CASE DIGESTS FOR POLITICAL LAW The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole— ut magis valeat quam

pereat
UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST – COLLEGE OF LAW FACTS:

Political Law Review 2020-2021 under Judge Gener M. Gito On June 2, 2003, an impeachment complaint (1st impeachment complaint)
was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr.
I. Preliminaries………………………………………………………….1 and 7 Associate Justices for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of
II. General Considerations……………………………………………..5 public trust and other high crimes”. On October 22, 2003, the House
III. Legislative Department…………………………………………….53 Committee on Justice voted to dismiss the complaint for being insufficient in
IV. Executive Department…………………………………………….104 substance, although it was sufficient in form.
V. Judicial Department……………………………………………….150
VI. Constitutional Commissions……………………………………...177 On October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to
VII. Bill of Rights………………………………………………………..180 dismiss the complaint or 4 months and 3 weeks since the filing thereof, a 2nd
VIII. Citizenship…………………………………………………...........287 impeachment complaint was filed with the House’s Secretary General by
IX. Law on Public Officers……………………………………………292 Representatives Teodoro, Jr. and Funtabella against Chief Justice Hilario
X. Administrative Law………………………………………………..312 Davide, founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry "to conduct an
XI. Election Law……………………………………………………….330 investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
XII. Local Governments……………………………………………….342 expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary
XIII. National Economy and Patrimony……………………………….349 Development Fund (JDF).”
XIV. Social Justice and Human Rights
XV. Education, Science, Technology, Arts, Culture and Sports The 2nd impeachment complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of
XVI. Public International Law Endorsement/ Impeachment” signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the
House of Representatives. Due to the events that took place, several instant
I. PRELIMINARIES petitions were filed against the House of Representatives, mostly contending
that the filing of the 2nd impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it
CONSTITUTION violates Article XI Section 5 of the Constitution that “no impeachment
proceedings shall be INITIATED against the same official more than once
1. FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES within a period of one year”; and that sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules
G.R. NO. 160261. November 10, 2003 of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 12th Congress are
unconstitutional as well.
DOCTRINE:
The House of Representatives argues that sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the
Statutory Construction; Verba Legis; Wherever possible, the words used in House Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of the
the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical present Constitution, contending that the term "initiate" does not mean "to file",
terms are employed. and concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment
proceedings against the same officials could not have been violated as the
The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and the 7 Associate
intent of the framers—ratio legis est anima—the object is to ascertain the Justices had not been initiated as the House of Representatives, acting as the
reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular collective body, has yet to act on it.
provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to
construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term
calculated to ef ect that purpose. "initiate".
Section 3 (2), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution
3 ways to file an impeachment complaint:

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1) by a verified complaint for impeachment by any member of the House of of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which
Representatives; or may make the words idle and nugatory.
2) by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any member (of the
House of Representatives); or Therefore, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by
3) by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., along with
Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules (of the 12th 7 Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to
Congress) the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment
complaint filed by Representatives Teodoro, Jr. and Fuentebella against the
Impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated: Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition
1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified against the initiation of impeachment proceedingsagainst the same
complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance; or impeachable officer within a one-year period.
2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on
Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in AMENDMENTS AND REVISIONS
substance; or
3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of 2. MIRIAM DEFENSOR- SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC
Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at G.R No. 127325, March 19, 1997
least 1/3 of the members of the House.
DOCTRINE:
ISSUE: Initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The
How to interpret when there is ambiguity in the provisions of the Constitution. people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or
reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative.
HELD: They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions."
Statutory Construction (of the Constitution)
1. First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the FACTS:
Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of the
terms are employed. We look to the language of the document Movement for People's Initiative, filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend
itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative"
where we begin. citing Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Acting on the petition, the
COMELEC set the case for hearing and directed Delfin to have the petition
2. Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the published. After the hearing the arguments between petitioners and opposing
Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. parties, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their
The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the "memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. On December
Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria
accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 raising
consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose. the following arguments, among others:

3. Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted 1.) That the Constitution can only be amended by people’s initiative if there is
as a whole. It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no an enabling law passed by Congress, to which no such law has yet been
one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be passed; and
considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject
are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great 2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on people’s initiative
purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative.
considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the
Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any ISSUES:
reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together. In other
words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor
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Whether R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by FACTS:
people’s initiative. Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative
petition to change the 1987 Constitution, they filed a petition with the
HELD: COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under RA
NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments 6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support of 6M individuals
to the Constitution. fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition changes
the 1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art
Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals 7 and by adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shift the present bicameral-
to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, presidential form of government to unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC
approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of denied the petition due to lack of enabling law governing initiative petitions and
initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to
resolutions." The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, implement the initiative petitions.
approved or rejected, amended or repealed" denotes that R.A. No. 6735
excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution. ISSUES:
1. Whether or Not the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with
Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the
and for Local Initiative and Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on Constitution through a people’s initiative.
the Constitution. This means that the main thrust of the law is initiative and 2. Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring
referendum on national and local laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended to fully RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and
provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the conditions” to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend
Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the Constitution.
the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of 3. Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more in denying due course to the Lambino Group’s petition.
important than the initiative on national and local laws.
HELD:
While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic
and referendum on national and local laws, it intentionally did not do so on the requirements for conducting a people’s initiative. The Court held that the
system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino
petition.
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is hereby declared void and orders the 1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of
respondent to forthwith dismiss the Delfin Petition . TRO issued on 18 the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People
December 1996 is made permanent. The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be
informed at the time of the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is
“deceptive and misleading” which renders the initiative void.
3. LAMBINO VS. COMELEC 2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
G.R. No. 174153, Oct. 25 2006 Disallowing Revision through Initiatives
The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between
DOCTRINE: “amendment” and “revision, it is intended that the third mode of stated in sec
The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through 2 art 17 of the constitution may propose only amendments to the constitution.
initiative upon a petition” is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by Merging of the legislative and the executive is a radical change, therefore
the people—first, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal, constitutes a revision.
and, second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied 3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
in a petition; The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the
on the face of the petition, or attached to it, and if so attached, the petition present petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply
must state the fact of such attachment. with the constitution before complying with RA 6735

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Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional Respondents assert that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution
provision that allows a people’s initiative to propose amendments to the is merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing
Constitution. This section states: provision and requires implementing legislation(s).
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by
the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of ISSUE:
the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district must be Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10,
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x are self-executing.
x (Emphasis supplied)
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission vividly explain the RULING:
meaning of an amendment “directly proposed by the people through initiative Yes. Sec 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.
upon a petition,” A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article
II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which
is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary
SELF-EXECUTING AND NON-SELF-EXECUTING PROVISIONS or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which
the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
4. MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to
G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997 enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of
the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated
DOCTRINE: as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have
A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.
II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no
or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its
the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.

FACTS:
The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) decided to sell through 5. TONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION VS COURT
public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila OF APPEALS
Hotel (MHC). G.R. No. 167324, July 17, 2007
In a close bidding, two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation
(MPHC), a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC at DOCTRINE:
P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are considered self-
as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per executing, and do not require future legislation for their enforcement. For if
share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law can
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder and the be easily nullified by the inaction of Congress. However, some provisions have
execution of the contracts, the MPHC matched the bid price in a letter to GSIS. already been categorically declared by this Court as non self-executing. Some
MPHC sent a manager’s check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, which GSIS of the constitutional provisions invoked in the present case were taken from
refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has Article II of the Constitution — specifically, Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and
disregarded the tender of the matching bid, MPHC came to the Court on 18 — the provisions of which the Court categorically ruled to be non self-
prohibition and mandamus. executing in the aforecited case of Tañada v. Angara, wherein the Court
Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and specifically set apart the sections as non self-executing and ruled that such
submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and broad principles need legislative enactments before they can be implemented.
has practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of
Philippine heritage and culture. FACTS:
In 1999, the DOH launched the Health Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA). It
provided for five general areas of reform:
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 A. To provide fiscal autonomy to government hospitals; constitutional provisions invoked in the present case were taken from
B. Secure funding for priority public health programs; Article II of the Constitution — specifically, Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13,
C. Promote the development of local health systems and ensure 15 and 18 — the provisions of which the Court categorically ruled to
its effective performance; be non self-executing in the aforecited case of Tañada v. Angara,
D. Strengthen the capacities of health regulatory agencies; wherein the Court specifically set apart the sections as non self-
E. Expand the coverage of the National Health Insurance executing and ruled that such broad principles need legislative
Program (NHIP) enactments before they can be implemented. Moreover, the records
are devoid of any explanation of how the HSRA supposedly violated
On 24 May 1999, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive the equal protection and due process clauses that are embodied in
Order No. 102, entitled “Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution. There were no allegations of
Department of Health,” which provided for the changes in the roles, functions, discrimination or of the lack of due process in connection with the
and organizational processes of the DOH. Under the assailed executive order, HSRA. Since they failed to substantiate how these constitutional
the DOH refocused its mandate from being the sole provider of health services guarantees were breached, petitioners are unsuccessful in
to being a provider of specific health services and technical assistance, as a establishing the relevance of this provision to the petition, and
result of the devolution of basic services to local government units. consequently, in annulling the HSRA.
2. Even granting that these alleged errors were adequately proven by the
A petition for the nullification of the Health Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA) petitioners, they would still not invalidate Executive Order No. 102.
Philippines 1999-2004 of the Department of Health (DOH); and Executive Any serious legal errors in laying down the compensation of the DOH
Order No. 102, “Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department employees concerned can only invalidate the pertinent provisions of
of Health,” Department Circular No. 312, Series of 2000. Likewise, any
questionable appointments or transfers are properly addressed by an
The Court of Appeals ruled that the HSRA cannot be declared void for violating appeal process provided under Administrative Order No. 94, series of
Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 18 of Article II; Section 1 of Article III; Sections 2000; and if the appeal is meritorious, such appointment or transfer
11 and 14 of Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3(2) of Article XV, all of the 1987 may be invalidated. The validity of Executive Order No. 102 would,
Constitution, which directly or indirectly pertain to the duty of the State to nevertheless, remain unaffected. Settled is the rule that courts are not
protect and promote the people’s right to health and well-being. It reasoned at liberty to declare statutes invalid, although they may be abused or
that the aforementioned provisions of the Constitution are not self-executing; disabused, and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of
they are not judicially enforceable constitutional rights and can only provide application. The validity of a statute or ordinance is to be determined
guidelines for legislation. from its general purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end
desired, not from its effects in a particular case. Section 17, Article VII
The Court of Appeals held that Executive Order No. 102 is detrimental to the of the 1987 Constitution, clearly states: “[T]he president shall have
health of the people cannot be made a justiciable issue. The question of control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices.” Section 31,
whether the HSRA will bring about the development or disintegration of the Book III, Chapter 10 of Executive Order No. 292, also known as the
health sector is within the realm of the political department. Administrative Code of 1987. It is an exercise of the President’s
constitutional power of control over the executive department,
ISSUE: supported by the provisions of the Administrative Code, recognized by
Whether the HSRA and EO NO. 102 violates the constitution? other statutes, and consistently affirmed by this Court.

HELD: II. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

The Court finds the present petition to be without merit.
1. As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are considered NATIONAL TERRITORY
self-executing, and do not require future legislation for their
enforcement. For if they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate 6. MAGALLONA v. ERMITA
of the fundamental law can be easily nullified by the inaction of G.R. 187167, August 16, 2011
Congress. However, some provisions have already been categorically
declared by this Court as non self-executing. Some of the
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DOCTRINE: itself commits the Phils.’ continues claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over
UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. it is just a KIG.
codified norm that regulates conduct of States.
Baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by United Nations Convention If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the UNCLOS III:
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) States parties to mark-out specific Art. 47 (3): ‘drawing of basepoints shall not depart to any appreciable extent
basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight from the general configuration of the archipelago’.
or contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not exceed 100 mm.
the maritime zones and continental shelf KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we draw to include them, we’ll breach
the rules: that it should follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.
FACTS:
In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of STATE IMMUNITY
the Philippines as an Archepelagic State pursuant to UNCLOS I of 9158,
codifying the sovereignty of State parties over their territorial sea. Then in 7. CHINA NATIONAL MACHINERY VS.HON. CESAR D. SANTAMARIA
1968, it was amended by R.A. 5446, correcting some errors in R.A. 3046 G.R. No. 185572, February 7, 2012
reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah.
In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with the DOCTRINE:
UNCLOS III of 1984. The requirements complied with are: to shorten one Immunity from Suit; Restrictive Theory; Since the Philippines adheres to the
baseline, to optimize the location of some basepoints and classify KIG and restrictive theory, it is crucial to ascertain the legal nature of the act involved—
Scarborough Shoal as ‘regime of islands’. whether the entity claiming immunity performs governmental, as opposed to
Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main reasons: proprietary, functions.—In JUSMAG v. National Labor Relations Commission,
1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1; 239 SCRA 224 (1994), this Court affirmed the Philippines’ adherence to the
2. it opens the country’s waters to innocent and sea lanes passages hence restrictive theory as follows: The doctrine of state immunity from suit has
undermining our sovereignty and security; and undergone further metamorphosis. The view evolved that the existence of a
3. treating KIG and Scarborough as ‘regime of islands’ would weaken our claim contract does not, per se, mean that sovereign states may, at all times, be
over those territories. sued in local courts. The complexity of relationships between sovereign states,
brought about by their increasing commercial activities, mothered a more
ISSUE: restrictive application of the doctrine. xxx xxx xxx As it stands now, the
Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional? application of the doctrine of immunity from suit has been restricted to
sovereign or governmental activities (jure imperii). The mantle of state
HELD: immunity cannot be extended to commercial, private and proprietary acts (jure
UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. it is just a gestionis).
codified norm that regulates conduct of States. On the other hand, RA 9522 is
a baseline law to mark out basepoints along coasts, serving as geographic FACTS:
starting points to measure. it merely notices the international community of the On 14 September 2002, petitioner China National Machinery & Equipment
scope of our maritime space. Corp. (Group) (CNMEG), represented by its chairperson, Ren Hongbin,
entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the North Luzon Railways
If passages is the issue, domestically, the legislature can enact legislation Corporation (Northrail), represented by its president, Jose L. Cortes, Jr. for the
designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea conduct of a feasibility study on a possible railway line from Manila to San
lanes passages. but in the absence of such, international law norms operate. Fernando, La Union (the Northrail Project).
the fact that for archipelagic states, their waters are subject to both passages On 30 August 2003, the Export Import Bank of China (EXIM Bank) and the
does not place them in lesser footing vis a vis continental coastal states. Department of Finance of the Philippines (DOF) entered into a Memorandum
Moreover, RIOP is a customary international law, no modern state can invoke of Understanding (Aug 30 MOU), wherein China agreed to extend Preferential
its sovereignty to forbid such passage. Buyer’s Credit to the Philippine government to finance the Northrail Project.
The Chinese government designated EXIM Bank as the lender, while the
On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA Philippine government named the DOF as the borrower. Under the Aug 30
3046 and in fact, it increased the Phils.’ total maritime space. Moreover, the MOU, EXIM Bank agreed to extend an amount not exceeding USD
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400,000,000 in favor of the DOF, payable in 20 years, with a 5-year grace HELD:
period, and at the rate of 3% per annum. There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held
On 1 October 2003, the Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines, Wang and firmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a
Chungui (Amb. Wang), wrote a letter to DOF Secretary Jose Isidro Camacho sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of
(Sec. Camacho) informing him of CNMEG’s designation as the Prime another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity
Contractor for the Northrail Project. of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure
On 30 December 2003, Northrail and CNMEG executed a Contract Agreement imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis.
for the construction of Section I, Phase I of the North Luzon Railway System Since the Philippines adheres to the restrictive theory, it is crucial to ascertain
from Caloocan to Malolos on a turnkey basis (the Contract Agreement). The the legal nature of the act involved – whether the entity claiming immunity
contract price for the Northrail Project was pegged at USD 421,050,000. performs governmental, as opposed to proprietary, functions. The restrictive
On 26 February 2004, the Philippine government and EXIM Bank entered into application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of
a counterpart financial agreement – Buyer Credit Loan Agreement No. BLA commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or
04055 (the Loan Agreement). In the Loan Agreement, EXIM Bank agreed to economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to
extend Preferential Buyer’s Credit in the amount of USD 400,000,000 in favor the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its
of the Philippine government in order to finance the construction of Phase I of consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not
the Northrail Project. apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.
On 13 February 2006, respondents filed a Complaint for Annulment of Contract It was CNMEG that initiated the undertaking, and not the Chinese government.
and Injunction with Urgent Motion for Summary Hearing to Determine the The Feasibility Study was conducted not because of any diplomatic gratuity
Existence of Facts and Circumstances Justifying the Issuance of Writs of from or exercise of sovereign functions by the Chinese government but was
Preliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction and/or TRO against plainly a business strategy employed by CNMEG with a view to securing this
CNMEG, the Office of the Executive Secretary, the DOF, the Department of commercial enterprise.
Budget and Management, the National Economic Development Authority and The use of the term “state corporation” to refer to CNMEG was only descriptive
Northrail. RTC Br. 145 issued an Order dated 17 March 2006 setting the case of its nature as a government-owned and/or -controlled corporation, and its
for hearing on the issuance of injunctive reliefs. On 29 March 2006, CNMEG assignment as the Primary Contractor did not imply that it was acting on behalf
filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of this Order. Before RTC Br. 145 of China in the performance of the latter’s sovereign functions. To imply
could rule thereon, CNMEG filed a Motion to Dismiss dated 12 April 2006, otherwise would result in an absurd situation, in which all Chinese corporations
arguing that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over (a) its person, as it was owned by the state would be automatically considered as performing
an agent of the Chinese government, making it immune from suit, and (b) the governmental activities, even if they are clearly engaged in commercial or
subject matter, as the Northrail Project was a product of an executive proprietary pursuits.
agreement. Even assuming arguendo that CNMEG performs governmental functions,
On 15 May 2007, RTC Br. 145 issued an Omnibus Order denying CNMEG’s such claim does not automatically vest it with immunity. This view finds support
Motion to Dismiss and setting the case for summary hearing to determine in Malong v. Philippine National Railways, in which this Court held that
whether the injunctive reliefs prayed for should be issued. CNMEG then filed “immunity from suit is determined by the character of the objects for which the
a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the trial court in an Order entity was organized.”
dated 10 March 2008. Thus, CNMEG filed before the CA a Petition for In the case at bar, it is readily apparent that CNMEG cannot claim immunity
Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary from suit, even if it contends that it performs governmental functions. Its
Injunction dated 4 April 2008. designation as the Primary Contractor does not automatically grant it
In the assailed Decision dated 30 September 2008, the appellate court immunity, just as the term “implementing agency” has no precise definition for
dismissed the Petition for Certiorari. Subsequently, CNMEG filed a Motion for purposes of ascertaining whether GTZ was immune from suit. Although
Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated 5 CNMEG claims to be a government-owned corporation, it failed to adduce
December 2008. evidence that it has not consented to be sued under Chinese law. Thus,
following this Court’s ruling in Deutsche Gesellschaft, in the absence of
ISSUE: evidence to the contrary, CNMEG is to be presumed to be a government-
Whether CNMEG is entitled to immunity, precluding it from being sued before owned and -controlled corporation without an original charter. As a result, it
a local court. has the capacity to sue and be sued under Section 36 of the Corporation Code.

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 An agreement to submit any dispute to arbitration may be construed as an original purpose to facilitate the development of social health insurance by
implicit waiver of immunity from suit. shoring up the national health insurance program and strengthening local
In the United States, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 provides initiatives, as Nicolay had refused to support local partners and new initiatives
for a waiver by implication of state immunity. In the said law, the agreement to on the premise that community and local government unit schemes were not
submit disputes to arbitration in a foreign country is construed as an implicit sustainable a philosophy that supposedly betrayed Nicolay’s lack of
waiver of immunity from suit. Although there is no similar law in the Philippines, understanding of the purpose of the project. This lead to an exchange of letters
there is a reason to apply the legal reasoning behind the waiver in this case. which was interpreted to be the resignation of the private respondents. Private
respondents then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal to the labor arbiter.
8. GERMAN AGENCY FOR TECHNICAL COOPERATION, (GTZ). VS CA GTZ, through counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that the Labor
G.R. No. 152318, April 16, 2009 Arbiter had no jurisdiction over the case, as its acts were undertaken in the
discharge of the governmental functions and sovereign acts of the
DOCTRINE: Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. This was opposed by private
The principle of state immunity from suit, whether a local state or a foreign respondents with the arguments that GTZ had failed to secure a certification
state, is reflected in Section 9, Article XVI of the Constitution, which states that that it was immune from suit from the Department of Foreign Affairs, and that
“the State may not be sued without its consent.” Who or what consists of “the it was GTZ and not the German government which had implemented the
State”? For one, the doctrine is available to foreign States insofar as they are SHINE Project and entered into the contracts of employment. The Labor
sought to be sued in the courts of the local State, necessary as it is to avoid Arbiter issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss. The Order cited,
“unduly vexing the peace of nations. among others, that GTZ was a private corporation which entered into an
FACTS: employment contract; and that GTZ had failed to secure from the DFA a
The governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of the certification as to its diplomatic status. GTZ did not file a motion for
Philippines ratified an Agreement concerning Technical Co-operation reconsideration to the Labor Arbiters Decision or elevate said decision for
(Agreement) in Bonn, West Germany. The Agreement affirmed the countries’ appeal to the NLRC. Instead, GTZ opted to assail the decision by way of a
common interest in promoting the technical and economic development of special civil action for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals. The Court of
their States, and recognized the benefits to be derived by both States from Appeals promulgated a Resolution dismissing GTZs petition, finding that
closer technical co-operation," and allowed for the conclusion of judicial recourse at this stage of the case is uncalled for, the appropriate
"arrangements concerning individual projects of technical co-operation." While remedy of the petitioners being an appeal to the NLRC. Thus, the present
the Agreement provided for a limited term of effective of five (5) years, it petition for review under Rule 45, assailing the decision and resolutions of the
nonetheless was stated that "the Agreement shall be tacitly extended for Court of Appeals and of the Labor Arbiter.
successive periods of one year unless either of the two Contracting Parties
denounces it in writing three months prior to its expiry," and that even upon the ISSUE: Whether GTZ can invoke State immunity from suit.
Agreement’s expiry, its provisions would "continue to apply to any projects
agreed until their completion." On 10 December 1999, the Philippine HELD: NO, GTZ cannot invoke State immunity from suit even if their activities
government, through then Foreign Affairs Secretary Domingo Siazon, and the performed pertaining to SHINE project are government in nature. The principle
German government, agreed to an Arrangement in furtherance of the 1971 of state immunity from suit, whether a local state or a foreign state, is reflected
Agreement, which affirmed the common commitment of both governments to in Section 9, Article XVI of the Constitution, which states that the State may
promote jointly a project called Social Health Insurance Networking and not be sued without its consent. In this case, GTZ’s counsel described GTZ as
Empowerment (SHINE) which was designed to "enable Philippine families the implementing agency of the Government of the Federal Republic of
especially poor ones and to maintain their health and secure health care of Germany, however it does not automatically mean that it has the ability to
sustainable quality." The Republic of Germany assigned the GTZ as the invoke State immunity from suit. They had failed to adduce evidence, a
implementing corporation for the program while the Philippines designated the certification from Department of Foreign Affairs which could have been their
Department of Health and the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation factual basis for its claim of immunity. At the same time, it appears that GTZ
(PHILHEALTH). Private respondents were engaged as contract employees was actually organized not through a legislative public charter, but under
hired by GTZ to work for SHINE. But in September of 1999, Anne Nicolay private law, in the same way that Philippine corporations can be organized
(Nicolay), a Belgian national, assumed the post of SHINE Project Manager. under the Corporation Code even if fully owned by the Philippine government.
Private respondents' had a misunderstanding with the Project Manager of The apparent equivalent under Philippine law is that of a corporation organized
SHINE. It was claimed that SHINE under Nicolay had veered away from its under the Corporation Code but owned by the Philippine government, or a
8
government-owned or controlled corporation (GOCC) without original charter. Petition for certiorari, prohibition and preliminary injunction
And it bears notice that Section 36 of the Corporate Code states that every
corporation incorporated under this Code has the power and capacity to sue ISSUES:
and be sued in its corporate name. The Court is thus holds and so rules that 1. Whether the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion
GTZ consistently has been unable to establish with satisfaction that it enjoys amounting to lack of jurisdiction
the immunity from suit generally enjoyed by its parent country, the Federal 2. Whether the petitioners were acting officially or only in their private
Republic of Germany. The nature of the acts performed by the entity invoking capacities when they did the acts where they are sued for damages.
immunity remains the most important barometer for testing whether the
privilege of State immunity from suit should apply. At the same time, our HELD:
Constitution stipulates that a State immunity from suit is conditional on its 1. Since the facts lead to that the petitioners are acting in the discharge
withholding of consent; hence, the laws and circumstances pertaining to the of their official duties, the petitioners are being sued as gov’t. Officials
creation and legal personality of an instrumentality or agency invoking of USA. If the trial will proceed damages will not be on the petitioner’s
immunity remain relevant. Consent to be sued, as exhibited in this decision, is personal capacity but of the petitioner’s principal. The USA
often conferred by the very same statute or general law creating the government. thus making the action a suit against that government
instrumentality or agency without its consent. The government of the United States has not given
its consent to be sued for the official acts of the petitioners, who cannot
satisfy any judgment that may be rendered against them
9. SANDERS VS. VERIDIANO II 2. It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the
No. L-46930 | 1988, June 10 petitioners are sued by are acts in the discharge of their official duties.
Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA
DOCTRINE: had supervision of its personnel and matters relating to their work and
It is stressed at the outset that the mere allegation that a government employment. As for Moreau, what he is claimed to have done was
functionary is being sued in his personal capacity will not automatically remove write the Chief of Naval Personnel for concurrence with the conversion
him from the protection of the law of public officers and, if appropriate, the of the private respondent’s type of employment even before the
doctrine of state immunity. By the same token, the mere invocation of official grievance proceedings had even commenced.
character will not suffice to insulate him from suability and liability for an act
imputed to him as a personal tort committed without or in excess of his 10. UP V. DIZON
authority. G.R. NO. 171182; AUGUST 23, 2012

FACTS: DOCTRINE:
Petitioner Sanders was then the special services director of the U.S. Naval Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the
Station (NAVSTA) in Olongapo City. Petitioner Moreau was the commanding applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is
officer of the Subic Naval Base, which includes the said station. Private suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can
respondents were American citizens with permanent address in the Phil and never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not
were both game room attendants of the NAVSTA. conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When
Herein respondents were then advised that there employment was changed the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the
from permanent full time to permanent part-time. They filed a case of the US chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.
Dept. of Defense then was gave a recommendation for their reinstatement.
The controversy of the case was when Sanders sent a letter to Moreau that he FACTS:
disagrees with the recommendation. Because of the letters private University of the Philippines (UP) entered into a General Construction
respondents filed a case with CFI of Zambales, the plaintiffs claim that the Agreement with respondent Stern Builders Corporation (Stern Builders) for the
letters contains libelous content and has caused them the prejudgment of the construction and renovation of the buildings in the campus of the UP in
grievance proceedings. Los Bas. UP was able to pay its first and second billing. However, the third
The lower court ruled that the defendants acted maliciously and in bad faith. billing worth P273,729.47 was not paid due to its disallowance by the
Motion to lift the default order and motion for reconsideration of the denial on Commission on Audit (COA). Thus, Stern Builders sued the UP to collect the
the motion to dismiss which was subsequently denied by the respondent court. unpaid balance.
9
 They include the income accruing from the use of real property ceded to the
On November 28, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision ordering UP to pay UP that may be spent only for the attainment of its institutional objectives.
Stern Builders. Then on January 16, 2002, the UP filed its motion for
reconsideration. The RTC denied the motion. The denial of the said motion A marked distinction exists between suability of the State and its liability. As
was served upon Atty. Felimon Nolasco (Atty.Nolasco) of the UPLB Legal the Court succinctly stated in Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme:
Office on May 17, 2002. Notably, Atty. Nolasco was not the counsel of record A distinction should first be made between suability and liability. "Suability
of the UP but the OLS inDiliman, Quezon City. depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law
and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not
Thereafter, the UP filed a notice of appeal on June 3, 2002. However, the RTC necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable
denied due course to the notice of appeal for having been filed out of time. On if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact
October 4, 2002, upon motion of Stern Builders, the RTC issued the writ of that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its
execution. sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can,
that the defendant is liable.
On appeal, both the CA and the High Court denied UPs petition. The denial
became final and executory. Hence, Stern Builders filed in the RTC its motion The Constitution strictly mandated that "no money shall be paid out of the
for execution despite their previous motion having already been granted and Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." The execution
despite the writ of execution having already issued. On June 11, 2003, the of the monetary judgment against the UP was within the primary jurisdiction of
RTC granted another motion for execution filed on May 9, 2003 (although the the COA. It was of no moment that a final and executory decision already
RTC had already issued the writ of execution on October 4, 2002). validated the claim against the UP.
Consequently, the sheriff served notices of garnishment to the UPs depositary
banks and the RTC ordered the release of the funds. 11. BERMOY v. PHILIPPINE NORMAL COLLEGE
G.R. L-8670 (May 18, 1956
Aggrieved, UP elevated the matter to the CA. The CA sustained the
RTC. Hence, this petition. DOCTRINE:
The Philippine Normal College has a juridical personality of its own, but
ISSUES: contends that, as it is an Instrumentality of government for the
Whether UP's funds validly garnished? discharge of state functions, it may not be sued without the consent of
the state. The answer to that contention is that the state has already
HELD: given that consent by investing the College with the express power to be
UP's funds, being government funds, are not subject to garnishment. sued in courts That the Act Authorizes the College to be sued is also
(Garnishment of public funds; suability vs. liability of the State) made clear in section 6, where it is provided that "all process against
the Board of Trustees shall be served on the President or secretary
Despite its establishment as a body corporate, the UP remains to be a thereof,".
"chartered institution" performing a legitimate government function. FACTS:
Irrefragably, the UP is a government instrumentality, performing the States
constitutional mandate of promoting quality and accessible education. As a On July 6, 1954, (24) twenty four employees from its dormitory known as
government instrumentality, the UP administers special funds sourced from Normal Hall of the Philippine Normal College, filled an action in the Court of
the fees and income enumerated under Act No. 1870 and Section 1 of First Instance of Manila against the PNC for the recovery of salary differentials
Executive Order No. 714, and from the yearly appropriations, to achieve the and overtime pay. The Solicitor General on behalf of the defendant answers
purposes laid down by Section 2 of Act 1870, as expanded in Republic Act No. and denies the latter liability. The court ordered it dismissed before the case
9500. All the funds going into the possession of the UP, including any interest was tried on the merits, on the ground that neither one of the defendants was
accruing from the deposit of such funds in any banking institution, constitute a a corporation or a juridical entity with capacity to be sued. The plaintiffs took
"special trust fund," the disbursement of which should always be aligned with an appeal to Supreme Court, alleging that it was an error to dismiss their case
the UPs mission and purpose, and should always be subject to auditing by the on the ground that, R.A. No. 416 took effect July, 1949 converted PNS to PNC,
COA. The funds of the UP are government funds that are public in character. thus created a Board of Trustees to administer the affairs as a corporation

10
under section 13 of the amended Act 1455 (Corporate Law), with the power a corporation the state divests itself so far of its sovereign character, and by
“to sue and to be sued in any court.” implication consents to suits against the corporation.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
The National Airports Corporation was organized under Republic Act No. 224,
Whether the PNC as a government corporation can be sued. which expressly made the provisions of the Corporation Law applicable to the
HELD: said corporation. It was abolished by Executive Order No. 365 and to take its
place the Civil Aeronautics Administration was created.
Yes. Republic Act No. 416, which took effect In July., 1949, converted the old
Philippine Normal School into the present Philippine Normal College and Before the abolition, the Philippine Airlines, Inc. paid to the National Airports
endowed it with the "general powers set out In section thirteen of Act Corporation P65,245 as fees for landing and parking for the period up to and
Numbered Fourteen hundred and fifty-nine, as amended" (Corporation Law)., including July 31, 1948. These fees are said to have been due and payable to
entrusting Its government and the administration of its affairs to a board of the Capitol Subdivision, Inc., who owned the land used by the National Airports
trustees therein created, which was to exercise for It "all the powers of a Corporation as airport. The owner commenced an action in the court against
corporation as provided in (said) section," and in particular, "to administer and the Philippine Airlines, Inc.
appropriate the funds of Normal Hill and to supervise and control its income The Philippine Airlines, Inc. countered with a third-party complaint against the
and expenses, all provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding." National Airports Corporation, which by that time had been dissolved, and
One of the powers specifically enumerated in the said section. 13 of the served summons on the Civil Aeronautics Administration. The third party
Corporation Law is the power "to sue and be sued in any.court." With plaintiff alleged that it had paid to the National Airports Corporation the fees
this express grant of power, we don't see how it could be doubted that the claimed by the Capitol Subdivision, Inc. “on the belief and assumption that the
Philippine Normal College could be made a defendant in a suit in court. third party defendant was the lessee of the lands subject of the complaint and
that the third party defendant and its predecessors in interest were the
The Solicitor General admits that the Philippine Normal College has a juridical operators and maintainers of said airport and, further, that the third party
personality of its own, but contends that, as it is an Instrumentality of defendant would pay to the landowners, particularly the Capitol Subdivision,
government for the discharge of state functions, it may not be sued without Inc., the reasonable rentals for the use of their lands.”
the consent of the state. The answer to that contention is that the state
has already given that consent by investing the College with the express The Solicitor General, after answering the third party complaint, filed a motion
power to be sued in courts That the Act Authorizes the College to be to dismiss on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the third-
sued is also made clear in section 6, where it is provided that "all process party complaint, first, because the National Airports Corporation “has lost its
against the Board of Trustees shall be served on the President or secretary juridical personality,” and, second, because agency of the Republic of the
thereof,". Philippines, unincorporated and not possessing juridical personality under the
law, is incapable of suing and being sued
ISSUE:
12. NATIONAL AIRPORTS CORPORATION v. TEODORO
G.R. No. L-5122, April 30, 1952 Whether or not the Civil Aeronautics Administration should be regarded as
engaged in private functions and therefore subject to suit.
DOCTRINE: HELD:
Suits against state agencies with relation to matters in which they have
assumed to act in private or nongovernment capacity, and various suits Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the Civil Aeronautics Administration comes
against certain corporations created by the state for public purposes, but to under the category of a private entity. Although not a body corporate it was
engage in matters partaking more of the nature of ordinary business rather created, like the National Airports Corporation, not to maintain a necessary
than functions of a governmental or political character, are not regarded as function of government, but to run what is essentially a business, even if
suits against the state. The Latter is true, although the state may own stock or revenues be not its prime objective but rather the promotion of travel and the
property of such a corporation for by engaging in business operations through convenience of the traveling public. It is engaged in an enterprise which, far

11
from being the exclusive prerogative of state, may, more than the construction employees of the Bureau of Printing, particularly, the members of the
of public roads, be undertaken by private concerns. complaining association petition, in their exercise of their right to self-
organization by “discriminating in regard to hire and tenure of their employment
In the light of a well-established precedents, and as a matter of simple justice in order to discourage them from pursuing the union activities.”
to the parties who dealt with the National Airports Corporation on the faith of
equality in the enforcement of their mutual commitments, the Civil Aeronautics The petitioners denied the charges. Their affirmative defense were the
Administration may not, and should not, claim for itself the privileges and following: the respondents were suspended for breach of Civil Service rules
immunities of the sovereign state. and regulations petitions; the Bureau of Printing has no juridical personality to
sue and be sued; the Bureau of Printing is not an industrial concern engaged
Not all government entities, whether corporate or non corporate, are immune for the purpose of gain but is an agency of the Republic performing
from suits. The power to sue and be sued is implied from the power to transact government functions. They petitioned for the dismissal of the case for lack of
private business. And if it has the power to sue and be sued on its behalf, the jurisdiction. They filed an Omnibus Motion, or a legal examination, before the
Civil Aeronautics Administration with greater reason should have the power to hearing of the case in the Industrial Court. It was granted, but after the hearing,
prosecute and defend suits for and against the National Airports Corporation, the theory of the court that that the functions of the Bureau of Printing are
having acquired all the properties, funds and choses in action and assumed "exclusively proprietary in nature" is maintained. Therefore, their prayer of
all the liabilities of the latter. The rule is thus stated in Corpus Juris: case dismissal was denied. Reconsideration was also denied. As an effect,
Suits against state agencies with relation to matters in which they have the petitioners brought the case to the Supreme Court through the present
assumed to act in private or nongovernment capacity, and various suits petition for certiorari and prohibition.
against certain corporations created by the state for public purposes, but to ISSUE:
engage in matters partaking more of the nature of ordinary business rather
than functions of a governmental or political character, are not regarded as Whether the Bureau of Printing may be sued.
suits against the state. The Latter is true, although the state may own stock or
property of such a corporation for by engaging in business operations through HELD:
a corporation the state divests itself so far of its sovereign character, and by No. The Bureau of Printing receives outside private printing jobs from time to
implication consents to suits against the corporation. time (only 0.5% of their overall job), imposes overtime work with pay on their
employees when needed, but since its function is to meet the printing needs
of the Government, it is chiefly a service bureau, not a business with an aim to
13. BUREAU OF PRINTING v. THE BUREAU OF PRINTING EMPLOYEES gain monetary profit. It is not fully proprietary in nature. In relation to this, the
ASSOCIATION Industrial Court has no jurisdiction in taking over the case as it is not an
G.R. No. L-15751, January 28, 1961 industrial or a business organization. Therefore, the Bureau of Printing cannot
be sued. A suit, action or proceeding against it, would actually be a suit, action
DOCTRINE: or proceeding against the Government itself, and the Government cannot be
As an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical personality, sued without its consent, much less over its objection, according to the Sec. 1,
the BOP cannot be sued. Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to Rule 3, Rules of Court.
produce any effect, would actually be a suit, action or proceeding against the
Government itself, and the rule is settled that the Government cannot be sued The case was proven to be a result of the charges against some officers of the
without its consent, much less over its jurisdiction. respondent Bureau of Printing Employees' Association by the Acting Secretary
of General Services due to “insubordination, grave misconduct and acts
prejudicial to public service committed by inciting the employees, of the Bureau
FACTS: of Printing to walk out of their jobs against the order of the duly constituted
officials.” The head may take responsibility in investigating administrative
The Bureau of Printing Employees Association (NLU) PacificoAdvincula, charges against erring employees.
Roberto Mendoza, PoncianoArganda and TeoduloToleran filed a complaint
against petitioners Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador, the Acting Secretary
of the Department of General Services, and Mariano Ledesma the Director of
the Bureau of Printing due to the unfair labor practices by interfering with 14. SHELL PHILIPPINES CORPORATION v. JALOS
12
 G.R. No. 179918, September 8, 2010 No. Shell cannot invoke state immunity because it is not an agent of the
Republic of the Philippines. It is just a service contractor for the exploration
and development of one of the country’s natural gas reserves. While the
DOCTRINE: Republic appointed Shell as the exclusive party to conduct petroleum
Shell cannot invoke state immunity because it is not an agent of the Republic operations in the Camago-Malampayo area under the State’s full control and
of the Philippines.While the Republic appointed Shell as the exclusive party to supervision, it does not follow that Shell has become the State’s “agent” within
conduct petroleum operations in the Camago-Malampayo area under the the meaning of the law.
State’s full control and supervision, it does not follow that Shell has become An agent is a person who binds himself to render some service or to do
the State’s “agent” within the meaning of the law. something in representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or
An agent is a person who binds himself to render some service or to do authority of the latter. The Essence of an agency is the agent’s ability to
something in representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or represent his principal and bring about business relations between the latter
authority of the latter. The Essence of an agency is the agent’s ability to and third persons.
represent his principal and bring about business relations between the latter Shell’s primary obligation under the Service Contract 38 is not to represent the
and third persons. Philippine government for the purpose of transacting business with third
FACTS: persons, rather, its contractual commitment is to develop and manage
petroleum operations on behalf of the state. Hence, Shell is not an agent of
Petitioner Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. and the Republic of the the Philippine government but a provider of services, technology and financing
Philippines entered into Service Contract 38 for the exploration and extraction for the Malampaya Natural Gas Project; it is not immune from suit and it may
of petroleum in northwestern Palawan. Two years later, Shell discovered be sued for claims even without the State’s consent. And as evident in the
natural gas in the Camago-Malampaya area and pursued its development of stipulations agreed upon by the parties under Service Contract 38, the State
the well under the Malampaya Natural Gas Project. This entailed the recognized that Shell could be sued in relation to the project.
construction and installation of a pipeline, which spanned 504 kms. and
crossed the Oriental Mindoro Sea, from Shell’s production platform to its gas 15. REPUBLIC v. PURISIMA
processing plant in Batangas. On May 19, 2003, respondents, 78 individuals, DOCTRINE: The consent to be sued, to be effective must come from the State
claiming that they were all subsistence fishermen from the coastal barangay thru a statute, not through any agreement made by counsel for the Rice and
of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro, filed a complaint for damages against Shell on Corn Administration.Apparently respondent Judge was misled by the terms of
the ground that their livelihood was adversely affected the construction and the contract between the private respondent, plaintiff in his sala, and defendant
operation of Shell’s natural gas pipeline. Shell moved for dismissal of the Rice and Corn Administration which, according to him, anticipated the case of
complaint alleging that the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), not the trial a breach of contract within the parties and the suits that may thereafter arise.
court, has primary jurisdiction over pollution cases and actions for related The consent, to be effective though, must come from the State acting through
damages and that it could not be sued pursuant to the doctrine of state a duly enacted statute as pointed out by Justice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus,
immunity without the State’s consent on the basis that it merely serves as an whatever counsel for defendant Rice and Corn Administration agreed to had
agent of the Philippine government in the development of the Malampaya gas no binding force on the government. That was clearly beyond the scope of his
reserves through Service Contract 38. authority.
The RTC dismissed the complaint ruling that it should be brought first to the FACTS: On September 7, 1972, a motion to dismiss was filed by defendant
PAB. CA reversed RTC’s order upon respondent’s petition for certiorari. Shell Rice and Corn Administration in a pending civil suit in the sala of respondent
moved for reconsideration of the CA’s decision but the same was denied. Judge for the collection of a money claim arising from an alleged breach of
Hence, Shell filed this petition for review. contract, the plaintiff being private respondent Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc.
ISSUE: At that time, the leading case of Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. v. Customs
Arrastre Service, where Justice Bengzon stressed the lack of jurisdiction of a
Whether the suit is barred under the doctrine of state immunity. court to pass on the merits of a claim against any office or entity acting as part
of the machinery of the national government unless consent be shown, had
RULING: been applied in 53 other decisions. Respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima of
13
the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the motion to dismiss dated 16. AMIGABLE v. CUENCA
October 4, 1972. Hence, the petition for certiorari and prohibition.
DOCTRINE: Where the government takes away property from a private
ISSUE: Whether or not an agreement between the Rice and Corn landowner for public use without going through the legal process of
Administration and Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc. operate as a waiver of the expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a
national government from suit suit against the government without violating the doctrine of governmental
immunity from suit.
HELD: No. The position of the Republic has been fortified with the explicit
affirmation found in this provision of the present Constitution: "The State may The doctrine of immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for
not be sued without its consent." perpetrating an injustice to a citizen. The only relief available is for the
government to make due compensation which it could and should have done
The doctrine of non-suability recognized in this jurisdiction even prior to the years ago. To determine just compensation of the land, the basis should be
effectivity of the [1935] Constitution is a logical corollary of the positivist the price or value at the time of the taking.
concept of law which, to para-phrase Holmes, negates the assertion of any
legal right as against the state, in itself the source of the law on which such a FACTS: The appellant Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of Lot No.
right may be predicated. Nor is this all, even if such a principle does give rise 639 of the Banilad Estate in Cebu City as shown by Transfer Certificate of Title
to problems, considering the vastly expanded role of government enabling it No. T-18060 issued to her by the Register of Deeds of Cebu on February 1,
to engage in business pursuits to promote the general welfare, it is not 1924. No annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in the
obeisance to the analytical school of thought alone that calls for its continued property appears at the back of the certificate.
applicability. Nor is injustice thereby cause private parties. They could still
proceed to seek collection of their money claims by pursuing the statutory Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion
remedy of having the Auditor General pass upon them subject to appeal to of said lot, with an area of 6,167 square meters, for the construction of the
judicial tribunals for final adjudication. We could thus correctly conclude as we Mango and Gorordo Avenues. It appears that said avenues already existed in
did in the cited Providence Washington Insurance decision: "Thus the doctrine 1921, the tracing of said roads began in 1924, and the formal construction in
of non-suability of the government without its consent, as it has operated in 1925.
practice, hardly lends itself to the charge that it could be the fruitful parent of On March 27, 1958, Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines,
injustice, considering the vast and ever-widening scope of state activities at requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had been appropriated by
present being undertaken. Whatever difficulties for private claimants may still the government. On December 9, 1958, The claim was indorsed to the Auditor
exist, is, from an objective appraisal of all factors, minimal. In the balancing of General, who disallowed it in his 9th Indorsement. A copy of said indorsement
interests, so unavoidable in the determination of what principles must prevail was transmitted to Amigable's counsel by the Office of the President. On
if government is to satisfy the public weal, the verdict must be, as it has been February 6, 1959, Amigable filed in the court a quo a complaint, which was
these so many years, for its continuing recognition as a fundamental postulate later amended on April 17, 1959 upon motion of the defendants, against the
of constitutional law. Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca for the recovery of ownership
The consent to be sued, to be effective must come from the State thru a and possession of the 6,167 sq. m. of land traversed by the Mango and
statute, not through any agreement made by counsel for the Rice and Corn Gorordo Avenues. She also sought the payment of compensatory damages
Administration.Apparently respondent Judge was misled by the terms of the for the illegal occupation of her land, moral damages, attorney's fees and the
contract between the private respondent, plaintiff in his sala, and defendant costs of the suit.
Rice and Corn Administration which, according to him, anticipated the case of The defendants filed a joint answer denying the material allegations of the
a breach of contract within the parties and the suits that may thereafter arise. complaint and interposing, among others, that the suit against the
The consent, to be effective though, must come from the State acting through Government, the claim for moral damages, attorney's fees and costs had no
a duly enacted statute as pointed out by Justice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus, valid basis since as the Government had not given its consent to be sued.
whatever counsel for defendant Rice and Corn Administration agreed to had
no binding force on the government. That was clearly beyond the scope of his On July 29, 1959, the court rendered its decision holding that it had no
authority. jurisdiction over the plaintiff's cause of action for the recovery of possession
and ownership of the portion of her lot in question on the ground that the
government cannot be sued without its consent; that it had neither original nor
14
appellate jurisdiction to hear, try and decide plaintiff's claim for compensatory postulate of non-suability cannot stand in the way. It is made to accommodate
damages in the sum of P50,000.00, the same being a money claim against itself to the demands of procedural due process, which is the negation of
the government; and that the claim for moral damages had long prescribed, arbitrariness and inequity. The government, in the final analysis, is the
nor did it have jurisdiction over said claim because the government had not beneficiary. It thereby manifests its adherence to the highest ethical standards,
given its consent to be sued. which can only be ignored at the risk of losing the confidence of the people,
the repository of the sovereign power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the suit is barred under the doctrine of state immunity
FACTS: On August 9, 1976, Ildefonso Santiago through his counsel filed an
RULING: Yes. Considering that no annotation in favor of the government action for revocation of a Deed of Donation executed by him and his spouse
appears at the back of her certificate of title and that she has not executed any in January of 1971, with the Bureau of Plant Industry as the Donee, in the
deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government, the appellant Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City. Mr. Santiago alleged that the
remains the owner of the whole lot. Bureau, contrary to the terms of donation, failed to install lighting facilities and
In a similar case involving a claim for payment of the value of a portion of land water system on the property and to build an office building and parking lot
used for the widening of the Gorordo Avenue in Cebu City (Ministerio vs. Court thereon which should have been constructed and ready for occupancy on
of First Instance of Cebu), this Court, through Mr. Justice Enrique M. before December7, 1974. That because of the circumstances, Mr. Santiago
Fernando, held that where the government takes away property from a private concluded that he was exempt from compliance with an explicit constitutional
landowner for public use without going through the legal process of command, as invoked in the Santos v Santos case, a 1952 decision which is
expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a similar. The Court of First Instance dismissed the action in favor of the
suit against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of respondent on the ground that the state cannot be sued without its consent,
governmental immunity from suit without its consent. and Santos v Santos case is discernible. The Solicitor General, Estelito P.
Mendoza affirmed the dismissal on ground of constitutional mandate.
Since restoration of possession of said portion by the government is neither Ildefonso Santiago filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.
convenient nor feasible at this time because it is now and has been used for
road purposes, the only relief available is for the government to make due ISSUE: Whether or not the State can be sued without its consent
compensation which it could and should have done years ago. To determine HELD: No. This is not to deny the obstacle posed by the constitutional
the due compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or value provision. It is expressed in language plain and unmistakable: "The State may
thereof at the time of the taking. not be sued without its consent. The Republic cannot be proceeded against
Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for unless it allows itself to be sued. Neither can a department, bureau, agency,
public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or office, or instrumentality of the government where the suit may result "in
negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the adverse consequences to the public treasury, whether in the disbursements of
government without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit. funds or loss of property.”

The doctrine of immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for Petitioner's counsel invoked Santos v. Santos, a 1952 decision. A more
perpetrating an injustice to a citizen. The only relief available is for the thorough analysis ought to have cautioned him against reliance on such a
government to make due compensation which it could and should have done case. It was therein clearly pointed out that the government entity involved was
years ago. To determine just compensation of the land, the basis should be originally the National Airports Corporation. Thereafter, it "was abolished by
the price or value at the time of the taking. Executive Order No. 365, series of 1950, and in its place and stead the Civil
Aeronautics Administration was created and took over all the assets and
assumed all the liabilities of the abolished corporation. The Civil Aeronautics
Administration, even if it is not a juridical entity, cannot legally prevent a party
17. SANTIAGO v. REPUBLIC or parties from enforcing their proprietary rights under the cloak or shield of
lack of juridical personality, because to took over all the powers and assumed
DOCTRINE: Our decision, it must be emphasized, goes no further than to rule
all the obligations of the defunct corporation which had entered into the
that a donor, with the Republic or any of its agency being the donee, is entitled
contract in question."
to go to court in case of an alleged breach of the conditions of such donation.
He has the right to be heard. Under the circumstances, the fundamental

15
The reliance on Santos v. Santos as a prop for this petition having failed, it agreeing to pay the balance in instalments. To secure the payment of the
would ordinarily follow that this suit cannot prosper. Nonetheless, as set forth balance of the purchase price, he executed a chattel mortgage of said vessel
at the outset, there is a novel aspect that suffices to call for a contrary in favor of the Shipping Commission. For various reasons, among them the
conclusion. It would be manifestly unfair for the Republic, as donee, alleged to non-payment of the installments, the Shipping Commission tool possession of
have violated the conditions under which it received gratuitously certain said vessel and considered the contract of sale cancelled. The Shipping
property, thereafter to put as a barrier the concept of non-suitability. That would Commission chartered and delivered said vessel to the defendant-appellant
be a purely one-sided arrangement offensive to one's sense of justice. Such Pan Oriental Shipping Co. subject to the approval of the President of the
conduct, whether proceeding from an individual or governmental agency, is to Philippines. Plaintiff appealed the action of the Shipping Commission to the
be condemned. As a matter of fact, in case it is the latter that is culpable, the President of the Philippines and, in its meeting the Cabinet restored him to all
affront to decency is even more manifest. The government, to paraphrase his rights under his original contract with the Shipping Commission. Plaintiff
Justice Brandeis, should set the example. If it is susceptible to the charge of had repeatedly demanded from the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. the possession
having acted dishonorably, then it forfeits public trust-and rightly so. of the vessel in question but the latter refused to do so.
Fortunately, the constitutional provision itself snows a waiver. Where there is Plaintiff, prayed that, upon the approval of the bond accompanying his
consent, a suit may be filed. Consent need not be express. It can be implied. complaint, a writ of replevin be issued for the seizure of said vessel with all its
equipment and appurtenances, and that after hearing, he be adjudged to have
Our decision, it must be emphasized, goes no further than to rule that a donor, the rightful possession thereof . The lower court issued the writ of replevin
with the Republic or any of its agency being the donee, is entitled to go to court prayed for by Froilan and by virtue thereof the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. was
in case of an alleged breach of the conditions of such donation. He has the divested of its possession of said vessel.
right to be heard. Under the circumstances, the fundamental postulate of non-
suability cannot stand in the way. It is made to accommodate itself to the Pan Oriental protested to this restoration of Plaintiff ‘s rights under the contract
demands of procedural due process, which is the negation of arbitrariness and of sale, for the reason that when the vessel was delivered to it, the Shipping
inequity. The government, in the final analysis, is the beneficiary. It thereby Administration had authority to dispose of said authority to the property,
manifests its adherence to the highest ethical standards, which can only be Plaintiff having already relinquished whatever rights he may have thereon.
ignored at the risk of losing the confidence of the people, the repository of the Plaintiff paid the required cash of P10,000.00 and as Pan Oriental refused to
sovereign power. The judiciary under this circumstance has the grave surrender possession of the vessel, he filed an action to recover possession
responsibility of living up to the ideal of objectivity and impartiality, the very thereof and have him declared the rightful owner of said property. The
essence of the rule of law. Only by displaying the neutrality expected of an Republic of the Philippines was allowed to intervene in said civil case praying
arbiter, even if it happens to be one of the departments of a litigant, can the for the possession of the in order that the chattel mortgage constituted thereon
decision arrived at, whatever it may be, command respect and be entitled to may be foreclosed.
acceptance.
ISSUE: Whether or not the suit is barred under the doctrine of state immunity
RULING: No. The other ground for dismissing the defendant's counterclaim is
18. FROILAN v. PAN ORIENTAL SHIPPING that the State is immune from suit. This is untenable, because by filing its
complaint in intervention the Government in effect waived its right of
DOCTRINE: The immunity of the state from suits does not deprive it of the nonsuability.
right to sue private parties in its own courts. The state as plaintiff may avail
itself of the different forms of actions open to private litigants. In short, by taking The immunity of the state from suits does not deprive it of the right to sue
the initiative in an action against a private party, the state surrenders its private parties in its own courts. The state as plaintiff may avail itself of the
privileged position and comes down to the level of the defendant. The latter different forms of actions open to private litigants. In short, by taking the
automatically acquires, within certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims initiative in an action against a private party, the state surrenders its privileged
and other defenses he might have against the state. position and comes down to the level of the defendant. The latter automatically
acquires, within certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims and other
FACTS: Plaintiff, Fernando Froilan filed a complaint against the defendant- defenses he might have against the state. The United States Supreme Court
appellant, Pan Oriental Shipping Co., alleging that he purchased from the thus explains:
Shipping Commission the vessel for P200,000, paying P50,000 down and

16
"No direct suit can be maintained against the United States. But when an appearance for the purpose only of questioning the jurisdiction of this court
action is brought by the United States to recover money in the hands of a party over the complaint being acts and omissions of the individual defendants as
who has a legal claim against them, it would be a very rigid principle to deny agents of defendant United States of America, a foreign sovereign which has
to him the right of setting up such claim in a court of justice, and turn him not given her consent to this suit or any other suit for the causes of action
around to an application to Congress." (Sinco, Philippine Political Law, Tenth asserted in the complaint.
Ed., pp. 36-37, citing U. S. vs. Ringgold, 8 Pet. 150, 8 L. ed. 899.)
ISSUE: Whether or not the suit is barred under the doctrine of state immunity
It is however, contended for the intervenor that, if there was at all any waiver,
it was in favor of the plaintiff against whom the complaint in intervention was HELD: Yes. The United States cannot be sued. The traditional rule of State
directed. This contention is untenable. As already stated, the complaint in immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State
intervention was in a sense in derogation of the defendant's claim over the without its consent or waiver. It is however contended that when a sovereign
possession of the vessel in question. state enters into a contract with a private person, the state can be sued upon
the theory that it has descended to the level of an individual from which it can
19. UNITED STATES v. RUIZ be implied that it has given its consent to be sued under the contract. Stated
differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual
DOCTRINE: The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when
sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. It is however it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates
contended that when a sovereign state enters into a contract with a private to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an
person, the state can be sued upon the theory that it has descended to the integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the
level of an individual from which it can be implied that it has given its consent United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government
to be sued under the contract. Stated differently, a State may be said to have of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or
descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly business purposes.
given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does
not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. The correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a
contract by a State but the legal nature of the act is shown in Syquia vs. Lopez.
FACTS: Sometime in May 1972, the United States organized an auction by In that case the plaintiffs leased three apartment buildings to the United States
invitation for the repair of its equipment and facilities in at the US Naval Station of America for the use of its military officials. The plaintiffs sued to recover
Subic Bay in Zambales, which was one of those provided in the Military Bases possession of the premises on the ground that the term of the leases had
Agreement between the Philippines and the US. expired. They also asked for increased rentals until the apartments shall have
Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. been vacated. The Court decided that the “US Government has not, given its
Subsequent thereto, the company received from the United States two consent to the filing of this suit which is essentially against her, though not in
telegrams requesting it to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its name. Moreover, this is not only a case of a citizen filing a suit against his own
bonding company; the company, thereby, complied. In June 1972, the Government without the latter's consent but it is of a citizen filing an action
company received a letter which was signed by Wilham I. Collins, Director for against a foreign government without said government's consent, which
Contracts Division of the Navy Department of US, saying that the company did renders more obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of his country.”
not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its previous In Syquia, the United States concluded contracts with private individuals but
unsatisfactory performance on a repair contract and that the projects had been the contracts notwithstanding the US was not deemed to have given or waived
awarded to third parties. its consent to be sued for the reason that the contracts were for jure imperii
The company sued the US and its officers in the US Navy who were and not for jure gestionis.
responsible for rejecting their services to order the defendants in allowing the 20. REPUBLIC v. VILLASOR
company to perform the work for the projects, and in the event that specific
performance was no longer possible, to order the defendants to pay the DOCTRINE: The provision of Sec 3 Article XVI declares that “the State may
damages. The company also asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary not be sued without its consent”. This provision is merely a recognition of the
injunction to restrain the defendants from entering into contracts with third sovereign character of the State and express an affirmation of the unwritten
parties for work on the projects. The defendants entered their special rule insulating it from the jurisdiction of the courts of justice. Another

17
justification is the practical consideration that the demands and be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The
inconveniences of litigation will divert time and resources of the State from the functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be
more pressing matters demanding its attention, to the prejudice of the public paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate
welfare. and specific objects, as appropriated by law.
FACTS: The case was filed by the Republic of the Philippines requesting to The provision of Sec 3 Article XVI declares that “the State may not be sued
nullify the ruling of The Court of First Instance in Cebu in garnishing the public without its consent”. This provision is merely a recognition of the sovereign
funds allocated for the Arm Forces of the Philippines. character of the State and express an affirmation of the unwritten rule
insulating it from the jurisdiction of the courts of justice. Another justification is
A decision was rendered in Special Proceedings in favor of respondents P. J. the practical consideration that the demands and inconveniences of litigation
Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction Corporation, will divert time and resources of the State from the more pressing matters
and against the petitioner herein, confirming the arbitration award in the demanding its attention, to the prejudice of the public welfare.
amount of P1,712,396.40, subject of Special Proceedings. The respondent
Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, issued an Order declaring the said decision As a general rule, whether the money is deposited by way of general or special
final and executory, directing the Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon City and deposit, they remain government funds and are not subject to garnishment.
Manila to execute the said decision. The corresponding Alia Writ of Execution An exception of the rule is a law or ordinance that has been enacted
was issued. On the strength of the aforementioned Alias Writ of Execution, the appropriating a specific amount to pay a valid government obligation.
Provincial Sheriff of Rizal served Notices of Garnishment with several Banks.
The funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on deposit with Philippine 21. NEA vs. MORALES
Veterans Bank and PNB are public funds duly appropriated and allocated for DOCTRINE: Without question, petitioner NEA is a GOCC—a juridical
the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of military and civilian
personality separate and distinct from the government, with capacity to sue
personnel and for maintenance and operations of the AFP.
and be sued. As such GOCC, petitioner NEA cannot evade execution; its funds
Petitioner filed prohibition proceedings against respondent Judge Villasor for may be garnished or levied upon in satisfaction of a judgment rendered against
acting in excess of jurisdiction with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack it. However, before execution may proceed against it, a claim for payment of
of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of a Writ of Execution against the the judgment award must first be filed with the COA.
properties of the AFP, hence the notices and garnishment are null and void.
FACTS: Danilo Morales and 105 others, employees of NEA, files a class suit
ISSUE: Whether or not the state can be sued without its consent. with the RTC against NEA for payment of rice allowance, meal allowance, etc.
HELD: It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the Pursuant to RA 6758. RTC favored Morales and ordered a writ of execution to
juristic concept of sovereignty that the state as well as its government is settle the employees’ claims. A notice of garnishment was issued against the
immune from suit unless it gives its consent. A sovereign is exempt from suit, funds of NEA. Willing to comply, NEA however claimed to have no funds to
not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical cover the claim and needed to request for supplement budget from DBM.
and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority Because of this, NEA filed Motion to Quash, which was denied by RTC but
that makes the law on which the right depends. A continued adherence to the was granted an extension.
doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience
that may cause private parties, the loss of government efficiency and the Meanwhile, COA advised NEA against making further payments because the
obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions are far greater is such employees may not have been hired in the dates specifically mentioned in RA
a fundamental principle were abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy 6758 that awards them of the benefits and that RTC had no jurisdiction to order
were not thus restricted. for the settlement under PD 1445. Morales appealed to the CA, who also ruled
in his favor and held that NEA can no longer take shelter under the provisions
What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of
of P.D. No. 1445 and SC Administrative Circular No. 10- 2000 because it is a
the Constitution. From a logical and sound sense from the basic concept of
the non-suability of the State, public funds cannot be the object of a government-owned or controlled corporation (GOCC) created under P.D. No.
garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been previously 269, as such GOCC, petitioner NEA may be subjected to court processes just
granted and the state liability adjudged. Disbursements of public funds must like any other corporation; specifically, its properties may be proceeded

18
against by way of garnishment or levy. NEA and its Board of Directors their subsidiaries. With respect to money claims arising from the
(petitioners) immediately filed herein petition for review. implementation of Republic Act No. 6758, their allowance or disallowance is
for COA to decide, subject only to the remedy of appeal by petition for certiorari
ISSUE: Whether the writ of execution is premature as Morales, et al. to this Court.
(respondents) have yet to file their judgment claim with the COA in accordance
with P.D. No. 1445 and SC Administrative Circular No. 10-2000 FACTS: Petitioner Lockheed Detective and Watchman Agency, Inc.
(Lockheed) entered into a contract for security services with respondent UP.
RULING: Yes. Respondents cannot proceed against the funds of petitioners In 1998, several security guards assigned to UP filed separate complaints
because the December 16, 1999 RTC Decision sought to be satisfied is not a against Lockheed and UP for payment of underpaid wages, 25% overtime pay,
judgment for a specific sum of money susceptible of execution by garnishment; premium pay for rest days and special holidays, holiday pay, service incentive
it is a special judgment requiring petitioners to settle the claims of respondents leave pay, night shift differentials, 13th month pay, refund of cash bond, refund
in accordance with existing regulations of the COA. The December 16, 1999 of deductions for the Mutual Benefits Aids System (MBAS), unpaid wages from
RTC Decision merely directs petitioners to “settle the claims of [respondents] December 16-31, 1998, and attorney’s fees.
and other employees similarly situated.” It does not require petitioners to pay
a certain sum of money to respondents. The judgment is only for the The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision making respondents Lockheed
performance of an act other than the payment of money. Detective and Watchman Agency, Inc. and UP as job contractor and principal
as solidarily liable to complainants. Both Lockheed and UP appealed the Labor
The RTC exceeded the scope of its judgment when, in its February 22, 2000 Arbiter’s decision. The NLRC modified the Labor Arbiter’s decision. The
Writ of Execution, it directed petitioners to “extend to [respondents] the benefits complaining security guards and UP filed their respective motions for
and allowances to which they are entitled but which until now they have been reconsideration. The NLRC denied said motions. As the parties did not appeal
deprived of as enumerated under Sec. 5 of DBM CCC No. 10 and x x x to the NLRC decision, the same became final and executor. A writ of execution
cause their inclusion in the Provident Fund Membership.” However, in its was then issued butl ater quashed by the Labor Arbiter on motion of UP due
subsequent Orders dated May 17, 2000 and January 8, 2001, the RTC to disputes regarding the amount of the award. Later, however, said order
attempted to set matters right by directing the parties to now await the outcome quashing the writ was reversed by the NLRC.
of the legal processes for the settlement of respondents’ claims.
ISSUE: Having a charter with which it can sue and be sued, can UP funds be
Without question, petitioner NEA is a GOCC—a juridical personality separate garnished?
and distinct from the government, with capacity to sue and be sued. As such
GOCC, petitioner NEA cannot evade execution; its funds may be garnished or HELD: Yes. We agree with UP that there was no point for Lockheed in
levied upon in satisfaction of a judgment rendered against it. However, before discussing the doctrine of state immunity from suit as this was never an issue
execution may proceed against it, a claim for payment of the judgment award in this case. Clearly, UP consented to be sued when it participated in the
must first be filed with the COA. proceedings below. What UP questions is the hasty garnishment of its funds
in its PNB account. This Court finds that the CA correctly applied the NEA
22. LOCKHEED VS. UP case. Like NEA, UP is a juridical personality separate and distinct from the
DOCTRINE: UP is a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government and has the capacity to sue and be sued. Thus, also like NEA, it
government and has the capacity to sue and be sued. Thus, also like NEA, it cannot evade execution, and its funds may be subject to garnishment or levy.
cannot evade execution, and its funds may be subject to garnishment or levy. However, before execution may be had, a claim for payment of the judgment
However, before execution may be had, a claim for payment of the judgment award must first be filed with the COA.
award must first be filed with the COA. Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as 23. UP VS. DIZON
amended by Section 26 of P.D. No. 1445, it is the COA which has primary
jurisdiction to examine, audit and settle “all debts and claims of any sort” due DOCTRINE: UP is a government instrumentality, performing the State’s
from or owing the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and constitutional mandate of promoting quality and accessible education. As a
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations and government instrumentality, the UP administers special funds sourced from

19
the fees and income enumerated under Act No. 1870 and Section 1 of Despite its establishment as a body corporate, the UP remains to be a
Executive Order No. 714, and from the yearly appropriations, to achieve the "chartered institution" performing a legitimate government function.
purposes laid down by Section 2 of Act 1870, as expanded in Republic Act No. Irrefragably, the UP is a government instrumentality, performing the States
9500. All the funds going into the possession of the UP, including any interest constitutional mandate of promoting quality and accessible education. As a
accruing from the deposit of such funds in any banking institution, constitute a government instrumentality, the UP administers special funds sourced from
“special trust fund,” the disbursement of which should always be aligned with the fees and income enumerated under Act No. 1870 and Section 1 of
the UP’s mission and purpose, and should always be subject to auditing by Executive Order No. 714, and from the yearly appropriations, to achieve the
the COA. A distinction should first be made between suability and liability. purposes laid down by Section 2 of Act 1870, as expanded in Republic Act No.
"Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the 9500.
applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is
suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can All the funds going into the possession of the UP, including any interest
never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not accruing from the deposit of such funds in any banking institution, constitute a
conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. "special trust fund," the disbursement of which should always be aligned with
the UPs mission and purpose, and should always be subject to auditing by the
FACTS: University of the Philippines (UP) entered into a General Construction COA. The funds of the UP are government funds that are public in character.
Agreement with respondent Stern Builders Corporation (Stern Builders) for the They include the income accruing from the use of real property ceded to the
construction and renovation of the buildings in the campus of the UP in Los UP that may be spent only for the attainment of its institutional objectives. A
Bas. UP was able to pay its first and second billing. However, the third billing marked distinction exists between suability of the State and its liability.
worth P273,729.47 was not paid due to its disallowance by the Commission
on Audit (COA). Thus, Stern Builders sued the UP to collect the unpaid As the Court succinctly stated in Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v.
balance. On November 28, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision ordering UP Firme: A distinction should first be made between suability and liability.
to pay Stern Builders. Then on January 16, 2002, the UP filed its motion for "Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the
reconsideration. The RTC denied the motion. The denial of the said motion applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is
was served upon Atty. Felimon Nolasco (Atty.Nolasco) of the UPLB Legal suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can
Office on May 17, 2002. Notably, Atty. Nolasco was not the counsel of record never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not
of the UP but the OLS in Diliman, Quezon City. Thereafter, the UP filed a notice conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When
of appeal on June 3, 2002. However, the RTC denied due course to the notice the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the
of appeal for having been filed out of time. On October 4, 2002, upon motion chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable. The Constitution strictly
of Stern Builders, the RTC issued the writ of execution. mandated that "no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law." The execution of the monetary
On appeal, both the CA and the High Court denied UPs petition. The denial judgment against the UP was within the primary jurisdiction of the COA. It was
became final and executory. Hence, Stern Builders filed in the RTC its motion of no moment that a final and executory decision already validated the claim
for execution despite their previous motion having already been granted and against the UP.
despite the writ of execution having already issued. On June 11, 2003, the
RTC granted another motion for execution filed on May 9, 2003 (although the 24. MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI VS. CA
RTC had already issued the writ of execution on October 4, 2002). DOCTRINE: Public Funds; Properties of a municipality, whether real or
Consequently, the sheriff served notices of garnishment to the UPs depositary personal, which are necessary for public use cannot be attached and sold at
banks and the RTC ordered the release of the funds. Aggrieved, UP elevated execution sale to satisfy a money judgment against the municipality. Public
the matter to the CA. The CA sustained the RTC. Hence, this petition. funds are not subject to levy and execution.
ISSUE: Was UP's funds validly garnished? FACTS: Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of land owned
HELD: No. UP's funds, being government funds, are not subject to by private respondent Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc. After
garnishment. (Garnishment of public funds; suability vs. liability of the State) hearing, the RTC fixed the appraised value of the property at P5,291,666.00,
20
and ordered petitioner to pay this amount minus the advanced payment of the fact that they had been required to do so. The evidence shows that these
P338,160.00 which was earlier released to private respondent. It then issued two appellants were duly notified by the corresponding authorities to appear
the corresponding writ of execution accompanied with a writ of garnishment of before the Acceptance Board in order to register for military service in
funds of the petitioner which was deposited in PNB. Petitioner filed a motion accordance with law, and that the said appellants, in spite of these notices,
for reconsideration, contending that its funds at the PNB could neither be had not registered up to the date of the filing of the information.
garnished nor levied upon execution, for to do so would result in the
disbursement of public funds without the proper appropriation required under The appellants do not deny these facts, but they allege in defense that they
the law. The RTC denied the motion. CA affirmed; hence, petitioner filed a have not registered in the military service because Primitivo de Sosa is
petition for review before the SC. fatherless and has a mother and a brother eight years old to support, and
Tranquilino Lagman also has a father to support, has no military leanings, and
ISSUE: Are the funds of the Municipality of Makati exempt from garnishment does not wish to kill or be killed. Each of these appellants was sentenced by
and levy upon execution? the Court of First Instance to one month and one day of imprisonment, with
the costs.
HELD: Yes. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not
subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute. More In this instance, the validity of the National Defense Law, under which the
particularly, the properties of a municipality, whether real or personal, which accused were sentenced, is impugned on the ground that it is unconstitutional.
are necessary for public use cannot be attached and sold at execution sale to Section 2, Article II of the Constitution of the Philippines provides as follows:
satisfy a money judgment against the municipality. Municipal revenues derived "SEC. 2. The defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the
from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are intended primarily and fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal
exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental activities and military or civil service."
functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution. Absent a showing
that the municipal council of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating ISSUE: Whether the National Defense Law is unconstitutional by requiring
from its public funds an amount corresponding to the balance due under the citizens to render personal military or civil service
RTC decision, no levy under execution may be validly effected on the public HELD: No. The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory
funds of petitioner. military service, does not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the
contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the Government to de-
GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
fend the State cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the
25. PEOPLE VS. LAGMAN & PEOPLE VS. ZOSA organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of
the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to
DOCTRINE: The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory enlist therein. In the United States the courts have held in a series of decisions
military service, does not go against section 2, Article II of the Philippine that the compulsory military service adopted by reason of the civil war and the
Constitution but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty world war does not violate the Constitution, because the power to establish it
of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through is derived from that granted to Congress to declare war and to organize and
an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would maintain an army. This is so because the right of the Government to require
be to make this duty of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient compulsory military service is a consequence of its duty to defend the State
men who volunteer to enlist therein. and is reciprocal with its duty to defend the life, liberty and property of the
FACTS: In these two cases (G. R. Nos. 45892 and 45893), the appellants citizen.
Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Sosa are charged with a violation of In the case of Jacobson vs. Massachusetts, it was said that, without violating
section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National Defense Law. the Constitution, a person may be compelled by force, if need be, against his
It is alleged that these two appellants, being Filipinos and having reached the will, against his pecuniary interests, and even against his religious or political
age of twenty years in 1936, willfully and unlawfully refused to register in the convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of his country, and risk
military service between the 1st and 7th of April of said year, notwithstanding the chance of being shot down in its defense. The circumstance that the
21
appellants have dependent families to support does not excuse them from ISSUE: Whether Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing Rules and
their duty to present themselves before the Acceptance Board because, if such Regulations (RIRR) issued by the Department of Health (DOH) is
circumstance exists, they can ask for de-ferment in complying with their duty unconstitutional
and, at all events, they can obtain the proper pecuniary allowance to attend to
these family responsibilities. HELD: No. Under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into
force for members, in the same way that conventions or agreements under
26. PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION OF THE Article 19 and regulations under Article 21 come into force. Article 23 of the
PHILIPPINES VS. DUQUE III WHO Constitution reads: Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority
to make recommendations to Members with respect to any matter within the
DOCTRINE: Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part
competence of the Organization for an international rule to be considered as
of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The customary law, it must be established that such rule is being followed by states
transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a because they consider it obligatory to comply with such rules Under the 1987
domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law
incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires
international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law. Treaties become that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a
part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to Article VII, constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method
Section 21 of the Constitution which provides that “[n]o treaty or international applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed
agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two- to have the force of domestic law. Treaties become part of the law of the land
thirds of all the members of the Senate.” Thus, treaties or conventional through transformation pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution
international law must go through a process prescribed by the Constitution for which provides that “[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and
it to be transformed into municipal law that can be applied to domestic conflicts. effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the
FACTS: Named as respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries, Senate.”
and Assistant Secretaries of the Department of Health (DOH). For purposes Thus, treaties or conventional international law must go through a process
of herein petition, the DOH is deemed impleaded as a co-respondent since prescribed by the Constitution for it to be transformed into municipal law that
respondents issued the questioned RIRR in their capacity as officials of said can be applied to domestic conflicts. The Court held that the ICMBS and WHA
executive agency. Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by Resolutions are not treaties as they have not been concurred in by at least
President Corazon Aquino on October 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative two-thirds of all members of the Senate as required under Section 21, Article
powers granted to the president under the Freedom Constitution. One of the VII of the 1987 Constitution. However, according to the Court, the ICMBS
preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to which was adopted by the WHA in 1981 had been transformed into domestic
Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes law through local legislation, the Milk Code. Consequently, it is the Milk Code
(ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. that has the force and effect of law in this jurisdiction and not the ICMBS per
From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that se.
breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should The Milk Code is almost a verbatim reproduction of the ICMBS, but the Court
be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk noted that the Milk Code did not adopt the provision in the ICMBS absolutely
substitutes. In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention on prohibiting advertising or other forms of promotion to the general public of
the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties products within the scope of the ICMBS. Instead, the Milk Code expressly
should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and provides that advertising, promotion, or other marketing materials may be
ensure that all segments of society, specially parents and children, are allowed if such materials are duly authorized and approved by the InterAgency
informed of the advantages of breastfeeding. On May 15, 2006, the DOH Committee (IAC). Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that
issued herein assailed RIRR which was to take effect on July 7, 2006 the Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land

22
and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and rights abuses such as arbitrary detention, torture and rape in the hands of
amity with all nations. The provisions embodies the incorporation method. police or military forces during the Marcos regime. The Alien Tort Act was
Generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the invoked as basis for the US District Court's jurisdiction over the complaint, as
incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even it involved a suit by aliens for tortious violations of international law. These
if they do not derive from treaty obligations. plaintiffs brought the action on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of
similarly situated individuals, particularly consisting of all current civilian
The classical formulation in international law sees those customary rules citizens of the Philippines, their heirs and beneficiaries, who between 1972
accepted as binding result from the combination of two elements: the and 1987 were tortured, summarily executed or had disappeared while in the
established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a custody of military or paramilitary groups.
psychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion
as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice Plaintiffs alleged that the class consisted of approximately ten thousand
in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. (10,000) members; hence, joinder of all these persons was impracticable. The
Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA institution of a class action suit was warranted under Rule 23(a) and (b)(1)(B)
Resolutions into domestic law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot of the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the provisions of which were
be considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by invoked by the plaintiffs. Trial ensued, and subsequently a jury rendered a
executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature. verdict and an award of compensatory and exemplary damages in favor of the
plaintiff class. Then, on 3 February 1995, the US District Court, presided by
27. MIJARES VS. RANADA Judge Manuel L. Real, rendered a Final Judgment (Final Judgment) awarding
DOCTRINE: There is an evident distinction between a foreign judgment in an the plaintiff class a total of One Billion Nine Hundred Sixty Four Million Five
action in rem and one in personam. For an action in rem, the foreign judgment Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty Nine Dollars and Ninety Cents
is deemed conclusive upon the title to the thing, while in an action in personam, ($1,964,005,859.90). The Final Judgment was eventually affirmed by the US
the foreign judgment is presumptive, and not conclusive, of a right as between Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a decision rendered on 17 December
the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title. However, in 1996.
both cases, the foreign judgment is susceptible to impeachment in our local On 20 May 1997, the present petitioners filed Complaint with the Regional Trial
courts on the grounds of want of jurisdiction or notice to the party, collusion, Court, City of Makati (Makati RTC) for the enforcement of the Final Judgment.
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. They alleged that they are members of the plaintiff class in whose favor the
There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that requires US District Court awarded damages. They argued that since the Marcos
the Philippines to recognize foreign judgments, or allow a procedure for the Estate failed to file a petition for certiorari with the US Supreme Court after the
enforcement thereof. However, generally accepted principles of international Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had affirmed the Final Judgment, the decision
law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the of the US District Court had become final and executory, and hence should be
laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. The classical recognized and enforced in the Philippines, pursuant to Section 50, Rule 39 of
formulation in international law sees those customary rules accepted as the Rules of Court then in force. On 5 February 1998, the Marcos Estate filed
binding result from the combination two elements: the established, a motion to dismiss, raising, among others, the non-payment of the correct
widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological filing fees. It alleged that petitioners had only paid Four Hundred Ten Pesos
element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or (P410.00) as docket and filing fees, notwithstanding the fact that they sought
necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question to enforce a monetary amount of damages in the amount of over Two and a
is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. Quarter Billion US Dollars (US$2.25 Billion).

FACTS: On 9 May 1991, a complaint was filed with the United States District The Marcos Estate cited Supreme Court Circular No. 7, pertaining to the
Court (US District Court), District of Hawaii, against the Estate of former proper computation and payment of docket fees. In response, the petitioners
Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos Estate). The action was claimed that an action for the enforcement of a foreign judgment is not capable
brought forth by ten Filipino citizens who each alleged having suffered human of pecuniary estimation; hence, a filing fee of only Four Hundred Ten Pesos

23
(P410.00) was proper, pursuant to Section 7(c) of Rule 141. RTC Ruling On 9 upon it to support the proposition that the subject matter of the complaint⎯the
September 1998, respondent Judge Santiago Javier Ranada of the Makati enforcement of a foreign judgment⎯is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
RTC issued the subject Order dismissing the complaint without prejudice. Admittedly the proposition, as it applies in this case, is counterintuitive, and
Respondent judge opined that contrary to the petitioners' submission, the thus deserves strict scrutiny. For in all practical intents and purposes, the
subject matter of the complaint was indeed capable of pecuniary estimation, matter at hand is capable of pecuniary estimation, down to the last cent. The
as it involved a judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering the payment of jurisprudential standard in gauging whether the subject matter of an action is
definite sums of money, allowing for easy determination of the value of the capable of pecuniary estimation is well-entrenched.
foreign judgment. Not surprisingly, petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which Judge Ranada denied in an Order dated 28 July 1999. The Marcos Estate cites Singsong v. Isabela Sawmill and Raymundo v. Court
From this denial, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of Appeals, which ruled: [I]n determining whether an action is one the subject
assailing the twin orders of respondent judge. Petitioners Contend Petitioners matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted
submit that their action is incapable of pecuniary estimation as the subject the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy
matter of the suit is the enforcement of a foreign judgment, and not an action sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
for the collection of a sum of money or recovery of damages. considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the
municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount
ISSUE: Whether or not an action to enforce a sum of money rendered by a of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right
foreign court is incapable of pecuniary estimation. to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or
a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such
HELD: No. To resolve this question, a proper understanding is required on the
actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in
nature and effects of a foreign judgment in this jurisdiction. There is an evident terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now
distinction between a foreign judgment in an action in rem and one in Regional Trial Courts).
personam. For an action in rem, the foreign judgment is deemed conclusive
upon the title to the thing, while in an action in personam, the foreign judgment Ultimately it is self-evident that while the subject matter of the action is
is presumptive, and not conclusive, of a right as between the parties and their undoubtedly the enforcement of a foreign judgment, the effect of a providential
successors in interest by a subsequent title. However, in both cases, the award would be the adjudication of a sum of money. Perhaps in theory, such
foreign judgment is susceptible to impeachment in our local courts on the an action is primarily for "the enforcement of the foreign judgment," but there
grounds of want of jurisdiction or notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear is a certain obtuseness to that sort of argument since there is no denying that
mistake of law or fact. Thus, the party aggrieved by the foreign judgment is the enforcement of the foreign judgment will necessarily result in the award of
entitled to defend against the enforcement of such decision in the local forum. a definite sum of money. But before we insist upon this conclusion past beyond
the point of reckoning, we must examine its possible ramifications.
As stated in Section 48, Rule 39, the actionable issues are generally restricted
to a review of jurisdiction of the foreign court, the service of personal notice, Petitioners raise the point that a declaration that an action for enforcement of
collusion, fraud, or mistake of fact or law. The limitations on review is in foreign judgment may be capable of pecuniary estimation might lead to an
consonance with a strong and pervasive policy in all legal systems to limit instance wherein a first level court such as the Municipal Trial Court would
repetitive litigation on claims and issues. Otherwise known as the policy of have jurisdiction to enforce a foreign judgment. But under the statute defining
preclusion, it seeks to protect party expectations resulting from previous the jurisdiction of first level courts, B.P. 129, such courts are not vested with
litigation, to safeguard against the harassment of defendants, to insure that jurisdiction over actions for the enforcement of foreign judgments. Section 33
the task of courts not be increased by never-ending litigation of the same of B.P. 129 refers to instances wherein the cause of action or subject matter
disputes, and – in a larger sense – to promote what Lord Coke in the Ferrer's pertains to an assertion of rights and interests over property or a sum of
Case of 1599 stated to be the goal of all law: "rest and quietness." If every money. But as earlier pointed out, the subject matter of an action to enforce a
judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would foreign judgment is the foreign judgment itself, and the cause of action arising
be forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the from the adjudication of such judgment.
previously concluded litigation. Petitioners appreciate this distinction, and rely

24
An examination of Section 19(6), B.P. 129 reveals that the instant complaint obligatory effect of executive agreements without the concurrence of the
for enforcement of a foreign judgment, even if capable of pecuniary estimation, Senate.
would fall under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts, thus negating the
fears of the petitioners. Indeed, an examination of the provision indicates that FACTS: In 2000, the RP, through Charge d’Affaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed
it can be relied upon as jurisdictional basis with respect to actions for the Rome Statute which, by its terms, is “subject to ratification, acceptance or
enforcement of foreign judgments, provided that no other court or office is approval” by the signatory states. In 2003, via Exchange of Notes with the US
vested jurisdiction over such complaint: Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — government, the RP, represented by then DFA Secretary Ople, finalized a non-
Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: xxx (6) In all surrender agreement which aimed to protect certain persons of the RP and
cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body US from frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against them in
exercising jurisdiction or any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial international tribunals. Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to
or quasi -judicial functions. respondents in concluding and ratifying the Agreement and prays that it be
struck down as unconstitutional, or at least declared as without force and
Thus, we are comfortable in asserting the obvious, that the complaint to effect.
enforce the US District Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary estimation.
But at the same time, it is also an action based on judgment against an estate, ISSUES: [1] Did respondents abuse their discretion amounting to lack or
thus placing it beyond the ambit of Section 7(a) of Rule 141. What provision excess of jurisdiction in concluding the RP-US Non Surrender Agreement in
then governs the proper computation of the filing fees over the instant contravention of the Rome Statute? (NO) [2] Is the agreement valid, binding
complaint? For this case and other similarly situated instances, we find that it and effective without the concurrence by at least 2/3 of all the members of the
is covered by Section 7(b)(3), involving as it does, "other actions not involving Senate? (NO)
property." Notably, the amount paid as docket fees by the petitioners on the HELD: The Agreement does not contravene or undermine, nor does it differ
premise that it was an action incapable of pecuniary estimation corresponds from, the Rome Statute. Far from going against each other, one complements
to the same amount required for "other actions not involving property." The the other. As a matter of fact, the principle of complementarity underpins the
petitioners thus paid the correct amount of filing fees, and it was a grave abuse creation of the ICC. According to Art. 1 of the Statute, the jurisdiction of the
of discretion for respondent judge to have applied instead a clearly ICC is to “be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions [of the signatory
inapplicable rule and dismissed the complaint. states].” the Rome Statute expressly recognizes the primary jurisdiction of
28. BAYAN MUNA VS. ROMULO states, like the RP, over serious crimes committed within their respective
borders, the complementary jurisdiction of the ICC coming into play only when
DOCTRINE: The terms “exchange of notes” and “executive agreements” have the signatory states are unwilling or unable to prosecute. Also, under
been used interchangeably, exchange of notes being considered a form of international law, there is a considerable difference between a State-Party and
executive agreement that becomes binding through executive action. On the a signatory to a treaty.
other hand, executive agreements concluded by the President “sometimes
take the form of exchange of notes and at other times that of more formal Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a signatory state is only
documents denominated ‘agreements’ or ‘protocols.’ An executive agreement obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a
that does not require the concurrence of the Senate for its ratification may not treaty. The Philippines is only a signatory to the Rome Statute and not a State-
be used to amend a treaty that, under the Constitution, is the product of the Party for lack of ratification by the Senate. Thus, it is only obliged to refrain
ratifying acts of the Executive and the Senate. from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the Rome Statute. Any
argument obliging the Philippines to follow any provision in the treaty would be
The presence of a treaty, purportedly being subject to amendment by an premature. And even assuming that the Philippines is a State Party, the Rome
executive agreement, does not obtain under the premises. Considering the Statute still recognizes the primacy of international agreements entered into
above discussion, the Court need not belabor at length the third main issue between States, even when one of the States is not a State-Party to the Rome
raised, referring to the validity and effectivity of the Agreement without the Statute. The RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement to be valid and effective must
concurrence by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate. The Court be ratified by the Philippine Senate, and unless so ratified, the Agreement is
has, in Eastern Sea Trading, as reiterated in Bayan, given recognition to the without force and effect.
25
 29. POE VS. COMELEC They then returned to the U.S. in 2004 but after few months, she rushed back
to the Philippines to attend to her ailing father. After her father’s death, the
DOCTRINE: Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under petitioner and her husband decided to move and reside permanently in the
the 1987 Constitution, an international law can become part of the sphere of Philippines in 2005 and immediately secured a TIN, then her children followed
domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation suit; acquired property where she and her children resided. In 2006, She took
method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to RA No.
through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. On the other 9225 or the Citizenship retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003; she filed a
hand, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the sworn petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship together with petitions for
incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even derivative citizenship on behalf of her three children which was granted. She
if they do not derive from treaty obligations. registered as a voter; secured Philippine passport; appointed and took her
Generally accepted principles of international law include international custom oath as Chairperson of the MTRCB after executing an affidavit of Renunciation
as evidence of a general practice accepted as law, and general principles of of American citizenship before the Vice Consul of the USA and was issued a
law recognized by civilized nations. International customary rules are accepted Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the USA in 2011.
as binding as a result from the combination of two elements: the established, In 2012, she filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for
widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she answered “6 years and 6 months”
element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or to the question “Period of residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013.”
necessity). Petitioner obtained the highest number of votes and was proclaimed Senator
FACTS: Petitioner Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares was found on 16 May 2013. On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the
abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo on Sept. 3, Presidency for the May 2016 Elections. In her COC, the petitioner declared
1968. After passing the parental care and custody over petitioner by Edgardo that she is a natural-born citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up
Militar to Emiliano Militar and his wife, she has been reported and registered to the day before 9 May 2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months
as a foundling and issued a Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, counted from 24 May 2005. The petitioner attached to her COC an “Affidavit
thus was given the name, Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar. When the Affirming Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship” subscribed and sworn to before
petitioner reached the age of five (5), celebrity spouses Ronal Allan Kelley (aka a notary public in Quezon City on 14 October 2015. Petitions were filed before
Fernando Poe, Jr) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (aka Susan Roces) filed a petition the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly,
foe her adoption. among others, that she cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen
since she cannot prove that her biological parents or either of them were
The trial court granted their petition and ordered that her name be changed to Filipinos.
Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe. Petitioner registered as a voter in San Juan
City at the age of 18 in 1986; in 1988, she applied and was issued Philippine The COMELEC en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she was
Passport by the DFA; in 1993 and 1998, she renewed her passport. She left in want of citizenship and residence requirements, and that she committed
for the United States (U.S.) in 1988 to continue her studies after enrolling and material misrepresentations in her COC. On certiorari, the Supreme Court
pursuing a degree in Development Studies at the University of the Philippines. reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is qualified as a candidate for
She graduated in 1991 from Boston College where she earned her Bachelor Presidency. Three justices, however, abstained to vote on the naturalborn
of Arts degree in Political Studies. She married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. citizenship issue.
Llamanzares, a citizen of both the Philippines and the U.S., in San Juan City ISSUE: Whether or not Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares is a
and decided to flew back to the U.S. after their wedding. She gave birth to her natural-born Filipino citizen.
eldest child while in the U.S.; and her two daughters in the Philippines. She
became a naturalized American citizen in 2001. She came back to the HELD: Yes. Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares may be considered a
Philippines to support her father’s candidacy for president in the May 2004 natural-born Filipino. It ruled that a foundling is a natural-born citizen of the
elections and gave birth to her youngest daughter. Philippines as there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude
foundlings as they are already impliedly so recognized. There are also no
26
provisions in the Constitution with intent or language permitting discrimination born of citizens of the country where he is found, contained in Article 2 of the
against foundlings as the three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal 1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness: Article 2
protection of the laws. There is a presumption on foundlings that a person with A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the absence
typical Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic Church in a municipality of proof to the contrary, be considered to have been born within the territory of
where the population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that parents possessing the nationality of that State.
there would be more than a ninety-nine percent (99%) chance that a child born
in the province would be a Filipino, would indicate more than ample probability 30. REPUBLIC VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
if not statistical certainty, that petitioner’s parents are Filipinos. Foundlings are
DOCTRINE/S:
likewise citizens under international law.

Under the 1987 Constitution, an international law can become part of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“Covenant”); Universal
sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The Declaration of Human Rights (“Declaration”); Even during the interregnum the
Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the Declaration,
transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a
almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.
domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. On
the other hand, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of FACTS:
the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land
even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. Generally accepted principles Immediately upon her assumption to office following the EDSA Revolution,
of international law include international custom as evidence of a general President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1 (EO No. 1)
practice accepted as law, and general principles of law recognized by civilized creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to
nations. International customary rules are accepted as binding as a result from recover all ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand E.
the combination of two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent Marcos.
practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the
opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Accordingly, the PCGG, through its Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, created an
AFP Anti-Graft Board (AFP Board) tasked to investigate reports of unexplained
Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel, whether in the active service
obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. The common thread of or retired. Investigations include the alleged unexplained wealth of respondent
the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to grant Major General Josephus Q. Ramas (Ramas), Commanding General of the
nationality from birth and ensure that no child is stateless. This grant of Philippine Army.
nationality must be at the time of birth, and it cannot be accomplished by the
application of our present naturalization laws, Commonwealth Act No. 473, as Evidences showed that respondent is the owner of a house and lot in Quezon
City as well in Cebu City. Moreover, equipment and communication facilities
amended, and R.A. No. 9139, both of which require the applicant to be at least
were found in the premises of Elizabeth Dimaano. Aside from the military
eighteen (18) years old. equipment, the raiding team also confiscated P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US
The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the Philippines, Dollars in the house of Elizabeth Dimaano. Affidavits of members of the Military
Security Unit disclosed that Elizabeth Dimaano is the mistress of respondent
are generally accepted principles of international law. The first is Article 14 of
Ramas. Dimaano had no visible means of income and is supported by
the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of
respondent for she was formerly a mere secretary.
Nationality Laws under which a foundling is presumed to have the “nationality
of the country of birth,” to wit: Article 14 A child whose parents are both With these, a prima facie case exists against respondent Ramas for ill-gotten
unknown shall have the nationality of the country of birth. If the child’s and unexplained wealth. The PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under
parentage is established, its nationality shall be determined by the rules Republic Act No. 1379, known as The Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully
applicable in cases where the parentage is known. A foundling is, until the Acquired Property (RA No. 1379), against Ramas and impleaded Dimaano as
contrary is proved, presumed to have been born on the territory of the State in co-defendant, in favor of the State.
which it was found. The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed

27
However, the Sandiganbayan subsequently dismissed the complaint because 2(1) of the Covenant requires each signatory State “to respect and to ensure
there was an illegal search and seizure of the items confiscated. The first to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights
Resolution dismissed petitioners Amended Complaint and ordered the return recognized in the present Covenant.” Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the
of the confiscated items to respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, while the second revolutionary government had the duty to insure that “[n]o one shall be
Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence.” The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory,
Hence, this appeal to SC. Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan erred in provides in its Article 17(2) that “[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
declaring the properties confiscated from Dimaanos house as illegally seized property.” Although the signatories to the Declaration did not intend it as a
and therefore inadmissible in evidence. legally binding document, being only a declaration, the Court has interpreted
the Declaration as part of the generally accepted principles of international law
ISSUE: and binding on the State. Thus, the revolutionary government was also
obligated under international law to observe the rights of individuals under the
Whether or not the search of Dimaano’s home was legal. (NO) Declaration.

RULING: The Declaration is part of customary international law, and that Filipinos as
human beings are proper subjects of the rules of international law laid down in
It is true that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative the Covenant.
during an interregnum (any period during which a state has no ruler or only a
temporary executive). However, the protection accorded to individuals in
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Covenant) and the 31. GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL vs. HON. OLALIA, JR.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Declaration) remained in effect during G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007
the interregnum.
DOCTRINE:
Wheno constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders issued by
government officers were valid so long as these officers did not exceed the The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations,
authority granted on them. The raiding team seized the items detailed in the committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth
seizure receipt together with other items not included in the search warrant. and dignity of every person. Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to
Dimaano was also not present during the raid (only Dimaano's cousins apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty
witnessed the raid). obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and
protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor
Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary government had the of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty
duty to insure that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful of every individual is not impaired.
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence. The Declaration
provides in its Article 17(2) that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his FACTS:
property. Thus, the revolutionary government is obligated under international
law to observe the rights of individuals under the Declaration. Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with
three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in
Thus, to rule that the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution remained in force violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201
during the interregnum, absent a constitutional provision excepting of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to
sequestration orders from such Bill of Rights, would clearly render all defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. Warrants of arrest were
sequestration orders void during the interregnum. Nevertheless, even during issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen
the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant (14) years for each charge.
and the Declaration, almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the
1973 Constitution. The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department
de jure government, assumed responsibility for the State’s good faith of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The RTC
compliance with the Covenant to which the Philippines is a signatory. Article
28
issued an Order of Arrest against private respondent. That same day, the NBI investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on
agents arrested and detained him. him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government.

Private respondent filed a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner. Extradition is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential
extraditee.
After hearing, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in
bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases character. Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted
and that private respondent is a high "flight risk." Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the
himself from further hearing the case, it was then raffled off to Branch 8 purpose of trial or punishment. It does not necessarily mean that in keeping
presided by respondent judge. Private respondent filed a motion for with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential
reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail and this was extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due process.
granted by respondent judge. Petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the
above Order, but it was denied by respondent judge. Hence, the instant More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but
petition. also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We
should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail,
ISSUE: provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.

Whether or not respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion There is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial
Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee. court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the
basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
RULING:
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the
No. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into
behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with
possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose
that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice. of extradition.

Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi However, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty
of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail. obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee’s rights to
life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the
committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth Philippines is a party.
and dignity of every person.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction This Court should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for
must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met. An
concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in
these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in
Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil
impaired. cases.

Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition While administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in
Law) defines "extradition" as, the removal of an accused from the Philippines administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law
with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction.
the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed
29
"clear and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition on 22 December 2014, 2PM. According to petitioners, they were only able to
cases. serve the Motion on Pemberton’s counsel through registered mail. In any case,
they claim to have also “furnished a copy of the Motion personally … at the
According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable hearing of the Motion. On 23 December 2014, the Urgent Motion was denied
doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. by Judge Ginez-Jabalde for lack of merit. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration on January 9, 2015, this was also later denied by Judge
The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that Ginez-Jabalde.
he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the
extradition court. Petitioners advance that Philippine authorities ought to “have primary
jurisdiction over Pemberton’s person while he is being tried in a Philippine
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence Court” in accordance with Article V paragraph 3(b) of the Visiting Forces
to show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded Agreement, which states that: “In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction
to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail is concurrent, the following rules shall apply: (a) Philippine authorities shall
on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." have the primary right to jurisdiction over all offenses committed by Uniter
States personnel”

32. LAUDE VS. GINEZ-JABALDE ISSUE:

G.R. No. 217456 November 24, 2015
Whether or not the Visiting Forces Agreementviolates Article VIII, Section 5
DOCTRINE: and Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution?

International Law; Parties; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; RULING:
There is no need to discuss whether this provision has attained customary
status, since under treaty law, the Philippines, as a State Party, is obligated to No. The constitutionality of an official act may be the subject of judicial review,
comply with its obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and provided the matter is not raised collaterally. The constitutionality of the Visiting
Political Rights. However, petitioners went too far in their interpretation, Forces Agreement is not the lismota of this Petition. Petitioners started their
ignoring completely the nature of the obligation contemplated by the provision Petition with a claim that their right to access to justice was violated, but ended
in an attempt to justify their failure to comply with a domestic procedural rule it with a prayer for a declaration of the Visiting Forces Agreement’s
aimed to protect a human right in a proceeding, albeit that of the adverse party. unconstitutionality. They attempt to create the connection between the two by
asserting that the Visiting Forces Agreement prevents the transfer of
FACTS: Pemberton to Olongapo City Jail, which allegedly is tantamount to the
impairment of the Supreme Court’s authority.
On October 11, 2014, Jeffrey “Jennifer” Laude was killed at the Celzone Lodge On the contention that to allow the transfer of custody of an accused to a
on Ramon Magsaysay Drive in Olongapo City allegedly by 19-year-old US foreign power is to provide for a different rule of procedure for that accused
Marine L/CPL Joseph Scott Pemberton (Pemberton). On October 15, 2014, a which violates the equal protection clause of Article III, Section 1 of the
Complaint for murder was filed by Jennifer’s sibling, Marilou S. Laude, against Constitution, the Court finds no violation of the Constitution. The equal
Pemberton before the Office of the City Prosecutor which Information was later protection clause is not violated, because there is a substantial basis for a
filed with the RTC in Olongapo City. On October 22, 2014, Pemberton was different treatment of a member of a foreign military armed forces allowed to
detained in Camp Aguinaldo. A warrant of arrest against Pemberton was enter our territory and all other accused.|||
issued on December 16, 2014. The rule in international law is that a foreign armed forces allowed to enter
one's territory is immune from local jurisdiction, except to the extent agreed
On 19 December 2014, Pemberton surrendered personally to the RTC Judge upon. The Status of Forces Agreements involving foreign military units around
Roline M. Ginez-Jabaldeand was later arraigned. On the same day of the world vary in terms and conditions, according to the situation of the parties
Arraignment petitioner Laude filed an Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed involved, and reflect their bargaining power. But the principle remains, i.e., the
Forces of the Philippines to Surrender the Custody of Accused to the Olongapo receiving State can exercise jurisdiction over the forces of the sending State
City Jail and a Motion to Allow Media Coverage. The motion was scheduled only to the extent agreed upon by the parties.
30
As a result, the situation involved is not one in which the power of this Court to further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued
adopt rules of procedure is curtailed or violated, but rather one in which, as is and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the
normally encountered around the world, the laws (including rules of procedure) same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding,
of one State do not extend or apply — except to the extent agreed upon — to they expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as
subjects of another State due to the recognition of extraterritorial immunity documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.
given to such bodies as visiting foreign armed forces.
Nothing in the Constitution prohibits such agreements recognizing immunity ISSUE:
from jurisdiction or some aspects of jurisdiction (such as custody), in relation
to long-recognized subjects of such immunity like Heads of State, diplomats Whether the petitioners have a locus standi.
and members of the armed forces contingents of a foreign State allowed to
enter another State's territory. On the contrary, the Constitution states that the HELD:
Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land. (Art. II, Sec. 2). The SC decided in the affirmative. Locus standi means the right of the litigant
to act or to be heard.Under Section 16, Article II of the 1987 constitution, it
The Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of grave abuse of discretion states that: The state shall protect and advance the right of the people to a
resulting in lack or excess of jurisdiction. The prayer for the issuance of a writ balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
of mandatory injunction is likewise DENIED for lack of merit. nature. Petitioners, minors assert that they represent their generation as well
as generation yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for
themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations,
33. OPOSA vs. FACTORAN file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding
G.R. No. 101083. July 30, 1993. generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
DOCTRINES: concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded considers the “rhythm and
harmony of nature”. Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such
Constitutional Law; The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition,
right—the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest,
our nation’s constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental mineral, land, waters fisheries, wildlife, off- shore areas and other natural
law. resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be
equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. Needless to
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm
to refrain from impairing the environment. and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a
little differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to a sound environment
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the
and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR’s duty—under its mandate and protection of that right for the generations to come. This landmark case has
by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative been ruled as a class suit because the subject matter of the complaint is of
Code of 1987—to protect and advance the said right. common and general interest, not just for several but for all citizens of the
Philippines.
FACTS:

The petitioners, all minors, sought the help of the Supreme Court to order the 34. MMDA V. CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY
respondent, then Secretary of DENR, to cancel all existing Timber License GR No. 171947-48
Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs. They alleged that the DOCTRINES:
massive commercial logging in the country is causing vast abuses on rain-
forest.They further asserted that the rights of their generation and the rights of The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority’s (MMDA’s) duty to put up an
the generations yet unborn to a balanced and healthful ecology. Plaintiffs adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal
31
as well as other alternative garbage disposal system is ministerial, its duty The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal is set forth not only in the
being a statutory imposition. Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty
of putting up a proper waste disposal system cannot be characterized as
These government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory obligation, discretionary, for, as earlier stated, discretion presupposes the power or right
to perform certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup, given by law to public functionaries to act officially according to their judgment
rehabilitation, protection and preservation of the Manila Bay. or conscience.
A perusal of other petitioners’ respective charters would yield to the conclusion
FACTS: that these government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory
obligation, to perform certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the
Respondents filed a complaint before the RTC against several government cleanup, rehabilitation, protection, and preservation of the Manila Bay. They
agencies, among them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and are precluded from choosing not to perform these duties.
protection of the Manila Bay. The complaint alleged that the water quality of
the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law,
specifically PD 1152. Respondents, as plaintiffs, prayed that petitioners be 35. WEST TOWER V. FIRST PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIAL CORP
ordered to clean the Manila Bay and submit to the RTC a concerted concrete G.R. No. 194239, June 16, 2015
plan of action for the purpose.
RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondents, ordering the defendant- DOCTRINE:
government agencies to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay.
Petitioners, before the CA, argued that PD 1152 relates only to the cleaning of Writ of Kalikasan; The filing of a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan
specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. Apart from under Sec. 1, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases does
raising concerns about the lack of funds, petitioners also asserted that the not require that a petitioner be directly affected by an environmental disaster.
cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act, which can be compelled by The rule clearly allows juridical persons to file the petition on behalf of persons
mandamus. whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or
The CA denied petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC in threatened with violation.
toto. Hence, this petition.
FACTS:
ISSUES:
A petition for issuance of writ of kalikasan was filed by West Tower
1. Does PD 1152 include a cleanup in general or is it limited only to the Condominium after First Philippine Industrial Corporation’s (FPIC) pipeline
cleanup of specific pollution incidents? used to transport diesel, gasoline, jet fuel and kerosene, burst and seeped into
2. Whether the petitioners may be compelled by mandamus to clean up the condominium’s basement. West Tower Condominium argued that FPIC’s
and rehabilitate the Manila Bay? omission or failure to timely replace its pipelines and to observe extraordinary
diligence caused the petroleum spill in the City of Makati; and the continued
RULING: use of the now 4 to 7-year old pipeline would not only be a hazard or a threat
to the lives, health, and property of those who live or sojourn in all the
1. PD 1152 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned municipalities in which the pipeline is laid, but would also affect the rights of
ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning the generations yet unborn to live in a balanced and healthful ecology. Prayed
operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. The underlying duty to for in the petition, among others, were the following: (a) that a special trust
upgrade the quality of water is not conditional on the occurrence of any fund be opened by FPIC to answer for future similar contingencies; and (b)
pollution incident. that the directors and officers of FPIC be held liable under the Environmental
Even assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically Protection Order.
prodding petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men and women
representing them cannot escape their obligation to future generations of ISSUES:
Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as
possible. 1. Whether a Permanent Environmental Protection Order should be
2. Yes, petitioners may be compelled. issued to direct the respondents to perform or to desist from
32
 performing acts in order to protect, preserve, and rehabilitate the (GSEC-102) entered by DOE with JAPEX. This contract involved geological
affected environment? and geophysical studies of the Tañon Strait. The studies included surface
2. Whether FGC and the directors and officers of respondents FPIC and geology, sample analysis, and reprocessing of seismic and magnetic data.
FGC may be held liable under the environmental protection order? JAPEX, assisted by DOE, also conducted geophysical and satellite surveys,
as well as oil and gas sampling in Tañon Strait.

JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well during the second sub-phase of
RULING: the project. Since the well was to be drilled in the marine waters of Aloguinsan
and Pinamungajan, where the Tañon Strait was declared a protected
1. No. To recall, petitioners’ persistent plea is for the conversion of the seascape in 1988, JAPEX agreed to comply with the Environmental Impact
November 19, 2010 TEPO into a Permanent Environmental Protection Order Assessment requirements pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1586. This was
(PEPO) pursuant to Sec. 3,Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental approved by the Protected Area Management Board of the Tañon Strait
Cases. For its part, respondent FPIC asserts that regular testing, as well as (PAMB-Tañon Strait), and an ECC was subsequently released to JAPEX for
the measures that are already in place, will sufficiently address any concern of the offshore oil and gas exploration project in Tañon Strait. From 16 November
oil leaks from the WOPL. 2007 to 8 February 2008, JAPEX drilled an exploratory well with a depth of
3,150 meters near Pinamungajan town. Being adversely affected by the
2. No. Individual directors and officers of FPIC and FGC are not liable due to activities, this petition was filed.
the explicit rule in the Rules of Procedure for Environmental cases that in a
petition for a writ of kalikasan, the Court cannot grant the award of damages Parties:
to individual petitioners under Rule 7, Sec. 15(e) of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases. The petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 are the “Resident Marine Mammals” which
As duly noted by the CA, the civil case and criminal complaint filed by inhibit the waters in and around the Tañon Strait, joined by “Stewards” Gloria
petitioners against respondents are the proper proceedings to ventilate and Estenzo Ramos and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio as their legal guardians and
determine the individual liability of respondents. friends seeking their protection. Also impleaded as unwilling co-petitioner is
former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.

36. RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS V. REYES In G.R. No. 181527, the petitioners are the Central Visayas Fisherfolk
G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015 Development Center (FIDEC), a non-stock, non-profit, non-governmental
organization established for the welfare of the marginal fisherfolk in Region VII
DOCTRINE: and representatives of the subsistence fisherfolk of the municipalities of
Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, Cebu.
Even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases became
effective, the SC had already taken a permissive position on the issue of locus The respondents in both petitions are: the late Angelo T. Reyes, DOE
standi in environmental cases. In Oposa, the SC allowed the suit to be brought Secretary; Jose L. Atienza, DENR Secretary; Leonardo Sibbaluca, DENR-
in the name of generations yet unborn “based on the concept of Region VII Director and Chairman of Tañon Strait PAMB; JAPEX, a Japanese
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful company; and Supply Oilfield Services, Inc. (SOS) as the alleged Philippine
ecology is concerned.” agent of JAPEX.

FACTS: Arguments:

This is a consolidated petition filed by two different petitioners. This is an Petitioners:

original petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing the validity
of Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46), which allowed the exploration, - A study made after the seismic survey showed that there is a
development, and exploitation of petroleum resources within Tañon Strait, a drastic reduce in fish catch by 50-70% attributable to the
narrow passage of water situated between the islands of Negros and Cebu. destruction of the “payao” or the artificial reef (from 15-20 kls.
SC-46 originated from a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102 per day to 1-2 kls.).
33
 - The ECC obtained by the respondents is invalid because
there is no public consultations and discussions prior to its Although the petition was filed in 2007, years before the effectivity of the Rules
issuance. of Procedure for Environmental Cases, it has been consistently held that rules
- SC-46 is null and void for having violated Section 2, Article XII of procedure may be retroactively applied to actions pending and
of the 1987 Constitution, considering that there is no general undetermined at the time of their passage and will not violate any right of a
law prescribing the standard or uniform terms, conditions, and person who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there is no
requirements for service contracts involving oil exploration vested rights in rules of procedure.
and extraction
Moreover, even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
FIDEC alleges that it was barred from entering and fishing within a 7-kilometer became effective, the SC had already taken a permissive position on the issue
radius from the point where the oilrig was located, an area grated than the 1.5- of locus standi in environmental cases. In Oposa, the SC allowed the suit to
kilometer radius exclusion zone stated in the Initial Environmental Examination be brought in the name of generations yet unborn “based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
Respondents: ecology is concerned.”

- The “Resident Marine Mammals” and “Stewards” have no In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal
legal standing to file the petition. standing has been eliminated by our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as
- SC-46 is constitutional. a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is
- The ECC was legally issued. worth noting here that the Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition
- The case is moot and academic since SC-46 is mutually and not just in representation of the named cetacean species. The Stewards,
terminated on 21 June 2008. Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be
ISSUE: possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine
Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the legal standing to file this
Whether the Petitioners have a legal standing petition.c (in a way, walagyudni rule ang Court if tagaanba legal standing ang
animals).
RULING:

1. YES. In our jurisdiction, locus standi in environmental cases has been 37. TAÑADA VS. ANGARA
given a more liberalized approach. The Rules of Procedure for GR No. 118295 May 2, 1997
Environmental Cases allow for a “citizen suit,” and permit any Filipino
citizen to file an action before our courts for violation of our DOCTRINE:
environmental laws on the principle that humans are stewards of
nature: The Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut
out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the
“Section 5. Citizen suit. – Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, Philippine economy. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and
including minors or generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair. The
rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent national economy does
suit, the court shall issue an order which shall contain a brief description of the not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services.
cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties to It contemplates neither economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the
manifest their interest to intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from international community.
notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order once in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all affected barangays copies FACTS:
of said order.
The Philippines joined World Trade Organization as a founding member with
Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No. 9003 shall be governed the goal of improving Philippine access to foreign markets, especially its major
by their respective provisions. (Emphasis supplied)” trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports. The President
34
also saw in the WTO the opening of new opportunities for the services sector, underlying consideration in this partial sovereignty is the reciprocal
the reduction of costs and uncertainty associated with exporting and the commitment of the other contracting states in granting the same privilege and
attraction of more investments into the country. On April 15, 1994, respondent immunities to the Philippines, its officials and its citizens. The same reciprocity
Navarro, then DTI Secretary, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act characterizes the same commitments under WTO-GATT. The point is that a
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations. On portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution, based
December 14, 1994, the Senate concurred in the ratification of the President on the rationale that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles
of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the WTO which includes of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of
various agreements and associated legal instruments. On December 16, cooperation and amity with all nations.
1994, the President signed the Instrument of Ratification.
3. No. The petitioners submit that concurrence in the WTO Agreement alone
ISSUES: is flawed because it is in effect a rejection of the Final Act. The Court held that
a final act is an instrument which records the winding up of the proceedings of
1. Whether the WTO Agreement violated the mandated economic nationalism a diplomatic conference and not the treaty itself. On the other hand, the WTO
by the Constitution Agreement itself expresses what multilateral agreements are deemed included
as its integral parts. It should be added that the Senate was well-aware of what
2. Whether the provisions of the WTO Agreement restricts and impairs it was concurring in as shown by the member’s deliberation.
Philippine sovereignty, specifically the legislative power vested in the
Congress
38. ESPINA v. ZAMORA
3. Whether the Senate concurrence in the WTO Agreement and its annexes
but not in the other documents referred to in the Final Act is defective and DOCTRINE:
insufficient and thus constitutes abuse of discretion
Here, to the extent that R.A. 8762, the Retail Trade Liberalization Act, lessens
the restraint on the foreigners’ right to property or to engage in an ordinarily
RULING lawful business, it cannot be said that the law amounts to a denial of the
Filipinos’ right to property and to due process of law. Filipinos continue to have
1. No. The Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not the right to engage in the kinds of retail business to which the law in question
shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the has permitted the entry of foreign investors.
Philippine economy. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and The law itself has provided strict safeguards on foreign participation in that
reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair. The business.
constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent national economy does First, aliens can only engage in retail trade business subject to the categories
not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. above-enumerated; Second, only nationals from, or juridical entities formed or
It contemplates neither economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the incorporated in countries which allow the entry of Filipino retailers shall be
international community. allowed to engage in retail trade business; and Third, qualified foreign retailers
shall not be allowed to engage in certain retailing activities outside their
2. No. While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all- accredited stores through the use of mobile or rolling stores or carts, the use
encompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and of sales representatives, door-to-door selling, restaurants and sari-sari stores
limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a and such other similar retailing activities.
member of the family of nations. Unquestionably, the Constitution did not
envision a hermit-type isolation of the country from the rest of the world. By FACTS:
the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted
principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part of On March 7, 2000 President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law RA 8762, also
our laws. A treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligation on the parties. known as the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000, which allows, among
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of others, for natural-born Filipino citizens, who had lost their citizenship and now
sovereignty. The Philippines has effectively agreed to limit the exercise of its reside in the Philippines, to engage in the retail trade business with the same
sovereign powers of taxation, eminent domain and police power. The rights as Filipino citizens.
35
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 8762 because: (1) the law runs requires. Thus, Congress can determine what policy to pass and when to pass
afoul of Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the Constitution which enjoins it depending on the economic exigencies. It can enact laws allowing the entry
the State to place the national economy under the control of Filipinos to of foreigners into certain industries not reserved by the Constitution to Filipino
achieve equal distribution of opportunities, promote industrialization and full citizens. In this case, Congress has decided to open certain areas of the retail
employment, and protect Filipino enterprise against unfair competition and trade business to foreign investments instead of reserving them exclusively to
trade policies; (2) the implementation of R.A. 8762 would lead to alien control Filipino citizens. The NEDA has not opposed such policy.
of the retail trade, which taken together with alien dominance of other areas of Here, to the extent that R.A. 8762, the Retail Trade Liberalization Act, lessens
business, would result in the loss of effective Filipino control of the economy. the restraint on the foreigners’ right to property or to engage in an ordinarily
Respondents countered that the Constitution mandates the regulation but not lawful business, it cannot be said that the law amounts to a denial of the
the prohibition of foreign investments. It directs Congress to reserve to Filipino Filipinos’ right to property and to due process of law. Filipinos continue to have
citizens certain areas of investments upon the recommendation of the NEDA the right to engage in the kinds of retail business to which the law in question
and when the national interest so dictates. But the Constitution leaves to the has permitted the entry of foreign investors.
discretion of the Congress whether or not to make such reservation. It does The law itself has provided strict safeguards on foreign participation in that
not prohibit Congress from enacting laws allowing the entry of foreigners into business. Thus –
certain industries not reserved by the Constitution to Filipino citizens. First, aliens can only engage in retail trade business subject to the categories
above-enumerated; Second, only nationals from, or juridical entities formed or
ISSUE: incorporated in countries which allow the entry of Filipino retailers shall be
allowed to engage in retail trade business; and Third, qualified foreign retailers
WON RA 8762 is unconstitutional shall not be allowed to engage in certain retailing activities outside their
accredited stores through the use of mobile or rolling stores or carts, the use
HELD: of sales representatives, door-to-door selling, restaurants and sari-sari stores
and such other similar retailing activities.
No. The Court explained in Tañada v. Angara that Article XII of the 1987
Constitution lays down the ideals of economic nationalism: (1) by expressing
preference in favor of qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and 39. GAMBOA v. FINANCE SECRETARY
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony and in the use of
Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally-produced goods; (2) by DOCTRINE:
mandating the State to adopt measures that help make them competitive; and
(3) by requiring the State to develop a self-reliant and independent national Considering that common shares have voting rights which translate to control,
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. as opposed to preferred shares which usually have no voting rights, the term
In other words, while Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution requires the "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to common
development of a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively shares. However, if the preferred shares also have the right to vote in the
controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy of Filipino election of directors, then the term "capital" shall include such preferred shares
monopoly of the economic environment. The objective is simply to prohibit because the right to participate in the control or management of the corporation
foreign powers or interests from maneuvering our economic policies and is
ensure that Filipinos are given preference in all areas of development. exercised through the right to vote in the election of directors. In short, the term
The 1987 Constitution does not rule out the entry of foreign investments, "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of
goods, and services. While it does not encourage their unlimited entry into the stock that can vote in the election of directors.
country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the This interpretation is consistent with the intent of the framers of the Constitution
basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is to place in the hands of Filipino citizens the control and management of public
unfair. The key, as in all economies in the world, is to strike a balance between utilities. Thus, 60 percent of the "capital" assumes, or should result in,
protecting local businesses and allowing the entry of foreign investments and "controlling interest" in the corporation and thus in the present case, only to
services. common shares, and not to the total outstanding capital stock (common and
More importantly, Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution gives non-voting preferred shares).
Congress the discretion to reserve to Filipinos certain areas of investments
upon the recommendation of the NEDA and when the national interest FACTS:
36
 Trial Court ruling adopting respondent's arguments, the common shares can
In 1969, General Telephone and Electronics Corporation (GTE), sold 26 be owned entirely by foreigners thus creating an absurd situation wherein
percent of the outstanding common shares of PLDT to Philippine foreigners, who are supposed to be minority shareholders, control the public
Telecommunications Investment Corporation (PTIC). In 1977, Prime Holdings, utility corporation.
Inc. (PHI) became the owner of 111,415 shares of stock of PTIC. In 1986, the The term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to
111,415 shares of stock of PTIC held by PHI were sequestered by the shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors, and thus in the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). The 111,415 PTIC present case only to common shares, and not to the total outstanding capital
shares, which represent about 46.125 percent of the outstanding capital stock stock comprising both common and non-voting preferred shares.
of PTIC, were later declared by this Court to be owned by the Republic of the Indisputably, one of the rights of a stockholder is the right to participate in the
Philippines. control or management of the corporation. This is exercised through his vote
In 1999, First Pacific, a Bermuda-registered acquired the remaining 54 percent in the election of directors because it is the board of directors that controls or
of the outstanding capital stock of PTIC. On 20 November 2006, the Inter- manages the corporation. In the absence of provisions in the articles of
Agency Privatization Council (IPC) of the Philippine Government through a incorporation denying voting rights to preferred shares, preferred shares have
public bidding sold the same shares to Parallax Venture who won with a bid of the same voting rights as common shares. However, preferred shareholders
P25.6 billion or US$510 million. are often excluded from any control, that is, deprived of the right to vote in the
Thereafter, First Pacific announced that it would exercise its right of first refusal election of directors and on other matters, on the theory that the preferred
as a PTIC stockholder and buy the 111,415 PTIC shares by matching the bid shareholders are merely investors in the corporation for income in the same
price of Parallax. On 14 February 2007, First Pacific, through its subsidiary, manner as bondholders. In fact, under the Corporation Code only preferred or
MPAH, entered into a Conditional Sale and Purchase Agreement of the redeemable shares can be deprived of the right to vote. Common shares
111,415 PTIC shares, or 46.125 percent of the outstanding capital stock of cannot be deprived of the right to vote in any corporate meeting, and any
PTIC, with the Philippine Government for the price of P25,217,556,000 or provision in the articles of incorporation restricting the right of common
US$510,580,189. The sale was completed on 28 February 2007. shareholders to vote is invalid.
Since PTIC is a stockholder of PLDT, the sale by the Philippine Government Considering that common shares have voting rights which translate to control,
of 46.125 percent of PTIC shares is actually an indirect sale of 12 million as opposed to preferred shares which usually have no voting rights, the term
shares or about 6.3 percent of the outstanding common shares of PLDT. With "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to common
the sale, First Pacific common shareholdings in PLDT increased from 30.7 shares. However, if the preferred shares also have the right to vote in the
percent to 37 percent, thereby increasing the common shareholdings of election of directors, then the term "capital" shall include such preferred shares
foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47 percent. This, according to petitioner, because the right to participate in the control or management of the corporation
violates Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which limits is exercised through the right to vote in the election of directors. In short, the
foreign ownership of the capital of a public utility to not more than 40 percent. term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares
of stock that can vote in the election of directors.
ISSUE: This interpretation is consistent with the intent of the framers of the Constitution
to place in the hands of Filipino citizens the control and management of public
WON the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers to utilities. Thus, 60 percent of the "capital" assumes, or should result in,
the total common shares only or to the total outstanding capital stock of PLDT, "controlling interest" in the corporation and thus in the present case, only to
a public utility? common shares, and not to the total outstanding capital stock (common and
non-voting preferred shares).
HELD:
SEPARATION OF POWERS
Yes. The intent of the framers of the Constitution in imposing limitations and
restrictions on fully nationalized and partially nationalized activities is for 40. GONZALES v. OP
Filipino nationals to be always in control of the corporation undertaking said
activities. Otherwise, if the Trial Court ruling upholding respondent's DOCTRINE:
arguments were to be given credence, it would be possible for the ownership
structure of a public utility corporation to be divided into one percent (1%) The Power of the President to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special
common stocks and ninety-nine percent (99%) preferred stocks. Following the Prosecutors Implied from his Power to Appoint. In giving the President the
37
power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, Congress The IIRC found Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and
simply laid down in express terms an authority that is already implied from the inexcusable negligence and gross violation of their own rules of procedure by
President's constitutional authority to appoint the aforesaid officials in the allowing Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to languish for more than nine
Office of the Ombudsman. The integrity and effectiveness of the Deputy (9) months without any justification, in violation of the Ombudsman prescribed
Ombudsman for the MOLEO as a military watchdog looking into abuses and rules to resolve motions for reconsideration in administrative disciplinary cases
irregularities that affect the general morale and professionalism in the military within five (5) days from submission.
is certainly of primordial importance in relation to the President's own role as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. It would not be incongruous for G.R. No. 196232: Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor of the Office of the
Congress, therefore, to grant the President concurrent disciplinary authority Ombudsman charged Major General Carlos F. Garcia, his wife Clarita D.
over the Deputy Ombudsman for the military and other law enforcement Garcia, their sons Ian Carl Garcia, Juan Paulo Garcia and Timothy Mark
offices. Garcia and several unknown persons with Plunder and Money Laundering
before the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan denied Major General
FACTS: Garcia’s urgent petition for bail holding that strong prosecution evidence
militated against the grant of bail. However, the government, represented by
A formal charge for Grave Misconduct (robbery, grave threats, robbery petitioner, Special Prosecutor Barreras-Sulitand sought the Sandiganbayan's
extortion and physical injuries) was filed before PNP-NCR against Manila approval of a Plea Bargaining Agreement ("PLEBARA") entered into with the
Police District Senior Inspector (P/S Insp.) Rolando Mendoza and four others. accused. The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding the change of plea
Private complainant, Christian M.Kalaw, before the Office of the City warranted and the PLEBARA compliant with jurisprudential guidelines.
Prosecutor, filed a similar charge. While said cases were still pending, the Outraged by the backroom deal that could allow Major General Garcia to get
Office of the Regional Director of the National Police Commission (NPC) off the hook with nothing but a slap on the hand notwithstanding the
turned over, upon the request of petitioner Gonzales III, all relevant documents prosecution's apparently strong evidence of his culpability for serious public
and evidence in relation to said case to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman offenses, the House of Representatives ‘Committee on Justice conducted
for appropriate administrative adjudication. Subsequently a case for Grave public hearings on the PLEBARA. At the conclusion of these public hearings,
Misconduct was lodged against P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow the Committee on Justice passed and adopted Committee Resolution No.
police officers in the Office of the Ombudsman. 3,recommending to the President the dismissal of petitioner Barreras-Sulit
Meanwhile, the case filed before the Office of the city Prosecutor was from the service and the filing of appropriate charges against her Deputies and
dismissed upon a finding that the material allegations made by the Assistants before the appropriate government office for having committed acts
complainant had not been substantiated "by any evidence at all to warrant the and/or omissions tantamount to culpable violations of the Constitution and
indictment of respondents of the offenses charged." Similarly, the Internal betrayal of public trust, which are violations under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Affairs Service of the PNP issued a Resolution recommending the dismissal Practices Act and grounds for removal from office under the Ombudsman Act.
without prejudice of the administrative case against the same police officers,
for failure of the complainant to appear in three (3) consecutive hearings ISSUE:
despite due notice. However, upon the recommendation of petitioner Gonzales
III, a Decision finding P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers WON the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise administrative
guilty of Grave Misconduct was approved by the Ombudsman. Mendoza and disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who
his colleagues filed for a motion for reconsideration which was forwarded to belong to the constitutionally-created Office of the Ombudsman.
Ombudsman Gutierrez for final approval, in whose office it remained pending
for final review and action when P/S Insp.Mendoza hijacked a bus-load of HELD:
foreign tourists on that fateful day of August 23, 2010 in desperate attempt to
have him reinstated in the police service. In the aftermath of the hostage-taking Yes. The Ombudsman's administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy
incident, which ended in the tragic murder of eight Hong Kong Chinese Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor is not exclusive.
nationals, the injury of seven others and the death of P/S Insp. Rolando? While the Ombudsman's authority to discipline administratively is extensive
Mendoza, a public outcry against the blundering of government officials and covers all government officials, whether appointive or elective, with the
prompted the creation of the Incident Investigation and Review Committee exception only of those officials removable by impeachment such authority is
(IIRC). It was tasked to determine accountability for the incident through the by no means exclusive. Petitioners cannot insist that they should be solely and
conduct of public hearings and executive sessions. directly subject to the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman. For, while
38
Section 21 of R.A. 6770 declares the Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority over the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman from office totally
all government officials, Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the President frustrates, if not resultantly negates the independence of the Office of the
express power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Ombudsman is tenuous. The independence which the Office of the
Prosecutor. A harmonious construction of these two apparently conflicting Ombudsman is vested with was intended to free it from political considerations
provisions in R.A. No.6770 leads to the inevitable conclusion that Congress in pursuing its constitutional mandate to be a protector of the people. What the
had intended the Ombudsman and the President to exercise concurrent Constitution secures for the Office of the Ombudsman is, essentially, political
disciplinary jurisdiction over petitioners as Deputy Ombudsman and Special independence. This means nothing more than that "the terms of office, the
Prosecutor, respectively. Indubitably, the manifest intent of Congress in salary, the appointments and discipline of all persons under the office" are
enacting both provisions - Section 8(2) and Section 21 - in the same Organic "reasonably insulated from the whims of politicians."
Act was to provide for an external authority, through the person of the Petitioner Gonzales may not be removed from office where the questioned
President, that would exercise the power of administrative discipline over the acts, falling short of constitutional standards, do not constitute betrayal of
Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without in the least diminishing public trust. Petitioner's act of directing the PNP-IAS to endorse P/S Insp.
the constitutional and plenary authority of the Ombudsman over all Mendoza's case to the Ombudsman without citing any reason therefor cannot,
government officials and employees. Such legislative design is simply a by itself, is considered a manifestation of his undue interest in the case that
measure of "check and balance" intended to address the lawmakers' real and would amount to wrongful or unlawful conduct. After all, taking cognizance of
valid concern that the Ombudsman and his Deputy may try to protect one cases upon the request of concerned agencies or private parties is part and
another from administrative liabilities. parcel of the constitutional mandate of the Office of the Ombudsman to be the
"champion of the people. “The factual circumstances that the case was turned
By granting express statutory power to the President to remove a Deputy over to the Office of the Ombudsman upon petitioner’s request; that
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, Congress merely filled an obvious gap administrative liability was pronounced against P/S Insp. Mendoza even
in the law. While the removal of the Ombudsman himself is also expressly without the private complainant verifying the truth of his statements; that the
provided for in the Constitution, which is by impeachment under Section 2 of decision was immediately implemented; or that the motion for reconsideration
the same Article, there is, however, no constitutional provision similarly dealing thereof remained pending for more than nine months cannot be simply taken
with the removal from office of a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor, as evidence of petitioner's undue interest in the case considering the lack of
for that matter. By enacting Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress simply filled evidence of any personal grudge, social ties or business affiliation with any of
a gap in the law without running afoul of any provision in the Constitution or the parties to the case that could have impelled him to act as he did. There
existing statutes. In fact, the Constitution itself, under Section 2, authorizes was likewise no evidence at all of any bribery that took place, or of any corrupt
Congress to provide for the removal of all other public officers, including the intention or questionable motivation. The OP's pronouncement of
Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, who are not subject to administrative accountability against petitioner and the imposition upon him of
impeachment. the corresponding penalty of dismissal must be reversed and set aside, as the
The Power of the President to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special findings of neglect of duty or misconduct in office do not amount to a betrayal
Prosecutors Implied from his Power to Appoint. In giving the President the of public trust. Hence, the President, while he may be vested with authority,
power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, Congress cannot order the removal of petitioner as Deputy Ombudsman, there being no
simply laid down in express terms an authority that is already implied from the intentional wrongdoing of the grave and serious kind amounting to a betrayal
President's constitutional authority to appoint the aforesaid officials in the of public trust.
Office of the Ombudsman. The integrity and effectiveness of the Deputy The Office of the President is vested with statutory authority to proceed
Ombudsman for the MOLEO as a military watchdog looking into abuses and administratively against petitioner Barreras-Sulit to determine the existence of
irregularities that affect the general morale and professionalism in the military any of the grounds for her removal from office as provided for under the
is certainly of primordial importance in relation to the President's own role as Constitution and the Ombudsman Act.
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. It would not be incongruous for
Congress, therefore, to grant the President concurrent disciplinary authority 41. OSMENA v. PENDATUN
over the Deputy Ombudsman for the military and other law enforcement
offices. DOCTRINE:
Granting the President the Power to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman does not
Diminish the Independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. he claim that Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental
Section 8(2) of R.A. No.6770 granting privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. It
39
guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being No. While parliamentary immunity guarantees the legislator complete freedom
made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions
forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall,
responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct however, it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body
are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly
On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive or unbecoming a member thereof. For unparliamentary conduct, members of
constitutes disorderly conduct for which Osmeña may be discipline, We Congress can be censured, committed to prison, suspended, even expelled
believe, however, that the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly by the votes of their colleagues.
behavior, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that “for any speech or
but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which debate” in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representative
the House knows best but which cannot be depicted in black and white for “shall not be questioned in any other place.” This section was taken or is a
presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States. In
that country, the provision has always been understood to mean that although
FACTS: exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress,
the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress
Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., submitted to this Court a verified petition itself. Observe that “they shall not be questioned in any other place” than
for "declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction" Congress.
against Congressman Salipada K. Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental
in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As
Resolution No. 59. He asked for annulment of such Resolution on the ground old as the English Parliament, its purpose “is to enable and encourage a
of infringement of his parliamentary immunity; he also asked, principally, that representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and
said members of the special committee be enjoined from proceeding in success” for “it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest
accordance with it, particularly the portion authorizing them to require him to liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of every
substantiate his charges against the President, with the admonition that if he one, however powerful, to whom exercise of that liberty may occasion offense.”
failed to do so, he must show cause why the House should not punish him. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of
On June 23, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr. delivered his privilege being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any
speech before the House making serious imputations of bribery against the other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from
President of the Philippines. Subsequently, House Resolution No. 59 was responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct
passed by the lower house in order to investigate the charges made by are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof.
Osmeña during the said speech, and that if his allegations were found to be On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive
baseless and malicious, he may be subjected to disciplinary actions by the constitutes disorderly conduct for which Osmeña may be discipline, We
lower house. believe, however, that the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly
Osmeña then questioned the validity of the said resolution before the Supreme behavior, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it,
Court. Osmeña avers that the resolution violates his parliamentary immunity but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which
for speeches delivered in Congress. the House knows best but which cannot be depicted in black and white for
Meanwhile, the special committee continued with its proceeding, and after presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts.
giving petitioner a chance to defend himself, found the latter guilty of seriously
disorderly behavior. Osmeña was suspended from office for a period of fifteen
months, for serious disorderly behaviour. 42. NERI v. SENATE

ISSUE: DOCTRINE:
WON the House Resolutions violated Osmeña’s parliamentary immunity for
speeches delivered in Congress. Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications
elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential
HELD: communications privilege. First, the communications relate to a “quintessential
and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an
40
executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to Yes. The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the
enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to
has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the the President, such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under our
communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief,
“operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of
a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no adequate separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy
showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege greater confidentiality than others.
and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential
investigating authority. communications privilege: (1) The protected communication must relate to a
“quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.”; (2) The
FACTS: communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor
of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor
On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication must be in “operational proximity” with the President; (3) The presidential
(DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome
Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely
Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 contains important evidence” and by the unavailability of the information
(approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
People’s Republic of China. In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the privilege on the ground that the communications elicited by the three (3)
September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high questions “fall under conversation and correspondence between the President
executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the and public officials” necessary in “her executive and policy decision-making
approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA. process” and, that “the information sought to be disclosed might impair our
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.”
Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs Simply put, the bases are presidential communications privilege and executive
and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.
P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications
that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential
instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what communications privilege. First, the communications relate to a “quintessential
they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an
“executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on: (a) executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to
whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project; (b) whether or enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature
not she directed him to prioritize it; and (c) whether or not she directed him to has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the
approve. communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being
senate averring that the communications between GMA and Neri are a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no adequate
privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege
He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
and detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony. investigating authority.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner’s claim of
ISSUE: executive privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the
people to information on matters of public concern.50 We might have agreed
WON the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions are with such contention if petitioner did not appear before them at all. But
covered by executive privilege petitioner made himself available to them during the September 26 hearing,
where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly
HELD: manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with

41
the exception only of those covered by his claim of executive privilege. No. In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional, the Court does
not lose sight of the presumption of validity accorded to statutory acts of
43. LAMP v. SECRETARY OF BUDGET Congress. To justify the nullification of the law or its implementation, there
must be a clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In
DOCTRINE: case of doubt in the sufficiency of proof establishing unconstitutionality, the
Court must sustain legislation because “to invalidate [a law] based on x x x
The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. No convincing proof was baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that
presented showing that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the passed it but also of the executive which approved it.”
Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to their sole The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. No convincing proof was
discretion. Devoid of any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of presented showing that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the
PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to their sole
unscrupulous Members of Congress, the Court cannot indulge the petitioner’s discretion. Devoid of any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of
request for rejection of a law which is outwardly legal and capable of lawful PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of
enforcement. unscrupulous Members of Congress, the Court cannot indulge the petitioner’s
request for rejection of a law which is outwardly legal and capable of lawful
FACTS: enforcement.
The Members of Congress are then requested by the President to recommend
For consideration of the Court is an original action for certiorari assailing the projects and programs which may be funded from the PDAF. The list submitted
constitutionality and legality of the implementation of the Priority Development by the Members of Congress is endorsed by the Speaker of the House of
Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the Representatives to the DBM, which reviews and determines whether such list
General Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004). of projects submitted are consistent with the guidelines and the priorities set
Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP), a group of lawyers by the Executive.” This demonstrates the power given to the President to
who have banded together with a mission of dismantling all forms of political, execute appropriation laws and therefore, to exercise the spending per se of
economic or social monopoly in the country. According to LAMP, the above the budget.
provision is silent and, therefore, prohibits an automatic or As applied to this case, the petition is seriously wanting in establishing that
direct allocation of lump sums to individual senators and congressmen for the individual Members of Congress receive and thereafter spend funds out of
funding of projects. It does not empower individual Members of Congress to PDAF. So long as there is no showing of a direct participation of legislators in
propose, select and identify programs and projects to be funded out of PDAF. the actual spending of the budget, the constitutional boundaries between the
For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of Executive and the Legislative in the budgetary process remain intact.
powers because in receiving and, thereafter, spending funds for their chosen
projects, the Members of Congress in effect intrude into an executive function.
Further, the authority to propose and select projects does not pertain to 44. BELGICA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
legislation. “It is, in fact, a non-legislative function devoid of constitutional
sanction,”8 and, therefore, impermissible and must be considered nothing less DOCTRINE:
than malfeasance.
Respondents counter that the perceptions of LAMP on the implementation of The PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which
PDAF must not be based on mere speculations circulated in the news media govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund realignment
preaching the evils of pork barrel. are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow
legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the
ISSUE: sphere of budget execution. This violates the principle of separation of powers.
Congress‘ role must be confined to mere oversight that must be confined to:
WON the implementation of PDAF by the Members of Congress is (1) scrutiny and (2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws.
unconstitutional and illegal. Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers
guaranteed by the constitution.
HELD:
FACTS:
42
 unequal." In particular, the Court observes that the gauge of PDAF and CDF
The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six whistle-blowers allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking into
who declared that JLN Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator
of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects" using dummy NGOs. represents.
Criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging In this regard, the allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine
five lawmakers for Plunder, and three other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct parameters of equality, wherein economic or geographic indicators have been
Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. 6 whistle- taken into consideration. As a result, a district representative of a highly-
blowers alleged that at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district
Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively
beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO. Several petitions were lodged "underdeveloped" compared to the former. The undermining effect on local
before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared autonomy caused by the post-enactment authority conferred to the latter was
unconstitutional. succinctly put by petitioners in the following wise:
The “Presidential Pork Barrel” questioned by the petitioners include the With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local development council
Malampaya Fund and the Presidential Social Fund. The Malampaya Fund was and initiate projects on his own, and even take sole credit for its execution.
created as a special fund under Section 8, Presidential Decree (PD) 910 by Indeed, this type of personality-driven project identification has not only
then-President Ferdinand Marcos to help intensify, strengthen, and contributed little to the overall development of the district, but has even
consolidate government efforts relating to the exploration, exploitation, and contributed to "further weakening infrastructure planning and coordination
development of indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth. efforts of the government." Thus, insofar as individual legislators are
The Presidential Social Fund was created under Section 12, Title IV, PD 1869 authorized to intervene in purely local matters and thereby subvert genuine
(1983) or the Charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation local autonomy, the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other similar forms of
(PAGCOR), as amended by PD 1993 issued in 1985. The Presidential Social Congressional Pork Barrel is deemed unconstitutional.
Fund has been described as a special funding facility managed and
administered by the Presidential Management Staff through which the Constitutionality of the PDAF
President provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects not The PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which
funded under the regular budget. It is sourced from the share of the govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund realignment
government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR. are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow
legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the
ISSUE: sphere of budget execution. This violates the principle of separation of powers.
Congress‘ role must be confined to mere oversight that must be confined to:
WON the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Pork Barrel Laws are (1) scrutiny and (2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws.
unconstitutional Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers
guaranteed by the constitution.
RULING:
The Presidential Pork Barrel
Yes. 2013 PDAF Article and all other Pork Barrel Laws are unconstitutional Regarding the Malampaya Fund: The phrase “and for such other purposes as
insofar as they violate the State’s policy on local autonomy. may be hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD 910
Section 25, Article II and Sections 2 and 3, Article X of the Constitution and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay
the LGC reveal the policy of the State to empower local government units down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President’s
(LGUs) to develop and ultimately, become self-sustaining and effective authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be
contributors to the national economy. In the cases at bar, petitioners contend used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the
that the Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the constitutional principles Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows
on local autonomy since it allows district representatives, who are national him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.
officers, to substitute their judgments in utilizing public funds for local The rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya Funds
development. “to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and
The Court agrees with petitioners. The Court finds an inherent defect in the projects of the government,” remains legally effective and subsisting.
system which actually belies the avowed intention of "making equal the
43
Regarding the Presidential Social Fund: Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended Issue:
by PD 1993, indicates that the Presidential Social Fund may be used “to
finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the Whether or not the doctrine of separation of powers was violated
restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be
directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines.” Ruling: YES
The second indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the
President to spend the Presidential Social Fund only for restoration purposes The Joint Congressional Committee in RA 9335 was created for the purpose
which arise from calamities. The first indicated purpose, however, gives him of approving the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the
carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any infrastructure project he DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC, and CSC. Acts done by Congress purportedly
may so determine as a “priority“. Verily, the law does not supply a definition of in the exercise of its oversight powers may be divided into three categories,
“priority infrastructure development projects” and hence, leaves the President namely: scrutiny, investigation, and supervision.
without any guideline to construe the same. To note, the delimitation of a
project as one of “infrastructure” is too broad of a classification since the said Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be
term could pertain to any kind of facility. Thus, the phrase “to finance the limited to scrutiny and investigation. In particular, congressional oversight must
priority infrastructure development projects” must be stricken down as be confined to the following:
unconstitutional since – similar to Section 8 of PD 910 – it lies independently
unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. As they are (1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress’ power of appropriation and the
severable, all other provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of
1993, remains legally effective and subsisting. departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any
matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation; and

45. ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST vs. HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA (2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the
power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
G.R. No. 166715 August 14, 2008
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an
Facts: administrative agency to present the proposed implementing rules and
regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee formed
RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve or disapprove such regulations
collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of a
(BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning
to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through
sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law initially
a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). The Fund is sourced from delegated broad powers.
the collection of the BIR and the SBOC in excess of their revenue targets for
the year, as determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement
Committee (DBCC). and interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law
and are entitled to respect. Such rules and regulations partake of the nature of
Petitioners invoking their right as taxpayers filed the present petition a statute and are just as binding as if they have been written in the statute
challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. It is their itself. As such, they have the force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption
contention that by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law of constitutionality and legality until they are set aside with finality in an
transforms the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into appropriate case by a competent court. Congress, in the guise of assuming
mercenaries and bounty hunters as they will do their best only in consideration the role of an overseer, may not pass upon their legality by subjecting them to
of such rewards. The petitioners also assailed the creation of a congressional its stamp of approval without disturbing the calculated balance of powers
oversight committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of established by the Constitution. In exercising discretion to approve or
powers. disapprove the IRR based on a determination of whether or not they
44
conformed with the provisions of RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial power conflict between the two, because if there is, then the law will have to give way
unto itself, a power exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution. and has to be declared invalid and unconstitutional.

46. GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA vs. EXECUTIVE

SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR DELEGATION OF POWERS

G.R. No. 209442 February 3, 2015 47. AKBAYAN CITIZENS ACTION PARTY ("AKBAYAN") vs. THOMAS G.
AQUINO
Facts:
G.R. No. 170516 July 16, 2008
In 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF as
enacted in the 2004 GAA for being unconstitutional. The National Bureau of Facts:
Investigation (NBI) began its probe into allegations that the government has
been defrauded of some P10 Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate Petitioners – non-government organizations, Congresspersons, citizens and
using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government taxpayers – seek via the present petition for mandamus and prohibition to
agencies for scores of ghost projects. The investigation was spawned by obtain from respondents the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic
sworn affidavits of six whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation- Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and Japanese offers
standing for Janet Lim Napoles – had swindled billions of pesos from the public submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and
coffers for “ghost projects” using no fewer than 20 dummy NGOs. annexes thereto.

Issue: In its letter the DFA explained that the Committee’s request to be furnished all
documents on the JPEPA may be difficult to accomplish at this time, since the
Whether or not the case is susceptible of judicial determination proposed Agreement has been a work in progress for about three years. A
copy of the draft JPEPA will however be forwarded to the Committee as soon
Ruling: YES as the text thereof is settled and complete. While the final text of the JPEPA
has now been made accessible to the public since September 11,
The argument of the respondents that the Executive has not violated the GAA 2006, respondents do not dispute that, at the time the petition was filed up to
because savings as a concept is an ordinary species of interpretation that calls the filing of petitioners’ Reply – when the JPEPA was still being negotiated –
for legislative, instead of judicial, determination is bereft of merit. The the initial drafts thereof were kept from public view.
consolidated petitions distinctly raised the question of the constitutionality of
the acts and practices under the DAP, particularly their non-conformity with Issue:
Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution and the principles of separation of
power and equal protection. Hence, the matter is still entirely within the Court’s Whether or not the Congress may compel the President to submit treaties to it
competence, and its determination does not pertain to Congress to the for concurrence
exclusion of the Court. Indeed, the interpretation of the GAA and its definition
of savings is a foremost judicial function. This is because the power of judicial Ruling: NO
review vested in the Court is exclusive. Under our system of constitutional
government, the Legislative department is assigned the power to make and In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is
enact laws. The Executive department is charged with the execution of regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the
carrying out of the provisions of said laws. But the interpretation and country's sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of
application of said laws belong exclusively to the Judicial department. And this foreign policy, the President acts as the country's mouthpiece with respect to
authority to interpret and apply the laws extends to the Constitution. Before the international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal
courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will have to with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain
interpret and ascertain the meaning not only of said law, but also of the diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of
pertinent portion of the Constitution in order to decide whether there is a
45
foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole Philcemcor, an association of at least 18 domestic cement manufacturers filed
authority to negotiate with other states. with the DTI a petition seeking the imposition of safeguard measures on gray
Portland cement, in accordance with the SMA. After the DTI issued a
Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter provisional safeguard measure, the application was referred to the Tariff
into treaties, the Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the Commission for a formal investigation pursuant to Section 9 of the SMA and
concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty its Implementing Rules and Regulations, in order to determine whether or not
entered into by him. to impose a definitive safeguard measure on imports of gray Portland cement.
The Tariff Commission held public hearings and conducted its own
While the power then to fix tariff rates and other taxes clearly belongs to investigation, then on 13 March 2002, issued its Formal Investigation Report
Congress, and is exercised by the President only by delegation of that body, it ("Report"). The Report determined as follows:
has long been recognized that the power to enter into treaties is vested directly
and exclusively in the President, subject only to the concurrence of at least The elements of serious injury and imminent threat of serious injury not having
two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty. In this been established, it is hereby recommended that no definitive general
light, the authority of the President to enter into trade agreements with foreign safeguard measure be imposed on the importation of gray Portland cement.
nations provided under P.D. 1464 may be interpreted as an acknowledgment
of a power already inherent in its office. It may not be used as basis to hold The DTI sought the opinion of the Secretary of Justice whether it could still
the President or its representatives accountable to Congress for the conduct impose a definitive safeguard measure notwithstanding the negative finding of
of treaty negotiations. the Tariff Commission. After the Secretary of Justice opined that the DTI could
not do so under the SMA, the DTI Secretary then promulgated a Decision
This is not to say, of course, that the President’s power to enter into treaties is wherein he expressed the DTI’s disagreement with the conclusions of the Tariff
unlimited but for the requirement of Senate concurrence, since the President Commission, but at the same time, ultimately denying Philcemcor’s application
must still ensure that all treaties will substantively conform to all the relevant for safeguard measures on the ground that the he was bound to do so in light
provisions of the Constitution. of the Tariff Commission’s negative findings.

It follows from the above discussion that Congress, while possessing vast
Issue:
legislative powers, may not interfere in the field of treaty negotiations. While
Article VII, Section 21 provides for Senate concurrence, such pertains only to
the validity of the treaty under consideration, not to the conduct of negotiations Whether or not the SMA is constitutional as it limits the delegated power of
attendant to its conclusion. Moreover, it is not even Congress as a whole that fixing tariff and customs duties by the president
has been given the authority to concur as a means of checking the treaty-
making power of the President, but only the Senate. Ruling: YES, it is constitutional.

Thus, as in the case of petitioners suing in their capacity as private citizens, The safeguard measures imposable under the SMA generally involve duties
petitioners-members of the House of Representatives fail to present a on imported products, tariff rate quotas, or quantitative restrictions on the
"sufficient showing of need" that the information sought is critical to the importation of a product into the country. Concerning as they do the foreign
performance of the functions of Congress, functions that do not include treaty- importation of products into the Philippines, these safeguard measures fall
negotiation. within the ambit of Section 28(2), Article VI of the Constitution, which states:

48. SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT CORPORATION vs. CEMENT The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits,
MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates,
import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
G.R. No. 158540 August 3, 2005 imposts within the framework of the national development program of the
Government.
Facts:

46
The Court acknowledges the basic postulates ingrained in the provision, and, limitations and restrictions must conform to prior statutes, internationally
hence, governing in this case. They are: accepted practices, accepted jurisprudence, or the considered opinion of
members of the executive branch.
(1) It is Congress which authorizes the President to impose tariff rates, import
and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts. The Court recognizes that the authority delegated to the President under
Thus, the authority cannot come from the Finance Department, the National Section 28(2), Article VI may be exercised, in accordance with legislative
Economic Development Authority, or the World Trade Organization, no matter sanction, by the alter egos of the President, such as department secretaries.
how insistent or persistent these bodies may be. Indeed, for purposes of the President’s exercise of power to impose tariffs
under Article VI, Section 28(2), it is generally the Secretary of Finance who
(2) The authorization granted to the President must be embodied in a law. acts as alter ego of the President. The SMA provides an exceptional instance
Hence, the justification cannot be supplied simply by inherent executive wherein it is the DTI or Agriculture Secretary who is tasked by Congress, in
powers. It cannot arise from administrative or executive orders promulgated their capacities as alter egos of the President, to impose such measures.
by the executive branch or from the wisdom or whim of the President. Certainly, the DTI Secretary has no inherent power, even as alter ego of the
President, to levy tariffs and imports.
(3) The authorization to the President can be exercised only within the
specified limits set in the law and is further subject to limitations and restrictions Concurrently, the tasking of the Tariff Commission under the SMA should be
which Congress may impose. Consequently, if Congress specifies that the likewise construed within the same context as part and parcel of the legislative
tariff rates should not exceed a given amount, the President cannot impose a delegation of its inherent power to impose tariffs and imposts to the executive
tariff rate that exceeds such amount. If Congress stipulates that no duties may branch, subject to limitations and restrictions. In that regard, both the Tariff
be imposed on the importation of corn, the President cannot impose duties on Commission and the DTI Secretary may be regarded as agents of Congress
corn, no matter how actively the local corn producers lobby the President. within their limited respective spheres, as ordained in the SMA, in the
Even the most picayune of limits or restrictions imposed by Congress must be implementation of the said law which significantly draws its strength from the
observed by the President. plenary legislative power of taxation. Indeed, even the President may be
considered as an agent of Congress for the purpose of imposing safeguard
measures. It is Congress, not the President, which possesses inherent powers
There is one fundamental principle that animates these constitutional
to impose tariffs and imposts. Without legislative authorization through statute,
postulates. These impositions under Section 28(2), Article VI fall within the
the President has no power, authority or right to impose such safeguard
realm of the power of taxation, a power which is within the sole province of the
measures because taxation is inherently legislative, not executive.
legislature under the Constitution.

When Congress tasks the President or his/her alter egos to impose safeguard
Without Section 28(2), Article VI, the executive branch has no authority to
measures under the delineated conditions, the President or the alter egos may
impose tariffs and other similar tax levies involving the importation of foreign
be properly deemed as agents of Congress to perform an act that inherently
goods. Assuming that Section 28(2) Article VI did not exist, the enactment of
the SMA by Congress would be voided on the ground that it would constitute belongs as a matter of right to the legislature. It is basic agency law that the
an undue delegation of the legislative power to tax. The constitutional provision agent may not act beyond the specifically delegated powers or disregard the
restrictions imposed by the principal. In short, Congress may establish the
shields such delegation from constitutional infirmity, and should be recognized
procedural framework under which such safeguard measures may be
as an exceptional grant of legislative power to the President, rather than the
affirmation of an inherent executive power. imposed, and assign the various offices in the government bureaucracy
respective tasks pursuant to the imposition of such measures, the task
assignment including the factual determination of whether the necessary
This being the case, the qualifiers mandated by the Constitution on this conditions exists to warrant such impositions. Under the SMA, Congress
presidential authority attain primordial consideration. First, there must be a assigned the DTI Secretary and the Tariff Commission their respective
law, such as the SMA. Second, there must be specified limits, a detail which functions in the legislature’s scheme of things.
would be filled in by the law. And further, Congress is further empowered to
impose limitations and restrictions on this presidential authority. On this last
power, the provision does not provide for specified conditions, such as that the There is only one viable ground for challenging the legality of the limitations
and restrictions imposed by Congress under Section 28(2) Article VI, and that
47
is such limitations and restrictions are themselves violative of the Constitution. "limited" as distinguished from "weak" government, McIlwain meant
Thus, no matter how distasteful or noxious these limitations and restrictions government limited to the orderly procedure of law as opposed to the
may seem, the Court has no choice but to uphold their validity unless their processes of force. The two fundamental correlative elements of
constitutional infirmity can be demonstrated. constitutionalism for which all lovers of liberty must yet fight are the
legal limits to arbitrary power and a complete political responsibility of
49. PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO government to the governed.101

G.R. No. 171396 May 3, 2006 In the final analysis, the various approaches to emergency of the above
political theorists –- from Lock’s "theory of prerogative," to Watkins’ doctrine of
Facts: "constitutional dictatorship" and, eventually, to McIlwain’s "principle of
constitutionalism" --- ultimately aim to solve one real problem in emergency
governance, i.e., that of allotting increasing areas of discretionary power
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the to the Chief Executive, while insuring that such powers will be exercised
Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of with a sense of political responsibility and under effective limitations and
national emergency. She cited that the elements in the political opposition checks.
have conspired with authoritarians of the extreme Left represented by the
NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right, represented by military adventurists –
the historical enemies of the democratic Philippine State – who are now in a Our Constitution has fairly coped with this problem. Fresh from the fetters of a
tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted and systematic conspiracy, over repressive regime, the 1986 Constitutional Commission, in drafting the 1987
Constitution, endeavored to create a government in the concept of Justice
a broad front, to bring down the duly constituted Government elected in May
2004 as basis for the declaration. Jackson’s "balanced power structure."102 Executive, legislative, and judicial
powers are dispersed to the President, the Congress, and the Supreme Court,
respectively. Each is supreme within its own sphere. But none has the
Issue: monopoly of power in times of emergency. Each branch is given a role
to serve as limitation or check upon the other. This system does
Whether or not G.O No. 5 is a valid exercise of the president’s emergency not weaken the President, it just limits his power, using the language of
powers McIlwain. In other words, in times of emergency, our Constitution reasonably
demands that we repose a certain amount of faith in the basic integrity and
Ruling: G.O. No. 5 is a valid exercise of the president’s emergency wisdom of the Chief Executive but, at the same time, it obliges him to
powers operate within carefully prescribed procedural limitations.

A concept of constitutionalism which is less misleading in the analysis of 50. SANTIAGO C. DIVINAGRACIA vs. CONSOLIDATED
problems of emergency powers, and which is consistent with the findings of BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. and PEOPLE'S BROADCASTING
this study, is that formulated by Charles H. McIlwain. While it does not by any SERVICE, INC.
means necessarily exclude some indeterminate limitations upon the
substantive powers of government, full emphasis is placed upon procedural G.R. No. 162272 April 7, 2009
limitations, and political responsibility. McIlwain clearly recognized the
need to repose adequate power in government. And in discussing the meaning Facts:
of constitutionalism, he insisted that the historical and proper test of
constitutionalism was the existence of adequate processes for keeping
government responsible. He refused to equate constitutionalism with the Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS) and People’s Broadcasting
Service, Inc. (PBS) were incorporated in 1961 and 1965, respectively. Both
enfeebling of government by an exaggerated emphasis upon separation of
are involved in the operation of radio broadcasting services in the Philippines,
powers and substantive limitations on governmental power. He found that the
really effective checks on despotism have consisted not in the weakening of they being the grantees of legislative franchises by virtue of two laws, Republic
government but, but rather in the limiting of it; between which there is a great Act (R.A.) No. 7477 and R.A. No. 7582. R.A. No. 7477 granted PBS a
and very significant difference. In associating constitutionalism with legislative franchise to construct, install, maintain and operate radio and
48
television stations within the Philippines for a period of 25 years. R.A. No. 7582 At the same time, both laws provided that "[the NTC], however, shall not
extended CBS’s previous legislative franchise to operate radio stations for unreasonably withhold or delay the grant of any such authority."
another 25 years. The CBS and PBS radio networks are two of the three
networks that comprise the well-known "Bombo Radyo Philippines." An important proviso is stipulated in the legislative franchises, particularly
under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7477 and Section 3 of R.A. No. 7582, in relation
Section 9 of R.A. No. 7477 and Section 3 of R.A. No. 7582 contain a common to Section 11 of R.A. No. 3902.
provision predicated on the "constitutional mandate to democratize ownership
of public utilities." The common provision states: Section 5. Right of Government. ― A special right is hereby reserved to the
President of the Philippines, in times of rebellion, public peril, calamity,
SEC. 9. Democratization of ownership. ― In compliance with the constitutional emergency, disaster or disturbance of peace and order, to temporarily take
mandate to democratize ownership of public utilities, the herein grantee shall over and operate the stations of the grantee, temporarily suspend the
make public offering through the stock exchanges of at least thirty percent operation of any stations in the interest of public safety, security and public
(30%) of its common stocks within a period of three (3) years from the date of welfare, or authorize the temporary use and operation thereof by any agency
effectivity of this Act: Provided, that no single person or entity shall be allowed of the Government, upon due compensation to the grantee, for the use of said
to own more than five percent (5%) of the stock offerings. stations during the period when they shall be so operated.

Santiago C. Divinagracia filed two complaints with the NTC, respectively The provision authorizes the President of the Philippines to exercise
lodged against PBS and CBS. He alleged that he was "the actual and considerable infringements on the right of the franchisees to operate their
beneficial owner of Twelve percent (12%) of the shares of stock" of PBS and enterprises and the right to free expression. Such authority finds corollary
CBS separately, and that despite the provisions in R.A. No. 7477 and R.A. No. constitutional justification as well under Section 17, Article XII, which allows
7582 mandating the public offering of at least 30% of the common stocks of the State "in times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires
PBS and CBS, both entities had failed to make such offering. Thus, x x x during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it,
Divinagracia commonly argued in his complaints that the failure on the part of temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public
PBS and CBS "to comply with the mandate of their legislative franchise is a utility or business affected with public interest." We do not doubt that the
misuse of the franchise conferred upon it by law and it continues to exercise President or the State can exercise such authority through the NTC, which
its franchise in contravention of the law to the detriment of the general public remains an agency within the executive branch of government, but such can
and of complainant who are unable to enjoy the benefits being offered by a be exercised only under limited and rather drastic circumstances. They still do
publicly listed company." He thus prayed for the cancellation of all the not vest in the NTC the broad authority to cancel licenses and permits.
Provisional Authorities or CPCs of PBS and CBS on account of the alleged
violation of the conditions set therein, as well as in its legislative franchises. These provisions granting special rights to the President in times of emergency
are incorporated in our understanding of the legislated state policy with respect
Issue: to the operation by private respondents of their legislative franchises. There
are restrictions to the operation of such franchises, and when these restrictions
Whether or not there was a valid delegation of power to the President are indeed exercised there still may be cause for the courts to review whether
said limitations are justified despite Section 3, Article I of the Constitution. At
Ruling: YES the same time, the state policy as embodied in these franchises is to restrict
the government’s ability to impair the freedom to broadcast of the stations only
upon the occurrence of national emergencies or events that compromise the
If the particular franchises of respondents are examined, it is readily apparent national security.
that Congress has especially invested the NTC with certain powers with
respect to their broadcast operations. Both R.A. No. 747759 and R.A. No.
It should be further noted that even the aforequoted provision does not
758260 require the grantee "to secure from the [NTC] the appropriate permits
authorize the President or the government to cancel the licenses of the
and licenses for its stations," barring the private respondents from "using any
frequency in the radio spectrum without having been authorized by the [NTC]." respondents. The temporary nature of the takeover or closure of the station is
emphasized in the provision. That fact further disengages the provision from

49
any sense that such delegated authority can be the source of a broad ruling Whether or not EO No. 626-A is unconstitutional for being an outright
affirming the right of the NTC to cancel the licenses of franchisees. confiscation of carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial
boundaries
With the legislated state policy strongly favoring the unimpeded operation of
the franchisee’s stations, it becomes even more difficult to discern what Ruling: YES, EO no. 626-A is unconstitutional for being an outright
compelling State interest may be fulfilled in ceding to the NTC the general confiscation of carabao or carabeef.
power to cancel the franchisee’s CPC’s or licenses absent explicit statutory
authorization. This absence of a compelling state interest strongly disfavors It is police power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive
petitioner’s cause. Order No. 626-A, amending the basic rule in Executive Order No. 626,
prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The
51. RESTITUTO YNOT vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT original measure was issued for the reason, as expressed in one of its
Whereases, that "present conditions demand that the carabaos and the
buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the small farmers who rely on them
G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987
for energy needs."

Facts: The Court does not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of
carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can
Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. The be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Even
petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat when they were if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed,
confiscated by the police station commander for violation of the above we would still have to reckon with the sanction that the measure applies for
measure. The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of violation of the prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao
Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersede as bond of or carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the executive authorities,
P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because
confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court
ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure,
constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is
authority and also for its presumed validity. immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as
forfeited to the government.
The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,
which upheld the trial court, and he has now come before us in this petition for To sum up, the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power
review on certiorari. because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably
necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due
The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied
as it authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and
transported across provincial boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to
because it is imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial
a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He complains functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is,
that the measure should not have been presumed, and so sustained, as finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned
constitutional. There is also a challenge to the improper exercise of the therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties
legislative power by the former President under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No.
Constitution. 626-A unconstitutional.

Issue:

50
 Ruling: NO, RA 9335 is constitutional for there was a valid delegation of
legislative power.
52. BUREAU OF CUSTOMS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (BOCEA) vs.
HON. MARGARITO B. TEVES The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great
branches of government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in
G.R. No. 181704 December 6, 2011 matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere. Necessarily
imbedded in this doctrine is the principle of non-delegation of powers, as
Facts: expressed in the Latin maxim potestas delegata non delegari potest, which
means "what has been delegated, cannot be delegated." This doctrine is
RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and based on the ethical principle that such delegated power constitutes not only
collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality
(BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another. However,
to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and this principle of non-delegation of powers admits of numerous exceptions, one
sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and of which is the delegation of legislative power to various specialized
a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). The Fund is sourced from administrative agencies like the Board in this case.
the collection of the BIR and the SBOC in excess of their revenue targets for
the year, as determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the
Committee (DBCC). completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when
it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by
Contending that the enactment and implementation of R.A. No. 9335 are the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate
tainted with constitutional infirmities in violation of the fundamental rights of its guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s
members, petitioner Bureau of Customs Employees Association (BOCEA), an authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the
association of rank-and-file employees of the Bureau of Customs (BOC) standard must specify the limits of the delegate’s authority, announce the
directly filed the present petition before this Court against respondents legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be
Margarito B. Teves, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Finance implemented.
(DOF), Commissioner Napoleon L. Morales (Commissioner Morales), in his
capacity as BOC Commissioner, and Lilian B. Hefti, in her capacity as RA [No.] 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). President in fixing revenue targets and the implementing agencies in carrying
out the provisions of the law.
BOCEA opined that the revenue target was impossible to meet due to the
Government’s own policies on reduced tariff rates and tax breaks to big Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection
businesses, the occurrence of natural calamities and because of other expected respectively of the BIR and the BOC for a given fiscal year as
economic factors. BOCEA claimed that some BOC employees were coerced approved by the DBCC and stated in the BESF submitted by the President to
and forced to sign the Performance Contract. The majority of them, however, Congress. Thus, the determination of revenue targets does not rest solely on
did not sign. In particular, officers of BOCEA were summoned and required to the President as it also undergoes the scrutiny of the DBCC.
sign the Performance Contracts but they also refused. To ease the brewing
tension, BOCEA claimed that its officers sent letters, and sought several On the other hand, Section 7 specifies the limits of the Board’s authority and
dialogues with BOC officials but the latter refused to heed them. identifies the conditions under which officials and employees whose revenue
collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5% may be removed from the
Issue: service.

Whether or not RA 9335 is unconstitutional for being an invalid delegation of At any rate, this Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards:
legislative power "public interest", "justice and equity", "public convenience and welfare" and
"simplicity, economy and welfare". In this case, the declared policy of

51
optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and powers among the three main branches of the Government. The Court has
the BOC is infused with public interest. recognized this, and emphasized so in Bengzon v. Drilon, viz:

We could not but deduce that the completeness test and the sufficient standard The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must
test were fully satisfied by R.A. No. 9335, as evident from the aforementioned have the independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their
Sections 2, 4 and 7 thereof. In sum, the Court finds that R.A. No. 9335, read constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the
and appreciated in its entirety, is complete in all its essential terms and manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds
conditions, and that it contains sufficient standards as to negate BOCEA’s appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative
supposition of undue delegation of legislative power to the Board. not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards
the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which
the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based.

53. GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA vs. EXECUTIVE In the funding of current activities, projects, and programs, the general rule
SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. should still be that the budgetary amount contained in the appropriations bill is
the extent Congress will determine as sufficient for the budgetary allocation for
G.R. No. 209442 February 3, 2015 the proponent agency. The only exception is found in Section 25 (5), Article VI
of the Constitution, by which the President, the President of the Senate, the
Facts: Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions are authorized to transfer
In 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF as appropriations to augmentany item in the GAA for their respective offices from
enacted in the 2004 GAA for being unconstitutional. The National Bureau of the savings in other items of their respective appropriations. The plain
Investigation (NBI) began its probe into allegations that the government has language of the constitutional restriction leaves no room for the petitioner’s
been defrauded of some P10 Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate posture, which we should now dispose of as untenable.
using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government
agencies for scores of ghost projects. The investigation was spawned by It bears emphasizing that the exception in favor of the high officials named in
sworn affidavits of six whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation- Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution limiting the authority to transfer
standing for Janet Lim Napoles – had swindled billions of pesos from the public savings only to augment another item in the GAA is strictly but reasonably
coffers for “ghost projects” using no fewer than 20 dummy NGOs. construed as exclusive.
Issue:
Accordingly, we should interpret Section 25(5), supra, in the context of a
limitation on the President’s discretion over the appropriations during the
Whether or not there was an invalid delegation of powers in the present case
Budget Execution Phase.
Ruling: YES
The following acts and practices under the Disbursement Acceleration
Program, National Budget Circular No. 541 and related executive issuances
The expenditure process, by its very nature, requires substantial discretion for
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being in violation of Section 25(5), Article VI of the
administrators. They need to exercise judgment and take responsibility for
1987 Constitution and the doctrine of separation of powers, namely:
their actions, but those actions ought to be directed toward executing
congressional, not administrative policy. Let there be discretion, but channel it
and use it to satisfy the programs and priorities established by Congress. (a) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing agencies,
and the declaration of the withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased
appropriations as savings prior to the end of the fiscal year and without
In contrast, by allowing to the heads of offices some power to transfer funds
complying with the statutory definition of savings contained in the General
within their respective offices, the Constitution itself ensures the fiscal
Appropriations Acts;
autonomy of their offices, and at the same time maintains the separation of

52
(b) The cross-border transfers of the savings of the Executive to augment the Ruling: YES, he lacks the residency requirement to run as an elective
appropriations of other offices outside the Executive; and local official

(c) The funding of projects, activities and programs that were not covered by Section 39 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
any appropriation in the General Appropriations Act. Government Code, requires that an elective local official must be a resident in
the barangay, municipality, city or province where he intends to serve for at
least one year immediately preceding the election.
III. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as
referring to "dwelling" or "habitation," but rather to "domicile" or legal
SENATE residence, that is, "the place where a party actually or constructively has his
permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given
54. MAKIL U. PUNDAODAYA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONSN and time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi)."
ARSENIO DENSING NOBLE
Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent for
G.R. No. 179313 September 17, 2009 business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return. It is a
question of intention and circumstances. In the consideration of
Facts: circumstances, three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a man must
have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) when once established it
Makil U. Pundaodaya is married to Judith Pundaodaya, who ran against Noble remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) a man can have but one residence
for the position of municipal mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental in the 2007 or domicile at a time.
elections. Noble filed his Certificate of Candidacy, indicating therein that he
has been a resident of Purok 3, Barangay Esperanza, Kinoguitan, Misamis If one wishes to successfully effect a change of domicile, he must demonstrate
Oriental for 15 years. an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of
Pundaodaya filed a petition for disqualification against alleging that the latter abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one, and
lacks the residency qualification prescribed by existing laws for elective local definite acts which correspond with the purpose. Without clear and positive
officials; that he never resided nor had any physical presence at a fixed place proof of the concurrence of these three requirements, the domicile of origin
in Purok 3, Barangay Esperanza, Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental; and that he continues. To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the
does not appear to have the intention of residing therein permanently. place must be coupled with conduct indicative of that intention. It requires not
Pundaodaya claimed that Noble is in fact a resident of Lapasan, Cagayan de only such bodily presence in that place but also a declared and probable intent
Oro City, where he also maintains a business called OBERT Construction to make it one’s fixed and permanent place of abode.
Supply.
In his Answer, Noble averred that he is a registered voter and resident of The above pieces of documentary evidence, however, fail to convince us that
Barangay Esperanza, Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental; that on January 18, 1992, Noble successfully effected a change of domicile. In this case, Noble’s
he married Bernadith Go, the daughter of then Mayor Narciso Go of marriage to Bernadith Go does not establish his actual physical presence in
Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental; that he has been engaged in electoral activities Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental. Neither does it prove an intention to make it his
since his marriage; and that he voted in the said municipality in the 1998, 2001 permanent place of residence. We are also not persuaded by his alleged
and 2004 elections. payment of water bills in the absence of evidence showing to which specific
In a resolution, the Second Division of the COMELEC ruled in favor of properties they pertain.
Pundaodaya and disqualified Noble from running as mayor,

Issue: 55. NORLAINIE MITMUG LIMBONA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

and MALIK "BOBBY" T. ALINGAN
Whether or not Noble is lacks qualification to run as an elective local official
G.R. No. 181097 June 25, 2008

53
Facts: indicative of such intention. The manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence
qualification is to exclude a stranger or newcomer, unacquainted with the
Norlainie Mitmug Limbona, her husband, Mohammad G. Limbona, and Malik conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an
"Bobby" T. Alingan were mayoralty candidates in Pantar, Lanao del Norte elective office to serve that community.
during the 2007 Synchronized National and Local Elections.
In order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or
Malik filed a petition to disqualify Mohammad for failure to comply with the bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an
residency requirement. Malik filed another petition to disqualify Norlainie also intention to abandon the old domicile. A person’s "domicile" once established
on the ground of lack of the one-year residency requirement. is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is
established.
Norlainie filed an Affidavit of Withdrawal of Certificate of Candidacy.
To successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an actual
Thereafter, she filed before the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor a
removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning
Motion to Dismiss the petition for disqualification in on the ground that the
the former place of residence and establishing a new one, and definite acts
petition had become moot in view of the withdrawal of her certificate of
candidacy. The Comelec en banc granted the withdrawal of Norlainie’s which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must basically be
animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain
certificate of candidacy.
in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the
change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen
Meanwhile, the First Division of Comelec issued a Resolution granting the
for the new domicile must be actual.
petition filed by Malik and disqualifying Mohammad from running as municipal
mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte for failing to satisfy the one year residency Petitioner’s claim that she has been physically present and actually residing in
requirement and for not being a registered voter of the said place. Pantar for almost 20 months prior to the elections, is self-serving and
unsubstantiated. Considering that petitioner failed to show that she maintained
Consequently, Norlainie filed a new certificate of candidacy as substitute a separate residence from her husband, and as there is no evidence to prove
candidate for Mohammad which was given due course by the Comelec en otherwise, reliance on these provisions of the Family Code is proper and is in
banc. Thus, Malik filed a second petition for disqualification against Norlainie. consonance with human experience. Thus, for failure to comply with the
After the elections, Norlainie emerged as the winning candidate and residency requirement, petitioner is disqualified to run for the office of mayor
accordingly took her oath and assumed office. However, the Second Division of Pantar, Lanao del Norte. However, petitioner’s disqualification would not
of Comelec disqualified Norlainie on three grounds: lack of the one-year result in Malik’s proclamation who came in second during the special election.
residency requirement; not being a registered voter of the municipality; and,
nullity of her certificate of candidacy for having been filed at a place other than
the Office of the Election Officer.
56. CASAN MACODE MAQUILING vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Issue: ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA

Whether or not Limbona lacks the qualification prescribed by law for the G.R. No. 195649 April 16, 2013
position of Mayor

Ruling: Fact:

The fact that petitioner’s certificate of candidacy as a substitute candidate was Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of his
given due course by the Comelec did not bar the Comelec from deciding on subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost
her qualifications to run as municipal mayor. his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San
The Comelec correctly found that petitioner failed to satisfy the one-year Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
residency requirement. The term "residence" as used in the election law is Philippines. Linog C. Balua, another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to
synonymous with "domicile," which imports not only intention to reside in a disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal
fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
54
mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of
local and national elections. another country to be qualified to run for a local elective position.

Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign
and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired
of Immigration indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-American." To by repatriation. However, by representing himself as an American citizen,
further bolster his claim of Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua presented in his Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen.
Memorandum a computer-generated travel record indicating that Arnado has Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado
been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and departing the represented himself as an American citizen by using his US passport.
Philippines.
This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship
Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections is fatal to Arnado’s bid for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a
where Arnado garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently disqualification to run for an elective local position.
proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte. 57. Social Justice Society vs. Dangerous Drugs Board

Issue: Facts:

Whether or not Arnado lacks qualification to run as Mayor In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act
No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
Ruling: YES of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public
office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of
The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor's office
positive and voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and with certain offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue.
citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it
recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 6486,
position. prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of
candidates for public office in connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized
By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino national and local elections.
citizen, regardless of the effect of such renunciation under the laws of the
foreign country. However, this legal presumption does not operate According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5)
permanently and is open to attack when, after renouncing the foreign qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the
citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his continued Senate. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA
possession of a foreign citizenship. Arnado himself subjected the issue of his 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates,
citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his foreign citizenship, he to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all
continued to use his US passport to travel in and out of the country before filing candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there
his certificate of candidacy. The pivotal question to determine is whether he is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to
was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at the time he filed his certificate expand the qualification requirements of candidates for senator.
of candidacy, thereby rendering him eligible to run for public office.
Issue:
While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in
Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine Whether or not Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486
citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of impose an additional qualification for candidates for senator? Corollarily, can

55
Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in 10, 2010 elections proceeded where Arnado garnered the highest number of
addition to those laid down by the Constitution? votes for the mayoralty post of Kauswagan. He was proclaimed the winning
candidate.
Ruling:
Issue:
Pimentel's contention is well - taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165
should be, as it is hereby declared as, unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance disqualifying petitioner who has fully complied with the requirements of RA
is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which 9225 before the filing of his COC
all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution.
In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of Ruling:
government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the
Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.
Congress enacted RA 9225 allowing natural-born citizens of the Philippines
who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization
In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and abroad to reacquire Philippine citizenship and to enjoy full civil and political
administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement rights upon compliance with the requirements of the law. They may now run
Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition for public office in the Philippines provided that they: (1) meet the qualifications
to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws;
senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is and, (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an oath prior to
election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not or at the time of filing of their CoC.
otherwise specified in the Constitution.
In the case at bench, the Comelec Second Division, as affirmed by the
58. Arnado vs. COMELEC Comelec En Banc, ruled that Arnado failed to comply with the second requisite
of Section 5 (2) of RA 9225 because, as held in Maquiling v. Commission on
Facts: Elections, his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation was deemed withdrawn
when he used his US passport after executing said affidavit. Consequently, at
Petitioner Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine the time he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012 for purposes of the May 13, 2013
citizenship after he was naturalized as citizen of the United States of America elections, Arnado had yet to comply with said second requirement. The
(USA). Subsequently, and in preparation for his plans to run for public office in Comelec also noted that while Arnado submitted an affidavit dated May 9,
the Philippines, Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act No. 9225 2013, affirming his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation, the same would not
before the Consul General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA. He took suffice for having been belatedly executed.
an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on July 10, 2008 and,
on even date, an Order of Approval of Citizenship Retention and Re- Finally, this case is strikingly similar to the case of Lopez v. Comelec. In that
acquisition was issued in his favor. On April 3, 2009, Arnado executed an case, petitioner Lopez was also a natural-born Filipino who lost his Philippine
Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship. Arnado filed his Certificate citizenship after he became a naturalized US citizen. He later reacquired his
of Candidacy (CoC) for the mayoralty post of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte for Philippine citizenship by virtue of RA 9225. Thereafter, Lopez filed his
the May 10, 2010 national and local elections. candidacy for Chairman of Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo in the
synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections held on
Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, however, filed a petition October 29, 2007 without first making a personal and sworn renunciation of
to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his CoC on the ground, among others, his foreign citizenship. In spite of the fact that Lopez won in the elections, this
that Arnado remained a US citizen because he continued to use his US Court still affmned the Resolution of the Comelec disqualifying Lopez as a
passport for entry to and exit from the Philippines after executing aforesaid candidate for a local elective position for his failure to comply with the
Affidavit of Renunciation. While Balua's petition remained pending, the May requirements of Section 5(2) of RA 9225.
56
Landslide election victory cannot override eligibility requirements. Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept her close ties to her domicile of origin
by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other
important personal milestones in her home province, instituting well-publicized
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES projects for the benefit of her province and hometown, and establishing a
political power base where her siblings and close relatives held positions of
power either through the ballot or by appointment, always with either her
59. Marcos vs. COMELEC influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin are
part of the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in our
Facts: country. Either they were entirely ignored in the COMELEC'S Resolutions, or
the majority of the COMELEC did not know what the rest of the country always
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the knew: the fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.
position of Representative of the First District of Leyte. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the
incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated
same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the by this court up to this point, we are persuaded that the facts established by
Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional the parties weigh heavily in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner's claim
requirement for residency. In his petition, private respondent contended that of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte.
Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement for
candidates for the House of Representatives on the evidence of declarations 60. CASCO Chemicals v. Gimenez
made by her. GR No. L-17931 February 28, 1963.

Issue: DOCTRINE(s):

Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First Enrolled Bill conclusive upon the courts; remedy in case of mistake in the
District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 printing of bills is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.
elections.
FACTS:
Ruling:
Petitioner Casco relying on R.A. No. 2609, requested a refund for its payment
(PhP 33,765.42 and PhP 6,345.72) for importation of urea and formaldehyde,
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which
which was already exempt from margin fee as provided for by Resolution No.
ought to be decisive in determining whether or not and individual has satisfied
1529 of the Monetary Board.
the constitution's residency qualification requirement. The said statement
becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to
Although the Central Bank issued the corresponding margin fee vouchers for
mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate
the refund of said amounts, the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit
ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and
and approve said vouchers, upon the ground that the exemption granted by
knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to
the Monetary Board for petitioner’s separate importations of urea and
his or her disqualification.
formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of section2, paragraph XVIII
of RA 2609.
Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is
inescapable is that petitioner held various residences for different purposes ISSUE:
during the last four decades. None of these purposes unequivocally point to
an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, Whether “urea” and “formaldehyde” are exempt by law from the payment of
while petitioner was born in Manila, as a minor she naturally followed the the aforesaid margin fee.
domicile of her parents. She grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there
and eventually established residence in different parts of the country for RULING:
various reasons. Even during her husband's presidency, at the height of the
57
 On March 30, 1964, HB 9266, a bill of local application, was filed. The same
It must be noted that Section 2 of RA 2609 reads as follows: “The margin was passed on third reading without amendments on April 21, 1964. The bill
established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provisions of section one was sent to the Senate and was referred to the Senate Committee on
hereof shall not be imposed upon the sake of foreign exchange for the Provinces, Municipal Governments and Cities headed by Sen. Gerardo Roxas.
importation of the following xxx XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture The committee recommended the approval with a minor amendment,
of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the exclusive use of end- suggested by the senator, that it be the President Pro-tempore of the Municipal
users.” Board who should succeed the Vice-Mayor in case of the latter’s incapacity to
act as Mayor. On May 20, 1964, substantial amendments to Section 1 of the
Petitioner contends, however, that the bill approved in Congress contained the Bill were introduced by Sen. Arturo Tolentino which were approved in toto by
copulative conjunction “and” between the terms “urea” and “formaldehyde”, the Senate. The amendment by Sen. Roxas does not appear in the Senate
and that the members of Congress intended to exempt “urea” and journal to have been acted upon.
“formaldehyde” separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the
synthetic resin glue called “urea formaldehyde”, not the latter as a finished On May 21, 1964, the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the House of
product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the Reps that HB 9266 had been passed by the Senate on May 20, 1964 with
Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members amendments, but what was attached to the letter was the certification of the
thereof. But, said individual statements do not necessarily reflect the view of amendment by Sen. Roxas, and not the ones by Sen. Tolentino. The House
the Senate. Much less do they indicate the intent of the House of of Reps then signified its approval and printed copies were certified and
Representatives. attested by the Secretaries and Leaders of both Houses. On June 16, 1964,
the Secretary of the House of Reps transmitted 4 printed copies of the bill to
It is well settled that the enrolled bill - which uses the term “urea formaldehyde” the President, who approved the same on June 18, 1964. It became RA 4065
instead of “urea and formaldehyde” - is conclusive upon the courts as regards (a.k.a. “An Act Defining the Powers, Rights, and Duties of the Vice Mayor of
the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. the City of Manila, Amending for the Purpose Sections 10 and 11 of RA 409,
If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified as amended, otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila”).
by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive - on which we The passage of the act irked respondent City Mayor, and Sen. Tolentino
cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers issued a press statement on July 5, 1964 that the enrolled copy of HB 9266
and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system - the signed into law by the president was a wrong version because it did not have
remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree. his amendments approved on the Senate floor. Consequently, the Senate
President, through the Senate Secretary, sent a letter to the President
61. Astorga v. Villegas explaining that the enrolled copy of the Bill signed by the secretaries and
G.R. No. L-23475; April 30, 1974 presiding officers of both Houses was not the bill approved by Congress, and
that his signature is invalid and has no effect, which means that the bill had
DOCTRINE(s): never been approved by the Senate and did not make the bill a valid
enactment.
The enrolled bill theory is based mainly on “the respect due to co-equal and
independent departments,” which requires the judicial department “to accept, On July 31, 1964, the President sent a message to the presiding officers of
as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated.” both Houses of Congress informing them that he was officially withdrawing his
signature on HB 9266, saying that ‘it would be untenable and against public
In the absence of attestation, courts may resort to journals of Congress for policy to convert into law what was not actually approved by Congress’. Manila
proof of statute’s due enactment. Mayor and respondent Antonio Villegas also issued circulars to disregard the
provisions of RA 4065. Vice Mayor and Petitioner Herminio Astorga filed a
Journal of Congress may be resorted to determine whether the text of the petition before the SC to compel the mayor, among others, to comply with the
House Bill signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both provisions of RA 4065.
Houses of Congress.
Respondents ’position is that RA 4065 never became law since it was not the
FACTS: bill actually passed by the Senate, and that the entries in the journal of that
body and not the enrolled bill itself should be decisive.
58
 In Brown v. Morris, the SC of Missouri said that the indispensable step is the
ISSUE: final passage, and if a bill, otherwise fully enacted as a law, is not attested by
the presiding officer, other proof that it has been passed by both houses will
Whether the enrolled bill doctrine should be applied in this case. satisfy the constitutional requirement.

RULING: Petitioner agrees that the attestation is not mandatory but argues that the
disclaimer by the Senate President would only mean that there was no
Congress devised its own system of authenticating bills, by the signatures of attestation at all, but would not affect the validity of the statute, hence RA 4065
their respective presiding officers and secretaries on the printed copy of the would remain valid. It would limit the Court’s inquiry to the presence or absence
approved bill. This procedure is merely a mode of authentication, signifying to of the attestation and its effect. The issue is in case attestation is absent and
the President that the bill being presented has been duly approved by there being no enrolled bill, the entries in the journal should be consulted. The
Congress and is ready for his approval. Attestation/Authentication is not journals discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced
approval. A bill is approved when it is passed by both Houses. on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the
printed text sent to the President and signed by him, hence the bill was not
In Fields v. Clark, the US Supreme Court ruled that the signatures of the duly enacted. For the Court to perpetuate the error by disregarding such
presiding officers on a bill, although not required by the Constitution, is rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to
conclusive evidence of its passage. It also said that the enrolled bill doctrine is sacrifice truth to fiction.
based mainly on the respect due to coequal and independent departments,
which requires the judicial department to accept as having passed Congress, 62. Bondoc v. Pineda
all bills authenticated in the manner stated. Also, it has been stated in other G.R. No. 97710; September 26, 1991.
cases that if the attestation is absent and the same is not required for the
validity of the statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other records DOCTRINE(s):
of Congress for proof of its due enactment.
Constitutional Law; House Electoral Tribunal; Nature of functions. - The use of
However, the 1935 Constitution is silent as to what shall constitute proof of the word “sole” in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of
due enactment. The following are to be noted: the 1935 Constitution underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the House
Electoral Tribunal as judge of contests relating to the election, returns and
Sec. 10(4) – Each House shall keep a journal of its proceedings and publish qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives (Robles vs.
the same from time to time. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5,
1990). The tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court although
Sec. 21(2) – No bill shall be passed by either House unless it shall have been two-thirds of its members are politicians. It is a non- political body in a sea of
printed and copies thereof in its final form furnished its Members. Upon the politicians x x x To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House
last reading of a bill no amendment shall be allowed, and the question upon Electoral Tribunal must be independent. Its jurisdiction to hear and decide
its passage shall be taken immediately and the votes entered on the journal. congressional election contests is not to be shared by it with the Legislature
nor with the Courts.
Petitioner’s argument that the attestation is proof of its due enactment is
neutralized by the fact that the Senate President declared his signature on the FACTS:
bill to be invalid and meant that the bill he had signed has never been
approved. This declaration should be given greater respect than the attestation Petitioner Emigdio Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party and respondent Marciano
it invalidated. As far as Congress is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in Pineda of Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino were candidates for the position
the certification made by the presiding officers. The certification does not add of Representative for the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was later on
to the validity of the bill or cure any defect already present upon its passage. proclaimed as winner of the election. Bondoc later filed a protest with the
It is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding officers House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. After revision of ballots,
that is essential. presentation of evidence and submission of memoranda, the protest was then
set for a decision, where eventually Bondoc would be declared the real winner.

59
Congressman Camasura, a member of the HRET later revealed that he voted To sanction such interference by the House of Representatives in the work of
for Bondoc, even when he was a member of the NP. the House Electoral Tribunal would reduce the tribunal to a mere tool for the
aggrandizement of the party in power (LDP) which the three justices of the
This resulted to expulsion from his political party. Cong. Camasura was Supreme Court and the lone NP member would be powerless to stop. A
subsequently terminated as member of the HRET due to his disloyalty to party. minority party candidate may as well abandon all hope at the threshold of the
HRET then cancelled its promulgation on the declaration of Bondoc as the tribunal.
winning candidate as a result of Camasura's termination as a member of
HRET. Bondoc then filed a petition, questioning such actions. Since the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral
Tribunal by the House of Representatives was not for a lawful and valid cause,
Congressman Pineda’s plea for the dismissal of the petition is centered on but to unjustly interfere with the tribunal’s disposition of ‘the Bondoc case and
Congress’ being the sole authority that nominates and elects from its to deprive Bondoc of the fruits of the Tribunal’s decision in his favor, the action
members, upon recommendation by the political parties therein, those who are of the House of Representatives is is clearly violative of the constitutional
to sit in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (and in the mandate (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) which created the House
Commission on Appointments as well), hence, it allegedly has the sole power Electoral Tribunal to be the “sole judge” of the election contest between Pineda
to remove any of them whenever the ratio in the representation of the political and Bondoc. It is, therefore, inevitable to declare null and void the resolution
parties in the House or Senate in materially change on account of death, dated: March 13, 1991 of the House of Representatives withdrawing the
incapacity, removal or expulsion from the political party; that a Tribunal nomination, and rescinding the election of Congressman Camasura as a
member’s term of office is not co-extensive with his legislative term, for if a member of the House Electoral Tribunal. The petitioner, Dr. Emigdio Bondoc,
member of the Tribunal who changes his party affiliation is not removed from is entitled to the reliefs he prays for in this case.
the Tribunal, the constitutional provision mandating representation based on
political affiliation would be completely nullified. 63. Reyes v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 207264; June 25, 2013
ISSUE:
DOCTRINE(s):
Whether the House of Representatives is empowered by the Constitution to
interfere with the disposition of an election contest in the House Electoral As held in Marcos v. COMELEC, the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal through the ruse of “reorganizing” the representation in the tribunal of Tribunal does not have jurisdiction over a candidate who is not a member of
the majority party? the House of Representatives.

RULING: To be considered a Member of the House of Representative, there must be a

concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation; (2) a proper
The independence of the House Electoral Tribunal so zealously guarded by oath; and, (3) assumption of office.
the framers of our Constitution, would, however, by a myth and its proceedings
a farce if the House of Representatives, or the majority party therein, may FACTS:
shuffle and manipulate the political (as distinguished from the judicial)
component of the electoral tribunal, to serve the interests of the , party in Petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of
power. Representative of the lone district of Marinduque. Respondent, a registered
voter and resident of the Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before the
The resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman COMELEC a petition for the cancellation of petitioner’s COC. On October 31,
Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP, because 2012, the respondent filed the amended petition on the ground that the
he cast his vote in favor of the Nacionalista Party’s candidate, Bondoc, is a petitioner’s COC contained material misrepresentations regarding the
clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral petitioner’s marital status, residency, date of birth and citizenship. Respondent
Tribunal to be the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and alleged that the petitioner is an American citizen and filed in February 8, 2013
Bondoc. a manifestation with motion to admit newly discovered evidence and amended
last exhibit.

60
On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner’s
cancelling the petitioner’s COC on the basis that petitioner is not a citizen of qualifications, as well as over the assailed COMELEC Resolutions, unless a
the Philippines because of her failure to comply with the requirements of petition is duly filed with said tribunal. Petitioner has not averred that she has
Republic Act (RA) No. 9225. filed such action.

The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on April 8, 2013. But on May Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is
14, 2013 the COMELEC en banc promulgated a Resolution denying the considered a Member of the House of Representatives. For petitioner to be
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. considered a member thereof, there must be a concurrence of the following
requisites: (1) a valid proclamation; (2) a proper oath; and, (3) assumption of
On May 18, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013 office.
elections and on June 5, 2013 took her oath of office before the Speaker of
House of Representatives. She has yet to assume office at noon of June 30, 64. Reyes v. COMELEC
2013. G.R. No. 207264; October 22, 2013

On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc issued a Certificate of Finality DOCTRINE(s):

declaring the May 14, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC en banc final and
executory. That the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of
Petitioner then filed before the court Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the House of Representatives is a written constitutional provision.
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Status Quo Ante Order. Arguing in the
main that the COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction when she was duly The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal jurisdiction over the
proclaimed because pursuant to Section 17, Article VI, the HRET has the qualification of the Member of the House of Representatives is original and
exclusive jurisdiction to be the “sole judge of all contests relating to the exclusive, and as such, proceeds de novo unhampered by the proceedings in
election, returns and qualifications” of the Members of the House of the COMELEC which, as just stated has been terminated.
Representative.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Petitioner is not asking the Honorable Court to make a determination as
Whether COMELEC had jurisdiction over petitioner. regards her qualifications, she is merely asking the Honorable Court to affirm
the jurisdiction of the HRET to solely and exclusively pass upon such
RULING: qualifications and to set aside the COMELEC Resolutions for having denied
Petitioner her right to due process and for unconstitutionally adding a
At the outset, it is observed that the issue of jurisdiction of respondent qualification not otherwise required by the constitution.
COMELEC vis-a-vis that of House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) appears to be a non-issue. Petitioner is taking an inconsistent, if not ISSUE:
confusing, stance for while she seeks remedy before this Court, she is
asserting that it is the HRET which has jurisdiction over her. Thus, she posits Whether COMELEC is without jurisdiction over Petitioner who is duly
that the issue on her eligibility and qualifications to be a Member of the House proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the position
of Representatives is best discussed in another tribunal of competent of Member of the House of Representatives for the lone congressional district
jurisdiction. It appears then that petitioner’s recourse to this Court was made of Marinduque.
only in an attempt to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing its final and
executory judgment in SPA No. 13-053. RULING:

Contrary to petitioner’s claim, however, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction for Petitioner, therefore, is in error when she posits that at present it is the HRET
the following reasons: which has exclusive jurisdiction over her qualifications as a Member of the
House of Representatives. That the HRET is the sole judge of all contests
61
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the House
of Representatives is a written constitutional provision. It is, however Petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-
unavailable to petitioner because she is NOT a Member of the House at list organization that won a seat in the House of Representatives during the
present. The COMELEC never ordered her proclamation as the rightful winner 2007 elections.
in the election for such membership. Indeed, the action for cancellation of
petitioner’s certificate of candidacy, the decision in which is the indispensable Respondents Perfecto C. Lucaban, Jr., Ronyl S. Dela Cruz, and Agustin C.
determinant of the right of petitioner to proclamation, was correctly lodged in Doroga, all registered voters, filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent
the COMELEC, was completely and fully litigated in the COMELEC and was HRET against Aangat Tayo and its nominee, petitioner Abayon, alleging that
finally decided by the COMELEC. On and after 14 May 2013, there was Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the House of
nothing left for the COMELEC to do to decide the case. The decision sealed Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized and
the proceedings in the COMELEC regarding petitioner's ineligibility as a underrepresented sectors.
candidate for Representative of Marinduque. The decision erected the bar to
petitioner's proclamation. The bar remained when no restraining order was Petitioner Abayon countered that the COMELEC had already confirmed the
obtained by petitioner from the Supreme Court within five days from 14 May status of Aangat Tayo as a national multi-sectoral party-list organization
2013. representing the workers, woelecmen, youth, urban poor, and elderly and that
she belonged to the women sector.
65. Abayon v. HRET
G.R. No. 189466; February 11, 2010. Finally, petitioner Abayon pointed out that respondent HRET had no
jurisdiction over the petition for quo warranto since respondent Lucaban and
DOCTRINE(s): the others with him collaterally attacked the registration of Aangat Tayo as a
party-list organization, a matter that fell within the jurisdiction of the
It is for the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal to interpret the COMELEC.
meaning of this particular qualification of a nominee - the need for him/her to
be a bona fide member or a representative of his party-list organization - in the On July 16, 2009 respondent HRET issued an order, dismissing the petition
context of the facts that characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparan’s as against Aangat Tayo but upholding its jurisdiction over the qualifications of
relation to Aangat Tayo and Bantay, respectively, and the marginalized and petitioner Abayon. The latter moved for reconsideration but the HRET denied
underrepresented interests that they presumably embody. the same on prompting Abayon to file the present petition for special civil action
of certiorari.
The right to examine the fitness of aspiring nominees and, eventually, to
choose five from among them after all belongs to the party or organization that In G.R. 189506, petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the
nominates them. But where an allegation is made that the party or organization Bantay party-list group that won a seat in the 2007 elections for the members
had chosen and allowed a disqualified nominee to become its party-list of the House of Representatives. Respondents Reynaldo Lesaca, Jr., Cristina
representative in the lower House and enjoy the secured tenure that goes with Palabay, Renato M. Reyes, Jr., Erlinda Cadapan, Antonio Flores, and Joselito
the position, the resolution of the dispute is taken out of its hand. Ustarez are members of some other party-list groups.

Once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed Shortly after the elections, respondent Lesaca and the others with him filed
and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the with respondent HRET a petition for quo warranto against Bantay and its
House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests nominee, petitioner Palparan, alleging that Palparan was ineligible to sit in the
relating to his qualifications ends and the House of Representatives Electoral House of Representatives as party-list nominee because he did not belong to
Tribunal’s (HRET’s) own jurisdiction begins. the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that Bantay represented,
namely, the victims of communist rebels, Civilian Armed Forces Geographical
FACTS: Units (CAFGUs), former rebels, and security guards. Lesaca and the others
said that Palparan committed gross human rights violations against
These two cases are about the authority of the House of Representatives marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations.
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) to pass upon the eligibilities of the nominees of the
party-list groups that won seats in the lower house of Congress.
62
Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his Abayon, that it has the power to do so as an incident of its authority to approve
person since it was actually the party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected to the registration of party-list organizations. But the Court need not resolve this
and assumed membership in the House of Representatives. Palparan claimed question since it is not raised here and has not been argued by the parties.
that he was just Bantays nominee. Consequently, any question involving his
eligibility as first nominee was an internal concern of Bantay. Such question What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that
must be brought, he said, before that party-list group, not before the HRET. the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things,
the qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since, as
Respondent HRET issued an order dismissing the petition against Bantay for pointed out above, party-list nominees are "elected members" of the House of
the reason that the issue of the ineligibility or qualification of the party-list group Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has
fell within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC pursuant to the Party-List System jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the
Act. cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-
list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and
ISSUE: assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's
jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the
Does respondent HRET have jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of HRET's own jurisdiction begins.
petitioners Abayon and Palparan as nominees of Aangat Tayo and Bantay
party-list organizations, respectively, who took the seats at the House of Hence, respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it
Representatives that such organizations won in the 2007 elections? dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and
Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the question of the
RULING: qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.

HRET has jurisdiction. As this Court also held in Bantay Republic Act or BA- 66. Abas Kida v. Senate
RA 7941 v. Commission on Elections, a party-list representative is in every G.R. No. 196271; October 18, 2011.
sense "an elected member of the House of Representatives." Although the
vote cast in a party-list election is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, DOCTRINE(s):
would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually
sit in the House of Representatives. The supermajority (2/3) voting requirement required under Section 1, Article
XVII of RA No. 9054 has to be struck down for giving RA No. 9054 the
Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the qualifications and character of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what the Constitution
grounds for disqualification of party-list nominees. demands.

In the cases before the Court, those who challenged the qualifications of FACTS:
petitioners Abayon and Palparan claim that the two do not belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors that they ought to represent. The On August 1, 1989 or two years after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution,
Party-List System Act provides that a nominee must be a "bona fide member Congress acted through Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 entitled "An Act Providing
of the party or organization which he seeks to represent." for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao."The
initially assenting provinces were Lanao del Sur,Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-
It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a tawi.RA No. 6734 scheduled the first regular elections for the regional officials
nominee the need for him or her to be a bona fide member or a representative of the ARMM on a date not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days after its
of his party-list organization in the context of the facts that characterize ratification.
petitioners Abayon and Palparans relation to Aangat Tayo and Bantay,
respectively, and the marginalized and underrepresented interests that they Thereafter, R.A. No. 9054 was passed to further enhance the structure of
presumably embody. ARMM under R.A. 6734. Along with it is the reset of the regular elections for
the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001.
Parenthetically, although the Party-List System Act does not so state, the
COMELEC seems to believe, when it resolved the challenge to petitioner
63
RA No. 9333was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the ARMM Even assuming that RA no. 9333 and RA no. 10153 did in fact amend RA no.
regional elections to the 2ndMonday of August 2005, and on the same date 9054, the supermajority (2/3) voting requirement required under Section 1,
every 3 years thereafter. Unlike RA No. 6734 and RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333 Article XVII of RA No. 9054 has to be struck down for giving RA No. 9054 the
was not ratified in a plebiscite. character of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what the Constitution
demands.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been
held onAugust 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that a “majority of each
and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to House shall constitute a quorum to do business.” In other words, as long as
be elected.But onJune 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the majority of the members of the House of Representatives or the Senate are
ARMM elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular national and local present, these bodies have the quorum needed to conduct business and hold
elections of the country.With the enactment into law of RA No. 10153, the session. Within a quorum, a vote of majority is generally sufficient to enact
COMELEC stopped its preparations for the ARMM elections. laws or approve acts.

Several cases for certiorari, prohibition and madamus originating from different In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a vote of no less
parties arose as a consequence of the passage of R.A. No. 9333 and R.A. No. than two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of Representatives and of
10153 questioning the validity of said laws. the Senate, voting separately, in order to effectively amend RA No. 9054.
Clearly, this 2/3 voting requirement is higher than what the Constitution
OnSeptember 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining order requires for the passage of bills, and served to restrain the plenary powers of
enjoining the implementation of RA No. 10153 and ordering the incumbent Congress to amend, revise or repeal the laws it had passed.
elective officials of ARMM to continue to perform their functions should these
cases not be decided by the end of their term onSeptember 30, 2011. Thus, while a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is a limitation
in excess of what the Constitution requires on the passage of bills and is
The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 assert constitutionally obnoxious because it significantly constricts the future
that these laws amend RA No. 9054 and thus, have to comply with the legislators’ room for action and flexibility.
supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements prescribed under Sections 1
and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9094 in order to become effective. 67. League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 176951; February 15, 2011.
The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is unconstitutional
for its failure to comply with the three-reading requirement of Section 26(2), DOCTRINE(s):
Article VI of the Constitution.Also cited as grounds are the alleged violations
of the right of suffrage of the people of ARMM, as well as the failure to adhere The enactment of the Cityhood Laws is an exercise by Congress of its
to the "elective and representative" character of the executive and legislative legislative power, which power is the authority, under the Constitution, to make
departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the petitioners challenged the grant to the laws, and to alter and repeal them.
President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the
elective ARMM officials until the officials elected under the May 2013 regular Without doubt, the Local Government Code (LGC) is a creation of Congress
elections shall have assumed office. Corrolarily, they also argue that the power through its law- making powers - Congress has the power to alter or modify it
of appointment also gave the President the power of control over the ARMM, as it did when it enacted Republic Act No. 9009, and such power of
in complete violation of Section 16, Article X of the Constitution. amendment of laws was again exercised when Congress enacted the
Cityhood Laws; Undeniably, Republic Act No. 9009 amended the Local
ISSUE: Government Code (LGC), but it is also true that, in effect, the Cityhood Laws
amended Republic Act No. 9009 through the exemption clauses found therein.
Whether RA 10153 violate the constitutional powers of congress, specifically
irrepealable law. FACTS:

RULING: These cases were initiated by the consolidated petitions for prohibition filed by
the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog,
64
and Jerry P. Treñas, assailing the constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws, Congress intended that those with pending cityhood bills during the 11th
each converting the municipality covered thereby into a component city Congress would not be covered by the new and higher income requirement of
(Cityhood Laws), and seeking to enjoin the COMELEC from conducting P100 million imposed by R.A. No. 9009. When the LGC was amended by R.A.
plebiscites pursuant to the subject laws. No. 9009, the amendment carried with it both the letter and the intent of the
law, and such were incorporated in the LGC by which the compliance of the
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law RA 9009 amending Cityhood Laws was gauged.
Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income
requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million Notwithstanding that both the 11th and 12th Congress failed to act upon the
to P100 million to restrain the “mad rush” of municipalities to convert into cities pending cityhood bills, both the letter and intent of Section 450 of the LGC, as
solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the amended by R.A. No. 9009, were carried on until the 13th Congress, when the
fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence. Cityhood Laws were enacted. The exemption clauses found in the individual
Cityhood Laws are the express articulation of that intent to exempt respondent
Prior to its enactment, a total of 57 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in municipalities from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009.
Congress. Congress did not act on 24 cityhood bills during the 11th Congress.
The enactment of the Cityhood Laws is an exercise by Congress of its
During the 12th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint legislative power. Legislative power is the authority, under the Constitution, to
Resolution No. 29. This Resolution reached the Senate. However, the make laws, and to alter and repeal them. The Constitution, as the expression
12th Congress adjourned without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. of the will of the people in their original, sovereign, and unlimited capacity, has
29. vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines. The grant of legislative
power to Congress is broad, general, and comprehensive. The legislative body
During the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities mentioned in the possesses plenary powers for all purposes of civil government. Any power,
unapproved Joint Resolution No. 29 filed between November and December deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by
of 2006, through their respective sponsors in Congress, individual cityhood Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. In fine, except as
bills containing a common provision, as follows: limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power
embraces all subjects, and extends to matters of general concern or common
Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. - The City of x x x shall be exempted interest.
from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009.
Without doubt, the LGC is a creation of Congress through its law-making
These cityhood bills lapsed into law on various dates from March to July 2007 powers. Congress has the power to alter or modify it as it did when it enacted
after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo failed to sign them. RA No. 9009. Such power of amendment of laws was again exercised when
Congress enacted the Cityhood Laws. When Congress enacted the LGC in
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws 1991, it provided for quantifiable indicators of economic viability for the creation
unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well of local government units - income, population, and land area. Congress
as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the deemed it fit to modify the income requirement with respect to the conversion
wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of of municipalities into component cities when it enacted RA No. 9009, imposing
existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share an amount of P100 million, computed only from locally-generated sources.
the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 However, Congress deemed it wiser to exempt respondent municipalities from
of the Local Government Code. such a belatedly imposed modified income requirement in order to uphold its
higher calling of putting flesh and blood to the very intent and thrust of the
ISSUE: LGC, which is countryside development and autonomy, especially accounting
for these municipalities as engines for economic growth in their respective
Whether RA No 9009 is unconstitutional for violating legislative powers. provinces.

RULING: Undeniably, R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC. But it is also true that, in effect,
the Cityhood Laws amended R.A. No. 9009 through the exemption clauses
found therein. Since the Cityhood Laws explicitly exempted the concerned
65
municipalities from the amendatory R.A. No. 9009, such Cityhood Laws are, amend certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code relative to the
therefore, also amendments to the LGC itself. For this reason, we reverse the value-added tax or VAT. These bills were referred to the House Ways and
November 18, 2008 Decision and the August 24, 2010 Resolution on their Means Committee which recommended for approval a substitute measure, H.
strained and stringent view that the Cityhood Laws, particularly their exemption No. 11197.
clauses, are not found in the LGC.
The bill (H. No. 11197) was considered on second reading starting November
68. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance 6, 1993 and, on November 17, 1993, it was approved by the House of
G.R. No. 115455; August 25, 1994. Representatives after third and final reading.

DOCTRINE(s): It was sent to the Senate on November 23, 1993 and later referred by that
body to its Committee on Ways and Means.
A bill originating in the House of Representatives may undergo such extensive
changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole; As a On February 7, 1994, the Senate Committee submitted its report
result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced and to insist that a recommending approval of S. No. 1630.
revenue statute must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to
deny the Senate’s power not only to “concur with amendments” but also to It was stated that the bill was being submitted “in substitution of Senate Bill
“propose amendments.” No. 1129, taking into consideration P.S. Res. No. 734 and H.B. No. 11197.”

Legislative power is vested in the Congress of the Philippines, consisting of “a On February 8, 1994, the Senate began consideration of the bill (S. No. 1630).
Senate and a House of Representatives,” not in any particular chamber. It finished debates on the bill and approved it on second reading on March 24,
1994. On the same day, it approved the bill on third reading by the affirmative
There is really no difference between the Senate preserving the House Bill up votes of 13 of its members, with one abstention.
to the enacting clause and then writing its own version following the enacting
clause and, on the other hand, separately presenting a bill of its own on the H. No. 11197 and its Senate version (S. No. 1630) were then referred to a
same subject matter. conference committee which, after meeting four times (April 13, 19, 21 and 25,
1994), recommended that “House Bill No. 11197, in consolidation with Senate
The Constitution simply means that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax Bill No. 1630, be approved in accordance with the attached copy of the bill as
bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of reconciled and approved by the conferees.”
local must come from the House of Representatives and that it does not
prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt The Conference Committee bill was thereafter approved by the House of
of the bill from the House. Representatives on April 27, 1994 and by the Senate on May 2, 1994. The
enrolled bill was then presented to the President of the Philippines who, on
FACTS: May 5, 1994, signed it. It became Republic Act No. 7716.

The contention of petitioners is that in enacting Republic Act No. 7716, or the ISSUE:
Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, Congress violated the Constitution because,
although H. No. 11197 had originated in the House of Representatives, it was Whether RA No. 7716 did not “originate exclusively” in the House of
not passed by the Senate but was simply consolidated with the Senate version Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution.
(S. No. 1630) in the Conference Committee to produce the bill which the
President signed into law. The following provisions of the Constitution are cited RULING:
in support of the proposition that because Republic Act No. 7716 was passed
in this manner, it did not originate in the House of Representatives and it has This argument will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law - but the
not thereby become a law. revenue bill - which is required by the Constitution to “originate exclusively” in
the House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this, because a bill
It appears that on various dates between July 22, 1992 and August 31, 1993, originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate
several bills were introduced in the House of Representatives seeking to that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. The possibility of a third version
66
by the conference committee will be discussed later. At this point, what is provisions, the courts are not at liberty to overlook or disregard its commands
important to note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be or countenance evasions thereof. When it is clear that a statute transgresses
produced. To insist that a revenue statute - and not only the bill which initiated the authority vested in a legislative body, it is the duty of the courts to declare
the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law - must that the constitution, and not the statute, governs in a case before them for
substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate’s judgment.
power not only to “concur with amendments” but also to “propose
amendments.” It would be to violate the coequality of legislative power of the FACTS:
two houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate.
PROMAT, where petitioner Fabian was the major stockholder and president,
The contention that the constitutional design is to limit the Senate’s power in participated in the bidding for government construction projects including those
respect of revenue bills in order to compensate for the grant to the Senate of under the FMED, First Metro Manila Engineering District, which private
the treaty-ratifying power and thereby equalize its powers and those of the respondent Nestor V. Agustin was the incumbent District Engineer, and private
House overlooks the fact that the powers being compared are different. We respondent reportedly taking advantage of his official position, inveigled
are dealing here with the legislative power which under the Constitution is petitioner into an amorous relationship. Their affair lasted for some time, in the
vested not in any particular chamber but in the Congress of the Philippines, course of which private respondent gifted PROMAT with public works
consisting of “a Senate and a House of Representatives.” The exercise of the contracts and interceded for it in problems concerning the same in his office.
treaty-ratifying power is not the exercise of legislative power. It is the exercise
of a check on the executive power. There is, therefore, no justification for Later, misunderstandings and unpleasant incidents developed between the
comparing the legislative powers of the House and of the Senate on the basis parties and when petitioner tried to terminate their relationship, private
of the possession of such nonlegislative power by the Senate. The possession respondent refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of
of a similar power by the U.S. Senate has never been thought of as giving it employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. She eventually filed
more legislative powers than the House of Representatives. an administrative case against, which was based on Section 19, RA 6770
(Ombudsman Act of 1989) and Section 36 of PD 807 (Civil Service Decree).
The Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in
anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Graft Investigator Eduardo R. Benitez issued a resolution finding private
Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. The Court respondent guilty of grave misconduct and ordered his dismissal from the
cannot, therefore, understand the alarm expressed over the fact that on March service, which was approved by Director Napoleon Baldrias and Assistant
1, 1993, eight months before the House passed H. No. 11197, S. No. 1129 Ombudsman Abelardo Aportadera.
had been filed in the Senate. After all it does not appear that the Senate ever
considered it. It was only after the Senate had received H. No. 11197 on Herein respondent Ombudsman, in an Order, approved the aforesaid
November 23, 1993 that the process of legislation in respect of it began with resolution with modifications. After private respondent moved for
the referral to the Senate Committee on Ways and Means of H. No. 11197 and reconsideration, respondent Ombudsman discovered that the former’s new
the submission by the Committee on February 7, 1994 of S. No. 1630. For that counsel had been his classmate and close associate hence he inhibited
matter, if the question were simply the priority in the time of filing of bills, the himself. The case was transferred to respodent Deputy Ombudsman Jesus F.
fact is that it was in the House that a bill (H. No. 253) to amend the VAT law Guerrero who, in the now challenged Joint Order, exonerating private
was first filed on July 22, 1992. Several other bills had been filed in the House respondent from the administrative charges.
before S. No. 1129 was filed in the Senate, and H. No. 11197 was only a
substitute of those earlier bills. Petitioner, now argues that, Section 27 of RA 6770 provides for an appeal to
the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari. Pointing out that under
69. Fabian v. Desierto Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 7 (Rules of Procedure of the
G.R. No. 129742; September 16, 1998. Office of the Ombudsman), when a respondent is absolved of the charges in
an administrative proceeding the decision of the Ombudsman is final and
DOCTRINE(s): unappealable. She accordingly submits that the Office of the Ombudsman has
no authority under the law to restrict, in the manner provided in its aforesaid
Since the constitution is intended for the observance of the judiciary and other Rules, the right of appeal allowed by RA 6770, nor to limit the power of review
departments of the government and the judges are sworn to support its of the Supreme Court.
67
 G.R. No. 217126-27; November 10, 2015.
Respondent argues that the Office of the Ombudsman is empowered by the
Constitution and the law to promulgate its own rules of procedure. Section DOCTRINE(s):
13(8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, provides among others, that the
Office of the Ombudsman can “promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise When Congress creates a court and delimits its jurisdiction, the procedure for
such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by which its jurisdiction is exercised is fixed by the Court through the rules it
law.” promulgates.

