SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 144476. April 8, 2003.]

ONG YONG, JUANITA TAN ONG, WILSON T. ONG, ANNA L.

ONG, WILLIAM T. ONG, WILLIE T. ONG, and JULIE ONG
ALONZO, petitioners, vs. DAVID S. TIU, CELY Y. TIU, MOLY YU
GAW, BELEN SEE YU, D. TERENCE Y. TIU, JOHN YU, LOURDES
C. TIU, INTRALAND RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT CORP.,
MASAGANA TELAMART, INC., REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
PASAY CITY, and the SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, respondents.

[G.R. No. 144629. April 8, 2003.]

DAVID S. TIU, CELY Y. TIU, MOLY YU GAW, BELEN SEE YU, D.

TERENCE Y. TIU, JOHN YU, LOURDES C. TIU, and INTRALAND
RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT CORP. , petitioners, vs. ONG
YONG, JUANITA TAN ONG, WILSON T. ONG, ANNA L. ONG,
WILLIAM T. ONG, WILLIE T. ONG, and JULIA ONG ALONZO ,
respondents.

Feria Feria Lugtu La O'Noche for petitioners.

Estelito P. Mendoza for petitioners.
Gonzales Batiller Bilog & Asso. for W. Ong.
Tan Acut & Lopez for respondents.
Aquilino L. Pimentel III for Landlink, etc.
Arturo Santos for Masagana.

SYNOPSIS

In these consolidated petitions, the Ongs moved for reconsideration of

the February 1, 2002 Decision of the Supreme Court affirming with
modification the October 5, 1999 Decision of the Court of Appeals, which in
turn upheld, likewise with modification, the decision of the SEC en banc
dated September 11, 1998, which confirmed the unilateral rescission by the
Tius of the Pre-Subscription Agreement between them and the Ongs. The
Tius, on the other hand, moved for the issuance of a writ of execution of the
February 1, 2002 decision of the Court.
Movants Ong argued that specific performance and not rescission was
the proper remedy under the premises. According to them, their alleged
breach of the Pre-Subscription Agreement was, at most casual, which did not
justify the rescission of the contract. They claimed that it was the Tius who
were guilty of fundamental violation in failing to remit funds to FLADC and
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 diverting the same to their MATTERCO account. They alleged that in view of
the findings that both parties were guilty of violating their Agreement,
neither of them could resort to rescission under the principle of pari delicto.
The Ongs further argued that assuming rescission to be proper, they should
be given the proportionate share of the mall.
In reversing itself, the Court ruled that the Tius could not legally rescind
the Pre-Subscription Agreement. According to the Court, although the Tius
were adversely affected by the Ong's unwillingness to let them assume the
positions of Vice-President and Treasurer of the Corporation, rescission due
to breach of contract was definitely a wrong remedy for their personal
grievances. The Corporation Code, SEC rules and even the Rules of Court
provide for appropriate adequate intra-corporate remedies, other than
rescission, in situations like this. Rescission is certainly not one of them,
especially if the party asking for it has no legal personality to do so and the
requirements of the law therefor have not been met. A contrary doctrine will
tread on extremely dangerous ground because it will allow just any
stockholder, for just about any real or imagined offense, to demand
rescission of his subscription and call for the distribution of some part of the
corporate assets to him without complying with the requirements of the
Corporation Code. Hence, the Court held that the Tius, in their personal
capacities, cannot seek the ultimate and extraordinary remedy of rescission
of the subject agreement based on a less than substantial breach of the
subscription contract. Moreover, the Court found that Masagana Citimall
would not be what it has become today were it not for the timely infusion of
P190 million by the Ongs in 1994. Without the Ongs, the Tius would have lost
everything they originally invested in said mall. Thus, it would be totally
against all rules of justice, fairness and equity to deprive the Ongs of their
interest on petty and tenuous grounds. Accordingly, the Court declared null
and void the unilateral rescission by the Tius of the subject Pre-Subscription
Agreement. It denied Tius' motion for issuance of a writ of execution for
being moot. EHTIcD

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; MOTIONS; MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION; NOT

PRO-FORMA FOR THE REASON ALONE THAT IT REITERATES THE ARGUMENTS
EARLIER PASSED UPON AND REJECTED BY THE APPELLATE COURT. — The
procedural rule on pro-forma motions pointed out by the Tius should not be
blindly applied to meritorious motions for reconsideration. As long as the
same adequately raises a valid ground (i.e., the decision or final order is
contrary to law), this Court has to evaluate the merits of the arguments to
prevent an unjust decision from attaining finality. In Security Bank and Trust
Company vs. Cuenca, we ruled that a motion for reconsideration is not pro
forma for the reason alone that it reiterates the arguments earlier passed
upon and rejected by the appellate court. We explained there that a movant
may raise the same arguments, if only to convince this Court that its ruling
was erroneous. Moreover, the rule (that a motion is pro-forma if it only
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 repeats the arguments in the previous pleadings) will not apply if said
arguments were not squarely passed upon and answered in the decision
sought to be reconsidered. In the case at bar, no ruling was made on some
of the petitioner Ongs' arguments. For instance, no clear ruling was made on
why an order distributing corporate assets and property to the stockholders
would not violate the statutory preconditions for corporate dissolution or
decrease of authorized capital stock. Thus, it would serve the ends of justice
to entertain the subject motion for reconsideration since some important
issues therein, although mere repetitions, were not considered or clearly
resolved by this Court.
2. COMMERCIAL LAW; CORPORATION LAW; CORPORATIONS;
SUBSCRIPTION CONTRACT; A PARTY WHO HAS NOT TAKEN PART IN THE
TRANSACTION CANNOT SUE OR BE SUED FOR PERFORMANCE OR FOR
CANCELLATION THEREOF, UNLESS HE SHOWS THAT HE HAS A REAL
INTEREST AFFECTED THEREBY. — A subscription contract necessarily
involves the corporation as one of the contracting parties since the subject
matter of the transaction is property owned by the corporation — its shares
of stock. Thus, the subscription contract (denominated by the parties as Pre-
Subscription Agreement) whereby the Ongs invested P100 million for
1,000,000 shares of stock was, from the viewpoint of the law, one between
the Ongs and FLADC, not between the Ongs and the Tius. Otherwise stated,
the Tius did not contract in their personal capacities with the Ongs since
they were not selling any of their own shares to them. It was FLADC that did.
Considering therefore that the real contracting parties to the subscription
agreement were FLADC and the Ongs alone, a civil case for rescission on the
ground of breach of contract filed by the Tius m their personal capacities will
not prosper. Assuming it had valid reasons to do so, only FLADC (and
certainly not the Tius) had the legal personality to file suit rescinding the
subscription agreement with the Ongs inasmuch as it was the real party in
interest therein. Article 1311 of the Civil Code provides that "contracts take
effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs. . ." Therefore, a
party who has not taken part in the transaction cannot sue or be sued for
performance or for cancellation thereof, unless he shows that he has a real
interest affected thereby.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RESCISSION BASED ON BREACH OF CONTRACT
NOT PROPER REMEDY WHERE PARTY ASKING FOR IT HAS NO LEGAL
PERSONALITY TO DO SO AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE LAW THEREFOR
HAVE NOT BEEN MET. — However, although the Tius were adversely affected
by the Ongs' unwillingness to let them assume their positions, rescission due
to breach of contract is definitely the wrong remedy for their personal
grievances. The Corporation Code, SEC rules and even the Rules of Court
provide for appropriate and adequate intra-corporate remedies, other than
rescission, in situations like this . Rescission is certainly not one of them,
specially if the party asking for it has no legal personality to do so and the
requirements of the law therefor have not been met. A contrary doctrine will
tread on extremely dangerous ground because it will allow just any
stockholder, for just about any real or imagined offense, to demand
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 rescission of his subscription and call for the distribution of some part of the
corporate assets to him without complying with the requirements of the
Corporation Code. Hence, the Tius, in their personal capacities, cannot seek
the ultimate and extraordinary remedy of rescission of the subject
agreement based on a less than substantial breach of subscription contract.
Not only are they not parties to the subscription contract between the Ongs
and FLADC; they also have other available and effective remedies under the
law.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RESCISSION THEREOF WILL RESULT IN THE
PREMATURE LIQUIDATION OF THE CORPORATION IN CASE AT BAR. —
Contrary to the Tius' allegation, rescission will, in the final analysis, result in
the premature liquidation of the corporation without the benefit of prior
dissolution in accordance with Sections 117, 118, 119 and 120 of the
Corporation Code. The Tius maintain that rescinding the subscription
contract is not synonymous to corporate liquidation because all rescission
will entail would be the simple restoration of the status quo ante and a
return to the two groups of their cash and property contributions. We wish it
were that simple. Very noticeable is the fact that the Tius do not explain why
rescission in the instant case will not effectively result in liquidation. The Tius
merely refer in cavalier fashion to the end-result of rescission (which
incidentally is 100% favorable to them) but turn a blind eye to its unfair,
inequitable and disastrous effect on the corporation, its creditors and the
Ongs. DAcaIE

