People vs.

Antonio Oanis and Alberto Galanta,

(July 27, 1943)

G.R. No. L-47722             July 27, 1943

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA, defendants-appellants.

Antonio Z. Oanis in his own behalf.

Maximo L. Valenzuela for appellant Galanta.
Acting Solicitor-General Ibañez and Assistant Attorney Torres for appellee.

MORAN, J.:

Charged with the crime of murder of one Serapio Tecson, the accused Antonio Z. Oanis
and Alberto Galanta, chief of police of Cabanatuan and corporal of the Philippine
Constabulary, respectively, were, after due trial, found guilty by the lower court of
homicide through reckless imprudence and were sentenced each to an indeterminate
penalty of from one year and six months to two years and two months of prison
correccional and to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased in the
amount of P1,000. Defendants appealed separately from this judgment.

In the afternoon of December 24, 1938. Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary

Provincial Inspector at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received from Major Guido a telegram
of the following tenor: "Information received escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas
with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or alive." Captain Monsod
accordingly called for his first sergeant and asked that he be given four men. Defendant
corporal Alberto Galanta, and privates Nicomedes Oralo, Venancio Serna and D.
Fernandez, upon order of their sergeant, reported at the office of the Provincial Inspector
where they were shown a copy of the above-quoted telegram and a newspaper clipping
containing a picture of Balagtas. They were instructed to arrest Balagtas and, if
overpowered, to follow the instruction contained in the telegram. The same instruction
was given to the chief of police Oanis who was likewise called by the Provincial
Inspector. When the chief of police was asked whether he knew one Irene, a bailarina, he
answered that he knew one of loose morals of the same name. Upon request of the
Provincial Inspector, the chief of police tried to locate some of his men to guide the
constabulary soldiers in ascertaining Balagtas' whereabouts, and failing to see anyone of
them he volunteered to go with the party. The Provincial Inspector divided the party into
two groups with defendants Oanis and Galanta, and private Fernandez taking the route
to Rizal street leading to the house where Irene was supposedly living. When this group
arrived at Irene's house, Oanis approached one Brigida Mallare, who was then stripping
banana stalks, and asked her where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place and
upon further inquiry also said that Irene was sleeping with her paramour. Brigida
trembling, immediately returned to her own room which was very near that occupied by
Irene and her paramour. Defendants Oanis and Galanta then went to the room of Irene,
and an seeing a man sleeping with his back towards the door where they were,
simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers.
Awakened by the gunshots, Irene saw her paramour already wounded, and looking at the
door where the shots came, she saw the defendants still firing at him. Shocked by the
entire scene. Irene fainted; it turned out later that the person shot and killed was not the
notorious criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful and innocent citizen named Serapio
Tecson, Irene's paramour. The Provincial Inspector, informed of the killing, repaired to
the scene and when he asked as to who killed the deceased. Galanta, referring to
himself and to Oanis, answered: "We two, sir." The corpse was thereafter brought to the
provincial hospital and upon autopsy by Dr. Ricardo de Castro, multiple gunshot wounds
inflicted by a .32 and a .45 caliber revolvers were found on Tecson's body which caused
his death.

These are the facts as found by the trial court and fully supported by the evidence,
particularly by the testimony of Irene Requinea. Appellants gave, however, a different
version of the tragedy. According to Appellant Galanta, when he and chief of police Oanis
arrived at the house, the latter asked Brigida where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated
the place, and upon further inquiry as to the whereabouts of Anselmo Balagtas, she said
that he too was sleeping in the same room. Oanis went to the room thus indicated and
upon opening the curtain covering the door, he said: "If you are Balagtas, stand up."
Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, and Irene woke up and as the former was about to sit up
in bed. Oanis fired at him. Wounded, Tecson leaned towards the door, and Oanis
receded and shouted: "That is Balagtas." Galanta then fired at Tecson.

On the other hand, Oanis testified that after he had opened the curtain covering the door
and after having said, "if you are Balagtas stand up." Galanta at once fired at Tecson, the
supposed Balagtas, while the latter was still lying on bed, and continued firing until he
had exhausted his bullets: that it was only thereafter that he, Oanis, entered the door and
upon seeing the supposed Balagtas, who was then apparently watching and picking up
something from the floor, he fired at him.