Ultimately, the parties attempted to review and rationalize the decisions of the To give true meaning to the judicial power contemplated by the Framers of our
Court in applying Section 27 of RA 6770 vis-a-vis Section 7, Rule III of Admin. Constitution, the Court’s duly promulgated rules of procedure should therefore
Order No. 7, where appeal can be had to the Court. remain unabridged, this, even by statute.

ISSUE: FACTS:

Whether Section 27 of RA 6770 is a prohibited legislation by increasing the On July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Nicolas "Ching" Enciso VI before the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay,
Jr. and other public officers and employees of the City Government of Makati
RULING: (Binay, Jr., et... al), accusing them of Plunder and violation of Republic Act No.
(RA) 3019, otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," in
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this connection with the five (5) phases of the procurement and construction of the
Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative Makati City Hall Parking Building (Makati Parking Building).
disciplinary cases. It violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the
Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this On even date, Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, docketed
Court. The constitutional prohibition was intended to give this Court a measure as CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, seeking the nullification of the preventive
of control over cases placed under its appellate Jurisdiction.Otherwise, the suspension order, and praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin
indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction its implementation.
would unnecessarily burden the Court. a) Phases I and II were undertaken before he was elected Mayor of Makati in
2010 Phases III to V transpired during his first term and that his re-election as
The submission that because this Court has taken cognizance of cases City Mayor of Makati for a second term effectively condoned his administrative
involving Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770, that fact may be viewed as liability therefor, if any, thus... rendering the administrative cases against him
“acquiescence” or “acceptance” by it of the appellate jurisdiction contemplated moot and academic.
in said Section 27, is unfortunately too tenuous. The jurisdiction of a court is
not a question of acquiescence as a matter of fact but an issue of conferment Prior to the hearing of the oral arguments before the CA, or on March 25, 2015,
as a matter of law. Besides, we have already discussed the cases referred to, the Ombudsman filed the present petition before this Court, assailing the CA's
including the inaccuracies of some statements therein, and we have pointed March 16, 2015 Resolution, which granted Binay, Jr.'s prayer for TRO.
out the instances when Rule 45 is involved, hence covered by Section 27 of
Republic Act No. 6770 now under discussion, and when that provision would The Ombudsman claims that: (a) the CA had no jurisdiction to grant Binay,
not apply if it is a judicial review under Rule 65. Jr.'s prayer for a TRO, citing Section 14 of RA 6770,[82] or "The Ombudsman
Act of 1989," which states that no injunctive writ could be issued to delay the
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Ombudsman's investigation unless there is prima facie evidence that the
Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative subject matter thereof is outside the latter's jurisdiction and (b) the CA's
disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, directive for the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt
Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate is illegal and improper, considering that the Ombudsman is an impeachable
jurisdiction of this Court. officer, and therefore, cannot be subjected to contempt proceedings.

70. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals

68
Binay, Jr. argues that Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution specifically The Ombudsman's argument against the CA's lack of subject matter
grants the CA judicial power to review acts of any branch or instrumentality of jurisdiction over the main petition, and her corollary prayer for its dismissal, is
government, including the Office of the Ombudsman, in case of grave abuse based on her interpretation of Section 14, RA 6770, or the Ombudsman Act.
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, which he asserts was
committed in this case when said office issued the preventive suspension The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is a prohibition against any court
order against him. (except the Supreme Court) from issuing a writ of injunction to delay an
investigation being conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman.
Binay, Jr. maintains that the CA correctly enjoined the implementation of the
preventive suspension order given his clear and unmistakable right to public As a general rule, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 bans the
office, and that it is clear that he could not be held administratively liable for whole range of remedies against issuances of the Ombudsman.
any of the charges against him since his subsequent re-election in 2013
operated as a condonation of any administrative offenses he may have The subject provision, however, crafts an exception to the foregoing general
committed during his previous term. rule. While the specific procedural vehicle is not explicit from its text, it is fairly
deducible that the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 excepts, as the
Binay, Jr. submits that while the Ombudsman is indeed an impeachable officer only allowable remedy against "the decision or findings of the Ombudsman,"
and, hence, cannot be removed from office except by way of impeachment, an a Rule 45 appeal, for the reason that it is the only remedy taken to the Supreme
action for contempt imposes the penalty of fine and imprisonment, without Court on "pure questions of law," whether under the 1964 Rules of Court or
necessarily resulting in removal from office. Thus, the fact that the the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure: Section 5, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution
Ombudsman is an impeachable officer should not deprive the CA of its guarantees the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.
inherent power to punish contempt.
As may be deduced from the various discourses in Gonzales III, the concept
the CA issued a Resolution which further enjoined the implementation of the of Ombudsman's independence covers three (3) things:
preventive suspension order.
First: creation by the Constitution, which means that the office cannot be
In so ruling, the CA found that Binay, Jr. has an ostensible right to the final abolished, nor its constitutionally specified functions and privileges, be
relief prayed for, namely, the nullification of the preventive suspension order, removed, altered, or modified by law, unless the Constitution itself allows, or
in view of the condonation doctrine, citing Aguinaldo v. Santos. an amendment thereto is made;

The Ombudsman has been adamant that the CA has no jurisdiction to issue Second: fiscal autonomy, which means that the office "may not be obstructed
any provisional injunctive writ against her office to enjoin its preventive from [its] freedom to use or dispose of [its] funds for purposes germane to [its]
suspension orders. As basis, she invokes the first paragraph of Section 14, functions; hence, its budget cannot be strategically decreased by officials of
RA 6770 in conjunction with her office's independence under the 1987 the political branches of government so as to impair said functions; and
Constitution. She advances the idea that "[i]n order to further ensure [her
office's] independence, [RA 6770] likewise insulated it from judicial Third: insulation from executive supervision and control, which means that
intervention," particularly, "from injunctive reliefs traditionally obtainable from those within the ranks of the office can only be disciplined by an internal
the courts," claiming that said writs may work "just as effectively as direct authority.
harassment or political pressure would."
Evidently, all three aspects of independence intend to protect the Office of the
ISSUE: Ombudsman from political harassment and pressure, so as to free it from the
"insidious tentacles of politics.”
Whether the CA has jurisdiction to issue a TRO and/or WPI enjoining the
implementation of a preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman. That being the case, the concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be
invoked as basis to insulate the Ombudsman from judicial power
RULING: constitutionally vested unto the courts. Courts are apolitical bodies, which are
ordained to act as impartial tribunals and apply even justice to all. Hence, the
Ombudsman's notion that it can be exempt from an incident of judicial power
69
- that is, a provisional writ of injunction against a preventive suspension order in the province of Cotabato are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur.
- clearly strays from the concept's rationale of insulating the office from political This brought about a change in the boundaries of the two provinces.
harassment or pressure.
Barrios Togaig and Madalum are within the municipality of Buldon in
The Ombudsman's erroneous abstraction of her office's independence the Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo,
notwithstanding, it remains that the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan are
textually prohibits courts from extending provisional injunctive relief to delay parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in the
any investigation conducted by her office. Despite the usage of the general Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur.
phrase "[n]o writ of injunction shall be issued by any court," the Ombudsman
herself concedes that the prohibition does not cover the Supreme Court. Apprised of this development, the Office of the President, recommended to
Comelec that the operation of the statute be suspended until "clarified by
Hence, with Congress interfering with matters of procedure (through passing correcting legislation."
the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770) without the Court's consent thereto,
it remains that the CA had the authority to issue the questioned injunctive writs Comelec, by resolution declared that the statute should be implemented
enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension order against unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.
Binay, Jr. At the risk of belaboring the point, these issuances were merely
ancillary to the exercise of the CA's certiorari jurisdiction conferred to it under ISSUE:
Section 9 (1), Chapter I of BP 129, as amended, and which it had already
acquired over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 case. Whether RA 4790, which is entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of
Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur", but which includes barrios located
71. Lidasan v. COMELEC in another province — Cotabato.
G.R. No. L-28089; October 25, 1967.
RULING:
DOCTRINE(s):
Yes, RA 4790 is unconstitutional for embracing more than one subject in the
Section 21(1), Art. VI of the Constitution contains dual limitations upon title.
legislative power. First, Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one
statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second, the title of the bill is to be couched Section 21(1), Art. VI of the Constitution contains dual limitations upon
in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those legislative power. First, Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one
concerned of the import of the single subject thereof. statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second, the title of the bill is to be couched
in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those
Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be concerned of the import of the single subject thereof.
expressed in the title of the bill. Compliance is imperative, given the fact that
the Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be
deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247, expressed in the title of the bill. Compliance is imperative, given the fact that
which became R.A. 4790, only its title was read from its introduction to its final the Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its
approval in the House of Representatives, where the bill, being of local deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247,
application, originated. which became R.A. 4790, only its title was read from its introduction to its final
approval in the House of Representatives, where the bill, being of local
FACTS: application, originated.

Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, The Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an
and a qualified voter for the 1967 elections assails the constitutionality of RA enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully indexed or
4790 and petitioned that Comelec's resolutions implementing the same for catalogued, all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title
electoral purposes be nullified. Under RA 4790, 12 barrios in two municipalities should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the
legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of
70
the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. G.R. No. 186616; November 20, 2009.
And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the
same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud DOCTRINE(s):
upon the legislators.
Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall
The test of the sufficiency of a title whether or not it is misleading; and, while be expressed in the title thereof.
technical accuracy is not essential and the subject need not be stated in
express terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title which
is so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the FACTS:
purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is
misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or Before the October 29, 2007 Synchronized Barangay and Sungguniang
different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression on Kabataan (SK) Elections, some of the then incumbent officials of several
indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad. In determining barangays of Caloocan City filed with the RTC a petition for declaratory relief
sufficiency of particular title its substance rather than its form should be to challenge the constitutionality of Section 2, RA 9164, amending RA 7160.
considered, and the purpose of the constitutional requirement, of giving notice
to all persons interested, should be kept in mind by the court. The RTC agrees with private respondent and said that the law violated the
one-act-one-subject rule embodied in the Constitution. The challenged law’s
The baneful effects of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to title is “AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE SYNCHRONIZED BARANGAY AND
perceive. Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full SANGGUNIANG KABATAAN ELECTIONS, AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT
impact of the law; it did not appraise the people in the towns of Bulden and 7160 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF
Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their 1991 AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.” To this court, the non-inclusion in the
territory is being taken away from the towns and province and added to the title of the act on the retroactivity of the reckoning of the term limits posed a
adjacent province of Lanao del Sur it kept the public in the dark as to what serious constitutional breach, particularly on the provision of the constitution
towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill. These are the pressures [sic] that every bill must embrace only one subject to be expressed in the title
which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of R.A. 4700. thereof. the Court is of the view that the affected barangay officials were not
sufficiently given notice that they were already disqualified by a new act, when
Respondent’s stance is that the change in boundaries of the two provinces under the previous enactments no such restrictions were imposed. Even if this
resulting in “the substantial diminution of the territoral limits” of Cotabato Court would apply the usual test in determining the sufficiency of the title of
province is “merely the incidental legal results of the definition of the boundary” the bill, the challenged law would still be insufficient for how can a retroactivity
of the municipality of Dianaton and that, therefore, reference to the fact that of the term limits be germane to the synchronization of an election.
portions in Cotabato are taken away “need not be expressed in the title of the
law.” This posture - we must say - but emphasizes the error of constitutional The COMELEC takes the position that the assailed law is valid and
dimensions in writing down the title of the bill. Transfer of a sizeable portion of constitutional. RA No. 9164 is an amendatory law to RA No. 7160 (the Local
territory from one province to another of necessity involves reduction of area, Government Code of 1991 or LGC) and is not a penal law; hence, it cannot be
population and income of the first and the corresponding increase of those of considered an ex post facto law. The three-term limit, according to the
the other. This is as important as the creation of a municipality. And yet, the COMELEC, has been specifically provided in RA No. 7160, and RA No. 9164
title did not reflect this fact. merely restated the three-term limitation. It further asserts that laws which are
not penal in character may be applied retroactively when expressly so provided
But when the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected, and when it does not impair vested rights. As there is no vested right to public
as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, office, much less to an elective post, there can be no valid objection to the
as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that if alleged retroactive application of RA No. 9164.
all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue
independently, then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which The COMELEC also argues that the RTC’s invalidation of RA No. 9164
are thus dependent, conditional, or connected, must fall with them. essentially involves the wisdom of the law - the aspect of the law that the RTC
has no right to inquire into under the constitutional separation of powers
72. COMELEC v. Cruz principle. The COMELEC lastly argues that there is no violation of the one
71
subject-one title rule, as the matters covered by RA No. 9164 are related; the Finally, to require the inclusion of term limitation in the title of RA No. 9164 is
assailed provision is actually embraced within the title of the law. to make the title an index of all the subject matters dealt with by law; this is not
what the constitutional requirement contemplates.

ISSUE: 73. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance

G.R. No. 115455; August 25, 1994.
Whether RA 9164 is violative of one subject-one title rule.
DOCTRINE(s):
RULING:
Presidential certification on urgency of a bill dispenses with the requirement
Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days.
be expressed in the title thereof. Fariñas v. Executive Secretary provides the
reasons for this constitutional requirement and the test for its application, as FACTS:
follows: “The proscription is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus
bills and log-rolling legislation as well as surreptitious and/or unconsidered Petitioners argue that Senate Bill No. 1630 did not pass three readings on
encroaches. The provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating to its separate days as required by the Constitution because the second and third
subject finding expression in its title. To determine whether there has been readings were done on the same day, March 24, 1994. But this was because
compliance with the constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall on February 24, 1994 and again on March 22, 1994, the President had certified
be expressed in its title. This Court has held that an act having a single general Senate Bill No. 1630 as urgent.
subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter
how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign ISSUE:
to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject
by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject. Whether RA 7716 violate Art. VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution.

We find, under these settled parameters, that the challenged proviso does not RULING:
violate the one subject-one title rule.
The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of
First, the title of RA No. 9164, “An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase “except
and Sangguniang Kabataang Elections, amending Republic Act No. 7160, as when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc.”
amended, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991,” states in Art. VI, § 26(2) qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become
the law’s general subject matter - the amendment of the LGC to synchronize a law: (i) the bill has passed three readings on separate days and (ii) it has
the barangay and SK elections and purposes. To achieve synchronization of been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally
the barangay and SK elections, the reconciliation of the varying lengths of the approved. In other words, the “unless” clause must be read in relation to the
terms of office of barangay officials and SK officials is necessary. Closely “except” clause, because the two are really coordinate clauses of the same
related with length of term is term limitation which defines the total number of sentence. To construe the “except” clause as simply dispensing with the
terms for which a barangay official may run for and hold office. This natural second requirement in the “unless” clause (i.e., printing and distribution three
linkage demonstrates that term limitation is not foreign to the general subject days before final approval) would not only violate the rules of grammar. It
expressed in the title of the law. would also negate the very premise of the “except” clause: the necessity of
securing the immediate enactment of a bill which is certified in order to meet a
Second, the congressional debates we cited above show that the legislators public calamity or emergency. For if it is only the printing that is dispensed with
and the public they represent were fully informed of the purposes, nature and by presidential certification, the time saved would be so negligible as to be of
scope of the law’s provisions. Term limitation therefore received the notice, any use in insuring immediate enactment. It may well be doubted whether
consideration, and action from both the legislators and the public. doing away with the necessity of printing and distributing copies of the bill three
days before the third reading would insure speedy enactment of a law in the
face of an emergency requiring the calling of a special election for President

72
and Vice-President. Under the Constitution such a law is required to be made Every bill passed by Congress must be presented to the President for approval
within seven days of the convening of Congress in emergency session. or veto and in the absence of presentment to the President, no bill passed by
Congress can become a law.
That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of three
readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed FACTS:
with is supported by the weight of legislative practice. For example, the bill
defining the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court which, in consolidation with the Petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the
Senate version, became Republic Act No. 5440, was passed on second and ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of power. While the legislative
third readings in the House of Representatives on the same day (May 14, function is deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment and
1968) after the bill had been certified by the President as urgent. approval of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight committee
permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the
There is, therefore, no merit in the contention that presidential certification law.
dispenses only with the requirement for the printing of the bill and its
distribution three days before its passage but not with the requirement of three Respondents, through the Solicitor General, they assert that the creation of
readings on separate days, also. the congressional oversight committee under the law enhances, rather than
violates, separation of powers. It ensures the fulfillment of the legislative policy
74. ABAKADA v. Purisima and serves as a check to any over-accumulation of power on the part of the
G.R. No. 166715; August 14, 2008. executive and the implementing agencies.

DOCTRINE(s): ISSUE:

Congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither Whether Section 12 of RA 9335 violates the constitution.
necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement
laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of powers, but to forestall RULING:
the danger of congressional encroachment “beyond the legislative sphere,” the
Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on Congress - it may Section 12 of RA 9335 creating a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee to
not vest itself, any of its committees or its members with either executive or approve the implementing rules and regulations of the law is unconstitutional.
judicial power, and, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the
“single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures” specified The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for the
under the Constitution, including the procedure for enactment of laws and purpose of approving the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated
presentment; Any post-enactment congressional measure should be limited to by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved
scrutiny and investigation - any action or step beyond that will undermine the the said IRR. From then on, it became functus officio and ceased to exist.
separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive function of
implementing and enforcing the law may be considered moot and academic.
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an
administrative agency to present the proposed implementing rules and In Macalintal, given the concept and configuration of the power of
regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee formed congressional oversight and considering the nature and powers of a
by it, retains a “right” or “power” to approve or disapprove such regulations constitutional body like the Commission on Elections, the Court struck down
before they take effect; Congress has two options when enacting legislation to the provision in RA 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) creating
define national policy within the broad horizons of its legislative competence - a Joint Congressional Committee. The committee was tasked not only to
it can itself formulate the details or it can assign to the executive branch the monitor and evaluate the implementation of the said law but also to review,
responsibility for making necessary managerial decisions in conformity with revise, amend and approve the IRR promulgated by the Commission on
those standards. Elections. The Court held that these functions infringed on the constitutional
independence of the Commission on Elections.

73
With this backdrop, it is clear that congressional oversight is not of Police to recall five members of the city police force who had been assigned
unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an to the Vice-Mayor presumably under authority of Republic Act 4065.
encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the
constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and Reacting to these steps taken by Mayor Villegas, the then Vice- Mayor,
balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even Herminio A. Astorga, filed a petition with this Court on September 7, 1964 for
enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of “Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and
power in the executive branch. Prohibitory Injunction” to compel respondents Mayor of Manila, the Executive
Secretary, the Commissioner of Civil Service, the Manila Chief of Police, the
Any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to Manila City Treasurer and the members of the municipal board to comply with
scrutiny and investigation. Any action or step beyond that will undermine the the provisions of Republic Act 4065.
separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in
Respondents’ position is that the so-called Republic Act 4065 never became
this class.
law since it was not the bill actually passed by the Senate, and that the entries
in the journal of that body and not the enrolled bill itself should be decisive in
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an
administrative agency to present the proposed implementing rules and the resolution of the issue.
regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or though a committee formed Issue:
by it, retains a “right” or “power” to approve or disapprove such regulations whether or not a resolution of both Houses of Congress proposing an
before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of a amendment to the (1935) Constitution to be appended as an ordinance thereto
congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning (the so-called parity rights provision) had been passed by “a vote of three-
delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives”
scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law initially pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution.
delegated broad power.

75. HERMINIO A. ASTORGA vs ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS Ruling:

GR No. L-23475. April 30, 1974 The Court declared RA was not duly enacted and therefore did not become
law. The (1935) Constitution is silent as to what shall constitute proof of due
Doctrine: enactment of a bill. It does not require the presiding officers to certify to the
same.
The enrolled bill theory is based mainly on “the respect due to co-equal and The enrolled bill theory is based mainly on “the respect due to co-equal and
independent departments,” which requires the judicial department “to accept, independent departments,” which requires the judicial department “to accept,
as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated.” as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated.”
Facts: The Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill 9266 signed
by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress.
The present controversy revolves around the passage of House Bill No. 9266, Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this
which became Republic Act 4065, “An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and and resort to the Senate journal for that purpose. The journal discloses that
Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila, Further Amending for the substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and
Purpose Sections Ten and Eleven of Republic Act Numbered Four Hundred approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to
Nine, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the Revised Charter of the City of the President and signed by him. This Court is not asked to incorporate such
Manila.” amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is a risky undertaking, but
The then Mayor of Manila, Antonio Villegas, issued circulars to the department to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law.
This We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief
heads and chiefs of offices of the city government as well as to the owners,
Executive did, when they withdrew their signatures therein.
operators and/or managers of business establishments in Manila to disregard
the provisions of Republic Act 4065. He likewise issued an order to the Chief

74
 76. DR. EMIGDIO A. BONDOC vs REPRESENTATIVES MARCIANO M. The Court answered in negative. The use of the word “sole” in both Section 17
PINEDA of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution underscores
the exclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal as judge of contests
G.R. No, 97710. September 26, 1991 relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House
of Representatives. The tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court
Doctrine:
although two thirds of its members are politicians. It is a non-political body in
The use of the word “sole” in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and a sea of politicians x x x To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House
Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of Electoral Tribunal must be independent. Its jurisdiction to hear and decide
the House Electoral Tribunal as judge of contests relating to the election, congressional election contests is not to be shared by it with the Legislature
returns and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. nor with the Courts.

Facts:
77. REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES vs COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano M. JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN
Pineda of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A.
Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for the position of G.R. No. 207264 June 25, 2013
Representative for the Fourth District of the province of Pampanga. Each
Doctrine:
received the following votes in the canvass made by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Pampanga The jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a
Member of the House of Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI of
Pineda was proclaimed winner in the election. In due time, Bondoc filed a
the 1987 Constitution
protest in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal which is composed
of nine (9) members, three of whom are Justices of the Supreme Court and Facts: Respondent Joseph Socorro Tan, a registered voter and resident of the
the remaining six are members of the House of Representatives chosen on Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC an Amended
the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC)
parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented of petitioner on the ground that it contained material misrepresentations,
therein. After the revision of the ballots, the presentation of evidence, and specifically: (1) that she is single when she is married to Congressman
submission of memoranda, Bondoc’s protest was submitted for decision in Herminaldo I. Mandanas of Batangas; (2) that she is a resident of Brgy. Lupac,
July, 1989. By October 1990, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc Boac, Marinduque when she is a resident of Bauan, Batangas which is the
won over Pineda by a margin of twenty-three (23) votes. At that point, the LDP residence of her husband, and at the same time, when she is also a resident
members in the Tribunal insisted on a reappreciation and recount of the ballots of 135 J.P. Rizal, Brgy. Milagrosa, Quezon City as admitted in the Directory of
cast in some precincts, thereby delaying by at least four (4) months the Congressional Spouses of the House of Representatives; (3) that her date of
finalization of the decision in the case. The reexamination and re-appreciation birth is 3 July 1964 when other documents show that her birthdate is either 8
of the ballots resulted in increasing Bondoc’s lead over Pineda to 107 votes, July 1959 or 3 July 1960; (4) that she is not a permanent resident of another
Congressman Camasura voted with the Supreme Court Justices and country when she is a permanent resident or an immigrant4 of the United
Congressman Cerilles to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest. States of America; and (5) that she is a Filipino citizen when she is, in fact, an
American citizen.
Issue:
Petitioner countered that, while she is publicly known to be the wife of
May the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant political
Congressman Herminaldo I. Mandanas there is no valid and binding marriage
party therein, change that party’s representation in the House Electoral
between them. According to petitioner, although her marriage with
Tribunal to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal
Congressman Mandanas was solemnized in a religious rite, it did not comply
in an election contest pending therein?
with certain formal requirements prescribed by the Family Code, rendering it
Ruling: void ab initio. Consequently, petitioner argues that as she is not duty-bound to
live with Congressman Mandanas, then his residence cannot be attributed to
her. As to her date of birth, the Certificate of Live Birth issued by the National
75
Statistics Office shows that it was on 3 July 1964. Lastly, petitioner notes that The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) is the sole judge of
the allegation that she is a permanent resident and/or a citizen of the United all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members
States of America is not supported by evidence. of the House of Representatives is a written constitutional provision.

The COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution cancelling petitioner’s COC. Facts:
Which was duly affirmed by the COMELEC En Banc. Four days thereafter or
on 18 May 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the 13 May 2013 This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the En Banc Resolution of 25 June
Elections. 2013. Petitioner is a duly proclaimed winner and having taken her oath of office
as member of the House of Representatives, all questions regarding her
Issue: qualifications are outside the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and are within the
HRET exclusive jurisdiction.
Whether or not Respondent Comelec is without jurisdiction over Petitioner who
is a duly proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath of office for Issue:
the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the lone
congressional district of Marinduque. Whether the petitioner is correct when she posits that at present it is the HRET
which has exclusive jurisdiction over her qualifications as a Member of the
House of Representatives.

Ruling: The Court answered in negative. The COMELEC retains jurisdiction Ruling:
for the following reasons:
The Court ruled that petitioner is in error when she posits that at present it is
First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner’s the HRET which has exclusive jurisdiction over her qualifications as a Member
qualifications, as well as over the assailed COMELEC Resolutions, unless a of the House of Representatives. That the HRET is the sole judge of all
petition is duly filed with said tribunal. Petitioner has not averred that she has contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of
filed such action. the House of Representatives is a written constitutional provision. It is,
however unavailable to petitioner because she is NOT a Member of the House
Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is at present. The COMELEC never ordered her proclamation as the rightful
considered a Member of the House of Representatives, as stated in Section winner in the election for such membership. Indeed, the action for cancellation
17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy, the decision in which is the
indispensable determinant of the right of petitioner to proclamation, was
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal supposed assumption
correctly lodged in the COMELEC, was completely and fully litigated in the
of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner’s qualifications after the May 8, 1995 COMELEC and was finally decided by the COMELEC. On and after 14 May
elections, suffice it to say that HRET’s jurisdiction as the sole judge of all 2013, there was nothing left for the COMELEC to do to decide the case. The
contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of
decision sealed the proceedings in the COMELEC regarding petitioner’s
Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House
ineligibility as a candidate for Representative of Marinduque. The decision
of Representatives. Petitioner not being a member of the House of
erected the bar to petitioner’s proclamation. The bar remained when no
Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction
restraining order was obtained by petitioner from the Supreme Court within five
over the question.
days from 14 May 2013.

78. REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES vs COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

79. DARYL GRACE J. ABAYON vs THE HONORABLE HOUSE OF
JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, PERFECTO C.
G.R. No. 207264. October 22, 2013 (MR) LUCABAN, JR., RONYL S. DE LA CRUZ and AGUSTIN C. DOROGA

Doctrine: G.R. No. 189466. February 11, 2010

Doctrine:

76
Once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed Issue:
and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the
House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of
relating to his qualifications ends and the House of Representatives Electoral qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan as nominees of Aangat Tayo
Tribunal (HRET’s) own jurisdiction begins. and Bantay party-list organizations, respectively, who took the seats at the
House of Representatives that such organizations won in the 2007 elections.

Ruling:
Facts:
The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion
In G.R. 189466, petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the when it dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-
Aangat Tayo party-list organization that won a seat in the House of list and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the question of the
Representatives during the 2007 elections. qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.

Respondents Perfecto C. Lucaban, Jr., Ronyl S. Dela Cruz, and Agustin C. What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that
Doroga, all registered voters, filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things,
HRET against Aangat Tayo and its nominee, petitioner Abayon. They claimed the qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since, as
that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party- list seat in the House of pointed out above, party-list nominees are “elected members” of the House of
Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized and Representatives no less than the district representatives are, theHRET has
underrepresented sectors. jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the
cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-
Petitioner Abayon pointed out that respondent HRET had no jurisdiction over list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and
the petition for quo warranto since respondent Lucaban and the others with assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s
him collaterally attacked the registration of Aangat Tayo as a party-list jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the
organization, a matter that fell within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC. It was HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of Representatives, and not
Abayon who was just its nominee. All questions involving her eligibility as first
nominee, said Abayon, were internal concerns of Aangat Tayo. POWERS OF CONGRESS
Respondent HRET issued an order, dismissing the petition as against Aangat 80. DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA vs SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Tayo but upholding its jurisdiction over the qualifications of petitioner Abayon.
G.R. No. 196271. October 18, 2011
In G.R. 189506, petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the
Bantay party-list group that won a seat in the 2007 elections for the members Doctrine:
of the House of Representatives. Respondents Reynaldo Lesaca, Jr., Cristina
Palabay, Renato M. Reyes, Jr., Erlinda Cadapan, Antonio Flores, and Joselito The House of Representatives and the Senate gave full recognition to the
Ustarez are members of some other party-list groups. President’s certification and promptly enacted RA No. 10153.

Shortly after the elections, respondent Lesaca and the others with him filed Facts:
with respondent HRET a petition for quo warranto against Bantay and its
nominee, petitioner Palparan. Lesaca and the others alleged that Palparan Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled “An Act Providing for the
was ineligible to sit in the House of Representatives as party-list nominee Synchronization of the Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim
because he did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and Local Elections and for Other
that Bantay represented. Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no Purposes” was enacted. The law reset the ARMM elections from the 8th of
jurisdiction over his person since it was actually the party-list Bantay, not he, August 2011, to the second Monday of May 2013 and every three (3) years
that was elected to and assumed membership in the House of thereafter, to coincide with the country’s regular national and local elections.
Representatives. The law as well granted the President the power to “appoint officers-in-charge
(OICs) for the Office of the Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor,
77
and the Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, who shall perform the Ruling:
functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May
2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.” The Court held that the enactment of the Cityhood Laws is an exercise by
Congress of its legislative power. Legislative power is the authority, under the
Even before its formal passage, the bills that became RA No. 10153 already Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them. The Constitution, as
spawned petitions against their validity; House Bill No. 4146 and Senate Bill the expression of the will of the people in their original, sovereign, and
No. 2756 were challenged in petitions filed with this Court. These petitions unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines.
multiplied after RA No. 10153 was passed. The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general, and
comprehensive. The legislative body possesses plenary powers for all
Issue: purposes of civil government. Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage
and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution
Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 violates Section 26(2), Article VI of the
has lodged it elsewhere. In fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either
1987 Constitution.
expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects, and extends to
Ruling: matters of general concern or common interest. Thus, the sixteen cityhood
laws violate Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution.
The Court ruled in negative and uphold the constitutionality of RA No. 10153
in toto. The House of Representatives and the Senate—in the exercise of their
legislative discretion—gave full recognition to the President’s certification and 82. ARTURO M. TOLENTINO vs THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and
promptly enacted RA No. 10153. Under the circumstances, nothing short of THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the two houses of Congress can justify Doctrine:
our intrusion under our power of judicial review.
A bill originating in the House of Representatives may undergo such extensive
changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole; As a
81. LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) vs COMMISSION
result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced and to insist that a
ON ELECTIONS
revenue statute must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to
G.R. No. 176951. February 15, 2011 deny the Senate’s power not only to “concur with amendments” but also to
“propose amendments.”
Doctrine:
Facts:
The enactment of the Cityhood Laws is an exercise by Congress of its
legislative power, which power is the authority, under the Constitution, to make The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods
laws, and to alter and repeal them. and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. It is equivalent
to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in money of goods or properties
Facts: sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale or exchange
of services. Republic Act No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing
These cases were initiated by the consolidated petitions for prohibition filed by VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal
the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, Revenue Code. There are various suits for certiorari and prohibition,
and Jerry P. Treñas, assailing the constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws, challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7716 on various grounds.
each converting the municipality covered thereby into a component city
(Cityhood Laws), and seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections The contention of petitioners is that in enacting Republic Act No. 7716, or the
(COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the subject laws. Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, Congress violated the Constitution because,
although H. No. 11197 had originated in the House of Representatives, it was
Issue: not passed by the Senate but was simply consolidated with the Senate version
(S. No. 1630) in the Conference Committee to produce the bill which the
Whether the sixteen cityhood laws violate Section 10, Article X of the 1987 President signed into law. The following provisions of the Constitution are cited
Constitution. in support of the proposition that because Republic Act No. 7716 was passed
78
in this manner, it did not originate in the House of Representatives and it has Respondents consequently contend that, on the foregoing constitutional and
not thereby become a law. statutory authority, petitioner cannot assail the validity of the rules of procedure
formulated by the Office of the Ombudsman governing the conduct of
Issue: proceedings before it, including those rules with respect to the availability or
non- availability of appeal in administrative cases, such as Section 7, Rule III
Whether Republic Act No. 7716 is a not law as it did not “originate exclusively”
of Administrative Order No. 07.
in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Section 24 of the
Constitution. Respondents also question the propriety of petitioner’s proposition that,
although she definitely prefaced her petition by categorizing the same as “an
Ruling:
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,” she makes the
The Court ruled in negative. The Court held that it is not the law—but the aforequoted ambivalent statement which in effect asks that, should the remedy
revenue bill—which is required by the Constitution to “originate exclusively” in under Rule 45 be unavailable, her petition be treated in the alternative as an
the House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this, because a bill original action for certiorari under Rule 65. The parties thereafter engage in a
originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate discussion of the differences between a petition for review on certiorari under
that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. The possibility of a third version Rule 45 and a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.
by the conference committee will be discussed later. At this point, what is Ultimately, they also attempt to review and rationalize the decisions of this
important to note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be Court applying Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 vis-à-vis Section 7, Rule
produced. To insist that a revenue statute—and not only the bill which initiated
III of Administrative Order No. 07.
the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law—must
substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate’s Issue:
power not only to “concur with amendments” but also to “propose
amendments.” It would violate the coequality of legislative power of the two Whether Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an
houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate. appeal to the Supreme Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
in administrative disciplinary cases.

83. TERESITA G. FABIAN vs HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO Ruling:

G.R. No. 129742. September 16, 1998 The Court held in negative. Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly
authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the
Doctrine: Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the
proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument
Supreme Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional
administrative disciplinary cases—it consequently violates the proscription in prohibition which, as correctly explained in First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs.
Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the The Court of Appeals, et al. was intended to give this Court a measure of
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, the
indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction
Facts:
would unnecessarily burden the Court.
Petitioner has appealed to us by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
from the “Joint Order” issued by public respondents which granted the motion
for reconsideration of and absolved private respondent from administrative 84. CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES vs COURT OF APPEALS
charges for inter alia grave misconduct committed by him as the Assistant G.R. Nos. 217126-27. November 10, 2015
Regional Director, Region IV-A, Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH). Doctrine:

79
The first paragraph of Section 14, Republic Act (RA) No. 6770 is a prohibition suspension of an action while the main case remains pending, the “writ of
against any court (except the Supreme Court [SC]) from issuing a writ of injunction” mentioned in this paragraph could only refer to injunctions of the
injunction to delay an investigation being conducted by the Office of the provisional kind, consistent with the nature of a provisional injunctive relief.
Ombudsman. The exception to the no injunction policy is when there is prima facie evidence
that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the office’s jurisdiction.
Facts: The Office of the Ombudsman has disciplinary authority over all elective and
appointive officials of the government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities,
It is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed on March 25, 2015 by petitioner
and agencies, with the exception only of impeachable officers, Members of
Conchita Carpio-Morales, in her capacity as the Ombudsman (Ombudsman), Congress, and the Judiciary. Nonetheless, the Ombudsman retains the power
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), assailing: (a) the Resolution to investigate any serious misconduct in office allegedly committed by officials
dated March 16, 2015 of public respondent the Court of Appeals which granted
removable by impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified complaint for
private respondent Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.’s (Binay, Jr.) prayer for the
impeachment, if warranted. Note that the Ombudsman has concurrent
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the implementation
jurisdiction over certain administrative cases which are within the jurisdiction
of the Joint Order (preventive suspension order) preventively suspending him
of the regular courts or administrative agencies, but has primary jurisdiction to
and several other public officers and employees of the City Government of investigate any act or omission of a public officer or employee who is under
Makati, for six (6) months without pay; and (b) the Resolution dated March 20, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
2015 of the CA, ordering the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.’s petition
for contempt. Pursuant to the Resolution dated April 6, 2015, the CA issued a
writ of preliminary injunction which further enjoined the implementation of the 85. BARA LIDASAN vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
preventive suspension order, prompting the Ombudsman to file a
supplemental petition on April 13, 2015. GR No. L-28089. October 25, 1967
Binay, Jr. argues that Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution specifically Doctrine:
grants the CA judicial power to review acts of any branch or instrumentality of
government, including the Office of the Ombudsman, in case of grave abuse Subject of statute to be expressed in the title of bill
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, which he asserts was
committed in this case when said office issued the preventive suspension Facts:
order against him. Binay, Jr. posits that it was incumbent upon the
The Chief Executive signed into law House Bill 1247, known as Republic Act
Ombudsman to have been apprised of the condonation doctrine as this would
4790, now in dispute. It came to light later that barrios Togaig and Madalum
have weighed heavily in determining whether there was strong evidence to
just mentioned are within the municipality of Buldon, Province of Cotabato, and
warrant the issuance of the preventive suspension order.
that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao,
Issue: Tiongko, Colodan, and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another
municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato and
Whether the first paragraph of Section 14, Republic Act (RA) No. 6770 is a not of Lanao del Sur. Doubtless, as the statute stands, twelve barrios—in two
prohibition against any court from issuing a writ of injunction to delay an municipalities in the province of Cotabato—are transferred to the province of
investigation being conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman. Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in the boundaries of the two
provinces. Comelec stood by its own interpretation, declared that the statute
Ruling: “should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court.”
The Court held that the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is a prohibition
against any court (except the Supreme Court) from issuing a writ of injunction This triggered the present original action for certiorari and prohibition by Bara
to delay an investigation being conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman. Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato,
Generally speaking, “injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding and a qualified voter for the 1967 elections. He prays that Republic Act 4790
whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain from doing a certain act. It may be be declared unconstitutional and that Comelec’s resolutions implementing the
the main action or merely a provisional remedy for and as an incident in the same for electoral purposes, be nullified.
main action.” Considering the textual qualifier “to delay,” which connotes a
80
Issue: RA No. 7160, as amended, otherwise known as the Local Government Code
of 1991” is unconstitutional.
Whether Republic Act No. 4790 is unconstitutional.
Ruling:
Ruling:
The Court held that the RTC legally erred when it declared the challenged
The Court held in affirmative. Section 21(1), Art. VI of the Constitution contains proviso unconstitutional.
dual limitations upon legislative power. First, Congress is to refrain from
conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second, the Through all these statutory changes, Congress had determined at its
title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators discretion both the length of the term of office of barangay officials and their
and the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof. term limitation. Given the textually demonstrable commitment by the 1987
Constitution to Congress of the authority to determine the term duration and
The subject of the statute must be expressed in the title of the bill. Compliance limitation of barangay officials under the Constitution, we consider it
is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution does not exact of Congress established that whatever Congress, in its wisdom, decides on these matters
the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact, are political questions beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny, subject only to the
in the case of House Bill 1247, which became R.A. 4790, only its title was read certiorari jurisdiction of the courts provided under Section 1, Article VIII of the
from its introduction to its final approval in the House of Representatives, Constitution and to the judicial authority to invalidate any law contrary to the
where the bill, being of local application, originated. Constitution.
86. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS vs CONRADO CRUZ 87. ARTURO M. TOLENTINO vs. THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and
G.R. No. 186616. November 20, 2009 THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

Doctrine: G.R. No. 115455. August 25, 1994

Whatever Congress in its wisdom decides on the term of office and term Doctrine:
limitation are political questions beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny. There is really no difference between the Senate preserving the House Bill up
Facts: to the enacting clause and then writing its own version following the enacting
clause and, on the other hand, separately presenting a bill of its own on the
Before the October 29, 2007 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang same subject matter.
Kabataan (SK) Elections, some of the then incumbent officials of several
barangays of Caloocan City filed with the RTC a petition for declaratory relief The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods
to challenge the constitutionality of Section 2 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9164 and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. It is equivalent
entitled “An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in money of goods or properties
Kabataan Elections, amending RA No. 7160, as amended, otherwise known sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale or exchange
as the Local Government Code of 1991” of services. Republic Act No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing
VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal
RTC agreed with the respondents’ contention that the challenged proviso Revenue Code. There are various suits for certiorari and prohibition,
retroactively applied the three-term limit for barangay officials. The COMELEC challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7716 on various grounds.
moved to reconsider this decision but the RTC denied the motion. Hence, the
present petition on a pure question of law. The contention of petitioners is that in enacting Republic Act No. 7716, or the
Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, Congress violated the Constitution because,
Issue: although H. No. 11197 had originated in the House of Representatives, it was
not passed by the Senate but was simply consolidated with the Senate version
Whether Section 2 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9164 entitled “An Act Providing (S. No. 1630) in the Conference Committee to produce the bill which the
for Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections, amending President signed into law. The following provisions of the Constitution are cited
in support of the proposition that because Republic Act No. 7716 was passed

81
in this manner, it did not originate in the House of Representatives and it has power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Any action or step
not thereby become a law. beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the
Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class.
Issue:
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an
Whether Republic Act No. 7716 is a not law as it did not “originate exclusively” administrative agency to present the proposed implementing rules and
in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Section 24 of the regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee formed
Constitution. by it, retains a “right” or “power” to approve or disapprove such regulations
Ruling: before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of a
congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning
The Court ruled in negative. The Court held insisted, however, that S. No. 1630 delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through
was passed not in substitution of H. No. 11197 but of another Senate bill (S. scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law initially
No. 1129) earlier filed and that what the Senate did was merely to “take [H. delegated broad powers. It radically changes the design or structure of the
No. 11197] into consideration” in enacting S. No. 1630. There is really no Constitution’s diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct role in
difference between the Senate preserving H. No. 11197 up to the enacting enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws. Congress has two options
clause and then writing its own version following the enacting clause (which, it when enacting legislation to define national policy within the broad horizons of
would seem, petitioners admit is an amendment by substitution), and, on the its legislative competence. It can itself formulate the details or it can assign to
other hand, separately presenting a bill of its own on the same subject matter. the executive branch the responsibility for making necessary managerial
In either case the result are two bills on the same subject. Thus, RA 7716 is a decisions in conformity with those standards. In the latter case, the law must
law. be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the hands
of the legislature. Thus, what is left for the executive branch or the concerned
88. ABAKADA Guro Party List vs. Purisima administrative agency when it formulates rules and regulations implementing
GR 166715; August 14, 2008 the law is to fill up details (supplementary rule-making) or ascertain facts
necessary to bring the law into actual operation (contingent rule-making).
Doctrine:
Facts:
Congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither
necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement RA 9335 or Attrition Act of 2005 was enacted to optimize the revenue-
laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. The law intends
integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of to encourage their officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by
government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of Rewards
prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch. However, to and Incentives Fund and Revenue Performance Evaluation Board.
forestall the danger of congressional encroachment “beyond the legislative
sphere,” the Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on The Boards in the BIR and BOC to be composed by their respective
Congress. It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its members with Commissioners, DOF, DBM, and NEDA, were tasked to prescribe the rules
either executive or judicial power. And, when it exercises its legislative power, and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and release of the fund, to set
it must follow the “single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, criteria and procedures for removing service officials and employees whose
procedures” specified under the Constitution, including the procedure for revenue collection fall short of the target; and further, to issue rules and
enactment of laws and presentment. Thus, any post-enactment congressional regulations. Also, the law tasked the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the
measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In CSC to promulgate and issue the IRR of RA 9335, subject to the approval of
particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following: (1) the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created solely for the purpose
scrutiny based primarily on Congress’ power of appropriation and the budget of approving the formulated IRR. Later, the JCOO having approved a
hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of formulated IRR by the agencies, JCOO became functus officio and ceased to
departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any exist.
matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation and (2)
investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the
82
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers, filed this petition challenging the Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers
constitutionality of RA 9335 and sought to prevent herein respondents from guaranteed by the Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class.
implementing and enforcing said law.
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an
Petitioners assail, among others, the creation of a congressional oversight administrative agency to present the proposed implementing rules and
committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers, regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee formed
as it permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of by it, retains a “right” or “power” to approve or disapprove such regulations
the law, when legislative function should have been deemed accomplished before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of a
and completed upon the enactment of the law. Respondents, through the congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning
OSG, counter this by asserting that the creation of the congressional oversight delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through
committee under the law enhances rather than violates separation of powers, scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law initially
as it ensures the fulfillment of the legislative policy. delegated broad powers. It radically changes the design or structure of the
Constitution’s diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct role in
Issue: enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.

Whether the creation of the congressional oversight committee violates the Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement
doctrine of separation of powers under the Constitution? and interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law
and are entitled to respect. Congress, in the guise of assuming the role of an
Ruling: overseer, may not pass upon their legality by subjecting them to its stamp of
approval without disturbing the calculated balance of powers established by
Congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither the Constitution. In exercising discretion to approve or disapprove the IRR
necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement based on a determination of whether or not they conformed with the provisions
laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is of RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power exclusively
integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of vested in this Court by the Constitution.
government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it
prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch. From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that
empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the
However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment “beyond the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation
legislative sphere,” the Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints of powers and is thus unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision that
on Congress. It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its members with requires Congress or its members to approve the implementing rules of a law
either executive or judicial power. And, when it exercises its legislative power, after it has already taken effect shall be unconstitutional, as is a provision that
it must follow the “single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, allows Congress or its members to overturn any directive or ruling made by
procedures” specified under the Constitution, including the procedure for the members of the executive branch charged with the implementation of the
enactment of laws and presentment. Thus, any post-enactment congressional law.
measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In
particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following: 89. Bolinao Electronics vs Valencia
GR L-20740; June 30, 1964
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress’ power of appropriation and the
budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of Doctrine:
departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any
matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation and The President may not legally veto a condition attached to an appropriation or
item in the appropriation bill without at the same time vetoing the particular
(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the item or Items to which it relates.
power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.

83
lf the veto of a condition attached to an item of an appropriation bill is (3) Whether or not Philippine Broadcasting Service can legally operate
unconstitutional, the same produces 110 effect whatsoever and the condition Channel 9 and Brigido Valencia is entitled to claim damages, for
imposed by the appropriation bill remains. Chronicle Broadcasting Network's refusal to give up operations thereof.
Facts:
Ruling:
This is an original petition for prohibition, mandatory injunction with preliminary
In the case at bar, the issuance of the said circular, the lone reason given
injunction filed by the Bolinao Electronics Corporation, Chronicle Broadcasting
for the investigation of petitioners' applications, i.e., late filing thereof, is
Network, Inc., and Monserrat Broadcasting System, Inc., owners and
therefore no longer tenable. The violation, in legal effect, ceased to exist and,
operators of radio and television stations enumerated therein, against
hence, there is no reason nor need for the present investigation.
respondents Secretary of Public Works and Communications and Acting Chief
of the Radio Control Division. Later the Republic of the Philippines, as operator
There was no express agreement there was abandonment or renunciation by
of the Philippine Broadcasting Service, sought and was allowed to intervene
the Chronicle Broadcasting Network (CBN) of channel 9 in favor of PBS. The
in this case, said interveners having been granted a construction permit to
only basis of the contention of the respondents that there was such
install and operate a television station in Manila.
renunciation is the statement "Channel 10 assigned in lieu of Channel 9",
appearing in the construction permit to transfer television station DZXL-TV
Petitioners applications for renewal of their station licenses were denied
from Quezon City to Baguio City, issued to petitioner. This statement alone,
because it should be filed two month before the expiration of the license.
however, does not establish any agreement between the radio control
Pursuant to Section 3 of Act 3846, as amended by Republic Act 584, on the
authority and the station operator, on the switch or change of operations of
powers and duties of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications
CBN from Channel 9 to Channel 10.
(formerly Commerce And Communications), he may approve or disapprove
any application for renewal of station or operator license, provided, however,
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Valencia failed to show that any right
That no application for renewal shall bed is approved without giving the
of his has been violated by the refusal of Chronicle Broadcasting Network to
licensee a hearing. Thus the notices of hearing were sent by respondents to
cease operation. Further, the Supreme Court noted that as the records show,
petitioners. Clearly, the intention of the investigation is to find out whether there
the appropriation to operate the Philippine Broadcasting Service as approved
is ground to disapprove the applications for renewal. According to petitioner
by Congress and incorporated in the 1962-1963 Budget of the Republic of the
however, the violation has ceased to exist when the act of late filing was
Philippines does not allow appropriations for TV stations particularly in Luzon.
condoned or pardoned by respondents by the issuance of the circular dated
Hence, since there was no appropriation allotted then there can be no damage;
July24, 1962.The lone reason given for the investigation of petitioners'
and if there are expenditures made by Valencia’s department they are in fact
applications, i.e., late filing thereof, is therefore no longer tenable. The
in violation of the law and they cannot claim damages therefrom. And even if
violation, in legal effect, ceased to exist and, hence, there is no reason nor
it is shown that the then President vetoed this provision of the Budget Act, this
need for the present investigation.
gives rise to the question of whether the President may legally veto a condition
attached to an appropriation or item in the appropriation bill. The executive's
They were summoned by Valencia, then Secretary of Communications, for
veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or
operating even after their permit has expired. Valencia claimed that because
restrictions, has been adhered to in subsequent cases.
of CBN’s continued operation sans license and their continuing operation had
caused damage to his department.
If the veto is unconstitutional, it follows that the same produced no effect
whatsoever, and the restriction imposed by the appropriation bill, therefore,
Issues:
remains. Any expenditure made by the intervener PBS, for the purpose of
installing or operating a television station in Manila, where there are already
(1) Whether the investigation being conducted by respondents,
television stations in operation, would be in violation of the express condition
in connection with petitioners' applications for renewal of their station for the release of the appropriation and, consequently, null and void. It is not
licenses, has any legal basis; difficult to see that even if it were able to prove its right to operate on Channel
(2) Whether or not there was abandonment or renunciation by the Chronicle 9, said intervener would not have been entitled to reimbursement of its illegal
Broadcasting Network (CBN) of channel 9in favor of PBS; and expenditures.
84
 90. Philconsa vs Enriquez Petition dismissed. Congress cannot include in the general appropriations
GR 113105; August 19, 1994 matters that should be enacted in a separate legislation and if it does so, the
inappropriate provision must be treated as an item and can be vetoed by the
Doctrine: President.

Where the veto is claimed to have been made without or in excess of the The provision in GAA authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment
authority vested on the President by the Constitution, the issue of an the pension and gratuity fund violates Section 25 (paragraph 5) and Section
impermissible intrusion of the Executive into the domain of the Legislature 29 (paragraph 1) of Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution. Only the President is
arises. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of authorized to augment items from savings in the general appropriation to the
each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the executive branch. Also pursuant to Section 29 – no money shall be paid out of
exercise of the powers of that institution. An act of the Executive which injures the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial
injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such a case,
any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts. 91. Garcillano vs House of Representatives
GR 170338; December 23, 2008
It is true that the Constitution provides a mechanism for overriding a veto (Art.
VI, Sec. 27 [1]). Said remedy, however, is available only when the presidential Doctrine:
veto is based on policy or political considerations but not when the veto is
claimed to be ultra vires. In the latter case, it becomes the duty of the Court to Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned
draw the dividing line where the exercise of executive power ends and the legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure; The requisite of
bounds of legislative jurisdiction begin. publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due
process.— The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the
Facts: questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in
clear derogation of the constitutional requirement. Section 21, Article VI of the
The General Appropriations Act appropriated Php 86.3 billion for debt 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that “[t]he Senate or the House of
services. Congress added a special provision which provided that the amount Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in
appropriated shall be used for payment of the national debt only and not to be aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.” The
paid to the liabilities of the Central Bank. The appropriation for DPWH also requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements
provided that the maximum amount to be contracted for the maintenance of of due process. Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of
national roads and bridges should not exceed 30% the appropriation for injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law
medicines by the Armed Forces of the Philippines required approval Congress or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
for the release of funds. What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which
provides that “[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of
In the General Appropriations Act of 1994 the appropriation for the Armed their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general
Forces of the Philippines contains a provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to circulation in the Philippines.”
use savings in the appropriation to augment the pension and gratuity fund of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The President vetoed the authorization The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senate’s
given by the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension and gratuity defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of
fund. Several Senators questioned the validity of the veto. the Constitution; The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails
over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate.—Respondents
Issue: justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by
arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that,
Whether or not the President’s veto is valid? they are published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and accessible
to the public at the Senate’s internet web page. The Court does not agree. The
Ruling: absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senate’s defiance
85
of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Ruling:
Constitution. The organic law instructs, without more, that the Senate or its
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance with The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in
duly published rules of procedure, and does not make any distinction whether pamphlet form available at the Senate, is not sufficient under the Tañada v.
or not these rules have undergone amendments or revision. The constitutional Tuvera ruling which requires publication either in the Official Gazette or in a
mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice or newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that
tradition followed by the Senate. the rules "shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation," precluding any other form of publication.
Facts: Publication in accordance with Tañada is mandatory to comply with the due
process requirement because the Rules of Procedure put a person’s liberty at
Tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly between risk. A person who violates the Rules of Procedure could be arrested and
the President of the Philippines and a high-ranking official of the Commission detained by the Senate.
on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. The tapes, notoriously referred to as the
"Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the President’s instructions to The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No.
COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support
of the 2004 presidential elections. These recordings were to become the their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more incorrect.
subject of heated legislative hearings conducted separately by committees of R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as
both Houses of Congress. the functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes.
In other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic
he is summoned to attend the Senate hearings without being apprised not only documents. It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules
of his rights therein through the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure and regulations.
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation
which underpins the investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could
bewailing the useless and wasteful expenditure of public funds involved in the not, in violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative
conduct of the questioned hearings. inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly
argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of published rules of procedure."
Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation only in
1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, 92. Neri vs Senate
however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, GR 180643; September 4, 2008
2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they
first opened their session. Doctrine:

Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated The presidential communications privilege is fundamental to the operation of
publication by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the
and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for Constitution- Respondent Committees argue as if this were the first time the
free, and accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web page. presumption in favor of the presidential communications privilege is mentioned
and adopted in our legal system. That is far from the truth. The Court, in the
Issue: earlier case of Almonte v. Vasquez, 244 SCRA 286 (1995), affirmed that
the presidential communications privilege is fundamental to the operation of
Whether or not publication of the Rules of Procedures Governing Inquiries in government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the
Aid of Legislation through the Senate’s website, satisfies the due process Constitution. Even Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006), the case relied upon
requirement of law. by respondent Committees, reiterated this concept. There, the Court
enumerated the cases in which the claim of executive privilege was
86
recognized, among them Almonte v. Chavez, Chavez v. Presidential executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), 299 SCRA 744 approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
(1998) and Chavez v. PEA, 384 SCRA 152 (2002). The Court articulated in
these cases that “there are certain types of information which the government Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue
may withhold from the public,” that there is a “governmental privilege against Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs
public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with
and other national security matters;” and that “the right to information does not P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated
extend to matters recognized as ‘privileged information’ under the separation that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she
of powers, by which the Court meant Presidential conversations, instructed him not to accept the bribe.
correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings.”
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project,
When an executive official, who is one of those mentioned in the said Sec. 2(b) petitioner refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he
of E.O. No. 464, claims to be exempt from disclosure, there can be no refused to answer the questions on:
presumption of authorization to invoke executive privilege given by the
President to said executive official, such that the presumption in this situation (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.— (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the (c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a
sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the
a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify senate averring that the communications between GMA and Neri are
it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied.
executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information by the He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest
mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of and detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.
the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against
executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure. Obviously, the last sentence of Issue:
the above-quoted paragraph in Senate v. Ermita refers to the “exemption”
being claimed by the executive officials mentioned in Section 2(b) of E.O. No. Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by
464, solely by virtue of their positions in the Executive Branch. This means executive privilege?
that when an executive official, who is one of those mentioned in the said Sec.
2(b) of E.O. No. 464, claims to be exempt from disclosure, there can be no Ruling:
presumption of authorization to invoke executive privilege given by the
President to said executive official, such that the presumption in this situation The communications are covered by executive privilege
inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure. The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow
and abide by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including,
Facts: among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative
inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any way diminish the concept of
On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional
(DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications underpinnings.
Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National
Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the
(approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to
People’s Republic of China. the President, such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under our
Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief,
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of
September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy
greater confidentiality than others.
87
 The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential Section 7 of Article III provides:
communications privilege:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non- recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers
delegable presidential power.” pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the
advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that 93. Senate vs Ermita
may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information GR 169777; April 20, 2006
sought “likely contains important evidence” and by the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. Doctrine:

In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized
privilege on the ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) exemptions to the power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of
questions “fall under conversation and correspondence between the President “executive privilege.” Since this term figures prominently in the challenged
and public officials” necessary in “her executive and policy decision-making order, it being mentioned in its provisions, its preambular clauses, and in its
process” and, that “the information sought to be disclosed might impair our very title, a discussion of executive privilege is crucial for determining the
diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.” constitutionality of E.O. 464.
Simply put, the bases are presidential communications privilege and executive
privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations. The phrase “executive privilege” is not new in this jurisdiction. It has been used
even prior to the promulgation of the 1986 Constitution. Being of American
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications origin, it is best understood in light of how it has been defined and used in the
elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential legal literature of the United States. Schwartz defines executive privilege as
communications privilege. First, the communications relate to a “quintessential “the power of the Government to withhold information from the public, the
and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an courts, and the Congress.” Similarly, Rozell defines it as “the right of the
executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to President and high-level executive branch officers to withhold information from
enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public.” Executive privilege is,
has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the nonetheless, not a clear or unitary concept. It has encompassed claims of
communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the varying kinds. Tribe, in fact, comments that while it is customary to employ the
“operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being phrase “executive privilege,” it may be more accurate to speak of
a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no adequate executive privileges “since presidential refusals to furnish information may be
showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege actuated by any of at least three distinct kinds of considerations, and may be
and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate asserted, with differing degrees of success, in the context of either judicial or
investigating authority. legislative investigations.”

Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner’s claim of In determining the validity of a claim of privilege, the question that must be
executive privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the asked is not only whether the requested information falls within one of the
people to information on matters of public concern.50 We might have agreed traditional privileges, but also whether that privilege should be honored in a
with such contention if petitioner did not appear before them at all. But given procedural setting.—That a type of information is recognized as
petitioner made himself available to them during the September 26 hearing, privileged does not, however, necessarily mean that it would be considered
where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly privileged in all instances. For in determining the validity of a claim of privilege,
manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the question that must be asked is not only whether the requested information
the exception only of those covered by his claim of executive privilege. falls within one of the traditional privileges, but also whether that privilege
should be honored in a given procedural setting.
88
 appearing before either House of Congress.” Pursuant to this Order, Executive
Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the Sec. Ermita communicated to the Senate that the executive and AFP officials
public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a would not be able to attend the meeting since the President has not yet given
sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, her consent. Despite the lack of consent, Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani,
a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify among all the AFP officials invited, attended the investigation. Both faced court
it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that marshall for such attendance.
executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere
fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the Issue:
exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive
secrecy and in favor of disclosure. Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress.

In the context of a parliamentary system of government, the “question hour” Ruling:

has a definite meaning. It is a period of confrontation initiated by Parliament to
hold the Prime Minister and the other ministers accountable for their acts and To determine the constitutionality of E.O. 464, the Supreme Court discussed
the operation of the government, corresponding to what is known in Britain as the two different functions of the Legislature: The power to conduct inquiries
the question period. There was a specific provision for a question hour in the in aid of legislation and the power to conduct inquiry during question hour.
1973 Constitution which made the appearance of ministers mandatory. The
same perfectly conformed to the parliamentary system established by that Question Hour:
Constitution, where the ministers are also members of the legislature and are
directly accountable to it. An essential feature of the parliamentary system of The power to conduct inquiry during question hours is recognized in Article 6,
government is the immediate accountability of the Prime Minister and the Section 22 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
Cabinet to the National Assembly. They shall be responsible to the National
Assembly for the program of government and shall determine the guidelines “The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative, with the consent of
of national policy. Unlike in the presidential system where the tenure of office the President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House
of all elected officials cannot be terminated before their term expired, the Prime shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter
Minister and the Cabinet remain in office only as long as they enjoy the pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the
confidence of the National Assembly. The moment this confidence is lost the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at
Prime Minister and the Cabinet may be changed. least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not
be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When
Facts: the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so
states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.”
This case is regarding the railway project of the North Luzon Railways
Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group as well The objective of conducting a question hour is to obtain information in pursuit
as the Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP, and the Fertilizer scam. of Congress’ oversight function. When Congress merely seeks to be informed
on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it had issued,
The Senate Committees sent invitations to various officials of the Executive the department heads’ appearance is merely requested.
Department and AFP officials for them to appear before Senate on Sept. 29,
2005. Before said date arrived, Executive Sec. Ermita sent a letter to Senate The Supreme Court construed Section 1 of E.O. 464 as those in relation to the
President Drilon, requesting for a postponement of the hearing on Sept. 29 in appearance of department heads during question hour as it explicitly referred
order to “afford said officials ample time and opportunity to study and prepare to Section 22, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution.
for the various issues so that they may better enlighten the Senate Committee
on its investigation.” Senate refused the request. In aid of Legislation:

On Sept. 28, 2005, the President issued EO 464, effective immediately, which, The Legislature’s power to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation is expressly
among others, mandated that “all heads of departments of the Executive recognized in Article 6, section21 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to
89
“The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective When an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its own judgment, might be covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded
duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in, or reasonable time to inform the President or the Executive Secretary of the
affected by, such inquiries shall be respected.” possible need for invoking the privilege. This is necessary to provide the
President or the Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to consider whether
The power of inquiry in aid of legislation is inherent in the power to legislate. A the matter indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege. If, after the lapse of
legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of that reasonable time, neither the President nor the Executive Secretary
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer bound to respect the failure of the
or change. And where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite official to appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of the necessary
information, recourse must be had to others who do possess it. legal means to compel his appearance.

But even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized Wherefore, the petitions are partly granted. Sections 2(b) and 3 of E.O. 464
exemptions to the power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of are declared void. Section 1(a) are however valid.
“executive privilege”. This is the power of the government to withhold
information from the public, the courts, and the Congress. This is recognized 94. Sabio vs Gordon
only to certain types of information of a sensitive character. When Congress GR 174318; October 17, 2006
exercise its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt
themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by Doctrine:
the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one official may be
exempted from this power -- the President. Article VI, Section 21 provides: The Senate or the House of Representatives
or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation
Section 2 & 3 of E.O. 464 requires that all the public officials enumerated in in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
Section 2(b) should secure the consent of the President prior to appearing appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. It must be
before either house of Congress. The enumeration is broad. In view thereof, stressed that the Order of Arrest for "contempt of Senate Committees and the
whenever an official invokes E.O.464 to justify the failure to be present, such Philippine Senate" was approved by Senate President Villar and signed by
invocation must be construed as a declaration to Congress that the President, fifteen (15) Senators. From this, it can be concluded that the Order is under
or a head of office authorized by the President, has determined that the the authority, not only of the respondent Senate Committees, but of the entire
requested information is privileged. Senate.

The letter sent by the Executive Secretary to Senator Drilon does not explicitly At any rate, Article VI, Section 21 grants the power of inquiry not only to the
invoke executive privilege or that the matter on which these officials are being Senate and the House of Representatives, but also to any of their respective
requested to be resource persons falls under the recognized grounds of the committees. Clearly, there is a direct conferral of power to the committees.
privilege to justify their absence. Nor does it expressly state that in view of the Father Bernas, in his Commentary on the 1987 Constitution, correctly pointed
lack of consent from the President under E.O. 464, they cannot attend the out its significance: It should also be noted that the Constitution explicitly
hearing. The letter assumes that the invited official possesses information that recognizes the power of investigation not just of Congress but also of "any of
is covered by the executive privilege. Certainly, Congress has the right to know its committees." This is significant because it constitutes a direct conferral of
why the executive considers the requested information privileged. It does not investigatory power upon the committees and it means that the means which
suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of office, the Houses can take in order to effectively perform its investigative function
has determined that it is so. are also available to the Committees.

The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is This is a reasonable conclusion. The conferral of the legislative power of
thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing inquiry upon any committee of Congress must carry with it all powers
precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled necessary and proper for its effective discharge. Otherwise, Article VI, Section
with an announcement that the President has not given her consent. 21 will be meaningless. The indispensability and usefulness of the power of
contempt in a legislative inquiry is underscored in a catena of cases, foreign
and local.
90
 agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the
Facts: power of Congress to regulate or even abolish.” PCGG belongs to this class.

Pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 455, Senator Gordon requested PCGG A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is not within the
Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners to appear as resource persons in the legislative power to enact; or it creates or establishes methods or forms that
public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government infringe constitutional principles; or its purpose or effect violates the
Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. Constitution or its basic principles.

Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment, and at Moreover, Sec. 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 has been repealed by the Constitution
the same time invoked Section 4(b) of EO No. 1: “No member or staff of the because it is inconsistent with the constitutional provisions on the Congress’
Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, power of inquiry (Art. VI, Sec. 21), the principle of public accountability (Art.
legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official XI, Sec. 1), the policy of full disclosure (Art. II, Sec. 28), and the right of access
cognizance.” to public information (Art. III, Sec. 7).

Issue: Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power
of Congress, in the absence of any constitutional basis.
Whether or not Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limits power of legislative inquiry by
exempting all PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative
or administrative proceeding. 95. Bengzon vs Senate Blue Ribbon
GR 89914; November 20, 1991
Ruling:
Doctrine:
No. Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution grants the power of inquiry
not only to the Senate and the House of Representatives, but also to any of The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of
their respective committees. Clearly, there is a direct conferral of investigatory Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. xxx The power of both
power to the committees and it means that the mechanism which the Houses houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, xxx,
can take in order to effectively perform its investigative functions are also absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the aforequoted
available to the committees. provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must
be “in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained more solid procedure” and that “the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
existence and expansive construal. The Court’s high regard to such power is inquiries shall be respected”. It follows then that the rights of persons under
rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and the
“the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive right not to be compelled to testify against one’s self.
branch.” Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that “the
operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper As held in Jean L. Arnault vs. Leon Nazareno, et al., the inquiry, to be within
subject for investigation” and that “the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the jurisdiction of the legislative body making it, must be material or necessary
the power to legislate.” to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate
or to expel a member. Under Sec. 4 of the aforementioned Rules, the Senate
Considering these jurisprudential instructions, Section 4(b) is directly may refer to any committee or committees any speech or resolution filed by
repugnant with Article VI, Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG any Senator which in its judgment requires an appropriate inquiry in aid of
members and staff from the Congress’ power of inquiry. This cannot be legislation. In order therefore to ascertain the character or nature of an inquiry,
countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting such resort must be had to the speech or resolution under which such an inquiry is
exemption. The Congress’ power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses proposed to be made.
everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as
proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends “to government Facts:

91
PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan against Benjamin Romualdez, et al for persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It
engaging in devices, schemes and stratagems to unjustly enrich themselves follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be
at the expense of plaintiff and the Filipino people. respected, including the right to due process and the right not to be compelled
to testify against one's self.
The Senate Minority Floor Leader Enrile delivered a speech before the Senate
on the alleged take-over personal privilege before the Senate on the alleged The civil case was already filed in the Sandiganbayan and for the Committee
"takeover of SOLOIL Inc," the FlagShip of the First Manila Management of to probe and inquire into the same justiciable controversy would be an
Companies or FMMC by Ricardo Lopa and called upon the Senate to look into encroachment into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had already
the possible violation of the law in the case with regard to RA 3019 (Anti Graft earlier set in. The issue sought to be investigated has already been pre-
and Corrupt Practices Act). empted by the Sandiganbayan. To allow the inquiry to continue would not only
pose the possibility of conflicting judgments between the legislative committee
The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (Committee on Accountability of Public and a judicial tribunal.
Officers [SBRC]) started its investigation on the matter. Petitioners and
Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the SBRC to appear before it and testify Finally, a congressional committee’s right to inquire is subject to all relevant
on what they know regarding the sale of 36 corporations belonging to Benjamin limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action ‘including the
Romualdez. Lopa and Bengzon refused to testify, invoking their rights to due relevant limitations of the Bill of Rights. One of these rights is the right of an
process, and that their testimony may unduly prejudice the defendants and individual to against self-incrimination. The right to remain silent is extended
petitioners in case before the Sandiganbayan. to respondents in administrative investigations but only if it partakes of the
nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding. Hence,
SBRC rejected the petitioner's plea to be excused from testifying and the the petitioners may not be compelled by respondent Committee to appear,
SBRC continued its investigation of the matter. testify and produce evidence before it only because the inquiry is not in aid of
legislation and if pursued would be violative of the principle of separation of
The petitioners filed for prohibition with a prayer for TRO and/or injunctive powers between the legislative and the judicial departments of the government
relief, claiming that the SBRC in requiring their attendance and testimony, as ordained by the Constitution.
acted in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose.
96. Standard Charter vs Senate Committee
The Supreme Court intervened upon a motion for reconsideration filed by one GR 167173; December 27, 2007
of the defendants of the civil case.
Doctrine:
Issue:
The mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or a
Whether or not the Blue Ribbon inquiry was in aid of legislation? quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative
investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any intended
Ruling: inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an
administrative complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative
No. There appears to be no intended legislation involved. The purpose of the authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component,
inquiry to be conducted is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or an administrative investigation.
Congress, it was conducted to find out whether or not the relatives of President As succinctly stated in the landmark case Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29
Aquino, particularly Mr. Lopa had violated RA 3019 in connection with the (1950)—The power of inquiry—with process to enforce it—is an essential and
alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot
Romualdez to the Lopa Group. legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the
conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information—which is not
is not absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the Constitution. infrequently true—recourse must be had to others who possess it.
As provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of Facts:
92
 legislative authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential
Senator Enrile delivered a privilege speech denouncing SCB-Philippines for component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or an administrative
selling unregistered foreign securities in violation of the Securities Regulation investigation.
Code (RA 8799) and urging the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry, in
aid of legislation, to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in Neither can the petitioners claim that they were singled out by the respondent
the future. Upon motion of Senator Pangilinan, the speech was referred to Committee. The Court notes that among those invited as resource persons
respondent, which through its Chairperson Senator Angara, set an initial were officials of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the
hearing and invited petitioners herein to attend the hearing. Petitioners via Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). These officials were subjected to the same
letter stressed that there were pending cases in court allegedly involving the critical scrutiny by the respondent relative to their separate findings on the
same issues subject of the legislative inquiry, thereby posing a challenge to illegal sale of unregistered foreign securities by SCB-Philippines. It is obvious
the jurisdiction of respondent committee to proceed with the inquiry. that the objective of the investigation was the quest for remedies, in terms of
legislation, to prevent the recurrence of the allegedly fraudulent activity.
Legislative investigation commenced but with the invited resource persons not
being all present, Senator Enrile moved for the issuance of subpoena and an
HDO or to include such absentees to the Bureau of Immigrations’ Watch List. 97. Balag vs Senate
During the hearing, it was apparent that petitioners lack proper authorizations GR 234608; July 3, 2018
to make disclosures and lack the copies of the accusing documents being
mentioned by Senator Enrile. Thus, when hearing adjourned, petitioners were Doctrine:
later served with subpoenas by respondent.
The period of imprisonment under the inherent power of contempt by the
Petitioner now seeks that respondent committee be enjoined from proceeding, Senate during inquiries in aid of legislation should only last until the termination
citing Bengzon Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, claiming that since the of the legislative inquiry under which the said power is invoked. In Arnault, it
issue is already preempted by the courts, the legislative investigation is an was stated that obedience to its process may be enforced by the Senate
encroachment upon the judicial powers vested solely in the courts. Committee if the subject of investigation before it was within the range of
legitimate legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony called relates to that
Issue: subject. Accordingly, as long as there is a legitimate legislative inquiry, then
the inherent power of contempt by the Senate may be properly exercised.
Whether the investigation in aid of legislation by respondent committee Conversely, once the said legislative inquiry concludes, the exercise of the
encroaches upon the judicial power of the courts inherent power of contempt ceases and there is no more genuine necessity to
penalize the detained witness.
Ruling:
Facts:
No. The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in the said
resolution, exposes the error in petitioners’ allegation that the inquiry, as On September 17, 2017, Horacio Tomas T. Castillo III (Horacio III), a first year
initiated in a privilege speech by the very same Senator Enrile, was simply “to law student of the University of Sto. Tomas (UST), died allegedly due to hazing
denounce the illegal practice committed by a foreign bank in selling conducted by the Aegis Juris Fraternity (AJ Fraternity) of the same university.
unregistered foreign securities x x x.” This fallacy is made more glaring when During the investigation of the Senate Committee on Public Order and
we consider that, at the conclusion of his privilege speech, Senator Enrile Dangerous Drugs chaired by Senator Panfilo Lacson (Senator Lacson)
urged the Senate “to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, so together with the Committees on Justice and Human Rights and Constitutional
as to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the future.” Amendment and Revision of Codes, petitioner and several other persons was
invited to the Joint Public Hearing on September 25, 2017 to discuss and
Indeed, the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a deliberate.
court or a quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of
legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any Petitioner, however, did not attend the hearing scheduled on September 25,
intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a 2017. On the same date, Spouses Carmina T. Castillo and Horacio M. Castillo,
criminal or an administrative complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign Jr. (Spouses Castillo), parents of Horacio III, filed a Criminal Complaint for
93
Murder and violation of Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8049, before the No. The period of imprisonment under the inherent power of contempt of the
Department of Justice (DOJ) against several members of the AJ Fraternity, Senate during inquiries in aid of legislation should only last until the termination
including petitioner. On October 9, 2017, Spouses Castillo filed a of the legislative inquiry under which the said power is invoked
Supplemental Complaint-Affidavit before the DOJ citing the relevant
transcripts of stenographic notes during the September 25, 2017 Senate Further, the Court rules that the legislative inquiry of the Senate terminates on
Hearing. two instances:

On October 11, 2017, Senator Lacson as Chairman of Senate Committee on First, upon the approval or disapproval of the Committee Report. Sections 22
Public Order and Dangerous Drugs, and as approved by Senate President and 23 of Senate Rules state:
Aquilino Pimentel III, issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum addressed to
petitioner directing him to appear before the committee and to testify as to the Sec. 22. Report of Committee. Within fifteen (15) days after the conclusion of
subject matter under inquiry. Another Subpoena Ad Testificandum was issued the inquiry, the Committee shall meet to begin the consideration of its Report.
on October 17, 2017, which was received by petitioner on the same day, The Report shall be approved by a majority vote of all its members. Concurring
requiring him to attend the legislative hearing on October 18, 2017. On said and dissenting reports may likewise be made by the members who do not sign
date, petitioner attended the senate hearing. At around 11:29 in the morning, the majority report within seventy-two (72) hours from the approval of the
Senator Grace Poe (Senator Poe) asked petitioner if he was the president of report. The number of members who sign reports concurring in the conclusions
AJ Fraternity but he refused to answer the question and invoked his right of the Committee Report shall be taken into account in determining whether
against self-incrimination. the Report has been approved by a majority of the members: Provided, That
the vote of a member who submits both a concurring and dissenting opinion
Senator Poe repeated the question but he still refused to answer. Senator shall not be considered as part of the majority unless he expressly indicates
Lacson then reminded him to answer the question because it was a very his vote for the majority position.
simple question, otherwise, he could be cited in contempt. Thereafter, Senator
Poe moved to cite him in contempt, which was seconded by Senators Joel The Report, together with any concurring and/or dissenting opinions, shall be
Villanueva (Senator Villanueva) and Zubiri. Senator Lacson ruled that the filed with the Secretary of the Senate, who shall include the same in the next
motion was properly seconded, hence, the Senate Sergeant-at-arms was Order of Business.
ordered to place petitioner in detention after the committee hearing.
Sec. 23. Action on Report. The Report, upon inclusion in the Order of
At around 12:09 in the afternoon, Senators Lacson and Poe gave petitioner Business, shall be referred to the Committee on Rules for assignment in the
another chance to purge himself of the contempt charge. Again, he was asked Calendar. (emphases supplied)
the same question twice and each time he refused to answer. Around 1:19 in
the afternoon, Senator Villanueva inquired from petitioner whether he knew Second, the legislative inquiry of the Senate also terminates upon the
whose decision it was to bring Horacio III to the Chinese General Hospital expiration of one (1) Congress.
instead of the UST Hospital. Petitioner apologized for his earlier statement and
moved for the lifting of his contempt. He admitted that he was a member of the The Court is of the view that these fears are insufficient to permit an indefinite
AJ Fraternity but he was not aware as to who its president was because, at or an unspecified period of imprisonment under the Senate's inherent power
that time, he was enrolled in another school. Senator Villanueva repeated his of contempt. If Congress believes that there is a necessity to supplement its
question to petitioner but the latter, again, invoked his right against self- power of contempt by extending the period of imprisonment beyond the
incrimination. conduct of its legislative inquiry or beyond its final adjournment of the last
session, then it can enact a law or amend the existing law that penalizes the
Issue: refusal of a witness to testify or produce papers during inquiries in aid of
legislation. The charge of contempt by Congress shall be tried before the
Whether the Senate as a continuing body may indefinitely detain a person held courts, where the contumacious witness will be heard. More importantly, it
in contempt in connection with its investigation in aid of legislation? shall indicate the exact penalty of the offense, which may include a fine and/or
imprisonment, and the period of imprisonment shall be specified therein. This
Ruling: constitutes as the statutory power of contempt, which is different from the
inherent power of contempt.
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 98. Senate vs Ermita Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in
GR 169777; April 20, 2006 Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before
either house of Congress, valid and constitutional?
Doctrine:
Ruling:
When Congress exercise its power of inquiry in aid of legislation, heads of
department cannot refuse appearance during the inquiry on the claim that they No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by
have not secured prior president’s consent. They can only refuse appearance the executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the
on a valid claim of executive privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential
that they are department heads. When Congress exercises its power of in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption
inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the
by a valid claim of privilege. Only one executive official may be exempted from necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in
this power — the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, enforcing that obligation in a particular case. Congress undoubtedly has a right
beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. By to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of
the same token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from this legislation.
power of inquiry. Unlike the Presidency, judicial power is vested in a collegial
body; hence, each member thereof is exempt on the basis not only of If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is
separation of powers but also on the fiscal autonomy and the constitutional privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be
independence of the judiciary. respected. The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive
branch to evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly
Facts: asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere
expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct
This case is regarding the railway project of the North Luzon Railways inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.
Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group as well
as the Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP, and the Fertilizer scam.
99. Pascual vs Secretary of Public Works
The Senate Committees sent invitations to various officials of the Executive L-10405; December 29, 1960
Department and AFP officials for them to appear before Senate on Sept. 29,
2005. Before said date arrived, Executive Sec. Ermita sent a letter to Senate Doctrine:
President Drilon, requesting for a postponement of the hearing on Sept. 29 in
order to “afford said officials ample time and opportunity to study and prepare It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public
for the various issues so that they may better enlighten the Senate Committee revenues for anything but a public purpose. It is the essential character of the
on its investigation.” Senate refused the request. direct object of the expenditure which must determine its validity as justifying
a tax and not the magnitude of the interests to be affected nor the degree to
On Sept. 28, 2005, the President issued EO 464, effective immediately, which, which the general advantage of the community, and thus the public welfare,
among others, mandated that “all heads of departments of the Executive may be ultimately benefited by their promotion. Incidental advantage to the
Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to public or to the state, which results from the promotion of private interests, and
appearing before either House of Congress.” Pursuant to this Order, Executive the prosperity of private enterprises or business, does not justify their aid by
Sec. Ermita communicated to the Senate that the executive and AFP officials the use of public money."
would not be able to attend the meeting since the President has not yet given
her consent. Despite the lack of consent, Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani, Facts:
among all the AFP officials invited, attended the investigation. Both faced court
marshal for such attendance. Petitioner, the governor of the Province of Rizal, filed an action for declaratory
relief with injunction on the ground that RA 920, Act appropriating funds for
Issue: public works, providing P85,000 for the construction, reconstruction, repair,
95
extension and improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals, were nothing but
projected and planned subdivision roads within Antonio Subdivision. Antonio Eusebio B. Garcia was a reserve officer on active duty with the Armed Forces
Subdivision is owned by the respondent, Jose Zulueta, a member of the of the Philippines until his reversion to inactive status on 15 November 1960.
Senate of the Philippines. Respondent offered to donate the said feeder roads At the time of reversion, Petitioner held the rank of Captain with a monthly
to the municipality of Pasig and the offer was accepted by the council, subject emolument of P478.00, comprising his base and longevity pay, quarters and
to a condition that the donor would submit plan of the roads and an agreement subsistence allowances. He has neither received any emoluments from the
to change the names of two of the street. However, the donation was not Armed Forces of the Philippines, nor was he ever employed in the Government
executed, which prompted Zuleta to write a letter to the district engineer calling in any capacity. Thus, he brought an action for “Mandamus and Recovery of
attention the approval of RA 920. The district engineer, on the other hand, did a Sum of Money” in the court a quo to compel the respondents Secretary of
not endorse the letter that inasmuch the feeder roads in question were private National Defense and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to
property at the time of passage and approval of RA 920, the appropriation for reinstate him in the active commissioned service of the Armed Forces of the
the construction was illegal and therefore, void ab initio. Petitioner, prayed for Philippines, to readjust his rank, and to pay all the emoluments and allowances
RA 920 be declared null and void and the alleged deed of donation be declared due to him from the time of his reversion to inactive status. However, the trial
unconstitutional. Lower court dismissed the case and dissolved the writ of court dismissed the petition. The court ruled that paragraph 11 of the “Special
preliminary injunction. Provisions for the Armed Forces of the Philippines” in Republic Act 1600 is
“invalid, unconstitutional and inoperative.”
Issue:
On petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, petitioner argues that his
Should incidental gains by the public be considered "public purpose" for the reversion to inactive status on November 15, 1960 was in violation of the
purpose of justifying an expenditure of the government? abovequoted provision which prohibits the reversion to inactive status of
reserve officers on active duty with at least ten years of accumulated active
Ruling: commissioned service.

No. The ruling case law rules that the legislature is without power to On the other hand, the respondents contend that the said provision has no
appropriate public revenue for anything but public purpose. The taxing power relevance or pertinence whatsoever to the budget in question or to any
must be exercised for public purposes only and the money raised by taxation appropriation item contained therein, and is therefore proscribed by Art. VI,
can be expended only for public purposes and not for the advantage of private Sec. 19, par. 4 2 of the 1935 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads: “No
individuals. provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriation bill
unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein; and any
In the case at bar, the legality of the appropriation of the feeder roads depend such provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to such
upon whether the said roads were public or private property when the bill was appropriation.”
passed by congress or when it became effective. The land which was owned
by Zulueta, the appropriation sought a private purpose and hence, null and Issue:
void. The donation did not cure the nullity of the appropriation; therefore a
judicial nullification of a said donation need not precede the declaration of Whether or not paragraph 11 of the “Special Provisions for the Armed Forces
unconstitutionality of the said appropriation. of the Philippines” in Republic Act 1600 is “invalid, unconstitutional and
inoperative.
100. Garcia vs. Mata
65 SCRA 517, July 30, 1975 Ruling:

Doctrine: Yes. A perusal of the challenged provision of R.A. 1600 fails to disclose its
relevance or relation to any appropriation item therein, or to the Appropriation
The insertion of a non-appropriation item in an appropriation measure is Act as a whole. From the very first clause of paragraph 11 itself, which reads,
unconstitutional. “After the approval of this Act, and when there is no emergency, no reserve
officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines may be called to a tour of active
Facts: duty for more than two years during any period of five consecutive years:” the
96
incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. While R.A. 1600 appropriated On the other hand, the constitutional provision under consideration reads as
money for the operation of the Government for the fiscal year 1956-1957, the follows: "Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
said paragraph 11 refers to the fundamental governmental policy matters of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the
the calling to active duty and the reversion to inactive status of reserve officers Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional
in the AFP. In the language of the respondents-appellees, “it was a non- commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriation item inserted in an appropriation measure in violation of the appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of
constitutional inhibition against ‘riders’ to the general appropriation act.” their respective appropriations."

The paragraph in question also violated Art. VI, Sec. 21, 5 par. 1 of the 1935 Issue:
Constitution of the Philippines which provided that “No bill which may be
enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be Whether or not the first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No.
expressed in the title of the bill.” This constitutional requirement nullified and 1177 which bestowed unlimited authority upon the President to transfer funds
rendered inoperative any provision contained in the body of an act that was from one department to another after the enactment of the General
not fairly included in the subject expressed in the title or was not germane to Appropriations Act is unconstitutional.
or properly connected with that subject. In determining whether a provision
contained in an act is embraced in the subject and is properly connected Ruling:
therewith, the subject to be considered is the one expressed in the title of the
act, and every fair intendment and reasonable doubt should be indulged in Yes. The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another was
favor of the validity of the legislative enactment. But when an act contains explicit and categorical under the 1973 Constitution. However, to afford the
provisions which are clearly not embraced in the subject of the act, as heads of the different branches of the government and those of the
expressed in the title, such provisions are inoperative and without effect. constitutional commissions considerable flexibility in the use of public funds
and resources, the constitution allowed the enactment of a law authorizing the
101. Demetria vs. Alba transfer of funds for the purpose of augmenting an item from savings in another
148 SCRA 208, February 27, 1987 item in the appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body
concerned. The leeway granted was thus limited. The purpose and conditions
Doctrine: for which funds may be transferred were specified, i.e. transfer may be allowed
for the purpose of augmenting an item and such transfer may be made only if
Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD 1177 being repugnant to Section 16(5) Article there are savings from another item in the appropriation of the government
VIII of the 1973 Constitution declared null and void. branch or constitutional body.
Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly overextends the privilege
Facts: granted under said Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately
transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive
Petitioners, as concerned citizens, members of the National Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or
Assembly/Batasan Pambansa, parties with general interest common to all the office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its
people of the Philippines, and as taxpayers assailed in this petition for enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are
prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction the constitutionality of actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether
the first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said
known as the "Budget Reform Decree of 1977. transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set
in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of
Said paragraph 1 of Section 44 provides: "The President shall have the legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such
authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void. "For
bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are the love of money is the root of all evil: x x x" and money belonging to no one
included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity in particular, i.e. public funds, provide an even greater temptation for
of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations misappropriation and embezzlement. Hence, the conditions on the release of
Act or approved after its enactment." money from the treasury.

97
 102. Pichay, Jr. vs. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Whether or not the creation of IAD-ODESLA would amount to an illegal
Affairs-Investigative and Adjudicatory Division appropriation by the President.
677 SCRA 408, July 24, 2012
Ruling:
Doctrines:
No. Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a
(1) There is no usurpation of the legislative power to appropriate public funds. division specially created within the ODESLA is properly within the prerogative
(2) The President is explicitly allowed by law to transfer any fund appropriated of the President under his continuing “delegated legislative authority to
for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive reorganize” his own office pursuant to E.O. 292. In the chief executive dwell
Department which is included in the General Appropriations Act, to any the powers to run government. Placed upon him is the power to recommend
program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the the budget necessary for the operation of the Government, which implies that
General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment. he has the necessary authority to evaluate and determine the structure that
each government agency in the executive department would need to operate
Facts: in the most economical and efficient manner. Hence, the express recognition
under Section 78 of R.A. 9970 or the General Appropriations Act of 2010 of
On April 16, 2001, then President Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo issued Executive the President’s authority to “direct changes in the organizational units or key
Order No. 12 (E.O. 12) creating the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission positions in any department agency.” The aforecited provision, often and
(PAGC) and vesting it with the power to investigate or hear administrative consistently included in the general appropriations laws, recognizes the extent
cases or complaints for possible graft and corruption, among others, against of the President’s power to reorganize the executive offices and agencies
presidential appointees and to submit its report and recommendations to the under him, which is, “even to the extent of modifying and realigning
President. On November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III appropriations for that purpose.”
issued Executive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13), abolishing the PAGC and
transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for And to further enable the President to run the affairs of the executive
Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established department, he is likewise given constitutional authority to augment any item
Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD). On April 6, 2011, respondent in the General Appropriations Law using the savings in other items of the
Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a appropriation for his office. In fact, he is explicitly allowed by law to transfer
complaint affidavit for grave misconduct against petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, any fund appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and
Jr., Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities agencies of the Executive Department which is included in the General
Administration (LWUA), as well as the incumbent members of the LWUA Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department,
Board of Trustees, which arose from the purchase by the LWUA of Four bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after
Hundred Forty-Five Thousand Three Hundred Seventy Seven (445,377) its enactment. Thus, while there may be no specific amount earmarked for the
shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc. IAD-ODESLA from the total amount appropriated by Congress in the annual
budget for the Office of the President, the necessary funds for the IAD-
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam manifesting ODESLA may be properly sourced from the President’s own office budget
that a case involving the same transaction and charge of grave misconduct without committing any illegal appropriation. After all, there is no usurpation of
entitled, “Rustico B. Tutol, et al. v. Prospero Pichay, et al.”, and docketed as the legislature’s power to appropriate funds when the President simply
OMB-C-A-10-0426-I, is already pending before the Office of the Ombudsman. allocates the existing funds previously appropriated by Congress for his office.
Alleging that no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available to him
in the ordinary course of law, petitioner has resorted to the instant petition for 103. Araullo vs. Executive Secretary
certiorari and prohibition. Petitioner asseverates, however, that since 728 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014
Congress did not indicate the manner by which the appropriation for the Office
of the President was to be distributed, taking therefrom the operational funds Doctrines:
of the IAD-ODESLA would amount to an illegal appropriation by the President. (1) It is the President who proposes the budget but it is Congress that has the
final say on matters of appropriations.
Issue: (2) Funds appropriated for one office are prohibited from crossing over to
another office even in the guise of augmentation of a deficient item or items.
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 (1) Whether or not the DAP violates Sec. 29, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution,
Facts: which provides: “No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”
On September 25, 2013, Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada delivered a privilege (2) Whether or not the DAP, NBC No. 541, and all other executive issuances
speech in the Senate of the Philippines to reveal that some Senators, including allegedly implementing the DAP violate Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the 1987
himself, had been allotted an additional P50 Million each as “incentive” for Constitution.
voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona. (3) Whether or not the unreleased appropriations and unobligated allotments
withdrawn from government agencies as “savings.”
Responding to Sen. Estrada’s revelation, Secretary Florencio Abad of the (4) Whether or not the cross-border augmentations from savings were
DBM issued a public statement entitled Abad: Releases to Senators Part of prohibited by the Constitution.
Spending Acceleration Program,[1] explaining that the funds released to the
Senators had been part of the DAP, a program designed by the DBM to ramp Rulings:
up spending to accelerate economic expansion. He clarified that the funds had
been released to the Senators based on their letters of request for funding; 1. No. The DAP was a government policy or strategy designed to stimulate
and that it was not the first time that releases from the DAP had been made the economy through accelerated spending. In the context of the DAP’s
because the DAP had already been instituted in 2011 to ramp up spending adoption and implementation being a function pertaining to the Executive as
after sluggish disbursements had caused the growth of the gross domestic the main actor during the Budget Execution Stage under its constitutional
product (GDP) to slow down. He explained that the funds under the DAP were mandate to faithfully execute the laws, including the GAAs, Congress did not
usually taken from (1) unreleased appropriations under Personnel Services; need to legislate to adopt or to implement the DAP. Congress could
(2) unprogrammed funds; (3) carry-over appropriations unreleased from the appropriate but would have nothing more to do during the Budget Execution
previous year; and (4) budgets for slow-moving items or projects that had been Stage. Indeed, appropriation was the act by which Congress “designates a
realigned to support faster-disbursing projects. particular fund, or sets apart a specified portion of the public revenue or of the
money in the public treasury, to be applied to some general object of
The revelation of Sen. Estrada and the reactions of Sec. Abad and the DBM governmental expenditure, or to some individual purchase or expense.” As
brought the DAP to the consciousness of the Nation for the first time, and made pointed out in Gonzales v. Raquiza: “In a strict sense, appropriation has been
this present controversy inevitable. That the issues against the DAP came at defined ‘as nothing more than the legislative authorization prescribed by the
a time when the Nation was still seething in anger over Congressional pork Constitution that money may be paid out of the Treasury,’ while appropriation
barrel — “an appropriation of government spending meant for localized made by law refers to ‘the act of the legislature setting apart or assigning to a
projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a representative’s particular use a certain sum to be used in the payment of debt or dues from
district” — excited the Nation as heatedly as the pork barrel controversy. the State to its creditors.’”

The petitioners contend in unison that based on how it was developed and On the other hand, the President, in keeping with his duty to faithfully execute
implemented the DAP violated the mandate of Section 29(1), Article VI of the the laws, had sufficient discretion during the execution of the budget to adapt
1987 Constitution that “[n]o money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in the budget to changes in the country’s economic situation. He could adopt a
pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” plan like the DAP for the purpose. He could pool the savings and identify the
PAPs to be funded under the DAP. The pooling of savings pursuant to the
The OSG posits, however, that no law was necessary for the adoption and DAP, and the identification of the PAPs to be funded under the DAP did not
implementation of the DAP because of its being neither a fund nor an involve appropriation in the strict sense because the money had been already
appropriation, but a program or an administrative system of prioritizing set apart from the public treasury by Congress through the GAAs. In such
spending; and that the adoption of the DAP was by virtue of the authority of actions, the Executive did not usurp the power vested in Congress under
the President as the Chief Executive to ensure that laws were faithfully Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution.
executed.
2. Yes. Requisites for the valid transfer of appropriated funds under Section
Issues: 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution The transfer of appropriated funds, to
be valid under Section 25(5), supra, must be made upon a concurrence of the
following requisites, namely: (1) There is a law authorizing the President, the
99
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the already satisfied, or the need for such funds had ceased to exist, for only then
Chief Justice of the (2) Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional could savings be properly realized. This interpretation prevents the Executive
Commissions to transfer funds within their respective offices; The funds to be from unduly transgressing Congress’ power of the purse.
transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for their respective
offices; and (3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general “Savings” refer to portions or balances of any programmed appropriation in
appropriations law for their respective offices. this Act free from any obligation or encumbrance which are: (i) still available
after the completion or final discontinuance or abandonment of the work,
Section 25(5), supra, not being a self-executing provision of the Constitution, activity or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized; (ii) from
must have an implementing law for it to be operative. That law, generally, is appropriations balances arising from unpaid compensation and related costs
the GAA of a given fiscal year. To comply with the first requisite, the GAAs pertaining to vacant positions and leaves of absence without pay; and (iii) from
should expressly authorize the transfer of funds. A reading shows, however, appropriations balances realized from the implementation of measures
that the aforequoted provisions of the GAAs of 2011 and 2012 were textually resulting in improved systems and efficiencies and thus enabled agencies to
unfaithful to the Constitution for not carrying the phrase “for their respective meet and deliver the required or planned targets, programs and services
offices” contained in Section 25(5), supra. The impact of the phrase “for their approved in this Act at a lesser cost. The three instances listed in the GAAs’
respective offices” was to authorize only transfers of funds within their offices aforequoted definition were a sure indication that savings could be generated
(i.e., in the case of the President, the transfer was to an item of appropriation only upon the purpose of the appropriation being fulfilled, or upon the need for
within the Executive). The provisions carried a different phrase (“to augment the appropriation being no longer existent.
any item in this Act”), and the effect was that the 2011 and 2012 GAAs thereby
literally allowed the transfer of funds from savings to augment any item in the The declaration of the DBM by itself does not state the clear legal basis for the
GAAs even if the item belonged to an office outside the Executive. treatment of unreleased or unalloted appropriations as savings. The fact alone
that the appropriations are unreleased or unalloted is a mere description of the
3. No. Unreleased appropriations and withdrawn unobligated allotments status of the items as unalloted or unreleased. They have not yet ripened into
under the DAP were not savings, and the use of such appropriations categories of items from which savings can be generated. Appropriations have
contravened Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. been considered “released” if there has already been an allotment or
In ascertaining the meaning of savings, certain principles should be borne in authorization to incur obligations and disbursement authority. For us to
mind. The first principle is that Congress wields the power of the purse. consider unreleased appropriations as savings, unless these met the statutory
Congress decides how the budget will be spent; what PAPs to fund; and the definition of savings, would seriously undercut the congressional power of the
amounts of money to be spent for each PAP. The second principle is that the purse, because such appropriations had not even reached and been used by
Executive, as the department of the Government tasked to enforce the laws, the agency concerned vis-à-vis the PAPs for which Congress had allocated
is expected to faithfully execute the GAA and to spend the budget in them.
accordance with the provisions of the GAA. The Executive is expected to
faithfully implement the PAPs for which Congress allocated funds, and to limit 4. Yes. It is the President who proposes the budget but it is Congress that
the expenditures within the allocations, unless exigencies result to deficiencies has the final say on matters of appropriations. For this purpose, appropriation
for which augmentation is authorized, subject to the conditions provided by involves two governing principles, namely: (1) “a Principle of the Public Fisc,
law. The third principle is that in making the President’s power to augment asserting that all monies received from whatever source by any part of the
operative under the GAA, Congress recognizes the need for flexibility in government are public funds”; and (2) “a Principle of Appropriations Control,
budget execution. In so doing, Congress diminishes its own power of the prohibiting expenditure of any public money without legislative authorization.”
purse, for it delegates a fraction of its power to the Executive. But Congress To conform with the governing principles, the Executive cannot circumvent the
does not thereby allow the Executive to override its authority over the purse prohibition by Congress of an expenditure for a PAP by resorting to either
as to let the Executive exceed its delegated authority. And the fourth principle public or private funds. Nor could the Executive transfer appropriated funds
is that savings should be actual. “Actual” denotes something that is real or resulting in an increase in the budget for one PAP, for by so doing the
substantial, or something that exists presently in fact, as opposed to something appropriation for another PAP is necessarily decreased. The terms of both
that is merely theoretical, possible, potential or hypothetical. The foregoing appropriations will thereby be violated.
principles caution us to construe savings strictly against expanding the scope
of the power to augment. It is then indubitable that the power to augment was By providing that the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of
to be used only when the purpose for which the funds had been allocated were the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and
100
the Heads of the Constitutional Commissions may be authorized to augment appropriations are free from any obligation or encumbrance, and that the work,
any item in the GAA “for their respective offices,” Section 25(5), supra, has activity or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized has been
delineated borders between their offices, such that funds appropriated for one completed, discontinued or abandoned.
office are prohibited from crossing over to another office even in the guise of
augmentation of a deficient item or items. Thus, we call such transfers of funds Facts:
cross-border transfers or cross-border augmentations. Regardless of the
variant characterizations of the cross-border transfers of funds, the plain text The respondents maintain that the issues in these consolidated cases were
of Section 25(5), supra, disallowing cross-border transfers was disobeyed. mischaracterized and unnecessarily constitutionalized; that the Court’s
Cross-border transfers, whether as augmentation, or as aid, were prohibited interpretation of savings can be overturned by legislation considering that
under Section 25(5), supra. savings is defined in the General Appropriations Act (GAA), hence making
savings a statutory issue; that the withdrawn unobligated allotments and
In sum, the Supreme Court DECLARES the following acts and practices under unreleased appropriations constitute savings and may be used for
the Disbursement Acceleration Program, National Budget Circular No. 541 augmentation; and that the Court should apply legally recognized norms and
and related executive issuances UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being in violation principles, most especially the presumption of good faith, in resolving their
of Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the doctrine of motion.
separation of powers, namely:
Furthermore, the respondents argue that the Executive has not violated the
(a) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing agencies, GAA because savings as a concept is an ordinary species of interpretation
and the declaration of the withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased that calls for legislative, instead of judicial, determination.
appropriations as savings prior to the end of the fiscal year and without
complying with the statutory definition of savings contained in the General Issues:
Appropriations Acts;
(1) Whether or not that the Executive has not violated the GAA because
(b) The cross-border transfers of the savings of the Executive to augment the savings as a concept is an ordinary species of interpretation that calls for
appropriations of other offices outside the Executive; and legislative, instead of judicial, determination.
(2) Whether or not the withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased
(c) The funding of projects, activities and programs that were not covered by appropriations constitute savings and may be used for augmentation.
any appropriation in the General Appropriations Act. (3) Whether or not the Court should apply legally recognized norms and
principles, most especially the presumption of good faith, in resolving their
104. Araullo vs. Aquino III motion.
749 SCRA 283, February 03, 2015
Rulings:
Doctrines:
1. No. Regardless of the perceived beneficial purposes of the DAP, and
(1) Regardless of the perceived beneficial purposes of the Disbursement regardless of whether the DAP is viewed as an effective tool of stimulating the
Acceleration Program (DAP), and regardless of whether the DAP is viewed as national economy, the acts and practices under the DAP and the relevant
an effective tool of stimulating the national economy, the acts and practices provisions of NBC No. 541 cited in the Decision should remain illegal and
under the DAP and the relevant provisions of National Budget Circular (NBC) unconstitutional as long as the funds used to finance the projects mentioned
No. 541 cited in the Decision should remain illegal and unconstitutional as long therein are sourced from savings that deviated from the relevant provisions of
as the funds used to finance the projects mentioned therein are sourced from the GAA, as well as the limitation on the power to augment under Section
savings that deviated from the relevant provisions of the General 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution. In a society governed by laws, even the
Appropriations Act (GAA), as well as the limitation on the power to augment best intentions must come within the parameters defined and set by the
under Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution. Constitution and the law. Laudable purposes must be carried out through legal
methods.
(2) When the President suspends or stops expenditure of funds, savings are
not automatically generated until it has been established that such funds or
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2. No. When the President suspends or stops expenditure of funds, savings
are not automatically generated until it has been established that such funds Facts:
or appropriations are free from any obligation or encumbrance, and that the
work, activity or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized has been Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church,
completed, discontinued or abandoned. Although the withdrawal of seeks the issuance from this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the
unobligated allotments may have effectively resulted in the suspension or respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps
stoppage of expenditures through the issuance of negative Special Allotment commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress.
Release Orders (SARO), the reissuance of withdrawn allotments to the original
programs and projects is a clear indication that the program or project from In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he
which the allotments were withdrawn has not been discontinued or would order the issuance –of postage stamps commemorating the celebration
abandoned. Consequently, as we have pointed out in the Decision, “the in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress,
purpose for which the withdrawn funds had been appropriated was not yet organized by the Roman Catholic Church. In spite of the protest of the
fulfilled, or did not yet cease to exist, rendering the declaration of the funds as petitioner's attorney, the respondent publicly announced having sent to the
savings impossible.” In this regard, the withdrawal and transfer of unobligated United States the designs of the postage stamps for printing.
allotments remain unconstitutional.
Issue:
Nevertheless, it bears repeating that the DAP is a policy instrument that the
Executive, by its own prerogative, may utilize to spur economic growth and Whether or not the action of the respondent is violative of the provisions of
development. Accordingly, so long as there is an item in the GAA for which section 13, subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, which
Congress had set aside a specified amount of public fund, savings may be provides that "no public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied,
transferred thereto for augmentation purposes. This interpretation is consistent or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect,
not only with the Constitution and the GAAs, but also with the degree of church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion.”
flexibility allowed to the Executive during budget execution in responding to
unforeseeable contingencies. Nonetheless, this modified interpretation does Ruling:
not take away the caveat that only DAP projects found in the appropriate GAAs
may be the subject of augmentation by legally accumulated savings. No. The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the principle of
separation of church and state. It should be stated that what is guaranteed by
3. Yes. As a general rule, the nullification of an unconstitutional law or act our Constitution is religious liberty, not mere religious toleration. Religious
carries with it the illegality of its effects. However, in cases where nullification freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound
of the effects will result in inequity and injustice, the operative fact doctrine reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs.
may apply. In so ruling, the Court has essentially recognized the impact on the Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates
beneficiaries and the country as a whole if its ruling would pave the way for man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the
the nullification of the P144.378 Billion 58worth of infrastructure projects, social purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated.
and economic services funded through the DAP. Bearing in mind the When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution, implored "the
disastrous impact of nullifying these projects by virtue alone of the invalidation aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody
of certain acts and practices under the DAP, the Court has upheld the efficacy their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the
of such DAP-funded projects by applying the operative fact doctrine. general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of
independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy," they thereby
105. Aglipay vs. Ruiz manifested their intense religious nature and placed unfaltering reliance upon
64 Phil. 201, March 13, 1937 Him who guides the destinies of men and nations.

