FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-7425. July 21, 1955.]

DAVID M. ALMEDA, ET AL., (Pepsi-Cola Labor

Organization), Petitioners, v. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
and PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY, INC., Respondents. 

Cid, Rafael & Villaluz, for Petitioners. 

Vicente J. Francisco for Respondents.

SYLLABUS
1. EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE; STRIKE; EFFECT OF UNJUSTIFIED STRIKE ON
THE RELATION OF EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE. — That by reason and as a
consequence of the unjustified strike, the relation of employer and employee
between the Company and the strikers is severed and the former may not be
compelled to reinstate the strikes as employees. (The doctrine in National
Labor Union v. Philippine Match Factory Co. 70 Phil. 300 and Luzon Marine
Department Union v. Roldan, Luzon Stevedoring Co., Et Al., 47 O.G. Supp. No.
12, p. 136 reiterated and reaffirmed.

DECISION
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
The facts pertinent in the present petition for review by certiorari necessary
for its determination are those found and related in the order of May 16, 1952,
issued by the Judge Jose S. Bautista of the Court of Industrial Relations who
heard the main case No. 697-V, which we accept as conclusive upon its
Tribunal and reproduce below for purposes of
reference:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company, Inc. prays that the strike staged at 8:55 p.m.
on May 8, 1952, be declared illegal. At the hearing of this petition, the
respondents failed to appear although notices of said motion have been
served by the bailiff to them and to their counsel. 

"The facts are these:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. On March 12, 1952, the respondents presented to the president of the

company, Mr. John P. Clarkin, certain demands (Exh. A). The latter, replying
that he would be glad to meet the respondents, invited them for a conference
(Exh. D), but they did not care to see the president, until Mr. Clarkin left the
Philippines on April 21. On April 23, the respondents submitted to Mr. Jose
Pascual, Treasurer of the company, new demands Exh. C, giving the
management two days to answer. Knowing that Mr. Pascual had no power to
act on their demands, they agreed to wait until April 28 for the reply of Mr.
Clarkin. 

"A conference was held on April 28 between Mr. Pascual and respondent
Antonio Ramos, as president of the Pepsi-Cola Labor Organization, who was
assisted by Attys. Cid and Rafael. 
"In the said conference, Mr. Pascual told the respondents that he cannot grant
their demands, especially the demand for collective bargaining for the reason
that neither the Pepsi-Cola Labor Organization has personality to enter into
such contract because it has not yet been registered in the Department of
Labor, nor Mr. Pascual has authority to act on the petition, being a mere
treasurer of the company. Hence, he promised to relay the petition to Mr.
Clarkin. In spite of this assurance, respondents threatened to declare a strike. 

"2. On April 30, the company filed its petition praying that the respondents be
enjoined from declaring a strike. The Court summoned the respondents for a
preliminary conference. The summons was received by the persons whose
signatures appear in the list (pp. 16, 17 and 18 of the record) but the rest
refused to accept it, saying it was their president Ramos who was in charge to
appear before the Court. (Officer’s return of service and bailiff’s testimony,
t.s.n. p. 6, hearing of May 13, 1952). 

A preliminary conference took place on April 30, and May 2, 1952, between
the company represented by its counsel, and the respondents by Antonio
Ramos, the president of the Pepsi-Cola Labor Organization. On April 30,
Ramos asked that the preliminary hearing be postponed because he was not
able to study the petition and that he had no attorney and that his lawyers
Vicente A. Rafael and Cipriano Cid should be notified to appear in Court. The
conference was reset for May 2, at 9:00 a.m. 

"On this day, May 2, Antonio Ramos, appeared in company with his co-
respondents Juan Grizalba and Pedro Amante and he informed the Court that
Attys. Vicente A. Rafael and Cipriano Cid were the counsel for the respondents
but could not appear then as they were busy with the hearing of other cases.
In other words, Attys. Rafael and Cid failed to appear in said conference,
although there is evidence in the record that they were in this building on the
morning of May 2, when this case was called for hearing. (Testimony of Jose
Pascual, p. 22, hearing of May 13, 1952). 