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RESCISSION THEREOF UNWARRANTED IN CASE

AT BAR. — After all is said and done, no one can close his eyes to the fact
that the Masagana Citimall would not be what it has become today were it
not for the timely infusion of P190 million by the Ongs in 1994. There are no
ifs or buts about it. Without the Ongs, the Tius would have lost everything
they originally invested in said mall. If only for this and the fact that this
Resolution can truly pave the way for both groups to enjoy the fruits of their
investments — assuming good faith and honest intentions — we cannot
allow the rescission of the subject subscription agreement. The Ongs'
shortcomings were far from serious and certainly less than substantial; they
were in fact remediable and correctable under the law. It would be totally
against all rules of justice, fairness and equity to deprive the Ongs of their
interests on petty and tenuous grounds.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; PIERCING THE VEIL OF CORPORATE FICTION; NOT
WARRANTED ABSENT PROOF THAT THE CORPORATION IS BEING USED AS A
CLOAK OR COVER FOR FRAUD OR ILLEGALITY, OR TO WORK INJUSTICE. — In
their February 28, 2003 Memorandum, the Tius claim that there are two
contracts embodied in the Pre-Subscription Agreement: a shareholder's
agreement between the Tius and the Ongs defining and governing their
relationship and a subscription contract between the Tius, the Ongs and
FLADC regarding the subscription of the parties to the corporation. They
point out that these two component parts form one whole agreement and
that their terms and conditions are intrinsically related and dependent on
each other. Thus, the breach of the shareholders' agreement, which was
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 allegedly the consideration for the subscription contract, was also a breach
of the latter. Aside from the fact that this is an entirely new angle never
raised in any of their previous pleadings until after the oral arguments on
January 29, 2003, we find this argument too strained for comfort. It is
obviously intended to remedy and cover up the Tius' lack of legal personality
to rescind an agreement in which they were personally not parties-in-
interest. Assuming arguendo that there were two "sub-agreements"
embodied in the Pre-Subscription Agreement, this Court fails to see how the
shareholders agreement between the Ongs and Tius can, within the bounds
of reason, be interpreted as the consideration of the subscription contract
between FLADC and the Ongs. There was nothing in the Pre-Subscription
Agreement even remotely suggesting such alleged interdependence. Be that
as it may, however, the Tius are nevertheless not the proper parties to raise
this point because they were not parties to the subscription contract
between FLADC and the Ongs. Thus, they are not in a position to claim that
the shareholders agreement between them and the Ongs was what induced
FLADC and the Ongs to enter into the subscription contract. It is the Ongs
alone who can say that. Though FLADC was represented by the Tius in the
subscription contract, FLADC had a separate juridical personality from the
Tius. The case before us does not warrant piercing the veil of corporate
fiction since there is no proof that the corporation is being used "as a cloak
or cover for fraud or illegality, or to work injustice."
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; HAS A SEPARATE JURIDICAL PERSONALITY FROM ITS
STOCKHOLDERS. — The Tius also argue that, since the Ongs represent
FLADC as its management, breach by the Ongs is breach by FLADC. This
must also fail because such an argument disregards the separate juridical
personality of FLADC. aDECHI

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESIDENT OF THE CORPORATION IS PROHIBITED

FROM ACTING CONCURRENTLY AS TREASURER THEREOF. — The Tius allege
that they were prevented from participating in the management of the
corporation. There is evidence that the Ongs did prevent the rightfully
elected Treasurer, Cely Tiu, from exercising her function as such. The
records show that the President, Wilson Ong, supervised the collection and
receipt of rentals in the Masagana Citimall; that he ordered the same to be
deposited in the bank; and that he held on to the cash and properties of the
corporation. Section 25 of the Corporation Code prohibits the President from
acting concurrently as Treasurer of the corporation. The rationale behind the
provision is to ensure the effective monitoring of each officer's separate
functions.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; TRUST FUND DOCTRINE; ELABORATED. — All this
notwithstanding, granting but not conceding that the Tius possess the legal
standing to sue for to rescission based on breach of contract, said action will
nevertheless still not prosper since rescission will violate the Trust Fund
Doctrine and the procedures for the valid distribution of assets and property
under the Corporation Code. The Trust Fund Doctrine, first enunciated by
this Court in the 1923 case of Philippine Trust Co. vs. Rivera , provides that
subscriptions to the capital stock of a corporation constitute a fund to which
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 the creditors have a right to look for the satisfaction of their claims. This
doctrine is the underlying principle in the procedure for the distribution of
capital assets, embodied in the Corporation Code, which allows the
distribution of corporate capital only in three instances: (1) amendment of
the Articles of Incorporation to reduce the authorized capital stock, (2)
purchase of redeemable shares by the corporation, regardless of the
existence of unrestricted retained earnings, and (3) dissolution and eventual
liquidation of the corporation. Furthermore, the doctrine is articulated in
Section 41 on the power of a corporation to acquire its own shares and in
Section 122 on the prohibition against the distribution of corporate assets
and property unless the stringent requirements therefor are complied with.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; DISTRIBUTION OF CORPORATE ASSETS AND
PROPERTY CANNOT BE MADE TO DEPEND ON THE WHIMS AND CAPRICES OF
THE STOCKHOLDERS, OFFICERS OR DIRECTORS OR EARNEST DESIRE OF THE
COURT A QUO TO PREVENT FURTHER SQUABBLES AND FUTURE
LITIGATIONS. — The distribution of corporate assets and property cannot be
made to depend on the whims and caprices of the stockholders, officers or
directors of the corporation, or even, for that matter, on the earnest desire
of the court a quo "to prevent further squabbles and future litigations" unless
the indispensable conditions and procedures for the protection of corporate
creditors are followed. Otherwise, the "corporate peace" laudably hoped for
by the court will remain nothing but a dream because this time, it will be the
creditors' turn to engage in "squabbles and litigations" should the court
order an unlawful distribution in blatant disregard of the Trust Fund Doctrine.
In the instant case, the rescission of the Pre-Subscription Agreement will
effectively result in the unauthorized distribution of the capital assets and
property of the corporation, thereby violating the Trust Fund Doctrine and
the Corporation Code, since rescission of a subscription agreement is not
one of the instances when distribution of capital assets and property of the
corporation is allowed.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; DECREASE OF CAPITAL STOCK; FORMAL
REQUIREMENTS; NOT COMPLIED WITH IN CASE AT BAR. — The Tius' case for
rescission cannot validly be deemed a petition to decrease capital stock
because such action never complied with the formal requirements for
decrease of capital stock under Section 33 of the Corporation Code. No
majority vote of the board of directors was ever taken. Neither was there
any stockholders meeting at which the approval of stockholders owning at
least two-thirds of the outstanding capital stock was secured. There was no
revised treasurer's affidavit and no proof that said decrease will not
prejudice the creditors' rights. On the contrary, all their pleadings contained
were alleged acts of violations by the Ongs to justify an order of rescission.
Furthermore, it is an improper judicial intrusion into the internal affairs of the
corporation to compel FLADC to file at the SEC a petition for the issuance of
a certificate of decrease of stock. Decreasing a corporation's authorized
capital stock is an amendment of the Articles of Incorporation. It is a decision
that only the stockholders and the directors can make, considering that they
are the contracting parties thereto. In this case, the Tius are actually not just
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 asking for a review of the legality and fairness of a corporate decision. They
want this Court to make a corporate decision for FLADC . We decline to
intervene and order corporate structural changes not voluntarily agreed
upon by its stockholders and directors. DCSTAH