Doctrine: The elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as

What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty, not mere religious elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded
toleration. Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not to religious sects and denominations. Our Constitution and laws exempt from
inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence taxation properties devoted exclusively to religious purposes. Sectarian aid is
in human affairs. not prohibited when a priest, preacher, minister or other religious teacher or
102
dignitary as such is assigned t the armed forces or to any penal institution, On March 23, 1976, the said barangay council adopted Resolution No. 5,
orphanage or leprosarium. Optional religious instruction in the public schools “reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration” every fifth day of April “of
is by constitutional mandate allowed. Thursday and Friday of Holy Week, the feast day of Señor San Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint of Valencia”. It
Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day, and Sundays are made legal holidays provided for the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the
because of the secular idea that their observance is conducive to beneficial image would be made available to the Catholic parish church during the
moral results. The law allows divorce but punishes polygamy and bigamy; and celebration of the saint’s feast day. The resolution was submitted to a
certain crimes against religious worship are considered crimes against the plebiscite and was duly ratified by the barangay general assembly. Funds
fundamental laws of the state. were raised by means of solicitations and cash donations of the barangay
residents and those of the neighboring places of Valencia. With those funds,
Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the a waiting shed was constructed and the wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer
Director of Posts is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of was acquired in Cebu City by the barangay council for four hundred pesos.
special postage stamps would be "advantageous to the Government." Of On April 5, 1976, the image was temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic
course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government" does not authorize the church of Barangay Valencia so that the devotees could worship the saint
violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation, use or during the mass for the fiesta.
application of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a
particular sect or church. In the present case, however, the issuance of the A controversy arose after the mass when the parish priest, Father Sergio
postage stamps in question by the Director of Posts and the Secretary of Marilao Osmeña, refused to return that image to the barangay council on the
Public Works and Communications was not inspired by any sectarian feeling pretext that it was the property of the church because church funds were used
to favor a particular church or religious denomination. The stamps were not for its acquisition. A replevin case was filed in the city court of Ormoc City
issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money against Father Osmeña and Bishop Cipriano Urgel. After the barangay
derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. On the contrary, it council had posted a cash bond of eight hundred pesos, Father Osmeña
appears from the letter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated turned over the image to the council. In his answer to the complaint for
on page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and replevin, he assailed the constitutionality of the said resolutions. The lower
selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists court dismissed the complaint. It upheld the validity of the resolutions.
to this country." The officials concerned merely took advantage of an event
considered of international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and The petitioners on appealed contented that the resolutions contravene the
its people". It is significant to note that the stamps' as actually designed and constitutional provisions that “no law shall be made respecting an
printed (Exhibit 2), instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally establishment of religion” and that “no public money or property shall ever be
planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of the City of appropriated, applied, paid, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit,
Manila, and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system
Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic of religion.
Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat of that
congress. Issue:

106. Garces vs. Estenzo Whether or not the questioned resolutions do not directly or indirectly establish
104 SCRA 510, May 25, 1981 any religion, nor abridge religious liberty, nor appropriate public money or
property for the benefit of any sect, priest or clergyman.
Doctrine:
Ruling:
A resolution of the Barangay Council for soliciting contributions to buy a statue
of the barangay’s patron saint and the use of such fund for said purpose does No. The questioned resolutions do not directly or indirectly establish any
not violate the Constitution’s provision prohibiting use of public funds for religion, nor abridge religious liberty, nor appropriate public money or property
religious purposes. for the benefit of any sect, priest or clergyman. The image was purchased with
private funds, not with tax money. Manifestly puerile and flimsy is petitioners’
Facts: argument that the barangay council favored the Catholic religion by using the
funds raised by solicitations and donations for the purchase of the patron
103
saint’s wooden image and making the image available to the Catholic church. seal, a set of personnel and confidential employees, to effect the constitutional
The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the mandate.
barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the Issue:
purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or the
religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was Whether or not the constitution of the PET, composed of the Members of this
the mass. Consequently, the image of the patron saint had to be placed in the Court, is unconstitutional, and violates Section 4, Article VII and Section 12,
church when the mass was celebrated. Article VIII of the Constitution.

If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a Ruling:

patron saint for the barrio, then any activity intended to facilitate the worship of
the patron saint (such as the acquisition and display of his image) cannot be No. Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, the provision under scrutiny,
branded as illegal. As noted in the first resolution, the barrio fiesta is a should be read with other related provisions of the Constitution such as the
socioreligious affair. Its celebration is an ingrained tradition in rural parallel provisions on the Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House of
communities. The fiesta relieves the monotony and drudgery of the lives of the Representatives. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the Supreme Court’s
masses. We find that the momentous issues of separation of church and state, constitutional mandate to act as sole judge of election contests involving our
freedom of religion and the use of public money to favor any sect or church country’s highest public officials, and its rule-making authority in connection
are not involved at all in this case even remotely or indirectly. It is not a therewith, is not restricted; it includes all necessary powers implicit in the
microcosmic test case on those issues. Not every governmental activity which exercise thereof. The exercise of our power to judge presidential and vice-
involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is presidential election contests, as well as the rule-making power adjunct
violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and thereto, is plenary; it is not as restrictive as petitioner would interpret it. The
state, freedom of worship and banning the use of public money or property. conferment of additional jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, with the duty
characterized as an “awesome” task, includes the means necessary to carry it
IV. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT into effect under the doctrine of necessary implication.

A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of

ELECTION AND PROCLAMATION authority to the Supreme Court sitting en banc. In the same vein, although the
method by which the Supreme Court exercises this authority is not specified
107. Macalintal vs. Presidential Electoral Tribunal in the provision, the grant of power does not contain any limitation on the
635 SCRA 783, November 23, 2010 Supreme Court’s exercise thereof. The Supreme Court’s method of deciding
presidential and vice-presidential election contests, through the PET, is
Doctrine: actually a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the
aforequoted constitutional provision. Thus, the subsequent directive in the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal; The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to provision for the Supreme Court to “promulgate its rules for the purpose.”
decide presidential and vice-presidential election protests while concurrently
acting as an independent Electoral Tribunal. The conferment of full authority to the Supreme Court, as a PET, is equivalent
to the full authority conferred upon the electoral tribunals of the Senate and
Facts: the House of Representatives, i.e., the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The different
Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal (Atty. Macalintal) questions the constitution of the electoral tribunals, with the Supreme Court functioning as the PET, are
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an illegal and unauthorized progeny constitutional bodies, independent of the three departments of government—
of Section 4, 2Article VII of the Constitution: “The Supreme Court, sitting en Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary—but not separate therefrom. By the
banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, same token, the PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the Supreme
and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its Court, albeit it has functions peculiar only to the Tribunal. It is obvious that the
rules for the purpose.” While petitioner concedes that the Supreme Court is PET was constituted in implementation of Section 4, Article VII of the
“authorized to promulgate its rules for the purpose,” he chafes at the creation Constitution, and it faithfully complies—not unlawfully defies—the
of a purportedly “separate tribunal” complemented by a budget allocation, a constitutional directive. The adoption of a separate seal, as well as the change
104
in the nomenclature of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices into General and respondent Joint Committee, this Court finds that the petition has
Chairman and Members of the Tribunal, respectively, was designed simply to absolutely no basis under the Constitution and must, therefore, be dismissed.
highlight the singularity and exclusivity of the Tribunal’s functions as a special
electoral court. The legislative functions of the Twelfth Congress may have come to a close
upon the final adjournment of its regular sessions on June 11, 2004, but this
The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterizes the does not affect its non-legislative functions, such as that of being the National
resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power. Board of Canvassers. In fact, the joint public session of both Houses of
When the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential Congress convened by express directive of Section 4, Article VII of the
election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power. With the Constitution to canvass the votes for and to proclaim the newly elected
explicit provision, the present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, President and Vice-President has not, and cannot, adjourn sine die until it has
in conjunction with latter’s exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the accomplished its constitutionally mandated tasks. For only when a board of
task of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests, with full canvassers has completed its functions is it rendered functus officio. Its
authority in the exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a derivative of membership may change, but it retains its authority as a board until it has
the plenary judicial power allocated to courts of law, expressly provided in the accomplished its purposes. Since the Twelfth Congress has not yet completed
Constitution. On the whole, the Constitution draws a thin, but, nevertheless, its non-legislative duty to canvass the votes and proclaim the duly elected
distinct line between the PET and the Supreme Court. The PET, as intended President and Vice-President, its existence as the National Board of
by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution independent, but not Canvassers, as well as that of the Joint Committee to which it referred the
separate, from the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court. preliminary tasks of authenticating and canvassing the certificates of canvass,
has not become functus officio.
108. Pimentel vs Congress
G.R. No. 163783, June 22, 2004 In sum, despite the adjournment sine die of Congress, there is no legal
impediment to the Joint Committee completing the tasks assigned to it and
Facts: transmitting its report for the approval of the joint public session of both Houses
of Congress, which may reconvene without need of call by the President to a
Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. seeks a judgment declaring null and void the special session.
continued existence of the Joint Committee of Congress (Joint Committee) to
determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass and PERQUISITES AND INHIBITIONS
preliminarily canvass the votes cast for Presidential and Vice-Presidential
candidates in the May 10, 2004 elections following the adjournment of 109. Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary
Congress sine die on June 11, 2004. Petitioner posits that with "the 194 SCRA 317, January 22, 1991
adjournment sine die on June 11, 2004 by the Twelfth Congress of its last
regular session, [its] term ... terminated and expired on the said day and the Doctrine:
said Twelfth Congress serving the term 2001 to 2004 passed out of legal
existence." Henceforth, petitioner goes on, "all pending matters and Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional as it allows Cabinet members,
proceedings terminate upon the expiration of ... Congress." undersecretaries or assistant secretaries to hold multiple offices or
employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Section 13,
Issue: Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so.

Whether or not the continued existence of the Joint Committee of Congress is Facts:
null and void.
Petitioners seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No.
Ruling: 284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987. In sum, the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 is being challenged by petitioners
No. After a considered and judicious examination of the arguments raised by on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Section 13, Article VII
petitioner as well as those presented in the Comments filed by the Solicitor other than those provided in the Constitution. According to petitioners, by
virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,” the only
105
exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are the governing bodies or boards of governmental agencies or instrumentalities
those provided in the Constitution, namely: (1) The Vice- President may be in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by their primary
appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII functions, they would be deprived of the means for control and supervision,
thereof; and (2) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial thereby resulting in an unwieldy and confused bureaucracy.
and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
Public respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the phrase “unless It bears repeating though that in order that such additional duties or functions
otherwise provided in the Constitution” in Section 13, Article VII makes may not transgress the prohibition embodied in Section 13, Article VII of the
reference to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX- B insofar as the appointive officials 1987 Constitution, such additional duties or functions must be required by the
mentioned therein are concerned. primary functions of the official concerned, who is to perform the same in an
ex-officio capacity as provided by law, without receiving any additional
Issue: compensation therefor. The ex-officio position being actually and in legal
contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that the official concerned
Whether or not the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said
insofar as Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants are concerned admit position. The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered
of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general under Section by the compensation attached to his principal office.
7, par. (2), Article IX-B.
In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Article VII in relation to
Ruling: Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, Executive Order No.
284 dated July 23, 1987 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number
No. Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries
all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than two (2) positions
Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the in the government and government corporations, Executive Order No. 284
Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. This actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct
being the case, the qualifying phrase “unless otherwise provided in this contravention of the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution” in Section 13, Article VII cannot possibly refer to the broad Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the
exceptions provided under Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. To 1987 Constitution itself.
construe said qualifying phrase as respondents would have us do, would
render nugatory and meaningless the manifest intent and purpose of the 110. Funa vs. Ermita
framers of the Constitution to impose a stricter prohibition on the President, 612 SCRA 308, February 11, 2010
Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with
respect to holding other offices or employment in the government during their Doctrine:
tenure.
The 1987 Constitution in prohibiting dual or multiple offices, as well as
Mandating additional duties and functions to the President, Vice-President, incompatible offices, refers to the holding of the office, and not to the nature of
Cabinet Members, their deputies or assistants which are not inconsistent with the appointment or designation, words which were not even found in Section
those already prescribed by their offices or appointments by virtue of their 13, Article VII nor in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B. To “hold” an office
special knowledge, expertise and skill in their respective executive offices is a means to “possess or occupy” the same, or “to be in possession and
practice long-recognized in many jurisdictions. It is a practice justified by the administration,” which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the
demands of efficiency, policy direction, continuity and coordination among the functions and duties of the office.
different offices in the Executive Branch in the discharge of its multifarious
tasks of executing and implementing laws affecting national interest and Facts:
general welfare and delivering basic services to the people. It is consistent with
the power vested on the President and his alter egos, the Cabinet members, On October 4, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed
to have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices and to respondent Maria Elena H. Bautista (Bautista) as Undersecretary of the
ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Without these additional duties Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC). On September
and functions being assigned to the President and his official family to sit in 1, 2008, following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator Vicente T.
106
Suazo, Jr., Bautista was designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the Yes. Respondent Bautista being then the appointed Undersecretary of DOTC,
Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent capacity as DOTC Undersecretary. she was thus covered by the stricter prohibition under Section 13, Article VII
Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, and consequently she cannot invoke the exception provided in Section 7,
filed the instant petition challenging the constitutionality of Bautista’s paragraph 2, Article IX-B where holding another office is allowed by law or the
appointment/designation, which is proscribed by the prohibition on the primary functions of the position. Neither was she designated OIC of MARINA
President, Vice President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and in an ex officio capacity, which is the exception recognized in Civil Liberties
assistants to hold any other office or employment. Union. The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment
under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution was held inapplicable to
Petitioner argues that Bautista’s concurrent positions as DOTC posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein, without additional
Undersecretary and MARINA OIC is in violation of Section 13, Article VII of the compensation in an ex officio capacity as provided by law and as required by
1987 Constitution. He points out that while it was clarified in Civil Liberties the primary functions of said office. The reason is that these posts do not
Union that the prohibition does not apply to those positions held in ex officio comprise “any other office” within the contemplation of the constitutional
capacities, the position of MARINA Administrator is not ex officio to the post of prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on
DOTC Undersecretary. The fact that Bautista was extended an appointment said officials.
naming her as OIC of MARINA shows that she does not occupy it in an ex
officio capacity since an ex officio position does not require any “further warrant Apart from their bare assertion that respondent Bautista did not receive any
or appoint.” compensation when she was OIC of MARINA, respondents failed to
demonstrate clearly that her designation as such OIC was in an ex officio
On the other hand, respondents submit that the petition should be dismissed capacity as required by the primary functions of her office as DOTC
for being unmeritorious considering that Bautista’s concurrent designation as Undersecretary for Maritime Transport. Given the vast responsibilities and
MARINA OIC and DOTC Undersecretary was constitutional. There was no scope of administration of the Authority, we are hardly persuaded by
violation of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution because respondent respondents’ submission that respondent Bautista’s designation as OIC of
Bautista was merely designated acting head of MARINA on September 1, MARINA was merely an imposition of additional duties related to her primary
2008. She was designated MARINA OIC, not appointed MARINA position as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport.
Administrator. When the position of MARINA Administrator was left vacant,
and pending the appointment of permanent Administrator, respondent Bautista The 1987 Constitution in prohibiting dual or multiple offices, as well as
was designated OIC in a temporary capacity for the purpose of preventing a incompatible offices, refers to the holding of the office, and not to the nature of
hiatus in the discharge of official functions. Her case thus falls under the the appointment or designation, words which were not even found in Section
recognized exceptions to the rule against multiple offices, i.e., without 13, Article VII nor in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B. To “hold” an office
additional compensation (she did not receive any emolument as MARINA OIC) means to “possess or occupy” the same, or “to be in possession and
and as required by the primary functions of the office. Besides, Bautista held administration,” which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the
the position for four (4) months only, as in fact when she was appointed functions and duties of the office. The disqualification laid down in Section 13,
MARINA Administrator on February 2, 2009, she relinquished her post as Article VII is aimed at preventing the concentration of powers in the Executive
DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, in acknowledgment of the Department officials, specifically the President, Vice President, Members of
proscription on the holding of multiple offices. the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants.

Issue: EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE

Whether or not the designation of respondent Bautista as OIC of MARINA, 111. Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
concurrent with the position of DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport Investigations
to which she had been appointed, violated the constitutional proscription 564 SCRA 152, September 04, 2008
against dual or multiple offices for Cabinet Members and their deputies and
assistants. Doctrine:

Ruling: Executive Privilege; There is a recognized presumptive presidential

communications privilege; The presidential communications privilege is
107
fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the
separation of powers under the Constitution. (1) Whether or not there is a recognized presumptive presidential
communications privilege in our legal system.
Facts: (2) Whether or not there is factual or legal basis to hold that the
communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by executive
On September 26, 2007, petitioner Romulo L. Neri appeared before privilege;
respondent Committees and testified for about eleven (11) hours on matters
concerning the National Broadband Project (the “NBN Project”), a project Rulings:
awarded by the Department of Transportation and Communications (“DOTC”)
to Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (“ZTE”). Petitioner disclosed 1. Yes. The Court, in the earlier case of Almonte v. Vasquez, affirmed
that then Commission on Elections (“COMELEC”) Chairman Benjamin Abalos that the presidential communications privilege is fundamental to the operation
offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the
further narrated that he informed President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo Constitution. Even Senate v. Ermita, the case relied upon by respondent
(“President Arroyo”) of the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to Committees, reiterated this concept. There, the Court enumerated the cases
accept the bribe. However, when probed further on President Arroyo and in which the claim of executive privilege was recognized, among them Almonte
petitioner’s discussions relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to v. Chavez, Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),
answer, invoking “executive privilege.” To be specific, petitioner refused to and Chavez v. PEA. The Court articulated in these cases that “there are certain
answer questions on: (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN types of information which the government may withhold from the public,” that
Project, 4(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or there is a “governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to
not she directed him to approve it. state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security
matters”; and that “the right to information does not extend to matters
Respondent Committees persisted in knowing petitioner’s answers to these recognized as ‘privileged information’ under the separation of powers, by
three questions by requiring him to appear and testify once more on November which the Court meant Presidential conversations, correspondences, and
20, 2007. On November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings.”
wrote to respondent Committees and requested them to dispense with
petitioner’s testimony on the ground of executive privilege. On November 20, In this case, it was the President herself, through Executive Secretary Ermita,
2007, petitioner did not appear before respondent Committees upon orders of who invoked executive privilege on a specific matter involving an executive
the President invoking executive privilege. Without responding to his request agreement between the Philippines and China, which was the subject of the
for advance notice of the matters that he should still clarify, they issued the three (3) questions propounded to petitioner Neri in the course of the Senate
Order dated January 30, 2008; In Re: P.S. Res. Nos. 127, 129, 136 & 144; Committees’ investigation. Senate v. Ermita expounds on the constitutional
and privilege speeches of Senator Lacson and Santiago (all on the ZTE-NBN underpinning of the relationship between the Executive Department and the
Project), citing petitioner in contempt of respondent Committees and ordering Legislative Department to explain why there should be no implied authorization
his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms until such or presumptive authorization to invoke executive privilege by the President’s
time that he would appear and give his testimony. subordinate officials, as follows: “When Congress exercises its power of
inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is
On March 25, 2008, the Court granted his petition for certiorari on two grounds: by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they
first, the communications elicited by the three (3) questions were covered by are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this
executive privilege; and second, respondent Committees committed grave power – the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the
abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order. The respondent Committees reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on
filed the present motion for reconsideration. Respondent Committees ardently he being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect
argue that the Court’s declaration that presidential communications are accorded to a co-equal branch of governments which is sanctioned by a long-
presumptively privileged reverses the “presumption” laid down in Senate v. standing custom.”
Ermita that “inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of
disclosure.” Thus, if what is involved is the presumptive privilege of presidential
communications when invoked by the President on a matter clearly within the
Issues: domain of the Executive, the said presumption dictates that the same be
108
recognized and be given preference or priority, in the absence of proof of a
compelling or critical need for disclosure by the one assailing such Considering that the information sought through the three (3) questions subject
presumption. Any construction to the contrary will render meaningless the of this Petition involves the President’s dealings with a foreign nation, with
presumption accorded by settled jurisprudence in favor of executive privilege. more reason, this Court is wary of approving the view that Congress may
peremptorily inquire into not only official, documented acts of the President but
2. Yes. There are factual and legal bases to hold that the even her confidential and informal discussions with her close advisors on the
communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by executive pretext that said questions serve some vague legislative need.
privilege.

A. The power to enter into an executive agreement is a “quintessential and 112. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDUARDO R. ERMITA
non-delegable presidential power.” G.R. No. 169777. April 20, 2006.

“Quintessential” is defined as the most perfect embodiment of something, the Doctrine:

concentrated essence of substance. On the other hand, “non-delegable”
means that a power or duty cannot be delegated to another or, even if Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Executive Privilege; Even where
delegated, the responsibility remains with the obligor. the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the
power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of „executive
The power to enter into an executive agreement is in essence an executive privilege.‰·Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still
power. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under
without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in the rubric of „executive privilege.‰ Since this term figures prominently in the
Philippine jurisprudence. Now, the fact that the President has to secure the challenged order, it being mentioned in its provisions, its preambular clauses,
prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, which shall submit to Congress a and in its very title, a discussion of executive privilege is crucial for determining
complete report of its decision before contracting or guaranteeing foreign the constitutionality of E.O. 464.
loans, does not diminish the executive nature of the power.
Same; Same; Executive Privilege; Words and Phrases; The phrase „executive
B. The “doctrine of operational proximity” was laid down precisely to limit the privilege” is not new in this jurisdiction; Executive privilege has been defined
scope of the presidential communications privilege but, in any case, it is not as „the power of the Government to withhold information from the public, the
conclusive. courts, and the Congress,” as well as „the right of the President and high-level
executive branch officers to withhold information from Congress, the courts,
In the case at bar, the danger of expanding the privilege “to a large swath of and ultimately the public.‰·The phrase „executive privilege‰ is not new in
the executive branch” (a fear apparently entertained by respondents) is absent this jurisdiction. It has been used even prior to the promulgation of the 1986
because the official involved here is a member of the Cabinet, thus, properly Constitution. Being of American origin, it is best understood in light of how it
within the term “advisor” of the President; in fact, her alter ego and a member has been defined and used in the legal literature of the United States. Schwartz
of her official family. defines executive privilege as „the power of the Government to withhold
information from the public, the courts, and the Congress.‰ Similarly, Rozell
C. The President’s claim of executive privilege is not merely based on a defines it as „the right of the President and high-level executive branch officers
generalized interest; and in balancing respondent Committees’ and the to withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public.‰
President’s clashing interests, the Court did not disregard the 1987 Executive privilege is, nonetheless, not a clear or unitary concept.It has
Constitutional provisions on government transparency, accountability and encompassed claims of varying kinds. Tribe, in fact, comments that while it is
disclosure of information. customary to employ the phrase „executive privilege,‰ it may be more
accurate to speak of executive privileges „since presidential refusals to furnish
It must be stressed that the President’s claim of executive privilege is not information may be actuated by any of at least three distinct kinds of
merely founded on her generalized interest in confidentiality. The Letter dated considerations, and may be asserted, with differing degrees of success, in the
November 15, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita specified presidential context of either judicial or legislative investigations.
communications privilege in relation to diplomatic and economic relations with
another sovereign nation as the bases for the claim.
109
Same; Same; Same; Varieties of Executive Privilege.·One variety of the Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and other
privilege, Tribe explains, is the state secrets privilege invoked by U.S. unlawful provisions of the contract covering the North Rail Project.
Presidents, beginning with Washington, on the ground that the information is
of such nature that its disclosure would subvert crucial military or diplomatic The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewise issued
objectives. Another variety is the informerÊs privilege, or the privilege of the invitations dated September 22, 2005 to the certain AFP officials for them to
Government not to disclose the identity of persons who furnish information of attend as resource persons in a public hearing scheduled on September 28,
violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement of that law. Finally, 2005 on the following: (1) Privilege Speech of Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel
a generic privilege for internal deliberations has been said to attach to Jr., delivered on June 6, 2005 entitled „Bunye has Provided Smoking Gun or
intragovernmental documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations has Opened a Can of Worms that Show Massive Electoral Fraud in the
and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental Presidential Election of May 2005‰; (2) Privilege Speech of Senator Jinggoy
decisions and policies are formulated. E. Estrada delivered on July 26, 2005 entitled „The Philippines as the Wire-
Tapping Capital of the World‰; (3) Privilege Speech of Senator Rodolfo
Same; Same; Same; In determining the validity of a claim of privilege, the Biazon delivered on August 1, 2005 entitled „Clear and Present Danger‰; (4)
question that must be asked is not only whether the requested information falls Senate Resolution No. 285 filed by Senator Maria Ana Consuelo Madrigal·
within one of the traditional privileges, but also whether that privilege should Resolution Directing the Committee on National Defense and Security to
be honored in a given procedural setting.·That a type of information is Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, and in the National Interest, on the
recognized as privileged does not, however, necessarily mean that it would be Role of the Military in the So-called „Gloriagate Scandal‰; and (5) Senate
considered privileged in all instances. For in determining the validity of a claim Resolution No. 295 filed by Senator Biazon·Resolution Directing the
of privilege, the question that must be asked is not only whether the requested Committee on National Defense and Security to Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of
information falls within one of the traditional privileges, but also whether that Legislation, on the WireTapping of the President of the Philippines.
privilege should be honored in a given procedural setting.
On September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. 464. Also on September
Same; Same; Same; Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, 28, 2005, Senate President Drilon received from Executive Secretary Ermita
the courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of a copy of E.O. 464, and another letter informing him „that officials of the Execu-
information of a sensitive character; The extraordinary character of the tive Department invited to appear at the meeting [regarding the NorthRail
exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive project] will not be able to attend the same without the consent of the
secrecy and in favor of disclosure.·From the above discussion on the meaning President, pursuant to [E.O. 464]” and that „said officials have not secured the
and scope of executive privilege, both in the United States and in this required consent from the President.” On even date which was also the
jurisdiction, a clear principle emerges. Executive privilege, whether asserted scheduled date of the hearing on the alleged wiretapping, Gen. Senga sent a
against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to letter to Senator Biazon, Chairperson of the Committee on National Defense
certain types of information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege and Security, informing him „that per instruction of [President Arroyo], thru the
is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on Secretary of National Defense, no officer of the [AFP] is authorized to appear
the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably before any Senate or Congressional hearings without seeking a written
absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to approval from the President‰ and „that no approval has been granted by the
disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the President to any AFP officer to appear before the public hearing of the Senate
extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption Committee on National Defense and Security scheduled [on] 28 September
inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure. 2005.”

FACTS: Despite the communications received from Executive Secretary Ermita and
Gen. Senga, the investigation scheduled by the Committee on National
On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued Defense and Security pushed through, with only Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen.
invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear Gudani among all the AFP officials invited attending.
on September 29, 2005 as resource speakers in a public hearing on the
railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China For defying President Arroyo’s order barring military personnel from testifying
National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project). The before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col.
public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce
110
Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were made to face court When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for
martial proceedings. department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of
privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department
ISSUE: heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power – the
President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of
Whether executive privilege may be invoked against Congress Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being
the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a
Ruling: co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a longstanding custom.

Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY
exemptions to the power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of
“executive privilege.” Since this term figures prominently in the challenged 113. JOSEPH E. ESTRADA vs. ANIANO DESIERTO
order, it being mentioned in its provisions, its preambular clauses, and in its G.R. Nos. 146710-15. April 3, 2001.
very title, a discussion of executive privilege is crucial for determining the
constitutionality of E.O. 464. Doctrine:

Schwartz defines executive privilege as „the power of the Government to Same; Impeachment; Presidential Immunity; Section 3(7) of Article XI of the
withhold information from the public, the courts, and the Congress.” Constitution conveys two uncomplicated ideas· first, it tells us that judgment in
impeachment cases has a limited reach, i.e., it cannot extend further than
One variety of the privilege, Tribe explains, is the state secrets privilege removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic
invoked by U.S. Presidents, beginning with Washington, on the ground that of the Philippines, and second, it tells us the consequence of the limited reach
the information is of such nature that its disclosure would subvert crucial of a judgment in impeachment proceedings considering its nature, i.e., that the
military or diplomatic objectives. Another variety is the informer’s privilege, party convicted shall still be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and
or the privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity of persons who punishment according to law.·Petitioner reiterates the argument that he must
furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with the be first convicted in the impeachment proceedings before he could be
enforcement of that law. Finally, a generic privilege for internal deliberations criminally prosecuted. A plain reading of the provision will not yield this
has been said to attach to intragovernmental documents reflecting advisory conclusion. The provision conveys two uncomplicated ideas: first, it tells us
opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by that judgment in impeachment cases has a limited reach . . . i.e., it cannot
which governmental decisions and policies are formulated. extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office
under the Republic of the Philippines, and second, it tells us the consequence
That a type of information is recognized as privileged does not, however, of the limited reach of a judgment in impeachment proceedings considering its
necessarily mean that it would be considered privileged in all instances. For in nature, i.e., that the party convicted shall still be liable and subject to
determining the validity of a claim of privilege, the question that must be asked prosecution, trial and punishment according to law. No amount of manipulation
is not only whether the requested information falls within one of the traditional will justify petitioner’s non sequitor submission that the provision requires that
privileges, but also whether that privilege should be honored in a given his conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition sine qua non to
procedural setting. his prosecution, trial and punishment for the offenses he is now facing before
the respondent Ombudsman.
While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be
valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in Same; Presidential Immunity; Administrative Law; Words and Phrases;
which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials „Term‰ and „Tenure,‰ Distinguished; The intent of the framers is clear that
are exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being the immunity of the president from suit is concurrent only with his tenure and
executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the exemptions not his term.·Petitioner, however, fails to distinguish between term and tenure.
indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold the office
secrecy and in favor of disclosure. as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall
succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the
incumbent actually holds office. The tenure may be shorter than the term for
111
reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent. From the deliberations, preserved under our system of government, albeit not expressly reserved in
the intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the president from suit is the present constitution. Addressing a concern of his co-members in the 1986
concurrent only with his tenure and not his term. Constitutional Commission on the absence of an express provision on the
matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already understood in
FACTS: jurisprudence that the President may not be sued during his or her tenure. The
Court subsequently made it abundantly clear in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,
For resolution are petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. Nos. 146710- 489 SCRA 160 (2006), a case likewise resolved under the umbrella of the 1987
15 and Omnibus Motion in G.R. No. 146738 of the Court’s Decision of March Constitution, that indeed the President enjoys immunity during her
2, 2001. incumbency, and why this must be so: Settled is the doctrine that the
President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued
In G.R. Nos. 146710-15, petitioner raises the following grounds: X X X in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the
II. IT HELD THAT PETITIONER IS NO LONGER ENTITLED TO Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President,
ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT. X X X the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as
such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of
RULING: harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the
performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and
We held that given the intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which
policy that a public office is a public trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties
President, cannot claim executive immunity for his alleged criminal acts imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the
committed while a sitting President. Petitioner’s rehashed arguments including Government.
their thinly disguised new spins are based on the rejected contention that he
is still President, albeit, a President on leave. His stance that his immunity Facts:
covers his entire term of office or until June 30, 2004 disregards the reality that
he has relinquished the presidency and there is now a new de jure President. On April 3, 2007, armed men belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and
Security Squadron (AISS, for short) based in Fernando Air Base in Lipa City
Petitioner, however, fails to distinguish between term and tenure. The term abducted Lourdes D. Rubrico (Lourdes), then attending a Lenten pabasa in
means the time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, Bagong Bayan, Dasmariñas, Cavite, and brought to, and detained at, the air
and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one base without charges. During the time Lourdes was missing, P/Sr. Insp.
another. The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually Arsenio Gomez (P/Insp. Gomez), then sub-station commander of Bagong
holds office. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or Bayan, Dasmariñas, Cavite, kept sending text messages to Lourdes’ daughter,
beyond the power of the incumbent. From the deliberations, the intent of the Mary Joy R. Carbonel (Mary Joy), bringing her to beaches and asking her
framers is clear that the immunity of the president from suit is concurrent only questions about Karapatan, an alliance of human rights organizations. He,
with his tenure and not his term. however, failed to make an investigation even after Lourdes’ disappearance
had been made known to him. A week after Lourdes’ release, another
114. LOURDES D. RUBRICO vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO daughter, Jean R. Apruebo (Jean), was constrained to leave their house
G.R. No. 183871. February 18, 2010. because of the presence of men watching them.

Doctrine: Lourdes has filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for
kidnapping and arbitrary detention and administrative complaint for gross
Separation of Powers; Presidential Immunity; The presidential immunity from abuse of authority and grave misconduct against Capt. Angelo Cuaresma
suit remains preserved under our system of government, albeit not expressly (Cuaresma), Ruben Alfaro (Alfaro), Jimmy Santana (Santana) and a certain
reserved in the present constitution. ·Petitioners first take issue on the Jonathan, c/o Headquarters 301st AISS, Fernando Air Base and Maj.
PresidentÊs purported lack of immunity from suit during her term of office. The Sy/Reyes with address at No. 09 Amsterdam Ext., Merville Subd., Parañaque
1987 Constitution, so they claim, has removed such immunity heretofore City, but nothing has happened; and the threats and harassment incidents
enjoyed by the chief executive under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. have been reported to the Dasmariñas municipal and Cavite provincial police
Petitioners are mistaken. The presidential immunity from suit remains stations, but nothing eventful resulted from their respective investigations.
112
 legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and
Before the CA, respondents President Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo, Gen. anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and
Hermogenes Esperon, then Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the
Staff, Police Director- General (P/Dir. Gen.) Avelino Razon, then Philippine operation of the Government.”
National Police (PNP) Chief, Police Superintendent (P/Supt.) Roquero of the
Cavite Police Provincial Office, Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Gomez, now retired, POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT
and the OMB (answering respondents, collectively) filed, through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), a joint return on the writ specifically denying the 115. FERDINAND E. MARCOS vs. HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS
material inculpatory averments against them. The OSG also denied the G.R. No. 88211. September 15, 1989.
allegations against the following impleaded persons, namely: Cuaresma,
Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan, and Sy/Reyes, for lack of knowledge or information Dotrine:
sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations’ truth. And by way of general
affirmative defenses, answering respondents interposed the following Same; Separation of Powers; Executive Powers; The grant of execu-tive
defenses: (1) the President may not be sued during her incumbency. power means a grant of all executive powers.·The 1987 Constitution has fully
restored the separation of powers of the three great branches of government.
Petitioners pleaded back to be allowed to present evidence ex parte against To recall the words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission [63
the President, et al. Phil. 139 (1936)], „the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in
bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial
By a separate resolution, the CA dropped the President as respondent in the departments of the government.‰ [At 157]. Thus, the 1987 constitution
case . explicitly provides that „[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress
of the Philippines‰ [Art. VI, Sec. 1], „[t]he executive power shall be vested in
Issue: the President of the Philippines‰ [Art. VII, Sec. 1], and „[t]he judicial power
shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
Whether the CA committed reversible error in dismissing their Petition and established by law‰ [Art. VIII, Sec. 1]. These provisions not only establish a
dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent. separation of powers by actual division [Angara v. Electoral Commission,
supra] but also confer plenary legislative, executive and judicial powers subject
Ruling: only to limitations provided in the Constitution. For as the Supreme Court in
Ocampo v. Cabangis [15 Phil. 626, (1910)] pointed out „a grant of the
The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of legislative power grant of all legislative power; and a grant of the judicial power
government, albeit not expressly reserved in the present constitution. means a grant of all the judicial power which may be exercised under the
Addressing a concern of his co-members in the 1986 Constitutional government.‰ [At 631-632.] If this can be said of the legislative power which
Commission on the absence of an express provision on the matter, Fr. Joaquin is exercised by two chambers with a combined membership of more than two
Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already understood in jurisprudence that the hundred members and of the judicial power which is vested in a hierarchy of
President may not be sued during his or her tenure. The Court subsequently courts, it can equally be said of the executive power which is vested in one
made it abundantly clear in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, a case likewise official ·the President.
resolved under the umbrella of the 1987 Constitution, that indeed the President
enjoys immunity during her incumbency, and why this must be so: Same; Same; Same; The President; The powers granted to the President are
not limited to those powers specifically enumerated in the Constitution.·It
“Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual would not be accurate, however, to state that „executive power‰ is the power
incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well as head of
need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the government and whatever powers inherent in such positions pertain to the
high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution
litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the
from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully President. It also grants the President other powers that do not involve the
attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the country’s foreign
relations. On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987
113
Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office
President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or
scope of „executive power.” Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of
said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.
In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so
enumerated. Facts:

Same; Same; Same; Same; Commander-In-Chief Powers: The President can This petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Court to order the
exercise Commander-In-Chief powers in order to keep the peace and maintain respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate
public order and security even in the absence of an emergency.·More members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President’s
particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President’s powers as decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
protector of the peace. [Rossiter, The Ameri-can Presidency.] The power of
the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the Issue:
commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State
against external and internal threats to its existence. The President is not only Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the
clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and
ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the Ruling:
horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential
duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want of an The right to return to one’s country is not among the rights specifically
emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision. For in making the guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and
President commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot the right to travel, but it is our well considered view that the right to return may
be said to exclude the President’s exercising as Commander-in-Chief powers be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and,
short of the calling of the armed forces, or suspending the privilege of the writ under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the
of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and Constitution.] However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and
maintain public order and security. enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of Civil and
Political Rights, i.e., against being „arbitrarily deprived” thereof [Art. 12 (4).]
Same; Same; Same; Same; The President has the power under the
Constitution to bar the Marcoses from returning to our country. ·That the As stated above, the Constitution provides that „[t]he executive power shall be
President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses from vested in the President of the Philippines.” [Art. VII, Sec. 1]. However, it does
returning has been recognized by members of the Legislature, and is not define what is meant by „executive power” although in the same article it
manifested by the Resolution proposed in the House of Representatives and touches on the exercise of certain powers by the President.
signed by 103 of its members urging the President to allow Mr. Marcos to
return to the Philippines „as a genuine unselfish gesture for true national It would not be accurate, however, to state that „executive power” is the power
reconciliation and as irrevocable proof of our collective adherence to to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well as head of
uncompromising respect for human rights under the Constitution and our government and whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain to the office
laws.” [House Resolution No. 1342, Rollo, p. 321.] The Resolution does not unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself
question the President’s power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the
Philippines, rather, it appeals to the President’s sense of compassion to allow President. It also grants the President other powers that do not involve the
a man to come home to die in his country. What we are saying in effect is that execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the country”s foreign
the request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the relations.
Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional
provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution
certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it
even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of
appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President „executive power.‰ Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to
114
be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other executive powers is located in the sitting President who heads the government
words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so and/or the „administration.‰ Under the government established under the
enumerated. Constitution, it is the executive branch, either pursuant to the residual power
of the President or by force of her enumerated powers under the laws, that has
It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is control over all matters pertaining to the disposition of government property or,
neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive. in this case, sequestered assets under the administration of the PCGG. Surely,
such control is neither legislative nor judicial. As the Court aptly held in
To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928),
common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power resolving the issue as to which between the Governor- General, as head of
involved is the President’s residual power to protect the general welfare of the the executive branch, and the Legislature may vote the shares of stock held
people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people. To by the government.
paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it is not only the power of the President but
also his duty to do anything not forbidden by the Constitution or the laws that Facts:
the needs of the nation demand]. It is a power borne by the President’s duty
to preserve and defend the Constitution. It also may be viewed as a power The Court, in its resolution adverted to, approved, upon motion of petitioner
implicit in the President’s duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed. Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED), the conversion of
the sequestered 753,848,312 Class „A‰ and „B‰ common shares of San
What we are saying in effect is that the request or demand of the Marcoses to Miguel Corporation (SMC), registered in the name of Coconut Industry
be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely Investment Fund (CIIF) Holding Companies (hereunder referred to as SMC
of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to Common Shares), into 753,848,312 SMC Series 1 Preferred Shares.
travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never
contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be Issue:
treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated
powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount Whether it is the government, as opposed to the current administration, who
duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that is the winning party in the case and thus has no incentive to convert.
context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader
discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted Ruling:
or denied.
The current administration, or any administration for that matter, cannot be
116. PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC. detached from the government. In the final analysis, the seat of executive
(COCOFED) vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES powers is located in the sitting President who heads the government and/or
G.R. Nos. 177857-58. February 11, 2010. the „administration.‰ Under the government established under the
Constitution, it is the executive branch, either pursuant to the residual power
Doctrine: of the President or by force of her enumerated powers under the laws, that has
control over all matters pertaining to the disposition of government property or,
Political Law; Presidency; The current administration, or any administration for in this case, sequestered assets under the administration of the PCGG. Surely,
that matter, cannot be detached from the government. In the final analysis, the such control is neither legislative nor judicial. As the Court aptly held in
seat of executive powers is located in the sitting President who heads the Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands,resolving the issue as to
government and/or the „administration.‰ Under the government established which between the Governor- General, as head of the executive branch, and
under the Constitution, it is the executive branch, either pursuant to the the Legislature may vote the shares of stock held by the government:
residual power of the President or by force of her enumerated powers under
the laws, that has control over all matters pertaining to the disposition of „It is clear that they are not legislative in character, and still more clear that
government property or, in this case, sequestered assets under the they are not judicial. The fact that they do not fall within the authority of either
administration of the Presidential Commission on Good Government of these two constitutes legal ground for concluding that they do fall within that
(PCGG).·The current administration, or any administration for that matter, of the remaining one among which the powers of the government are divided.”
cannot be detached from the government. In the final analysis, the seat of
115
The executive branch, through the PCGG, has given its assent to the power of Congress. Among the petitioners, only the following are members of
conversion and such decision may be deemed to be the decision of the the Commission on Appointments of the 13th Congress: Senator Enrile as
government. The notion suggested by oppositors-intervenors that the current Minority Floor Leader, Senator Lacson as Assistant Minority Floor Leader, and
administration, thru the PCGG, is without power to decide and act on the Senator Angara, Senator Ejercito-Estrada, and Senator Osmeña as members.
conversion on the theory that the head of the current administration is not Thus, on the impairment of the prerogatives of members of the Commission
government, cannot be sustained for lack of legal basis. on Appointments, only Senators Enrile, Lacson, Angara, Ejercito-Estrada, and
Osmeña have standing in the present petition. This is in contrast to Senators
117. AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR vs. EXEC. SECRETARY EDUARDO R. Pimentel, Estrada, Lim, and Madrigal, who, though vigilant in protecting their
ERMITA perceived prerogatives as members of Congress, possess no standing in the
G.R. No. 164978. October 13, 2005. present petition.

Doctrine: Same; Same; Same; Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President
the obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary as her temporary
Constitutional Law; Appointments; Executive Department; Congress; The alter ego.·The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary
power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the legislature may not nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until
interfere with the exercise of this executive power except in those instances the appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in
when the Constitution expressly allows it to interfere.·The power to appoint is an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a
essentially executive in nature, and the legislature may not interfere with the department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of
exercise of this executive power except in those instances when the her choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice
Constitution expressly allows it to interfere. Limitations on the executive power could assume office. Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President
to appoint are construed strictly against the legislature. The scope of the the obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary as her temporary
legislature’s interference in the executive’s power to appoint is limited to the alter ego. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of
power to prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office. Congress cannot great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications
appoint a person to an office in the guise of prescribing qualifications to that to an office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be.
office. Neither may Congress impose on the President the duty to appoint any Same; Same; Same; Statutes; Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO
particular person to an office. 292 states that „[t]he President may temporarily designate an officer already
in the government service or any other competent person to perform the
Same; Same; Commission on Appointments; Even if the Commission on functions of an office in the executive branch.‰·The law expressly allows the
Appointments is composed of members of Congress, the exercise of its President to make such acting appointment. Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I,
powers is executive and not legislative.·Even if the Commission on Book III of EO 292 states that „[t]he President may temporarily designate an
Appointments is composed of members of Congress, the exercise of its officer already in the government service or any other competent person to
powers is executive and not legislative. The Commission on Appointments perform the functions of an office in the executive branch.‰ Thus, the
does not legislate when it exercises its power to give or withhold consent to President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the
presidential appointments. Thus: x x x The Commission on Appointments is a government service, as long as the President deems that person competent.
creature of the Constitution. Although its membership is confined to members
of Congress, said Commission is independent of Congress. The powers of the Same; Same; Same; Ad interim appointments are extended only during recess
Commission do not come from Congress, but emanate directly from the of Congress and are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for
Constitution. Hence, it is not an agent of Congress. In fact, the functions of the confirmation or rejection, whereas appointments in an acting capacity may be
Commissioner are purely executive in nature. x x x extended any time there is a vacancy and are not submitted to the Commission
on Appointments.·In distinguishing ad interim appointments from
Same; Same; Same; Considering the independence of the Commission on appointments in an acting capacity, a noted textbook writer on constitutional
Appointments from Congress, it is error for petitioners to claim standing in the law has observed: Ad interim appointments must be distinguished from
present case as members of Congress.·Considering the independence of the appointments in an acting capacity. Both of them are effective upon
Commission on Appointments from Congress, it is error for petitioners to claim acceptance. But ad interim appointments are extended only during a recess of
standing in the present case as members of Congress. President ArroyoÊs Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a
issuance of acting appointments while Congress is in session impairs no vacancy. Moreover ad interim appointments are submitted to the Commission
116
on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not However, even if the Commission on Appointments is composed of members
submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a of Congress, the exercise of its powers is executive and not legislative. The
way of temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a Commission on Appointments does not legislate when it exercises its power
way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on to give or withhold consent to presidential appointments.
Appointments.
The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature.
Facts: It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the
appointment of a permanent occupant to the office.
The Senate and the House of Representatives (“Congress”) commenced their
regular session on 26 July 2004. The Commission on Appointments, In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such
composed of Senators and Representatives, was constituted on 25 August as the office of a department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint
2004. an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee
of her choice could assume office.
Meanwhile, President Arroyo issued appointments to respondents as acting
secretaries of their respective departments. Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to
appoint automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter
Respondents took their oath of office and assumed duties as acting ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and
secretaries. confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office,
cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be.
On 8 September 2004, petitioners filed the present petition as Senators of the
Republic of the Philippines. The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in
session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the
Congress adjourned on 22 September 2004. On 23 September 2004, acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the President’s
President Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to respondents as confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a department secretary,
secretaries of the departments to which they were previously appointed in an the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even
acting capacity. while Congress is in session. That person may or may not be the permanent
appointee, but practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting
Issue: appointee will also be the permanent appointee.

The petition questions the constitutionality of President Arroyo’s appointment The law expressly allows the President to make such acting appointment.
of respondents as acting secretaries without the consent of the Commission Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 states that „[t]he President
on Appointments while Congress is in session. may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any
other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive
Ruling: branch.” Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person
not yet in the government service, as long as the President deems that person
The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the legislature may competent.
not interfere with the exercise of this executive power except in those instances
when the Constitution expressly allows it to interfere. Limitations on the 118. ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III vs. SALVADOR MISON
executive power to appoint are construed strictly against the legislature. The G.R. No. 79974 December 17, 1987
scope of the legislature’s interference in the executive’s power to appoint is
limited to the power to prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office. Facts:
Congress cannot appoint a person to an office in the guise of prescribing
qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress impose on the President the In this petition for prohibition, the petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers,
duty to appoint any particular person to an office. members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and professors of
Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin the respondent Salvador Mison from
performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of
117
Customs and the respondent Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law
Department of Budget, from effecting disbursements in payment of Mison's vest in the President alone.
salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Mison's appointment as The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by
not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on
respondents, on the other hand, maintain the constitutionality of respondent Appointments, the President appoints.
Mison's appointment without the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments. The second, third and fourth groups of officers are the present bone of
contention. Should they be appointed by the President with or without the
Issue: consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments? By following the
accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express
Whether the appointment of respondent Mison's right to the Office of enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs should be subject to the approval of only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require
the Commission on Appointment the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. But we need
not rely solely on this basic rule of constitutional construction. We can refer to
Ruling: historical background as well as to the records of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission to determine, with more accuracy, if not precision, the intention
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution says: of the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, on whether
the appointments by the President, under the second, third and fourth groups,
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the 119. ONOFRE P. GUEVARA, petitioner, vs. RAOUL M. INOCENTES,
rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are respondent.
vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the No. L-25577. March 15, 1966.
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and
those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by Doctrine:
law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone,
in the courts, or in the heads of the departments, agencies, commissions or Public officers; Modes of terminating appointments.·Article VII, section 10,
boards. subsection 4 of the Constitution provides that the President shall have the
power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess appointments shall be effective only (a) until disapproval by the Commission
of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments on Appointments or (b) until the next adjournment of the Congress. These two
shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments modes of termination of an ad interim appointment are completely separate
or until the next adjournment of the Congress. from, and independent of, each other.

It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, just Same; Phrase „until the next adjournment of the Congress‰ refers either to
quoted, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. regular or special session.·It is true that the phrase „until the next adjournment
These four (4) groups, to which we will hereafter refer from time to time, are: of the Congress‰ does not make any reference to any specific session of the
Congress·whether regular or special·but such silence is of no moment, for it is
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public a well-known maxim in statutory construction that when the law does not
ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. Consequently, it is safe to
naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this conclude that the framers of the Constitution in employing merely the word
Constitution; adjournment as a mode of terminating an appointment made during the recess
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not of Congress had in mind either the regular or special session, and not simply
otherwise provided for by law; the regular one.
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
118
Same; Effect of adjournment of the Congress without having organized the Executive, can it be said that Congress is deemed to have impliedly exercised
Commission on Appointments.·The power to appoint is inherently an executive its power to check on such recess appointments when it adjourned its special
function while the power to confirm or reject appointments belongs to the session at about 12:00 oÊclock midnight of January 22, 1966?
legislative department, the latter power having been conferred as a check on
the former. This power to check may be exercised through the members of Ruling:
both Houses in the Commission on Appointments. But although the
Commission on Appointments is provided for in the Constitution, its The answer must of necessity be in the affirmative inasmuch as that special
organization requires Congressional action, and once organized, by express session actually adjourned in legal contemplation at about 12:00 midnight of
provision of the Constitution, it „shall meet only while Congress is in session.‰ January 22, 1966 considering that the Senate adjourned sine die at about said
Consequently, if for any reason Congress adjourns a regular or special session hour. Although the House allegedly suspended its session at 10:55 p.m. on
without organizing the Commission on Appointments, Congress should be January 22, 1966 to be resumed on Monday, January 24, 1966, at 10:00 a.m.,
deemed to have impliedly exercised said power to check by allowing the ad Congress cannot be considered to be in special session subsequently to
interim appointment to lapse as provided for in the Constitution. January 22 for the reason that the House without the Senate which had
adjourned sine die, is not “Congress.” Indeed, when the Senate adjourned at
Same; Irregular ad interim appointments; Case at bar.· PetitionerÊs ad interim 12:00 midnight on January 22, 1966 this adjournment should be considered
appointment and others extended under similar conditions, in the light of the as the „next adjournment of the Congress” ‘of the special session
doctrine laid down in the case of Aytona vs. Castillo, L-19313, January 19, notwithstanding the alleged suspension of the session earlier by the House for
1962, were even more irregular than those involved in said case to the extent the reason that neither the House nor the Senate can hold session
that they may be voided even on this ground alone. Thus, while President independently of the other in the same manner as neither can transact any
Garcia only extended 350 ad interim appointments after he had lost the legislative business after the adjournment of the other.
election, President Macapagal made 1,717 ad interim appointments most of
which were made only after the elections in November, 1965. As a Considering now petitionerÊs ad interim appointment and others extended
consequence, the following anomalies were noted: a former Presidential under similar conditions in the light of the doctrine we laid down in the Aytona
Assistant was appointed judge of three different salas, another was appointed case, we may say that they were even more irregular than those involved in
to a non-existing branch of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, while still said case to the extend that they may be avoided even on this ground alone.
another, who had a pending disbarment case, received an ad interim Thus, while President Garcia only extended 350 ad interim appointments after
appointment as judge of first instance. he had lost the election, President Macapagal made 1,717 ad interim
appointments most of which were made only after the elections in November,
Facts: 1965. As a consequence, the following anomalies were noted: a former
presidential assistant was appointed judge of three different salas, another
Petitioner was extended an ad interim appointment as Undersecretary of was appointed to a non-existing branch of the Court of First Instance of
Labor by the former Executive on November 18,1965, having taken his oath Pangasinan, while still another who had a pending disbarment case received
of office on November 25 of the same year, and considering that the ad interim an ad interim appointment as judge of first instance.
appointment for the same position extended to respondent by the incumbent
Executive on January 23, 1966 is invalid in spite of Memorandum Circular No. 120. MA. J. ANGELINA G. MATIBAG, petitioner, vs. ALFREDO L.
8 issued by the latter on the same date declaring all ad interim appointments BENIPAYO
made by the former Executive as having lapsed with the adjournment of the G.R. No. 149036. April 2, 2002.
special session of Congress at about midnight of January 22, 1966, petitioner
brought before this Court the instant petition for quo warranto seeking to be Doctrine:
declared the person legally entitled to said office of Undersecretary of Labor.
Administrative Law; Public Officers; Appointments; Words and Phrases; An ad
Issue: interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect
immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the
Since Congress in its special session held under Proclamation No. 2 of the appointee has qualified into office the fact that it is subject to confirmation by
President, series of 1966, did not deem it wise to organize the Commission on the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. An
Appointments to act on the recess appointments made by the former ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect
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immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the term, although not found in the text of the Constitution, has acquired a definite
appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by legal meaning under Philippine jurisprudence. The Court had again occasion
the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The to explain the nature of an ad interim appointment in the more recent case of
Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by Marohombsar vs. Court of Appeals, where the Court stated: „We have already
making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or mentioned that an ad interim appointment is not descriptive of the nature of
until the next adjournment of Congress. The second paragraph of Section 16, the appointment, that is, it is not indicative of whether the appointment is
Article VII of the Constitution provides as follows: „The President shall have temporary or in an acting capacity, rather it denotes the manner in which the
the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether appointment was made. In the instant case, the appointment extended to
voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until private respondent by then MSU President Alonto, Jr. was issued without
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment condition nor limitation as to tenure. The permanent status of private
of the Congress.‰ (Emphasis supplied) Thus, the ad interim appointment respondent’s appointment as Executive Assistant II was recognized and
remains effective until such disapproval or next adjournment, signifying that it attested to by the Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. 12.
can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President. The fear that the Petitioner’s submission that private respondent’s ad interim appointment is
President can withdraw or revoke at any time and for any reason an ad interim synonymous with a temporary appointment which could be validly terminated
appointment is utterly without basis. at any time is clearly untenable. Ad interim appointments are permanent but
their terms are only until the Board disapproves them.‰ (Emphasis supplied)
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Constitution imposes no condition on the
effectivity of an ad interim appointment, and thus an ad interim appointment Same; Same; Same; Same; An ad interim appointment becomes complete
takes effect immediately; In case of an appointment made by the President and irrevocable once the appointee has qualified into office, and the
when Congress is in session, the President nominates, and only upon the withdrawal or revocation of an ad interim appointment is possible only if it is
consent of the Commission on Appointments may the person thus named communicated to the appointee before the moment he qualifies, as any
assume office, while with reference to an ad interim appointment, it takes effect withdrawal or revocation thereafter is tantamount to removal from office. An ad
at once, and the individual chosen may thus qualify and perform his function interim appointee who has qualified and assumed office becomes at that
without loss of time. The Constitution imposes no condition on the effectivity moment a government employee and therefore part of the civil service. He
of an ad interim appointment, and thus an ad interim appointment takes effect enjoys the constitutional protection that „[n]o officer or employee in the civil
immediately. The appointee can at once assume office and exercise, as a de service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law.‰
jure officer, all the powers pertaining to the office. In Pacete vs. Secretary of Thus, an ad interim appointment becomes complete and irrevocable once the
the Commission on Appointments, this Court elaborated on the nature of an appointee has qualified into office. The withdrawal or revocation of an ad
ad interim appointment as follows: „A distinction is thus made between the interim appointment is possible only if it is communicated to the appointee
exercise of such presidential prerogative requiring confirmation by the before the moment he qualifies, and any withdrawal or revocation thereafter is
Commission on Appointments when Congress is in session and when it is in tantamount to removal from office. Once an appointee has qualified, he
recess. In the former, the President nominates, and only upon the consent of acquires a legal right to the office which is protected not only by statute but
the Commission on Appointments may the person thus named assume office. also by the Constitution. He can only be removed for cause, after notice and
It is not so with reference to ad interim appointments. It takes effect at once. hearing, consistent with the requirements of due process.
The individual chosen may thus qualify and perform his function without loss
of time. His title to such office is complete. In the language of the Constitution, Same; Same; Same; An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two
the appointment is effective “until disapproval by the Commission on causes specified in the Constitution. First, by the disapproval of his ad interim
Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.” appointment by the Commission on Appointments, and, second, by the
adjournment of Congress without the Commission on Appointments acting on
Same; Same; Same; Same; The term „ad interim appointment,‰ as used in his appointment. An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes
letters of appointment signed by the President, means a permanent specified in the Constitution. The first cause is the disapproval of his ad interim
appointment made by the President in the meantime that Congress is in appointment by the Commission on Appointments. The second cause is the
recess. The term „ad interim appointment‰, as used in letters of appointment adjournment of Congress without the Commission on Appointments acting on
signed by the President, means a permanent appointment made by the his appointment. These two causes are resolutory conditions expressly
President in the meantime that Congress is in recess. It does not mean a imposed by the Constitution on all ad interim appointments. These resolutory
temporary appointment that can be withdrawn or revoked at any time. The conditions constitute, in effect, a Sword of Damocles over the heads of ad
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interim appointees. No one, however, can complain because it is the
Constitution itself that places the Sword of Damocles over the heads of the ad Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A by-passed appointment is one that has
interim appointees. not been finally acted upon on the merits by the Commission on Appointments
at the close of the session of Congress. ·An ad interim appointment that is by-
Same; Same; Same; Security of Tenure; An appointment or designation in a passed because of lack of time or failure of the Commission on Appointments
temporary or acting capacity is the kind of appointment that the Constitution to organize is another matter. A by-passed appointment is one that has not
prohibits the President from making to the three independent constitutional been finally acted upon on the merits by the Commission on Appointments at
commissions. While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable the close of the session of Congress. There is no final decision by the
except as provided by law, an appointment or designation in a temporary or Commission on Appointments to give or withhold its consent to the
acting capacity can be withdrawn or revoked at the pleasure of the appointing appointment as required by the Constitution. Absent such decision, the
power. A temporary or acting appointee does not enjoy any security of tenure, President is free to renew the ad interim appointment of a by-passed
no matter how briefly. This is the kind of appointment that the Constitution appointee. This is recognized in Section 17 of the Rules of the Commission on
prohibits the President from making to the three independent constitutional Appointments, which provides as follows: „Section 17. Unacted Nominations
commissions, including the COMELEC. or Appointments Returned to the President. Nominations or appointments
submitted by the President of the Philippines which are not finally acted upon
Same; Same; Same; Constitutional Commissions; Commission on Elections; at the close of the session of Congress shall be returned to the President and,
Statutory Construction; To hold that the independence of the COMELEC unless new nominations or appointments are made, shall not again be
requires the Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad interim considered by the Commission.‰ (Emphasis supplied) Hence, under the
appointees before the appointees can assume office will negate the Rules of the Commission on Appointments, a by-passed appointment can be
President’s power to make ad interim appointments. While the Constitution considered again if the President renews the appointment.
mandates that the COMELEC „shall be independent,‰ this provision should
be harmonized with the President’s power to extend ad interim appointments. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The prohibition on reappointment in
To hold that the independence of the COMELEC requires the Commission on Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution applies neither to disapprove nor
Appointments to first confirm ad interim appointees before the appointees can by-passed ad interim appointments. The prohibition on reappointment in
assume office will negate the President’s power to make ad interim Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution applies neither to disapproved
appointments. This is contrary to the rule on statutory construction to give nor by-passed ad interim appointments. A disapproved ad interim appointment
meaning and effect to every provision of the law. It will also run counter to the cannot be revived by another ad interim appointment because the disapproval
clear intent of the framers of the Constitution. is final under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and not because a
reappointment is prohibited under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the
Same; Same; Same; Commission on Appointments; Principle of Check and Constitution. A by-passed ad interim appointment can be revived by a new ad
Balance; An ad interim appointee disapproved by the Commission on interim appointment because there is no final disapproval under Section 16,
Appointments can no longer be extended a new appointment the disapproval Article VII of the Constitution, and such new appointment will not result in the
is a final decision of the Commission on Appointments in the exercise of its appointee serving beyond the fixed term of seven years.
checking power on the appointing authority of the President. There is no
dispute that an ad interim appointee disapproved by the Commission on Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The framers of the Constitution made it
Appointments can no longer be extended a new appointment. The disapproval quite clear that any person who has served any term of office as COMELEC
is a final decision of the Commission on Appointments in the exercise of its member whether for a full term of seven years, a truncated term of five or three
checking power on the appointing authority of the President. The disapproval years, or even for an unexpired term of any length of time can no longer be
is a decision on the merits, being a refusal by the Commission on reappointed to the COMELEC. The framers of the Constitution made it quite
Appointments to give its consent after deliberating on the qualifications of the clear that any person who has served any term of office as COMELEC member
appointee. Since the Constitution does not provide for any appeal from such whether for a full term of seven years, a truncated term of five or three years,
decision, the disapproval is final and binding on the appointee as well as on or even for an unexpired term of any length of time can no longer be
the appointing power. In this instance, the President can no longer renew the reappointed to the COMELEC. Commissioner Foz succinctly explained this
appointment not because of the constitutional prohibition on reappointment, intent in this manner: „MR. FOZ. But there is the argument made in the
but because of a final decision by the Commission on Appointments to concurring opinion of Justice Angelo Bautista in the case of Visarra vs.
withhold its consent to the appointment. Miraflor, to the effect that the prohibition on reappointment applies only when
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the term or tenure is for seven years. But in cases where the appointee serves office anew.
only for less than seven years, he would be entitled to reappointment. Unless
we put the qualifying words „without reappointment‰ in the case of those In his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, Benipayo issued a Memorandum
appointed, then it is possible that an interpretation could be made later on their dated April 11, 2001 addressed to petitioner as Director IV of the EID and to
case, they can still be reappointed to serve for a total of seven years. Precisely, Cinco as Director III also of the EID, designating Cinco Officer-in- Charge of
we are foreclosing that possibility by making it clear that even in the case of the EID and reassigning petitioner to the Law Department. COMELEC EID
those first appointed under the Constitution, no reappointment can be made.‰ Commissioner-in-Charge Mehol K. Sadain objected to petitioner’s
(Emphasis supplied) reassignment in a Memorandum dated April 14, 2001 addressed to the
COMELEC en banc. Specifically, Commissioner Sadain questioned
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An ad interim appointment that has lapsed Benipayo’s failure to consult the Commissioner-in-Charge of the EID in the
by inaction of the Commission on Appointments does not constitute a term of reassignment of petitioner.
office the period from the time the ad interim appointment is made to the time
it lapses is neither a fixed term nor an unexpired term. However, an ad interim On April 16, 2001, petitioner requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as
appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on Appointments Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the Law Department. Petitioner
does not constitute a term of office. The period from the time the ad interim cited Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7 dated April 10,
appointment is made to the time it lapses is neither a fixed term nor an 2001, reminding heads of government offices that “transfer and detail of
unexpired term. To hold otherwise would mean that the President by his employees are prohibited during the election period beginning January 2 until
unilateral action could start and complete the running of a term of office in the June 13, 2001.” Benipayo denied her request for reconsideration citing
COMELEC without the consent of the Commission on Appointments. This COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 on April 18, 2001, dated November 6, 2000.
interpretation renders inutile the confirming power of the Commission on
Appointments. During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner
filed the instant petition questioning the appointment and the right to remain in
FACTS: office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of the
COMELEC, respectively.
On March 22, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed, ad interim,
Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman, and Borra and Tuason as COMELEC ISSUE:
Commissioners, each for a term of seven years and all expiring on February
2, 2008. Benipayo took his oath of office and assumed the position of Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on
COMELEC Chairman. Borra and Tuason likewise took their oaths of office and the basis of the ad interim appointments issued by the President amounts to a
assumed their positions as COMELEC Commissioners. The Office of the temporary appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the
President submitted to the Commission on Appointments on May 22, 2001 the Constitution
ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason for confirmation.
However, the Commission on Appointments did not act on said appointments. RULING:

On June 1, 2001, President Arroyo renewed the ad interim appointments of An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason to the same positions and for the same term of immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the
seven years, expiring on February 2, 2008. They took their oaths of office for appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by
a second time. The Office of the President transmitted on June 5, 2001 their the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The
appointments to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by
making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or
Congress adjourned before the Commission on Appointments could act on until the next adjournment of Congress. The second paragraph of Section 16,
their appointments. Thus, on June 8, 2001, President Macapagal Arroyo Article VII of the Constitution provides as follows:
renewed again the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason to
the same positions. The Office of the President submitted their appointments „The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess
for confirmation to the Commission on Appointments. They took their oaths of of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments

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shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments however, we have already established that the supermajority vote requirement
or until the next adjournment of the Congress.‰ (Emphasis supplied) set forth in Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 is unconstitutional for
violating the principle that Congress cannot pass irrepealable laws. The power
Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or of the legislature to make laws includes the power to amend and repeal these
next adjournment, signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by laws. Where the legislature, by its own act, attempts to limit its power to amend
the President. The fear that the President can withdraw or revoke at any time or repeal laws, the Court has the duty to strike down such act for interfering
and for any reason an ad interim appointment is utterly without basis. with the plenary powers of Congress.

An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two he causes specified in Same; Same; Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM);
the Constitution. The first cause is the disapproval of his ad interim Amendments; Only amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act
appointment by the Commission on Appointments. The second cause is the constitutionally-essential to the creation of autonomous regions i.e., those
adjournment of Congress without the Commission on Appointments acting on aspects specifically mentioned in the Constitution which Congress must
his appointment. These two causes are resolutory conditions expressly provide for in the Organic Act – require ratification through a plebiscite. We
imposed by the Constitution on all ad interim appointments. These resolutory struck down the petitioners’ contention that the plebiscite requirement applies
conditions constitute, in effect, a Sword of Damocles over the heads of ad to all amendments of RA No. 9054 for being an unreasonable enlargement of
interim appointees. No one, however, can complain because it is the the plebiscite requirement set forth in the Constitution. Section 18, Article X of
Constitution itself that places the Sword of Damocles over the heads of the ad the Constitution provides that „[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be
interim appointees. effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units
in a plebiscite called for the purpose[.]‰ We interpreted this to mean that only
While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable except as amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to
provided by law, an appointment or designation in a temporary or acting the creation of autonomous regions i.e., those aspects specifically mentioned
capacity can be withdrawn or revoked at the pleasure of the appointing power. in the Constitution which Congress must provide for in the Organic Act require
ratification through a plebiscite. We stand by this interpretation. The petitioners
A temporary or acting appointee does not enjoy any security of tenure, no argue that to require all amendments to RA No. 9054 to comply with the
matter how briefly. This is the kind of appointment that the Constitution plebiscite requirement is to recognize that sovereignty resides primarily in the
prohibits the President from making to the three independent constitutional people. While we agree with the petitioners’ underlying premise that
commissions, including the COMELEC. sovereignty ultimately resides with the people, we disagree that this legal
reality necessitates compliance with the plebiscite requirement for all
In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners amendments to RA No. 9054. For if we were to go by the petitioners’
to fill the vacancies in the COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the interpretation of Section 18, Article X of the Constitution that all amendments
Commission on Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were extended to the Organic Act have to undergo the plebiscite requirement before
permanent appointments during the recess of Congress. They were not becoming effective, this would lead to impractical and illogical results
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. The ad interim hampering the ARMM’S progress by impeding Congress from enacting laws
appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are expressly allowed by the that timely address problems as they arise in the region, as well as weighing
Constitution which authorizes the President, during the recess of Congress, to down the ARMM government with the costs that unavoidably follow the holding
make appointments that take effect immediately. of a plebiscite.

121. DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA vs. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES Same; Election Law; Synchronized Elections; Autonomous Region in Muslim
G.R. No. 196271. February 28, 2012. Mindanao (ARMM); Holdover Positions; Elective ARMM officials are also local
officials; they are, thus, bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the
Doctrine: Constitution; Congress has no authority to extend the three-year term limit by
inserting a holdover provision in RA No. 9054.·The clear wording of Section 8,
Constitutional Law; Congress; Republic Act No. 9054; The supermajority vote Article X of the Constitution expresses the intent of the framers of the
requirement set forth in Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 is Constitution to categorically set a limitation on the period within which all
unconstitutional for violating the principle that Congress cannot pass elective local officials can occupy their offices. We have already established
irrepealable laws. Even assuming that RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054, that elective ARMM officials are also local officials; they are, thus, bound by
123
the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution. It, therefore, becomes Commission on Appointments. The second group of officials the President can
irrelevant that the Constitution does not expressly prohibit elective officials appoint are „all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
from acting in a holdover capacity. Short of amending the Constitution, otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law
Congress has no authority to extend the three- year term limit by to appoint.‰ The second sentence acts as the „catch-all provision‰ for the
inserting a holdover provision in RA No. 9054. Thus, the term of three years President’s appointment power, in recognition of the fact that the power to
for local officials should stay at three (3) years, as fixed by the Constitution, appoint is essentially executive in nature. The wide latitude given to the
and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress. President to appoint is further demonstrated by the recognition of the
President’s power to appoint officials whose appointments are not even
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is for the legislature and the executive, and not provided for by law. In other words, where there are offices which have to be
the Supreme Court, to decide how to fill the vacancies in the Autonomous filled, but the law does not provide the process for filling them, the Constitution
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) regional government which arise from recognizes the power of the President to fill the office by appointment.
the legislature complying with the constitutional mandate of synchronization.
Even assuming that a holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had FACTS:
been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054), the
rule of holdover can only apply as an available option where no express or These motions assail our Decision dated October 18, 2011, where we upheld
implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such the constitutionality of Republic Act (RA) No. 10153. Pursuant to the
contrary intent is evident. Congress, in passing RA No. 10153 and removing constitutional mandate of synchronization, RA No. 10153 postponed the
the holdover option, has made it clear that it wants to suppress the holdover regional elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
rule expressed in RA No. 9054. Congress, in the exercise of its plenary (which were scheduled to be held on the second Monday of August 2011) to
legislative powers, has clearly acted within its discretion when it deleted the the second Monday of May 2013 and recognized the President’s power to
holdover option, and this Court has no authority to question the wisdom of this appoint officers-in- charge (OICs) to temporarily assume these positions upon
decision, absent any evidence of unconstitutionality or grave abuse of the expiration of the terms of the elected officials.
discretion. It is for the legislature and the executive, and not this Court, to
decide how to fill the vacancies in the ARMM regional government which arise ISSUE:
from the legislature complying with the constitutional mandate of
synchronization. Whether the holdover principle adopted in R.A. No. 9054 does not violate the
Constitution
Same; Executive Department; Appointments; Catch-all Provision; The wide
latitude given to the President to appoint is demonstrated by the recognition of RULING:
the President’s power to appoint officials whose appointments are not even
provided for by law. Where there are offices which have to be filled, but the The clear wording of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution expresses the
law does not provide the process for filling them, the Constitution recognizes intent of the framers of the Constitution to categorically set a limitation on the
the power of the President to fill the office by appointment. The main distinction period within which all elective local officials can occupy their offices. We have
between the provision in the 1987 Constitution and its counterpart in the 1935 already established that elective ARMM officials are also local officials; they
Constitution is the sentence construction; while in the 1935 Constitution, the are, thus, bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution. It,
various appointments the President can make are enumerated in a single therefore, becomes irrelevant that the Constitution does not expressly prohibit
sentence, the 1987 Constitution enumerates the various appointments the elective officials from acting in a holdover capacity. Short of amending the
President is empowered to make and divides the enumeration in two Constitution, Congress has no authority to extend the three-year term
sentences. The change in style is significant; in providing for this change, the limit by inserting a holdover provision in RA No. 9054. Thus, the term of
framers of the 1987 Constitution clearly sought to make a distinction between three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years, as fixed by the
the first group of presidential appointments and the second group of Constitution, and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress.
presidential appointments. x x x The first group of presidential appointments,
specified as the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other Even assuming that a holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had
public ministers and consuls, or officers of the Armed Forces, and other been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054), the
officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution, rule of holdover can only apply as an available option where no express or
pertains to the appointive officials who have to be confirmed by the implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such
124
contrary intent is evident. Congress, in passing RA No. 10153 and removing constituting a Betrayal of Public Trust. The petition primarily seeks to declare
the holdover option, has made it clear that it wants to suppress the holdover as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise
rule expressed in RA No. 9054. Congress, in the exercise of its plenary known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, which gives the President the power
legislative powers, has clearly acted within its discretion when it deleted the to dismiss a Deputy Ombudsman of the Office of the Ombudsman.
holdover option, and this Court has no authority to question the wisdom of this
decision, absent any evidence of unconstitutionality or grave abuse of The second case, docketed as G.R. No. 196232, is a Petition for Certiorari
discretion. It is for the legislature and the executive, and not this Court, to and Prohibition (with application for issuance of a temporary restraining order
decide how to fill the vacancies in the ARMM regional government which arise or status quo order) seeking to annul, reverse and set aside (1) the undated
from the legislature complying with the constitutional mandate of Order requiring petitioner Wendell Barreras- Sulit to submit a written
synchronization. explanation with respect to alleged acts or omissions constituting
serious/grave offenses in relation to the Plea Bargaining Agreement
122. EMILIO A. GONZALES III vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT (PLEBARA) entered into with Major General Carlos F. Garcia; and (2) the April
G.R. No. 196231. September 4, 2012. 7, 2011 Notice of Preliminary Investigation, both issued by the Office of the
President in OP-DC-Case No. 11-B-003, the administrative case initiated
Doctrine: against petitioner as a Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The petition likewise seeks to declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of R.A.
Ombudsman; Administrative Law; While Section 21 of the Ombudsman Act of No. 6770 giving the President the power to dismiss a Special Prosecutor of
1989 (R.A. No. 6770) declares the Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority over the Office of the Ombudsman.
all government officials, Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the President
express power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special ISSUE:
Prosecutor. While the Ombudsman’s authority to discipline administratively is
extensive and covers all government officials, whether appointive or elective, RULING:
with the exception only of those officials removable by impeachment, the
members of congress and the judiciary, such authority is by no means It is true that the authority of the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct
exclusive. Petitioners cannot insist that they should be solely and directly administrative investigations proceeds from its constitutional mandate to be an
subject to the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman. For, while Section 21 effective protector of the people against inept and corrupt government officers
declares the Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority over all government officials, and employees, and is subsumed under the broad powers „explicitly
Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the President express power of removal conferred‰ upon it by the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770.
over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor.
While the OmbudsmanÊs authority to discipline administratively is extensive
FACTS: and covers all government officials, whether appointive or elective, with the
exception only of those officials removable by impeachment, the members of
These two petitions have been consolidated not because they stem from the congress and the judiciary, such authority is by no means exclusive.
same factual milieu but because they raise a common thread of issues relating Petitioners cannot insist that they should be solely and directly subject to the
to the PresidentÊs exercise of the power to remove from office herein disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman. For, while Section 21 declares the
petitioners who claim the protective cloak of independence of the OmbudsmanÊs disciplinary authority over all government officials, Section
constitutionally-created office to which they belong the Office of the 8(2), on the other hand, grants the President express power of removal over a
Ombudsman. Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor.

The first case, docketed as G.R. No. 196231, is a Petition for Certiorari (with A harmonious construction of these two apparently conflicting provisions in
application for issuance of temporary restraining order or status quo order) R.A. No. 6770 leads to the inevitable conclusion that Congress had intended
which assails on jurisdictional grounds the Decision dated March 31, 2011 the Ombudsman and the President to exercise concurrent disciplinary
rendered by the Office of the President in OP Case No. 10-J-460 dismissing jurisdiction over petitioners as Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor,
petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III, Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other respectively. This sharing of authority goes into the wisdom of the legislature,
Law Enforcement Offices (MOLEO), upon a finding of guilt on the which prerogative falls beyond the pale of judicial inquiry.
administrative charges of Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct
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 123. HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON vs. MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM version of what the Code should be. He did not pronounce the ordinance
G.R. No. 112497. August 4, 1994. unwise or unreasonable as a basis for its annulment. He did not say that in his
judgment it was a bad law. What he found only was that it was illegal. All he
Doctrine: did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were
performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed
Same; Local Governments; Control and Supervision; Taxation; Where the procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the
Secretary of Justice reviews, pursuant to law, a tax measure enacted by a local city government under the Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an
government unit to determine if the officials performed their functions in act not of control but of mere supervision.
accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the enactment
of tax ordinances and the grant of powers under the Local Government Code, Significantly, a rule similar to Section 187 appeared in the Local Autonomy
the same is an act of mere supervision, not control. Section 187 authorizes the Act, which provided in its Section 2 as follows:
Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax
ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. A tax ordinance shall go into effect on the fifteenth day after its passage, unless
When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also the ordinance shall provide otherwise: Provided, however, That the Secretary
permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local of Finance shall have authority to suspend the effectivity of any ordinance
government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the within one hundred and twenty days after receipt by him of a copy thereof, if,
Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what in his opinion, the tax or fee therein levied or imposed is unjust, excessive,
the Code should be. He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or oppressive, or confiscatory, or when it is contrary to declared national
unreasonable as a basis for its annulment. He did not say that in his judgment economy policy, and when the said Secretary exercises this authority the
it was a bad law. What he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in effectivity of such ordinance shall be suspended, either in part or as a whole,
reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were performing for a period of thirty days within which period the local legislative body may
their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure either modify the tax ordinance to meet the objections thereto, or file an appeal
for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city with a court of competent jurisdiction; otherwise, the tax ordinance or the part
government under the Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an act or parts thereof declared suspended, shall be considered as revoked.
not of control but of mere supervision. Thereafter, the local legislative body may not reimpose the same tax or fee
until such time as the grounds for the suspension thereof shall have ceased to
FACTS: exist.

Pursuant thereto, the Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil That section allowed the Secretary of Finance to suspend the effectivity of a
companies and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known tax ordinance if, in his opinion, the tax or fee levied was unjust, excessive,
as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance with the oppressive or confiscatory. Determination of these flaws would involve the
prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing exercise of judgment or discretion and not merely an examination of whether
certain provisions contrary to law and public policy. or not the requirements or limitations of the law had been observed; hence, it
would smack of control rather than mere supervision. That power was never
ISSUE: questioned before this Court but, at any rate, the Secretary of Justice is not
given the same latitude under Section 187. All he is permitted to do is ascertain
Whether Section 187 of the Local Government Code is constitutional the constitutionality or legality of the tax measure, without the right to declare
that, in his opinion, it is unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. He has
RULING: no discretion on this matter. In fact, Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila
Revenue Code only on two grounds, to wit, the inclusion therein of certain ultra
Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the vires provisions and non- compliance with the prescribed procedure in its
constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it enactment. These grounds affected the legality, not the wisdom or reasonable-
on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a ness, of the tax measure.
tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the
judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon 124. Araneta vs Gatmaitan
did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own 101 Phil. 328, April 30, 1957
126
 the Governor-General to make rules and regulations to carry it into effect, then
Doctrine: the Legislature created the law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid.
On the other hand, if the act within itself does not define a crime and is not
Article VI Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution states that, “The legislative power complete, and some legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a
shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a crime, the doing of which is vested in the Governor-General, the act is
Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the delegation of legislative power is unconstitutional and void.
people by the provision on initiative and referendum.”
Congress provided under the Fisheries Act that a.) it is unlawful to take or
There is due delegation when the statue making the delegation be complete catch fry or fish eggs in the waters of the Philippines and b.) it authorizes Sec.
by itself. This is to ensure that the power being passed by the legislative of Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide regulations/ restrictions as
department is just for law-execution. may be deemed necessary. The Act was complete in itself and leaves it to the
Sec. to carry into effect its legislative intent. The President did nothing but
Facts: show an anxious regard for the welfare of the inhabitants and dispose of issues
of general concern which were in consonance and strict conformity with law.
The President issued EO 22 - prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay,
and the EO 66 and 80 as amendments to EO 22, as a response for the general 125. Pichay vs. Office of DESLA
clamor among the majority of people living in the coastal towns of San Miguel G.R. No. 196425, July 24, 2012
Bay that the said resources of the area are in danger of major depletion
because of the effects of trawl fishing. Doctrine:

A group of Otter trawl operators took the matter to the court by filing a Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution provides:
complaint for injunction and/or declaratory relief with preliminary injunction with The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and
the Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 24867, offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
praying that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to restrain the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Fisheries from The obligation to see to it that laws are faithfully executed necessitates the
enforcing said executive order; to declare the same null and void, and for such corresponding power in the President to conduct investigations into the
other relief as may be just and equitable in the premises conduct of officials and employees in the executive department.
.
Issue: Facts:

Whether Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80 were valid, for the issuance On April 16, 2001, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive
thereof was not in the exercise of legislative powers unduly delegated to the Order No. 12 (E.O. 12) creating the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission
President. (PAGC) and vesting it with the power to investigate or hear administrative
cases or complaints for possible graft and corruption, among others, against
Ruling: presidential appointees and to submit its report and recommendations to the
President. However, on November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon
Yes. As already held by this Court, the true distinction between delegation of Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13), abolishing the PAGC and
the power to legislate and the conferring of authority or discretion as to the transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for
execution of law consists in that the former necessary involves a discretion as Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established
to what the law shall be, while in the latter the authority or discretion as to its Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD).
execution has to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first
cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed before
the IAD-ODESLA a complaint affidavit for grave misconduct against petitioner
In the case of U. S. vs. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil. 1, We also held, the power to Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Local Water
delegate - the Legislature cannot delegate legislative power to enact any law. Utilities Administration (LWUA), as well as the incumbent members of the
If Act No. 2868 is a law unto itself, and it does nothing more than to authorize LWUA Board of Trustees (BOT), which arose from the purchase by the LWUA
127
of 445,377 shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc. Petitioner, along with The obligation to see to it that laws are faithfully executed necessitates the
the other members of the BOT of LWUA, was required to submit their corresponding power in the President to conduct investigations into the
respective written explanations and in compliance, petitioner filed a motion to conduct of officials and employees in the executive department.
dismiss the complaint as a case involving the same transaction was already
pending before the Office of the Ombudsman. 126. Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines
(TIDCORP) vs Manalang-Demigilio
Issue: G.R. No. 176343, September 18, 2012

Whether or not Executive Order No. 13 is unconstitutional for usurping the Doctrine:
power of Congress to delegate quasi-judicial powers to administrative
agencies. The rule-making power of the administrative body is intended to enable it to
implement the policy of the law and to provide for the more effective
Ruling: enforcement of its provisions. Through the exercise of this power of
subordinate legislation, it is possible for the administrative body to transmit
NO. As the OSG aptly explained in its Comment, while the term "adjudicatory" "the active power of the state from its source to the point of application," that
appears part of its appellation, the IAD-ODESLA cannot try and resolve cases, is, apply the law and so fulfill the mandate of the legislature. It is an elementary
its authority being limited to the conduct of investigations, preparation of rule in administrative law that administrative regulations and policies enacted
reports and submission of recommendations. E.O. 13 explicitly states that the by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to
IAD-ODESLA shall "perform powers, functions and duties xxx, of PAGC." enforce, have the force of law, are entitled to great respect, and have in their
favor a presumption of legality.
Under E.O. 12, the PAGC was given the authority to "investigate or hear
administrative cases or complaints against all presidential appointees in the Facts:
government “and to "submit its report and recommendations to the President.
“The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body to the Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines (TIDCORP)
President, not having the power to settle controversies and adjudicate cases. is a wholly owned government corporation whose primary purpose is to
As the Court ruled in Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights,and later guarantee foreign loans, in whole or in part, granted to any domestic entity,
reiterated in Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission: enterprise or corporation organized or licensed to engage in business in the
Philippines. On May 13, 2003, the Board of Directors of TIDCORP formally
Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function charged Maria Rosario Manalang-Demigillo (Demigillo), then a Senior Vice-
of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or office. The function of President in TIDCORP, with grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best
receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not interest of the service, insubordination, and gross discourtesy in the course of
a judicial function. To be considered as such, the act of receiving evidence and official duties. Finally, and after considering Section 19 of the same Rules,
arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the which gives authority to the disciplining body to issue an order of preventive
authority of applying the law to the factual conclusions to the end that the suspension, you are hereby preventively suspended for a period of ninety (90)
controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and days from receipt hereof.
definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided
by law. Issue:

The President's authority to issue E.O. 13 and constitute the IAD-ODESLA as Whether or not preventive suspension of Demigilio is valid pending the
his fact-finding investigator cannot be doubted. After all, as Chief Executive, administrative investigation.
he is granted full control over the Executive Department to ensure the
enforcement of the laws. Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution provides: Ruling:

Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, Yes. The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 (RAC) embodies the major
bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. structural, functional and procedural principles and rules of governance of
government agencies and constitutional bodies like the CSC. Section 1,
128
Chapter 1, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V, of the RAC states that the CSC is the which something is done or exists,” while a condition refers to a “necessary
central personnel agency of the government. Section 51 and Section 52, requirement for something else to happen;” or is a “restriction, qualification.”
Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the RAC respectively contain the rule The two terms have different meanings and implications, and one cannot
on preventive suspension of a civil service officer or employee pending substitute for the other.
investigation, and the duration of the preventive suspension.
127. Biraogo vs Philippine Truth Commission of 2010
Section 51. Preventive Suspension. – The proper disciplining authority may G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010
preventively suspend any subordinate officer or employee under his authority
pending an investigation, if the charge against such officer or employee Doctrine:
involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect in the
performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not
guilty of charges which would warrant his removal from the service. assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify
or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred
Pursuant to its rule-making authority, the CSC promulgated the Uniform Rules obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
on August 31, 1999. Section 19 and Section 20 of Rule II of the Uniform Rules authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual
defined the guidelines in the issuance of an order of preventive suspension controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them.
and the duration of the suspension.
Facts:
It is clear from Section 19, supra, that before an order of preventive suspension
pending an investigation may validly issue, only two prerequisites need be Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of
shown, namely: (1) that the proper disciplining authority has served a formal 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.
charge to the affected officer or employee; and (2) that the charge involves
either dishonesty, oppression, grave misconduct, neglect in the performance PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the
of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-
charges which would warrant her removal from the service. Proof showing that level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
the subordinate officer or employee may unduly influence the witnesses accessories during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and
against her or may tamper the documentary evidence on file in her office is not recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has
among the prerequisites. all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it
cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes
CSC Resolution No. 030502 apparently reiterates the rule stated in Section 19 between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess
of the Uniform Rules, supra, that for a preventive suspension to issue, there evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have
must be a formal charge and the charge involves the offenses enumerated subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less
therein. The resolution considers an order of preventive suspension as null order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from
and void if the order was not premised on any of the mentioned grounds, or if such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in
the order was issued without a formal charge. As in the case of Section 19, our courts of law.
the resolution does not include as a condition for issuing an order of preventive
suspension that there must be proof adduced showing that the subordinate Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC
officer or employee may unduly influence the witnesses against her or tamper from performing its functions. They argued that:
the documentary evidence in her custody.
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the
Preventing the subordinate officer or employee from influencing the witnesses Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.
and tampering the documentary evidence under her custody are mere (b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code
purposes for which an order of preventive suspension may issue as reflected of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the
under paragraph 2 of Section 19, supra. This is apparent in the phrase “for the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve
same purpose” found in paragraph 3 of Section 19. A “purpose” cannot be economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an
considered and understood as a “condition.” A purpose means “reason for
129
entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the “Truth
Commission.” The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the
the “Truth Commission” with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of
superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987 the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and
Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987. substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality
investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality
administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes must be the very lis mota of the case.
those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and body to which they belong as members. To the extent the powers of Congress
argued that: are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers
a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the
President’s executive power and power of control necessarily include the Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and
inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they
executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind,
of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.
jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of
because there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of
appropriated by Congress. E. O. No. 1.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the
Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi- Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.”
judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latter’s In private suits, standing is governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule. It
jurisdiction. provides that “every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because real party in interest.” Real-party-in interest is “the party who stands to be
it was validly created for laudable purposes. benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails
of the suit.”
Issue:
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff
1. Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file their respective who asserts a “public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does
petitions and question Executive Order No. 1. so as a representative of the general public. He has to show that he is entitled
to seek judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the
2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of separation of vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a “citizen” or
powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds “taxpayer.
for public offices, agencies and commissions;
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and
3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers of the substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct
Ombudsman and the DOJ; injury as a result.” The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogo’s assertion that
the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise
4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause; of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which
and deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and
weight as precedents
Ruling:
130
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully
executed. The powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are
under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc
committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal
if laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc protection clause. The clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate and
investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during
President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous
the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the administration is plain, patent and manifest.
laws of the land.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations
funds already appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause
of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to
amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.
whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.
be the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be
allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at
so there is no impropriety in the funding. least, have the authority to investigate all past administrations.

3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which
powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will complement all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights
those of the two offices. The function of determining probable cause for the determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to
filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the the Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.
DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTC’s power to investigate is limited to obtaining
facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of his WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby
duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No.
1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined 128. Pichay vs. Office of DESLA
in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution. G.R. No. 196425, July 24, 2012

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be Doctrine:
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It
requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution provides:
a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and
person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its
improper execution through the state’s duly constituted authorities. The obligation to see to it that laws are faithfully executed necessitates the
corresponding power in the President to conduct investigations into the
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid conduct of officials and employees in the executive department.
classification. Equal protection clause permits classification. Such
classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The Facts:
test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing On April 16, 2001, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive
conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. Order No. 12 (E.O. 12) creating the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission
131
(PAGC) and vesting it with the power to investigate or hear administrative authority of applying the law to the factual conclusions to the end that the
cases or complaints for possible graft and corruption, among others, against controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and
presidential appointees and to submit its report and recommendations to the definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided
President. However, on November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon by law.
Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13), abolishing the PAGC and
transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for The President's authority to issue E.O. 13 and constitute the IAD-ODESLA as
Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established his fact-finding investigator cannot be doubted. After all, as Chief Executive,
Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD). he is granted full control over the Executive Department to ensure the
enforcement of the laws. Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution provides:
On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed before
the IAD-ODESLA a complaint affidavit for grave misconduct against petitioner Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Local Water bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
Utilities Administration (LWUA), as well as the incumbent members of the
LWUA Board of Trustees (BOT), which arose from the purchase by the LWUA The obligation to see to it that laws are faithfully executed necessitates the
of 445,377 shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc. Petitioner, along with corresponding power in the President to conduct investigations into the
the other members of the BOT of LWUA, was required to submit their conduct of officials and employees in the executive department.
respective written explanations and in compliance, petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint as a case involving the same transaction was already 129. IBP vs. Zamora
pending before the Office of the Ombudsman. G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000

Issue: Doctrine:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 13 is unconstitutional for usurping the
power of Congress to delegate quasi-judicial powers to administrative When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
agencies. violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power
solely vested in his wisdom. There is no provision dealing with the revocation
Ruling: or review of the President’s action to call out the armed forces. The distinction
places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare
NO. As the OSG aptly explained in its Comment, while the term "adjudicatory" martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
appears part of its appellation, the IAD-ODESLA cannot try and resolve cases, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together
its authority being limited to the conduct of investigations, preparation of the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review without any
reports and submission of recommendations. E.O. 13 explicitly states that the qualification.
IAD-ODESLA shall "perform powers, functions and duties xxx, of PAGC."
Facts:
Under E.O. 12, the PAGC was given the authority to "investigate or hear
administrative cases or complaints against all presidential appointees in the Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
government “and to "submit its report and recommendations to the President. Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to
“The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body to the coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the
President, not having the power to settle controversies and adjudicate cases. Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless
As the Court ruled in Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights,and later violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-
reiterated in Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission: crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period
only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a
Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and
of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or office. The function of void and unconstitutional.
receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not
a judicial function. To be considered as such, the act of receiving evidence and Issue:
arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the
132
Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together
the armed forces is subject to judicial review. the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review without any
qualification.
Ruling:
Facts:
No. When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of
solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state
Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the of national emergency and call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts
of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision of terrorism and lawless violence in the country. The Office of the President
dealing with the revocation or review of the President’s action to call out the announced the cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20th
armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the permits to
category from the power to declare martial law and power to suspend the hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments and dispersal of the rallyists
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the along EDSA. The police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David,
Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided a professor at the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also
for their revocation and review without any qualification. arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the In the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal
intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017
the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila and attempt to arrest
power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas was made against representatives of ANAKPAWIS, GABRIELA and BAYAN
corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the MUNA whom suspected of inciting to sedition and rebellion. On March 3, 2006,
curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national
freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the emergency has ceased to exist. Petitioners filed seven (7) certiorari with the
court. Supreme Court and three (3) of those petitions impleaded President Arroyo as
respondent questioning the legality of the proclamation, alleging that it
In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power encroaches the emergency powers of Congress and it violates the
to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and assembly.
the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual
basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is Issue:
no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling
out the armed forces. 1. Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 is
unconstitutional?
2. Whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever
130. David vs. Arroyo the alarming powers incident to Martial Law are used?
GR No. 171396,May 3, 2006
Ruling:
Doctrine:
1. The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress
violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power lawless violence whenever becomes necessary as prescribe under Section
solely vested in his wisdom. There is no provision dealing with the revocation 18, Article VII of the Constitution. However, there were extraneous provisions
or review of the President’s action to call out the armed forces. The distinction giving the President express or implied power
places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare
martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
133
(A) To issue decrees; (" Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of Court to review can be exercised independently from the power of revocation
the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that "[t]he legislative of Congress.
power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of
a Senate and a House of Representatives.") Judicial review does not include the calibration of the President's
(B) To direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related decision of which of his graduated powers be availed of in a given situation.
to lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President [The To do so would be tantamount to an incursion into the exclusive domain of the
absence of a law defining "acts of terrorism" may result in abuse and Executive and an infringement on the prerogative that solely, at least initially,
oppression on the part of the police or military]; and lies with the President.
(C) To impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press,
are ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section The calling out power is in a different category from the power to
17, Article XII of the Constitution, the President, in the absence of legislative declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private business corpus. The power to call is fully discretionary to the President; the only
affected with public interest. limitations being that he acts within permissible constitutional boundaries or in
Therefore, the PP No. 1017 is only partly unconstitutional. a manner not constituting grave abuse of discretion.

2. YES. Under Article XII Section 17 of the 1987 Philippine Facts:

Constitution, in times of national emergency, when the public interest so
requires, the President may temporarily take over a privately owned public On September 4, 2016, Proclamation No. 55, declaring a state of
utility or business affected with public interest only if there is congressional national emergency on account of lawless violence in Mindanao, was issued.
authority or approval. There must enactment of appropriate legislation
prescribing the terms and conditions under which the President may exercise On May 23, 2017 at 10:00pm, after the ISIS-backed Maute Group took
the powers that will serves as the best assurance that due process of law over a hospital in Marawi City, established several checkpoints, set ablaze
would be observed. government and private facilities, inflicted casualties on the part of the
government forces, and hoisted the flag of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
131. Lagman vs Medialdea (ISIS) in several areas;
GR No. 231658, July 04 2017
President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216,
Doctrine: “declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao,” in pursuant to Section 18, Article
The Supreme Court is the reviewing tribunal to examine, in an VII of the 1987 Constitution:
appropriate proceeding, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation
of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. “xxx in case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may,
Likewise, any action commenced by any citizen to demand the factual basis for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of
of the said proclamation should be denominated as a petition to be resolved habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law
by the Supreme Court. xxx”

The President is not subject to any condition to obtain a On May 25, 2017, within the 60-days timeline set by Section 18, Article
recommendation of, or consultation with, the Secretary of National Defense or VII of the Constitution, President Duterte submitted a written report on the
other high-ranking officials. The President can declare martial law as long as factual basis of Proclamation No. 216. After the submission of the report, the
the following requirements are present: invasion or rebellion, and when public Senate issued P.S. Resolution No. 388 expressing full support to the
safety requires it. proclamation of martial law as they deemed it to be satisfactory, constitutional,
and in accordance with the law.The House of Representatives likewise
The power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by issued House Resolution No. 1050 expressing their full support to the
Congress are not only totally different, but likewise independent from each same.
other although concededly, they have the same trajectory, which is, the
nullification of the presidential proclamation. Needless to say, the power of the
134
 Nevertheless, several persons filed a petition (Cullamat Petition, b. for a declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
Mohamad Petition, and Lagman Petition) under the Paragraph 3, Section writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao region?
18 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, claiming that the declaration of martial 8.) Are terrorism or acts attributable to terrorism equivalent to actual
law has no sufficient factual basis because there is no rebellion or invasion rebellion and the requirements of public safety sufficient to declare martial law
in Marawi City or in any part of Mindanao. It argues that acts of terrorism do or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus?
not constitute rebellion, since there is no proof that its purpose is to remove 9.) Will nullifying Proclamation No. 216:
Mindanao or any part thereof from its allegiance to the Philippines. a. have the effect of recalling Proclamation No. 55 s. 2016; or
b. also nullify the acts of the President in calling out the armed forces to
On June 12, 2017, respondents’ consolidated comment was filed as quell lawless violence in Marawi and other parts of the Mindanao region.
required by the Court.
Ruling:
Issue:
1.) YES. The unique features of the third paragraph of Section 18, Article
1.) Are the petitions (GR No. 231658, 231771, and 231774) the “appropriate VII clearly indicate that it should be treated as sui generis separate and
proceeding covered by Paragraph 3, Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 different from those enumerated in Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. Under
Constitution? the said paragraph, a petition filed pursuant therewith will follow a different rule
2.) Is the President, in declaring martial law and suspending the writ of on standing as any citizen may file it. Said provision of the Constitution also
habeas corpus, limits the issue to the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise by the
a. required to be factually correct or only not arbitrary in his appreciation of Chief Executive of his emergency powers. The usual period for filing pleadings
facts; in Petition for Certiorari is likewise not applicable under the third paragraph of
b. required to obtain favorable recommendation thereon of the Secretary Section 18, Article VII considering the limited period within which this Court
of National Defense; or has to promulgate its decision.
c. required to take into account only the situation at the time of the The Supreme Court is the reviewing tribunal to examine, in an appropriate
proclamation, even if subsequent events prove the situation to have not been proceeding, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial
accurately reported; law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Likewise,
3.) Is the power of the Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of any action commenced by any citizen to demand the factual basis of the said
the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus proclamation should be denominated as a petition to be resolved by the
independent of the actual actions that have been taken by Congress jointly or Supreme Court.
separately? “The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any
4.) Were there sufficient factual basis for the proclamation of martial law or citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus: the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension
a. What are the parameters for review? thereof xxx”
b. Who has the burden of proof?
c. What is the threshold of evidence? 2.)
5.) Is the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Court involves the a. NO. Due to the urgency of the situation, the President cannot be able to
calibration of graduated powers granted the President as Commander-in- verify the accuracy and veracity of all the facts and information reported to him.
Chief, namely calling out powers, suspension of the privilege of the writ of In case of actual invasion or rebellion, there is a need for immediate response
habeas corpus, and declaration of martial law? and time is paramount in situations necessitating the proclamation of martial
6.) Is the Proclamation No. 216 be considered, vague, and thus null and law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
void: The Court does not need to satisfy itself that the President's decision is correct,
a. with its inclusion of "other rebel groups; or accurate, and precise, rather it only needs to determine whether the
b. since it has no guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters President's decision had sufficient factual basis. Court's review is confined to
within the entire Mindanao region? the sufficiency, not accuracy, of the information at hand during the declaration
7.) Are the armed hostilities mentioned in Proclamation No. 216 and in the or suspension.
Report of the President to Congress sufficient bases: b. NO. According to Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the
a. for the existence of actual rebellion; or President is not subject to any condition to obtain a recommendation of, or
135
consultation with, the Secretary of National Defense or other high-ranking Executive and an infringement on the prerogative that solely, at least initially,
officials. The President can declare martial law as long as the following lies with the President.
requirements are present: invasion or rebellion, and when public safety “"Graduation" of powers refers to hierarchy based on scope and effect; it does
requires it. The power to impose martial law is vested solely on the President not refer to a sequence, order, or arrangement by which the Commander-in-
as the Commander-in-Chief, subject to the revocation of Congress and the Chief must adhere to.”
review of the Court. Therefore, lack of recommendation even from the
Secretary of National Defense will not compromise the sufficiency of the 6.)
declaration’s factual basis. a. NO. Inclusion of "other rebel groups" does not make Proclamation
c. YES. The President is required to take into account only the situation at No.216 vague when viewed in the context of the words that accompany it.
the time of the proclamation. In reviewing the sufficiency of the proclamation’s Verily, the text of Proclamation No. 216 refers to "other rebel groups" found in
factual basis, the Court considers only the information and data available to Proclamation No. 55, which it cited by way of reference in its Whereas clauses.
the President prior to or at the time of declaration, which can be found in the b. NO. Operational guidelines will serve only as mere tools for the
proclamation as well as the written Report submitted by him to Congress. Past implementation of the proclamation. There is no need for the Court to
events may be considered as justifications for the declaration and/or determine the constitutionality of the implementing and/or operational
suspension as long as these are connected or related to the current situation guidelines, general orders, arrest orders and other orders issued after the
existing at the time of the declaration. proclamation for being irrelevant to its review. Thus, any act committed under
the said orders in violation of the Constitution and the laws, such as criminal
3.) YES. The power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by acts or human rights violations, should be resolved in a separate proceeding.
Congress are not only totally different, but likewise independent from each Finally, there is a risk that if the Court wades into these areas, it would be
other although concededly, they have the same trajectory, which is, the deemed as trespassing into the sphere that is reserved exclusively for
nullification of the presidential proclamation. Needless to say, the power of the Congress in the exercise of its power to revoke.
Court to review can be exercised independently from the power of revocation
of Congress. 7.)
a. YES. The President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient
4.) YES. The series of violent attacks committed by the ISIS-backed Maute factual bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The President’s
Group, their brazen display of DAESH flags, and their attempt to establish a conclusion was reached after a tactical consideration of the facts. In fine, the
DAESH wilayat or province in Marawi constitute a clear and open attempt to President satisfactorily discharged his burden of proof. After all, what the
remove from the allegiance of the Philippine Government, the city of Marawi, President needs to satisfy is only the standard of probable cause for a valid
a part of Mindanao, and deprive the Chief Executive of his power, authority, declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
and prerogatives to enforce laws of the land and to maintain public order and corpus.
safety in Mindanao, constituting the crime of rebellion. Hence, the factual basis b. YES. The 1987 Constitution grants to the President, as Commander-in-
for the Proclamation No. 216 is sufficient. Chief, the discretion to determine the territorial coverage or application of
a. Based on Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the parameters martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The
for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ Kilometer Zero marker in Mindanao is found in Marawi City, the only Islamic
of habeas corpus are invasion or rebellion, and when public safety requires it. City of the South, thereby making Marawi City the point of reference of all
b. The basic rule is that he who alleges must prove his case. The burden roads in Mindanao. Thus, there is reasonable basis to believe that Marawi is
lies with the petitioners to prove that the Proclamation No. 216 lacks factual only the staging point of the rebellion, both for symbolic and strategic reasons.
basis. (Rule No. 131: Burden of proof and presumptions, Rules of the Court) Moreover, the President's duty to maintain peace and public safety is not
Otherwise, the President’s actions are presumed to be valid and constitutional. limited only to the place where there is actual rebellion; it extends to other
c. The President just need to satisfy the given parameters for a valid areas where the present hostilities are in danger of spilling over.
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, beyond reasonable doubt. 8.) YES. Rebellion is only one of the various means by which terrorism can
be committed. Terrorism neither negates nor absorbs rebellion. While rebellion
5.) NO. Judicial review does not include the calibration of the President's is one of the predicate crimes of terrorism, one cannot absorb the other as
decision of which of his graduated powers be availed of in a given situation. they have different elements. For the validity of the declaration of martial law
To do so would be tantamount to an incursion into the exclusive domain of the and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, there must
136
be a concurrence of actual invasion or rebellion, and when public safety Proclamation:
requires it. — Senate Resolution No. 49: Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Senate
Not to Revoke Proclamation No. 216
9.) — House Resolution No. 1050: Resolution Expressing the Full Support of the
a. NO. The calling out power is in a different category from the power to House of Representatives to President Rodrigo Duterte as it Finds No Reason
declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas to Revoke Proclamation No. 216.
corpus; the nullification of Proclamation No. 216 will not affect Proclamation
No. 55. Among the three extraordinary powers of the President, the calling out The House of Representatives also purportedly discussed the
power is the most benign and involves ordinary police action. The President proposal calling for a joint session of the Congress to deliberate and vote on
may resort to this extraordinary power whenever it becomes necessary to the Proclamation but was rejected.
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. “The power to call
is fully discretionary to the President;" the only limitations being that he acts Petitioners contend that the Congress has an obligation to jointly
within permissible constitutional boundaries or in a manner not constituting convene and vote in case there is declaration of martial law or suspension of
grave abuse of discretion. the privilege of the writ.
b. NO. Neither would the nullification of Proclamation No. 216 result in the .
nullification of the acts of the President done pursuant thereto. Under the
"operative fact doctrine," the unconstitutional statute is recognized as an Issue:
"operative fact" before it is declared unconstitutional. Is it mandatory for the Congress under Article VII, Section 18 of the
1987 Constitution, to automatically convene in joint session in the event that
132. Padilla vs Congress of the Philippines the president proclaims a state of martial law and/or suspends the privilege of
G.R. No. 231671, July 25, 2017 the writ of habeas corpus in the Philippines or any part thereof?

