Clemena, Ej R.

Legal Counseling 3S
Ruby v Bayot

Facts:

Complainant Michael Ruby alleges that he and his mother engaged the services of respondents Atty.
Erlinda Espejo and Atty. Rudolph Bayot in connection with a case for cancellation and nullification of
deeds of donation. Pursuant to their retainer agreement, the complainant and Felicitas would pay
Atty. Espejo the amount of ₱100,000.00 as acceptance fee, ₱70,000.00 of which was actually paid
upon the signing of the agreement and the remaining ₱30,000.00 to be paid after the hearing on the
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO). The complainant and Felicitas
likewise agreed to pay the amount of ₱5,000.00 as appearance fee for every hearing, which was
apparently later reduced to ₱4,000.00.

Later, the complainant gave Atty. Espejo the amount of ₱50,000.00 as payment for filing fee but the
actual filing fee that was paid by her only amounted to 7,561.00. Atty. Espejo allegedly asked the
complainant to give Atty. Bayot the amount of ₱30,000.00 – the remaining balance of the acceptance
fee agreed upon – notwithstanding that the prayer for the issuance of a TRO has yet to be heard. The
complainant asserted that the same was not yet due, but Atty. Espejo told him that Atty. Bayot was in
dire need of money. The complainant gave Atty. Bayot the amount of ₱8,000.00 supposedly as partial
payment for the balance of the acceptance fee and an additional ₱4,000.00 as appearance fee for the
September 22, 2009 hearing.
On October 23, 2009, the complainant deposited the amount of ₱4,000.00 to the bank account of Atty.
Bayot as appearance fee for the hearing on the motion to serve summons through publications, which
was set at 2:00 p.m. on even date. However, Atty. Bayot allegedly did not appear in court and instead
met with the complainant at the lobby of the Quezon City Hall of Justice, telling them that he already
talked to the clerk of court who assured him that the court would grant their motion.

Thereafter, the complainant alleged, the respondents failed to update him as to the status of his
complaint. He further claimed that Atty. Bayot had suddenly denied that he was their counsel. Atty.
Bayot asserted that it was Atty. Espejo alone who was the counsel of the complainant and that he was
merely a collaborating counsel.
Issue:

Whether or not Atty. Bayot violated the Code of Professional Responsibility?

Ruling:
YES. The Supreme Court held that there exists a lawyer-client relationship between complainant and
Atty. Bayot. In relation to this, the SC cited the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides
that:
CANON 16 — A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT
MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 — A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the
client.
Rule 16.02 — A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of
others kept by him.
xxx xxx xxx

CANON 18 — A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

xxx xxx xxx

Rule 18.03 — A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 — A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within
a reasonable time to the client's request for information.

Atty. Bayot owes fidelity to the cause of the complainant and is obliged to keep the latter informed of
the status of his case. He is likewise bound to account for all money or property collected or received
from the complainant. He may be held administratively liable for any inaptitude or negligence he may
have had committed in his dealing with the complainant.

Sison v. Camacho

Facts:

Atty. Sison alleged that Atty. Camacho was the counsel of MDAHI in an insurance claim action against
Paramount Life & General Insurance Corp with an insurance claim amounting to P14,863,777.00.
Atty. Camacho met with Atty. Enrique Dimaano (Atty. Dimaano), corporate secretary of MDAHI, and
proposed to increase their claim to P64,412,534.18 by taking into account the interests imposed.
Atty. Camacho, however, clarified that the increase in the claim would require additional docket fees
in the amount of P1,288,260.00, as shown in his hand-written computation. MDAHI agreed and
granted the said amount to Atty. Dimaano which was evidenced by a Payment Request/Order Form.
On May 27, 2011, Atty. Dimaano gave the money for docket fees to Atty. Camacho who promised to
issue a receipt for the said amount, but never did. Atty. Sison later discovered that on May 26, 2011,
the RTC had already rendered a decision 5 in favor of MDAHI granting its insurance claim plus
interests in the amount of approximately P65,000,000.00.
Atty. Camacho sent a letter to MDAHI recommending a settlement with Paramount Insurance in Civil
Case No. 05-655 in the amount of P15,000,000.00 allegedly to prevent a protracted appeal with the
appellate court. MDAHI refused the offer of compromise and did not indicate its conforme on the
letter of Atty. Camacho. Surprisingly, even without the written conformity of MDAHI, Atty. Camacho
filed the Satisfaction of Judgment, dated August 15, 2011, before the RTC stating that the parties had
entered into a compromise agreement. On August 18, 2011, Atty. Sison met with Atty. Camacho to
clarify the events that transpired. He asked Atty. Camacho whether he paid the amount of
P1,288,260.00 as additional dockets fees, and the latter replied that he simply gave it to the clerk of
court as the payment period had lapsed. Disappointed with the actions of Atty. Camacho, Atty. Sison
sent a letter, dated August 24, 2011, stating that he was alarmed that the former would accept a
disadvantageous compromise; that it was against company policy to bribe any government official
with respect to the P1,288,260.00 given to the clerk of court; and that MDAHI would only pay
P200,000.00 to Atty. Camacho as attorney's fees.
Issue:

Whether or not Atty. Camacho violated rules 16.01 of the CPR?

Ruling:

Yes. The Court held that when Atty. Camacho personally requested MDAHI for additional docket fees,
the latter obediently granted the amount of P1,288,260.00 to the former. Certainly, it was understood
that such amount was necessary for the payment of supposed additional docket fees in Civil Case No.
05-655. Yet, when Atty. Sison confronted Atty. Camacho regarding the said amount, the latter replied
that he simply gave it to the clerk of court as the payment period had lapsed. Whether the said amount
was pocketed by him or improperly given to the clerk of court as a form of bribery, it was
unmistakably clear that Atty. Camacho did not apply the amount given to him by his client for its
intended legal purpose. Moreover, Atty. Camacho failed to issue a receipt to MDAHI from the moment
he received the said amount. In Tarog v. Ricafort, 29 the Court held that ethical and practical
considerations made it both natural and imperative for a lawyer to issue receipts, even if not
demanded, and to keep copies of the receipts for his own records. Pursuant to Rule 16.01 of the CPR,
a lawyer must be aware that he is accountable for the money entrusted to him by the clients, and that
his only means of ensuring accountability is by issuing and keeping receipts.

People v. Nadera

Facts:

Accused-appellant Elegio Nadera, Jr. has four children by his wife Daisy. Daisy left for a job in Bahrain.
After working abroad for several years, she returned home and learned that her two daughters had
been raped by no less than her own husband and their own father, herein accused-appellant.
Thereupon, they went to the police authorities of Naujan and filed a complaint against accused-
appellant. Four informations charging accused-appellant with rape on various dates were filed in the
Regional Trial Court. Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges. The trial court, however,
rendered judgment finding accused-appellant guilty of four counts of rape against his daughters. He
was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and three death penalties for the rapes
committed. In this automatic review, the accused-appellant's lone assignment of error was that the
trial court accepted his plea of guilty to a capital offense without making a searching inquiry to
determine whether he understood the consequences of his plea.

Issue:

Whether or not Atty Brotonel who served as counsel de oficio was properly fulfilling his duty as
counsel of the accused?

Ruling:

No. According to the Supreme Court, the warnings given by the trial court in this case fell short of the
requirement that it must make a searching inquiry to determine whether accused-appellant
understood fully the import of his guilty plea. Clearly, the plea of guilty of accused in this case was
made improvidently. Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea
is the sole basis of the judgment. The Supreme Court found it necessary to set aside the decision of
the trial court and remand the case for proper arraignment and trial of the accused, considering not
only the accused's improvident plea of guilt but also his lawyer's neglect in representing his cause.
Atty. Brotonel, as counsel de oficio, had the duty to defend his client and protect his rights, no matter
how guilty or evil he perceives accused-appellant to be. The performance of this duty was all the more
imperative because the life of accused-appellant hangs in the balance. His duty was no less because
he was counsel de oficio.
|||

People v. Servo
Facts:

Appellant Mario Serzo was convicted of murder by the RTC of Antipolo; during his arraignment, he
appeared in court without counsel and insisted that he had no need of one even as the court
appointed a counsel de officio for him.

Issue:

Whether or not appellant was deprived of counsel?

