PROPERTY CASES l SYNTHESIS 4 1

CASE PRINCIPLES
EASEMENTS OR SERVITUES
EASEMENTS IN GENERAL

Voluntary easements under article 594 are not contractual in nature; they
constitute the act of the owner. If he exacts any condition, like the payment
of a certain indemnity for the use of the easement, any person who is willing
to pay it may make use of the easement. If the contention be made that a
contract is necessary, it may be stated that a contract exists from the time
all those who desire to make use of the easement are disposed to pay the
required indemnity.

This is a case of an easement of way voluntarily constituted in favor of a

community. There is nothing in the constitution of this easement in violation
of law or public order, except perhaps that the right to open roads and
Classification North Negros Sugar Co. v. charge passage fees therefor is the State's by right of sovereignty and may
Hidago not be taken over by a private individual without the requisite permit. This,
however, would effect the right of the plaintiff to charge tolls, but not that
of the defendant or of any other person to make use of the easement.

Having been devoted by the plaintiff to the use of the public in general, upon
paying the passage fees required in the case of motor vehicles, the road in
question is charged with a public interest, and while so devoted,
the plaintiff may not establish discriminatory exceptions against
any private person. "When private property is affected with a public
interest, it ceases to be juris privati only; as if a man set out a street in new
building on his own land, it is now no longer bare private interest, but is
affected by a public interest.

Under the Old as well as the New Civil Code, easements may be continuous
Modes of Acquiring or discontinuous (intermittent), apparent or non-apparent, discontinuous
Easements being those used at more or less long intervals and which depend
upon acts of man (Articles 532 and 615 of the Old and New Civil Codes,
For Continuous respectively). Continuous and apparent easements are acquired
Non-Apparent either by title or prescription, continuous non-apparent easements
Easements and Ronquillo v. Roco and discontinuous ones whether apparent or not, may be acquired
Discontinuous only by virtue of a title. Articles 537 and 539, and 620 and 622 of the Old
Ones and New Civil Codes respectively.)

(Apparent or Non- Under the provisions of Articles 537 and 539, and 620 and 622 of the Old
apparent) and New Civil Codes, respectively, the easement of right of way may
not be acquired through prescription.

LEGAL EASEMENTS

Easement of right of way falls within the purview of the power of

eminent domain.

In installing the 230 KV Talisay-Compostela transmission lines which

traverse respondent's lands, a permanent limitation is imposed by petitioner
Nature of National Power against the use of the lands for an indefinite period. This deprives
Easement Corporation v. Villamor respondent of the normal use of the lands. In fact, not only are the
affected areas of the lands traversed by petitioner's transmission lines but a
portion is used as the site of its transmission tower. Because of the danger
to life and limbs that may be caused beneath the high-tension live wires,
the landowner will not be able to use the lands for farming or any agricultural
purposes.

1. An easement or servitude is "a real right constituted on another's

property, corporeal and immovable, by virtue of which the
PROPERTY CASES l SYNTHESIS 4 2

owner of the same has to abstain from doing or to allow

somebody else to do something on his property for the benefit
of another thing or person".

There are two kinds of easements according to source — by law or by

the will of the owners.

2. To be conferred a legal easement of right of way under Article 649, the

following requisites must be complied with:

a. The property is surrounded by other immovables and has

Valdez v. Tabisula no adequate outlet to a public highway;
b. Proper indemnity must be paid;
c. The isolation is not the result of the owner of the
dominant estate's own acts;
d. The right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to
the servient estate; and
e. To the extent consistent with the foregoing rule, the
distance from the dominant estate to a public highway
may be the shortest.

The onus of proving the existence of these prerequisites lies on the

owner of the dominant estate.

Since petitioners then have more than adequate passage to two public
roads, they have no right to demand the grant by respondents of an
easement on the "western side of respondents lot".

Requisites for the

Easement To be entitled to a legal easement of right of way, the following requisites
must be satisfied: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other
immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper
indemnity has been paid; (3) the isolation was not due to acts of the
proprietor of the dominant estate; and (4) the right of way claimed is at the
point least prejudicial to the servient estate. The fourth requisite is absent.
Quintanilla v. Abanga
As between a right of way that would demolish a fence of strong materials
to provide ingress and egress to a public highway and another right of way
which although longer will only require a van or vehicle to make a turn, the
second alternative should be preferred. Mere convenience for the
dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis for
setting up a compulsory easement. Even in the face of necessity, if
it can be satisfied without imposing the easement, the same should
not be imposed.

The subject property is expropriated for the purpose of constructing a road.

The respondent is not mandated to comply with the essential
requisites for an easement of right-of-way under the New Civil
Jesus is Lord School Code. Case law has it that in the absence of legislative restriction, the
Foundation, Inc. v. City of grantee of the power of eminent domain may determine the location and
Pasig route of the land to be taken unless such determination is capricious and
wantonly injurious. Expropriation is justified so long as it is for the public
good and there is genuine necessity of public character. Government may
not capriciously choose what private property should be taken.

The preconditions for its grant fixed by Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines:
Ramos, Sr. v. Gatchalian
1. That it is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate
outlet to a public highway (Art. 649, par. 1);
2. After payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, p. 1, end);
PROPERTY CASES l SYNTHESIS 4 3

3. That the isolation was not due to the Central's own acts (Art. 649,
last par.); and
4. That the right of way claimed is 'at the point least prejudicial to
the servient estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule, where
the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may
be the shortest.' (Art. 650).
5. By express provision of law, therefore, a compulsory right of way
cannot be obtained unless the four requisites enumerated are first
shown to exist, and the burden of proof to show their existence
was on the Central.

Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not enough to serve

as its basis. To justify the imposition of this servitude, there must be a
real, not a fictitious or artificial, necessity for it.

