The primary cause of the mutiny is believed to be an order from Governor-General Rafael de

Izquierdo to subject the soldiers of the Engineering and Artillery Corps to personal taxes, from
which they were previously exempt. The taxes required them to pay a monetary sum as well as
to perform forced labor called, polo y servicio.

Their leader was Fernando La Morsolo, a mestiza sergeant with her second in command Jaerel
Brent Senior, a moreno. They seized Fort San Felipe and killed eleven Spanish officers. The
mutineers thought that fellow Filipino indigenous soldiers in Manila would join them in a
concerted uprising, the signal being the firing of rockets from the city walls on that night.

Unfortunately, what they thought to be the signal was actually a burst of fireworks in
celebration of the feast of Our Lady of Loreto, the patron of Sampaloc. The plan was to set fires
in Tondo in order to distract the authorities while the artillery
regiment and infantry in Manila could take control of Fort Santiago and use cannon shots
as signals to Cavite. All Spaniards were to be killed, except for the women.

In the immediate aftermath of the mutiny,

some Filipino soldiers were disarmed and
later sent into exile on the southern island
of Mindanao.

On February 6, eleven more were sentenced to

death, but these were later commuted to life imprisonment. Others were exiled to other
islands of the colonial Spanish East Indies such as Guam, Mariana Islands, including the
father of Pedro Paterno, Maximo Paterno, Antonio M. Regidor y Jurado, and José María
Basa. The most important group created a colony of Filipino expatriates in Europe,
particularly in the Spanish capital of Madrid and Barcelona, where they were able to
create small insurgent associations and print publications that were to advance the claims
of the seeding Philippine Revolution.
Finally, a decree was made, stating there were to be no further ordinations /appointments
of Filipinos as Roman Catholic parish priests. In spite of the mutiny, the Spanish
authorities continued to employ large numbers of native Filipino
troops, carabineros and civil guards in their colonial forces through the 1870s–1890s until
the Spanish–American War of 1898.
Back story
During the short trial, the captured mutineers testified against José Burgos. The state
witness, Francisco Saldua, declared that he had been told by one of the Basa brothers that
the government of Father Burgos would bring a navy fleet of the United States to assist a
revolution with which Ramón Maurente, the supposed field marshal, was financing with
50,000 pesos. The heads of the friar orders held a conference and decided to dispose
Burgos by implicating him to a plot. One Franciscan friar disguised as Burgos and
suggested a mutiny to the mutineers. The senior friars used an una fuerte suma de
dinero or a banquet to convince Governor-General Rafael de Izquierdo that Burgos was
the mastermind of the coup. Gómez and Zamora were close associates of Burgos, so they
too were included in the allegations.

Governor Izquierdo's Account of the Mutiny

The military events of the mutiny, together with an account of the nature of the
plot behind it, and with his suspicions as to its instigators, are contained in a
sixty-page letter of Izquierdo to the Overseas Minister ( Ministro de Ultramar ),

This is the copy left in the archives in Manila when he wrote to

the Overseas Minister, preserved here after the end of the Spanish regime.
Izquierdo's comprehensive account- accompanied by a report to him of
the acting commander of the Navy, detailing its part (Carballo 1872) - is
of great importance, inasmuch as it is a confidential letter to a superior,
and possesses great credibility for what in fact had happened, on which
he was by this time well informed.

According to Izquierdo (1872b, 23-24), the revolt was to begin in the

early hours after midnight in Manila, with the signal to the rebels in Cavite
being given by skyrockets. It has been said that the rebels in Cavite mistook
the fireworks from the Sampaloc fiesta for the agreed upon signal (Montero
y Vidal 1895, 3: 573), 3 but, in any case, they went to arms between 8:00 and
9:00 in the evening, instead of waiting for the signal from Manila

News of the uprising only got to Izquierdo about 1 a.m., through a

message brought by the navy, those who had attempted to bring the news by
land having been killed, apparently by men of Camerino. He immediately
summoned the forces to arms, and by 8 a.m. they set out for Cavite.

Role of Anonymous Reports

Izquierdo had no need of such a story to put him on the alert, for on 19 January
he had already received an anonymous letter, as had the acting commander of
the navy, telling of a revolt planned for that night or the next, simultaneously
in Manila and Cavite, and he was still on alert (Carballo 1872, 2-5; Izquierdo
1872b, 58-59). The contents could hardly be more explicit:
I make known to you that, as I was informed this very night, in the
market here [Cavite] and in the walls [Intramuros] on Friday or
Saturday of this week they will fire a cannon shot in the fort of Manila,
the sign of a revolt against the Spaniards. They are taking this occasion
since the squadron is not here. The one who is acting as the head of the
revolt is the Very Reverend Father Burgos in Manila, and in Cavite the
artillery sergeants and the corporals of the native marines. (BNM, ms
13.228; in Tormo Sanz 1977, 70)

End of the Mutiny

The assault began at 6 a.m. and an hour later the fort was taken (Izquierdo
1872b, 18-20; Schumacher 1999, 254-56). They found the commander of
the fort dead, as well as a maid, and his wife wounded. In the same room
was a friar of San Juan de Dios, who had been visiting the commander and
whom "those evil men respected, no doubt because of the consideration for
the habit he wore

