De Guzman v.

De Dios
FACTS:
Diana De Guzman filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. De Dios for
representing conflicting interests. Complainant averred that she engaged the
services of respondent in 1995 as counsel in order to form a hotel and
restaurant corporation. With the assistance of respondent, said corporation
was registered with the SEC. Respondent also represented complainant in
one case involving a property of the corporation. Respondent however
averred that since the action involved a property of the corporation, she
represented complainant to protect the interests of the corporation, she being
its legal counsel. Complainant also averred that while respondent rose to
become president of the corporation, she lost all her investments when her
delinquent shares were sold by the corporation in a public auction upon the
advise of respondent. The IBP dismissed the complaint on the ground that
there was no attorney – client relationship.
ISSUE:
Whether there was attorney – client relationship which may justify holding
respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests.
HELD:
Yes. It was complainant who retained respondent to form a corporation. She
appeared as counsel in behalf of the complainant. There was also evidence of
collusion between the board of directors and respondent. Indeed, the board of
directors now included respondent as the president. It was also upon her
advice that the delinquent shares of complainant were sold at public auction.
The present situation shows a clear case of conflict of interests of the
respondent.

Castro v. Galing
FACTS:
In 2003, complainant Lydia Castro-Justo engaged the services of respondent
Atty. Rodolfo Galing in connection with dishonored checks issued by Manila
City Councilor Arlene W. Koa (Ms. Koa). After she paid his professional fees,
the respondent drafted and sent a letter to Ms. Koa demanding payment of
the checks.Respondent advised complainant to wait for the lapse of the
period indicated in the demand letter before filing her complaint. complainant
filed a criminal complaint against Ms. Koa for estafa and violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila.
Complainant then received a copy of Motion for Consolidation that was filed
for the respondent on behalf of the opposing party. Complainant submits that
by representing conflicting interests, respondent violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility.He admitted that he drafted a demand letter for
complainant but argued that it was made only in deference to their long
standing friendship and not by reason of a professional engagement as
professed by complainant. He denied receiving any professional fee for the
services he rendered. It was allegedly their understanding that complainant
would have to retain the services of another lawyer. He alleged that
complainant, based on that agreement, engaged the services of Atty. Manuel
A. Ao.respondent stated that the movants in these cases are mother and
daughter while complainants are likewise mother and daughter and that these
cases arose out from the same transaction. Thus, movants and complainants
will be adducing the same sets of evidence and witnesses. Respondent
argued that no lawyer-client relationship existed between him and
complainant because there was no professional fee paid for the services he
rendered. Complainant filed filed the instant administrative complaint against
Atty.Galing seeking his disbarment from the practice of law for violation of
Canon 15 of Code of Professional Responsibility and conflict of interest.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent violated Canon 15 Rule 15.03 of Code of
Professional Responsibility.
HELD:
Yes,the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
found respondent guilty of violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility by representing conflicting interests and for his
daring audacity and for the pronounced malignancy of his act. Under Rule
15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that [a] lawyer shall
not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure
of the facts. Respondent was therefore bound to refrain from representing
parties with conflicting interests in a controversy. The prohibition against
representing conflicting interest is founded on principles of public policy and
good taste. A lawyer-client relationship can exist notwithstanding the close
friendship between complainant and respondent. The relationship was
established the moment complainant sought legal advice from respondent
regarding the dishonored checks. By drafting the demand letter respondent
further affirmed such relationship. The fact that the demand letter was not
utilized in the criminal complaint filed and that respondent was not eventually
engaged by complainant to represent her in the criminal cases is of no
moment. In the course of the lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns of
the facts connected with the clients case, including the weak and strong
points of the case. The nature of the relationship is, therefore, one of trust and
confidence
of the highest degree.It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the clients
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing
for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their
lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.The
excuse proffered by respondent that it was not him but Atty. Ao who was
eventually engaged by complainant will not exonerate him from the clear
violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The take-
over of a clients cause of action by another lawyer does not give the former
lawyer the right to represent the opposing party. It is not only malpractice but
also constitutes a violation of the confidence resulting from the attorney-client
relationship. Considering that it is respondents first infraction, the disbarment
sought in the complaint is deemed to be too severe. As recommended by the
Board of Governors of the IBP, respondent is suspended from the practice of
law for one (1) year.
People v. Servo
FACTS:
As early as his arraignment for murder, accused-appellant refused to be
assisted by a counsel de officio, insisting that a counsel of his own choice
assist him. He also refused to secure the services of a counsel de parte and
to present evidence in his defense despite ample opportunity accorded to him.
Due to the delays and postponement, which dragged the case for years, the
trial court was forced to render a decision convicting him of murder.
ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant had been denied effective legal representation.
HELD:
No. Appellant had been given ample time to secure the services of a counsel
de parte, but his subsequent appearances in court without such counsel and
his act of allowing this situation to continue until the presentation of his
evidence betrays his lack of intention to do so. It even appears that he was
merely delaying his own presentation of evidence on purpose to prejudice the
offended party, the trial court, and the orderly administration of justice.
Furthermore, appellant did not demonstrate in what way the services of his
counsels de officio were unsatisfactory. He was afforded a chance to be
heard by counsel of his own choice, but by his own neglect or mischief, he
effectively waived such right.