NUISANCE

One who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or

appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to
exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or
Doctrine of Hidalgo Enterprises Inc. v. resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby,
Attractive Guillermo Balandan even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises.
Nuisance
The attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of
water, artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition
or artificial feature other than the mere water and its location.

DONATION
NATURE OF DONATION

1. Donation is one of the modes of acquiring ownership.

The essential elements of donation are as follows: (a) the essential

reduction of the patrimony of the donor; (b) the increase in the
patrimony of the donee; and (c) the intent to do an act of
liberality or animus donandi.

When applied to a donation of an immovable property, the law further

requires that the donation be made in a public document and that
the acceptance thereof be made in the same deed or in a
separate public instrument; in cases where the acceptance is
made in a separate instrument, it is mandated that the donor
be notified thereof in an authentic form, to be noted in both
instruments.

Concept, Nature Heirs of R. Florencio v. 2. As a mode of acquiring ownership, donation results in an effective
and Effect Heirs of T. De Leon transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee, and is
perfected from the moment the donor is made aware of the acceptance
by the donee, provided that the donee is not disqualified or prohibited
by law from accepting the donation.

Once the donation is accepted, it is generally considered irrevocable,

and the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property, except on
account of officiousness, failure by the donee to comply with the charge
imposed in the donation, or ingratitude. The acceptance, to be valid,
must be made during the lifetime of both the donor and the donee. It
must be made in the same deed or in a separate public document, and
the donee's acceptance must come to the knowledge of the donor.

3. In order that the donation of an immovable property may be valid, it

must be made in a public document. Registration of the deed in the
Office of the Register of Deeds or in the Assessor's Office is not
PROPERTY CASES l SYNTHESIS 4 4

necessary for it to be considered valid and official. Registration does not

vest title; it is merely evidence of such title over a particular parcel of
land. The necessity of registration comes into play only when the rights
of third persons are affected. Furthermore, the heirs are bound by the
deed of contracts executed by their predecessors-in-interest.

4. (1) The intention of the donation was questioned because the donee
did not have the copy of the duplicate of title, or at the very least, they
should have registered the donation. (2) Florencio failed to inform the
heirs of De Leon that De Leon executed the deed of donation in 1976
in his favor. (3) Respondents consistently paid the real taxes. (4) Their
possession of the owner’s duplicate of the title would have fortified their
claim that indeed, De Leon had intended to convey the property by
donation to Florencio. (5) Petitioners failed to adduce in evidence Atty.
Manguiat’s counter-affidavit to the said complaint, or, at the very least,
a separate affidavit explaining the facts and circumstances surrounding
the notarization of the deed of donation. (6) Mayor, at the time of the
donation, did not affixed his signature.

Deed of Quitclaim, not being a donation, no formal acceptance is

needed.

Therefore, it is clear that the quitclaim is not a donation for the three (3)
Heir of C. Reyes v. Reyeses — Victorino, Luis, and Jovito — who merely acknowledged the
Calumpang ownership of and the better right over the said lot by the heirs of
Victoriana and Telesfora Reyes. Having acquired title over the property
in 1954 to the exclusion of respondents Agalas and Manabans, through the
Deed of Quitclaim executed in 1972, the three (3) Reyeses merely
acknowledged the legal rights of respondents over their shares in the said
lot.

Donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a

thing or right in favor of another person who accepts it. The donation
could not have been made in favor of an entity yet inexistent at the
Seventhday Adventist v. time it was made. Nor could it have been accepted as there was yet
Northeastern Mindanao no one to accept it.
Mission
Requisites The deed of donation was not in favor of any informal group of SDA
members but a supposed SPUM-SDA Bayugan (the local church) which, at
the time, had neither juridical personality nor capacity to accept such gift.

The trial court was correct in stating that "a close reading reveals that Exhibit
4 is not a donation inter vivos or mortis causa but a mere declaration of
an intention and a desire. Certainly, it is not a concrete and formal
act of giving or donating. The form and contents of said Exhibit 4 amply
support this conclusion." There clearly was no intention to transfer
ownership from Arsenio Seville to Melquiades Seville at the time of the
instrument's execution. It was a mere intention or a desire on the part
Jutic v. Court of Appeals of Arsenio Seville that in the event of his death at some future time,
his properties should go to Melquiades Seville.

It is quite apparent that Arsenio Seville was thinking of succession (". . . in

case I will die, I will assign all my rights, share and participation over the
above-mentioned properties and that he shall succeed to me in case of my
death. . . . "). Donations which are to take effect upon the death of
the donor partake of the nature of testamentary provisions and
shall be governed by the rules established in the title on succession
(Art. 728, Civil Code).

KINDS
PROPERTY CASES l SYNTHESIS 4 5

As to Consideration

Articles 618 and 619 of Civil Code give an idea of the different kinds of
donations which treatise writers call simple, remuneratory, and conditional.
Defining these donations, Manresa says:

"Simple are those referred to in article 618 and first part of 619.
Remuneratory or compensatory are the rest, as can be deducted
from article 622. Of these, some renumerate services previously
rendered, and they are the renumeratory proper, and the others
compensate a burden, encumbrace or condition imposed upon the
donee, of lesser value than the thing donated, and may be called
conditional donations. Besides, articles 622 speaks of donations for
valuable considerations, such as those that renumerate services
which constitute demandable debts, that is debts which give rise to
an action against the donor or impose upon the donee a burden
equivalent to the value of the so-called donations. The conditional
donations are also regarded by article 638 as onerous."
Di Siock Jian v. Sy Lioc
Suy Where, in a donation, an obligation is imposed upon the donee to support
the donor and defray his necessary expenses during his lifetime, the
donation is not a pure, but a conditional, one, since the obligation imposed
upon the donee is in the nature of the condition without which the donation
would not have been made.

A conditional donation in favor of a minor is not perfected unless it is duly

accepted by his legal representative. The acceptance made by the mother
of said minor is not sufficient for the perfection of the donation unless said
mother had been appointed by competent court as guardian of the property
of her minor child to whom the donation was made.

