G.R. No.

174689             October 22, 2007

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and female. (Genesis
5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming from inside the
bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She pecked the reed once, then
twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came two human beings; one was a male and
the other was a female. Amihan named the man "Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful).
(The Legend of Malakas and Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the changes
made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a person’s sex? May a person
successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex
reassignment surgery?
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first
name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as
SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio
and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his
certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a
female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. 1 Feeling trapped in a man’s body,
he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone
treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27,
2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr.
Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical
certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his
name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People’s Journal Tonight, a newspaper of
general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks. 3 Copies of the order were sent to the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to the petition was
made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American fiancé,
Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any
unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance with the principles of
justice and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a
woman, now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not
his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in
granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part
of the petitioner and her [fiancé] and the realization of their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present petition despite due
notice and publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any [o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila
to change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner, specifically for petitioner’s first name
from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and petitioner’s gender from "Male" to FEMALE. 5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in
the Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by
reason of sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals 7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial
court’s decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate
of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the Republic’s
petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied.9 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under
Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.10
The petition lacks merit.
A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and sex. As found by
the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any
unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex.
(emphasis supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became entitled to the civil
registry changes sought. We disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. 11 A
change of name is a privilege, not a right. 12 Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes. 13 In this
connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048
provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. – No
entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical
errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or
municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing
rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for
change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law,
therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the
aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name
from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil
Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and
subsequently denied.15 It likewise lays down the corresponding venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the
remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for change of first name or
nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to
write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has
been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to make
his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a
change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status.18 RA 9048 does not sanction a change of
first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name
for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any
compelling reason justifying such change.19 In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of
his true and official name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as
a result of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name was not within
that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned,
assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative,
that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office
of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use
of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly
dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to
the statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical or
typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through
administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit
of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. 22 Rule 108 now applies only to substantial
changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.23
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
xxx       xxx       xxx
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing,
copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled
name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and
can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That
no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis
supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are
those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil
register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children;
(10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of
filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that
occur after birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it
covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to change means "to
replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute."26 The
birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first
name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as legitimations,
acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births, marriages, naturalization
and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of
marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of
filiation and changes of name). These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch
upon the legal capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws.
In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it
recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and
incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership.27
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in
nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being
married or not. The comprehensive term status… include such matters as the beginning and end of legal
personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth,
legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even succession.28 (emphasis
supplied)
A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal capacity
and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to
petitioner’s cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance at
the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the
registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and
shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in
attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date and hour of birth;
(b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents or, in case the father is not
known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; and (f) such other
data as may be required in the regulations to be issued.
xxx       xxx       xxx (emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of
birth.29 Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or
midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex
reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by
error,30 is immutable.31
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in the
absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil Register Law
and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their common
and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as "the
sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a female" 32 or "the distinction
between male and female."33 Female is "the sex that produces ova or bears young" 34 and male is "the sex that
has organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and "female" in everyday
understanding do not include persons who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are
employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have been used in that
sense unless the context compels to the contrary."36 Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was
enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used then is
something alterable through surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to
be included in the category "female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the
intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that
reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth
certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground of
Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. It
believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences.
First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first step towards his eventual
marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract
of permanent union between a man and a woman.37 One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the
contracting parties who must be a male and a female.38 To grant the changes sought by petitioner will
substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a
man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual).
Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on
employment of women,39 certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code40 and the presumption of survivorship
in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, 41 among others. These laws underscore the public
policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to be granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by
reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in
judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what guidelines
should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes
particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or change of
entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be
presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has
undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it
has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be recognized as
having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or
on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written
word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and [the]
realization of their dreams." No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose
preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social convention
and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of
public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, respondent. 
ROMERO, J.:p
The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G.
Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit
Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency
in office and ignorance of the law.
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan and
Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife.
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G.
del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent judge holds office and has
jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was
solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his
jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from
the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
In his letter-comment to the office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge avers that the office and name
of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been used by someone else, who, as the mayor's "lackey," is overly
concerned with his actuations both as judge and as a private person. The same person had earlier filed
Administrative Matter No 94-980-MTC, which was dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 1994, and
Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI-95-16, "Antonio Adapon v. Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy," which is still
pending.
In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having solemnized
the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating
that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact
that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven years. 1 With respect to the
second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not
violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any
incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;" and that article 8 thereof applies to the case
in question.
The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings submitted were considered
sufficient for a resolution of the case. 2
Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of complainant have not been sufficiently
proven, they will not be dwelt upon. The acts complained of and respondent judge's answer thereto will suffice
and can be objectively assessed by themselves to prove the latter's malfeasance.
The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga states that
Tagadan's civil status is "separated." Despite this declaration, the wedding ceremony was solemnized by
respondent judge. He presented in evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer,
subscribed and sworn to before Judge Demosthenes C. Duquilla, Municipal Trial Judge of Basey,
Samar. 3 The affidavit was not issued by the latter judge, as claimed by respondent judge, but merely
acknowledged before him. In their affidavit, the affiants stated that they knew Gaspar Tagadan to have been
civilly married to Ida D. Peñaranda in September 1983; that after thirteen years of cohabitation and having
borne five children, Ida Peñaranda left the conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not
returned nor been heard of for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that she is already
dead.
In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient proof of Ida
Peñaranda's presumptive death, and ample reason for him to proceed with the marriage ceremony. We do not
agree.
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:
A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void,
unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead.
In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of
Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death
of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis added.)
There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is clear and simple.
Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a
mandatory requirement which has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent
marriages where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually
or presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent provisions of law.
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wife's
presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Peñaranda. Whether wittingly or
unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted
by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage.
Under Article 35 of the Family Code, " The following marriage shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those
bigamous . . . marriages not falling under Article 41."
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the court's jurisdiction, covered
by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:
Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by :
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers the judge or in open court, in the church,
chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not
elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance
with Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the
marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.
Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justification for his having solemnized the
marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his court's jurisdiction. As the
aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the
following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon
request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo
or del Rosario was at the point of death or in the remote place. Moreover, the written request presented
addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario. 4
More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the solemnizing judge.
Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer." Under
Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary within the
court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony
and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision.
Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage.
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to do so only
within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this
Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as
the requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may
officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his
court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it
may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability. 5
Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was not
clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8
and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge again
demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil law.
Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal principles
applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude
that respondent's failure to apply them is due to a lack of comprehension of the law.
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law they are
sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and
applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in
instant case. 6 It is not too much to expect them to know and apply the law intelligently. 7 Otherwise, the system
of justice rests on a shaky foundation indeed, compounded by the errors committed by those not learned in the
law. While magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the
respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced
the status of married persons.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void, there being a
subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Peñaranda.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a six-month suspension
and a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Considering
that one of the marriages in question resulted in a bigamous union and therefore void, and the other lacked the
necessary authority of respondent judge, the Court adopts said recommendation. Respondent is advised to be
more circumspect in applying the law and to cultivate a deeper understanding of the law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby SUSPENDED for a
period of six (6) months and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely.
G.R. No. 167746               August 28, 2007
RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA, Petitioner,
vs.
ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Restituto Alcantara assailing the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66724 denying petitioner’s
appeal and affirming the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 143, in Civil Case
No. 97-1325 dated 14 February 2000, dismissing his petition for annulment of marriage.
The antecedent facts are:
A petition for annulment of marriage3 was filed by petitioner against respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging
that on 8 December 1982 he and respondent, without securing the required marriage license, went to the
Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for them. They met a
person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel
of the CDCC BR Chapel.4 They got married on the same day, 8 December 1982. Petitioner and respondent
went through another marriage ceremony at the San Jose de Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March
1983. The marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. The alleged
marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party
was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar
of the said place. On 14 October 1985, respondent gave birth to their child Rose Ann Alcantara. In 1988, they
parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued declaring
their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage contract5 and its entry
on file.6
Answering petitioner’s petition for annulment of marriage, respondent asserts the validity of their marriage and
maintains that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil
Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Contrary to petitioner’s representation, respondent gave birth to their first child
named Rose Ann Alcantara on 14 October 1985 and to another daughter named Rachel Ann Alcantara on 27
October 1992.7 Petitioner has a mistress with whom he has three children.8 Petitioner only filed the annulment
of their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage. 9 Respondent, in fact, has filed a case for concubinage
against petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 60.10 Respondent prays that
the petition for annulment of marriage be denied for lack of merit.
On 14 February 2000, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143, rendered its Decision disposing as follows:
The foregoing considered, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit;
2. Petitioner is ordered to pay respondent the sum of twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) per month as
support for their two (2) children on the first five (5) days of each month; and
3. To pay the costs.11
As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petitioner’s appeal. His Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied in a resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 6 April 2005.12
The Court of Appeals held that the marriage license of the parties is presumed to be regularly issued and
petitioner had not presented any evidence to overcome the presumption. Moreover, the parties’ marriage
contract being a public document is a prima facie proof of the questioned marriage under Section 44, Rule 130
of the Rules of Court.13
In his Petition before this Court, petitioner raises the following issues for resolution:
a. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it ruled that the Petition for Annulment
has no legal and factual basis despite the evidence on record that there was no marriage license at the precise
moment of the solemnization of the marriage.
b. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it gave weight to the Marriage License
No. 7054133 despite the fact that the same was not identified and offered as evidence during the trial, and was
not the Marriage license number appearing on the face of the marriage contract.
c. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to apply the ruling laid down by
this Honorable Court in the case of Sy vs. Court of Appeals. (G.R. No. 127263, 12 April 2000 [330 SCRA 550]).
d. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to relax the observance of
procedural rules to protect and promote the substantial rights of the party litigants.14
We deny the petition.
Petitioner submits that at the precise time that his marriage with the respondent was celebrated, there was no
marriage license because he and respondent just went to the Manila City Hall and dealt with a "fixer" who
arranged everything for them.15 The wedding took place at the stairs in Manila City Hall and not in CDCC BR
Chapel where Rev. Aquilino Navarro who solemnized the marriage belongs. 16 He and respondent did not go to
Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage license. Assuming a marriage license from Carmona, Cavite, was
issued to them, neither he nor the respondent was a resident of the place. The certification of the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, cannot be given weight because the certification states that "Marriage
License number 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario"17 but their
marriage contract bears the number 7054033 for their marriage license number.
The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8 December 1982, or prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code, the applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the
time of its celebration.
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which
renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)18 in relation to Article 58 of the same Code.19
Article 53 of the Civil Code20 which was the law applicable at the time of the marriage of the parties states:
Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State’s demonstration of its involvement and
participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested.21
Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his marriage. The cases
where the court considered the absence of a marriage license as a ground for considering the marriage void
are clear-cut.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,22 the Local Civil Registrar issued a certification of due
search and inability to find a record or entry to the effect that Marriage License No. 3196182 was issued to the
parties. The Court held that the certification of "due search and inability to find" a record or entry as to the
purported marriage license, issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, enjoys probative value, he being the officer
charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Based on said
certification, the Court held that there is absence of a marriage license that would render the marriage void ab
initio.
In Cariño v. Cariño,23 the Court considered the marriage of therein petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased
Santiago S. Carino as void ab initio. The records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the
deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro
Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. The court held that the certification issued by the
local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of the marriage license. Their marriage having been
solemnized without the necessary marriage license and not being one of the marriages exempt from the
marriage license requirement, the marriage of the petitioner and the deceased is undoubtedly void ab initio.
In Sy v. Court of Appeals,24 the marriage license was issued on 17 September 1974, almost one year after the
ceremony took place on 15 November 1973. The Court held that the ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage
was indeed contracted without a marriage license.
In all these cases, there was clearly an absence of a marriage license which rendered the marriage void.
Clearly, from these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of absence of a
marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage
contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage
license was issued to the parties. In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent
reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of
Carmona, Cavite.25 The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the parties to whom the
marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that a
license was in fact issued to the parties herein.
The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz of Carmona, Cavite, reads:
This is to certify that as per the registry Records of Marriage filed in this office, Marriage License No. 7054133
was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario on December 8, 1982.
This Certification is being issued upon the request of Mrs. Rosita A. Alcantara for whatever legal purpose or
intents it may serve.26
This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance of the
marriage license was done in the regular conduct of official business.27 The presumption of regularity of official
acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. However, the
presumption prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus,
unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in
support of the presumption and, in case of doubt as to an officer’s act being lawful or unlawful, construction
should be in favor of its lawfulness.28 Significantly, apart from these, petitioner, by counsel, admitted that a
marriage license was, indeed, issued in Carmona, Cavite.29
Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims that neither he nor
respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is no sufficient basis to annul
petitioner and respondent’s marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence
of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or
prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect
the validity of the marriage.30 An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its
validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable.31
Again, petitioner harps on the discrepancy between the marriage license number in the certification of the
Municipal Civil Registrar, which states that the marriage license issued to the parties is No. 7054133, while the
marriage contract states that the marriage license number of the parties is number 7054033. Once more, this
argument fails to sway us. It is not impossible to assume that the same is a mere a typographical error, as a
closer scrutiny of the marriage contract reveals the overlapping of the numbers 0 and 1, such that the marriage
license may read either as 7054133 or 7054033. It therefore does not detract from our conclusion regarding
the existence and issuance of said marriage license to the parties.
Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands,32 petitioner cannot pretend that
he was not responsible or a party to the marriage celebration which he now insists took place without the
requisite marriage license. Petitioner admitted that the civil marriage took place because he "initiated
it."33 Petitioner is an educated person. He is a mechanical engineer by profession. He knowingly and voluntarily
went to the Manila City Hall and likewise, knowingly and voluntarily, went through a marriage ceremony. He
cannot benefit from his action and be allowed to extricate himself from the marriage bond at his mere say-so
when the situation is no longer palatable to his taste or suited to his lifestyle. We cannot countenance such
effrontery. His attempt to make a mockery of the institution of marriage betrays his bad faith.34
Petitioner and respondent went through a marriage ceremony twice in a span of less than one year utilizing the
same marriage license. There is no claim that he went through the second wedding ceremony in church under
duress or with a gun to his head. Everything was executed without nary a whimper on the part of the
petitioner.lavvphi1
In fact, for the second wedding of petitioner and respondent, they presented to the San Jose de Manuguit
Church the marriage contract executed during the previous wedding ceremony before the Manila City Hall.
This is confirmed in petitioner’s testimony as follows—
WITNESS
As I remember your honor, they asked us to get the necessary document prior to the wedding.
COURT
What particular document did the church asked you to produce? I am referring to the San Jose de Manuguit
church.
WITNESS
I don’t remember your honor.
COURT
Were you asked by the church to present a Marriage License?
WITNESS
I think they asked us for documents and I said we have already a Marriage Contract and I don’t know if it is
good enough for the marriage and they accepted it your honor.
COURT
In other words, you represented to the San Jose de Manuguit church that you have with you already a
Marriage Contract?
WITNESS
Yes your honor.
COURT
That is why the San Jose de Manuguit church copied the same marriage License in the Marriage Contract
issued which Marriage License is Number 7054033.
WITNESS
Yes your honor.35
The logical conclusion is that petitioner was amenable and a willing participant to all that took place at that
time. Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage, thereby cleansing whatever
irregularity or defect attended the civil wedding.36
Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner -- that they appeared before a "fixer" who arranged everything for them
and who facilitated the ceremony before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC
Br Chapel -- will not strengthen his posture. The authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have performed
a marriage ceremony will be presumed in the absence of any showing to the contrary.37 Moreover, the
solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and
regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has
been issued by the competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the license that said
official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law.38
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of the marriage. 39 Every
intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this
presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.
Wherefore, premises considered, the instant Petition is Denied for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 30 September 2004 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143 of Makati
City, dated 14 February 2000, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 103047 September 2, 1994
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO, respondents.
Parungao, Abesamis, Eleazar & Pulgar Law Offices for private respondent.
PUNO, J.:
The case at bench originated from a petition filed by private respondent Angelina M. Castro in the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to Edwin F. Cardenas. 1 As
ground therefor, Castro claims that no marriage license was ever issued to them prior to the solemnization of
their marriage.
Despite notice, defendant Edwin F. Cardenas failed to file his answer. Consequently, he was declared in
default. Trial proceeded in his absence.
The controlling facts are undisputed:
On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by
Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The marriage was celebrated without the knowledge
of Castro's parents. Defendant Cardenas personally attended to the processing of the documents required for
the celebration of the marriage, including the procurement of the marriage, license. In fact, the marriage
contract itself states that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in the name of the contracting parties on
June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage was unknown to Castro's
parents. Thus, it was only in March 1971, when Castro discovered she was pregnant, that the couple decided
to live together. However, their cohabitation lasted only for four (4) months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways.
On October 19, 1971, Castro gave birth. The baby was adopted by Castro's brother, with the consent of
Cardenas.
The baby is now in the United States. Desiring to follow her daughter, Castro wanted to put in order her marital
status before leaving for the States. She thus consulted a lawyer, Atty. Frumencio E. Pulgar, regarding the
possible annulment of her marriage. Through her lawyer's efforts, they discovered that there was no marriage
license issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration of their marriage.
As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a certification from the Civil Register of Pasig, Metro Manila. It
reads:
February 20, 1987
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the names EDWIN F. CARDENAS and ANGELINA M. CASTRO who were allegedly
married in the Pasay City Court on June 21, 1970 under an alleged (s)upportive marriage license
no. 3196182 allegedly issued in the municipality on June 20, 1970 cannot be located as said license
no. 3196182 does not appear from our records.
Issued upon request of Mr. Ed Atanacio.
(Sgd) CENONA D. QUINTOS
Senior Civil Registry Officer
Castro testified that she did not go to the civil registrar of Pasig on or before June 24, 1970 in order to apply for
a license. Neither did she sign any application therefor. She affixed her signature only on the marriage contract
on June 24, 1970 in Pasay City.
The trial court denied the petition. 2 It held that the above certification was inadequate to establish the alleged
non-issuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the marriage between the parties. It ruled that the
"inability of the certifying official to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show that there was no
marriage license issued."
Unsatisfied with the decision, Castro appealed to respondent appellate court. She insisted that the certification
from the local civil registrar sufficiently established the absence of a marriage license.
As stated earlier, respondent appellate court reversed the Decision of the trial court. 3 It declared the marriage
between the contracting parties null and void and directed the Civil Registrar of Pasig to cancel the subject
marriage contract.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines urges that respondent appellate court erred when it ruled that the
certification issued by the civil registrar that marriage license no. 3196182 was not in their record adequately
proved that no such license was ever issued. Petitioner also faults the respondent court for relying on the self-
serving and uncorroborated testimony of private respondent Castro that she had no part in the procurement of
the subject marriage license. Petitioner thus insists that the certification and the uncorroborated testimony of
private respondent are insufficient to overthrow the legal presumption regarding the validity of a marriage.
Petitioner also points that in declaring the marriage between the parties as null and void, respondent appellate
court disregarded the presumption that the solemnizing officer, Judge Pablo M. Malvar, regularly performed his
duties when he attested in the marriage contract that marriage license no. 3196182 was duly presented to him
before the solemnization of the subject marriage.
The issues, being interrelated, shall be discussed jointly.
The core issue presented by the case at bench is whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence
presented by private respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued by the Civil
Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of the marriage of private respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas.
We affirm the impugned Decision.
At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital relations was the
New Civil Code. The law 4 provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license first
issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license
would render the marriage void ab initio. 5
Petitioner posits that the certification of the local civil registrar of due search and inability to find a record or
entry to the effect that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued to the parties is not adequate to prove its non-
issuance.
We hold otherwise. The presentation of such certification in court is sanctioned by Section 29, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court, viz.:
Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record. — A written statement signed by an officer having custody of an official record
or by his deputy, that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records
of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his
office contain no such record or entry.
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular
document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a
register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia,
of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including
the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data. 6
The certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative
value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a
marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court, a certificate of "due search and inability to find" sufficiently proved that his office did not
issue marriage license no. 3196182 to the contracting parties.
The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in support of her petition is, in itself, not a
ground to deny her petition. The failure to offer any other witness to corroborate her testimony is mainly due to
the peculiar circumstances of the case. It will be remembered that the subject marriage was a civil ceremony
performed by a judge of a city court. The subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a "secret
marriage" — a legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the
knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either or both of the contracting parties. The records show that the
marriage between Castro and Cardenas was initially unknown to the parents of the former.
Surely, the fact that only private respondent Castro testified during the trial cannot be held against her. Her
husband, Edwin F. Cardenas, was duly served with notice of the proceedings and a copy of the petition.
Despite receipt thereof, he chose to ignore the same. For failure to answer, he was properly declared in
default. Private respondent cannot be faulted for her husband's lack of interest to participate in the
proceedings. There was absolutely no evidence on record to show that there was collusion between private
respondent and her husband Cardenas.
It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the appellate court that the marriage between the contracting
parties is null and void for lack of a marriage license does not discount the fact that indeed, a spurious
marriage license, purporting to be issued by the civil registrar of Pasig, may have been presented by Cardenas
to the solemnizing officer.
In fine, we hold that, under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence
presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED there being no showing of any reversible error committed by
respondent appellate court.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 167684             July 31, 2006
JAIME O.SEVILLA, petitioner,
vs.
CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 74416 dated 20 December 2004 which set aside the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati City, in Civil Case No. 94-1285 dated 25 January 2002.
In a Complaint3 dated 28 March 1994 filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before the RTC, he claimed that on 19 May
1969, through machinations, duress and intimidation employed upon him by Carmelita N. Cardenas and the
latter's father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed forces of the Philippines, he and Carmelita went to
the City Hall of Manila and they were introduced to a certain Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister
of the Gospel. On the said date, the father of Carmelita caused him and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract
before the said Minister of the Gospel. According to Jaime, he never applied for a marriage license for his
supposed marriage to Carmelita and never did they obtain any marriage license from any Civil Registry,
consequently, no marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer.
For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime, and claims that she and Jaime were married civilly
on 19 May 1969,4 and in a church ceremony thereafter on 31 May 19695 at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish in
Quezon City. Both marriages were registered with the local civil registry of Manila and the National Statistics
Office. He is estopped from invoking the lack of marriage license after having been married to her for 25 years.
The trial court made the following findings:
In support of his complaint, plaintiff [Jaime] testified that on May 19, 1969, he and defendant [Carmelita]
appeared before a certain Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales, a Minister of the Gospel, at the city hall in Manila where
they executed a Marriage Contract (Exh. "A") in civil rites. A certain Godofredo Occena who, plaintiff alleged,
was an aide of defendant's father accompanied them, and who, together with another person, stood as witness
to the civil wedding. That although marriage license no. 2770792 allegedly issued in San Juan, Rizal on May
19, 1969 was indicated in the marriage contract, the same was fictitious for he never applied for any marriage
license, (Ibid., p. 11). Upon verifications made by him through his lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Abola, with the Civil
Registry of San Juan, a Certification dated March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") was issued by Rafael D. Aliscad, Jr.,
Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, that "no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by said office." On
May 31, 1969, he and defendant were again wed, this time in church rites, before Monsignor Juan Velasco at
the Most Holy Redeemer Parish Church in Brixton Hills, Quezon City, where they executed another marriage
contract (Exh. "F") with the same marriage license no. 2770792 used and indicated. Preparations and
expenses for the church wedding and reception were jointly shared by his and defendant's parents. After the
church wedding, he and defendant resided in his house at Brixton Hills until their first son, Jose Gabriel, was
born in March 1970. As his parents continued to support him financially, he and defendant lived in Spain for
some time, for his medical studies. Eventually, their marital relationship turned bad because it became difficult
for him to be married he being a medical student at that time. They started living apart in 1976, but they
underwent family counseling before they eventually separated in 1978. It was during this time when
defendant's second son was born whose paternity plaintiff questioned. Plaintiff obtained a divorce decree
against defendant in the United States in 1981 and later secured a judicial separation of their conjugal
partnership in 1983.
Atty. Jose M. Abola, then counsel for the plaintiff, himself manifested that when his service was engaged by
plaintiff, and after the latter narrated to him the circumstances of his marriage, he made inquiries with the
Office of Civil Registry of San Juan where the supposed marriage license was obtained and with the Church of
the Most Holy Redeemer Parish where the religious wedding ceremony was celebrated. His request letters
dated March 3, 1994 (Exh. "J"), March 7, 1994 (Exh. "L"), March 9, 1994 (Exh. "M") and March 11, 1994 (Exh.
"K") were all sent to and received by the Civil Registrar of San Juan, who in reply thereto, issued Certifications
dated March 4, 1994 (Exh. "I"), and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") and September 20, 1994 (Exh. "C"), that "no
marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by that office." Upon his inquiry, the Holy Redeemer Parish
Church issued him a certified copy of the marriage contract of plaintiff and defendant (Exh. "F") and a
Certificate of Marriage dated April 11, 1994 (Exh. "G"), wherein it noted that it was a "purely religious
ceremony, having been civilly married on May 19, 1969 at the City Hall, Manila, under Marriage License No.
2770792 issued at San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969."
Perlita Mercader, Registration Officer III of the Local Registry of San Juan, identified the Certificates dated
March 4, 1994, March 11, 1994 and September 20, 1994 issued by Rafael Aliscad, Jr., the Local Civil
Registrar, and testified that their office failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 may
have been registered (TSN, 8-6-96, p. 5).
Defendant Carmelita Cardenas testified that she and plaintiff had a steady romantic relationship after they met
and were introduced to each other in October 1968. A model, she was compelled by her family to join the
Mutya ng Pilipinas beauty pageant when plaintiff who was afraid to lose her, asked her to run away with him to
Baguio. Because she loved plaintiff, she turned back on her family and decided to follow plaintiff in Baguio.
When they came back to Manila, she and plaintiff proceeded to the latter's home in Brixton Hills where
plaintiff's mother, Mrs. Sevilla, told her not to worry. Her parents were hostile when they learned of the
elopement, but Mrs. Sevilla convinced them that she will take care of everything, and promised to support
plaintiff and defendant. As plaintiff was still fearful he may lose her, he asked her to marry him in civil rites,
without the knowledge of her family, more so her father (TSN, 5-28-98, p. 4) on May 19, 1969, before a
minister and where she was made to sign documents. After the civil wedding, they had lunch and later each
went home separately. On May 31, 1969, they had the church wedding, which the Sevilla family alone
prepared and arranged, since defendant's mother just came from hospital. Her family did not participate in the
wedding preparations. Defendant further stated that there was no sexual consummation during their
honeymoon and that it was after two months when they finally had sex. She learned from Dr. Escudero,
plaintiff's physician and one of their wedding sponsors that plaintiff was undergoing psychiatric therapy since
age 12 (TSN, 11-2-98, p. 15) for some traumatic problem compounded by his drug habit. She found out
plaintiff has unusual sexual behavior by his obsession over her knees of which he would take endless pictures
of. Moreover, plaintiff preferred to have sex with her in between the knees which she called "intrafemural sex,"
while real sex between them was far and between like 8 months, hence, abnormal. During their marriage,
plaintiff exhibited weird sexual behavior which defendant attributed to plaintiff's drug addiction (TSN, 11-5-98,
pp. 5-8). A compulsive liar, plaintiff has a bad temper who breaks things when he had tantrums. Plaintiff took
drugs like amphetamines, benzedrine and the like, "speed" drugs that kept him from sleep and then would take
barbiturates or downers, like "mogadon." Defendant tried very hard to keep plaintiff away from drugs but failed
as it has become a habit to him. They had no fixed home since they often moved and partly lived in Spain for
about four and a half years, and during all those times, her mother-in-law would send some financial support
on and off, while defendant worked as an English teacher. Plaintiff, who was supposed to be studying, did
nothing. Their marriage became unbearable, as plaintiff physically and verbally abused her, and this led to a
break up in their marriage. Later, she learned that plaintiff married one Angela Garcia in 1991 in the United
States.
Jose Cardenas, father of defendant, testified that he was not aware of the civil wedding of his daughter with the
plaintiff; that his daughter and grandson came to stay with him after they returned home from Spain and have
lived with him and his wife ever since. His grandsons practically grew up under his care and guidance, and he
has supported his daughter's expenses for medicines and hospital confinements (Exhs. "9" and "10").
Victoria Cardenas Navarro, defendant's sister, testified and corroborated that it was plaintiff's family that
attended to all the preparations and arrangements for the church wedding of her sister with plaintiff, and that
she didn't know that the couple wed in civil rites some time prior to the church wedding. She also stated that
she and her parents were still civil with the plaintiff inspite of the marital differences between plaintiff and
defendant.
As adverse witness for the defendant, plaintiff testified that because of irreconcilable differences with
defendant and in order for them to live their own lives, they agreed to divorce each other; that when he applied
for and obtained a divorce decree in the United States on June 14, 1983 (Exh. "13"), it was with the knowledge
and consent of defendant who in fact authorized a certain Atty. Quisumbing to represent her (TSN, 12-7-2000,
p. 21). During his adverse testimony, plaintiff identified a recent certification dated July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE")
issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, that the marriage license no. 2770792, the same marriage
license appearing in the marriage contract (Exh. "A"), is inexistent, thus appears to be fictitious.6
In its Decision dated 25 January 2002, declaring the nullity of the marriage of the parties, the trial court made
the following justifications:
Thus, being one of the essential requisites for the validity of the marriage, the lack or absence of a license
renders the marriage void ab initio. It was shown under the various certifications (Exhs. "I", "E", and "C") earlier
issued by the office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of San Juan, and the more recent one issued
on July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") that no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by that office, hence, the
marriage license no. 2770792 appearing on the marriage contracts executed on May 19, 1969 (Exh. "A") and
on May 31, 1969 (Exh. "F") was fictitious. Such a certification enjoys probative value under the rules on
evidence, particularly Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, x x x.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the civil marriage between Jaime O. Sevilla and Carmelita N.
Cardenas solemnized by Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales at the Manila City Hall on May 19, 1969 as well as their
contract of marriage solemnized under religious rites by Rev. Juan B. Velasco at the Holy Redeemer Parish on
May 31, 1969, NULL and VOID for lack of the requisite marriage license. Let the marriage contract of the
parties under Registry No. 601 (e-69) of the registry book of the Local Civil Registry of Manila be cancelled.