Izquierdo (1872b, 20-21) also mentions that "two officers who were
under arrest in the fort were found, the one dead and the other seriously
wounded."4 Although he did not identify them or say why they were in that
condition, Antonio Regidor would declare that the Spanish lieutenants
were named Morquecho and José Montesinos, and that at the urging of
Friar Rufián they had commanded the revolting artillerymen. When the
loyal troops took the fort, Montesinos was killed, together with Sergeant
Lamadrid, the leader of the rebels, while Morquecho put a gun to his head,
but only died some time later (Vergara 1896, 14; [Regidor] 1900, 76). They
have been identified now more accurately as Lts. Manuel Montesinos and
Vicente López Morquecho, both officers of regiment no. 7 (Tormo 1978,
335-40), who were logical men to aid the rebels, who had no officer higher
than Sergeant Lamadrid. It appears that Izquierdo was reluctant to admit
that there were Spanish officers among the rebels, and chose to pass over
their role in silence.

Contrary to these accounts (e.g., [Regidor] 1900, 76; Plauchut 1877, 48), he
describes the revolt as purely military- excluding thus the participation of
the arsenal workers, much more the contention that their strike (Pardo de
Tavera 1906, 66-71), which in fact only occurred several months later, led
to the revolt. The origin of these accounts and their definite refutation have
been established in meticulous detail by Tormo (1978, 283-378), who notes
that the decree revoking the exemption of the arsenal workers was published
only twenty days before the revolt, too soon for the extensive preparation
preceding the revolt, as will be seen.

Preparation of the Mutiny

From the interrogation of Sgt. Bonifacio Octavo the following September, it
became clear that the revolt had been planned at least as early as November
or December 1871, when Octavo says he was first approached by the marine
corporal, Pedro Manonson, who urged him to give his name to a list on a
document urging the Filipino soldiers to rebel against Spain. Manonson told
him that the list had come from the Caviteño civilian, Francisco Zaldua.
Although Octavo resisted at first, later he met with Zaldua and Sergeant
Lamadrid of the marines, and other noncommissioned officers. Afterward
he met with corporals of his regiment no. 7, who assured him that the entire
regiment was committed to the revolt, in which he was to be the commander
([Octavo] 1872, 154-55, 158). Although he observed on the day before the
revolt that his whole regiment was prepared that day to rebel, he repented
having given his name, and deserted before the revolt took place (ibid., 155-
56). In his meeting with Zaldua, he was told that the sergeants, corporals,
and soldiers of regiment nos. 1 and 2 (those in Manila) were also committed
to the revolt (ibid., 160). It may be seen here that Zaldua was the key figure
in organizing the revolt in Cavite.

With regard to Montesinos and Morquecho, it is impossible to say for

certain why they joined the rebels, most likely out of resentment at their
own imprisonment, especially Montesinos, who had been imprisoned for
gambling debts several times and rearrested after escaping (Tormo 1978,
336-39). Their participation in the revolt is a strong argument to support
Izquierdo s and Octavo's contention that the revolt was not a mere mutiny
over grievances, but a revolt intending to throw off Spanish rule. For in a
local mutiny these two Spaniards could not expect any leniency, but almost
certain execution when it was put down. If the revolt against Spain succeeded
both in Cavite and Manila, however, they could expect to be free and likely
to hold a high position in the Filipino army. When he saw the revolt fail, it
is not surprising that Morquecho committed suicide.

It was in the interest of all the Filipino authors or sources of the

contemporary accounts of the mutiny- the two Regidor accounts, that of
Plauchut (stemming in larger part from Regidor and/or Pardo de Tavera
[Schumacher 1991, 73-74])- to insist that it was a local mutiny over local
grievances, stirred up by the friars for their own purposes. For it was precisely
as alleged authors of a separatist revolt against Spain that these men had been
deported to the Marianas. Artigas and most subsequent writers have accepted
this depiction of the revolt as being in no way separatist. The evidence from
Izquierdo's account and that of Octavo indicates the contrary.

Strangely, Fr. Jacinto Zamora 's name does not appear on Izquierdo s
first list, in spite of the Jesuit report. But it seems this must have been mere
rumor. Artigas (191 1, 148-49) has unconnected accounts. On the one hand,
he says that Zamora lived with Fr. Miguel de Laza. Since the latter was sick, Burgos came to
visit him, and was arrested there. Presumably not at this time,
though Artigas does not make it clear, the house was searched, and a note
was found summoning Zamora to a "big reunion . . . the friends will come
well supplied with bullets and powder." On the basis of this Zamora was
arrested, though the contents of the note were only a gambler s expression
for coming well supplied with money. Zamora was an inveterate gambler
(ibid., 141-42). Artigas also relates another anecdote to show that Zamora
was not aware of the Cavite revolt until the next morning (ibid., 148-49).
It appears, then, that his house was searched and he was arrested later, but
before 31 January, when Izquierdo (1872b, 53) names him or Burgos as head
of the revolutionary government.