"On that occasion, the undersigned, knowing from the minutes of the meeting
of the Board of Directors of the company (Exh. D) that Treasurer Pascual had
no authority to act on the respondent’s demands, expressed the opinion that
Mr. Clarkin should be given an opportunity to act on said demands; and
consequently, the Court, upon agreement of both parties, postponed the
hearing of the case for May 15, at which time Mr. Pascual would have received
the answer of Mr. Clarkin. In said hearing, the Court asked Antonio Ramos if
he and his co-respondents would go on strike at least not before May 15, and
Ramos repeatedly assured the Court that they will not declare a strike nor
even had the intention of doing so. In view of such assurances, the
undersigned said the Court could issue the injunction restraining the
respondents from declaring a strike but because the Court had been assured
by president Ramos and believing that the president of the union would fulfill
the promise, the Court viewed that the issuance of an injunction would not be
necessary. 
"3. On May 3, 1952, Antonio Ramos presented another petition to Mr. Jose
Pascual (Exh. E). This petition contained five (5) demands which were the
same demands 4, 7, 15, 16 and 18 of the petition of April 23, 1952, Exh. C. In
conformity with Exhibit E, Mr. Pascual transmitted to Mr. Clarkin said second
petition by telegram, copy of which was given to the officers of the union. 

"On May 8, at 8:55 p.m. the respondents went on strike. The syrup, which
was usually prepared and placed in the tanks, from 5:00 to 11:00 p.m., was
spoiled when the workers left, because unless it is completely mixed, it sours.
The syrup was worth about P2,000.00. 

"On the morning of May 9, the respondents formed the picket line and
prevented, by means of threat, the other employees of the company and the
brokers, distributors and drivers to enter the premises of the company.
(Testimonies of Alberto Araullo, Jose Matias and William Yonan, t.s.n. pp. 37-
50, hearing of May 13, 1952). Great amount of empty bottles belonging to the
company were unloaded in the streets end in a private lot, because the trucks
were not permitted to go into the company’s compound. (Exhs. F, F-1 and F-
2). Due to said strike and picketing the company has suffered damages in the
amount of P4,000 daily, up to the present. 

"Taking these facts into account, the Court finds that the strike was unjustified
and it is being carried out through unlawful means. Unjustified, because all the
strikers knew beforehand that Treasurer Pascual had no authority to act on
their demands, and consequently, they should have waited for Clarkin’s
answer, before staging the strike. Unjustified, because it was declared after
the respondents, through their legitimate representatives, have promised and
assured the Court that they would not go on strike before May 15. The
picketing, which is the means employed in carrying it on is illegal, because the
strikers resorted to threat and intimidation. 

"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares said strike unjustified and illegal and
orders the respondents to dissolve the picket line."cralaw virtua1aw library

SO ORDERED. 

Manila, May 16, 1952. 

(Sgd.) JOSE S. BAUTISTA

Associate Judge" 

We understand that said-order was eventually appealed to this Tribunal but

that we refused to give it due course, thereby indirectly giving it our sanction
as to its correctness and validity and rendering it final (Rule 44, Section 4, of
the Rules of Court). 

On May 16, 1952, after Jose Pascual, Treasurer of the Pepsi-Cola Company
who at the time was in charge of the same in the absence of Mr. Clarkin who
was then in the United States, learned of the order of May 16th declaring the
strike illegal, he invited the strikers to resume work on condition that their
employment was on a temporary basis, because it was only the President of
the company who had the authority to appoint permanent employees, and he
gave said strikers 48 hours within which to return to work. On May 19th he
posted notices on the main entrance of the company’s premises stating that
those who wanted to be reinstated temporarily should see the official in
charge not later than 4:00 p.m. on May 26, 1952. Up to May 28th 50 of the
strikers out of the 82 members of the Pepsi-Cola Labor Organization returned
to work, but 32 of the strikers refused to work under a temporary basis and
on May 19th advised the court and the company that they were willing to
resume work only under the conditions existing before the strike on May 8,
1952, in order to maintain the status quo. These 32 strikers later filed a
petition for reinstatement in incidental case No. 697-V (1). 

