PEOPLE v.

VELASCO

G.R. No. 166479   February 28, 2006

Lessons Applicable: Attempted

Laws Applicable: Art. 6

FACTS:
•    April 19, 1998 7:30 am: Frederick Maramba was cleaning and washing his owner type jeep in
front of his house when a motorized tricycle stopped near him.  Rodolfo C. Velasco dashed out
of the tricycle, approached the complainant and fired at him several times with a .45 caliber
pistol.  Velasco missed his first shot but the second one hit the complainant at the upper arm,
causing him to stumble on the ground.  But, Frederick stood up and ran, while Velasco fired 6
more but missed.
•    After being reported as wearing a vest or a “chaleco”, the police, composed of SPO4 Romulo
Villamil, PO3 Rolando Alvendo, and SPO1 Soliven pursued and caught Velasco who was on
board a motorized tricycle to the highway going to Barangay Banaoang in Calasiao town with a
firearm protruding from the waistline
•    Velasco’s Alibi: April 18, 1998, he spent the night at a friend’s house in Lingayen,
Pangasinan and between 6:00-7:00am, he left Lingayen riding in the Volkswagen car of Berting
Soriano then alighted at the corner of Banaoang diversion road to ride a tricycle where he heard a
jeep behind him blowing its horn and when he looked back he saw three men on board pointing
their guns at him.
•    RTC: guilty of attempted murder appreciating treachery in the commission of the crime
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of Four (4) years of prision correccional, as
minimum to Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum and to pay P2,696 as
actual damages
•    CA: Affirmed RTC
•    Velasco filed a petition for certiorari
o    he had no motive to harm, much less kill, the victim for he was total stranger and since the
identity of the assailant is in doubt, motive becomes important and his alibi gains weight and
value and that the testimony of Armando Maramba is not credible, he being a relative of the
victim

ISSUE:

W/N Velasco is guilty of attempted murder

HELD:

YES. petition is DENIED

•    it was not physically impossible for Velasco to be at the crime scene when the crime was
committed since it only takes a 10-minute ride from the place where he allegedly alighted from
the car of one Berting Soriano to the crime scene
•    Even without a ballistic report, the positive identification by prosecution witnesses is more
than sufficient to prove accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
•    It must be stressed that motive is a state of (one’s) mind which others cannot discern. It is not
an element of the crime, and as such does not have to be proved.  In fact, lack of motive for
committing a crime does not preclude conviction. It is judicial knowledge that persons have been
killed or assaulted for no reason at all. Even in the absence of a known motive, the time-honored
rule is that motive is not essential to convict when there is no doubt as to the identity of the
culprit. Motive assumes significance only where there is no showing of who the perpetrator of
the crime was.
o    since petitioner has been positively identified the lack of motive is no longer of consequence
•    relationship could strengthen the witnesses’ credibility, for it is unnatural for an aggrieved
relative to falsely accuse someone other than the actual culprit
•    The fact that the shooting occurred in broad daylight does not render its commission
impossible.  The fact that petitioner was a navy man, a protector of the people, does not mean
that he is innocent of the crime charged or that he is incapable of doing it.
•    The suddenness of the shooting and the fact that he was unarmed left private complainant
with no option but to run for his life. – treachery
•    Having commenced the criminal act by overt acts but failing to perform all acts of execution
as to produce the felony by reason of some cause other than his own desistance, petitioner
committed an attempted felony.  Petitioner already commenced his attack with a manifest intent
to kill by shooting private complainant seven times, but failed to perform all the acts of
execution by reason of causes independent of his will, that is, poor aim and the swiftness of the
latter.  Private complainant sustained a wound on the left arm that is not sufficient to cause his
death.  The settled rule is that where the wound inflicted on the victim is not sufficient to cause
his death, the crime is only attempted murder, since the accused did not perform all the acts of
execution that would have brought about death
•    Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and there being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, the minimum of the penalty to be imposed should be within the range of prision
correccional, and the maximum of the penalty to be imposed should be within the range of
prision mayor in its medium period.
PEOPLE V. LISTERIO

G.R.No. 122099  July 5, 2000

Lessons Applicable: Conspiracy, Attempted or Frustrated Stage

Laws Applicable:

FACTS:
•    Criminal Case No. 91-5842 and Criminal Case No. 91-5843 were filed against Agapito
Listerio y Prado and Samson dela Torre y Esquela
•    Upon arraignment, accused Agapito Listerio y Prado and Samson dela Torre y Esquela
pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged.  Their other co-accused have remained at large.
•    May 14, 1991:
o    Marlon Araque’s Version: Marlon and his brother Jeonito were in Purok 4, Alabang,
Muntinlupa to collect a sum of money from Tino. Having failed they turned backAs they were
passing Tramo near Tino’s place, a group composed of Agapito Listerio, Samson dela Torre,
George dela Torre, Marlon dela Torre and Bonifacio Bancaya blocked their path and attacked
them with lead pipes and bladed weapons. Jeonito Araque from behind with 3 stab wounds: 1.
upper right portion of his back, 2. lower right portion and 3. middle portion of the left side of his
back causing him to fall down.  Marlon was hit on the head by Samson dela Torre and Bonifacio
Bancaya with lead pipes and momentarily lost consciousness.  When he regained consciousness
3 minutes later, Jeonito was already dead and the group fled.  He was brought to the hospital for
treatment of his forearm and the shoulder
o    Agapito Listerio’s Version: Agapito Listerio is a 39 years old, married, side walk vegetable
vendor and a resident of Purok 4.
    1:00 pm: He was in store of Nimfa Agustin drinking beer with Edgar Demolador and Andres
Gininao
    2:00 pm: He went to his house and slept
    5:00 pm: Remolador and Gininao woke him up and told him there was a quarrel near the
railroad track
    6:00 pm: 2 policemen passed by going to the house of Samson de la Torre while he was
chatting with Remolador and Gininao and invited them for questioning.  But, the two were sent
home.  He was handed a Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by Marlon Araque, implicating him for
the death of Jeonito Araque and the frustrated murder of Marlon Araque.  When he confronted
Marlon as to why he was being included in the case, the latter replied “because you ejected us
from your house”
•    Dr. Manimtim’s Autopsy Reports:
o    Marlon Araque: 2 wounds on the forearm and the shoulder were caused by a sharp object like
a knife while the other 2 were caused by a blunt instrument such as a lead pipe
o    Jeonito Araque: 3 stab wounds were inflicted from behind by a sharp, pointed and single-
bladed instrument like a kitchen knife, balisong or any similar instrument.   Considering the
involvement of a vital organ and a major blood vessel, the first wound was considered fatal. 
Unlike the first, the second and third wounds were non-fatal. The first and second wounds were
inflicted by knife thrusts delivered starting below going upward by assailants who were standing
behind the victim
•    RTC: Attempted Homicide only on the basis of Dr. Manimtim’s testimony that none of the
wounds sustained by Marlon Araque were fatal

ISSUE: W/N there is a conspiracy for frustrated homicide

HELD: YES. appealed decision is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

1.] the award of P5,000.00 to Marlon Araque by way of moral damages in Criminal Case No. 91-
5843 is DELETED;

2.] Accused-Appellant is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 91-
5843 of Frustrated Homicide and is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of Six (6) Years
of Prision Correccional, as minimum to Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor, as
maximum.

After finality of this Decision, the records shall be remanded to the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, which is directed to render judgment based on the evidence against Samson dela
Torre y Esquela.