12. ID.; ID.; ID.; BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE; EXPLAINED;

RATIONALE BEHIND THE RULE; CASE AT BAR. — Truth to tell, a judicial order
to decrease capital stock without the assent of FLADC's directors and
stockholders is a violation of the "business judgment rule" which states that:
. . . (C)ontracts intra vires entered into by the board of directors are binding
upon the corporation and courts will not interfere unless such contracts are
so unconscionable and oppressive as to amount to wanton destruction to the
rights of the minority, as when plaintiffs aver that the defendants (members
of the board), have concluded a transaction among themselves as will result
in serious injury to the plaintiffs stockholders. The reason behind the rule is
aptly explained by Dean Cesar L. Villanueva, an esteemed author in
corporate law, thus: Courts and other tribunals are wont to override the
business judgment of the board mainly because, courts are not in the
business of business, and the laissez faire rule or the free enterprise system
prevailing in our social and economic set-up dictates that it is better for the
State and its organs to leave business to the businessmen; especially so,
when courts are ill-equipped to make business decisions. More importantly,
the social contract in the corporate family to decide the course of the
corporate business has been vested in the board and not with courts.
Apparently, the Tius do not realize the illegal consequences of seeking
rescission and control of the corporation to the exclusion of the Ongs. Such
an act infringes on the law on reduction of capital stock. Ordering the return
and distribution of the Ongs' capital contribution without dissolving the
corporation or decreasing its authorized capital stock is not only against the
law but is also prejudicial to corporate creditors who enjoy absolute priority
of payment over and above any individual stockholder thereof.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J : p

Before us are the (1) motion for reconsideration, dated March 15, 2002,
of petitioner movants Ong Yong, Juanita Tan Ong, Wilson Ong, Anna Ong,
William Ong, Willie Ong and Julia Ong Alonzo (the Ongs); (2) motion for
partial reconsideration, dated March 15, 2002, of petitioner movant Willie
Ong seeking a reversal of this Court's Decision, 1 dated February 1, 2002, in
G.R. Nos. 144476 and 144629 affirming with modification the decision 2 of
the Court of Appeals, dated October 5, 1999, which in turn upheld, likewise
with modification, the decision of the SEC en banc, dated September 11,
1998; and (3) motion for issuance of writ of execution of petitioners David S.
Tiu, Cely Y. Tiu, Moly Yu Gow, Belen See Yu, D. Terence Y. Tiu, John Yu and
Lourdes C. Tiu (the Tius) of our February 1, 2002 Decision. DaAETS

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 A brief recapitulation of the facts shows that:
In 1994, the construction of the Masagana Citimall in Pasay City was
threatened with stoppage and incompletion when its owner, the First
Landlink Asia Development Corporation (FLADC), which was owned by the
Tius, encountered dire financial difficulties. It was heavily indebted to the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) for P190 million. To stave off foreclosure of
the mortgage on the two lots where the mall was being built, the Tius invited
Ong Yong, Juanita Tan Ong, Wilson T. Ong, Anna L. Ong, William T. Ong and
Julia Ong Alonzo (the Ongs), to invest in FLADC. Under the Pre-Subscription
Agreement they entered into, the Ongs and the Tius agreed to maintain
equal shareholdings in FLADC: the Ongs were to subscribe to 1,000,000
shares at a par value of P100.00 each while the Tius were to subscribe to an
additional 549,800 shares at P100.00 each in addition to their already
existing subscription of 450,200 shares. Furthermore, they agreed that the
Tius were entitled to nominate the Vice-President and the Treasurer plus five
directors while the Ongs were entitled to nominate the President, the
Secretary and six directors (including the chairman) to the board of directors
of FLADC. Moreover, the Ongs were given the right to manage and operate
the mall.
Accordingly, the Ongs paid P100 million in cash for their subscription to
1,000,000 shares of stock while the Tius committed to contribute to FLADC a
four-storey building and two parcels of land respectively valued at P20
million (for 200,000 shares), P30 million (for 300,000 shares) and P49.8
million (for 49,800 shares) to cover their additional 549,800 stock
subscription therein. The Ongs paid in another P70 million 3 to FLADC and
P20 million to the Tius over and above their P100 million investment, the
total sum of which (P190 million) was used to settle the P190 million
mortgage indebtedness of FLADC to PNB.
The business harmony between the Ongs and the Tius in FLADC,
however, was shortlived because the Tius, on February 23, 1996, rescinded
the Pre-Subscription Agreement. The Tius accused the Ongs of (1) refusing
to credit to them the FLADC shares covering their real property
contributions; (2) preventing David S. Tiu and Cely Y. Tiu from assuming the
positions of and performing their duties as Vice-President and Treasurer,
respectively, and (3) refusing to give them the office spaces agreed upon.
According to the Tius, the agreement was for David S. Tiu and Cely S.
Tiu to assume the positions and perform the duties of Vice-President and
Treasurer, respectively, but the Ongs prevented them from doing so.
Furthermore, the Ongs refused to provide them the space for their executive
offices as Vice-President and Treasurer. Finally, and most serious of all, the
Ongs refused to give them the shares corresponding to their property
contributions of a four-story building, a 1,902.30 square-meter lot and a 151
square-meter lot. Hence, they felt they were justified in setting aside their
Pre-Subscription Agreement with the Ongs who allegedly refused to comply
with their undertakings.
In their defense, the Ongs said that David S. Tiu and Cely Y. Tiu had in
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 fact assumed the positions of Vice-President and Treasurer of FLADC but
that it was they who refused to comply with the corporate duties assigned to
them. It was the contention of the Ongs that they wanted the Tius to sign the
checks of the corporation and undertake their management duties but that
the Tius shied away from helping them manage the corporation. On the
issue of office space, the Ongs pointed out that the Tius did in fact already
have existing executive offices in the mall since they owned it 100% before
the Ongs came in. What the Tius really wanted were new offices which were
anyway subsequently provided to them. On the most important issue of their
alleged failure to credit the Tius with the FLADC shares commensurate to the
Tius' property contributions, the Ongs asserted that, although the Tius
executed a deed of assignment for the 1,902.30 square-meter lot in favor of
FLADC, they (the Tius) refused to pay P570,690 for capital gains tax and
documentary stamp tax. Without the payment thereof, the SEC would not
approve the valuation of the Tius' property contribution (as opposed to cash
contribution). This, in turn, would make it impossible to secure a new
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) over the property in FLADC's name. In any
event, it was easy for the Tius to simply pay the said transfer taxes and,
after the new TCT was issued in FLADC's name, they could then be given the
corresponding shares of stocks. On the 151 square-meter property, the Tius
never executed a deed of assignment in favor of FLADC. The Tius initially
claimed that they could not as yet surrender the TCT because it was "still
being reconstituted" by the Lichaucos from whom the Tius bought it. The
Ongs later on discovered that FLADC had in reality owned the property all
along, even before their Pre-Subscription Agreement was executed in 1994.
This meant that the 151 square-meter property was at that time already the
corporate property of FLADC for which the Tius were not entitled to the
issuance of new shares of stock. TEAICc

The controversy finally came to a head when this case was

commenced 4 by the Tius on February 27, 1996 at the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), seeking confirmation of their rescission of the
Pre-Subscription Agreement. After hearing, the SEC, through then Hearing
Officer Rolando G. Andaya, Jr., issued a decision on May 19, 1997 confirming
the rescission sought by the Tius, as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered confirming the
rescission of the Pre-Subscription Agreement, and consequently
ordering:

(a) The cancellation of the 1,000,000 shares subscription of

the individual defendants in FLADC;
(b) FLADC to pay the amount of P170,000,000.00 to the
individual defendants representing the return of their
contribution for 1,000,000 shares of FLADC;
(c) The plaintiffs to submit with (sic) the Securities and
Exchange Commission amended articles of incorporation of
FLADC to conform with this decision;
(d) The defendants to surrender to the plaintiffs TCT Nos.
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 132493, 132494, 134066 (formerly 15587), 135325 and
134204 and any other title or deed in the name of FLADC,
failing in which said titles are declared void;
(e) The Register of Deeds to issue new certificates of titles in
favor of the plaintiffs and to cancel the annotation of the
Pre-Subscription Agreement dated 15 August 1994 on TCT
No. 134066 (formerly 15587);
(f) The individual defendants, individually and collectively,
their agents and representatives, to desist from exercising
or performing any and all acts pertaining to stockholder,
director or officer of FLADC or in any manner intervene in
the management and affairs of FLADC;
(g) The individual defendants, jointly and severally, to return
to FLADC interest payment in the amount of P8,866,669.00
and all interest payments as well as any payments on
principal received from the P70,000,000.00 inexistent loan,
plus the legal rate of interest thereon from the date of their
receipt of such payment until fully paid;
(h) The plaintiff David Tiu to pay individual defendants the
sum of P20,000,000.00 representing his loan from said
defendants plus legal interest from the date of receipt of
such amount.
SO ORDERED. 5

On motion of both parties, the above decision was partially

reconsidered but only insofar as the Ongs' P70 million was declared not as a
premium on capital stock but an advance (loan) by the Ongs to FLADC and
that the imposition of interest on it was correct. 6
Both parties appealed 7 to the SEC en banc which rendered a decision
on September 11, 1998, affirming the May 19, 1997 decision of the Hearing
Officer. The SEC en banc confirmed the rescission of the Pre-Subscription
Agreement but reverted to classifying the P70 million paid by the Ongs as
premium on capital and not as a loan or advance to FLADC, hence, not
entitled to earn interest. 8
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered a decision on October 5,
1999, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Order dated September 11, 1998 issued by the
Securities and Exchange Commission En Banc in SEC AC CASE NOS.
598 and 601 confirming the rescission of the Pre-Subscription
Agreement dated August 15, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED, subject to the
following MODIFICATIONS:
1. The Ong and Tiu Groups are ordered to liquidate First Landlink
Asia Development Corporation in accordance with the following
cash and property contributions of the parties therein.
(a) Ong Group — P100,000,000.00 cash contribution for one
(1) million shares in First Landlink Asia Development
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 Corporation at a par value of P100.00 per share;
(b) Tiu Group:
1) P45,020,000.00 original cash contribution for
450,200 shares in First Landlink Asia Development
Corporation at a par value of P100.00 per share;

2) A four-storey building described in Transfer

Certificate of Title No. 15587 in the name of Intraland
Resources and Development Corporation valued at
P20,000,000.00 for 200,000 shares in First Landlink
Asia Development Corporation at a par value of
P100.00 per share;
3) A 1,902.30 square-meter parcel of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15587 in the name of
Masagana Telamart, Inc. valued at P30,000,000.00
for 300,000 shares in First Landlink Asia
Development Corporation at a par value of P100.00
per share.
2) Whatever remains of the assets of the First Landlink Asia
Development Corporation and the management thereof is (sic)
hereby ordered transferred to the Tiu Group.
3) First Landlink Asia Development Corporation is hereby ordered
to pay the amount of P70,000,000.00 that was advanced to it by
the Ong Group upon the finality of this decision. Should the
former incur in delay in the payment thereof, it shall pay the
legal interest thereon pursuant to Article 2209 of the New Civil
Code.
4) The Tius are hereby ordered to pay the amount of
P20,000,000.00 loaned them by the Ongs upon the finality of this
decision. Should the former incur in delay in the payment
thereof, it shall pay the legal interest thereon pursuant to Article
2209 of the New Civil Code.
SO ORDERED. 9

An interesting sidelight of the CA decision was its description of the

rescission made by the Tius as the "height of ingratitude" and as "pulling a
fast one" on the Ongs. The CA moreover found the Tius guilty of withholding
FLADC funds from the Ongs and diverting corporate income to their own
MATTERCO account. 10 These were findings later on affirmed in our own
February 1, 2002 Decision which is the subject of the instant motion for
reconsideration. 11
But there was also a strange aspect of the CA decision. The CA
concluded that both the Ongs and the Tius were in pari delicto (which would
not have legally entitled them to rescission) but, "for practical
considerations," that is, their inability to work together, it was best to
separate the two groups by rescinding the Pre-Subscription Agreement,
returning the original investment of the Ongs and awarding practically
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 everything else to the Tius.
Their motions for reconsideration having been denied, both parties
filed separate petitions for review before this Court.
In their petition docketed as G.R. No. 144476, Ong et al. vs. Tiu et al.,
the Ongs argued that the Tius may not properly avail of rescission under
Article 1191 of the Civil Code considering that the Pre-Subscription
Agreement did not provide for reciprocity of obligations; that the rights over
the subject matter of the rescission (capital assets and properties) had been
acquired by a third party (FLADC); that they did not commit a substantial
and fundamental breach of their agreement since they did not prevent the
Tius from assuming the positions of Vice-President and Treasurer of FLADC,
and that the failure to credit the 300,000 shares corresponding to the
1,902.30 square-meter property covered by TCT No. 134066 (formerly
15587) was due to the refusal of the Tius to pay the required transfer taxes
to secure the approval of the SEC for the property contribution and,
thereafter, the issuance of title in FLADC's name. They also argued that the
liquidation of FLADC may not legally be ordered by the appellate court even
for so called "practical considerations" or even to prevent "further squabbles
and numerous litigations," since the same are not valid grounds under the
Corporation Code. Moreover, the Ongs bewailed the failure of the CA to grant
interest on their P70 million and P20 million advances to FLADC and David S.
Tiu, respectively, and to award costs and damages.
In their petition docketed as G.R. No. 144629, Tiu et al. vs. Ong et al.,
the Tius, on the other hand, contended that the rescission should have been
limited to the restitution of the parties' respective investments and not the
liquidation of FLADC based on the erroneous perception by the court that:
the Masagana Citimall was threatened with incompletion since FLADC was in
financial distress; that the Tius invited the Ongs to invest in FLADC to settle
its P190 million loan from PNB; that they violated the Pre-Subscription
Agreement when it was the Lichaucos and not the Tius who executed the
deed of assignment over the 151 square-meter property commensurate to
49,800 shares in FLADC thereby failing to pay the price for the said shares;
that they did not turn over to the Ongs the entire amount of FLADC funds;
that they were diverting rentals from lease contracts due to FLADC to their
own MATTERCO account; that the P70 million paid by the Ongs was an
advance and not a premium on capital; and that, by rescinding the Pre-
Subscription Agreement, they wanted to wrestle away the management of
the mall and prevent the Ongs from enjoying the profits of their P190 million
investment in FLADC.
On February 1, 2002, this Court promulgated its Decision (the subject
of the instant motions), affirming the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals but with the following modifications:
1. the P20 million loan extended by the Ongs to the Tius shall earn
interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum to be computed
from the time of judicial demand which is from April 23, 1996;

2. the P70 million advanced by the Ongs to the FLADC shall earn
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 interest at ten percent (10%) per annum to be computed from
the date of the FLADC Board Resolution which is June 19, 1996;
and

3. the Tius shall be credited with 49,800 shares in FLADC for their
property contribution, specifically, the 151 sq. m. parcel of land.

