Recommendations of 4th conference on SAFETY IN MINES held in

Calcutta on 24 December, 1978

This conference was held in the normal course and not immediately after a big disaster as was the case
with the previous three conferences which were held respectively after the Chinakuri, Dhori and Jeetpur
explosions. This was appreciated by the members but they felt that the agenda was too heavy for one day
programme, and some of the important members left the conference in protest. The other members then
discussed in a general way the following suggestions of the Polish arid I.L.O. experts :
i. The statute should be made rigorous with a view to achieving higher standards of safety.
ii. Mine managements should develop their own Internal Safety Organisation which should be placed
directly under the charge of the Managing Director.
iii. New strategies should be planned to achieve the goal of reaching Zero Accident Potential (ZAP).
iv. A Training College should be developed to train up surveyors, engineers, ventilation officers, safety
officers etc.

Recommendations of 5th conference on SAFETY IN MINES held in New

Delhi on 26-27 December, 1980
1. Defining the Safety Policy of Mining Companies
1.2 An in-depth, mine wise and cause wise analysis of all fatal and serious accidents that have occurred
at every mine of each mining company during the last three years shall be made by the ISO
(Internal Safety Organisation) of the Company. (A copy of the analysis made should be submitted).

4. Internal Safety Organisation

4.1 The Internal Safety Organisation (ISO) should be independent of the production line at all levels.
4.2 The Chief of ISO should be a senior officer next in rank only to the Director (Tech.) if any or MD/the
Chief Executive.
4.3 The ISO should be a multi-disciplinary team and the field setup should start above the level of mine.
The Safety Officer at the mine level being a specialist staff officer to the Mine Manager should not
be deemed to be part of the ISO.
4.4 In order that the Internal Safety Organisation is able to play an effective role, detailed guidelines
for their functioning may be laid down covering, inter-alia, the following:
i. Formulation of safety policy at the corporate level;
ii. Effective monitoring of the state of implementation of the policy directives on safety;
iii. Periodic inspection of mines for assessing status of safety;
iv. Enquiry into all accidents and dangerous occurrences;
v. Actively associated in opening new districts and in obtaining permissions, relaxations and
exemptions under the statute;
vi. The findings of ISO should be placed before the Pit Safety Committee for discussion and
dissemination.
DGMS (Gen) Circular No: 01 of 1998
The role of the Internal Safety Organisation (ISO) in promoting the cause of safety does not need any more
emphasis when viewed from the current safety scenario in mines. Though, the successive safety
conferences in mines deliberated on certain principles of self-regulation, it was the Fifth Conference on
Safety in Mines held in 1980 which clearly spelt-out the structure, role and functions of the ISO in every
mining company. The matter was also covered extensively in the recommendations of the Courts of Inquiry
of Kessurgarh Colliery and Sudamdih Colliery, wherein the role of Internal Safety Organisation was made
specific. These recommendations have been circulated to the Industry vide DGMS Technical Circular No.5
of 1979. The Sixth Conference on Safety in Mines contemplated further on expansion of the role and
functions of the ISO.

But, from its inception as one of the main recommendations of the Fifth Conference on Safety in Mines, the
ISO's contribution to safety in mines has been unfortunately clouded. It is an accepted fact that more thrust
is required in strengthening the role and functioning of this institution.

An analysis of the chronological sequence of the status of Internal Safety Organisation and its functioning
in mines from inception, in light of the present safety scenario in mines, appears to convey the following as
the major shortcomings.
1. The functioning of the ISO in mines, is far from meeting the desired objectives.
2. The formulated and effected Corporate level Safety Policy in mines by the mining companies have
not been successful in mitigating the incidence of mining accidents and disasters.
3. Failure to effectively monitor the status of implementation of policy directives by the mining
companies.
4. Ineffective Inspection of mines for assessment of safety status.
5. Failure to effectively propagate the theme of safety in mine across the entire cross section of the
management.

Thus, there appears to be an urgent need for reviewing critically, the entire quantum of the concept of ISO,
with a view to streamlining the efforts and in identifying the grey areas in the field of safety, for tackling the
challenges effectively. In this connection, attention is also drawn to this Directorate's General Circular No. 2
of 1997, which was explicit in the role of ISO for meeting the challenges of the future.