Doctrine: Ruling:
The Congress is not constitutionally mandated to convene in joint
session in the event that the President proclaims a state of martial law and/or NO. The Congress is not constitutionally mandated to convene in joint
suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the Philippines or any session except to vote jointly to revoke the president’s declaration or
part thereof, except to vote jointly to revoke the President's declaration or suspension.
suspension.
The Commander-in-Chief clause of Art. VII, Sec. 18 of the Constitution
Facts: vests with the President control over the persons and actions of the members
of the AFP in recognition of its role as the Chief Executive to promote public
On May 23, 2017, President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, peace, and as Commander-in-Chief, the more specific duty to suppress
declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of lawless violence and rebellion. Thus, he is granted the power to declare a state
habeas corpus in the Mindanao group of islands on the grounds of rebellion of martial law and/or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the
and necessity of public safety pursuant to Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Philippines or a portion thereof.
Constitution. However, in order to safeguard against possible abuse of power, the
Constitution instituted checks and balances on the President’s power through
On May 25, 2017, or within 48 hours from said proclamation, the the two co-equal branches, the legislative and the judiciary.
President submitted a report to the Congress pursuant to aforementioned
constitutional provision.The Senate and the House of Representatives — 1) The Constitution requires the President to submit a report to the
separately conducted conference briefings regarding the circumstances, Congress after his proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the
details, and updates surrounding the President’s proclamation.Both houses privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and grants the Congress the power to
deliberated separately and adopted below resolutions indicating their support revoke, as well as extend, the proclamation and/or suspension;
of the President’s — 2) The Constitution vests upon the Judiciary the power to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis for such proclamation and/or suspension.

137
There are four provision in Art. VII, Sec. XVIII that pertains specifically to the 2017, asked both the Senate and the House of Representatives to further
role of the Congress when the President proclaims martial law and/or extend the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of
suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus: the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year, from January 1,
— 1) The requirement for the President to submit a report to the Congress 2018 to December 31, 2018, or for such period as the Congress may
within 48 hours after such declaration; determine. The Congess granted the President’s request.
— 2) The power of the Congress to revoke such declaration by a vote of at .
least a majority of the all its Members voting jointly;
— 3) The power of the Congress to extend such declaration, for a period to be Issue:
determined by it, upon the initiative of the President, voting in the same manner 1.Whether or not the President and the Congress had sufficient factual
provided in No. 2; basis to extend Proclamation No. 216.
— 4) If not in session, to convene within 24 hours following such proclamation
or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of call. 2. Whether or not there is necessity to impose tests on the choice and
manner of the President’s exercise of military powers.
133. Lagman vs. Pimentel
G.R. No. 235935, February 6, 2018 Ruling:

Doctrine: 1. Yes, Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution requires two
factual bases for the extension of the proclamation of martial law or of the
The determination of which among the Constitutionally given military suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus: (a) the invasion or
powers should be exercised in a given set of factual circumstances is a rebellion persists; and (b) public safety requires the extension.
prerogative of the President. The Court’s power of review, as provided under
Section 18, Article VII do not empower the Court to advise, nor dictate its own Rebellion persists as to satisfy the first condition for the extension of
judgment upon the President, as to which and how these military powers martial law or of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
should be exercised. corpus.
Facts:
The reasons cited by the President in his request for further extension
On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation indicate that the rebellion, which caused him to issue Proclamation No. 216,
No. 216, declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the continues to exist and its “remnants” have been resolute in establishing a
writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao for a period not exceeding DAESH/ISIS territory in Mindanao, carrying on through the recruitment and
sixty (60) days, to address the rebellion mounted by members of the Maute training of new members, financial and logistical build-up, consolidation of
Group and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). forces and continued attacks.

Within the 48-hour period set in Section 18, Article VII of the AFP General Guerrero also cited, among others, the continued armed
Constitution, the President submitted to the Senate and the House of resistance of the DAESH-inspired DIWM and their allies. Moreover, The AFP’s
Representatives his written Report, citing the events and reasons that impelled data also showed that Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) are now acting as
him to issue Proclamation No. 216. Thereafter, both Houses expressed full instructors to the new members of the Dawlah Islamiyah.
support to the Proclamation and finding no cause to revoke the same. On July
18, 2017, the President requested the Congress to extend the effectivity of Also, it does not necessarily follow that with the liberation of Marawi,
Proclamation No. 216. In a Special Joint Session on July 22, 2017, the the DAESH/ISIS-inspired rebellion no longer exists. Secretary Lorenzana,
Congress adopted Resolution of Both Houses No. 2, extending Proclamation during the Congress’ Joint Session on December 13, 2017, explained that
No. 216 until December 31, 2017. In a letter to the President, through Defense while the situation in Marawi has substantially changed, the rebellion has not
Secretary Lorenzana, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff, ceased but simply moved to other places in Mindanao.
General Rey Leonardo Guerrero (General Guerrero), recommended the
further extension of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of 2. No.The Court reiterated their ruling in the earlier Lagman case that
habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year beginning January 1, 2018. the determination of which among the Constitutionally given military powers
Acting on said recommendations, the President, in a letter dated December 8, should be exercised in a given set of factual circumstances is a prerogative of
138
the President. The Court’s power of review, as provided under Section 18, On May 23, 2017 at 10:00pm, after the ISIS-backed Maute Group took
Article VII do not empower the Court to advise, nor dictate its own judgment over a hospital in Marawi City, established several checkpoints, set ablaze
upon the President, as to which and how these military powers should be government and private facilities, inflicted casualties on the part of the
exercised. government forces, and hoisted the flag of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
(ISIS) in several areas;
134. Lagman vs Medialdea
GR No. 231658, July 04 2017 President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216,
“declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of
Doctrine: habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao,” in pursuant to Section 18, Article
The Supreme Court is the reviewing tribunal to examine, in an VII of the 1987 Constitution:
appropriate proceeding, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation
of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. “xxx in case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may,
Likewise, any action commenced by any citizen to demand the factual basis for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of
of the said proclamation should be denominated as a petition to be resolved habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law
by the Supreme Court. xxx”

The President is not subject to any condition to obtain a On May 25, 2017, within the 60-days timeline set by Section 18, Article
recommendation of, or consultation with, the Secretary of National Defense or VII of the Constitution, President Duterte submitted a written report on the
other high-ranking officials. The President can declare martial law as long as factual basis of Proclamation No. 216. After the submission of the report, the
the following requirements are present: invasion or rebellion, and when public Senate issued P.S. Resolution No. 388 expressing full support to the
safety requires it. proclamation of martial law as they deemed it to be satisfactory, constitutional,
and in accordance with the law.The House of Representatives likewise
The power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by issued House Resolution No. 1050 expressing their full support to the
Congress are not only totally different, but likewise independent from each same.
other although concededly, they have the same trajectory, which is, the
nullification of the presidential proclamation. Needless to say, the power of the Nevertheless, several persons filed a petition (Cullamat Petition,
Court to review can be exercised independently from the power of revocation Mohamad Petition, and Lagman Petition) under the Paragraph 3, Section
of Congress. 18 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, claiming that the declaration of martial
law has no sufficient factual basis because there is no rebellion or invasion
Judicial review does not include the calibration of the President's in Marawi City or in any part of Mindanao. It argues that acts of terrorism do
decision of which of his graduated powers be availed of in a given situation. not constitute rebellion, since there is no proof that its purpose is to remove
To do so would be tantamount to an incursion into the exclusive domain of the Mindanao or any part thereof from its allegiance to the Philippines.
Executive and an infringement on the prerogative that solely, at least initially,
lies with the President. On June 12, 2017, respondents’ consolidated comment was filed as
required by the Court.
The calling out power is in a different category from the power to
declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas Issue:
corpus. The power to call is fully discretionary to the President; the only 1.) Are the petitions (GR No. 231658, 231771, and 231774) the “appropriate
limitations being that he acts within permissible constitutional boundaries or in proceeding covered by Paragraph 3, Section 18, Article VII of the 1987
a manner not constituting grave abuse of discretion. Constitution?
2.) Is the President, in declaring martial law and suspending the writ of
Facts: habeas corpus,
a. required to be factually correct or only not arbitrary in his appreciation of
On September 4, 2016, Proclamation No. 55, declaring a state of facts;
national emergency on account of lawless violence in Mindanao, was issued. b. required to obtain favorable recommendation thereon of the Secretary
of National Defense; or
139
c. required to take into account only the situation at the time of the
proclamation, even if subsequent events prove the situation to have not been The Supreme Court is the reviewing tribunal to examine, in an appropriate
accurately reported; proceeding, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial
3.) Is the power of the Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Likewise,
the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus any action commenced by any citizen to demand the factual basis of the said
independent of the actual actions that have been taken by Congress jointly or proclamation should be denominated as a petition to be resolved by the
separately? Supreme Court.
4.) Were there sufficient factual basis for the proclamation of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus: “The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any
a. What are the parameters for review? citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or
b. Who has the burden of proof? the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension
c. What is the threshold of evidence? thereof xxx”
5.) Is the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Court involves the
calibration of graduated powers granted the President as Commander-in- 2.)
Chief, namely calling out powers, suspension of the privilege of the writ of a. NO. Due to the urgency of the situation, the President cannot be able to
habeas corpus, and declaration of martial law? verify the accuracy and veracity of all the facts and information reported to him.
6.) Is the Proclamation No. 216 be considered, vague, and thus null and In case of actual invasion or rebellion, there is a need for immediate response
void: and time is paramount in situations necessitating the proclamation of martial
a. with its inclusion of "other rebel groups; or law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
b. since it has no guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters The Court does not need to satisfy itself that the President's decision is correct,
within the entire Mindanao region? accurate, and precise, rather it only needs to determine whether the
7.) Are the armed hostilities mentioned in Proclamation No. 216 and in the President's decision had sufficient factual basis. Court's review is confined to
Report of the President to Congress sufficient bases: the sufficiency, not accuracy, of the information at hand during the declaration
a. for the existence of actual rebellion; or or suspension.
b. for a declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the b. NO. According to Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the
writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao region? President is not subject to any condition to obtain a recommendation of, or
8.) Are terrorism or acts attributable to terrorism equivalent to actual consultation with, the Secretary of National Defense or other high-ranking
rebellion and the requirements of public safety sufficient to declare martial law officials. The President can declare martial law as long as the following
or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus? requirements are present: invasion or rebellion, and when public safety
9.) Will nullifying Proclamation No. 216: requires it. The power to impose martial law is vested solely on the President
a. have the effect of recalling Proclamation No. 55 s. 2016; or as the Commander-in-Chief, subject to the revocation of Congress and the
b. also nullify the acts of the President in calling out the armed forces to review of the Court. Therefore, lack of recommendation even from the
quell lawless violence in Marawi and other parts of the Mindanao region. Secretary of National Defense will not compromise the sufficiency of the
declaration’s factual basis.
Ruling: c. YES. The President is required to take into account only the situation at
the time of the proclamation. In reviewing the sufficiency of the proclamation’s
1.) YES. The unique features of the third paragraph of Section 18, Article factual basis, the Court considers only the information and data available to
VII clearly indicate that it should be treated as sui generis separate and the President prior to or at the time of declaration, which can be found in the
different from those enumerated in Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. Under proclamation as well as the written Report submitted by him to Congress. Past
the said paragraph, a petition filed pursuant therewith will follow a different rule events may be considered as justifications for the declaration and/or
on standing as any citizen may file it. Said provision of the Constitution also suspension as long as these are connected or related to the current situation
limits the issue to the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise by the existing at the time of the declaration.
Chief Executive of his emergency powers. The usual period for filing pleadings
in Petition for Certiorari is likewise not applicable under the third paragraph of 3.) YES. The power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by
Section 18, Article VII considering the limited period within which this Court Congress are not only totally different, but likewise independent from each
has to promulgate its decision. other although concededly, they have the same trajectory, which is, the
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nullification of the presidential proclamation. Needless to say, the power of the deemed as trespassing into the sphere that is reserved exclusively for
Court to review can be exercised independently from the power of revocation Congress in the exercise of its power to revoke.
of Congress.
7.)
4.) YES. The series of violent attacks committed by the ISIS-backed Maute a. YES. The President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient
Group, their brazen display of DAESH flags, and their attempt to establish a factual bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The President’s
DAESH wilayat or province in Marawi constitute a clear and open attempt to conclusion was reached after a tactical consideration of the facts. In fine, the
remove from the allegiance of the Philippine Government, the city of Marawi, President satisfactorily discharged his burden of proof. After all, what the
a part of Mindanao, and deprive the Chief Executive of his power, authority, President needs to satisfy is only the standard of probable cause for a valid
and prerogatives to enforce laws of the land and to maintain public order and declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
safety in Mindanao, constituting the crime of rebellion. Hence, the factual basis corpus.
for the Proclamation No. 216 is sufficient. b. YES. The 1987 Constitution grants to the President, as Commander-in-
a. Based on Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the parameters Chief, the discretion to determine the territorial coverage or application of
for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The
of habeas corpus are invasion or rebellion, and when public safety requires it. Kilometer Zero marker in Mindanao is found in Marawi City, the only Islamic
b. The basic rule is that he who alleges must prove his case. The burden City of the South, thereby making Marawi City the point of reference of all
lies with the petitioners to prove that the Proclamation No. 216 lacks factual roads in Mindanao. Thus, there is reasonable basis to believe that Marawi is
basis. (Rule No. 131: Burden of proof and presumptions, Rules of the Court) only the staging point of the rebellion, both for symbolic and strategic reasons.
Otherwise, the President’s actions are presumed to be valid and constitutional. Moreover, the President's duty to maintain peace and public safety is not
c. The President just need to satisfy the given parameters for a valid limited only to the place where there is actual rebellion; it extends to other
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of areas where the present hostilities are in danger of spilling over.
habeas corpus, beyond reasonable doubt.
8.) YES. Rebellion is only one of the various means by which terrorism can
5.) NO. Judicial review does not include the calibration of the President's be committed. Terrorism neither negates nor absorbs rebellion. While rebellion
decision of which of his graduated powers be availed of in a given situation. is one of the predicate crimes of terrorism, one cannot absorb the other as
To do so would be tantamount to an incursion into the exclusive domain of the they have different elements. For the validity of the declaration of martial law
Executive and an infringement on the prerogative that solely, at least initially, and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, there must
lies with the President. be a concurrence of actual invasion or rebellion, and when public safety
“"Graduation" of powers refers to hierarchy based on scope and effect; it does requires it.
not refer to a sequence, order, or arrangement by which the Commander-in-
Chief must adhere to.” 9.)
a. NO. The calling out power is in a different category from the power to
6.) declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
a. NO. Inclusion of "other rebel groups" does not make Proclamation corpus; the nullification of Proclamation No. 216 will not affect Proclamation
No.216 vague when viewed in the context of the words that accompany it. No. 55. Among the three extraordinary powers of the President, the calling out
Verily, the text of Proclamation No. 216 refers to "other rebel groups" found in power is the most benign and involves ordinary police action. The President
Proclamation No. 55, which it cited by way of reference in its Whereas clauses. may resort to this extraordinary power whenever it becomes necessary to
b. NO. Operational guidelines will serve only as mere tools for the prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. “The power to call
implementation of the proclamation. There is no need for the Court to is fully discretionary to the President;" the only limitations being that he acts
determine the constitutionality of the implementing and/or operational within permissible constitutional boundaries or in a manner not constituting
guidelines, general orders, arrest orders and other orders issued after the grave abuse of discretion.
proclamation for being irrelevant to its review. Thus, any act committed under b. NO. Neither would the nullification of Proclamation No. 216 result in the
the said orders in violation of the Constitution and the laws, such as criminal nullification of the acts of the President done pursuant thereto. Under the
acts or human rights violations, should be resolved in a separate proceeding. "operative fact doctrine," the unconstitutional statute is recognized as an
Finally, there is a risk that if the Court wades into these areas, it would be "operative fact" before it is declared unconstitutional.

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 135. Padilla vs Congress of the Philippines the president proclaims a state of martial law and/or suspends the privilege of
G.R. No. 231671, July 25, 2017 the writ of habeas corpus in the Philippines or any part thereof?

Doctrine: Ruling:
The Congress is not constitutionally mandated to convene in joint
session in the event that the President proclaims a state of martial law and/or NO. The Congress is not constitutionally mandated to convene in joint
suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the Philippines or any session except to vote jointly to revoke the president’s declaration or
part thereof, except to vote jointly to revoke the President's declaration or suspension.
suspension.
The Commander-in-Chief clause of Art. VII, Sec. 18 of the Constitution
Facts: vests with the President control over the persons and actions of the members
of the AFP in recognition of its role as the Chief Executive to promote public
On May 23, 2017, President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, peace, and as Commander-in-Chief, the more specific duty to suppress
declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of lawless violence and rebellion. Thus, he is granted the power to declare a state
habeas corpus in the Mindanao group of islands on the grounds of rebellion of martial law and/or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the
and necessity of public safety pursuant to Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Philippines or a portion thereof.
Constitution. However, in order to safeguard against possible abuse of power, the
Constitution instituted checks and balances on the President’s power through
On May 25, 2017, or within 48 hours from said proclamation, the the two co-equal branches, the legislative and the judiciary.
President submitted a report to the Congress pursuant to aforementioned
constitutional provision.The Senate and the House of Representatives — 1) The Constitution requires the President to submit a report to the
separately conducted conference briefings regarding the circumstances, Congress after his proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the
details, and updates surrounding the President’s proclamation.Both houses privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and grants the Congress the power to
deliberated separately and adopted below resolutions indicating their support revoke, as well as extend, the proclamation and/or suspension;
of the President’s — 2) The Constitution vests upon the Judiciary the power to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis for such proclamation and/or suspension.
Proclamation: There are four provision in Art. VII, Sec. XVIII that pertains specifically to the
— Senate Resolution No. 49: Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Senate role of the Congress when the President proclaims martial law and/or
Not to Revoke Proclamation No. 216 suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus:
— House Resolution No. 1050: Resolution Expressing the Full Support of the — 1) The requirement for the President to submit a report to the Congress
House of Representatives to President Rodrigo Duterte as it Finds No Reason within 48 hours after such declaration;
to Revoke Proclamation No. 216. — 2) The power of the Congress to revoke such declaration by a vote of at
least a majority of the all its Members voting jointly;
The House of Representatives also purportedly discussed the — 3) The power of the Congress to extend such declaration, for a period to be
proposal calling for a joint session of the Congress to deliberate and vote on determined by it, upon the initiative of the President, voting in the same manner
the Proclamation but was rejected. provided in No. 2;
— 4) If not in session, to convene within 24 hours following such proclamation
Petitioners contend that the Congress has an obligation to jointly or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of call.
convene and vote in case there is declaration of martial law or suspension of
the privilege of the writ. 136. REPRESENTATIVE EDCEL C. LAGMAN, et. Al. vs. SENATE
. PRESIDENT AQUILINO PIMENTEL III
G.R. No. 235935, EN BANC, February 6, 2018, TIJAM, J.
Issue:
Is it mandatory for the Congress under Article VII, Section 18 of the DOCTRINE:
1987 Constitution, to automatically convene in joint session in the event that

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In Lagman v. Medialdea, the Court sustained the constitutionality of
Proclamation No. 216, holding that the President had probable cause to Within the 48-hour period set in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the
believe that actual rebellion exists and public safety required the Proclamation. President submitted to the Senate and the House of Representatives his
The Court held: written Report, citing the events and reasons that impelled him to issue
Proclamation No. 216. Thereafter, both Houses expressed full support to the
A review of the aforesaid facts similarly leads the Court to conclude that Proclamation and finding no cause to revoke the same.
the President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual
bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The President's On July 18, 2017, the President requested the Congress to extend the
conclusion, that there was an armed public uprising, the culpable purpose effectivity of Proclamation No. 216. In a Special Joint Session on July 22, 2017,
of which was the removal from the allegiance of the Philippine Government the Congress adopted Resolution of Both Houses No. 2, extending
a portion of its territory and the deprivation of the President from Proclamation No. 216 until December 31, 2017. In a letter to the President,
performing his powers and prerogatives, was reached after a tactical through Defense Secretary Lorenzana, the Armed Forces of the Philippines
consideration of the facts. In fine, the President satisfactorily discharged (AFP) Chief of Staff, General Rey Leonardo Guerrero (General Guerrero),
his burden of proof. recommended the further extension of martial law and suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year
After all, what the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of beginning January 1, 2018. Acting on said recommendations, the President,
probable cause for a valid declaration of martial law and suspension of the in a letter dated December 8, 2017, asked both the Senate and the House of
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. x x x Representatives to further extend the proclamation of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao
In this case, the reasons cited by the President in his request for further for one year, from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018, or for such period
extension indicate that the rebellion, which caused him to issue Proclamation as the Congress may determine. In granting the President's request, the
No. 216, continues to exist and its "remnants" have been resolute in Congress stated:
establishing a DAESH/ISIS territory in Mindanao, carrying on through the
recruitment and training of new members, financial and logistical build-up, “WHEREAS, the President informed the Congress of the Philippines of the
consolidation of forces and continued attacks. In recommending the one-year remarkable progress made during the period of Martial Law, but
extension of Proclamation No. 216 to the President, AFP General Guerrero nevertheless reported the following essential facts: First, despite the death
cited, among others, the continued armed resistance of the DAESH-inspired of Hapilon and the Maute brothers, the remnants of their groups have
DIWM and their allies. continued to rebuild their organization; Second, the Turaifie Group has
likewise been monitored to be planning to conduct bombings, notably
As to public safety, the rising number of these rebel groups, their training in targeting the Cotabato area; Third, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom
and predilection to terrorism, and their resoluteness in wresting control of Fighters continue to defy the government by perpetrating at least fifteen
Mindanao from the government, pose a serious danger to Mindanao. In a short (15) violent incidents; Fourth, the remnants of the Abu Sayyaf Group in
period after the Marawi crisis was put under control, said rebel groups have Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-tawi, and Zamboanga Peninsula remain a serious
managed to increase their number by 400, almost the same strength as the security concern; and last, the New People's Army took advantage of the
group that initially stormed Marawi. Their current number is now more than half situation and intensified their decades-long rebellion against the
the 1,010 rebels in Marawi which had taken the AFP five months to neutralize. government…”
To wait until a new battleground is chosen by these rebel groups before We
consider them a significant threat to public safety is neither sound nor prudent. “WHEREAS, Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution authorizes the
Congress of the Philippines to extend, at the initiative of the President,
FACTS: such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the
Congress of the Philippines, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and
On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. public safety requires it;”
216, declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao for a period not exceeding sixty (60) “WHEREAS, on December 13, 2017, after thorough discussion and
days, to address the rebellion mounted by members of the Maute extensive debate, the Congress of the Philippines in a Joint Session by
Group and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). two hundred forty (240) affirmative votes comprising the majority of all its
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 Members, has determined that rebellion persists, and that public safety Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argue that:
indubitably requires the further extension of the Proclamation of Martial (a) The period for deliberation on the President's request for further
Law and the Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in extension was not unduly constricted. The extension or revocation of
the Whole of Mindanao” martial law cannot be equated with the process of ordinary legislation.
Given the time-sensitive nature of martial law or its extension, the time
Based on their respective petitions and memoranda and their oral arguments cap was necessary in the interest of expediency.
before this Court on January 16, 2018 and January 17, 2018, petitioners' (b) The Constitution does not limit the period for which Congress can
arguments are: extend the proclamation and the suspension, nor does it prohibit
(a) The Congress committed grave abuse of discretion for precipitately Congress from granting further extension. In the absence of any
and perfunctorily approving the extension of martial law despite the express or implied prohibition in the Constitution, the Court cannot
absence of sufficient factual basis. In G.R. No. 235935, petitioners prevent Congress from granting further extensions.
impute grave abuse of discretion specifically against the "leadership (c) Although the leadership of the Mautes was decimated in Marawi, the
and supermajority" of both Chambers of Congress, arguing that the rebellion in Mindanao persists as the surviving members of the militant
extension was approved with inordinate haste as the Congress' group have not laid down their arms. The remnants remain a
deliberation was unduly constricted to an indecent 3 hours and 35 formidable force to be reckoned with, especially since they have
minutes. established linkage with other rebel groups. With the persistence of
(b) The Constitution allows only a one-time extension of martial law and/or rebellion in the region, the extension of martial law is, therefore, not
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, not a series just for preventive reasons. The extension is premised on the
of extensions amounting to perpetuity. In addition, the period of existence of an ongoing rebellion.
extension of martial law should satisfy the standards of necessity and (d) Under the Constitution, the extension of martial law and the
reasonableness. suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus are justified
(c) The one-year extension of the proclamation of martial law and as long as there is rebellion and public safety requires it. The provision
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus lacked does not require that the group that started the rebellion should be the
sufficient factual basis because there is no actual rebellion in same group that should continue the uprising. Thus, the violence
Mindanao. The Marawi siege and the other grounds under committed by other groups, such as the BIFF, AKP, ASG, DI Maguid,
Proclamation No. 216 that were used as the alleged bases to justify and DI Toraype (Turaifie) should be taken into consideration in
the extension have already been resolved and no longer persist. determining whether the rebellion has been completely quelled, as
(d) Since the framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the phrase they are part of the rebellion.
"imminent danger" as one of the grounds for declaring martial law, the (e) The President has the sole prerogative to choose which of the
President can no longer declare or extend martial law on the basis of extraordinary commander-in-chief powers to use against the rebellion
mere threats of an impending rebellion. plaguing Mindanao. Thus, petitioners cannot insist that the Court
(e) The alleged rebellion in Mindanao does not endanger public safety. impose upon the President the proper measure to defeat a rebellion.
The threat to public safety contemplated under Section 18, Article VII (f) The alleged human rights violations are irrelevant in the determination
of the Constitution is one where the government cannot sufficiently or of whether Congress had sufficient factual basis to further extend
effectively govern, as when the courts or government offices cannot martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. As
operate or perform their functions. ruled in Lagman, petitioners' claim of alleged human rights violations
(f) There is no need to extend martial law to suppress or defeat remnants should be resolved in a separate proceeding and should not be taken
of vanquished terrorist groups, as these may be quelled and cognizance of by the Court.
addressed using lesser extraordinary powers (i.e., calling out powers) (g) Martial law does not automatically equate to curtailment and
of the President. suppression of civil liberties and individual freedom. A state of martial
(g) Petitioners in G.R. No. 235935 allege that martial law and the law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, including the
suspension of the writ trigger the commission of human rights Bill of Rights. The Constitution lays down safeguards to protect human
violations and suppression of civil liberties. In fact, the implementation rights during martial law. Civil courts are not supplanted.
of the same resulted to intensified human rights violations in
Mindanao. ISSUE:

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Whether or not the President and the Congress had sufficient factual basis to
extend Proclamation A. Rebellion persists.
No. 216?
The reasons cited by the President in his request for further extension indicate
RULING: that the rebellion, which caused him to issue Proclamation No. 216, continues
to exist and its "remnants" have been resolute in establishing a DAESH/ISIS
Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: territory in Mindanao, carrying on through the recruitment and training of new
members, financial and logistical build-up, consolidation of forces and
SECTION 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed continued attacks.
forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out
such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or In recommending the one-year extension of Proclamation No. 216 to the
rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he President, AFP General Guerrero cited, among others, the continued armed
may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of resistance of the DAESH-inspired DIWM and their allies. The rebellion that
habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. spawned the Marawi crisis persists, and that its remaining members have
Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension regrouped, substantially increased in number, and are no less determined to
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report turn Mindanao into a DAESH/ISIS territory.
in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote
of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may Petitioners in G.R. No. 235935 argue that "remnants" or a residue of a rebel
revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set group cannot possibly mount a rebellion. The argument, however, fails to take
aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress into account the 185 persons identified in the Martial Law Arrest Orders who
may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a are still at large; the 400 new members whom said remnants were able to
period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion recruit; the influx of 48 FTFs who are training the new recruits in their ways of
shall persist and public safety requires it. terrorism; and the financial and logistical build-up which the group is currently
undertaking with their sympathizers and protectors.
Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution requires two factual bases for
the extension of the proclamation of martial law or of the suspension of the The termination of armed combat in Marawi does not conclusively indicate that
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus: (a) the invasion or rebellion persists; the rebellion has ceased to exist. As noted in Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile, modern day
and (b) public safety requires the extension. rebellion has other facets than just the taking up of arms, including financing,
recruitment and propaganda, that may not necessarily be found or occurring
In Lagman v. Medialdea, the Court sustained the constitutionality of in the place of the armed conflict. Furthermore, as We explained in Lagman,
Proclamation No. 216, holding that the President had probable cause to "(t)he crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is a vast movement of men
believe that actual rebellion exists and public safety required the Proclamation. and a complex net of intrigues and plots."
The Court held:
The Court, thus, finds that the government has sufficiently established the
A review of the aforesaid facts similarly leads the Court to conclude that the persistence of the DAESH/ISIS rebellion.
President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual bases
tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The President's conclusion, that B. Public safety requires the extension
there was an armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was the
removal from the allegiance of the Philippine Government a portion of its The rising number of these rebel groups, their training in and predilection to
territory and the deprivation of the President from performing his powers and terrorism, and their resoluteness in wresting control of Mindanao from the
prerogatives, was reached after a tactical consideration of the facts. In fine, government, pose a serious danger to Mindanao. In a short period after the
the President satisfactorily discharged his burden of proof. Marawi crisis was put under control, said rebel groups have managed to
increase their number by 400, almost the same strength as the group that
After all, what the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of probable initially stormed Marawi. Their current number is now more than half the 1,010
cause for a valid declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of rebels in Marawi which had taken the AFP five months to neutralize. To wait
the writ of habeas corpus. x x x
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until a new battleground is chosen by these rebel groups before We consider amparo to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or
them a significant threat to public safety is neither sound nor prudent. threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity. Similarly, in A.M. No. 08-1-16-
The magnitude of the atrocities already perpetrated by these rebel groups SC, this Court also crafted the rule on the writ of habeas data to provide a
reveals their capacity to continue inflicting serious harm and injury, both to life remedy for any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
and property. The sinister plans of attack, as uncovered by the AFP, confirm violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
this real and imminent threat. The manpower and armaments these groups employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
possess, the continued radicalization and recruitment of new rebels, the collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home
financial and logistical build-up cited by the President, and more importantly, and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
the groups' manifest determination to overthrow the government through force,
violence and terrorism, present a significant danger to public safety. 137. SENATOR AQUILINO PIMENTEL vs. OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY
The facts as provided by the Executive and considered by Congress amply G.R. No. 158088. July 6, 2005, PUNO, J.
establish that rebellion persists in Mindanao and public safety is significantly
endangered by it. The Court, thus, holds that there exists sufficient factual DOCTRINE:
basis for the further extension sought by the President and approved by the
Congress in its Resolution of Both Houses No. 4. International Law; Treaties; Presidency; In our system of government, the
President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority
The determination of which among the constitutionally given military powers in external relations and is the country’s sole representative with foreign
should be exercised in a given set of factual circumstances is a prerogative of nations.—In our system of government, the President, being the head of state,
the President. The Court's power of review, as provided under Section 18, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the
Article VII do not empower the Court to advise, nor dictate its own judgment country’s sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of
upon the President, as to which and how these military powers should be foreign policy, the President acts as the country’s mouthpiece with respect to
exercised. international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal
with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain
Petitioners’ fear that the one-year extension of martial law will only intensify diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of
the human rights violations committed by government forces against civilians. foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole
However, the possibility of abuse and even the country's martial law authority to negotiate with other states. Nonetheless, while the President has
experience under the Marcos regime did not prevent the framers of the 1987 the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the Constitution provides
Constitution from including it among the Commander-in-Chief powers of the a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members
President. This is in recognition of the fact that during critical times when the of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21,
security or survival of the state is greatly imperiled, an equally vast and Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that “no treaty or international
extraordinary measure should be available for the President to protect and agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-
defend it. Nevertheless, cognizant of such possibility of abuse, the framers of thirds of all the Members of the Senate.”
the 1987 Constitution endeavored to institute a system of checks and balances
to limit the President's exercise of the martial law and suspension powers, and Same; Same; Same; The participation of the legislative branch in the treaty-
to establish safeguards to protect civil liberties. making process was deemed essential to provide a check on the executive in
the field of foreign relations. —The participation of the legislative branch in the
Human rights violations and abuses in the implementation of martial law and treaty-making process was deemed essential to provide a check on the
suspension powers cannot by any measure be condoned. However, as the executive in the field of foreign relations. By requiring the concurrence of the
Court settled in Lagman, alleged human rights violations committed during the legislature in the treaties entered into by the President, the Constitution
implementation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of ensures a healthy system of checks and balance necessary in the nation’s
habeas corpus should be resolved in a separate proceeding. pursuit of political maturity and growth.

This Court has likewise promulgated rules aimed at enforcing human rights. In Same; Same; Same; The signing of the treaty and the ratification are two
A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, this Court made available the remedy of a writ of separate and distinct steps in the treaty-making process—the signature is
146
primarily intended as a means of authenticating the instrument and as a to the interest of the state and its people. Thus, the President has the discretion
symbol of the good faith of the parties, usually performed by the state’s even after the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative whether or
authorized representative, while ratification is the formal act by which a state not to ratify the same. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does not
confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its representative, contemplate to defeat or even restrain this power of the head of states. If that
and is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the were so, the requirement of ratification of treaties would be pointless and futile.
state or of the government.—Petitioners’ arguments equate the signing of the It has been held that a state has no legal or even moral duty to ratify a treaty
treaty by the Philippine representative with ratification. It should be which has been signed by its plenipotentiaries. There is no legal obligation to
underscored that the signing of the treaty and the ratification are two separate ratify a treaty, but it goes without saying that the refusal must be based on
and distinct steps in the treaty-making process. As earlier discussed, the substantial grounds and not on superficial or whimsical reasons. Otherwise,
signature is primarily intended as a means of authenticating the instrument the other state would be justified in taking offense.
and as a symbol of the good faith of the parties. It is usually performed by the
state’s authorized representative in the diplomatic mission. Ratification, on the Same; Same; Same; It is within the authority of the President to refuse to
other hand, is the formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification,
provisions of a treaty concluded by its representative. It is generally held to be refuse to ratify it. —It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the
an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the government. power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of the
Thus, Executive Order No. 459 issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding
November25, 1997 provides the guidelines in the negotiation of international its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority
agreements and its ratification. It mandates that after the treaty has been of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured
signed by the Philippine representative, the same shall be transmitted to the its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state
Department of Foreign Affairs. The Department of Foreign Affairs shall then to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that
prepare the ratification papers and forward the signed copy of the treaty to the should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the competence of the
President for ratification. After the President has ratified the treaty, the President alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of
Department of Foreign Affairs shall submit the same to the Senate for mandamus. This Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the
concurrence. Upon receipt of the concurrence of the Senate, the Department President in the performance of his official duties. The Court, therefore, cannot
of Foreign Affairs shall comply with the provisions of the treaty to render it issue the writ of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is beyond its
effective. jurisdiction to compel the executive branch of the government to transmit the
signed text of Rome Statute to the Senate.
Same; Same; Same; Petitioners’ submission that the Philippines is bound
under treaty law and international law to ratify the treaty which it has signed is FACTS:
without basis—it is the ratification that binds the state to the provisions thereof;
There is no legal obligation to ratify a treaty, but it goes without saying that the This is a petition of Senator Aquilino Pimentel and the other parties to ask the
refusal must be based on substantial grounds and not on superficial or Supreme Court to require the Executive Department to transmit the Rome
whimsical reasons; The President has the discretion even after the signing of Statute which established the International Criminal Court for the Senate’s
the treaty by the Philippine representative whether or not to ratify the same.— concurrence in accordance with Sec 21, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioners’ submission that the Philippines is bound under treaty law and
international law to ratify the treaty which it has signed is without basis. The It is the theory of the petitioners that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic
signature does not signify the final consent of the state to the treaty. It is the law and international law, is a function of the Senate. Hence, it is the duty of
ratification that binds the state to the provisions thereof. In fact, the Rome the executive department to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute to
Statute itself requires that the signature of the representatives of the states be the Senate to allow it to exercise its discretion with respect to ratification of
subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory states. treaties. Moreover, petitioners submit that the Philippines has a ministerial duty
Ratification is the act by which the provisions of a treaty are formally confirmed to ratify the Rome Statute under treaty law and customary international law.
and approved by a State. By ratifying a treaty signed in its behalf, a state Petitioners invoke the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties enjoining the
expresses its willingness to be bound by the provisions of such treaty. After states to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a
the treaty is signed by the state’s representative, the President, being treaty when they have signed the treaty prior to ratification unless they have
accountable to the people, is burdened with the responsibility and the duty to made their intention clear not to become parties to the treaty.
carefully study the contents of the treaty and ensure that they are not inimical
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 counter-proposals, becomes the basis of the subsequent negotiations. The
The Office of the Solicitor General, commenting for the respondents, negotiations may be brief or protracted, depending on the issues involved, and
questioned the standing of the petitioners to file the instant suit. It also may even “collapse” in case the parties are unable to come to an agreement
contended that the petition at bar violates the rule on hierarchy of courts. On on the points under consideration.
the substantive issue raised by petitioners, respondents argue that the
executive department has no duty to transmit the Rome Statute to the Senate If and when the negotiators finally decide on the terms of the treaty, the same
for concurrence. is opened for signature. This step is primarily intended as a means of
authenticating the instrument and for the purpose of symbolizing the good faith
ISSUE: of the parties; but, significantly, it does not indicate the final consent of the
state in cases where ratification of the treaty is required. The document is
Whether or not the executive department has a ministerial duty to transmit the ordinarily signed in accordance with the alternate, that is, each of the several
Rome Statute (or any treaty) to the Senate for concurrence. negotiators is allowed to sign first on the copy which he will bring home to his
own state.
RULING:
Ratification, which is the next step, is the formal act by which a state confirms
The petition was dismissed. The Supreme Court ruled that the President, being and accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its representatives. The
the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external purpose of ratification is to enable the contracting states to examine the treaty
relations and is the country’s sole representative with foreign nations. As the more closely and to give them an opportunity to refuse to be bound by it should
chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country’s mouthpiece they find it inimical to their interests. It is for this reason that most treaties are
with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the made subject to the scrutiny and consent of a department of the government
authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold other than that which negotiated them.
recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise
transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the The last step in the treaty-making process is the exchange of the instruments
President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states. of ratification, which usually also signifies the effectivity of the treaty unless a
different date has been agreed upon by the parties. Where ratification is
Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter dispensed with and no effectivity clause is embodied in the treaty, the
into treaties, the Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the instrument is deemed effective upon its signature.
concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty
entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides Petitioners’ arguments equate the signing of the treaty by the Philippine
that “no treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless representative with ratification. It should be underscored that the signing of the
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.” treaty and the ratification are two separate and distinct steps in the treaty-
making process. As earlier discussed, the signature is primarily intended as a
Justice Isagani Cruz, in his book on International Law, describes the treaty- means of authenticating the instrument and as a symbol of the good faith of
making process in this wise: the parties. It is usually performed by the state’s authorized representative in
the diplomatic mission. Ratification, on the other hand, is the formal act by
The usual steps in the treaty-making process are: negotiation, signature, which a state confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its
ratification, and exchange of the instruments of ratification. The treaty may representative.
then be submitted for registration and publication under the U.N. Charter,
although this step is not essential to the validity of the agreement as between It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is
the parties. vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of
the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or
Negotiation may be undertaken directly by the head of state but he now usually concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President
assigns this task to his authorized representatives. These representatives are to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its
provided with credentials known as full powers, which they exhibit to the other ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty
negotiators at the start of the formal discussions. It is standard practice for one which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that should not be taken
of the parties to submit a draft of the proposed treaty which, together with the lightly, such decision is within the competence of the President alone, which
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cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus. This Court has from respondents the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership
no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted
of his official duties. during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes
thereto. The Congress, through the House Committee called for an inquiry into
138. AKBAYAN vs. THOMAS G. AQUINO the JPEPA, but at the same time, the Executive refused to give them the said
G.R. No. 170516. July 16, 2008, CARPIO-MORALES, J. copies until the negotiation was completed.
JPEPA was the bilateral free trade agreement entered between the Philippine
DOCTRINE: government with Japan, concerned with trade in goods, rules of origin,
customs procedures, paperless trading, trade in services, investment,
Separation of Powers; Presidency; Congress; Tariff Powers; Diplomatic intellectual property rights, government procurement, movement of natural
Power; While the power then to fix tariff rates and other taxes clearly belongs persons, cooperation, competition policy, mutual recognition, dispute
to Congress, and is exercised by the President only by delegation of that body, avoidance and settlement, improvement of the business environment, and
it has long been recognized that the power to enter into treaties is vested general and final provisions.
directly and exclusively in the President, subject only to the concurrence of at
least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty; ISSUES:
Congress, while possessing vast legislative powers, may not interfere in the 1. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing to request for the full
field of treaty negotiations.—While the power then to fix tariff rates and other text of JPEPA.
taxes clearly belongs to Congress, and is exercised by the President only by 2. Whether or not the President can validly exclude Congress, exercising
delegation of that body, it has long been recognized that the power to enter its power of inquiry and power to concur in treaties, from the
into treaties is vested directly and exclusively in the President, subject only to negotiation process.
the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate for the
validity of the treaty. In this light, the authority of the President to enter into RULING:
trade agreements with foreign nations provided under P.D. 1464 may be 1. In a petition anchored upon the right of the people to information on
interpreted as an acknowledgment of a power already inherent in its office. It matters of public concern, which is a public right by its very nature,
may not be used as basis to hold the President or its representatives petitioners need not show that they have any legal or special interest
accountable to Congress for the conduct of treaty negotiations. This is not to in the result, it being sufficient to show that they are citizens and,
say, of course, that the President’s power to enter into treaties is unlimited but therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right. As the
for the requirement of Senate concurrence, since the President must still present petition is anchored on the right to information and petitioners
ensure that all treaties will substantively conform to all the relevant provisions are all suing in their capacity as citizens and groups of citizens
of the Constitution. It follows from the above discussion that Congress, while including petitioners-members of the House of Representatives who
possessing vast legislative powers, may not interfere in the field of treaty additionally are suing in their capacity as such, the standing of
negotiations. While Article VII, Section 21 provides for Senate concurrence, petitioners to file the present suit is grounded in jurisprudence.
such pertains only to the validity of the treaty under consideration, not to the From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it
conduct of negotiations attendant to its conclusion. Moreover, it is not even is evident that the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the
Congress as a whole that has been given the authority to concur as a means negotiations towards its execution are matters of public concern. This,
of checking the treaty-making power of the President, but only the Senate. respondents do not dispute. They only claim that diplomatic
Thus, as in the case of petitioners suing in their capacity as private citizens, negotiations are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege, thus
petitioners-members of the House of Representatives fail to present a constituting an exception to the right to information and the policy of
“sufficient showing of need” that the information sought is critical to the full public disclosure.
performance of the functions of Congress, functions that do not include treaty-
negotiation. “Showing of Need” Test

FACTS: In executive privilege controversies, the requirement that parties

present a “sufficient showing of need” only means, in substance, that
Petitioners, non-government organizations, Congresspersons, citizens and they should show a public interest in favor of disclosure sufficient in
taxpayers requested, via the petition for mandamus and prohibition, to obtain degree to overcome the claim of privilege. Verily, the Court in such
149
 cases engages in a balancing of interests. Such a balancing of It follows from the above discussion that Congress, while possessing
interests is certainly not new in constitutional adjudication involving vast legislative powers, may not interfere in the field of treaty
fundamental rights. negotiations. While Article VII, Section 21 provides for Senate
concurrence, such pertains only to the validity of the treaty under
However, when the Executive has – as in this case – invoked the consideration, not to the conduct of negotiations attendant to its
privilege, and it has been established that the subject information is conclusion. Moreover, it is not even Congress as a while that has been
indeed covered by the privilege being claimed, can a party overcome given the authority to concur as a means of checking the treaty-making
the same by merely asserting that the information being demanded is power of the President, but only the Senate.
a matter of public concern, without any further showing required?
Certainly not, for that would render the doctrine of executive privilege Thus, as in the case of petitioners suing in their capacity as private
of no force and effect whatsoever as a limitation on the right to citizens, petitioners-members of the House of Representatives fail to
information, because then the sole test in such controversies would present a “sufficient showing of need” that the information sought is
be whether an information is a matter of public concern. critical to the performance of the functions of Congress, functions that
do not include treaty-negotiation.
2. Petitioners argue that the President cannot exclude Congress from the
JPEPA negotiations since whatever power and authority the President V. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
has to negotiate international trade agreements is derived only by
delegation of Congress, pursuant to Article VI, Section 28(2) of the
Constitution and Sections 401 and 402 of Presidential Decree No. JURISDICTION
1464.
139. ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, petitioner vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR
The subject of Article VI Section 28(2) of the Constitution is not the COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL – ARROYO,
power to negotiate treaties and international agreements, but the respondent.
power to fix tariff rates, import and export quotas, and other taxes. G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010, BERSAMIN, J.

As to the power to negotiate treaties, the constitutional basis thereof DOCTRINE:

is Section 21 of Article VII – the article on the Executive Department.
Presidency; Appointments; Midnight Appointment Ban; The prohibition against
While the power then to fix tariff rates and other taxes clearly belongs presidential appointments under Section 15, Article VII does not extend to
to Congress, and is exercised by the President only be delegation of appointments in the Judiciary.—In the consolidated petitions, the petitioners,
that body, it has long been recognized that the power to enter into with the exception of Soriano, Tolentino and Inting, submit that the incumbent
treaties is vested directly and exclusively in the President, subject only President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement
to the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the Members of the on May 17, 2010, on the ground that the prohibition against presidential
Senate for the validity of the treaty. In this light, the authority of the appointments under Section 15, Article VII does not extend to appointments in
President to enter into trade agreements with foreign nations provided the Judiciary. The Court agrees with the submission.
under P.D. 1464 may be interpreted as an acknowledgment of a power
already inherent in its office. It may not be used as basis to hold the FACTS:
President or its representatives accountable to Congress for the
conduct of treaty negotiations. The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010
occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
This is not to say, of course, that the President’s power to enter into
treaties is unlimited but for the requirement of Senate concurrence, These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the
since the President must still ensure that all treaties will substantively forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or
conform to all the relevant provisions of the Constitution. seven days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to
Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the
occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three nominees prepared by the
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Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.” Also considering that Section 15, Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice
Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President Puno upon his retirement.
or Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except RULING:
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill
a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to
start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice. Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.

Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15.
the position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the
the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments,
Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued
Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination through letters dated
January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively. The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4.
(1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three,
Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from
Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues the occurrence thereof.
that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its
occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15,
the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could
they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering
why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not written of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition
in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers also incorporated in made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the President’s power to appoint appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely
members of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from “political in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals
vicissitudes” and its “insulation from political pressures,” such as stringent that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making
qualifications for the positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up
period within which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice. to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the
Members of the Supreme Court.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly
initiated the process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositors- Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15,
intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could
is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering
resume its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision of of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition
Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely
Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals
vacancy. that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making
appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up
ISSUE: to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the
Members of the Supreme Court.

151
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, be taken to mean the entire legislative department. A fortiori, a pretext of
in that they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section oversight cannot prevail over the more pragmatic scheme which the
14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department Constitution laid with firmness, that is, that the JBC has a seat for a single
renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive representative of Congress, as one of the co-equal branches of government.
Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the
statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part FACTS:
must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the
general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers The case is in relation to the process of selecting the nominees for the vacant
deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they seat of Supreme Court Chief Justice following Renato Corona’s unexpected
intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was departure.
their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only
to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article Prompted by the clamor to rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary
VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof. from political pressure and partisan activities, the members of the
Constitutional Commission saw the need to create a separate, competent and
APPOINTMENT independent body to recommend nominees to the President. Thus, it
conceived of a body representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial
140. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, -versus- JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, appointment process and called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).
SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO AND REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR.,
G.R. No. 202242, EN BANC, July 17, 2012, MENDOZA, J. In particular, Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution states that “(1) A Judicial
and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court
DOCTRINE: composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice,
and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative
It is worthy to note that the seven-member composition of the JBC serves a of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme
practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in Court, and a representative of the private sector. xxx” In compliance therewith,
voting. This underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single vote Congress, from the moment of the creation of the JBC, designated one
may not be divided into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress, representative from the Congress to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex officio
or among any of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter. This members.
unsanctioned practice can possibly cause disorder and eventually muddle the
JBC’s voting process, especially in the event a tie is reached. In 1994, however, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered.
Instead of having only seven (7) members, an eighth (8th) member was added
The aforesaid purpose would then be rendered illusory, defeating the precise to the JBC as two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC
mechanism which the Constitution itself created. While it would be – one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each
unreasonable to expect that the Framers provide for every possible scenario, having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, curiously, the JBC En Banc, in separate
it is sensible to presume that they knew that an odd composition is the best meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the
means to break a voting deadlock. Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. During the
existence of the case, Sen. Escudero and Cong. Tupas, Jr. (respondents)
It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its simultaneously sat in JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is this
primary function in government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition.
Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the process.
The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative powers. An inter-play ISSUE:
between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers
causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This, Whether JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and the House of
however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison Representatives making 8 instead of 7 sitting members unconstitutional. (YES)
between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. No mechanism is
required between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the RULING:
screening and nomination of judicial officers. Hence, the term “Congress” must
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From a simple reading of the Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, it that they knew that an odd composition is the best means to break a voting
can readily be discerned that the provision is clear and unambiguous. The first deadlock.
paragraph calls for the creation of a JBC and places the same under the
supervision of the Court. Then it goes to its composition where the regular It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its
members are enumerated: a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor primary function in government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the
of law, a retired member of the Court and a representative from the private Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the process.
sector. On the second part lies the crux of the present controversy. It The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative powers. An interplay
enumerates the ex officio or special members of the JBC composed of the between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers
Chief Justice, who shall be its Chairman, the Secretary of Justice and “a causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This,
representative of Congress.” however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison
between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. No mechanism is
The use of the singular letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is required between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the
unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of screening and nomination of judicial officers. Hence, the term “Congress” must
what the members of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, be taken to mean the entire legislative department. A fortiori, a pretext of
Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been oversight cannot prevail over the more pragmatic scheme which the
the intention that more than one (1) representative from the legislature would Constitution laid with firmness, that is, that the JBC has a seat for a single
sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided. representative of Congress, as one of the co-equal branches of government.

It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of
employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid. In the interest of fair
where technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the play under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration
Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in common use. of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified.
Verba legis non est recedendum – from the words of a statute there should be
no departure. 141. ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, petitioner, vs. PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, respondent.
Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or G.R. No. 191618. November 23, 2010
phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its
correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the DOCTRINE:
company of words in which it is founded or with which it is associated.
Constitutional Law; Courts; Supreme Court; The conferment of additional
Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, with the duty characterized as an “awesome”
“Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its task, includes the means necessary to carry it into effect under the doctrine of
generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the necessary implication.—The conferment of additional jurisdiction to the
Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either Supreme Court, with the duty characterized as an “awesome” task, includes
case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC. the means necessary to carry it into effect under the doctrine of necessary
implication. We cannot overemphasize that the abstraction of the PET from
It is worthy to note that the seven-member composition of the JBC serves a the explicit grant of power to the Supreme Court, given our abundant
practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in experience, is not unwarranted. A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4,
voting. This underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single vote paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of authority to the Supreme Court sitting
may not be divided into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress, en banc. In the same vein, although the method by which the Supreme Court
or among any of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter. This exercises this authority is not specified in the provision, the grant of power
unsanctioned practice can possibly cause disorder and eventually muddle the does not contain any limitation on the Supreme Court’s exercise thereof. The
JBC’s voting process, especially in the event a tie is reached. The aforesaid Supreme Court’s method of deciding presidential and vice-presidential
purpose would then be rendered illusory, defeating the precise mechanism election contests, through the PET, is actually a derivative of the exercise of
which the Constitution itself created. While it would be unreasonable to expect the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Thus,
that the Framers provide for every possible scenario, it is sensible to presume
153
the subsequent directive in the provision for the Supreme Court to “promulgate The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) commented that the petition was
its rules for the purpose.” unspecified and without statutory basis and that the liberal approach in its
preparation is a violation of the well-known rules of practice and pleading in
Same; Same; The Presidential Electoral Tribunal is not a separate and distinct this jurisdiction.
entity from the Supreme Court, albeit it has functions peculiar only to the
Tribunal. — By the same token, the PET is not a separate and distinct entity ISSUE:
from the Supreme Court, albeit it has functions peculiar only to the Tribunal. It 1. Whether or not Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution does not
is obvious that the PET was constituted in implementation of Section 4, Article provide for the creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
VII of the Constitution, and it faithfully complies—not unlawfully defies—the 2. Whether or not the PET violates Section 12, Article VIII of the
constitutional directive. The adoption of a separate seal, as well as the change Constitution.
in the nomenclature of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices into
Chairman and Members of the Tribunal, respectively, was designed simply to RULING:
highlight the singularity and exclusivity of the Tribunal’s functions as a special
electoral court. The conferment of additional jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, with the duty
characterized as an "awesome" task, includes the means necessary to carry
Same; Same; The Presidential Electoral Tribunal, as intended by the framers it into effect under the doctrine of necessary implication. We cannot
of the Constitution, is to be an institution independent, but not separate, from overemphasize that the abstraction of the PET from the explicit grant of power
the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court. — We have previously to the Supreme Court, given our abundant experience, is not unwarranted. A
declared that the PET is not simply an agency to which Members of the Court plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of
were designated. Once again, the PET, as intended by the framers of the authority to the Supreme Court sitting en banc. In the same vein, although the
Constitution, is to be an institution independent, but not separate, from the method by which the Supreme Court exercises this authority is not specified
judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court. McCullochv. State of Maryland in the provision, the grant of power does not contain any limitation on the
proclaimed that “[a] power without the means to use it, is a nullity.” The vehicle Supreme Court’s exercise thereof. The Supreme Court’s method of deciding
for the exercise of this power, as intended by the Constitution and specifically presidential and vice-presidential election contests, through the PET, is
mentioned by the Constitutional Commissioners during the discussions on the actually a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the
grant of power to this Court, is the PET. Thus, a microscopic view, like the constitutional provision.
petitioner’s, should not constrict an absolute and constitutional grant of judicial
power. The conferment of full authority to the Supreme Court, as a PET, is equivalent
to the full authority conferred upon the electoral tribunals of the Senate and
FACTS: the House of Representatives, i.e., the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
Atty. Macalintal filed a petition that question the constitutionality of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an illegal and unauthorized progeny Petitioner still claims that the PET exercises quasi-judicial power and, thus, its
of Sec. 4, Article VII of the Constitution. members violate the proscription in Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution,
which reads:
The petitioner highlighted the Supreme Court’s decision in the case of Buac
vs. COMELEC which declared that contests involving the President and the SEC. 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established
Vice-President fell within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the PET, in the by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or
exercise of quasi-judicial power. On this point, petitioner reiterated that the administrative functions.
constitution of PET, with the designation of the Members of the Court as
Chairman and Members thereof, contravenes Section 12, Article VIII of the The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, which prohibits the designation of Members of the Supreme Constitution which provides that the power “shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and of other Courts established by law to any agency performing quasi- Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.” Consistent with
judicial or administrative functions. our presidential system of government, the function of “dealing with the
settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties or
prerogatives that are legally demandable and enforceable” is apportioned to
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courts of justice. With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power was G.R. No. 103524. April 15, 1992
expanded to include “the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, DOCTRINE:
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or Constitutional Law; Separation of powers; Under the principle of separation of
instrumentality of the Government.” The power was expanded, but it remained powers, neither Congress, the President, nor the Judiciary may encroach on
absolute. fields allocated to the other branches of government. —It cannot be
overstressed that in a constitutional government such as ours, the rule of law
The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterize the must prevail. The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other
resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power. laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest official of
this land, must defer. From this cardinal postulate, it follows that the three
At the barangay and municipal levels, original and exclusive jurisdiction over branches of government must discharge their respective functions within the
election contests is vested in the municipal or metropolitan trial courts and the limits of authority conferred by the Constitution. Under the principle of
regional trial courts, respectively. separation of powers, neither Congress, the President, nor the Judiciary may
encroach on fields allocated to the other branches of government. The
At the higher levels — city, provincial, and regional, as well as congressional legislature is generally limited to the enactment of laws, the executive to the
and senatorial — exclusive and original jurisdiction is lodged in the COMELEC enforcement of laws and the judiciary to their interpretation and application to
and in the House of Representatives and Senate Electoral Tribunals, which cases and controversies.
are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law. Although not courts of law,
they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests which involve, Same; Same; Veto; The act of the Executive in vetoing the particular
in essence, an exercise of judicial power, because of the explicit constitutional provisions is an exercise of a constitutionally vested power; The veto power is
empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and not absolute. —The act of the Executive in vetoing the particular provisions is
Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals) of the an exercise of a constitutionally vested power. But even as the Constitution
Constitution. Besides, when the COMELEC, the HRET, and the SET decide grants the power, it also provides limitations to its exercise. The veto power is
election contests, their decisions are still subject to judicial review — via a not absolute.
petition for certiorari filed by the proper party — if there is a showing that the
decision was rendered with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or Same; Same; Same; The power to disapprove any item or items in an
excess of jurisdiction. appropriate bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to
approve the remaining portion of the same item. —The Constitution provides
It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a that only a particular item or items may be vetoed. The power to disapprove
presidential or vice-presidential election disputes, it performs what is any item or items in an appropriate bill does not grant the authority to veto a
essentially a judicial power. part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the same item.
The present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in conjunction
with latter’s exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the task of deciding FACTS:
presidential and vice-presidential election contests, with full authority in the
exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary The petitioners are retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals
judicial power allocated to courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution. who are currently receiving monthly pensions under R.A. No. 910 as amended
by R.A. No. 1797. Section 3-A, which authorizes said pensions, of R.A. No.
The PET is not simply an agency to which Members of the Court were 1797 was repealed by President Marcos. The legislature saw the need to re-
designated. As intended by the framers of the Constitution, the PET is to be enact said R.A.s to restore said retirement pensions and privilege. President
an independent institution, but not separate, from the judicial department, i.e., Aquino, however, vetoed House Bill No. 16297 as well as portions of Section
the Supreme Court. 1 and the entire Section 4 of the Special Provisions for the Supreme Court of
the Philippines and the Lower Courts (GAA of FY 1992).
FISCAL AUTONOMY
ISSUES:
142. CESAR BENGZON vs. HON.FRANKLIN N.
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 1. Whether the President may veto certain provisions of the the who, what, where, when and how of the privileges and benefits they extend
General Appropriations Act; and to justices, judges, court officials and court personnel within the parameters of
2. Whether the questioned veto impairs the Fiscal Autonomy the Court’s granted power; they determine the terms, conditions and
guaranteed to the Judiciary restrictions of the grant as grantor.

RULING: In the context of the grant now in issue, the use of the formula provided in
CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 is a part of the Court’s exercise of its
1. The act of the Executive in vetoing the particular provisions is an discretionary authority to determine the manner the granted retirement
exercise of a constitutionally vested power. But even as the Constitution privileges and benefits can be availed of. Any kind of interference on how these
grants the power, it also provides limitations to its exercise. The retirement privileges and benefits are exercised and availed of, not only
Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all. He or she is, violates the fiscal autonomy and independence of the Judiciary, but also
therefore, compelled to approve into law the entire bill, including its encroaches upon the constitutional duty and privilege of the Chief Justice and
undesirable parts. It is for this reason that the Constitution has wisely the Supreme Court En Banc to manage the Judiciary’s own affair.
provided the “item veto power” to avoid inexpedient riders from being
attached to an indispensable appropriation or revenue measure. What FACTS:
was done by the President was the vetoing of a provision and not an
item. The Legal Services Sector, Office of the General Counsel of the Commission
on Audit (COA) found an underpayment amounting to P221,021 which
2. Section 3, Article VIII of the Constitution provides for the Fiscal resulted when five (5) retired SC justices purchased from the SC the personal
Autonomy of the Judiciary. The veto of the specific provisions in the properties assigned to them during their incumbency.
GAA is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary how its funds should be
utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. The freedom of The COA attributed this underpayment to the use by the Property Division of
the Chief Justice to make adjustments in the utilization of the funds the SC of the wrong formula in computing the appraisal value of the purchased
appropriated for the expenditures of the judiciary, including the use of vehicles. According to the COA, the Property Division erroneously appraised
any savings from any particular item to cover deficits or shortages in the subject motor vehicles by applying Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group
other items of the judiciary is withheld. Pursuant to the Constitutional (CFAG) Joint Resolution No. 35 dated April 23, 1997 and its guidelines, in
mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in law. It knows its priorities compliance with the Resolution of the Court En Banc dated March 23, 2004 in
just as it is aware of the fiscal restraints. The Chief Justice must be A.M. No. 03-1201, when it should have applied the formula found in COA
given a free hand on how to augment appropriations where Memorandum No. 98-569-A dated August 5, 1998.
augmentation is needed, which is provided for in Section 25(5), Article
VI of the Constitution. In her Memorandum, Atty. Candelaria recommended that the SC advise the
COA to respect the inhouse computation based on the CFAG formula, noting
143. RE: COA OPINION ON THE COMPUTATION OF THE APPRAISED that this was the first time that the COA questioned the authority of the Court
VALUE OF THE PROPERTIES PURCHASED BY THE RETIRED in using CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 and its guidelines in the appraisal and
CHIEF/ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT. disposal of government property since these were issued in 1997. As a matter
A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC, EN BANC, July 31, 2012, PER CURIAM of fact, in two previous instances involving two (2) retired CA Associate
Justices, the COA upheld the inhouse appraisal of government property using
DOCTRINE: the formula found in the CFAG guidelines.

Under this administrative authority, the Court has the power to administer the More importantly, the Constitution itself grants the Judiciary fiscal autonomy in
Judiciary’s internal affairs, and this includes the authority to handle and the handling of its budget and resources. Full autonomy, among others,
manage the retirement applications and entitlements of its personnel as contemplates the guarantee of full flexibility in the allocation and utilization of
provided by law and by its own grants. the Judiciary’s resources, based on its own determination of what it needs.
The Court thus has the recognized authority to allocate and disburse such
Thus, under the guarantees of the Judiciary’s fiscal autonomy and its sums as may be provided or required by law in the course of the discharge of
independence, the Chief Justice and the Court En Banc determine and decide its functions. To allow the COA to substitute the Court’s policy in the disposal
156
of its property would be tantamount to an encroachment into this judicial One of the most important aspects of judicial independence is the
prerogative. constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy. Just as the Executive may not prevent
a judge from discharging his or her judicial duty (for example, by physically
ISSUE: preventing a court from holding its hearings) and just as the Legislature may
not enact laws removing all jurisdiction from courts, the courts may not be
Whether the COA should respect the in-house computation based on the obstructed from their freedom to use or dispose of their funds for purposes
CFAG formula. (YES) germane to judicial functions. While, as a general proposition, the authority of
legislatures to control the purse in the first instance is unquestioned, any form
RULING: of interference by the Legislative or the Executive on the Judiciary’s fiscal
autonomy amounts to an improper check on a co-equal branch of government.
The COA’s authority to conduct post-audit examinations on constitutional If the judicial branch is to perform its primary function of adjudication, it must
bodies granted fiscal autonomy is provided under Section 2(1), Article IX-D of be able to command adequate resources for that purpose. This authority to
the 1987 Constitution. This authority, however, must be read not only in light exercise (or to compel the exercise of) legislative power over the national
of the Court’s fiscal autonomy, but also in relation with the constitutional purse (which at first blush appears to be a violation of concepts of
provisions on judicial independence and the existing jurisprudence and Court separateness and an invasion of legislative autonomy) is necessary to
rulings on these matters. maintain judicial independence and is expressly provided for by the
Constitution through the grant of fiscal autonomy under Section 3, Article VIII.
Recognizing the vital role that the Judiciary plays in our system of government
as the sole repository of judicial power, with the power to determine whether In Bengzon v. Drilon, we had the opportunity to define the scope and extent of
any act of any branch or instrumentality of the government is attended with fiscal autonomy in the following manner:
grave abuse of discretion, no less than the Constitution provides a number of
safeguards to ensure that judicial independence is protected and maintained. As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the
Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the
The Constitution expressly prohibits Congress from depriving the SC of its Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a
jurisdiction, as enumerated in Section 5, Article VII of the Constitution, or from guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the
passing a law that undermines the security of tenure of the members of the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power and
judiciary. The Constitution also mandates that the judiciary shall enjoy fiscal authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not
autonomy, and grants the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation and pay plans
courts and judicial personnel. Jurisprudence has characterized administrative of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided
supervision as exclusive, noting that only the Supreme Court can oversee the by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their functions.
judges and court personnel's compliance with all laws, rules and regulations.
No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. If the Supreme
afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. Court says it needs 100 typewriters but DBM rules we need only 10 typewriters
and sends its recommendations to Congress without even informing us, the
The Constitution protects as well the salaries of the Justices and judges by autonomy given by the Constitution becomes an empty and illusory platitude.
prohibiting any decrease in their salary during their continuance in office, and
ensures their security of tenure by providing that “Members of the Supreme The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must
Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until have the independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their
they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the
duties of their office.” With these guarantees, justices and judges can manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the
administer justice undeterred by any fear of reprisals brought on by their funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy
judicial action. They can act inspired solely by their knowledge of the law and and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but
by the dictates of their conscience, free from the corrupting influence of base especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and
or unworthy motives. separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional
system is based. In the interest of comity and cooperation, the Supreme
Court, Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman have so far limited
157
their objections to constant reminders. We now agree with the petitioners that
this grant of autonomy should cease to be a meaningless provision. Judicial Review; By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval
of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial
The Judiciary’s fiscal autonomy is realized through the actions of the Chief controversy even without any other overt act—indeed, even a singular
Justice, as its head, and of the Supreme Court En Banc, in the exercise of violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.—
administrative control and supervision of the courts and its personnel. As the This is a rather novel theory—that people should await the implementing evil
Court En Banc’s Resolution (dated March 23, 2004) in A.M. No. 03-12 01 to befall on them before they can question acts that are illegal or
reflects, the fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary serves as the basis in allowing unconstitutional. Be it remembered that the real issue here is whether the
the sale of the Judiciary’s properties to retiring Justices of the Supreme Court Constitution and the law are contravened by Section 4 of AO372, not whether
and the appellate courts. they are violated by the acts implementing it. In the unanimous en banc case
Tañada v. Angara, this Court held that when an act of the legislative
By way of a long standing tradition, partly based on the intention to reward department is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, settling the
long and faithful service, the sale to the retired Justices of specifically controversy becomes the duty of this Court. By the mere enactment of the
designated properties that they used during their incumbency has been questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to
recognized both as a privilege and a benefit. This has become an established have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act.
practice within the Judiciary that even the COA has previously recognized. The Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough
En Banc Resolution also deems the grant of the privilege as a form of to awaken judicial duty.
additional retirement benefit that the Court can grant its officials and
employees in the exercise of its power of administrative supervision. Under Same; When an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a co-
this administrative authority, the Court has the power to administer the equal of Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and
Judiciary’s internal affairs, and this includes the authority to handle and the laws, settling the dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility of the
manage the retirement applications and entitlements of its personnel as courts.—By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our
provided by law and by its own grants. constitutional scheme is a coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution and the laws, as in the present case, settling the
Thus, under the guarantees of the Judiciary’s fiscal autonomy and its dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts.
independence, the Chief Justice and the Court En Banc determine and decide
the who, what, where, when and how of the privileges and benefits they extend FACTS:
to justices, judges, court officials and court personnel within the parameters of
the Court’s granted power; they determine the terms, conditions and In 1997, President Ramos issued AO 372 which: (1) required all government
restrictions of the grant as grantor. departments and agencies, including SUCs, GOCCs and LGUs to identify and
implement measures in FY 1998 that will reduce total expenditures for the year
In the context of the grant now in issue, the use of the formula provided in by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services
CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 is a part of the Court’s exercise of its items (Section 1) and (2) ordered the withholding of 10% of the IRA to
discretionary authority to determine the manner the granted retirement LGUs (Section 4) . On 10 December 1998, President Estrada issued AO 43,
privileges and benefits can be availed of. Any kind of interference on how these reducing to 5% the amount of IRA to be withheld from LGU.
retirement privileges and benefits are exercised and availed of, not only
violates the fiscal autonomy and independence of the Judiciary, but also ISSUES:
encroaches upon the constitutional duty and privilege of the Chief Justice and
the Supreme Court En Banc to manage the Judiciary’s own affair. 1. Whether or not the president committed grave abuse of discretion in
ordering all LGUS to adopt a 25% cost reduction program in violation of
POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW the LGU'S fiscal autonomy

144. AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR, vs. Hon. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE 2. Whether Section 4 of the same issuance, which withholds 10 percent of
G.R. No. 132988. July 19, 2000, PANGANIBAN, J. their internal revenue allotments, are valid exercises of the President's
power of general supervision over local governments.
DOCTRINE:
158
 3. Whether the petition is premature. AO 372, however, is merely directory and has been issued by the
President consistent with his power of supervision over local governments. It
RULING: is intended only to advise all government agencies and instrumentalities to
undertake cost-reduction measures that will help maintain economic stability
1. Section 1 of AO 372 does not violate local fiscal autonomy. Local fiscal in the country, which is facing economic difficulties. Besides, it does not
autonomy does not rule out any manner of national government intervention contain any sanction in case of noncompliance. Being merely an advisory,
by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and therefore, Section 1 of AO 372 is well within the powers of the President. Since
otherwise, are consistent with national goals. Significantly, the President, by it is not a mandatory imposition, the directive cannot be characterized as an
constitutional fiat, is the head of the economic and planning agency of the exercise of the power of control.
government, primarily responsible for formulating and implementing
continuing, coordinated and integrated social and economic policies, plans 2. Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal
and programs for the entire country. However, under the Constitution, the autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national
formulation and the implementation of such policies and programs are subject internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than the Constitution. The Local
to "consultations with the appropriate public agencies, various private sectors, Government Code specifies further that the release shall be made directly to
and local government units." The President cannot do so unilaterally. the LGU concerned within five (5) days after every quarter of the year and
"shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the
Consequently, the Local Government Code provides: national government for whatever purpose." As a rule, the term "shall" is a
"x x x [I]n the event the national government incurs an unmanaged public word of command that must be given a compulsory meaning. The provision is,
sector deficit, the President of the Philippines is hereby authorized, upon the therefore, imperative.
recommendation of [the] Secretary of Finance, Secretary of the Interior and
Local Government and Secretary of Budget and Management, and subject to 3. Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan dissents from our Decision on the grounds
consultation with the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and the that, allegedly, the Petition is premature, among others.
presidents of the liga, to make the necessary adjustments in the internal
revenue allotment of local government units but in no case shall the allotment According to the Dissent, when “the conduct has not yet occurred and the
be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue challenged construction has not yet been adopted by the agency charged with
taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year x x x." administering the administrative order, the determination of the scope and
constitutionality of the executive action in advance of its immediate adverse
There are therefore several requisites before the President may interfere in effect involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of
local fiscal matters: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national judicial function.”
government; (2) consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the
House of Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; and This is a rather novel theory—that people should await the implementing evil
(3) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of to befall on them before they can question acts that are illegal or
Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget and Management. unconstitutional. Be it remembered that the real issue here is whether the
Furthermore, any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than Constitution and the law are contravened by Section 4 of AO 372, not whether
thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the they are violated by the acts implementing it. In the unanimous en banc case
third fiscal year preceding the current one. Tañada v. Angara, this Court held that when an act of the legislative
department is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, settling the
Petitioner points out that respondents failed to comply with these requisites controversy becomes the duty of this Court. By the mere enactment of the
before the issuance and the implementation of AO 372. At the very least, they questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to
did not even try to show that the national government was suffering from an have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act.
unmanageable public sector deficit. Neither did they claim having conducted Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough
consultations with the different leagues of local governments. Without these to awaken judicial duty. Said the Court:
requisites, the President has no authority to adjust, much less to reduce,
unilaterally the LGU's internal revenue allotment. “In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it
contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable
controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to
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have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the DOCTRINE:
duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. The question thus posed is judicial
rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the Same; Same; Moot and Academic; Court dismissed G.R. No. 170338 for being
supremacy of the Constitution is upheld.’ Once a ‘controversy as to the moot and academic; The exercise by the Court of judicial power is limited to
application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this the determination and resolution of actual cases and controversies. —The
Court x x x , it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional Court, however, dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being moot and academic.
mandate to decide.’ Repeatedly stressed in our prior decisions is the principle that the exercise by
xxxxxxxxx this Court of judicial power is limited to the determination and resolution of
actual cases and controversies. By actual cases, we mean existing conflicts
“As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases, it will not appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, for
shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the otherwise the decision of the Court will amount to an advisory opinion. The
Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it power of judicial inquiry does not extend to hypothetical questions because
in appropriate cases, committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal
department of the government.” questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Neither will the
Court determine a moot question in a case in which no practical relief can be
In the same vein, the Court also held in Tatad v. Secretary of the Department granted. A case becomes moot when its purpose has become stale. It is
of Energy: unnecessary to indulge in academic discussion of a case presenting a moot
question as a judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in
“x x x Judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts to settle actual the nature of things, cannot be enforced.
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
but also the duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of FACTS:
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of government. The courts, as guardians of the Constitution, During the hype of Arroyo administration, a new controversy arises. During
have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the the 2007 election the conversation of President Arroyo and the herein
legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law. Where the petitioner Virgilio Garciliano, COMELEC regional director, regarding the desire
statute violates the Constitution, it is not only the right but the duty of the of the president to have a favourable outcome in terms of her
judiciary to declare such act unconstitutional and void.” senatoriables. Such conversation was recorded and was played during the
house of representative investigation. Because of such turn of events, a
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional petition was filed before the court praying that such playing of the illegally
scheme is a coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the seized communication was in violation of RA 4200 or the anti-wire tapping
Constitution and the laws, as in the present case, settling the dispute becomes law. Also such petition for injunction prays that the Senate committee be
the duty and the responsibility of the courts. prevented from further conducting such investigation for the basic reason that
there was no proper publication of the senate rules, empowering them to make
Besides, the issue that the Petition is premature has not been raised by the such investigation of the unlawfully seized documents.
parties; hence it is deemed waived. Considerations of due process really
prevents its use against a party that has not been given sufficient notice of its ISSUE:
presentation, and thus has not been given the opportunity to refute it.
Whether or not there was proper publication of the rules as to empower the
senate to further proceed with their investigation?
145. VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC INFORMATION, PUBLIC RULING:
ORDER AND SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY,
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and Preliminarily, the Court dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being moot and
SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL REFORMS, respondents. academic. Repeatedly stressed in our prior decisions is the principle that the
G.R. No. 170338. December 23, 2008 exercise by this Court of judicial power is limited to the determination and
resolution of actual cases and controversies. By actual cases, we mean
160
existing conflicts appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not conjectural The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot
or anticipatory, for otherwise the decision of the Court will amount to an justify the Senate’s defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of
advisory opinion. The power of judicial inquiry does not extend to hypothetical Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law instructs, without
questions because any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and does
Neither will the Court determine a moot question in a case in which no practical not make any distinction whether or not these rules have undergone
relief can be granted. A case becomes moot when its purpose has become amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules
stale. It is unnecessary to indulge in academic discussion of a case presenting prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate.
a moot question as a judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect
or, in the nature of things, cannot been forced. The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792,
otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano implores from the Court, as claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A.
aforementioned, the issuance of an injunctive writ to prohibit the respondent 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the
House Committees from playing the tape recordings and from including the functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes. In
same in their committee report. He likewise prays that the said tapes be other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their
stricken off the records of the House proceedings. But the Court notes that the being the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents.
recordings were already played in the House and heard by its members. There It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and
is also the widely publicized fact that the committee reports on the “Hello Garci” regulations.
inquiry were completed and submitted to the House in plenary by the
respondent committees.40 Having been overtaken by these events, the Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could
Garcillano petition has to be dismissed for being moot and academic. After all, not, in violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative
prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of
done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already accomplished. legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the
publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly
On the main issue, the Supreme Court mentioned the following: published rules of procedure."

The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned Indeed the inquiry to be conducted by the senate in aid of legislation cannot
legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation proceed for the reason that the rules that they will observe was not properly
of the constitutional requirement. published as provided by the Fundamental Law of the land. Such inquiry if
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "the allowed without observance of the required publication will put a person’s life,
Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees liberty and property at stake without due process of law. Also, the further
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published assertion of the senate that they already published such rules through their
rules of procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to web page, in observance of the RA 8792 or the Electronic Commerce Act was
satisfy the basic requirements of due process. Publication is indeed only viewed by the court as matter of evidence and still does not conform with
imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a what the constitution propounded.
citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one. What constitutes publication is set In this regard the high court granted the petition for injunction preventing the
forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that "laws shall take effect senate to conduct such inquiry in aid of legislation.
after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in the Official
Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines."
146. ATTY. ELIAS OMAR A. SANA, Petitioner, v. CAREER EXECUTIVE
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated SERVICE BOARD, Respondent.
publication by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 G.R. No. 192926: November 15, 2011, CARPIO, J.
and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for
free, and accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web page. DOCTRINE:

161
Career Executive Service (CES); Executive Order No. 883 and Career the 13 executive officials to CESO rank are void for violating the constitutional
Executive Service Board (CESB) Resolution No. 870 having ceased to have ban on midnight appointment under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution.
any force and effect; the Court finds no reason to reach the merits of the
petition and pass upon these issuances/validity. To do so would transgress In its Comment, the CESB prays for the dismissal of the petition as the issue
the requirement of case and controversy as precondition for the Court’s it raises was rendered moot by EO 3s revocation of EO 883. Alternatively, the
exercise of judicial review. —The petition seeks a review of the constitutionality CESB defends the vesting of CESO rank to the 13 officials based on an
of EO 883 and CESB Resolution No. 870 for being repugnant to Section 15, opinion given by Atty. Ferdinand Rafanan, head of the Commission on
Article VII of the Constitution. At the time this petition was filed, however, Elections (COMELEC) Law Department,12 that "the appointment to a CES[O]
President Aquino had already issued EO 3revoking EO 883 expressly (under rank is not equivalent to an appointment to an office since the latter entails the
Section 1) and CESB Resolution No. 870impliedly (under Section 2). EO 883 conferment of an authority to exercise the functions of an office whereas the
and CESB Resolution No. 870 having ceased to have any force and effect, the former is merely a completion of a previous appointment."
Court finds no reason to reach the merits of the petition and pass upon these
issuances’ validity. To do so would transgress the requirement of case and ISSUE:
controversy as precondition for the Court’s exercise of judicial review.
Whether the issue has become moot already.
FACTS:
RULING:
On 28 May 2010, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Arroyo)
issued EO 883 granting the rank of CESO III or higher to officers and We dismiss the petition on the threshold ground of mootness.
employees "occupying legal positions in the government executive service
who have obtained graduate degrees in law and successfully passed the bar The petition seeks a review of the constitutionality of EO 883 and CESB
examinations" (Section 1). EO 883 invoked the granting of CESO "rank to Resolution No. 870 for being repugnant to Section 15, Article VII of the
government personnel who successfully complete certain graduate programs, Constitution. At the time this petition was filed, however, President Aquino had
such as Masters in Public Safety Administration (MPSA) and Masters in already issued EO 3 revoking EO 883 expressly (under Section 1) and CESB
National Security Administration (MNSA)" as basis for the granting of CESO Resolution No. 870 impliedly (under Section 2). EO 883 and CESB Resolution
rank to government lawyers in the executive service. No. 870 having ceased to have any force and effect, the Court finds no reason
to reach the merits of the petition and pass upon these issuances/validity. To
On 2 June 2010, the CESB issued Resolution No. 870 finding no legal do so would transgress the requirement of case and controversy as
impediment for the President to vest CESO rank to executive officials during precondition for the Courts exercise of judicial review.
the periods covered by the constitutional ban on midnight appointment and
statutory ban on pre-election appointment. True, this Court had relaxed the case and controversy requirement to resolve
moot issues. In those instances, however, the issues presented were
The CESB subsequently endorsed to President Arroyo its recommendation to grounded on peculiar set of facts giving rise to important constitutional
vest CESO rank to 13 officials from various departments and agencies, questions capable of repetition yet evading review or indicating intent on the
including three members of the CESB who signed CESB Resolution No. 870. part of potential or actual parties to place a constitutional question beyond the
On 10 June 2010, President Arroyo appointed the 13 officials to varying CESO ambit of judicial review by performing acts rendering moot an incipient or
ranks. pending justiciable controversy.

On 30 July 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III (President Aquino) issued These factors do not obtain here. The question whether an appointment to a
EO 3 expressly revoking EO 883 (Section 1) and "[a]ll x x x administrative CESO rank of an executive official amounts to an "appointment" for purposes
orders, proclamations, rules and regulations" that conflict with EO 3 (Section of the constitutional ban on midnight appointment, while potentially recurring,
2). holds no certainty of evading judicial review as the question can be decided
even beyond the appointments-ban period under Section 15, Article VII of the
On 4 August 2010, petitioner Atty. Elias Omar A. Sana (petitioner) filed the Constitution.
present petition, contending that EO 883 and the subsequent appointment of

162
 147. EVELIO B. JAVIER, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION which the petitioner had seasonably made. Finally, on July 23, 1984, the
ONELECTIONS, and ARTURO F. PACIFICADOR, respondents. Second Division promulgated the decision now subject of this petition which
Nos. L-68379-81. September 22, 1986, CRUZ, J. inter alia proclaimed Arturo F. Pacificador the elected assemblyman of the
province of Antique. The petitioner then came to this Court, asking to annul
DOCTRINE: the said decision on the basis that it should have been decided by COMELEC
en banc.
Constitutional Law; Words and Phrases; The word “contests” in the
Constitution of 1973 should not be given a restrictive meaning. It should refer The case was still being considered when on February 11, 1986, the petitioner
to any matter involving a claim to an elective office, whether before or after was gunned down in cold blood and in broad daylight. And a year later,
proclamation of a winner. —The word “contests” should not be given a Batasang Pambansa was abolished with the advent of the 1987 Constitution.
restrictive meaning; on the contrary, it should receive the widest possible Respondents moved to dismiss the petition, contending it to be moot and
scope conformably to the rule that the words used in the Constitution should academic.
be interpreted liberally. As employed in the 1973Constitution, the term should
be understood as referring to any matter involving the title or claim of title to ISSUES:
an elective office, made before or after proclamation of the winner, whether or
not the contestant is claiming the office in dispute. Needless to stress, the term 1. Whether it is correct for the court to dismiss the petition due to the
should be given a consistent meaning and understood in the same sense petitioner being dead and the respondent missing.
under both Section 2(2) and Section 3 of Article XII-C of the Constitution. 2. Whether the Second Division of the Commission on Elections was
authorized to promulgate its decision of July 23, 1984, proclaiming the
FACTS: private respondent the winner in the election?

The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the RULING:
Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984 elections. On May 13, 1984, the eve of
the elections, the bitter contest between the two came to a head when several 1. No. The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the
followers of the petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter’s office in dispute between the petitioner and the private respondent-both of
men. Seven suspects, including respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial whom have gone their separate ways-could be a convenient justification for
for these murders. dismissing this case. But there are larger issues involved that must be resolved
now, once and for all, not only to dispel the legal ambiguities here raised. The
It was in this atmosphere that the voting was held, and the post-election more important purpose is to manifest in the clearest possible terms that this
developments were to run true to form. Owing to what he claimed were Court will not disregard and in effect condone wrong on the simplistic and
attempts to railroad the private respondent’s proclamation, the petitioner went tolerant pretext that the case has become moot and academic.
to the Commission on Elections to question the canvass of the election returns. The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also
His complaints were dismissed and the private respondent was proclaimed the conscience of the government. The citizen comes to us in quest of law but
winner by the Second Division of the said body. The petitioner thereupon came we must also give him justice. The two are not always the same. There are
to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void because made only by a times when we cannot grant the latter because the issue has been settled and
division and not by the Commission on Elections en banc as required by the decision is no longer possible according to the law. But there are also times
Constitution. when although the dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless
cries out to be resolved. Justice demands that we act then, not only for the
On May 18, 1984, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but also for the guidance of and
directed the provincial board of canvassers of Antique to proceed with the as a restraint upon the future.
canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate until further
orders. On June 7, 1984, the same Second Division ordered the board to 2. No. The applicable provisions are found in Article XII-C, Sections 2 and 3,
immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the of the 1973 Constitution.
outcome of the case before the Commission. On certiorari before this Court,
the proclamation made by the board of canvassers was set aside as Section 2 confers on the Commission on Elections the power to:
premature, having been made before the lapse of the 5-day period of appeal, (2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
163
qualifications of all member of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial Proclamation 1017 Randolf David got arrested without a warrant. The
and city officials. petitioners then assail Proclamation 1017 stating that it encroaches on the
emergency powers of the Congress and that it also infringes on the right of the
Section 3 provides: people to freedom of expression. The respondents state that the claims of
The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in three divisions. All election petitioners are moot and academic due to the passage of Proclamation 1021
cases may be heard and decided by divisions except contests involving which declared that the state of national emergency has ceased. Therefore it
members of the Batasang Pambansa, which shall be heard and decided en
cannot be subjected to judicial review.
banc. Unless otherwise provided by law, all election cases shall be decided
within ninety days from the date of their submission for decision. Issue: Whether or not the case of the petitioners are moot and academic due
to the issuance of Proclamation 1021.
We believe that in making the Commission on Elections the sole judge of all
contests involving the election, returns and qualifications of the members of Ruling: No. The Court ruled that the issuance of Proclamation 1021 did not
the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials, the make the case of the petitioners moot and academic. Mootness is not a
Constitution intended to give it full authority to hear and decide these cases magical formula that immediate dissuades the Court from resolving a case.
from beginning to end and on all matters related thereto, including those Mootness may still be judicially reviewed if there is grave violation of the
arising before the proclamation of the winners. Constitution, when the case is of paramount public interest, when the case
requires controlling formulation for the guidance of the bench and bar, when
As correctly observed by the petitioner, the purpose of Section 3 in requiring
that cases involving members of the Batasang Pambansa be heard and the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. An actual case and
decided by the Commission en banc was to insure the most careful controversy involves a conflict of legal right and opposite legal claims
consideration of such cases. Obviously, that objective could not be achieved susceptible to judicial review.
if the Commission could act en banc only after the proclamation had been
The case at bar is laden with public interest since the issues raised by the
made, for it might then be too late already. We are all-too-familiar with the
grab-the-proclamation-and-delay-the-protest strategy of many unscrupulous petitioners affect the people’s right to freedom of expression. The petitioners
candidates, which has resulted in the frustration of the popular will and the also claim that the respondents committed acts that are in violation of the
virtual defeat of the real winners in the election. The respondent’s theory would Constitution.
make this gambit possible for the pre- proclamation proceedings, being
149. Pimentel vs Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita
summary in nature, could be hastily decided by only three members in division,
without the care and deliberation that would have otherwise been observed by G.R. No 164978
the Commission en banc.
Doctrine: The issue of the appointments of acting secretaries in the present
WHEREFORE, let it be spread in the records of this case that were it not for case is capable of repetition yet evading review. Therefore it should not be
the supervening events that have legally rendered it moot and academic, this dismissed for being moot and academic.
petition would have been granted and the decision of the Commission on
Elections dated July 23, 1984, set aside as violative of the Constitution. Facts: Petitioners question the constitutionality of the appointments made by
the President Arroyo in 2004 for acting secretaries without the consent of the
148. David vs Arroyo Commission on Appointments.
G.R No 171396 Issue: Whether or not the case may be judicially reviewed.
Doctrine: An actual case and controversy involves a conflict of legal right and Ruling: Yes. The Court stated that the issue of the appointments of acting
opposite legal claims susceptible to judicial review. secretaries in the present case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
Therefore it should not be dismissed for being moot and academic. The
Facts: The then President Gloria Arroyo issued Proclamation 1017 which calls
appointments of acting secretaries made by the President are valid since the
on the Armed Forces of the Philippines to suppress acts of terrorism from the
power to appoint is executive in nature and the Commission on Appointments
NPA and lawless violence. The petitioners claim that after the issuance of
is an executive office despite its members being legislators. The President
164
shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress title rule in the making of a law based on Section 26(1) of Article 6 of the
but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Constitution.
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
Issue: Whether or not the case is subject to judicial review.
150. Antolin vs Domondon
Ruling: Yes. It is the duty of the Judiciary to settle a dispute when an action of
G.R. No. 165036 the legislative branch is alleged to have infringed on the principles of the
Constitution. The Court states that an actual case or controversy exists and
Doctrine: Any citizen may challenge the obstruction to his or her right to that the same is ripe for judicial determination since the RH Law and its
information. Such right in this case is not belated by her passing of the board implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to
exams in 1998. The question raised in this case warrants review since it is carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject
capable of repetition. petitions present a justiciable controversy. An actual case or controversy must
Facts: Petitioner questioned the results of her board exam in accountancy. be an existing case or controversy ripe for determination. It must be an
The petitioner requested for the questionnaires to the said exam, her answer antagonistic assertion of a legal right opposed by the denial of another and
sheets, answer keys, and an explanation of the said exam’s grading system. that it must concern a real and tangible issue.
Respondent denied the request due to PRC Resolution 332 which only
PROPER PARTY
permitted the examinee’s access to his or her own answer sheets and due to
PRC Resolution 338 which precludes access to the exam’s questions through 152. People vs Vera
reproduction. In 1998 petitioner passed the board exam in accountancy.
G.R. No L-45685
Issue: Whether or not petitioner’s case is subject to judicial review.
Doctrine: Because even if the Probation Act has been repeatedly relied upon
Ruling: Yes. Any citizen may challenge the obstruction to his or her right to the past and all that time has not been attacked as unconstitutional by the
information. Such right in this case is not belated by her passing of the board Fiscal of Manila but has been impliedly regarded by him as constitutional is
exams in 1998. The question raised in this case warrants review since it is not a reason for considering that the People of the Philippines is estopped from
capable of repetition. Article 3 Section 7 of the Constitution gives the people assailing its validity.
the right to information subject to limitations provided by law. These limitations
include information about national security, trade secrets or banking Facts: Unjieng was penalized with prision correccional. Unjieng then filed for
transactions. In this case while information about the result of the board exam probation but the fiscal opposed it. Judge Vera denied the probation of Unjieng
for accountancy is a public concern on the other hand the inherent difficulties as well. The constitutionality of Act 4221 or the Probation Act is then assailed.
in the preparation, checking and encoding of the exams warrants its questions Issue: Whether or not the said case is subject to judicial review
to be confidential in a limited duration of time.
Ruling: Yes. The people are waiting on the Court to decide this case since it
151. Imbong vs Ochoa could be relied upon by person accused of committing a crime or by a person
G.R. No. 204819 convicted of a crime. Thus considering that this case has assumed importance
and to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public policy demand that
Doctrine: An actual case or controversy must be an existing case or the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 must be resolved by the Court. The people
controversy ripe for determination. It must be an antagonistic assertion of a being represented by the City Fiscal may still question the validity of the
legal right opposed by the denial of another and that it must concern a real and Probation Act. Because even if the Probation Act has been repeatedly relied
tangible issue. upon the past and all that time has not been attacked as unconstitutional by
the Fiscal of Manila but has been impliedly regarded by him as constitutional
Facts: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 10354 which is the
is not a reason for considering that the People of the Philippines is estopped
Reproductive Health Law. The petitioners state that the law violates the one
from assailing its validity. Courts will pass upon a constitutional question only

165
when presented before it in bona fide cases for determination, and the fact that Ruling: No. Petitioner in a quo warranto proceeding must be able to prove that
the question has not been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to he or she is entitled to the office that is subject of the quo warranto proceeding.
allow it to be raised later. The Probation Act is not valid since only the President Petitioner in this case concedes that he is not entitled to the said office of an
may pardon a convicted person under the Jones Law. Associate Justice of Sandiganbayan. The Court ruled that the person
instituting Quo Warranto proceedings on his own behalf, under Section 5, Rule
153. Cuyegkeng vs Cruz 66 of the Rules of Court, must aver and be able to show that he is entitled to
G.R No. L-16263 the office in dispute. Without such averment or evidence of such right, the
action may be dismissed at any stage.
Doctrine: Private citizens may file a quo warranto proceeding if they claim that
the current holder of the office usurped or unlawfully held or exercised said 155. Paguia vs Office of the President
office. G.R No. 176278
Facts: Petitioner wanted the court to declare the appointment of Dr. Cruz as Doctrine: The three factors that affect the validity of a citizen’s suit include the
Board of Medical Examiners illegal. The respondent stated that petitioners are character of funds or assets involved in the controversy, a clear disregard of
not qualified for the Board of Medical Examiners pursuant to Section 14 constitutional or statutory prohibition, and the lack of any other party with a
Republic Act 2382. more direct and specific interest to bring the suit.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is a proper party to this case. Facts: Petitioner filed writ of certiorari seeking to invalidate the President’s
Ruling: No. None of the petitioners have a cause of action against the nomination of respondent Chief Justice Hilario Davide as permanent
respondent since they are 7 petitioners of a quo warranto proceeding. Private representative of the Philippines to United Nations. Respondents raise
citizens may file a quo warranto proceeding if they claim that the current holder threshold issues against the petition. First, they question petitioner’s standing
of the office usurped or unlawfully held or exercised said office. In this case to bring this suit because of his indefinite suspension from the practice of law.
the 7 petitioners all claim to have a right to 1 office. The appointment for the They also argue that neither petitioner’s citizenship nor his taxpayer status
said office though depends upon the President their claim therefore depends vests him with standing to question respondent Davide’s appointment because
on whether or not they be appointed to hold the said office. petitioner has no personal and substantial interest in the outcome of a suit
since it does not involve the taxing power of the state or the illegal
154. Topacio vs Ong disbursement of public funds.
G.R. No. 179895 Issue: Whether or not petitioner is a proper party in this case.
Doctrine: Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, must aver and be able to Ruling: No. Petitioner has no capacity of sue in this case. The petitioner being
show that he is entitled to the office in dispute. Without such averment or a taxpayer and a citizen does not clothe him with capacity to sue in this case
evidence of such right, the action may be dismissed at any stage. since citizen’s suit are only granted when they are of transcendental
importance. The three factors that affect the validity of a citizen’s suit
Facts: Petitioners via present petition of certiorari sought to prevent the
include the character of funds or assets involved in the controversy, a clear
respondent Ong from holding the office of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
disregard of constitutional or statutory prohibition, and the lack of any other
In the petition petitioners stated that under Section 7 par. 1 of the 1987
party with a more direct and specific interest to bring the suit. These factors do
Constitution respondent was not qualified to be appointed as a Sandiganbayan
not apply to the petitioner’s case. The petitioner being a taxpayer will also not
Associate Justice because as of October 1998, respondent’s birth certificate
help because the salary that Davide will receive during his tenure as United
indicated that respondent is a Chinese citizen and because as of October 1998
Nations representative is fixed by law therefore such expenditure is not illegal
records show that the Court has declared respondent as a naturalized Filipino
in nature.
citizen.
156. White Light Corporation vs City of Manila
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is a proper party in this case
166
 G.R. No 122846 Fourth Judicial District, with the authority to preside over the Fifth Branch of
the Court of First Instance of Manila and the Court of First Instance of Palawan,
Doctrine: In third party suits the third party must be hindered in his or her ability and his appointment was approved by the Commission on Appointments of
to protect his or her own interest and the litigant must also have a close the National Assembly. Zandueta then questions the constitutionality of
relationship to the third party, the litigant must also have suffered an injury in Commonwealth Act 145 the law that caused his ad interim appointment.
fact which would give him sufficient concrete interest.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is allowed to question the constitutionality
Facts: The City of Manila passed an ordinance which prohibits short time of Commonwealth Act 145.
admissions in hotels and same establishments in Manila. The petitioners
question the validity of the said ordinance. Petitioner stated that as an Ruling: No. When an appointee accepts a position based on a statute he or
establishment offering short time admissions she cannot question the validity of the law which caused the granting of his
appointment. He is excepted from said rule only when his non-acceptance of
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is a proper party of the suit. the new appointment may affect public interest or when he is compelled to
Ruling: Yes. The third party and overbreadth doctrine apply in this case. In accept it by reason of legal exigencies. In the case under consideration, the
third party suits the third party must be hindered in his or her ability to protect petitioner was free to accept or not the ad interim appointment issued by the
his or her own interest, the litigant must also have a close relationship to the President of the Commonwealth in his favor, in accordance with said
third party and the litigant must also have suffered an injury in fact which would Commonwealth Act No. 145. Nothing or nobody compelled him to do so. If the
give him sufficient concrete interest. In this case the petitioner’s business petitioner believed, as he now seems to believe, that Commonwealth Act No.
interests are also affected by the ordinance. The overbreadth doctrine applies 145 is unconstitutional he should have refused to accept the appointment
when a statute encroaches on constitutionally guaranteed rights. In offered him or, at least, he should have accepted it with reservation, had he
overbreadth analysis, challengers to government action are in effect permitted believed that his duty of obedience to the laws compelled him to do so, and
to raise the rights of third parties. In this case the petitioner claims that the afterwards resort to the power entrusted with the final determination of the
ordinance intrudes on their clients’ right to liberty. The Court sees from these question whether a law is unconstitutional or not.
allegations that the ordinance suffers from overbreadth. 158. General vs Urro
LIS MOTA G.R. No. 191560
157. Zandueta vs De La Costa Doctrine: Lis Mota is the cause or suit of the action. With this element of judicial
G.R. No. L-26467 review the litigant must show that the case cannot be resolved without settling
the constitutional question.
Doctrine: When an appointee accepts a position based on a statute he or she
cannot question the validity of the law which caused the granting of his Facts: The PGMA appointed Urro in place of the petitioner for the permanent
appointment. position of NAPOLCOM Commissioner. Petitioner was only appointed for an
ad interim position as NAPOLCOM Commissioner. She then filed a quo
Facts: This is a quo warranto proceeding instituted by the Honorable warranto proceeding against Urro.
Francisco Zandueta against the Honorable Sixto de la Costa praying that the
respondent be declared as illegally occupying the office of Judge of the Fifth Issue: Whether or not the court may exercise judicial review over the case.
Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Fourth Judicial District and Ruling: No. The Court may exercise judicial review over a case with
holding that the petitioner is entitled to continue occupying the office in constitutional significance when there is an actual controversy, the litigant filing
question. The Commission of Appointments of the National Assembly then the suit has legal standing, the constitutional question is raised at the earliest
denies the ad interim appointment of Zandueta as Judge of the Fifth Branch of opportunity and the constitutional issue must be the lis mota of the case. Lis
the Court of Manila in 1938. The President in November 1938 appointed the Mota is the cause or suit of the action. With this element of judicial review the
herein respondent, Honorable Sixto de la Costa, judge of first instance of the litigant must show that the case cannot be resolved without settling the
167
constitutional question. In this case the lis mota is not the validity of the Issue: Whether or not judicial review applies to this case.
respondent’s appointment but the validity of the petitioner’s quo warranto
petition. Ruling: Yes. The Court ruled that the Congress may only 1 representative for
the Judicial Bar Council. The said representative may either come from the
159. Demetria vs Alba Senate or House of Representatives. The doctrine of operative fact recognizes
the existence of the statute as an operative fact before it was declared to be
G.R. No. 71977 unconstitutional. It is applicable when an undue burden will be caused to the
Doctrine: Taxpayers may also maintain the suit since they have an interest in persons who relied to the validity of the statute before it was declared
preventing the illegal disbursement of funds taken from taxation. unconstitutional. In this case the Court finds that the actions of the Judicial Bar
Council when it came to its composition before it was declared unconstitutional
Facts: Petitioners in this case assail the constitutionality of PD 1177 or the was valid.
Budget Reform Decree of 1977 which allegedly allows the President to
override safeguards for the approving appropriations by authorizing illegal 161. British American Tobacco vs Camacho
transfers of public money. G.R. No. 163583
Issue: Whether or not the constitutionality of PD 1177 is the lis mota of this Doctrine: The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by
case. an administrative agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the
Ruling: Yes. The constitutional question for this case is its lis mota since the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
conflict between paragraph PD No. 1177 and Section 16, Article VIII of the Facts: Petitioner assails the validity of Section 145 of the NIRC as amended
1973 Constitution is readily perceivable from a mere reading thereof. PD 1177 by RA 8424 and RA 9334 along with Revenue Regulation Memorandum Order
authorizes the President to transfer any fund appropriated for different No. 6 2003. This section provides that cigarettes that are packed by a machine
departments of Executive Department to any program, fund or office listed in will be taxed at the rates listed within the said Section. The petitioner claims
the general appropriations act. Section 16 Art. VIII on the other hand only that Revenue Regulation No 6 2003 discriminates against new brands of
allows the augmentation of any item by the President in the general cigarettes and is therefore a violation of the equal protection clause of the
appropriation’s act from savings of his or her respective appropriation. The suit Constitution.
may be maintained by a person who will suffer personal injury due to the
statute if it was enforced. Taxpayers may also maintain the suit since they Issue: Whether or not judicial review applies to this case.
have an interest in preventing the illegal disbursement of funds taken from
taxation. They may therefore question the validity of such law. The petitioners Ruling: Yes. This case was submitted to the Supreme Court by petition for
in this case have legal standing. review on the basis of pure question of law. Where what is assailed is the
validity or constitutionality of a law, or a rule or regulation issued by the
160. Chaves vs Judicial Bar Council administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the
regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of
G.R No 202242 whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency
Doctrine: The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the statute contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular
as an operative fact before it was declared to be unconstitutional. courts. Revenue Regulation Memorandum Order No. 6 2003 is invalid since it
authorizes for the Commissioner on Internal Revenue to reclassify new brands
Facts: Petitioner questions the validity of having two members of the of cigarettes every two years when it was not stated in Section 145 of NIRC.
legislature within the Judicial Bar Council. Respondents argue that the Judicial
Bar Council was made in contemplation of a unicameral legislature and it was 162. Leo Echegaray vs. The Secretary of Justice
made to adapt to a bicameral legislature by the 1986 Constitutional G.R. No. 132601. October 12, 1998
Commission. Respondents also argue that two representatives of legislature
would balance out the six other members of the council who are all appointees. Doctrine
168
Court held that "punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering On March 25, 1998, the Commission on Human Rights filed a Motion for Leave
death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word of Court to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus Curiae with the attached
as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, Petition to Intervene and/or Appear asAmicus Curiae alleging that the death
something more than the mere extinguishment of life." Would the lack in penalty imposed under R.A. No. 7659 which is to be implemented by R.A. No.
particularity then as to the details involved in the execution by lethal injection 8177 is cruel, degrading and outside the limits of civil society standards.
render said law "cruel, degrading or inhuman"? The Court believes not. For
reasons hereafter discussed, the implementing details of R.A. No. 8177 are ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules do not pass
matters which are properly left to the competence and expertise of constitutional muster for:
administrative officials. (a) Violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or
Facts inhuman punishment,

On June 25, 1996, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo (b) Violation of our international treaty obligations,
Echegaray for the crime of rape of the 10 year-old daughter of his common- (c) Being an undue delegation of legislative power, and
law spouse and the imposition upon him of the death penalty for the said crime.
(d) Being discriminatory.
Procedure
Decision:
Petitioner filed motion for reconsideration and a supplemental motion for
reconsideration raising constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 and the LETHAL INJECTION, NOT CRUEL, DEGRADING OR INHUMAN
death penalty for rape. Both were denied. Consequently, Congress changed PUNISHMENT UNDER SECTION 19, ARTICLE III OF THE 1987
the mode of execution of the death penalty from electrocution to lethal CONSTITUTION. REIMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY LAW DOES
injection, and passed Republic Act No. 8177, designating death by lethal NOT VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL TREATY OBLIGATIONS
injection
THERE IS NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER IN R.A. NO.
On March 2, 1998, petitioner filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction and/or 8177 TO THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND THE DIRECTOR OF
Temporary Restraining Order from carrying out the execution by lethal BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, BUT SECTION 19 OF THE RULES AND
injection of petitioner for being: (a) cruel, degrading and inhuman REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT R.A. NO. 8177 IS INVALID.
punishment per se as well as by reason of its being (b) arbitrary, unreasonable
SECTION 17 OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT R.A.
and a violation of due process, (c) a violation of the Philippines' obligations
NO. 8177 IS INVALID FOR BEING DISCRIMINATORY AND CONTRARY TO
under international covenants, (d) an undue delegation of legislative power by
LAW.
Congress, (e) an unlawful exercise by respondent Secretary of the power to
legislate, and (f) an unlawful delegation of delegated powers by the Secretary Reasoning:
of Justice to respondent Director. In his motion to amend, the petitioner added
equal protection as a ground. LETHAL INJECTION, NOT CRUEL, DEGRADING OR INHUMAN
PUNISHMENT UNDER SECTION 19, ARTICLE III OF THE 1987
The Solicitor General stated that the Supreme Court has already upheld the CONSTITUTION.
constitutionality of the Death Penalty Law, and has declared that the death
penalty is not cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment; execution by It is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel,
lethal injection, as authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the questioned rules, degrading or inhuman punishment. In the oft-cited case of Harden v. Director
is constitutional, lethal injection being the most modern, more humane, more of Prisons, this Court held that "punishments are cruel when they involve
economical, safer and easier to apply (than electrocution or the gas chamber); torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the
in addition to that, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something
not expressly or impliedly prohibit the imposition of the death penalty. inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of
life." Would the lack in particularity then as to the details involved in the
169
execution by lethal injection render said law "cruel, degrading or III. THERE IS NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER IN R.A.
inhuman"? The Court believes not. For reasons hereafter discussed, the NO. 8177 TO THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND THE DIRECTOR OF
implementing details of R.A. No. 8177 are matters which are properly left to BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS.
the competence and expertise of administrative officials.
Empowering the Secretary of Justice in conjunction with the Secretary of
In a limited sense, anything is cruel which is calculated to give pain or distress, Health and the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, to promulgate rules and
and since punishment imports pain or suffering to the convict, it may be said regulations on the subject of lethal injection is a form of delegation of legislative
that all punishments are cruel. But of course the Constitution does not mean authority to administrative bodies.
that crime, for this reason, is to go unpunished.” The cruelty against which the
Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of The reason for delegation of authority to administrative agencies is the
punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to increasing complexity of the task of government requiring expertise as well as
extinguish life humanely. the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems
demanding its attention. Considering the scope and the definiteness of R.A.
For as long as the death penalty remains in our statute books and meets the No. 8177, which changed the mode of carrying out the death penalty, the Court
most stringent requirements provided by the Constitution, the Court must finds that the law sufficiently describes what job must be done, who is to do it,
confine their inquiry to the legality of R.A. No. 8177, whose constitutionality and what is the scope of his authority.
was duly sustain in the face of petitioner's challenge. The Court find that the
legislature's substitution of the mode of carrying out the death penalty from R.A. No. 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative
electrocution to lethal injection infringes no constitutional rights of petitioner policy, mark its limits, map out its boundaries, and specify the public agencies
herein. which will apply it. it indicates the circumstances under which the legislative
purpose may be carried out. R.A. No. 8177 specifically requires that "the death
II. REIMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY LAW DOES NOT VIOLATE sentence shall be executed under the authority of the Director of the Bureau
INTERNATIONAL TREATY OBLIGATIONS of Corrections, endeavoring so far as possible to mitigate the sufferings of the
person under the sentence during the lethal injection as well as during the
Indisputably, Article 6 of the Covenant enshrines the individual's right to proceedings prior to the execution." Further, "the Director of the Bureau of
life. Nevertheless, Article 6 (2) of the Covenant explicitly recognizes that Corrections shall take steps to ensure that the lethal injection to be
capital punishment is an allowable limitation on the right to life, subject to the administered is sufficient to cause the instantaneous death of the convict." The
limitation that it be imposed for the "most serious crimes". Moreover, legislature also mandated that "all personnel involved in the administration of
International Covenant on Civil And Political Rights states that in countries lethal injection shall be trained prior to the performance of such task." The
which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be Court cannot see that any useful purpose would be served by requiring greater
imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force detail. The question raised is not the definition of what constitutes a criminal
at the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions offense, but the mode of carrying out the penalty already imposed by the
of the present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Courts. In this sense, R.A. No. 8177 is sufficiently definite and the exercise of
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out discretion by the administrative officials concerned is, to use the words of
pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court." Justice Benjamin Cardozo, canalized within banks that keep it from
The punishment was subject to the limitation that it be imposed for the "most overflowing.
serious crimes". Included with the declaration was the Second Optional Thus, the Court finds that the existence of an area for exercise of discretion by
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Secretary of Justice and the Director of the Bureau of Corrections under
the Abolition of the Death Penalty was adopted by the General Assembly on delegated legislative power is proper where standards are formulated for the
December 15, 1989. The Philippines neither signed nor ratified said guidance and the exercise of limited discretion, which though general, are
document. capable of reasonable application.