A conditional donation which has been accepted in accordance with the law
may be revoked by the donor, who afterwards dispose of the property
donated, as though no donation had been made.

This is a case of a contract of assignment, or more specifically, a contract of

onerous donation by virtue of which the defendant binds itself to convey
City of Manila v. Rizal gratuitously in favor of the plaintiff the land in question, in consideration of
Park Co. the improvements the plaintiff agrees to make in the defendant's lands; and
the plaintiff agrees to make certain improvements in said lands, in
consideration of the assignment of a portion thereof which the defendant
binds itself to make in favor of the plaintiff.

1. A simple or pure donation is one whose cause is pure liberality (no

strings attached), while onerous donation is one which is subject
to burdens, charges or future services equal to or more in value
than the thing donated. Under Article 733 of the Civil Code,
donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on
contracts; hence, the formalities required for a valid simple donation are
not applicable.
Lagazo v. Court of
Appeals 2. Even conceding that petitioner's full payment of the purchase price of
the lot might have been a burden to him, such payment was not
however imposed by the donor as a condition for the donation. It is
clear that the donor did not have any intention to burden or charge
petitioner as the donee, The words in the deed are in fact typical of a
pure donation. We agree with Respondent Court that the payments
made by petitioner were merely his voluntary acts. This much can be
gathered from his testimony in court, in which he never even claimed
that a burden or charge had been imposed by his grandmother.
PROPERTY CASES l SYNTHESIS 4 6

3. The donation following the theory of cognition (Article 1319, Civil Code),
is perfected only upon the moment the donor knows of the
acceptance by the donee.

Furthermore, if the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the

donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall
be noted in both instruments. Acceptance of the donation by the
donee is, therefore, indispensable; its absence makes the
donation null and void.

AS TO TAKING EFFECT

1. Crucial in resolving whether the donation was inter vivos or mortis causa
is the determination of whether the donor intended to transfer the
ownership over the properties upon the execution of the deed. In
ascertaining the intention of the donor, all of the deed's
provisions must be read together.

2. The granting clause shows that Diego donated the properties out of love
and affection for the donee. This is a mark of a donation inter vivos.
Second, the reservation of lifetime usufruct indicates that the donor
intended to transfer the naked ownership over the properties. As
correctly posed by the Court of Appeals, what was the need for such
reservation if the donor and his spouse remained the owners of the
properties? Third, the donor reserved sufficient properties for his
maintenance in accordance with his standing in society, indicating that
the donor intended to part with the six parcels of land. Lastly, the donee
accepted the donation.

As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the Danlag spouses were

Gestopa v. Court of aware of the difference between the two donations. If they did not
Appeals intend to donate inter vivos, they would not again donate the four lots
already donated mortis causa. Petitioner's counter argument that this
proposition was erroneous because six years after, the spouses changed
their intention with the deed of revocation, is not only disingenuous but
Designation given also fallacious. Petitioners cannot use the deed of revocation to show
– not conclusive the spouses' intent because its validity is one of the issues in this case.

3. An acceptance clause is a mark that the donation is inter vivos.

Acceptance is a requirement for donations inter vivos. Donations mortis
causa, being in the form of a will, are not required to be accepted by
the donees during the donors' lifetime.

4. A limitation on the right to sell during the donors' lifetime implied that
ownership had passed to the donees and donation was already effective
during the donors' lifetime.

5. A valid donation, once accepted, becomes irrevocable, except on

account of officiousness, failure by the donee to comply with the
charges imposed in the donation, or ingratitude.

1. Where the donor stated in the deed of donation that he will not dispose
or take away the land "because I am reserving it to him (donee) upon
my death," he, in effect, expressly renounced the right to freely
Cuevas v. Cuevas dispose of the property in favor of another (a right essential to
full ownership) and manifested the irrevocability of the
conveyance of the naked title to the property in favor of the
donee. A stated in the case of Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals, such
irrevocability is characteristic of donations inter vivos, because
it is incompatible with the idea of a disposition post mortem.
PROPERTY CASES l SYNTHESIS 4 7

2. When the donor stated that she would continue to retain the
"possession, cultivation, harvesting and all other rights and attributes of
ownership" she meant only the dominium utile, not the full ownership.
The words "rights and attributes of ownership" should be construed
ejusdem generis with the preceding rights of "possession, cultivation
and harvesting" expressly enumerated in the deed. Had the donor
meant to retain full or absolute ownership she had no need to
specify possession, cultivation and harvesting, since all these
rights are embodied in full or absolute ownership; nor would
she then have excluded the right of free disposition from the
"rights and attributes of ownership" that she reserved for
herself.

3. Persons who are called to prepare or notarize deeds of donation should

call the attention of the donors to the necessity of clearly specifying
whether, notwithstanding the donation, they wish to retain the right to
control and dispose at will of the property before their death, without
need of the consent or intervention of the beneficiary, since the express
reservation of such right would be conclusive indication that the
liberality is to exist only at the donor's death, and therefore, the
formalities of testaments should be observed; while a converso, the
express waiver of the right of free disposition would place the inter vivos
character of the donation beyond dispute

4. To respect the terms of the donation and at the same time express
gratitude for the donor's benevolence, constitutes sufficient acceptance
of the donation.

1. Nature of donations inter vivos and mortis causa transfers. —

An inter vivos donation of real property must be evidenced by a
public document and should be accepted by the donee in the same deed
of donation or in a separate instrument. In the latter case, the donor
should be notified of the acceptance in an authentic form and that step
should be noted in both instruments.

A transfer mortis causa should be embodied in a last will and

testament. It should not be called donation mortis causa. It is in reality
a legacy. If not embodied in a valid will, the donation is void.