Ruling:

NO. Appellant had been given ample time to secure the services of a counsel de parte, but his
subsequent appearances in court without such counsel and his act of allowing this situation to
continue until the presentation of his evidence betrays his lack of intention to do so. It even appears
that he was merely delaying his own presentation of evidence on purpose to the prejudice of the
offended party, the trial court and the orderly administration of justice.
Furthermore, appellant did not demonstrate in what way the services of his counsels de oficio were
unsatisfactory. He did not cite any instance substantiating his claim that he was not effectively
represented. In short, he was afforded a chance to be heard by counsel of his own choice, but by his
own neglect or mischief, he effectively waived such right. It taxes the mind to think that, almost two
years 37 since appellant first invoked his right to be represented by counsel de parte, he still could
not find one who would suit his needs and desires. Neither did he cooperate with his court-named
lawyers.
The facts of this case do not constitute a deprivation of appellant's constitutional right to counsel
because he was adequately represented by three court-appointed lawyers. Courts are not required
to await indefinitely the pleasure and convenience of the accused as they are also mandated to
promote the speedy and orderly administration of justice. Nor should they countenance such an
obvious trifling with the rules. Indeed, public policy requires that the trial continue as scheduled,
considering that appellant was adequately represented by counsels who were not shown to be
negligent, incompetent or otherwise unable to represent him.

Justo v. Galing

Facts:
Complainant alleged that she engaged the services of Atty. Galing in connection with dishonored
checks issued by Manila City Councilor Arlene W. Koa (Ms. Koa). After she paid his professional fees,
the respondent drafted and sent a letter to Ms. Koa demanding payment of the checks. Respondent
advised complainant to wait for the lapse of the period indicated in the demand letter before filing
her complaint. After the said period has lapsed, complainant filed a complaint against Ms. Koa for
violation of BP 22. A motion for reconsideration was then filed by respondent for and on behalf of
Ms. Koa, the accused in the criminal cases and later appeared as the counsel of Ms. Koa.

Respondent argued that no lawyer-client relationship existed between him and complainant because
there was no professional fee paid for the services he rendered. Moreover, he argued that he drafted
the demand letter only as a personal favor to complainant who is a close friend.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility?

Ruling:

YES. The Supreme Court held that a lawyer-client relationship can exist notwithstanding the close
friendship between complainant and respondent. The relationship was established the moment
complainant sought legal advice from respondent regarding the dishonored checks. By drafting the
demand letter respondent further affirmed such relationship. The fact that the demand letter was not
utilized in the criminal complaint filed and that respondent was not eventually engaged by
complainant to represent her in the criminal cases is of no moment.

Under Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, "[a] lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts." Respondent was therefore bound to refrain from representing parties with conflicting
interests in a controversy. By doing so, without showing any proof that he had obtained the written
consent of the conflicting parties, respondent should be sanctioned. The prohibition against
representing conflicting interest is founded on principles of public policy and good taste. In the
course of the lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns of the facts connected with the client's
case, including the weak and strong points of the case. The nature of the relationship is, therefore,
one of trust and confidence of the highest degree.

De Guzman v. de Dios
Facts:

This is a complaint for disbarment against respondent for representing conflicting interest and for
acquiring property in litigation. Evidence disclosed that complainant engaged the services of
respondent in forming a hotel and restaurant business. Thereafter, Suzuki Beach Hotel, Inc. (SBHI)
came into being. Complainant became the majority stockholder having subscribed to 29,800 shares
equivalent to P2,980,000 and her paid subscription amounted to P745,000.00. Respondent,
thereafter, received a monthly retainer fee of P5,000 from the former whom she even represented in
a case. The unpaid 745 subscribed shares of complainant was later declared delinquent, sold and
acquired by Ramon del Rosario, one of the company's incorporators. Out of the 745 shares conveyed
to Del Rosario, respondent purchased 100 shares. She later became the president of the company.
Respondent denied the existence of attorney-client relationship between her and complainant. The
IBP ruled in her favor.|
Issue:

Whether or not attorney-client exists?

Ruling:
YES. The Court found that there was an attorney-client relationship between the parties and there
was evidence of collusion between the board of directors and respondent in ousting complainant
from the corporation. Respondent's purchase of shares of stock originally owned by complainant
constitutes conflict of interest. Respondent as a lawyer is bound by her oath to do no falsehood or
consent to its commission and to conduct herself according to the best of her knowledge and
discretion. Her acts clearly violated her oath. She was suspended from the practice of law for six (6)
months.