Let copies of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property registries in accordance with Article
52 of the Family Code. Likewise, let a copy hereof be forwarded the Office of the Solicitor General for its record
and information.7
Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 20 December 2004, the Court of
Appeals disagreed with the trial court and held:
In People v. De Guzman (G.R. No. 106025, February 9, 1994), the Supreme Court explained that: "The
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to
perform a duty. The presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive."
In this case, We note that a certain Perlita Mercader of the local civil registry of San Juan testified that
they "failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered," for the reason that
"the employee handling is already retired." With said testimony We cannot therefore just presume that the
marriage license specified in the parties' marriage contract was not issued for in the end the failure of the office
of the local civil registrar of San Juan to produce a copy of the marriage license was attributable not to the fact
that no such marriage license was issued but rather, because it "failed to locate the book wherein marriage
license no. 2770792 is registered." Simply put, if the pertinent book were available for scrutiny, there is a
strong possibility that it would have contained an entry on marriage license no. 2720792.
xxxx
Indeed, this Court is not prepared to annul the parties' marriage on the basis of a mere perception of plaintiff
that his union with defendant is defective with respect to an essential requisite of a marriage contract, a
perception that ultimately was not substantiated with facts on record.8
Jaime filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 6 January 2005 which the Court of Appeals denied in a
Resolution dated 6 April 2005.
This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime.
He raises the following issues for Resolution.
1. Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in accordance with law to the parties herein prior to the
celebration of the marriages in question;
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly applied and relied on the presumption of regularity of officials
acts, particularly the issuance of a marriage license, arising solely from the contents of the marriage contracts
in question which show on their face that a marriage license was purportedly issued by the Local Civil Registry
of San Juan, Metro Manila, and
3. Whether or not respondent could validly invoke/rely upon the presumption of validity of a marriage arising
from the admitted "fact of marriage."9
At the core of this controversy is the determination of whether or not the certifications from the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan stating that no Marriage License No. 2770792 as appearing in the marriage contract of
the parties was issued, are sufficient to declare their marriage as null and void ab initio.
We agree with the Court of Appeals and rule in the negative.
Pertinent provisions of the Civil Code which was the law in force at the time of the marriage of the parties are
Articles 53,10 5811 and 80.12
Based on the foregoing provisions, a marriage license is an essential requisite for the validity of marriage. The
marriage between Carmelita and Jaime is of no exception.
At first glance, this case can very well be easily dismissed as one involving a marriage that is null and void on
the ground of absence of a marriage license based on the certifications issued by the Local Civil Registar of
San Juan. As ruled by this Court in the case of Cariño v. Cariño13:
[A]s certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage
license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that such a certification is adequate to prove the non-
issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the certification
issued by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a
record of all date relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has been
sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and that they
secured the required marriage license. Although she was declared in default before the trial court, petitioner
could have squarely met the issue and explained the absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the
Court of Appeals and this Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain from
pursuing an argument that will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage cannot
stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having
been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the
marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
The foregoing Decision giving probative value to the certifications issued by the Local Civil Registrar should be
read in line with the decision in the earlier case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,14 where it was held that:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular
document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found
in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter
alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses,
including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically state that the document does
not exist in his office or the particular entry could not be found in the register despite diligent search. Such
certification shall be sufficient proof of lack or absence of record as stated in Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – a written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an official
record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the
records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the
records of his office contain no such record or entry.
We shall now proceed to scrutinize whether the certifications by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan in
connection with Marriage License No. 2770792 complied with the foregoing requirements and deserved to be
accorded probative value.
Note that the first two certifications bear the statement that "hope and understand our loaded work cannot give
you our full force locating the above problem." It could be easily implied from the said statement that the Office
of the Local Civil Registrar could not exert its best efforts to locate and determine the existence of Marriage
License No. 2770792 due to its "loaded work." Likewise, both certifications failed to state with absolute
certainty whether or not such license was issued.
This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the representative from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar
of San Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader, who stated that they cannot locate the logbook due to the fact that the
person in charge of the said logbook had already retired. Further, the testimony of the said person was not
presented in evidence. It does not appear on record that the former custodian of the logbook was deceased or
missing, or that his testimony could not be secured. This belies the claim that all efforts to locate the logbook or
prove the material contents therein, had been exerted.
As testified to by Perlita Mercader:
Q Under the subpoena duces tecum, you were required to bring to this Court among other things the register
of application of/or (sic) for marriage licenses received by the Office of the :Local Civil Registrar of San Juan,
Province of Rizal, from January 19, 1969 to May 1969. Did you bring with you those records?
A I brought may 19, 1969, sir.
Q Is that the book requested of you under no. 3 of the request for subpoena?
A Meron pang January. I forgot, January . . .
Q Did you bring that with you?
A No, sir.
Q Why not?
A I cannot locate the book. This is the only book.
Q Will you please state if this is the register of marriage of marriage applications that your office maintains as
required by the manual of the office of the Local Civil Registrar?
COURT
May I see that book and the portion marked by the witness.
xxxx
COURT
Why don't you ask her direct question whether marriage license 2880792 is the number issued by their office
while with respect to license no. 2770792 the office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan is very definite
about it it was never issued. Then ask him how about no. 2880792 if the same was ever issued by their office.
Did you ask this 2887092, but you could not find the record? But for the moment you cannot locate the books?
Which is which now, was this issued or not?
A The employee handling it is already retired, sir.19
Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost efforts were not exerted to locate the
logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been entered, the presumption of regularity of
performance of official function by the Local Civil Registrar in issuing the certifications, is effectively rebutted.
According to Section 3(m),20 Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed is among the disputable presumptions.
In one case, it was held:
A disputable presumption has been defined as a species of evidence that may be accepted and acted on
where there is no other evidence to uphold the contention for which it stands, or one which may be overcome
by other evidence. One such disputable/rebuttable presumption is that an official act or duty has been regularly
performed. x x x.21
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to
perform a duty.22
The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty is disputable and can be overcome by other
evidence as in the case at bar where the presumption has been effectively defeated by the tenor of the first
and second certifications.
Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage License No.
2770792. It can also mean, as we believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot be found. In the
absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we cannot easily accept that absence of
the same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.
Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage, the
indissolubility of the marriage bonds.23 The courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be
lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.24
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved
in favor of the validity of the marriage.25
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and lived together for several years producing
two offsprings,26 now adults themselves. It took Jaime several years before he filed the petition for declaration
of nullity. Admittedly, he married another individual sometime in 1991. 27 We are not ready to reward petitioner
by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in the process allow him to profit from his
own deceit and perfidy.28
Our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. Our family
law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is
vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break-up
of families weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, their preservation is not the concern of the family
members alone.29
"The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is x x x marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not
only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply
interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special
to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties
were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency
and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is `that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.' Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio – Always presume marriage."30
This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.31
By our failure to come to the succor of Jaime, we are not trifling with his emotion or deepest sentiments. As we
have said in Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco,32 regrettably, there are situations like this one, where neither law
nor society can provide the specific answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 20 December 2004 and the Resolution dated 6 April 2005 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 145226             February 06, 2004
LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision1 dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the judgment2 dated August 5, 1996 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch 4, in Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial court found herein petitioner Lucio Morigo
y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy and sentenced him to a prison term of seven (7) months
of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. Also
assailed in this petition is the resolution3 of the appellate court, dated September 25, 2000, denying Morigo’s
motion for reconsideration.
The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City,
Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978).
After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other.
In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former replied
and after an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts.
In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they
maintained constant communication.
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both
agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at
Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for divorce against
appellant which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992.
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago 4 at the Virgen sa Barangay
Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional
Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The complaint seek (sic) among others, the declaration
of nullity of accused’s marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information 5 filed by the City Prosecutor of
Tagbilaran [City], with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.6
The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for judicial nullification
of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion was granted, but
subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case,
which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 8688, herein petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial
thereafter ensued.
On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal Case No. 8688, as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy and sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from
Seven (7) Months of Prision Correccional as minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor as
maximum.
SO ORDERED.7
In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioner’s claim that his first marriage to Lucia was
null and void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals,8 the trial court ruled that want of a valid marriage
ceremony is not a defense in a charge of bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume
that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of
their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v. Gmur,9 which held that the court
of a country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and in which one or both spouses may resort merely
for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial status of the parties. As
such, a divorce granted by said court is not entitled to recognition anywhere. Debunking Lucio’s defense of
good faith in contracting the second marriage, the trial court stressed that following People v. Bitdu,10 everyone
is presumed to know the law, and the fact that one does not know that his act constitutes a violation of the law
does not exempt him from the consequences thereof.
Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 20700.
Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before the appellate court, the
trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab
initio since no marriage ceremony actually took place. No appeal was taken from this decision, which then
became final and executory.
On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.11
In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the subsequent declaration of
nullity of Lucio’s marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could not acquit Lucio. The reason is that what is
sought to be punished by Article 34912 of the Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage
before the first marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact that the first marriage was void from
the beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the Canadian court could
not be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 15 13 of the Civil Code and given the fact that it is
contrary to public policy in this jurisdiction. Under Article 17 14 of the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy
cannot be rendered ineffectual by a judgment promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision, contending that the doctrine in Mendiola
v. People,15 allows mistake upon a difficult question of law (such as the effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be
a basis for good faith.
On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of merit. 16 However, the denial was by a
split vote. The ponente of the appellate court’s original decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S.
Labitoria, joined in the opinion prepared by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis. The dissent observed that as the
first marriage was validly declared void ab initio, then there was no first marriage to speak of. Since the date of
the nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage and since herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the law,
never married, he cannot be convicted beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.
The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT IN
CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE, CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE
REQUISITE. COROLLARILY, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONER’S LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT WHEN HE CONTRACTED THE SECOND
MARRIAGE.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN PEOPLE VS.
BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT EACH
AND EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO
ACCOUNT.17
To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether his
defense of good faith is valid.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the divorce decree of the
Ontario court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the second marriage openly and publicly, which a
person intent upon bigamy would not be doing. The petitioner further argues that his lack of criminal intent is
material to a conviction or acquittal in the instant case. The crime of bigamy, just like other felonies punished
under the Revised Penal Code, is mala in se, and hence, good faith and lack of criminal intent are allowed as a
complete defense. He stresses that there is a difference between the intent to commit the crime and the intent
to perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not necessarily follow that his intention to contract a second marriage is
tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy.
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good faith in the instant case is a
convenient but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon our ruling in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,18 which
held that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided all the elements concur, stressing that under Article
4019 of the Family Code, a judicial declaration of nullity is a must before a party may re-marry. Whether or not
the petitioner was aware of said Article 40 is of no account as everyone is presumed to know the law. The
OSG counters that petitioner’s contention that he was in good faith because he relied on the divorce decree of
the Ontario court is negated by his act of filing Civil Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of
his marriage to Lucia.
Before we delve into petitioner’s defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent, we must first determine
whether all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,20 we laid down the
elements of bigamy thus:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse
has not been judicially declared presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first.
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency of CA-G.R. CR No. 20700,
the RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following decision in Civil Case No. 6020, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the annulment of the marriage
entered into by petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and further
directing the Local Civil Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect the cancellation of the marriage contract.
SO ORDERED.21
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a
solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without
the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance
with Articles 322 and 423 of the Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts
it, "This simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to
the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the
declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused
was, under the eyes of the law, never married."24 The records show that no appeal was taken from the decision
of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had long become final and executory.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this
case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to
speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never
married "from the beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to
its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the
marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of
the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no
first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan.25 In the latter case, the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the second marriage was already
celebrated. We held therein that:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally
contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty
of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as "void."26
It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not just once, but twice:
first before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again six months later before a priest
in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to have transpired, although later declared
void ab initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing
officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of
signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of
nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which
petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he
contracts a subsequent marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in favor of an
accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done.
Under the circumstances of the present case, we held that petitioner has not committed bigamy. Further, we
also find that we need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent,
which is now moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated October 21, 1999 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of the appellate court dated September 25,
2000, denying herein petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner
Lucio Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt has not been
proven with moral certainty.
G.R. No. 182438               July 2, 2014
RENE RONULO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Fr. Rene Ronulo challenging the April 3,
2008 decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028 which affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, (RTC) Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte.
The Factual Antecedents
The presented evidence showed that3 Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry each other
on March 29, 2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. However, on the day
of the wedding, the supposed officiating priest, Fr. Mario Ragaza, refused to solemnize the marriage upon
learning that the couple failed to secure a marriage license. As a recourse, Joey, who was then dressed in
barong tagalong,and Claire, clad in a wedding gown, together with their parents, sponsors and guests,
proceeded to the Independent Church of Filipino Christians, also known as the Aglipayan Church. They
requested the petitioner, an Aglipayan priest, to perform a ceremony to which the latter agreed despite having
been informed by the couple that they had no marriage certificate.
The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled a mass for the couple on the same date. He conducted the
ceremony in the presence of the groom, the bride, their parents, the principal and secondary sponsors and the
rest of their invited guests.4
An information for violation of Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, was filed against the
petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Batac, Ilocos Norte for allegedly performing an illegal
marriage ceremony.5
The petitioner entered the plea of "not guilty" to the crime charged on arraignment.
The prosecution’s witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne Yere, testified on the incidents of the ceremony. Joseph
was the veil sponsor while Mary Anne was the cord sponsor in the wedding. Mary Anne testified that she saw
the bride walk down the aisle. She also saw the couple exchange their wedding rings, kiss each other, and
sign a document.6 She heard the petitioner instructing the principal sponsors to sign the marriage contract.
Thereafter, they went to the reception, had lunch and took pictures. She saw the petitioner there. She also
identified the wedding invitation given to her by Joey.7
Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey, testified that she heard the couple declare during the ceremony that they
take each other as husband and wife.8 Days after the wedding, she went to the municipal local civil registrar of
San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte with Atty. Mariano R. Nalupta Jr. where she was given a certificate that no marriage
license was issued to the couple.9
The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied that his act of blessing the couple was
tantamount to a solemnization of the marriage as contemplated by law.10
The MTC Judgment
The MTC found the petitioner guilty of violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, and imposed on him a
₱200.00 fine pursuant to Section 44 of Act No. 3613. It held that the petitioner’s act of giving a blessing
constitutes a marriage ceremony as he made an official church recognition of the cohabitation of the couple as
husband and wife.11 It further ruled that in performing a marriage ceremony without the couple’s marriage
license, the petitioner violated Article 352 of the RPC which imposes the penalty provided under Act No. 3613
or the Marriage Law. The MTC applied Section 44 of the Marriage Law which pertinently states that a violation
of any of its provisions that is not specifically penalized or of the regulations to be promulgated, shall be
punished by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment of not more than one month, or
both, in the discretion of the court.
The RPC is a law subsequent to the Marriage Law, and provides the penalty for violation of the latter law.
Applying these laws, the MTC imposed the penalty of a fine in the amount of ₱200.00.12
The RTC Ruling
The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC and added that the circumstances surrounding the act of the
petitioner in "blessing" the couple unmistakably show that a marriage ceremony had transpired. It further ruled
that the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses deserve more credence than the petitioner’s
negative statements.13 The RTC, however, ruled that the basis of the fine should be Section 39, instead of
Section 44, of the Marriage Law.
The CA Decision
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling. The CA observed that although there is no prescribed form or
religious rite for the solemnization of marriage, the law provides minimum standards in determining whether a
marriage ceremony has been conducted, viz.: (1) the contracting parties must appear personally before the
solemnizing officer; and (2) they should declare that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence
of at least two witnesses of legal age.14 According to the CA, the prosecution duly proved these requirements.
It added that the presence of a marriage certificate is not a requirement in a marriage ceremony.15
The CA additionally ruled that the petitioner’s criminal liability under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, is not
dependent on whether Joey or Claire were charged or found guilty under Article 350 of the same Code.16
The CA agreed with the MTC that the legal basis for the imposition of the fine is Section 44 of the Marriage
Law since it covers violation of regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities such as the RPC.
The Petition
The petitioner argues that the CA erred on the following grounds: First, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, is
vague and does not define what constitutes "an illegal marriage ceremony." Assuming that a marriage
ceremony principally constitutes those enunciated in Article 55 of the Civil Code and Article 6 of the Family
Code, these provisions require the verbal declaration that the couple take each other as husband and wife, and
a marriage certificate containing the declaration in writing which is duly signed by the contracting parties and
attested to by the solemnizing officer.17 The petitioner likewise maintains that the prosecution failed to prove
that the contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as husband and wife.18 Second,
under the principle of separation of church and State, the State cannot interfere in ecclesiastical affairs such as
the administration of matrimony. Therefore, the State cannot convert the "blessing" into a "marriage
ceremony."19
Third, the petitioner had no criminal intent as he conducted the "blessing" in good faith for purposes of giving
moral guidance to the couple.20
Fourth, the non-filing of a criminal case against the couple in violating Article 350 of the RPC, as amended,
should preclude the filing of the present case against him.21
Finally, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not provide for a penalty. The present case is not covered
by Section 44 of the Marriage Law as the petitioner was not found violating its provisions nor a regulation
promulgated thereafter.22
THE COURT’S RULING:
We find the petition unmeritorious.
The elements of the crime punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, were proven by the
prosecution
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall perform or
authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are as follows: (1) authority of the
solemnizing officer; and (2) his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony. In the present case, the petitioner
admitted that he has authority to solemnize a marriage. Hence, the only issue to be resolved is whether the
alleged "blessing" by the petitioner is tantamount to the performance of an "illegal marriage ceremony" which is
punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.
While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not specifically define a "marriage ceremony" and what
constitutes its "illegal" performance, Articles 3(3) and 6 of the Family Code are clear on these matters. These
provisions were taken from Article 5523 of the New Civil Code which, in turn, was copied from Section 324 of the
Marriage Law with no substantial amendments. Article 625 of the Family Code provides that "[n]o prescribed
form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the
contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less
than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife."26 Pertinently, Article
3(3)27 mirrors Article 6 of the Family Code and particularly defines a marriage ceremony as that which takes
place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal
declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of
legal age.
Even prior to the date of the enactment of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, the rule was clear that no
prescribed form of religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. However, as correctly found
by the CA, the law sets the minimum requirements constituting a marriage ceremony: first, there should be the
personal appearance of the contracting parties before a solemnizing officer; and second, heir declaration in the
presence of not less than two witnesses that they take each other as husband and wife.
As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted that the parties appeared before him and this fact was
testified to by witnesses. On the second requirement, we find that, contrary to the petitioner’s allegation, the
prosecution has proven, through the testimony of Florida, that the contracting parties personally declared that
they take each other as husband and wife.
The petitioner’s allegation that the court asked insinuating and leading questions to Florida fails to persuadeus.
A judge may examine or cross-examine a witness. He may propound clarificatory questions to test the
credibility of the witness and to extract the truth. He may seek to draw out relevant and material testimony
though that testimony may tend to support or rebut the position taken by one or the other party. It cannot be
taken against him if the clarificatory questions he propounds happen to reveal certain truths that tend to
destroy the theory of one party.28
At any rate, if the defense found the line of questioning of the judge objectionable, its failure to timely register
this bars it from belatedly invoking any irregularity.
In addition, the testimonies of Joseph and Mary Anne, and even the petitioner’s admission regarding the
circumstances of the ceremony, support Florida’s testimony that there had indeed been the declaration by the
couple that they take each other as husband and wife. The testimony of Joey disowning their declaration as
husband and wife cannot overcome these clear and convincing pieces of evidence. Notably, the defense failed
to show that the prosecution witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne, had any ill-motive to testify against the
petitioner.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the principle of separation of church and State precludes the
State from qualifying the church "blessing" into a marriage ceremony. Contrary to the petitioner’s allegation,
this principle has been duly preserved by Article 6 of the Family Code when it provides that no prescribed form
or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage is required. This pronouncement gives any religion or sect the
freedom or latitude in conducting its respective marital rites, subject only to the requirement that the core
requirements of law be observed.
We emphasize at this point that Article 1529 of the Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable social
institution and that our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social
institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State has paramount interest in the enforcement of its
constitutional policies and the preservation of the sanctity of marriage. To this end, it is within its power to
enact laws and regulations, such as Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which penalize the commission of
acts resulting in the disintegration and mockery of marriage.
From these perspectives, we find it clear that what the petitioner conducted was a marriage ceremony, as the
minimum requirements set by law were complied with. While the petitioner may view this merely as a
"blessing," the presence of the requirements of the law constitutive of a marriage ceremony qualified this
"blessing" into a "marriage ceremony" as contemplated by Article 3(3) of the Family Code and Article 352 of
the RPC, as amended.
We come now to the issue of whether the solemnization by the petitioner of this marriage ceremony was
illegal.
Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of marriage is the presence of a valid
marriage certificate. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he knew that the couple had no marriage
license, yet he conducted the "blessing" of their relationship.
Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite knowledge that the essential and formal
requirements of marriage set by law were lacking. The marriage ceremony, therefore, was illegal. The
petitioner’s knowledge of the absence of these requirements negates his defense of good faith.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the lack of a marriage certificate negates his criminal liability in
the present case. For purposes of determining if a marriage ceremony has been conducted, a marriage
certificate is not included in the requirements provided by Article 3(3) of the Family Code, as discussed above.
Neither does the non-filing of a criminal complaint against the couple negate criminal liability of the petitioner.
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not make this an element of the crime. The penalty imposed is
proper
On the issue on the penalty for violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, this provision clearly provides
that it shall be imposed in accordance with the provision of the Marriage Law. The penalty provisions of the
Marriage Law are Sections 39 and 44 which provide as follows: Section 39 of the Marriage Law provides that:
Section 39. Illegal Solemnization of Marriage – Any priest or minister solemnizing marriage without being
authorized by the Director of the Philippine National Library or who, upon solemnizing marriage, refuses to
exhibit the authorization in force when called upon to do so by the parties or parents, grandparents, guardians,
or persons having charge and any bishop or officer, priest, or minister of any church, religion or sect the
regulations and practices whereof require banns or publications previous to the solemnization of a marriage in
accordance with section ten, who authorized the immediate solemnization of a marriage that is subsequently
declared illegal; or any officer, priest or minister solemnizing marriage in violation of this act, shall be punished
by imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than two years, or by a fine of not less than two
hundred pesos nor more than two thousand pesos. [emphasis ours]
On the other hand, Section 44 of the Marriage Law states that:
Section 44. General Penal Clause – Any violation of any provision of this Act not specifically penalized, or of
the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities, shall be punished by a fine of not more than two
hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or both, in the discretion of the court.
[emphasis ours]
From a reading of the provisions cited above, we find merit in the ruling of the CA and the MTC that the penalty
imposable in the present case is that covered under Section 44, and not Section 39, of the Marriage Law.
The penalized acts under Section 39 of Act No. 3613 do not include the present case.1âwphi1 As correctly
found by the MTC, the petitioner was not found violating the provisions of the Marriage Law but Article 352 of
the RPC, as amended. It is only the imposition of the penalty for the violation of this provision which is referred
to the Marriage Law. On this point, Article 352 falls squarely under the provision of Section 44 of Act No. 3613
which provides for the penalty for any violation of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities;
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which was enacted after the Marriage Law, is one of such regulations.
Therefore, the CA did not err in imposing the penalty of fine of ₱200.00 pursuant to Section 44 of the Marriage
Law.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 3, 2008 in
CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028.
G.R. No. 198780               October 16, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t of Court assailing the September 29,
2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which affirmed the April 25,
2008Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC). declaring the marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer
(Fringer) and respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void from the beginning.
The facts
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage with
Register No. 2004-1588.3
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity 4 of her marriage with
Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife
because they never really had any intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of their
essential marital obligations. She described their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab
initio .
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion
to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to
conduct an investigation and determine the existence of a collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant
Prosecutor complied and reported that she could not make a determination for failure of both parties to appear
at the scheduled investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the hearing
despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits ensued.
Ruling of the RTC
In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of Liberty Albios
and Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very beginning. As a necessary consequence of this pronouncement,
petitioner shall cease using the surname of respondent as she never acquired any right over it and so as to
avoid a misimpression that she remains the wife of respondent.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.6
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only. Giving credence to the
testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire
American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the
ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United States and never again
communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her
petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that when marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the
establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion
for reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated February 5, 2009, denying the motion for want of merit.
It explained that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the
marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means to acquire American
citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the
essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that the parties clearly did not understand the nature
and consequence of getting married and that their case was similar to a marriage in jest. It further explained
that the parties never intended to enter into the marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and
wife or build a family. It concluded that their purpose was primarily for personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain
foreign citizenship, and for Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A MARRIAGE
CONTRACTED FOR THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS DONEIN JEST, HENCE,
LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OFCONSENT.8
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship and for Fringer to be
paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, as they knowingly and willingly entered
into that marriage and knew the benefits and consequences of being bound by it. According to the OSG,
consent should be distinguished from motive, the latter being inconsequential to the validity of marriage.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest. The parties
here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of
Albios to acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment 9 to the petition, reiterating her stand that her marriage was
similar to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void from the beginning.
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its arguments in its petition for review on certiorari.
Ruling of the Court
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of
acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?
The Court resolves in the negative.
Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of marriage fraud for the purposes
of immigration.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration
The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the development of marriage
fraud for the sole purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the United States, marriages where a couple
marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific benefits, have been referred to as "limited
purpose" marriages.11 A common limited purpose marriage is one entered into solely for the legitimization of a
child.12 Another, which is the subject of the present case, is for immigration purposes. Immigration law is
usually concerned with the intention of the couple at the time of their marriage, 13 and it attempts to filter out
those who use marriage solely to achieve immigration status.14
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,15 established the principal test for
determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a "marriage is a sham if the bride
and groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time they were married. "This standard was modified
with the passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the
couple to instead demonstrate that the marriage was not "entered into for the purpose of evading the
immigration laws of the United States." The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to establish a life
together, to determining the intention of evading immigration laws. 16 It must be noted, however, that this
standard is used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the legal validity or
existence of a marriage.
The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for the limited purpose of
immigration is also legally void and in existent. The early cases on limited purpose marriages in the United
States made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable case of
United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to stay in the country, the
parties had agreed to marry but not to live together and to obtain a divorce within six months. The Court,
through Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert temporary into permanent permission to stay in
the country was not a marriage, there being no consent, to wit:
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is necessary to every
contract; and no matter what forms or ceremonies the parties may go through indicating the contrary, they do
not contract if they do not in fact assent, which may always be proved. x x x Marriage is no exception to this
rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. x x x It is quite true that a marriage without subsequent
consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a marriage only for the sake of representing it as such
to the outside world and with the understanding that they will put an end to it as soon as it has served its
purpose to deceive, they have never really agreed to be married at all. They must assent to enter into the
relation as it is ordinarily understood, and it is not ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to
deceive others.18
(Italics supplied)
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines,19 which declared as valid a
marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating that a valid marriage
could not be avoided "merely because the marriage was entered into for a limited purpose."20 The 1980
immigration case of Matter of McKee,21 further recognized that a fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically
different from a non subsisting one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been recognized as problematic.
The problem being that in order to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal marriage is first necessary. 22 At
present, United States courts have generally denied annulments involving" limited purpose" marriages where a
couple married only to achieve a particular purpose, and have upheld such marriages as valid.23
The Court now turns to the case at hand.
Respondent’s marriage not void
In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered into for a
purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be
recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying the OSG’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC went on
to explain that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the
marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means for the respondent to
acquire American citizenship. Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was
lacking. It held that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married. As in
the Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering that the parties
only entered into the marriage for the acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They never
intended to enter into a marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family.
The CA’s assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties’ supposed lack of consent. Under Article 2
of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that the
absence of any essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a
solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter
into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the
vices of consent under Articles45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue
influence.24 Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently
understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act. 25 Their
understanding should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.26
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent
because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious
and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their
marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by
their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that
they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid
marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and
complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie
which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to a marriage by
way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no real
intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding that the parties would not
be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation. 27 It is
a pretended marriage not intended to be real and with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence,
the absence of any genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or
unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent because the parties
have absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.
The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest.1âwphi1 Albios and Fringer had an
undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent to acquire
American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow them to further their objective,
considering that only a valid marriage can properly support an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an
apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose.
Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish a conjugal
and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real intention to establish a life
together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance with law. The same
Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by
law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the
Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the
essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds
provided by law, it shall be declared valid.28
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on the kind
of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right
to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions. 29 The right to marital privacy allows married
couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have
children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on. 30 Thus, marriages entered into for other
purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that
they comply with all the legal requisites, 31 are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage
contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly
support a marriage.
Although the Court views with disdain the respondent’s attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest purposes, It
cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the respondent’s marriage may be considered a sham or
fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and continues to be valid and subsisting.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of the Family
Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may constitute fraud, namely, (1) non-
disclosure of a previous conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by
another man; (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction,
alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an
action to annul a marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not
qualify under any of the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may only
be brought by the injured or innocent party. In the present case, there is no injured party because Albios and
Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage with Fringer to
be declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court cannot declare such a
marriage void in the event the parties fail to qualify for immigration benefits, after they have availed of its
benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the
courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios already misused a judicial institution to enter into a
marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient
situation.
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State.32 It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of
the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered into when
it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer needed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.
A.M. No. MTJ-92-721 September 30, 1994
JUVY N. COSCA, EDMUNDO B. PERALTA, RAMON C. SAMBO, and APOLLO A.
VILLAMORA, complainants,
vs.
HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR., Presiding Judge, and NELIA B. ESMERALDA-BAROY, Clerk of
Court II, both of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, respondents.
Esteban R. Abonal for complainants.
Haide B. Vista-Gumba for respondents.

