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Romualdez III vs. Civil Service Commission, 197 SCRA 168, G.R. Nos. 94878-94881 May 15, 1991

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61 views7 pages

Romualdez III vs. Civil Service Commission, 197 SCRA 168, G.R. Nos. 94878-94881 May 15, 1991

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Ej Calaor
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© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Romualdez III vs. Civil Service Commission

*
G.R. Nos. 94878-94881. May 15, 1991.

NORBERTO A. ROMUALDEZ
**
III, petitioner, vs. CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION and THE PHILIPPINE
COCONUT AUTHORITY, respondents.

Civil Service; Appointments; When petitioner accepted his


temporary appointment, he was thereby effectively divested of
security of tenure, and his tenure of office became dependent upon
the pleasure of the appointing authority.—No doubt the
appointment extended to petitioner by respondent PCA as PCA
Deputy Administrator for Industrial Research and Market
Development was temporary. Although petitioner was formerly
holding a permanent appointment as a commercial attache, he
sought and accepted this temporary appointment to respondent
PCA. His temporary appointment was for a definite period and
when it lapsed and was not renewed on February 28, 1987, he
complains that there was a denial of due process. This is not a
case of removal from office. Indeed, when he accepted this
temporary appointment he was thereby effectively divested of
security of tenure. A temporary appointment does not give the
appointee any definite tenure of office but makes it dependent
upon the pleasure of the appointing power. Thus, the matter of
converting such a temporary appointment to a permanent one is
addressed to the sound discretion of the appointing authority.
Respondent CSC cannot direct the appointing authority to make
such an appointment if it is not so disposed.
Mandamus; A discretionary duty cannot be compelled by
mandamus.—And even if the said circular may apply to
petitioner’s situation, under said circular it is recognized that “the
appointing authority is given a wide latitude of discretion in the
selection of personnel of his department or agency.” Respondent
PCA exercised its discretion and opted not to extend the
appointment of petitioner. It cannot be compelled to extend
petitioner’s appointment, much less can it be directed to extend a
permanent appointment to petitioner. A discretionary duty cannot
be compelled by mandamus . More so when as in this case
petitioner has not shown a lawful right to the position.

________________
* EN BANC.

** Originally captioned in the Petition as “Commission on Civil Service; page 2,


Rollo.

169

VOL. 197, MAY 15, 1991 169

Romualdez III vs. Civil Service Commission

If the legal rights of the petitioner are not well-defined, clear and
certain, the petition must be dismissed.

PETITION for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to


review the decision of the Civil Service Commission.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.


     Fernando T. Collantes for petitioner.

GANCAYCO, J.:

By this petition the intervention of public respondent Civil


Service Commission (SCS) is sought to compel public
respondent Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) to
reinstate and extend a permanent appointment to
petitioner as Deputy Administrator for Industrial Research
and Market Development.
Petitioner was appointed and served as a Commercial
Attache of the Department of Trade continuously for twelve
years from September, 1975 to August 30, 1987. His civil
service eligibilities are: Patrolman of the City of Manila
(1963 CS Exam) and a Commercial Attache (1973 CS
Exam).
On September 1, 1987, he was transferred to the
respondent PCA whereby he was extended an appointment
as Deputy Administrator1
for Industrial Research and
Market Development. The nature of his appointment was
“reinstatement” and his employment status was
“temporary,” for the period covering September 1, 1987 to
August 30, 1988. His appointment was renewed for another
six months from September 1, 1988 to February 28, 1989
also on a “temporary” status and subject to certain
conditions to which petitioner agreed.
When his appointment expired on February 28, 1989,
the Governing Board did not renew the same so he was
promptly informed thereof by the Acting 2
Chairman of the
Board of the PCA, Apolonio V. Bautista.
On February 6, 1990, petitioner appealed to respondent
CSC. He requested reinstatement to his previous position
in PCA and in support of the request, he invoked the
provisions of CSC

________________

1 Annex H to the Petition.


2 Annex J to the Petition.

170

170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Romualdez III vs. Civil Service Commission

3
Memorandum Circular No. 29 dated July 19, 1989.
Respondent CSC denied petitioner’s request for
reinstatement on May 2, 1990 by way of its Resolution No.
90-407, holding that CSC Memorandum Circular No. 29
was not applicable to petitioner’s case because it took effect
on July 19, 1989 when petitioner had long been out of the
government service since February 28, 1989 and that his
reappointment was essentially discretionary on the part of
the proper appointing authority.
On May 11, 1990, respondent PCA appointed Mr.
Roman Santos to the contested position.
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of Resolution No.
90-407 but it was denied by respondent
4
CSC in Resolution
No. 90-693 dated July 31, 1990.
Hence, petitioner filed this petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order, raising the following issues—

“1. Public Respondent Civil Service Commission


committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
capricious, whimsical, and despotic refusal to
perform a legal/constitutional duty to enforce the
Civil Service Law and/or constituting non-
feasance/mis-feasance in office in issuing Resolution
Nos. 90-407 and 90-693;
2. The legal issue of the applicability of Civil Service
Commission Circular No. 29, Series 1989 on the
appointment of petitioner as PCA Deputy
Administrator for Industrial Research and Market
Development;
3. The legal issue as to whether it is mandatory for an
appointing authority to extend permanent
appointments to selected appointees with
corresponding civil service eligibilities;
4. Public respondent Civil Service Commission
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction and/or non-feasance/misfeasance
of official functions in not exercising its authority to
enforce/implement the Civil Service Law and in not
affording petitioner who belongs to the career
service in the government the protective security of
tenure and due process clause of the Philippine
1987 Constitution as well as the Civil Service Law
under P.D. 807;

