CHINA AND THE RETURN OF GREAT

POWER STRATEGIC COMPETITION

BRUCE JONES

FEBRUARY 2020

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY order could hold. Or we could see the emergence of

a sharply competitive period, one in which the risk of
China’s rise — to the position of the world’s second- conflict is present but not dominant, and in which the
largest economy, its largest energy consumer, and main liberal powers work together in new arrangements
its number two defense spender — has unsettled to defend key interests and key values.
global affairs. Beijing’s shift in strategy towards a
more assertive posture towards the West is amplifying Chinese leaders exude optimism while American
a change in international dynamics from patterns politics is in disarray. But this is misleading. While in the
of multilateral cooperation towards a pattern of short term, the dynamics of great power competition
competition. We are entering, or have entered, a phase afford China (and Russia) some opportunities, the
of rivalry between the great and major powers. United States still has a better balance of risk and
opportunity to shape international affairs in the
While several actors have agency in this unfolding period that lies ahead. What’s more, there’s continued
dynamic, the choices made by China and the United strength and some emerging vitality among America’s
States will matter more than those of others. The most powerful allies — Japan, Germany, even Britain
interplay between those two countries’ choices will — and putative partners like India. Mobilizing that
shape the prospects for peace, especially in East Asia; strength to confront the new realities of great power
for prosperity, globally; for the way technology plays rivalry is the challenge for American statecraft in the
into the next phase of social and economic dynamics; period ahead.
and for the role and space accorded to democracy
and human rights in international affairs. The obvious
American response should be to bolster its alliances
THE CLOSING OF A CHAPTER
and defend the core precepts of the multilateral When foreign guests have met with Chinese political
order. Instead, America has turn to unilateralism (and leaders in recent years, it rarely takes long for their
Britain, handmaiden to much of American foreign hosts to invoke the “Unequal Treaties” — the Treaty
policy, has withdrawn from the European Union and of Nanking in 1842 and the Treaty of the Bogue in
must renegotiate its place in the world.) 1843 that ended the first Opium Wars and set the
terms of international trade with China — and what
On American and Chinese choices hinge three followed, i.e. the “century of humiliation.” Chinese
scenarios. We could face the “return of the jungle” — a strategists have always referenced this long period of
period of increasingly unchecked rivalry between the Chinese subjugation to Western dominance but during
world’s top powers, with risk of military conflict growing the period when China focused on market reforms,
apace. In a more ideal scenario, all powers could it receded as a leitmotif of their diplomacy. Now the
exercise a degree of respect for the key treaties and end of the humiliation is front and center in Beijing’s
provisions of the multilateral system, and the existing communications.

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This is propaganda, of course, and for the Chinese notion that America, Russia, Britain, and China would
leadership it has two purposes. Internally, it is part of each work to provide security in their own sphere of
a deliberate effort to replace the legitimating narrative influence.1 That concept ended up embedded in the
of continuing Chinese Communist Party rule, switching structure of the veto-wielding members of the U.N.
from an emphasis on fast economic growth to a narrative Security Council (British Prime Minister Winston
of ambitious nationalism. This is a necessary shift as Churchill insisted that the French get a veto as well)
Chinese growth slows from the stratospheric highs of but did not survive its first test with reality, to wit the
the 1990s and 2000s to its current modest levels. But U.N. effort at reconstruction of Eastern Europe, nor
internationally, Chinese leaders are also expressing Roosevelt’s death.2 The differences in U.S. and Soviet
their ambition to play the game of international order perspectives on postwar Europe and Harry Truman’s
from pole position. The international order has been in deep distrust of Joseph Stalin quickly put paid to the
constant evolution, including in the post-Cold War era; “four policemen” moment.
now China wants to drive a new set of changes.
What followed was the Marshall Plan and the start of
While China under Xi Jinping expresses a sense of the Cold War. And that did set some essential patterns:
confidence, even hubris, about its capacity to reshape a mutual self-defense pact with Western Europe
the rules of the game, and the United States under against the Soviet Union; the forward deployment of
Donald Trump is engaged in a kind of denialist narrative American troops and airpower in Europe and Asia; and
about its ability to impose order without allies and the restoration of substantial economic ties between
suppress Chinese ambitions without costs, the reality the United States and Europe (and later, with the Asian
is that both the United States and China confront a set partners.) The patterns and concepts of what we now
of uncomfortable and consequential choices. The now refer to as American leadership of the free world were
very real power gap between these two top powers and born in this period. The titanic struggle against the
everyone else is a central reality of international order. Soviet Union provided an existential rationale for this
The other powers must worry about Washington’s order and America’s vital role within it. America also
preferences, Beijing’s preferences, and the tensions took on the role of guaranteeing the free flow of oil out
between them. But the power gap between the United of the Persian Gulf, giving it a sustained rationale for
States and China is still very real, too — especially if political and military engagement in the Middle East.3
American leaders reverse the erosion of political ties Admittedly, there was much that was hardly liberal in
to the allies. this phase, especially in America’s foreign policy in
the “Third World”; in some regions, that legacy still
BACKDROP: AN EVOLVING tarnishes the West’s efforts to defend a “liberal order.”