The trial court refused to believe the appellants. Their testimonies are certainly incredible
not only because they are vitiated by a natural urge to exculpate themselves of the crime,
but also because they are materially contradictory. Oasis averred that be fired at Tecson
when the latter was apparently watching somebody in an attitudes of picking up
something from the floor; on the other hand, Galanta testified that Oasis shot Tecson
while the latter was about to sit up in bed immediately after he was awakened by a noise.
Galanta testified that he fired at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, when the latter was
rushing at him. But Oanis assured that when Galanta shot Tecson, the latter was still
lying on bed. It is apparent from these contradictions that when each of the appellants
tries to exculpate himself of the crime charged, he is at once belied by the other; but their
mutual incriminating averments dovetail with and corroborate substantially, the testimony
of Irene Requinea. It should be recalled that, according to Requinea, Tecson was still
sleeping in bed when he was shot to death by appellants. And this, to a certain extent, is
confirmed by both appellants themselves in their mutual recriminations. According, to
Galanta, Oanis shot Tecson when the latter was still in bed about to sit up just after he
was awakened by a noise. And Oanis assured that when Galanta shot Tecson, the latter
was still lying in bed. Thus corroborated, and considering that the trial court had the
opportunity to observe her demeanor on the stand, we believe and so hold that no error
was committed in accepting her testimony and in rejecting the exculpatory pretensions of
the two appellants. Furthermore, a careful examination of Irene's testimony will show not
only that her version of the tragedy is not concocted but that it contains all indicia of
veracity. In her cross-examination, even misleading questions had been put which were
unsuccessful, the witness having stuck to the truth in every detail of the occurrence.
Under these circumstances, we do not feel ourselves justified in disturbing the findings of
fact made by the trial court.

The true fact, therefore, of the case is that, while Tecson was sleeping in his room with
his back towards the door, Oanis and Galanta, on sight, fired at him simultaneously or
successively, believing him to be Anselmo Balagtas but without having made previously
any reasonable inquiry as to his identity. And the question is whether or not they may,
upon such fact, be held responsible for the death thus caused to Tecson. It is contended
that, as appellants acted in innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance of their
official duties, both of them believing that Tecson was Balagtas, they incur no criminal
liability. Sustaining this theory in part, the lower court held and so declared them guilty of
the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence. We are of the opinion, however, that,
under the circumstances of the case, the crime committed by appellants is murder
through specially mitigated by circumstances to be mentioned below.

In support of the theory of non-liability by reasons of honest mistake of fact, appellants

rely on the case of U.S. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488. The maxim is ignorantia facti
excusat, but this applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or
carelessness. In the Ah Chong case, defendant therein after having gone to bed was
awakened by someone trying to open the door. He called out twice, "who is there," but
received no answer. Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he leaped from his bed and
called out again., "If you enter the room I will kill you." But at that precise moment, he
was struck by a chair which had been placed against the door and believing that he was
then being attacked, he seized a kitchen knife and struck and fatally wounded the
intruder who turned out to be his room-mate. A common illustration of innocent mistake
of fact is the case of a man who was marked as a footpad at night and in a lonely road
held up a friend in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled, pistol demanded his money or
life. He was killed by his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack was real, that the
pistol leveled at his head was loaded and that his life and property were in imminent
danger at the hands of the aggressor. In these instances, there is an innocent mistake of
fact committed without any fault or carelessness because the accused, having no time or
opportunity to make a further inquiry, and being pressed by circumstances to act
immediately, had no alternative but to take the facts as they then appeared to him, and
such facts justified his act of killing. In the instant case, appellants, unlike the accused in
the instances cited, found no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to
immediate action. The person in the room being then asleep, appellants had ample time
and opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to themselves, and could even
effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the victim
was unarmed, according to Irene Requinea. This, indeed, is the only legitimate course of
action for appellants to follow even if the victim was really Balagtas, as they were
instructed not to kill Balagtas at sight but to arrest him, and to get him dead or alive only if
resistance or aggression is offered by him.

Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using such force as is

reasonably necessary to secure and detain the offender, overcome his resistance,
prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself from bodily harm
(People vs. Delima, 46 Phil, 738), yet he is never justified in using unnecessary force or
in treating him with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means when the arrest
could be effected otherwise (6 C.J.S., par. 13, p. 612). The doctrine is restated in the new
Rules of Court thus: "No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an
arrest, and the person arrested shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is
necessary for his detention." (Rule 109, sec. 2, par. 2). And a peace officer cannot claim
exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary force or violence in making an
arrest (5 C.J., p. 753; U.S. vs. Mendoza, 2 Phil., 109). It may be true that Anselmo
Balagtas was a notorious criminal, a life-termer, a fugitive from justice and a menace to
the peace of the community, but these facts alone constitute no justification for killing him
when in effecting his arrest, he offers no resistance or in fact no resistance can be
offered, as when he is asleep. This, in effect, is the principle laid down, although upon
different facts, in U.S. vs. Donoso (3 Phil., 234, 242).

It is, however, suggested that a notorious criminal "must be taken by storm" without
regard to his right to life which he has by such notoriety already forfeited. We may
approve of this standard of official conduct where the criminal offers resistance or does
something which places his captors in danger of imminent attack. Otherwise we cannot
see how, as in the present case, the mere fact of notoriety can make the life of a criminal
a mere trifle in the hands of the officers of the law. Notoriety rightly supplies a basis for
redoubled official alertness and vigilance; it never can justify precipitate action at the cost
of human life. Where, as here, the precipitate action of the appellants has cost an
innocent life and there exist no circumstances whatsoever to warrant action of such
character in the mind of a reasonably prudent man, condemnation — not condonation —
should be the rule; otherwise we should offer a premium to crime in the shelter of official
actuation.

The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being
intentional and not accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should
be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed without malice.
(People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939). In the words of Viada, "para que se celifique un hecho
de imprudencia es preciso que no haya mediado en el malicia ni intencion alguna de
dañar; existiendo esa intencion, debera calificarse el hecho del delito que ha producido,
por mas que no haya sido la intencion del agente el causar un mal de tanta gravedad
como el que se produjo." (Tomo 7, Viada Codigo Penal Comentado, 5.a ed. pag. 7). And,
as once held by this Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially
inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232;
People vs. Bindor, 56 Phil., 16), and where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in
the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence
(People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605) to support a plea of mitigated liability.

As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is murder with the
qualifying circumstance of alevosia. There is, however, a mitigating circumstance of
weight consisting in the incomplete justifying circumstance defined in article 11, No. 5, of
the Revised Penal Code. According to such legal provision, a person incurs no criminal
liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office.
There are two requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one:
(a) that the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right;
and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due
performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. In the instance
case, only the first requisite is present — appellants have acted in the performance of a
duty. The second requisite is wanting for the crime by them committed is not the
necessary consequence of a due performance of their duty. Their duty was to arrest
Balagtas or to get him dead or alive if resistance is offered by him and they are
overpowered. But through impatience or over-anxiety or in their desire to take no
chances, they have exceeded in the fulfillment of such duty by killing the person whom
they believed to be Balagtas without any resistance from him and without making any
previous inquiry as to his identity. According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the
penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall, in such case, be
imposed.

For all the foregoing, the judgment is modified and appellants are hereby declared guilty
of murder with the mitigating circumstance above mentioned, and accordingly sentenced
to an indeterminate penalty of from five (5) years of prision correctional to fifteen (15)
years of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of the law, and to pay the heirs of the
deceased Serapio Tecson jointly and severally an indemnity of P2,000, with costs.

Yulo, C.J., Bocobo, Generoso and Lopez Vito, A., concur.

Separate Opinions

PARAS, J., dissenting:

Anselmo Balagtas, a life termer and notorious criminal, managed to escape and flee form
Manila to the provinces. Receiving information to the effect that he was staying with one
Irene in Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, the office of the Constabulary in Manila ordered the
Provincial Inspector in Cabanatuan by telegram dispatched on December 25, 1938, to
get Balagtas "dead or alive". Among those assigned to the task of carrying out the said
order, were Antonio Z. Oanis, chief of police of Cabanatuan, and Alberto Galanta, a
Constabulary corporal, to whom the telegram received by the Provincial Inspector and a
newspaper picture of Balagtas were shown. Oanis, Galanta and a Constabulary private,
after being told by the Provincial Inspector to gather information about Balagtas, "to
arrest him and, if overpowered, to follow the instructions contained in the telegram,"
proceeded to the place where the house of Irene was located. Upon arriving thereat,
Oanis approached Brigida Mallari, who was then gathering banana stalks in the yard, and
inquired for the room of Irene. After Mallari had pointed out the room, she was asked by
Oanis to tell where Irene's paramour, Balagtas, was, whereupon Mallari answered that
he was sleeping with Irene. Upon reaching the room indicated, Oanis and Galanta, after
the former had shouted "Stand up, if you are Balagtas," started shooting the man who
was found by them lying down beside a woman. The man was thereby killed, but
Balagtas was still alive, for it turned out that the person shot by Oanis and Galanta was
one Serapio Tecson.