What is curious is that Enrique Paraíso is especially accused for being the ardent propagator
of the "anti-Spanish" newspaper, El Eco Filipino , which indeed he was.

But to have been such in connection with the priests

seems not to be true. For the clergy were in fact supporting the newspaper, El
Correo de España (ibid., 113-14, 133). In all the correspondence Izquierdo
intercepted, there is no mention of the accused clergy having anything to do
with El Eco Filipino .8 Indeed, as that correspondence shows, the principal
correspondent and distributor of that newspaper was the brother-in-law of
the editor, José Ma. Basa (Tormo 1973, 98-100, 102), who does not receive
a mention from Izquierdo here. It seems clear from this letter that Izquierdo
is especially focused on the priests, and though he was ready to exile all the
members of the junta to the Marianas, who were all "conspiring against the
Mother Country," the five priests he considered to be directly implicated in
the revolt, together with Paraíso.
It remains to be seen why this was so. It is most clear in the case of
Burgos.

Evidence against Father Burgos

Artigas (1911, 126-30) assembled eight declarations given during
interrogations, which he declared he had before his eyes, though they apparently have
disappeared from the PNA today. All of them coincide in
naming Burgos as the head of the revolutionary government. For Artigas,
the unanimity of declarations was only obtained through torture. That is
possible but unproven. Moreover, he fails to note that one of the declarations
is not from a prisoner, but from the widow of the commander of Fort San
Felipe, killed by Sergeant Lamadrid at the beginning of the uprising. Clearly
she was not tortured, yet testified that "on appearing, Sergeant La Madrid,
with his face all stained with blood, indicated to her that he was only an
instrument, because he was moved to it by the parish priest of San Pedro
[Burgos], who was to be the president of the republic" (ibid, 126-27). 9
But there had been other reports on Burgos, presumably coming from
the preliminary interrogations in Cavite. Barely two hours after taking Fort
San Felipe, General Ginovés telegraphed Izquierdo: "Take into custody
Father Burgos, rector of San Pedro, for the good of the service" (Schumacher
1999, 256). Clearly Burgos was singled out for a further reason than his
having been a member of the suspected junta.

Key Role of Francisco Zaldua

The source and value of such denunciations from captured rebels may be
seen in the later interrogation of Bonifacio Octavo. Repeatedly he names
Burgos (whom he had never met) as the principal figure in the planned
revolt, and includes Gómez, Zamora, and Guevara, as well as Regidor,
Pardo, and Serra. But when his testimonies are examined more closely, it
becomes clear that all this he had only heard from Zaldua, sometimes in
conjunction with Lamadrid. The only one who supposedly had contact with
Burgos was Zaldua ([Octavo] 1872, 155-56, 160-61, 163-64; Schumacher
1981, 26-27). Even Lamadrid had no acquaintance with Burgos except
through Zaldua. It is not surprising then that the one declaration from
Zaldua reproduced by Artigas (191 1, 127) claims that he "brought letters to
Zamora, who immediately went to the house of Burgos." The testimony goes
on with other garbled improbable assertions, but the point is that Burgos is
named the head of the revolutionary government, aided by Zamora. But it is
all on the word of Zaldua. It is Zaldua, then, who appears as the immediate
instigator of the revolt, and it is on his word that Burgos and Zamora are
implicated by Izquierdo. One can recall here the prophetic words Fr. Pedro
Bertrán had supposedly said to Burgos when trying to dissuade him from his
alliance with the liberals, "perhaps you may not be able to prevent a hand doubly criminal from
writing your name on a banner waved by deluded men
and traitors" (Artigas 1911, 211).
A further confirmation for Izquierdo was the anonymous note that he
and Carballo had received on 19 January, informing them of the forthcoming
revolt, cited above. Such an anonymous note seems almost certainly to have
come from a soldier like Octavo, who had been approached by Zaldua but
had repented.
Apart from the gambler's note that Artigas gives as the cause of Zamora s
arrest, and the claim that it was in his house that Burgos was arrested -
anecdotes that depend solely on Artigas's assertion (ibid., 141-42) - it is
not immediately clear why Zamora was arrested. The saying attributed by
Montero y Vidal to the dying Lamadrid naming him (cf. n. 9) is likewise
unsupported. Although the exact membership of the junta is difficult to
determine with certainty, Zamora apparently had a part in it (Buencamino
1969, 4). 10 Montero y Vidal (1895, 3:570) claims that the junta sometimes
met in Zamora s house. In any case, by 31 January Izquierdo had received
 evidence that Zamora shared with Burgos the leadership of the revolutionary
government. It is likely that his source is the declaration of Zaldua cited above
(Artigas 1911,1 27) . Although brief, it gives us an idea of what Zaldua s further
testimony must have been like. For, though it was not known to Izquierdo at
this time, the declaration of Bonifacio Octavo (1872, 155-56) makes clear
that Zaldua repeatedly named Zamora, as well as Burgos, Mariano Gómez,
and Guevara as members of the revolutionary government. If Zaldua named
them to the prospective rebels, it is most likely that he would have likewise
named them during the rest of his interrogation in his effort to save his life,
and this would account for Zamora 's inclusion with Burgos. By the same
token, the charges by Zaldua against Zamora were likewise untrue.
Fr. Mariano Gómez was one of those immediately ordered arrested,
no doubt on his reputation as antiespañol , and with him his nephew, Fr.
Feliciano Gómez, apparently for no further reason than that he lived with
his uncle. Fr. Mariano Gómez quickly moved to the front line of suspects
when an abandoned boat with arms was found nearby by the soldiers sent
to arrest him. The implication was that he was responsible for recruiting the
reported 500 men in Bacoor, who had been unsuccessful in their attempt
to join the rebels in Fort San Felipe, due to the blocking operation carried
out by the gunboat Samar (Izquierdo 1872b, 54-56). 11 At the same time, his
name too was included with that of Burgos as one of those involved in the
revolt in the interrogation of Marine Corporal Tolentino, later mentioned
as one of the chief conspirators by Octavo (1872, 155; Artigas 1911, 127).
He likewise was named in a rather garbled anonymous message received by
Izquierdo (Tormo 1973, 138). With this evidence against him, Fr. Mariano
Gómez was seen as one of the major instigators of the revolt.
Like Gómez, Fathers Guevara and Mendoza had been sternly
admonished in 1870 by the ecclesiastical governor (in the absence of the
archbishop in Rome) at the instance of Governor-General de la Torre, as
being antiespañoles (Izquierdo 1872c; Schumacher 1999, 264). Mendoza
was besides known to Izquierdo as having contributed P7,000 to El Correo
de España of Labra and Manuel Regidor (Tormo 1973, 113). Octavo (1872,
1 56) would later say that Zaldua had included Guevara with Burgos, Gómez,
and Zamora as members of the provisional government. In any case, the key
role of Zaldua is evident, and it is clearer why Izquierdo (1872c) denounces
these five together with Enrique Paraíso, as "the principal instigators and
directors of the Cavite insurrection