Foster v. Agtang
Facts:

Complainant Erlinda Foster was referred to respondent Atty. Jaime Agtang in connection with her
legal problem regarding a deed of absolute sale she entered into with Tierra Realty, which
respondent had notarized. After their discussion, complainant agreed to engage his legal services for
the filing of the appropriate case in court, for which they signed a contract. Complainant paid
respondent P20,000.00 as acceptance fee and P5,000.00 for incidental expenses. Multiple loans were
then later made by respondent to complainant for varying amounts with multiple reasons. Further,
on September 28, 2009, respondent wrote a letter 12 to Tropical Villas Subdivision in relation to the
legal problem referred by complainant. He then visited the latter in her home and asked for a loan of
P100,000.00, payable in sixty (60) days, for the repair of his car. Complainant, having trust and
confidence on respondent being her lawyer, agreed to lend the amount without interest. A
promissory note 13 evidenced the loan.
In November 2009, complainant became aware that Tierra Realty was attempting to transfer to its
name a lot she had previously purchased. She referred the matter to respondent who recommended
the immediate filing of a case for reformation of contract with damages. On November 8, 2009,
respondent requested and thereafter received from complainant the amount of P150,000.00, as filing
fee. 14 When asked about the exorbitant amount, respondent cited the high value of the land and the
sheriffs' travel expenses and accommodations in Manila, for the service of the summons to the
defendant corporation. Later, complainant confirmed that the fees paid for the filing of Civil Case No.
14791-65, entitled Erlinda Foster v. Tierra Realty and Development Corporation, only amounted to
P22,410.00 per trial court records.
Issue:

Whether or not respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR)?

Ruling:
YES. Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct." It is well-established that a lawyer's conduct is "not confined to the
performance of his professional duties. A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either
in his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in
moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court."

In this case, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his
professional and private capacity. As a lawyer, he clearly misled complainant into believing that the
filing fees for her case were worth more than the prescribed amount in the rules, due to feigned
reasons such as the high value of the land involved and the extra expenses to be incurred by court
employees. In other words, he resorted to overpricing, an act customarily related to depravity and
dishonesty. He demanded the amount of P150,000.00 as filing fee, when in truth, the same amounted
only to P22,410.00. His defense that it was complainant who suggested that amount deserves no iota
of credence. For one, it is highly improbable that complainant, who was then plagued with the rigors
of litigation, would propose such amount that would further burden her financial resources.
Assuming that the complainant was more than willing to shell out an exorbitant amount just to
initiate her complaint with the trial court, still, respondent should not have accepted the excessive
amount. As a lawyer, he is not only expected to be knowledgeable in the matter of filing fees, but he
is likewise duty-bound to disclose to his client the actual amount due, consistent with the values of
honesty and good faith expected of all members of the legal profession.
Moreover, the "fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes on the
lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client." 28
Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose but not used for the purpose should be
immediately returned. A lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of
his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation
of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of
professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.

Santos v Beltran
Facts:
Complainant filed a verified complaint against respondent lawyer Rodolfo C. Beltran before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), alleging that when
respondent notarized a Deed of Donation executed by his mother in favor of her nine children, except
complainant, the siblings did not personally appear before him. Complainant submitted the affidavit
executed by his brothers Benito and Renato attesting to the fact that they signed the Deed of Donation
not in the law office of the respondent but in their houses at Villa Benita Subdivision. Complainant
contended that respondent notarized the Deed of Donation in disregard of Article 904 of the Civil
Code. Complainant further alleged that respondent represented conflicting interest when he entered
his appearance as defense counsel in an ejectment case in which his former client, Erlinda R. Santos-
Crawford, was the plaintiff.|||
Issue:
Whether or not conflict of interest existed?
Ruling:

Yes. The Supreme Court found respondent guilty of representing conflicting interest. According to
the Court, there is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. In the case at bar, Civil Case No. 12105 for ejectment was filed by Arcely Y. Santos
in behalf of Erlinda Santos-Crawford against complainant and Renato Santos. Respondent, however,
appeared as counsel for Evalyn Valino, Norberto Valino and Danilo Agsaway in Civil Case No. 14823
for ejectment filed by complainant as attorney-in-fact of Erlinda Santos-Crawford. Civil Case No.
14823, although litigated by complainant, was actually brought in behalf of and to protect the interest
of Erlinda Santos-Crawford. Respondent's act of representing the parties against whom his other
client, Erlinda Santos-Crawford, filed suit constituted conflict of interest. The Court, however, ruled
that complainant failed to controvert by clear and convincing evidence the evidentiary weight with
respect to its due execution and presumption of regularity conferred upon a notarized document and
documents acknowledged before a notary public. Instead, the quantum of evidence showed that
complainant's siblings appeared before the respondent as notary public and in fact, signed the deed.
The claim of Renato and Benito Santos in their affidavit that they did not sign the document in the
law office of the respondent but in their houses at Villa Benita Subdivision is admissible only against
them. Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year and sternly
warned that a commission of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Samala v. Valencia
Facts:

Clarita J. Samala (complainant) against Atty. Luciano D. Valencia (respondent) for Disbarment on the
following grounds: (a) serving on two separate occasions as counsel for contending parties; (b)
knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary evidence; (c) initiating numerous
cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental fees; and (d) having a reputation of being immoral by
siring illegitimate children.
Issue:

Whether or not respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility?

Ruling:
YES. Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure
of the facts. A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a
person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client. He may not also undertake
to discharge conflicting duties any more than he may represent antagonistic interests. This stern rule
is founded on the principles of public policy and good taste. It springs from the relation of attorney
and client which is one of trust and confidence. Lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate the
client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then
can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice.
One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would
prevent the full discharge of the lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty.

The stern rule against representation of conflicting interests is founded on principles of public policy
and good taste. It springs from the attorney's duty to represent his client with undivided fidelity and
to maintain inviolate the client's confidence as well as from the injunction forbidding the examination
of an attorney as to any of the privileged communications of his client.

In this case, respondent's averment that his relationship with Alba has long been severed by the act
of the latter of not turning over the proceeds collected in Civil Case No. 98-6804, in connivance with
the complainant, is unavailing. Termination of the attorney-client relationship precludes an attorney
from representing a new client whose interest is adverse to his former client. Alba may not be his
original client but the fact that he filed a case entitled "Valdez and Alba v. Bustamante and her
husband," is a clear indication that respondent is protecting the interests of both Valdez and Alba in
the said case. Respondent cannot just claim that the lawyer-client relationship between him and Alba
has long been severed without observing Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court wherein the
written consent of his client is required.

Respondent is also bound to comply with Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
states that "a lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his client even after the attorney-
client relation is terminated."

The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one of trust and
confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his
client's case. He learns from his client the weak points of the action as well as the strong ones. Such
knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care.

Yumang v. Alaestante

Facts:
This is a merged disbarment case against respondents, charging them violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Respondent lawyer wrote then Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary
Leila De Lima (Secretary De Lima) requesting to conduct preliminary investigation against herein
complainant for the crimes of syndicated Estafa, Qualified Theft and Grave Threats. On even date,
respondent lawyer's clients, Ernesto S. Mallari (Ernesto) and Danilo A. Rustia, Jr. (Danilo), executed
a Joint Complaint Affidavit against herein complainants for syndicated estafa, qualified theft and
grave threats cases.

Claiming that respondent lawyer's January 3, 2012 letter contained scurrilous statements intended
to malign and besmirch Cynthia's reputation and business standing, Cynthia and her husband, the
complainant Rodolfo, filed a libel complaint against respondent lawyer, Ernesto, and Danilo before
the Pasig City Prosecutor's Office (libel case).

In their counter-affidavit, Ernesto and Danilo denied any knowledge of, or participation in, the
writing of the said letter.
On the other hand, respondent lawyer admitted that he was the author of the letter. 7 He denied,
however, that the letter was libelous or defamatory, and insisted that the same was privileged
communication. He claimed that he wrote the letter to protect and advance the interests of Ernesto
and Danilo.

In the meantime, in a Resolution 10 dated November 28, 2012, the DOJ dismissed for lack of merit,
the complaint for syndicated estafa, qualified theft, and grave threats filed by Ernesto and Danilo
against herein complainants.