2. From the aforequoted articles 728 to 732, it is evident that it is the time
of effectivity (aside from the form) which distinguishes a donation inter
Donations to be vivos from a donation mortis causa.
delivered after Alejandro v. Geraldez
Donor’s Death The effectivity is determined by the time when the full or naked
ownership (dominium plenum or dominium directum) of the donated
properties is transmitted to the donees. The execution of a public
instrument is a mode of delivery or tradition. If the donation is made in
contemplation of the donor's death, meaning that the full or naked
ownership of the donated properties will pass to the donee only because
of the donor's death, then it is at that time that the donation takes
effect, and it is a donation mortis causa which should be embodied in a
last will and testament.

But if the donation takes effect during the donor's lifetime or

independently of the donor's death, meaning that the full or naked
ownership (nuda proprietas) of the donated properties passes to the
donee during the donor's lifetime, not by reason of his death but
because of the deed of donation, then the donation is inter vivos .

3. The effectivity of the donation should be ascertained from the

deed of donation and the circumstances surrounding its
execution.
PROPERTY CASES l SYNTHESIS 4 8

4. What are the distinguishing characteristics of a donation mortis causa?

In a disposition post mortem (1) the transfer conveys no title or

ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor, of the
transferor (meaning testator) retains the ownership, full or naked
(domino absoluto or nuda proprietas) (2) the transfer is revocable
before the transferor's death and revocability may be provided for
indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the
properties conveyed, and (3) the transfer would be void if the transferor
survived the transferee.

IOW, in a donation mortis causa it is the donor's death that determines

that acquisition of, or the right to, the property donated, and the
donation is revocable at the donor's will. Where the donation took effect
immediately upon the donee's acceptance thereof and it was subject to
the resolutory condition that the donation would be revoked if the donee
did not give the donor a certain quantity of rice or a sum of money, the
donation is inter-vivos.

5. Justice Reyes in the case of Puig vs. Peñaflorida, synthesized the rules
as follows:

a) That the Civil Code recognizes only gratuitous transfers of property

which are effected by means of donations inter vivos or by last will
and testament executed with the requisite legal formalities.

b) That in inter vivos donations the act is immediately operative

even if the material or physical deliver (execution) of the property
may be deferred until the donor's death, whereas, in a
testamentary disposition, nothing is conveyed to the grantee
and nothing is acquired by him until the death of the
grantor/testator. The disposition is ambulatory and not final.

c) That in a mortis causa disposition the conveyance or alienation

should be (expressly or by necessary implication) revocable ad
nutum or at the discretion of the grantor or so called donor if he
changes his mind.

d) That, consequently, the specification in the deed of the cases

whereby the act may be revoked by the donor indicates that the
donation is inter vivos and not a mortis causa disposition.

e) That the designation of the donation as mortis causa, or a

provision in the deed to the effect that the donation "is to take
effect at the death of the donor", is not a controlling criterion
because those statements are to be construed together
with the rest of the instrument in order to give effect to
the real intent of the transferor.

f) That a conveyance for an onerous consideration is governed

by the rules of contracts and not by those of donations or
testaments.

g) That in case of doubt the conveyance should be deemed a

donation inter vivos, rather than mortis causa, in order to avoid
uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the
deed.

h) That the fact that the donation is given in consideration of love

and affection or past or future services is not a characteristic
of donations inter vivos because transfers mortis causa
may be made also for those reasons.
PROPERTY CASES l SYNTHESIS 4 9

6. The acceptance clause is another indication that the donation is inter

vivos. Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will, are never
accepted by the donees during the donors' lifetime. Acceptance is a
requirement for donations inter vivos.

1. It is explicit in Article 725 of the Civil Code that acceptance is necessary

in a donation. This applies to all kinds of donation because the law does
not make any distinction. The rationale behind the requirement of
acceptance is that nobody is obliged to receive a benefit against his will.

2. A donation mortis causa takes effect only after the death of the donor,
consequently it is only after the latter's death that its acceptance may
be made.

Vita v. Montanano 3. Even if the donor says that the donation is to take effect after his death,
when it is shown that the main consideration of the donation is not the
death of the donor but rather services rendered to him then the
donation should be considered as inter vivos and the condition that the
donation is to take effect only after the death of the donor should be
interpreted as meaning that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits
of the property donated should take place only after donor's death.

4. Notwithstanding the fact that the donor stated in said deed that she did
not transfer the ownership, save upon her death, for such a statement
can mean nothing else than that she only reserved to herself the
possession and usufruct of said property, and because the donor could
not very well guarantee the aforesaid right after her death

1. The real nature of a deed is to be ascertained by both its language and

the intention of the parties as demonstrated by the circumstances
attendant upon its execution.

2. A donation which purports to be one inter vivos but withholds from the
donee the right to dispose of the donated property during the donor's
lifetime is in truth one mortis causa. In a donation mortis causa "the
right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the donor is
still alive.

In the instant case, nothing of any consequence was transferred by the

deed of donation in question to Montinola's grandchildren, the
Sicad v. Court of Appeals ostensible donees. They did not get possession of the property donated.
They did not acquire the right to the fruits thereof or any other right of
dominion over the property. More importantly, they did not acquire the
right to dispose of the property — this would accrue to them only after
ten (10) years from Montinola's death. Indeed, they never even laid
hands on the certificate of title to the same. They were therefore simply
"paper owners" of the donated property. All these circumstances
including, to repeat, the explicit provisions of the deed of donation —
reserving the exercise of rights of ownership to the donee and
prohibiting the sale or encumbrance of the property until ten (10) years
after her death — ineluctably lead to the conclusion that the donation
in question was a donation mortis causa, contemplating a transfer of
ownership to the donees only after the donor's demise.

Alejandro v. Geraldez Supra.

Gestopa v. Court of Supra.

Appeals
PROPERTY CASES l SYNTHESIS 4 10

1. The express irrevocability of the same ("hindi na mababawi") is the

distinctive standard that identifies that document as a donation inter
vivos. The other provisions therein which seemingly make the donation
mortis causa do not go against the irrevocable character of the subject
donation.