PER CURIAM, J.:
Complainants Juvy N. Cosca, Edmundo B. Peralta, Ramon C. Sambo, and Apollo Villamora, are Stenographer
I, Interpreter I, Clerk II, and Process Server, respectively, of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines
Sur. Respondents Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy are respectively the
Presiding Judge and Clerk of Court II of the same court.
In an administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on October 5, 1992, herein
respondents were charged with the following offenses, to wit: (1) illegal solemnization of marriage; (2)
falsification of the monthly reports of cases; (3) bribery in consideration of an appointment in the court; (4) non-
issuance of receipt for cash bond received; (5) infidelity in the custody of detained prisoners; and (6) requiring
payment of filing fees from exempted entities. 1
Pursuant to a resolution issued by this Court respondents filed their respective Comments. 2 A Reply to
Answers of Respondents was filed by complainants. 3 The case was thereafter referred to Executive Judge
David C. Naval of the Regional Trial Court, Naga City, for investigation report and recommendation. The case
was however transferred to First Assistant Executive Judge Antonio N. Gerona when Judge Naval inhibited
himself for the reason that his wife is a cousin of respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. 4
The contending versions of the parties regarding the factual antecedents of this administrative matter, as culled
from the records thereof, are set out under each particular charge against respondents.
1. Illegal solemnization of marriage
Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the requisite marriage license.
Thus, the following couples were able to get married by the simple expedient of paying the marriage fees to
respondent Baroy, despite the absence of a marriage license, viz.: Alano P. Abellano and Nelly Edralin,
Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias and Maria Gacer, Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga,
Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario, and Sammy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte. As a consequence, their
marriage contracts (Exhibits B, C, D, F, G, and A, respectively) did not reflect any marriage license number. In
addition, respondent judge did not sign their marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization,
the reason being that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which
was usually several days after the ceremony. Indubitably, the marriage contracts were not filed with the local
civil registrar. Complainant Ramon Sambo, who prepares the marriage contracts, called the attention of
respondents to the lack of marriage licenses and its effect on the marriages involved, but the latter opted to
proceed with the celebration of said marriages.
Respondent Nelia Baroy claims that when she was appointed Clerk of Court II, the employees of the court
were already hostile to her, especially complainant Ramon Sambo who told her that he was filing a protest
against her appointment. She avers that it was only lately when she discovered that the court had a marriage
Register which is in the custody of Sambo; that it was Sambo who failed to furnish the parties copies of the
marriage contract and to register these with the local civil registrar; and that apparently Sambo kept these
marriage contracts in preparation for this administrative case. Complainant Sambo, however, claims that all file
copies of the marriage contracts were kept by respondent Baroy, but the latter insists that she had instructed
Sambo to follow up the submission by the contracting parties of their marriage licenses as part of his duties but
he failed to do so.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. contends that the marriage between Alano P. Abellano and Nelly Edralin
falls under Article 34 of the Civil Code, hence it is exempt from the marriage license requirement; that he gave
strict instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish the couple a copy of the marriage contract and to file the
same with the civil registrar, but the latter failed to do so; that in order to solve the problem, the spouses
subsequently formalized their marriage by securing a marriage license and executing their marriage contract, a
copy of which was filed with the civil registrar; that the other five marriages alluded to in the administrative
complaint were not illegally solemnized because the marriage contracts were not signed by him and they did
not contain the date and place of marriage; that copies of these marriage contracts are in the custody of
complainant Sambo; that the alleged marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias and
Maria Emma Gaor, Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga, and of Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario were not
celebrated by him since he refused to solemnize them in the absence of a marriage license; that the marriage
of Samy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte was celebrated even without the requisite license due to the insistence of
the parties in order to avoid embarrassment to their guests but that, at any rate, he did not sign their marriage
contract which remains unsigned up to the present.
2. Falsification of monthly report for July, 1991 regarding the number of marriages solemnized and the number
of documents notarized.
It is alleged that respondent judge made it appear that he solemnized seven (7) marriages in the month of July,
1992, when in truth he did not do so or at most those marriages were null and void; that respondents likewise
made it appear that they have notarized only six (6) documents for July, 1992, but the Notarial Register will
show that there were one hundred thirteen (113) documents which were notarized during that month; and that
respondents reported a notarial fee of only P18.50 for each document, although in fact they collected P20.00
therefor and failed to account for the difference.
Respondent Baroy contends, however, that the marriage registry where all marriages celebrated by
respondent judge are entered is under the exclusive control and custody of complainant Ramon Sambo, hence
he is the only one who should be held responsible for the entries made therein; that the reported marriages are
merely based on the payments made as solemnization fees which are in the custody of respondent Baroy. She
further avers that it is Sambo who is likewise the custodian of the Notarial Register; that she cannot be held
accountable for whatever alleged difference there is in the notarial fees because she is liable only for those
payments tendered to her by Sambo himself; that the notarial fees she collects are duly covered by receipts;
that of the P20.00 charged, P18.50 is remitted directly to the Supreme Court as part of the Judiciary
Development Fund and P150 goes to the general fund of the Supreme Court which is paid to the Municipal
Treasurer of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Respondent theorizes that the discrepancies in the monthly report
were manipulated by complainant Sambo considering that he is the one in charge of the preparation of the
monthly report.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon avers that the erroneous number of marriages celebrated was intentionally
placed by complainant Sambo; that the number of marriages solemnized should not be based on
solemnization fees paid for that month since not all the marriages paid for are solemnized in the same month.
He claims that there were actually only six (6) documents notarized in the month of July, 1992 which tallied
with the official receipts issued by the clerk of court; that it is Sambo who should be held accountable for any
unreceipted payment for notarial fees because he is the one in charge of the Notarial Register; and that this
case filed by complainant Sambo is merely in retaliation for his failure to be appointed as the clerk of court.
Furthermore, respondent judge contends that he is not the one supervising or preparing the monthly report,
and that he merely has the ministerial duty to sign the same.
3. Bribery in consideration of an appointment in the court
Complainants allege that because of the retirement of the clerk of court, respondent judge forwarded to the
Supreme Court the applications of Rodel Abogado, Ramon Sambo, and Jessell Abiog. However, they were
surprised when respondent Baroy reported for duty as clerk of court on October 21, 1991. They later found out
that respondent Baroy was the one appointed because she gave a brand-new air-conditioning unit to
respondent judge.
Respondent Baroy claims that when she was still in Naga City she purchased an air-conditioning unit but when
she was appointed clerk of court she had to transfer to Tinambac and, since she no longer needed the air
conditioner, she decided to sell the same to respondent judge. The installation and use thereof by the latter in
his office was with the consent of the Mayor of Tinambac.
Respondent judge contends that he endorsed all the applications for the position of clerk of court to the
Supreme Court which has the sole authority over such appointments and that he had no hand in the
appointment of respondent Baroy. He contends that the air-conditioning unit was bought from his
co-respondent on installment basis on May 29, 1992, eight (8) months after Baroy had been appointed clerk of
court. He claims that he would not be that naive to exhibit to the public as item which could not be defended as
a matter of honor and prestige.
4. Cash bond issued without a receipt
It is alleged that in Criminal Case No. 5438, entitled "People vs. Mendeza, et al., "bondswoman Januaria
Dacara was allowed by respondent judge to change her property bond to cash bond; that she paid the amount
of P1,000.00 but was never issued a receipt therefor nor was it made to appear in the records that the bond
has been paid; that despite the lapse of two years, the money was never returned to the bondswoman; and
that it has not been shown that the money was turned over to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac.
Respondent Baroy counters that the cash bond was deposited with the former clerk of court, then turned over
to the acting clerk of court and, later, given to her under a corresponding receipt; that the cash bond is
deposited with the bank; and that should the bondswoman desire to withdraw the same, she should follow the
proper procedure therefor.
Respondent judge contends that Criminal Case No. 5438 was archieved for failure of the bondsman to deliver
the body of the accused in court despite notice; and that he has nothing to do with the payment of the cash
bond as this is the duty of the clerk of court.
5. Infidelity in the custody of prisoners
Complainants contend that respondent judge usually got detention prisoners to work in his house, one of
whom was Alex Alano, who is accused in Criminal Case No. 5647 for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act;
that while Alano was in the custody of respondent judge, the former escaped and was never recaptured; that in
order to conceal this fact, the case was archived pursuant to an order issued by respondent judge dated April
6, 1992.
Respondent judge denied the accusation and claims that he never employed detention prisoners and that he
has adequate household help; and that he had to order the case archived because it had been pending for
more than six (6) months and the accused therein remained at large.
6. Unlawful collection of docket fees
Finally, respondents are charged with collecting docket fees from the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur,
Inc. although such entity is exempt by law from the payment of said fees, and that while the corresponding
receipt was issued, respondent Baroy failed to remit the amount to the Supreme Court and, instead, she
deposited the same in her personal account.
Respondents Baroy contends that it was Judge-Designate Felimon Montenegro (because respondent judge
was on sick leave) who instructed her to demand payment of docket fees from said rural bank; that the bank
issued a check for P800.00; that she was not allowed by the Philippine National Bank to encash the check and,
instead, was instructed to deposit the same in any bank account for clearing; that respondent deposited the
same in her account; and that after the check was cleared, she remitted P400.00 to the Supreme Court and
the other P400.00 was paid to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac.
On the basis of the foregoing contentions, First Vice-Executive Judge Antonio N. Gerona prepared and
submitted to us his Report and Recommendations dated May 20, 1994, together with the administrative matter.
We have perspicaciously reviewed the same and we are favorably impressed by the thorough and exhaustive
presentation and analysis of the facts and evidence in said report. We commend the investigating judge for his
industry and perspicacity reflected by his findings in said report which, being amply substantiated by the
evidence and supported by logical illations, we hereby approve and hereunder reproduce at length the material
portions thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
The first charge against the respondents is illegal solemnization of marriage. Judge Palaypayon is charged
with having solemnized without a marriage license the marriage of Sammy Bocaya and Gina Besmonte (Exh.
A). Alano Abellano and Nelly Edralin (Exh. B), Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido (Exh. C), Eddie Terrobias
and Maria Emma Gaor (Exh. D), Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga (Exh. F) and Arsenio Sabater and
Margarita Nacario (Exh. G).
In all these aforementioned marriages, the blank space in the marriage contracts to show the number of the
marriage was solemnized as required by Article 22 of the Family Code were not filled up. While the contracting
parties and their witnesses signed their marriage contracts, Judge Palaypayon did not affix his signature in the
marriage contracts, except that of Abellano and Edralin when Judge Palaypayon signed their marriage
certificate as he claims that he solemnized this marriage under Article 34 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
In said marriages the contracting parties were not furnished a copy of their marriage contract and the Local
Civil Registrar was not sent either a copy of the marriage certificate as required by Article 23 of the Family
Code.
The marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte is shown to have been solemnized by Judge Palaypayon without a
marriage license. The testimonies of Bocay himself and Pompeo Ariola, one of the witnesses of the marriage
of Bocaya and Besmonte, and the photographs taken when Judge Palaypayon solemnized their marriage
(Exhs. K-3 to K-9) sufficiently show that Judge Palaypayon really solemnized their marriage. Bocaya declared
that they were advised by Judge Palaypayon to return after ten (10) days after their marriage was solemnized
and bring with them their marriage license. In the meantime, they already started living together as husband
and wife believing that the formal requisites of marriage were complied with.
Judge Palaypayon denied that he solemnized the marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte because the parties
allegedly did not have a marriage license. He declared that in fact he did not sign the marriage certificate, there
was no date stated on it and both the parties and the Local Civil Registrar did not have a copy of the marriage
certificate.
With respect to the photographs which show that he solemnized the marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte, Judge
Palaypayon explains that they merely show as if he was solemnizing the marriage. It was actually a simulated
solemnization of marriage and not a real one. This happened because of the pleading of the mother of one of
the contracting parties that he consent to be photographed to show that as if he was solemnizing the marriage
as he was told that the food for the wedding reception was already prepared, visitors were already invited and
the place of the parties where the reception would be held was more than twenty (20) kilometers away from the
poblacion of Tinambac.
The denial made by Judge Palaypayon is difficult to believe. The fact alone that he did not sign the marriage
certificate or contract, the same did not bear a date and the parties and the Local Civil Registrar were not
furnished a copy of the marriage certificate, do not by themselves show that he did not solemnize the marriage.
His uncorroborated testimony cannot prevail over the testimony of Bocaya and Ariola who also declared,
among others, that Bocaya and his bride were advised by Judge Palaypayon to return after ten (10) days with
their marriage license and whose credibility had not been impeached.
The pictures taken also from the start of the wedding ceremony up to the signing of the marriage certificate in
front of Judge Palaypayon and on his table cannot possibly be just to show a simulated solemnization of
marriage. One or two pictures may convince a person of the explanation of Judge Palaypayon, but not all
those pictures.
Besides, as a judge it is very difficult to believe that Judge Palaypayon would allows himself to be
photographed as if he was solemnizing a marriage on a mere pleading of a person whom he did not even
know for the alleged reasons given. It would be highly improper and unbecoming of him to allow himself to be
used as an instrument of deceit by making it appear that Bocaya and Besmonte were married by him when in
truth and in fact he did not solemnize their marriage.
With respect to the marriage of Abellano and Edralin (Exh. B), Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized
their marriage, but he claims that it was under Article 34 of the Family Code, so a marriage license was not
required. The contracting parties here executed a joint affidavit that they have been living together as husband
and wife for almost six (6) years already (Exh. 12; Exh. AA).
In their marriage contract which did not bear any date either when it was solemnized, it was stated that
Abellano was only eighteen (18) years, two (2) months and seven (7) days old. If he and Edralin had been
living together as husband and wife for almost six (6) years already before they got married as they stated in
their joint affidavit, Abellano must ha(ve) been less than thirteen (13) years old when he started living with
Edralin as his wife and this is hard to believe. Judge Palaypayon should ha(ve) been aware of this when he
solemnized their marriage as it was his duty to ascertain the qualification of the contracting parties who might
ha(ve) executed a false joint affidavit in order to have an instant marriage by avoiding the marriage license
requirement.
On May 23, 1992, however, after this case was already filed, Judge Palaypayon married again Abellano and
Edralin, this time with a marriage license (Exh. BB). The explanation given by Judge Palaypayon why he
solemnized the marriage of the same couple for the second time is that he did not consider the first marriage
he solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code as (a) marriage at all because complainant Ramon Sambo
did not follow his instruction that the date should be placed in the marriage certificate to show when he
solemnized the marriage and that the contracting parties were not furnished a copy of their marriage certificate.
This act of Judge Palaypayon of solemnizing the marriage of Abellano and Edralin for the second time with a
marriage license already only gave rise to the suspicion that the first time he solemnized the marriage it was
only made to appear that it was solemnized under exceptional character as there was not marriage license and
Judge Palaypayon had already signed the marriage certificate. If it was true that he solemnized the first
marriage under exceptional character where a marriage license was not required, why did he already require
the parties to have a marriage license when he solemnized their marriage for the second time?
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon that the first marriage of Abellano and Edralin was not a marriage at all
as the marriage certificate did not state the date when the marriage was solemnized and that the contracting
parties were not furnished a copy of their marriage certificate, is not well taken as they are not any of those
grounds under Article(s) 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code which declare a marriage void from the
beginning. Even if no one, however, received a copy of the marriage certificate, the marriage is still valid
(Jones vs. H(o)rtiguela, 64 Phil. 179). Judge Palaypayon cannot just absolve himself from responsibility by
blaming his personnel. They are not the guardian(s) of his official function and under Article 23 of the Family
Code it is his duty to furnish the contracting parties (a) copy of their marriage contract.
With respect to the marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido (Exh. C), and Arsenio Sabater and
Margarita Nacario (Exh. G), Selpo and Carrido and Sabater and Nacarcio executed joint affidavits that Judge
Palaypayon did not solemnize their marriage (Exh. 13-A and Exh. 1). Both Carrido and Nacario testified for the
respondents that actually Judge Palaypayon did not solemnize their marriage as they did not have a marriage
license. On cross-examination, however, both admitted that they did not know who prepared their affidavits.
They were just told, Carrido by a certain Charito Palaypayon, and Nacario by a certain Kagawad Encinas, to
just go to the Municipal building and sign their joint affidavits there which were already prepared before the
Municipal Mayor of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
With respect to the marriage of Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga (Exh. f), their marriage contract was signed
by them and by their two (2) witnesses, Atty. Elmer Brioso and respondent Baroy (Exhs. F-1 and F-2). Like the
other aforementioned marriages, the solemnization fee was also paid as shown by a receipt dated June 7,
1992 and signed by respondent Baroy (Exh. F-4).
Judge Palaypayon also denied having solemnized the marriage of Gamay and Belga allegedly because there
was no marriage license. On her part, respondent Baroy at first denied that the marriage was solemnized.
When she was asked, however, why did she sign the marriage contract as a witness she answered that she
thought the marriage was already solemnized (TSN, p. 14; 10-28-93).
Respondent Baroy was, and is, the clerk of court of Judge Palaypayon. She signed the marriage contract of
Gamay and Belga as one of the two principal sponsors. Yet, she wanted to give the impression that she did not
even know that the marriage was solemnized by Judge Palaypayon. This is found very difficult to believe.
Judge Palaypayon made the same denial of having solemnized also the marriage of Terrobias and Gaor (Exh.
D). The contracting parties and their witnesses also signed the marriage contract and paid the solemnization
fee, but Judge Palaypayon allegedly did not solemnize their marriage due to lack of marriage license. Judge
Palaypayon submitted the affidavit of William Medina, Vice-Mayor of Tinambac, to corroborate his testimony
(Exh. 14). Medina, however, did not testify in this case and so his affidavit has no probative value.
Judge Palaypayon testified that his procedure and practice have been that before the contracting parties and
their witnesses enter his chamber in order to get married, he already required complainant Ramon Sambo to
whom he assigned the task of preparing the marriage contract, to already let the parties and their witnesses
sign their marriage contracts, as what happened to Gamay and Belga, and Terrobias and Gaor, among others.
His purpose was to save his precious time as he has been solemnizing marriages at the rate of three (3) to
four (4) times everyday (TSN, p. 12;
2-1-94).
This alleged practice and procedure, if true, is highly improper and irregular, if not illegal, because the
contracting parties are supposed to be first asked by the solemnizing officer and declare that they take each
other as husband and wife before the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two (2) witnesses before
they are supposed to sign their marriage contracts (Art. 6, Family Code).
The uncorroborated testimony, however, of Judge Palaypayon as to his alleged practice and procedure before
solemnizing a marriage, is not true as shown by the picture taken during the wedding of Bocaya and Besmonte
(Exhs. K-3 to K-9) and by the testimony of respondent Baroy herself who declared that the practice of Judge
Palaypayon ha(s) been to let the contracting parties and their witnesses sign the marriage contract only after
Judge Palaypayon has solemnized their marriage (TSN, p. 53;
10-28-93).
Judge Palaypayon did not present any evidence to show also that he was really solemnizing three (3) to four
(4) marriages everyday. On the contrary his monthly report of cases for July, 1992 shows that his court had
only twenty-seven (27) pending cases and he solemnized only seven (7) marriages for the whole month (Exh.
E). His monthly report of cases for September, 1992 shows also that he solemnized only four (4) marriages
during the whole month (Exh. 7).
In this first charge of having illegally solemnized marriages, respondent Judge Palaypayon has presented and
marked in evidence several marriage contracts of other persons, affidavits of persons and certification issued
by the Local Civil Registrar (Exhs. 12-B to 12-H). These persons who executed affidavits, however, did not
testify in this case. Besides, the marriage contracts and certification mentioned are immaterial as Judge
Palaypayon is not charged of having solemnized these marriages illegally also. He is not charged that the
marriages he solemnized were all illegal.
The second charge against herein respondents, that of having falsified the monthly report of cases submitted
to the Supreme Court and not stating in the monthly report the actual number of documents notarized and
issuing the corresponding receipts of the notarial fees, have been sufficiently proven by the complainants
insofar as the monthly report of cases for July and September, 1992 are concerned.
The monthly report of cases of the MTC of Tinambac, Camarines Sur for July, 1992 both signed by the
respondents, show that for said month there were six (6) documents notarized by Judge Palaypayon in his
capacity as Ex-Officio Notary Public (Exhs. H to H-1-b). The notarial register of the MTC of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur, however, shows that there were actually one hundred thirteen (113) documents notarized by
Judge Palaypayon for the said month (Exhs. Q to Q-45).
Judge Palaypayon claims that there was no falsification of the monthly report of cases for July, 1992 because
there were only six (6) notarized documents that were paid (for) as shown by official receipts. He did not,
however, present evidence of the alleged official receipts showing that the notarial fee for the six (6)
documetns were paid. Besides, the monthly report of cases with respect to the number of documents notarized
should not be based on how many notarized documents were paid of the notarial fees, but the number of
documents placed or recorded in the notarial register.
Judge Palaypayon admitted that he was not personally verifying and checking anymore the correctness of the
monthly reports because he relies on his co-respondent who is the Clerk of Court and whom he has assumed
to have checked and verified the records. He merely signs the monthly report when it is already signed by
respondent Baroy.
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon is not well taken because he is required to have close supervision in the
preparation of the monthly report of cases of which he certifies as to their correctness. As a judge he is
personally responsible for the proper discharge of his functions (The Phil. Trial Lawyer's Asso. Inc. vs. Agana,
Sr., 102 SCRA 517). In Nidera vs. Lazaro, 174 SCRA 581, it was held that "A judge cannot take refuge behind
the inefficiency or mismanagement of his court personnel."
On the part of respondent Baroy, she puts the blame of the falsification of the monthly report of cases on
complainant Sambo whom she allegedly assigned to prepare not only the monthly report of cases, but the
preparation and custody of marriage contracts, notarized documents and the notarial register. By her own
admission she has assigned to complainant Sambo duties she was supposed to perform, yet according to her
she never bother(ed) to check the notarial register of the court to find out the number of documents notarized
in a month (TSN, p. 30; 11-23-93).
Assuming that respondent Baroy assigned the preparation of the monthly report of cases to Sambo, which was
denied by the latter as he claims that he only typed the monthly report based on the data given to him by her,
still it is her duty to verify and check whether the report is correct.
The explanation of respondent Baroy that Sambo was the one in custody of marriage contracts, notarized
documents and notarial register, among other things, is not acceptable not only because as clerk of court she
was supposed to be in custody, control and supervision of all court records including documents and other
properties of the court (p. 32, Manual for Clerks of Court), but she herself admitted that from January, 1992 she
was already in full control of all the records of the court including receipts (TSN, p. 11; 11-23-93).
The evidence adduced in this cases in connection with the charge of falsification, however, also shows that
respondent Baroy did not account for what happened to the notarial fees received for those documents
notarized during the month of July and September, 1992. The evidence adduced in this case also sufficiently
show that she received cash bond deposits and she did not deposit them to a bank or to the Municipal
Treasurer; and that she only issued temporary receipts for said cash bond deposits.
For July, 1992 there were only six (6) documents reported to have been notarized by Judge Palaypayon
although the documents notarized for said month were actually one hundred thirteen (113) as recorded in the
notarial register. For September, 1992, there were only five (5) documents reported as notarized for that
month, though the notarial register show(s) that there were fifty-six (56) documents actually notarized. The fee
for each document notarized as appearing in the notarial register was P18.50. Respondent Baroy and Sambo
declared that what was actually being charged was P20.00. Respondent Baroy declared that P18.50 went to
the Supreme Court and P1.50 was being turned over to the Municipal Treasurer.
Baroy, however, did not present any evidence to show that she really sent to the Supreme Court the notarial
fees of P18.50 for each document notarized and to the Municipal Treasurer the additional notarial fee of P1.50.
This should be fully accounted for considering that Baroy herself declared that some notarial fees were allowed
by her at her own discretion to be paid later. Similarly, the solemnization fees have not been accounted for by
Baroy considering that she admitted that even (i)n those instances where the marriages were not solemnized
due to lack of marriage license the solemnization fees were not returned anymore, unless the contracting
parties made a demand for their return. Judge Palaypayon declared that he did not know of any instance when
solemnization fee was returned when the marriage was not solemnized due to lack of marriage license.
Respondent Baroy also claims that Ramon Sambo did not turn over to her some of the notarial fees. This is
difficult to believe. It was not only because Sambo vehemently denied it, but the minutes of the conference of
the personnel of the MTC of Tinambac dated January 20, 1992 shows that on that date Baroy informed the
personnel of the court that she was taking over the functions she assigned to Sambo, particularly the collection
of legal fees (Exh. 7). The notarial fees she claims that Sambo did not turn over to her were for those
documents notarized (i)n July and September, 1992 already. Besides there never was any demand she made
for Sambo to turn over some notarial fees supposedly in his possession. Neither was there any memorandum
she issued on this matter, in spite of the fact that she has been holding meetings and issuing memoranda to
the personnel of the court (Exhs. V, W, FF, FF-1, FF-2, FF-3; Exhs. 4-A (supplement(s), 5-8, 6-S, 7-S and 8-
S).
It is admitted by respondent Baroy that on October 29, 1991 a cash bond deposit of a certain Dacara in the
amount of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos was turned over to her after she assumed office and for this cash
bond she issued only a temporary receipt (Exh. Y). She did not deposit this cash bond in any bank or to the
Municipal Treasurer. She just kept it in her own cash box on the alleged ground that the parties in that case
where the cash bond was deposited informed her that they would settle the case amicably.
Respondent Baroy declared that she finally deposited the aforementioned cash bond of One Thousand
(P1,000.00) Pesos with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) in February, 1993, after this administrative
case was already filed (TSN, pp. 27-28; 12-22-93). The Pass Book, however, shows that actually Baroy
opened an account with the LBP, Naga Branch, only on March 26, 1993 when she deposited an amount of
Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos (Exhs. 8 to 8-1-a). She claims that One Thousand (P1,000.000) Pesos of
the initial deposit was the cash bond of Dacara. If it were true, it was only after keeping to herself the cash
bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for around one year and five months when she finally deposited it
because of the filing of this case.
On April 29, 1993, or only one month and two days after she finally deposited the One Thousand (P1,000.00)
Pesos cash bond of Dacara, she withdrew it from the bank without any authority or order from the court. It was
only on July 23, 1993, or after almost three (3) months after she withdrew it, when she redeposited said cash
bond (TSN, p. 6; 1-4-94).
The evidence presented in this case also show that on February 28, 1993 respondent Baroy received also a
cash bond of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos from a certain Alfredo Seprones in Crim. Case No. 5180. For
this cash bond deposit, respondent Baroy issued only an annumbered temporary receipt (Exh. X and X-1).
Again Baroy just kept this Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos cash bond to herself. She did not deposit it
either (in) a bank or (with) the Municipal Treasurer. Her explanation was that the parties in Crim. Case No.
5180 informed her that they would settle the case amicably. It was on April 26, 1993, or almost two months
later when Judge Palaypayon issued an order for the release of said cash bond (Exh. 7).
Respondent Baroy also admitted that since she assumed office on October 21, 1991 she used to issue
temporary receipt only for cash bond deposits and other payments and collections she received. She further
admitted that some of these temporary receipts she issued she failed to place the number of the receipts such
as that receipt marked Exhibit X (TSN, p. 35; 11-23-93). Baroy claims that she did not know that she had to
use the official receipts of the Supreme Court. It was only from February, 1993, after this case was already
filed, when she only started issuing official receipts.
The next charge against the respondents is that in order to be appointed Clerk of Court, Baroy gave Judge
Palaypayon an air conditioner as a gift. The evidence adduced with respect to this charge, show that on
August 24, 1991 Baroy bought an air conditioner for the sum of Seventeen Thousand Six Hundred
(P17,600.00) Pesos (Exhs. I and I-1). The same was paid partly in cash and in check (Exhs. I-2 and I-3). When
the air conditioner was brought to court in order to be installed in the chamber of Judge Palaypayon, it was still
placed in the same box when it was bought and was not used yet.
The respondents claim that Baroy sold it to Judge Palaypayon for Twenty Thousand (P20,00.00) Pesos on
installment basis with a down payment of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos and as proof thereof the
respondents presented a typewritten receipt dated May 29, 1993 (Exh. 22). The receipt was signed by both
respondents and by the Municipal Mayor of Tinambac, Camarines Sur and another person as witness.
The alleged sale between respondents is not beyond suspicion. It was bought by Baroy at a time when she
was applying for the vacant position of Clerk of Court (to) which she was eventually appointed in October,
1991. From the time she bought the air conditioner on August 24, 1991 until it was installed in the office of
Judge Palaypayon it was not used yet. The sale to Judge Palaypayon was only evidenced by a mere
typewritten receipt dated May 29, 1992 when this case was already filed. The receipt could have been easily
prepared. The Municipal Mayor of Tinambac who signed in the receipt as a witness did not testify in this case.
The sale is between the Clerk of Court and the Judge of the same court. All these circumstances give rise to
suspicion of at least impropriety. Judges should avoid such action as would subject (them) to suspicion and
(their) conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety (Jaagueta vs. Boncasos, 60 SCRA 27).
With respect to the charge that Judge Palaypayon received a cash bond deposit of One Thousand (P1,000.00)
Pesos from Januaria Dacara without issuing a receipt, Dacara executed an affidavit regarding this charge that
Judge Palaypayon did not give her a receipt for the P1,000.00 cash bond she deposited (Exh. N). Her affidavit,
however, has no probative value as she did not show that this cash bond of P1,000.00 found its way into the
hands of respondent Baroy who issued only a temporary receipt for it and this has been discussed earlier.
Another charge against Judge Palaypayon is the getting of detention prisoners to work in his house and one of
them escaped while in his custody and was never found again. To hide this fact, the case against said accused
was ordered archived by Judge Palaypayon. The evidence adduced with respect to this particular charge,
show that in Crim. Case No. 5647 entitled People vs. Stephen Kalaw, Alex Alano and Allan Adupe, accused
Alex Alano and Allan Adupe were arrested on April 12, 1991 and placed in the municipal jail of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur (Exhs. 0, 0-1, 0-2 and 0-3; Exh. 25). The evidence presented that Alex Alano was taken by
Judge Palaypayon from the municipal jail where said accused was confined and that he escaped while in
custody of Judge Palaypayon is solely testimonial, particularly that of David Ortiz, a former utility worker of the
MTC of Tinambac.
Herein investigator finds said evidence not sufficient. The complainants should have presented records from
the police of Tinambac to show that Judge Palaypayon took out from the municipal jail Alex Alano where he
was under detention and said accused escaped while in the custody of Judge Palaypayon.
The order, however, of Judge Palaypayon dated April 6, 1992 in Crim. Case No. 5047 archiving said case
appears to be without basis. The order states: "this case was filed on April 12, 1991 and the records show that
the warrant of arrest (was) issued against the accused, but up to this moment there is no return of service for
the warrant of arrest issued against said accused" (Exh. 0-4). The records of said case, however, show that in
fact there was a return of the service of the warrant of arrest dated April 12, 1991 showing that Alano and
Adupe were arrested (Exh. 0-3).
Judge Palaypayon explained that his order dated April 6, 1992 archiving Crim. Case No. 5047 referred only to
one of the accused who remained at large. The explanation cannot be accepted because the two other
accused, Alano and Adupe, were arrested. Judge Palaypayon should have issued an order for the arrest of
Adupe who allegedly jumped bail, but Alano was supposed to be confined in the municipal jail if his claim is
true that he did not take custody of Alano.
The explanation also of Judge Palaypayon why he ordered the case archived was because he heard from the
police that Alano escaped. This explanation is not acceptable either. He should ha(ve) set the case and if the
police failed to bring to court Alano, the former should have been required to explain in writing why Alano was
not brought to court. If the explanation was that Alano escaped from jail, he should have issued an order for his
arrest. It is only later on when he could not be arrested when the case should have been ordered archived. The
order archiving this case for the reason that he only heard that Alano escaped is another circumstance which
gave rise to a suspicion that Alano might have really escaped while in his custody only that the complainants
could not present records or other documentary evidence to prove the same.
The last charge against the respondents is that they collected filing fees on collection cases filed by the Rural
Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur which was supposed to be exempted in paying filing fees under existing
laws and that the filing fees received was deposited by respondent Baroy in her personal account in the bank.