INTERNATIONAL ORDER Much of the rhetoric and some of the patterns of the
Cold War period continued into the post-Cold War
It is commonplace to hear American pundits and
era; but in reality, the basic structure of international
policymakers talk about a 75-year tradition of
relations changed. Dramatically so: the collapse of the
American foreign policy premised on defense of a
Soviet Union opened a moment of international affairs
“liberal international order.” In point of fact, both the
in which there was only one, dominant great power, the
nature of international order and America’s role in it
United States, which stood alone astride international
has evolved considerably during the period since the
affairs with no peer competitors and few intrinsic
surrender of Germany and Japan ended World War II.
constraints.4
Both have evolved through several decades, marked
by key changes in the structure of power. The first decade of this third phase of the order saw the
U.S. behave in a very unusual way: it chose to exercise
The first phase was brief and more aspirational than
its hegemonic power in large part by advancing
actual. In the design of the Bretton Woods institutions
multilateral institutions for trade and security, and
and in U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s
inviting formal rivals to join those institutions.5 It was
image of postwar life, the central pillar of order was
a period of shared prosperity and relative comity in
to be the concept of the “four policemen” — the

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great power relations — not totally free of tensions but of globalization.10 Yet during this period the Western
largely free of a risk of military clashes among the top powers extended their engagement in international
powers.6 In parts of the developing world, the first part order and expanded the scope of the normative reach
of the post-Cold War era saw a surge in civil wars; but of it — incorporating concepts like “the Responsibility
as the era continued, dedicated conflict management to Protect” and humanitarian intervention into some
efforts saw wars decline steadily, in all regions.7 Wider elements of strategy. The gap between the reach of the
concepts of liberalism — connected to the spread of Western powers and the ambition of the order grew.
democracy and the advance of human rights — began

“
to appear more centrally in the rhetoric of the West,
and sometimes in its actions.8
What followed was a confused
This post-Soviet strategy was sharply interrupted by the
al-Qaida attacks of September 11, 2001 and the start
and turbulent decade, leavened by
of what would become nearly two decades of sustained widespread international support for
American warfare in the wider Middle East. Briefly, President Barack Obama but in fact
it seemed as if this strategy would actually deepen laying the groundwork for present
American leadership and bring even more countries tensions.
into its sphere or into active security cooperation with
the United States, as wide coalitions joined forces with
the U.S. in Afghanistan to tackle al-Qaida. The Iraq What followed was a confused and turbulent decade,
War, though, strained this wider coalition and began leavened by widespread international support for
to erode fulsome support for American leadership. President Barack Obama but in fact laying the
Still, the scale of American power and the absence groundwork for present tensions. Key markers of the
of alternative economic or security powers left the uncertainty of the times came in Russia’s seizure
United States broadly in command of the dynamics of and annexation of Crimea from Ukraine; in U.S.-U.K.
international order. dithering over Syria, and Russia’s decision to deploy
forces there (returning significant Russian military
The Arab Spring, the global financial crisis, and the power to the Middle East for the first time since the fall
growth of the “rising powers” conspired to bring this of the Berlin Wall); in China’s decision to install military
phase of American unipolarity to a close and move facilities initially on Woody Island in the South China
us into a fourth phase of the order. The overthrow of Sea and more broadly to expand its coercive posture
dictators in Tunisia and Egypt and the subsequent in the South and East China Seas; and in the failure
descent of the wider Middle East and North Africa of the so-called “developing world round” of the World
into a sustained dynamic of internal and regional Trade Organization (WTO) talks. These dynamics of
strife drew the United States further into the turbulent deterioration were alleviated by episodes of successful
region and created wider fissures between Washington cooperation — for example in the negotiation of a
and its allies and partners, both European and Middle global climate agreement in Paris in 2015, in the
Eastern. And this came after the global financial crisis robust international response to the 2014-2016 Ebola
bled the American treasury and strained international outbreak in West Africa, and in the 2015 conclusion
confidence in the competence of Washington to of the P5+1 nuclear deal with Iran — but they were not
manage international economic affairs (although reversed by these more positive developments.
Washington did also lead the G-20 response to the
crisis).9 These events came at a point in international And all that was before the Brexit referendum and the
affairs when the “rising powers” — most importantly election of Donald Trump brought skeptics of integration
China, but also India, a recovered Russia, Brazil, Turkey, to power in London and Washington — the two key
and others — had reached a point in their own growth architects of the international system. It remains to
that they had the economic muscle and diplomatic be seen whether Brexit and Trump’s victory mark the
clout needed to start to push back on Western end of U.S. and U.K. commitment to multilateral order,
dominance of international institutions and the rules or merely significant bumps in the road. But even if

