[G.R. No. L-24365. June 30, 1966.

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E.

CHRISTENSEN, deceased. ADOLFO C. AZNAR, executor-
appellee, vs. MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DUNCAN, oppositor-
appellant. MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, oppositor-appellee.

J. Salonga and L.M. Abellera for oppositor-appellee.

Carlos Dominguez, Jr. for executor-appellee.
M.R. Sotelo for appellant.

DECISION

MAKALINTAL, J : p

Edward E. Christensen, a citizen of California with domicile in the

Philippines, died leaving a will executed on March 5, 1951. The will was
admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of Davao in its decision of
February 28, 1954. In that same decision the court declared that Maria Helen
Christensen Garcia (hereinafter referred to as Helen Garcia) was a natural child
of the deceased. The declaration was appealed to this Court, and was affirmed
in its decision of February 14, 1958 (G.R. No. L-11484)
In another incident relative to the partition of the deceased's estate, the
trial court approved the project submitted by the executor in accordance with
the provisions of the will, which said court found to be valid under the law of
California. Helen Garcia appealed form the order of approval, and this Court,
on January 31, 1963, reversed the same on the ground that the validity of the
provisions of the will should be governed by Philippine law, and returned the
case to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as provided
by said law (G.R. No. L-16749)
On October 29, 1964, the Court of First Instance of Davao issued an
order approving the project of partition submitted by the executor, dated June
30, 1964, wherein the properties of the estate were divided equally between
Maria Lucy Christensen Duncan (named in the will as Maria Lucy Christensen
Daney, and hereinafter referred to as merely Lucy Duncan), whom the testator
had expressly recognized in his will as his daughter (natural) and Helen Garcia,
who had been judicially declared as such after his death. The said order was
based on the proposition that since Helen Garcia had been preterited in the will
the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir was annulled, and hence the properties
passed to both of them as if the deceased had died intestate, saving only the
legacies left in favor of certain other persons, which legacies have been duly
approved by the lower court and distributed to the legatees.
The case is once more before us on appeal, this time by Lucy Duncan,
on the sole question of whether the estate, after deducting the legacies, should
pertain to her and to Helen Garcia in equal shares, or whether the inheritance
of Lucy Duncan as instituted heir should be merely reduced to the extent
necessary to cover the legitimate of Helen Garcia, equivalent to 1/4 of the entire
estate.
The will of Edward E. Christensen contains, among others, the following
clauses which are pertinent to the issue in this case:
"3. I declare . . . that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN (Now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born in the
Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, who is now residing at No. 665
Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. "4. I further
declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants
except my above-named daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN
DANEY.
xxx xxx xxx
"7. I give, devise, and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN
CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of
age and who, notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized Christensen,
is not in any way related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by
me, and who, from all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos,
Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
PESOS (P3,600), Philippine Currency, the same to be deposited in trust
for the said Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch of the
Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred
Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency per month until the principal thereof
as well as any interest which may have accrued thereon, is exhausted.'
xxx xxx xxx
"12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved
daughter, the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard
Daney now residing, as aforesaid, at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los
Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest, remainder, and
residue of my property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of
whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever situated, of which I may
be possessed at my death and which may have come to me from any
source whatsoever, during her lifetime; Provided, however, that should the
said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY at anytime prior to her
decease having living issue, then and in that event, the life interest herein
 given shall terminate, and if so terminated, then I give, devise, and