According to the findings of Judge Bautista contained in his order of June 12,
1953, of the 50 union members readmitted, 19 were later dismissed on
September 6, 1952 but together with this 19 dismissed union members the
company also dismissed 42 non-union members. After dismissing these 19
union members and the 42 non-union members, no replacements were hired
by the company. The said 19 dismissed union members later filed a petition
for reinstatement in incidental case No. 697-V(2). Judge Jose S. Bautista heard
and decided these two incidental cases 697-V(1) and 697-V(2). With respect
to Case No. 697-V(2), in his order of June 12, 1953, he found that the said 19
union members readmitted on a temporary basis were given the same salary,
privileges and benefits given them before the strike, the only difference being
that their re-admission was on a temporary basis; that it had to be on such
basis because only the President of the company Mr. Clarkin who had the
authority to hire permanent employees, was in the United States; that the
terms and conditions of the contract of re-admission signed by the 19 strikers
were the same as those signed by the non-strikers and non-unionists; that in
August 1952, all the laborers hired in May executed a second contract wherein
they agreed to extend their temporary status, which second contract
confirmed and ratified the due execution of the first contract; that upon their
dismissal, they received one month separation pay in lieu of one month
advance notice, and they accepted it without protest and even requested
letters of recommendation from Mr. Clarkin; that there was nothing in the
contracts of re-employment executed in May and August, 1952 which was
contrary to law, morals or public policy, and that the said 19 laborers having
been employed on temporary basis, the company was justified in dismissing
them. We agree to this finding and holding of Judge Bautista. 

Now, as regards Case No. 697-V(1), it was found that after the 32 strikers
refused to go back to work under a temporary basis, the company employed
68 newcomers non-unionists, the need for this larger number of laborers
being the extra work during the summer months. In his order of June 12,
1953, Judge Bautista held that although the strike was declared unjustified
and illegal, still the company had no power to dismiss the strikers or to hire
workers to take their place without court authority; and that even when a
strike is declared illegal, only those strikers who committed illegal acts lose
their right to continue working in the company. He therefore, in said order
directed the company to reinstate the said 32 laborers, but without backpay,
and to submit to the court the names of the strikers who committed the illegal
acts in furtherance of the strike, for proper action. 

Both parties, the company and strikers moved for reconsideration of said order
of June 12, 1953. In a resolution dated January 4, 1954, penned by Associate
Judge Modesto Castillo and concurred in by Presiding Judge Arsenio C. Roldan
and Associate Judge Juan E. Lanting, the majority reconsidered the said order
of June, 1953. Associate Judges Jose S. Bautista and V. Jimenez Yanzon
dissented in separate opinions voting to affirm the order of June 12, 1953. The
strikers David M. Almeda, et al, have filed the present petition for review
by certiorari of the aforementioned resolution of the Court of Industrial
Relations of January 4, 1954 and "to issue an order to reinstate all the strikers
except those who in the judgment of the Court committed specific
unwarranted acts."cralaw virtua1aw y

In relation to Case No. 697-V(2), it is clear that there is no merit in the claim
for reinstatement of the 19 strikers who after the strike had been declared
illegal, had accepted re-employment under temporary basis and who were
later dismissed, accepted their dismissal including separation pay in lieu of
notice, and even asked for recommendations from the President of the
company. As Judge Bautista said they voluntarily entered into two contracts of
employment under a temporary basis, under which contract the company had
the right to dismiss them when their services were no longer needed and were
given their separation pay. 

Case No. 697-V (1) requires a more serious consideration. The question
involved is the effect of an illegal and unjustified strike on the relation
between the company and the strikers. The majority in the industrial court
held that by staging an unjustified and an illegal strike the strikers
automatically forfeited their right to continue as employees and laborers of the
employer, while the dissenters equally claim that only those strikers who had
committed illegal acts such as employing force, coercion, intimidation, etc.,
lose their jobs and that the rest of the strikers continue their relations with the
company and should be reinstated but without backpay. This Tribunal has
already ruled more than once upon this matter. 