It is therefore advised that the management of all mining companies, adopt the following measures as
recommended in the 5th and 6th Conferences on Safety in Mines and also in the recommendations of the
Courts of Inquiries of 'Kessurgarh' Colliery and 'Sudamdih' Colliery in reviving the institution of the ISO for
justifying its role in improvement of safety standards in mines—
(a) The ISO in every mining company, shall make an in-depth mine-wise, cause-wise analysis of all
fatal/serious accidents.
(b) The ISO shall monitor the impact of the 'Safety Campaigns' drawn up by Board of Directors based
on the ISO's analysis of accidents as mentioned above, and also submit a report to the Board of
Directors at intervals not exceeding 3 months.
(c) The ISO shall be made independent of the production line at all levels.
(d) The Chief of ISO shall be of a senior rank, next only to the Dir(Tech.)M.D./Chief Executive of mining
company.
(e) The ISO shall be multidisciplinary team, with a field set-up which shall be above the mine level.
(f) For ISO to be effective in its functioning, suitable policy shall be framed on the basis of the
following guidelines :
i. A proper Safety Policy shall be drawn up at corporate level of the company.
ii. A suitable machinery shall be evolved for effective monitoring of the implementation status
of policy directives.
iii. There shall be a system of periodic mine inspections for assessment of safety status.
 iv. All mine accidents arid dangerous occurrences shall be independently enquired into by the
ISO.
v. The ISO shall make independent assessment of the safety implications in all cases of
opening of new mine/district, use of new equipment, adoption of new method of work and
all grievances on safety related matters.
vi. All applications for obtaining statutory permission, shall be studied and vetted by the ISO
before submission.
vii. Findings of the ISO on safety matters shall be discussed in the Safety Committee at mines.
viii. The ISO shall periodically assess the proper functioning of the institutions of workmen's
inspectors and the Safety Committees in mines.
ix. There shall be a system of auditing the safety standards at intervals of not more than a
year, for each mine.

Therefore Owners, Agents and Managers of all Coal, Metalliferous and Oil Mines are requested to take all
possible steps in achieving the set objectives of the institution of the Internal Safety Organisation.

DGMS (Gen) Circular No: 02 of 1997

Internal Safety Organisation (ISO) is one of the most powerful tool in the hands of the mine operators and
workers for enhancement and improvement of the status of safety in Indian mines. Fifth Conference on
Safety in Mines held at New Delhi on the 26th & 27th December 1980 in its’ recommendations framed
guidelines for the formation of “Safety Policy” and” Internal Safety Organisation”. Arising out of the
recommendations of the Fifth Conference on Safety in Mines, many mining companies have since
formulated their “|Safety Policy” and created “Int3rnal Safety Organisation” to translate the principle of
self-regulation into practice. So far as the functioning of the ISOs are concerned, it has been observed that
their functioning could not reach the desired heights of achievement as projected by the National Tri-
partite forum.

Under the present circumstances in the mining industry looking at introduction of new and sophisticated
technology, mining in increasingly difficult geo-mining locale and evolution of a more conscious techno-
social environment, it is now time to revitalize the institution of ISO and all efforts must be directed
towards making this institution highly effective.

The Internal Safety Organisation in a company/ organisation should be made independent and directly
responsible to the authority/person made responsible for ensuring safety in mines, i.e. . The
Chairman/Chairman-cum-Managing Director or a Director on the Board of Directors of a mining company.
A system of reporting contraventions of the provisions of law by officers in this cadre should be evolved. A
complimentary system for the rectification of the violations by the operative persons in the mines should
also be developed and enforced.

The head of ISO should regularly interact with the persons responsible for production in the mine to review
the standard of safety therein. A written record for all such meetings should be maintained for information
as well as necessary actions at all levels.

THE COAL MINES REGULATIONS, 1957

37. General Management – (1) The owner, agent and manager shall provide for the safety and proper
discipline of persons employed in the mine.
 Kessurgarh Colliery Accident
Date of the Accident 9.8.1975
Number of persons killed 11
Owner Bharat Coking Coal Ltd.
Place Jharia Coalfield

A roof fall occurred during loading of coal in a depillaring district in IX seam in which 11 persons were killed;
one loader received serious injury while another got a minor injury.