•    Direct proof of conspiracy is rarely found for criminals do not write down their lawless plans
and plots. Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during and after the
commission of the crime which indubitably point to and are indicative of a joint purpose, concert
of action and community of interest
•    conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy need not be established by direct
evidence of acts charged, but may and generally must be proved by a number of indefinite acts,
conditions and circumstances, which vary according to the purpose accomplished.  Previous
agreement to commit a crime is not essential to establish a conspiracy, it being sufficient that the
condition attending to its commission and the acts executed may be indicative of a common
design to accomplish a criminal purpose and objective
•    It is necessary that a conspirator should have performed some overt acts as a direct or indirect
contribution in the execution of the crime planned to be committed.  The overt act may consist of
active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of moral
assistance to his con-conspirators by being present at the commission of the crime or by exerting
moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators
•    Conspiracy transcends mere companionship, it denotes an intentional participation in the
transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose
o    all of them armed with deadly weapons at the locus criminis, indubitably shows their
criminal design to kill the victims
•    conspirator is equally liable for the crime as it is unnecessary to determine who inflicted the
fatal wound because in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all
•    Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.  That circumstance qualifies the crime into murder.
o    all of them armed with bladed weapons and lead pipes, blocked (hinarang) the path of the
victims effectively cutting off their escape
•    The commission of the crime was also attended by abuse of superior strength on account of
the fact that accused-appellant and his companions were not only numerically superior to the
victims but also because all of them, armed with bladed weapons and lead pipes, purposely used
force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the persons attacked.  However, this
aggravating circumstance is already absorbed in treachery. In the light of the finding of
conspiracy, evident premeditation need not be further appreciated, absent concrete proof as to
how and when the plan to kill was hatched or what time had elapsed before it was carried out.
•    What determines whether a felony is attempted or frustrated is whether or not the subjective
phase in the commission of an offense has been passed (NOT gravity of the wound)
•    Subjective phase
o    portion of the acts constituting the crime included between the act which begins the
commission of the crime and the last act performed by the offender which, with the prior acts,
should result in the consummated crime.
•    Objective phase
o    Forward the subjective phase
o    period occupied by the acts of the offender over which he has control – that period between
the point where he begins and the point where he voluntarily desists.
•    If between these two points the offender is stopped by reason of any cause outside of his own
voluntary desistance, the subjective phase has not been passed and it is an attempt.
•    If he is not so stopped but continues until he performs the last act, it is frustrated
•    frustrated when: (subjective phase is completely passed. Subjectively the crime is complete)
o    the offender has performed all the acts of execution which would produce the felony
o    the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator’s will
•    attempted felony: (offender never passes the subjective phase of the offense)
o    the offender commits overt acts to commence the perpetration of the crime
o    he is not able to perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony; and
o    his failure to perform all the acts of execution was due to some cause or accident other than
his spontaneous desistance
•    intent to kill determines whether the infliction of injuries should be punished as attempted or
frustrated murder, homicide, parricide or consummated physical injuries
o    intent to kill of the malefactors herein who were armed with bladed weapons and lead pipes
can hardly be doubted given the prevailing facts of the case
o    can not be denied that the crime is a frustrated felony not an attempted offense considering
that after being stabbed and clubbed twice in the head as a result of which he lost consciousness
and fell, Marlon’s attackers apparently thought he was already dead and fled.

PEOPLE v. GUIHAMA

G.R No. 126113 June 25,2003

FACTS:

An information was filed against appellant as follows:

“That on or about the 27th day of March, 1993, in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Court, said accused, armed with a knife, by means of violence and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of
Merly Jaminadan against her will, and by reason or on occasion thereof, with intent to kill, hit
and wound Merly Jaminadan with the knife he was then provided at the time, thus causing upon
said Merly Jaminadan various injuries on the vital parts of her body which caused her death.”

Appellant pleaded not guilty to the information and trial ensued.

A child came to the house bringing a pair of slippers belonging to Merly. The child said
he found the slippers on the pathway near some banana plants. Pakulaba felt nervous and
immediately went to where the slippers were found. It was then that she discovered the lifeless
and naked body of Merly. The victim had multiple wounds on the body and was covered in
blood. Pakulaba immediately screamed for help.

At the crime scene, the police team first saw the victim’s bloodied body with a bloody
panty beside it. They surveyed the surrounding areas to look for evidence and found a bloody
Batangueño knife about 10 meters away from the body. They also gathered information from
people living in the nearby houses and learned that appellant was “interested” in the victim. They
thus went to appellant’s house, which was just 100 to 150 meters from the crime scene. Only
appellant’s wife was home, who told them that appellant left early that morning to drive a
jeepney.

Cornelio Lopez (Lopez) took the witness stand and testified11 that appellant had
confessed to him that he killed Merly. Thereafter, he asked appellant about the murder weapon
and appellant said that it was in his house. Because of appellant’s confession he sent a team of
policemen to the house of appellant. When the policemen came back, they brought with them a
bloody knife, a brief and a pair of slippers. Upon being shown these items, appellant confirmed
that the kitchen knife was the weapon he used in killing Merly and that the brief and slippers
were what he wore when he committed the crime.

Aranas testified that the NBI also received from the Jaro Police Station specimen taken
from the victim’s vagina and fingernails. The specimen tested positive for the presence of
seminal stains and human tissues.

ISSUE:

WON appellant, Guihama, did rape victim, Merly Jamidan and killed her after.

RULING:

The trial court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with
homicide committed against his sister-in-law, Merly Jaminadan.

We are satisfied that the evidence adduced against appellant constitutes an unbroken
chain leading to the one fair and reasonable conclusion that appellant was the perpetrator of the
crime.

It is doctrinal that the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal law does not
mean such a degree of proof as to exclude the possibility of error and produce absolute certainty.
Only moral certainty is required or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind.35 This was sufficiently established in the case at bar.

Appellant’s defense of denial and alibi, should be rejected. Alibi is generally considered a weak
defense because of the facility with which it can be fabricated. Thus, courts have always looked
upon it with suspicion and have received it with caution. For alibi to preail, the defense must
establish by positive, clear and satisfactory proof that it was physically impossible for the
accused to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, and not merely that
the accused was somewhere else.

The crime was approximated to have been committed between 6:45 p.m. and 8:45 p.m. of March
27, 1993. Appellant stated he was inside his house on March 27, 1993 from 7:00 p.m. until 5:00
a.m. the next day. Appellant’s house was a mere 150 meters away from the place of the incident.
Prior to that, appellant said he was just walking around Tabuc Suba, Jaro, Iloilo City. Clearly, the
alleged whereabouts of appellant do not make it impossible for him to be in the place of the
incident at the probable time of death.

PEOPLE v. SOMERA
G.R No.47275 170 SCRA 428 February 21, 1989

FACTS:

Merlita was employed as a salesgirl at the St. Martin’s Pharmacy in Vigan, Ilocos Sur,
Her husband was then in Pampanga visiting his family. At 6:00 o’clock in the afternoon of said
day, she left the drugstore for home. As it was Christmas Day, she passed by the nearby Venus
Restaurant and Bakery and bought some barbecue and chopsuey for her family. While on her
way to the parking lot, accused-appellant passed by on a motorcycle and offered to take her
home on his vehicle. Appellant Somera was known to Merlita, being a townmate and a
childhood friend. Likewise, he was a former Chief of Police of Sta. Catalina, Ilocos Sur and a
distant relative of hers. (Tsn., pp. 10-15, id.) Merlita declined the offer after thanking him.
However, Somera insisted on taking her home and, because Merlita was eager to get home early
to deliver the medicine she had bought for her ailing father, she consented to ride with Somera.
She sat behind Somera sideways on the motorcycle holding the paper bag containing the food
with right hand, while her left hand was resting on the seat of the motorcycle.