bequeath to my daughter, the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY
the rest, remainder and residue of my property with the same force and
effect as if I had originally so given, devised and bequeathed it to her; and
provided, further, that should the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN
DANEY die without living issue, then, and in that event, I give, devise and
bequeath all the rest, remainder and residue of my property, one-half (1/2)
to my well-beloved sister, Mrs. CARRIE LOUISE C. BORTON, now
residing at No. 2124, Twentieth Street, Bakersfield, California, U.S.A., and
one-half (1/2) to the children of my deceased brother, JOSEPH C.
CHRISTENSEN, namely: Mrs. Carol F. Ruggaver, of Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A., and Joseph Raymond Christensen, of Manhattan
Beach, California, U.S.A., share and share alike, the share of any of the
three above named who may predecease me, to go in equal parts to the
descendants of the deceased; and, provided further, that should my sister
Mrs. Carol Louise C. Borton die before my own decease, then, and in that
event, the share of my estate devised to her herein I give, devise and
bequeath to her children, Elizabeth Borton de Treviño, of Mexico City,
Mexico; Barbara Borton Philips, of Bakersfield, California, U.S.A., or to the
heirs of any of them who may die before my own decease, share and
share alike."
The trial court ruled, and appellee now maintains, that there has been
preterition of Helen Garcia, a compulsory heir in the direct line, resulting in the
annulment of the institution of heir pursuant to Article 854 of the Civil Code,
which provides:
"ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the
execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the
institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as
they are not inofficious."
On the other hand, appellant contends that this is not a case of
preterition, but is governed by Article 906 of the Civil Code, which says: "Any
compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title less the legitime
belonging to him may demand that the same be fully satisfied," Appellant also
suggests that considering the provisions of the will whereby the testator
expressly denied his relationship with Helen Garcia, but left to her a legacy
nevertheless, although less than the amount of her legitime, she was in effect
defectively disinherited within the meaning of Article 918, which reads:
"ART. 918. Disinheritance without a specification of the cause, or
for a cause the truth of which, if contradicted, is not proved, or which is
not one of those set forth in this Code, shall annul the institution of heirs
insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited; but the devises and
 legacies and other testamentary dispositions shall be valid to such extent
as will not impair the legitime."
Thus, according to appellant, under both Articles 906 and 918, Helen
Garcia is entitled only to her legitime, and not to a share of the estate equal that
of Lucy Duncan as if the succession were intestate.
Article 854 is a reproduction of Article 814 of the Spanish Civil Code; and
Article 906 of Article 815. Commenting on Article 815, Manresa explains:
"Como dice Goyena, en el caso de pretericion puede presumirse
ignorancia o falta de memoria en el testador; en el de dejar algo al
heredero forzoso, no. Este no se encuentra privado totalmente de su
legitima: ha recibido por cualquier titulo una porcion de los bienes
hereditarios, porcion que no alcanza a completar la legitima, pero que
influeye poderosamente en el animo del legislador para decidirle a
adoptar una solucion bien diferente de la señalada para el caso de
pretericion."
"El testador no ha olvidado por completo al heredero forzoso; le ha
dejado bienes; pero haciendo un claculo equivocado, ha repartido en
favor de extraños o en favor de otros legitimarios por via de legado,
donacion o mejora mayor cantidad de la que la ley de consentia disponer.
El heredero forzoso no puede perder su legitima, pero tampoco puede
pedir mas que la misma. De aqui su derecho a reclamar solamente lo que
le falta; al complemento de la porcion que forzosamente la corresponde."
" . . . Dejar el testador por cualquier titulo, equivale a disponer en
testamento por titulo de herencia, legado o mejora, y en favor de
legitimarios, de alguna cantidad o porcion de bienes menos que la
legitima o igual a la misma. Tal sentido, que es el mas proprio en al
articulo 815, no pubna tampoco con la doctrina de la ley. Cuando en el
testamento se deja algo al heredero forzoso, la pretericion es incompleta:
es mas formularia que real. Cuando en el testamento nada se deja el
legitimario, hay verdadera pretericion." (6 Manresa, 7th Ed., 1951, p. 437.)
On the difference between preterition of a compulsory heir and the right
to ask for completion of his legitime, Sanchez Roman says:
"La desheredacion, como expresa, es siempre voluntaria; la
pretericion puede serlo, pero se presume involuntaria la omision en que
consiste, en cuanto olvida o no atiende el testador en su testamento a la
satisfaccion del derecho a la legitima del heredero forzoso preterido,