IX seam, about 5 m thick and dipping at I in 6, had been developed along the floor on bord & pillar system
with square pillars, 15 m centre to centre, and rectangular galleries, 3.6 m wide and 2.4 m high. Extraction
of the pillars was done by stooking, dividing each pillar into 4 stooks. The heightening of galleries and splits
was done in two stages. In the first stage, they were heightened upto 3.9 m and in the second stage, upto
the roof of the seam which was 4.6 to 5 m high. The stooks were extracted in the full section. The
Systematic Timbering Rules provided for props at 1.2 m interval and cogs at 2.4 m interval in the area under
actual extraction. Galleries and splits were to be supported by two rows of props set at 1.2 m interval and a
cog at every junction of galleries. At the place of the accident, the gallery had been heightened upto the
roof and extraction of a stook had been started. 16 shotholes were blasted in the corner of the stook and
immediately after the blasting operation was completed, 22 loaders were engaged to load the coal. The
first lot of 7 tubs was loaded and a fresh supply of 9 empty tubs was provided. When these tubs were being
loaded, a mass of sandstone roof measuring 10m X 7 m (area =70 m2) and 15 to 30 cm thick fell at the
junction of roadways adjoining the stook under extraction from a height of about 4.6 m. 9 persons died
instantly and 2 more died soon after they were brought out from under the debris. One loader received-
serious injury and another one escaped with minor injury. The accident occurred because supports were
not erected before the loaders were allowed to enter the place. According to the Systematic Timbering
Rules, there should have been at least 20 props and 2 cogs under the roof stone which fell down. On
examining the evidence given by the different witnesses, it became clear that there was no support at all
under the roof that fell except for the possibility of 2 or 3 props at one edge. The immediate roof was thin,
coarse-grained, micaceous sandstone with pebbles and a layer of clayey material. The contact plane was
wet. Such a condition would give inadequate cohesion with the roof mass above. Because of the lack of
supports, bed separation took place over a period of time and the roof fell en masse by gravity. Failure to
test the roof was another lapse which resulted in the tragedy. (In fact, there was no wooden bunton
available at the place for testing the roof as required under the regulations). A day after the accident, the
management decided to take disciplinary action against the Assistant Manager, the Overman and the
Mining Sirdar. All the three officers were suspended immediately and as a result of the proceedings, one
increment of the Assistant Manager was stopped. The Overman and Mining Sirdar were dismissed. There
was also a definite intention to proceed departmentally against the shotfirer. Fortunately, for the
management, they discovered at that stage that the shotfirer was well over 60 years in age. The
management therefore took the easier course of superannuating him. Later, the records produced by
DGMS showed that the shotfirer was 69 years of age at the time of the accident and had not been
medically examined for years as required under CMR-27 and 28. From the facts that came to light during
the inquiry, the Court had made some very interesting observations which are summarized below:-

Management’s attitude to safety

A cat-and-mouse race seems to be going on between the DGMS and the mine management. The DGMS in
the role of policemen and prosecutors and the management trying to avoid prosecutions. The management
had shown no sign of being anxious to promote safety on its own but was keen to keep up appearance
merely of being law-abiding. The attitude of the management was primarily one of defense against the
criticism of possible violation of the safety regulations. Underlying this attitude are the assumptions that all
the wisdom in regard to safety matters is contained in the regulations and therefore nothing further needs
to be done but to follow them; and the duty of pointing out violations of these regulations lies entirely with
the DGMS. These assumptions are not only incorrect and dangerous but are negative in nature. It must be
clearly understood that the primary responsibility for safety is that of the mine management. In the event
of an accident, the plea that there has been no serious violation of the directives of the inspectorate or that
a particular practice has been adopted with the approval of DGMS should not be regarded as sufficient
defense. It should be for the management to prove that all possible precautions, whether or not they were
required by the DGMS, were taken and that the practices followed were justifiable on their own merit.

Reporting of accident to DGMS

Accident was not reported to DGMS until a little more than 2 hours after it occurred. The delay informing
DGMS has led to the suspicion that it was motivated, or even if it was not motivated, the delay was taken
advantage of to make such changes at the accident site as would give a better impression on DGMS in
regard to compliance with the Systematic Timbering Rules. This action was against the spirit of CMR-199.