In their Joint Affidavit of Complaint/Petition for Disbarment, 11 complainants Rodolfo, Cynthia, and
Arlene averred that respondent lawyer violated his Oath of Office and the Code of Professional
Responsibility, when he prepared, wrote, signed, and published the malicious and libelous January 3,
2012 letter.
For their part, complainants Berlin and Higino declared in their Sinumpaang Salaysay 12 that they
were the respondents in the alleged syndicated estafa, grave threats and qualified theft cases
alongside their relatives, Cynthia and Arlene. They claimed that they had previously engaged
respondent lawyer's legal services in other cases; that since they knew respondent lawyer, they
approached him regarding his letter dated January 3, 2012, but respondent lawyer told them not to
worry about the cases mentioned in the said letter, and promised to draft the appropriate pleadings
for their defense; that indeed respondent lawyer drafted their Counter-Affidavit and their Rejoinder
by way of defense; and that in payment for his professional legal services, they issued respondent
lawyer a Bank of Commerce check in the amount of P50,000.00.
Higino stressed that respondent lawyer's act of preparing their responsive pleadings in the
syndicated estafa, grave threats and qualified theft cases was violative of the proscription against
lawyers representing conflicting interests since he was the very same lawyer who initiated and/or
drafted the complaint in these cases against them; and that as a consequence thereof, he (Berlin)
moved to discharge respondent lawyer as counsel in another case.

Issue:
Whether or not respondents violated the Code of Professional Responsibility?

Ruling:
YES. These administrative cases bear some factual resemblance to Pacana, Jr. v. Atty. Pascual-Lopez.
19 In Pacana, Jr., the lawyer denied any lawyer-client relationship with the complainant, saying that
no formal agreement had been entered to that effect; also, the therein counsel questioned the
admissibility of an electronic mail he sent to therein complainant. In said case, the lawyer likewise
assured the complainant that there was nothing to worry about when the latter expressed doubts
over the propriety of the lawyer's representing conflicting interests. We therein rejected the erring
lawyer's defenses, thus:
Respondent also tries to disprove the existence of such relationship by arguing that no written
contract for the engagement of her services was ever forged between her and complainant. This
argument all the more reveals respondent's patent ignorance of fundamental laws on contracts and
of basic ethical standards expected from an advocate of justice. The IBP was correct when it said:
The absence of a written contract will not preclude the finding that there was a professional
relationship between the parties. Documentary formalism is not an essential element in the
employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or implied. To establish the relation, it is
sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent
to his profession.
Given the situation, the most decent and ethical thing which respondent should have done was either
to advise complainant to engage the services of another lawyer since she was already representing
the opposing parties, or to desist from acting as representative of Multitel investors and stand as
counsel for complainant. She cannot be permitted to do both because that would amount to double-
dealing and violate our ethical rules on conflict of interest.

Sabitsana v. Muertigue

Facts:

Alberto Garcia (Garcia) executed an unnotarized Deed of Sale in favor of respondent Juanito
Muertegui (Juanito) over a parcel of unregistered land (the lot) located in Dalutan Island, Talahid,
Almeira, Biliran, Leyte del Norte. Juanito's father Domingo Muertegui, Sr. (Domingo Sr.) and brother
Domingo Jr. took actual possession of the lot and planted thereon coconut and ipil-ipil trees. They
also paid the real property taxes on the lot for the years 1980 up to 1998.

Garcia sold the lot to the Muertegui family lawyer, petitioner Atty. Clemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr. (Atty.
Sabitsana), through a notarized deed of absolute sale; and a deed was issued in Sabitsana's name.
Although Domingo Jr. and Sr. paid the real estate taxes, Atty. Sabitsana also paid real property taxes
and an improvement which was destroyed by a typhoon.

When Domingo Sr. passed away, his heirs applied for registration and coverage of the lot under the
Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141. Atty. Sabitsana, opposed the application, claiming
that he was the true owner of the lot. He asked that the application for registration be held in
abeyance until the issue of conflicting ownership has been resolved.
On April 11, 2000, Juanito, through his attorney-in-fact Domingo Jr., filed for the quieting of title and
preliminary injunction, against herein petitioners Atty. Sabitsana and his wife, Rosario, claiming that
they bought the lot in bad faith and are exercising acts of possession and ownership over the same,
which acts thus constitute a cloud over his title. The Complaint prayed, among others, that the
Sabitsana Deed of Sale, the August 24, 1998 letter, and TD No. 5327 be declared null and void and of
no effect; that petitioners be ordered to respect and recognize Juanito's title over the lot; and that
moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses be awarded to him.

In their Answer with Counterclaim, petitioners asserted mainly that the sale to Juanito is null and
void absent the marital consent of Garcia's wife, Soledad Corto (Soledad); that they acquired the
property in good faith and for value; and that the Complaint is barred by prescription and laches.

