NEYPES ET. AL. V.

CA
G.R. 141524
SEPTEMBER 14, 2005

FACTS: Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/ or
reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the RTC against the private
respondents.

In the course of the proceedings, the parties filed various motions with the trial court,
amoung which were (1) the motion filed by petitioners to declare the respondent heirs, the
Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forest Development in default and (2) the motions to dismiss
filed by the respondent heirs and the Land Bank of the Philippines, respectively.

The RTC resolved the foregoing motions by declaring the respondents Bureau of Lands
and Bureau of Forest Development in default for failing to file their answer, but denied with
regards to the heirs of del Mundo because the substituted service of summons on them was
improper. The RTC also denied Land Bank’s motion to dismiss because there were hypothetical
admissions and matters that could be determined only after trial, and the respondent heirs motion
to dismiss by the same reason.

The respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the
petitioners’ complaint on the ground of prescription of action. “Petitioners allegedly received a
copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18,
1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order
dismissing the motion for reconsideration3 which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five
days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal4 and paid the appeal fees on
August 3, 1998.”

The court denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late. “This was
received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this
too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998.”

Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the Court of Appeals.
The petitioners claimed they seasonably filed their notice of appeal, arguing that the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998, since this was the day they
received the final order of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration. When they
filed their notice of appeal, only five days have elapsed since the RTC’s denial, well within the
15-day reglementary period.

The CA dismissed the petition, ruling that the 15-day period to appeal should have been
reckoned on March 3, 1998, when the petitioners received the copy of the order of dimissal, or
on February 12, 1998, when the RTC dismissed the petitioners’ complaint.

Thus, the case reached the Supreme Court.

RULING: Yes. First and foremost, the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due
process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must
comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to
appeal. The period to appeal is fixed by both statute (BP 129) and procedural rules (Section 3,
Rule 41).

Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of
judgment or final order appealed from. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a
case, leaving nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication on the
merits which, considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the
rights and obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses an
action.

Petitioners argue that the final order that triggered the reckoning period was the denial of
their motion for reconsideration, not the dismissal of their complaint. Since they only received
the copy of the order on July 22, 1998, the 15-day period should be counted from there.

The Supreme Court agreed that the final order here was the denial of the motion for
reconsideration, which constituted the final order. Now, the question here is whether or not they
seasonably filed their notice of appeal.

After a discussion of previous jurisprudence regarding appeal, the Supreme Court stated
that: “To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days
within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the
order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.”

This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states
that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed
from. The use of the disjunctive word "or" signifies disassociation and independence of one thing
from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies. Hence,
the use of "or" in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15
days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the "final order," which we
already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or
reconsideration.

Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which
shortened the appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The
original period of appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the requirement for strict
compliance still applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts
to file a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which
rendered the assailed decision is given another opportunity to review the case and, in the process,
minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and
to have judgments of courts become final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver
justice fairly.

In this case, the new period of 15 days eradicates the confusion as to when the 15-day
appeal period should be counted – from receipt of notice of judgment (March 3, 1998) or from
receipt of notice of "final order" appealed from (July 22, 1998).

—————————————-EXTRAS—————————————————————

According to the foregoing provision, the appeal period previously consisted of 30 days. BP 129,
however, reduced this appeal period to 15 days. In the deliberations of the Committee on Judicial
Reorganization20 that drafted BP 129, the raison d’ etre behind the amendment was to shorten the
period of appeal21 and enhance the efficiency and dispensation of justice. We have since required
strict observance of this reglementary period of appeal. Seldom have we condoned late filing of
notices of appeal,22 and only in very exceptional instances to better serve the ends of justice.

In National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority and Authority v. Municipality of

In de la Rosa v. Court of Appeals,24 we stated that, as a rule, periods which require litigants to do
certain acts must be followed unless, under exceptional circumstances, a delay in the filing of an
appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice. There, we condoned the delay incurred by
the appealing party due to strong considerations of fairness and justice.

In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due course to tardy appeals, we have not
been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal application of the
Rules. In those situations where technicalities were dispensed with, our decisions were not meant to
undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. But we hasten to add that in those rare
cases where procedural rules were not stringently applied, there always existed a clear need to
prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have always tried to
maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee
that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause. 25