Consequently, Oanis and Galanta were charged with having committed murder. The
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, however, convicted them only of homicide through
reckless imprudence and sentenced them each to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
from 1 year and 6 months to 2 years and 2 months of prision correctional, to jointly and
severally indemnify the heirs of Serapio Tecson in the amount of P1,000, and to pay the
costs. Oanis and Galanta have appealed.

In accomplishing the acts with which the appellants were charged, they undoubtedly
followed the order issued by the Constabulary authorities in Manila requiring the
Provincial Inspector in Cabanatuan to get Balagtas dead or alive, in the honest belief that
Serapio Tecson was Anselmo Balagtas. As the latter became a fugitive criminal, with
revolvers in his possession and a record that made him extremely dangerous and a
public terror, the Constabulary authorities were justified in ordering his arrest, whether
dead or alive. In view of said order and the danger faced by the appellants in carrying it
out, they cannot be said to have acted feloniously in shooting the person honestly
believed by them to be the wanted man. Conscious of the fact that Balagtas would rather
kill than be captured, the appellants did not want to take chances and should not be
penalized for such prudence. On the contrary, they should be commended for their
bravery and courage bordering on recklessness because, without knowing or
ascertaining whether the wanted man was in fact asleep in his room, they proceeded
thereto without hesitation and thereby exposed their lives to danger.

The Solicitor-General, however, contends that the appellants were authorized to use their
revolvers only after being overpowered by Balagtas. In the first place, the alleged
instruction by the Provincial Inspector to that effect, was in violation of the express order
given by the Constabulary authorities in Manila and which was shown to the appellants.
In the second place, it would indeed be suicidal for the appellants or, for that matter, any
agent of the authority to have waited until they have been overpowered before trying to
put our such a character as Balagtas. In the third place, it is immaterial whether or not the
instruction given by the Provincial Inspector was legitimate and proper, because the facts
exist that the appellants acted in conformity with the express order of superior
Constabulary authorities, the legality or propriety of which is not herein questioned.

The theory of the prosecution has acquired some plausibility, though quite psychological
or sentimental, in view only of the fact that it was not Balagtas who was actually killed,
but an "innocent man . . . while he was deeply asleep." Anybody's heart will be
profoundly grieved by the trade, but in time will be consoled by the realization that the life
of Serapio Tecson was not vainly sacrificed, for the incident will always serve as a loud
warning to any one desiring to follow in the footsteps of Anselmo Balagtas that in due
time the duly constituted authorities will, upon proper order, enforce the summary
forfeiture of his life.
In my opinion, therefore, the appellants are not criminally liable if the person killed by
them was in fact Anselmo Balagtas for the reason that they did so in the fulfillment of
their duty and in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose
(Revised Penal Code, art. 11, pars. 5 and 6). They also cannot be held criminally liable
even if the person killed by them was not Anselmo Balagtas, but Serapio Tecson,
because they did so under an honest mistake of fact not due to negligence or bad faith.
(U.S. vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488).

It is true that, under article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by
any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended; but said article is clearly inapplicable since the killing of the person
who was believed to be Balagtas was, as already stated, not wrongful or felonious.

The case of U.S. vs. Mendieta (34 Phil., 242), cited by the Solicitor-General, is not in
point, inasmuch as the defendant therein, who intended to injure Hilario Lauigan with
whom he had a quarrel, but killed another by mistake, would not be exempted from
criminal liability if he actually injured or killed Hilario Lauigan, there being a malicious
design on his part. The other case involved by the prosecution is U.S. vs. Donoso (3
Phil., 234). This is also not in point, as it appears that the defendants therein killed one
Pedro Almasan after he had already surrendered and allowed himself to be bound and
that the said defendants did not have lawful instructions from superior authorities to
capture Almasan dead or alive.