Merlita, now apprehensive of Somera’s intentions towards her, forthwith jumped off the
motorcycle, hitting her knees on the ground and damaging her left shoe in the process. She got
up and screamed for help as she ran away from Somera. But the latter overtook her at the yard of
a house occupied by one Leticia Rafanan whose husband was then out fishing. Despite
complainant’s continued efforts to get free from Somera’s hold, the latter was able to drag and
bring her inside a nearby vacant and abandoned store belonging to one Martin Rafanan about
two to three meters away from the house of Leticia Rafanan. Once inside the store, Somera
locked the door. Irked by complainant’s continued resistance and her statement that she would
sue him if he does something wrong to her, Somera boxed Merlita near the abdomen and pulled
her hair and, with his other hand, pressed her throat. Then he brought out a knife and pointed it at
complainant’s throat threatening to stab her with it if she would shout. Putting down the knife,
the accused undressed complainant amidst her struggles. As the accused was removing her
panty, Merlita continued resisting him and her panty was torn. Thereafter, Somera inserted his
penis inside her private part and then stood up. Complainant also stood up and put on her clothes.
When she tried to get out, Somera forbade her from leaving and threatened to kill her if she
reports the matter to anyone.

Whereupon, complainant’s mother immediately went to the Municipal building and

reported the incident to the Chief of Police. Finally, on June 28, 1974, or six months after the
issuance of the original warrant, the accused, through his counsel, filed a petition for bail. After
trial and considering all the evidence presented both by the prosecution and the defense, the court
a quo on October 24, 1977 rendered judgment for the offended party, Merlita S. Soliman.

ISSUE:
 WON THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE ABSENCE OF
SPERMATOZOA IN COMPLAINANT’S VAGINA AS WELL AS IN THE PERIPHERAL
PARTS THEREOF AND THE UTTER LACK OF EVIDENCE OF SEXUAL INTERCOURSE
ON THE PART OF COMPLAINANT AT ABOUT THE TIME SHE WAS ALLEGEDLY
ABUSED BY APPELLANT AS INDUBITABLE PROOF THAT THE CRIME OF RAPE WAS
NEVER COMMITTED IN THE INSTANT CASE.

RULING:

In the crime of rape, the slightest penetration is enough, proof of emission is not
necessary.—The ninth assigned error of the lower court that it did not consider the absence of
spermatozoa in the complainant’s vagina as well as in the peripheral parts thereof, as an
indubitable proof that the crime of rape was never committed in the instant case is untenable.
The non-appearance of spermatozoa in the vagina of complainant could be due, according to the
examining physician, to the lack of ejaculation on the part of appellant (t.s.n., p. 21, Dec. 20,
1976). It must be borne in mind that the slightest penetration is enough. Proof of emission is not
necessary (People vs. Selfaison, et al. No. L-14732, Jan. 28, 1961, 110 Phil. 839). The absence of
spermatozoa in the vagina does not negate rape (People vs. Canastre, 82 Phil. 480). It is worthy
of note that the absence of spermatozoa gives and lends credence to complainant’s account that
after the insertion, appellant stood up. There was no mention by her of ejaculation.

Moreover, certainly these are the well-established facts surrounding the consummation of
rape on the night of December 25, 1973, as found by the trial court, viz:

“1.Estefania Rapanut Rebaula, the mother of the complainant, immediately reported that
very same night to the Chief of Police of Sta. Catalina that the accused had earlier raped her
daughter, and the said peace officer lost no time in entering the rape of the complainant by the
accused in the police blotter and in instructing his men to investigate forthwith the report.

“2.Upon the instruction of the Chief of Police, Pat. Evaristo Rabe of Sta. Catalina,
together with the complainant and other policemen, immediately repaired to the crime scene and
there, about past 8:00 P.M., inside the vacant store nearby the house of Leticia Rafanan, he found
the bracelet (Exh. “H”) and the broken necklace (Exh. “1”) which were worn by the complainant
when she was raped. Pat. Rabe found outside the store about a meter away from its door, the
stick of the barbecue, the banana leaf (Exh. “L”) and the piece of newspaper (Exh. L-2) with
which the chop suey was wrapped, and also the paper bag (Exh. “L-1”) wherein the wrapped
chop suey and the barbecue were placed. Also, the complainant surrendered the 5-peso bill (Exh.
“J”) to the police that same night.

“3.When interviewed in her house by Pat. Rabe at about past 8:00 that same night, Leticia
Rafanan stated that earlier she helped in pulling Merlita away from the accused.
 “4.The complainant, her mother Estefania Rapanut Rebaula and Leticia Rafanan, when
investigated by the police the following morning, December 26, 1973, gave their respective
statements, Exh. “F”, “B-1” and Exhibit “I”, which they forthwith subscribed before Municipal
Judge Pedro R. Arce of Sta. Catalina. There was therefore no time for the complainant and these
two prosecution witnesses to contrive and falsely declare during the investigation against the
accused.

VALENZUELA v. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 160188 June 21, 2007

FACTS: On May 19, 1994, at around 4:30 p.m., petitioner and Calderon were sighted outside the
Super Sale Club, a supermarket within the ShoeMart (SM) complex along North EDSA, by
Lorenzo Lago (Lago), a security guard who was then manning his post at the open parking area
of the supermarket. Lago saw petitioner, who was wearing an identification card with the mark
“Receiving Dispatching Unit (RDU),” hauling a push cart with cases of detergent of the well-
known “Tide” brand . Petitioner unloaded these cases in an open parking space, where Calderon
was waiting. Petitioner then returned inside the supermarket, and after five (5) minutes, emerged
with more cartons of Tide Ultramatic and again unloaded these boxes to the same area in the
open parking space.

Thereafter, petitioner left the parking area and haled a taxi. He boarded the cab and directed it
towards the parking space where Calderon was waiting. Calderon loaded the cartons of Tide
Ultramatic inside the taxi, then boarded the vehicle . All these acts were eyed by Lago, who
proceeded to stop the taxi as it was leaving the open parking area. When Lago asked petitioner
for a receipt of the merchandise, petitioner and Calderon reacted by fleeing on foot, but Lago
fired a warning shot to alert his fellow security guards of the incident. Petitioner and Calderon
were apprehended at the scene, and the stolen merchandise recovered . The filched items seized
from the duo were four (4) cases of Tide Ultramatic, one (1) case of Ultra 25 grams, and three
(3) additional cases of detergent, the goods with an aggregate value of P12,090.00.

In arguing that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft , petitioner cites two decisions
rendered many years ago by the Court of Appeals: People vs. Diño and People vs. Flores. Both
decisions elicit the interest of the Court, as they modified trial court convictions from
consummated to frustrated theft and involve a factual milieu that bears similarity to the present
case. Petitioner invoked the same rulings in his appeal to the Court of Appeals, yet the appellate
court did not expressly consider the import of the rulings when it affirmed the conviction.
ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is guilty of frustrated theft only (NO, GUILTY OF CONSUMMATED
THEFT)

HELD:

Article 6 defines those three stages, namely the consummated, frustrated and attempted felonies.
A felony is consummated “when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present.” It is frustrated “when the offender performs all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.” Finally, it is attempted
“when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not
perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.”

Court has long recognized the following elements of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code, namely: 1) that there be taking of personal property; 2) that said property
belongs to another; 3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; 4) that the taking be done
without the consent of the owner; and 5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of
violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.

So long as the “descriptive” circumstances that qualify the taking are present, including animo
lucrandi and apoderamiento, the completion of the operative act that is the taking of personal
property of another establishes, at least, that the transgression went beyond the attempted stage.
As applied to the present case, the moment petitioner obtained physical possession of the cases
of detergent and loaded them in the pushcart, such seizure motivated by intent to gain, completed
without need to inflict violence or intimidation against persons nor force upon things, and
accomplished without the consent of the SM Super Sales Club, petitioner forfeited the
extenuating benefit a conviction for only attempted theft would have afforded him.

Now, in order to ascertain whether the theft is consummated or frustrated, it is necessary to

inquire as to how exactly is the felony of theft “produced .” Parsing through the statutory
definition of theft under Article 308, there is one apparent answer provided in the language of the
law — that theft is already “produced” upon the “taking of personal property of another without
the latter’s consent.”