The evidence and testimonies of the respondent's witnesses during trial reveal that petitioner Atty.
Sabitsana was the Muertegui family's lawyer at the time Garcia sold the lot to Juanito, and that as
such, he was consulted by the family before the sale was executed; that after the sale to Juanito,
Domingo Sr. entered into actual, public, adverse and continuous possession of the lot, and planted
the same to coconut and ipil-ipil; and that after Domingo Sr.'s death, his wife Caseldita, succeeded
him in the possession and exercise of rights over the lot.
On the other hand, Atty. Sabitsana testified that before purchasing the lot, he was told by a member
of the Muertegui family, Carmen Muertegui Davies (Carmen), that the Muertegui family had bought
the lot, but she could not show the document of sale; that he then conducted an investigation with
the offices of the municipal and provincial assessors; that he failed to find any document, record, or
other proof of the sale by Garcia to Juanito, and instead discovered that the lot was still in the name
of Garcia; that given the foregoing revelations, he concluded that the Muerteguis were merely
bluffing, and that they probably did not want him to buy the property because they were interested
in buying it for themselves considering that it was adjacent to a lot which they owned; that he then
proceeded to purchase the lot from Garcia; that after purchasing the lot, he wrote Caseldita in October
1991 to inform her of the sale; that he then took possession of the lot and gathered ipil-ipil for
firewood and harvested coconuts and calamansi from the lot; and that he constructed a rip-rap on
the property sometime in 1996 and 1997.
Issue:

Whether or not the awarding of attorney's fees is proper?

Ruling:
NO. Petitioners' actual and prior knowledge of the first sale to Juanito makes them purchasers in bad
faith. It also appears that petitioner Atty. Sabitsana was remiss in his duties as counsel to the
Muertegui family. Instead of advising the Muerteguis to register their purchase as soon as possible to
forestall any legal complications that accompany unregistered sales of real property, he did exactly
the opposite: taking advantage of the situation and the information he gathered from his inquiries
and investigation, he bought the very same lot and immediately caused the registration thereof ahead
of his clients, thinking that his purchase and prior registration would prevail. The Court cannot
tolerate this mercenary attitude. Instead of protecting his client's interest, Atty. Sabitsana practically
preyed on him.
Petitioner Atty. Sabitsana took advantage of confidential information disclosed to him by his client,
using the same to defeat him and beat him to the draw, so to speak. He rushed the sale and
registration thereof ahead of his client. He may not be afforded the excuse that he nonetheless
proceeded to buy the lot because he believed or assumed that the Muerteguis were simply bluffing
when Carmen told him that they had already bought the same; this is too convenient an excuse to be
believed. As the Muertegui family lawyer, he had no right to take a position, using information
disclosed to him in confidence by his client, that would place him in possible conflict with his duty.
He may not, for his own personal interest and benefit, gamble on his client's word, believing it at one
time and disbelieving it the next. He owed the Muerteguis his undivided loyalty. He had the duty to
protect the client, at all hazards and costs even to himself.

Petitioner Atty. Sabitsana is enjoined to "look at any representation situation from the point of view
that there are possible conflicts, and further to think in terms of impaired loyalty, that is[,] to evaluate
if his representation in any way will impair his loyalty to a client."

Moreover, as the Muertegui family's lawyer, Atty. Sabitsana was under obligation to safeguard his
client's property, and not jeopardize it. Such is his duty as an attorney, and pursuant to his general
agency.
Even granting that Atty. Sabitsana has ceased to act as the Muertegui family's lawyer, he still owed
them his loyalty. The termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification for a lawyer to
represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client on a matter involving
confidential information which the lawyer acquired when he was counsel. The client's confidence
once reposed should not be divested by mere expiration of professional employment. 41 This is
underscored by the fact that Atty. Sabitsana obtained information from Carmen which he used to his
advantage and to the detriment of his client.

From the foregoing disquisition, it can be seen that petitioners are guilty of bad faith in pursuing the
sale of the lot despite being apprised of the prior sale in respondent's favor. Moreover, petitioner
Atty. Sabitsana has exhibited a lack of loyalty toward his clients, the Muerteguis, and by his acts,
jeopardized their interests instead of protecting them. Over and above the trial court's and the CA's
findings, this provides further justification for the award of attorney's fees, litigation expenses and
costs in favor of the respondent.