The evidence presented show that on February 4, 1992 the Rural Bank of Tinambac filed ten (10) civil cases
for collection against farmers and it paid the total amount of Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos representing filing
fees. The complainants cited Section 14 of Republic Act 720, as amended, which exempts Rural Banks (from)
the payment of filing fees on collection of sums of money cases filed against farmers on loans they obtained.
Judge Palaypayon, however, had nothing to do with the payment of the filing fees of the Rural Bank of
Tinambac as it was respondent Baroy who received them and besides, on February 4, 1992, he was on sick
leave. On her part Baroy claims that the bank paid voluntarily the filing fees. The records, however, shows that
respondent Baroy sent a letter to the manager of the bank dated January 28, 1992 to the effect that if the bank
would not pay she would submit all Rural Bank cases for dismissal (Annex 6, comment by respondent Baroy).
Respondent Baroy should have checked whether the Rural Bank of Tinambac was really exempt from the
payment of filing fees pursuant to Republic Act 720, as amended, instead of threatening the bank to have its
cases be submitted to the court in order to have them dismissed. Here the payment of the filing fees was made
on February 4, 1992, but the Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos was only turned over to the Municipal Treasurer
on March 12, 1992. Here, there is an undue delay again in complying with her obligation as accountable
officer.
In view of the foregoing findings that the evidence presented by the complainants sufficiently show that
respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. had solemnized marriages, particularly that of Sammy Bocaya and
Gina Besmonte, without a marriage license, and that it having been shown that he did not comply with his duty
in closely supervising his clerk of court in the preparation of the monthly report of cases being submitted to the
Supreme Court, particularly for the months of July and September, 1992 where it has been proven that the
reports for said two (2) months were falsified with respect to the number of documents notarized, it is
respectfully recommended that he be imposed a fine of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS with a warning
that the same or similar offenses will be more severely dealt with.
The fact that Judge Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts or certificates of those marriages he
solemnized without a marriage license, there were no dates placed in the marriage contracts to show when
they were solemnized, the contracting parties were not furnished their marriage contracts and the Local Civil
Registrar was not being sent any copy of the marriage contract, will not absolve him from liability. By
solemnizing alone a marriage without a marriage license he as the solemnizing officer is the one responsible
for the irregularity in not complying (with) the formal requ(i)sites of marriage and under Article 4(3) of the
Family Code of the Philippines, he shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Judge Palaypayon is likewise liable for his negligence or failure to comply with his duty of closely supervising
his clerk of court in the performance of the latter's duties and functions, particularly the preparation of the
monthly report of cases (Bendesula vs. Laya, 58 SCRA 16). His explanation that he only signed the monthly
report of cases only when his clerk of court already signed the same, cannot be accepted. It is his duty to
closely supervise her, to check and verify the records if the monthly reports prepared by his clerk of court do
not contain false statements. It was held that "A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or
incompetence of court personnel (Nidua vs. Lazaro, 174 SCRA 158).
In view also of the foregoing finding that respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy, the clerk of court of the Municipal
Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, has been found to have falsified the monthly report of cases for the
months of July and September, 1992 with respect to the number of documents notarized, for having failed to
account (for) the notarial fees she received for said two (2) months period; for having failed to account (for) the
solemnization fees of those marriages allegedly not solemnized, but the solemnization fees were not returned;
for unauthorized issuance of temporary receipts, some of which were issued unnumbered; for receiving the
cash bond of Dacara on October 29, 1991 in the amount of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for which she
issued only a temporary receipt (Exh. Y) and for depositing it with the Land Bank of the Philippines only on
March 26, 1993, or after one year and five months in her possession and after this case was already filed; for
withdrawing said cash bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos on April 29, 1993 without any court order or
authority and redepositing it only on July 23, 1993; for receiving a cash bond of Three Thousand (P3,000.00)
Pesos from Alfredo Seprones in Crim. Case No. 5180, MTC, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, for which she issued
only an unnumbered temporary receipt (Exhs. X and X-1) and for not depositing it with a bank or with the
Municipal Treasurer until it was ordered released; and for requiring the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines
Sur to pay filing fees on February 4, 1992 for collection cases filed against farmers in the amount of Four
Hundred (P400.00) Pesos, but turning over said amount to the Municipal Treasurer only on March 12, 1992, it
is respectfully recommended that said respondent clerk of court Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy be dismissed from the
service.
It is provided that "Withdrawal of court deposits shall be by the clerk of court who shall issue official receipt to
the provincial, city or municipal treasurer for the amount withdrawn. Court deposits cannot be withdrawn except
by order of the court, . . . ." (Revised Manual of Instructions for Treasurers, Sec. 183, 184 and 626; p. 127,
Manual for Clerks of Court). A circular also provides that the Clerks of Court shall immediately issue an official
receipt upon receipt of deposits from party litigants and thereafter deposit intact the collection with the
municipal, city or provincial treasurer and their deposits, can only be withdrawn upon proper receipt and order
of the Court (DOJ Circular No. 52, 26 April 1968; p. 136, Manual for Clerks of Court). Supreme Court
Memorandum Circular No. 5, 25 November 1982, also provides that "all collections of funds of fiduciary
character including rental deposits, shall be deposited immediately by the clerk of court concerned upon
receipt thereof with City, Municipal or Provincial Treasurer where his court is located" and that "no withdrawal
of any of such deposits shall be made except upon lawful order of the court exercising jurisdiction over the
subject matter.
Respondent Baroy had either failed to comply with the foregoing circulars, or deliberately disregarded, or even
intentionally violated them. By her conduct, she demonstrated her callous unconcern for the obligations and
responsibility of her duties and functions as a clerk of court and accountable officer. The gross neglect of her
duties shown by her constitute(s) a serious misconduct which warrant(s) her removal from office. In the case of
Belen P. Ferriola vs. Norma Hiam, Clerk of Court, MTCC, Branch I, Batangas City; A.M. No. P-90-414; August
9, 1993, it was held that "The clerk of court is not authorized to keep funds in his/her custody; monies received
by him/her shall be deposited immediately upon receipt thereof with the City, Municipal or Provincial Treasurer.
Supreme Court Circular Nos. 5 dated November 25, 1982 and 5-A dated December 3, 1982. Respondent
Hiam's failure to remit the cash bail bonds and fine she collected constitutes serious misconduct and her
misappropriation of said funds constitutes dishonesty. "Respondent Norma Hiam was found guilty of
dishonesty and serious misconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and (the Court) ordered her
immediate dismissal (from) the service.
x x x           x x x          x x x
We here emphasize once again our adjuration that the conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an
office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized
by propriety and decorum but, above all else, must be beyond suspicion. Every employee should be an
example of integrity, uprightness and honesty. 5 Integrity in a judicial office is more than a virtue, it is a
necessity. 6 It applies, without qualification as to rank or position, from the judge to the least of its personnel,
they being standard-bearers of the exacting norms of ethics and morality imposed upon a Court of justice.
On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code pertinently provides that the formal requisites of
marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for therein. 7 Complementarily, it
declares that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage
void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage,
the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. 8
The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the illegal marriages, and what
we are providing for herein pertains to the administrative liability of respondents, all without prejudice to their
criminal responsibility. The Revised Penal Code provides that "(p)riests or ministers of any religious
denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be
punished in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law."9 This is of course, within the province of the
prosecutorial agencies of the Government.
The recommendation with respect to the administrative sanction to be imposed on respondent judge should,
therefore, be modified. For one, with respect to the charge of illegal solemnization of marriages, it does appear
that he had not taken to heart, but actually trifled with, the law's concern for the institution of marriage and the
legal effects flowing from civil status. This, and his undeniable participation in the other offenses charged as
hereinbefore narrated in detail, approximate such serious degree of misconduct and of gross negligence in the
performance of judicial duties as to ineludibly require a higher penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby imposes a FINE of P20,000.00 on respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon.
Jr., with a stern warning that any repetition of the same or similar offenses in the future will definitely be
severely dealt with. Respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture
of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Let copies of this decision be spread on their records and furnished to the Office of the Ombudsman for
appropriate action.
G.R. No. 138322           October 2, 2001
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner,
vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid
according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of
the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
laws and judgment; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must
be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the January 7, 1999
Decision1 and the March 24, 1999 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil
Case No. 3026-AF. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio solemnized
on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can now remarry under existing and
applicable laws to any and/or both parties."3
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.
The Facts
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on
March 1, 1987.4 They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, 5 a decree of divorce,
purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of Australian
Citizenship" issued by the Australian government.6 Petitioner – a Filipina – and respondent were married on
January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City. 7 In their application for a marriage
license, respondent was declared as "single" and "Filipino."8
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their
marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in
accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.9
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage 10 in the court a quo, on the
ground of bigamy – respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January
12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondent's marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior
marriage and its subsequent dissolution.11 He contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had
been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australian in 1989; 12 thus, he was legally capacitated to
marry petitioner in 1994.1âwphi1.nêt
On July 7, 1998 – or about five years after the couple's wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity
was pending – respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia
because the "marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down."13
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complained be dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause of
action.14 The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent.15 The court marked and admitted the
documentary evidence of both parties.16 After they submitted their respective memoranda, the case was
submitted for resolution.17
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and
recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential
element of the marriage; that is, respondent's alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its
Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus,
there was no more martial union to nullify or annual.
Hence, this Petition.18
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
"I
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by the respondent ipso
facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to contract a second marriage
with the petitioner.
"2
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a certificate of legal capacity to
marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the petitioner' marriage to the respondent.
"3
The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case.
"4
The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of the Family
Code as the applicable provisions in this case.
"5
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce
decree obtained by the respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to remarry, without first
securing a recognition of the judgment granting the divorce decree before our courts."19
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1)
whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and (2) whether respondent was
proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of our ruling on these two, there is no more
necessity to take up the rest.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson
Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson.
Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,20 petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any other foreign judgment,
may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing
absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself. She adds that respondent miserably failed to
establish these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages solemnized
abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex loci celebrationist). In effect,
the Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to show the conformity of the marriage in question to the
legal requirements of the place where the marriage was performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our discussion. Philippine law
does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. 21 A marriage between two Filipinos
cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 22 and 1723 of the Civil
Code.24 In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 25 of the Family Code allows the
former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry."26 A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.27
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be made. Van
Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that "aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law." 28 Therefore, before a foreign divorce
decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate
its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.29 Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply with the
registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These articles read as follows:
"ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file separately a sworn
application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall specify the following:
x x x     x x x     x x x
"(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled;
x x x      x x x      x x x
"ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be required
to furnish, instead of the birth of baptismal certificate required in the last preceding article, the death certificate
of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous
marriage. x x x.
"ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the
appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons."
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document – a written
official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its authenticity and due
execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the
document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. 30 A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the
divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. 31 The decree purports to be
a written act or record of an act of an officially body or tribunal of a foreign country.32
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested33 by the
officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.34
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an
Australian family court.35 However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforemetioned rules on
evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence,
counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the
Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.36 The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner's
qualification.37 Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's
failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of
Sydney, Australia.38
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no
longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.39 Naturalization is
the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a
citizen.40 Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their
adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and
the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because she is the
party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of
the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in
that country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts:
thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing
necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action."41 In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the
material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of
proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. 42 Since the divorce was a
defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely
upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.43 Like any other
facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are
supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. 44 The power of judicial notice must be exercised with
caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.
Second Issue:
Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was legally incapacitated to
marry her in 1994.
Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in evidence, adequately
established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.
Respondent's contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful
union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1)
absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates
the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. 45 There is no showing in the case
at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree – a conditional or provisional judgment of
divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may follow
after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected.46
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict
remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a
divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from remarrying again. The court may
allow a remarriage only after proof of good behavior.47
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has
died) commits the offence of bigamy."48
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been restricted. It did
not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for
the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored
respondent's capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or presumptive
evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 3949 of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that
no proof has been presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code was not
submitted together with the application for a marriage license. According to her, its absence is proof that
respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party
concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient to establish
the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted
certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage
license.50
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner. A
review of the records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits were presented before the lower
court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit "A" – Complaint;51 (b) Exhibit "B" – Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick
A. Recto (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva
Ecija;52 (c) Exhibit "C" – Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson
(Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila; 53 (d) Exhibit "D" – Office of the City Registrar of
Cabanatuan City Certification that no information of annulment between Rederick A. Recto and Editha D.
Samson was in its records;54 and (e) Exhibit "E" – Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A.
Recto;55 (2) for respondent: (Exhibit "1" – Amended Answer;56 (b) Exhibit "S" – Family Law Act 1975 Decree
Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia;57 (c) Exhibit "3" – Certificate of Australian
Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto;58 (d) Exhibit "4" – Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court
of Australia Certificate;59 and Exhibit "5" – Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A.
Recto and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995.60
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian
citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with petitioner's contention
that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal
capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law
governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of
bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a
direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to
the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioner's legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in
that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties' marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being
already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in
Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND the case to the
court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondent's legal capacity to marry
petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties' marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above
discussed. No costs.
G.R. No. 173540               January 22, 2014
PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO, Petitioner,
vs.
TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.ofthe Rules of Court, assailing the 31 August 2005
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 79444, which reversed the 25 March 2003
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8 of Davao City, in a complaint for Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Marriage· docketed as Civil Case No. 26, 908-98.
The Facts
This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to have been validly married to the same man,
now deceased.
Respondent Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11 November 1998, a Complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage against Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido (Peregrina) on the ground that she (Tecla), is the
lawful wife of the deceased Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio). In her complaint, Tecla alleged that her marriage
to Eustaquio was solemnized on 30 September 1942 in Talibon, Bohol in rites officiated by the Parish Priest of
the said town. According to her, the fact of their marriage is evidenced by a Marriage Certificate recorded with
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar (LCR) of Talibon, Bohol. However, due to World War II, records were
destroyed. Thus, only a Certification3 was issued by the LCR.
During the existence of Tecla and Eustaquio’s union, they begot four (4) children, namely: Climaco H. Avenido,
born on 30 March 1943; Apolinario H. Avenido, born on 23 August 1948; Editha A. Ausa, born on 26 July 1950,
and Eustaquio H. Avenido, Jr., born on 15 December 1952. Sometime in 1954, Eustaquio left his family and
his whereabouts was not known. In 1958, Tecla and her children were informed that Eustaquio was in Davao
City living with another woman by the name of Buenaventura Sayson who later died in 1977 without any issue.
In 1979, Tecla learned that her husband Eustaquio got married to another woman by the name of Peregrina,
which marriage she claims must be declared null and void for being bigamous – an action she sought to
protect the rights of her children over the properties acquired by Eustaquio.
On 12 April 1999, Peregrina filed her answer to the complaint with counterclaim, 4 essentially averring that she
is the legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio who died on 22 September 1989 in Davao City, their marriage
having been celebrated on 30 March 1979 at St. Jude Parish in Davao City. She also contended that the case
was instituted to deprive her of the properties she owns in her own right and as an heir of Eustaquio.
Trial ensued.
Tecla presented testimonial and documentary evidence consisting of:
1) Testimonies of Adelina Avenido-Ceno (Adelina), Climaco Avenido (Climaco) and Tecla herself to
substantiate her alleged prior existing and valid marriage with (sic) Eustaquio;
2) Documentary evidence such as the following:
a. Certification of Loss/Destruction of Record of Marriage from 1900 to 1944 issued by the Office of the Civil
Registrar, Municipality of Talibon, Bohol;5
b. Certification of Submission of a copy of Certificate of Marriage to the Office of the Civil Registrar General,
National Statistics Office (NSO), R. Magsaysay Blvd., Sta Mesa, Manila;6
c. Certification that Civil Registry records of births, deaths and marriages that were actually filed in the Office of
the Civil Registrar General, NSO Manila, started only in 1932;7
d. Certification that Civil Registry records submitted to the Office of the Civil Registrar General, NSO, from
1932 to the early part of 1945, were totally destroyed during the liberation of Manila;8
e. Certification of Birth of Apolinario Avenido;9
f. Certification of Birth of Eustaquio Avenido, Jr.;10
g. Certification of Birth of Editha Avenido;11
h. Certification of Marriage between Eustaquio Sr., and Tecla issued by the Parish Priest of Talibon, Bohol on
30 September 1942;12
i. Certification that record of birth from 1900 to 1944 were destroyed by Second World War issued by the Office
of the Municipal Registrar of Talibon, Bohol, that they cannot furnish as requested a true transcription from the
Register of Birth of Climaco Avenido;13
j. Certificate of Baptism of Climaco indicating that he was born on 30 March 1943 to spouses Eustaquio and
Tecla;14
k. Electronic copy of the Marriage Contract between Eustaquio and Peregrina.15
On the other hand, Peregrina testified on, among others, her marriage to Eustaquio that took place in Davao
City on 3 March 1979; her life as a wife and how she took care of Eustaquio when he already had poor health,
as well as her knowledge that Tecla is not the legal wife, but was once a common law wife of
Eustaquio.16 Peregrina likewise set forth documentary evidence to substantiate her allegations and to prove
her claim for damages, to wit:
1) Marriage Contract17 between Pregrina and the late Eustaquio showing the date of marriage on 3 March
1979;
2) Affidavit of Eustaquio executed on 22 March 1985 declaring himself as single when he contracted marriage
with the petitioner although he had a common law relation with one Tecla Hoybia with whom he had four (4)
children namely: Climaco, Tiburcio, Editha and Eustaquio, Jr., all surnamed Avenido;18
3) Letter of Atty. Edgardo T. Mata dated 15 April 2002, addressed to the Civil Registrar of the Municipality of
Alegria, Surigao del Norte;19 and
4) Certification dated 25 April 2002 issued by Colita P. Umipig, in her capacity as the Civil Registrar of Alegria,
Surigao del Norte.20
In addition, as basis for the counterclaim, Peregrina averred that the case was initiated in bad faith so as to
deprive her of the properties she owns in her own right and as an heir of Eustaquio; hence, her entitlement to
damages and attorney’s fees.
On 25 March 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision21 denying Tecla’s petition, as well as Peregrina’s counter-
claim. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
For The Foregoing, the petition for the "DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE" filed by petitioner
TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO against respondent PEREGRINA MACUA is hereby DENIED.
The "COUNTERCLAIM" filed by respondent PEREGRINA MACUA against petitioner TECLA HOYBIA
AVENIDO is hereby DISMISSED.22
Not convinced, Tecla appealed to the CA raising as error the trial court’s alleged disregard of the evidence on
the existence of her marriage to Eustaquio.
In its 31 August 2005 Decision,23 the CA ruled in favor of Tecla by declaring the validity of her marriage to
Eustaquio, while pronouncing on the other hand, the marriage between Peregrina and Eustaquio to be
bigamous, and thus, null and void. The CA ruled:
The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of [Adelina], the sister of
EUSTAQUIO who testified that she personally witnessed the wedding celebration of her older brother
EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco], the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO
and [Tecla], who testified that his mother [Tecla] was married to his father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself;
and (2) the documentary evidence mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed that the due execution and
the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the condition sine qua non, for the introduction of secondary
evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence the trial court has disregarded.24
Peregrina now questions the said ruling assigning as error, among others, the failure of the CA to appreciate
the validity of her marriage to Eustaquio. For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its
Memorandum25 dated 5 June 2008, raises the following legal issues:
1. Whether or not the court can validly rely on the "presumption of marriage" to overturn the validity of a
subsequent marriage;
2. Whether or not secondary evidence may be considered and/or taken cognizance of, without proof of the
execution or existence and the cause of the unavailability of the best evidence, the original document;
and
3. Whether or not a Certificate of Marriage issued by the church has a probative value to prove the existence of
a valid marriage without the priest who issued the same being presented to the witness stand.26
Our Ruling
Essentially, the question before us is whether or not the evidence presented during the trial proves the
existence of the marriage of Tecla to Eustaquio.
The trial court, in ruling against Tecla’s claim of her prior valid marriage to Eustaquio relied on Tecla’s failure to
present her certificate of marriage to Eustaquio. Without such certificate, the trial court considered as useless
the certification of the Office of the Civil Registrar of Talibon, Bohol, that it has no more records of marriages
during the period 1900 to 1944. The same thing was said as regards the Certification issued by the National
Statistics Office of Manila. The trial court observed:
Upon verification from the NSO, Office of the Civil Registrar General, Manila, it, likewise, issued a Certification
(Exhibit "B") stating that:
records from 1932 up to early part of 1945 were totally destroyed during the liberation of Manila on February 4,
1945. What are presently filed in this office are records from the latter part of 1945 to date, except for the city of
Manila which starts from 1952. Hence, this office has no way of verifying and could not issue as requested,
certified true copy of the records of marriage between [Eustaquio] and [Tecla], alleged to have been married on
30th September 1942, in Talibon, Bohol.27
In the absence of the marriage contract, the trial court did not give credence to the testimony of Tecla and her
witnesses as it considered the same as mere self-serving assertions. Superior significance was given to the
fact that Tecla could not even produce her own copy of the said proof of marriage. Relying on Section 3 (a)
and Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the trial court declared that Tecla failed to prove the existence of
the first marriage.
The CA, on the other hand, concluded that there was a presumption of lawful marriage between Tecla and
Eustaquio as they deported themselves as husband and wife and begot four (4) children. Such presumption,
supported by documentary evidence consisting of the same Certifications disregarded by the trial court, as well
as the testimonial evidence especially that of Adelina Avenido-Ceno, created, according to the CA, sufficient
proof of the fact of marriage. Contrary to the trial court’s ruling, the CA found that its appreciation of the
evidence presented by Tecla is well in accord with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
We uphold the reversal by the CA of the decision of the trial court. Quite recently, in Añonuevo v. Intestate
Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni,28 we said, citing precedents, that:
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole
and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by
relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be
recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.
The error of the trial court in ruling that without the marriage certificate, no other proof of the fact can be
accepted, has been aptly delineated in Vda de Jacob v. Court of Appeals.29 Thus:
It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the conditio
sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence they
have disregarded. They have thus confused the evidence to show due execution and loss as "secondary"
evidence of the marriage. In Hernaez v. Mcgrath, the Court clarified this misconception thus:
x x x [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of the execution of the instrument
was barred. The court confounded the execution and the contents of the document. It is the contents, x x x
which may not be proven by secondary evidence when the
instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution are not dependent on the existence or non-existence of
the document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs of the contents: due execution, besides the loss, has to be
shown as foundation for the inroduction of secondary evidence of the contents.
xxxx
Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily collateral or primary. It generally
consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the document is actually produced, its authencity is
not necessarily, if at all, determined from its face or recital of its contents but by parol evidence. At the most,
failure to produce the document, when available, to establish its execution may effect the weight of the
evidence presented but not the admissibility of such evidence.
The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this issue by relying on Lim Tanhu v.
Ramolete. But even there, we said that "marriage may be prove[n] by other competent evidence.
Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing officer, by
witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to whom the parties have
previously narrated the execution thereof. The Court has also held that "[t]he loss may be shown by any
person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one who ha[s] made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient
examination in the place or places where the document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the
person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other
investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument [has] indeed [been] lost."
In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was present during
the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The subsequent loss was shown by
the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as relevant, competent and
admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the
evidence presented, secondary evidence–testimonial and documentary–may be admitted to prove the fact of
marriage.30
As correctly stated by the appellate court:
In the case at bench, the celebration of marriage between [Tecla] and EUSTAQUIO was established by the
testimonial evidence furnished by [Adelina] who appears to be present during the marriage ceremony, and by
[Tecla] herself as a living witness to the event. The loss was shown by the certifications issued by the NSO and
LCR of Talibon, Bohol. These are relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and
the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence –
testimonial and documentary – may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage. In PUGEDA v. TRIAS, the
Supreme Court held that "marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. The testimony by
one of the parties to the marriage or by one of the witnesses to the marriage has been held to be admissible to
prove the fact of marriage. The person who officiated at the solemnization is also competent to testify as an
eyewitness to the fact of marriage."
xxxx
The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of [Adelina], the sister of
EUSTAQUIO who testified that she personally witnessed the wedding celebration of her older brother
EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco], the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO
and [Tecla], who testified that his mother [Tecla] was married to his father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself;
and (2) the documentary evidence mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed that the due execution and
the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the condition sine qua non for the introduction of secondary
evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence the trial court has disregarded.31
The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.
As early as the case of Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 32 this Court has elucidated on the rationale behind the
presumption:
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage.1âwphi1 Marriage in this
jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the
public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony.
Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or
evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and
if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant
violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. (Sec. 334,
No. 28) Semper – praesumitur pro matrimonio – Always presume marriage.
In the case at bar, the establishment of the fact of marriage was completed by the testimonies of Adelina,
Climaco and Tecla; the unrebutted the certifications of marriage issued by the parish priest of the Most Holy
Trinity Cathedral of Talibon, Bohol.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
79444 is AFFIRMED. The marriage between petitioner Peregrina Macua Avenido and the deceased Eustaquio
Avenido is hereby declared NULL and VOID. No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. L-57062 January 24, 1992
MARIA DEL ROSARIO MARIATEGUI, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JACINTO MARIATEGUI, JULIAN MARIATEGUI and PAULINA
MARIATEGUI, respondents.
Montesa, Albon & Associates for petitioners.
Parmenio B. Patacsil, Patacsil Twins Law Office for the heirs of the late Maria del Rosario Mariategui.
Tinga, Fuentes & Tagle Firm for private respondents.

BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of the Court of Appeals dated December 24, 1980 in
CA-G.R. No. 61841, entitled "Jacinto Mariategui, et al. v. Maria del Rosario Mariategui, et al.," reversing the
judgment of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VIII ** at Pasig, Metro Manila.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 (Brief for respondents, Rollo, pp. 116; 8). During his
lifetime, Lupo Mariategui contracted three (3) marriages. With his first wife, Eusebia Montellano, who died on
November 8, 1904, he begot four (4) children, namely: Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbana and Ireneo.
Baldomera died and was survived by her children named Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia
and Federico, all surnamed Espina. Ireneo also died and left a son named Ruperto. With his second wife,
Flaviana Montellano, he begot a daughter named Cresenciana who was born on May 8, 1910 (Rollo, Annex
"A", p. 36).
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco (Lupo's third wife) got married sometime in 1930. They had three children,
namely: Jacinto, born on July 3, 1929, Julian, born on February 16, 1931 and Paulina, born on April 19, 1938.
Felipa Velasco Mariategui died in 1941 (Rollo, Ibid).
At the time of his death, Lupo Mariategui left certain properties which he acquired when he was still unmarried
(Brief for respondents, Rollo, pp. 116; 4). These properties are described in the complaint as Lots Nos. 163,
66, 1346 and 156 of the Muntinglupa Estate (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 39).
On December 2, 1967, Lupo's descendants by his first and second marriages, namely, Maria del Rosario,
Urbana, Ruperto, Cresencia, all surnamed Mariategui and Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia
and Federico, all surnamed Espina, executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated unto
themselves Lot No. 163 of the Muntinglupa Estate. Thereafter, Lot No. 163 was the subject of a voluntary
registration proceedings filed by the adjudicatees under Act No. 496, and the land registration court issued a
decree ordering the registration of the lot. Thus, on April 1, 1971, OCT No. 8828 was issued in the name of the
above-mentioned heirs. Subsequently, the registered owners caused the subdivision of the said lot into Lots
Nos. 163-A to 163-H, for which separate transfer certificates of title were issued to the respective parties
(Rollo, ibid).
On April 23, 1973, Lupo's children by his third marriage with Felipa Velasco (Jacinto, Julian and Paulina) filed
with the lower court an amended complaint claiming that Lot No. 163 together with Lots Nos. 669, 1346 and
154 were owned by their common father, Lupo Mariategui, and that, with the adjudication of Lot No. 163 to
their co-heirs, they (children of the third marriage) were deprived of their respective shares in the lots. Plaintiffs
pray for partition of the estate of their deceased father and annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition
dated December 2, 1967 (Petition, Rollo, p. 10). Cresencia Mariategui Abas, Flaviana Mariategui Cabrera and
Isabel Santos were impleaded in the complaint as unwilling defendants as they would not like to join the suit as
plaintiffs although they acknowledged the status and rights of the plaintiffs and agreed to the partition of the
parcels of land as well as the accounting of their fruits (Ibid., Rollo, p. 8; Record on Appeal, p. 4).
The defendants (now petitioners) filed an answer with counterclaim (Amended Record on Appeal, p. 13).
Thereafter, they filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and prescription. They
specifically contended that the complaint was one for recognition of natural children. On August 14, 1974, the
motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court, in an order the dispositive portion of which reads:
It is therefore the opinion of the Court that Articles 278 and 285 of the Civil Code cited by counsel for the
defendants are of erroneous application to this case. The motion to dismiss is therefore denied for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED. (Ibid, p. 37).
However, on February 16, 1977, the complaint as well as petitioners' counterclaim were dismissed by the trial
court, in its decision stating thus:
The plaintiffs' right to inherit depends upon the acknowledgment or recognition of their continuous enjoyment
and possession of status of children of their supposed father. The evidence fails to sustain either premise, and
it is clear that this action cannot be sustained. (Ibid, Rollo, pp. 67-68)
The plaintiffs elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the trial court committed an error ". .
. in not finding that the parents of the appellants, Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco (were) lawfully married,
and in holding (that) they (appellants) are not legitimate children of their said parents, thereby divesting them of
their inheritance . . . " (Rollo, pp. 14-15).
On December 24, 1980, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision declaring all the children and descendants
of Lupo Mariategui, including appellants Jacinto, Julian and Paulina (children of the third marriage) as entitled
to equal shares in the estate of Lupo Mariategui; directing the adjudicatees in the extrajudicial partition of real
properties who eventually acquired transfer certificates of title thereto, to execute deeds of reconveyance in
favor, and for the shares, of Jacinto, Julian and Paulina provided rights of innocent third persons are not
prejudiced otherwise the said adjudicatees shall reimburse the said heirs the fair market value of their shares;
and directing all the parties to submit to the lower court a project of partition in the net estate of Lupo
Mariategui after payment of taxes, other government charges and outstanding legal obligations.
The defendants-appellees filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision but it was denied for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition which was given due course by the court on December 7, 1981.
The petitioners submit to the Court the following issues: (a) whether or not prescription barred private
respondents' right to demand the partition of the estate of Lupo Mariategui, and (b) whether or not the private
respondents, who belatedly filed the action for recognition, were able to prove their successional rights over
said estate. The resolution of these issues hinges, however, on the resolution of the preliminary matter, i.e., the
nature of the complaint filed by the private respondents.
The complaint alleged, among other things, that "plaintiffs are the children of the deceased spouses Lupo
Mariategui . . . and Felipa Velasco"; that "during his lifetime, Lupo Mariategui had repeatedly acknowledged
and confirmed plaintiffs as his children and the latter, in turn, have continuously enjoyed such status since their
birth"; and "on the basis of their relationship to the deceased Lupo Mariategui and in accordance with the law
on intestate succession, plaintiffs are entitled to inherit shares in the foregoing estate (Record on Appeal, pp. 5
& 6). It prayed, among others, that plaintiffs be declared as children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and
adjudication in favor of plaintiffs their lawful shares in the estate of the decedent (Ibid, p. 10).
A perusal of the entire allegations of the complaint, however, shows that the action is principally one of
partition. The allegation with respect to the status of the private respondents was raised only collaterally to
assert their rights in the estate of the deceased. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly adopted the settled rule
that the nature of an action filed in court is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint constituting the
cause of action (Republic vs. Estenzo, 158 SCRA 282 [1988]).
It has been held that, if the relief demanded is not the proper one which may be granted under the law, it does
not characterize or determine the nature of plaintiffs' action, and the relief to which plaintiff is entitled based on
the facts alleged by him in his complaint, although it is not the relief demanded, is what determines the nature
of the action (1 Moran, p. 127, 1979 ed., citing Baguioro vs. Barrios, et al., 77 Phil. 120).
With respect to the legal basis of private respondents' demand for partition of the estate of Lupo Mariategui,
the Court of Appeals aptly held that the private respondents are legitimate children of the deceased.
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to have been lawfully married in or about 1930. This fact is
based on the declaration communicated by Lupo Mariategui to Jacinto who testified that "when (his) father was
still living, he was able to mention to (him) that he and (his) mother were able to get married before a Justice of
the Peace of Taguig, Rizal." The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the
community to be such. Although no marriage certificate was introduced to this effect, no evidence was likewise
offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not
invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present (People vs. Borromeo, 133 SCRA 106
[1984]).
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and Felipa. The
laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and
board is legitimate; and that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary
habits of life (Section 5 (z), (bb), (cc), Rule 131, Rules of Court; Corpus v. Corpus, 85 SCRA 567 [1978];
Saurnaba v. Workmen's Compensation, 85 SCRA 502 [1978]; Alavado v. City Gov't. of Tacloban, 139 SCRA
230 [1985]; Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439 [1985]).
Courts look upon the presumption of marriage with great favor as it is founded on the following rationale:
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not
only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply
interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special
to that case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society and if the parties
were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency
and of
law . . . (Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 56 [1922] quoted in Alavado vs. City Government of
Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230 [1985]).
So much so that once a man and a woman have lived as husband and wife and such relationship is not denied
nor contradicted, the presumption of their being married must be admitted as a fact (Alavado v. City Gov't. of
Tacloban, supra).
The Civil Code provides for the manner under which legitimate filiation may be proven. However, considering
the effectivity of the Family Code of the Philippines, the case at bar must be decided under a new if not entirely
dissimilar set of rules because the parties have been overtaken by events, to use the popular phrase
(Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76873, October 26, 1989). Thus, under Title VI of the Family Code,
there are only two classes of children — legitimate and illegitimate. The fine distinctions among various types
of illegitimate children have been eliminated (Castro vs. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 656 [1989]).
Article 172 of the said Code provides that the filiation of legitimate children may be established by the record of
birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment or by the open and continuous possession of the status
of a legitimate child.
Evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation of the private respondents. Jacinto's birth certificate is a
record of birth referred to in the said article. Again, no evidence which tends to disprove facts contained therein
was adduced before the lower court. In the case of the two other private respondents, Julian and Paulina, they
may not have presented in evidence any of the documents required by Article 172 but they continuously
enjoyed the status of children of Lupo Mariategui in the same manner as their brother Jacinto.
While the trial court found Jacinto's testimonies to be inconsequential and lacking in substance as to certain
dates and names of relatives with whom their family resided, these are but minor details. The nagging fact is
that for a considerable length of time and despite the death of Felipa in 1941, the private respondents and
Lupo lived together until Lupo's death in 1953. It should be noted that even the trial court mentioned in its
decision the admission made in the affidavit of Cresenciana Mariategui Abas, one of the petitioners herein, that
" . . . Jacinto, Julian and Paulina Mariategui ay pawang mga kapatid ko sa
ama . . ." (Exh. M, Record on Appeal, pp. 65-66).
In view of the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that private respondents are legitimate children
and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and therefore, the time limitation prescribed in Article 285 for filing an action for
recognition is inapplicable to this case. Corollarily, prescription does not run against private respondents with
respect to the filing of the action for partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit prescription is invoked,
have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the co-ownership. In other words, prescription of an action for
partition does not lie except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner (Del Banco vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 156 SCRA 55 [1987] citing Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532 [1982]).
Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners absent a clear
repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated to the other co-owners (Mariano vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342
[1987]). Furthermore, an action to demand partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches (Del
Banco vs. IAC, 156 SCRA 55 [1987]). On the other hand, an action for partition may be seen to be at once an
action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the
property involved (Roque vs. IAC, 165 SCRA 118 [1988]).
Petitioners contend that they have repudiated the co-ownership when they executed the extrajudicial partition
excluding the private respondents and registered the properties in their own names (Petition, p. 16; Rollo, p.
20). However, no valid repudiation was made by petitioners to the prejudice of private respondents. Assuming
petitioners' registration of the subject lot in 1971 was an act of repudiation of the co-ownership, prescription
had not yet set in when private respondents filed in 1973 the present action for partition (Ceniza vs. C.A., 181
SCRA 552 [1990]).
In their complaint, private respondents averred that in spite of their demands, petitioners, except the unwilling
defendants in the lower court, failed and refused to acknowledge and convey their lawful shares in the estate
of their father (Record on Appeal, p. 6). This allegation, though denied by the petitioners in their answer
(Ibid, p. 14), was never successfully refuted by them. Put differently, in spite of petitioners' undisputed
knowledge of their relationship to private respondents who are therefore their co-heirs, petitioners fraudulently
withheld private respondent's share in the estate of Lupo Mariategui. According to respondent Jacinto, since
1962, he had been inquiring from petitioner Maria del Rosario about their (respondents) share in the property
left by their deceased father and had been assured by the latter (Maria del Rosario) not to worry because they
will get some shares. As a matter of fact, sometime in 1969, Jacinto constructed a house where he now
resides on Lot No. 163 without any complaint from petitioners.
Petitioners' registration of the properties in their names in 1971 did not operate as a valid repudiation of the co-
ownership. In Adille vs. Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 455, 461-462 [1988]), the Court held:
Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have been preceded by repudiation (of
the co-ownership). The act of repudiation, in turn, is subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the
co-ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence
thereon is clear and conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession through open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession of the property for the period required by law.
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that registration under the Torrens system is constructive notice of title, but it has likewise been our
holding that the Torrens title does not furnish shield for fraud. It is therefore no argument to say that the act of
registration is equivalent to notice of repudiation, assuming there was one, notwithstanding the long-standing
rule that registration operates as a universal notice of title.
Inasmuch as petitioners registered the properties in their names in fraud of their co-heirs prescription can only
be deemed to have commenced from the time private respondents discovered the petitioners' act of
defraudation (Adille vs. Court of Appeals, supra). Hence, prescription definitely may not be invoked by
petitioners because private respondents commenced the instant action barely two months after learning that
petitioners had registered in their names the lots involved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 24,
1980 is Affirmed.
G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen
and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry
under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling on this apparently
novel question, presented as a pure question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision1 dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial
Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution2 dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion
for reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated
to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code and by reason
of the divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry
under the Philippine Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.3
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer
Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano
discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married
a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue,
San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26
of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The
Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was
denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE4
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case
because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and
an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal
separation.5 Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs respondent’s situation. The OSG posits
that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial determination.6
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists that when his
naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by
operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.7
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually constituted a
petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other
governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional
Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or
duties, thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the
controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a
legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.8
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino citizens
where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The
interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the
institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry.
Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial
determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of
his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply to the case of
respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come about in the first place, and what was
the intent of the legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as
the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise
signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to
Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by the case at hand. It
seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties
were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently
obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while
residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings9 on the Family Code, the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the
Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are Filipinos who divorce them
abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who
validly divorce them abroad can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino citizens. For those whose
foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be considered to be validly divorced here and can re-
marry. We propose that this be deleted and made into law only after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article
26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce,
is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.10 The Van
Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce
decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is
capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.11 In Quita, the parties were,
as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in
1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino
divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2
of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains
a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a
foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and
injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its
spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to
cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.12
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse,
then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that
has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently
obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should
be allowed to remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file either a
petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in
this particular case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to have all the
badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever
the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien
spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by respondent concerning
the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondent’s wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has
the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.13
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized
as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the
party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing
it.14 Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any
other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved. 15 Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce
decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no
evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No.
209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by
a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the
present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on
respondent’s bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a
divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such
declaration could only be made properly upon respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated
May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur,
Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE. No pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. 186571               August 11, 2010