For the purpose of ascertaining whether theft is susceptible of commission in the frustrated stage,
the question is again, when is the crime of theft produced? There would be all but certain
unanimity in the position that theft is produced when there is deprivation of personal property
due to its taking by one with intent to gain. Viewed from that perspective, it is immaterial to the
product of the felony that the offender, once having committed all the acts of execution for theft ,
is able or unable to freely dispose of the property stolen since the deprivation from the owner
alone has already ensued from such acts of execution. This conclusion is reflected in Chief
Justice Aquino’s commentaries, as earlier cited, that “in theft or robbery the crime is
consummated after the accused had material possession of the thing with intent to appropriate the
same , although his act of making use of the thing was frustrated.”

It might be argued, that the ability of the offender to freely dispose of the property stolen delves
into the concept of “taking” itself, in that there could be no true taking until the actor obtains
such degree of control over the stolen item. But even if this were correct, the effect would be to
downgrade the crime to its attempted , and not frustrated stage, for it would mean that not all the
acts of execution have not been completed, the “taking not having been accomplished.” Perhaps
this point could serve as fertile ground for future discussion, but the concern now is whether
there is indeed a crime of frustrated theft, and such consideration proves ultimately immaterial to
that question. Moreover, such issue will not apply to the facts of this particular case. The Court is
satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the taking by the petitioner was completed in this case.
With intent to gain, he acquired physical possession of the stolen cases of detergent for a
considerable period of time that he was able to drop these off at a spot in the parking lot, and
long enough to load these onto a taxicab .

Again, there is no language in Article 308 that expressly or impliedly allows that the “free
disposition of the items stolen” is in any way determinative of whether the crime of theft has
been produced. The Court thus concludes that under the Revised Penal Code, there is no crime of
frustrated theft. That it has taken all these years for the Court to recognize that there can be no
frustrated theft under the Revised Penal Code, does not detract from the correctness of this
conclusion. It will take considerable amendments to our Revised Penal Code in order that
frustrated theft may be recognized.

People of the Philippines versus Diño

Facts

On June 20, 1946, Roberto Diño was hired as a driver of the US army at a station

in Quezon City. At above 11:30 in the morning, he brought a truck load of articles to manila
harbor; the article came from the US army. At the check point a guard approached the
truck and found three boxes, containing ten caliber 30 army rifles. The guard brought Diño to
the lieutenant of the US army for questioning, Diño pointed to the gangbut later denied.
Later Diño confessed that there were four persons who placed the boxes on board and he was
instructed to bring them out of the area. While they were to meet after the truck passed the
checkpoint.
Issue:

whether or not the crime f theft was consummated considering the foregoing.

Ruling:

Trial Court: Diño was found guilty as an accomplice in the consummated crime of
theft.Supreme Court: Diño was found guilty as a principal in the frustrated crime of

theft.Reason: in order for the crime of theft to be consummated the article should have passed the
checkpoint, so thatthe thief could have full control and could dispense of the property.

PEOPLE v. Flores

No. 45089. September 17, 1936

FACTS:

This is an appeal taken by the accused Dominador Flores y Aguilar from the judgment of
the Court of First Instance of Manila finding him self-confessed and guilty of the crime of
frustrated theft provided for and punished in article 309, case 5, in connection with article 50, of
the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to the principal penalty of eleven days of arresto
menor and the additional penalty of two years, four months and one day of prisión correccional f
or being a habitual delinquent, with the accessory penalties of the law and costs.

In support of his appeal, the appellant contends that the court a quo erred in sentencing him to
the principal penalty of eleven days of arresto menor.

The penalty prescribed by article 309, case 5, of the Revised Penal Code for the crime of
consummated theft is arresto mayor to its full extent, if the value of the thing stolen is over P5
but does not exceed P50. As the crime of which the defendant-appellant pleaded guilty is
frustrated theft, the penalty which should be imposed upon him is the one next lower in degree to
arresto mayor, which is arresto menor, in accordance with the provisions of article 50, in
connection with articles 61 and 70 of said Code. Inasmuch as the aggravating circumstance of
recidivism (art. 14, subsec. 9 of the Revised Penal Code), which is compensated by the
mitigating circumstance of the plea of guilty (art. 13, subsec. 7, of said Code), was present at the
commission of the crime, said penalty of arresto menor should be imposed in its medium period,
or from eleven to twenty days of arresto menor, pursuant to rules 1 and 4 of article 64 of said
Code. The principal penalty imposed by the trial court is, therefore, in accordance with law.

ISSUE:
RULING:

THEFT; HABITUAL DELINQUENCY; PLEA OF GUILTY WHICH DOES NOT

IMPLY ADMISSION OF HABITUAL DELINQUENCY NOT SUFFICIENTLY PROVEN.—
The defendant-appellant does not assign as error the fact that he was declared a habitual
delinquent and sentenced to the corresponding additional penalty by the trial court. Having
pleaded guilty of the crime of frustrated theft with which he is charged in the information, and
having admitted thereby only the facts alleged therein, which facts are insufficient to prove the
existence of habitual delinquency because neither the dates of the former convictions nor those
of the commission of the crimes of which he was convicted are specified in said information, the
additional penalty prescribed for habitual delinquency cannot be imposed upon him and,
therefore, the court a quo committed an error of law in declaring- the defendant-appellant a
habitual delinquent.

Wherefore, the appealed sentence is reversed in so far as it declares the accused a

habitual delinquent and imposes the corresponding additional penalty upon him, and it is
affirmed in all other respects, with the costs of both instances to the appellant. So ordered.

BALEROS v. PP

G.R. No. 138033             February 22, 2006

Lessons Applicable: Attempted Rape

Laws Applicable: Art. 6

FACTS:
•    Martina Lourdes Albano (Malou), a medical student of the University of Sto. Tomas, stayed
at Room 307 with her maid Marvilou.
•    December 12 10:30 pm: Malou slept.  Her maid Marvilou slept on a folding bed right in front
of her bedroom door.
•    December 13, 1991 1:00 am: Chito left the fraternity party with Robert Chan and Alberto
wearing a barong tagalog, with t-shirt inside, with short pants with stripes lent by Perla Duran
and leather shoes.
•    December 13, 1991 1:30 am: Chito arrived at the Building wearing a white t-shirt with
fraternity symbols and black shorts with the brand name “Adidas” from a party.  He requested
permission from S/G Ferolin to go up to Room 306 leased by Ansbert Co but at that time only
Joseph Bernard Africa was there.  Although Chito could not produce the required written
authorization, he let him in because he will be a tenant in the coming summer break.  Joseph was
awaken by Chito’s knock so he glanced the alarm clock and let him.  He saw him wearing dark-
colored shorts and white T-shirt.
•    December 13, 1991 1:50 am: Renato Baleros, Jr. y David (Chito) forcefully covered the face
of Martina Lourdes T. Albano with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical with dizzying effects. 
This awakened Malou.  She struggled but could not move because she was tightly held and
pinned down on the bed.  She kicked him and got her right hand free to squeeze his sex organ
causing him to let her go.  She went for the bedroom door and woke up Marvilou.  She also
intercommed S/G Ferolin saying: "may pumasok sa kuarto ko pinagtangkaan ako".  Malou
proceed to Room 310 where her classmates Christian Alcala, Bernard Baptista, Lutgardo Acosta
and Rommel Montes were staying and seeked help.  She saw her bed in a mess and noticed that
her nightdress was stained with blue.  Aside from the window with grills which she had
originally left opened, another window inside her bedroom which leads to Room 306 was now
open.
•    December 13, 1991 3:30 pm: Christian and his roommates, Bernard and Lutgardo were asked
by the CIS people to look for anything not belonging to them in their Unit when Rommel Montes
went inside and found a grey bag.
o    Christian knew right away that it belonged to Chito.  It contained white t-shirt with fraternity
symbol, a Black Adidas short pants, a handkerchief , 3 white T-shirts, an underwear and socks.
•    Chito pleaded NOT Guilty
•    13 witnesses including Malou and her classmates, Joseph Bernard Africa, Rommel Montes,
Renato Alagadan and Christian Alcala
o    Malou: Chito was her classmate whom he rejected a week before
o    Chito: He only slept and at about 6 to 6:30, Joseph told him that something had happened and
asked him to follow him to Room 310 carrying his gray bag and since no one was there they
went to Room 401 where Renato Alagadan was. He left his grey bag at Room 306 the day
before.
•    handkerchief and Malou’s night dress both contained chloroform, a volatile poison which
causes first degree burn exactly like what Malou sustained on that part of her face where the
chemical-soaked cloth had been pressed
•    RTC: guilty of attempted rape
•    CA: Affirmed