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D. SECTION 17 OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT R.A. 163. IN RE CUNANAN
NO. 8177 IS INVALID FOR BEING DISCRIMINATORY AND CONTRARY TO 94 PHIL. 534, MARCH 18, 1954
LAW.
Doctrine
Petitioner contends that Section 17 is unconstitutional for being discriminatory
as well as for being an invalid exercise of the power to legislate by respondent In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission,
Secretary. Petitioner insists that Section 17 amends the instances when lethal suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice
injection may be suspended, without an express amendment of Article 83 of of the profession and their supervision have been indisputably a judicial
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659. function and responsibility. We have said that in the judicial system from which
ours has been derived, the admission, suspension, disbarment or
"SEC. 17. SUSPENSION OF THE EXECUTION OF THE DEATH reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly
SENTENCE. Execution by lethal injection shall not be inflicted upon a woman judicial.
within the three years next following the date of the sentence or while she is
pregnant, nor upon any person over seventy (70) years of age. In this latter Facts
case, the death penalty shall be commuted to the penalty of reclusion Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act,
perpetua with the accessory penalties provided in Article 40 of the Revised in 1952. Under the Rules of Court governing admission to the bar, "in order
Penal Code." that a candidate (for admission to the Bar) may be deemed to have passed his
examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per
On this point, the Courts finds petitioner's contention impressed with cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject."(Rule 127,
merit. While Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 sec. 14, Rules of Court).
of Republic Act No. 7659, suspends the implementation of the death
penalty while a woman is pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, Section Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered
17 of the implementing rules omits the one (1) year period following delivery and passed by this court, and feeling conscious of having been discriminated
as an instance when the death sentence is suspended, and adds a ground for against (See Explanatory Note to R. A. No. 972), unsuccessful candidates who
suspension of sentence no longer found under Article 83 of the Revised Penal obtained averages of a few percentage lower than those admitted to the Bar
Code as amended, which is the three-year reprieve after a woman is agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No.
sentenced. This addition is, in petitioner's view, tantamount to a gender-based 12 which, among others, reduced the passing general average in bar
discrimination sans statutory basis, while the omission is an impermissible examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946.
contravention of the applicable law.
The President requested the views of the court on the bill. Complying with that
Being merely an implementing rule, Section 17 aforecited must not override, request, seven members of the court subscribed to and submitted written
but instead remain consistent and in harmony with the law it seeks to apply comments adverse thereto, and shortly thereafter the President vetoed it.
and implement. Administrative rules and regulations are intended to carry out, Congress did not override the veto. Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371
neither to supplant nor to modify, the law." An administrative agency cannot which is an Act to fix the passing marks for bar examinations from nineteen
amend an act of Congress. In case of discrepancy between a provision of hundred and forty-six up to and including nineteen Hundred and fifty-five,
statute and a rule or regulation issued to implement said statute, the statutory embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill.
provision prevails. Since the cited clause in Section 17 which suspends the
execution of a woman within the three (3) years next following the date of Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar
sentence finds no supports in Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code as those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and
amended, perforce Section 17 must be declared invalid. inadequate preparations. By and large, the law is contrary to public interest
since it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who had inadequate preparation for the
practice of law profession, as evidenced by their failure in the exams.

171
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions legislation 5. Art. 2 of R.A. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary
for admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while others whose motions to what the constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of
for the revision of their examination papers were still pending also invoked the art. 1, the entire law is void.
aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. To avoid injustice to
individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, Republic Act Number 972 is held to be unconstitutional.
irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972.
Unfortunately, the court has found no reason to revise their grades. If they are 164. SALVADOR ESTIPONA vs. HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO
to be admitted to the bar, it must be pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, G.R. No. 226679 August 15, 2017
if declared valid, should be applied equally to all concerned whether they have
filed petitions or not. Doctrine

The Supreme Court held that the power to promulgate rules of

Issue
pleading, practice and procedure is now Their exclusive domain and no longer
Whether or Not RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid.
shared with the Executive and Legislative departments.
Held Facts
RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those
candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and Petitioner Estipona, Jr. was charged with violation of Section 11 of RA 9165.
inadequate preparation.
On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into
a Plea Bargaining Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and,
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission,
instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section 12 (NOTE: should have
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice
been Section 15?) of the same law, with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of
of the profession and their supervision have been indisputably a judicial
his being a first-time offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug
function and responsibility. We have said that in the judicial system from which
seized in his possession.
ours has been derived, the admission, suspension, disbarment or
reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly Petitioner argues that Section 23 of RA 9165 which prohibits plea bargaining
judicial. in all violations of said law violates:

On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of 1. The intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof;
the judicial and legislative departments of the government.
2. The rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5),
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and
of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on
the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities may say, merely 3. The principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches
to fix the minimum conditions for the license. of the government.

Reasons for Unconstitutionality: 1. There was a manifest encroachment on the Issues

constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court. 2. It is in effect a judgment
revoking the resolution of the court, and only the S.C. may revise or alter them, 1. Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional as it
in attempting to do so R.A. 972 violated the Constitution. 3. That congress has encroached upon the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules
exceeded its power to repeal, alter, and supplement the rules on admission to of procedure.
the bar (since the rules made by congress must elevate the profession, and
those rules promulgated are considered the bare minimum.) 4. It is a class

172
 2. Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional for being except the Supreme Court from issuing temporary restraining order
violative of the Constitutional right to equal protection of the law. and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin an investigation
conducted by the Ombudsman, is unconstitutional as it contravenes
Held: Rule 58 of the Rules.
FIRST ISSUE: YES Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this Court
The Supreme Court held that the power to promulgate rules of asserted its discretion to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of
pleading, practice and procedure is now Their exclusive domain and no longer procedure, to the exclusion of the legislative and executive branches of
shared with the Executive and Legislative departments. government. To reiterate, the Court’s authority to promulgate rules on
pleading, practice, and procedure is exclusive and one of the safeguards of
The Court further held that the separation of powers among the three co-equal Our institutional independence.
branches of our government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the
power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole SECOND ISSUE: UNRESOLVED
province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if The Supreme Court did not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A.
they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of No. 9165 is contrary to the constitutional right to equal protection of the law in
the procedural rules promulgated by the Court. order not to preempt any future discussion by the Court on the policy
Viewed from this perspective, the Court had rejected previous attempts on the considerations behind Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165.
part of the Congress, in the exercise of its legislative power, to amend the Pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the statutory provision in toto
Rules of Court (Rules), to wit: or a qualified version thereof, the Court deemed it proper to declare as invalid
the prohibition against plea bargaining on drug cases until and unless it is
1. Fabian v. Desierto -Appeal from the decision of the Office of the
made part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly
Ombudsman in an administrative disciplinary case should be taken to
issued for the purpose.
the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules
instead of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 as provided in Section ADDITIONAL DISCUSSIONS ABOUT PLEA BARGAINING:
27 of R.A. No. 6770.
Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure
2. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Fabian v. Hon. Desierto laid down the test for determining whether a rule is
Cooperative, Inc. – The Cooperative Code provisions on notices substantive or procedural in nature.
cannot replace the rules on summons under Rule 14 of the Rules.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for
3. RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from the practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies
Payment of Legal Fees; Baguio Market Vendors MultiPurpose any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure,
that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by
Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge Cabato-Cortes; In
substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard
Re: Exemption of the National Power Corporation from Payment
or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural.
of Filing/Docket Fees; and Rep. of the Phils. v. Hon. Mangotara,
If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a
et al. – Despite statutory provisions, the GSIS, BAMARVEMPCO, and substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing
NPC are not exempt from the payment of legal fees imposed by Rule right then the rule deals merely with procedure.
141 of the Rules.
In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a procedural rule
4. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division) – The first violates substantive rights. By the same token, it is towards the provision of a
paragraph of Section 14 of R.A. No. 6770, which prohibits courts simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases in all
173
courts that the rules on plea bargaining was introduced. As a way of disposing court could rightfully act in allowing change in the former plea of not guilty could
criminal charges by agreement of the parties, plea bargaining is considered to be nothing more and nothing less than the evidence on record. The ruling on
be an “important,” “essential,” “highly desirable,” and “legitimate” component the motion must disclose the strength or weakness of the prosecution’s
of the administration of justice. evidence. Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence on hand, the
judge’s acceptance of the defendant’s change of plea is improper and
In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as “a process whereby irregular.
the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition
of the case subject to court approval.” There is give-and-take negotiation 165. Carpio-Morales vs. Binay,
common in plea bargaining. The essence of the agreement is that both the
prosecution and the defense make concessions to avoid potential losses. G.R. No. 217126-27, Nov. 10, 2015 (Digest on RA 6770)
Properly administered, plea bargaining is to be encouraged because the chief Doctrine
virtues of the system – speed, economy, and finality – can benefit the accused,
the offended party, the prosecution, and the court. RA 6770 and, in so doing, took away from the courts their power to issue a
TRO and/or WPI to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, it
Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage, the rules on plea encroached upon this Court’s constitutional rule-making authority. Through
bargaining neither create a right nor take away a vested right. Instead, it this provision, Congress interfered with a provisional remedy that was created
operates as a means to implement an existing right by regulating the judicial by this Court under its duly promulgated rules of procedure, which utility is both
process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for integral and inherent to every court’s exercise of judicial power. Without the
justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. Court’s consent to the proscription, as may be manifested by an adoption of
No constitutional right to plea bargain the same as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular
issued therefor, there thus, stands to be a violation of the separation of powers
Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are principle
infringed by trying him rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor
need not do so if he prefers to go to trial. Under the present Rules, the Facts:
acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable right but depends – The Ombudsman’s argument against the CA’s lack of subject matter
on the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, which is a condition jurisdiction over the main petition, and her corollary prayer for its dismissal, is
precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense that is necessarily based on her interpretation of Section 14, RA 6770, or the Ombudsman Act,
included in the offense charged. The reason for this is that the prosecutor has which reads in full:
full control of the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to always Section 14. Restrictions. – No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to
prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on what the delay an investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act,
evidence on hand can sustain. unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the
Plea bargaining, when allowed investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.

Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision
the point when the prosecution already rested its case. or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question
of law.
As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, the trial court’s
exercise of discretion should not amount to a grave abuse thereof. – The Ombudsman’s maintains that the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770
textually prohibits courts from extending provisional injunctive relief to delay
If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail any investigation conducted by her office. Despite the usage of the general
hearing or after the prosecution rested its case, the rules allow such a plea phrase “[n]o writ of injunction shall be issued by any court,” the Ombudsman
only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the herself concedes that the prohibition does not cover the Supreme Court.
guilt of the crime charged. The only basis on which the prosecutor and the
174
Issue: Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the
Are the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 14 of R.A. No. 6770, valid and trial are ordinarily rejected unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of
constitutional? the appellate court is involved in which case it may be raised at any time or on
the court’s own motion. The Court ex mero motu may take cognizance of lack
Ruling: The first paragraph is declared INEFFECTIVE until the Court adopts of jurisdiction at any point in the case where that fact is developed. The court
the same as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular has a clearly recognized right to determine its own jurisdiction in any
duly issued; The second paragraph is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND proceeding.
INVALID.
166.Maceda vs. Vasquez
The Court rules that when Congress passed the first paragraph of Section 14,
RA 6770 and, in so doing, took away from the courts their power to issue a G.R. No. 102781
TRO and/or WPI to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, it
encroached upon this Court’s constitutional rule-making authority. Through Doctrine
this provision, Congress interfered with a provisional remedy that was created Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative
by this Court under its duly promulgated rules of procedure, which utility is both supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of
integral and inherent to every court’s exercise of judicial power. Without the the CA down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it
Court’s consent to the proscription, as may be manifested by an adoption of is only the SC that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance
the same as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they
issued therefor, there thus, stands to be a violation of the separation of powers commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into
principle. this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
In addition, it should be pointed out that the breach of Congress in prohibiting Facts: Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office
provisional injunctions, such as in the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, of the Ombudsman against petitioner RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda.
does not only undermine the constitutional allocation of powers; it also Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda has falsified his certificate
practically dilutes a court’s ability to carry out its functions. This is so since a of service by certifying that all civil and criminal cases which have been
particular case can easily be mooted by supervening events if no provisional submitted for decision for a period of 90 days have been determined and
injunctive relief is extended while the court is hearing the same. decided on or before January 31, 1989, when in truth and in fact, petitioner
Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the remedy against Maceda knew that no decision had been rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal
“decision or findings” of the Ombudsman to a Rule 45 appeal and thus – similar cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera alleged that
to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770- attempts to effectively petitioner Maceda falsified his certificates of service for 17 months.
increase the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction without its advice and Issue: Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes
concurrence, it is therefore concluded that the former provision is also an encroachment into the SC’s constitutional duty of supervision over all
unconstitutional and perforce, invalid. Contrary to the Ombudsman’s inferior courts
posturing, Fabian should squarely apply since the above-stated Ombudsman
Act provisions are in part materia in that they “cover the same specific or Held: A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to
particular subject matter,” that is, the manner of judicial review over issuances the SC for serious misconduct and under Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of
of the Ombudsman. Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his
felonious act.
Note that since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is clearly
determinative of the existence of the CA’s subject matter jurisdiction over the In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court with
main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, including all subsequent proceedings regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the
relative thereto, as the Ombudsman herself has developed, the Court deems Ombudsman encroaches into the Court’s power of administrative supervision
it proper to resolve this issue ex mero motu (on its own motion):
175
over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of Petitioner moved for reconsideration, raising the issue of jurisdiction. She
powers. argued that the exclusive authority to discipline employees of the judiciary lies
with the Supreme Court and the CSC acted with abuse of discretion. She
Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative contended that at the time the case was instituted the CSC already lost
supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of jurisdiction over her.
the CA down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it
is only the SC that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance Issue
with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they
commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into W/N CSC can properly assume jurisdiction over administrative proceedings
this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. against a judicial employee involving acts of dishonesty as a teacher,
committed prior to her appointment to the judiciary
Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises
from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said Ruling
complaint and refer the same to the SC for determination whether said judge Administrative jurisdiction over a court employee belongs to the Supreme
or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative. Court, regardless of whether the offense was committed before or after
167. Ampong v. CSC employment in the judiciary. However, the Court constrained to uphold the
ruling of the CSC based on the principle of estoppel. The previous actions of
G.R. No. 167916 petitioner have estopped her from attacking the jurisdiction of the CSC. A party
who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal exercising
Doctrine quasi-judicial functions to secure an affirmative relief may not afterwards deny
Administrative jurisdiction over a court employee belongs to the Supreme that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty. Under the principle of estoppel, a
Court, regardless of whether the offense was committed before or after party may not be permitted to adopt a different theory on appeal to impugn the
employment in the judiciary. However, the Court constrained to uphold the court’s jurisdiction. Petitioner’s admission of guilt stands.
ruling of the CSC based on the principle of estoppel. 168. In Re: Gonzalez
Facts 160 SCRA 771
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision of CA affirming Facts:
the Civil Service Commission’s exercise of administrative jurisdiction over
petitioner. Cuenco filed a disbarment case against Justice Marcelo Fernan, which the SC
dismissed for utter lack of merit.
In November 1991, Evelyn Junio Decir took the Professional Board
Examination. At the time of PBET, both Evelyn and Sarah Ampong were public Meanwhile, Tanodbayan/Special Prosecutor Gonzalez received a letter-
school teachers under the supervision of the Department of Education, Culture complaint. Attached in the letter was an anonymous letter by "Concerned
and Sports. In 1993, Ampong was appointed as Court Interpreter III in RTC, Employees of the Supreme Court" addressed to Gonzalez referring to charges
Isabel Sarangani Province. In 1994, a woman representing herself as Evelyn for disbarment brought by Cuenco against Justice Fernan and asking
Decir went to CSRO to claim a copy of her PBET Certificate of Eligibility. Gonzalez "to do something about this." Also attached was a copy of
CSRO personnel noticed that the woman did not resemble the examinee in a telegram from Cuenco addressed to Gonzalez wherein Cuenco encouraged
the Picture Seat Plan and was later confirmed that the person claiming Gonzalez to file responsive pleading to the Supreme Court en banc to comply
eligibility was different from the one who took the exam. It was petitioner with the Petition of Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court asking
Ampong who took and passed the examinations under the name Evelyn Decir. Tanodbayan's intervention.
Ampong voluntarily appeared at the CSRO and admitted to the wrongdoing.
In 1996, the CSC found petitioner Ampong and Decir guilty of dishonesty, Gonzalez indorsed the letter-complaint to Justice Fernan, who, in turn, brought
dismissing them from the service.
176
the matter to the SC en banc. DOCTRINE

Issue: The COA Chairman shall be appointed by the President for a term of seven
years, and if he has served the full term, then he can no longer be reappointed
May a Supreme Court justice be disbarred during his term of office? or extended another appointment. In the same vein, a Commissioner who was
appointed for a term of seven years who likewise served the full term is barred
Held: from being reappointed. In short, once the Chairman or Commissioner shall
have served the full term of seven years, then he can no longer be reappointed
No. A public officer who under the Constitution is required to be a Member of to either the position of Chairman or Commissioner. The obvious intent of the
the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be framers is to prevent the president from “dominating” the Commission by
removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment allowing him to appoint an additional or two more commissioners.
during the incumbency of such public officer. Further, such public officer,
during his incumbency, cannot be charged criminally before the FACTS: Funa challenges the constitutionality of the appointment of Reynaldo
Sandiganbayan or any other court with any offence which carries with it A. Villar as Chairman of the COA.
the penalty of removal from office, or any penalty service of which would
amount to removal from office. Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the fourth
year of Villar as COA Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting
To grant a complaint for disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Chairman of COA from February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008. Subsequently, on
Member's incumbency, would in effect be to circumvent and hence to run afoul April 18, 2008, Villar was nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA.
of the constitutional mandate that Members of the Court may be removed from Shortly thereafter, on June 11, 2008, the Commission on Appointments
office only by impeachment for and conviction of certain offenses listed in confirmed his appointment. He was to serve as Chairman of COA, as
Article XI (2) of the Constitution. expressly indicated in the appointment papers, until the expiration of the
original term of his office as COA Commissioner or on February 2, 2011.
The Court is not here saying that it Members or the other constitutional officers Challenged in this recourse, Villar, in an obvious bid to lend color of title to his
we referred to above are entitled to immunity from liability for possibly criminal hold on the chairmanship, insists that his appointment as COA Chairman
acts or for alleged violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics or other supposed accorded him a fresh term of 7 years which is yet to lapse. He would argue, in
misbehavior. What the Court is saying is that there is a fundamental fine, that his term of office, as such chairman, is up to February 2, 2015, or 7
procedural requirements that must be observed before such liability may be years reckoned from February 2, 2008 when he was appointed to that position.
determined and enforced. A Member of the Supreme Court must first be Before the Court could resolve this petition, Villar, via a letter dated February
removed from office via the constitutional route of impeachment 22, 2011 addressed to President Benigno S. Aquino III, signified his intention
under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Should the tenure to step down from office upon the appointment of his replacement. True to his
of the Supreme Court Justice be thus terminated by impeachment, he may word, Villar vacated his position when President Benigno Simeon Aquino III
then be held to answer either criminally or administratively (by disbarment named Ma. Gracia Pulido-Tan (Chairman Tan) COA Chairman. This
proceedings) for any wrong or misbehavior that may be proven against him in development has rendered this petition and the main issue tendered therein
appropriate proceedings. (In Re: Gonzalez, A.M. No. 88-4-5433, April 15, moot and academic.
1988)
Although deemed moot due to the intervening appointment of Chairman Tan
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS and the resignation of Villar, We consider the instant case as falling within the
requirements for review of a moot and academic case, since it asserts at least
REAPPOINTMENT four exceptions to the mootness rule discussed in David vs Macapagal Arroyo
169. DENNIS A. B. FUNA VS. THE CHAIRMAN, COA, REYNALDO A. namely:
VILLAR
G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012
177
a. There is a grave violation of the Constitution; On the substantive issue:
b. The case involves a situation of exceptional character and is of paramount Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution provides that:
public interest; (2) The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed by the
c. The constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of
principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public; seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman
d. The case is capable of repetition yet evading review. shall hold office for seven years, one commissioner for five years, and the
The procedural aspect comes down to the question of whether or not the other commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to
following requisites for the exercise of judicial review of an executive act obtain any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the
in this petition, viz: predecessor. In no case shall any member be appointed or designated in a
a. There must be an actual case or justiciable controversy before the court temporary or acting capacity.
b. The question before it must be ripe for adjudication;
c. The person challenging the act must be a proper party; and Petitioner now asseverates the view that Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987
d. The issue of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity and Constitution proscribes reappointment of any kind within the commission, the
must be the very litis mota of the case point being that a second appointment, be it for the same position
(commissioner to another position of commissioner) or upgraded position
ISSUES: (commissioner to chairperson) is a prohibited reappointment and is a nullity ab
initio.
a. WON the petitioner has Locus Standi to bring the case to court
b. WON Villar’s appointment as COA Chairman, while sitting in that body and The Court finds petitioner’s position bereft of merit. The flaw lies in regarding
after having served for four (4) years of his seven (7) year term as COA the word “reappointment” as, in context, embracing any and all species of
commissioner, is valid in light of the term limitations imposed under, and the appointment. The rule is that if a statute or constitutional provision is clear,
circumscribing concepts tucked in, Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation.
HELD:
The first sentence is unequivocal enough. The COA Chairman shall be
Issue of Locus Standi: This case before us is of transcendental importance, appointed by the President for a term of seven years, and if he has served the
since it obviously has “far-reaching implications,” and there is a need to full term, then he can no longer be reappointed or extended another
promulgate rules that will guide the bench, bar, and the public in future appointment. In the same vein, a Commissioner who was appointed for a term
analogous cases. We, thus, assume a liberal stance and allow petitioner to of seven years who likewise served the full term is barred from being
institute the instant petition. reappointed. In short, once the Chairman or Commissioner shall have served
In David vs Macapagal Arroyo, the Court laid out the bare minimum norm the full term of seven years, then he can no longer be reappointed to either the
before the so-called “non-traditional suitors” may be extended standing to sue, position of Chairman or Commissioner. The obvious intent of the framers is to
thusly: prevent the president from “dominating” the Commission by allowing him to
a. For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds appoint an additional or two more commissioners.
or that the tax measure is unconstitutional; On the other hand, the provision, on its face, does not prohibit a promotional
b. For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the appointment from commissioner to chairman as long as the commissioner has
election law in question not served the full term of seven years, further qualified by the third sentence
c. For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of Sec. 1(2), Article IX (D) that “the appointment to any vacancy shall be only
of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor.” In addition, such
d. For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of promotional appointment to the position of Chairman must conform to the
infringes their prerogatives as legislators. rotational plan or the staggering of terms in the commission membership such
that the aggregate of the service of the Commissioner in said position and the
term to which he will be appointed to the position of Chairman must not exceed
178
seven years so as not to disrupt the rotational system in the commission 2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death,
prescribed by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D). resignation, disability or impeachment) shall only be for the unexpired portion
of the term of the predecessor, but such appointments cannot be less than the
In conclusion, there is nothing in Sec. 1(2), Article IX(D) that explicitly unexpired portion as this will likewise disrupt the staggering of terms laid down
precludes a promotional appointment from Commissioner to Chairman, under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
provided it is made under the aforestated circumstances or conditions.
3. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or CSC, who were
The Court is likewise unable to sustain Villar’s proposition that his promotional appointed for a full term of seven years and who served the entire period, are
appointment as COA Chairman gave him a completely fresh 7- year term–– barred from reappointment to any position in the Commission. Corollarily, the
from February 2008 to February 2015––given his four (4)-year tenure as COA first appointees in the Commission under the Constitution are also covered by
commissioner devalues all the past pronouncements made by this Court. the prohibition against reappointment.
While there had been divergence of opinion as to the import of the word
“reappointment,” there has been unanimity on the dictum that in no case can 4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than
one be a COA member, either as chairman or commissioner, or a mix of both seven years is eligible for an appointment to the position of Chairman for the
positions, for an aggregate term of more than 7 years. A contrary view would unexpired portion of the term of the departing chairman. Such appointment is
allow a circumvention of the aggregate 7-year service limitation and would be not covered by the ban on reappointment, provided that the aggregate period
constitutionally offensive as it would wreak havoc to the spirit of the rotational of the length of service as commissioner and the unexpired period of the term
system of succession. of the predecessor will not exceed seven (7) years and provided further that
the vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted from death, resignation,
In net effect, then President Macapagal-Arroyo could not have had, under any disability or removal by impeachment. The Court clarifies that “reappointment”
circumstance, validly appointed Villar as COA Chairman, for a full 7- year found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a movement to one and the same office
appointment, as the Constitution decrees, was not legally feasible in light of (Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman). On the other
the 7-year aggregate rule. Villar had already served 4 years of his 7-year term hand, an appointment involving a movement to a different position or office
as COA Commissioner. A shorter term, however, to comply with said rule (Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute a new appointment and, hence,
would also be invalid as the corresponding appointment would effectively not, in the strict legal sense, a reappointment barred under the Constitution.
breach the clear purpose of the Constitution of giving to every appointee so
appointed subsequent to the first set of commissioners, a fixed term of office 5. Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a
of 7 years. To recapitulate, a COA commissioner like respondent Villar who temporary or acting capacity.
serves for a period less than seven (7) years cannot be appointed as chairman
when such position became vacant as a result of the expiration of the 7-year 170. Brillantes v. Yorac
term of the predecessor (Carague). Such appointment to a full term is not valid DOCTRINE
and constitutional, as the appointee will be allowed to serve more than seven
(7) years under the constitutional ban. Article IX-A, Section 1, of the Constitution expressly describes all the
Constitutional Commissions as “independent.” Although essentially executive
To sum up, the Court restates its ruling on Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the in nature, they are not under the control of the President of the Philippines in
Constitution, viz: the discharge of their respective functions. Each of these Commissions
1. The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional commissions, conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and
after the expiration of the uneven terms of office of the first set of in the exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are
commissioners, shall always be for a fixed term of seven (7) years; an subject only to review on Certiorari by this Court as provided by the
appointment for a lesser period is void and unconstitutional. The appointing Constitution in Article IX-A, Section 7
authority cannot validly shorten the full term of seven (7) years in case of the FACTS:
expiration of the term as this will result in the distortion of the rotational system
prescribed by the Constitution.
179
A coup attempt occurred in December 1989 prompting president Aquino to POLICE POWER
create a fact finding commission which would be chaired by Hilario Davide.
Consequently he has to vacate his chairmanship over the Commission on 171. WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION V. CITY OF MANILA
Elections (COMELEC). Haydee Yorac, an associate commissioner in the 576 SCRA 416
COMELEC, was appointed by then President Corazon Aquino as a temporary DOCTRINES
substitute.
It also violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for
The petitioner is challenging the designation on the ground that the choice of protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance invades
the Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections is an internal matter that private rights. Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up
should be resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of the rate are really there for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who needed
President of the Philippines violates their independence. He cites the practice rest or to “wash up” or to freshen up.
in this Court, where the senior Associate Justice serves as Acting Chief Justice
in the absence of the Chief Justice. No designation from the President of the FACTS:
Philippines is necessary.
In 1992, Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law the Ordinance No. 7744 that
ISSUE: prohibits hotels, motels, inns, lodging houses, pension houses and similar
establishments from offering short-time admission, as well as pro-rated
Whether or not the designation of the Acting Chairman of the COMELEC is or “wash up” rates or other similarly concocted terms, in the City of Manila.
unconstitutional.
The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of
HELD: the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike.
The Supreme Court ruled that the designation is unconstitutional. Petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC) et. al. filed a petition on the ground
Article IX-A, Section 1, of the Constitution expressly describes all the that the Ordinance directly affects their business interests as operators of
Constitutional Commissions as “independent.” Although essentially executive drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila.
in nature, they are not under the control of the President of the Philippines in RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner.
the discharge of their respective functions. Each of these Commissions
conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and CA reversed the decision and asserted that the Ordinance is a valid exercise
in the exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are of police power.
subject only to review on Certiorari by this Court as provided by the
Constitution in Article IX-A, Section 7. The choice of a temporary chairman ISSUE:
comes under that discretion. Such discretion cannot be exercised for it, even WON the ordinance is constitutional.
with its consent, by the President of the Philippines.
HELD:
The Court has not the slightest doubt that the President of the Philippines was
moved only by the best of motives when she issued the challenged NO.The ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon individual liberty.
designation. But while conceding her goodwill, we cannot sustain her act It also violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for
because it conflicts with the Constitution. Hence, even as this Court revoked protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance invades
the designation in the Bautista case, so too must it annul the designation in private rights. Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up
the case at bar. rate are really there for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who needed
rest or to “wash up” or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided
VII. BILL OF RIGHTS by the said ordinance is more or less subjected only to a limited group of
people. The SC reiterates that individual rights may be adversely affected only
FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF STATE
180
to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public HELD
interest or public welfare.
YES. To warrant a valid exercise of police power, the following must be
Hence, Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is present: (a) that the interests of the public, generally, as distinguished from
REVERSED. those of a particular class, require such interference, and; (b) that the means
are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose. In US v.
172. YNOT v. IAC Toribio, the Court has ruled that EO 626 complies with the above
148 SCRA 659 requirements—that is, the carabao, as a poor man’s tractor so to speak, has
a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of the order,
DOCTRINE and that the method chosen is also reasonably necessary for the purpose
sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive. The ban of the slaughter of
To warrant a valid exercise of police power, the following must be present: (a)
carabaos except those seven years old if male and eleven if female upon
that the interests of the public, generally, as distinguished from those of a
issuance of a permit adequately works for the conservation of those still fit for
particular class, require such interference, and; (b) that the means are
farm work or breeding, and prevention of their improvident depletion. Here,
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose.
while EO 626-A has the same lawful subject, it fails to observe the second
FACTS requirement. Notably, said EO imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter
of the carabaos but on their movement. The object of the prohibition is unclear.
Here, the constitutionality of former President Marcos’s Executive Order No. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose
626-A is assailed. Said order decreed an absolute ban on the inter-provincial sought to be achieved by the disputed measure is missing. It is not clear how
transportation of carabao (regardless of age, sex, physical condition or the interprovincial transport of the animals can prevent their indiscriminate
purpose) and carabeef. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of slaughter, as they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province
this shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government, to be than in another. Obviously, retaining them in one province will not prevent their
distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the slaughter there, any more that moving them to another will make it easier to
Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission (NMIC) may see fit, in kill them there. Even if assuming there was a reasonable relation between the
the case of carabeef. In the case of carabaos, these shall be given to deserving means and the end, the penalty is invalid as it amounts to outright confiscation,
farmers as the Director of Animal Industry (AI) may also see fit. Petitioner had denying petitioner a chance to be heard. Unlike in the Toribio case, here, no
transported six (6) carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo. These were trial is prescribed and the property being transported is immediately
confiscated by the police for violation of the above order. He sued for recovery, impounded by the police and declared as forfeited for the government.
which the RTC granted upon his filing of a supersedeas bond worth 12k. After Concededly, there are certain occasions when notice and hearing can be
trial on the merits, the lower court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos, validly dispensed with, such as summary abatement of a public nuisance,
and as they can no longer be produced, directed the confiscation of the bond. summary destruction of pornographic materials, contaminated meat and
It deferred from ruling on the constitutionality of the executive order, on the narcotic drugs. However, these are justified for reasons of immediacy of the
grounds of want of authority and presumed validity. On appeal to problem sought to be corrected and urgency of the need to correct it. In the
the Intermediate Appellate Court, such ruling was upheld. Hence, this petition instant case, no such pressure is present. The manner by which the disposition
for review on certiorari. On the main, petitioner asserts that EO 626-A is of the confiscated property also presents a case of invalid delegation of
unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation, and that legislative powers since the officers mentioned (Chairman and Director of the
its penalty suffers from invalidity because it is imposed without giving the NMIC and AI respectively) are granted unlimited discretion. The usual
owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court—as standard and reasonable guidelines that said officers must observe in making
guaranteed by due process. the distribution are nowhere to be found; instead, they are to go about it as
they may see fit. Obviously, this makes the exercise prone to partiality and
ISSUE
abuse, and even corruption.
Whether EO 626-A is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process
173. Carlos Balacuit et.al v. CFI of Agusan del Norte
clause.
181
Doctrine to fix what prices of admission they think most for their own advantage, and
that any person who did not approve could stay away.
A lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be
unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police power.33 A police Ordinance No. 640 clearly invades the personal and property rights of
measure for the regulation of the conduct, control and operation of a business petitioners for even if We could assume that, on its face, the interference was
should not encroach upon the legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of reasonable, from the foregoing considerations, it has been fully shown that it
their property rights.34 The right of the owner to fix a price at which his property is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of the property and personal rights
shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself and, as such, of citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot,
within the protection of the due process clause."" under the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid.

Facts: 174. HON. LEONCIO EVASCO, JR. VS ALEX P. MONTANEZ,

the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan pass an ordinance penalizing any G.R. NO. 199172, FEBRUARY 21, 2018
person, group of persons, entity, or corporation engaged in the business of
selling admission tickets to any movie or other public exhibitions, games, DOCTRINE
contests, or other performances to require children between seven (7) and While police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature, Congress
twelve (12) years of age to pay full payment for admission tickets intended for may delegate this power to local government units. Once delegated, the
adults but should charge only one-half of the value of the said tickets. agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by
The Petitioners, theater owners, aggrieved by said ordinance, they file a the national lawmaking body.
complaint before the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan As such, Congress expressly granted the Davao City government, through the
City assailing the constitutionalit of Ordinance No. 640. Sangguniang Panlungsod, police power to regulate billboard structures within
The Court rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 640 of the City of its territorial jurisdiction. An ordinance constitutes a valid exercise of police
Butuan constitutional and valid. power if: (a) it has a lawful subject such that the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise;
Issue:
and (b) it uses a lawful method such that its implementing measures must be
WON Ordinance No. 640 is a valid exercise of police power reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals.
Held:
First, Ordinance No. 092-2000 seeks to regulate all signs and sign structures
YES. Ordinance No. 640 infringes theater owners’ right to property. based on prescribed standards as to its location, design, size, quality of
While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such materials, construction and maintenance to: (a) safeguard the life and property
regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory of Davao City's inhabitants; (b) keep the surroundings clean and orderly;
ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive (c) ensure public decency and good taste; and (d) preserve a harmonious
amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of aesthetic relationship of these structures as against the general surroundings.
regulation. A lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation,
be unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police power.33 A Second, the ordinance employs the following rules in implementing its policy:
police measure for the regulation of the conduct, control and operation of a (a) minimum distances must be observed in installing and constructing outdoor
business should not encroach upon the legitimate and lawful exercise by the billboards; (b) additional requirements shall be observed in locations
citizens of their property rights.34 The right of the owner to fix a price at which designated as "regulated areas" to preserve the natural view and beauty of the
his property shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself
and, as such, within the protection of the due process clause."" Hence, the Davao River, Mt. Apo, the Davao City Skyline, and the view of Samal Island;
proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their property in their own way, (c) sign permits must be secured from and proper fees paid to the city
182
government; and (d) billboards without permits, without the required marking Thereafter, the City Engineer issued orders of demolition directing erring
signs, or otherwise violative of any provision thereof shall be removed, allowing outdoor advertising businesses, including APM, to "voluntarily dismantle" their
billboards that violate Ordinance No. 092- 2000. Otherwise, the city
the owner 60 days from receipt of notice to correct and address its violation. government shall remove these structures without further notice.
For the foregoing reasons, the validity of Ordinance No. 092-2000, Respondent Montanez then filed a petition for injunction and declaration of
including the provisions at issue in the present petition, Sections 7, 8, nullity of Ordinance No. 092-2000 and Order of Demolition with application for
37, and 45 must be upheld. a writ of preliminary injunction and TRO before the RTC. Respondent claimed
FACTS: that Ordinance No. 092-2000 is unconstitutional for being overbreadth in its
application, vague, and inconsistent with the Presidential Decree No. 1096 or
The city government of Davao (City Government), through its Sangguniang the National Building Code of the Philippines (National Building Code).
Panlungsod, approved Ordinance No. 092-2000 entitled "An Ordinance
Regulating the Construction, Repair, Renovation, Erection, Installation and RTC granted respondent's application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
Maintenance of Outdoor Advertising Materials and For Related Purposes." injunction. Meanwhile, in response to the damage caused by typhoon Milenyo,
former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Arroyo) issued
Sections 7, 8, 37, and 45 of the said Ordinance are as follows: Administrative Order (AO) No. 160 directing the Department of Public Works
and Highways (DPWH) to conduct nationwide field inspections, evaluations,
SECTION 7 – BILLBOARD. Outdoor advertising signs shall not be allowed in
and assessments of billboards, and to abate and dismantle those: (a) posing
a residential zone as designated in the Official Zoning Map. Adjacent
imminent danger or threat to the life, health, safety and property of the public;
billboards shall be erected in such a way as to maintain 150.00 meters
(b) violating applicable laws, rules and regulations; (c) constructed within the
unobstructed line of sight.
easement of road right-of-way; and/or (d) constructed without the necessary
Billboards and other self-supporting outdoor signs along highways shall be permits.
located within a minimum of 10.00 meters away from the property lines
Assuming the role given by AO No. 160, Acting DPWH Secretary Hermogenes
abutting the road right-of-way.
E. Ebdane, Jr. issued National Building Code Development Office (NBCDO)
SECTION 8 - REGULATED AREAS. Bridge approach areas within 200 Memorandum Circular No. 3 directing all local government building officials to
meters of the following bridges shall be designated as "regulated areas" in cease and desist from processing application for, and issuing and renewing
order to preserve, among others, the natural view and beauty of the Davao billboard permits.
River, Mt. Apo, the Davao City Skyline and the view of Samal Island x xx
While respondent’s case was still pending before the RTC, the city government
SECTION 37 – FEES. Fees for the application of Sign Permits to be paid at issued another Order of Demolition, this time directed against Prime
the Office of the City Treasurer x xx Advertisements & Signs (Prime), on the ground that the latter's billboards had
no sign permits and encroached a portion of the road right of way. The city
SECTION 45 - REMOVAL. The City Engineer or his duly authorized
representative shall remove, upon recommendation of the Building Official, the government ordered Prime to voluntarily trim its structures. Otherwise, the
following at the expense of the displaying party x xx same shall be removed.

The petitioner City Engineer of Davao City (City Engineer) started sending This prompted respondent-intervenor Davao Billboards and Signmakers
notices of illegal construction to various outdoor advertising businesses, Association, Inc. (DABASA) to intervene in the case, in behalf of its members,
including Ad & Promo Management (APM), owned by respondent Alex consisting of outdoor advertising and signmaker businesses in Davao City,
P.Montanez. The City Engineer reminded the entities to secure a permit such as APM and Prime.

or apply for a renewal for each billboard structure as required by Ordinance The RTC ruled in favor of respondents Montanez and DABASA. The RTC
No. 092-2000. declared Sections 7, 8, and 41 of the City Ordinance No. 092-2000, void and
unconstitutional for being contrary to the National Building Code. Both parties
183
moved for reconsideration. Thus, the RTC, in its Joint Order, modified its ISSUE:
original decision. It declared Sections 7, 8, and 37 of the City Ordinance No.
092-2000, void and unconstitutional for being contrary to the National Building Whether Ordinance No. 092-2000, particularly Sections 7, 8, 37, and 45, is
Code. It deleted Section 41 of the same Ordinance. Aggrieved, the petitioner valid and constitutional.
City Engineer sought recourse before the CA. The CA denied the appeal. It (YES)
declared Sections 7, 8, and 45 of the City Ordinance No. 092-2000, null and RULING:
void. It, however, reinstated Section 41 of the same Ordinance.
It is settled that an ordinance's validity shall be upheld if the following requisites
Again, both parties moved for reconsideration. Subsequently, the CA are present: First, the local government unit must possess the power to enact
promulgated its Amended Decision. It declared Sections 7, 8, 37, and 45 of an ordinance covering a particular subject matter and according to the
the City Ordinance No. 092-2000, null and void. It, however, reinstated Section procedure prescribed by law. Second, the ordinance must not contravene
41 of the same Ordinance. The petitioner City Engineer argues that Ordinance
No. 092-2000 is not inconsistent with the National Building Code. As to Section the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or must not be
7, it cannot be held to be inconsistent with Section 1002, under Chapter 10, of against public policy or must not be unreasonable, oppressive, partial,
the National Building Code because said provision applies to all building discriminating or in derogation of a common right.
projections, in general. As to Section ff, Section 458(a)(3)(iv) of R.A. No. 7160
The power to regulate billboards was validly delegated to the local city
or the Local Government Code of the Philippines (LGC), the city government
council via Davao 's charter
has the power to regulate the display of signs for the purpose of preserving
the natural view and beauty of the surroundings. Aesthetic considerations do Ordinance No. 092-2000, which regulates the construction and installation of
building and other structures such as billboards within Davao City, is an
not constitute undue interference on property rights because it merely sets a
exercise of police power. It has been stressed in Metropolitan Manila
limitation and, in fact, still allows construction of property, provided it is done
Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association that while police power is
beyond the setback. As to Section 37, when the CA nullified the same, it did
not state the specific legal findings and bases supporting its nullity. As to lodged primarily in the National Legislature, Congress may delegate this power
Section 45, the CA went beyond its authority when it invalidated the said to local government units. Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such
Section because both of the parties did not raise any issue as to the validity of legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.
the said section. Moreover, under the LGC, the city engineer is empowered to
perform duties and functions prescribed by ordinances, such as Ordinance No. R.A. No. 4354 otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City of Davao
092-2000. Thus, the city engineer has the authority to cause the removal of (Davao City Charter), vested the local Sangguniang Panlungsod with the
structures found to have violated the ordinance. legislative power to regulate, prohibit, and fix license fees for the display,
construction, and maintenance of billboards and similar structures. As
The respondents, on the other hand, maintain that Ordinance No. 092-2000 is such, Congress expressly granted the Davao City government, through the
invalid. First, Section 7 of the Ordinance contradicts the National Building Code
because, while the latter does not impose a minimum setback from the Sangguniang Panlungsod, police power to regulate billboard structures within
property lines abutting the road right-of-way, the said provision requires a 10- its territorial jurisdiction.
meter setback. Second, Section 8's establishment of "regulated areas" in
Consistency between Ordinance No. 092-2000 and the National Building
keeping with aesthetic purposes of the surroundings is not a valid exercise of
Code is irrelevant As stated earlier, the power to regulate billboards within its
police power. Third, the fees required by Section 37 of the ordinance are
territorial jurisdiction has been delegated by Congress to the city government
excessive, confiscatory, and oppressive. Fourth, Section 45, insofar as it
via the Davao City Charter. The city government does not need to refer to the
empowers the building official to cause the removal of erring billboards, is an
procedures laid down in the National Building Code to exercise this power.
undue delegation of derivative power. Under the National Building Code, the
building official's authority is limited to the determination of ruinous and Thus, the consistency between Ordinance No. 092-2000 with the National
dangerous buildings and structures. Building Code is irrelevant to the validity of the former. To be clear, even
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if the National Building Code imposes minimum requirements as to the clear legal duty imposed upon the office or the officer sought to be compelled
construction and regulation of billboards, the city government may impose to perform an act, and the party seeking mandamus has a clear legal right to
stricter limitations because its police power to do so originates from its the performance of such act.
charter and not from the National Building Code
Facts:
Ordinance No. 092-2000 is a valid exercise of police power
DMCI Project Developers, Inc. acquired a lot in the City of Manila. The said
An ordinance constitutes a valid exercise of police power if: (a) it has a lawful lot was earmarked for the construction of Torre de Manila Condominium
subject such that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from project. After having acquired all the necessary permits and documents, the
those of a particular class, require its exercise; and (b) it uses a lawful method DMCI-PDI was ready to commence the intended project. However, the City of
such that its implementing measures must be reasonably necessary Manila Council issued a resolution to temporarily suspend the Building Permit
until such time that issues had been cleared. Consultations after consultations
for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon had he been initiated both by the City of Manila and DMCI-PDI. Finally, On
individuals. Jan. 2014, the City Council of Manila, issued another resolution ratifying and
First, Ordinance No. 092-2000 seeks to regulate all signs and sign structures confirming all previously issued permits, licenses and approvals issued by the
based on prescribed standards as to its location, design, size, quality of City for Torre de Manila.
materials, construction and maintenance to: (a) safeguard the life and property Knights of Rizal, on the other hand, filed a petition for injunction seeking TRO,
of Davao City's inhabitants; (b) keep the surroundings clean and orderly; (c) and later a permanent injunction, against the construction of the project. The
ensure public decency and good taste; and (d) preserve a harmonious KOR argued that the building, if completed, would be a sore to the view of the
aesthetic relationship of these structures as against the general surroundings. monument, an endangerment to the nation’s cultural heritage, and a
Second, the ordinance employs the following rules in implementing its policy: construction borne out of bad faith.
(a) minimum distances must be observed in installing and constructing outdoor Issue:
billboards; (b) additional requirements shall be observed in locations
designated as "regulated areas" to preserve the natural view and beauty of Whether or not the court should issue a writ of mandamus against the City
Officials to stop the construction of Torre de Manila.
the Davao River, Mt. Apo, the Davao City Skyline, and the view of Samal
Island; (c) sign permits must be secured from and proper fees paid to the city Ruling:
government; and (d) billboards without permits, without the required marking
signs, or otherwise violative of any provision thereof shall be removed, No, The SC ruled that there was no law prohibiting the construction of the
project. It was not even considered as contrary to morals, customs and public
allowing the owner 60 days from receipt of notice to correct and address its order. The project was way well from the Park where the monument was
violation. located. The SC ruled further that a mandamus did not lie against the City of
Manila. It is categorically clear that “a mandamus is issued when there is a
For the foregoing reasons, the validity of Ordinance No. 092-2000, clear legal duty imposed upon the office or the officer sought to be compelled
including the provisions at issue in the present petition, Sections 7, 8, to perform an act, and the party seeking mandamus has a clear legal right to
37, and 45 must be upheld. the performance of such act.” In the case at bar, such factors were wanting.
175. Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Nowhere was it found in the ordinance, or in any Law or rule that the
construction of such building outside the Rizal Park was prohibited if the
Doctrine building was within the background sightline or vision of the Rizal
Monument. Thus, the petition was lacking of merit and, thus dismissed.
The project was way well from the Park where the monument was
located. The SC ruled further that a mandamus did not lie against the City of EMINENT DOMAIN
Manila. It is categorically clear that “a mandamus is issued when there is a
185
 176. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. 177. MUNICIPALITY OF MEYCAUAYAN vs. IAC
LA ORDEN DE PP. BENEDICTINOS DE FILIPINAS
G.R. No. 72126, January 29, 1988
G.R. No. L-12792 February 28, 1961
Doctrine: Condemnation of private property is justified only if it is for the public
Doctrine: In expropriation case, the parties should be given an opportunity to good and there is a genuine necessity of a public character.
present their respective evidence upon factors that might be of direct or
indirect help in determining the vital question of fact involved. Facts: In 1975, respondent Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation
filed with the Office of the Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan, an
Facts: To ease and solve the daily traffic congestion on Legarda Street, the application for a permit to fence a parcel of land with a width of 26.8 meters
Government drew plans to extend Azcarraga street from its junction with and a length of 184.37 meters covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
Mendiola street, up to the Sta. Mesa Rotonda, Sampaloc, Manila. To carry out 215165 and 37879. The fencing of said property was allegedly to enable the
this plan it offered to buy a portion of approximately 6,000 square meters of a storage of the respondent's heavy equipment and various finished products
bigger parcel belonging to La Orden de PP. Benedictinos de Filipinas, a such as large diameter steel pipes, pontoon pipes for ports, wharves, and
domestic religious corporation that owns the San Beda College, a private harbors, bridge components, pre-stressed girders and piles, large diameter
educational institution situated on Mendiola street. Not having been able to concrete pipes, and parts for low cost housing.
reach an agreement on the matter with the owner, the Government instituted
the present expropriation proceedings. In the same year, the Municipal Council of Meycauayan, headed by then
Mayor Celso R. Legaspi, passed Resolution No. 258, manifesting the intention
On June 8, 1957, Defendant, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint based on to expropriate the respondent's parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate
the following grounds: of Title No. 37879.

I. That the property sought to be expropriated is already dedicated to public On March 10, 1976, the Special Committee recommended that the Provincial
use and therefore is not subject to expropriation. Board of Bulacan disapprove or annul the resolution in question because there
was no genuine necessity for the Municipality of Meycauayan to expropriate
II. That there is no necessity for the proposed expropriation. the respondent's property for use as a public road.
III. That the proposed Azcarraga Extension could pass through a different site On October 21, 1983, the Municipal Council of Meycauayan, now headed by
which would entail less expense to the Government and which would not Mayor Adriano D. Daez, passed Resolution No. 21, for the purpose of
necessitate the expropriation of a property dedicated to education. expropriating anew the respondent's land. The Provincial Board of Bulacan
IV. That the present action filed by the plaintiff against the defendant is approved the aforesaid resolution on January 25, 1984.
discriminatory. Thereafter, the petitioner, on February 14, 1984, filed with the Regional Trial
V. That the herein plaintiff does not count with sufficient funds to push through Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch VI, a special civil action for expropriation.
its project of constructing the proposed Azcarraga Extension and to allow the Upon deposit of the amount of P24,025.00, which is the market value of the
plaintiff to expropriate defendant's property at this time would be only to land, with the Philippine National Bank, the trial court on March 1, 1984 issued
needlessly deprive the latter of the use of its property. a writ of possession in favor of the petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not the filing of expropriation case has merit? Issue: Whether or not Petition filed has merit?
Ruling: Supreme Court ruled that the parties should have been given an Ruling: Supreme Court ruled on the negative. The jurisdiction of this Court in
opportunity to present their respective evidence upon these factors and others cases brought to us from the Court of Appeals is limited to the review of errors
that might be of direct or indirect help in determining the vital question of fact of law, factual issues not being proper in certiorari proceedings.
involved, namely, the need to open the extension of Azcarraga street to ease
and solve the traffic congestion on Legarda street.
186
This Court reviews and rectifies the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals expropriation of the cemetery would create irreparable loss and injury to them
only under certain established exceptions such as: (1) when the conclusion is and to all those persons owing and interested in the graves and monuments
a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and conjectures; (2) that would have to be destroyed.
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd and impossible; (3)
when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not necessary on
misapprehension of facts; and (5) when the court, in making its finding, went the particular-strip of land in question. Plaintiff herein assailed that they have
beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of the right to exercise the power of eminent domain and that the courts have no
both the appellant and the appellee. right to inquire and determine the necessity of the expropriation. Thus, the
same filed an appeal.
There is no question here as to the right of the State to take private property
for public use upon payment of just compensation. What is questioned is the ISSUE: Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and hear proof of the
existence of a genuine necessity therefore. necessity of the expropriation.

In the case of City of Manila vs Chinese Community Manila, the Court held Ruling: The courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent
that the foundation of the right to exercise the power of eminent domain is domain to the actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes
genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public character. designated by the law. The moment the municipal corporation or entity
Condemnation of private property is justified only if it is for the public good and attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions
there is a genuine necessity of a public character. Consequently, the courts accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a
have the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly
domain and to determine whether there is a genuine necessity therefore . within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation
or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions
There is absolutely no showing in the petition why the more appropriate lot for imposed by the general authority, is a question that the courts have the right
the proposed road which was offered for sale has not been the subject of the to inquire to.
petitioner's attempt to expropriate assuming there is a real need for another
connecting road. Here, even granting that a necessity exists for the opening of the street in
question, the record contains no proof of the necessity of opening the same
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. through the cemetery. The record shows that adjoining and adjacent lands
have been offered to the city free of charge, which will answer every purpose
178. THE CITY OF MANILA vs. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA, ET of the plaintiff. Thus, the petition was dismissed.
AL.,
179. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. SPS.
G.R. No. L-14355 October 31, 1919 MISERICORDIA GUTIERREZ and RICARDO MALIT and THE
Doctrine: The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the G.R. No. L-60077 January 18, 1991
power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity
is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the Doctrine: The power of eminent domain may be exercised although title was
general authority, is a question that the courts have the right to inquire to. not transferred to the expropriator.

Facts: The City of Manila prayed for the expropriation of a portion private Facts: Plaintiff National Power Corporation, a government owned and
cemetery for the conversion into an extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff claims controlled entity, in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 120, is invested
that it is necessary that such public improvement be made in the said portion with the power of eminent domain for the purpose of pursuing its objectives,
of the private cemetery and that the said lands are within their jurisdiction. which among others is the construction, operation, and maintenance of electric
transmission lines for distribution throughout the Philippines. For the
Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not necessary construction of its 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, plaintiff's lines
because other routes were available. They further claimed that the
187
have to pass the lands belonging to defendants Matias Cruz, Heirs of Natalia appellees heedlessness, slovenliness, and carelessness. Its findings and
Paule and spouses Misericordia Gutierrez and Ricardo Malit. conclusions are biding upon us, there being no showing of the existence of
any of the exceptions to the general rule that findings of fact of the Court of
Plaintiff initiated negotiations for the acquisition of right of way easements over Appeals are conclusive upon this Court.
the aforementioned lots for the construction of its transmission lines but
unsuccessful in this regard, said corporation was constrained to file eminent 180. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs.
domain proceedings against the herein defendants on January 20, 1965. CARMEN M. VDA. DE CASTELLVI, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

Upon filing of the complaint, plaintiff corporation deposited the amount of G.R. No. L-20620 August 15, 1974
P973.00 with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga, tendered to cover the
provisional value of the land of the defendant spouses Ricardo Malit and Doctrine: Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the “just compensation”
Misericordia Gutierrez. And by virtue of which, the plaintiff corporation was is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.
placed in possession of the property of the defendant spouses so it could Facts: The Republic of the Philippines filed on June 26, 1959, a complaint for
immediately proceed with the construction of its Mexico-Limay 230 KV eminent domain against defendant-appellee, Carmen M. Vda. de Castellvi,
transmission line. judicial administratrix of the estate of the late Alfonso de Castellvi, over a
In this connection, by the trial court's order of September 30, 1965, the parcel of land situated in the barrio of San Jose, Florida blanca,
defendant spouses were authorized to withdraw the fixed provisional value of Pampanga,and against defendant-appellee Maria Nieves Toledo Gozun over
their land in the sum of P973.00. two parcels of land

Issue: Whether Petitioner should made to pay simple easement fee or full The Republic alleged, that the fair market value of the above-mentioned lands,
compensation for the land traversed by its transmission lines? according to the Committee on Appraisal for the Province of Pampanga, was
not more than P2,000 per hectare, or a total market value of P259,669.10; and
Ruling: The trial court's observation shared by the appellate court show that prayed, that the provisional value of the lands be fixed at P259.669.10, that
"While it is true that plaintiff are only after a right-of-way easement, it the court authorizes plaintiff to take immediate possession of the lands upon
nevertheless perpetually deprives defendants of their proprietary rights as deposit of that amount with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga;
manifested by the imposition by the plaintiff upon defendants that below said
transmission lines no plant higher than three (3) meters is allowed. On June 29, 1959 the trial court issued an order fixing the provisional value of
Furthermore, because of the high-tension current conveyed through said the lands at P259,669.10.
transmission lines, danger to life and limbs that may be caused beneath said After the Republic had deposited with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga
wires cannot altogether be discounted, and to cap it all plaintiff only pays the the amount of P259,669.10, the trial court ordered that the Republic be placed
fee to defendants once, while the latter shall continually pay the taxes due on in possession of the lands. The Republic was actually placed in possession of
said affected portion of their property the lands on August 10, 1959.
For these reasons, the owner of the property expropriated is entitled to a just ISSUE: whether or not the taking happened on 1959 ?
compensation, which should be neither more nor less than the money
equivalent of said property. Ruling: The court ruled that under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court, the “just compensation” is to be determined as of the date of the filing
Petitioner only sought an easement of right-of-way, and as earlier discussed, of the complaint. This Court has ruled that when the taking of the property
the power of eminent domain may be exercised although title was not sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the
transferred to the expropriator. public respondent found as conclusively expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the
established that indeed, the petitioners were guilty of patent gross and evident complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as
lack of foresight,imprudence and negligence in the management and of the date of the filing of the complaint. In the instant case, it is undisputed
operation of Angat Dam and that the extent of the opening of the spillways, that the Republic was placed in possession of the Castellvi property, by
and the magnitude of the water released, are all but products of defendants- authority of the court, on August 10, 1959. The “taking” of the Castellvi property
188
for the purposes of determining the just compensation to be paid must, Issue: Whether or not the contention of Petitioner to return back the property
therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for eminent has merit?
domain was filed.
Ruling: The act of respondent NHA in entering into a contract with a real estate
181. MARINA Z. REYES, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL HOUSING developer for the construction of low cost housing on the expropriated lots to
AUTHORITY, respondent. be sold to qualified low income beneficiaries cannot be taken to mean as a
deviation from the stated public purpose of their taking. The low cost housing
G.R. No. 147511 January 20, 2003 project of respondent NHA on the expropriated lots is compliant with the
Doctrine: The refusal to pay just compensation, allegedly for failure of "public use" requirement.
petitioners to pay capital gains tax and surrender the owners' duplicate The expropriation judgment declared that respondent NHA has a lawful right
certificates of title, to be unfounded and unjustified. to take petitioners properties "for the public use or purpose of expanding the
First, under the expropriation judgment the payment of just compensation is Dasmariñas Resettlement Project." The taking here is absolute, without any
not subject to any condition. Second, it is a recognized rule that although the condition, restriction or qualification.
right to enter upon and appropriate the land to public use is completed prior to The refusal of respondent NHA to pay just compensation, allegedly for failure
payment, title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the of petitioners to pay capital gains tax and surrender the owners' duplicate
expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation certificates of title, to be unfounded and unjustified.
Facts: Respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) filed separate First, under the expropriation judgment the payment of just compensation is
complaints for the expropriation of sugarcane lands, particularly Lot Nos. 6450, not subject to any condition. Second, it is a recognized rule that although the
6448-E, 6198-A and 6199 of the cadastral survey of Dasmariñas, Cavite right to enter upon and appropriate the land to public use is completed prior to
belonging to the petitioners, before the then Court of First Instance of Cavite,. payment, title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the
The stated public purpose of the expropriation was the expansion of the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation
Dasmariñas Resettlement Project to accommodate the squatters who were
relocated from the Metropolitan Manila area. The trial court rendered judgment With respect to the amount of the just compensation still due and demandable
ordering the expropriation of these lots and the payment of just compensation. from respondent NHA, the lower courts erred in not awarding interest
This was affirmed by the Supreme Court in a decision rendered on October computed from the time the property is actually taken to the time when
29, 1987 in the case of NHA vs. Zaballero2 and which became final on compensation is actually paid or deposited in court.
November 26, 1987.3
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is modified as follows:
For the alleged failure of respondent NHA to comply with the above order,
petitioners filed on April 28, 1992 a complaint for forfeiture of rights before the 1. Ordering respondent National Housing Authority to pay petitioners the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 79. They alleged that respondent amount of P1,218,574.35 with legal interest thereon at 12% per annum
NHA had not relocated squatters from the Metropolitan Manila area on the computed from the taking of the expropriated properties in 1997 until the
expropriated lands in violation of the stated public purpose for expropriation amount due shall have been fully paid;
and had not paid the just compensation fixed by the court. 2. Ordering petitioners to pay the capital gains tax; and
In its Answer, respondent NHA averred that it had already paid a substantial 3. Ordering petitioners to surrender to respondent National Housing Authority
amount to petitioners and that the expropriation judgment could not be the owners' duplicate certificates of title of the expropriated properties upon
executed in view of several issues raised by respondent NHA before the full payment of just compensation
expropriation court concerning capital gains tax, registration fees and other
expenses for the transfer of title to respondent NHA, as well as the claims for 182. EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY, petitioner vs.
attorney's fees of Atty. Joaquin Yuseco, Jr., collaborating counsel for HON. CEFERINO E. DULAY, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge,
petitioners.
189
 Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XVI, Lapu-Lapu City, and SAN own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such
ANTONIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents. amount

G.R. No. L-59603 April 29, 1987 The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial
function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial
Doctrine: The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill
is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just
the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own
in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without determination shall prevail over the court's findings. Much less can the courts
just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its be precluded from looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed compensation
own determination shall prevail over the court's findings.
183. ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN PHILIPPINES v.
Facts: On January 15, 1979, the President of the Philippines, issued SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
Proclamation No. 1811, reserving a certain parcel of land of the public domain
situated in the City of Lapu-Lapu, Island of Mactan, Cebu and covering a total GR No. 78742, July 14, 1989
area of 1,193,669 square meters, for the establishment of an export
processing zone by petitioner Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA). Doctrine: The CARP Law conditions the transfer of possession and ownership
of the land to the government on receipt by the Landowner of the
Not all the reserved area, however, was public land. The proclamation corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash
included, , four (4) parcels of land with an aggregate area of 22,328 square or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the
meters owned and registered in the name of the private respondent. The Landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated
petitioner, offered to purchase the parcels of land from the respondent in
acccordance with the valuation set forth in Section 92, Presidential Decree Facts: On September 3, 1986, the petitioner protested the erroneous inclusion
(P.D.) No. 464, as amended. However, the parties failed to reach an of his small landholding under Operation Land transfer and asked for the recall
agreement regarding the sale of the property. and cancellation of the Certificates of Land Transfer in the name of the private
respondents.
The petitioner filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, a complaint for The petitioner contends that the issuance of E.0. Nos. 228 and 229 shortly
expropriation with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of possession against the before Congress convened is anomalous and arbitrary, besides violating the
private respondent, to expropriate the aforesaid parcels of land pursuant to doctrine of separation of powers. The petitioner also invokes his rights not to
P.D. No. 66,, which empowers the petitioner to acquire by condemnation be deprived of his property without due process of law and to the retention of
proceedings any property for the establishment of export processing zones, his small parcels of rice holding as guaranteed under Article XIII, Section 4 of
for the purpose of establishing the Mactan Export Processing Zone. the Constitution
Issue:
ISSUE: whether or not Sections 5 to 8, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court Whether or not CARP law violates due process ?
had been repealed or deemed amended by P.D. No. 1533 insofar as the
appointment of commissioners to determine the just compensation is Ruling:
concerned? NO. The general rule, is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from
the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation.
Ruling: The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited
decrees constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It The CARP Law conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the
tends to render this Court inutile in a matter which under the Constitution is land to the government on receipt by the Landowner of the corresponding
reserved to it for final determination. payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds
with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the Landowner. No
The valuation in the decree may only serve as a guiding principle or one of the outright change of ownership is contemplated. Hence, the argument that the
factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute the court's
190
assailed measures violate the due process by arbitrarily transferring title damage to people and property; 5) in spite of the precautions undertaken and
before the land is fully paid must be rejected. the diligence exercised, they could still not contain or control the flood that
resulted and; 6) the damages incurred by the private respondents were caused
184. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE by a fortuitous event or force majeure and are in the nature and character
COURT OF APPEALS, GAUDENCIO C. RAYO, ET AL., respondents of damnum absque injuria. By way of special affirmative defense, the
G.R. Nos. 103442-45 May 21, 1993 defendants averred that the NPC cannot be sued because it performs a purely
governmental function.
Doctrine: When the negligence of a person concurs with an act of God in
producing a loss, such person is not exempt from liability by showing that the Issue: Whether or not National Power Corporation is guilty negligence?
immediate cause of the damage was the act of God. To be exempt from liability Ruling: The court ruled that upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act
for loss because of an act of God, he must be free from any previous of God, there concurs a corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or violation or
negligence or misconduct by which that loss or damage may have been contravention in any manner of the tenor of the obligation as provided for in
occasioned Article 1170 of the Civil Code, which results in loss or damage, the obligor
Facts: This present controversy traces its beginnings to four (4) separate cannot escape liability.
complaints for damages filed against the NPC and Benjamin Chavez before It has been held that when the negligence of a person concurs with an act of
the trial court. The plaintiffs therein, now private respondents, sought to God in producing a loss, such person is not exempt from liability by showing
recover actual and other damages for the loss of lives and the destruction to that the immediate cause of the damage was the act of God. To be exempt
property caused by the inundation of the town of Norzagaray, Bulacan on 26- from liability for loss because of an act of God, he must be free from any
27 October 1978. The flooding was purportedly caused by the negligent previous negligence or misconduct by which that loss or damage may have
release by the defendants of water through the spillways of the Angat. In said been occasioned
complaints, the plaintiffs alleged, that: 1) defendant NPC operated and
maintained a multi-purpose hydroelectric plant in the Angat River at Hilltop, Petitioners cannot be heard to invoke the act of God or force majeure to
Norzagaray, Bulacan; 2) defendant Benjamin Chavez was the plant supervisor escape liability for the loss or damage sustained by private respondents since
at the time of the incident in question; 3) despite the defendants' knowledge, the petitioners, were guilty of negligence.
as early as 24 October 1978, of the impending entry of typhoon "Kading," they
failed to exercise due diligence in monitoring the water level at the dam; 4) Thus, the whole occurrence was thereby humanized, as it were, and removed
when the said water level went beyond the maximum allowable limit at the from the laws applicable to acts of God.
height of the typhoon, the defendants suddenly, opened three (3) of the dam's 185. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GENERAL ROMEO ZULUETA,
spillways, thereby releasing a large amount of water which inundated the COMMODORE EDGARDO GALEOS, ANTONIO CABALUNA, DOROTEO
banks of the Angat River; and 5) as a consequence, members of the MANTOS & FLORENCIO BELOTINDOS, petitioners vs. VICENTE G.
household of the plaintiffs, together with their animals, drowned, and their LIM, respondent.
properties were washed away in the evening of 26 October and the early hours
of 27 October 1978. G.R. No. 161656 June 29, 2005

In their Answers, the defendants, now petitioners, alleged that: 1) the NPC Doctrine: The doctrine is that "the non-payment of just compensation does not
exercised due care, diligence and prudence in the operation and maintenance entitle the private landowner to recover possession of the expropriated
of the hydroelectric plant; 2) the NPC exercised the diligence of a good father lots,however, in cases where the government failed to pay just
in the selection of its employees; 3) written notices were sent to the different compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the judgment in the
municipalities of Bulacan warning the residents therein about the impending expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to
release of a large volume of water with the onset of typhoon "Kading" and recover possession of their property.
advise them to take the necessary precautions; 4) the water released during
Facts: On September 5, 1938, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic)
the typhoon was needed to prevent the collapse of the dam and avoid greater
instituted a special civil action for expropriation with the Court of First Instance
191
of Cebu, involving Lots 932 and 939 of the Banilad Friar Land Estate, Lahug, On December 2, 1994, the DOTC issued Dept. Order No. 94-832 constituting
Cebu City, for the purpose of establishing a military reservation for the the Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) for the
Philippine Army. Lot 932 was registered in the name of Gervasia Denzon implementation of the NAIA IPT III project
under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 14921 with an area of 25,137
square meters, while Lot 939 was in the name of Eulalia Denzon and covered On February 13, 1996, the NEDA passed Board Resolution No. 2 which
by TCT No. 12560 consisting of 13,164 square meters. approved the NAIA IPT III project.

After depositing ₱9,500.00 with the Philippine National Bank, pursuant to the On June 7, 14, and 21, 1996, DOTC/MIAA caused the publication in two daily
Order of the CFI dated October 19, 1938, the Republic took possession of the newspapers of an invitation for competitive or comparative proposals on
lots. Thereafter, or on May 14, 1940, the CFI rendered its Decision ordering AEDC's unsolicited proposal,
the Republic to pay the Denzons the sum of ₱4,062.10 as just compensation. On September 20, 1996, the consortium composed of People’s Air Cargo and
For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, on September 20, 1961, the Warehousing Co., Inc. (Paircargo), Phil. Air and Grounds Services, Inc.
Denzons’ successors-in-interest, Francisca Galeos-Valdehueza and (PAGS) and Security Bank Corp. (Security Bank) (collectively, Paircargo
Josefina Galeos-Panerio, filed with the same CFI an action for recovery of Consortium) submitted their competitive proposal to the PBAC. PBAC
possession with damages against the Republic and officers of the Armed awarded the project to Paircargo Consortium. Because of that, it was
Forces of the Philippines in possession of the property. incorporated into Philippine International Airport Terminals Co., Inc.

ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent can recover the possession of the AEDC subsequently protested the alleged undue preference given to PIATCO
property? and reiterated its objections as regards the prequalification of PIATCO.

RULING:: The court ruled that while the prevailing doctrine is that "the non- On July 12, 1997, the Government and PIATCO signed the “Concession
payment of just compensation does not entitle the private landowner to recover Agreement for the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement of the NAIA
possession of the expropriated lots,however, in cases where the government Passenger Terminal III” (1997 Concession Agreement). The Government
failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the granted PIATCO the franchise to operate and maintain the said terminal during
judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall the concession period and to collect the fees, rentals and other charges in
have the right to recover possession of their property. This is in consonance accordance with the rates or schedules stipulated in the 1997 Concession
with the principle that "the government cannot keep the property and dishonor Agreement. The Agreement provided that the concession period shall be for
the judgment. Wherefore, the Respondent has the right to recover the twenty-five (25) years starting from the in-service date, and may be renewed
possession of the property. at the option of the Government for a period not exceeding twenty-five (25)
years. At the end of the concession period, PIATCO shall transfer the
186. DEMOSTHENE AGAN vs PIATCO development facility to MIAA.

GR no. 155001, May 5, 2003 Meanwhile, the MIAA which is charged with the maintenance and operation of
the NAIA Terminals I and II, had existing concession contracts with various
Doctrine: Article XII sec 17 of the constitution pertains to the right of the State service providers to offer international airline airport services, to several
in times of national emergency, and in the exercise of its police power, to international airlines at the NAIA.
temporarily take over the operation of any business affected with public
interest. On September 17, 2002, the workers of the international airline service
providers, claiming that they would lose their job upon the implementation of
Facts: On October 5, 1994, AEDC submitted an unsolicited proposal to the the questioned agreements, filed a petition for prohibition. Several employees
Government through the DOTC/MIAA for the development of NAIA of MIAA likewise filed a petition assailing the legality of the various
International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) under a build-operate-and- agreements.
transfer arrangement pursuant to RA 6957
ISSUE:
192
Whether or not the State can temporarily take over a business affected with of MIAA funds, to issue a manager’s check for said amount payable to
public interest. Tabuena. The check was encashed, however, at the PNB Villamor Branch.
Dabao and the cashier of the PNB Villamor branch counted the money after
RULING: which, Tabuena took delivery thereof. The P25 Million in cash was delivered
Yes. Under Article XII sec 17 of the constitution pertains to the right of the on the same day to the office of Mrs. Gimenez. Mrs. Gimenez did not issue
State in times of national emergency, and in the exercise of its police power, any receipt for the money received. Similar circumstances surrounded the
to temporarily take over the operation of any business affected with public second withdrawal/encashment and delivery of another P25 Million, made on
interest. The duration of the emergency itself is the determining factor as to 16 January 1986. The third and last withdrawal was made on 31 January 1986
how long the temporary takeover by the government would last. The temporary for P5 Million. Peralta was Tabuena’s co-signatory to the letter- request for a
takeover by the government extends only to the operation of the business and manager’s check for this amount. Peralta accompanied Tabuena to the PNB
not to the ownership thereof. As such the government is not required to Villamor branch as Tabuena requested him to do the counting of the P5 Million.
compensate the private entity-owner of the said business as there is no After the counting, the money was loaded in the trunk of Tabuena’s car. Peralta
transfer of ownership, whether permanent or temporary. The private entity- did not go with Tabuena to deliver the money to Mrs. Gimenez’ office. It was
owner affected by the temporary takeover cannot, likewise, claim just only upon delivery of the P5 Million that Mrs. Gimenez issued a receipt for all
compensation for the use of the said business and its properties as the the amounts she received from Tabuena. The receipt was dated January
temporary takeover by the government is in exercise of its police power and 30,1986. Tabuena and Peralta were charged for malversation of funds, while
not of its power of eminent domain. Thus, requiring the government to pay Dabao remained at large.. On 12 October 1990, they were found guilty beyond
reasonable compensation for the reasonable use of the property pursuant to reasonable doubt. Tabuena and Peralta filed separate petitions for review,
the operation of the business contravenes the Constitution. appealing the Sandiganbayan decision dated 12 October 19990 and the
Resolution of 20 December 1991.
POWER OF TAXATION
Issue:
DUE PROCESS
Whether or not petitioners are guilty of the crime of malversation.
188. LUIS A. TABUENA, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN,
Ruling:
and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
No, Luis Tabuena and Adolfo Peralta are acquitted of the crime of
G.R. Nos. 103501-03 February 17, 1997
malversation. Tabuena acted in strict compliance with the MARCOS
Doctrine: No law that makes the payment of an obligation illegal. Memorandum. The order emanated from the Office of the President and bears
the signature of the President himself, the highest official of the land. It carries
Facts: Then President Marcos instructed Luis Tabuena over the phone to pay with it the presumption that it was regularly issued. And on its face, the
directly to the president’s office and in cash what the Manila International memorandum is patently lawful for no law makes the payment of an obligation
Airport Authority (MIAA) owes the Philippine National Construction illegal. This fact, coupled with the urgent tenor for its execution constrains one
Corporation (PNCC), pursuant to the 7 January 1985 memorandum of then to act swiftly without question.
Minister Trade and Industry Roberto Ongpin. Tabuena agreed. About a week
later, Tabuena received from Mrs. Fe Roa-Gimenez, then private secretary of 189. RESTITUTO YNOT, PETITIONER, VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
Marcos, a Presidential Memorandum dated January 8, 1986 reiterating in COURT
black and white such verbal instruction. In obedience to President Marcos’
G.R. NO. 74457 MARCH 20, 1987
verbal instruction and memorandum, Tabuena, with the help of Gerardo G.
Dabao and Adolfo Peralta, caused the release of P55 Million of MIAA funds by Doctrine: The executive act defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner
means of three (3) withdrawals. On 10 January 1986, the first withdrawal was and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. Due
made for P25 Million, following a letter of even date signed by Tabuena and process was not properly observed.
Dabao requesting the PNB extension office at the MIAA the depository branch
193
Facts:The former President Ferdinand E. Marcos has given orders prohibiting Issue: Whether or not treaty stipulations must take precedence over an
the interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos individual’s due process rights?
not complying with the requirements of Executive Order No. 626, effective
October 25, 1980. Ruling::The court ruled that the human right of person and the accused
guaranteed in the Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights
On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat claimed by a contracting party, the doctrine of incorporation is applied
from Masbate to Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the police station whenever the municipal tribunal are confronted with a situation where there is
commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. 626-A. A case a conflict between a rule of international law and Constitution. However, the
was filed by the petitioner questioning the constitutionality of executive order provision must be harmonize to give effect to both,but if conflict is
and the recovery of the carabaos. After considering the merits of the case, the irreconcilable, municipal law must be upheld. Eventhough the International
confiscation was sustained and the court declined to rule on the Law has been made part of the law of the land, it does not imply the primacy
constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate of international law over municipal law. In state where the Constitution is the
Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC. supreme law of the land, both statute and treaties maybe invalidated if they
are in conflict with the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not E.O. 626-A is unconstitutional?
.The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for "justice
Ruling: The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive outside legality," since private respondents due process rights, although not
act defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees.
punishment, which was carried out forthright. Due process was not properly Therefore, Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the
observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant him a reasonable
police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.
filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of Php 12,000.00.
The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving EQUAL PROTECTION
him a chance to be heard, therefore petitioner was denied of due process.
191. Serrano vs Gallant
190. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. HON. RALPH C. LANTION
G.R. No. 167614
G.R. No. 139465 January 18, 2000
Doctrine: The standards for judicial review include deferential or rational basis
Doctrine: The Doctrine of Incorporation is applied whenever the municipal scrutiny which shows that the classification is rationally related to legitimate
tribunal are confronted with a situation where there is a conflict between a rule state interest, intermediate scrutiny which should show that the classification
of international law and Constitution. However, the provision must be serves an important state interest with it also being at least substantially
harmonize to give effect to both,but if conflict is irreconcilable, municipal law related to serving the said interest and strict judicial scrutiny which should
must be upheld. Eventhough the International Law has been made part of the show that there is a compelling state interest for the classification since it
law of the land, it does not imply the primacy of international law over municipal infringes on the fundamental rights of the members of the class affected by the
law. said classification.
FACTS: The Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Facts: Petitioner questions the validity of Section 10 of RA 8042. The said
Affairs a request from the United States for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to section provides that those workers whose contracts exceed 1 year will only
the United States pursuant to PD No. 1609 prescribing the procedure for have reimbursement corresponding to the unexpired portion of their service or
extradition of persons who have committed a crime in a foreign country. reimbursement equivalent to three months of service whichever is lower if it is
Jimenez requested for copies of the request and that he be given ample time a claim based on dismissal without valid or just cause.
to comment on the said request. The petitioners denied the request pursuant
to the RP-US Extradition Treaty. Issue: Whether or not the case is subject to judicial review.

194
Ruling: Yes. The standards for judicial review include deferential or rational examination/investigation, and that their findings as to the existence thereof
basis scrutiny which shows that the classification is rationally related to constitute sufficient basis for the issuance of warrants of arrest by the court.
legitimate state interest, intermediate scrutiny which should show that the
classification serves an important state interest with it also being at least Issues: Whether the certification of the investigating fiscal in the information
substantially related to serving the said interest and strict judicial scrutiny as to the existence of probable cause obligates respondent City Judge to issue
which should show that there is a compelling state interest for the classification a warrant of arrest.
since it infringes on the fundamental rights of the members of the class Whether or not the respondent city judge may, for the purpose of issuing a
affected by the said classification. The government has burden to prove the warrant of arrest, compel the fiscal to submit to the court the supporting
compelling state interest and that the classification is the least restrictive affidavits and other documentary evidence presented during the preliminary
means to protect such interest. investigation.
Section 10 of RA 8042 is invalid since it introduced a computation of the money Held:
claims of illegally dismissed OFWs based on their employment periods
thereby singling out those whose contracts have an unexpired portion of one 1. No.
year or more and subjecting them to the peculiar disadvantage of having their
2. Yes.
monetary awards limited to their salaries for 3 months or for the unexpired
portion thereof, whichever is less but all the while sparing the others from such The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it calls for the
prejudice, simply because the latter's unexpired contracts fall short of one exercise of judicial discretion on the part of the issuing magistrate. This is
year. Subjecting it to strict judicial scrutiny the Court found no definitive clear from the following provisions of Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court:
governmental purpose for the said classification making it invalid.
“Warrant of arrest, when issued. – If the judge be satisfied from the preliminary
SEARCH AND SEIZURE examination conducted by him or by the investigating officer that the offense
complained of has been committed and that there is reasonable ground to
192. Placer vs. Villanueva, 126 SCRA 463
believe that the accused has committed it, he must issue a warrant or order
G.R. Nos. 60349-62, December 29, 1983 for his arrest.”

Doctrine: The judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause Under this section, the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable
before issuing a warrant or order of arrest. If on the face of the information the cause before issuing a warrant or order of arrest. If on the face of the
judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal’s certification and information the judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard
require the submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a the fiscal’s certification and require the submission of the affidavits of
conclusion as to the existence of a probable cause. witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of a
probable cause. This has been the rule
Facts: Following receipt of informations from petitioners that probable cause since U.S. vs. Ocampo and Amarga vs. Abbas. And this evidently is the
has been established which necessitates the issuance of warrants of arrest, reason for the issuance by respondent of the questioned orders of April 13,
respondent judge issued an order the hearing of said criminal cases for the 15, 16, 19, 1982 and July 13, 1982. Without the affidavits of the prosecution
purpose of determining the propriety of issuing the corresponding warrants of witnesses and other evidence which, as a matter of long-standing practice had
arrest. After said hearing, respondent issued the questioned orders requiring been attached to the informations filed in his sala, respondent found
petitioners to submit to the court the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses the informations inadequate bases for the determination of probable
and other documentary evidence in support of the informations to aid him in cause. For as the ensuing events would show, after petitioners had submitted
the exercise of his power of judicial review of the findings of probable cause the required affidavits, respondent wasted no time in issuing the warrants of
by petitioners arrest in the cases where he was satisfied that probable cause existed.
Petitioners contended that under P.D. Nos. 77 and 911, they are authorized to
determine the existence of a probable cause in a preliminary
195
The obvious purpose of requiring the submission of affidavits of the affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving
complainant and of his witnesses is to enable the court to determine whether his right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law
to dismiss the case outright or to require further proceedings. does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-
affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is
193. Soliven vs. Makasiar, required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-
167 SCRA 393 affidavits if he is so minded.

Doctrine: What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal (2) What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal
responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable
cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance
of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure,
he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents
Facts: Pres. Cory Aquino filed a criminal complaint for libel against Beltran. submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the
Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds
suit impose a correlative disability to file suit". He contends that if criminal no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the
proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
she may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
under the trial court's jurisdiction. This would in an indirect way defeat her
privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden
be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury. Beltran also with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints
contends that he could not be held liable for libel because of the privileged instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their
character of the publication. He also says that to allow the libel case to proceed courts.
would produce a “chilling effect” on press freedom. (3) The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from
Issues: suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any
hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the
(1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process when informations for Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's time,
libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima also demands undivided attention.
facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently,
by the President; But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of
the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other
(2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when person in the President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which
respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a
examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
cause; and
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from
(3) whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection
initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of
complaint-affidavit. whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's
prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other
Held:
person.
(1) The allegation of denial of due process of law in the preliminary
investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter-
196
(4) Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts. Court finds no basis at this preliminary investigation is judicial in nature and is lodged with the judge. In
stage to rule on the “chilling effect” point. (Soliven vs. Makasiar, G.R. No. making the required personal determination, a judge is not precluded from
82585, November 14, 1988) relying on the evidence earlier gathered by responsible officers. The extent of
reliance depend s on the circumstances of each case and is subject to the
194. Cruz vs. Judge Areola, judge’s sound discretion . It is not obligatory, but merely discretionary, upon
March 6, 2002 the investigating judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused, even
after having personally examined the complainant and his witnesses in the
Doctrine: Issuance of a warrant of arrest is discretionary upon the investigating form of searching questions and answers. For the determination of whether a
judge. probable cause exists and whether it is necessary to arrest the accused in
order not to frustrate the ends of justice, is left to his sound judgment or
FACTS: On November 26, 1998, the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation
discretion. It appears from the records that the challenged Orders issued by
Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman issued a Resolution recommending
the respondent Judge were not at all baseless. The respondent Judge merely
the filing of an Information for Estafa against Marilyn Carreon, an employee of
exercised his sound discretion in not immediately is suing the warrant of arrest
the Land Transportation Office, based on the complaint filed by herein
and in suspending further proceedings pending reinvestigation of the case. On
complainants. The Office of the City Prosecutor found no cogent reason to
her part, respondent Branch Clerk of Court cannot be faulted for performing a
reverse, modify, or alter the resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman and
ministerial function, that is, releasing Orders duly signed by the respondent
recommended that the case be set for trial. Complainants filed the instant
Judge.
complaint charging both respondent Judge and his Branch Clerk of Court with
ignorance of the law. Complainants take issue of the fact that although 195. Burgos vs. Chief of Staff,
respondent Judge already issued a warrant of arrest, he still deferred its
implementation to give way to a reinvestigation of the case on motion of the G.R. No. L-64261
accused. They believe that there is no longer any reason why the respondent
Doctrine: Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and
Judge should withhold the issuance of a warrant of arrest considering that the
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
Office of the City Prosecutor already made a finding that there exists probable
believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
cause to indict the accused. In their Joint Comment, respondent Judge
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. And when
manifests that the issuance of a warrant of arrest is not a ministerial function
the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or
of a judge as he is mandated to determine the existence of probable cause
editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, as in the case
before issuing a warrant. Respondent Branch Clerk of Court, on the other
at bar, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a
hand, claims that it is a ministerial duty on her part to release duly signed
specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has
orders, resolutions and decisions of the presiding judge of her branch.
published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Judge erred in deferring the
Facts: The "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum” newspapers were searched
implementation s of the warrant of arrest.
and its office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles
HELD: NO. and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said
newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written
The 1987 Constitution provides that no warrant of arrest shall issue except literature alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos,
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized based on the
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he strength of the two [2] search warrants issued by respondent Judge Ernani
may produce. Preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to whether Cruz-Pano. Petitioners averred that the search warrant should be declared
it is an investigation for the determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of illegal because:
the information r it is an investigation for the determination of a probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first kind of preliminary investigation
is executive in nature. It is part of the prosecution’s job. The second kind of
197
1. The judge failed to conduct an examination under oath or affirmation of the punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as amended ..." is a mere
applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted constitutional conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable
provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of
probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as the basis for the issuance of
2. There are two (2) search warrants issued but pinpointed only one place where a search warrant and it was a grave error for the respondent judge to have
petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was allegedly keeping and concealing the articles done so.
listed.
196. Pangandaman vs. Casar,
3. That the articles belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani
G.R. No. 71782
Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized although the
warrants were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. Alone. Doctrine: Warrants of arrest should particularly describe the person or persons
to be seized.
4. That real property was seized under the disputed warrants like machinery,
receptacles, instruments, etc. Facts: The shooting incident by armed men in Lanao led to the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. Petitioners assert that the respondent Judge issued a
5. The search warrant was based only on the affidavits of Col. Abadilla’s that they warrant of arrest against fifty (50) “John Does” transgressing the Constitutional
conducted surveillance of the premises could not have provided sufficient basis provision requiring that such warrants should particularly describe the persons
for the finding of a probable cause. or things to be seized.

Issue: Whether said warrant is valid

Respondents insinuates that petitioners are estopped by laches that they only
impugned the search warrant six months later. Held: No.
Issue: Insofar as said warrant is issued against fifty (50) “John Does” not one of whom
the witnesses to the complaint could or would identify, it is of the nature of a
WON there is probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant.
general warrant, one of a class of writs long proscribed as unconstitutional
Held: and once anathematized as “totally subversive of the liberty of the
subject.”[30] Clearly violative of the constitutional injunction that warrants
NO. The search warrant is in the nature of general warrants. of arrest should particularly describe the person or persons to be
seized,[31] the warrant must, as regards its unidentified subjects, be voided.
Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense WHEREFORE, the warrant complained of is upheld and declared valid insofar
has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense as it orders the arrest of the petitioners. Said warrant is voided to the extent
are in the place sought to be searched. And when the search warrant applied that it is issued against fifty (50) “John Does.” The respondent Judge is
for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the directed to forward to the Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Sur the record of the
publication of subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the application and/or preliminary investigation of the complaint in Criminal Case No. 1748 of his
its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity court for further appropriate action.
the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to
publish. Mere generalization will not suffice. 197. Kho vs. Judge Makalintal, April 21, 1999

The broad statement in Col. Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in G.R. No. 94902-06.
possession or has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia,
news publications and other documents which were used and are all Doctrine: The Judge was the one who personally examined the applicants and
continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion witnesses and who asked searching questions vis-a-vis the applications for
search warrants. He was thus able to observe and determine whether subject
198
applicants and their witnesses gave accurate accounts of the surveillance and to a large extent upon the finding or opinion of the judge who conducted the
investigation they conducted at the premises to be searched. In the absence required examination of the applicants and the witnesses.
of any showing that respondent judge was recreant of his duties in connection
with the personal examination he so conducted on the affiants before him,
there is no basis for doubting the reliability and correctness of his findings and After a careful study, the Court discerns no basis for disturbing the findings
impressions. and conclusions arrived at by the respondent Judge after examining the
Facts: Petitioners sought to restrain the respondent NBI from using the objects applicants and witnesses. Respondent judge had the singular opportunity to
seized by virtue of such warrants in any case or cases filed or to be filed assess their testimonies and to find out their personal knowledge of facts and
against them and to return immediately the said items, including the firearms, circumstances enough to create a probable cause. The Judge was the one
ammunition and explosives, radio communication equipment, hand sets, who personally examined the applicants and witnesses and who asked
transceivers, two units of vehicles and motorcycle. searching questions vis-a-vis the applications for search warrants. He was
thus able to observe and determine whether subject applicants and their
Petitioners question the issuance of subject search warrants, theorizing upon witnesses gave accurate accounts of the surveillance and investigation they
the absence of any probable cause therefor. They contend that the conducted at the premises to be searched. In the absence of any showing
surveillance and investigation conducted by NBI agents within the premises that respondent judge was recreant of his duties in connection with the
involved, prior to the application for the search warrants under controversy, personal examination he so conducted on the affiants before him, there is no
were not sufficient to vest in the applicants personal knowledge of facts and basis for doubting the reliability and correctness of his findings and
circumstances showing or indicating the commission of a crime by them impressions.
(petitioners).
198. People vs. Salanguit, April 19, 2001
Issue: Whether petitioners’ contention of the absence of probable cause in the
given situation is tenable. GR Nos. 133254-55

Held: Petitioners’ contention is untenable. Records show that the NBI agents Doctrine: Not being in a transparent container, the contents wrapped in
who conducted the surveillance and investigation testified unequivocably that newsprint could not have been readily discernible as marijuana. That being
they saw guns being carried to and unloaded at the two houses searched, and said, we hold that the marijuana is inadmissible in evidence against Salanguit
motor vehicles and spare parts were stored therein. In fact, applicant Max B.
FACTS: Two criminal cases were filed against Salanguit, the first for
Salvador declared that he personally attended the surveillance together with
possession/use of shabu, and the second, for possession/use of marijuana.
his witnesses (TSN, May 15, 1990, pp. 2-3), and the said witnesses personally
Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied in the RTC of Cavite a warrant to search the premises
saw the weapons being unloaded from motor vehicles and carried to the
of Robert Salanguit for shabu and shabu paraphernalias. He presented as a
premises referred to. NBI Agent Ali Vargas testified that he actually saw the
witness Edmund Badua, an undercover officer, which transacted with
firearms being unloaded from a Toyota Lite-Ace van and brought to the
Salanguit for the purchase of shabu.
aformentioned house in BF Homes, Paranaque because he was there inside
the compound posing as an appliance agent (TSN, May 15, 1990, pp. 4-5). It The application was granted and the team of Aguilar proceeded to the
is therefore decisively clear that the application for the questioned search premises of Salanguit in QC to serve the warrant. The operatives proceeded
warrants was based on the personal knowledge of the applicants and their to knock on Salanguit’s door but the same was left unanswered. The
witnesses. operatives heard people panicking inside the house and they began to force
their way inside the house. They indicated their authority to conduct the search
In the case of Central Bank v. Morfe (20 SCRA 507), this Court ruled that the
and began which yielded to the finding of clear plastic bags with shabu and 2
question of whether or not a probable cause exists is one which must be
bricks of dried marijuana leaves covered in newspaper.
determined in light of the conditions obtaining in given situations. In Luna v.
Plaza (26 SCRA 310), it held that the existence of a probable cause depends Salanguit refused to sign the receipt for the confiscated drugs. During his
arraignment, he pleaded not guilty and in the trial court, he gave stated that he
199
never got the chance to review the purported warrant that Aguilar and his team 3. Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant and
has. He further stated that the operatives ate their food and took his cash and thus known to the police operatives, it is reasonable to assume that
valuable, as well as canned goods. the police found the packets and shabu first. Once the valid portion of
The RTC found him guilty for possession/use of shabu and marijuana. the search warrant has been executed, the plain view doctrine can no
Salanguit appealed the said decision and argues that the shabu allegedly longer provide basis for admitting the other items subsequently found.
recovered from his residence is inadmissible as evidence against him on the The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There was no
ground that the warrant used to obtain it was invalid and that the marijuana apparent illegality to justify their seizure. Not being in a transparent
seized from him was also inadmissible as evidence against him pursuant to container, the contents wrapped in newsprint could not have been
the plain view doctrine, and that the operatives employed unnecessary force readily discernible as marijuana. That being said, we hold that the
in executing the warrant. marijuana is inadmissible in evidence against Salanguit.
ISSUES:
199. Paper Industries Corp. vs. Asuncion,
1. W/N the warrant used to seize the shabu was valid and the said shabu was
inadmissible in evidence against him. 307 SCRA 253
2. W/N the marijuana seized was admissible in evidence against Salanguit Doctrine: The requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause is
pursuant to plain view doctrine. present; (2) such presence is determined personally by the judge; (3) the
HELD: complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce are personally
examined by the judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation; (4) the
1. Yes, all the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant were satisfied. applicant and the witnesses testify on facts personally known to them; and (5)
the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to
2. No, the marijuana was not one of the drugs indicated in the warrant and it
be seized.
was not in plain view when it was seized.
FACTS: On January 25, 1995, Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua
RATIO:
applied for a search warrant before the RTC of Quezon City, stating: 1. That
1. The warrant authorized the seizure of undetermined quantity of shabu and the management of Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at
drug paraphernalia. Salanguit contends that it should be void as it did not PICOP compound, is in possession or ha[s] in [its] control high powered
indicate the existence of drug paraphernalias. The warrant was valid as to the firearms, ammunitions, explosives, which are the subject of the offense, or
seizure of shabu and void as to the seizure of drug paraphernalia. It is to be used or intended to be used in committing the offense, and which . . . are [being
noted that no drug paraphernalia was seized. Salanguit further contends that kept] and conceal[ed] in the premises described; 2. That a Search Warrant
the warrant was issued for more than one specific offense because possession should be issued to enable any agent of the law to take possession and bring
or uses are punished under two different provisions in the Dangerous Drugs to the described properties. After propounding several questions to Bacolod,
Act. This Court has decided in the case of People v Dichoso that a warrant Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued the contested search warrant. On
that does not specify what provisions of the law were violated, is valid as to February 4, 1995, the police enforced the search warrant at the PICOP
the authority to search and seize marijuana, shabu and drug paraphernalias. compound and seized a number of firearms and explosives. Believing that the
Lastly, Salanguit argues that the search warrant failed to indicate the place to warrant was invalid and the search unreasonable, the petitioners filed a
be searched with sufficient particularity. The rule is that a description of the “Motion to Quash” before the trial court. Subsequently, they also filed a
place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with “Supplemental Pleading to the Motion to Quash” and a “Motion to
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place to be searched. The location SuppressEvidence.” On March 23, 1995, the RTC issued the first contested
of Salanguit’s house being indicated by the evidence on record, there can be Order which denied petitioners’ motions. On August 3, 1995, the trial court
no doubt that the warrant described the place to be searched with sufficient rendered its second contested Order denying petitioners’ Motion for
particularity. Reconsideration.
200
ISSUE: WON the search warrant issued was valid The police team was able to overtake and arrest appellant at the corner of C.
Quimpo and Veterans Sts. The police recovered 19 sticks and 4 teabags of
HELD: The requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause is marijuana from the cart inside the chapel and another teabag from Macabante,
present; (2) such presence is determined personally by the judge; (3) the
complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce are personally Accused appealed that the marijuana teabags were seized without serving
examined by the judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation; (4) the upon him a search warrant.
applicant and the witnesses testify on facts personally known to them; and (5)
the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to The accused-appellant contends that his arrest was illegal, is a violation of his
be seized. In the present case, the search warrant is invalid because (1) the rights granted under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
trial court failed to examine personally the complainant and the other He stresses that there was sufficient time for the police officers to apply for a
deponents; (2) SPO3 Cicero Bacolod, who appeared during the hearing for search and arrest warrants considering that Fulgencio informed his Station
the issuance of the search warrant, had no personal knowledge that petitioners Commander of the activities of the accused two days before March 21, 1989,
were not licensed to possess the subject firearms; and (3) the place to be the date of his arrest.
searched was not described with particularity.
ISSUE:
WARRANTLESS ARREST
WON the arrest without warrant of the accused is lawful and consequently
200.People vs. Sucro, 195 SCRA 388
WON the evidence resulting from such arrest is admissible.
G.R. No. 93239 March 18, 1991
HELD:
Doctrine: The general rule is that searches and seizures must be supported
by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule... Among the exceptions granted by YES. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the
law is a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the RCP instances where an arrest without warrant is considered lawful. The rule states:
which provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
Arrest without warrant, when lawful. — A peace officer or private person may,
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an
without a warrant, arrest a person:
offense, without a search warrant.
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
Facts:
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
Roy Fulgencio, a member of the INP, Kalibo, Aklan, was instructed by their
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
Station Commander to monitor the activities of appellant Edison Sucro,
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
because of information gathered by Seraspi that Sucro was selling marijuana
(Emphasis supplied)
As planned Roy Fulgencio monitored the activities of the accused under the
An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within
house of Regalado and near the chapel where the accused was selling
the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the
marijuana to a group of persons around 5 pm.
officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances
Pat reported this to their station commander and instructed him to continue his created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof.
monitoring.
From the records of the case, Fulgencio saw Sucro three times dealing drugs
At about 6:30 P.M., Pat. Fulgencio again called up Seraspi to report that a third inside the chapel where he is 2 meters away monitoring his nefarious activities
buyer later Identified as Ronnie Macabante, was transacting with appellant. then after the 3rd deal, the police intercepted the buyer Macabante and when
confronted by the police, Macabante readily admitted that he bought the
At that point, after Macabante bought from the accused, they pursue marijuana from Sucro. Therefore, Sucro had just committed an illegal act of
Macabante and told them he bought it from herein accused-appellant.
201
which the police officers had personal knowledge, being members of the team  when it is made on vessels and aircraft for violation of customs laws;
which monitored accused-appellants nefarious activity.
 when it is made on automobiles for the purpose of preventing
The accused questions the failure of the police officers to secure a warrant
violations of smuggling or immigration laws;
considering that Fulgencio himself knew of Sucro's activities even prior to the
former's joining the police force. Fulgencio reported Sucro's activities only  when it involves prohibited articles in plain view;
three days before the incident.

As the records reveal, Fulgencio and Sucro had known each other since their  in cases of inspection of buildings and other premises for the
childhood years and that after Fulgencio joined the police force, he told the enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations,
accused-appellant not to sell drugs in their locality. Hence, it is possible that
FACTS: A search, to be valid, must generally be authorized by a search
because of this friendship, Fulgencio hesitated to report his childhood friend
warrant duly issued by the proper government authority
and merely advised him not to engage in such activity. However, because of
reliable information was given by some informants that selling was going on The police officers of Ibalon, Legaspi City, received a confidential information
every day, he was constrained to report the matter to the Station Commander. regarding an ongoing illegal traffic of prohibited drugs in Tagas, Daraga, Albay.
On the other hand, the failure of the police officers to secure a warrant stems The police officer (Taduran) acted as a poseur-buyer. He was told by the
from the fact that their knowledge acquired from the surveillance was informant to look for a certain Don, the alleged seller of prohibited drugs.
insufficient to fulfill the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant. What
is paramount is that probable cause existed. Taduran went to Tagas alone and, while along the road, he met Samuel
Segovia. He asked Segovia where be could find Don and where he could buy
The general rule is that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid marijuana. Segovia left for a while and when be returned, he was accompanied
warrant is not an absolute rule... Among the exceptions granted by law is a by a man who was later on introduced to him as Don, herein appellant.
search incidental to a lawful arrest under Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the RCP which
provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous After agreeing on the price (P200.00) for 100 grams of marijuana, Don left
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an Taduran and Segovia and when he came back, he’s already bringing with him
offense, without a search warrant. a plastic containing Marijuana. Thereafter, Taduran returned to the
headquarters and made a report regarding his said purchase of marijuana.
Since the arrest was considered valid, the evidence presented is admissible in
evidence. Based on that information, they apprehended the accused without a warrant
of arrest.
Hence, this Court is convinced that appellant Edison Sucro had indeed
committed the offense charged. The trial court's decision must be upheld. Thereafter, NARCOM agents raided without a search warrant the house of the
father(Jovencio Rodrigueza) of herein accused-appellant. During the raid, they
201. People vs. Rodrigueza, 205 SCRA 791 were able to confiscate dried marijuana leaves and a plastic syringe, among
others.
G.R. No. 95902 February 4, 1992
The next 2 days, the father was released and Don and co-accused remained.
Doctrine: True, in some instances, this Court has allowed government
authorities to conduct searches and seizures even without a search warrant. The three accused (Don, Segovia, Lonceras) presented different versions of
their alleged participation.
 when the owner of the premises waives his right against such
incursion; TC found Don Rodrigueza guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section
4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425, as
 when the search is incidental to a lawful arrest; amended) while the two co-accused were acquitted.

202
Hence, this appeal raising the issue of the legality of his arrest. The Court further notes the confusion and ambiguity in the identification of the
confiscated marijuana leaves and other prohibited drug paraphernalia
ISSUE: presented as evidence against appellant.
WON the warrantless arrest was in consonance to his constitutional right From the records of the case, Taduran (poseur-buyer) bought 100 grams of
HELD: marijuana from Don but the evidence presented were the prohibited articles
were among those confiscated during the so-called follow-up raid in the house
NO. The arrest and seizure were illegally conducted. of Jovencio Rodrigueza.
As provided in the present Constitution, a search, to be valid, must generally The unanswered question then arises as to the identity of the marijuana leaves
be authorized by a search warrant duly issued by the proper government that became the basis of appellant's conviction. In People vs. Rubio, this
authority. True, in some instances, this Court has allowed government Court had the occasion to rule that the plastic bag and the dried marijuana
authorities to conduct searches and seizures even without a search warrant. leaves contained therein constitute the corpus delicti of the crime. As such,
the existence thereof must be proved with certainty and conclusiveness.
 when the owner of the premises waives his right against such Failure to do so would be fatal to the cause of the prosecution.
incursion;
Finally, the Court has repeatedly ruled that to sustain the conviction of the
 when the search is incidental to a lawful arrest; accused, the prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and
not on the weakness of the defense. 31 As clearly shown by the evidence, the
 when it is made on vessels and aircraft for violation of customs laws; prosecution has failed to establish its cause. It has not overcome the
presumption of innocence accorded to appellant. This being the case,
 when it is made on automobiles for the purpose of preventing appellant should not be allowed to suffer for unwarranted and imaginary
violations of smuggling or immigration laws; imputations against him.

 when it involves prohibited articles in plain view; 202. People vs. Nuevas, February 22, 2007

Title: People of the Philippines Vs Jesus Nuevas y Garcia, Reynaldo Din y

 in cases of inspection of buildings and other premises for the
Gonzaga and Fernando Inocensio y Abadeos, 516 SCRA 463, GR 170233
enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations,
(February 22, 2007)
In the case at bar, however, the raid conducted by the NARCOM agents in the Doctrine: Our Constitution states that a search and seizure must be carried
house of Jovencio Rodrigueza was not authorized by any search warrant. through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure become
It does not appear, either, that the situation falls under any of the "unreasonable" and any evidence obtained therefrom is inadmissible for any
aforementioned cases above. purpose in any proceeding.