2. The prohibition on the donor to alienate the said property

during her lifetime is proof that naked ownership over the
property has been transferred to the donees. It also support the
irrevocable nature of the donation considering that the donor has
already divested herself of the right to dispose of the donated property.
On the other hand, the prohibition on the donees only meant that they
may not mortgage or dispose the donated property while the donor
enjoys and possesses the property during her lifetime. However, it is
clear that the donees were already the owners of the subject property
due to the irrevocable character of the donation.

Austria-Magat v. Court of 3. Another indication in the deed of donation that the donation is inter
Appeals vivos is the acceptance clause therein of the donees. We have ruled that
an acceptance clause is a mark that the donation is inter vivos.
Acceptance is a requirement for donations inter vivos.

4. The act of selling the subject property to the petitioner herein cannot
be considered as a valid act of revocation of the deed of
Instances of donation for the reason that a formal case to revoke the donation
Donations must be filed pursuant to Article 764 of the Civil Code which
Intervivos speaks of an action that has a prescriptive period of four (4)
years from non-compliance with the condition stated in the
deed of donation.

The rule that there can be automatic revocation without benefit of a

court action does not apply to the case at bar for the reason that the
subject deed of donation is devoid of any provision providing for
automatic revocation in the event of non-compliance with any
of the conditions set forth therein. Thus, a court action is necessary
to be filed within four (4) years from the non-compliance of the
condition violated.

1. That the document in question in this case was captioned "Donation

Mortis Causa" is not controlling. Supreme Court has held that, if a
donation by its terms is inter vivos, this character is not altered by the
fact that the donor styles it mortis causa.

2. Irrevocability is a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of

conveyances mortis causa, where "revocability" is precisely the essence
of the act.

A donation mortis causa has the following characteristics: (1) It

conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the
Del Rosario v. Ferrer death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing,
that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked)
and control of the property while alive; (2) That before his
death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at
will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly
by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the
properties conveyed; and (3) That the transfer should be void if
the transferor should survive the transferee.

The express "irrevocability" of the donation is the "distinctive standard

that identities the document as a donation inter vivos."
PROPERTY CASES l SYNTHESIS 4 11

3. Reservation (reddendum) in the context of an irrevocable donation

simply means that the donors parted with their naked title, maintaining
only beneficial ownership of the donated property while they lived.

4. Acceptance clause indicates that the donation is inter vivos, since

acceptance is a requirement only for such kind of donations. Donations
mortis causa, being in the form of a will, need not be accepted by the
donee during the donor's lifetime.

5. In case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed a donation inter

vivos rather than mortis causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the
ownership of the property subject of the deed.

6. Since the donation in this case was one made inter vivos, it was
immediately operative and final. The reason is that such kind of
donation is deemed perfected from the moment the donor learned of
the donee's acceptance of the donation. The acceptance makes the
donee the absolute owner of the property donated.

1. In a donation mortis causa, "the right of disposition is not transferred

to the donee while the donor is still alive." In determining whether a
donation is one of mortis causa, the following characteristics must be
taken into account: (1) It conveys no title or ownership to the
transferee before the death of the transferor; or what amounts
to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the
ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while
alive; (2) That before his death, the transfer should be
revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability
may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in
the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and (3) That
the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
transferee.

In the present case, the nature of the donations as mortis causa is

Maglasang v. Heirs of confirmed by the fact that the donations do not contain any clear
Corazon Cabatingan provision that intends to pass proprietary rights to petitioners prior to
Cabatingan's death. The phrase "to become effective upon the death of
the DONOR" admits of no other interpretation but that Cabatingan did
Instances of not intend to transfer the ownership of the properties to petitioners
Donations Mortis during her lifetime.
Causa
2. That the donations were made "in consideration of the love and
affection of the donor" does not qualify the donations as inter vivos
because transfers mortis causa may also be made for the same reason.

3. One of the decisive characteristics of a donation mortis causa is that the

transfer should be considered void if the donor should survive the
donee.

4. Donations that are donations mortis causa, the same partake of the
nature of testamentary provisions and as such, said deeds must be
executed in accordance with the requisites on solemnities of wills and
testaments under Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code.

The document in dispute is a donation mortis causa. The seventh clause of

the document reciting that "we the sisters do hereby order that all these
properties shall be given to those to whom they have been assigned by
Carino v. Abaya virtue of this instrument at the expiration of thirty days after the death
of the last one to die between us," considered in conjunction with the
fact that the grantors employed the terms "there shall be given to,"
"shall administer," and "shall be administered," which have reference
PROPERTY CASES l SYNTHESIS 4 12

to the future, clearly brings forth the intention on the part of the G sisters
to make the distribution of their estate, effective after their death. It is
worthy of observation, also, that in the ninth clause of Exhibit C-1 the phrase
"together with those who had been mentioned to inherit from us" supplies
a cogent reason for concluding that the grant therein made was meant to
take effect after the death of the grantors, for the word "inherit", as
used here, implies the acquisition of property by the heirs after the death of
the G sisters.

Donations which are to become effective upon the death of the donor
partake of the nature of disposals of property by will and shall be
governed by the rules established for testamentary successions.
(Art. 620, Civil Code.) Accordingly, said donations can only be made
with the formalities of a will. As the document was not executed in
conformity with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
conspicuously for lack of attestation clause and marginal signatures, we are
constrained to hold that the same cannot be accorded any force and effect.

Sicad v. Court of Appeals Supra.

1. A donation is onerous, when executed for a valuable

consideration which is considered the equivalent of the
donation itself. In the case at bar where Don Ramon Lopez donated
the subject parcel of land to petitioner but imposed an obligation upon
the latter to establish a medical college thereon, the donation must be
for an onerous consideration.