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new elections or changing political views pull London the second-largest economy in the world (in nominal
and Washington back to an internationalist worldview, GDP terms), the second-largest defense budget, and
the West now confronts new realities in the shaping of the second-most-important technology sector. It is
international order. number one in population, and the largest energy
importer and largest carbon emitter in the world. More
WHAT WORLD DO THE debatable is the new strategy, but few would query
the notion that China under Xi Jinping has shed its
UNITED STATES AND CHINA old strategy of “peaceful rise” (together with the more
CONFRONT? subtle “hide and bide”) in favor of a more assertive,
more nationalist, and more ideological approach.11
This brings us to a world in which the choices that Whether that strategy is also confrontational is a
Washington and Beijing make will be the most question we’ll return to.
consequential factors shaping international order and
great power competition. They will not make those The third feature of the present order is not a third
choices in an empty space, though. Rather they both player — it’s the sizeable gap between the power of the
confront an international arena with a number of top two players and all the rest. Several other players
complicated features. It’s become commonplace to have a world-leading capacity in one issue space; but
refer to this moment (2016 onwards) as marked by only the United States and China now have genuinely
a return to great power competition. But what are the global economic and political influence, with the United
contours and elements of that? Six features of the States also having global military capacity — and China
landscape shape the choices available to Washington potentially catching up on that score. What’s more,
and Beijing. the first mover advantages of technological prowess,
especially in artificial intelligence (AI), is increasing the
The first is the continued scale and weight of the power gap between the top two players and the rest.
United States. For all the talk of decline and all the
retreat to semi-isolationist instincts, the United States The alliance dynamic thus becomes — or more
remains the world’s largest individual market, has the accurately, has returned to being — a central dynamic in
largest and most powerful armed capacity in the world, the balance of power. The U.S.-led system of alliances
and has a network of global bases and relationships encompasses 15 of the top 20 militaries in the world.
that is eroded but far from eclipsed. It’s the largest That system has been frayed by a lack of focus in
energy exporter in the world (though still a very large the second term of the Obama administration and
importer), hosts the most powerful technology firms, by outright contempt from President Trump (though
and its research universities remain in a league of their not from his administration), but it is not yet broken
own. Notwithstanding the utter failure of the political and still constitutes a weighty fact in international
class in Washington to protect let alone buttress affairs. The challenge of the alliance system is this:
these assets, they will endure for period to come — the most coherent part, NATO, lacks a clear strategic
how quickly they erode will primarily be a function focus, while the most geographically relevant part,
of U.S. domestic policy. China’s propaganda and the network of bilateral alliances in Asia, lacks an
international posture (like Russia’s) aim to highlight effective operational structure. The alliance structure
Western weakness for the purpose of eroding Western is a powerful latent geopolitical fact; mobilizing it to
self-confidence; but the reality of continued American confront the dynamics of a changing order is the key
and European material strength and strengths in the challenge for American statecraft.
Western model limits the effectiveness of Chinese
diplomacy — especially as China increasingly shows its The fourth feature of the contemporary order is a layer
cards in its international dealings. of major powers vying for space and security. These are
the European Union (and within that body Germany,
The second is the new position and evolving strategy and to a lesser degree France, enjoying both clout
of China. The position is unquestionable: China is now within the European institutions and outside them),
a clear number two in the international system, with Britain (now formally out of the EU and engaged in