This Court affirmed the fact that both the Ongs and the Tius violated
their respective obligations under the Pre-Subscription Agreement. The Ongs
prevented the Tius from assuming the positions of Vice-President and
Treasurer of the corporation. On the other hand, the Decision established
that the Tius failed to turn over FLADC funds to the Ongs and that the Tius
diverted rentals due to FLADC to their MATTERCO account. Consequently, it
held that rescission was not possible since both parties were in pari delicto.
However, this Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the remedy of
specific performance, as espoused by the Ongs, was not practical and sound
either and would only lead to further "squabbles and numerous litigations"
between the parties.
On March 15, 2002, the Tius filed before this Court a Motion for
Issuance of a Writ of Execution on the grounds that: (a) the SEC order had
become executory as early as September 11, 1998 pursuant to Sections 1
and 12, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court; (b) any further delay would be
injurious to the rights of the Tius since the case had been pending for more
than six years; and (c) the SEC no longer had quasi-judicial jurisdiction under
RA 8799 (Securities Regulation Code). The Ongs filed their opposition,
contending that the Decision dated February 1, 2002 was not yet final and
executory; that no good reason existed to issue a warrant of execution; and
that, pursuant to Section 5.2 of RA 8799, the SEC retained jurisdiction over
pending cases involving intra-corporate disputes already submitted for final
resolution upon the effectivity of the said law.
Aside from their opposition to the Tius' Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Execution, the Ongs filed their own "Motion for Reconsideration;
Alternatively, Motion for Modification (of the February 1, 2002 Decision)" on
March 15, 2002, raising two main points: (a) that specific performance and
not rescission was the proper remedy under the premises; and (b) that,
assuming rescission to be proper, the subject decision of this Court should
be modified to entitle movants to their proportionate share in the mall.
On their first point (specific performance and not rescission was the
proper remedy), movants Ong argue that their alleged breach of the Pre-
Subscription Agreement was, at most, casual which did not justify the
rescission of the contract. They stress that providing appropriate offices for
David S. Tiu and Cely Y. Tiu as Vice-President and Treasurer, respectively,
had no bearing on their obligations under the Pre-Subscription Agreement
since the said obligation (to provide executive offices) pertained to FLADC
itself. Such obligation arose from the relations between the said officers and
the corporation and not any of the individual parties such as the Ongs.
Likewise, the alleged failure of the Ongs to credit shares of stock in favor of
the Tius for their property contributions also pertained to the corporation and
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 not to the Ongs. Just the same, it could not be done in view of the Tius'
refusal to pay the necessary transfer taxes which in turn resulted in the
inability to secure SEC approval for the property contributions and the
issuance of a new TCT in the name of FLADC.
Besides, according to the Ongs, the principal objective of both parties
in entering into the Pre-Subscription Agreement in 1994 was to raise the
P190 million desperately needed for the payment of FLADC's loan to PNB.
Hence, in this light, the alleged failure to provide office space for the two
corporate officers was no more than an inconsequential infringement. For
rescission to be justified, the law requires that the breach of contract should
be so "substantial or fundamental" as to defeat the primary objective of the
parties in making the agreement. At any rate, the Ongs claim that it was the
Tius who were guilty of fundamental violations in failing to remit funds due
to FLADC and diverting the same to their MATTERCO account.
The Ongs also allege that, in view of the findings of the Court that both
parties were guilty of violating the Pre-Subscription Agreement, neither of
them could resort to rescission under the principle of pari delicto. In addition,
since the cash and other contributions now sought to be returned already
belong to FLADC, an innocent third party, said remedy may no longer be
availed of under the law.
On their second point (assuming rescission to be proper, the Ongs
should be given their proportionate share of the mall), movants Ong
vehemently take exception to the second item in the dispositive portion of
the questioned Decision insofar as it decreed that whatever remains of the
assets of FLADC and the management thereof (after liquidation) shall be
transferred to the Tius. They point out that the mall itself, which would have
been foreclosed by PNB if not for their timely investment of P190 million in
1994 and which is now worth about P1 billion mainly because of their efforts,
should be included in any partition and distribution. They (the Ongs) should
not merely be given interest on their capital investments. The said portion of
our Decision, according to them, amounted to the unjust enrichment of the
Tius and ran contrary to our own pronouncement that the act of the Tius in
unilaterally rescinding the agreement was "the height of ingratitude" and an
attempt "to pull a fast one" as it would prevent the Ongs from enjoying the
fruits of their P190 million investment in FLADC. It also contravenes this
Court's assurance in the questioned Decision that the Ongs and Tius "will
have a bountiful return of their respective investments derived from the
profits of the corporation."
Willie Ong filed a separate "Motion for Partial Reconsideration" dated
March 8, 2002, pointing out that there was no violation of the Pre-
Subscription Agreement on the part of the Ongs; that, after more than seven
years since the mall began its operations, rescission had become not only
impractical but would also adversely affect the rights of innocent parties;
and that it would be highly inequitable and unfair to simply return the P100
million investment of the Ongs and give the remaining assets now
amounting to about P1 billion to the Tius. AISHcD

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 The Tius, in their opposition to the Ongs' motion for reconsideration,
counter that the arguments therein are a mere re-hash of the contentions in
the Ongs' petition for review and previous motion for reconsideration of the
Court of Appeals' decision. The Tius compare the arguments in said
pleadings to prove that the Ongs do not raise new issues, and, based on
well-settled jurisprudence, 12 the Ongs' present motion is therefore pro
forma and did not prevent the Decision of this Court from attaining finality.
On January 29, 2003, the Special Second Division of this Court held oral
arguments on the respective positions of the parties. On February 27, 2003,
Dr. Willie Ong and the rest of the movants Ong filed their respective
memoranda. On February 28, 2003, the Tius submitted their memorandum.
We grant the Ongs' motions for reconsideration.
This is not the first time that this Court has reversed itself on a motion
for reconsideration. In Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. vs. National
Telecommunications Commission , 13 this Court, through then Chief Justice
Felix V. Makasiar, said that its members may and do change their minds,
after a re-study of the facts and the law, illuminated by a mutual exchange
of views. 14 After a thorough re-examination of the case, we find that our
Decision of February 1, 2002 overlooked certain aspects which, if not
corrected, will cause extreme and irreparable damage and prejudice to the
Ongs, FLADC and its creditors.
The procedural rule on pro forma motions pointed out by the Tius
should not be blindly applied to meritorious motions for reconsideration. As
long as the same adequately raises a valid ground 15 (i.e., the decision or
final order is contrary to law), this Court has to evaluate the merits of the
arguments to prevent an unjust decision from attaining finality. In Security
Bank and Trust Company vs. Cuenca , 16 we ruled that a motion for
reconsideration is not pro forma for the reason alone that it reiterates the
arguments earlier passed upon and rejected by the appellate court. We
explained there that a movant may raise the same arguments, if only to
convince this Court that its ruling was erroneous. Moreover, the rule (that a
motion is pro forma if it only repeats the arguments in the previous
pleadings) will not apply if said arguments were not squarely passed upon
and answered in the decision sought to be reconsidered. In the case at bar,
no ruling was made on some of the petitioner Ongs' arguments. For
instance, no clear ruling was made on why an order distributing corporate
assets and property to the stockholders would not violate the statutory
preconditions for corporate dissolution or decrease of authorized capital
stock. Thus, it would serve the ends of justice to entertain the subject motion
for reconsideration since some important issues therein, although mere
repetitions, were not considered or clearly resolved by this Court.
Going now to the merits, we resolve whether the Tius could legally
rescind the Pre-Subscription Agreement. We rule that they could not.
FLADC was originally incorporated with an authorized capital stock of
500,000 shares with the Tius owning 450,200 shares representing the paid-
up capital. When the Tius invited the Ongs to invest in FLADC as
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 stockholders, an increase of the authorized capital stock became necessary
to give each group equal (50-50) shareholdings as agreed upon in the Pre-
Subscription Agreement. The authorized capital stock was thus increased
from 500,000 shares to 2,000,000 shares with a par value of P100 each, with
the Ongs subscribing to 1,000,000 shares and the Tius to 549,800 more
shares in addition to their 450,200 shares to complete 1,000,000 shares.
Thus, the subject matter of the contract was the 1,000,000 unissued shares
of FLADC stock allocated to the Ongs. Since these were unissued shares, the
parties' Pre-Subscription Agreement was in fact a subscription contract as
defined under Section 60, Title VII of the Corporation Code:
Any contract for the acquisition of unissued stock in an existing
corporation or a corporation still to be formed shall be deemed a
subscription within the meaning of this Title, notwithstanding the fact
that the parties refer to it as a purchase or some other contract (Italics
supplied).