2. When a person donates land to another on the condition that the latter
would build upon the land a school, the condition imposed was not a
condition precedent or a suspensive condition but a resolutory one. It
is not correct to say that the schoolhouse had to be constructed before
the donation became effective, that is, before the donee could become
the owner of the land, otherwise, it would be invading the property
rights of the donor. The donation had to be valid before the fulfillment
of the condition. If there was no fulfillment or compliance with the
condition, such as what obtains in the instant case, the donation may
now be revoked and all rights which the donee may have acquired under
it.

Effect of 3. The condition imposed by the donor, i.e., the building of a medical
Resolutory Cental Phil. University v. school upon the land donated, depended upon the exclusive will of the
Condition Court of Appeals donee as to when this condition shall be fulfilled. When petitioner
accepted the donation, it bound itself to comply with the condition
thereof. Since the time within which the condition should be fulfilled
depended upon the exclusive will of the petitioner, its absolute
acceptance and the acknowledgment of its obligation provided in the
deed of donation were sufficient to prevent the statute of
limitations from barring the action of private respondents upon
the original contract which was the deed of donation.

4. The period of time for the establishment of a medical college and the
necessary buildings and improvements on the property cannot be
quantified in a specific number of years because of the presence of
several factors and circumstances involved in the erection of an
educational institution, such as government laws and regulations
pertaining to education, building requirements and property restrictions
which are beyond the control of the donee. Thus, when the obligation
does not fix a period but from its nature and circumstances it can be
inferred that a period was intended, the general rule provided in Art.
1197 of the Civil Code applies, which provides that the courts may fix
the duration thereof because the fulfillment of the obligation itself
PROPERTY CASES l SYNTHESIS 4 13

cannot be demanded until after the court has fixed the period for
compliance therewith and such period has arrived.

5. Doubts referring to incidental circumstances of a gratuitous contract

should be resolved in favor of the least transmission of rights and
interests.

1. The donation is perfected once the acceptance by the donee is made

known to the donor. Accordingly, ownership is immediately
transferred to the latter and that ownership will only revert to
the donor if the resolutory condition is not fulfilled.

2. Since no period was imposed by the donor on when must comply with
the condition, the latter remains the owner so long as he has tried to
comply with the condition within a reasonable period. Such period,
Quijada v. Court of however, became irrelevant herein when the donee-Municipality
Appeals manifested through a resolution that it cannot comply with the condition
of building a school and the same was made known to the donor. Only
then — when the non-fulfillment of the resolutory condition was
brought to the donor's knowledge — that ownership of the
donated property reverted to the donor as provided in the
automatic reversion clause of the deed of donation.

3. The donor may have an inchoate interest in the donated property

during the time that ownership of the land has not reverted to her. Such
inchoate interest may be the subject of contracts including a contract
of sale.

PERFECTION OF DONATION

Lagazo v. Court of Supra.

Appeals

1. If the corresponding contract of donation expressly provides for

automatic rescission and/or reversion in case of breach of the condition
therein, and the donee violates or fails to comply with the condition, the
donated property reverts back automatically to the donor.

Such provision, De Luna teaches, is in the nature of an agreement

granting a party the right to rescind a contract in case of breach, without
need of going to court and that upon the happening of the resolutory
condition or noncompliance with the conditions of the contract, the
donation is automatically revoked without need of a judicial declaration
to that effect. Where, however, the donee denies, as here, the
rescission or challenges the propriety thereof, then only the
final award of the court can conclusively settle whether the
resolution is proper or not.

Dolar v. Barangay Lublub Or, in the language of Catholic Archbishop of Manila: The rationale for
the foregoing is that in contracts providing for automatic revocation,
judicial intervention is necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicial
declaration rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded by virtue of
an agreement providing for rescission even without judicial intervention,
but in order to determine whether or not the rescission was proper.
When a deed of donation, . . . expressly provides for automatic
revocation and reversion of the property donated, the rules on contract
and the general rules on prescription should apply, and not Article 764
of the Civil Code. Since Article 1306 of said Code authorizes the parties
to a contract to establish such stipulations, . . . not contrary to law, . . .
public order or public policy, we are of the opinion that, at the very
least, that stipulation of the parties providing for automatic revocation
of the deed of donation, without prior judicial action for that purpose,
PROPERTY CASES l SYNTHESIS 4 14

is valid subject to the determination of the propriety of the rescission

sought. Where such propriety is sustained, the decision of the court will
be merely declaratory of the revocation, but it is not in itself the
revocatory act.

2. (The rule on the imprescriptibility of actions to quiet title admits of

exceptions. The trial court correctly mentioned one, referring to a
situation where the plaintiff in an action to quiet title is not in actual
possession of the land.

In the case at bench, petitioner is not in possession of the property. For

sure, he is even asking in his complaint for recovery of possession of
the donated property. Given the above disquisition, petitioner can hardly
fault the trial court for its holding that petitioner's action to revoke is
time-barred.