prescindiendo absoluta y totalmente de el y no mencionandole en
ninguna de sus disposiciones testamentarias, o no instituyendole en parte
alguna de la herencia, ni por titulo de heredero ni por el de legatar o
aunque le mencionara o nombrara sin dejarle mas o menos bienes. Si le
dejara algunos, por pocos que sean e insuficientes para cubrir su
legitima, ya no seria caso de pretericion, sino de complemento de
 aquella. El primer supuesto o de pretericion se regula por el articulo 814,
y produce accion de nulidad de la institucion de heredero; y el segundo,
o de complemento de legitima por el 815 y solo origina la accion ad
suplementum, para completar la legitima." (Sanchez Roman, Tomo VI,
Vol. 2, p. 1131.)
Manresa defines preterition as the omission of the heir in the will, either
by not naming him at all or, while mentioning him as father, son, etc., by not
instituting him as heir without disinheriting him expressly, nor assigning to him
some part of the properties. Manresa continues:
"Se necesita, pues: (a) Que la omision se refiera a un heredero
forzoso; (b) Que la omision sea completa; que el heredero forzoso nada
reciba en el testamento.
xxx xxx xxx
"B. Que la omision sea completa — Esta condicion se deduce del
mismo Articulo 814 y resulta conevidencia al relacionar esta articulo con
el 815. El heredero forzoso a quien el testador deja algo por cualquier
titulo en su testamento, no se halla propiamente omitido, pues se le
nombra y se le reconoce participacion en los bienes hereditarios. Podria
discutirse en el Articulo 814 si era o no necesario que se reconociese el
derecho del heredero como tal heredero, pero el arrticulo 815 desvanece
esta duda. Aquel se ocupa de privacion completa o total, tacita; este, de
la privacion parcial. Los efectos deben ser y son, como veremos,
completamente distintos."
"La privacion de la legitima puede ser total o parcial.
"Privar totalmente de la legitima es negarla en absoluto al
legitimario, despojarle de ella por completo. A este caso se refiere el
articulo 814. Privar parcialmente de la legitima, es menguarla o reducirla,
dejar al legitimario una porcion menor que la que le corresponde. A este
caso se refiere el articulo 815. El 813 sienta, pues, una regla general, y
las consecuencias del que brantamiento de esta regla se determina en
los articulos 814 y 815." (6 Manresa p. 418.)
Again Sanchez Roman:
"QUE LA OMISION SEA TOTAL. — Aunque el articulo 814 no
consigna de modo expreso esta circunstancia de que la pretericion o falta
de mencion e instituticion o disposicion testamentaria a su favor, sea total,
completa y absoluta, asi se deduce de no hacer distinion o salvedad
alguna empleandola en terminos generales; pero sirve a confirmarlo de
un modo indudable el siguiente articulo 815, al decir que el heredero
forzoso a quien el testador haya dejado, por cualquier titulo, menos de la
legitima que la corresponda, podria pedir el complemento de la misma, lo
cual ya no son el caso ni los efectos de la pretericion, que anula la
 institucion, sino simplemente los del suplemento necesario para cubrir su
legitima." (Sanchez Roman — Tomo VI, Vol. 2.0 p. 1133.)
The question may be posed: In order that the right of a forced heir may
be limited only to the completion of his legitime (instead of the annulment of the
institution of heirs) is it necessary that what has been left to him in the will "by
any title," as by legacy, be granted to him in his capacity as heir, that is, a titulo
de heredero? In other words, should he be recognized or referred to in the will
as heir? This question is pertinent because in the will of the deceased Edward
E. Christensen Helen Garcia is not mentioned as an heir — indeed her status
as such is denied — but is given a legacy of P3,600.00
While the classical view, pursuant to the Roman law, gave an affirmative
answer to the question, according to both Manresa (6 Manresa 7th 3rd. 436)
and Sanchez Roman (Tomo VI, Vol. 2.0 — p. 937), that view was changed by
Article 645 of the "Proyecto de Codigo de 1851," later on copied in Article 906
of our own Code. Sanchez Roman, in the citation given above, comments as
follows:
"RESPECTO DEL COMPLEMENTO DE LA LEGITIMA. — Se
inspira el Codigo en esta materia en la doctrina clasica del Derecho
romano y patrio (2); pero con alguna racional modificacion. Concedian
aquellos precedentes legales al heredero forzoso, a quien no se le dejaba
por titulo de tal el completo de su legitima, la accion para invalidar la
institucion hecha en el testamento y reclamar y obtener aquella mediante
el ejercicio de la querella de inoficioso, y aun cuando favorecido como
donatorio, por otro titulo que fuera el de heredero, sino al honor de que
se le privaba no dandole este caracter, y solo cuando era instituido
heredero en parte o cantidad inferior a lo que le correspondiera por
legitima, era cuando bastaba el ejercicio de la accion ad suplementum
para completarla, sin necesidad de anular las otras instituciones de
heredero o demas disposiciones contenidas en el testamento.
El Articulo 851 se aparta de este criterio estricto y se ajusta a la
unica necesidad que le inspira, cual es la de que se complete la legitima
