G.R. No.

L-14132             January 22, 1920 which the consolidation of the property was accelerated; and to this
end she impleaded Dimatulac in a civil action (No. 1092 of the
LUCIANO VITUG DIMATULAC, plaintiff-appellee,  Court of First Instance of Pampanga) to compel him to surrender
vs. the property in question and to pay the past-due rent. This action
DOLORES CORONEL, defendant-appellant. was settled by a compromise, which was reduced to writing,
approved by the Judge of the Court of First Instance, and entered
Ceferino Hilario for appellant. of record in that action on April 9, 1915. By the terms of this
Aurelio Pineda for appellee. compromise Dimatulac agreed to place at the disposition of
Dolores Coronel all the property to which the action related,
STREET, J.: including the crops already harvested thereon but not yet
converted into money; and inasmuch as Dimatulac had already
The plaintiff in this action, Luciano Vitug Dimatulac, resident of the made an agreement with a third person for the sale of the growing
municipality of Lubao, in the Province of Pampanga, seeks to cane, Dolores Coronel was authorized to arrange with the buyer as
redeem several parcels of land, with a dwelling-house and other to the price, to receive the proceeds, and to apply the same to the
improvements thereon, from a contract of sale with pacto de retro, satisfaction of the past-due rent. In conformity with this agreement
whereby said property was transferred by the plaintiff on June 30, Dimatulac surrendered to Dolores Coronel the possession of most,
1911, to the defendant, Dolores Coronel. The trial judge sustained but not all, of the parcels in question, including the crops harvested
the action and entered a judgment requiring the defendant to and to be harvested thereon.
permit the redemption and to surrender such of the property as is
now in her possession. From this judgment the defendant Thus the situation remained until in May of the year 1916, when
appealed. Dimatulac, through his wife, offered to redeem the entire property
under the original contract of sale with pacto de retro, the five
It appears in evidence that, upon June 30, 1911, the plaintiff sold years named therein as the period during which repurchase might
the property in question to Dolores Coronel for the sum of P9,000, be effected not having as yet expired. This redemption Dolores
reserving the privilege to repurchase within the period of five years. Coronel refused to concede, on the ground that the title to the
The contract contained a provision, commonly found in contracts of property had become absolute in herself. Thereupon the present
this character, converting the vendor into a lessee of the vendee at action was instituted, as already stated, to compel her to permit
an agreed rental, payable annually in the months of January and redemption.
February, and permitting the vendor to retain possession of the
property as lessee until the time allowed for repurchase should be It is undeniable that the clause in the contract of sale with pacto de
past. It was also stipulated that in the event the original vendor retro of June 30, 1911, providing for extinction of the right of the
(now lessee) should fail to pay the agreed rental for any year of the plaintiff to repurchase in case he should default in the payment of
five, the right to repurchase would be lost and the property the rent for any year was lawful. The parties to a contract of this
consolidated in the vendee. character may legitimately fix any period they please, not in excess
of ten years, for the redemption of the property by the vendor; and
Under this contract the payment of rent should have begun in the no sufficient reason occurs to us why the determination of the right
year 1912. The vendor, however, entirely failed in the performance of redemption may not be made to depend upon the delinquency of
of this obligation and continued in arrears upon account of rent for the vendor — now become lessee — in the payment of the
at least three years. In view of this default Dolores Coronel, the stipulated rent. The supreme court of Spain sustains the affirmative
vendee, decided to take advantage of the clause in the contract by of this proposition (decision of January 18, 1900); and although
such a provision, being of penal nature, may involve hardship to Counsel for the appellant insists that the rights of the parties with
the lessee, the consequences are not worse than such as follow respect to the property in question were conclusively settled by the
from many other form of agreement to which contracting parties compromise agreement effected with the approval of the court in
may lawfully attach their signatures. Nevertheless, admitting the civil case No. 1092, it being supposed that by the agreement
validity of such a provision, it is not to be expected that any court Dolores Coronel was recognized as absolute owner. In this we are
will be reluctant to relieve from its effects wherever this can be unable to concur. Any right which Dolores Coronel may have
done consistently with established principles of law. derived from that contract is entirely consistent with the title which
she had acquired under the original contract; and there is nothing
Considering this clause in the light of a penal provision, or in the compromise agreement which has the necessary effect of
stipulation for the forfeiture of the right to repurchase, it is at once extinguishing the right of redemption. Her possession under this
evident that Dolores Coronel, upon the default in the payment of agreement must therefore be considered to be of the same
any of the installments of annual rent, had the choice either to avail character, and her rights of the same extent, as if she had taken
herself of the forfeiture and take possession of the property as possession at once when the original contract was executed. (Art.
owner or to waive the forfeiture and claim the payment of the past- 1815, Civ. Code.) It must be admitted that the provision for the
due rent as a subsisting debt. She could not claim for the rent lease, under which the plaintiff was permitted to retain possession
during the whole period and at the same time assert her ownership of the property, was abrogated as a result of the compromise
to the whole, the two positions being mutually inconsistent. The agreement, but it would be an unnecessary and unjust inference to
trial court was, therefore, justified in holding that when provision say that the right of redemption created by the original contract had
was made in the compromise agreement of 1915 for the payment also been destroyed. Every intendment both of law and equity
of the past-due rent and the claim therefor was recognized as a favors the preservation of that right.
subsisting debt, Dolores Coronel in effect waived the forfeiture
which was incident to the non-payment of the rent on the date due. As already stated, the plaintiff Dimatulac did not surrender all of the
She could not insist on the performance of the principal obligation property of Dolores Coronel as he had agreed to do in the
and at the same time exact the penalty (art. 1153, Civ. Code). compromise of 1915. This circumstance can not affect the solution
Furthermore, when she assumed possession of the property, by of this case, and it is immaterial whether he remained in
taking it out of the hands of the former owner, then her lessee, his possession of part in defiance of Dolores Coronel or retained it with
obligation for future rent ceased. In Municipality of Moncada vs. her consent. Of course he might be required to account for the
Cajuigan (21 Phil. Rep., 184), it was held that where the lessee value of the use and occupation of the property so retained, prior to
was ousted before the expiration of the stipulated period, the the offer to redeem, but his right to redeem within the period limited
landlord could not recover rent from the date of such ouster, even by the contract cannot be made to depend upon his performance in
though by the contract the rent was payable prior to the date of the good faith of the compromise agreement.
ouster and was then in arrears.
What has been said effectually disposes of all the grounds of error
It results from the foregoing that Luciano Vitug Dimatulac, the assigned by the appellant in this Court. The affirmance of the
former owner of the property in question and plaintiff herein, was judgment is therefore appropriate and it is accordingly ordered that
relieved from the forfeiture resulting from his failure to pay the rent the same be affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
upon the date due; and his right to repurchase must be considered
to have been still subsisting when the offer to redeem was made.