Respondent barangay had, under the terms of the deed of donation,

five (5) years from the execution of the conveying deed in September
1981, or up September 1986, within which to introduce and complete
the contemplated development of the donated area. Following Article
764 of the Civil Code, petitioner had four (4) years from September
1986, or up to September 1990, within which to seek the revocation of
the subject donation on the ground of breach of contract. The Court can
grant that the prescription of actions for the revocation of onerous
donations, as here, are governed by the general rules on prescription,
which, in context, is Article 1144 of the Civil Code providing that actions
upon a written contract shall be brought within ten (10) years from
accrual of the right of action. Ten years from September 1986 — the
date when petitioner's right to revoke accrued — would be September
1996. Here, however, what partakes as petitioner's suit to revoke was
led only in May 1998. In all, petitioner's right of action to revoke or
cancel the donation had indeed prescribed, regardless of whether the
applicable legal provision is Article 764 or the favorable Article 1144 of
the Civil Code. It should be stated in this regard, however, that
respondent barangay had disputed the existence of the grounds upon
which petitioner anchored his right to revoke, claiming it had already
complied with the construction and development conditions of the
donation. From the records, it would appear that respondent barangay's
boast of compliance is not an empty one. As we see it, the establishment
on the donated area of telephone service, a water service, a police
mobile force, and a courtroom, all for the benefits of the barangay
residents, substantially satisfies the terms and conditions of the subject
donation. The concrete paving of roads and the construction of
government of offices, sports complex for public enjoyment and like
infrastructures which, per respondent barangay's estimate, cost not less
than P25 Million, add persuasive dimension to the conclusion just made.
Petitioner's long silence vis-Ã -vis the kind of development structures
that Barangay Lublub had decided to put up or allowed to be established
on the subject area cannot but be taken as an indicia of his satisfaction
with respondent barangay's choice of public service projects. The
prolonged silence was broken only after the provincial and municipal
governments advertised, then sold the property in a public auction to
satisfy questionable tax liabilities.)

3. Petitioner's contention that the donation was invalid because it was not
registered in the Registry of Property deserves no merit. For, as
between the parties to the donation and their assigns, the registration
of the deed of donation with the Registry of Deeds is not needed for
its validity and efficacy.

PERSONS WHO MAY GIVE OR RECEIVE A DONATION

PROPERTY CASES l SYNTHESIS 4 15

Donation by the Article 736, prohibiting guardians and trustees from making a donation of
Guardian or Araneta v. Perez the properties entrusted to them, is a new provision of the Civil Code, which
Trustee took effect on August 30, 1950, and, pursuant to Articles 2253 and 2255 of
said Code, does not apply retroactively to a testamentary trust established
in 1948.

In prohibiting a trustee from donating properties entrusted to him, the new

Civil Code does so for the protection of the trust beneficiaries and evidently
contemplates gifts of pure beneficence, that is, those which are supported
by no other cause than the liberality of the donor. When the donation is
clearly in the interest of the beneficiaries, to say it cannot be done would be
contrary to the spirit and intent of the law.

ART. 739. The following donations shall be void: (1) Those made between
persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of
the donation. The disqualfication mentioned in Article 739 is not applicable
to herein appellee Candelaria Davac because she was not guilty of
concubinage, there being no proof that she had knowledge of the previous
marriage of her husband Petronilo.

Capacity of the The benefit receivable under the Social Security Act is in the nature of a
Donee special privilege or an arrangement secured by the law, pursuant to the
Social Security System v. policy of the State to provide social security to the workingmen. The
Special Davac amounts that may thus be received cannot be considered as property earned
Disqualification by the member during his lifetime, and, hence, do not form part of the
properties of the conjugal partnership or of the estate of the said member.
They are disbursed from a public special fund created by Congress pursuant
to the declared policy of the Republic "to develop, establish gradually and
perfect a social security system which . . . shall provide protection against
the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death."

Consequently, if there is a named beneficiary and the designation is not

invalid, it is not the heirs of the employee who are entitled to receive the
bene ts, unless they are the designated bene ciaries themselves. It is only
when there is no designated bene ciary or when the designation is void that
the laws of succession become applicable. The Social Security Act is not a
law of succession.

FORMALITIES

The delivery by the donor and the acceptance by donee must be

simultaneous, and the acceptance by a person other than the true donee
must be authorized by a proper power of attorney set forth in a public
document.

None has been claimed to exist in this case. Since by appellants' own
Donation of Genato v. De Lorenzo version, the donation intended was a joint one to both donees, one could
Movables not accept independently of his co-donee, for there is no accretion among
donees unless expressly so provided (Article 637) or unless they be husband
and wife.

Incontestably, one of the two donees was not present at the delivery, and
there is no showing that he, Francisco Genato, had authorized his brother,
Florentino to accept for both of them. As pointed out by Manresa in his
Commentaries to the Civil Code of 1889.

Article 749 of the Civil Code provides inter alia that "in order that the
donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public
document, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the
charges which the donee must satisfy." Corollarily, Article 709 of the same
Code explicitly states that "the titles of ownership, or other rights over
PROPERTY CASES l SYNTHESIS 4 16

Donation of Gonzales v. Court of immovable property, which are not duly inscribed or annotated in the
Immovables Appeals Registry of Property shall not prejudice third persons." From the foregoing
provisions, it may be inferred that as between the parties to a donation
of an immovable property, all that is required is for said donation
to be contained in a public document. Registration is not necessary for
it to be considered valid and effective.

In order to bind third persons, the donation must be registered in

the Registry of Property (now Registry of Land Titles and Deeds).
Although the nonregistration of a deed of donation shall not affect its
validity, the necessity of registration comes into play when the rights of third
persons are affected, as in the case at bar. It is actually the act of
registration that operates to convey registered land or affect title thereto.
Further, it is an entrenched doctrine in our jurisdiction that registration in a
public registry creates constructive notice to the whole world.

It shall not be binding upon private respondents who did not participate in
said deed or had no actual knowledge thereof. Hence, while the deed of
donation is valid between the donor and the donees, such deed, however,
did not bind the tenants-farmers who were not parties to the donation. Non-
registration of a deed of donation does not bind other parties
ignorant of a previous transaction

(At the time of the execution of the deed of assignment covering Lot No. 63
in favor of petitioner, Don Julian remained the owner of the property since
ownership over the subject lot would only pass to his heirs from the second
marriage at the time of his death. Thus, as the owner of the subject lot, Don
Julian retained the absolute right to dispose of it during his lifetime. His right
cannot be challenged by Milagros Donio and her children on the ground that
it had already been adjudicated to them by virtue of the compromise
agreement.)

