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G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013 Republic of The Philippines, Petitioner, LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent

This document summarizes a Supreme Court of the Philippines decision regarding whether a marriage entered into solely for the purpose of one spouse obtaining American citizenship through the other spouse is valid or void. The Court examined the issue of "marriage fraud" in immigration cases and prior foreign decisions on "limited purpose" marriages. Ultimately, the Court ruled that such a marriage contracted solely for citizenship purposes and monetary consideration is not void for lack of consent, distinguishing motive from consent to enter the marriage contract.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
48 views6 pages

G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013 Republic of The Philippines, Petitioner, LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent

This document summarizes a Supreme Court of the Philippines decision regarding whether a marriage entered into solely for the purpose of one spouse obtaining American citizenship through the other spouse is valid or void. The Court examined the issue of "marriage fraud" in immigration cases and prior foreign decisions on "limited purpose" marriages. Ultimately, the Court ruled that such a marriage contracted solely for citizenship purposes and monetary consideration is not void for lack of consent, distinguishing motive from consent to enter the marriage contract.

Uploaded by

Joem Mendoza
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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G.R. No.

198780 October 16, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,


vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t of Court assailing the September 29,
2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which affirmed the April 25,
2008Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC). declaring the marriage of Daniel Lee
Fringer (Fringer) and respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void from the beginning.

The facts

On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo
of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate of
Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588.3

On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity 4 of her marriage with
Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband
and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a married state or complying with
any of their essential marital obligations. She described their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore,
null and void ab initio .

Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a
motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and determine the existence of a collusion. On October 2, 2007,
the Assistant Prosecutor complied and reported that she could not make a determination for failure of
both parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.

At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the hearing
despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits ensued.

Ruling of the RTC

In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of Liberty
Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very beginning. As a necessary consequence of this
pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the surname of respondent as she never acquired any right
over it and so as to avoid a misimpression that she remains the wife of respondent.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.6

The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only. Giving credence to the
testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire
American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after
the ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United States and never
again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never
processed her petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that when marriage was entered into for a
purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be
recognized from its inception.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a
motion for reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated February 5, 2009, denying the motion for
want of merit. It explained that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give
their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a
means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.

Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.

Ruling of the CA

In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the
essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that the parties clearly did not understand the
nature and consequence of getting married and that their case was similar to a marriage in jest. It further
explained that the parties never intended to enter into the marriage contract and never intended to live as
husband and wife or build a family. It concluded that their purpose was primarily for personal gain, that is,
for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.

Hence, this petition.

Assignment of Error

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A MARRIAGE


CONTRACTED FOR THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS DONEIN JEST,
HENCE, LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OFCONSENT.8

The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship and for Fringer to
be paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, as they knowingly and willingly
entered into that marriage and knew the benefits and consequences of being bound by it. According to
the OSG, consent should be distinguished from motive, the latter being inconsequential to the validity of
marriage.

The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest. The
parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were otherwise, the
purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.

On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the petition, reiterating her stand that her marriage
was similar to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void from the beginning.

On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its arguments in its petition for review on
certiorari.

Ruling of the Court

The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole
purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of
lack of consent?
The Court resolves in the negative.

Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of marriage fraud for the
purposes of immigration.

Marriage Fraud in Immigration

The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the development of
marriage fraud for the sole purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the United States, marriages
where a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific benefits, have been
referred to as "limited purpose" marriages.11 A common limited purpose marriage is one entered into
solely for the legitimization of a child.12 Another, which is the subject of the present case, is for
immigration purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned with the intention of the couple at the time of
their marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out those who use marriage solely to achieve immigration
status.14

In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,15 established the principal
test for determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a "marriage is a
sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time they were married. "This
standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA),
which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the marriage was not "entered into for the
purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United States." The focus, thus, shifted from determining
the intention to establish a life together, to determining the intention of evading immigration laws.16 It must
be noted, however, that this standard is used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not
purport to rule on the legal validity or existence of a marriage.

The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for the limited
purpose of immigration is also legally void and in existent. The early cases on limited purpose marriages
in the United States made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable case of

United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to stay in the country,
the parties had agreed to marry but not to live together and to obtain a divorce within six months. The
Court, through Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert temporary into permanent
permission to stay in the country was not a marriage, there being no consent, to wit:

x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is necessary to every
contract; and no matter what forms or ceremonies the parties may go through indicating the contrary, they
do not contract if they do not in fact assent, which may always be proved. x x x Marriage is no exception
to this rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. x x x It is quite true that a marriage without
subsequent consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a marriage only for the sake of
representing it as such to the outside world and with the understanding that they will put an end to it as
soon as it has served its purpose to deceive, they have never really agreed to be married at all. They
must assent to enter into the relation as it is ordinarily understood, and it is not ordinarily understood as
merely a pretence, or cover, to deceive others.18

(Italics supplied)

On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines,19 which declared as valid a
marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating that a valid
marriage could not be avoided "merely because the marriage was entered into for a limited
purpose."20 The 1980 immigration case of Matter of McKee,21 further recognized that a fraudulent or sham
marriage was intrinsically different from a non subsisting one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been recognized as
problematic. The problem being that in order to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal marriage is first
necessary.22 At present, United States courts have generally denied annulments involving" limited
purpose" marriages where a couple married only to achieve a particular purpose, and have upheld such
marriages as valid.23

The Court now turns to the case at hand.

Respondent’s marriage not void

In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered into for a
purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be
recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying the OSG’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC
went on to explain that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give their
consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means for
the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential
requisite of consent was lacking. It held that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and
consequence of getting married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a
marriage in jest considering that the parties only entered into the marriage for the acquisition of American
citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a marriage contract and never
intended to live as husband and wife or build a family.

The CA’s assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties’ supposed lack of consent. Under
Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same Code
provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio.

Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a
solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately
enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by
any of the vices of consent under Articles45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation,
and undue influence.24 Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable
of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their
act.25 Their understanding should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.26

Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent
because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also
conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient
consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely
given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage.
Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear
intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an
application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be
created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.

In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to a
marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a
joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding that
the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating a purpose to
enter into such a relation.27 It is a pretended marriage not intended to be real and with no intention to
create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void
ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent. There
is no genuine consent because the parties have absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for
any purpose.
The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest.1âwphi1 Albios and Fringer had an
undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent to
acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow them to further their
objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly support an application for citizenship. There
was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for
a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.

The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish a
conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real intention to
establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance with
law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage are governed
by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the
grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes
other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore,
so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or
voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.28

Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on
the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the
realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions.29 The right to marital
privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live together
or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on.30 Thus, marriages
entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money,
status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites,31 are equally valid. Love, though
the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other
considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.

Although the Court views with disdain the respondent’s attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest purposes,
It cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the respondent’s marriage may be considered a sham
or fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and continues to be valid and
subsisting.

Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of the
Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may constitute fraud,
namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by the
wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted disease; and (4)
concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or deceit shall
constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole
purpose of evading immigration laws does not qualify under any of the listed circumstances. Furthermore,
under Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent party. In the
present case, there is no injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham
marriage.

Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage with
Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court cannot declare
such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to qualify for immigration benefits, after they have
availed of its benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These unscrupulous individuals cannot be
allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios already misused a judicial
institution to enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed to again abuse it to get
herself out of an inconvenient situation.

No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the foundation
of the family and shall be protected by the State.32 It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and
caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be
entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer needed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

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