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renegotiating trading relationships), Russia, India, and course it may soon find allies and partners like South
Japan. Each of these countries or entities has a major Korea, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates forging
population, substantial economic weight, or military very different kinds of relationships with Beijing and
heft — but none have all of them. The rest of the G-20, Moscow. China’s relations with India remain a complex
countries like Saudi Arabia, Turkey, South Korea, mix of competition, outright rivalry, occasional limited
Brazil, Indonesia, and the smaller Western economies, hostility, and important collaboration.13
all have some degree of economic or diplomatic clout
within the system, but not at the same level as the A fifth feature is the continued existence of a wide and
major powers — all of which wield a population of 65 deep network of multilateral institutions, commitments
million or more and a top 10 economy. Collectively, and mechanisms that bind together large parts of the
though, they are a consequential fact of international rest of the world, and in which deep habits of cooperation
affairs — and it was only with Brexit last month that the have been forged — especially in the issue spaces of
Chinese economy surpassed that of the EU in nominal development, infrastructure, climate, and health. China
terms. is taking active advantage of America’s myopic under-
attention to multilateralism to penetrate and attempt
While these players are similar in the weight they carry to reshape that system to its advantage, or at least to
in international affairs, their strategies are radically limit the West’s continued ability to use that system as
different. Russia, as an economic welterweight a force multiplier for its own interests and values. The
and an energy heavyweight, has thrown a hugely major multilateral mechanisms are frayed and fragile,
disproportionate amount of its GDP into retaining/ but not yet abandoned or broken.14 And they enjoy
regaining a globally competitive nuclear/conventional something that the strategic elites of the great powers
military capacity. It has adopted a strategy of probing, do not: widespread corporate, civic, and youth support.
risk-taking, and provoking designed to weaken the

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unity of NATO — with some success. Europe, for its
part, is meeting the rise of China, the aggression of
Russia, and the unilateralism of the United States China is taking active advantage of
with a combination of bewilderment, nostalgia, and America’s myopic under-attention
hesitant exploration of self-help approaches that so far
fall well short of a credible strategic response. India —
to multilateralism to penetrate and
which perhaps has the greatest intrinsic capacity to re- attempt to reshape that system to
weight the options facing China and the United States its advantage.
— seems content to play a role of suitor to many, bride
to none, eschewing an ordering role despite rhetoric
to the contrary. Japan, militarily weakest and most And that constitutes a sixth feature of the contemporary
vulnerable of these second-tier players, is unique in system — the presence of an informed and active,
having adopted a credible strategy of buttressing increasingly activist, network of civic organizations,
economic multilateralism and pressuring both Beijing private sector companies, and publics. Those
and Washington to moderate their escalatory dynamic dynamics — different from but overlapping with the
— with some success.12 populist politics that have generated both left and right
disruptions in Europe and Latin America, to say nothing
The Leninist nature of the Chinese system and its of the United States and Britain — constitute a feature
foreign policy means that it has no such alliance option of international politics easily overlooked in strategic
available to it — but there is a growing degree of policy assessments. They are not likely to be a powerful
coordination with Russia, approaching the features enough force to prevent the United States and China
of a “concert” arrangement. Moscow and Beijing from locking into strategic hostility, and in some issue
share an overarching interest in further weakening spaces like human rights may amplify that escalatory
the West’s hold on the key dynamics of international dynamic. But in other domains, like climate change,
order. And if American policy continues in its present they may constitute a check on a rush to rivalry.