In the case of National Labor Union Incorporated, Et Al., v. Philippine Match

Factory Co., and the Court of Industrial Relations, 70 Phil. 300, the Labor
Union demanded the immediate dismissal of one Pablo Pabalan, a factory
foreman for supposedly assaulting one named Dineros. Acting upon said
demand, the company indorsed the case to the City Fiscal’s Office where it
was dropped for failure of the complainant to furnish the address of the
accused. In spite of the dropping of the case, the company itself thru its
attorney caused the case to be reopened in order to give the company and the
labor union the benefit of an impartial investigation. While the Fiscal was
investigating the case, and although he had announced that he would release
the result of his investigation on September 18, 1939, the members of the
union employed by the Match Company went on strike on September 16th or
two days before. The strike was certified by the Secretary of Labor to the
Court of Industrial Relations on September 21, 1939. On October 11th while
the case was pending hearing 15 strikers representing themselves to be duly
authorized representatives of all the strikers addressed a letter to the acting
Manager seeking their admission for re-employment. The Manager declined to
take action while the dispute was pending adjudication by the industrial court.
Thereupon, the 15 strikers through counsel filed a motion for an order to
compel the company to re-admit the strikers. The industrial court rendered
judgment denying the petition to dismiss the company’s foreman as well as
the petition for the re-admission of the strikers to their employment. Against
said judgment the Labor Union appealed to this Tribunal. We held that the
strike was clearly unjustified because despite the attention given by the
company to the laborers’ demand for the dismissal of its foreman for an
alleged assault, the company even asking the Fiscal to reopen the case after
he had dropped it, the laborers went on strike without awaiting the result of
the Fiscal’s investigation of the case; and we said that as a consequence of
such unjustified strike, the strikers automatically ceased in their employment
and that the company may not be compelled to re-admit them. It will be
noticed that in said case, no acts of violence, coercion, intimidation or
sabotage were involved. The strike was found merely to be unjustified, and
yet the strikers were declared to have forfeited their status as workers of the
company. Judge Bautista in his dissenting opinion in the present case, to
support his stand that even in the case of an illegal strike, only those strikers
who committed illegal acts lose their jobs, states that "The Supreme Court
pointed out in the case of National Labor Union v. Philippine Match Co. (70
Phil., 303) that not all the strikers could be punished but only those who
commit specific unwarranted acts." We have carefully examined said case of
National Labor Union v. Philippine Match Co., supra, but we failed to find any
support or basis for said statement. 

The doctrine laid down in the case of National Labor Union v. Philippine Match
Factory Co., supra, was affirmed and reiterated by this Court in the case of
Luzon Marine Department Union v. Arsenio C. Roldan, Luzon Stevedoring Co.,
Et Al., * G. R. No. L-2660, May 30, 1950 (47 Off. Gaz. Supp. No. 12, p. 136).
In that case the labor union presented to the Luzon Stevedoring Co., a petition
containing 12 demands and later filed the corresponding case with the Court
of Industrial Relations praying that the Stevedoring Company be directed to
comply immediately with the demands. After hearing the petition for dismissal
and after receiving evidence Judge Bautista of the CIR issued an order
denying the motion to dismiss and declaring that the court had jurisdiction
over the case; but before receipt of the notice of said order 65 alleged
members of the petitioning union went on strike without previously notifying
the respondent company. Thereafter, the union asked the CIR to issue a
restraining order to prevent the respondent company from employing strike
breakers. Judge Bautista issued an order enjoining the strikers to return to
work and the respondent company to reinstate them in the positions they
were occupying before the strike. On motion for reconsideration of this last
order of Judge Bautista the CIR en banc set aside said order on the ground
that the strike was unjustified and illegal. On appeal from that resolution of
the CIR en banc we affirmed said resolution and held that the right of an
employee, tenant or laborer to be continued in the service of the company for
whom he is working under the last terms and conditions existing before the
dispute arose, carries with it the corresponding obligation on his part not to
strike or to return to work if he has already done so, because if he goes on
strike and the courts later find said strike to be unjustified or illegal he has to
suffer the consequences, one of which, is the loss of his post or job in the
company. Reiterating the ruling laid down in the case of Philippine Match
Factory Co., supra, this Tribunal said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . Conformably to these principles the Supreme Court, in the case of