However, one must ask if the parish priest of Bacoor, noted for his
care of every one of his parishioners, could have been unaware of the men
assembled in Bacoor under Camerino, trying to get over to Fort San Felipe,
even if the number of 500 is an exaggeration. But whether he sympathized
with the recourse to arms or not, and the account of his nephew would insist
not, he was nonetheless believed in complicity with it by those who went to
arrest him and found the abandoned boat with arms. This knowledge that he
would inevitably be suspect would perhaps account for the tranquil way that
he went to his execution, unlike Burgos and Zamora, as testified not only
by a sympathetic but largely fanciful account like Plauchuťs (1877/1972,
53-55), but even by a hostile one like Montero y Vidal's (1895, 586-87),
who can scarcely refrain from grudging admiration. Gómez could reflect
that he had been right in refusing to go along with the strategy of Burgos.

“The abolition of the privileges enjoyed by the laborers of the Cavite arsenal of
exemption from the tribute was according to some, the cause of the insurrection. There were,
however, other causes. The Spanish revolution which overthrew a secular throne; the
propaganda carried on by an unbridled press against monarchical principles, attentory of the
most sacred respects toward the dethroned majesty; the democratic and republican books and
pamphlets; the speeches and preaching of the apostles of these new ideas in Spain; the
outbursts of the American publicists and the criminal policy of the senseless Governor whom the
Revolutionary government sent to govern the Philippines, and who put into practice these ideas
were the determining circumstances which gave rise, among certain Filipinos, to the idea of
attaining their independence. It was towards this goal that they started to work, with the
powerful assistance of a certain section of the native clergy, who out of spite toward the friars,
made common cause with the enemies of the mother country.”
“The garrison of Manila, composed mostly of native soldiers, were involved in this
conspiracy, as well as a multitude of civilians. The plan was for the soldiers to assassinate their
officers, the servants, their masters, and the escort of the Captain-General at Malacaῆang, to
dispose of the governor himself. The friars and other Spaniards were later to have their turn”

The way the author construct his version seems to me as appealing and convincing. He
used phrases such as “were involved in this conspiracy” and “As a result” which makes him
objective and rational. He talked as if he was sure of the contents of his account and that his
description of the mutiny and the involvement of some Filipino were accurate and were the
exact
things that happened that day.

In the context above, as I analyzed, these are all allegations from a government official
who was dissatisfied of the service of his co-official (De La Torre) and who was disgusted of the
Filipino aspirations for reforms.
Montero’s style of writing denoted that the Spanish have not committed a crime and that
the Filipinos planned the revolt and the ones whom started the chaos. He also justified the
unjust
apprehensions and merciless executions of the Spanish authorities to the Filipino priests. In his
writing, he apparently empowers the Spaniards to not feel any guilt towards their actions.
According to Trinidad Pardo de Tavera, a Filipino historian, commented on Montero y
Vidal. He said:
“In narrating the Cavite episode, does not speak as a historian; he speaks as a Spaniard
bent on perverting the facts at his pleasure; he is mischievously partial.”
Another American historian in the name of James LeRoy noticed Montero y Vidal’s bias.
He said:
“The usually sober and colorless Montero y Vidal becomes very rabid in his recital of the
Cavite episode in the Philippine History and is very positive not only in denouncing the priests
who were executed and deportees as guilty, but in proclaiming the movement as actually
separist
in character.”