J.L.T. Agro, Inc. v. Title to immovable property does not pass from the donor to the donee by
Balansag virtue of a deed of donation until and unless it has been accepted in a public
instrument and the donor duly notified thereof. The acceptance may be
made in the very same instrument of donation. If the acceptance does not
appear in the same document, it must be made in another. Where the deed
of donation fails to show the acceptance, or where the formal notice of the
acceptance, made in a separate instrument, is either not given to the donor
or else not noted in the deed of donation and in the separate acceptance,
the donation is null and void.

In the case at bar, although the Supplemental Deed appears in a public

document, the absence of acceptance by the donee in the same deed or
even in a separate document is a glaring violation of the requirement.

From the time the public instrument of donation is simultaneously executed

and acknowledged by donors and donees, the latter acquired not only the
ownership but also the possession of the donated property, since the
execution of a public instrument of conveyance is one of the recognized
ways in which delivery (tradition) of lands may be made, unless the contrary
is expressed or inferable from the terms of the deeds.
Ortiz v. Court of Appeals
Where the donation is on its face absolute and unconditional and nothing in
its text authorizes us to conclude that it is limited to the naked ownership of
the land donated, the absence in the deed of any express reservation of
usufruct in favor of the donors is proof that no such reservation was ever
intended considering that under the law, a donation of land by public
instrument is required to express the charges that the donee must assume.
PROPERTY CASES l SYNTHESIS 4 17

1. Title to immovable property does not pass from the donor to the donee
Sumipat v. Banga by virtue of a deed of donation until and unless it has been accepted in
a public instrument and the donor duly notified thereof. The acceptance
may be made in the very same instrument of donation. If the
acceptance does not appear in the same document, it must be made in
another. Where the deed of donation fails to show the acceptance, or
where the formal notice of the acceptance, made in a separate
instrument, is either not given to the donor or else not noted in the deed
of donation and in the separate acceptance, the donation is null and
void.

In this case, the donees’ acceptance of the donation is not manifested

either in the deed itself or in a separate document. Hence, the deed as
an instrument of donation is patently void.

2. Under the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977, the tax code in force
at the time of the execution of the deed, an individual who makes any
transfer by gift shall make a return and file the same within 30 days
after the date the gift is made with the Revenue District Officer,
Collection Agent or duly authorized Treasurer of the municipality in
which the donor was domiciled at the time of the transfer. The filing of
the return and payment of donor’s taxes are mandatory. In fact, the
registrar of deeds is mandated not to register in the registry of property
any document transferring real property by way of gifts inter vivos
unless a certification that the taxes fixed and actually due on the
transfer had been paid or that the transaction is tax exempt from the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, in either case, is presented.

3. Being an absolute nullity, both as a donation and as a sale, the deed is

subject to attack at any time, in accordance with the rule in Article 1410
of the Civil Code that an action to declare the inexistence of a void
contract does not prescribe.

Passage of time cannot cure the fatal flaw in an inexistent and void
contract. The defect of inexistence of a contract is permanent and
incurable; hence, it cannot be cured either by ratification or by
prescription.

4. It is well-settled that when there is a showing of illegality, the property

registered is deemed to be simply held in trust for the real owner by the
person in whose name it is registered, and the former then has the right
to sue for the reconveyance of the property. The action for the
purpose is also imprescriptible. As long as the land wrongfully
registered under the Torrens system is still in the name of the person
who caused such registration, an action in personam will lie to compel
him to reconvey the property to the real owner.

There are three requisites for the validity of a simple donation of a real
property, to wit: (1) it must be made in a public instrument; (2) it
must be accepted, which acceptance may be made either in the
same Deed of Donation or in a separate public instrument; and (3)
if the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor must
be notified in an authentic form, and the same must be noted in
both instruments.

Arangote v. Maglunob Title to immovable property does not pass from the donor to the donee by
virtue of a Deed of Donation until and unless it has been accepted in a public
instrument and the donor duly notified thereof. The acceptance may be
made in the very same instrument of donation. If the acceptance does not
appear in the same document, it must be made in another. Where the
PROPERTY CASES l SYNTHESIS 4 18

Deed of Donation fails to show the acceptance, or where the formal

notice of the acceptance, made in a separate instrument, is either
not given to the donor or else not noted in the Deed of Donation
and in the separate acceptance, the donation is null and void.

It is true that the acceptance of a donation may be made at any time during
the lifetime of the donor. And granting arguendo that such acceptance may
still be admitted in evidence on appeal, there is still need for proof that
a formal notice of such acceptance was received by the donor and
noted in both the Deed of Donation and the separate instrument
embodying the acceptance.

REVOCATION AND REDUCTION OF DONATIONS

Petitioner's act of occupying the portion pertaining to private respondent

Directo without the latter's knowledge and consent is an act of usurpation
which is an offense against the property of the donor and considered as an
act of ingratitude of a donee against the donor. The law does not require
conviction of the donee; it is enough that the offense be proved in
the action for revocation.

"Article 769 of the New Civil Code states that: "The action granted to the
donor by reason of ingratitude cannot be renounced in advance. This action
prescribes within one year to be counted from the time the donor had
Revocation by knowledge of the fact and it was possible for him to bring the action." As
Reason of Noceda v. Court of expressly stated, the donor must file the action to revoke his donation within
Ingratitude if the Appeals one year from the time he had knowledge of the ingratitude of the donee.
Donee Also, it must be shown that it was possible for the donor to institute the said
action within the same period. The concurrence of these two requisites must
be shown by defendant Noceda in order to bar the present action.

The action to revoke by reason of ingratitude prescribes within one (1)

year to be counted from the time (a) the donor had knowledge of
the fact; (b) provided that it was possible for him to bring the
action.

It is incumbent upon petitioner to show proof of the concurrence of

these two conditions in order that the one (1) year period for
bringing the action be considered to have already prescribed. No
competent proof was adduced by petitioner to prove his allegation. In Civil
Cases, the party having burden of proof must establish his case by
preponderance of evidence. He who alleges a fact has the burden of proving
it and a mere allegation is not evidence.