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Less certain is the role that will be played by the technology for deeper cooperation in fiscal and military affairs:
giants of the West Coast of the United States and China’s instead we see Brexit and the resurgence of far-right
dynamic cities. For all the technology nationalism of “Made parties across the European landscape. Each of these
in China 2025” and “America First,” the fact remains that dynamics is adding to disorder and the risk of conflict.
tech giants on both sides of the Pacific remain deeply
intertwined. It is a remarkable feature of the moment that However, even if the United States renews its focus
one of America’s most influential artificial intelligence on the alliance structure and multilateralism, it will
companies, Microsoft, could announce within months confront some uncomfortable realities. First among
the following two decisions: winning the Pentagon’s $10 them is the simple fact that the economic and
billion tender for cloud computing services, and a large- technological weight of China — now, not in the future
scale expansion of its AI research hub in Shanghai. — means that China will be able to claim a full seat at
the table in the writing of the next phase of the rules
Taken together, these features of the contemporary of the international trade, financial, and technological
international system will shape and constrain the order. Will the United States accede? It would mark
dynamics of great power competition. And all of it the first time in nearly two centuries that an illiberal
confronts strategists in Washington and Beijing with power has had a major voice in the shaping of the
complex, and mostly uncomfortable, choices. rules of international commerce. (The Soviet Union
never sought to play this role in more than an episodic,
WHAT CHOICES DO THE GREAT blocking way.) That would mean ceding some degree
of control to a country whose political system is moving
POWERS HAVE? in the opposite direction of the West’s — away from
It’s indicative of the continuing power of the United market reform and incremental advances of the rule of
States that the most important question regarding the law, towards fuller social control and an increased role
next phase of great power relations and international of the state in the economic sphere. Combined with
order is a question about American policy: will aggressive human rights suppression in Xinjiang and
Washington recommit to the alliance system, and deepening political control through social monitoring,
perhaps to a wider sense of multilateral order, or will it the Chinese approach may simply be too unpalatable
allow those commitments to continue to fray? for the West to accede to a sharing of power. If so, we
are likely to see some areas of economic decoupling
If the United States more deeply abandons its alliance accelerate (at substantial cost to both), and perhaps
commitments or more fully alienates its core allies, the emergence of two zones of globalization. Global
the first effect of this will be to make the world safer economics would go from being a source of perceived
for Russian adventurism and Chinese ambition. Some stability in U.S.-China relations to a zone of contestation
have argued differently, making the case that it is the and systemic competition. (The echoes of the 1880s
very fact of the alliance structure that is provoking would reverberate particularly loudly in this scenario.)
Chinese and Russian behavior and that a retreat from
its forward posture in Asia and Europe will lead to China confronts uncomfortable realities as well. Although
more stable self-help arrangements among our former Xi Jinping conveys a sense of exuberance about China’s
allies.15 While the point needs to be argued country by new status, the fact is that he confronts a degree of
country, the early evidence is not encouraging. Turkey elite discontent at home, and a deteriorating reputation
could have taken diminished U.S. interest in the Middle in the West (and in some parts of the developing world;
East as an opportunity to deepen ties with Berlin and though in others, China has adapted its tactics and
Brussels; instead it has turned towards Moscow. Japan improved its standing.) For all of the displeasure of
and South Korea could have taken their growing concern European elites and publics about American political
about the credibility of America’s commitment in Asia unilateralism, few are so gullible as to confuse their
as an opportunity to bury the hatchet and join hands in unhappiness about contemporary American policy
blunting the effect of Chinese pressure; instead their with sympathy for China’s own brand of increasingly
relationship is in its worst state in decades. Europe assertive unilateralism, let alone Russia’s recklessness
could be treating an inward turn in America as grounds (which China not only tolerates but indirectly enables). A