________________

3 Annexes K and H to the Petition.


4 Annexes D to D-2 to the Petition.

171

VOL. 197, MAY 15, 1991 171


Romualdez III vs. Civil Service Commission

5. Public respondent Philippine Coconut Authority


unlawfully and maliciously deliberately
failed/refused to strictly comply with the provision
of par. a, Section 25 of P.D. 807 in the matter of
extending permanent appointment to petitioner
constituting likewise grave abuse of discretion on
the part of public respondent Civil Service
Commission amounting to gross ignorance of the
law in not correcting/rectifying such malicious and
deliberate non-compliance, in view of the
mandatory directive of Section 8, Rule III of the
Civil Service
5
Rules on Personnel Actions and
Policies.”

The petition is devoid of merit.


No doubt the appointment extended to petitioner by
respondent PCA as PCA Deputy Administrator for
Industrial Research and Market Development was
temporary. Although petitioner was formerly holding a
permanent appointment as a commercial attache, he
sought and accepted this temporary appointment to
respondent PCA.
His temporary appointment was for a definite period
and when it lapsed and was not renewed on February 28,
1987, he complains that there was a denial of due process.
This is not a case of removal from office. Indeed, when he
accepted this temporary appointment he6 was thereby
effectively divested of security of tenure. A temporary
appointment does not give the appointee any definite
tenure of office but makes 7
it dependent upon the pleasure
of the appointing power. Thus, the matter of converting
such a temporary appointment to a permanent one is
addressed to the sound discretion of the appointing
authority. Respondent CSC cannot direct the appointing
authority8 to make such an appointment if it is not so
disposed.
The duty of respondent CSC is to approve or disapprove
an

______________

5 Page 8, Rollo.
6 Tolentino v. de Jesus, 56 SCRA 167 (1974); Mendiola v. Tancinco, 52
SCRA 66, 71 (1973); Festejo v. Barreras, 30 SCRA 873, 879 (1969);
Esquillo v. Subido, 29 SCRA 31, (1969); Barañgan v. Hernando, 27 SCRA
239 (1969); Santos v. Chico, 25 SCRA 343, 346 (1968); and Jimenea v.
Guanzon, 22 SCRA 224, 229 (1968).
7 Cuadra v. Cordova, 103 Phil. 391, 394 (1958).
8 Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744 (1989);
Orbos v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 92561, September 12, 1990.

172

172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Romualdez III vs. Civil Service Commission

appointment. Its attestation is limited to the determination


whether the appointee possesses the required
qualifications for9 the position as the appropriate civil
service eligibility.
Petitioner invokes CSC Memorandum Circular No. 29,
S. 1989, dated July 19, 1989 which provides—

(a) A permanent appointment shall be issued to a


person who meets all the requirements for the
position to which he is being appointed, including
the appropriate eligibility prescribed, in accordance
with the provisions of law, rules and standards
promulgated in pursuance thereof. (Section 25 (a),
P.D. 807).
(b) While the appointing authority is given a wide
latitude of discretion in the selection of personnel
for his department or agency, in the exercise of this
discretion he shall be guided 10by and subject to the
Civil Service Law and Rules.”

As aptly observed by respondent CSC said circular cannot


be given retrospective effect as to apply to the case of
petitioner who was separated from the service on February
28, 1989. And even if the said circular may apply to
petitioner’s situation, under said circular it is recognized
that “the appointing authority is given a wide latitude of
discretion in the selection of personnel of his department or
agency.” Respondent PCA exercised its discretion and
opted not to extend the appointment of petitioner. It cannot
be compelled to extend petitioner’s appointment, much less
can it be directed to extend a permanent appointment to
petitioner. A11
discretionary duty cannot be compelled by
mandamus. More so when as in this case petitioner has
not shown a lawful right to the position. If the legal rights
of the petitioner are not well-defined,
12
clear and certain, the
petition must be dismissed.

________________

9 Luego v. CSC, 143 SCRA 327 (1986).


10 Annexes N to N-1 to the Petition.
11 Ynchausti & Co. v. Wright, 47 Phil. 866 (1925); Marcelo Steel Corp.
v. Import Control Board, 48 O.G. 117; Caltex Filipino Managers v. CIR, 23
SCRA 492 (1968); Lim v. Sabarre, 24 SCRA 76 (1968); and Gonzales v.
Serrano, 25 SCRA 64 (1968).
12 Hipolito v. de City of Manila, 47 O.G. Supp. (12) 365; Vda. Hijos de
Crispulo/Zamora v. Wright, 53 Phil. 613 (1929); Pilar v. Secretary of
Public Works and Communications, 19 SCRA 358 (1967); JRS

173

VOL. 197, MAY 15, 1991 173


Parungao vs. Sandiganbayan

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of


merit.
SO ORDERED.

          Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera,


Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and
Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

Petition dismissed.

Note.—Temporary appointee is subject to removal at


anytime without the necessity of following the procedure
set up by RA 4864 for removal at the pleasure of the
appointing power. (Police Commission vs. Lood, 127 SCRA
757.)

——o0o——

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