ISSUE:

W/N Chito is guilty of attempted rape

HELD:

NO. REVERSED and SET ASIDE. ACQUITTING Renato D. Baleros, Jr. of the charge for
attempted rape. GUILTY of light coercion and is accordingly sentenced to 30 days of arresto
menor and to pay a fine of P200.00, with the accessory penalties thereof and to pay the costs.
•    Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by a man who has carnal
knowledge or intercourse with a woman under any of the following circumstances: (1) By using
force or intimidation; (2) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
(3) When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
•    Under Article 6, in relation to the aforementioned article of the same code, rape is attempted
when the offender commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts and does not
perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of some
cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
o    whether or not the act of the petitioner, i.e., the pressing of a chemical-soaked cloth while on
top of Malou, constitutes an overt act of rape.
o    Overt or external act has been defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the
intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if
carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by
external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and
necessarily ripen into a concrete offense
•    Chito was fully clothed and that there was no attempt on his part to undress Malou, let alone
touch her private part
•    Verily, while the series of acts committed by the petitioner do not determine attempted rape,
they constitute unjust vexation punishable as light coercion under the second paragraph of
Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code.
o    As it were, unjust vexation exists even without the element of restraint or compulsion for the
reason that this term is broad enough to include any human conduct which, although not
productive of some physical or material harm, would unjustly annoy or irritate an innocent
person
o    That Malou, after the incident in question, cried while relating to her classmates what she
perceived to be a sexual attack and the fact that she filed a case for attempted rape proved
beyond cavil that she was disturbed, if not distressed

PEOPLE v. PILOLA

G.R. No. 121828  June 27, 2003

FACTS:

February 5, 1988 11:30 pm: Elisa Rolan was inside their store waiting for her husband to arrive.
Joselito Capa and Julian Azul, Jr. were drinking beer. Although already drunk, Edmar Aguilos
and Odilon Lagliba joined them.  Edmar had a heated argument with Julian.  Elisa pacified
Edmar and advised them to go home as she was already going to close up. Edmar and Odilon left
then returned to block Joselito and Julian.  Edmar took off his eyeglasses and punched Julian in
the face.  Elisa shouted: “Tama na.  Tama na” but she was ignored as they continued until they
reached the end of the street.  Odilon positioned himself on top of a pile of hollow blocks and
watched as Edmar and Julian swapped punches.  As Joselito tried to stop the fight, Odilon pulled
out his knife with his right hand and stepped down from his perch.  He placed his left arm around
Joselito’s neck, and stabbed him.  Ronnie and Rene Gayot Pilola, who were across the street, saw
their gangmate Odilon stabbing the victim and decided to join the fray.  Ronnie took a knife from
the kitchen of Teresita and rushed together with Pilola to the scene and stabbed Joselito.  As
Joeslito was stabbed 11 times (6 fatal stab wounds), he fell in the canal.  Odilon and Pilola fled
while Ronnie went after Julian who ran dear life.  When Julian noticed that Ronnie was no
longer running after him, he looked back and saw Ronnie pick up a piece of hollow block and
bashed Joselito’s head.  Then, Ronnie got a piece of broken bottle and struck Joselito once more
before fleing from the scene.  Joselito died on the spot.  Elisa rushed to Joselito’s house and
informed his wife and brother of the incident.

Agripina Gloria, a female security guard, saw Ronnie repeatedly stabbed Joselito and fled
towards the direction of the mental hospital.  She did not see Odilon.

Elisa cross-examination had an inconsistency, she stated that it was Edmar who struck the victim
(before it was Ronnie)

RTC: Pilola GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder qualified by treachery and sentenced
to reclusion perpetua

ISSUE:

W/N Pilola is guilty of murder

HELD:

YES.  Rene Gayot Pilola GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder is
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION

The identity of the person who hit the victim with a hollow block is of de minimis
importance.  Elisa’s testimony is corroborated by the autopsy report of Dr. Bienvenido Muñoz.
No showing of any improper motive on the part of a witness to testify falsely against the accused
or to falsely implicate the latter in the commission of the crime.  The trial court gave credence
and full probative weight to Elisa’s testimony.

There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit
it.  Conspiracy as a mode of incurring criminal liability must be proved separately from and with
the same quantum of proof as the crime itself. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct
evidence.  After all, secrecy and concealment are essential features of a successful conspiracy.  It
may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the
crime, showing that they had acted with a common purpose and design. Conspiracy may be
implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment
of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently
independent of each other, were, in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of
personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. There may be conspiracy even if an
offender does not know the identities of the other offenders, and even though he is not aware of
all the details of the plan of operation or was not in on the scheme from the beginning. One need
only to knowingly contribute his efforts in furtherance of it. One who joins a criminal conspiracy
in effect adopts as his own the criminal designs of his co-conspirators.  If conspiracy is
established, all the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the manner and extent of
their participation since in contemplation of law, the act of one would be the act of all. Each of
the conspirators is the agent of all the others.

The mere presence of an accused at the situs of the crime will not suffice. There must be
intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design
and purpose.

Even if two or more offenders do not conspire to commit homicide or murder, they may be held
criminally liable as principals by direct participation if they perform overt acts which mediately
or immediately cause or accelerate the death of the victim.  Art. 4.  Criminal liability. – Criminal
liability shall be incurred:

o    1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different
from that which he intended.

Art. 18.  Accomplices. – Accomplices are the persons who, not being included in Article 17,
cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.

o    To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two elements must concur:

1.    the community of criminal design; that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by
direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose;

2.    the performance of previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the
commission of the crime

Accomplices come to know about the criminal resolution of the principal by direct participation
after the principal has reached the decision to commit the felony and only then does the
accomplice agree to cooperate in its execution.  Accomplices do not decide whether the crime
should be committed; they merely assent to the plan of the principal by direct participation and
cooperate in its accomplishment

However, where one cooperates in the commission of the crime by performing overt acts which
by themselves are acts of execution, he is a principal by direct participation, and not merely an
accomplice
Odilon all by himself initially decided to stab the victim. However, while Odilon was stabbing
the victim, the appellant and Ronnie agreed to join. All the overt acts of Odilon, Ronnie and the
Pilola before, during, and after the stabbing incident indubitably show that they conspired to kill
the victim.  Since the victim is not yet dead, the crime is not yet consummated so Pilola is a
principal by direct participation.

Alibi is a weak, if not the weakest of defenses in a criminal prosecution, because it is easy to
concoct but hard to disprove.  To serve as basis for acquittal, it must be established by clear and
convincing evidence.  For it to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was absent from
the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, but also that it was physically impossible for
him to have been present then.

Pilola knew that he was charged for the stabbing but instead of surrendering to the police
authorities, he evaded arrest and this flight is evidence of guilt

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.  The essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack on the unarmed victim
without the slightest provocation on his part -  attack on the unarmed victim was sudden.  The
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is absorbed by treachery.