The appealed judgment should therefore be reversed and the appellants, Antonio Z.
Oanis and Alberto Galanta, acquitted, with costs de oficio.

HONTIVEROS, J., dissenting:

According to the opinion of the majority, it is proper to follow the rule that a notorious
criminal "must be taken by storm without regard to his life which he has, by his conduct,
already forfeited," whenever said criminal offers resistance or does something which
places his captors in danger of imminent attack. Precisely, the situation which confronted
the accused-appellants Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta in the afternoon of
December 24, 1938, was very similar to this. It must be remembered that both officers
received instructions to get Balagtas "dead or alive" and according to the attitude of not
only the said appellants but also of Capt. Monsod, constabulary provincial inspector of
Nueva Ecija, it may be assumed that said instructions gave more emphasis to the first
part; namely, to take him dead. It appears in the record that after the shooting, and
having been informed of the case, Capt. Monsod stated that Oanis and Galanta might be
decorated for what they had done. That was when all parties concerned honestly
believed that the dead person was Balagtas himself, a dangerous criminal who had
escaped from his guards and was supposedly armed with a .45 caliber pistol Brigida
Mallari, the person whom the appellants met upon arriving at the house of Irene
Requinea, supposed mistress of Balagtas, informed them that said Balagtas was
upstairs. Appellants found there asleep a man closely resembling the wanted criminal.
Oanis said: If you are Balagtas stand up," But the supposed criminal showed his intention
to attack the appellants, a conduct easily explained by the fact that he should have felt
offended by the intrusion of persons in the room where he was peacefully lying down with
his mistress. In such predicament, it was nothing but human on the part of the appellants
to employ force and to make use of their weapons in order to repel the imminent attack
by a person who, according to their belief, was Balagtas It was unfortunate, however that
an innocent man was actually killed. But taking into consideration the facts of the case, it
is, according to my humble opinion, proper to apply herein the doctrine laid down in the
case of U.S. vs. Ah Chong (15 Phil., 488). In the instant case we have, as in the case
supra, an innocent mistake of fact committed without any fault or carelessness on the
part of the accused, who having no time to make a further inquiry, had no alternative but
to take the facts as they appeared to them and act immediately.

The decision of the majority, in recognition of the special circumstances of this case
which favored the accused-appellants, arrives at the conclusion that an incomplete
justifying circumstance may be invoked, and therefore, according to Article 69 of the
Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty should be one which is lower by one or two
degrees than that prescribed by law. This incomplete justifying circumstance is that
defined in Article 11, No. 5 of the Revised Penal Code, in favor of "a person who acts in
the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office." I believe that the
application of this circumstance is not proper. Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code
provides as follows:

Art. 69. Penalty to be imposed when the crime committed is not wholly excusable. — A
penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed if the
deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to
justify the same or to exempt from criminal liability in the several cases mentioned in
articles 11 and 12, provided that the majority of such conditions be present. The courts
shall impose the penalty in the period which may be deemed proper, in view of the
number and nature of the conditions of exemption present or lacking.

This provision has been copied almost verbatim from Article 84 of the old Penal Code of
the Philippines, and which was also taken from Article 87 of the Spanish Penal Code of
1870.

Judge Guillermo Guevara, one of the members of the Committee created by

Administrative Order No. 94 of the Department of Justice for the drafting of the Revised
Penal Code, in commenting on Article 69, said that the justifying circumstances and
circumstances exempting from liability which are the subject matter of this article are the
following: self-defense, defense of relatives, defense of strangers, state of necessity and
injury caused by mere accident. Accordingly, justifying circumstance No. 5 of Article 11
dealing with the fulfillment of a duty or the lawful exercise of a right, calling or office,
cannot be placed within its scope.

The eminent treatiser of criminal law Mr. Groizard, in his commentary of Article 87 of the
Spanish Penal Code of 1870 which is the source of Article 69 of our Code says:

Ni tratandose de la imbecilidad, ni de la locura, ni de la menor edad, ni del que obra

violentado por una fuerza inrresistible o impulsado por miedo insuperable de un mal igual
o mayor, o en cumplimiento de un deber, o en el ejercito legitimo de un derecho, oficio o
cargo, o en virtud de obediencia debida, ni del que incurre en alguna omision hallandose
impedido por causa legitima o insuperable, puede tener aplicacion al articulo que
comentamos. Y la razon es obvia. En ninguna de estas execiones hay pluralidad de
requisitos. La irrespondabilidad depende de una sola condicion. Hay o no perturbacion
de la razon; el autor del hecho es o no menor de nueve años; existe o no violencia
material o moral irresistible, etc., etc.; tal es lo que respectivamente hay que examinar y
resolver para declarar la culpabilidad o inculpabilidad. Es, por lo tanto, imposible que
acontezca lo que el texto que va al frente de estas lineas rquiere, para que se imponga
al autor del hecho la penalidad excepcional que establece; esto es, que
falten algunos requisitos de los que la ley exige para eximir de responsabilidad, y que
concurran el mayor numero de ellos, toda vez que, en los casos referidos, la ley no
exige multiples condiciones.

It must be taken into account the fact according to Article 69 a penalty lower by one or
two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly
excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required by the law to justify
the same or exempt from criminal liability. The word "conditions" should not be confused
with the word "requisites". In dealing with justifying circumstance No. 5 Judge Guevara
states: "There are two requisites in order that this circumstance may be taken into
account: (a) That the offender acted in the performance of his duty or in the lawful
exercise of a right; and (b) That the injury or offense committed be the necessary
consequence of the performance of a duty or the lawful exercise of a right or office." It is
evident that these two requisites concur in the present case if we consider the intimate
connection between the order given to the appellant by Capt. Monsod, the showing to
them of the telegram from Manila to get Balagtas who was with a bailarina named Irene,
the conduct of said appellants in questioning Brigida Mallari and giving a warning to the
supposed criminal when both found him with Irene, and the statement made by Capt.
Monsod after the shooting.

If appellant Oanis is entitled to a reversal of the decision of the court below, there are
more reasons in favor of the acquittal of appellant Galanta. According to the evidence no
bullet from the gun fired by this accused ever hit Serapio Tecson. Galanta was armed in
the afternoon of December 24, 1938, with a .45 caliber revolver (Exhibit L). He so
testified and was corroborated by the unchallenged testimony of his superior officer Sgt.
Valeriano Serafica. According to this witness, since Galanta was made a corporal of the
Constabulary he was given, as part of his equipment, revolver Exhibit L with a serial No.
37121. This gun had been constantly used by Galanta, and, according to Sgt. Pedro
Marasigan, who accompanied said accused when he took it from his trunk in the
barracks on the night of December 24, 1938, upon order of Captain Monsod, it was the
same revolver which was given to the witness with five .45 caliber bullets and one empty
shell. Fourteen unused bullets were also taken from Galanta by Sergeant Serafica, thus
completing his regular equipment of twenty bullets which he had on the morning of
December 24, 1938, when Sergeant Serafica made the usual inspection of the firearms
in the possession of the non-commissioned officers and privates of the constabulary post
at Cabanatuan. Galanta stated that he had fired only one shot and missed. This
testimony is corroborated by that of a ballistic expert who testified that bullets exhibits F
and O, — the first being extracted from the head of the deceased, causing wound No. 3
of autopsy report Exhibit C and the second found at the place of the shooting, — had not
been fired from revolver Exhibit L nor from any other revolver of the constabulary station
in Cabanatuan. It was impossible for the accused Galanta to have substituted his
revolver because when Exhibit L was taken from him nobody in the barracks doubted
that the deceased was none other than Balagtas. Moreover, Exhibit L was not out of
order and therefore there was no reason why Galanta should carry along another gun,
according to the natural course of things. On the other hand, aside from wound No. 3 as
above stated, no other wound may be said to have been caused by a .45 caliber revolver
bullet. Doctor Castro's record gives the conclusion that wound No. 2 must have been
caused by a .45 caliber revolver bullet. Doctor Castro's record gives the conclusion that
wound No. 2 must have been caused by a .45 caliber bullet, but inasmuch as the
diameter of the wound's entrance was only 8 mm., the caliber should be .32 and not .45,
because according to the medico-legal expert who testified in this case, a bullet of a .45
caliber will produce a wound entrance with either 11 mm. or 12 mm. diameter. All other
wounds found by the surgeon who performed the autopsy appeared to have been
caused by bullets of a lesser caliber. In consequence, it can be stated that no bullet fired
by Galanta did ever hit or kill Serapio Tecson and therefore there is no reason why he
should be declared criminally responsible for said death.