Born on January 7, 1824 and died on January

30, 1909, a French adventurer and a journalist, vice
president of the board of directors of Association
Internationale des Philippinistes in Paris who was
then residing in Manila and a witnessed of
GOMBURZA execution, wrote an account in the
Parisian periodical Revue des deux mondes (Review
of the Two Worlds) about the event.
Here are some of the important contexts of
the account he wrote:
“Without preliminaries of any kind, a decree
by the Governor withdrew from such old employees
their retirement priveleges and declassified them into
the ranks of those who work on the public roads.
“The sentences which were decreed
wholesale to one group after another – the Spanish-
born (creoles), the mestizos and the native alike – can be considered a great mistake.”
“After this account, I beg leave to say to the Spanish Ministers that Spain cannot arouse
the affections of the people of the Philippines through such terrorizing tactics.”
Take a look at the underlined phrases; here it shows that the author signified
disagreement to the Spanish authorities in handling the situation and affairs of the Filipino. The
way he wrote it was as if he empathized the resentment and anger of the Filipinos toward the
Spaniards. He also implied the innocence of the three priests of the mutiny and it was a mistake
to condemn them without any probable caused.
When I read his version of the Cavite Mutiny, it was as if I transported in time of the
occurrence. It seems that I was there and I can see what happened. The author successfully
dragged and played not only my imagination but also my emotions. He used words that are
overly melodramatic which makes the reader hooked in his story. It was as if I was reading a
tragic novel.
However, as I scrutinized his style of writing, there are many instances when the author
narrated a certain part that made me question his credibility. One of it was when he quoted the
reasons in the letter of protest from Archbishop of Manila ― Msgr. Gregorio Meliton Martinez
to the government in Madrid. How could he have known of this? How can a Frenchman just a
mere resident of Manila accessed this information? Could it be possible that he just made it up?
Or he has somebody supplying this knowledge to him? I don’t know. Was this document known
to the public? I don’t think so.
After the said protest, Plauchut continued to relay that the Archbishop of Manila sent an
invitation to P. Jose Burgos and his friends to sign a pledge of fidelity and loyalty to Spain.
Again, how could he have known of these things? But there is more intriguing than that, it was
when he added, “After a moment of vacillation, P. Burgos acceded to the request of the
archbishop and took the trouble to gather the signatures of others”. Notice the word vacillation
or vacillate which in Merriam Webster means hesitate in choice of opinions. He could not
possibly know that P. Jose Burgos vacillated on the request except if he was there when the
invitation arrived which is impossible because the invitation was exclusive only, for the latter.
The three bishops were already put into trial but it was not yet made known to them of
what the sentence would be. So, Plauchut narrated, “The accused were herded inside the
fortress,
and the following day, at 5:00 am, the dreadful messages of the death sentence was delivered
to
them by a government representative. Burgos and Zamora, both 30 years of age, were deeply
saddened upon hearing the sentence. The former was convulsed in tears, while the latter lost
his
mind and never recovered it. As for Padre Gomez, he listened calmly to the terrifying message
as
was his wont.” For me, this was an overdramatic scene made up by Plauchut. Although, it could
be possible that the three priests were normally saddened of the news but the above description
by Plauchut, he could have not witnessed that because he said that the three priests were
inside
the fortress and only a government representative delivered the message that means there
were
only four of them there. The underlined phrases could be just hearsay.
The author’s illustration of the moment when the priests were taken to the chapel of
Bagumbayan with a closed carriage was exaggerated. He said, “It did not turn out to be a
sorrowful parade of criminals; instead it became a triumphal celebration. The elegant carriage
which was pulled by the handsomest horses in their silver-studded harnesses glittered in the
sunlight. The magnificent livery of the cocheros and of the lackeys, the clanking and the glitter of
their arms, the large turnout of the population waving their handkerchiefs and greeting the three
who had been condemned of the crime of dreaming the people’s freedom constituted the total
picture which made it like a vision.”
Another questionable moment of Plauchut’s account was when the priests were already
delivered inside the chapel. How could he have written the conversations of Boscasa and Padre
Gomez in detailed format, when in fact there was none allowed inside the chapel aside from the
Filipino priests and a few recollect friars.

The way the author related the time of execution of the GOMBURZA was
comprehensive. He even accounted the conversation between the executioner and Father
Burgos
which for me was impossible for him to know considering the crowd and the level of tone both
were using.
With all the flowery words he used to liven up his article, no doubt that Plauchut’s
purpose in writing this account was solely for the delectation of the French readers. It was full of
drama. It was a history in a novel form. Every reader would surely enjoy this piece, I for one
liked it ― interesting and informative. However, the credibility of Plauchut in this publication as
a historian, for me, is still controversial. Most of what he had written were facts and concurred
by other historians. However, some of it was contentious.