People vs. Nadera, Jr.

FACTS: Nadera, Jr. has four children by his wife Daisy. Oleby and Maricris,
assisted by a neighbor, Macalalad, told their mother that they had been raped
by their father, herein accused.
Accused then pleaded guilty and his lawyer did not cross examine the first
daughter because he was convinced that she was in fact telling the truth.
the cross examination of the second daughter focused on what she did when
she was able to see that her sister was being raped. Not only did defense
counsel fail to object to the documentary evidence presented by the
prosecution, he even expressed his conformity to the admission of the same.
Neither did he present any evidence on behalf of accused-appellant. Worse,
accused was not informed, of his right to present evidence, if he so desires.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Brotonel should be reprimanded
HELD: YES. Only faithful performance by counsel of his duty towards his
client can give meaning and substance to the accused right to due process
and to be presumed innocent until proven otherwise.
The lawyer has the duty to defend his client and protect his rights, n matter
how guilty or evil he perceives him to be.

Sabitsana v. Muertegui
FACTS: P Clemencio Sabitsana, lawyer, was the counsel of Respondents.
The dispute involved a parcel of land bought by R Juanito by virtue of an not
notarized deed of sale from Garcia. Juanito’s father and his brother Domingo,
also R herein, took actual possession of the land. Later on, Garcia sold the
same land to P, this time, through a notarized deed of sale.
When Rs’ father passed away, the heirs applied for the registration and
coverage of the lot under Public Land Act or CA No. 141. P opposed the
application, claiming as a true owner of the lot. Respondents filed for quieting
of title and preliminary injunction against Ps, Clemencio and his wife, Rosario,
claiming that they bought the land in bad faith and are exercising possession
and ownership of the same, which act thus constitute cloud over the title. RTC
and CA ruled in favour of Rs.
ISSUE: Whether RTC has jurisction over the declaratory relief.
HELD: YES, petition dismissed. The RTC has jurisdiction over the suit for
quieting of title.
On the question of jurisdiction, it is clear under the Rules that an action for
quieting of title may be instituted in the RTCs, regardless of the assessed
value of the real property in dispute. Under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, an
action to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom may be
brought in the appropriate RTC.
Samala v. Valencia
FACTS:
This is a complaint filed by Clarita J. Samala against Atty. Luciano D. Valencia
for Disbarment on the following grounds: (a) serving on two separate
occasions as counsel for contending parties; (b) knowingly misleading the
court by submitting false documentary evidence; (c) initiating numerous cases
in exchange for nonpayment of rental fees; and (d) having a reputation of
being immoral by siring illegitimate children.
ISSUE: WON respondent violated his Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD: Yes. Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes found respondent guilty of
violating Canons 15 and 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
recommended the penalty of suspension for six months.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and
recommendation of Commissioner Reyes but increased the penalty of
suspension from six months to one year.
The Court held:
a. On serving as counsel for contending parties – Canon 21
The fact that respondent filed a case entitled "Valdez and Alba v. Bustamante
and her husband," is a clear indication that respondent is protecting the
interests of both Valdez and Alba in the said case. Respondent cannot just
claim that the lawyer-client relationship between him and Alba has long been
severed without observing Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court wherein
the written consent of his client is required. Respondent's representation of
Valdez and Alba against Bustamante and her husband, in one case, and
Valdez against Alba, in another case, is a clear case of conflict of interests
which merits a corresponding sanction from this Court.
b. On knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary
evidence – Canon 10
Respondent cannot feign ignorance of the fact that the title he submitted was
already cancelled in lieu of a new title issued in the name of Alba in 1995 yet,
as proof of the latter's ownership. What is decisive in this case is respondent's
intent in trying to mislead the court by presenting TCT No. 273020 despite the
fact that said title was already cancelled and a new one, TCT No. 275500,
was already issued in the name of Alba.
c. On initiating numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental fees –
Dismissed for lack of sufficient basis
The act of respondent of filing the aforecited cases to protect the interest of
his client, on one hand, and his own interest, on the other, cannot be made
the basis of an administrative charge unless it can be clearly shown that the
same was being done to abuse judicial processes to commit injustice.
d. On having a reputation for being immoral by siring illegitimate children –
Canon 1, Rule 1.01
The Court found respondent liable for being immoral by siring illegitimate
children. During the hearing, respondent admitted that he sired three children
by Teresita Lagmay who are all over 20 years of age, while his first wife was
still alive. In this case, the admissions made by respondent are more than
enough to hold him liable on the charge of immorality.
In sum, the Court found respondent Atty. Luciano D. Valencia guilty of
misconduct and violation of Canons 21, 10 and 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and suspended him from the practice of law for three years.
Foster v. Agtang
FACTS: Complainant Foster had a legal problem over a deed of sale she
entered with Tierra Realty. Atty. Agtang agreed to represent her as her
counsel for the filing of the appropriate case in court, even though he was the
one who notarized the deed of sale.
In the course of being Foster’s lawyer, Agtang committed the following acts:
(1) Borrowed money from Foster in the amount of P100,000 and P220,000;
(2) Misrepresented the amount of filing fee; (3) Asked for P50,000 purportedly
to be given to the judge as bribe; and (4) Failed to notify Foster that the case
was dismissed in September 2010. Foster found out when he checked it
herself in December of the same year. Also, it turned out that Agtang had
legal relationships with Tierra Realty.
ISSUE: Whether or not Agtang violated CPR
HELD: Yes. Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the CPR, Provides that “a lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” It is well
established that a lawyer’s conduct is not confined to the performance of his
duties. A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his
professional or private capacity.
Ruby v. Bayot
FACTS: The complainant alleged that he and his mother, Felicitas Ruby Bihla
(Felicitas), engaged the services of the respondents in connection with a case
for cancellation and nullification of deeds of donation. Pursuant to the retainer
agreement dated August 29, 2009, the complainant and Felicitas would pay
Atty. Espejo the amount of P100,000.00 as acceptance fee, P70,000.00 of
which was actually paid upon the signing of the agreement and the remaining
P30,000.00 to be paid after the hearing on the prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO). The complainant and Felicitas likewise
agreed to pay the amount of P5,000.00 as appearance fee for every hearing,
which was apparently later reduced to P4,000.00.
On September 15, 2009, the complainant gave Atty. Espejo the amount of
P50,000.00 as payment for filing fee. On September 16, 2009, Atty. Espejo
filed the complaint for nullification and cancellation of deeds of donation with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 219. However, the
actual filing fee that was paid by her only amounted to P7,561.00; she failed
to account for the excess amount given her despite several demand letters
therefor.
Thereafter, the complainant alleged, the respondents failed to update him as
to the status of his complaint. He further claimed that Atty. Bayot had
suddenly denied that he was their counsel. Atty. Bayot asserted that it was
Atty. Espejo alone who was the counsel of the complainant and that he was
merely a collaborating counsel.
In its Order dated January 7, 2010, the IBP-CBD directed the respondents to
submit their respective answers to the complaint.
In his Answer, Atty. Bayot claimed that he was not the counsel of the
complainant; that he merely assisted him and Atty. Espejo.
Atty. Bayot further pointed out that he had no part in the retainer agreement
that was entered into by the complainant.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Bayot violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which would warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction.
HELD: It is undisputed that Atty. Espejo was the counsel of record in the case
that was filed in the RTC. Equally undisputed is the fact that it was only Atty.
Espejo who signed the retainer agreement. However, the evidence on record,
including Atty. Bayot’s admissions, points to the conclusion that a lawyer-
client relationship existed between him and the complainant.
Atty. Bayot was the one who prepared the complaint that was filed with the
RTC. He was likewise the one who prepared the motion to serve summons
through publication. He likewise appeared as counsel for the complainant in
the hearings of the case before the RTC. He likewise advised the complainant
on the status of the case.