National Labor Union, Inc. v. Philippine Match Company (70 Phil., 300)
declared illegal and unjustified a strike motivated by an unreasonable demand
of the labor union for the dismissal of a factory foreman. In that case the
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Moran, held that although Commonwealth
Act No. 103 recognizes, in a negative way, the laborers’ right to strike, it also
creates all the means by which a resort thereto may be avoided, ’because a
strike is a remedy essentially coercive in character and general in its disturbing
effects upon the social order and the public interests’; that ’as the strike is an
economic weapon at war with the policy of the Constitution and the law, a
resort thereto by laborers shall be deemed to be a choice of a remedy
peculiarly their own, and outside of the statute, and, as such, the strikers must
accept all the risks attendant upon their choice’; and that when the petitioners
declared a strike even before the outcome of the investigation by the company
of their complaint against the factory foreman was announced, ’and without
previously having resorted to any of the pacific means provided by law, they
acted unreasonably, and the law cannot interpose its hand to protect them
from the consequences of their behavior. Their cessation from their
employment as a result of such an unjustified strike is one of such
consequences which they must take by the choice of a remedy of their own,
outside of the statute.’" 

This Court then concluded:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"To summarize, the rulings of this Court in the cases hereinabove cited
are:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) The law does not look with favor upon strikes and lockouts because of
their disturbing and pernicious effects upon the social order and the public
interests; to prevent or avert them and to implement section 6, Article XIV of
the Constitution, the law has created several agencies, namely: the Bureau of
Labor, the Department of Labor, the Labor-Management Advisory Board, and
the Court of Industrial Relations. See Sec. 4, Commonwealth Act No. 103; and
Executive Order No. 158, dated July 28, 1948.) 

(2) The law does not expressly ban strikes except when enjoined against by
the court; but if a strike is declared for a trivial, unjust or unreasonable
purpose, or if it is carried out through unlawful means, the law will not
sanction it and the court will declare it illegal, with the adverse consequences
to the strikers. 

(3) If the laborers resort to a strike to enforce their demands, instead of

resorting first to the legal processes provided by law, they do so at their own
risk, because the dispute will necessarily reach the court and, if they later
should find that the strike was unjustified, the strikers would suffer the
adverse consequences. 

"The Court of Industrial Relations has merely applied to this case the settled
doctrines of this Court as above summarized. We reaffirm those doctrines and
must, consequently, sustain the resolution complained of."cralaw virtua1aw
library
It is not necessary for the purposes of this decision to rule upon acts of
illegality committed in the course of the strike and their effect on the status of
the strikers as employees of the company. We agree with the majority of the
CIR in its appealed resolution, that the strike in the present case was clearly
unjustified because the petitioners-appellants went on strike knowing that
their demands could not be acted upon by the Treasurer of the company in
the absence of its President who was then in the United States, and they did
not wait until their demands could be transmitted to said President and acted
upon by him. Not only this, but the strikers through their representatives had
misled, not to say deceived the trial court. Despite the assurances given by
them that they would not go on strike and did not even have the intention of
striking, they went on strike just the same. Said strike may, in a way, even be
regarded as equivalent to a violation or disobedience of an order of the
Industrial Court. When the Union commenced these proceedings before the
CIR the Union members threatened to immediately go on strike. Sensing this
attitude of the workers, the Company petitioned the CIR to issue an order to
prohibit the threatened strike. Judge Bautista said that he was ready and was
about to issue a writ of injunction against the laborers and employees not to
strike, and that the only reason he did not issue the writ was because of the
assurances given to him by the Union, assurances which were not fulfilled. It
should also be stated that the strikers unanimously voted in favor of the strike.
As a result of the unjustified strike, the syrup daily prepared and placed in the
tanks valued at P2,000 soured and became a loss; and because the strikers by
means of threats, prevented the other employees, and the brokers,
distributors and drivers of the Company to enter its premises, the Company
suffered damages in the sum of P4,000 daily, up to May 16, 1952. 

Under the doctrine laid down in the cases of the Philippine Match Factory Co.,
and the Luzon Marine Department Union, supra, where no acts of violence
were involved and where the strikes were declared merely unjustified, and yet
the workers were held to have forfeited their status as laborers of their
employer, which doctrines we again reiterate and reaffirm, we hold that by
reason and as a consequence of the unjustified strike herein staged, the
relation of employer and employee between the Company and the strikers was
severed and the former may not be compelled to reinstate the strikers as
employees. The resolution appealed from is affirmed, with costs. 

Bengzon, Acting C.J., Padilla, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo and

Labrador, JJ., concur. 

Concepcion and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concur in the result. 

Footnote

* 86 Phil., 507.