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch
11, elevated via a petition for review on certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization on November 29, 2000.3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto.
Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.4 Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada
soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was
shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert
returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada
granted Gerbert’s petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on
January 8, 2006.5
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of
marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and
registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate. Despite the registration of
the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage
between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree
must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of
1982.6
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as
dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but
submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerbert’s
petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by financial and personal
circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to
Gerbert’s.
In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not
the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a
naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,8 in order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine
law.9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III; 10 the
provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse."11
THE PETITION
From the RTC’s ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that filed in
Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC
ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the Filipino
spouse – an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code. He considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case,
as there is a possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiancée in the
Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil Registry Office. The
Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective Comments,14 both support Gerbert’s position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
THE COURT’S RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the
substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages – void 15 and voidable16 marriages. In both
cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at
the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause
arising after the marriage.17 Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.18
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an alien, President
Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution, 19 enacted
Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its present wording, as follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into the law
this Court’s holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases, the Court refused
to acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion of marital rights after a foreign court’s divorce decree between the
alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital
bond between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still married to [the alien
spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged
to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should
not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.22
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse."23 The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital
status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse
considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry.24 Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted
precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the
Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond;25 Article 17 of
the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments
promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code
provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage
between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the
recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to
remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage.
No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that
already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national
law.26
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino
spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest to
petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no
rights in favor of aliens – with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to
dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the
recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity
with the alien’s national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which
provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a
foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the
title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of
a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice
to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with
the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a
divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law.27
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do
not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign
is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country."28 This
means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence,
together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or
herself.29 The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action
where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her
capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies
attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the
Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer
in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required
certificates proving its authenticity,30 but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce. 31 Under this
situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we
deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent
with the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests that will be
served and the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will
allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner’s presumptive
evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a
recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata 32 between
the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.33
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign
judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper
basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same
effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.
Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded
the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of the
decree.34 We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench and
the bar to what had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees
that produce legal consequences touching upon a person’s legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting "all
his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will,
such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not."35
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a person’s legal capacity and
status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires
the registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. – A civil register is established for recording the civil status of persons, in which shall be
entered:
(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. — The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their offices the following books,
in which they shall, respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil status of persons:
(1) Birth and death register;
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized but also divorces and
dissolved marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization register.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the submission of the
decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree’s registration. The law should be read in relation
with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect.
In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus,
the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the
Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign
decree presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court recognition, as it cited
NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982,36 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 1982 37 – both of
which required a final order from a competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a
marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For
being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is
patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.1avvphi1
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian
divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for
recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the
cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without
judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a
special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule
108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied
with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also
requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located;38 that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest
must be made parties to the proceedings; 39 and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a
newspaper of general circulation.40 As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present
case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate
proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry – one for recognition of the
foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special
proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a
party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial
proceeding41 by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of
jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the
REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy
of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.
G.R. No. 196049               June 26, 2013
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,
vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY,
AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS
OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City, through a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of law. The petition
assails the Order1 dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2
March 2011 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and
the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay
(Marinay) in the Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus,
Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being
dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought
Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and
started to contact Fujiki.3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped
Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled:
"Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1)
the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and
Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines; 5 and (3)
for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment
on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of
the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).6
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the petition and
withdrawing the case from its active civil docket.7 The RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC):
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –
(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the
respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in the case of a non-resident
respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. x x x
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the above provisions.
The trial court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides that "[f]ailure to
comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the
petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara or
Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil
actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A
petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a right
or a particular fact,"9 and not a civil action which is "for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong."10 In other words, the petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status
and concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the
Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground
of bigamy. The petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the
Family Code of the Philippines11 on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts.12
In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void marriages under Article 36
of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity. 13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
provides that "a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be filed solely by the husband
or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd because only the guilty parties would be
permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult to realize that the party interested in
having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would be the husband in the prior, pre-existing
marriage."14 Fujiki had material interest and therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court is
applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753)15 in relation to
Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law imposes a duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce
or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the court to the local registrar of the municipality
where the dissolved or annulled marriage was solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the
civil registry relating to "marriages," "judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning" are subject to cancellation or correction.18 The petition in the RTC sought
(among others) to annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage between
Marinay and Maekara.
Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely erred" when, on its own,
it dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be confusing the concept of
venue with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case
on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot pre-
empt the defendant’s prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the
case."20 Moreover, petitioner alleged that the trial court should not have "immediately dismissed" the petition
under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC because he substantially complied with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC
stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity
of marriage.21 The trial court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper
venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person"22 in
the proceeding because he "is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court,
which he now seeks to be judicially recognized, x x x."23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground
of impropriety of venue. It only said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for
dismissal of this case[,] it should be taken together with the other ground cited by the Court x x x which is Sec.
2(a) x x x."24
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of
Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental.25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special proceeding for correction of
entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no
jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x."26 Braza emphasized that the "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy
and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a
collateral attack such as [a] petition [for correction of entry] x x x."27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara. The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the petition. 28 Moreover, the
verification and certification against forum shopping of the petition was not authenticated as required under
Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the petition
under the same provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Letters of Marinay and
Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for review. 30 The public
respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the
NSO, participated through the Office of the Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed
a Manifestation and Motion.31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC’s "pronouncement that the petitioner
failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be reinstated in the trial
court for further proceedings.32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is
an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara void. The
Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does
not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court explained:
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered during the
connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished.
Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that
they would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who
should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved
party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior
marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will
always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is
protected by the Constitution.34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment may be
made in a Rule 108 proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he recognition of the
foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings
(such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact."37 While Corpuz concerned a foreign divorce decree, in the present case the Japanese Family
Court judgment also affected the civil status of the parties, especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record "[a]cts, events
and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil registry as required by Article 407 of the
Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal
consequences upon a person’s legal capacity and status x x x."38 The Japanese Family Court judgment directly
bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage under
Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Niñal v. Bayadog40 which declared that "[t]he validity of a void
marriage may be collaterally attacked."41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for them to comment on
the petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact that she was previously married to
Fujiki.43 Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay
wrote that she had no reason to oppose the petition.45 She would like to maintain her silence for fear that
anything she say might cause misunderstanding between her and Fujiki.46
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying
the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this Court
held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy."48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under
the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and
proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of
Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a
certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is
in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer
of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.50
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the
trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and contents of the petition, 51 the
service of summons,52 the investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the
judgment of the trial court.56 This is absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of
recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues."57 The interpretation
of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Rañada,58 this Court explained that
"[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on
his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation."59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its
parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment
in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public
policy and other mandatory laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and
duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine
State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment
affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal
capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a
Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts
cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot
substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the
jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a
fact according to the rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a person
creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment or final order may be
repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to
delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine
court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of
efficiency and the protection of party expectations,61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states.62
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce decrees
between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of evidence. 64 Divorce
involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the
extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not
have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign
spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no
divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous
marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family
Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the
Rules of Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a
special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a
party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a
person’s life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are
facts of public consequence such as birth, death or marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording. As
noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign
divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that
in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact."67
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning
the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the
cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil
status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to
cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of
the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the
marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in
the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of
his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in
limited instances68) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by
operation of law the moment he contracts marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the right to
be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family" 70 and preserving the property regime of the
marriage.71
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, 72 but a spouse’s right in a marriage
extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and
Wife") of the Family Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right
of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage.74 In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
preserves this substantive right by limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union
recognized by law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the
validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a]
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife"75—
it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code,
bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the
husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who
has the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the civil
aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, 76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus,
anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and
prevention of crimes.77 If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a
bigamous marriage,78 there is more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a
subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing
crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party and is
therefore interested in the judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is clearly the
aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect
of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse." 80 Being a real party in
interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he
can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as
a fact that such judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once established, there should be no more
impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held that a "trial court
has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a direct
action" to nullify the marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign
judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action
to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and
procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws.
Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of
marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and children,84 the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses,85 and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. 86 A direct
action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the
jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the
corresponding civil registry is located."87 In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the
mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the
recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign
country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under
Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment
is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign
judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law. The
procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a
bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369
define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce
decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.
The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law." In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article
26 which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who,
after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse"89 under the laws of his or her country. The
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a
foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try
the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that results from a
marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce.
The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry
under the laws of his or her country. The correction is made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the
foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in the country where it was rendered. The second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on this Court’s decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that
the Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served."91
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen
who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a
petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the
marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not
recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminated—the foreign spouse can remarry while
the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered to correct a
situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry.
Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend
the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene
domestic public policy. A critical difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully
consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her.
Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without
prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a
case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or on the status,
condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine
courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts
only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article
15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an
overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic
ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the
judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence
of a right between the parties." Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and
the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition
of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new status,
right and fact92 that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between
the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in the Philippines.1âwphi1
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without prejudice to
prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. 93 The recognition of a foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the
Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the
crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago."
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address the questions on
venue and the contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the Resolution dated 2 March
2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for
further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
G.R. No. 221029
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner
vs
MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent
RESOLUTION
PERALTA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks to reverse and set aside
the September 18, 2014 Decision1 and October 12, 2015 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 100076. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 15 October 2012 of the Regional Trial
Court of Dagupan City, First Judicial Region, Branch 43, in SPEC. PROC. NO. 2012-0005
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila.
SO ORDERED.3
The facts are undisputed.
On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation of
Entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan , Metro Manila, by virtueof a judgment of divorce Japanese
court.
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch 43 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Dagupan City set the case for initial hearing on April 25, 2012. The petition and the notice of initial hearing
were published once a week for three consecutive weeks in newspaper of general circulation. During the initial
hearing, counsel for Manalo marked the documentary evidence (consisting of the trial courts Order dated
January 25, 2012, affidavit of publication, and issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012,
February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012) for purposes of compliance with the jurisdictional
requirements.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for petitioner Republic of the Philippines
authorizing the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan to appear on its behalf. Likewise, a Manifestation and
Motion was filed questioning the title and/or caption of the petition considering that based on the allegations
therein, the proper action should be a petition for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment.
As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the court granted. The Amended Petition,
which captioned that if it is also a petition for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment alleged:
2. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national named YOSHINO MINORO as
shown by their Marriage Contract xxx;
3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein [petitioner] in Japan and after die proceedings, a divorce
decree dated December 6, 2011 was rendered by the Japanese Court x x x;
4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree, petitioner and her divorce Japanese husband are no
longer living together and in fact, petitioner and her daughter are living separately from said Japanese former
husband;
5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage in Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila
cancelled, where the petitioner and the former Japanese husband's marriage was previously registered, in
order that it would not appear anymore that petitioner is still married to the said Japanese national who is no
longer her husband or is no longer married to her, she shall not be bothered and disturbed by aid entry of
marriage;
6. That this petition is filed principally for the purpose of causing the cancellation of entry of the marriage
between the petitioner and the said Japanese national, pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which marriage was already dissolved by virtue of the aforesaid divorce decree; [and]
7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together with the cancellation of the said entry of her marriage, that
she be allowed to return and use her maiden surname, MANALO.4
Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was scheduled to leave for Japan for her employment. Among
the documents that were offered and admitted were:
1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the petition and its attachments to be sufficient in form and in
substance;
2. Affidavit of Publication;
3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12,
2012;
4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese husband;
5. Divorce Decree of Japanese court;
6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the Notification of
Divorce; and
7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.5
The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of Manalo.
On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce obtained by
Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the
Philippine law "does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce whether they are in the country or living
abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or
in another country" and that unless Filipinos "are naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine laws
shall have control over issues related to Filipinos' family rights and duties, together with the determination of
their condition and legal capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations, inclusing marriages."6
On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines
(Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband because
the decree may obtained makes the latter no longer married to the former, capacitating him to remarry.
Conformably with Navarro, et al. V. Exec. Secretary Ermita, et al. 7 ruling that the meaning of the law should be
based on the intent of the lawmakers and in view of the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be height of
injustice to consider Manalo as still married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married to her.
For the appellate court, the fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce case is inconsequential. Cited as
similar to this case was Van Dorn v. Judge Romilo, Jr. 8 where the mariage between a foreigner an a Filipino
was dissolved filed abroad by the latter.
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this petition.
We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.
Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after the marriage, are of two types: (1)
absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et
thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.9 In this jurisdiction, the following rules exist:
1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.10
2. Consistent with Articles 1511 and 1712 of the New Civil Code, the marital bond between two Filipinos cannot
be dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad.13
3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.14
4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a subsequent
marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.15
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise
known as the Family Code of the Philippines, which took effect on August 3, 1988.16 Shortly thereafter , E.O.
No. 227 was issued on July 17, 1987.17 Aside from amending Articles 36 and 39 of the Family Code, a second
paragraph was added to Article 26.18 This provision was originally deleted by the Civil Code Revision
Committee (Committee),but it was presented and approved at a Cabinet meeting after Pres. Aquino signed
E.O. No. 209.19 As modified, Article 26 now states:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the where
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him her to remarry under Philippine law.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce
decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the
marriage.20 It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the
Philippines does not allow divorce.21 Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is
tantamount to trying a divorce case.22 Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce
obtained by the spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of
the children or property relations of the spouses, must still be determined by our courts.23
According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Committee, the idea of the amendment is to avoid the
absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer
married to the former because he or she had obtained a divorce abroad that is recognized by his or national
law.24 The aim was that it would solved the problem of many Filipino women who, under the New Civil Code,
are still considered married to their alien husbands even after the latter have already validly divorced them
under their (the husbands') national laws and perhaps have already married again.25
In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a case where, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them acquired foreign
citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding, and obtained a favorable decree. We held
in Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III:26
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals. In Quita, the parties were,
as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became naturalized American citizen n 1954
and obtained a divorce in the same year. The court therein hinted, by the way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino
divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2
of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as foreign citizen and obtains
divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were foreigner
at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice.
xxx
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse,
then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of marriage, but their
citizenship at the time valid divorced obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino citizen has the capacity to
remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment
against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry. Specifically, Manalo pleads for the recognition of
enforcement of the divorced decree rendered by the Japanese court and for the cancellation of the entry of
marriage in the local civil registry " in order that it would not appear anymore that she is still married to the said
Japanese national who is no longer her husband or is no longer married to her; [and], in the event that [she]
decides to be remarried, she shall not be bothered and disturbed by said entry of marriage," and to use her
maiden surname.
We rule in the affirmative.
Both Dacasin v. Dacasin28 and Van Dorn29 already recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and
obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property
relation, respectively.
In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an Agreement for the joint custody of their minor
daughter. Later on, the husband who is a US citizen, sued his Filipino wife enforce the Agreement, alleging
that it was only the latter who exercised sole custody of their child. The trial court dismissed the action for lack
of jurisdiction, on the ground, among others, that the divorce decree is binding following the "nationality rule"
prevailing in this jurisdiction. The husband moved to reconsider, arguing that the divorce decree obtained by
his former wife is void, but it was denied. In ruling that the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit bu not
to enforce the Agreement, which is void, this Court said:
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged invalidity - not because the Illinois court lacked
jurisdiction or that the divorced decree violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was obtained by his
Filipino spouse - to support the Agreement's enforceability . The argument that foreigners in this jurisdiction are
not bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dron v. Romillo settled the matter by holding that an
alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree obtained abroad. There, we dismissed the alien
divorcee's Philippine suit for accounting of alleged post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his submission
that the foreign divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction x x x.30
Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There, a complaint was filed by the ex-husband
, who is a US citizen, against his Filipino wife to render an accounting of a business that was alleged to be a
conjugal property and to be declared with right to manage the same. Van Dorn moved to dismiss the case on
the ground that the cause of action was barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings that she
initiated, but the trial court denied the motion. On his part, her ex-husband averred that the divorce decree
issued by the Nevada court could not prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared
national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to
public policy, divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction . In dismissing the
case filed by the alien spouse, the Court discussed the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their
conjugal property in the Philippines. Thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States.
The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot
sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the
divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.
Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals
are covered by the policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorce abroad, which may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada
released private respondent from the marriage from standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs.
Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794,799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction
are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the
bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as stone party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or
a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides in the nature of penalty, that the guilty
party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely feed from the bond of the former
marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As
he is estopped by his own representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to
private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot
be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support
to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.31
In addition, the fact that a validity obtained foreign divorce initiated by the Filipino spouse can be recognized
and given legal effects in the Philippines is implied from Our rulings in Fujiki v. Marinay, et al. 32 and Medina v.
Koike.33
In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her husband, who is a Japanese national, was able to obtain a
judgment from Japan's family court. Which declared the marriage between her and her second husband, who
is a Japanese national, void on the ground of bigamy. In resolving the issue of whether a husband or wife of a
prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between
his her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy, We ruled:
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil
status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to
cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of
the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the
marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in
the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of
his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in
limited instances) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by
operation of law the moment he contracts marriage. These property interests in marriage included the right to
be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family" and preserving the property regime of the
marriage.
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, but a spouse's right in a marriage
extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and
Wife") of the Family Code. x x x34
On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her Japanese husband jointly filed for divorce, which was
granted.1âwphi1 Subsequently, she filed a petition before the RTC for judicial recognition of foreign divorce
and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Article 26. The RTC denied the petition on
the ground that the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse recognizing his capacity to
obtain a divorce must be proven in accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence. This Court agreed and ruled that, consistent with Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et al.35 and Garcia v.
Recio,36 the divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse must be proven. Instead of dismissing the
case, We referred it to the CA for appropriate action including the reception of evidence to determine and
resolve the pertinent factual issues.
There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned rulings. When this Court recognized a
foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on
the issues of child custody and property relation, it should not stop short in a likewise acknowledging that one
of the usual and necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer
a mutual obligation to live together and observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist,
the civil status and the domestic relation of the former spouses change as both of them are freed from the
marital bond.
The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle, Manalo's personal status is subject to Philippine
law, which prohibits absolute divorce. Hence, the divorce decree which she obtained under Japanese law
cannot be given effect, as she is, without dispute, a national not of Japan, bit of the Philippines. It is said that
that a contrary ruling will subvert not only the intention of the framers of the law, but also that of the Filipino
peopl, as expressed in the Constitution. The Court is, therefore, bound to respect the prohibition until the
legislature deems it fit to lift the same.
We beg to differ.
Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 speaksof "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a
divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one
who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the
Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the
words of the statute; neither can We put words in the mouth of lawmakers. 37 The legislature is presumed to
know the meaning of the words to have used words advisely and to have expressed its intent by the use of
such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words if a statute there
should be departure."38
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that the divorce
proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter of the statute
when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions
inconsistent with the general purpose of the act.39 Law have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so
construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes.40 As held in League of Cities of the Phils.
et al. v. COMELEC et. al.:41
The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the resulting law is couched.
Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it meaningless and lead to
inconvience, an absurd situation or injustice. To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that
the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be to the rule that the spirit of the law control its
letter.
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it
was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure is free to
marry under the laws of his or her countr.42 Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding
or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will
have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a
foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstances as a Filipino who is at the receiving
end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction. In both
instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on a Filipinos
whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operations of their alien spouses are severed by
operation on the latter's national law.
Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found under Article 15 of the City
Code, is not an absolute and unbending rule. In fact, the mer e existence of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a
testament that the State may provide for an exception thereto. Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality
principle must be disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain classes of
individuals whose rights are equally protected by law. The courts have the duty to enforce the laws of divorce
as written by the Legislature only if they are constitutional.43
While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification and that its decision is
accorded recognition and respect by the court of justice, such classification may be subjected to judicial
review.44 The deference stops where the classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons
accorded special protection by the Constitution.45 When these violations arise, this Court must discharge its
primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting adherence
to constitutional limitations.46 If a legislative classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class strict judicial scrutiny is required
since it is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that the classification is
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such
interest.47
"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause are those
basic liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution.48 It includes the right to free speech, political
expression, press, assembly, and forth, the right to travel, and the right to vote.49 On the other hand, what
constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale rights and powers arrayed in the Constitution
and calibrated by history.50 It is akin to the paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties
must give way, such as the promotion of public interest, public safety or the general welfare.51 It essentially
involves a public right or interest that, because of its primacy, overrides individual rights, and allows the former
to take precedence over the latter.52
Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the same principle applies with respect to the
acts of the President which have the force and effect of law unless declared otherwise by the court. In this
case, We find that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one of the essential requisites 53 of the equal protection
clause.54 Particularly, the limitation of the provision only to a foreign divorce decree initiated by the alien
spouse is unreasonable as it is based on superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification.
A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino who is married to a foreign
citizen. There are real, material and substantial differences between them. Ergo, they should not be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and liabilities imposed. Without a doubt, there are political, economic cultural,
and religious dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems and procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino
national who is married to an alien spouse has to contend with. More importantly, while a divorce decree
obtained abroad by a Filipino against another Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien
against his her Filipino spouse is recognized if made in accordance with the national law of the foreigner.55
On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce
proceedings a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien spouse . In the eyes
of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in
a alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are
still married to their foreigner spouses who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction
between them based merely on the superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or
not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.
Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 Article 26 is arbitrary. There is inequality in treatment because a
foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by a Filipino citizen against his or her alien spouse
would not be recognized even if based on grounds similar to Articles 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code. 56 In
filing for divorce based on these grounds, the Filipino spouse cannot be accused of invoking foreign law at
whim, tantamount to insisting that he or she should be governed with whatever law he or she chooses. The
dissent's comment that Manalo should be "reminded that all is not lost, for she may still pray for the severance
of her martial ties before the RTC in accordance with the mechanism now existing under the Family Code" is
anything but comforting. For the guidance of the bench and the bar, it would have been better if the dissent
discussed in detail what these "mechanism" are and how they specifically apply in Manalo's case as well as
those who are similarly situated. If the dissent refers to a petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage, the reality is that there is no assurance that our courts will automatically grant the same. Besides,
such proceeding is duplicitous, costly, and protracted. All to the prejudice of our kababayan.
It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 encourages Filipinos to marry
foreigners, opening the floodgate to the indiscriminate practice of Filipinos marrying foreign nationals or
initiating divorce proceedings against their alien spouses.
The supposition is speculative and unfounded.
First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data whatsoever was sworn to support what he intends
to prove. Second, We adhere to the presumption of good faith in this jurisdiction. Under the rules on evidence,
it is disputable presumed (i.e., satisfactory if uncontradicted and overcome by other evidence) that a person is
innocent of crime or wrong,57 that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns, 59 that acquiescence resulted
from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the law and fact, 60 that a man and woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage,61 and that the law
has been obeyed.62 It is whimsical to easily attribute any illegal, irregular or immoral conduct on the part of a
Filipino just because he or she opted to marry a foreigner instead of a fellow Filipino. It is presumed that
interracial unions are entered into out of genuine love and affection, rather than prompted by pure lust or
profit. Third, We take judicial notice of the fact that Filipinos are relatively more forbearing and conservative in
nature and that they are more often the victims or losing end of mixed marriages. And Fourth, it is not for Us to
prejudge the motive behind Filipino's decision to marry an alien national. In one case, it was said:
Motive for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictated on the kind
of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right
to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions. The right marital privacy allows married couples to
structure their marriages in almost any way they see it fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no
children, to love one another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or
otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all
the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the
only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.63
The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State.64 Nevertheless, it was not meant to be a general prohibition on
divorce because Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon, in response to a question by Father Joaquin G.
Bernas during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, was categorical about this
point.65 Their exchange reveal as follows:
MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that Commissioner Bernas be recognized.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco). Commissioner Bernas is recognized.
FR. BERNAS. Just one question, and I am not sure if it has been categorically answered. I refer specifically to
the proposal of Commissioner Gascon. Is this be understood as a prohibition of a general law on divorce? His
intention is to make this a prohibition so that the legislature cannot pass a divorce law.
MR. GASCON. Mr. Presding Officer, that was not primarily my intention. My intention was primarily to
encourage the social institution of marriage, but not necessarily discourage divorce. But now that the
mentioned the issue of divorce, my personal opinion is to discourage it. Mr. Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS. No my question is more categorical. Does this carry the meaning of prohibiting a divorce law?
MR. GASCON. No Mr. Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS. Thank you.66
Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country. Effectivity March 11, 1917, Philippine courts could
grant an absolute divorce in the grounds of adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the
husband by virtue of Act No. 2710 of the Philippine Legislature. 67 On March 25, 1943, pursuant to the authority
conferred upon him by the Commander-in-Chief fo the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines and with
the approval of the latter, the Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission promulgated an E.O. No. 141
("New Divorce Law"), which repealed Act No. 2710 and provided eleven ground for absolute divorce, such as
intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for at least one year prior to the filing of the action, slander by
deed or gross insult by one spouse against the other to such an extent as to make further living together
impracticable, and a spouse's incurable insanity.68 When the Philippines was liberated and the Commonwealth
Government was restored, it ceased to have force and effect and Act No. 2710 again prevailed. 69 From August
30, 1950, upon the effectivity of Republic Act No. 836 or the New Civil Code, an absolute divorce obatined by
Filipino citizens, whether here or abroad, is no longer recognized.70
Through the years, there has been constant clamor from various sectors of the Philippine society to re-institute
absolute divorce. As a matte of fcat, in the currnet 17th Congress, House Bill (H.B.) Nos.
11671 106272 238073 and 602774 were filed in the House of representatives. In substitution of these bills, H.B.
No. 7303 entitled "An Act Instituting Absolute Divorce and Dissolution of Marriage in the Philippines" or
the Absolute Divorce Act of 2018 was submitted by the House Committee on Population
And Family Relations of February 8, 2018. It was approved on March 19, 2018 on Third Reading - with 134 in
favor, 57 against, and 2 absentations. Under the bill, the grounds for a judicial decree of absolute divorce are
as follows:
1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code, modified or amended, as follows:
a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of
the petitioner;
b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation;
c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of a petitioner, to
engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six (6) years, even if pardoned;
e. Drug addiction or habitual alchoholism ro chronic gambling of respondent;
f. Homosexuality of the respondent;
g. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines or abroad;
h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a child with another person other than one's spouse during the
marriage, except when upon the mutual agreement of the spouses, a child is born to them by in vitro or a
similar procedure or when the wife bears a child after being a victim of rape;
i. attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner, a common child or a child of a petitioner; and
j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one (1) year.
When the spouses are legally separated by judicial decree for more thath two (2) years, either or both spouses
can petition the proper court for an absolute divorce based on said judicial decree of legal separation.
1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the Family Code restated as follows:
a. The party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen (18) years of age or over
but below twety-one (21), and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents guradian or
personl having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of
twenty-one (21) such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife;
b. either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other
as husband and wife;
c. The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards with full knowledge of the
facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other husband and wife;
d. consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having
disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
e. Either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other and such incapacity
continues or appears to be incurable; and
f. Either part was afflicted with the sexually transmissible infection found to be serious or appears to be
incurable.
Provided, That the ground mentioned in b, e and f existed either at the time of the marriage or supervening
after the marriage.
1. When the spouses have been separated in fact for at least five (5) years at the time the petition for absolute
divorce is filed, and the reconciliation is highly improbable;
2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as provided for in Article 36 of the Family Code, whether or not the
incapacity was present at the time of the celebration of the marriage or later;
3. When one of the spouses undergoes a gender reassignment surgery or transition from one sex to another,
the other spouse is entitled to petition for absolute divorce with the transgender or transsexual as respondent,
or vice-versa;
4. Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts which have resulted in the total breakdown of the marriage
beyond repair, despite earnest and repeated efforts at reconciliation.
To be sure, a good number of Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic Church react adversely to any attempt to
enact a law on absolute divorce, viewing it as contrary to our customs, morals, and traditions that has looked
upon marriage and family as an institution and their nature of permanence,
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it also
limits what religious sects can or cannot do. They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular
doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in
simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus establish a state religion.76
The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the
citizenry nor can it demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it is sincerely believes that they are good for
country.77 While marriage is considered a sacrament, it has civil and legal consequences which are governed
by the Family Code.78 It is in this aspect, bereft of any ecclesiastical overtone, that the State has a legitimate
right and interest to regulate.
The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is a foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State, should not be read in total isolation but must be harmonized with other
constitutional provision. Aside from strengthening the solidarity of the Filipino family, the State is equally
mandated to actively promote its total development.79 It is also obligated to defend, among others, the right of
children to special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial to their development.80 To Our mind, the State cannot effectively enforce these obligation s if We
limit the application of Paragraph 2 or Article 26 only those foreign divorce initiated by the alien spouse. It is not
amiss to point that the women and children are almost always the helpless victims of all forms of domestic
abuse and violence. In fact, among the notable legislation passed in order to minimize, if not eradicate, the
menace are R.A. No. 9262 ("Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004") R.A. No.
9710 ("The Magna Carta of Women"), R.A. No 10354 ("The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health
Act of 2012") and R.A. No 9208 ("Anti-Trafficking in Person Act of 2003"), as amended by R.A. No.
10364 ("ExpandedAnti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012"). Moreover, in protecting and strengthening the
Filipino family as a basic autonomous social institution, the Court must not lose sight of the constitutional
mandate to value the dignity of every human person, guarantee full respect for human rights, and ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men.81
A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If We disallow a Filipino citizen
who initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2 Article 26 and still require him or
her to first avail of the existing "mechanisms" under the Family Code, any subsequent relationship that he or
she would enter in the meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of the Philippine law. Worse, any child
born out such "extra-marital" affair has to suffer the stigma of being branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are
just but a few of the adverse consequences, not only to the parent but also to the child, if We are to hold a
restrictive interpretation of the subject provision. The irony is that the principle of inviolability of marriage under
Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is meant to be tilted in favor of marriage and against unions not
formalized by marriage, but without denying State protection and assistance to live-in arrangements or to
families formed according to indigenous customs.82
This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. With the advancement of
communication and information technology, as well as the improvement of the transportation system that
almost instantly connect people from all over the world, mixed marriages have become not too uncommon.
Likewise, it is recognized that not all marriages are made in heaven and that imperfect humans more often
than not create imperfect unions.83 Living in a flawed world, the unfortunate reality for some is that the
attainment of the individual's full human potential and self fulfillment is not found and achieved in the context of
a marriage. Thus it is hypocritical to safeguard the quantity of existing marriages and, at the same time, brush
aside the truth that some of them are rotten quality.
Going back, we hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot
possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital bond while
the other remains bound to it.84 In reiterating that the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his
or her own country if the ends of justice are to be served, San Luis v. San Luis85 quoted:
x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Applellate Court, the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results: and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It
is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in
its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as
to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we
presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are
inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may
seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just
the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance between the sord and
the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it worded, yielding like
robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking
too closely to the words of law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes agaian, "where these words import a
policy that goes beyond them."
xxxx
More that twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render every
one of his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in ever case
brought to it for decisions. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts
warrant, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention if the
lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice.86
Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous
results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and
reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law.87 A statute may therefore, be extended to cases
not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.88
The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis to this controversy by granting Manalo's petition to
recognize and enforce the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese court and to cancel the entry of marriage
in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Jurisprudence has set guidelines before the Philippine courts recognize a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of foreign country. Presentation solely of the divorce
decree will not suffice.89 The fact of divorce must still first be proven. 90 Before a a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity
to the foreign law allowing it.91
x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented
and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. The decree
purports to be written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer
having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)authenticated by the seal of his
office.92
In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:
In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a quo the 1) Decision of the Japanese Court
allowing the divorce; 2) the Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippines Consulate General in Osaka,
Japan of the Decree of Divorce; and 3) Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce byu the Petitioner and the
Japanese national. Under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of
Court, these documents sufficiently prove the subject Divorce Decree as a fact. Thus, We are constrained to
recognize the Japanese Court's judgment decreeing the divorce.93
If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce decree is rendered admissible a a
written act of the foreign court.94 As it appears, the existence of the divorce decree was not denied by the OSG;
neither was the jurisdiction of the divorce court impeached nor the validity of its proceedings challenged on the
ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit an opportunity to do so.95
Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.
x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the
prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material
defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new
matters. x x x
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other
facts, they must alleged and proved. x x x The power of judicial notice must be exercise d with caution, and
every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.96
Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent Japanese law validating it, as well
as her former husband's capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her. Japanese laws on persons and family
relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial
function.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The September 18, 2014 Decision and October
12, 2015 Resolution if the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV. No. 100076, are AFFIRMED IN PART. The case
is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant
Japanese law on divorce.

