accordance with the schedule October 7, 1941. This is erroneous, since the promissory note was
of amortizations set forth in the promissory note executed on executed on October 7, 1936, and said installment accordingly
October 7, 1936, for which it is clear that said installments were to became payable on October 7, 1942. It results that only the fourth
be settled at the "End of Year 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10" and fifth installments amounting to P119.22 according to the
(Record on Appeal, p. 38), computed logically without saying from schedule of amortizations are no longer collectible.
the date of the note, October 7, 1936.
We agree with the appellee that the assessment of attorney's fees
It appears that the promissory note was secured by a mortgage is within judicial discretion, depending upon the circumstances of
providing that, in case the mortgagor failed or refused to pay any each case. In this particular instance, the allowance by the lower
amortization, "all the other amortizations shall then be and become court of P100.00 as attorney's fees for the two claims is
due and payable and the mortgagee may forthwith foreclose this reasonable.
mortgage in accordance with law". This is considered by the bank
merely as optional acceleration clause for its sole benefit. While WHEREFORE, the administration-appellee is ordered to pay to the
the bank was thus granted a permissive right to foreclose the appellant, Philippine National Bank's first claim, the sum of P98.38
mortgage, it is obvious that said permissive right did not prevent all with interest at the daily rate of P0.0133 from September 19, 1955;
the amortizations from becoming due and payable, because the the sum of P191.151 in the second claim with interest at the rate of
covenant is that, upon failure to pay one amortization, all the others eight per cent (80/0) per annum computed semi-annually from
"Shall then be and become due and payable", again in mandatory September 18, 1955; and the sum of P100.00 as attorney's fees.
vein. Under the law, the right of the bank to sue the debtor for the So ordered.
whole mortgage debt had accrued when the fourth installment was