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small number of countries where public opinion carries If China wants to pursue a more robust strategy, with
little sway may feel forced or tempted to move towards a greater focus on coercive instruments, it also has a
the Chinese camp, but Chinese behavior, at home and steep hill to climb. Let us presume for a moment — and
abroad, is starting to increase the costs to its diplomacy. the preponderance of evidence suggest that this is so
— that China wants to have what the United States has
What’s more, China confronts an unenviable enjoyed: the ability to project hard power, in addition
international structure, most notably in the form of the to the political and economic influence it can already
immediate presence on its eastern borders of a network wield, at a global level. That is a necessary feature of
of U.S. allies. It may, overtime, succeed in weakening true great power status, and a necessary feature of
the alignment of some of those allies, like the the effective competition with the United States — at least
Philippines or South Korea. But not others — there are in classical terms. To develop the most important
few historically credible scenarios that sees Japan or feature of global power projection, a global blue water
Australia fall into the Chinese camp. It also confronts navy, China has to overcome the following obstacles: a
a United States that even in a moment of deep internal highly sophisticated American global navy that shows
division has forged a growing elite and social consensus no signs of giving ground; Japan’s not inconsiderable
about the problem of China — though, not yet a fleshed- naval capacity right off its eastern shore; a further
out strategy for wide-spectrum containment. And it chain of islands from its northeast to its southeast
confronts an international system that has grown that can hem in its naval power projection; Europe’s
accustomed to the more liberal tendencies of the United residual global naval capacity which, while modest,
States — including its stated policy, more honored than usefully amplifies U.S. capacity; and India’s extremely
ignored in the post-Cold War period, of allowing even inconvenient geography and growing appetite for power
small countries to choose their own alliances and projection in the Indian Ocean.16 That is to say nothing
governance. None of this makes it easy for China to of significant technological-bureaucratic obstacles
translate its new weight into actual clout. to the kind of sea-space-land linkages required to
operationalize a global navy in times of pressure.
An obvious strategy for China is not to confront the

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United States, but to erode its influence. This could be
accomplished by persistent application of the following
policy measures: Supplanting the United States in
the developing world by providing a combination of
A strategy of direct confrontation
loans on attractive terms, technological and financial with the United States and its allies
know-how, non-interference on policy and support in will be difficult, risky, and expensive
multilateral institutions; fill gaps left by U.S. myopia in for China. This does not mean it is
shaping the work of multilateral institutions; deepen
not possible.
financial and strategic ties with other countries that feel
threatened by the United States or the West, including
Russia and Iran; and impose substantial financial and In short: a strategy of direct confrontation with the
political costs on countries in its own neighborhood or United States and its allies will be difficult, risky,
with whom it has advanced ties if they align with the and expensive for China. This does not mean it is
United States. Washington manages to score repeated not possible. A number of Chinese investments in
own goals here, so poorly crafted are U.S. development military systems, bases, and relationships can best be
policy and multilateral engagement (beyond NATO). explained as Beijing’s effort to lay the ground-work for
But Beijing confronts a more formidable challenge global power projection, even with the attendant risk
from a combination of Brussels, London, Berlin, and of confrontation with the United States. Indeed, there
above all Tokyo, all of which have substantial assets to is evidence to suggest that at least some Chinese
offer developing countries and multilateral institutions, strategists and planners have reached the conclusion
including in Asia, without the downstream risk of that they have no option but to take this pathway. This
coercive pressure. faction of Chinese strategists read of the evidence
about U.S. behavior from 2009 onwards as indicating