G.R. No. 133743             February 6, 2007

EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
x ---------------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 134029             February 6, 2007
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside the September 12, 1995 2 and January 31,
1996 3 Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May
15, 1998 Resolution 4 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the
former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first
marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila,
Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias.
However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce 5 before the
Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree
Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. 6
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev.
Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California,
U.S.A. 7 He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to
his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of
Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration 8 before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146
thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent was
residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedent’s surviving
heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage;
that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued at ₱30,304,178.00 more or less; that
the decedent does not have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be
liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a
motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed
that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was
Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality
to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was
still legally married to Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking the
dismissal 10 of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 11 denying the two motions to
dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her opposition 12 thereto.
She submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in
Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they
bought sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of
the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been
dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph
2, 13 Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for reconsideration
from the Order denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family
Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondent’s bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because
this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256 16 of the Family Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a motion to disqualify
Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the motions for reconsideration. It ruled that
respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition and that venue was
properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was deemed moot and academic 18 because then
Acting Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the resolution of said
motion.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On even date, Edgar also
filed a motion for reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their motion for reconsideration arguing that it does
not state the facts and law on which it was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting the motion for inhibition. The case was re-
raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their respective position papers on the twin
issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested 23 that
he is adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in his previous motion for reconsideration as his position
paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers on June 14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the
time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence,
the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent
was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo
was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage
to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled
that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair the
vested rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate children.
Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but said motions
were denied. 28
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court in its
assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and the records of the case is
REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings. 29
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term "place of residence" of
the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or
physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person as distinguished from legal residence or
domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided
in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of administration was properly filed in Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2,
Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It
found that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of
absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph
2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus –
With the well-known rule – express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family Code of the Philippines,
the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227, —
there is no justiciable reason to sustain the individual view — sweeping statement — of Judge Arc[h]angel, that
"Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code, contravenes the basic policy of our state against divorce in any form
whatsoever." Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law grants. All that the courts should do is to give force and
effect to the express mandate of the law. The foreign divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on
December 14, 1992, 32 the Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry under Philippine laws". For
this reason, the marriage between the deceased and petitioner should not be denominated as "a bigamous
marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving spouse can institute the judicial
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. x x x 33
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration 34 which were denied by the Court of
Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review on certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later
filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition which was granted. 36
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject petition for letters of
administration was improperly laid because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz,
Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban
City, 38 "residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when
absent, one intends to return. They claim that a person can only have one domicile at any given time. Since
Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta.
Cruz, Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous because it was
performed during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26
cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair vested rights and ratify the void bigamous marriage. As
such, respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file
the petition for letters of administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether respondent has legal capacity
to file the subject petition for letters of administration.
The petition lacks merit.
Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of
Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his
death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining the
residence – as contradistinguished from domicile – of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or
domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in
the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue
statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than
domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as
meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms
"residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood
in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place
of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term
means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply
requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place
and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though;
however, the residence must be more than temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the
estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to
the instant case because they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction between
"residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In
election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent
residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue
under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual
residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides
therein with continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence in one
place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna,
respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his
death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983 showing that the
deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing statements 45 from the Philippine Heart
Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period August to December 1992 indicating the address of
Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of membership
of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association 46 and Ayala Country Club, Inc., 47 letter-
envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceased’s children to him at his Alabang address, and the
deceased’s calling cards 49 stating that his home/city address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village,
Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the
venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly
filed in the Regional Trial Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject
petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of
the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa
were then seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition
was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to file the petition for letters of administration, we
must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly
remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20,
1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not
retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is
sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which
marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the
divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from their
conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the validity of the divorce and held
that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of
American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the
United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to
change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The
marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife
without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty
party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former
marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As
he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and
whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. 53
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be considered
married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations.
It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations  under Article 109, et. seq. of the
Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity,
and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible
rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of
justice are to be served. 54 (Emphasis added)
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the Court recognized the validity of a
divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the
adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the severance of the marital bond had the effect of
dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy
on the other." 56
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a Filipino is divorced by his naturalized
foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the
said case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of divorce in the Philippines
cannot be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties between parties in a mixed
marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary consequence of upholding the validity
of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating
that "if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law." 59 In Garcia v. Recio, 60 the Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to Article
26. 61
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical background and legislative intent behind
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as
the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise
signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to
Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
x x x x
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article
26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce,
is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo,
Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held
therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and
consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our
lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial precedent.1awphi1.net
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties
and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. 64 Marriage,
being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the
society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is
the state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this
case.
Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void under Philippine law
insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Court’s rulings in the cases discussed above, the
Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his own country if the ends of justice are to be
served. 67 In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 68 the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It
is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in
its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as
to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we
presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are
inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may
seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we
are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to
their language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done
even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding
like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by
sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words
import a policy that goes beyond them."
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render every
one his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case
brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts
warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the
lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. 69
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which
absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the
present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence
to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo
under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, 70 the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and
proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient
and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132,
a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official
publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is
not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic
or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept
and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. 71
With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted
photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text 72 of the Family Law Act of California which
purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however,
the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved. 73
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce
decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the
latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered
the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their
cohabitation.
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted to the surviving
spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition for letters of administration must be filed
by an interested person and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one
who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not
merely indirect or contingent. 75
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of
Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the
validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was
validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article
144 76 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties who live together as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that
the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall
be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired
through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed
to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be
presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. 77
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the applicable
provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by
expressly regulating the property relations of couples living together as husband and wife but are incapacitated
to marry. 78 In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, 79 we held that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property
occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The Court described the property regime
under this provision as follows:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally capacitated
to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired
during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the
extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their
contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.
xxxx
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-ownership of
properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we
ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. x x x
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the
nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and
reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s
defense. x x x 81
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article
144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating and affirming the
February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its
October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be
REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
[G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000.]

ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID
NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., Petitioners, v. NORMA BAYADOG, Respondent.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death?

Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein
petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months
thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage
license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage
license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father’s death, petitioners filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for
lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second
marriage would affect petitioner’s successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for
"annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.chanrobles.com : law library

Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition
after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following
issues:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the declaration of the nullity
of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her specially so when at the time of the filing of this
instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is already dead;

(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs’ deceased father with defendant is null and void ab initio;

(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second marriage after it was
dissolved due to their father’s death.

Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void their father’s
marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates
the time and the persons who could initiate an action for annulment of marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for
review with this Court grounded on a pure question of law.

This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioner’s averment that the allegations in
the petition are ‘true and correct’." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect
under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules. 3 However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the
dismissal and reinstated the petition for review.

The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the
applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their
celebration. 5 A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, 6 the
absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) 7 in relation to Article 58. 8 The
requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State’s demonstration of its involvement and participation
in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested. 9 This interest proceeds from
the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the
family as a basic "autonomous social institution" 10 Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an
"inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall be protected by the State. 11 This is
why the Family Code considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent union" 12 and case law
considers it not just an adventure but a lifetime commitment." 13

However there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed
with, one of which is that provided in Article 76, 14 referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have
lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at
least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing
the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons
outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant’s name for a marriage license. The publicity
attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve
peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip
arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them
from that requirement.
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners’ father to respondent Norma was celebrated without any
marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority,
and, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire
to marry each other." 16 The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is
contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to
exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties
are capacitated to marry each other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation
wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the entire
five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married,
which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?

Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years
without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as
"husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In
other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration
of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year
period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation
characterized by exclusivity — meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and
continuity — that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any
distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the
law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing
them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship
must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the
law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use
the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no
exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the
exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two persons are about
to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of
the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar. 17 The Civil Code provides:

Article 63: ". . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to
advice the local civil registrar thereof. . . ."

Article 64: "Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil registrar shall
forthwith make an investigation, examining persons under oath. . . ."

This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:

Article 17 provides in part: ". . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to
the marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof . . . .

Article 18 reads in part: ". . . In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought to his
attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for a marriage
license. . . ." 
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence of multiple
marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted during the
lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void, 18 subject only to the exception in cases of absence or
where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that
the contracting of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e.,
bigamy and concubinage and adultery. 19 The law sanctions monogamy.

In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent’s marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each
other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito’s first
marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed.
Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent
had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year
period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union
that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a
subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with Respondent. It is immaterial that when they
lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the
marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot
make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife" .

Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the
requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.

The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their father’s
marriage void after his death?

Contrary to respondent judge’s ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code 20 cannot be applied even by analogy to
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the
trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at any time before the death of either
party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit,
not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the
nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until
otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to
have taken place 21 and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free
cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed
collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void
marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only
during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will
be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. 22 That is why the action or defense for nullity is
imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage
can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects
except those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or
ownership through actual joint contribution, 23 and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as
provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On
the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the
children conceived before its annulment are legitimate.