Management structure: Sub-Area manager (SAM) and Agent

A fact which came out very prominently before the Court was a divorce between powers and
responsibilities. In the set up that existed, the Colliery Manager was functionally under the SAM (who had
been assigned no position under the statute) but statutorily under another individual who had been
declared to be the Agent of the mine under the Mines Act. It was difficult to comprehend this distinction
between functional and statutory control. It became apparent that the Manager regarded himself to be the
immediate subordinate of the SAM and not the Agent. Thus the first information of the accident was
conveyed by the Manager, not to the Agent but to the SAM. Perhaps the Manager cannot be blamed for
this because the Agent was obviously not regarded to be an officer of any consequence. He did not have a
telephone or a car and his residence was a long distance away from the colliery. It became evident that
even the decisions of the Agent to ensure compliance with the Mines Act could be vetoed by the SAM on
financial grounds. In the circumstances, it is difficult to comprehend why the SAM himself was not
designated as the Agent.

The Manager
Kessurgarh Colliery has a large number of workings which are well dispersed and it is physically difficult, if
not impossible, for the Manager to visit all the workings regularly. The duty of an officer at this level is to
ensure that there is a good reporting system which would keep him in touch with what is going on in the
different workings. It is also his duty to scrutinize these reports, pass necessary orders and to make sure
that his orders are carried out by his subordinates. This is the primary function of a Manager and in this the
Kessurgarh manager failed miserably. His own reports of inspections were not only scrapy but do not
appear in any paged book. A large number of the reports of the Assistant Manager were not countersigned
by the Manager. The Overman’s diary does not carry the countersignature of any superior officer and the
Assistant Manager denied having seen any of his reports. The reporting system in this colliery, to put it
mildly, was slipshod and was never utilized for the purpose for which it was meant. Naturally, the Colliery
Manager could not keep himself abreast of what was happening in his mine.

The Safety Officer

The Safety Officer had been allotted production duties in XIV seam as the Assistant Manager Incharge of
that seam was on leave at that time. This was a blatant violation of the law which stipulates that except in
an emergency, no other duties should be assigned to the safety officer and whenever other duties are
assigned to the safety officer by the manager, a written notice thereof should be sent to the RIM within 3
days of such assignment. If the safety officer had discharged his functions as a safety officer, the lack of
timbering under the STR should have come to his notice and should have been reported by him to the
higher authorities. It was admitted by the senior officers of the company that quite often the safety officers
were employed on production work. This further shows the management’s feeling of indifference to safety
matters. The Court recommended that safety officer should not be under the administrative control of the
manager but should be a part of a separate safety hierarchy. The role of the safety officer should be that of
an internal auditor. He should have the right of constructive criticism and this should be his main function.
 Recommendations of the Kessurgarh Court of Enquiry
DGMS (Tech) Circular No: 05 of 1979
1. Role of Safety Unit
The role of the Safety Unit in Colliery Management needs to be re-defined. In paragraph 9.1.6 of the
Jeetpur Report, I had recommended that the role of the Safety set up should be that of internal audit, and
that the set-up should be reorganised accordingly. In particular, I had suggested that the Safety Officer
should not be under the administrative control of the Colliery Manager, but should be a part of a separate
hierarchy, the head of which should report to the Technical Director on the Board of Directors, if there is
such a Director, or to the Chief Executive of the organisation. I do not know if this recommendation was
considered by the Government, but even if it was, there is no evidence of its having been implemented.
The Safety Officer continues to be under the immediate control of the Colliery Manager and he continues
to be saddled by the latter with duties other than those connected with his own. Even if he is not so
saddled, his direct subordination to the Manager deprives him in practice of his right of constructive
criticism, which should be his main function. It may possibly be an exaggeration to say that the accident
under enquiry could have been averted if there had been such an independent Safety Officer in the
Colliery, but it would certainly be no exaggeration to hold that such an officer could well have been
expected to point out that the Systematic Timbering Rules were not being followed, and thus fore-warn the
Manager against what was really the main cause of the tragedy. I would, therefore, like to reiterate that the
Management of a group of mines like B.C.C.L. should organise an internal safety wing completely
independent of local mines management. This wing should be headed by a Senior Safety Inspector of the
rank of a General Manager, possibly designated General Manager (Safety), who should report direct either
to the Chief Executive, or to a Functional Technical Director of the Board, if there is one such. The General
Manager (Safety) should have a Sufficient number of Inspectors under him who will supervise the work of
the Safety Officers, of whom there should be one in every colliery, as at present. Neither the Inspectors or
the Safely Officers should be either administratively or functionally under the Agent or the Mine Manager,
or any other officer belonging o the production hierarchy. They will be responsible only to their superiors in
their own hierarchy. The role of the Safety hierarchy would be advisory and critical, if necessary, but not
executive. The Safety Officer, for instance, will point out deficiencies, if any, to the manager, but not pass
orders on the Mines Management to rectify these deficiencies except under the authority of the Manager.
If, however, the Safety Officer is dissatisfied with the safety conditions, it will be his duty to report this state
of affairs to his superiors in his own hierarchy, on the other hand, not being subordinate to the Colliery
Manager. It will not be open to the latter to allot duties to the Safety Officer or make entries in his Personal
File or his Confidential Character Roll.