A subscription contract necessarily involves the corporation as one of

the contracting parties since the subject matter of the transaction is property
owned by the corporation — its shares of stock. Thus, the subscription
contract (denominated by the parties as a Pre-Subscription Agreement)
whereby the Ongs invested P100 million for 1,000,000 shares of stock was,
from the viewpoint of the law, one between the Ongs and FLADC, not
between the Ongs and the Tius. Otherwise stated, the Tius did not contract
in their personal capacities with the Ongs since they were not selling any of
their own shares to them. It was FLADC that did.
Considering therefore that the real contracting parties to the
subscription agreement were FLADC and the Ongs alone, a civil case for
rescission on the ground of breach of contract filed by the Tius in their
personal capacities will not prosper. Assuming it had valid reasons to do so,
only FLADC (and certainly not the Tius) had the legal personality to file suit
rescinding the subscription agreement with the Ongs inasmuch as it was the
real party in interest therein. Article 1311 of the Civil Code provides that
"contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs. . ."
Therefore, a party who has not taken part in the transaction cannot sue or be
sued for performance or for cancellation thereof, unless he shows that he
has a real interest affected thereby. 17
In their February 28, 2003 Memorandum, the Tius claim that there are
two contracts embodied in the Pre-Subscription Agreement: a shareholder's
agreement between the Tius and the Ongs defining and governing their
relationship and a subscription contract between the Tius, the Ongs and
FLADC regarding the subscription of the parties to the corporation. They
point out that these two component parts form one whole agreement and
that their terms and conditions are intrinsically related and dependent on
each other. Thus, the breach of the shareholders' agreement, which was
allegedly the consideration for the subscription contract, was also a breach
of the latter.
Aside from the fact that this is an entirely new angle never raised in
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 any of their previous pleadings until after the oral arguments on January 29,
2003, we find this argument too strained for comfort. It is obviously intended
to remedy and cover up the Tius' lack of legal personality to rescind an
agreement in which they were personally not parties-in-interest. Assuming
arguendo that there were two "sub-agreements" embodied in the Pre-
Subscription Agreement, this Court fails to see how the shareholders
agreement between the Ongs and Tius can, within the bounds of reason, be
interpreted as the consideration of the subscription contract between FLADC
and the Ongs. There was nothing in the Pre-Subscription Agreement even
remotely suggesting such alleged interdependence. Be that as it may,
however, the Tius are nevertheless not the proper parties to raise this point
because they were not parties to the subscription contract between FLADC
and the Ongs. Thus, they are not in a position to claim that the shareholders
agreement between them and the Ongs was what induced FLADC and the
Ongs to enter into the subscription contract. It is the Ongs alone who can say
that. Though FLADC was represented by the Tius in the subscription
contract, FLADC had a separate juridical personality from the Tius. The case
before us does not warrant piercing the veil of corporate fiction since there is
no proof that the corporation is being used "as a cloak or cover for fraud or
illegality, or to work injustice." 18
The Tius also argue that, since the Ongs represent FLADC as its
management, breach by the Ongs is breach by FLADC. This must also fail
because such an argument disregards the separate juridical personality of
FLADC.
The Tius allege that they were prevented from participating in the
management of the corporation. There is evidence that the Ongs did prevent
the rightfully elected Treasurer, Cely Tiu, from exercising her function as
such. The records show that the President, Wilson Ong, supervised the
collection and receipt of rentals in the Masagana Citimall; 19 that he ordered
the same to be deposited in the bank; 20 and that he held on to the cash and
properties of the corporation. 21 Section 25 of the Corporation Code prohibits
the President from acting concurrently as Treasurer of the corporation. The
rationale behind the provision is to ensure the effective monitoring of each
officer's separate functions.
However, although the Tius were adversely affected by the Ongs'
unwillingness to let them assume their positions, rescission due to breach of
contract is definitely the wrong remedy for their personal grievances. The
Corporation Code, SEC rules and even the Rules of Court provide for
appropriate and adequate intra-corporate remedies, other than rescission, in
situations like this. Rescission is certainly not one of them, specially if the
party asking for it has no legal personality to do so and the requirements of
the law therefor have not been met. A contrary doctrine will tread on
extremely dangerous ground because it will allow just any stockholder, for
just about any real or imagined offense, to demand rescission of his
subscription and call for the distribution of some part of the corporate assets
to him without complying with the requirements of the Corporation Code.
Hence, the Tius, in their personal capacities, cannot seek the ultimate
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 and extraordinary remedy of rescission of the subject agreement based on a
less than substantial breach of subscription contract. Not only are they not
parties to the subscription contract between the Ongs and FLADC; they also
have other available and effective remedies under the law.
All this notwithstanding, granting but not conceding that the Tius
possess the legal standing to sue for rescission based on breach of contract,
said action will nevertheless still not prosper since rescission will violate the
Trust Fund Doctrine and the procedures for the valid distribution of assets
and property under the Corporation Code.
The Trust Fund Doctrine, first enunciated by this Court in the 1923 case
of Philippine Trust Co. vs. Rivera , 22 provides that subscriptions to the capital
stock of a corporation constitute a fund to which the creditors have a right to
look for the satisfaction of their claims. 23 This doctrine is the underlying
principle in the procedure for the distribution of capital assets, embodied in
the Corporation Code, which allows the distribution of corporate capital only
in three instances: (1) amendment of the Articles of Incorporation to reduce
the authorized capital stock, 24 (2) purchase of redeemable shares by the
corporation, regardless of the existence of unrestricted retained earnings, 25
and (3) dissolution and eventual liquidation of the corporation. Furthermore,
the doctrine is articulated in Section 41 on the power of a corporation to
acquire its own shares 26 and in Section 122 on the prohibition against the
distribution of corporate assets and property unless the stringent
requirements therefor are complied with. 27
The distribution of corporate assets and property cannot be made to
depend on the whims and caprices of the stockholders, officers or directors
of the corporation, or even, for that matter, on the earnest desire of the
court a quo "to prevent further squabbles and future litigations" unless the
indispensable conditions and procedures for the protection of corporate
creditors are followed. Otherwise, the "corporate peace" laudably hoped for
by the court will remain nothing but a dream because this time, it will be the
creditors' turn to engage in "squabbles and litigations" should the court
order an unlawful distribution in blatant disregard of the Trust Fund Doctrine.
In the instant case, the rescission of the Pre-Subscription Agreement
will effectively result in the unauthorized distribution of the capital assets
and property of the corporation, thereby violating the Trust Fund Doctrine
and the Corporation Code, since rescission of a subscription agreement is
not one of the instances when distribution of capital assets and property of
the corporation is allowed.
Contrary to the Tius' allegation, rescission will, in the final analysis,
result in the premature liquidation of the corporation without the benefit of
prior dissolution in accordance with Sections 117, 118, 119 and 120 of the
Corporation Code. 28 The Tius maintain that rescinding the subscription
contract is not synonymous to corporate liquidation because all rescission
will entail would be the simple restoration of the status quo ante and a
return to the two groups of their cash and property contributions. We wish it
were that simple. Very noticeable is the fact that the Tius do not explain why
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 rescission in the instant case will not effectively result in liquidation. The Tius
merely refer in cavalier fashion to the end-result of rescission (which
incidentally is 100% favorable to them) but turn a blind eye to its unfair,
inequitable and disastrous effect on the corporation, its creditors and the
Ongs.
In their Memorandum dated February 28, 2003, the Tius claim that
rescission of the agreement will not result in an unauthorized liquidation of
the corporation because their case is actually a petition to decrease capital
stock pursuant to Section 38 of the Corporation Code. Section 122 of the law
provides that "(e)xcept by decrease of capital stock . . ., no corporation shall
distribute any of its assets or property except upon lawful dissolution and
after payment of all its debts and liabilities." The Tius claim that their case
for rescission, being a petition to decrease capital stock, does not violate the
liquidation procedures under our laws. All that needs to be done, according
to them, is for this Court to order (1) FLADC to file with the SEC a petition to
issue a certificate of decrease of capital stock and (2) the SEC to approve
said decrease. This new argument has no merit.
The Tius' case for rescission cannot validly be deemed a petition to
decrease capital stock because such action never complied with the formal
requirements for decrease of capital stock under Section 33 of the
Corporation Code. No majority vote of the board of directors was ever taken.
Neither was there any stockholders meeting at which the approval of
stockholders owning at least two-thirds of the outstanding capital stock was
secured. There was no revised treasurer's affidavit and no proof that said
decrease will not prejudice the creditors' rights. On the contrary, all their
pleadings contained were alleged acts of violations by the Ongs to justify an
order of rescission.
Furthermore, it is an improper judicial intrusion into the internal affairs
of the corporation to compel FLADC to file at the SEC a petition for the
issuance of a certificate of decrease of stock. Decreasing a corporation's
authorized capital stock is an amendment of the Articles of Incorporation. It
is a decision that only the stockholders and the directors can make,
considering that they are the contracting parties thereto. In this case, the
Tius are actually not just asking for a review of the legality and fairness of a
corporate decision. They want this Court to make a corporate decision for
FLADC. We decline to intervene and order corporate structural changes not
voluntarily agreed upon by its stockholders and directors.
Truth to tell, a judicial order to decrease capital stock without the
assent of FLADC's directors and stockholders is a violation of the "business
judgment rule" which states that:
. . . (C)ontracts intra vires entered into by the board of directors
are binding upon the corporation and courts will not interfere unless
such contracts are so unconscionable and oppressive as to amount to
wanton destruction to the rights of the minority, as when plaintiffs aver
that the defendants (members of the board), have concluded a
transaction among themselves as will result in serious injury to the
plaintiffs stockholders. 29
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 The reason behind the rule is aptly explained by Dean Cesar L.
Villanueva, an esteemed author in corporate law, thus:
Courts and other tribunals are wont to override the business
judgment of the board mainly because, courts are not in the business
of business, and the laissez faire rule or the free enterprise system
prevailing in our social and economic set-up dictates that it is better for
the State and its organs to leave business to the businessmen;
especially so, when courts are ill-equipped to make business decisions.
More importantly, the social contract in the corporate family to decide
the course of the corporate business has been vested in the board and
not with courts. 30