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both a growing unwillingness to tolerate China’s rise competition. This would still entail substantial risk,
and substantial weakness in the coherence and but less quickly and less directly. It would involve a
effectiveness of the West — both factors make it more military focus on deterrence, and an arms race, but
tempting to pursue a confrontational or potentially combined with a willingness to invest in arms control
confrontational strategy. But none of this makes such mechanisms or deconfliction and de-escalation
a strategy any easier. arrangements. It would involve some degree of
continued economic engagement, although it would
One variable given too little focus in the United States is be also be compatible with the emergence over time
the possibility that Russia could help China out of this of a kind of bifurcated globalization — the emergence
particularly thorny challenge. When American analysts of two zones of technological, infrastructure, and
debate the prospect for an “alliance” between Russia commercial integration, one that has Beijing as its hub
and China, many of them are quick to dismiss such an and for which Beijing sets the rules of the game, and
idea, pointing to a difficult history, lack of trust, and other revolving around Washington and its core allies.
substantial racism each to the other — and the fact (Europe and Japan will work hard to avoid such an
that Moscow would chafe at the role of junior partner. outcome, while Russia would welcome it; Singapore,
But this may be imposing too much of a Western India, and some the Gulf monarchies will try a “have
sensibility on the framework that Moscow and Beijing your cake and eat it too” approach of sustaining ties
would use to assess their options, which is more likely with both spheres.) And it would involve substantial
to focus narrowly on core interests than on concepts efforts by each side to win coalitions of influence in
like “shared values.” We could see the emergence of a multilateral arena. This could lead to stalemate in
“concert” between Russia and China — two rivals who some domains, but potentially also to a race-to-the-
set aside some of their differences for the greater gain top competition in others.
of weakening the top power. Indeed, we are already
seeing something of this behavior in Central Asia, in And then there’s climate change. For the past century
the Middle East, and at the United Nations. A major or more, any assessment of great power relations or
step up in this concert could see Russia increasing international order had to account for military power,
Chinese access to its wider global network of naval economic clout, energy dynamics, and technology — as
bases and assets, and deepening energy ties between well as more unmeasurable features like history, culture,
the two — as it is doing with its massive natural gas religion, and values. Now, any such assessment must
fields in the Arctic. also incorporate both the real dynamics and the real
politics of climate change. Climate change is already
WHAT LIES AHEAD? solidly established as the most important issue for
youth movements across the West. If America elects
If China and Russia were to reach a concert a Democrat as president in November, climate change
arrangement of this sort, and if American unilateralism will vault to the top tier of American priorities. As India
drives a deeper wedge between itself and its allies, we confronts a serious and soon to be acute challenge
could rapidly find ourselves in a world characterized of access to fresh water, Japan confronts a serious
by two more equal blocks of military competitors and rising challenge of increasingly intensive storms,
and a situation brimming with risks of direct military the United States confronts a mounting challenge of
confrontation between the two. This scenario, and storms, sea level rise, and loss of groundwater in its
variants on it, is now solidly within the world of the agricultural heartland, the pressure to get far more
feasible. Fortunately, it is not as yet either baked into serious about climate change will grow. The obvious
the dynamics of what lies ahead, or even necessarily point is that real policy on climate change would
the most likely scenario. require profound shifts in America’s infrastructure,
China’s economic consumption patterns, India’s
The more likely scenario is that both Washington and
industrialization pathway, and Russia’s base economic
Beijing, pushed by their allies/partners and aware
activity, as well as changes to carbon-intensive patterns
of the substantial costs to themselves of direct
of global supply chain production. All of this could
confrontation, instead pursue a strategy of strategic
throw a serious wrench into the relationships between

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CHINA AND THE RETURN OF GREAT POWER STRATEGIC COMPETITION

the world’s most influential countries. Of course it is the core structures of stability and trade. This would
also possible that each of these markets will find ways require important shifts in the global supply chain,
to cooperate deeply on energy and climate policy while but not unmanageable ones. It might result in two
competing with or confronting one another in other globalizations — one Chinese-led, one American-led —
issue domains. but not to the breakdown of globalization itself. It would
constrict China, and occasionally confront China — a
Then, there is still a scenario where decision by the willingness to use coercive power to deter the worst
political leaderships of both Beijing and Washington of Chinese and Russian behavior would have to be
(supported by wider sets of elites and publics) to walk an essential feature of such an arrangement — but it
back from the brink of strategic rivalry could enable a would not be organized in the first instance to engage
less zero-sum dynamic of competition within a retooled in conflict with China. It would not obviate cooperation
multilateral order. This would require tough decisions with China on issues like poverty reduction, infectious
on the part of both the United States and China, and a disease and public health, ocean science and ocean
great deal of clear-eyed policy change from the leading pollution, and climate change.
second-tier powers, especially Germany, Japan, and
India. Restoring the multilateral order in this sense This would require the United States to shed both the
would require at least three hard things: a willingness unilateralist instinct of President Trump and President
by the major and middle powers to put serious Obama’s aversion to the use of coercive power as a
military muscle into conflict management and non- tool of diplomacy. It would require American strategic
proliferation, a willingness that has so far been quite elites to restore political ties with NATO but at the
absent from all but British policy; a deep retooling of same time re-orient American strategic policy away
the WTO, both by restoring some capacity for small from its trans-Atlantic habits towards a wider set
group decision-making, upgrading its representation, of partnerships. And it would require subtlety in our
and most importantly by improving its capacity to approaches to Germany, Japan, and India (admittedly
shape technology policy; and the articulation of a more not exactly America’s strong suit.) Still, it is well within
credible industrial policy for a rapid shift towards low both the capacity of the United States and its most
carbon technologies. effective foreign policy traditions to craft this strategy.
China’s options are much poorer.
None of this is particularly likely. The weight of history
lies against it, as do the trends of contemporary politics. The return of geopolitical competition to the center stage
Left unchecked, these point us to a darker scenario of international affairs is a worrisome development
of more systemic conflict. China’s behavior under Xi and does afford China some opportunities — but
Jinping gives less and less ammunition for American for now, if the United States returns to an alliance-
restraint, while America’s current behavior gives more oriented multilateralism, it affords the United States a
and more ammunition to the allies’ America-skeptics, better balance of risk and opportunity to shape great
and the allies adopt policies that give more and more power politics for the purposes of defending the key
ammunition to the skeptics of multilateral order — in a democracies, protecting at least some of the advances
vicious and intensifying cycle. of liberalism, and limiting the risk of unwarranted
conflict and escalation.
AMERICA’S OPPORTUNITY
Between the poles of a “return of the jungle” and a
“status quo ante multilateralism” is a more realistic
pathway that the United States could still construct.
This would involve pulling the major economies of Asia
and Europe together into a wider “partnership” — a
kind of wider-than-the-West concert of free societies
(or largely free societies) who would work together
to deter China, Russia, and others that would erode