PEOPLE V. BULAN

G.R No. 143404 June 8,2005

FACTS:

This case was certified by the Court of Appeals (CA) to this Court for review, in view of
its finding in its Decision1 that appellants Jose Bulan and his son, Allan Bulan, are guilty of
murder as principals by indispensable cooperation punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, and
not merely as accomplices as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes,
Branch 42.

On the night of June 6, 1994, a dance was taking place at the barangay plaza of Barangay
Datag, Municipality of Caramoran, Catanduanes. Alberto Mariano, a barangay tanod in said
barangay was assigned the task of seeing to it that anybody who entered the gate to the dance
hall at the plaza must have a ribbon. Appellant Allan Bulan came to the dance and entered the
gate without the required ribbon. Alberto Mariano followed appellant Allan Bulan into the dance
hall and asked him why he entered the gate without a ribbon. Instead of answering Alberto’s
question, Allan boxed him on the head. Accused Estemson Bulan, Allan’s brother, who had
entered the dance hall, likewise, boxed Alberto. Estemson then held Alberto, while Allan boxed
the latter on the chest. Perlita Mariano, Alberto’s sister, who was present at the dance, embraced
her brother as Allan and Estemson unceasingly pummeled him. The other barangay tanods
present at the dance, Ceferino Ceballo and Juan Boribor, and a barangay kagawad, Dante Ereso,
stopped Allan and Estemson from further beating Alberto. After being pacified by the barangay
officials, Allan and Estemson left the dance hall. Alberto, on the other hand, went back to where
he originally stood to resume his duty. His sister Perlita stood beside him.

One Edwin Solo, a policeman, suddenly came into the dance hall and dragged Alberto
into the street just outside the entrance. Perlita embraced Alberto as he was dragged outside the
barangay plaza. Appellants Jose Bulan and Allan Bulan were waiting for Alberto and
immediately held the latter by his shoulders. Jose held Alberto’s right shoulder while Allan held
his left shoulder. Perlita was still embracing her brother but she was pulled away from him.
Accused Estemson Bulan suddenly appeared behind Alberto and stabbed him twice in the back
with a small bolo. Perlita screamed for help. However, despite the fact that there were people at
the entrance gate, nobody came to help Alberto and Perlita. After stabbing Alberto, Estemson
immediately escaped, while Jose and Allan dragged the fatally wounded Alberto away from the
barangay plaza to the store of Valentin Talion, which was forty meters away from the scene of
the stabbing. They dropped Alberto face down on the ground in front of Valentin’s store and
then left, running towards the direction of [the] barangay plaza. Perlita, who followed Jose and
Allan as they dragged her brother, kept on shouting for help but nobody came to help them. After
Jose and Allan left, Perlita returned to the barangay plaza and sought help from her relatives who
were at the dance. She, likewise, sought the help of the barangay officials present and informed
them that Alberto was already dead.

Minutes later, Nelson Rubio, a policeman, went to the place where Alberto lay. When the
policeman tried to lift Alberto, the small bolo which was used in stabbing Alberto and which
remained embedded in his back, fell to the ground. The Municipal Mayor of Caramoran and Dr.
Rico Lareza, a doctor and the Chief of the Caramoran Municipal Hospital, also went to the site
where Alberto lay. The doctor then requested the mayor to bring Alberto’s body to the hospital
for a post-mortem examination. On the same night, at around 11:30, Dr. Lareza examined
Alberto and found that his body bore the following wounds and injuries.

According to Dr. Lareza, “(t)he most fatal wound is wound No. 1” (p. 9, tsn, Lareza, May
22, 1995) and that Alberto Mariano died of CardioRespiratory Arrest due to a stab wound
penetrating towards the heart.

ISSUE:

WON the appellant are guilty of the crime charged as principals, by direct participation
as ruled by CA or as ruled by the RTC, mere accomplices to the crime of murder.
RULING:

If conspiracy is proved, all the conspirators are criminally liable for the crime charged
and proved—the act of one is the act of all.—Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
there is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a crime and decide to commit it.
Direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy; it may be established by the acts of the accused
before, during and after the commission of the crime charged, from which it may be logically
inferred the existence of a common purpose to commit the same. The prosecution must prove
conspiracy by the same quantum of evidence as the felony charged itself. Indeed, proof of
previous agreement among the malefactors to commit the crime is not essential to prove
conspiracy. It is not necessary to show that all the conspirators actually hit and killed the victim;
what is primordial is that all the participants performed specific acts with such closeness and
coordination as to indicate a common purpose or design to bring out the victim’s death. Once
conspiracy is established, it is unnecessary to prove who among the conspirators inflicted the
fatal injury. If conspiracy is proved, all the conspirators are criminally liable for the crime
charged and proved. The act of one is the act of all.

In this case, the appellants were waiting outside the dance hall near the gate when Edwin
Solo brought the victim towards them, onto the street. Jose held the victim by the right shoulder,
while Allan held him by the left. Estemson suddenly appeared from behind the victim and
stabbed the latter at the back with a small bolo. The appellants continued holding the victim as
Estemson stabbed him yet again. Even as Estemson fled, the appellants dragged the victim from
the gate, towards the store, where they dropped the victim’s body and fled from the scene. Allan
then left Catanduanes and hid in Pasay City where he was arrested by the NBI on August 7,
1994. Considering the foregoing, the Court affirms the finding of the CA that the appellants are
guilty as principals by direct participation in the killing of Alberto Mariano.
PEOPLE vs. FABRO, GR 114261, Feb 10, 2000

FACTS:
Appellant Fabro together with her common-law husband Donald Pilay and Irene Martin, was
charged with the crime of "violation of Section 21 (b) Art. IV, in relation to Section 4, Art. II of
Republic Act No. 6425. They conspired and sold/delivered to PO2 APDUHAN, who acted as
poseur-buyer, one (1) kilo of dried marijuana leaves. Two concerned individuals, Gloria and
Emma Borce, reported to Chief Inspector Evasco that a in Baguio City, was engaged in selling
marijuana. They added that sales usually took place between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m. Acting on that
report, Chief Inspector Evasco organized two teams to conduct a buy-bust operation. Senior
Inspector Mabanag was to be the overall team leader with Batag as his assistant. SPO2 Ellonito
Apduhan was designated poseur-buyer in the operation. After briefing the group, Chief Inspector
Evasco gave P600.00 as purchase money to Apduhan. The amount consisted of six P100-bills
with their serial numbers duly listed down.
As Apduhan, Gloria and Emma drew near Pilay’s residence, appellant met them. Donald Pilay
who appeared drunk was inside the house by the main door. Gloria and Emma introduced
Apduhan to appellant as a stranger in the place who wanted to buy marijuana. Appellant told
them that a kilo would cost them P700.00 but she agreed to Apduhan’s price of P600.00. After
Apduhan had ordered a kilo of the contraband, appellant told them to wait a while. Appellant
then went to a house just behind her own. After a few minutes, she returned in the company of
another woman who was later identified as Irene Martin. Appellant handed the stuff to Apduhan.
Her companion, Irene Martin, demanded payment therefor. Apduhan gave her the P600.00. After
ascertaining that it was a brick of marijuana, he made the pre-arranged signal of lighting his
cigarette. Immediately, the back-up team rushed towards their direction. However, before the
team could reach them, Irene Martin ran away. Apduhan held appellant so that she could not
escape. Donald Pilay was also arrested.