del heredero forzoso, a quien por cualquier titulo se haya dejado menos
de lo que le corresponda, y se le otorga tan solo el derecho de pedir
el complemento de la misma sin necesidad de que se anulen las
disposiciones testamentarias, que se reduciran en lo que sean
inoficiosas, conforme al articulo 817, cuya interpretacion y sentido tienen
ya en su apoyo la sancion de la jurisprudencia (3); siendo condicion
precisa que lo que se hubiere dejado de menos de la legitima al heredero
forzoso, lo haya sido en el testamento o sea por disposicion del testador,
segun lo revela el texto del articulo, "el heredero forzoso a quien
el testador haya dejado, etc., esto es, por titulo de legado o
donacion mortis causa en el testamento y no fuera de al." (Sanchez
Roman, Tomo VI, Vol. 2.0 — p. 937.)"
 Manresa cites particularly three decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain
dated January 16, 1895, May 25, 1917, and April 23, 1932, respectively. In each
one of those cases the testator left to one who was a forced heir a legacy worth
less than the legitime, but without referring to the legatee as an heir or even as
a relative, and willed the rest of the estate to other persons. It was held that
Article 815 applied, and the heir could not ask that the institution of heirs be
annulled entirely, but only that the legitimate be completed. (6 Manresa, pp.
438, 441.)
The foregoing solution is indeed more in consonance with the expressed
wished of the testator in the present case as may be gathered very clearly from
the provisions of his will. He refused to acknowledge Helen Garcia as his natural
daughter, and limited her share to a legacy of P3,600.00. The fact that she was
subsequently declared judicially to possess such status is no reason to assume
that had the judicial declaration come during his lifetime his subjective attitude
towards her would have undergone any change and that he would have willed
his estate equally to her and to Lucy Duncan, who alone was expressly
recognized by him.
The decision of this Court in Neri, et al. v. Akutin, 74 Phil. 185, is cited by
appellees in support of their theory of preterition. That decision is not here
applicable, because it referred to a will where "the testator left all his property
by universal title to the children by his second marriage, and (that) without
expressly disinheriting the children by h is first marriage, he left nothing to them
or, at least, some of them." In the case at bar the testator did not entirely omit
oppositor-appellee Helen Garcia, but left her a legacy of P3,600.00
The estate of the deceased Christensen upon his death consisted of 399
shares of stocks in the Christensen Plantation Company and a certain amount
in cash. One-fourth (1/4) of said estate descended to Helen Garcia as her
legitime. Since she became the owner of her share as of the moment of the
death of the decedent (Arts. 774, 777, Civil Code), she is entitled to a
corresponding portion of all the fruits or increments thereof subsequently
accruing. These include the stock dividends on the corporate holdings. The
contention of Lucy Duncan that all such dividends pertain to her according to
the terms of the will cannot be sustained, for it would in effect impair the right
of ownership of Helen Garcia with respect to her legitime.
One point deserves to be here mentioned. although no reference to it has
been made in the brief for oppositor-appellant. It is the institution of substitute
heirs to the estate bequeathed to Lucy Duncan in the event she should die
without living issue. This substitution results in effect from the fact that under
paragraph 12 of the will she is entitled only to the income from said estate,
unless prior to her decease she should have living issue, in which event she
would inherit in full ownership; otherwise the property will go to the other
 relatives of the testator named in the will. Without deciding this point, since it is
not one of the issues raised before us, we might call attention to the limitations
imposed by law upon this kind of substitution, particularly that which says that
it can never burden the legitime (Art. 864 Civil Code), which means that the
legitime must descend to the heir concerned in fee simple.
WHEREFORE, the order of the trial court dated October 29, 1964,
approving the project of partition as submitted by the executor- appellee, is
hereby set aside; and the case is remanded with instructions to partition as
submitted by the executor-appellee, is hereby set aside; and the case is
remanded with instructions to partition the hereditary estate anew as indicated
in this decision, that is, by giving the oppositor-appellee Maria Helen
Christensen Garcia no more than the portion corresponding to her as legitime,
equivalent to one-fourth (1/4) of the hereditary estate, after deduction all debts
and charges, which shall not include those imposed in the will of the decedent,
in accordance with Article 908 of the Civil Code. Costs against appellees in this
instance.
Concepcion, C.J., J.B.L. Reyes, Barrera, Dizon, Regala, J.P. Bengzon,
Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.