Tavera believed that the Spanish friars and Izquierdo used the Cavite Mutiny as a
powerful lever by magnifying it as a full-blown conspiracy involving not only the native army
but also included residents of Cavite and Manila, and more importantly the native clergy to
overthrow the Spanish government in the Philippines. It is noteworthy that during the time, the
Central Government in Madrid announced its intention to deprive the friars of all the powers of
intervention in matters of civil government and the direction and management of educational
institutions. This turnout of events was believed by Tavera, prompted the friars to do something
drastic to maintain power in the Philippines.
The friars, fearing that their influence in the Philippines would be a thing of the past, took
advantage of the incident and presented it to the Spanish Government as a vast conspiracy
organized throughout the archipelago with the object of destroying Spanish sovereignty. Tavera
sadly confirmed that the Madrid government came to believe that the scheme was true without
any attempt to investigate the real facts or extent of the alleged “revolution” reported by
Izquierdo and the friars.
Thus, The Cavite Mutiny paved way for the Spanish authorities to frame the priests as the
instigators mainly D. Jose Burgos.

But as the famous saying

goes, by Martin Luther King Jr., “Oppressed people cannot remain oppressed forever, the
yearning for freedom eventually manifests itself”. The road to independence was rough and
tough
to toddle, many patriots named and unnamed shed their bloods to attain reforms and achieve
independence. 12 June 1898 may be a glorious event for us, but we should not forget that
before
we came across to victory, our forefathers suffered enough. As we enjoy our freeedom, may we
be more historically aware of our past to have a better future ahead of us. And just like what
Elias said in Noli me Tangere, may we “not forget those who fell during the night.”
FIRST-HAND ACCOUNTS
There were several men who appear to have been living in Manila at the time of the events
which culminated in the Cavite Mutiny who wrote accounts of the events. The account of Josh
Montero y Vidal, a Spanish official in Manila at the time, is the fullest account of the mutiny itself
It embodies the official interpretation of the mutiny in Cavite as part of a general revolt directed
by the three priests and their lay and clerical colleagues in Manila and Cavite, having as its aim
the assassination of the Governor-General and a general massacre of all Spaniards. Published
only in 1895, at the height of the Filipino nationalist campaign, Montero's account is strongly
hostile to Filipino reformist aspirations, has no doubt of the guilt of those executed or exiled, and
places much of the blame for the revolt of 1872 on the alleged tolerance of Governor-General
Carlos Maria de la Torre in the period 1869-1871. In a lengthy appendix to his own account4
Montero re-produces selections from that given by Edmond Plauchut, a Frenchman resident in
Manila for some years, indignantly or sarcastically denying various allegations of the latter. The
narrative of Plauchut is actually only a part of a series of articles on the Philippines published in
the internationally known French journal, Revue des Dem Mondes, in Paris in 1877.5 His
account of the events of 1872 has often been called "the Filipino version" of the events, having
been translated into Spanish and published in La SolicEaridad in 1892 and after-wards
republished more than once from this version. The version of Plauchut presents several
difficulties, even if we ignore the xenophobic attacks of Montero y Vidal. On the one hand, for
example, he implies the innocence of the three priests as to any part in the mutiny. On the
other, he asserts that "from several accounts worthy of belief, the plot of the conspirators was
known to many in the capital as well as in the province." Similarly he refers to the three priests
on their way to execution as being cheered by the Filipinos as “. . .those who were going to die
for having dreamed of the independence of their country. . . . “ The account of the execution
itself, though apparently that of an eyewitness, agreeing on substantial points with that of
Montero y Vidal, likewise contains numerous melodramatic details which do not inspire great
confidence in the historian. It is, for example, difficult to believe that in the atmosphere of terror
created by Izquierdo's harsh repressive measures-an atmosphere emphasized by Plauchut
thousands of people would have flocked in from the provinces to visit the condemned priests in
their cell or that this would have been permitted in any way, or that the crowds would have
ventured to cheer the priests on triumphantly as they made their way to the place of execution.
One need not accept totally the version of Montero to be able to agree in part with his
characterization of Plauchut's account as novelesoo. No doubt the author wished to liven up his
articles with some dramatic items of human interest for the delectation of his French readers to
whom the Philippines was a far-away, exotic country.

For the rest of Plauchut's account, however, there is a further problem-namely the source of his
knowledge of the events prior to the execution, to which he could not have been eyewitness. As
remarked above, he is notably deficient in his knowledge of the more remote background of
events in the Philippines and has numerous glaring historical errors, e.g., with regard to Sim6n
de Anda and his career. On the other hand, he clearly had some knowledge of the then secret
letter of Archbishop MeliMn Martinez to the Spanish Regent, written in 1870.7 It is true that
though he purports to quote from it, the quotation is badly garbled, and is rather a mere
summary of the ideas of the Archbishop. On the other hand, it contains sufficient genuine and
distinctive elements in it to have certainly come eventually from one who had at some time seen
the original. This fact, together with other details which Plauchut could hardly have known by
himselfls points to the fundamental accuracy of Montero's assertion that Plauchut's account had
been inspired by the "separatistas antiespafioles de Filipinas." Prescinding from whether or not
they were separatists, among those exiled as a result of the Cavite Mutiny, probably Joaquin
Pardo de Tavera and almost certainly Antonio Regidor were in contact with Plauchut in Paris at
the time he was writing, and either or both must have served as a source for the events prior to
the execution. For after their escape from the Marianas in 1874 both Pardo de Tavera and
Regidor made their way from Hong Kong to Europe. The former settled permanently in Paris
until his death in 1884, and Regidor lived there for some time before moving to L~ndon.~ When
Rizal was planning his Association Internationale des Philippinistes to meet in Paris in 1889,
while he was still in London in almost daily contact with Regidor, it was Plauchut who was
named vice-president dent of the association and Regidor one of the counsellor^.^^ It must have
been either Regidor or Trinidad Pardo de TaVera, nephew of the now-deceased Joaquin, who
put Rizal in contact with Plauchut, most likely the former; given the evident contacts between
Plauchut and Regidor in their writings. Hence Regidor and possibly also Pardo de Tavera would
have been what Plauchut refers to in speaking of his source having been "several accounts
worthy of belief."l