Contrary to the trial court’s ruling, the death of petitioner’s father extinguished the alleged marital bond
between him and Respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that there
was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void
hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the death of either extinguished
nothing.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of
a marriage. 24 "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights
or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the
sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the
marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." 25 "Under
ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the
parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its
invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or
collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both
the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded
or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked
except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the
marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. 26 But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly
provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a
party can enter into a second marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to
that effect. 28 For the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage imprescriptible. 29 Corollary, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action
or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the
court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long
as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the
case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is
other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in
Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu,
Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered
REINSTATED.
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329            March 8, 2001
(Formerly A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 99-706-MTJ)
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta, Pangasinan, respondent.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were both bound by a prior existing
marriage is the bone of contention of the instant complaint against respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez,
Municipal Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act, complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges
respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the
Court Administrator on 12 May 1999.
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to him on 21
May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City.1 Four children were born out of
that marriage.2 On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda
Payao before respondent Judge.3 When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to
know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting
parties were "separated."
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the marriage between
Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two had
been living together as husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as
manifested in their joint affidavit.4 According to him, had he known that the late Manzano was married, he
would have advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He
then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed merely to harass him.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator recommended that respondent
Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning that
a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.
On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the case
for resolution on the basis of the pleadings thus filed. Complainant answered in the affirmative.
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the complaint and
setting aside his earlier Comment. He therein invites the attention of the Court to two separate affidavits5 of the
late Manzano and of Payao, which were allegedly unearthed by a member of his staff upon his instruction. In
those affidavits, both David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were married to
Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since their respective marriages had been marked
by constant quarrels, they had both left their families and had never cohabited or communicated with their
spouses anymore. Respondent Judge alleges that on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the
marriage in question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.
We find merit in the complaint.
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties
shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The
solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties
and found no legal impediment to the marriage.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the
marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years [and are
without legal impediment to marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the
parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.6
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their separate
affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and
Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it
was indicated that both were "separated."
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which
would make the subsequent marriage null and void.7 In fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he known that
the late Manzano was married he would have discouraged him from contracting another marriage. And
respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzano’s and Payao’s subsisting previous marriage, as the
same was clearly stated in their separate affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before him.
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time already is
immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to
live separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal
separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all
the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao
stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and
voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting
previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who are legally
capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as
a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior
existing marriage.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous
marriage. The maxim "ignorance of the law excuses no one" has special application to judges,8 who, under
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and
independence. It is highly imperative that judges be conversant with the law and basic legal principles.9 And
when the law transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the
law.10
ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED, with the
MODIFICATION that the amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to
P20,000.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 175581               March 28, 2008
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 179474
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions for Review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines and Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa),
respectively, both challenging the Amended Decision1 of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-
G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the marriage between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at the Pasay City Hall. The
marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.2 In lieu of a marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a
sworn affidavit,3 also dated 24 November 1986, attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity,
and that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint 4 for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a
sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn
affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that his consent to
the marriage was secured through fraud.
In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the same. According to Jose, he
was introduced to Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live as a boarder in Felisa’s house, the
latter being his landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa requested him to accompany her to the Pasay City
Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a package sent to her by her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City
Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them.
They were told that Jose needed to sign the papers so that the package could be released to Felisa. He initially
refused to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his refusal could get both of them killed by her
brother who had learned about their relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to
the man who immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he discovered that he had contracted marriage
with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying on top of the table at the sala of Felisa’s house.
When he perused the same, he discovered that it was a copy of his marriage contract with Felisa. When he
confronted Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Jose’s allegations and defended the validity of their marriage. She
declared that they had maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the legality of marriage in the early
part of 1980, but that she had deferred contracting marriage with him on account of their age difference. 5 In her
pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage
with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy
against Jose. Subsequently, she filed an administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the
Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating
Board.6 The Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct, and meted
out to him the penalty of suspension from service for one year without emolument.7
On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision8 dismissing the Complaint. It disposed:
WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence presented by both parties, this Court
finds and so holds that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable consideration. Accordingly, the above-
entitled case is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against [Jose].9
The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated between Jose and
Felisa on 24 November 1986 was valid. It dismissed Jose’s version of the story as implausible, and
rationalized that:
Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt to make him or her sign a blank sheet
of paper. [Jose] could have already detected that something was amiss, unusual, as they were at Pasay City
Hall to get a package for [Felisa] but it [was] he who was made to sign the pieces of paper for the release of
the said package. Another indirect suggestion that could have put him on guard was the fact that, by his own
admission, [Felisa] told him that her brother would kill them if he will not sign the papers. And yet it took him,
more or less, three months to "discover" that the pieces of paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the
marriage contract. [Jose] does not seem to be that ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to be "taken in for a
ride" by [Felisa.]
[Jose’s] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the fact that he acknowledged Felisa
Tecson as his wife when he wrote [Felisa’s] name in the duly notarized statement of assets and liabilities he
filled up on May 12, 1988, one year after he discovered the marriage contract he is now claiming to be sham
and false. [Jose], again, in his company I.D., wrote the name of [Felisa] as the person to be contacted in case
of emergency. This Court does not believe that the only reason why her name was written in his company I.D.
was because he was residing there then. This is just but a lame excuse because if he really considers her not
his lawfully wedded wife, he would have written instead the name of his sister.
When [Jose’s] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she testified that she signed her name
voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in the marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25, November 29, 1996) and
she further testified that the signature appearing over the name of Jose Dayot was the signature of his [sic]
brother that he voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract (page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29, 1996),
and when she was asked by the Honorable Court if indeed she believed that Felisa Tecson was really chosen
by her brother she answered yes. The testimony of his sister all the more belied his claim that his consent was
procured through fraud.10
Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Jose’s action had prescribed. It cited Article 87 11 of the
New Civil Code which requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the injured
party within four years after the discovery of the fraud. Thus:
That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was obtained by [Felisa] through fraud, trickery
and machinations, he could have filed an annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage at the earliest possible
opportunity, the time when he discovered the alleged sham and false marriage contract. [Jose] did not take any
action to void the marriage at the earliest instance. x x x.12
Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated
11 August 2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit. The dispositive portion of the
appellate court’s Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.13
The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose and Felisa as it was solemnized
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate court observed that the circumstances constituting
fraud as a ground for annulment of marriage under Article 8614 of the Civil Code did not exist in the marriage
between the parties. Further, it ruled that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed
beyond the prescriptive period provided by law. The Court of Appeals struck down Jose’s appeal in the
following manner:
Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed on Jose in giving his consent to the
marriage, the action for the annulment thereof had already prescribed. Article 87 (4) and (5) of the Civil Code
provides that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground that the consent of a party was obtained by
fraud, force or intimidation must be commenced by said party within four (4) years after the discovery of the
fraud and within four (4) years from the time the force or intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was
allegedly discovered by Jose in February, 1987 then he had only until February, 1991 within which to file an
action for annulment of marriage. However, it was only on July 7, 1993 that Jose filed the complaint for
annulment of his marriage to Felisa.15
Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose’s assertion that his marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for
lack of a marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was solemnized under Article 7616 of the Civil Code as one
of exceptional character, with the parties executing an affidavit of marriage between man and woman who
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. The Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity
in the affidavit to the effect that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife for the period required
by Article 76 did not affect the validity of the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the
statements contained therein. In this manner, the Court of Appeals gave credence to the good-faith reliance of
the solemnizing officer over the falsity of the affidavit. The appellate court further noted that on the dorsal side
of said affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing officer, stated that he took steps to
ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to their
marriage. Finally, the Court of Appeals dismissed Jose’s argument that neither he nor Felisa was a member of
the sect to which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza belonged. According to the Court of Appeals, Article 5617 of the Civil
Code did not require that either one of the contracting parties to the marriage must belong to the solemnizing
officer’s church or religious sect. The prescription was established only in Article 718 of the Family Code which
does not govern the parties’ marriage.
Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof.1avvphi1 His
central opposition was that the requisites for the proper application of the exemption from a marriage license
under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal
condition that the man and the woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five
years before the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him
and Felisa was false.
The Court of Appeals granted Jose’s Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself. Accordingly, it rendered
an Amended Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET ASIDE and another one entered
declaring the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City.19
In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this Court in Niñal v. Bayadog,20 and
reasoned that:
In Niñal v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage solemnized without a marriage license on the
basis of their affidavit that they had attained the age of majority, that being unmarried, they had lived together
for at least five (5) years and that they desired to marry each other, the Supreme Court ruled as follows:
"x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This
5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity – meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years
and continuity – that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any
distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the
law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing
them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship
must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the
law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use
the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no
exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the
exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two persons are about
to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of
the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages
of exceptional character, shall be void from the beginning. Inasmuch as the marriage between Jose and Felisa
is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is, therefore, void ab initio because
of the absence of a marriage license.21
Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The appellate court rendered a
Resolution22 dated 10 May 2007, denying Felisa’s motion.
Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Petition
for Review before this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court of Appeals’ Amended Decision dated 7
November 2006 be reversed and set aside for lack of merit, and that the marriage between Jose and Felisa be
declared valid and subsisting. Felisa filed a separate Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474,
similarly assailing the appellate court’s Amended Decision. On 1 August 2007, this Court resolved to
consolidate the two Petitions in the interest of uniformity of the Court rulings in similar cases brought before it
for resolution.23
The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the allowance of its Petition, to wit:
I
RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY OF HIS MARRIAGE TO
FELISA.
II
RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS AND SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED
TO PROFIT FROM HIS OWN FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.
III
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF
MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E.24
Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals misapplied Niñal. 25 She differentiates the
case at bar from Niñal by reasoning that one of the parties therein had an existing prior marriage, a
circumstance which does not obtain in her cohabitation with Jose. Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only
sought the annulment of their marriage after a criminal case for bigamy and an administrative case had been
filed against him in order to avoid liability. Felisa surmises that the declaration of nullity of their marriage would
exonerate Jose from any liability.
For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To reach a considered ruling on the
issue, we shall jointly tackle the related arguments vented by petitioners Republic of the Philippines and Felisa.
The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid
marriage exists between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes the claim that any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage by citing this Court’s ruling in Hernandez v. Court of
Appeals.26 To buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the affidavit executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24
November 1986, attesting that they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, which they
used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the Republic’s position that the falsity of the statements in the affidavit
does not affect the validity of the marriage, as the essential and formal requisites were complied with; and the
solemnizing officer was not required to investigate as to whether the said affidavit was legally obtained. The
Republic opines that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully
obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that the parties incorporated a fabricated statement
in their affidavit that they cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years. In addition, the Republic posits
that the parties’ marriage contract states that their marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code.
It also bears the signature of the parties and their witnesses, and must be considered a primary evidence of
marriage. To further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the following documents: (1) Jose’s notarized
Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisa’s name as his wife; (2)
Certification dated 25 July 1993 issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay City,
attesting that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife in said barangay; and (3) Jose’s
company ID card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating Felisa’s name as his wife.
The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect of a false affidavit under
Article 76 of the Civil Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in order.
It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24 November 1986, prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union. Article 53 of the Civil Code
spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract:
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character. (Emphasis ours.)
Article 5827 makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local
civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an
exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article 75. 28 Article 80(3)29 of the Civil
Code makes it clear that a marriage performed without the corresponding marriage license is void, this being
nothing more than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the
marriage contract.30 This is in stark contrast to the old Marriage Law, 31 whereby the absence of a marriage
license did not make the marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license under
the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper
government official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.32
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising
Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death during
peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2) consular marriages,33 (3) ratification of marital cohabitation,
(4) religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5) Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6) mixed marriages.34
The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil Code, which
provides:
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age of
majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to
marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also
state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties
and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
The reason for the law,35 as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the publicity attending a marriage
license may discourage such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from legalizing their status.36
It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without a marriage license. In
lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that "they have attained the age of maturity; that being
unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years; and that because of this union,
they desire to marry each other."37 One of the central issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of
an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year
requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.
We answer in the affirmative.
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the
formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule,
should be strictly38 but reasonably construed.39 They extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and
all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. 40 Where a general
rule is established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or add to the latter by
implication.41 For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman
must have attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but to read the law as it is
plainly written. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no
ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five years of cohabitation. No other reading of the
law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation
is an indispensability carved in the language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid,
this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one
that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the
contracting parties shall state the requisite facts42 in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an
affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he
found no legal impediment to the marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they executed
their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living
together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage.43 The Court of
Appeals also noted Felisa’s testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel,
sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution. 44 The appellate court also cited Felisa’s own
testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose commenced to live in her house.45
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the minimum five-year requisite is
factual in nature. A question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth or falsehood of the
alleged facts.46 Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to this Court’s review.47 It is already
well-settled that:
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. A recognized
exception to this rule is when the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case the administrative body,
make contradictory findings. However, the exception does not apply in every instance that the Court of Appeals
and the trial court or administrative body disagree. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain
conclusive on this Court if such findings are supported by the record or based on substantial evidence.48
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt them
from the requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties’ affidavit will not
affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were complied with. The argument
deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated
without the formal requisite of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal
requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as
to be excepted from the requirement of a marriage license.
Anent petitioners’ reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that the same finds no applicability
to the case at bar. Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is with reference to the prima
facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage.49 Restated more explicitly, persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are
presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact
married.50 The present case does not involve an apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs to be
applied. There is no question that Jose and Felisa actually entered into a contract of marriage on 24 November
1986, hence, compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage,
which spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code 51 that every intendment of law or fact leans towards the
validity of marriage will not salvage the parties’ marriage, and extricate them from the effect of a violation of the
law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into without the requisite marriage license or compliance
with the stringent requirements of a marriage under exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage
without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration
of fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by
making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage.52 The protection of marriage as a sacred institution
requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.53 To
permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention of the law. If
this Court is to protect the fabric of the institution of marriage, we must be wary of deceptive schemes that
violate the legal measures set forth in our laws.
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a license is not
invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by a
fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at least five years as required by law. The contrast is
flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence of one.
Here, there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating
to the period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to
the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that
the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the
sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was
no affidavit at all.
In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on equity, Jose should be
denied relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit from his wrongdoing. This is a
misplaced invocation. It must be stated that equity finds no room for application where there is a law. 54 There is
a law on the ratification of marital cohabitation, which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code.
Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent that the declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage is without
prejudice to their criminal liability.55
The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed estopped from assailing the
legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived together from
1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Jose’s subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it
took Jose seven years before he sought the declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.
This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.56 Jose and Felisa’s marriage was
celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except that it is void ab initio. In this
case, the right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised any time.
Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law cohabitation
period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of celebration of marriage, and
refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a marriage. 57 It covers the years immediately
preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at any
time within the five years - and continuity that is unbroken.58
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November
2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is
AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their criminal liability, if any. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 200233               JULY 15, 2015
LEONILA G. SANTIAGO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLEOF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago from the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566.1 The CA affirmed the Decision and Order
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 7232 2 convicting her of bigamy.
THE FACTS
Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on 29 July 1997, 3 Leonila G. Santiago and Nicanor F.
Santos faced an Information 4 for bigamy. Petitioner pleaded "not guilty," while her putative husband escaped
the criminal suit. 5
The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been married to Estela Galang since 2 June
1974, 6 asked petitioner to marry him. Petitioner, who 'was a 43-year-old widow then, married Santos on 29
July 1997 despite the advice of her brother-in-law and parents-in-law that if she wanted to remarry, she should
choose someone who was "without responsibility." 7
Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she could not be included as an accused in the crime of
bigamy, because she had been under the belief that Santos was still single when they got married. She also
averred that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, his second marriage to her should be proven valid by the
prosecution; but in this case, she argued that their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license.
Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the first wife, Estela Galang, testified for the
prosecution.1âwphi1 She alleged that she had met petitioner as early as March and April 1997, on which
occasions the former introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos. Petitioner denied this allegation and
averred that she met Galang only in August and September 1997, or after she had already married Santos.
THE RTC RULING
The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that petitioner married Santos during the subsistence of his marriage
to Galang. Based on the more credible account of Galang that she had already introduced herself as the legal
wife of Santos in March and April 1997, the trial court rejected the affirmative defense of petitioner that she had
not known of the first marriage. It also held that it was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to be easily
duped by a person like Santos. 8
The RTC declared that as indicated in the Certificate of Marriage, "her marriage was celebrated without a need
for a marriage license in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code, which is an admission that she
cohabited with Santos long before the celebration of their marriage." 9Thus, the trial court convicted petitioner
as follows: 10
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused Leonila G. Santiago GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy, defined and penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
and imposes against her the indeterminate penalty of six ( 6) months and one (1) day of Prision Correctional as
minimum to six ( 6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as maximum.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She contended that her marriage to Santos was void ab initio for having
been celebrated without complying with Article 34 of the Family Code, which provides an exemption from the
requirement of a marriage license if the parties have actually lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years prior to the celebration of their marriage. In her case, petitioner asserted that she and Santos had
not lived together as husband and wife for five years prior to their marriage. Hence, she argued that the
absence of a marriage license effectively rendered their marriage null and void, justifying her acquittal from
bigamy.
The RTC refused to reverse her conviction and held thus: 11
Accused Santiago submits that it is her marriage to her co-accused that is null and void as it was celebrated
without a valid marriage license x x x. In advancing that theory, accused wants this court to pass judgment on
the validity of her marriage to accused Santos, something this court cannot do. The best support to her
argument would have been the submission of a judicial decree of annulment of their marriage. Absent such
proof, this court cannot declare their marriage null and void in these proceedings.
THE CA RULING
On appeal before the CA, petitioner claimed that her conviction was not based on proof beyond reasonable
doubt. She attacked the credibility of Galang and insisted that the former had not known of the previous
marriage of Santos.
Similar to the RTC, the CA gave more weight to the prosecution witnesses' narration. It likewise disbelieved
the testimony of Santos. Anent the lack of a marriage license, the appellate court simply stated that the claim
was a vain attempt to put the validity of her marriage to Santos in question. Consequently, the CA affirmed her
conviction for bigamy. 12
THE ISSUES
Before this Court, petitioner reiterates that she cannot be a co-accused in the instant case, because she was
not aware of Santos's previous marriage. But in the main, she argues that for there to be a conviction for
bigamy, a valid second marriage must be proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
Citing People v. De Lara, 13 she contends that her marriage to Santos is void because of the absence of a
marriage license. She elaborates that their marriage does not fall under any of those marriages exempt from a
marriage license, because they have not previously lived together exclusively as husband and wife for at least
five years. She alleges that it is extant in the records that she married Santos in 1997, or only four years since
she met him in 1993. Without completing the five-year requirement, she posits that their marriage without a
license is void.
In the Comment 14 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), respondent advances the argument that
the instant Rule 45 petition should be denied for raising factual issues as regards her husband's subsequent
marriage. As regards petitioner's denial of any knowledge of Santos' s first marriage, respondent reiterates that
credible testimonial evidence supports the conclusion of the courts a quo that petitioner knew about the
subsisting marriage.
The crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
In Montanez v. Cipriano, 15 this Court enumerated the elements of bigamy as follows:
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage has not
been legally dissolved x x x; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or
subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The felony is consummated on the celebration
of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged
second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the
first marriage. (Emphasis supplied)
For the second spouse to be indicted as a co-accused in the crime, People v. Nepomuceno, Jr. 16 instructs that
she should have had knowledge of the previous subsisting marriage. People v. Archilla 17 likewise states that
the knowledge of the second wife of the fact of her spouse's existing prior marriage constitutes an
indispensable cooperation in the commission of bigamy, which makes her responsible as an accomplice.
THE RULING OF THE COURT
The penalty for bigamy and petitioner's knowledge of Santos's first marriage
The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint liability of two persons who marry each other while the
previous marriage of one of them is valid and subsisting. As explained in Nepomuceno: 18
In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties depending on the
circumstances, as when the second spouse married the accused without being aware of his previous marriage.
Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the previous undissolved marriage of the accused could she be
included in the information as a co-accused. (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertained petitioner's knowledge of Santos's marriage to Galang. Both
courts consistently found that she knew of the first marriage as shown by the totality of the following
circumstances: 19 (1) when Santos was courting and visiting petitioner in the house of her in-laws, they openly
showed their disapproval of him; (2) it was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to not know of his true
civil status; and (3) Galang, who was the more credible witness compared with petitioner who had various
inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly testified that she had already told petitioner on two occasions that
the former was the legal wife of Santos.
After a careful review of the records, we see no reason to reverse or modify the factual findings of the R TC,
less so in the present case in which its findings were affirmed by the CA. Indeed, the trial court's assessment
of the credibility of witnesses deserves great respect, since it had the important opportunity to observe
firsthand the expression and demeanor of the witnesses during the trial. 20
Given that petitioner knew of the first marriage, this Court concurs with the ruling that she was validly charged
with bigamy. However, we disagree with the lower courts' imposition of the principal penalty on her. To recall,
the RTC, which the CA affirmed, meted out to her the penalty within the range of prision correctional as
minimum to prision mayor as maximum.
Her punishment as a principal to the crime is wrong. Archilla 21 holds that the second spouse, if indicted in the
crime of bigamy, is liable only as an accomplice. In referring to Viada, Justice Luis B. Reyes, an eminent
authority in criminal law, writes that "a person, whether man or woman, who knowingly consents or agrees to
be married to another already bound in lawful wedlock is guilty as an accomplice in the crime of
bigamy." 22 Therefore, her conviction should only be that for an accomplice to the crime.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for a principal in the crime of bigamy is
prision mayor, which has a duration of six years and one day to twelve years. Since the criminal participation of
petitioner is that of an accomplice, the sentence imposable on her is the penalty next lower in degree, 23 prision
correctional, which has a duration of six months and one day to six years. There being neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstance, this penalty shall be imposed in its medium period consisting of two years, four
months and one day to four years and two months of imprisonment. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, 24 petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree,
arresto mayor, which has a duration of one month and one day to six months imprisonment.
The criminal liability of petitioner resulting from her marriage to Santos
Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of bigamy, the second or subsequent
marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity. 25 If the accused wants to raise the nullity of the
marriage, he or she can do it as a matter of defense during the presentation of evidence in the trial proper of
the criminal case. 26 In this case, petitioner has consistently27 questioned below the validity of her marriage to
Santos on the ground that marriages celebrated without the essential requisite of a marriage license are void
ab initio. 28
Unfortunately, the lower courts merely brushed aside the issue. The RTC stated that it could not pass
judgment on the validity of the marriage.1âwphi1 The CA held that the attempt of petitioner to attack her union
with Santos was in vain.
On the basis that the lower courts have manifestly overlooked certain issues and facts, 29 and given that an
appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case open for review, 30 this Court now resolves to correct the error
of the courts a quo.
After a perusal of the records, it is clear that the marriage between petitioner and Santos took place without a
marriage license. The absence of this requirement is purportedly explained in their Certificate of Marriage,
which reveals that their union was celebrated under Article 34 of the Family Code. The provision reads as
follows:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties
shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The
solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties
are found no legal impediment to the marriage.31
Here, respondent did not dispute that petitioner knew Santos in more or less in February 1996 32 and that after
six months of courtship,33 she married him on 29 July 1997. Without any objection from the prosecution,
petitioner testified that Santos had frequently visited her in Castellano, Nueva Ecija, prior to their marriage.
However, he never cohabited with her, as she was residing in the house of her in-laws, 34 and her children from
her previous marriage disliked him.35 On cross examination, respondent did not question the claim of petitioner
that sometime in 1993, she first met Santos as an agent who sold her piglets.36
All told, the evidence on record shows that petitioner and Santos had only known each other for only less than
four years. Thus, it follows that the two of them could not have cohabited for at least five years prior to their
marriage.
Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact opposite of this demonstrable fact. Although the records do
not show that they submitted an affidavit of cohabitation as required by Article 34 of the Family Code, it
appears that the two of them lied before the solemnizing officer and misrepresented that they had actually
cohabited for at least five years before they married each other. Unfortunately, subsequent to this lie was the
issuance of the Certificate of Marriage, 37 in which the solemnizing officer stated under oath that no marriage
license was necessary, because the marriage was solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code.
The legal effects in a criminal case of a deliberate act to put a flaw in the marriage
The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained the misrepresentation perpetrated by
them that they were eligible to contract marriage without a license. We thus face an anomalous situation
wherein petitioner seeks to be acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal actions of (1) marrying Santos without a
marriage license despite knowing that they had not satisfied the cohabitation requirement under the law; and
(2) falsely making claims in no less than her marriage contract.
We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically a bigamous and illicit marriage in an effort to
escape criminal prosecution. Our penal laws on marriage, such as bigamy, punish an individual's deliberate
disregard of the permanent and sacrosanct character of this special bond between spouses.38 In Tenebro v.
Court of Appeals,39 we had the occasion to emphasize that the State's penal laws on bigamy should not be
rendered nugatory by allowing individuals "to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some
manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of
hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment."
Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance petitioner's illegal acts of feigning a marriage and, in the
same breath, adjudge her innocent of the crime. For us, to do so would only make a mockery of the sanctity of
marriage. 40
Furthermore, it is a basic concept of justice that no court will "lend its aid to x x x one who has consciously and
voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause of action is founded." 41 If the cause of action
appears to arise ex turpi causa or that which involves a transgression of positive law, parties shall be left
unassisted by the courts. 42 As a result, litigants shall be denied relief on the ground that their conduct has
been inequitable, unfair and dishonest or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue. 43
Here, the cause of action of petitioner, meaning her affirmative defense in this criminal case of bigamy, is that
her marriage with Santos was void for having been secured without a marriage license. But as elucidated
earlier, they themselves perpetrated a false Certificate of Marriage by misrepresenting that they were
exempted from the license requirement based on their fabricated claim that they had already cohabited as
husband and wife for at least five years prior their marriage. In violation of our law against illegal
marriages,44 petitioner married Santos while knowing full well that they had not yet complied with the five-year
cohabitation requirement under Article 34 of the Family Code. Consequently, it will be the height of absurdity
for this Court to allow petitioner to use her illegal act to escape criminal conviction.
The applicability of People v. De Lara
Petitioner cites De Lara as the relevant jurisprudence involving an acquittal for bigamy on the ground that the
second marriage lacked the requisite marriage license. In that case, the Court found that when Domingo de
Lara married his second wife, Josefa Rosales, on 18 August 1951, the local Civil Registrar had yet to issue
their marriage license on 19 August 1951. Thus, since the marriage was celebrated one day before the
issuance of the marriage license, the Court acquitted him of bigamy.
Noticeably, Domingo de Lara did not cause the falsification of public documents in order to contract a second
marriage. In contrast, petitioner and Santos fraudulently secured a Certificate of Marriage, and petitioner later
used this blatantly illicit act as basis for seeking her exculpation. Therefore, unlike our treatment of the accused
in De Lara, this Court cannot regard petitioner herein as innocent of the crime.
No less than the present Constitution provides that "marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State." 45 It must be safeguarded from the whims and
caprices of the contracting parties. 46 in keeping therefore with this fundamental policy, this Court affirms the
conviction of petitioner for bigamy
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is DENIED. The
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. As modified, petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of bigamy as an accomplice. She is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six months of
arresto mayor as minimum to four years of prision correctional as maximum plus accessory penalties provided
by law.