Facts:
Hence, appellant's right against unreasonable search and seizure was clearly
violated. The NARCOM agents could not have justified their act by invoking Police officer received information that a certain male person a man would
the urgency and necessity of the situation because the testimonies of the make a delivery of marijuana dried leaves. While stationed thereat, they saw
prosecution witnesses reveal that the place had already been put under a male person who fit the description, carrying a plastic bag, who was Nuevas.
surveillance for quite some time. Had it been their intention to conduct the raid,
then they should, because they easily could, have first secured a search They confronted the latter and ask. Later on, Nuevas voluntarily pointed to the
warrant during that time. police officers a plastic bag which, when opened, contained marijuana dried
leaves and bricks wrapped in a blue cloth. Nuevas disclosed where the two (2)
other male persons would make the delivery of marijuana weighing more or
less five (5) kilos.
203
The police officers together with Nuevas, then proceeded the place where 2. Search of evidence in "plain view." The elements are: (a) a prior valid
according to Nuevas was where his two (2) companions, Din and Inocencio, intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are
could be located. From there, they saw and approached two (2) persons along legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence
the National Highway, introducing themselves as police officers. Din was was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be
carrying a light blue plastic bag. where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; (d)
When asked, Din disclosed that the bag belonged to Nuevas. Officers then "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;
took the bag and upon inspection found inside it "marijuana packed in
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the
newspaper and wrapped therein." are violated.
vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially
All of the said materials are confiscated and the 3 are arrested. The trial court when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
found them guilty with illegal possession of marijuana in violation of Section 8, suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed
Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended. Nuevas, by manifestation, a criminal activity;
waived his right of appeal.
4. Consented warrantless search;
The appellate court found Fami and Cabling’s version of how appellants were
apprehended to be categorical and clear. However the other 2 filed there 5. Customs search;
recourse in the Court of Appeals base on their allegations that they are not
guilty and their constitutional rights against warrantless arrest. However, the 6. Stop and Frisk; and
appellate court stated that the search in the instant case is exempted from the
requirement of a judicial warrant as appellants themselves waived their right 7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.
against unreasonable searches and seizures. According to the appellate court,
both Cabling and Fami testified that Din voluntarily surrendered the bag. In the instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or
Appellants never presented evidence to rebut the same. Thus, in the instant seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except without a warrant, what
case, the exclusionary rule does not apply. Hence, the petition. constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial
question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved,
Issue: including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of
probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the
Whether or not the arrest was valid?
place or thing searched and the character of the articles procured.
Ruling:
Arrest must precede the search. A search substantially contemporaneous with
No. an arrest can make the arrest as the outset of the search. Reliable information
alone is not a sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under Sec. 5(a), Rule
The conviction or acquittal of appellants rests on the validity of the warrantless 113. A peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an
searches and seizure made by the police officers and the admissibility of the invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy
evidence obtained by virture thereof. of the law. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a
Our Constitution states that a search and seizure must be carried through or waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal
with a judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure become warrantless arrest.
"unreasonable" and any evidence obtained therefrom is inadmissible for any In Nuevas’s case, the Court is convinced that he indeed voluntarily
purpose in any proceeding. The constitutional proscription, however, is not surrendered the incriminating bag to the police officers. Thus, the Court would
absolute but admits of exceptions, namely: have affirmed Nuevas’s conviction had he not withdrawn his appeal.
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. (Sec. 12, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence);
204
However, with respect to the search conducted in the case of Din, the Court and Totoy Echigoren and Gerente carried out their plan to kill Clarito Blace at
finds that no such consent had actually been given. Thus, their arrest was about 2:00 p.m. of the same day. The prosecution witness, Edna Edwina
indeed a violation of their rights. The arrest was an invalid warrantless arrest. Reyes, testified that she witnessed the killing. Fredo Echigoren struck the first
blow against Clarito Blace, followed by Totoy Echigoren and Gabriel Gerente
203. People vs. Del Rosario, April 14, 1999 who hit him twice with a piece of wood in the head and when he fell, Totoy
G.R. NO. 109633 Echigoren dropped a hollow block on the victim’s head. Thereafter, the three
men dragged Blace to a place behind the house of Gerente. At about 4:00 p.m.
Doctrine: Sec 2 art. III of the constitution specifically provides that a search of the same day, Patrolman Jaime Urrutia of the Valenzuela Police Station
warrant must particularly describe the things to be seized. received a report from the Palo Police Detachment about a mauling incident.
He went to the Valenzuela District Hospital where the victim was brought. He
Facts: Accused was charged and convicted by the trial court of illegal
was informed by the hospital officials that the victim died on arrival. The cause
possession of firearms and illegal possession and sale of drugs, particularly
of death was massive fracture of the skull caused by a hard and heavy object.
methamphetamine or shabu. After the issuance of the search warrant, which
Right away, Patrolman Urrutia, together with Police Corporal Romeo Lima and
authorized the search and seizure of an undetermined quantity of
Patrolman Alex Umali, proceeded to Paseo de Blas where the mauling incident
methamphetamine and its paraphernalia’s, an entrapment was planned that
took place. There they found a piece of wood with blood stains, a hollow block
led to the arrest of del Rosario and to the seizure of the shabu, its
and two roaches of marijuana. They were informed by the prosecution witness,
paraphernalia’s and of a .22 caliber pistol with 3 live ammunition.
Edna Edwina Reyes that she saw the killing and she pointed to Gabriel
Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the firearms was proper. Gerente as one of the three men who killed Clarito. The policemen proceeded
to the house of the appellant who was then sleeping. They told him to come
Held: No. Sec 2 art. III of the constitution specifically provides that a search out of the house and they introduced themselves as policemen. Patrolman
warrant must particularly describe the things to be seized. In herein case, the Urrutia frisked appellant and found a coin purse in his pocket which contained
only objects to be seized that the warrant determined was the dried leaves wrapped in cigarette foil. The dried leaves were sent to the
methamphetamine and the paraphernalia’s therein. The seizure of the firearms National Bureau of Investigation for examination. The Forensic Chemist found
was unconstitutional. them to be marijuana. When arraigned the appellant pleaded not guilty to both
charges. A joint trial of the two cases was held. The trial court rendered a
Wherefore the decision is reversed and the accused is acquitted.
decision convicting him of Violation of Section 8 of R.A. 6425 and of Murder.
204. People vs. Gerente, 219 SCRA 746
Issue: Whether the Personal Knowledge of the policeman of the crime
G.R. No. 95847-48 committed by the accused is justified and valid in arresting the latter without
securing an arrest and search warrant.
Doctrine: A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons
or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, Held: Yes, “To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched
without a search warrant.” The frisk and search of appellant’s person upon his for the evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave
arrest was a permissible precautionary measure of arresting officers to protect society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and
themselves, for the person who is about to be arrested may be armed and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances.”
might attack them unless he is first disarmed. The policemen arrested Gerente only some 3 hours after Gerente and his
companions had killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when
Facts: Edna Edwina Reyes testified that appellant Gabriel Gerente, together they inspected the scene of the crime, they found the instruments of death: a
with Fredo Echigoren and Totoy Echigoren, started drinking liquor and piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to
smoking marijuana in the house of the appellant which is about six (6) meters bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the
away from the house of the prosecution witness who was in her house on that happening to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of
day. She overheard the three men talking about their intention to kill Clarito the killers. Under those circumstances, since the policemen had personal
Blace. Appellant allegedly agreed: “Sigue, papatayin natin mamaya.” Fredo knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente
205
and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a Issues:
warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he
would have fled the law as his two companions did. The search conducted on 1. W/N the arrest was valid?
Gerente’s person was likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to a
2. 2. W/N his constitutional rights was violated when he was
valid arrest. This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised
subjected to a police line-up without the assistance of a
Rules of Court which provides that Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person
lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which counsel?
may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search
Held:
warrant.” The frisk and search of appellant’s person upon his arrest was a
permissible precautionary measure of arresting officers to protect themselves, Accused-appellant invokes his right against warrantless arrests on the ground
for the person who is about to be arrested may be armed and might attack that there nothing on record show that his arrest for the minor offense of
them unless he is first disarmed. malicious mischief was effected by virtue of a warrant. He also points out to
the fact that he was arrested for the crime of killing the victim 3 months after
205. People vs.Salvatierra, July 24, 1997
the said commission of the crime, which according to him is sufficient time for
G.R. No. 104663, July 24, 1997 the police authorities to secure a warrant of arrest. In the present case, while
the arguments presented are plausible, the appellant is now estopped from
Doctrine: The right to counsel guaranteed in Art. III, Section 12(1) of the questioning the legality of his arrest considering that he never raised
Constitution does not extend to police lineups because they are not part of this before entering before entering his plea. Any objection objection involving
custodial investigations. involving a warrant o warrant of arrest or arrest or the procedure in procedure
in the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made
Facts: Accused-appellant David Salvatierra was found guilty of the crime of
before he enters his plea, otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.
murder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The
Voluntary submission to the jurisdiction jurisdiction of the court by active
facts of the case would show that the victim, Charlie Fernandez was walking
participation participation in the trial would cure any defect in the arrest made
along M. de la Fuente Street when a Fuente Street when suddenly, 3 persons
against him.
met suddenly, 3 persons met him including accused-appellant who lunged a
pointed instrument at the victim. The latter was able to parry the thrust but the Accused-appellant also claims that his right was violated because he was
appellant swung the instrument anew which hit the victim at the left instrument deprived of his constitutional right to counsel during the of his constitutional
anew which hit the victim at the left breast. breast. The said assault assault right to counsel during the police line-up. However, it is a well-settled olice line-
was witnessed witnessed by Milagros Milagros Martinez Martinez but due to up. However, it is a well-settled doctrine that the right to counsel does not
feat, she did not immediately report the incident to the authorities. As a result extend to police line-ups since at that point, the process has not yet
of the said assault, the victim died. Three months later, accused-appellant was shift process has not yet shifted from the investigatory ed from the
arrested due to a report that he was causing a commotion along Sampaloc investigatory to the accusatory. The ac to the accusatory. The accused’s
Manila. He was taken into custody by the police who then later ound out that cused’s right to counsel attaches only from the time that adversary judicial
he was one of the suspects in the killing of Charlie Fernandez. Accused- proceedings are taken against him. WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial
appellant was then rlie Fernandez. Accused-appellant was then turned over to court convicting appellant David Salvatierra of the crime of murder for the
the WPD wherein the witness Milagrosa identified him in the police line-up as killing of Charlie Fernandez of murder for the killing of Charlie Fernandez is
the one who stabbed Charlie. Thereafter, a booking sheet and arrest order hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Cost de oficio.
was prepared by the police and signed by the appellant. He was then charged
with murder and convicted of the same crime. Accused-appellant belies all
these assertions. On appeal, he faults the trial court for not finding that his
206. People vs Peralta
arrest, investigation and detention for the offense charged was violative of his
constitutional rights. G.R. No. 145176

206
 Doctrine: Objection as to the validity of a warrantless arrest must be Facts: Two complaints for grave oral defamation were filed against Faustina
raised before entering an accused’s plea, otherwise he is deemed to have Callanta. The City Judge of Dagupan City, Felipe Villanueva, denied the
waived the illegality of his arrest motions to quash the complaints. Thus, petitioner Callanta brought the suits
for certiorari in the Supreme Court. Petitioner questions the validity of the
Facts: Santiago Peralta and others were found guilty of qualified theft, issuance of warrant of arrest by respondent, arguing that the City Fiscal should
pleading not guilty on arraignment. have conducted the preliminary investigation. According to petitioner’s
The version of the prosecution, Ulysses Garcia, one of the accused, was counsel, there was jurisdictional infirmity. After the issuance of the warrants of
apprehended without a warrant while he was waiting for a passenger bus and arrest and the bail fixed at P600, petitioner posted the bail bond, thus obtaining
was brought to the police station for investigation. Garcia gave three separate her provisional liberty. The City Fiscal in this case did not disagree with the
statements admitting his guilt and participation in the crime charged. On the judge’s investigation, and agreed with the complaints filed.
side of the defense, Garcia was tortured on and it was Mr. Labita who gave Issue: Whether or Not petitioner there is valid waiver of right against
the statements. warrantless arrest
Atty. Sanchez manifested in open court that he did not assist accused- Held: Yes. With the admission by petitioner that she has posted the required
appellant Garcia when the police investigated accused-appellant Garcia, and bail to obtain her provisional liberty, it becomes futile to assail the validity of
that he signed x x x the three (3) sworn statements only as a witness thereto. the issuance of the warrants of arrest. As sprovided by Zacharias vs. Cruz,
Accused-appellant Garcia signed the alleged three sworn statements due to posting of a bail bond constitutes waiver of any irregularity attending the arrest
SPO4 Coronel’s warning that if he would not do so, he would again be tortured of a person, estops him from discussing the validity of his arrest. Luna v. Plaza:
by water cure. RTC ruled in favor of the prosecution. Where petitioner has filed an application for bail and waived the preliminary
Issue: whether or not there is valid waiver of right against warrantless arrest investigation proper, he waived his objection to whatever defect, if any, in the
preliminary examination conducted, prior to the issuance of the warrant of
Held: Yes. The police arrested Garcia without a warrant, while he had merely arrest.
been waiting for a passenger bus after being pointed out by the Cash
Department personnel of the BSP. At the time of his arrest, he had not 208.Larranaga vs CA
committed, was not committing, and was not about to commit any crime. G.R. No. 130644
Neither was he acting in a manner that would engender a reasonable ground
to suspect that he was committing a crime. None of the circumstances Doctrine: if the accused objects to the jurisdiction of the court over his person,
justifying an arrest without a warrant under Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules he may move to quash the information, but only on that ground. If, the accused
of Court was present. raises other grounds in the motion to quash, he is deemed to have waived that
objection and to have submitted his person to the jurisdiction of the court
Hence, Garcia was not lawfully arrested. Nonetheless, not having raised the
matter before entering his plea, he is deemed to have waived the illegality of Facts: Francisco Juan Larranaga is charged with two counts of kidnapping and
his arrest. Note, however, that this waiver is limited to the arrest. It does not serious illegal detention, presently detained at the Bagong Buhay
extend to the search made as an incident thereto or to the subsequent seizure Rehabilitation Center. He was arrested without a warrant, the prosecution
of evidence allegedly found during the search. alleging his offense was a continuing crime. He filed with this Court a petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with writs of preliminary prohibitory
207. Callanta vs Villuaneva and mandatory injunction.
G.R. Nos. L-24646 & L-24674 Larranaga alleged that he was denied the right to preliminary investigation and
Doctrine: posting of a bail bond constitutes waiver of any irregularity attending sought to annul the informations as well as the warrant of arrest issued in
the arrest of a person consequence thereof. In the alternative, he prayed that a preliminary
investigation be conducted and that he be released from detention pending
the investigation. He filed a supplemental petition for habeas corpus or bail.
207
The Solicitor General recommended that petitioner be accorded his right to Facts: Joseph Layong, a PC constable, put up a checkpoint at the junction of
preliminary investigation and that he be released from detention during the the roads, one going to Sagada and the other to with other PC soldiers. They
pendency thereof. stopped and checked all vehicles that went through the checkpoint. Layong
and his teammate, Constable David Osborne Famocod flagged down a cream-
The Court set aside the inquest investigation of the Larranaga and ordered the colored Ford Fiera bearing Plate No. ABT-634 coming from the Bontoc
Prosecutor of Cebu to conduct a regular preliminary investigation, immediate Poblacion and headed towards Baguio.
release of Larranaga pending his preliminary investigation, and Judge
Ocampo to cease and desist from proceeding with arraignment and trial. The vehicle was driven by appellant and had no passengers. Layong and his
companions asked permission to inspect the vehicle and appellant acceded to
The counsels for the prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing the request. When they peered into the rear of the vehicle, they saw a travelling
that Larranaga was charged with a continuing offense, thus, he was lawfully bag which was partially covered by the rim of a spare tire under the passenger
arrested without warrant. seat on the right side of the vehicle. Layong and his companions asked
Issue: Whether or not there is a valid waiver of right against warrantless arrest permission to see the contents of the bag. Appellant consented to the request
but told them that it only contained some clothes. When Layong opened the
Held: YES. The original warrantless arrest of the petitioner was doubtless bag, he found that it contained forty-one (41) plastic packets of different sizes
illegal. Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction containing pulverized substances. Layong gave a packet to his team leader,
over the person of the petitioner by virtue of the warrant of arrest it issued on constable David Osborne Fomocod, who, after sniffing the stuff concluded that
August 26, 1993 against him and the other accused in connection with the it was marijuana. The PC constables, together with appellant, boarded the
rape-slay cases. It was belated, to be sure, but it was nonetheless legal. latter’s Ford Fiera and proceeded to the Bontoc poblacion to report the incident
to the PC.
Even on the assumption that no warrant was issued at all, we find that the trial
court still lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. The The prohibited drugs were surrendered to the evidence custodian, Sgt. Angel
rule is that if the accused objects to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, Pokling. The plastic packets taken from appellant were to be positive for
he may move to quash the information, but only on that ground. If, as in this hashish or marijuana. A criminal complaint was filed against the accused
case, the accused raises other grounds in the motion to quash, he is deemed where the judge convicting the accused of the crime of transporting prohibited
to have waived that objection and to have submitted his person to the drugs.
jurisdiction of the court.
Issue: Whether the constitutional rights of the accused against unreasonable
The Court notes that on August 13, 1993, after the petitioner was unlawfully search was violated even if he consented the opening of the said bag.
arrested, Judge Lanzanas issued a warrant of arrest against Antonio L.
Sanchez in connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 93-124634 to 93-124637 for Held: He willingly gave prior consent to the search and voluntarily agreed to
violation of R.A. No. 6713. Pending the issuance of the warrant of arrest for have it conducted on his vehicle and travelling bag. Thus, the accused waived
the rape-slay cases, this first warrant served as the initial justification for his his right against unreasonable searches and seizures. When one voluntarily
detention. submits to a search or consents to have it made of (sic) his person or premises,
he is precluded from later complaining thereof, he right to be secure from
WARRANTLESS SEARCH unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be
made either expressly or impliedly. “Since in the course of the valid search
209. People vs Omaweng forty-one (41) packages of drugs were found, it behooved the officers to seize
G.R. No. 99050 the same; no warrant was necessary for such seizure. Besides, when said
packages were identified by the prosecution witnesses and later on formally
Doctrine: When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it offered in evidence, the accused did not raise any objection whatsoever
made of (sic) his person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining
thereof, he right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like every right, 210. People vs Gatward
be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly.
208
 G.R. 119722-73 Doctrine: consent given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is no
consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty. There must be
Doctrine: A passenger of an air flight already agreed to the inspection thereof justifying circumstances that are suspicious for a valid warrantless search
in accordance with customs rules and regulations an international practice of
strict observance, and waived any objection to a warrantless search. Facts: Pursuant to the Gun Ban, the Sergeant-at-Arms wrote to petitioner,
requesting the return of the two firearms issued to him. Thereafter, petitioner
FACTS: U Aung Win was charged and convicted with violating RA 6425 for instructed his driver to pick the firearms from petitioner’s house and return
importing and bringing into the Philippines 5, 579.80 grams of heroin. Nigel them to Congress. Upon heading to the Congress, the driver was
Gatward was also charged the same for transporting 5, 237.70 of heroin. The apprehended at a checkpoint. The car was searched and the gun was found
former (U Aung Win) was caught at NAIA after arriving from Bangkok. While neatly packed in their cases.
his luggage was being inspected, he then proceeded to the conveyor as if to
get another luggage, but never came back. The Customs Examiner became Issue: Whether or not there is a valid waiver against warrantless search
alarmed by this and subjected the luggage under x-ray and found the powdery
substance of heroin. Thereafter, Customs Police were alerted and U Aung Win Held: NO. It was an invalid warrantless search conducted by the PNP. There
was arrested a day after. Meanwhile, Gatward was caught with the help of U was no evidence to show that the policemen were impelled to do so because
Aung Win’s information during his investigation. U Aung Win pleaded guilty of a confidential report leading them to reasonably believe that certain
and was sentenced by the RTC to 25 years of reclusion perpetua, taking into motorists matching the description furnished by their informant were engaged
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty. Gatward was sentenced in gunrunning, transporting firearms or in organizing special strike forces. Nor,
to 35 years of reclusion perpetua, there being no aggravating or mitigating as adverted to earlier, was there any indication from the package or behavior
circumstance present. The Court rationalized the penalty (reclusion perpetua of Arellano that could have triggered the suspicion of the policemen. Absent
to death) under R.A. 6425 as divisible into 3 periods: 20 years and 1 day as such justifying circumstances specifically pointing to the culpability of petitioner
minimum, 30 years and 1 day as medium, and death as maximum. During the and Arellano, the search could not be valid.
pendency of the case and while awaiting the filing of appellant’s brief, the Court It may be argued that the seeming acquiescence of Arellano to the
received a mimeographed Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal. It was signed search constitutes an implied waiver of petitioner's right to question the
by appellant, but not by his counsel. The Court denied the motion for lack of reasonableness of the search of the vehicle and the seizure of the firearms.
merit. The pleading of the appellant was unauthorized, and the Court does not
discuss or transmit notices of judicial action except to counsel of the parties. While Resolution No. 2327 authorized the setting up of checkpoints, it
however stressed that "guidelines shall be made to ensure that no
Issue: Whether or not the trial court was correct in rejecting the challenge to infringement of civil and political rights results from the implementation of this
the admissibility in evidence of the heroin retrieved from the bag of appellant. authority," and that "the places and manner of setting up of checkpoints shall
Held: YES. The trial court was correct in rejecting the challenge to the be determined in consultation with the Committee on Firearms Ban and
admissibility in evidence of the heroin retrieved from the bag of appellant. Security Personnel created under Sec. 5, Resolution No. 2323."
While no search warrant had been obtained for that purpose, when appellant The facts show that PNP installed the checkpoint at about five o'clock
checked in his bag as his personal luggage as a passenger of KLM Flight No. in the afternoon of 13 January 1992. The search was made soon thereafter,
806 he thereby agreed to the inspection thereof in accordance with customs or thirty minutes later. It was not shown that news of impending checkpoints
rules and regulations an international practice of strict observance, and waived without necessarily giving their locations, and the reason for the same have
any objection to a warrantless search. His subsequent arrest, although been announced in the media to forewarn the citizens. Nor did the informal
likewise without a warrant, was justified since it was effected upon the checkpoint that afternoon carry signs informing the public of the purpose of its
discovery and recovery of the heroin in his bag, or in flagrante delicto. operation. As a result, motorists passing that place did not have any inkling
211. Aniag vs COMELEC whatsoever about the reason behind the instant exercise. With the authorities
in control to stop and search passing vehicles, the motorists did not have any
G.R. No. 104961 choice but to submit to the PNP's scrutiny. Otherwise, any attempt to turnabout

209
albeit innocent would raise suspicion and provide probable cause for the police Based on this, Damaso was charged with illegal possession of
to arrest the motorist and to conduct an extensive search of his vehicle. firearms.

In the case of the petitioner, only his driver was in the car at that time Issue: Whether there is a valid waiver of right against warrantless search
it was stopped for inspection. As conceded by COMELEC, driver Arellano did
not know the purpose of the checkpoint. In the face of fourteen (14) armed Held: No. The Court ruled that the law enforcers failed to comply with the
policemen conducting the operation, driver Arellano being alone and a mere requirements of a valid search and seizure. None of these exceptions for a
employee of the petitioner could not have marshaled the strength and the warrantless search is present in this case.
courage to protest against the extensive search conducted in the vehicle. In Moreover, the constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and
such scenario, the "implied acquiescence," if there was any, could not be more seizures, being personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except 1) the
than a mere passive conformity on Arellano's part to the search, and "consent" person whose rights are invaded or 2) one who is expressly authorized to do
given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is no consent within the so in his or her behalf.
purview of the constitutional guaranty.
In this case, the records show that Damaso was not in his house at that time
Luz, his alleged helper, allowed the authorities to enter. There was no
212. People vs Damaso evidence that would establish the fact that Luz was indeed Damaso’s helper
or if it was true that she was his helper, that Damaso had given her authority
GR No. 93516 to open his house in his absence.

Doctrine: The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal Being a helper, she does not qualify as a person authorized to waive such right
right. in representation of her employer. Thus, the search being invalid for lack of
warrant, the evidence obtained thereafter is inadmissible.
The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being
personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except 1) the person whose rights 213. Manalili vs Court of Appeals
are invaded or 2) one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf.
Gr no. 113447
Facts: The group of Lt. Quijardo were sent to verify the presence of CPP/NPA
members in Dagupan City. Doctrine: stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the
general rule against a search without a warrant, provided it is supported by a
They put under surveillance the rented apartment of Rosemarie, sister probable cause
of someone whom they earlier arrested. They interviewed Luzviminda
Morados, a visitor of Rosemarie, who stated that she worked with Bernie Facts: The Police Anti-Narcotics Unit of Kalookan City conducted
Mendoza alias Basilio Damaso, the appellant. surveillance along A. Mabini Street, in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery.
This was done after receiving information that drug addicts were roaming
Together with Morados, they reached the house of Damaso where around said area. Upon reaching the cemetery, the policemen chanced upon
they saw Luz Tanciangco, a helper. Tanciangco then allowed the group to the petitioner in front of the cemetery who appeared high on drugs. The
enter inside the house. The group of Lt. Quijardo entered the dwelling of petitioner had reddish eyes and was walking in a swaying manner.
Damaso without a valid warrant when the latter was absent. They requested
the persons in the house to allow them to look around. In one of the rooms, Petitioner was trying to avoid the policemen, but the officers were able
they saw subversive materials which they confiscated. They likewise brought to introduce themselves and asked him what he was holding in his hands.
the persons found in the house to the headquarters for investigation and the Petitioner resisted. Policeman Espiritu asked him if he could see what the
persons revealed that Damaso was the lessee of the house and owned the petitioner had in his hands. The petitioner showed his wallet and allowed the
items confiscated. officer to examine it. Policeman Espiritu found suspected crushed marijuana
residue inside. He kept the wallet and its marijuana contents and took
petitioner to headquarters to be further investigated.
210
Issue: Whether or not the search and seizure of the suspected marijuana is operatives. The group positioned themselves across McArthur Highway near
unreasonable Bali Hai Restaurant, fronting the hotel. The other group acted as their back up.

Held: No. The general rule is a search and seizure must be validated by a The accused-appellant alighted from the car carrying a sealed Zest-O
previously secured judicial warrant. The exceptions to the rule provide that the juice box, SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag hurriedly accosted him and introduced
search and seizure without a warrant may be made only with probable cause. themselves as police officers. As accused-appellant pulled out his wallet, a
Probable cause being at best defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion, small transparent plastic bag with a crystalline substance protruded from his
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a right back pocket. Forthwith, SPO2 Nulud subjected him to a body search
cautious man in the belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which yielded twenty (20) pieces of live .22 caliber firearm bullets from his left
which he is charged; or the existence of such facts and circumstances which back pocket. When SPO2 Nunag peeked into the contents of the Zest-O box,
could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense he saw that it contained a crystalline substance. SPO2 Nulud instantly
has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in confiscated the small transparent plastic bag, the Zest-O juice box, the twenty
connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by is in the (20) pieces of .22 caliber firearm bullets and the car used by accused-
place to be searched. appellant. SPO2 Nulud and the other police operatives who arrived at the
scene brought the confiscated items to the office of Col. Guttierez at the PNP
Additionally, stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to Headquarters in Camp Pepito, Angeles City.
the general rule against a search without a warrant.
Accused-appellant vehemently denied the accusation against him and
In the case at hand, Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed during narrated a different version of the incident where he was coerced to do by
their surveillance that appellant had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk threat of the police and pressure by the media. The lower court acquitted Sy
along the Caloocan City Cemetery, which according to police information was Chua for the Illegal Possession of Ammunitions, yet convicted him for Illegal
a popular hangout of drug addicts. From his experience as a member of the Possession of 1,955.815 grams of shabu. Hence, this appeal to the Court.
Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Caloocan City Police, such suspicious behavior was
characteristic of drug addicts who were "high." The policemen therefore had Issue: Whether or not the warrantless search is valid
sufficient reason to stop petitioner to investigate if he was actually high on
drugs. During such investigation, they found marijuana in petitioner’s Held: NO. The trial court confused the concepts of a “stop-and-frisk” and of a
possession. search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches
differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly
214. People vs Sy Chua effected and in their allowable scope.

GR no. 137066-67 For all intents and purposes, there was no overt manifestation that
accused-appellant has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
Doctrine: mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a “stop-and-frisk”. A to commit a crime. “Reliable information” alone, absent any overt act indicative
genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer’s experience and of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in
weapons concealed about him. flagrante delicto arrest.
Facts: Binad Sy Chua was charged with violation of Section 16, Article III of With regard to the concept of “stop-and frisk”: mere suspicion or a
R.A. 6425, and for Illegal Possession of Ammunitions and Illegal Possession hunch will not validate a “stop-and-frisk”. A genuine reason must exist, in light
of Drugs in two separate Informations. of the police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the
SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag received a report from their confidential belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a
informant that Sy Chua was about to deliver drugs that night at the Thunder “stop-and-frisk” serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective
Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City. So, the PNP Chief formed a team of crime prevention and detection for purposes of investigating possible criminal
behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the interest of safety and self-

211
preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the record of the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR CR
the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could 15988). In its decision of 24 January 1996, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer. trial court. Manalili filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.

A stop-and-frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to stop a Issue: Whether the search made on Malacat is valid
citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband.
It should also be emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the Held: No. The concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental to a
arrest for this principle to apply. The foregoing circumstances do not obtain in lawful arrest must not be confused. These two types of warrantless searches
the case at bar. To reiterate, accused-appellant was first arrested before the differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly
search and seizure of the alleged illegal items found in his possession. The effected and in their allowable scope. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest,
apprehending police operative failed to make any initial inquiry into accused- as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search.
appellant’s business in the vicinity or the contents of the Zest-O juice box he Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit
was carrying. The apprehending police officers only introduced themselves arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the
when they already had custody of accused-appellant. part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of Malacat,
Neither the in flagrante delicto nor the “stop and frisk” principles is indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was
applicable to justify the warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure going to be committed.
made by the police operatives on accused-appellant. Plainly, the search conducted on Malacat could not have been one
215. Malacat vs CA incidental to a lawful arrest. On the other hand, while probable cause is not
required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion
GR no. 123595 or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in
light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant
Doctrine: to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally,
suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective
exist crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police
Facts: On 27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m., allegedly in response to bomb officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner,
threats reported seven days earlier, Rodolfo Yu of the Western Police District, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior
Metropolitan Police Force of the Integrated National Police, Police Station No. even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and
3, Quiapo, Manila, was on foot patrol with three other police officers (all of them self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself
in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that
store at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.
men, with each group, comprised of three to four men, posted at opposite sides Reasons why the "stop-and-frisk" was invalid:
of the corner of “stop and frisk,” where a “warrant and seizure can be effected
without necessarily being preceded by an arrest” and “whose object is either  Yu's claim that Malacat was a member of the group which attempted
to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain to bomb Plaza Miranda 2 days is neither supported by any police
more information”; and that the seizure of the grenade from Malacat was report or record nor corroborated by any other police officer who
incidental to a lawful arrest. The trial court thus found Malacat guilty of the allegedly chased that group.
crime of illegal possession of explosives under Section 3 of PD 1866, and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of not less than 17 years, 4 months and 1  There was nothing in Malacat's behavior or conduct which could have
day of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum, and not more than 30 years of reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were
Reclusion Perpetua, as maximum. On 18 February 1994, Malacat filed a notice "moving very fast"
of appeal indicating that he was appealing to the Supreme Court. However,

212
  There was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that A search incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of
Malacat was armed with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for Court. Recent jurisprudence holds that the arrest must precede the search;
as he admitted, the alleged grenade was "discovered" "inside the front the process cannot be reversed as in this case where the search preceded the
waistline" of Malacat, and from all indications as to the distance arrest. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest
between Yu and Malacat, any telltale bulge, assuming that Malacat can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at
the outset of the search.
was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu.
In this case, Nuevas, Din and Inocencio were not committing a crime
216. People vs Nuevas
in the presence of the police officers. Moreover, police officers Fami and
GR No. 170233 Cabling did not have personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the
persons to be arrested had committed an offense. The searches conducted on
Doctrine: A search incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of the plastic bag then cannot be said to be merely incidental to a lawful arrest.
Court. Recent jurisprudence holds that the arrest must precede the search; Reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under
the process cannot be reversed as in this case where the search preceded the Section 5(a), Rule 113. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform
arrest. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest some overt act that would indicate that he "has committed, is actually
can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at committing, or is attempting to commit an offense."
the outset of the search.
217. People vs Valdez
Facts: Police officer received information that a certain male person a man
would make a delivery of marijuana dried leaves. While stationed thereat, they GR no. 127801
saw a male person who fit the description, carrying a plastic bag, who was Doctrine: a lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or
Nuevas. They confronted the latter and ask. Nuevas voluntarily pointed to the a private person under the ff. circumstances: a) When, in his presence, the
police officers a plastic bag which, when opened, contained marijuana dried person has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
leaves and bricks wrapped in a blue cloth. offense; b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
Nuevas led the police where two (2) other male persons would make personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
the delivery of marijuana, Din and Inocencio, could be located. From there, committed it; and c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
they saw and approached two (2) persons along the National Highway, escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
introducing themselves as police officers. Din was carrying a light blue plastic judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
bag. When asked, Din disclosed that the bag belonged to Nuevas. Officers while being transferred from one confinement to another.
then took the bag and upon inspection found inside it "marijuana packed in Facts: SPO1 Mariano was in the municipality of Banaue waiting for a ride to
newspaper and wrapped therein." are violated. report to Lagawe when a civilian asset approached him to intimate that an
All of the said materials are confiscated and the 3 are arrested. The Ilocano was ready to transport marijuana. Asset described him as thin and
trial court found them guilty with illegal possession of marijuana. possessing a green bag. The two proceeded to Brgy. O-ong, Hingyon, Ifugao,
where they halted two buses to look for the alleged Ilocano. A quick search of
However the other 2 filed there recourse in the Court of Appeals base the second bus yielded respondent, whom Mariano ordered to get out and
on their allegations that they are not guilty and their constitutional rights against open his green bag. Contents: red and white water jug and lunch box. He told
warrantless arrest. the man to open both and saw marijuana leaves inside. Accused was then
taken and turned over to the PNP Headquarters of Lagawe.
Issue: Whether or not there is a valid warrantless search
Forensic Chemist of PNP Crime Lab averred that from her
Held: NO. The Court holds that the searches and seizures conducted do not
examination, the items from the jug and lunch box gave positive results to the
fall under the first exception, warrantless searches incidental to lawful arrests.

213
test for the presence of marijuana. RTC convicted the accused of guilty of the person has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
crime of illegal transport of marijuana buds/leaves. offense; b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
Issue: Whether or not there is a valid warrantless search committed it; and c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
Held: Yes. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
or a private person under the ff. circumstances: a) When, in his presence, the judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
person has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an while being transferred from one confinement to another.
offense; b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has Facts: At around 9:30 in the evening the Patrolmen noticed a person carrying
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has a red traveling bag who was acting suspiciously and they confronted him; that
committed it; and c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has the person was requested by Patrolman Quevedo and Punzalan to open the
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final red traveling bag but the person refused, only to accede later on when the
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped patrolmen identified themselves; that found inside the bag were marijuana
while being transferred from one confinement to another. leaves wrapped in plastic wrapper and weighing one kilo, more or less.
Appellant was caught in flagrante since he was carrying marijuana at the time The counsel for the accused stated that the marijuana allegedly seized
of his arrest. The search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under from the accused was a product of an unlawful search without a warrant and
par (a) of the foregoing provisions of law. While Mariano was not armed with is therefore inadmissible in evidence.
a search warrant, under the case’s circumstances, there was sufficient
probable cause for said police officer to believe that appellant was then and Issue: Whether there is a valid warrantless search
there committing a crime. Mariano had to respond quickly to the call of duty.
No other passenger’s bag or possession was inspected so it cannot be said Held: yes. The contention is devoid of merit. One of the exceptions to the
that he was fishing for evidence of a crime. Guilt was proven when, upon general rule requiring a search warrant is a search incident to a lawful arrest.
ordered to get “his” bag, accused brought with him the green bag placed Thus, Section 12 of Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
underneath the seat in front of him. provides:

Probable Cause signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by “Section 12. Search incident to a lawful arrest. A person lawfully
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man’s arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be
belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged, used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.”
or the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a Meanwhile, Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) provides:
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the items, articles or objects sought in connection with said “xxx A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be person:
searched; resolved according to the facts of the case.
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
Tipped information is a sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.”
and seizure (People v. Tangliben, People v. Maspil, People v. Malmstedt,
Accused was caught in flagrante, since he was carrying marijuana at the time
People v. Bagista, Manalili v. CA)
of his arrest. This case therefore falls squarely within the exception. The
218. People vs Tangliben warrantless search was incident to a lawful arrest and is consequently valid.

GR No. L-63630 219. People vs Malsmtedt

Dotrine: a lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a GR No. 91107
private person under the ff. circumstances: a) When, in his presence, the
214
Doctrine: Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances
which could lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an which could lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed, and that the object sought in connection with the offense has been committed, and that the object sought in connection with the
offense are in the placed sought to be searched. offense are in the placed sought to be searched. When NARCOM received the
information that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was
Facts: Captain Alen Vasco, the commanding officer of the first regional carrying with him a prohibited drug, there was no time to obtain a search
command (NARCOM) stationed at camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up warrant.
a temporary checkpoint for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from
the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint was prompted by 220. People vs Chua Ho San
persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting
marijuana and other prohibited drugs and an information also was received GR no. 128222
about a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited Doctrine: While a contemporaneous search of a person arrested may be
drugs. effected to deliver dangerous weapons or proofs or implements used in the
In the afternoon the bus where accused was riding stopped. Sgt. Fider commission of the crime and which search may extend to the area within his
and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they were members of immediate control where he might gain possession of a weapon or evidence
the NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection. During the he can destroy, a valid arrest must precede the search.
inspection CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused waist. Suspecting the Facts: While monitoring the coastal area CID intercepted a radio call from
bulge on accused waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused’s passport ALMOITE requesting police assistance regarding an unfamiliar speedboat.
and other identification papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer When the speedboat landed, the male passenger alighted, and using both
required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging o his waist. And it hands, carried what appeared a multicolored strawbag. He then walked
turned out to be a pouched bag and when accused opened the same bag the towards the road. CID and his men became suspicious of the man as he
officer noticed four suspicious looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape. suddenly changed direction and broke into a run upon seeing the approaching
It contained hashish, a derivative of marijuana. officers. BADUA, however, prevented the man from fleein.
Thereafter, the accused was invited outside the bus for questioning but Although CID introduced themselves as police officers, the man
before he alighted from the bus accused stopped to get two travelling bags. appeared impassive. CID tried to communicate with the man and used sign
The officer inspects the bag. It was only after the officers had opened the bags language to him to open the bag. This time, the man apparently understood
that the accused finally presented his passport. The two bags contained a and acceded to the request. A search of the bag yielded several transparent
stuffed toy each, upon inspection the stuff toy contained also hashish. plastic packets containing yellowish crystalline substances that was later found
Issue: Whether or not there is a valid warrantless search out to be Shabu. CID then gestured to the man to close the bag.

Held: Yes. Arrest without warrant; when lawful – a peace officer or a private As CID wished to proceed to the police station, he signaled the man
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: a) When, in the presence, the to follow, but the latter did not to comprehend. Hence, CID placed his arm
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting around the shoulders of the man and escorted the latter to the police
to commit an offense; headquarters. CHUA was initially charged with illegal possession of
methaphetamine hydrochloride before the RTC. The RTC convicted Chua Ho
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited San guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Chua Ho San prays for his acquitttal and
drugs. A crime was actually being committed by the accused and he was the reversal of the judgment of the RTC.
caught in flagrante delicto, thus the search made upon his personal effects
falls squarely under paragraph 1 of the foregoing provision of law, which allows Issue: Whether or not there is a valid warrantless search
a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. Held: No, the Court, finds that these do not constitute “probable cause.”
None of the telltale clues, e.g., bag or package emanating the pungent odor of
215
marijuana or other prohibited drug, confidential report and/or positive issued a search warrant. They then returned to their commanding officer who
identification by informers of courier(s) of prohibited drug and/or the time and hatched a plan that a buy-bust operation be first conducted on the accused
place where they will transport/deliver the same, suspicious demeanor or Cuenco before the implementation of the search warrant. As planned, the
behavior and suspicious bulge in the waist — accepted by this Court as informant introduced PO1 Camantigue to Cuenco who at that time was
sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest exists in this case. standing by the door of his store which is just an extension of the house where
he was staying. Cuenco asked Camantigue how much worth of marijuana was
In cases of in fragrante delicto, arrests, a peace officer or a private he buying to which the latter replied he wanted to buy marijuana worth
person may without a warrant, arrest a person, when, in his presence, the P150.00. Cuenco got the money, called his common-law wife, Florida Fajardo,
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting and instructed her to get marijuana worth P150.00. Fajardo went inside the
to commit an offense. The arresting officer, therefore, must have personal house and when she returned, she handed Camantigue the marijuana.
knowledge of such facts or as recent case law adverts to, personal knowledge Camantigue then removed his cap as a signal to his companions that the sale
of facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable has been consummated. The police officers arrested Cuenco and proceeded
cause. with the search, in the course of which, SPO1 Sarmiento found a box which
The search cannot therefore be denominated as incidental to an contained dried flowering tops of marijuana.
arrest. While a contemporaneous search of a person arrested may be effected The corresponding criminal complaints were filed against the accused
to deliver dangerous weapons or proofs or implements used in the commission Ferdinand Cuenco and Florida Fajardo for the sale and possession of a
of the crime and which search may extend to the area within his immediate prohibited drug. The trial court convicted both accused. Cuenco appealed
control where he might gain possession of a weapon or evidence he can questioning his conviction because of the illegality of the search made in his
destroy, a valid arrest must precede the search. The process cannot be house. Appellant insinuates a frame-up.
reversed. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest
determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is
questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was
merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law Issues:
requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the Whether or not the search of the house consequent to a lawful arrest
process cannot be reversed. is valid.
221. People of the Philippines vs Cueno

G.R. No. 128277November 16, 1998 Held:

Yes. The search of the house is valid as the latter is still within the
Doctrine: In lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the permissible area of search. The arrest of appellant has been made in the
apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person course of a buy-bust operation, thus, in flagrante delicto. A buy-bust operation
of the suspect but also in the permissible area within his reach, i.e., that point - a form of entrapment which has repeatedly been accepted to be a valid
which is within the effective control of the person arrested, or that which may means of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law - is far variant from
furnish him with the means of committing violence or of escaping. an ordinary arrest. In lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of
the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the
person of the suspect but also in the permissible area within his reach, i.e.,
that point which is within the effective control of the person arrested, or that
Facts: which may furnish him with the means of committing violence or of escaping.
After the conduct of surveillance operations, a group of police officers When the operation took place, it becomes advisable, for the peace
reported the result of the same to their commanding officer who instructed officers to forthwith undertake a search of the house as being within the
them to apply for a search warrant. The police officers applied for and were
216
permissible area. The arrest was made in the course of an entrapment,
following a surveillance operation, normally performed by police officers in the
apprehension of violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act. In the absence of proof Held:
of any odious intent on the part of the police authorities to falsely impute a
serious crime, the court will not allow their testimony to be overcome by the
self-serving and uncorroborated claim of ‘frame-up.’ No, the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a
crime about to be committed or had just been committed to justify the
warrantless arrest allowed under the Rules of Court.

222. PEOPLE vs. IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI

The present case presented no such urgency. It is clear that they had
G.R.No. 74869 July 6, 1988
at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and
search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name
was known. The vehicle was Identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And
Doctrine: Warrantless arrest and seizure based on an informer’s tip, at a time from the information they had received, they could have persuaded a judge
when accused was not committing a crime is illegal. Hence the evidence that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet
obtained was inadmissible. they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights
was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the
arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a “search warrant
was not necessary.” In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the
Facts:
moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about
to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the
gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called
The PC Officers had earlier received a tip from their informers that the for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers
accussed was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed
marijuana. Acting on this tip, the PC officers waited for him and accused was to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and
arrested shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 The PC officers who so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest.
were in fact waiting for him simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding The Identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by
what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin
investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and immediately arrest him. While this is not to say that the accused-appellant
and later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. When they were verified is innocent, for indeed his very own words suggest that he is lying, that fact
as marijuana leaves, an information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act alone does not justify a finding that he is guilty. The constitutional presumption
was filed against him. However, and it is Aminnudin’s claim that he was is that he is innocent, and he will be so declared even if his defense is weak
arrested and searched without warrant, making the marijuana allegedly found as long as the prosecution is not strong enough to convict him.
in his possession inadmissible in evidence against him under the Bill of Rights.

Issue:
223. People of the Philippines vs Alvaro Saycon

G.R. No. 110995 September 5, 1994

Whether or not the accused was caught in flagrante delicto hence
justifies the warrantless arrest.
217
Doctrine:When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search,
such a warrantless search would be constitutionally permissible only if the
officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, Whether or not the warrantless arrest and search are valid?
before the search, that either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents or
cargo of the vehicle are or have been instruments or the subject matter or the
proceeds of some criminal offense. Held:

Facts: Yes. The requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior to
the carrying out of a search and seizure is not absolute. The exception which
On or about 8 July 1992, at about 6:00 in the morning, the Coastguard appears most pertinent in respect of the case at bar is that relating to the
personnel received information from NARCOM agent Ruben Laddaran that a search of moving vehicles. In People v. Barros, the Court said:
suspected "shabu" courier by the name of Alvaro Saycon was on board the
MV Doña Virginia, which was arriving at that moment in Dumaguete City. Upon Peace officers may lawfully conduct searches of moving vehicles -
receipt of the information, the Coastguard chief officer CPO Tolin, instructed automobiles, trucks, etc. - without need of a warrant, it not being practicable to
them to intercept the suspect. A combined team of NARCOM agents and secure a judicial warrant before searching a vehicle, since such vehicle can be
Philippine Coastguard personnel consisting of CPO Tolin, a certain Miagme, quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be
and Senior Police Officers Ruben Laddaran and Winifredo Noble of NARCOM sought. In carrying out warrantless searches of moving vehicles, however,
posted themselves at the gate of Pier 1. peace officers are limited to routine checks, that is, the vehicles are neither
really searched nor their occupants subjected to physical or body searches,
The MV Doña Virginia docked at 6:00 a.m. that same morning at Pier the examination of the vehicles being limited to visual inspection.
1 in Dumaguete City. Alvaro Saycon alighted from the boat carrying a black
bag and went through the checkpoint manned by the Philippine Coastguard While the analogy is perhaps not perfect, we consider that appellant
where he was identified by police officer Winifredo Noble of NARCOM. Saycon Saycon stands in the same situation as the driver or passenger of a motor
was then invited to the Coastguard Headquarters at the Pier area. He willingly vehicle that is stopped by police authorities and subjected to an extensive
went with them. At the headquarters, the coastguard asked Saycon to open search. In this situation, the warrantless search and arrest of appellant Saycon
his bag, and the latter willingly obliged. In it were personal belongings and a would be constitutionally permissible only if the officer conducting the search
maong wallet. Inside that maong wallet, there was a Marlboro pack containing had reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that Saycon
the suspected "shabu". When police officer Winifredo Noble asked Saycon who had just disembarked from the MV Doña Virginia upon arrival of that
whether the Marlboro pack containing the suspected "shabu" was his, Saycon vessel at 6:00 a.m. of 8 July 1992 at Pier I of Dumaguete city, was violating
merely bowed his head. Then Saycon, his bag and the suspected "shabu" some law or that the contents of his luggage included some instrument or the
were brought to the NARCOM office for booking. When Alvaro Saycon was subjects matter or the proceeds of some criminal offense.
arrested, the NARCOM agents did not have a warrant of arrest.
Close examination of the record of the case at bar shows that there
In his appeal before this Court seeking reversal of the decision of the did exist reasonable or probable cause to believe that appellant Alvaro Saycon
court a quo finding him guilty of the crime charged, Saycon contends that the would be carrying or transporting prohibited drugs upon arriving in Dumaguete
search of his bag was illegal because it had been made without a search City on the MV Doña Virginia on 8 July 1992. This probable cause in fact
warrant and that, therefore, the "shabu" discovered during the illegal search consisted of two (2) parts. Firstly, Senior Police Officer Winifredo Noble had
was inadmissible in evidence against him testified in court that the NARCOM Agents had, approximately three (3) weeks
before 8 July 1992, conducted a test-buy which confirmed that appellant
Saycon was indeed engaged in transporting and selling "shabu." The police
Issue: authorities did not, on that occasion, arrest Alvaro Saycon, but what should be
noted is that the identity of Saycon as a drug courier or drug distributor was
218
established in the minds of the police authorities. Secondly, the arresting FACTS:
officers testified that they had received confidential information that very early
morning of 8 July 1992, Alvaro Saycon would probably be on board the
MV Doña Virginia which was scheduled to arrive in Dumaguete City at 6:00 On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command
a.m. on 8 July 1992, probably carrying "shabu" with him. (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine
In respect of the first element of the probable cause here involved, the General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security
testimony of Police Officer Winifredo Noble had not been denied or rebutted operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the
by the defense; as it happened, Officer Noble was not even cross-examined purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and
on this point by defense counsel. order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and
political development of the National Capital Region. As part of its duty to
In respect of the second element of the probable cause here involved, maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts
appellant Saycon contended that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
showed that the NARCOM Agents knew three (3) weeks before 8 July 1992
that the MV Doña Virginia would be arriving and that the would probably be on
board that vessel. It was argued by Saycon that the police authorities should Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela,
have procured, and had the time to procure, the necessary judicial warrants Metro Manila, and the Union of Lawyers and Advocates For People’s Rights
for search and arrest. Saycon also sought to underscore a supposed confusion (ULAP) sought the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and
in the testimonies of NARCOM Officer Winifredo Noble and Coastguard Officer elsewhere as unconstitutional. In the alternative, they prayed that respondents
Lajot relating to who, as between the NARCOM agent and the Coastguard Renato De Villa and the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC)
elements, had informed the other that appellant would probably be arriving on be directed to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints for
board the MV Doña Virginia. the protection of the people. Petitioners contended that the checkpoints gave
the respondents blanket authority to make searches and seizures without
search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution.
224. RICARDO C. VALMONTE AND UNION OF LAWYERS AND
ADVOCATES FOR PEOPLE'S RIGHTS (ULAP), petitioners, vs. GEN.
RENATO DE VILLA AND NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION DISTRICT ISSUE: Whether or notthe military and police checkpoints violate the right of
COMMAND, the people against unreasonable search and seizures
G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989

DOCTRINE: The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and HELD:

seizures is a personal right invocable only by those whose rights have been
infringed or threatened to be infringed.
No.Military and police checkpoints do not violate the right of the people
against unreasonable search and seizures. Not all searches and seizures are
Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable
public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved
however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail. according to the facts of each case.

219
 In the case at bar, the setting up of the questioned checkpoints in
Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be considered as a security
measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing an
effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of 225. RUDY CABALLES y TAIÑO v. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE
the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to OF THE PHILIPPINES
destabilize the government, in the interest of public security. In this connection,
the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs G.R. No. 136292. January 15, 2002
of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings in
cities of police and military men by NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the
abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and Doctrine:
violence in such urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most
likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions — which all sum up In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional
to what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between guarantee against obtrusive searches, it is fundamental that to constitute a
the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right exists; (2) that the person
welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is however involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of
reasonably conducted, the former should prevail. such right; and (3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the
right.

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of

abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner, that all governmental power Facts:
is susceptible to abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience,
On or about the 28th day of June, 1989, in the Municipality of
discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these
Pangasinan, and/or elsewhere in the Province of Laguna, and within the
abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price
jurisdiction of this Honourable Court, the above mentioned accused with
we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.
intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof,
the National Power Corporation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and carry away about 630 kg of Aluminium cable
Furthermore, the Court stressed that the constitutional right against conductors, valued at Php 27, 450.00, belonging to and to the damage and
unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by prejudice of said owner National Power Corporation, in the aforesaid amount.
those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed. What
constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure in any particular
case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the
Issue:
circumstances involved.
WON the warrantless search without consent is valid?

Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been

stopped and searched without a search warrant by the military manning the Ruling:
checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the details of the incidents
which amount to a violation of his right against unlawful search and seizure, is
not sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether there was a violation of
NO. In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional
Valmonte's right against unlawful search and seizure.
guarantee against obtrusive searches, it is fundamental that to constitute a
waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right exists; (2) that person involved
220
had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right,
and (3) said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
The seized articles were later brought to the PNP Crime Lab in Pampanga.
In the case at bar, the evidence is lacking that the petitioner intentionally Forensic Chemist Babu conducted a lab exam on them and concluded that the
surrendered his right against unreasonable searches. articles were marijuana. For their part, both accused denied the accusation
against them.
WHEREFORE, the impugned decision is reversed and set aside, and
accused Rudy Caballes is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

Libnao argued that her arrest was unlawful, capitalizes on the absence of a
warrant for her arrest. She also takes the issue of the fact that she was not
assisted by a lawyer when police officers interrogated her. She claimed that
226. People vs Libnao she was not duly informed of her right to remain silent and to have competent
counsel of her choice. Hence, she argues that the confession or admission
G.R. No. 136860 January 20 2003 obtained therein should be considered inadmissible in evidence against her.

FACTS: ISSUE:

This is a case finding appellant AgpangaLibnao and her co-accused Rosita Whether both the accused can be convicted based on the prosecution’s
Nunga guilty of violating Art. II, Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 6425 (The Dangerous Drugs evidence.
Act of 1972).

HELD:
The intelligence operatives of the PNP stationed in Tarlac, Tarlac began
conducting surveillance operation on suspected drug dealers in the area. They
learned from their asset that a certain woman from Tajiri, Tarlac and a YES. The above contentions deserve scant attention. The warrantless
companion from Baguio City were transporting illegal drugs once a month in search in the case at bench is not bereft of a probable cause. The Tarlac Police
big bulks. Intelligence Division had been conducting surveillance operation for 3 months
in the area. The surveillance yielded information that once a month, appellant
and her co-accused Nunga transport drugs in big bulks. It is also clear that at
On Oct. 20, 1996, at about 1AM, SPO1 Gamotea and PO3 Ferrer flagged the time Libnao was apprehended, she was committing offense. She was
down a passing tricycle. It had two female passengers seated inside, who were making a delivery or transporting prohibited drugs in violation of Art. II, Sec. 4
later identified as the herein appellant and her co-accused. In front of them of R.A. No. 6425. Under the ROC, one of the instances a police officer is
was a black bag. Suspicious of the black bag and the twos uneasy behavior permitted to carry out a warrantless arrest is when the person to be arrested
when asked about its ownership and content, the officers invited them to is caught committing a crime in flagrante delicto.
Kabayan Center No.2. Upon reaching the center, P03 Ferrer fetched Brgy.
Captain Pascual to witness the opening of the black bag. As soon as the brgy. Appellant also faults the trial court for appreciating and taking into account the
Captain arrived, the black bag was opened in the presence of the appellant, object and documentary evidence of the prosecution despite the latter’s failure
her co-accused and personnel of the center. Found inside were eight bricks of to formally offer them. She argues that absent any formal offer, they must be
leaves sealed in plastic bags and covered with newspaper. deemed inadmissible.

221
The contention is untenable. Evidence not formally offered can be considered was engaged in illegal drug activities and decided to entrap and arrest “Jun”
by the court as long as they have been properly identified by testimony duly in a buy-bust operation.During the buy-bust operation, “Jun” took out from his
recorded and they have themselves been incorporated in the records of the bag an object wrapped in plastic and gave it to PO3 Manlangit. PO3 Manlangit
case. All the documentary and object evidence in this case were properly forthwith arrested “Jun” as SPO1 Badua rushed to help in the arrest. They
identified, presented and marked as exhibits in court, including the bricks of frisked “Jun” but did not find the marked bills on him. Upon inquiry, “Jun”
marijuana. Even without their formal offer; therefore, the prosecution can still revealed that he left the money at the house of his associate named “Neneth”
establish the case because witnesses properly identified those exhibits, and (Violeta Gaddao), “Jun” led the police team to “Neneth’s” house.
their testimonies are recorded. Furthermore, appellant’s counsel had cross-
examined the prosecution witnesses who testified on the exhibits. The team found the door of “Neneth’s” house open and a woman
inside. “Jun” identified the woman as his associate. SPO1 Badua asked
Against the credible positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, “Neneth” about the P1,600.00 as PO3 Manlangit looked over “Neneth’s”
appellants defense of denial and alibi cannot stand. The defense of denial and house. Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the
alibi has been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can just as dining table. He saw that one of the box’s flaps was open and inside the box
easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most was something wrapped in plastic. The plastic wrapper and its contents
cases involving violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. It has to be appeared similar to the marijuana earlier “sold” to him by “Jun.” His suspicion
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. aroused, PO3 Manlangit entered “Neneth’s” house and took hold of the box.
He peeked inside the box and found that it contained 10 bricks of what
The appeal is DENIED. appeared to be dried marijuana leaves.

The prosecution’s story was denied by accused-appellants.

Gaddao testified that inside her house were her co-accused Doria and
227. People of the Philippines vs Florencio Doria and Violeta Gaddao three (3) other persons. They asked her about a box on top of the table. This
was the first time she saw the box. The box was closed and tied with a piece
G.R. No. 125299 January 22, 1999 of green straw. The men opened the box and showed her its contents. She
said she did not know anything about the box and its contents.

She denied the charge against her and Doria and the allegation that
Doctrine: It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly
marked bills were found in her person.
exposed to sight. The difficulty arises when the object is inside a closed
container. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the object The RTC convicted the accused-appellants.
itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant.
However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive
configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, Issues:
then the contents are in plain view and may be seized.

(1) Whether or not the buy-bust operation in the apprehension of

Facts: accused-appellant Doria is valid; and
Accused-appellants Florencio Doria and Violeta Gaddao were (2) Whether or not there is a valid warrantless arrest of accused-
charged with violation of Section 4, in relation to Section 21 of the Dangerous appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and house, and the admissibility
Drugs Act of 1972. of the pieces of evidence obtained therefrom.
Members of PNP Narcotics Command, received information from two
civilian informantsthat one “Jun” who was later identified to be Florencio Doria
222
Held: warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based upon “probable cause”
which means an “actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.” The
grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of
1. The warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is not unlawful. the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably
Warrantless arrests are allowed in three instances as provided by Section 5 of guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts. A reasonable
Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.Under Section 5 (a), a suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good
person may be arrested without a warrant if he “has committed, is actually faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.” Appellant Doria was caught Accused-appellant Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the
in the act of committing an offense. When an accused is apprehended in alleged identification made by her co-accused. PO3 Manlangit, however,
flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation, the police are not only declared in his direct examination that appellant Doria named his co-accused
authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant. in response to his (PO3 Manlangit’s) query as to where the marked money
The warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao, the search of her person was. Appellant Doria did not point to appellant Gaddao as his associate in the
and residence, and the seizure of the box of marijuana and marked bills are drug business, but as the person with whom he left the marked bills. This
different matters. identification does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that appellant
Gaddao conspired with her co-accused in pushing drugs. Appellant Doria may
Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure without a judicial have left the money in her house,with or without her knowledge, with or without
warrant and any evidence obtained without such warrant is inadmissible for any conspiracy. Save for accused-appellant Doria’s word, the agents had no
any purpose in any proceeding. The rule is, however, not absolute. Search reasonable grounds to believe that she was engaged in drug pushing. If there
and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained is no showing that the person who effected the warrantless arrest had, in his
therefrom may be admissible in the following instances:(1) search incident to own right, knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested to the
a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of perpetration of a criminal offense, the arrest is legally objectionable.
customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused
himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures.

The prosecution admits that appellant Gaddao was arrested without a 2. Since the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao was
warrant of arrest and the search and seizure of the box of marijuana and the illegal, it follows that the search of her person and home and the subsequent
marked bills were likewise made without a search warrant. It is claimed, seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot be deemed legal as an
however, that the warrants were not necessary because the arrest was made incident to her arrest. This brings us to the question of whether the trial court
in “hot pursuit” and the search was an incident to her lawful arrest. correctly found that the box of marijuana was in plain view, making its
warrantless seizure valid.
To be lawful, the warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao must fall
under any of the three (3) instances under Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the
Rules on Criminal Procedure. position to have that view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant
and may be introduced in evidence.
Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the
buy-bust operation to give ground for her arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule The “plain view” doctrine applies when the following requisites concur:
113. She was not committing any crime. Contrary to the finding of the trial (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior
court, there was no occasion at all for appellant Gaddao to flee from the justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a
policemen to justify her arrest in “hot pursuit.” In fact, she was going about her particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent;
daily chores when the policemen pounced on her. (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be
evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law
Neither could the arrest of appellant Gaddao be justified under the enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a
second instance of Rule 113. “Personal knowledge” of facts in arrests without position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such
223
lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence 228. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROBERTO SALANGUIT
incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its
discovery inadvertent. G.R. No. 133254-55 April 19, 2001
It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly
Doctrine: Once the valid portion of the search warrant has been executed,
exposed to sight. The difficulty arises when the object is inside a closed
the plain view doctrine can no longer provide basis for admitting the other
container. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the object items subsequently found.
itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant.
However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive Facts:
configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer,
then the contents are in plain view and may be seized. In other words, if the
package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance On 26 December 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant in the
that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmariñas, Cavite, to search the residence
It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe of Robert Salanguit y Ko on Binhagan St., Novaliches, Quezon City. He
may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. presented as his witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who testified that as a poseur-
buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from Salanguit. The sale
PO3 Manlangit and the police team were at appellant Gaddao’s house took place in Salunguit's room, and Badua saw that the shabu was taken by
because they were led there by appellant Doria. The agents testified that they Salunguit from a cabinet inside his room. The application was granted, and a
had no information on appellant Gaddao until appellant Doria named her and search warrant was later issued by Presiding Judge Dolores L. Español. At
led them to her. Standing by the door of appellant Gaddao’s house, PO3 about 10:30 p.m. of said day, a group of about 10 policemen, along with one
Manlangit had a view of the interior of said house. Two and a half meters away civilian informer, went to the residence of Salunguit to serve the warrant. The
was the dining table and underneath it was a carton box. The box was partially police operatives knocked on Salanguit’s door, but nobody opened it. They
open and revealed something wrapped in plastic. heard people inside the house, apparently panicking. The police operatives
then forced the door open and entered the house. After showing the search
He did not know exactly what the box contained that he had to ask warrant to the occupants of the house, Lt. Cortes and his group started
appellant Gaddao about its contents. It was not immediately apparent to PO3 searching the house. They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic
Manlangit that the content of the box was marijuana. The marijuana was not bags containing a white crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing
in plain view and its seizure without the requisite search warrant was in a white crystalline substance, and two bricks of dried leaves which appeared
violation of the law and the Constitution. It was fruit of the poisonous tree and to be marijuana wrapped in newsprint having a total weight of approximately
should have been excluded and never considered by the trial court. 1,255 grams. A receipt of the items seized was prepared, but Salanguit refused
The fact that the box containing about six (6) kilos of marijuana was to sign it. After the search, the police operatives took Salanguit with them to
found in the house of accused-appellant Gaddao does not justify a finding that Station 10, EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City, along with the items they had
she herself is guilty of the crime charged. seized. PO3 Duazo requested a laboratory examination of the
confiscated evidence. The white crystalline substance with a total weight of
In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is 2.77 grams and those contained in a small box with a total weight of 8.37
material is the submission of proof that the sale took place between the grams were found to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. On
poseur-buyer and the seller thereof and the presentation of the drug. The the other hand, the two bricks of dried leaves, one weighing 425 grams and
prosecution has clearly established the fact that in consideration of P1,600.00 the other 850 grams, were found to be marijuana.
which he received, accused-appellant Doria sold and delivered nine hundred
seventy (970) grams of marijuana to PO3 Manlangit, the poseur-buyer. The
prosecution, however, has failed to prove that accused-appellant Gaddao Charges against Roberto Salanguit y Ko for violations of Republic Act
conspired with accused-appellant Doria in the sale of said drug. (RA) 6425, i.e. for possession of shabu and marijuana were filed. After
hearing, the trial court rendered its decision, convicting Salanguit in Criminal
224
Cases Q-95-64357 and Q-95-64358 for violation of Section 16 and 8, judge under oath or affirmation of the deposing witness and particularly
respectively, of RA 6425. describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.

2. No. Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant and thus
Salanguit appealed; contesting his conviction on the grounds of: known to the police operatives, it is reasonable to assume that the police found
the packets and shabu first. Once the valid portion of the search warrant has
(1) The admissibility of the shabu allegedly recovered from his residence as been executed, the plain view doctrine can no longer provide basis for
evidence against him on the admitting the other items subsequently found. The marijuana bricks were
wrapped in newsprint. There was no apparent illegality to justify their seizure.
ground that the warrant used in obtaining it was invalid; Not being in a transparent container, the contents wrapped in newsprint could
not have been readily discernible as marijuana. That being said, the marijuana
(2) The admissibility in evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from
is inadmissible in evidence against Salanguit.
Salanguit to the "plain view"

doctrine; and 229. People of the Philippines vs De Gracia

(3) The employment of unnecessary force by the police in the execution of the G. R. Nos. 102009-10 July 6, 1994
warrant.

Doctrine: Where the military operatives had reasonable grounds to believe

Issues: that a crime was being committed, and had no opportunity to apply for and
secure a search warrant from the courts, the same constituted an exception to
1. Whether the warrant was invalid for failure of providing evidence to support the prohibition against warrantless searches.
the seizure of “drug paraphernalia.”

2. Whether the marijuana may be included as evidence in light of the “plain Facts:
view doctrine.”
Early morning of December 1, 1989, Maj. Efren Soria of the
Intelligence Division, National Capital Region Defense Command, was on
HELD: board a brown Toyota car conducting a surveillance of the Eurocar Sales
Office located at Epifanio de los Santos Avenue in Quezon City, together with
1. Yes. The warrant authorized the seizure of “undetermined quantity of shabu his team composed of Sgt. Crispin Sagario, M/Sgt. Ramon Briones, S/Sgt.
and drug paraphernalia.” Evidence was presented showing probable cause of Henry Aquino, one S/Sgt. Simon and a Sgt. Ramos.
the existence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The fact that there
was no probable cause to support the application for the seizure of drug Sgt. Crispin Sagario, the driver of the car, parked the vehicle around
paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is void. ten to fifteen meters away from the Eurocar building near P. Tuazon Street,
This fact would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the S/Sgt. A crowd was then gathered near the Eurocar office watching the on-
police. The fact is that none was taken by virtue of the search warrant issued. going bombardment near Camp Aguinaldo. After a while, a group of five men
If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the disengaged themselves from the crowd and walked towards the car of the
seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of surveillance team. At that moment, Maj. Soria, who was then seated in front,
methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented saw the approaching group and immediately ordered Sgt. Sagario to start the
showing probable cause as to its existence. In sum, with respect to the seizure car and leave the area. As they passed by the group, then only six meters
of shabu from Salanguit’s residence, Search Warrant 160 was properly issued, away, the latter pointed to them, drew their guns and fired at the team, which
such warrant being founded on probable cause personally determined by the
attack resulted in the wounding of Sgt. Sagario on the right thigh. Nobody in
225
the surveillance team was able to retaliate because they sought cover inside them to do so, thereby compelling the former to break into the office. The
the car and they were afraid that civilians or bystanders might be caught in the Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun store and it is definitely not an
cross-fire. armory or arsenal which are the usual depositories for explosives and
ammunition. It is primarily and solely engaged in the sale of automobiles. The
As a consequence, at around 6:30 A.M. of December 5, 1989, a presence of an unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and explosives
searching team composed of F/Lt. VirgilioBabao as team leader, M/Sgt. could not be justifiably or even colorably explained. In addition, there was
Lacdao, Sgt. Magallion, Sgt. Patricio Pacatang, and elements of the 16th general chaos and disorder at that time because of simultaneous and intense
Infantry Battalion under one Col. delos Santos raided the Eurocar Sales Office. firing within the vicinity of the office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo which
They were able to find and confiscate six cartons of M-16 ammunition, five was under attack by rebel forces.
bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different calibers, and "molotov" bombs
inside one of the rooms belonging to a certain Col. Matillano which is located
at the right portion of the building. Sgt. Oscar Obenia, the first one to enter the
Eurocar building, saw appellant De Gracia inside the office of Col. Matillano, The courts in the surrounding areas were obviously closed and, for
holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping through a door. De Gracia was the that matter, the building and houses therein were deserted. Under the
only person then present inside the room. A uniform with the nametag of Col. foregoing circumstances, it is the Court’s opinion that the instant case falls
Matillano was also found. As a result of the raid, the team arrested appellant, under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless search. In
as well as SopriesoVerbo and Roberto Jimena who were janitors at the the first place, the military operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining
Eurocar building. No search warrant was secured by the raiding team because, in this case, had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being
according to them, at that time there was so much disorder considering that committed. There was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to
the nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being mopped up by the rebel forces and warrant their action. Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the
there was simultaneous firing within the vicinity of the Eurocar office, aside raiding team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from
from the fact that the courts were consequently closed. The group was able to the courts. The trial judge himself manifested that on December 5, 1989 when
confirm later that the owner of Eurocar office is a certain Mr. Gutierrez and that the raid was conducted, his court was closed. Under such urgency and
appellant is supposedly a "boy" therein. exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.

Issue: 230. EDDIE GUAZON, ET. AL., vs. MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG.
GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG.
GEN. ALFREDO LIM, and COL. JESUS GARCIA,
G.R. No. 80508, January 30, 1990
Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure
DOCTRINE: Nothing in the Constitution denies the authority of the Chief
Executive to order police actions to stop unabated criminality, rising
lawlessness and alarming communist activities.
Held:
FACTS:

Yes. It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar The 41 petitioners alleged that the “saturation drive” or “aerial target
Sales Office were not armed with a search warrant at that time. The raid was zoning” that were conducted in their place (Tondo Manila) were
actually precipitated by intelligence reports that said office was being used as unconstitutional. They alleged that there is no specific target house to be
headquarters by the RAM. Prior to the raid, there was a surveillance conducted search and that there is no search warrant or warrant of arrest served. Most of
on the premises wherein the surveillance team was fired at by a group of men the policemen are in their civilian clothes and without nameplates or
coming from the Eurocar building. When the military operatives raided the identification cards. The residents were rudely rouse from their sleep by
banging on the walls and windows of their houses. The residents were at the
place, the occupants thereof refused to open the door despite requests for
226
point of high-powered guns and herded like cows. Men were ordered to strip
down to their briefs for the police to examine their tattoo marks. The residents
complained that they’re homes were ransacked, tossing their belongings and The areal target zonings in this petition were intended to flush out subversives
destroying their valuables. Some of their money and valuables had and criminal elements particularly because of the blatant assassinations of
disappeared after the operation. The residents also reported incidents of public officers and police officials by elements supposedly coddled by the
maulings, spot-beatings and maltreatment. Those who were detained also communities where the "drives" were conducted.
suffered mental and physical torture to extract confessions and tactical
informations.
The respondents said that such accusations were all lies. Respondents
Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution which denies the authority of the
contends that the Constitution grants to government the power to seek and
cripple subversive movements for the maintenance of peace in the state. The Chief Executive, to order police actions to stop unabated criminality, rising
aerial target zoning were intended to flush out subversives and criminal lawlessness, and alarming communist activities.
elements coddled by the communities were the said drives were conducted.
They said that they have intelligently and carefully planned months ahead for
the actual operation and that local and foreign media joined the operation to Where there is large scale mutiny or actual rebellion, the police or military may
witness and record such event. go in force to the combat areas, enter affected residences or buildings, round
up suspected rebels and otherwise quell the mutiny or rebellion without having
ISSUE: to secure search warrants and without violating the Bill of Rights.

Whether or not the areal target zoning and the saturation drive is legal The Constitution grants the Government the power to seek and cripple
subversive movements which would bring down constituted authority and
substitute a regime where individual liberties are suppressed as a matter of
policy in the name of security of the State.
HELD:

PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS AND CORRESPONDENCE

Yes.The conduct of areal target zoning or saturation drive is a valid exercise
of the military powers of the President. 231. Socorro Ramirez vs. CA and Garcia

G.R. No. 93833. September 28, 1995

According to the Supreme Court, everything Doctrine:
stated before them consists only of allegations. According to petitioners, more
than 3,407 persons were arrested in the saturation drives covered by the Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the
petition. No estimates are given for the drives in Block 34, Dagat-dagatan, statute.
Navotas; Apelo Cruz Compound, Pasig; and Sun Valley Drive near the Manila
International Airport area. Not one of the several thousand persons treated in
the illegal and inhuman manner described by the petitioners appears as a The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together
petitioner or has come before a trial court to present the kind of evidence with the above-quoted deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore
admissible in courts of justice. Moreover, there must have been tens of plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks
thousands of nearby residents who were inconvenienced in addition to the to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law
several thousand allegedly arrested. None of those arrested has apparently makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
been charged and none of those affected has apparently complained.
227
 involved in the private communication. The statute’s intent to penalize all
persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of
Facts: the qualifier “any”.
Petitioner made a secret recording of the conversation that was part
of a civil case filed in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the
private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a
“hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and 232. Gaanan vs IAC
personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.”. Private G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986
respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City
for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to prohibit and penalize wire
tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other
Facts:
purposes.” Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information. The trial court
granted the said motion. The private respondent filed a Petition for Review
on Certiorari with the Supreme Court, which referred the case to the Court of
Appeals in a Resolution. Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its Complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in
decision declaring the trial court’s order as null and void, after subsequently the living room of complainant’s residence discussing the terms for the
denied the motion for reconsideration by the petitioner. withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed with the Office of
the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on
the proposed conditions, complainant made a telephone call to Laconico. That
Issue: same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his
office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his
Whether or not the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip.
apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the
conversation.
When complainant called, Laconico requested appellant to secretly
listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to
Ruling: hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement. Twenty minutes
later, complainant called again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the
conditions. Laconico answered ‘Yes’. Complainant then told Laconico to wait
YES. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, ” An Act to Prohibit and for instructions on where to deliver the money.
Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private
Communication and Other Purposes,” provides that it shall be unlawful for any
person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication Complainant called again and instructed Laconico to give the money
or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or to his wife at the office of the then Department of Public Highways. Laconico
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or who earlier alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation
spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or Service of the Philippine Constabulary, insisted that complainant himself
dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however should receive the money. When he received the money at the Igloo
otherwise described. The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally Restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents of the Philippine
makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private Constabulary.
communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape
recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be
penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those
228
 Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he Doctrine: The right to privacy of communication may be invoked against the
heard complainant demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct wife who went to the clinic of her husband and there took documents consisting
assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the complainant for of private communications between her husband and his alleged paramour.
robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant. Since appellant listened
to the telephone conversation without complainant’s consent, complainant
charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act. Facts:
The lower court found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of Dr. Alfredo Martin. One day, she went to
of Republic Act No. 4200, which prompted petitioner to appeal. The IAC the clinic of her husband, together with her mom, her driver and Dr. Martin’s
affirmed with modification hence the present petition for certiorari. secretary forcibly opened the drawer of her husband’s clinic and took 157
documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his
alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martins
Issue: passport, and photographs without Dr. Martin’s knowledge and consent. The
documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal
separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which
W/N an extension telephone is covered by the term “device or arrangement” petitioner had filed against her husband.
under Rep. Act No. 4200 Dr. Martin brought an action for the recovery of documents and
papers, as well as damages against her wife before the RTC. The RTC ruled
in his favor, declaring him to be the exclusive owner of such documents. The
Held: writ of preliminary injunction was made final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and
her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from using or
submitting/admitting as evidence the documents and papers in question. On
No. The law refers to a “tap” of a wire or cable or the use of a “device appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
or arrangement” for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or Hence this petition.
recording the communication. There must be either a physical interruption
Cecilia contends that the case of Alfredo Martin vs Alfonso Felix, Jr.
through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in
(her lawyer), where the court ruled that the documents and papers were
order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.
admissible in evidence and that the use of those documents by Atty. Alfonso
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a did not constitute gross malpractice and gross misconduct.
dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA
No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as “tapping” the wire or
cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not Issues:
installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use.
Whether or not the documents that are in question should be
inadmissible as evidence.
233. Cecilia Zulueta vs Court of Appeals and Alfredo Martin

253 SCRA 699 February 20, 1996 Held:

The documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence.

The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication and
correspondence inviolable is no less applicable simply because it is the wife
229
(who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands infidelity) who is the party Saldana, the clerk of Waterous Drug Corp. opened the envelope and saw that
against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception there was a check for P640 for Catolico.
to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order of the court or
when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any
violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any Waterous Drug Corp. ordered the termination of Catolico for acts of
purpose in any proceeding. dishonesty. NLRC: Dismissed the Petition. Evidence of respondents (check
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of from YSP) being rendered inadmissible, by virtue of the constitutional right
them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them invoked by complainants.
for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage,
does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. In the light of the decision in the People v. Marti, the constitutional
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the of one’s person from interference by government and cannot be extended to
spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of
against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of
Issue:
communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one
knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that
Whether or not the check is admissible as evidence.
each owes to the other.
Held:

Yes. In the case of People vs Marti, the Supreme Court held that the
234. WATEROUS DRUG CORPORATION and MS. EMMA Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and
CO, Petitioners, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and seizures perpetrated by private individuals.
ANTONIA MELODIA CATOLICO, Respondents.
It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no
recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits,
G.R. No. 113271. October 16, 1997. such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities. Despite this, the
SC ruled that there was insufficient evidence of cause for the dismissal of
Doctrine: The Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable Catolico from employment Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided
searches and seizure perpetrated by private individuals. by the Labor Code for the termination of Employment.

Facts:
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug
Corp. Catolico sold to YSP Inc. 10 bottles of Voren Tablets at P384 per unit. 235. Grosjean vs. American Press Co, Inc.
However, the normal selling price is P320 per unit. Catolico overcharged by
P64 per unit for a total of P640. YSP sent a check payable to Catolico as a 297 US 233, February 10, 1936
“refund” for the jacked-up price. It was sent in an envelope addressed to her. Doctrine: The act imposing the tax in question is unconstitutional under the
due process of law clause because it abridges the freedom of the press. A free
230
press stands as one of the great interpreters between the government and the Yes. The tax imposed is designated a “license tax for the privilege of
people. To allow it to be fettered is to fetter ourselves. engaging in such business” -- that is to say, the business of selling, or making
any charge for, advertising. As applied to appellees, it is a tax of two percent
on the gross receipts derived from advertisements carried in their newspapers
Facts: when, and only when, the newspapers of each enjoy a circulation of more than
20,000 copies per week. It thus operates as a restraint in a double sense. First,
its effect is to curtail the amount of revenue realized from advertising, and,
second, its direct tendency is to restrict circulation. This is plain enough when
This suit was brought by nine publishers of newspapers in the state of
we consider that, if it were increased to a high degree, as it could be if valid, it
Louisiana, to enjoin the enforcement against them of the provisions of section
well might result in destroying both advertising and circulation.
1 of the act of the Legislature of Louisiana known as Act No. 23, passed and
approved July 12, 1934, as follows: 'That every person, firm, association or
corporation, domestic or foreign, engaged in the business of selling, or making
any charge for, advertising or for advertisements, whether printed or The tax here involved is bad because, in the light of its history and of
published, or to be printed or published, in any newspaper, magazine, its present setting, it is seen to be a deliberate and calculated device in the
periodical or publication whatever having a circulation of more than 20,000 guise of a tax to limit the circulation of information to which the public is entitled
copies per week, or displayed and exhibited, or to be displayed and exhibited, in virtue of the constitutional guaranties. A free press stands as one of the
by means of moving pictures, in the State of Louisiana, shall, in addition to all great interpreters between the government and the people. To allow it to be
other taxes and licenses levied and assessed in this State, pay a license tax fettered is to fetter ourselves.
for the privilege of engaging in such business in this State of two per cent. (2%)
of the gross receipts of such business.'
236. FRANCISCO CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. RAUL M. GONZALES, in his
capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Justice; and NATIONAL
The act requires every one subject to the tax to file a sworn report TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC), respondents.
every three months showing the amount and the gross receipts from the G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008
business described in section 1. The resulting tax must be paid when the report
is filed. Failure to file the report or pay the tax as thus provided constitutes a
misdemeanor and subjects the offender to a fine not exceeding $500, or
imprisonment not exceeding six months, or both, for each violation. Any DOCTRINE:Tests for Restraints on Freedom of Speech and Expression.—
corporation violating the acts subjects itself to the payment of $500 to be Generally, restraints on freedom of speech andexpression are evaluated by
recovered by suit. All of the appellees are corporations. The lower court either or a combination of three tests,i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine
entered a decree for appellees and granted a permanent injunction. which permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been
established between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated; (b)
the balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to
balance conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a
Issue: conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable
in a given situation of type of situation; and (c) the clear and present danger
rule which rests on the premise that speech may be restrained because there
Whether or not Act No. 23 abridged the freedom of the press in contravention is substantial danger that the speech will likely lead to an evil the government
of the due process clause contained in the Fourteenth Amendment. has a right to prevent. This rule requires that the evil consequences sought to
be prevented must be substantive, “extremely serious and the degree of
imminence extremely high.
Held:
231
 identity of the voices in the tape recording. Secondly, the integrity of the taped
conversation is also suspect. The Press Secretary showed to the public two
FACTS:A year following the 2004 national and local elections, Press Secretary versions, one supposed to be a “complete” version and the other, an “altered”
Ignacio Bunye disclosed to the public how the opposition planned to version. Thirdly, the evidence of the respondents on the who’s and the how’s
destabilize the administration by releasing an audiotape of a mobile phone of the wiretapping act is ambivalent, especially considering the tape’s different
conversation allegedly between President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and versions. The identity of the wire-tappers, the manner of its commission and
Commissioner Garcillano of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The other related and relevant proofs are some of the invisibles of this
conversation was alleged to have been audio-taped through wire-tapping. On case. Fourthly, given all these unsettled facets of the tape, it is even arguable
June 8, 2005, respondent Secretary Raul Gonzales of the Department of whether its airing would violate the anti-wiretapping law.
Justice (DOJ) warned reporters who are in possession of copies of the said
conversation, as well as those broadcasting companies and/or publishers that
they may be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. Consequently, the
National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) issued a press release We rule that not every violation of a law will justify straitjacketing the exercise
strengthening the prohibition on the dissemination of the same – that the of freedom of speech and of the press.
broadcasting/airing of such information shall be just cause for the suspension,
revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued by the
Commission. Petitioner Francisco Chavez filed a petition against respondent The need to prevent their violation cannot per se trump the exercise of free
Chavez and NTC, praying for the issuance of writs of certiorari and prohibition speech and free press, a preferred right whose breach can lead to greater
for the nullification of the acts, issuances and orders of respondents – as they evils. For this failure of the respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear
were outright violations of the freedom of expression and of the press, and the and present danger test, the Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of
right of the people to information on matters of public concern. free speech and free press. There is no showing that the feared violation of
the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the national security of the State.

ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of the respondents abridge freedom of speech
and of the press. 237. Adiong vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 103956 March 31, 1992

HELD: Yes.Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are
evaluated by either or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous
tendency doctrine, which limits speech once a rational connection has been Doctrine:
established between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated; (b) The right to property may be subject to a greater degree of regulation
the balancing of interests tests, a standard when courts balance conflicting but when this right is joined by a "liberty" interest, the burden of justification
social values and individual interests, and (c) the clear and present danger on the part of the Government must be exceptionally convincing and
rule which rests on the premise that speech may be restrained because there irrefutable.
is substantial danger that the speech will likely lead to an evil the government
has a right to prevent.

Facts:

It appears that the great evil which government wants to prevent is the airing Public respondent promulgated a resolution prohibiting the posting of
of a tape recording in alleged violation of the anti-wiretapping law. However, decals and stickers on “mobile” places, public or private, and limit their
respondents’ evidence falls short of satisfying the clear and present danger location or publication to the authorized posting areas that COMELEC fixes.
test. Firstly, the various statements of the Press Secretary obfuscate the Petitioner senatorial candidate assails said resolution insofar as it prohibits
232
the posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving an appropriate test for restrictions on speech which, like 11(b), are content-
vehicles, wherein it is his last medium to inform the electorate that he is a neutral. Unlike content-based restrictions, they are not imposed because of
senatorial candidate, due to the ban on radio, tv and print political the content of the speech. For this reason, content-neutral restrictions are
advertisements. tests demanding standards. For example, a rule such as that involved in
Sanidad v. COMELEC, prohibiting columnists, commentators, and
announcers from campaigning either for or against an issue in a plebiscite
Issue: must have a compelling reason to support it, or it will not pass muster under
strict scrutiny. These restrictions, it will be seen, are censorial and therefore
Whether or not the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) may they bear a heavy presumption of constitutional invalidity. In addition, they will
prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places, public or be tested for possible over breadth and vagueness. It is apparent that these
private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas doctrines have no application to content-neutral regulations which, like11(b),
that it fixes. are not concerned with the content of the speech. These regulations need only
a substantial governmental interest to support them. A deferential standard of
review will suffice to test their validity.
Ruling:

NO. The prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on

Facts: This is a petition for prohibition, seeking a re-examination of the validity
“mobile”places whether public or private except in the authorized areas
of §11(b) of R.A. No.6646, the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which prohibits
designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be justified
mass media from selling or giving free of charge print space or air time for
by the Constitution:
campaign or other political purposes, except to the Commission on Elections.
Petitioners are candidates for public once in the forthcoming elections.
Petitioner Emilio M. R. Osmena is candidate for President of the Philippines,
The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law, setting forth while petitioner Pablo P. Garcia is governor of Cebu Province, seeking re-
the criterion for the validity of any public act whether proceeding from election. They contend that events after the ruling in National Press Club v.
the highest official or the lowest functionary, is a postulate of our Commission on Elections "have called into question the validity of the very
system of government. That is to manifest fealty to the rule of law, premises of that [decision]."Indeed, petitioners do not complain of any harm
with priority accorded to that which occupies the topmost rung in the suffered as a result of the operation of the law. They do not complain that they
legal hierarchy. The three departments of government in the have in any way been disadvantaged as a result of the ban on media
discharge of the functions with which it is entrusted have no choice advertising. Their contention that, contrary to the holding in NPC, Section 11(b)
but to yield obedience to its commands. Whatever limits it imposes works to the disadvantage of candidates who do not have enough resources
must be observed. to wage a campaign outside of mass media can hardly apply to them. Their
financial ability to sustain a long drawn-out campaign, using means other than
238. Osmena vs COMELEC
the mass media to communicate with voters, cannot be doubted. If at all, it is
G.R. No. 132231 March 31, 1998 candidates like intervenor Roger Pa notes, who is running for mayor of Daet,
Camarines Norte, who can complain against 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646. But Pa
notes is for the law which, he says, has to some extent, reduced the
advantages of moneyed politicians and parties over their rivals who are
Doctrine: A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
similarly situated as ROGER PANOTES. He claims that the elimination of this
constitutional power of the Government, if it furthers an important or substantial
substantial advantage is one reason why ROGER PANOTES and others
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to
similarly situated have dared to seek an elective position this coming elections.
the suppression of free expression; and if the incident restriction on alleged
What petitioners seek is not the adjudication of a case but simply the holding
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of
of an academic exercise.
that interest. This test was actually formulated in United States v. OBrien. It is
233
NPC is founded in error; it will suffice for present purposes simply to reaffirm Section 11 of Republic Act No. 6646 (Electoral Reforms Law of 1987)
the ruling in that case. Stare decisis et non qui eta movere. This is what makes prohibiting mass media from selling or giving free of charge print space or air
the present case different from the overruling decisions invoked by petitioners. time for campaign or other political purposes except to the Commission on
Nevertheless, we have undertaken to revisit the decision in NPC v. Elections is again challenged on the ground that events afterthe ruling in the
COMELEC in order to clarify our own understanding of its reach and set forth National Press Club v. Commission on Elections have called for
a theory of freedom of speech. its reexamination. The Supreme Court, finding that petitioners failed to present
any empirical data to back up their claim and simply seek the holding of an
academic exercise and not the adjudication of a case or controversy,
Issue: W/N Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 abridged the freedom of speech reaffirmed the ruling on the NPC. Besides, a majority of the present Court is
and of the press. unpersuaded that its decision in the NPC case is founded in error.

Held: 239. Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB) vs
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation and Loren Legarda

G.R. No. 155282 January 17, 2005

No.

No Ad Ban, Only a Substitution of COMELEC Space and COMELEC Time for

the Advertising Pageand Commercials in Mass Media. Doctrine: The only exception from the MTRCB’s power of review are those
expressly mentioned in Section 7 of P.D. No. 1986, such as (1) television
The term political ad ban, when used to describe 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, is programs imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or its
misleading, for even as11(b) prohibits the sale or donation of print space and departments and agencies, and (2) newsreels.
air time to political candidates, it mandates the COMELEC to procure and itself
allocate to the candidate’s space and time in the media. There isno
suppression of political ads but only a regulation of the time and manner of Facts:
advertising.
On October 15, 1991, at 10:45 in the evening, respondent ABS-CBN
aired “Prosti-tuition,” an episode of the television (TV) program “The Inside
Thus, 11(b) states: Story” produced and hosted by respondent Legarda. It depicted female
students moonlighting as prostitutes to enable them to pay for their tuition fees.
Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. In addition to the forms of election In the course of the program, student prostitutes, pimps, customers, and some
propaganda prohibitedin Section 85 of Batas PambansaBlg. 881, it shall be faculty members were interviewed. The Philippine Women’s University (PWU)
unlawful:. . . . was named as the school of some of the students involved and the facade of
PWU Building at Taft Avenue, Manila conspicuously served as the background
(b) for any newspapers, radio broadcasting or television station, or other mass
of the episode.
media, or any person making use of the mass media to sell or to give free of
charge print space or air time for campaign nor other political purposes except The showing of “The Inside Story” caused uproar in the PWU
to the Commission as provided under Section 90 and 92 of Batas Pambansa community. Dr. Leticia P. de Guzman, Chancellor and Trustee of the PWU,
Blg. 881. Any mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality and the PWU Parents and Teachers Association filed letter-complaints with
who is a candidate for any elective public office shall take a leave of absence petitioner MTRCB. Both complainants alleged that the episode besmirched
from his work as such during the campaign period.
234
the name of the PWU and resulted in the harassment of some of its female Issues:
students.
Whether or not the MTRCB has the power to review the “Inside Story”
Acting on the letter-complaints, the MTRCB Legal Counsel initiated a prior to its exhibition or broadcast by television.
formal complaint with the MTRCB Investigating Committee, alleging among
others, that respondents did not submit “The Inside Story” to petitioner for its
review and exhibited the same without its permission, thus, violating Section 7 Held:
of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1986 and Section 3, Chapter III and Section
7, Chapter IV of the MTRCB Rules and Regulations. Settled is the rule in statutory construction that where the law does not
make any exception, courts may not except something therefrom, unless there
Heretofore, all subsequent programs of the ‘The Inside Story’ and all is compelling reason apparent in the law to justify it. Ubi lex non
other programs of the ABS-CBN Channel 2 of the same category shall be distinguitnecdistingueredebemos. Thus, when the law says “all television
submitted to the Board of Review and Approval before showing; otherwise, the programs,” the word “all” covers all television programs, whether religious,
Board will act accordingly.” public affairs, news documentary, etc. The principle assumes that the
Respondents then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the legislative body made no qualification in the use of general word or expression.
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 77, Quezon City. It seeks to: declare as It bears stressing that the sole issue here is whether petitioner MTRCB
unconstitutional Sections 3(b), 3(c), 3(d), 4, 7, and 11 of P. D. No. 1986 and has authority to review “The Inside Story.” Clearly, we are not called upon to
Sections 3, 7, and 28 (a) of the MTRCB Rules and Regulations; (in the determine whether petitioner violated Section 4, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the
alternative) exclude the “The Inside Story” from the coverage of the above Constitution providing that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
cited provisions; and annul and set aside the MTRCB Decision dated March speech, of oppression or the press. Petitioner did not disapprove or ban the
12, 1993 and Resolution dated April 14, 1993. Respondents averred that the showing of the program. Neither did it cancel respondents’ permit.
above-cited provisions constitute “prior restraint” on respondents’ exercise of Respondents were merely penalized for their failure to submit to petitioner
freedom of expression and of the press, and, therefore, unconstitutional. “The Inside Story” for its review and approval. Therefore, we need not resolve
Furthermore, the above cited provisions do not apply to the “The Inside Story” whether certain provisions of P. D. No. 1986 and the MTRCB Rules and
because it falls under the category of “public affairs program, news Regulations specified by respondents contravene the Constitution.
documentary, or socio-political editorials” governed by standards similar to
those governing newspapers. The RTC rendered a decision in favour of the Consequently, we cannot sustain the RTC’s ruling that Sections 3 (c)
respondent. (d), 4, 7 and 11 of P. D. No. 1986 and Sections 3, 7 and 28 (a) of the MTRCB
Rules and Regulations are unconstitutional. It is settled that no question
Petitioner MTRCB through the Solicitor General, contends inter alia: involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be
first, all television programs, including “public affairs programs, news heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the legal
documentaries, or socio-political editorials,” are subject to petitioner’s power requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (1) that the question must be raised by
of review under Section 3 (b) of P.D. No. 1986 and pursuant to this Court’s the proper party; (2) that there must be an actual case or controversy; (3) that
ruling in Iglesiani Cristo vs. Court of Appeals; second, television programs are the question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and, (4) that
more accessible to the public than newspapers, thus, the liberal regulation of the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the
the latter cannot apply to the former; third, petitioner’s power to review determination of the case itself.
television programs under Section 3(b) of P. D. No. 1986 does not amount to
“prior restraint;” and fourth, Section 3(b) of P. D. No. 1986 does not violate
respondents’ constitutional freedom of expression and of the press.
240. ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

G.R. No. 133486. January 28, 2000.

235
Doctrine: Issue:

The Constitution mandates that no law shall be passed abridging Whether or not the Comelec acted with grave abuse of discretion in
freedom of speech and press. prohibiting ABS-CBN in conducting exit polls during the election.

There are limitations however to this freedom in which the state, in the
exercise of its police power, can curtail whenever these tests are satisfied:
Held:
1. Clear and present danger rule – the evil consequence of comment or
utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence Yes. The measure is overbroad and unnecessarily restricts fundamental
must be extremely high before the utterance can be punished. The rights of speech and of press.
danger to be guarded against is the substantive evil sought to be
prevented. The Constitution mandates that no law shall be passed abridging freedom
2. Dangerous tendency rule - If the words uttered create a dangerous of speech and press. These freedoms basically consist of the liberty to discuss
tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are publicly and truthfully any matter of public interest without prior restraint.
punishable. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect (Gonzales v. COMELEC) It represents a profound commitment to the principle
of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the that debates on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open.
legislative body seeks to prevent. Note that the words need not be
definite so as to incite the listeners to acts of force, violence or There are limitations however to this freedom in which the state, in the
unlawfulness. exercise of its police power, can curtail whenever these tests are satisfied:

Facts:
1. Clear and present danger rule – the evil consequence of comment or
This case involves athe filing of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence must
of the Rules of Court assailing Commission on Elections (Comelec) en banc be extremely high before the utterance can be punished. The danger to
Resolution No. 98-14191 dated April 21, 1998. In the said Resolution, the poll be guarded against is the substantive evil sought to be prevented.
body RESOLVED to approve the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS-
CBN or any other groups, its agents or representatives from conducting such 2. Dangerous tendency rule - If the words uttered create a dangerous
exit survey and to authorize the Honorable Chairman to issue the same. The tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are
Resolution was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon "information from [a] punishable. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the
reliable source that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a project, with PR utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body
groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections and to make an exit seeks to prevent. Note that the words need not be definite so as to incite
survey of the vote during the elections for national officials particularly for the listeners to acts of force, violence or unlawfulness.
President and Vice President, results of which shall be [broadcast]
immediately."

The electoral body believed that such project might conflict with the The court adheres to the clear and present danger rule which is a
official Comelec count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the National question on the proximity and degree of the utterance will result to the danger
Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had not authorized or evil sought to be avoided. This is a heavy burden because the court is
or deputized Petitioner ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey. On May 9, always on the side of freedom of expression. To justify restriction, the
1998, the Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by promotion of substantial governmentt interest must be clearly shown. And
petitioner. It directed the Comelec to cease and desist, until further orders, even when its purpose are legitimate and substantial, the means employed
from implementing the assailed Resolution or the restraining order issued should not be broad as to stifle personal liberties when the end can be more
pursuant thereto, if any. In fact, the exit polls were actually conducted and narrowly achieved.
reported by media without any difficulty or problem.
236
 In this case, the freedoms of speech and of the press should all the more And lastly, on the issue of violation of ballot secrecy, the court said that
be upheld when what is sought to be curtailed is the dissemination of such is not at issue here. The exit poll dies not seek to access the ballots of
information meant to add meaning to the equally vital right of suffrage. The the interviewees. The contents of their ballots are not exposed. Even the
interest being protected is the fundamental right to vote and securing its choice of revealing who they voted for is not mandatory but voluntary.
sanctity through the ballots. However the means employed are necessarily
broad because it effectively prevents other uses of exit poll data – for long term The reason behind the principle of ballot secrecy is to avoid vote buying
research purposes. through voter identification. Thus, voters are prohibited from exhibiting the
contents of their official ballots to other persons, from making copies thereof,
or from putting distinguishing marks thereon so as to be identified. Also
proscribed is finding out the contents of the ballots cast by particular voters or
COMELEC tried to justify the restraint in arguing that such conduct of exit disclosing those of disabled or illiterate voters who have been assisted.
polls present a clear and present danger of destroying the credibility and Clearly, what is forbidden is the association of voters with their respective
integrity of electoral process. (na unreliable and surveys and might conflict with votes, for the purpose of assuring that the votes have been cast in accordance
the count of COMELEC and NAMFREL) However its arguments are purely with the instructions of a third party. This result cannot, however, be achieved
speculative. Why? merely through the voters' verbal and confidential disclosure to a pollster of
1. Because in a survey, the participants are randomly selected so the whom they have voted for.
results will be a representation or reflection of the general sentiment
of the community.
2. It is merely an opinion of the community or group polled. Its result is
not meant to replace or be at par with the official COMELEC count.
241. Social Weather Stations, Inc. and Kamahalan Publishing
Corporationvs Commission on Elections
COMELEC ‘s restriction on exit polls is overly broad. Its application is
without qualification whether the exit polls is disruptive or not. And assuming G.R. No. 147571 May 1, 2001
arguendo that there is such qualification, there is no showing that exit polls will
cause chaos in voting centers. The absolute prohibition restricts the future use
of valuable information for long-term research on the impact of current events
Doctrine: Under the O’Brien test, even if a law furthers an important or
on the voting behavior of people.
substantial governmental interest, it should be invalidated if such
ABS-CBN even explained its methodology which has enough precautions governmental interest is "not unrelated to the Expression of free expression."
against the evils enumerated by COMELEC: Moreover, even if the purpose is unrelated to the suppression of free speech,
the law should nevertheless be invalidated if the restriction on freedom of
(1) communities are randomly selected in each province; expression is greater than is necessary to achieve the governmental purpose
in question.
(2) residences to be polled in such communities are also chosen at
random;

(3) only individuals who have already voted, as shown by the indelible ink Facts:
on their fingers, are interviewed;
Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS) is a private non-stock,
(4) the interviewers use no cameras of any sort; non-profit social research institution conducting surveys in various fields. On
(5) the poll results are released to the public only on the day after the the other hand, petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation publishes
elections the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation.
237
 Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission [A] Government regulation is sufficiently justified [1] if it is within the
on Elections from enforcing Section 5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act), constitutional power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an important or
which provides: “Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published substantial governmental interest; [3] if the governmental interest is unrelated
fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall to the suppression of free expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on
not be published seven (7) days before an election”. alleged First Amendment freedoms [of speech, expression and press] is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election
survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech Under the O’Brien test, even if a law furthers an important or
without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint. They claim that substantial governmental interest, it should be invalidated if such
SWS and other pollsters conducted and published the results of surveys prior governmental interest is "not unrelated to the Expression of free expression."
to the 1992, 1995, and 1998 elections up to as close as two days before the Moreover, even if the purpose is unrelated to the suppression of free speech,
election day without causing confusion among the voters and that there is the law should nevertheless be invalidated if the restriction on freedom of
neither empirical nor historical evidence to support the conclusion that there is expression is greater than is necessary to achieve the governmental purpose
an immediate and inevitable danger to tile voting process posed by election in question.
surveys. No similar restriction is imposed on politicians from explaining their
First. Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion [3] of the O 'Brien test because
opinion or on newspapers or broadcast media from writing and publishing
the causal connection of expression to the asserted governmental interest
articles concerning political issues up to the day of the election. They contend
makes such interest "not related to the suppression of free expression." By
that there is no reason for ordinary voters to be denied access to the results of
prohibiting the publication of election survey results because of the possibility
election surveys, which are relatively objective.
that such publication might undermine the integrity of the election, Sec. 5.4
Respondent Commission on Elections justifies the restrictions in §5.4 actually suppresses a whole class of expression, while allowing the expression
of R.A. No. 9006 as necessary to prevent the manipulation and corruption of of opinion concerning the same subject matter by newspaper columnists, radio
the electoral process by unscrupulous and erroneous surveys just before the and TV commentators, armchair theorists, and other opinion takers. In effect,
election. It contends that (1) the prohibition on the publication of election Sec. 5.4 shows a bias for a particular subject matter, if not viewpoint, by
survey results during the period proscribed by law bears a rational connection referring personal opinion to statistical results. The constitutional guarantee of
to the objective of the law, i.e., the prevention of the debasement of the freedom of expression means that "the government has no power to restrict
electoral process resulting from manipulated surveys, bandwagon effect, and expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."
absence of reply; (2) it is narrowly tailored to meet the "evils" sought to be
prevented; and (3) the impairment of freedom of expression is minimal, the
restriction being limited both in duration, i.e., the last 15 days before the 242. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON
national election and the last 7 days before a local election, and in scope as it ELECTIONS, represented by its Chairman, BENJAMIN S. ABALOS,
does not prohibit election survey results but only require timeliness. ESMERALDA AMORA-LADRA, in her capacity as Acting Director IV,
National Capital Judicial Region, Commission on Elections, and the
Issue: Whether or not Section 5.4 of RA 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
abridgment of freedom of speech, expression and the press
G.R. NO. 162777, August 31, 2004

Held:

Yes.The United States Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Warren, DOCTRINE:Under the Constitution, the COMELEC is expressly authorized to
held in United States v. O 'Brien: supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all media communication

238
or information to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space. All these are The COMELEC, however, ordered him to remove or cause the removal of the
aimed at the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. billboards, or to cover them from public view pending the approval of his
request.

FACTS:Petitioner Chavez, on various dates, entered into formal agreements

with certain establishments to endorse their products. Pursuant to these Feeling aggrieved, petitioner Chavez filed a petition for prohibition with the SC,
agreements, three billboards were set up showing petitioner promoting the asking that the COMELEC be enjoined from enforcing the assailed provision.
products of said establishments. He urges the Court to declare the assailed provision unconstitutional as the
same is allegedly (1) a gross violation of the non-impairment clause; (2) an
invalid exercise of police power; (3) in the nature of an ex-post facto law; (4)
On December 30, 2003, however, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy contrary to the Fair Elections Act; and (5) invalid due to overbreadth.
for the position of Senator.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 32 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 is

On January 6, 2004, respondent COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6520, unconstitutional
which contained Section 32:

HELD:
Section 32. All propaganda materials such as posters, streamers,
stickers or paintings on walls and other materials showing the picture,
image, or name of a person, and all advertisements on print, in radio Police power
or on television showing the image or mentioning the name of a
person, who subsequent to the placement or display thereof becomes
a candidate for public office shall be immediately removed by said Petitioner argues that the billboards, while they exhibit his name and image,
candidate and radio station, print media or television station within 3 do not at all announce his candidacy for any public office nor solicit support for
days after the effectivity of these implementing rules; otherwise, he such candidacy from the electorate. They are, he claims, mere product
and said radio station, print media or television station shall be endorsements and not election propaganda. Prohibiting, therefore, their
presumed to have conducted premature campaigning in violation of exhibition to the public is not within the scope of the powers of the COMELEC.
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power to prescribe

On January 21, 2004, petitioner was directed to comply with the said provision regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, or
by the COMELEC's Law Department. He replied, by requesting the COMELEC safety, and the general welfare of the people. To determine the validity of a
that he be informed as to how he may have violated the assailed provision. He police measure, two questions must be asked: (1) Does the interest of the
sent another letter, this time asking the COMELEC that he be exempted from public in general, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
the application of Section 32, considering that the billboards adverted to are exercise of police power? and (2) Are the means employed reasonably
mere product endorsements and cannot be construed as paraphernalia for necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
premature campaigning under the rules. upon individuals?

239
A close examination of the assailed provision reveals that its primary targeted by the Government. Equal opportunity to proffer oneself for public
objectives are to prohibit premature campaigning and to level the playing field office, without regard to the level of financial resources one may have at his
for candidates of public office, to equalize the situation between popular or disposal, is indeed of vital interest to the public. The State has the duty to enact
rich candidates, on one hand, and lesser-known or poorer candidates, on the and implement rules to safeguard this interest. Time and again, this Court has
other, by preventing the former from enjoying undue advantage in exposure said that contracts affecting public interest contain an implied reservation of
and publicity on account of their resources and popularity. the police power as a postulate of the existing legal order. This power can be
activated at anytime to change the provisions of the contract, or even abrogate
it entirely, for the promotion or protection of the general welfare. Such an act
Moreover, petitioner cannot claim that the subject billboards are purely product will not militate against the impairment clause, which is subject to and limited
endorsements and do not announce nor solicit any support for his candidacy. by the paramount police power.
Under the Omnibus Election Code, election campaign or partisan
political activity is defined as an act designed to promote the election or defeat
of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office. It includes directly or Ex post facto law
indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate.