ISSUE:

Whether there is conspiracy in the commission of the crime

RULING:

Appellant’s contention that Irene Martin was the real culprit being the source of the contraband
does not in any way absolve her of the crime of selling marijuana. While it is true that it was
Irene Martin who took the money, appellant was the one who negotiated with the poseur-buyers;
fetched her co-accused; carried and handed over the marijuana to Apduhan. The acts of Martin
and appellant clearly show a unity of purpose in the consummation of the sale of marijuana. In
other words, between Martin and appellant, conspiracy in the commission of the crime was
indubitably proven by the prosecution.
Section 21 (b) of R.A. 6425 punishes the mere conspiracy to commit the offense of selling,
delivering, distributing and transporting of dangerous drugs. Conspiracy herein refers to the mere
agreement to commit the said acts and not the actual execution thereof. While the rule is that a
mere conspiracy to commit a crime without doing any overt act is not punishable, the exception
is when such is specifically penalized by law, as in the case of Section 21 of Republic Act 6425.
Conspiracy as crime should be distinguished from conspiracy as a manner of incurring criminal
liability the latter being applicable to the case at bar.

PEOPLE vs. BELLO (GR 124871, May 13, 2004, 428 SCRA 388)

FACTS:
To support his family, ROLANDO ANDASAN left Cabanatuan City and landed a job as
messenger/collector at the Sunshine Moneychanger in Pasay City, earning a measly net income
of P2,000.00 per month. On July 25, 1995, in the course of his employment, he was mercilessly
stabbed 28 times and died.
Only accused Marife and Eladio, Jr. were arrested. Accused Danny and Cayo remain at large.
At about 10:30 a.m., a cab entered the Queensland Lodge in Pasay City, with accused Marife and
Eladio, Jr. on board. They alighted in front of the private garage of room no. 2 and informed
Jonathan Deniega, a roomboy, that they needed a room. Jonathan led them. He then gave a stub
to their telephone operator, DIGNA SIAZON, where he indicated that two customers checked in
at room no. 2. Accused Marife called up Digna and asked for an outside line. Marife then called
up the Sunshine Moneychanger in Pasay City and talked with the officer-in-charge, EDUARDO
RAFAEL. Identifying herself as Joann Redillo, accused Marife misrepresented to Eduardo that
she came from Japan and would like to convert her 40 pieces of yen to pesos. She requested that
the currency conversion be made in her room inside the nearby Queensland Lodge as she did not
want to carry around a huge sum of money. Eduardo instructed his messenger ROLANDO
ANDASAN to proceed to the lodge and give the lady occupant of room no. 2 the sum of
P114,000.00 in exchange for her 40 pieces of yen. ROSE CAHARIAN, an accounting clerk of
the lodge, saw Rolando standing by the hallway. Rolando informed her that he had about a
hundred thousand pesos with him as they have a female guest in room no. 2 who wanted to have
her yen converted into pesos. Rose escorted Rolando to Digna, the telephone operator, and
directed the latter to call up room no. 2 and announce the presence and purpose of Rolando.
Digna called up room no. 2 and accused Marife confirmed the currency transaction. Roomboy
MAYONITO WAYCO escorted Rolando and directed him to wait in the garage while he first
went up the room to announce his presence. Accused Eladio, Jr. opened the door and instructed
Mayonito to let Rolando in. Mayonito returned to the garage and waited. At about 2 p.m.,
accused Marife called up telephone operator Digna and informed her that they were checking out
of the room. Seconds later, Mayonito, who was still waiting for Rolando in the garage, saw
accused Marife emerge from room no. 2 While waiting for the bill and the cab, Mayonito
inquired from accused Marife where Rolando was. She dismissed his query and directed him to
follow-up instead the preparation of their bill as she and her companion were in a hurry.
Mayonito rushed to the cashier to get the bill, only to be told that it was already with Jonathan.
Meanwhile, Jonathan returned to accused Marife with the bill. He waited with her at the garage
for about 5 minutes for the arrival of her cab. As she seemed quite impatient to leave, they
started to walk towards the gate of the lodge. Just then, security guard Leonardo was able to hail
a cab and instructed it to enter the lodge. Mayonito instructed cab driver ERNESTO RAMOS to
stay for a while as they still had to inspect room no. 2. Accused Marife likewise directed Ernesto
to wait for her companion accused Eladio, Jr. who, seconds later, emerged from the garage but
did not board the cab and fled on foot. Accused Marife then ordered Ernesto to follow him. In
the meantime, roomboys Mayonito and Jonathan discovered the lifeless body of Rolando inside
the room, lying beside the bed and covered by blood-stained bedsheets. He sustained multiple
stab wounds and a TV cable wire was tied around his neck. Mayonito immediately left the room
to pursue its former occupants but he saw accused Marife’s cab already on its way out of the
lodge and accused Eladio, Jr. fleeing on foot. Eladio, Jr. deftly freed himself from Leonardo’s
grip and ran inside the nearby Violeta Court Subdivision. At about the same time, the cab
boarded by accused Marife left the premises of the lodge and followed accused Eladio, Jr. in the
subdivision. When the cab reached the end of the road, the two accused alighted and scaled the
wall of the subdivision. Accused Eladio, Jr. succeeded but Marife failed to climb over the wall
and was left behind.When Ernesto drove back to the gate of the subdivision, the security guards
stopped him, inspected his cab and saw a brown envelope which was left by accused Marife at
the backseat. They instructed Ernesto to return to the lodge as a crime had been committed by his
passengers.
Appellant Marife avers that her alleged conspiracy with the other accused was not sufficiently
established by circumstantial evidence as there was no showing that she had the same purpose
and united with the other accused in the execution of the crime. She alleges that her mere
presence in the crime scene is not per se a sufficient indicium of conspiracy. She insists that she
acted against her will due to the irresistible force employed by her co-accused.

ISSUE:

WON accused appellant were in conspiracy with the other accused.

RULING:

Conspiracy exists where the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the crime and
decide to pursue it. Conspiracy is predominantly a state of mind as it involves the meeting of the
minds and intent of the malefactors. Consequently, direct proof is not essential to establish it.
The existence of the assent of minds of the co-conspirators may be inferred from proof of facts
and circumstances which, taken together, indicate that they are parts of the complete plan to
commit the crime.
In the case at bar, the records clearly reveal that appellant Marife was part of the plan to rob the
moneychanger. This plan was mapped out in accused Danny’s house in Cavite by appellants,
together with accused Danny and Cayo. The four drove in a cab from Cavite to Baclaran. As the
robbery will be set up inside a motel room, only appellants Marife and Eladio, Jr. boarded a
tricycle and checked in the lodge so as not to arouse suspicion. A number of employees of the
Queensland Lodge and the cab driver testified on the conduct of appellant Marife inside the
lodge on that fateful day: the roomboys identified her and Eladio, Jr. as the ones who alighted
from the tricycle and checked into room no. 2; contrary to her account, the employees did not
notice that appellant Marife was nervous, crying or trembling due to fear when she entered the
lodge; appellant Marife asked the telephone operator thrice that day for an outside line; using an
alias, she called up the moneychanger twice to set up the robbery; appellants were the last to see
the victim alive; after they accomplished their criminal design, appellant Marife rushed out of the
room, personally paid for the bill and asked for a cab; the roomboys noticed that she was nervous
and in a hurry to leave; after she boarded the cab, she ordered the driver to wait for her
companion; she and Eladio, Jr. then fled from the lodge while the roomboys were inspecting
their room; both sought refuge in a subdivision; and, finally, they tried to scale the wall of the
subdivision in an attempt to get away. All these chain of events and the conduct of appellant
Marife lead to no other conclusion than that she conspired with her co-accused to commit the
crime.
Neither can we give credit to appellant Marife’s claim of duress and irresistible fear. Her story
simply does not add up. First, the records show that she had close relations with all her co-
accused: she has a child with appellant Eladio, Jr.; she and her co-accused all resided in Cavite;
accused Danny Dineros asked her to be the godmother of his child; she knew where Danny
resided in Cavite and they both hail from Samar; and, even Marife’s aunt in Samar was
acquainted with Danny. Indeed, her claim of irresistible force from her co-accused is difficult to
fathom as it would be easier to instill fear on a stranger than on a friend or close relation. Second,
while appellant Marife claims that she was mostly in tears during the time she was abducted by
her co-accused, none of the employees of the lodge noticed any manifestation of fear or coercion
on her part. Third, her claim of duress and irresistible fear is negated by her failure to escape or
ask for succor during her alleged abduction despite several opportunities to do so. She could
have asked help from the people she saw along the road when they left Danny’s house in Cavite
and while she was allegedly being dragged towards the cab; from the tricycle driver who drove
them to the lodge; from the roomboys who stayed with her in the garage after the stabbing
incident, while she was waiting for her bill and cab; and, from the cab driver who picked her up
from the lodge. She could have escaped after the stabbing incident when she went out of the
room alone and conversed with the roomboy. An innocent victim of circumstances would have
waited for and eagerly grabbed the first chance to escape or seek help; but not appellant Marife.
Fourth, she escaped from the lodge, fled to the nearby subdivision and tried to scale its wall with
appellant Eladio, Jr. who, moments before, was supposed to be her aggressor. Finally, even at the
time she was arrested, she stuck to her alias and identified herself as Joann Redillo to the police
authorities. Hence, apart from her biased testimony, the records are bereft of evidence to
corroborate and bolster her claim of coercion. The more logical and inescapable conclusion is
that she was part of the conspiracy. Plainly, her conduct all throughout the incident reveals that
she was united in purpose with her co-accused in the execution of the crime.
On the whole, the incriminating circumstantial evidence against the appellants sufficiently
proves their complicity.
Circumstantial evidence is that which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in
issue may be established by inference.25 Resort to circumstantial evidence is, in the nature of
things, a necessity as crimes are usually committed clandestinely and under conditions where
concealment is highly probable. To require direct testimony would, in many cases, result in
freeing criminals and deny proper protection to society.26 Thus, the guilt of an accused may be
established through circumstantial evidence provided that the requisites are present, viz: (1) there
is more than one circumstance; (2) the inferences must be based on proven facts; (3) the
combination of all the circumstances produces a conviction beyond doubt as to the guilt of the
accused.27
In the case at bar, while no witness testified to the actual stabbing and robbing of the victim, the
circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution supports a judgment of conviction.
Appellants asked roomboy Jonathan for a room; Jonathan escorted them to room no. 2, prepared
the room for them by turning on the lights, television and airconditioning unit before ushering
them in. The telephone operator received a request for an outside line from the lady occupant of
room no. 2 thrice that day. Eduardo, the manager of the moneychanger, got phone calls from the
lady occupant of room no. 2 who identified herself as Joann Redillo; the caller pretended that she
just arrived from Japan and asked her yen be converted to pesos. Eduardo gave his messenger,
the victim Rolando Andasan, the amount of P114,000.00 to be delivered to the lady occupant of
room no. 2. Rolando arrived at the lodge and explained his purpose to the employees therein.
Rolando was a familiar face in the lodge which had an internal arrangement with the
moneychanger to extend currency conversion services upon the request of their guests. Appellant
Eladio, Jr. used to be employed as a messenger of the moneychanger and knew about the office’s
internal arrangement with the lodge. Roomboy Mayonito escorted Rolando to room no. 2 for the
currency transaction; when appellant Eladio, Jr. opened the door to Mayonito, the latter informed
him about the presence of Rolando in the garage; appellant Eladio, Jr. gave the go signal for
Rolando to come up to the room; Mayonito returned to the garage, fetched Rolando and escorted
him to room no. 2; again, it was appellant Eladio, Jr. who opened the door and let Rolando in.
That was the last time Rolando was seen alive and the money was no longer to be found.
After accomplishing their criminal design, appellants emerged from the room, hurriedly paid
their bill and left. The roomboys discovered the cadaver of Rolando in the room which sustained
several stab wounds. Appellants fled and scaled the wall of the subdivision. The police
authorities recovered a knife under the bed of room no. 2 which fitted the scabbard left by
appellant Marife in the cab, together with a bloodied face towel. The width of this knife is
compatible with the width of the stab wounds sustained by the victim.
Thus, while no person actually witnessed the appellants rob and kill the victim, the confluence of
the incriminating circumstances enumerated above clearly shows that the appellants had motive
and opportunity to kill the victim when he resisted the robbery. As the victim was last seen alive
with them, coupled with their conduct that fateful day and their possession of the deadly weapon,
there can be no other reasonable conclusion than that the appellants authored the crime. To be
sure, their conviction is essentially based on this unbroken chain of events as testified to by the
prosecution witnesses and not on the uncounselled interrogation of appellant Marife by the
police authorities.
Appealed Decision is AFFIRMED with modification. Appellants MARIFE BELLO y ROSCO
and ELADIO M. CONSUELO, JR. are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals in the
crime of robbery with homicide and, in the absence of any aggravating circumstance, are
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.. No costs.

PEOPLE vs. QUIROL

GR 149259, October 2005, 473 SCRA 509

FACTS:
In celebration of a fiesta in Apas, Lahug, Cebu City, a “benefit disco dance” was held.
Appellants, Juanito and Mario Quirol, and the two victims, Benjamin Silva and Roel Ngujo,
attended. Policeman PO3 Jed Daloso, a third accused who remains at large, was also there. At
the dance, Juanito, Mario and Jed were together and drank all through the night with some
friends. Jed was later seen in a drunken state chasing people around while Juanito was seen
toying with a Batangas knife. The dance ended just prior to 4 a.m. and prosecution principal
witness Wilson Cruz testified that it was about that time when he was asked by Benjamin and
Roel to accompany them in escorting some ladies home. Wilson told them to go ahead and that
he would just follow. Wilson was behind them at a distance of 7 to 10 fathoms when the group
passed by the house of Jed. From his vantage point, Wilson saw Jed stop the two victims in front
of his house and frisk them. The ladies, perhaps not wanting to be delayed, went ahead.
Thereafter, Wilson saw Jed bind Benjamin and Roel together with a pair of handcuffs and lead
them towards the control tower of the old airport of Lahug, Cebu City. There, the three were met
by Juanito and Mario and together they proceeded to the airport runway. Wilson, hidden behind
a bush, could hear Benjamin plead for his life. Jed took out his .38 caliber service revolver and
shot Benjamin at point-blank range on the head. As Benjamin fell, Roel was dragged down to his
knees since he was handcuffed to Benjamin. Mario then held Roel while Juanito started stabbing
him using a Batangas knife. Jed finished it by shooting Roel. At around 7 a.m. that same
morning, Juanito went to collect his wages at the house of Galileo Banate, a construction
foreman for whom the former was working. Galileo observed Juanito to be somewhat in an
inebriated state, and so when Juanito asked permission to sleep on the floor, Galileo acceded.
Juanito was so sleepy that he unconsciously dropped his Batangas knife. Galileo later saw it
beside him on the floor, picked it up and kept it as there were children around who could play
with it. When he later gave Juanito his wages, he forgot to return the knife. Four days later, at the
construction site, Mario arrived with a policeman and picked up Juanito. Before leaving the
construction site, Juanito asked his knife back from Galileo. Galileo retrieved the knife from his
house and turned it over to the policeman. A subsequent examination on the knife revealed that it
had human bloodstains on it.

ISSUE:

WON

RULING:

We sustain the finding of conspiracy. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence of prior
agreement to commit the crime. Neither is its necessary to show that all the conspirators actually
hit and killed the victim. What has to be shown is that all the participants performed specific acts
with such closeness and coordination as to unmistakably indicate a common purpose and design.
The conspiracy in the instant case was sufficiently proven by Jed meeting with appellants at the
old airport tower and walking together with them towards the runway where appellants and Jed
performed acts in unison with each other as to unmistakably reveal a common purpose and
design.