RESOLUTION

July 30, 1967

MAKALINTAL, J : p

Oppositor-appellant has filed an ex-parte petition dated July 11, 1966,

making reference to an alleged oversight and asking for the corresponding
correction, in the last paragraph before the dispositive part of our decision,
which reads as follows:
"One point deserves to be here mentioned, although no reference
to it has been made in the brief for oppositor-appellant. It is the institution
of substituted heirs to the estate bequeathed to Lucy Duncan in the event
she should die without living issue. This substitution results in effect from
the fact that under paragraph 12 of the will she is entitled only to the
income from said estate, unless prior to her decease she should have
living issue, in which event she would inherit in full ownership; otherwise
the property will go to the other relatives of the testator named in the will.
Without deciding this point, since it is not one of the issues raised before
us, we might call attention to the limitations imposed by law upon this kind
of substitution, particularly that which says that it can never burden the
legitime (Art. 864, Civil Code), which means that the legitime must
 descend to the heir concerned in fee simple." (Decision, June 30, 1966,
pages 14-15; emphasis ours)
Oppositor-appellant points out that the matter of substitution of heirs was
taken up and discussed in her brief, particularly in pages 28 and 32 thereof.
This is indeed quite true, but the reference to and discussion of the rights of the
substitute heirs (called American heirs in the brief) appears to be merely for the
purpose of refuting the theory advanced by appellees and not for the purpose
of having the rights of said heirs defined in so far as, under the terms of the will,
they may affect the legitime of oppositor-appellant. This point of course was not
and could hardly have been squarely raised as an issue inasmuch as the
substitute heirs are not parties in this case. We have nevertheless called
attention "to the limitations imposed by law upon this kind of substitution,"
because in the brief for oppositor-appellant, at page 45, she makes the
conclusion "that the Last Will and Testament of Edward E. Christensen are valid
under Philippine Law and must be given full force and effect;" and to give them
full force and effect would precisely affect the legitime of oppositor-appellant.
WHEREFORE, the last paragraph before the dispositive part of our
decision quoted above is amended by eliminating the following phrase in the
first sentence: "although no reference to it has been made in the brief for
oppositor-appellant."
(In re: Aznar v. Duncan, G.R. No. L-24365, [June 30, 1966], 123 PHIL 1450-
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1461)