2. Co-operation of the Workers and their Unions

A nominee of the union, or where there are more than one union in a Colliery, of the union having the
largest membership, should be associated with the Internal Safety Wing during their inspections. In
concrete terms, I would recommend that the Safety Officer attached to a Colliery, accompanied by the
nominee of the union, should inspect all the mines in the Colliery once every month. The Inspectors
functioning under the General Manager (Safety), as recommended by me, should also when they inspect
the mines be accompanied by the nominee of the union. The Inspection Reports drawn up in both these
cases should be signed also by the union representative with such clarifactory or dissenting remarks, and
also with such further suggestions in regard to safety matters, as he might wish to make. These Inspection
reports should be put up to and considered by the General Manager (Safety), and while the latter should
have the right to accept or reject any suggestion made in the reports either by the Inspecting Officer or by
the Union representative, he should, in case he rejects any of these suggestions, record his reason for doing
so.
 Sudamdih Colliery
Date of the Accident 4.10.1976
Number of persons killed 43
Owner Bharat Coking Coal Ltd.
Place Jharia Coalfield

A firedamp explosion occurred in the 400 m horizon workings of XV seam on 4.10.1976 at about 0840 hrs.
The explosion occurred between the second and third rises. There were four closed holidays (30.9.1976,
1.10.1976, 2.10.1976 and 3.10.1976) on account of Durga Puja immediately preceding the accident. The XV
seam is 6 to 7 m thick and has igneous intrusions which have burnt the coal to “jhama” at places. Gas
survey conducted in May 1973 had shown a gas emission of upto 8 m3/min and it was classified as a gassy
seam of the third degree. The depth of the seam in the area of the accident was about 400 m. The dip of
the seam varied from about 27° to 60°. The 400 m horizon workings are entirely below the river Damodar.

Method of work: The seams at Sudamdih have been opened up on the horizon system of mining. Three
horizons, namely, 200m, 300m and 400m, have been developed to work XV, XIVA, XI/XII and IX/X seams.
Rises at 100 m intervals have been driven from the lower to the upper horizon to form blocks of coal for
subsequent extraction. All roadways are driven by blasting off-the-solid. The pattern of development is
shown in Fig.1.

