Mamaril v. BSP
Uploaded by
Jonathan BravaMamaril v. BSP
Uploaded by
Jonathan BravaG.R. No.
179382 January 14, 2013
Spouses Benjamin C. Mamaril and Sonia P. Mamaril, petitioners
vs.
The Boy Scout Of The Philippines, AIB Security Agency, Inc., Cesario Peña, and Vicente
Gaddi, respondents
Ponente: Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
Jeepney operators and Sps. Benjamin and Sonia Mamaril would park their 6 passenger
jeepneys every night at the Boy Scout of the Philippines' compound located at Malate, Manila for
a fee of ₱300Php/month for each unit. One morning, one of the vehicles was missing and was
never recovered. According to the security guards Peña and Gaddi of AIB Security Agency, Inc.
with whom BSP had contracted for its security and protection, a male person who looked familiar
to them took the subject vehicle out of the compound. Sps. Mamaril filed a complaint and prayed
that Peña and Gaddi, together with AIB and BSP, be held liable for: (a) the value of the subject
vehicle and its accessories in the aggregate amount of ₱300,000.00; (b) ₱275.00 representing daily
loss of income/boundary reckoned from the day the vehicle was lost; (c) exemplary damages; (d)
moral damages; (e) attorney's fees; and (f) cost of suit. BSP denied any liability.
ISSUE:
Whether or not BSP is liable for the loss of the vehicle based on the Guard Service Contract.
RULING:
NO. The proximate cause of the loss of Sps. Mamaril's vehicle was the negligent act of
security guards Peña and Gaddi in allowing an unidentified person to drive out the subject vehicle.
On the other hand, the records are bereft of any finding of negligence on the part of BSP. Hence,
no reversible error was committed by the CA in absolving it from any liability for the loss of the
subject vehicle based on fault or negligence. The latter's negligence cannot be imputed against
BSP but should be attributed to AIB, the true employer of Peña and Gaddi.
In accordance with Article 1331 of the Civil Code, the instant case did not meet the
requisites in order for a third person be benefited by the second paragraph of the said article,
referred to as a stipulation pour autrui. In this case, Sps. Mamaril are not parties to the Guard
Service Contract. Neither did the subject agreement contain any stipulation pour autrui. And even
if there was, Sps. Mamaril did not convey any acceptance thereof. Thus, under the principle of
relativity of contracts, they cannot validly claim any rights or favor under the said agreement.
COMMENT:
I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court that BSP is not liable for the loss of the said
vehicle of the Sps. Mamaril on the basis of the Guard Service Contract that the latter entered into
with AIB. In order that a third person benefited by the second paragraph of Article 1311, referred
to as a stipulation pour autrui, may demand its fulfillment, the following requisites must concur:
(1) There is a stipulation in favor of a third person; (2) The stipulation is a part, not the whole, of
the contract; (3) The contracting parties clearly and deliberately conferred a favor to the third
person - the favor is not merely incidental; (4) The favor is unconditional and uncompensated; (5)
The third person communicated his or her acceptance of the favor before its revocation; and (6)
The contracting parties do not represent, or are not authorized, by the third party. However, none
of the foregoing elements obtains in this case.