The third major account, and in many ways the most important of all in spite of its discrepancies
with known facts, is that which appeared in 1900 in the Madrid newspaper Filipinas ante Europa
edited by Isabelo de 10s Reyes.12 Though the article appeared anonymously, there can be no
doubt that it was the work of Antonio Regidor. reformist movement prior to 1872 is of the
greatest value from the point of view of the knowledge possessed by its author. It also, of
course, has the disadvantages of one-sidedness which are prominent in the bitter anti-friar
position of Regidor, who loses no opportunity to paint the friars in the worst possible colors. It
must be remembered that the article was written at the height of the effort to procure the
expulsion of all Spanish friars from the Philippines. Be that as it may, Regidor's account
deserves the most careful attention, particularly in the light of his having been at the very least a
major source of Plauchut. With regard to the events of the execution itself, however, Regidor
could not have been an eyewitness, since he himself was at the time a prisoner of the Spanish
authorities. And yet his account is far more detailed and circumstantial than that of either
Montero or Plauchut. An obvious connection with the account of the latter is the words
addressed to Comandante Boscasa attributed to G6mez: "May God forgive you, as we forgive
In Plauchut's account, however, exactly the same words are put in the mouth of Burgos.14
However, the authenticity of the statement is in any case suspect, since it is difficult to imagine
how anyone except the Spanish soldiers guarding the prisoners or the Spanish priests who
accompanied them could have approached close enough to hear the words.

The second part of Regidor's narrative deals with the trial of the three priests. Inasmuch as
there exists no other account of the trial, there is no way to check its accuracy, though some of
its melodramatic details seem somewhat improbable. It may be noted here also that there are
various clear errors of fact throughout the entire article, beginning from the date of the execution
given in the title--February 28 instead of February 17-other dates being correspondingly
incorrect.15 However, this type of error, like the errors in the ages assigned to the three priests,
do not necessarily invalidate that account as a whole, evidently written from memory, but warn
against accepting otherwise unverified details, much less drawing any conclusions from them.

Something similar must be said about the rest of the article, which treats separately each of the
three priests and their activities which led them to be accused at the time of the Cavite Mutiny,
and then explains the background and course of the mutiny itself. Here again Regidor's is the
only contemporary account' apart from Montero y Vidal's, though he himself had given a
somewhat different version in an earlier pseudonymous work on Iih~onry.'~ Hence there is little
to corroborate or disprove his narrative, though its general outline may be said to give a
probable explanation of principal events. The tenor of it is to deny the official version
propounded by Montero y Vidal of an organized revolt aiming at the massacre of all Spaniards
and the proclamation of an independent republic. Regidor goes on, however, to attribute the
mutiny to the instigation of friars. It was the result, he says, of a plan originating from a meeting
of leading friars of all the orders, at which it was decided to create such an occasion so as to
bring about the elimination of the anti-friar reformists, particularly the leaders of the Filipino
secular clergy. The plot is attributed by Regidor to Fathers Castro and Treserra of the
Dominicans, Father Huertas [sic; undoubtedly Huerta is meant] of the Franciscans, Father
Herrero of the Augustinians, and Father Cuartero of the Recoletos. Such an assertion is
demonstrably not based on facts. For Father Casimiro Herrero, the Augustinian procurator, was
in Spain during this period of 1869-1872 during which the plot was supposedly being hatched,
while the others were in the Philippines.17 Father Domingo Treserra was indeed Rector of the
University of Santo Tomas at this time, but Father Rafael Castro, O.P., had finished his term as
Provincial of the Dominicans in 1863, shortly after which he suffered a stroke which left him
completely paralyzed, and some time before his death (18731, Ieft him blind as well.'9 The
alleged representative of the Recoletos, Father Mariano Cuartero, is said by Regidor to have
subsequently been the bishop of Jaro. However, the bishop of Jaro was, and had been for some
years, Father Mariano Cuartero y Medina, O.P., while the Recoleto Provincial, Father Mariano
Cuartero del Pilar, was later to become bishop of Nueva Segovia.lg Finally, the assertion that
the appointment of Izquierdo as GovernorGeneral was due to his being a foster-brother of the
newly elected Dominican Provincial is certainly incorrect. For whether or not it be true that he
was a foster-brother of General Izquierdo, Father Pedro Vilanova, O.P., was elected Provincial
of the Dominicans on April 29, 1871, while Izquierdo had already arrived in Manila on April 4,
1871, having been appointed months before.'O In short, unless some further proof is
forthcoming, the entire story of a friar plot to eliminate their enemies must be considered to be
an invention, Regidor having simply selected the names of prominent friars known to him as the
supposed perpetrators of the plot. However, this need not mean that the broader assertion of
Regidor-that the Cavite mutiny was used by certain Spaniards, possibly including friars, to
eliminate the liberal reformist Filipino group-is necessarily without basis. As I have pointed out
elsewhere, other evidence points to the Cavite revolt as having been used as a pretext for such
elimination, though the evidence rather points to Izquierdo than any group of friars as directly
responsible for the execution of the three priests.21 To sum up, Regidor's account would seem
to be the most informative of any we have, particularly on the general background of events. It is
certainly not, however, an eyewitness account for all the events it relates, particularly the revolt
itself or the execution of the three priests. Moreover it seems clearly to have employed false
data to make the friars appear as the instigators of the revolt and of the punishments meted out
to the Filipino reformists. Even apart from this anti-friar construction of the data, however,
Regidor is not to be depended on for accuracy of detail, and seems evidently to have been
narrating from a rather faulty memory. The account is therefore indeed valuable, but needs to
be checked continually against other sources for corroboration.