More importantly, Atty. Bayot admitted that he received P8,000.00, which is

part of the acceptance fee indicated in the retainer agreement, from the
complainant. It is true that it was Atty. Espejo who asked the complainant to
give Atty. Bayot the said amount. However, Atty. Bayot admitted that he
accepted from the complainant the said P8,000.00 without even explaining
what the said amount was for.
The foregoing circumstances clearly established that a lawyer-client
relationship existed between Atty. Bayot and the complainant. “Documentary
formalism is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney; the
contract may be express or implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient
that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any
matter pertinent to his profession.” Further, acceptance of money from a
client establishes an attorney-client relationship. Accordingly, as regards the
case before the RTC, the complainant had two counsels – Atty. Espejo and
Atty. Bayot.
Sison v. Camacho
FACTS: Sison charged respondent Atty. Camacho with violation fo the CPR
for dishonestly entering into a compromise agreement without authorization
and for failure to render an accounting of funds supposed to be paid as docket
fees.
Atty. Camacho was the counsel of Marsman in an insurance claim against
Paramount Life and General Insurance. He proposed to increase their claim
against the said insurance company and require additional docket fees. The
money for the payment of additional docket fees was given to Atty. Camacho
who promised to issue a receipt. Atty. Sison discovered that RTC had
rendered a decision in favor of MDAHI granting its insurance claim plus
interests. However, Atty. Camacho sent a letter to MDAHI recommending a
settlement with Paramount Insurance. MDAHI refused to offer a compromise
agreement. Even without the written conformity, Atty. Camacho entered into a
compromise agreement.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Camacho has authority to enter a compromise
agreement in behalf of his client.
HELD: No. According to Sec. 23, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
Authority of attorneys to bind clients. — Attorneys have authority to bind their
clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and
in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure. But they
cannot, without special authority, compromise their client's litigation, or
receive anything in discharge of a client's claim but the full amount in cash.