In the XV seam, companion galleries to the main lateral gallery are driven off these rises leaving coal blocks
of 25 m to 30 m. The companion galleries are shown in Fig.-2.Room rises at 10m intervals are driven from
the lowest companion to the next higher companion.Thus in each wing of the block, 10 rooms can be
formed. The cross-section of these room rises is 3 m x 2 m. Each room is widened to a total width of 7 m
and heightened upto the main roof which is normally 7 m from the floor. Extraction of the room is carried
out from dip to rise with solid blasting. This method of extraction is called the “Komora” method. The
rooms, when regular extraction of coal commences, are referred to as “Komoras “. Complete extraction of
a “Komora” normally takes 15 days. After extraction, the “Komoras” are stowed with sand.
Conditions prior to the accident: The last working shift before the accident was the third shift of 29.9.1976.
Normal mining operations were suspended during the holidays. Many of the officers, including the General
Manager, were on leave during the Puja period. A roster duty chart was prepared according to which one
Assistant Manager or Under Manager or JET, one Overman or Mining Sirdar and one Electrician or Electrical
Helper would be on duty in each shift during the holidays. However, due to various reasons, during the
entire holiday period, only one officer (an Under Manager) visited the XV seam workings in the third shift of
1.10.1976. No officer went underground on 2nd and 3rd October. On 3rd October the Under Manager and
Mining Sirdar who were on roster duty in the second shift left the mine at the end of the shift without
waiting for their respective relief. In the third shift, neither the Under Manager nor the Mining Sirdar came
for their roster duty. Both pleaded illness in their evidence. The mine Time-keeper also failed in his duty to
inform senior officers that no one had turned up for roster work in that shift. The result of these lapses was
that no check on the auxiliary fans was made by anyone at least during the last shift before the mine
reopened on the morning of 4th October. It was subsequently found out that out of the six auxiliary fans in
the affected area; at least three did not work at least in the third shift on 3.10.1976. Stoppage of auxiliary
fans had caused accumulation of inflammable gas in a number of places. On 4th morning, either the
working places were not checked for gas before employing the workers or, even if they were checked and
gas was detected, persons were not evacuated before starting the fans. An explosive mixture was formed
and the explosion occurred within a few minutes of the starting of the fans.

Factors leading to the explosion:

(a) Gas accumulation
Prior to the accident, the following 5 blind headings were under drivage:
400m lateral along the strike line of the seam
3rd companion -do-
4th rise towards the rise of the seam
3rd rise -do-
6th room rise -do-
During the course of the inquiry, a study was undertaken on gas emission in the different drivages. Taking
into account the capacities of the auxiliary fans in the different drivages, it was observed that gas
accumulations from these drivages, could be cleared in the time shown against each:-
400m lateral 182 seconds
4th rise 182 seconds
3rd rise 144 seconds
6th room rise Within a few seconds
3rd companion Did not indicate gas accumulation except
in small pockets in roof cavities
The likely places of gas accumulations were identified as: 400 m lateral, 4th rise, 3rd rise, 6th room-rise and
3rd companion. The faces of 3rd rise and 3rd companion had been blasted in the last shift of 29.9.1976
before closure for Puja holidays. Fresh exposure of coal and broken coal would have contributed to some
increase in gas emission in these places. There was also a possibility of some gas accumulation in the three
“Komoras” due to the construction of barricades for stowing and the 4th , 5th , 6th , 7th and 8th room-rise
due to inadequate air flow. The Court thus came to the conclusion that the explosion occurred in the zone
between the 1st and 2nd companion bounded by the 2nd and 3rd rises.

(b) Source of ignition

It is unfortunate that the source of ignition could not be pin-pointed. No explosives were taken
underground and locomotives did not travel in the affected area on the day of the accident. No flame
safety lamp was taken to 400m horizon. Contrabands like matches or other sources of lighting were not
detected underground. Men were thoroughly checked for contrabands before they entered the cage.
However, nine “agarbatti” sticks were reported to have been found in the 1st companion gallery by the
captain of rescue team No.8. But the statements of the team members differed from that of the captain in
a number of details. The Management’s representative stated that “agarbattis” being the source of ignition
was not possible. Some Trade Union representatives felt that the “agarbattis” were planted. DGMS in their
statement said that the captain’s statement did not appear to be convincing. The Court concluded that the
“agarbattis” were definitely not in the 1st companion at the time of the accident and were ruled out as a
possible source of ignition. There was no evidence of any sparking or flashing in any of the damaged cap
lamps recovered from the accident site. After all the electrical equipments in the affected area were
examined by experts, the Court ruled out electrical sparking as a source of ignition. Sparks arising out of
compressed air equipment were also ruled out because the two loading machines, which were the only
compressed air operated equipment in the area, were not operated. Frictional sparking produced in
auxiliary fans due to rubbing of blades against the liner or guide vanes was also ruled out firstly because in
none of the fans, blades were found rubbing against the guide vanes and secondly, CMRS tests showed that
rubbing of blades against the aluminum liner did not produce an incendive spark. The Management’s
representative had suggested that the ignition was probably caused by a spark produced by a piece of
stone from the sill in the 2nd companion falling on the conveyor structure. DGMS suggested the possibility
of fall of roof stone from the sill in 6th room-rise. The spark could also be produced by rubbing of a metallic
part of the conveyor against a stone. One witness had heard a casualty saying that, “he was at the loading
point at the time of the blast. Some machine was started and immediately thereafter came the big bang”.
After considering all the evidence, the Court was of the opinion that in all probability the ignition was
caused due to rubbing of stone against the metallic parts of the conveyor when it was started.