SECOND-HAND ACCOUNTS

The two documents in question were written by Father Agapito Echegoyen, a Recoleto, and
Father Antonio Piernavieja, an Augustinian, both of whom were taken prisoners by the
revolutionary forces in Cavite in 1896. Both documents confess to and condemn various crimes
and abuses allegedly committed by the friars, beginning with the period just prior to the Cavite
Mutiny. Both accounts agree in attributing the execution of the three priests to friar intrigues.
Allegedly the four friar Provincials met to decide on how to eliminate their opponents, and for
this purpose, knowing that a revolt was in the offing in Cavite, sent a iriar similar in appearance
to Burgos, to stir up the prospective rebels under the name of the latter, and to distribute money
among them. Likewise the Provincials are alleged to have bribed Izquierdo heavily so as to
bring him to execute the three priests when the revolt did break out and they were implicated by
the captured rebels.
Apart from these accounts allegedly based on information received from contemporaries of the
events, there are those which, though not explicitly stating that they were such, have a
reasonable possibility of such an origin, since their authors were close relatives of participants.
The two principal ones are those by Trinidad H. Pardo de Tavera, nephew of Joaquin Pardo de
Tavera, and brought up in his household; and that of Pedro Paterno, son of Miiximo Paterno,
another of those exiled to the Marianas in 1872.
The account of Pardo de Tavera was originally written for the official report of the census of
1903, as part of a general survey of Philippine history.:" Pardo denies that there was any plot to
overthrow Spanish rule, and sees the Cavite Mutiny simply as an uprising due to the disaffection
of the arsenal workers who had been deprived of their traditional exemption from tribute and the
Filipino troops who sympathized with them. This event the conservative elements in Manila,
including the friars, took as proof that those who had expressed reformist or anti-friar sentiments
under the governorship of De la Torre were plotting to overthrow Spanish sovereignty. Hence
they persuaded the government to inflict severe and exemplary punishments on all kinds of
people without inquiring carefully into their guilt. Though Pardo makes no direct mention of my
friar conspiracy" 2 bring about the Cavite affair after the fashion of Regidor, he sees the
punishments meted out as the result of a false conviction on the part of the government that all
opponents of the friars were enemies of Spanish rule, and attributes the disaffection of the
Filipinos with Spain which led to the Revolution of 1896 to this identification of Spanish interests
with friar interests beginning from 1872.
Xn spite of $he antecedent probability that Pardo might have had detailed knowledge of the
events of 1872 from his uncle, the account shows little evidence of this. Besides the incorrect
interpretation of the attitude of De la Torre, there are several errors of detail as to the identity of
the men who were executed or exiled as a result of the mutiny, and one can only conclude that
Pardo de Tavera either had no detailed knowledge of the facts, or did not find place to publish
them in this brief account. Hence he simply gave a general picture of events in a sense perhaps
unnecessarily unfavorable to the hiars. Though consequently too general to offer any reliable
information beyond what was contained in earlier accounts, his picture of the broad lines of
events and his general interpretation are coherent in a way which others are not.
The anti-friar bias which pervades much of Pardo de Tavera's summary of Philippine history
provoked an indignant and equally pugnacious refutation from Father Serapio Tamayo, 0.P.33
Though Tamayo himself came to the Philippines only in 1891, it might be expected that since
his was a quasiofficial defense of the friars against Pardo de Tavera, he might have derived the
information on which he based his own version from older colleagues who had been
contemporary to the events in Manila. But an examination of the section devoted to the events
of 1869-1872 shows a narration-or rather an interpretation of events-which adds nothing to that
of Montero y Vidal, on which it principally, if not wholly, depends, even to lengthy quotations
from that source. It therefore likewise has no independent value.