Apparently, the Tius do not realize the illegal consequences of seeking

rescission and control of the corporation to the exclusion of the Ongs. Such
an act infringes on the law on reduction of capital stock. Ordering the return
and distribution of the Ongs' capital contribution without dissolving the
corporation or decreasing its authorized capital stock is not only against the
law but is also prejudicial to corporate creditors who enjoy absolute priority
of payment over and above any individual stockholder thereof.
Stripped to its barest essentials, the issue of rescission in this case is
not difficult to understand. If rescission is denied, will injustice be inflicted on
any of the parties? The answer is no because the financial interests of both
the Tius and the Ongs will remain intact and safe within FLADC. On the other
hand, if rescission is granted, will any of the parties suffer an injustice?
Definitely yes because the Ongs will find themselves out in the streets with
nothing but the money they had in 1994 while the Tius will not only enjoy a
windfall estimated to be anywhere from P450 million to P900 million 31 but
will also take over an extremely profitable business without much effort at
all.
Another very important point follows. The Court of Appeals and, later
on, our Decision dated February 1, 2002, stated that both groups were in
pari delicto, meaning, that both the Tius and the Ongs committed breaches
of the Pre-Subscription Agreement. This may be true to a certain extent but,
judging from the comparative gravity of the acts separately committed by
each group, we find that the Ongs' acts were relatively tame vis-à-vis those
committed by the Tius in not surrendering FLADC funds to the corporation
and diverting corporate income to their own MATTERCO account. The Ongs
were right in not issuing to the Tius the shares corresponding to the four-
story building and the 1,902.30 square-meter lot because no title for it could
be issued in FLADC's name, owing to the Tius' refusal to pay the transfer
taxes. And as far as the 151 square-meter lot was concerned, why should
FLADC issue additional shares to the Tius for property already owned by the
corporation and which, in the final analysis, was already factored into the
shareholdings of the Tius before the Ongs came in?
We are appalled by the attempt by the Tius, in the words of the Court
of Appeals, to "pull a fast one" on the Ongs because that was where the
problem precisely started. It is clear that, when the finances of FLADC
improved considerably after the equity infusion of the Ongs, the Tius started
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 planning to take over the corporation again and exclude the Ongs from it. It
appears that the Tius' refusal to pay transfer taxes might not have really
been at all unintentional because, by failing to pay that relatively small
amount which they could easily afford, the Tius should have expected that
they were not going to be given the corresponding shares. It was, from every
angle, the perfect excuse for blackballing the Ongs. In other words, the Tius
created a problem then used that same problem as their pretext for showing
their partners the door. In the process, they stood to be rewarded with a
bonanza of anywhere between P450 million to P900 million in assets (from
an investment of only P45 million which was nearly foreclosed by PNB), to
the extreme and irreparable damage of the Ongs, FLADC and its creditors.
After all is said and done, no one can close his eyes to the fact that the
Masagana Citimall would not be what it has become today were it not for the
timely infusion of P190 million by the Ongs in 1994. There are no ifs or buts
about it. Without the Ongs, the Tius would have lost everything they
originally invested in said mall. If only for this and the fact that this
Resolution can truly pave the way for both groups to enjoy the fruits of their
investments — assuming good faith and honest intentions — we cannot
allow the rescission of the subject subscription agreement. The Ongs'
shortcomings were far from serious and certainly less than substantial; they
were in fact remediable and correctable under the law. It would be totally
against all rules of justice, fairness and equity to deprive the Ongs of their
interests on petty and tenuous grounds.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration, dated March 15, 2002, of
petitioners Ong Yong, Juanita Tan Ong, Wilson Ong, Anna Ong, William Ong,
Willie Ong and Julie Ong Alonzo and the motion for partial reconsideration,
dated March 15, 2002, of petitioner Willie Ong are hereby GRANTED. The
Petition for Confirmation of the Rescission of the Pre-Subscription Agreement
docketed as SEC Case No. 02-96-5269 is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The unilateral rescission by the Tius of the subject Pre-Subscription
Agreement, dated August 15, 1994, is hereby declared as null and void.
The motion for the issuance of a writ of execution, dated March 15,
2002, of petitioners David S. Tiu, Cely Y. Tiu, Moly Yu Gow, Belen See Yu, D.
Terence Y. Tiu, John Yu and Lourdes C. Tiu is hereby DENIED for being moot.
Accordingly, the Decision of this Court, dated February 1, 2002,
affirming with modification the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
October 5, 1999, and the SEC en banc, dated September 11, 1998, is hereby
REVERSED.
Costs against the petitioner Tius.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Quisumbing and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Ong Yong, et al. vs. Tiu, et al. , G.R. No. 144476; Tiu, et al. vs. Ong Yong, et al. ,
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 G.R. No. 144629.
2. Rollo of G.R. No. 144476, pp. 111-135.

3 . The testimony of Wilson Ong, never refuted by the Tius, was that the parties'
original agreement was to increase FLADC's authorized capital stock from
P50 million to P340 million (which explains the Ongs' 50% share of P170
million). Later on, the parties decided to downgrade the proposed new
authorized capital stock to only P200 million but the Ongs decided to leave
the overpayment of P70 million in FLADC to help pay off the loan to PNB.
(TSN at the SEC, January 29, 1997 cited in CA Rollo , pp. 429-452; TSN at the
SEC, February 6, 1997 cited in CA Rollo , pp. 485-489).