GREAT POWERS

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REFERENCES
1 Steward Patrick, The Best Laid Plans: The Origins of American Multilateralism and the Dawn of the Cold War
(New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009).

2 Bruce Jones, ed., with Strobe Talbott and Will Moreland, The Marshall Plan and the Shaping of American
Strategy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2017).

3 For an account of the roots of this strategy, see Bruce Reidel, Beirut 1958: How America’s Wars in the Middle
East Began (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2019).

4 For different accounts of this moment, see Michael Mandelbaum, The Case for Goliath: How America Acts
as the World’s Government in the 21st Century (New York: Public Affairs, 2005); Andrew J. Bacevich, American
Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002);
and Hal Brands, Making the Unipolar Moment: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Rise of the Post-Cold War Order
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016).

5 See G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011).

6 Thomas J. Wright, All Measures Short of War: The Contest for the 21st Century and the Future of American
Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017).

7 “2011 World Development Report: Conflict, Security, and Development,” (Washington, DC: The World Bank,
2011), https://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDRS/Resources/WDR2011_Full_Text.pdf.

8 Roland Paris, At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

9 Daniel Drezner, The System Worked: How the World Stopped Another Great Depression (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2014).

10 Bruce Jones, Still Ours to Lead: America, Rising Powers, and the Tension between Rivalry and Restraint
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2014).

11 See inter alia Alexander Sullivan, Andrew Erickson, Elbridge Colby, Ely Ratner, and Zachary Hosford, “More
Willing and More Able: Charting China’s Internatioal Security Activism,” (Washington, DC: Center for a New
American Security, May 19, 2015), https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/more-willing-and-able-charting-
chinas-international-security-activism.

12 Mireya Solís, ”Follower No More?: Japan’s Leadership Role as a Champion of the Liberal Trading Order,” in
The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism: Japan and the World Order, eds. Yoichi Funabashi and G. John Ikenberry
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2020), 79-106.

13 Kanti Bajpai, Huang Jing, and Kishore Mahbubani, ed., China-India Relations: Cooperation and conflict
(Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2015).

14 Bruce Jones, Jeffrey Feltman, and Will Moreland, “Competitive multilateralism: Adapting institutions to meet
the new geopolitical environment,” (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, September 2019), https://
www.brookings.edu/research/competitive-multilateralism/.

15 See inter alia Chris Preble, The Power Problem: How American Military Dominance Makes Us Less Safe,
Less Prosperous, and Less Free (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009).

16 For a comprehensive account of Chinese naval tradition and ambition, see M. Taylor Fravel, Active Defense:
China’s Military Strategy since 1949 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019).

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Bruce Jones is director and a senior fellow in the Project on International Order and Strategy of the Foreign Policy
program at the Brookings Institution; he also works with the Security and Strategy team and the Center for East
Asia Policy Studies. Jones previously served as the vice president and director for the Foreign Policy program for
the past five years. His research expertise and policy experience is in international security. His current research
focus is on U.S. strategy, international order, and great power relations.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I'm grateful to Mireya Solís, Michael O'Hanlon, Rush Doshi, Ryan Hass, Tarun Chhabra, and two anonymous
reviewers for comments on an earlier draft. Ted Reinert edited this paper, and Rachel Slattery provided layout.

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