Observations and recommendations of the Court

1. Some officers and supervisors of the mine showed good leadership and dedication to their duty
towards their men. Risking their own lives, they went into the affected area immediately after the
explosion, even without a methanometer or flame safety lamp, and saved a number of lives. Their
conduct and behaviour deserve the highest praise.
2. Proper arrangement should be made for supervision of the mine during holidays. At least in gassy
seams of the third degree, all working faces should be inspected by an officer in each shift even on
holiday. On the first working shift after a holiday, an officer should be deputed to check for gas in
all parts of the mine before workers are allowed in.
3. CMR-44(8) requires that a Sirdar shall not leave his district unless relieved by a successor. This
provision regarding handing over charge by the Sirdars in the district (i.e. belowground) should be
strictly enforced. Overmen should also be enjoined to wait until they are relieved. During rest days
and holidays, persons on roster duty should also be required to go only after handing over charge
to their successors.
4. CMR-186 lays down that “no machinery shall be operated otherwise than by or under the constant
supervision of a competent person”. Quite often auxiliary fans are operated by miners. Competent
persons should be authorized to handle these fans. They must ensure that the fans are started in
proper sequence.
5. An environmental survey should be conducted before the capacity and location of auxiliary fans are
decided upon. The survey should take into account the possible ill effects of running an auxiliary
fan on the neighbouring working places as well as the places being ventilated by the auxiliary fan.
Such surveys should be carried out periodically even after installation of the fan as there can be
variation in gas emission and air circulation.
6. There were not enough methanometers and flame safety lamps in working order to meet the daily
requirements of overmen and mining sirdars. This situation needs to be corrected. Even though
methanometers are now in common use for detection of methane, the only equipment mentioned
in the CMR is the flame safety lamp. The CMR should be suitably amended to make the use of
methanometers lawful.
7. On the day of the accident, no flame safety lamp was taken to the 400m horizon by any of the
officials and it is doubtful if tests for the presence of inflammable gas were made with
methanometers in all the relevant areas. It is recommended that additional precautions for Degree
 III mines should be taken by installing an automatic multi-point methane recorder. Additionally,
automatic methane alarms should be placed at all faces where gas is likely to accumulate.
8. The rescue work in 300 m horizon was done promptly and completed by about 12 noon, yet there
was too much delay in dealing with 400 m horizon where the accident had actually occurred. The
Control Room was made aware of the serious situation in 400 m horizon but it dithered and did not
issue any direction for work to start in 400 m horizon. The whole thing was managed so badly that
the first rescue team started work in 400 m horizon only at 1600 hrs, i.e. more than 7 hours after
the accident.
9. There are no clear instructions as to who should take control of rescue and recovery operations in
an emergency. In this case no one seems to have performed this duty effectively. In the view of the
Court this responsibility should be given to a committee consisting of a senior officer of the mine
(who has detailed knowledge of the mine), a representative each from DGMS, Rescue Station and
the recognised Trade Union. This committee should take decisions and direct operations from the
Control Room.
10. In each mine there should be a standing order with regard to the action to be taken when there is
an accident.
Also there should be definite emergency plans for every mine and rehearsals should be undertaken
periodically for evacuation, rescue operations, etc.