4. Docketed as SEC Case No. 02-96-5269.

5. Rollo of G.R. No. 144476, pp. 114-116.
6. Ibid. , pp. 116-117.
7. Docketed as SEC Cases Nos. 598 and 601.

8. Rollo of G.R. No. 144476, pp. 117-118.

9. Ibid. , pp. 133-135.
10. CA Decision dated October 5, 1999, p. 18; CA Records, p. 1045; Penned by
Associate Justice Ramon A. Barcelona and concurred in by Associate Justices
Mariano M. Umali and Edgardo P. Cruz. Then Associate Justice Demetrio G.
Demetria dissented while also then Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales
concurred and dissented.
11. Supreme Court Decision dated February 1, 2002, pp. 34-35; Rollo , pp. 299-300.

12. Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo, 28 SCRA 890 [1969]; Cruz vs. Tuazon & Co., Inc. , 76
SCRA 543 [1977]; Llanter vs. Court of Appeals, 105 SCRA 609 [1981]; Luzon
Brokerage Co., Inc. vs. Maritime Building Co., Inc. , 86 SCRA 305 [1978].
13. 131 SCRA 200 [1984].
14. Id. at 221.
15. See Section 1, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

16. G.R. No. 138544, October 3, 2000 citing Guerra Enterprises vs. CFI, 32 SCRA
314 [1970].
1 7 . Sustiguer vs. Tamayo , 176 SCRA 579 [1989] citing Marimperio Compania
Naviera vs. Court of Appeals, 156 SCRA 368 [1987].
18. Boyer-Roxas vs. Court of Appeals, 211 SCRA 470 [1992].

19. TSN, December 11, 1996, pp. 699-702, Rollo , pp. 705-706.
20. TSN, December 17, 1996, pp. 28-34; Rollo , pp. 699-702.
21. TSN, January 17, 1997, pp. 92-93; Rollo , pp. 705-706.
22. 44 Phil. 469 [1923].

23. Id.; Garcia vs. Lim Chu Sing, 59 Phil. 562 [1934]; Boman Environmental Dev't.
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 Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 167 SCRA 540 [1988].
24. Section 38 of the Corporation Code provides for the process to be followed for
reduction of the authorized capital stock. First, a proposal to decrease capital
stock must be approved by a majority vote of the board of directors and
affirmed by stockholders who own 2/3 of the outstanding capital stock in a
meeting duly called for that purpose. Written notice of the time and place of
the meeting on the proposed decrease in the capital stock must be served to
each of the stockholders at his place of residence as shown in the corporate
books. Thereafter, the SEC shall approve the certificate of decrease of capital
stock only if the same is accompanied by a new treasurer's affidavit stating
that 25% of the authorized capital stock has been subscribed while 25% of
the subscribed capital stock has been paid-up, and also if said decrease will
not prejudice the rights of corporate creditors.
25. Section 8 of the Corporation Code provides that:
  SEC. 8. Redeemable shares — Redeemable shares may be issued by the
corporation when expressly so provided in the articles of incorporation. They
may be purchased or taken up by the corporation upon the expiration of a
fixed period, regardless of the existence of unrestricted retained earnings in
the books of the corporation, and upon such other terms and conditions as
may be stated in the articles of incorporation, which terms and conditions
must also be stated in the certificate of stock representing said shares.
  Section 5, par. 5, SEC Rules Governing Redeemable and Treasury Shares
provides that redeemable shares may be redeemed regardless of the
existence of unrestricted retained earning, provided that the corporation has,
after such redemption, assets in its books to cover debts and liabilities of
capital stock. Therefore, redemption, according to SEC Opinion, January 23,
1985, may not be made where the corporation is insolvent or if such
redemption would cause insolvency or inability of the corporation to meet its
debts as they mature. (cited in Hector De Leon, The Corporation Code of the
Philippines, 1999 Ed., pp. 96-97).
26. Section 41 of the Corporation Code provides that:
  Sec. 41. Power to acquire own shares. — A stock corporation shall have the
power to purchase or acquire its own shares for a legitimate corporate
purpose or purposes, including but not limited to the following cases:
Provided, That the corporation has unrestricted retained earnings in its books
to cover the shares to be purchased or acquired:
  (1) To eliminate fractional shares arising out of stock dividends;

  (2) To collect or compromise an indebtedness to the corporation, arising out

of unpaid subscription, in a delinquency sale, and to purchase delinquent
shares sold during said sale; and
  (3) To pay dissenting or withdrawing stockholders entitled to payment for
their shares under the provisions of this Code. (Italics supplied)
27. . . .
  Except by decrease of capital stock and as otherwise allowed by this Code,
no corporation shall distribute any of its assets or property except upon
lawful dissolution and after payment of all its debts and liabilities.
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 28. Sections 117, 118, 119, and 120 of the Corporation Code provide that:

  SEC. 117. Methods of dissolution. — A corporation formed or organized under

the provisions of this Code may be dissolved voluntarily or involuntarily. (n)
  SEC. 118. Voluntary dissolution where no creditors are affected. — If
dissolution of a corporation does not prejudice the rights of any creditor
having a claim against it, the dissolution may be effected by majority vote of
the board of directors or trustees, and by a resolution duly adopted by the
affirmative vote of the stockholders owning at least two-thirds (2/3) of the
outstanding capital or of at least two-thirds (2/3) of the members at a
meeting to be held upon call of the directors or trustees after publication of
the notice of time, place and object of the meeting for three (3) consecutive
weeks in a newspaper published in the place where the principal office of
said corporation is located; and if no newspaper is published in such place,
then in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, after sending
such notice to each stockholder or member either by registered mail or by
personal delivery at least thirty (30) days prior to said meeting. A copy of the
resolution authorizing the dissolution shall be certified by a majority of the
board of directors or trustees and countersigned by the secretary of the
corporation. The Securities and Exchange Commission shall thereupon issue
the certificate of dissolution. (62a)
  SEC. 119. Voluntary dissolution where creditors are affected. — Where the
dissolution of a corporation may prejudice the rights of any creditor, the
petition for dissolution shall be filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission. The petition shall be signed by a majority of its board of
directors or trustees or other officers having the management of its affairs,
verified by its president or secretary or one of its directors or trustees, and
shall set forth all claims and demands against it, and that its dissolution was
resolved upon by the affirmative vote of the stockholders representing at
least two-thirds (2/3) of the outstanding capital stock or by at least two-thirds
(2/3) of the members, at a meeting of its stockholders or members called for
that purpose.
  If the petition is sufficient in form and substance, the Commission shall, by
an order reciting the purpose of the petition, fix a date on or before which
objections thereto may be filed by any person, which date shall not be less
than thirty (30) days nor more than sixty (60) days after the entry of the
order. Before such date, a copy of the order shall be published at least once
a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation
published in municipality or city where the principal office of the corporation
is situated, or if there be no such newspaper, then in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines, and a similar copy shall be posted for three (3)
consecutive weeks in three (3) public places in such municipality or city.
  Upon five (5) days' notice, given after the date on which the right to file
objections as fixed in the order has expired, the Commission shall proceed to
hear the petition and try any issue made by the objections filed; and if no
such objection is sufficient, and the material allegations of the petition are
true, it shall render judgment dissolving the corporation and directing such
disposition of its assets as justice requires, and may appoint a receiver to
collect such assets and pay the debts of the corporation. (Rule 104, RCa)
  SEC. 120. Dissolution by shortening corporate term. — A voluntary
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 dissolution may be effected by amending the articles of incorporation to
shorten the corporate term pursuant to the provisions of this Code. A copy of
the amended articles of incorporation shall be submitted to the Securities
and Exchange Commission in accordance with this Code. Upon approval of
the amended articles of incorporation or the expiration of the shortened
term, as the case may be, the corporation shall be deemed dissolved without
any further proceedings, subject to the provisions of this Code on liquidation.
(n)

29. Gamboa vs. Victoriano , 90 SCRA 40 [1979].

30. Cesar L. Villanueva, Philippine Corporate Law, 1998 Ed., p. 228.
31. Estimates of FLADC's current net worth cited during the oral arguments on
January 29, 2003 ranged from P450 million to P1 billion.

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