Recommendations of the Sudamdih Court of Enquiry

DGMS (Tech) Circular No: 05 of 1979
1. In each mine, there should be a standing order with regard to action to be taken when there is an
accident; which should in particular mention (a) the authorities that must be immediately
informed, (b) in what order they should be informed, (c) telephone numbers of these authorities,
(d) specially in regard to the Rescue Station, nearest telephone in case their telephone is not in
working order, (e) the nearest mines which should be approached for voluntary rescue teams;
these should tally with the mines in the standing order for Rescue Station (recommendation 2
below). These standing orders should always hang in the rooms of the senior officers and there
should be mock trials once a quarter at least as far as the mine itself is concerned.
2. There are no clear instructions laying down the authority, which should take control of rescue and
recovery operations in an emergency. In practice at present the DGMS is expected to exercise this
control. It would be preferable to give this responsibility to a group consisting of a senior official of
the management, a representative each from DGMS, Rescue Station, and of the recognised union
of the workers. This group should take decisions and direct operations from the Control Room. To
start with it should be recognised that the management (the senior most officer present at the
mine) would have to and must take the necessary decisions.
3. It would be advantageous to provide or earmark a special room as a rest room for rescue teams.
Such a room should have rescue plans, standing orders on rescue work, the plans of the various
parts of the mine, and some canteen facilities readily available not far from its location.
4. The number of methanometers and safety lamps in stock should be enough to deal with the
maximum requirements which may arise and there should in addition be a reserve in both items.
For supervisors, they should all be in supervisor's pool and there should ordinarily be no occasion
for a supervisor to seek this equipment from the officers' pool.
5. During each holiday in a degree III gassy mine some officer of the rank of Under Manager and
above should pay a surprise visit for an underground inspection in each shift.
6. Whenever a degree III gassy mine is closed for holiday or holidays, on the first shift of the next
working day, an officer should be earmarked for ensuring a check for gas in all parts of the mine
according to a set schedule before the workers are allowed in.
7. The Regulation on the handing over charge by the sirdar in the district i.e., underground, should be
strictly enforced. The overman should also be enjoined to wait until he is relieved. During rest days
and holidays persons on roster duty should also be-required to go only after handing over charge to
their successors, and except with permission in writing from a senior officer no roster duty person
should leave his duty unless relieved by a successor.
8. There must be a programmed of inspections by officers of Mines Safety as well as of Internal Safety
Wing of the management. While there should be frequent surprise underground inspections by
these officers a detailed inspection in degree III gassy mines should be undertaken at least once in
six months in the case of the former, and quarterly in the case of the latter, in accordance with laid
down proforma.
9. Underground, inside the mine, there should be FLP and intrinsically safe telephones connected to
the mine PBX so that not only in case of accidents but also to deal with other problems,
communication between surface and underground improves. There should at least be a telephone
in each lateral near point where the rises meet the laterals especially in high incline mines and
those functioning with j horizon systems.
10. The Mines Safety Department should be taken into confidence when it is proposed to effect any
important changes in mining practices. In any case a departure from the permission letter of the
Mines Safety Department should be immediately brought to the notice of that Department.
11. Management should lay down norms for inspection and supervision by higher ranks to ensure that
all records are properly and regularly maintained and that they are seen, scrutinized and
countersigned by appropriate senior officer who should also be enjoined to issue requisite
instructions where necessary.
12. All freshly recruited Asstt. Managers should be attached to suitable Mines Safety officers for 2
months to be trained on safety measures and standards.
13. There should be a vigorous and systematic programme of training workers and supervisory staff in
the mines including provision for refresher courses, which should cover all personnel.
14. Automatic multipoint methane recorder should be installed in all degree III gassy mines. The
indigenously developed multi point methanometer has not given good service. The experience on
its development and manufacture should help to reduce the foreign exchange content even in the
first buys.
15. Automatic portable methane alarms should be placed at all faces where as is likely to accumulate
so that automatic audiovisual alarm is given as soon as gas concentration exceeds predetermined
percentage.
16. There should be definite emergency plans for every mine and rehearsals should be undertaken
periodically for evacuation rescue operations etc.
17. In gassy mines, there should be a system of inspection of spare blades of booster and auxiliary fans
and of parts of other equipment in CMRS for flameproof characteristics before use in the mine.
18. It is desirable that an environmental survey is conducted before the capacity and location of
auxiliary fans are decided upon. Environmental survey should include survey of pressure, quantity,
temperature and humidity of mine atmosphere as well as determination of the rate of gas emission
from coal seams and also from the floor and roof of coal seams. The survey should take into
account the possible ill-effect of running an auxiliary fan in the neighboring working places as well
as the places being ventilated by the auxiliary fan. The survey should be carried out periodically
even after the installation of the auxiliary fan, as there can be installation in gas emission and air
circulation.
19. There must be orders to prescribe electricians and other categories of personnel who are
authorised to handle auxiliary fans within a gassy mine.