Petitioner argued that the assailed provision makes an individual criminally

It is true that when petitioner entered into the contracts or agreements to liable for an election offense for not removing such advertisement, even if at
endorse certain products, he acted as a private individual and had all the right the time the said advertisement was exhibited, the same was clearly legal.
to lend his name and image to these products. However, when he filed his Hence, it makes a person, whose name or image is featured in any such
certificate of candidacy for Senator, the billboards featuring his name and advertisement, liable for premature campaigning under the Omnibus Election
image assumed partisan political character because the same indirectly Code.
promoted his candidacy. Therefore, the COMELEC was acting well within its
scope of powers when it required petitioner to discontinue the display of the
subject billboards. If the subject billboards were to be allowed, candidates for Section 32, although not penal in nature, defines an offense and prescribes
public office whose name and image are used a penalty for said offense. Laws of this nature must operate prospectively,
to advertise commercial products would have more opportunity to make except when they are favorable to the accused. It should be noted, however,
themselves known to the electorate, to the disadvantage of that the offense defined in the assailed provision is not the putting up of
other candidates who do not have the same chance of lending their faces and propaganda materials such as posters, streamers, stickers or paintings on
names to endorse popular commercial products as image models. Similarly, walls and other materials showing the picture, image or name of a person, and
an individual intending to run for public office within the next few months, could all advertisements on print, in radio or on television showing the image or
pay private corporations to use him as their image model with the intention of mentioning the name of a person, who subsequent to the placement or display
familiarizing the public with his name and image even before the start of the thereof becomes a candidate for public office. Nor does it prohibit or consider
campaign period. This, without a doubt, would be a circumvention of the rule an offense the entering of contracts for such propaganda materials by an
against premature campaigning. individual who subsequently becomes a candidate for public office. One
definitely does not commit an offense by entering into a contract with private
parties to use his name and image to endorse certain products prior to his
Non-impairment of contract becoming a candidate for public office. The offense, as expressly prescribed
in the assailed provision, is the non-removal of the described propaganda
materials three (3) days after the effectivity of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520.
Section 32 is not a gross violation of the non-impairment clause. The non- If the candidate for public office fails to remove such propaganda materials
impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes after the given period, he shall be liable under Section 80 of the Omnibus

240
Election Code for premature campaigning. Indeed, nowhere is it indicated in There is no blanket prohibition of the use of propaganda materials and
the assailed provision that it shall operate retroactively. There is, therefore, no advertisements. During the campaign period, these may be used subject only
ex post facto law in this case. to reasonable limitations necessary and incidental to achieving the purpose of
preventing premature campaigning and promoting equality of opportunities
among all candidates. The provision, therefore, is not invalid on the ground of
Fair Elections Act overbreadth.

Next, petitioner urges that Section 32 is a violation of the Fair Elections Act. 243. Alonzo vs. CA
According to him, under this law, billboards are already permitted as lawful G.R. No. 110088 February 1, 1995
election propaganda. He claims, therefore, that the COMELEC, in effectively
prohibiting the use of billboards as a form of election propaganda through the
assailed provision, violated the Fair Elections Act. Petitioners argument is not
tenable. The Solicitor General rightly points out that the assailed provision Doctrine:
does not prohibit billboards as lawful election propaganda. It only regulates The presumption of malice or malice in law was negated by the
their use to prevent premature campaigning and to equalize, as much as privileged character of the report. The privilege may only be lost by proof of
practicable, the situation of all candidates by preventing popular and rich malice in fact. It is, nevertheless, settled that "[a] privileged communication
candidates from gaining undue advantage in exposure and publicity on should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of
account of their resources and popularity. Moreover, by regulating the use of malice or falsity. Such excessive scrutiny would defeat the protection which
such election propaganda materials, the COMELEC is merely doing its duty the law throws over privileged communications. The ultimate test is that
under the law. of bona fides.

Overbreadth Facts:

A statute or regulation is considered void for overbreadth when it offends the From 1984 to 1986, accused Dra. Merle A. Alonzo was the Field
constitutional principle that a governmental purpose to control or prevent Operations Officer of the Philippine Medical Care Commission (PMCC) for
activities constitutionally subject to State regulations may not be achieved by Region XI. On June 13, 1985, accused was directed by Executive Officer of
means that sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of the PMCC, Rossi Castro, to conduct inspections of Medicare-accredited clinics
protected freedoms. and hospitals (Exhibit 1). The directive was approved by the Chairman of
PMCC, Dr. Pacifico Marcos; as Special Order No. 73. Among the Medicare-
accredited clinics inspected by accused were the Sto. Niño Medical Clinic in
The provision in question is limited in its operation both as to time and scope. Astorga, Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur, and Our Lady of Fatima Medical Clinic in
It only disallows the continued display of a persons propaganda materials and Guihing,Hagonoy, Davao del Sur (ExhibitsE,E-1,andF). The clinics were
advertisements after he has filed a certificate of candidacy and before the start owned and managed by complainant Dra. Angeles Velasco, married to Judge
of the campaign period. Said materials and advertisements must also show Dan Velasco of the MTC-Hagonoy, Davao del Sur. After the inspection,
his name and image. accused submitted her report on her findings to Dr. Jesus Tamesis, PMCC
Vice-Chairman.

241
 Dra. Angeles Velasco received summons from the PMCC, together G.R. No. 80806 October 5, 1989
with attached complaint and annexes, which included the report of accused
(Exhibit A). Thereupon, after reading the papers, she went to see her husband,
Judge Dan Velasco, at the latter's office at Hagonoy, Davao del Sur, and Facts:
showed him the same. Finding that the last portions of the report to be libelous,
complainant Judge Velasco and complainant Dra. Angeles Velasco went to In 1983, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, and the Manila Police,
see their lawyer Atty. David Montaña at the latter's office in Quimpo Building, seized and confiscated from dealers along Manila sidewalks, magazines
Rizal St., Davao City. believed to be obscene. These were later burned. One of the publications was
Pinoy Playboy published by Leo Pita.
Dr. Velasco and her husband, Judge Dan Velasco, then filed a
complaint for libel against the petitioner with the Office of the City Fiscal of He filed an injunction case against the mayor of manila to enjoin him from
Davao City and, after preliminary investigation, Assistant City Fiscal Raul confiscating more copies of his magazine and claimed that this was a violation
Bendigo filed the corresponding information for libel against the petitioner with of freedom of speech. The court ordered him to show cause. He then filed an
the Regional Trial Court, Davao City; which docketed it as Criminal Case No. Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order against
13698. indiscriminate seizure.

Defendant Mayor Bagatsing admitted the confiscation and burning of

obscence reading materials but admitted that these were surrendered by the
Issue: stall owners and the establishments were not raided.
Whether or not the report is libellous The other defendant, WPD Superintendent, Narcisco Cabrera, filed no
answer.

Ruling: On January 11, 1984, the trial court issued an Order setting the case for
hearing on January 16, 1984 "for the parties to adduce evidence on the
NO. We affirmed the dismissal by the trial court of a complaint for question of whether the publication 'Pinoy Playboy Magazine alleged (sic)
damages arising from an allegedly libelous indorsement sent by Godinez, a seized, confiscated and/or burned by the defendants, are obscence per se or
district supervisor, to the Division Superintendent of Schools, his immediate not".
superior, by way of an explanation of an alleged confusion concerning a
dental-medical report wherein Godinez stated that Deaño, the school dentist, On February 3, 1984, the trial court promulgated the Order appealed from
"is a carping critic, a fault-finder and suspects every teacher or school official denying the motion for a writ of preliminary injunction, and dismissing the case
to be potential grafters and swindlers of the medical-dental funds, and that for lack of merit
"she did more harm than good to the teeth of the patients she treated." The CA also dismissed the appeal due to the argument that freedom of the
Consequently, the presumption of malice or malice in law was negated by the press is not without restraint.
privileged character of the report. The privilege may only be lost by proof of In the SC, the petitioner claimed that:
malice in fact. It is, nevertheless, settled that "[a] privileged communication
should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of 1. The CA erred in holding that the police officers could without any court
malice or falsity. Such excessive scrutiny would defeat the protection which warrant or order seize and confiscate petitioner's magazines on the basis
the law throws over privileged communications. The ultimate test is that simply of their determination that they are obscene.
of bona fides.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court and, in
effect, holding that the trial court could dismiss the case on its merits without
any hearing thereon when what was submitted to it for resolution was merely
244. Pita vs CA the application of petitioner for the writ of preliminary injunction.
242
 Apparently, the courts have assumed that "obscenity" is not included in the
guaranty of free speech, an assumption that, as we averred, has allowed a
Issue: Was the seizure constitutional? (NO) climate of opinions among magistrates predicated upon arbitrary, if vague
theories of what is acceptable to society.

Held: Test for obscenity: "whether the tendency of the matter charged as In the case at bar, there is no challenge on the right of the State, in the
obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral legitimate exercise of police power, to suppress smut provided it is smut. For
influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being obvious reasons, smut is not smut simply because one insists it is smut. So is
obscene may fall it equally evident that individual tastes develop, adapt to wide-ranging
influences, and keep in step with the rapid advance of civilization. What
Also, "whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the shocked our forebears, say, five decades ago, is not necessarily repulsive to
circumstances of the case, and that ultimately, the question is to be decided the present generation.
by the "judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it."
(Kottinger) But neither should we say that "obscenity" is a bare (no pun intended) matter
of opinion. As we said earlier, it is the divergent perceptions of men and women
When does a publication have a corrupting tendency, or when can it be said that have probably compounded the problem rather than resolved it.
to be offensive to human sensibilities?
Undoubtedly, "immoral" lore or literature comes within the ambit of free
The issue is a complicated one, in which the fine lines have neither been drawn expression, although not its protection. In free expression cases, this Court
nor divided. has consistently been on the side of the exercise of the right, barring a "clear
and present danger" that would warrant State interference and action. But the
Katigbak- "Whether to the average person, applying contemporary standards,
burden to show this lies with the authorities.
the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeal to prurient
interest." "There must be objective and convincing, not subjective or conjectural, proof
of the existence of such clear and present danger."
Kalaw-Katigbak represented a marked departure from Kottinger in the sense
that it measured obscenity in terms of the "dominant theme" of the work, rather As we so strongly stressed in Bagatsing, a case involving the delivery of a
than isolated passages, which were central to Kottinger (although both cases political speech, the presumption is that the speech may validly be said. The
are agreed that "contemporary community standards" are the final arbiters of burden is on the State to demonstrate the existence of a danger, a danger that
what is "obscene"). Kalaw-Katigbak undertook moreover to make the must not only be: (1) clear but also, (2) present, to justify State action to stop
determination of obscenity essentially a judicial question and as a the speech.
consequence, to temper the wide discretion Kottinger had given unto law
enforcers. The Court is not convinced that the private respondents have shown the
required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature for
The latest say on American jurisprudence was Miller v. California, which which mandatory injunction had been sought below. First of all, they were not
expressly abandoned Massachusettes, and established "basic guidelines," to possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be
wit: "(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary standards' would pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by
find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest . . .; (b) whether way of a search warrant.
the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, Has petitioner been found guilty for publishing obscene works under
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. Presidential Decrees Nos. 960 and 969? This not answered, one can conclude
that the fact that the former respondent Mayor's act was sanctioned by "police
The lack of uniformity in American jurisprudence as to what constitutes power" is no license to seize property in disregard of due process. The PD’s
"obscenity" has been attributed to the reluctance of the courts to recognize the don’t give the authorities the permission to execute high-handed acts.
constitutional dimension of the problem.
243
It is basic that searches and seizures may be done only through a judicial and desist from promoting and marketing of the said movie. writ of preliminary
warrant, otherwise, they become unreasonable and subject to challenge. injunction "enjoining petitioner from further proceeding, engaging, using or
implementing the promotional, advertising and marketing programs for the
There is of course provision for warrantless searches under the Rules of Court movie entitled 'The Jessica Alfaro Story' and from showing or causing the
but as the provision itself suggests, the search must have been an incident to same to be shown or exhibited in all theaters in the entire country UNTIL after
a lawful arrest and it must be on account fo a crime committed. the final termination and logical conclusion of the trial in the criminal action
The Court rejected the argument that "[t]here is no constitutional nor legal now pending before the Parañaque Regional Trial Court.
provision which would free the accused of all criminal responsibility because Ma. Jessica M. Alfaro the star witness of the Vizconde massacre was
there had been no warrant, and there is no "accused" here to speak of, who offered a movie contract by Viva Productions, Inc. for the filming of her life
ought to be "punished". story, she inked with the latter the said movie contract while the said case (I.S.
Second, to say that the respondent Mayor could have validly ordered the raid 95-402) was under investigation by the Department of Justice. The private
(as a result of an anti-smut campaign) without a lawful search warrant respondent sent separate letters to Viva Productions, Inc. and Alfaro, warning
because, in his opinion, "violation of penal laws" has been committed, is to them that the projected showing of subject movie on the life story of Alfaro
make the respondent Mayor judge, jury, and executioner rolled into one. would violate the sub judice rule, and his (Hubert J.P. Webb's) constitutional
rights as an accused in said criminal case.

245. VIVA Productions, Inc., vs Court of Appeals and Hubert J.P. Webb
Issues:
G.R. No. 123881 March 13, 1997
(1) Whether or not private respondent committed forum shopping by
filing two (2) cases with exactly the same factual set-up, issues involved and
reliefs sought before two (2) different courts of coordinate jurisdiction; and
Doctrine: Ordinarily, where a litigant sues the same party against whom
another action or actions for the alleged violation of the same right and the (2) Whether or not the Parañaque Court can totally disregard and
enforcement of the same relief or reliefs is or are still pending any one action indiscriminately curtail the petitioner’s constitutional right to freedom of
may be dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia and a final judgment in any expression and of the press without presence of a clear and present danger.
one case would constitute res judicata on the other. In either instance, there is
a clear and undeniable case of forum shopping, another ground for the
summary dismissal of both actions, and at the same time an act of direct Held:
contempt of court, which includes a possible criminal prosecution and
disciplinary action against the erring lawyer. 1.The private respondent has committed forum shopping. It is found
that shrewd and astute maneuverings of private respondent’s ill-advised. It
won’t escape anybody's notice that the act of filing the supposed action for
Facts: injunction with damages with the Makati court, albeit a separate and distinct
action from the contempt proceedings then pending before the Parañaque
Assailed in the petition are the decision and resolution of respondent court, is obviously and solely intended to obtain the preliminary relief of
Court of Appeals sustaining both the order of the Regional Trial Court of the injunction so as to prevent petitioner from exhibiting the movie on its premiere
National Capital JudicialRegion (Parañaque, Branch 274 —hereinafter and on its regular showing. Thealleged relief for damages becomes a mere
referred to as the Parañaque court) restraining "the exhibition of the movie subterfuge to camouflage private respondent's real intent and to feign the
'The Jessica Alfaro Story' at its scheduled premiere showing at the New semblance of a separate and distinct action from the contempt proceedings
Frontier Theater on September 11, 1995 at 7:30 in the evening and at its already filed and on- going with the Parañaque court.
regular public exhibition beginning September 13,1995, as well as to cease
244
 2.The assailed decision and order of respondent court are SET necessary permit for its TV programs. But on appeal by the respondent Board,
ASIDE, and a new one entered declaring null and void all orders of Branch 58 the CA reversed the RTC. The CA ruled that: (1) the respondent Board has
of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in jurisdiction and power to review the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo,” and
Makati City in its Civil Case No. 95-1365 and forthwith dismissing said case, (2) the respondent Board did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it
and declaring the order of the Regional Trial Court of the same National Capital denied permit for the exhibition on TV of the three series of “Ang Iglesia ni
Judicial Region stationed in Parañaque (Branch 274), functus officio insofar Cristo” on the ground that the materials constitute an attack against another
as it restrains the public showing of the movie "The Jessica Alfaro Story”. religion. The CA also found the subject TV series “indecent, contrary to law
and contrary to good customs.” Dissatisfied with the CA decision, petitioner
INC appealed to the Supreme Court.

246. IGLESIA NI CRISTO, (INC.), petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT Issue:
OF APPEALS, BOARD OF REVIEW FOR MOVING PICTURES AND
TELEVISION and HONORABLE HENRIETTA S. MENDOZA, respondents.
Whether or not respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it
prohibited the airing of petitioner’s religious program.
G.R. No. 119673 July 26, 1996

Doctrine: Any act that restrains speech is accompanied with presumption of Held:
invalidity.
Yes. Any act that restrains speech is accompanied with presumption
In American Bible Society v. City of Manila, the Court held: “The constitutional of invalidity. It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this
guaranty of free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be
carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of struck down.
such right can be justified like other restraints on freedom of expression on the
ground that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which
the State has the right to prevent.” In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers So-called "attacks" are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held
Union, the court further ruled that “it is only where it is unavoidably necessary dogmas and tenets of other religions. RTC’s ruling clearly suppresses
to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of
community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to religion. “attack” is different from “offend” any race or religion. The respondent
the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger.” Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that
gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may be.
Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any
Facts: religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion. Religious dogmas
and beliefs are often at war and to preserve peace among their followers,
Several pre-taped episodes of the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni especially the fanatics, the establishment clause of freedom of religion
Cristo” of the religious group Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) were rated “X” – i.e., not prohibits the State from leaning towards any religion. Respondent board
for public viewing – by the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures cannot censor the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it
and Television (now MTRCB). These TV programs allegedly “offended and attacks other religions, even if said religion happens to be the most numerous
constituted an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by church in our country. The basis of freedom of religion is freedom of thought
law” because of petitioner INC’s controversial biblical interpretations and its and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace of dueling ideas. It is only
“attacks” against contrary religious beliefs. where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger
to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious
freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid
the danger.
Petitioner INC went to court to question the actions of respondent
Board. The RTC ordered the respondent Board to grant petitioner INC the
245
 There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will It is settled law that as to public places, especially so as to parks and
bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior streets, there is freedom of access. Nor is their use dependent on who is the
restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by applicant for the permit, whether an individual or a group.
hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil.
While the General rule is that a permit should recognize the right of
247. Jose B.L. Reyes, in behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition (ABC) vs.
the applicants to hold their assembly at a public place of their choice, another
RamonBagatsing
place may be designated by the licensing authority if it be shown that there is
G.R. No. 65366 November 9, 1983 a clear and present danger of a substantive evil if no such change were made.
There was in this case, however, the assurance of General Narciso Cabrera,
Doctrine: There is to be no previous restraint on the communication of views Superintendent, Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force, that the
or subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action police force is in a position to cope with such emergency should it arise That
for damages, or contempt proceedings unless there be a clear and present is to comply with its duty to extend protection to the participants of such
danger of a substantive evil that [the State] has a right to prevent. peaceable assembly.

Facts: 248. APOLONIO CABANSAG, plaintiff, vs. GEMINIANA MARIA

FERNANDEZ, ET AL., defendants.
Petitioner, retired Justice JB L. Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-Bases G.R. No. L-8974, October 18, 1957
Coalition sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and
rally on October 26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon, starting from the
Luneta, a public park, to the gates of the United States Embassy. DOCTRINE:If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state
has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that
The filing of this suit for mandamus with alternative prayer for writ of some definite or immediate acts of force violence, or unlawfulness be
preliminary mandatory injunction on October 20, 1983 was due to the fact that advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is
as of that date, petitioner had not been informed of any action taken on his it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons
request on behalf of the organization to hold a rally. It turned out that on to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency
and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil
October 19, such permit was denied. Petitioner was unaware of such a fact as
which the legislative body seeks to prevent.
the denial was sent by ordinary mail. The reason for refusing a permit was due
to police intelligence reports which strongly militate against the advisability of
issuing such permit at this time and at the place applied for." To be more FACTS: This is a contempt proceeding which arose in Civil Case No. 9564 of
specific, reference was made to persistent intelligence reports affirm[ing] the the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan wherein ApolonioCabansag and his
plans of subversive/criminal elements to infiltrate and/or disrupt any assembly lawyers Roberto V. Merrera were found guilty and sentenced the first to pay a
or congregations where a large number of people is expected to attend." fine of P20 and the last two P50 each with the warning that a repetition of the
of offense will next time be heavily dealt with.

Issue: Whether or not freedom of expression and the right to peaceably Cabansag wrote a letter to the Presidential Complaints and Action
assemble was violated Commission seeking for the fast resolution of his case pending at the CFI of
Pangasinan. Fernandez prayed that Cabansag be declared in contempt of
Held: court for a line in his letter.

Petitioner (ApolonioCabansag) sought for the ejectment of Geminiana

Fernandez from a parcel of land who, on the other end, filed their answer and
246
a motion to dismiss. Even though pleadings were submitted, the hearings were between freedom of expression and the independence of the judiciary. These
suspended several times from 1947 to 1952. are“the clear and present danger” rule and the “dangerous tendency” rule.

Upon President Magsaysay’s assumption in office and creation of Presidential The first as interpreted in a number of cases, means that the evil consequence
Complaints and Action Commission (PCAC), Cabansag wrote the PCAC, a of the comment or utterance must be “extremely serious and the degree of
letter copy which he furnished the Secretary of Justice and the Executive imminence extremely high” before the utterance can be punished. The danger
Judge of the CFI of Pangasinan. He claimed that the case which had been to be guarded against is the “substantive evil” sought to be prevented. And this
long been pending be decided already. The Secretary of Justice indorsed the evil is primarily the “disorderly and unfair administration of justice.” This test
said letter to the Clerk of CFI Pangasinan. establishes a definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to
what words maybe published. Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot
Counsel for defendants (Atty. Manuel Fernandez) filed a motion before Judge constitutionally be abridged unless there is a clear and present danger that
Morfe praying that Cabansag be declared in contempt of court for an alleged such advocacy will harm the administration of justice. The US Supreme Court
scurrilous remark he made in his letter to the PCAC: xxx “The undersigned has has made the significant suggestion that this rule “is an appropriate guide in
long since been deprived of his land thru the careful maneuvers of a tactical determining the constitutionality of restriction upon expression where the
lawyer. The said case which had long been pending could not be decided due substantial evil sought to prevent by the restriction is destruction of life or
to the fact that the transcript of the records has not, as yet, been transcribed property or invasion of the right of privacy.” The Court furthers “clear and
by the stenographers who took the stenographic notes. The new Judges could present danger of substantive evil as a result of indiscriminate publications
not proceed to hear the case before the transcription of the said notes. The regarding judicial proceedings justifies an impairment of the constitutional right
stenographers who took the notes are now assigned in another courts. It of freedom of speech and press only if the evils are extremely serious and the
seems that the undersigned will be deprived indefinitely of his right of degree of imminence extremely high… A public utterance or publication is not
possession over the land he owns. He has no other recourse than to ask the to be denied the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press
help of the ever willing PCAC to help him solve his predicament at an early merely because it concerns a judicial proceeding still pending in the courts,
date.” upon the theory that in such a case, it must be necessarily tend to obstruct the
orderly and fair administration of justice. The possibility of engendering
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be liable for indirect contempt disrespect for the judiciary as a result of the published criticism of a judge is
not such a substantive evil as will justify impairment of the constitutional right
of freedom of speech and press.”
HELD: No.The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right
on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect affairs As declared in Craig v. Harney, the US Supreme Court said that the “*freedom
and to petition for a redress of grievances. The First Amendments of the of speech and press should not be impaired through the exercise of the
Federal expressly guarantees that right against abridgment by Congress. But punishment for contempt of court unless there is no doubt that the utterances
mention does not argue exclusion elsewhere. For the right is one that cannot in question are a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice.
be denied without violating those fundamental principles of liberty and justice A judge may hold in contempt one who ventures to publish anything that tends
which lie at the base of all civil and political institutions principles which the to make him unpopular or to belittle him… The vehemence of the language
Amendment embodies in the general terms of its due process clause. used in newspaper publications concerning a judge’s decision is not alone the
measure of the power to punish for contempt. The fires which it kindles must
The freedom of the press in itself presupposes an independent judiciary constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat to the administration of
through which that freedom may, if necessary, be vindicated. And one of the justice.”
potent means of assuring judges their independence is a free press.
Furthered in Pennekamp v.Florida, “*and in weighing the danger of possible
Two theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting interference with the courts by newspaper criticism against the right of free
rights of similar import in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary speech to determine whether such criticism may constitutionally be punished

247
as contempt, it was ruled that ‘freedom of public comment should in borderline he said that he “has long since been deprived of his land thru the careful
instances weigh heavily against a possible tendency to influence pending maneuvers of a tactical lawyer.” Analyzing said utterances, one would see that
cases.’” Thus, the question in every case, according to Justice Holmes, is if they ever criticize, “the criticism refers, not to the court, but to opposing
whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a counsel whose tactical manoeuvres” has allegedly caused the undue delay of
nature to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the the case. The grievance or complaint, if any, is addressed to the stenographers
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of for their apparent indifference in transcribing their notes.
proximity and degree.
The only disturbing effect of the letter which perhaps has been the motivating
The second, which is the “dangerous tendency” rule, has been adopted in factor of the lodging of the contempt charge is the fact that the letter was sent
cases where extreme difficulty is confronted in determining where the freedom to the Office of the President, asking for help because of the precarious
of expression ends and the right of courts to protect their independence predicament of Cabansag. Such act alone would not be contemptuous. To be
begins. There must be a remedy to borderline cases and the basic principle of so, the danger must cause a serious imminent threat to the administration of
this rule lies in that the freedom of speech and of the press, as well as the right justice. Nor can the Court infer that such act has “a dangerous tendency” to
to petition for redress of grievance, while guaranteed by the Constitution, are belittle the court or undermine the administration of justice for Cabansag
not absolute. As held in Gilbert v. Minnesota, “*they are subject to restrictions merely exercised his constitutional right to petition the government for redress
and limitations, one of them being the pro tection of the courts against of a legitimate grievance.
contempt.”
249. Ayer vs. Capulong
As furthered by the US Supreme Court in Gitlow v. New York, the dangerous
tendency rule may be epitomized as follows: If the words uttered create a G.R. No. 82380 April 29, 1988
dangerous tendency which the State has a right to prevent, then such words
are punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of
force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be Doctrine:
advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be
Freedom of speech and of expression includes the freedom to film and
reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence or
produce motion pictures and to exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or to
unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the
diffuse them through television.
utterance be to bring about the substantive evil the utterance be to bring about
the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent.

It is a fundamental principle, long established, that the freedom of speech and Facts:
of the press, which is secured by the Constitution does not confer an absolute
Petitioner McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie production
right to speak or publish, without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or
company, Ayer Productions, envisioned, sometime in 1987, for commercial
an unrestricted and unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible
viewing and for Philippine and international release, the historic peaceful
use of language, and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this
struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA. The proposed motion picture entitled "The
freedom. Reasonably limited, it was said by story in the passage cited, this
Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by the MTRCB as and other government
freedom is an inestimable privilege in a free government; without such
agencies consulted. Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film
limitation, it might become the scourge of the Republic.
production. It is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play,
presented in a "docu-drama" style, creating four fictional characters
The Court saw at once that it was far from Cabansag’s mind to put the court
interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual documentary footage as
in ridicule and much less to belittle or degrade it in the eyes of those to whom
background. David Williamson is Australia's leading playwright and Professor
the letter was addressed for. This is clearly inferable from its context wherein,
McCoy (University of New South Wales) is an American historian have
in respectful and courteous language, Cabansag gave vent to his feeling when
developed a script. Enrile declared that he will not approve the use,
248
appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency and call upon
any member of his family in any cinema or television production, film or other AFP and the to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in
medium for advertising or commercial exploitation. petitioners acceded to this the country. Permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments
demand and the name of Enrile was deleted from the movie script, and were revoked. Rallyists were dispersed. The police arrested petitioner David
petitioners proceeded to film the projected motion picture. However, a and Llamas without a warrant.
complaint was filed by Enrile invoking his right to privacy. RTC ordered for the President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national
desistance of the movie production and making of any reference to plaintiff or emergency has ceased to exist. Petitioners filed petitions with the SC,
his family and from creating any fictitious character in lieu of plaintiff which impleading Arroyo, questioning the legality of the proclamation.
nevertheless is based on, or bears substantial or marked resemblance to
Enrile. Hence the appeal.
ISSUE:

Issue: Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 is unconstitutional.

Whether or not freedom of expression was violated

RULING:

Ruling:

YES. The respondent Judge should have stayed his hand, instead of No. PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President
issuing an ex-parte Temporary Restraining Order one day after filing of a for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence whenever becomes
complaint by the private respondent and issuing a Preliminary Injunction necessary as prescribe under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.
twenty (20) days later; for the projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted However, the SC ruled that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution,
and hence not exhibited to any audience. Neither private respondent nor the the President, in the absence of legislative legislation, cannot take over
respondent trial Judge knew what the completed film would precisely look like. privately-owned public utility and private business affected with public interest.
There was, in other words, no "clear and present danger" of any violation of Therefore, the PP No. 1017 is only partly unconstitutional.
any right to privacy that private respondent could lawfully assert. The subject
matter, as set out in the synopsis provided by the petitioners and quoted
above, does not relate to the individual life and certainly not to the private life
of private respondent Ponce Enrile The extent of that intrusion, as this Court
251. Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr., et. Al., vs The Secretary of Justice
understands the synopsis of the proposed film, may be generally described as
such intrusion as is reasonably necessary to keep that film a truthful historical G.R. No. 203335February 18, 2014
account.

Doctrine: The only instance where a facial challenge to a statute is allowed is

when it operates in the area of freedom of expression. In such instance, the
overbreadth doctrine permits a party to challenge the validity of a statute even
250. David vs Arroyo
though as applied to him it is not unconstitutional, but it might be if applied to
May 3 2006 others not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected.
Invalidation of the statute “on its face” rather than “as applied” is permitted in
the interest of preventing a “chilling” effect on freedom of expression. But in
FACTS: other cases, even if it is found that a provision of a statute is unconstitutional,
249
courts will decree only partial invalidity unless the invalid portion is so far
inseparable from the rest of the statute that a declaration of partial invalidity is
not possible.
Issues:

Facts: (1) The petitioners contend that Section 4(a)(1) fails to meet the strict
scrutiny standard required of laws that interfere with the fundamental rights of
These consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of the people. Is Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access unconstitutional?
Republic Act (RA) 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012,
unconstitutional and void. (2) Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3) suffers from overbreadth in
that, while is seeks to discourage data interference, it intrudes into the area of
The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the protected speech and expression, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on
cyberspace. The cyberspace is a boon to the need of a current generation for these guaranteed freedoms.
greater information and facility of communication. But all is not well with the
system since it could not filter out a number of persons of ill-will, who would (3) Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or cyber-squatting violates
want to use cyberspace technology for mischiefs and crimes. One of them can, the equal protection clause in that, not being narrowly tailored, it will cause a
for instance, avail himself of the system to unjustly ruin the reputation of user using his real name to suffer the same fate as those who use aliases or
another or bully the latter by posting defamatory statements against him that take the name of another in satire, parody, or any other literary device.
people can read. (4) Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) violates the constitutional
By linking with the internet opens up a user to communication from rights to due process and to privacy and correspondence, and transgresses
others, the ill-motivated can use the cyberspace for committing theft by the freedom of the press.
hacking into or surreptitiously accessing his bank account or credit card or (5) Petitioners claim that cybersex violates the freedom of expression
defrauding him through false representations. clause of the Constitution.
The wicked can use the cyberspace, too, for illicit trafficking in sex or (6) Petitioners are wary that a person who merely doodles on paper
for exposing to pornography guileless children who have access to the and imagines a sexual abuse of a 16-year old is not criminally liable for
internet. producing child pornography but one who formulates the idea on his laptop
For these reasons, the government has a legitimate right to regulate would be.
the use of cyberspace and contain and punish wrongdoings. The government (7) Is Section 4(c)(3) unconstitutional for penalizing the transmission
certainly has the duty and the right to prevent these tomfooleries from of unsolicited commercial communications?
happening and punish their perpetrators, hence the Cybercrime Prevention
Act. (8) Petitioners dispute the constitutionality of both the penal code
provisions on libel as well as Section4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act
But petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law on cyber-libel.
for regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their
constitutional rights. (9) Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 5 that renders
criminally liable any person who wilfully abets or aids in the commission or
Pending hearing and adjudication of the issues presented in these attempts to commit any of the offenses enumerated as cybercrimes. It suffers
cases, on February 5, 2013, the Court extended the original 120-day from overbreadth, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on protected
temporary restraining order (TRO) that it earlier issued on October 9, 2012, expression.
enjoining respondent government agencies from implementing the cybercrime
law until further orders. (10) Is Section 6 on the penalty of one degree higher constitutional?

250
 (11) Is Section 7 on the prosecution under both the Revised Penal protected speech. Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach on these freedoms at all.
Code (RPC) and RA 10175 constitutional? It simply punishes what essentially is a form of vandalism, the act of wilfully
destroying without right the things that belong to others, in this case their
(12) Is Section 8 valid and constitutional? computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message. Such act has
(13) Is Section 12 on Real-Time collection of traffic data valid and no connection to guaranteed freedoms. Ergo, there is no freedom to destroy
constitutional? other people’s computer systems and private documents. All penal laws, like
the cybercrime law, have of course an inherent chilling effect, an in terrorem
(14) Is Section 13 on preservation of computer data valid and effect, or the fear of possible prosecution that hangs on the heads of citizens
constitutional? who are minded to step-beyond the boundaries of what is proper. But to
prevent the State from legislating criminal laws because they instill such kind
(15) Is Section 14 on disclosure of computer data valid and
of fear is to render the state powerless in addressing and penalizing socially
constitutional?
harmful conduct.
(16) Is Section 15 on search, seizure and examination of computer
3. No, the challenge to the constitutionality of Section 4(a)(6) is
data valid and constitutional?
baseless. The law is reasonable in penalizing the act of acquiring the domain
(17) Is Section 17 on destruction of computer data valid and name in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy reputation, or deprive others who
constitutional? are not ill-motivated of the rightful opportunity of registering the same. It is the
evil purpose for which one uses the name that the law condemns.
(18) Is Section 19 on restricting or blocking access to computer data
valid and constitutional? 4. No. In assessing the challenge that the State has impermissibly
intruded into these zones of privacy, a court must determine whether a person
(19) Is Section 20 on obstruction of justice valid and constitutional? has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that
expectation has been violated by unreasonable government intrusion. The law
(20) Is Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating
punishes those who acquire or use identifying information without right,
Center (CICC) valid and constitutional?
implicitly to cause damage. Petitioners fail to show how government effort to
(21) Is Section 26(a) on CICC’s power and functions valid and curb computer-related identity theft violates the right to privacy and
constitutional. correspondence as well as the right to due process. There is no fundamental
right to acquire another’s personal right. The Court has defined intent to gain
Held: as an internal act which can be established through overt acts of the offender,
and it may be presumed from the furtive taking of useful property pertaining to
1. No. The strict scrutiny standard, an American constitutional
another, unless special circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of
construct, is useful in determining the constitutionality of laws that tend to
the perpetrator. As such, the press, whether in the quest of news reporting or
target a class of things or persons. According to this standard, a legislative
social investigation, has nothing to fear since a special circumstance is present
classification that impermissibly interferes with the exercise of fundamental
to negate intent to gain which is required by this Section.
right or operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect class is
presumed unconstitutional. The Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls 5. The Court will not declare Section 4(c)(1) unconstitutional where it
for the application of the strict scrutiny standard since no fundamental freedom, stands a construction that makes it apply only to persons engaged in the
like speech, is involved in punishing what is essentially a condemnable act – business of maintaining, controlling, or operating, directly or indirectly, the
accessing the computer system of another without right. It is a universally lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity with the aid of a
condemnable act. computer system as Congress has intended.
2. Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, 6. The constitutionality of Section 4(c)(3) is not successfully
constitutionally subject to state regulation, may not be achieved by means that challenged. The law makes the penalty higher by one degree when the crime
unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the area of is committed in cyberspace. But no one can complain since the intensity or
251
duration of penalty is a legislative prerogative and there is a rational basis for of the cybercrime law that punishes “aiding or abetting” libel on the cyberspace
such higher penalty. is a nullity.

7. Yes, because to prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would 10. Yes, because there exists a substantial distinction between crimes
deny a person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads committed through the use of information and communication technology and
addressed to him. Commercial speech is a separate category of speech which similar crimes committed using other means. In using the technology in
us not accorded the same level of protection as that given to other question, the offender often evades identification and is able to reach far more
constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled to victims or cause greater harm.
protection. The State cannot rob him of this right without violating the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Thus, unsolicited 11. The Court resolves to leave the determination of the correct
advertisements are legitimate forms of expression. application of Section 7 that authorizes prosecution of the offender under both
the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act 10175 to actual cases, with the
8. Since the penal code and implicitly, the cybercrime law, mainly exception of the crimes of:
target libel against private persons, the Court recognizes that these laws imply
a stricter standard of malice to convict the author of a defamatory statement a. Online libel as to which, charging the offender under both
where the offended party is a public figure. The elements of libel are: (a) the Section 4(c)(4) of Republic Act 10175 and Article 353 of the Revised
allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication Penal Code constitutes a violation of the proscription against double
of the charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of jeopardy; as well as
malice.There is actual malice or malice in fact when the offender makes the b. Child pornography committed online as to which, charging
defamatory statement with the knowledge that it is false or with reckless the offender under both Section 4(c)(2) of Republic Act 10175 and
disregard of whether it was false or not. The reckless disregard standard used Republic Act 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 also
here required a high degree of awareness of probable falsity. There must be constitutes a violation of the same proscription, and, in respect to
sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the accused in fact entertained these, is void and unconstitutional.
serious doubts as to the truth of the statement he published. Gross or even
extreme negligence is not sufficient to establish actual malice. The defense of 12. Valid and constitutional, because the matter of fixing penalties for
absence of actual malice, even when the statement turns out to be false, is the commission of crimes is as a rule a legislative prerogative.
available where the offended party is a public official or a public figure. But,
13. Void and unconstitutional, because Section 12 does not permit law
where the offended party is a private individual, the prosecution need not prove
enforcement authorities to look into the contents of the messages and uncover
the presence of actual malice. For his defense, the accused must show that
the identities of the sender and the recipient. Thus, the authority that Section
he has a justifiable reason for the defamatory statement even if it was in fact
12 gives law enforcement agencies is too sweeping and lacks restraint.
true.
14. Valid and constitutional, because the user ought to have kept a
9. A governmental purpose, which seeks to regulate the use of
copy of that data when it crossed his computer if he was so minded. There
cyberspace communication technology to protect a person’s reputation and
was no undue deprivation of property since the data that service providers
peace of mind, cannot adopt means that will unnecessarily and broadly sweep,
preserve on orders of law enforcement authorities are not made accessible to
invading the area of protected freedoms. If such means are adopted, self-
users by reasons of the issuance of such orders.
inhibition borne of fear of what sinister predicaments await internet users will
suppress otherwise robust discussion of public issues. Democracy will be 15. Valid and constitutional, because what Section 14 envisions is
threatened and with it, all liberties. Penal laws should provide reasonably clear merely the enforcement of a duly issued court warrant. Disclosure can be
guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of facts to prevent arbitrary made only after judicial intervention.
and discriminatory enforcement. The terms “aiding or abetting” constitute
broad sweep that generates chilling effect on those who express themselves 16. Valid and constitutional, because Section 15 merely enumerates
through cyberspace posts, comments, and other messages. Hence, Section 5 the duties of law enforcement authorities that would ensure proper collection,

252
preservation, and use of computer system or data that have been seized by Whether or not the RH Law cannot be challenged “on its face”
virtue of a court warrant. because it is not a speech regulating measure.

17. Valid and constitutional, because it is unclear that the user has a Held:
demandable right to require the service provider to have that copy of data
saved indefinitely for him in its storage system. No. While the Court has withheld the application of facial challenges
to strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only
18. Void and unconstitutional, because Section 19 not only precludes regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other
any judicial intervention but it also disregards jurisprudential guidelines fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For
established to determine the validity of restrictions on speech. unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is
mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies
19. Valid and constitutional insofar as it applies to the provisions of involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to
Chapter IV which are not struck down by the Court. determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
20. and 21. Valid and constitutional, because cybercrime law is amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
complete in itself when it directed the CICC to formulate and implement a instrumentality of the Government. Consequently, considering that the
national cybersecurity plan. The law gave sufficient standards for the CICC to foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights
follow when it provided a definition of cybersecurity. to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights have been violated by
the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of the
petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional
254. JAMES M. IMBONG vs. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR
scrutiny.
G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014

Doctrine: The Supreme Court expanded the application of facial challenges FREEDOM OF RELIGION
to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving
255. Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines vs. Executive Secretary
religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to
peaceably assemble and to petition the government for a redress of G.R. No. 153888 July 9, 2003
grievances.

Doctrine:Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the

Facts:
security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious
On December 21, 2012, Congress enacted RH Law (RA 10354). RH freedom.
Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current
laws on contraception, women’s health and population control. Petitioners Facts:
assail its constitutionality because according to them, it violates the right to
health of women and the sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to Petitioner IDCPis a non-governmental organization that extends
protect and promote. The proponents of the RH law, however, assails the voluntary services to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim communities. It
propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions, contending claims to be a federation of national Islamic organizations and an active
that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech member of international organizations such as the Regional Islamic Da'wah
regulating measure. Council of Southeast Asia and the Pacific (RISEAP) and The World Assembly
Issue: of Muslim Youth. The RISEAP accredited petitioner to issue halal certifications
in the Philippines.
253
 On October 26, 2001, respondent Office of the Executive Secretary consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications,
issued EO 46 creating the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the
designating respondent OMA to oversee its implementation. Under the EO, Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food.
respondent OMA has the exclusive authority to issue halal certificates and
perform other related regulatory activities. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security
and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious
On May 8, 2002, a news article entitled "OMA Warns NGOs Issuing freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of
Illegal 'Halal' Certification" was published in the Manila Bulletin, a newspaper the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. In the case at bar,
of general circulation. In said article, OMA warned Muslim consumers to buy we find no compelling justification for the government to deprive muslim
only products with its official halal certification since those without said organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product
certification had not been subjected to careful analysis and therefore could as halal, even on the premise that the health of muslim Filipinos can be
contain pork or its derivatives. Respondent OMA also sent letters to food effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal
manufacturers asking them to secure the halal certification only from OMA lest certifications. The protection and promotion of the muslim Filipinos' right to
they violate EO 46 and RA 4109. As a result, petitioner lost revenues after food health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by
manufacturers stopped securing certifications from it. government agencies charged with ensuring that food products released in the
market are fit for human consumption, properly labeled and safe. Unlike EO
Hence, this petition for prohibition.Petitioner contends that the subject 46, these laws do not encroach on the religious freedom of muslims.
EO violates the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and
State. It is unconstitutional for the government to formulate policies and 256. PASTOR DIONISIO V. AUSTRIA vs. HON. NATIONAL LABOR
guidelines on the halal certification scheme because said scheme is a function RELATIONS COMMISSION
only religious organizations, entity or scholars can lawfully and validly perform
G.R. No. 124382, August 16, 1999
for the Muslims.

Issue: Whether or not the EO violates the constitutional provision on the

separation of Church and State FACTS:Private respondent Central Philippine Union Mission Corporation of
the Seventh Day Adventists (SDA) is a religious corporation under Philippine
Held: law and is represented by the other private respondents. Petitioner had worked
with the private respondent Seventh Day Adventists (SDA) for 28 years before
he was terminated. Prior to said termination, petitioner was asked to admit
Yes. Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers
accountability for the church offerings collected by his wife in the amount of
of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred
P15,078.10. Petitioner refused since it was private respondents Pastor Buhat
status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty
and Eufronio Ibesate who authorized his wife to collect. Thereafter petitioner
of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to requested Pastor Buhat to convene the Executive Committee to settle the
profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with dispute between him and Pastor Rodrigo, but the latter denied the same
the liberty of others and with the common good." because there was no quorum. The two exchanged heated arguments until
petitioner left the office. Later, an Executive Committee meeting was held
Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function where the non-remittance of church collections and the events that transpired
because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By were discussed. Subsequently, petitioner received a letter of dismissal citing
giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 therein grounds for the termination of his services. Petitioner then filed a
encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein complaint for illegal dismissal and a decision was rendered in his favor. The
petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim SDA appealed the same to the NLRC and after much argument; the case was

254
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the case involved an Doctrine:
ecclesiastical affair to which the State cannot interfere.
The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious
institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the officials,
and the laws and canons, of said institution/organization.
ISSUE: Whether or not the termination of the services of petitioner is an
ecclesiastical affair, and as such, involves the separation of church and state.

Facts:

HELD: The principle of separation of church and state finds no application in The antecedents show that petitioners were lay members of the
this case. The rationale of principle of separation of church and state is Philippine Independent Church (PIC) in Socorro, Surigao del Norte.
summed up in the familiar saying, “Strong fences make good neighbors.” The Respondents Porfirio de la Cruz and Rustom Florano were the bishop and
idea advocated by this principle is to delineate the boundaries between the parish priest, respectively, of the same church in that locality. Petitioners, led
two institutions and thus avoid encroachments by one against the other by DominadorTaruc, clamored for the transfer of Fr. Florano to another parish
because of a misunderstanding of the limits of their respective exclusive but Bishop de la Cruz denied their request. It appears from the records that
jurisdictions. While the State is prohibited from interfering in purely the family of Fr. Florano’s wife belonged to a political party opposed to
ecclesiastical affairs, the Church is likewise barred from meddling in purely petitioner Taruc’s, thus the animosity between the two factions with Fr. Florano
secular matters. being identified with his wife’s political camp. Bishop de la Cruz, however,
found this too flimsy a reason for transferring Fr. Florano to another parish
Taruc tried to organize an open mass to be celebrated by a certain Fr. Renato
The case at bar does not concern an ecclesiastical or purely religious affair as Z. Ambong during the town fiesta of Socorro. When Taruc informed Bishop de
to bar the State from taking cognizance of the same. An ecclesiastical affair is la Cruz of his plan, the Bishop tried to dissuade him from pushing through with
"one that concerns doctrine, creed, or form of worship of the church, or the it because Fr. Ambong was not a member of the clergy of the diocese of
adoption and enforcement within a religious association of needful laws and Surigao and his credentials as a parish priest were in doubt On June 28, 1993,
regulations for the government of the membership, and the power of excluding Bishop de la Cruz declared petitioners expelled/excommunicated from the
from such associations those deemed unworthy of membership. Examples of Philippine Independent Church Because of the order of
this so-called ecclesiastical affair are proceedings for excommunication, expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a complaint for damages with
ordinations of religious ministers, administration of sacraments and other preliminary injunction against Bishop de la Cruz before the Regional Trial
activities with attached religious significance. The case at bar does not even Court of Surigao City, Branch 32. They impleaded Fr. Florano and one Delfin
remotely concern any of the given examples. What is involved here is the T. Bordas on the theory that they conspired with the Bishop to have petitioners
relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an employee. It expelled and excommunicated from the PIC. They contended that their
is purely secular and has no relation whatsoever with the practice of faith, expulsion was illegal because it was done without trial thus violating their right
worship or doctrines of the church. The matter of terminating an employee, to due process of law.
which is purely secular in nature, is different from the ecclesiastical act of
expelling a member from the religious congregation.
Issue:

Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction.

257. Taruc vs. Bishop de la Cruz

G.R. No. 144801. March 10, 2005

Ruling:

255
 NO. The SC hold the Church and the State to be separate and distinct for refusing, on account of their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag
from each other. "Give to Ceasar what is Ceasar’s and to God what is God’s." ceremony which includes playing (by a band) or singing the Philippine national
upon the examination of the decisions it will be readily apparent that cases anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic pledge.
involving questions relative to ecclesiastical rights have always received the
profoundest attention from the courts, not only because of their inherent
interest, but because of the far-reaching effects of the decisions in human Ruling:
society. [However,] courts have learned the lesson of conservatism in dealing
with such matters, it having been found that, in a form of government where
the complete separation of civil and ecclesiastical authority is insisted upon,
No, they cannot be expelled for this reason. We hold that a similar exemption
the civil courts must not allow themselves to intrude unduly in matters of an
may be accorded to the Jehovah's Witnesses with regard to the observance
ecclesiastical nature.
of the flag ceremony out of respect for their religious beliefs, however "bizarre"
those beliefs may seem to others. Nevertheless, their right not to participate in
the flag ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt such patriotic exercises.
258. Ebralinag vs Superintendent Paraphrasing the warning cited by this Court in Non vs. Dames II, 185 SCRA
G.R. No. 95770 and 95887 March 1, 1993 523, 535, while the highest regard must be afforded their right to the free
exercise of their religion, "this should not be taken to mean that school
authorities are powerless to discipline them" if they should commit breaches
of the peace by actions that offend the sensibilities, both religious and patriotic,
Facts: of other persons. If they quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony
while their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem
and recite the patriotic pledge, we do not see how such conduct may possibly
The petitioners (Ebralinag, et al.) are elementary and high school students who disturb the peace, or pose "a grave and present danger of a serious evil to
were expelled from their classes by public school authorities for refusing to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest
salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent (German vs. Barangan, 135
required by RA 1265 and Department Order No. 8 of the DepEd. SCRA 514, 517).
Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, sing 259. Alejandro Estrada vs Soledad Escritor
the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those
are "acts of worship" or "religious devotion” which they "cannot conscientiously A.M. No. P-02-1651August 4, 2003
give . . . to anyone or anything except God". They feel bound by the Bible's Doctrine: The State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely
command to "guard ourselves from idols — 1 John 5:21". They consider the abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free
flag as an image or idol representing the State (p. 10, Rollo). They think the exercise claim.
action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge
transcends constitutional limitations on the State's power and invades the Facts:
sphere of the intellect and spirit which the Constitution protect against official
control Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City.
She has been living with Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more
than twenty five years and had a son with him as well. Respondent’s husband
died a year before she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally
Issue: married to another woman.
Whether school children who are members or a religious sect known as
Jehovah's Witnesses may be expelled from school (both public and private),
256
 Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate G.R. No. 133253 July 9, 2002
respondent. According to complainant, respondent should not be allowed to
remain employed therein for it will appear as if the court allows such act. Doctrine: A consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise of
the right to information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if
Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her
no contract is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late
religion—the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace
for the public to expose its defects.
Society. They allegedly have a ‘Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness’ under
the approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is effective when legal
impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.
Facts: On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Issues: Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA "to
reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop,
Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal
improve, acquire, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands." On the same date,
arrangement.
then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to
Held: PEA the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay"
under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her
right to freedom of religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special
articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson Patent No. 3517, granting and transferring toPEA "the parcels of land so
put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human rights. The State’s interest reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation
in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be Project (MCCRRP)
sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, containing
hundred ninety
a total
fourarea
(1,915,894)
of one square
million meters."
nine hundred fifteen thousand eight
Subsequently,
Parañaque issued
on April
Transfer
9, 1988,
Certificates
the Register
of of Deeds of the Municipality of
the State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage Title Nos. islands
reclaimed 7309, 7311,
knownand as the7312,
"Freedom
in the name of PEA, covering the three
or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. Thus the State’s interest Islands" located
Parañaque City. at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road,
bidding.
PEA On andApril
AMARI28, 1995,
entered theinto
Boardthe of
JVA through negotiation without public
only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition. Directors
1995, thenofPresident
PEA, in its Fidel
Resolution
V. Ramos, No. 1245, confirmed the JVA. On June 8,
through then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA.
Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and religious in Senate
The Senate Committee
CommitteesReportreportedNo. 560 the dated
results of their investigation
morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to Septemberlands
reclaimed 16, PEA
1997.seeks
Among to transfer
the conclusions
to AMARI of their report are: (1) the
under the as
classified JVA alienable
are lands lands
of theandpublic
therefore
domain which the government has not
public and secular morality. PEA cannot
Freedom Islands
alienate
are thus
thesevoid, lands;
and (3)(2) the
theJVAcertificates of title covering the
itself is illegal.
The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent Administrative
On December Order5, 1997,
No. 365 then creating
Presidenta Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential
Legal Task
Senate CommitteeForce Report
to conductNo. 560.
a studyThe on the legality of the JVA in view of
neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises members
the Chief ofPresidential
the Legal Legal Task Counsel,
Force were and thethe Secretary of Justice,
as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could Government
legality of the Corporate
JVA, contraryCounsel. to the The conclusions
Legal Task Force upheld the
reached by the Senate Committees.
allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not taxpayer,
On April filed
27,the1998,
instant
petitioner
PetitionFrankfor I. Chavez ("Petitioner" for brevity) as a
offend compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has Mandamus Restraining
Temporary with Prayer for Order.
the Issuance
Petitionerof a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
contends
of the reclaimed
the government
lands to AMARI.
stands Petitioner
to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA
proved a compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state prays that
invoking Section
PEA publicly
28, Article
disclose
II, andthe Section
terms7,of any renegotiation of the JVA,
Article III,
matters ofofpublic
the 1987
concern.
Constitution on the right of the people to information on
has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not petitioner
Due tonow the prays
approval thatofonthe"constitutional
Amended JVA by the Office of the President,
infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. and statutory grounds the renegotiated contract be declared null and void."
On February
Decree No. 10844, 1977,
creating
then PEA.
President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential
Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes an PD No. and
areas," 1084"to tasked
develop,PEAimprove,
"to reclaim acquire,
land, including foreshore and submerged
exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion. lease and
Marcos issued
sell any
Presidential
and all kindsDecree of lands."
No. 1085 On the same date, then President
transferring
Manila Bay" to under
PEAthe theManila-Cavite
"lands reclaimed Coastal
in the foreshore and offshore of the
Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
Patent
On January
No. 3517,19, granting
1988, andthentransferring
President Corazon
to C. Aquino issued Special
RIGHT TO INFORMATION PEA "the
Road and parcels
Reclamation
of land so Project
reclaimed
(MCCRRP) under the Manila-Cavite Coastal
containing
hundred ninety
a total
fourarea
(1,915,894)
of one square
million meters."
nine hundred fifteen thousand eight
Subsequently,
Parañaque issued
on April
Transfer
9, 1988,
Certificates
the Register
of of Deeds of the Municipality of
260. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. PUBLIC ESTATES Title Nos. islands
reclaimed 7309, 7311,
knownand as the7312,
"Freedom
in the name of PEA, covering the three
Islands" located
Parañaque City. at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road,
bidding.
PEA On andApril
AMARI28, 1995,
entered theinto
Boardthe of
JVA through negotiation without public 257
Directors
1995, thenofPresident
PEA, in its Fidel
Resolution
V. Ramos, No. 1245, confirmed the JVA. On June 8,
through then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA.
in Senate
The Senate Committee
CommitteesReportreportedNo. 560 the dated
results of their investigation
Septemberlands
reclaimed 16, PEA
1997.seeks
Among to transfer
the conclusions
to AMARI of their report are: (1) the
In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to reclaim recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic
areas of Manila Bay with the Construction and Development Corportion of the secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order.
Philippines (CDCP). Congress has also prescribed other limitations on the right to information in
several legislations.
PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under P.D.
1084, tasked with developing and leasing reclaimed lands. These lands were
transferred to the care of PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila Cavite
Road and Reclamation Project (MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered into an 261. Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 vs. Commission on Elections
agreement that all future projects under the MCRRP would be funded and
owned by PEA. G.R. Nos. 177271 and 177314 May 4, 2007

By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands
to PEA. It was followed by the transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312)
Doctrine: The people’s right to know is limited to "matters of public concern"
by the Register of Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering the three reclaimed
islands known as the FREEDOM ISLANDS. and is further subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. Similarly,
the policy of full disclosure is confined to transactions involving "public
Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, interest" and is subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law.
a Thai-Philippine corporation to develop the Freedom Islands. Along with
another 250 hectares, PEA and AMARI entered the JVA which would later
transfer said lands to AMARI. This caused a stir especially when Sen. Maceda
assailed the agreement, claiming that such lands were part of public domain Facts:
(famously known as the “mother of all scams”).
On January 12, 2007, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 7804
Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a prescribing rules and regulations to govern the filing of manifestation of intent
writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands by to participate and submission of names of nominees under the party-list
PEA to AMARI and from implementing the JVA. Following these events, under system of representation in connection with the May 14, 2007 elections.
President Estrada’s admin, PEA and AMARI entered into an Amended JVA
Pursuant thereto, a number of organized groups filed the necessary
and Mr. Chaves claim that the contract is null and void.
manifestations. Among these – and ostensibly subsequently accredited by the
Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections - are 14 party-list groups.
Petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR presented a longer, albeit an overlapping,
Issue: list.
Whether the constitutional right to information includes official information on
on-going negotiations before a final agreement. Subsequent events saw BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR filing with the
Comelec an Urgent Petition to Disqualify, thereunder seeking to disqualify the
nominees of certain party-list organizations. Meanwhile, reacting to the
emerging public perception that the individuals behind the aforementioned 14
Held:
party-list groups do not, as they should, actually represent the poor and
marginalized sectors, petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed a
letter5dated March 29, 2007 to Director AliodenDalaig of the Comelec’s Law
Yes. Section 7 of Article III of the Constitution explains the people’s right to
Department requesting a list of that groups’ nominees.
information on matters of public concern. The court has held that the
constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going
Neither the Comelec Proper nor its Law Department officially
negotiations before a final contract. The information, however, must
responded to petitioner Rosales’ requests. On April 16, 2007, Atty. Emilio
constitute definite propositions by the government and should not cover
258
Capulong, Jr. and ex-Senator Jovito R. Salonga, in their own behalves and as the party-list groups subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore,
counsels of petitioner Rosales, forwarded a letter to the Comelec formally lies.
requesting action and definitive decision on Rosales’ earlier plea for
information regarding the names of several party-list nominees. Invoking their The last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: "[T]he names of
constitutionally-guaranteed right to information, Messrs. Capulong and the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list" is certainly not
Salonga at the same time drew attention to the banner headline adverted to a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the requested disclosure. To us, the
earlier, with a request for the Comelec, "collectively or individually, to issue a prohibition imposed on the Comelec under said Section is limited in scope and
formal clarification, either confirming or denying … the banner headline and duration, meaning, that it extends only to the certified list which the same
the alleged statement of Chairman Benjamin Abalos, Sr. xxx" Evidently provision requires to be posted in the polling places on election day. To stretch
unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales, et al., was the issuance of Comelec en the coverage of the prohibition to the absolute is to read into the law something
banc Resolution 07-0724 under date April 3, 2007 virtually declaring the that is not intended. As it were, there is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941
nominees’ names confidential and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales’ that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through
basic disclosure request. mediums other than the "Certified List" the names of the party-list nominees.
The Comelec obviously misread the limited non-disclosure aspect of the
The herein consolidated petitions are cast against the foregoing provision as an absolute bar to public disclosure before the May 2007
factual setting, albeit petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR appear not to be elections. The interpretation thus given by the Comelec virtually tacks an
aware, when they filed their petition on April 18, 2007, of the April 3, 2007 unconstitutional dimension on the last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7941.
Comelec Resolution 07-0724.
The Comelec’s reasoning that a party-list election is not an election of
Issue: Whether or not Comelec has violated the right to information and free personalities is valid to a point. It cannot be taken, however, to justify its
access of documents as guaranteed by the Constitution assailed non-disclosure stance which comes, as it were, with a weighty
presumption of invalidity, impinging, as it does, on a fundamental right to
Held: information.

Yes. The right to information is a public right where the real parties in RIGHT TO FORM ASSOCIATION
interest are the public, or the citizens to be precise. Like all constitutional
guarantees, however, the right to information and its companion right of access
to official records are not absolute. As articulated in Legaspi, supra, the 262. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA),
people’s right to know is limited to "matters of public concern" and is further DIONISION T. BAYLON, RAMON MODESTO, JUANITO MADURA,
subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. Similarly, the policy of REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE ALDAY, SERGIO ARANETA, PLACIDO
full disclosure is confined to transactions involving "public interest" and is AGUSTIN, VIRGILIO MAGPAYO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF
subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law. Too, there is also the need APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS), HON. CEZAR C.
of preserving a measure of confidentiality on some matters, such as military, PERALEJO, RTC, BRANCH 98, QUEZON CITY, respondents.
trade, banking and diplomatic secrets or those affecting national security.
G.R. No. 85279, July 28, 1989
As may be noted, no national security or like concerns is involved in
the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the party-list groups in
question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in DOCTRINE:At present, in the absence of any legislation allowing government
employees to strike, recognizing their right to do so, or regulating the exercise
refusing the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of
of the right, they are prohibited from striking by express provision of
Memorandum Circular No. 6 and as implied in E.O. No. 180.
259
 ISSUE: Whether or not SSS employees have the right to strike

FACTS: Primarily, the issue raised in this petition is whether or not the
Regional Trial Court can enjoin the Social Security System Employees
Association (SSSEA) from striking and order the striking employees to return HELD: No. The 1987 Constitution provides that the State “shall guarantee the
to work. Collaterally, it is whether or not employees of the Social Security rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and
System (SSS) have the right to strike. negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in
accordance with law” [Art. XIII, Sec. 31].

SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for
damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, By itself, this provision would seem to recognize the right of all workers and
alleging that officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and employees, including those in the public sector, to strike. But the Constitution
barricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking itself fails to expressly confirm this impression, for it provides, after defining
employees from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting the scope of the civil service as “all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities,
business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
– Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the corporations with original charters,” that “[t]he right to self-organization shall
strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a not be denied to government employees” [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(l) and (50)].
result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction Parenthetically, the Bill of Rights also provides that “[tlhe right of the people,
be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work; including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions,
that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not abridged”
the strike be declared illegal. [Art. III, Sec. 8]. Thus, while there is no question that the Constitution
recognizes the right of government employees to organize, it is silent as to
whether such recognition also includes the right to strike.

It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the
union’s demands, which included: implementation of the provisions of the old
SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in
dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; understanding the meaning of these provisions. A reading of the proceedings
conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would
of service into regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the
same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or
the SSS; and payment of the children’s allowance of P30.00, and after the associations only, without including the right to strike.
SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and
allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices.
At present, in the absence of any legislation allowing government employees
to strike, recognizing their right to do so, or regulating the exercise of the right,
In dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary they are prohibited from striking, by express provision of Memorandum
injunction filed by petitioners, the Court of Appeals held that since the Circular No. 6 and as implied in E.O. No. 180.
employees of the SSS, are government employees, they are not allowed to
strike, and may be enjoined by the Regional Trial Court, which had jurisdiction
over the SSS’ complaint for damages, from continuing with their strike. The SSS is a GOCC with an original charter, having been created under R.A.
No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service and are covered by the
Civil Service Commission’s memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the
260
case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal. The strike Whether or not Resolution no. 27 declaring Lot 5 and 6 to be part of
staged by the employees of the SSS belonging to petitioner union being an industrial and commercial zone is valid considering the contract stipulation
prohibited by law, an injunction may be issued to restrain it. in the Transfer Certificate of Titles.

NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE Ruling:

YES. Resolution No. 27 prevails over the contract stipulations.

Section 3 of RA 2264 of the Local Autonomy Act empowers a Municipal
263. Ortigas vs. Feati Bank Council to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for the
G.R. No. L-24670 December 14, 1979 Municipality. Section 12 or RA 2264 states that implied power of the
municipality should be “liberally construed in it’sfavour”, “to give more power
to the local government in promoting economic conditions, social welfare,
and material progress in the community”. This is found in the General
Doctrine: Welfare Clause of the said act. Although non-impairment of contracts is
The state, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with constitutionally guaranteed, it is not absolute since it has to be reconciled
personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons with the legitimate exercise of police power, e.g. the power to promote
may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of
general comfort health and prosperity of the state and to this fundamental the people. Resolution No. 27 was obviously passed in exercise of police
aim of our Government, the rights of the individual are subordinated. power to safeguard health, safety, peace and order and the general welfare
of the people in the locality as it would not be a conducive residential area
considering the amount of traffic, pollution, and noise which results in the
surrounding industrial and commercial establishments.
Facts:

On March 4, 1952, Ortigas sold Lot 5 and 6, Block 31 of the Highway

Hills Subdivision at Mandaluyong to Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad 264. Ysmael vs DES
Angeles. The latter transferred their rights in favour of Emma Chavez, upon
completion of payment a deed was executed with stipulations, one of which G.R. No. 79538 October 18, 1990
is that the use of the lots are to be exclusive for residential purposes only.
This was annotated in the Transfer Certificate of Titles No. 101509 and
101511. Feati then acquired Lot 5 directly from Emma Chavez and Lot 6 Facts:
from Republic Flour Mills. On May 5, 1963, Feati started construction of a
building on both lots to be devoted for banking purposes but could also be for
residential use. Ortigas sent a written demand to stop construction but Feati Petitioner sought the reconsideration of a memorandum order issued by the
continued contending that the building was being constructed according to Bureau of Forest Development which cancelled its timber license agreement
the zoning regulations as stated in Municipal Resolution 27 declaring the in 1983, as well as the revocation of TLA No. 356 subsequently issued by the
area along the West part of EDSA to be a commercial and industrial zone. Bureau to private respondents in 1984 by sending letters to the Office of the
Civil case No. 7706 was made and decided in favour of Feati. President and the MNR [now the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR). Petitioner’s prayers were to no avail. Hence the petition
in the Court, imputing grave abuse of discretion to public respondents.
Issue:

261
Issue: WON admin bodies decisions are res judicata. Private respondent Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the
Philippine Airlines (PAL), assigned at its Baguio City station. It having allegedly
come to light that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets,
RULING: the PAL management notified him of an investigation to be conducted into the
matter of February 9, 1986. During the investigation, Ramos’ answers were to
the effect inter alia that he had not indeed made disclosure of the tickets
mentioned in the Audit Team’s findings, that the proceeds had been “misused”
The Court stressed the authority of administrative bodies to handle matters
by him, that although he had planned on paying back the money, he had been
within there scope without need of interference by the courts of law. These
prevented from doing so, “perhaps (by) shame,” that he was still willing to settle
administrative bodies are deemed to be in better positions to determine issues
his obligation, and preferred a “compromiseto pay on staggered basis, (and)
within their specialty and resolve the same. The Court cited the doctrine of res
the amount would be known in the next investigation.”
judicata which avers that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies
have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment. The About two (2) months later, an information was filed against Felipe
rule of res judicata thus forbids the reopening of a matter once determined by Ramos charging him with the crime of estafa. On arraignment on this charge,
competent authority acting within their exclusive jurisdiction Felipe Ramos entered a plea of “Not Guilty,” and trial thereafter ensued. The
prosecution of the case was undertaken by lawyers of PAL under the direction
The Court also held that the assailed orders by public respondent was in line
and supervision of the Fiscal.
with the latter’s duty to develop and conserve the country’s natural resources
in view of the constitutional mandate of the right of the people to a balanced The private prosecutors made a written offer of evidence which
and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. It is included “the (above mentioned) statement of accused Felipe J. Ramos taken
their duty to regulate the issuance of licenses (TLA) as they see fit, which the on February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket Office,” which had been marked
court cannot interfere with. The Court further held that sans grave abuse of as Exhibit A, as well as his handwritten admission given on February 8, 1986,
discretion which may be imputed to public respondents, the court ruled that also marked as Exhibit K.
petitioner cannot seek affirmative relief.
The respondent judge declared Exhibit A “inadmissible in evidence, it
appearing that the accused was not reminded of his constitutional rights to
remain silent and to have counsel, and that when he waived the same and
MIRANDA RIGHTS gave his statement, it was [not] with the assistance actually of a counsel.” He
also declared inadmissible “Exhibit K, the handwritten admission made by
accused Felipe J. Ramos, for the same reason stated in the exclusion of
265. People of the Philippines vs Hon. Judge Ruben Ayson Exhibit ‘A’ since it does not appear that the accused was assisted by counsel
when he made said admission.”
175 SCRA 216July 7, 1989
The private prosecutors filed a motion for reconsideration which was
subsequently denied. Consequently, they filed a petition for certiorari and
Doctrine: The right against self-incrimination is not self- executing or prohibition.
automatically operational. It must be claimed. If not claimed by or in behalf of
the witness, the protection does not come into play. It follows that the right may
be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the appropriate Issues:
time.
Whether or not respondent judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion when it excluded the People’s Exhibits A and K.

Facts:
262
Held: The second sentence refers the rights of persons “under investigation
for the commission of an offense,” i.e., “suspects” under investigation by police
Yes. At the core of the controversy is Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 authorities; and this is what makes these rights different from that embodied
Constitution, to which respondent Judge has given a construction that is in the first sentence, that against self-incrimination which, as aforestated,
disputed by the People. The section reads as follows: indiscriminately applies to any person testifying in any proceeding, civil,
SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself criminal, or administrative.
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in “custodial
the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No interrogations,” or “in-custody interrogation of accused persons.” And, as this
force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free Court has already stated, by custodial interrogation is meant “questioning
will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
section shall be inadmissible in evidence. custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.”
It should at once be apparent that there are two (2) rights, or sets of
rights, dealt with in the section, namely:
It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe Ramos was
not in any sense under custodial interrogation, as the term should be properly
1) the right against self-incrimination — i.e., the right of a person not to be understood, prior to and during the administrative inquiry into the discovered
compelled to be a witness against himself — set out in the first sentence, which irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a hand. The
is a verbatim reproduction of Section 18, Article III of the 1935 Constitution, constitutional rights of a person under custodial interrogation under Section
and is similar to that accorded by the Fifth Amendment of the American 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did not therefore come into play, were
Constitution, 12 and of no relevance to the inquiry. It is also clear, too, that Ramos had voluntarily
answered questions posed to him on the first day of the administrative
investigation, February 9, 1986 and agreed that the proceedings should be
recorded, the record having thereafter been marked during the trial of the
2) the rights of a person in custodial interrogation, i.e., the rights of every
criminal action subsequently filed against him as Exhibit A, just as it is obvious
suspect “under investigation for the commission of an offense.”
that the note (later marked as Exhibit K) that he sent to his superiors on
February 8,1986, the day before the investigation, offering to compromise his
liability in the alleged irregularities, was a free and even spontaneous act on
That first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution his part. They may not be excluded on the ground that the so-called “Miranda
does not impose on the judge, or other officer presiding over a trial, hearing or rights” had not been accorded to Ramos.
investigation, any affirmative obligation to advise a witness of his right against
self-incrimination. It is a right that a witness knows or should know, in
accordance with the well known axiom that every one is presumed to know the
law, that ignorance of the law excuses no one. Furthermore, in the very nature 266. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JUANITO
of things, neither the judge nor the witness can be expected to know in BALOLOY, Accused-Appellant.
advance the character or effect of a question to be put to the latter.
G.R. No. 140740. April 12, 2002
The right against self-incrimination is not self- executing or
automatically operational. It must be claimed. If not claimed by or in behalf of Doctrine: The constitutional provision on custodial investigation does not
the witness, the protection does not come into play. It follows that the right may apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the
be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the appropriate authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the suspect orally
time. admits having committed the crime. Neither can it apply to admissions or
confessions made by a suspect in the commission of a crime before he is
263
placed under investigation. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory In the case at bar, Juanito voluntarily narrated to the barangay captain
disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. that he raped Genelyn and thereafter threw her body into the ravine. This
narration was spontaneous answer, freely and voluntarily given in an ordinary
Facts: manner. It was given before he was arrested or placed under custody for
investigation in connection with the commission of the offense. On the other
At Barangay Inagasan, Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur, on the evening hand, as far as the custodial investigation of Judge Dicon is concerned, the
of August 3, 1996, the body of 11 years old Genelyn Camacho was found at conduct of such was in violation of the constitutional rights of Juanito. It is
the waterfalls at the said barangay. Autopsy report found that Genelyn was settled that at the moment the accused voluntarily surrenders to, or is arrested
raped before she was drowned. The one who caused its discovery was by, the police officers, the custodial investigation is deemed to have started.
accused-appellant Juanito Baloloy himself, who claimed that he had caught So, he could not thenceforth be asked about his complicity in the offense
sight of it while he was catching frogs in the nearby creek. While in the wake without the assistance of counsel. Judge Dicon’s claim that no complaint has
of Genelyn, Juanito confessed to the barangay captain that he only wanted to yet been filed and that neither was he conducting a preliminary investigation
frighten the girl but ended up raping and throwing her body in the ravine. The
deserves scant consideration. The fact remains that at that time, Juanito was
accused was later brought to the police headquarters and thereafter a
complaint was filed against him. already under the custody of the police authorities, who had already taken the
statement of the witnesses who were then before Judge Dicon for the
administration of their oaths on their statements.
On August 4, 1996, several people came to the courtroom of Presiding
Judge Celestino V. Dicon to swear to their affidavits before him. Judge Dicon At any rate, while it is true that Juanito’s extrajudicial confession before
asked Juanito several questions where the latter spontaneously narrated how Judge Dicon was made without the advice and assistance of counsel and
he killed Genelyn and dropped her body into the precipice. During his hence inadmissible in evidence, it could however be treated as a verbal
investigation by the police officers and by Judge Dicon, Juanito was never admission of the accused, which could be established through the testimonies
assisted by a lawyer. Juanito was charged with the crime of rape with of the persons who heard it or who conducted the investigation of the accused.
homicide. Subsequently, the trial court convicted Juanito of rape with homicide
and imposed on him the penalty of death. 267. People of the Philippines vs. Joselito Del Rosario

G.R. No. 127755 April 14, 1999

Issue:

Whether or not the accused’s extrajudicial confession before the barangay

captain and Judge Dicon was admissible. Doctrine: Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is
no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on
Held: a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who carry out a process
of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements
Yes. As to his confession with the barangay captain, it has been held
that the constitutional provision on custodial investigation does not apply to a Facts:
spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities but
given in an ordinary manner whereby the suspect orally admits having On 13 May 1996, Alonzo stopped his tricycle by the side of Nita's
committed the crime. Neither can it apply to admissions or confessions made Drugstore, General Luna St., Cabanatuan City, when three women flagged
by a suspect in the commission of a crime before he is placed under him. Parked at a distance of about one and a-half (1 1/2) meters in front of him
investigation. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of was a tricycle driven by accused Joselito del Rosario. At that point, Alonzo saw
incriminating facts or confessions. two (2) men and a woman grappling for possession of a bag. After taking hold
of the bag one of the two men armed with a gun started chasing a man who
was trying to help the woman, while the other snatcher kicked the woman
264
sending her to the ground. Soon after, the armed man returned and while the Held:
woman was still on the ground he shot her on the head. The bag taken by the
man was brought to the tricycle of accused del Rosario where someone inside Yes. Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation
received the bag. The armed man then sat behind the driver while his is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus
companion entered the sidecar. When the tricycle sped away Alonzo gave on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who carry out a
chase and was able to get the plate number of the tricycle. He also recognized process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. It is
the driver, after which he went to the nearest police headquarters and reported well-settled that it encompasses any question initiated by law enforces after a
the incident. person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprive of his freedom of
action in any significant way. This concept of custodial investigation has been
The court a quo found accused Joselito del Rosario guilty as charged broadened by RA 7438 to include "the practice of issuing an "invitation" to a
and sentenced him to death. Del Rosario contends that there was violation of person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to
his right to remain silent, right to have competent and independent counsel have committed."
preferably of his own choice, and right to be informed of these rights as
enshrined and guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. As testified to by SPO4 From the foregoing, it is clear that del Rosario was deprived of his
Geronimo de Leon, the prosecution witness who was the team leader of the rights during custodial investigation. From the time he was "invited" for
policemen who investigated the 13 May incident, during his cross-examination questioning at the house of the baranggay captain, he was already under
— effective custodial investigation, but he was not apprised nor made aware
thereof by the investigating officers. The police already knew the name of the
“Upon finding the name of the owner of the tricycle, they proceeded to Bakod tricycle driver and the latter was already a suspect in the robbing and
Bayan in the house of the barangay captain where the owner of the tricycle senseless slaying of Virginia Bernas. Since the prosecution failed to establish
was summoned and who in turn revealed the driver's name and was invited that del Rosario had waived his right to remain silent, his verbal admissions on
for interview. The driver was accused Joselito del Rosario who volunteered to his participation in the crime even before his actual arrest were inadmissible
name his passengers on May 13, 1996. On the way to the police station, against him, as the same transgressed the safeguards provided by law and
accused informed them of the bag and lunch kit's location and the place where the Bill of Rights.
the hold-uppers may be found and they reported these findings to their officers,
Capt. Biag and Capt. Cruz. After lunch, they proceeded to Brgy. Dicarma
composed of 15 armed men where a shoot-out transpired that lasted from 1:00
268. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PABLITO
to 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon. After a brief encounter, they went inside the ANDAN y HERNANDEZ @ BOBBY,
house where they found Marquez dead holding a magazine and a gun. While
all of these were happening, accused del Rosario was at the back of the G.R. No. 116437 March 3, 1997
school, after which they went back to the police station. The investigator took
the statement of the accused on May 14, 1996, and was only subscribed on
May 22, 1996. All the while, he was detained in the police station as ordered DOCTRINE: An investigation begins when it is no longer a general inquiry into
by the Fiscal. His statements were only signed on May 16, 1996. He also an unsolved crime but starts to focus ona particular person as a suspect, i.e,
executed a waiver of his detention. His SinumpaangSalaysay was done with when the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession from
the assistance of Ex-Judge Talavera.” the suspect in connection with an alleged offense.

FACTS:
Issue: Whether or not Del Rosario was deprived of his rights during the
custodial investigation

265
Marianne Guevarra, a second-year nursing student at Fatima was on her way testified that policemen tortured and coerced him to admit the crime but the
to her school dormitory in Valenzuelal, Metro Manila when PablitoAndan asked trial court found him guilty and sentenced him to death.
her to check the blood pressure of the grandmother of Andan’s wife but there
was nobody inside the house. She was punched in the abdomen by Andan
and was brought to the kitchen where he raped her. She was left in the toilet ISSUE:
until it was dark and was dragged to the backyard. It was when Andan lifted Whether or not the admission of Andan to the mayor without the assistance of
her over the fence to the adjacent vacant lot where she started to move. Andan counsel is in violation of the constitution and cannot be admitted as evidence
hit her head with a concrete block to silence her and dragged her body to a in court.
shallow portion of the lot and abandoned it.

HELD:
The death of Marianne drew public attention which prompted Baliuag Mayor
Cornelio Trinidad to form a team of police officers to solve the case. Apart from
the vacant lot, they also searched Andan’s nearby house and found evidences
Under these circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the appellant’s
linked to the crime. The occupants of the house were interviewed and learned
confession before the mayor is inadmissible. A municipal mayor has
that accused-appellant was in Barangay Tangos, Baliuag, Bulacan. A police
“operational supervision and control” over the local police and may be deemed
team lead by Mayor Trinidad located Andan and took him to the police
a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of
headquarters where he was interrogated where he said that Dizon killed the
Article III of the Constitution. However, Andan’s confession to the mayor was
girl. The three were then brought to Andan’s house where he showed the
not made in response to any interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did
police where the bags of Marianne were hidden. They were then brought back
not question appellant at all and no police authority ordered the appellant to
to the police station while waiting for the result of the investigation.
talk to the mayor. It was the appellant who spontaneously, freely and
voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor acted as a
confidant and not as a law enforcer and therefore did not violate his
The gruesome crime attracted the media and as they were gathered at the constitutional rights.
police headquarters for the result of the investigation, Mayor Trinidad arrived
and proceeded to the investigation room. Upon seeing the mayor, appellant
approved him and whispered a request that they talk privately to which the
Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a
mayor agreed. They went to another room and there, the Andan agreed to tell
spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but
the truth and admitted that he was the one who killed Marianne. The mayor
given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having
opened the door of the room to let the public and the media representatives
committed the crime. What the constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure
witness the confession. Mayor Trinidad first asked for a lawyer to assist the
of incriminating facts or confession. Hence, we hold that appellant’s confession
appellant but since no lawyer was available he ordered the proceedings
to the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court.
photographed and recorded in video. In the presence of the media and his
relatives, Andan admitted to the crime and disclosed how he killed Marianne
and that he falsely implicated Larin and Dizon because of ill-feelings against
them. 269. People vs. Piedad

G. R. No. 131923 - December 5, 2002

However, appellant entered a plea of “not guilty” during his arraignment. He

provided an alibi why he was at his father’s house at another barangay and
Doctrine:

266
 There is no law which requires a police lineup before a suspect can 270. People vs. Escordial
be identified as the culprit of a crime. What is important is that the
prosecution witnesses positively identify the persons charged as the G.R. No. 138934-35 January 16 2002
malefactors.

Facts:
Facts: Petitioners were all living in the ground floor of a boarding house. On
Accused, Niel Piedad and others were charged with Murder. Upon the night of the crime (December 27, 1997), a jeep was parked in front of the
arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge. The trial court boarding house where children (later witnesses) were playing. They were told
rendered a decision finding Piedad guilty. His conviction was founded upon a to go home by a man who would be later identified as the accused. While the
testimony of Luz Lactawan, widow of the victim, identifying Piedad’s group as three were sleeping, Erma was awakened by the presence of a man. This man
the suspect in beating up her husband causing his death. had his head covered with a t-shirt to prevent identification and carried a knife
about four inches long. He asked for her money and was able to get P500 from
In this instant appeal, accused-appellant argues that the way that he her. She then turned to the other petitioners who were already awake by that
was identified by prosecution was suggestive and fatally flawed. Niel claims time and was able to take P3100 from Michelle and none from Teresa because
that he should have been put in a police lineup instead of being shoveled into her bag was in the other room.
a “confrontation” with the alleged witnesses and immediately singled out by
the police as suspects.
After taking the money, they were told to blindfold one another. He then
proceeded to have carnal knowledge with Michelle. Michelle said that although
Issue: she was blindfolded and could not see, she could feel that the man had no
cover on his face when he was raping her. She felt that his chest was rough
Whether or not accused-appellants constitutional rights were and had some scars. When he placed her hands on his nape, she felt that it
violated. was also rough (keloid). On the other hand, Erma claimed she was able to see
through her blindfold and that she saw the man’s face.

Ruling: After he finished raping Michelle, he sat down on the bed and talked to the
women. He then raped Michelle for the second time, threatening her so she’d
concede that it would be much worse if he’d call others (companions) from
outside to rape her. After which (about 12:30am) he left.
NO. The claim by the defense that Niels pre-trial identification was
suggestive due to the absence of a police lineup is more theoretical than PO3 Tancinco was one of those who responded to the crime. A report was
real. It must be pointed out that even before the incident, Luz Lactawan knew made in the police station. Subsequent searches, through the descriptions of
the accused. Fidel, on the other hand, knew Niel because they played the petitioners, the children playing in the jeep in front of the boarding house,
basketball together. Hence, the witnesses were not identifying persons whom and others led to the pinpointing of accused-appellant.
they were unfamiliar with, where arguably, improper suggestion may set in.
On the contrary, when the accused were presented before the witnesses, Accused was playing in basketball when the police “invited” him to the
they were simply asked to confirm whether they were the ones responsible Pontevedra police station for as his alleged robber and rapist. He was also
for the crime perpetrated. The witnesses did not incriminate the accused brought to the Bacolod police station so that the other witnesses could identify
simply because they were the only ones presented by the police, rather, the him. They picked him out of four in the line-up.
witnesses were certain they recognized the perpetrators of the crime. Accused claims that he went home to Pontevedra, Negros Occidental at the
time of the incident as testified by three other witnesses for the defense.
267
HELD: inadmissible as evidence against him. However, again, failure to object when
these pieces of evidence were presented constituted a waiver.
WON the warrantless arrest was valid?
TESTIMONIES OF THE WITNESSES (regarding the identity of the accused):
It was invalid but was cured due to accused-appellants failure to question should be regarded as inadmissible under the fruit of the poisonous tree
warrantless arrest before arraignment (waiver). Valid warrantless searches are doctrine. In court.
enumerated under Rule 113, §5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure:
IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION: inadmissibility of these out-of-court
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is identifications does not render the in-court identification of accused-appellant
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; inadmissible for being the “fruits of the poisonous tree.” As it was not derived
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable or drawn from the illegal arrest of accused-appellant or as a consequence
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that thereof, it is admissible as evidence against him.
the person to be arrested has committed it; and (Credibility of the witnesses were also discussed)
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from
a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being 271. Ernesto Navallo vs Hon. Sandiganbayan
transferred from one confinement to another.
234 SCRA 175July 16, 1994
In these cases, the crime took place on December 27, 1996. But, accused-
appellant was arrested only on January 3, 1997, a week after the occurrence
of the crime. As the arresting officers were not present when the crime was Doctrine: A person under a normal audit examination is not under custodial
committed, they could not have “personal knowledge of the facts and investigation. An audit examiner himself can hardly be deemed to be the law
circumstances of the commission of the crime”. enforcement officer contemplated in the above rule.
Personal knowledge of facts in arrests without a warrant must be based upon
“probable cause” which means “an actual belief or reasonable grounds of
suspicion.” (Reasonable: in the absence of actual belief of the arresting Facts:
officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of
Accused was the Collecting and Disbursing Officer of the Numancia
committing the offense is based on actual facts)
National Vocational School, which school is also located at del Carmen,
WON evidence should have been excluded by the RTC for failure to apprise Surigao del Norte. His duties included the collection of tuition fees, preparation
him with his right to remain silent and his right to counsel? of vouchers for salaries of teachers and employees, and remittance of
collections exceeding P500.00 to the National Treasury. An information for
No. He has not shown that, as a result of his custodial interrogation, malversation of public funds was filed.
the police obtained any statement from him – whether inculpatory or
exculpatory - which was used in evidence against him. A warrant of arrest was issued, but accused-petitioner could not be
found. on 10 December 1978, Presidential Decree No. 1606 took effect
WON evidence regarding the identification of accused was inadmissible creating the Sandiganbayan and conferring on it original and exclusive
because of absence of counsel? jurisdiction over crimes committed by public officers embraced in Title VII of
OUT-OF-COURT IDENTIFICATION: This should have been inadmissible the Revised Penal Code. On 15 November 1984, Navallo was finally arrested.
because identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police line-up, or He was released on provisional liberty upon the approval of his property bail
in a show-up for that matter, after the start of the custodial investigation is bond. When arraigned by the RTC on 18 July 1985, he pleaded not guilty.
Upon motion of the prosecution, the RTC transferred the case and transmitted
its records to the Sandiganbayan.
268
 Special Prosecutor Luz L. Quiñones-Marcos opined that since Navallo No. Appellant is not in custodial investigation. A person under a normal
had already been arraigned before the case was transferred to the audit examination is not under custodial investigation. An audit examiner
Sandiganbayan, the RTC should continue taking cognizance of the case. The himself can hardly be deemed to be the law enforcement officer contemplated
matter was referred to the Office of the Ombudsman which held otherwise. in the above rule. In any case, the allegation of his having been "pressured" to
The information was then docketed with the Sandiganbayan. A new order for sign the Examination Report prepared by Dulguime (examined cash, as
Navallo's arrest was issued by the Sandiganbayan. ordered by Espino, the provincial auditor) appears to be belied by his own
testimony.
The warrant was returned with a certification by the RTC Clerk of Court
that the accused had posted a bail bond. Navallo filed a motion to quash,
contending (1) that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the offense 272. JOSUE R. LADIANA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
and the person of the accused and (2) that since the accused had already PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
been arraigned by the RTC, the attempt to prosecute him before the
Sandiganbayan would constitute double jeopardy. G.R. No. 144293. December 4, 2002.]

However, this was denied and trial ensued and he was found guilty.
Doctrine: The Constitution bars the admission in evidence of any statement
extracted by the police from the accused without the assistance of competent
and independent counsel during a custodial investigation. However, a counter-
Issues: affidavit voluntarily presented by the accused during the preliminary
Whether or Not the constitutional right against double jeopardy and in investigation, even if made without the assistance of counsel, may be used as
custodial investigations in favor of the accused violated. evidence against the affiant.

The right to have a competent and independent counsel only

applies during custodial investigations, and not preliminary investigations.
Held: Custodial investigation is the questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
No. Double jeopardy requires the existence of the following requisites:
freedom of action in any case. A preliminary investigation is an inquiry or
proceeding to determine whether there is a sufficient ground to engender that
a crime has been committed and respondent is probably guilty thereof and
(1) The previous complaint or information or other formal charge is sufficient should be held for trial. A defendant under trial or under preliminary
in form and substance to sustain a conviction; investigation is not under custodial investigation.
(2) The court has jurisdiction to try the case; Facts:
(3) The accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the charge; and Petitioner, a public officer, being then a member of the Integrated
National Police (now Philippine National Police) assigned at the Lumban
(4) The accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is dismissed without his
Police Station, Lumban, Laguna, confronted Francisco San Juan while the
express consent.
latter was removing the steel pipes which were previously placed to serve as
barricade to prevent the entry of vehicles along P. Jacinto Street, Barangay
Salac, Lumban, Laguna, when Francisco San Juan told the accused that the
The RTC was devoid of jurisdiction when it conducted an arraignment latter has no business in stopping him. Thereafter, petitioner shot Francisco
of the accused which by then had already been conferred on the with his firearm thereby causing the latter’s death.
Sandiganbayan. Moreover, neither did the case there terminate with conviction
or acquittal nor was it dismissed. The Sandiganbayan ruled that the prosecution had been able to
establish the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. The court a quo held
269
that his Counter-Affidavit, in which he had admitted to having fired the fatal fact, the court has declared that a defendant on trial or under preliminary
shots that caused the victim's death, may be used as evidence against him. It investigation is not under custodial investigation.
underscored the admission made by the defense as to the authorship, the
authenticity and the voluntariness of the execution of the Counter-Affidavit. It
ruled that the document had sufficiently established his responsibility for the Even in the absence of counsel, the admissions made by petitioner in his
death of the victim. Counter-Affidavit are not violative of his constitutional rights. It is clear that it
was not exacted by the police while he was under custody or interrogation.
Hence, the constitutional rights of a person under custodial investigation as
The resolution of this case hinges mainly on the admissibility of the embodied in Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, are not at issue in
Counter-Affidavit submitted by petitioner during the preliminary investigation. this case.
He argues that no counsel was present when the Affidavit was executed. In
support of his argument, he cites the Constitution thus:
"SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense 273. People of the Philippines vs. Santiago Peralta
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person G.R. No. 145176 March 30, 2004
cannot afford the services of counsel, he... must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. ... x
xxxxxxxx
Doctrine: The basic law specifically requires that any waiver of the right to
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 counsel must be made in writing and executed in the presence of a counsel
hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him."
Facts:

Issue: In an Information dated November 9, 1992, 3 appellants and their co-

accused were charged as follows:
Whether or not the Counter-Affidavit the accused executed during the
preliminary investigation may be admitted against him as evidence of guilt
"That sometime in the year 1990 and including November 4, 1992, in the City
beyond reasonable doubt even if he was not assisted then by counsel.
of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating with
others whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still
unknown and helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
Ruling:
feloniously, with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the
owner thereof, take, steal and carry away punctured currency notes due for
shredding in the total amount of P194,190.00, belonging to the Central Bank
Yes. A preliminary investigation is an inquiry or a proceeding to determine of the Philippines as represented by Pedro Labita y Cabriga, to the damage
whether there is sufficient ground to endanger a well-founded belief that a
and prejudice of the latter in the aforesaid sum of P194,190.00 Philippine
crime has been committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof
currency”
and should be held for trial.
During their arraignment on May 4, 1993, appellants, assisted by their
respective counsels, pleaded not guilty. After trial in due course, they were all
Evidently, a person undergoing preliminary investigation before the public found guilty and convicted of qualified theft in the appealed Decision.
prosecutor cannot be considered as being under custodial investigation. In

270
 The trial court convicted appellants mainly on the strength of the three trial court was in error when it admitted in evidence the uncounseled
confessions given by Garcia and the three perforated P100 currency notes confessions of Garcia and convicted appellants on the basis thereof.
confiscated from him upon his arrest. Appellants, however, contend that these
pieces of evidence are inadmissible. Appellants aver that the alleged three
Sworn Statements of Garcia were obtained without the assistance of counsel
274. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALEJANDRO
in violation of his rights under Article III, Section 12 (1) and (2) of the 1987 LUCERO y CORTEL, accused-appellant.
Constitution
G.R. No. 97936, May 29, 1995
Issue: Whether or not the constitutional right of the accused to competent and
independent counsel was violated
DOCTRINE:In custodial investigation, right to counsel attaches from the
Held: moment the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information
and confessions or admissions from the accused.
Yes. It is clear from a plain reading of the three extrajudicial
confessions that Garcia was not assisted by Atty. Sanchez. The signature of
the latter on those documents was affixed after the word "SAKSI." Moreover, FACTS: Appellant was among those charged with the crime of robbery with
he appeared in court and categorically testified that he had not assisted Garcia homicide. Atty. Diosdado Peralta, acting as his counsel during the
when the latter was investigated by the police, and that the former had signed investigation, conferred with the appellant and apprised the latter of his
the Sworn Statement only as a witness.The written confessions, however, constitutional rights. When the investigator started asking the preliminary
were still admitted in evidence by the RTC on the ground that Garcia had questions, Atty. Peralta left to attend the wake of his friend, Capt. Emilio
expressed in writing his willingness and readiness to give the Sworn Dacanay, at Fort Bonifacio. He gave word that in case of need, he could be
Statements without the assistance of counsel. The lower courts action is reached at his residence. The resulting extrajudicial statement, already signed
manifest error. by the appellant, was later presented to Atty. Peralta who examined the same
and explained to Lucero its legal implications. After confirming with appellant
The right to counsel has been written into our Constitution in order to that the statements were given voluntarily, the counsel signed the document.
prevent the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions
from a suspect in a crime. The basic law specifically requires that any waiver
of this right must be made in writing and executed in the presence of a counsel. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was denied the right to counsel
In such case, counsel must not only ascertain that the confession is voluntarily
made and that the accused understands its nature and consequences, but
also advise and assist the accused continuously from the time the first question HELD: Yes. When the Constitution requires the right to counsel, it did not
is asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the confession. mean any kind of counsel but effective and vigilant counsel. Appellant received
no effective counseling from Atty. Peralta. At the crucial point when the
Hence, the lawyer’s role cannot be reduced to being that of a mere interrogation was just starting, Atty. Peralta left appellant to attend the wake of
witness to the signing of a pre-prepared confession, even if it indicated a friend. At that critical stage, appellant gave his uncounselled extrajudicial
compliance with the constitutional rights of the accused. The accused is confession. In People v. De Guzman , we held that in custodial investigation,
entitled to effective, vigilant and independent counsel. A waiver in writing, like the right to counsel attaches from the moment the investigation starts, i.e.,
that which the trial court relied upon in the present case, is not enough. Without when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and
the assistance of a counsel, the waiver has no evidentiary relevance. The confessions or admissions from the accused. In this case, at the crucial point
Constitution states that "[a]ny confession or admission obtained in violation of when the interrogation was just starting, Atty. Peralta left appellant to attend
[the aforecited Section 12] shall be inadmissible in evidence x xx." Hence, the the wake of a friend. At that critical stage, appellant gave his uncounselled
271
extra-judicial confession. Surely, such a confession where appellant was Appellant Rizal Espiritu was convicted as charged for the crime of murder and
unprotected from mischief cannot convict. was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua by the Regional Trial
Court of Baguio City. The conviction was based mainly on his confession and
the corroborating evidence of corpus delicti. His extra-judicial confession
275. People vs. Bandula stated that he and Fred Malicdan killed Sato Sanad after being hired by Gerald
Alicoy to do so for the sum of P20,000.00. Aside from describing the details of
G.R. No. 89223 May 27, 1994 how he had his cohort killed Sanad, during the ocular inspection, he even
pointed out the place where the killing had been committed. And when he
executed his extra-judicial confession before the police and during the
Doctrine: preliminary investigation of the case before the city prosecutor wherein he
admitted his participation in the said incident, he was assisted by Atty. Daniel
The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e., Mangallay. However, during the trial of the case, the accused denied any
when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or participation in the killing of Sanad. He also assailed the admissibility of his
confessions or admissions from respondent/accused. extra-judicial confession. And, he claimed that Atty. Mangallay was retained
by Alfredo Kinao and not by himself and that the said lawyer was unable to
advise or to explain to him the contents of his extra-judicial confession before
Facts: he signed it.

The accused was charged of robbery with homicide. Hence, this appeal.
During investigation he was investigated and made an extrajudicial confession
during the interrogation in the absence of a counsel. It was 2 weeks later that
he was provided with one in the person of Atty. Zena, a municipality attorney Issue:
where he was made to sign a sworn statement admitting the shooting of the
victim. Whether or not the extra-judicial confession of Espiritu is admissible as
evidence.
Issue:

Whether or not the accused was accorded with due process of

custodial investigation. Held:

Ruling: The Court ruled that appellant's contention that Atty. Mangallay was retained
not by the appellant personally but by his uncle, Alfredo Kinao, is not proof of
NO. The right of the accused to due process was clearly violated since counsel deprivation. The fact remains that Kinao, in hiring the counsel, acted
the authorities failed to provide him counsel during the interrogation and he on behalf of appellant. Besides, appellant did not object when Atty. Mangallay
was not informed of his right to remain silent and right to a counsel. represented him during the investigations before the police and the city
prosecutor. In fact, he expressly acknowledged Atty. Mangallay as his counsel.

We must clarify that the right to counsel does not mean that the accused must
276. People vs Espiritu
personally hire his own counsel. The constitutional requirement is satisfied
G.R. No. 128287 February 2,1999 when a counsel is (1) engaged by anyone acting on behalf of the person under
investigation or (2) appointed by the court upon petition of the said person or
Facts: by someone on his behalf.

272
The assistance rendered to appellant by Atty. Mangallay met the standards These two cases are like the case of Teresita Q. Tucay v. Judge Roger
that had been set in Deniega for the purpose of safeguarding the right of the Domagas, 242 SCRA 110 being classified as heinous crimes there (sic) are
accused against involuntary confession. In the present case, the counsel was supposedly unbailable;
vigilant in informing Espiritu of his rights. He was clear in explaining to his client
every question propounded by the investigating officer. And he was not 2. On May 3, 1995, Barangay Captain Rodolfo Castanedas Criminal
negligent in relating to the appellant the legal consequences of the latter's Case for Illegal Possession of Firearm was raffled and assigned to his sala.
extra-judicial confession. The provincial prosecutor granted a bailbond of P180,000.00 but it was
reduced by Judge Segundo Catral for only P30,000.00. The worst part of it no
And as a consequence of the confession of the appellant, his conviction hearing has been made from 1995 to the present because according to his
became inevitable. Such confession was evidence of a high order, "since it is clerks, he is holding it in abeyance. This Barangay Captain Rodolfo Castaneda
supported by the strong presumption that no person of normal mind would is one of the goons of Julio Bong Decierto his nephew who has a pending
deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and murder case;
his conscience."
3. Another Barangay Captain Nilo de Rivera with a homicide case was
The assailed Decision was AFFIRMED. granted with a bailbond of P14,800.00 by Judge Segundo Catral. The amount
is too low. It is because this Nilo de Rivera is another goon of Julio Bong
Decierto;
RIGHT TO BAIL Respondent’s Contention:

1. Respondent judge, in his comment, clarified that Criminal Case No.

277. Flaviano Cortes vs Judge Segundo Catral 07-893 is the case of People v. Willie Bumanglag y Magno for frustrated
homicide pending in Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri where the
A.M. No. RTJ-97-1387 September 10, 1997 presiding judge is Hon. Virgilio Alameda. However, if the complainant is
referring Ahmed Duerme y Paypon, et al. for murder pending in Branch 7 of
the RTC where respondent was then designated as presiding judge,
Doctrine: Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the respondent stresses that the provincial prosecutorrecommended P
application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to 200,000.00 as bailbond for each of the accused. Subsequently, in a motion for
present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose reduction of bailbond, the resolution of the motion was submitted to the sound
of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion. discretion of the court. The court, mindful of the fact that the prosecution is
banking on weak circumstantial evidence issued an order for reduction of the
bailbond from P200,000.00 to P50,000.00.

Facts: In the case of People v. Rodrigo Bumanglag the inquest judge issued
a warrant of arrest for the accused with no bail recommended. When the case
A sworn letter complaint was filed by Flaviano Cortes charging Judge was elevated to the Regional Trial Court upon information filed by the
Segundo B. Catral of the RTC of Aparri, Cagayan with Gross Ignorance of the provincial prosecutor, the information made no mention of a bailbond. In the
Law committed as follows: hearing of the petition to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt is
1. He granted bail in murder cases without hearing: People v. Duerme strong, the fiscal opted not to introduce evidence and recommended bail in the
(Criminal Case No. 07-893) and People v. Rodrigo Bumanglag both cases of sum of P200,000.00 instead. Respondent judge acting on the said approved
murder. the recommendation of Prosecutor Apolinar Carraomotion to reduce bail. In
the course of the hearing of the petition, the public prosecutor
manifested"guided by the factual setting and the supporting evidence extant
on record" reduced the bail bondAccused through counsel filed that he had no
273
objection to the sum of P50,000.00 as bail for the accused. Respondent judge, against him or her. It is awarded to the accused to honor the presumption of
thenfrom P200,000.00 to P50,000.00as recommended by the prosecutor. innocence until his guilt
Once again, the ordergranting the bail of P200,000.00, as well as the reduced
bail bond of P50,000.00, did not contain asummary of the evidence presented is proven beyond reasonable doubt, and to enable him to prepare his defense
by the prosecution. without being subject

2. As regards the third charge concerning the illegal possession of to punishment prior to conviction.
firearm against Barangay Captain Rodolfo Castaneda, the bailbond Bail should be fixed according to the circumstances of each case. The
recommended by the prosecutor was P180,000.00.Accused, through counsel amount fixed should be
Atty. Bulseco, filed a motion for reduction of the bailbond to P30,000.00.
Counsel even vouched and guaranteed the appearance of the accused in sufficient to ensure the case presence of the accused at the trial yet
court, whenever required. The motion for reduction of bailbond was submitted reasonable enough to comply
without serious opposition and the prosecutor mindful perhaps that there is no
with the constitutional provision that bail should not be excessive.Therefore,
corpus of the crime as no firearm was caught or taken from the possession of
whether bail is amatter of right or of discretion, reasonable notice of hearing is
the accused merely submitted the same to the discretion of the court.
required to be given to the prosecutoror fiscal or at least he must be asked for
3. In Criminal Case concerning a homicide case against Barangay his recommendation because in fixing the amount of bail,the judge is required
Captain Nilo de Rivero, respondent judge says that the bailbond of P14,800.00 to take into account a number of factors such as the applicant's character and
was recommended by the acting Officer-In-Charge (OIC) as contained in his reputation, forfeiture of other bonds or whether he is a fugitive from justice.
manifestation accompanying the information. Respondent judge then acting
When a person is charged with an offense punishable by death,
on the recommendation of the OIC provincial prosecutor and mindful of the
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail is a matter of discretion. Rule 114,
guidelines in fixing a reasonable amount of bailbond coupled by the fact that
Section 7 of the Rules of Court states: "No person charged with a capital
the evidence on record is merely circumstantial and there was no eyewitness
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment
to the commission of crime granted bailbond in the sum of P14,800.00.
when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the
The Office of the Court Administrator recommended the dismissal of stage of the criminal action." Consequently, when the accused is charged with
the complaint saying that there is nothing in the allegations of the complainant an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the
that would warrant the imposition of administrative sanction against judge is mandated to conduct a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the
respondent judge. discretion of the court, not only to take into account the guidelines set forth in
Section 9, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, but primarily to determine the
existence of strong evidence of guilt or lack of it, against the accused.
Issues: A summary hearing means such brief and speedy method of receiving
Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance of law for and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the
his acts of granting bail on the abovementioned criminal cases. purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for
purposes of bail.

Respondent judge, in two instances, granted bail to an accused

Held: charged with murder, without

Yes.Bail is the security required by the court and given by the accused having conducted any hearing as to whether the evidence of guilt against the
to ensure that the accused accused is strong.

appears before the proper court at the scheduled time and place to answer the
charges brought
274
 The judge is mandated to conduct a hearing even in cases where the 278. FELISA TABORITE and LUCY T. GALLARDO, Complainants, v.
prosecution chooses to just filea comment or leave the application of bail to JUDGE MANUEL S. SOLLESTA, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT,
the sound discretion of the court. A hearing is likewise SURALLAH, SOUTH COTABATO, Respondent.

required if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the

application to grant andfix bail. The importance of a hearing has been
emphasized in not a few cases wherein the court ruled that, even if the A.M. No. MTJ-02-1388. August 12, 2003.
prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose an objection to
themotion for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or ask Doctrine: The prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to present
searching questions fromwhich it may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, evidence. It is on the basis of such evidence that judicial discretion is
or the lack of it against the accused. We needonly remind him that he is not exercised in determining whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is
bound by the recommendation of the prosecutor and the affidavits and sworn strong. In other words, discretion must be exercised regularly, legally and
statements of the witnesses are mere hearsay statements which could hardly within the confines of procedural due process, that is, after evaluation of the
be the basis fordetermining whether or not the evidence of guilt against the evidence submitted by the prosecution. Any order issued in the absence
accused is strong. thereof is not a product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice
The case against respondent for the first allegation was even and outright arbitrariness
aggravated when in the case of Peoplev. Duerme, the accused was still at
large yet a bail was already fixed. There is a need to reiterate thebasic principle
that the right to bail can only be availed of by a person who is in custody of the Facts:
law or

otherwise deprived of his liberty and it would be premature, not to say

The administrative case was filed with the Office of the Court Administrator by
incongruous, to file a petition
Felisa Taborete and Lucy Gallardo against Judge Sollesta as acting presiding
for bail for someone whose freedom has yet to be curtailed. judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court because of his unjust judgement in a
criminal case for murder.
In the case of illegal possession of fire arms, the complainant failed to
show that there was bad faith in respondents decision in reducing the bail
bond. Accused, as well as the fact that counsel for the accused vouched and
The petitioners is the widow and sister of the deceased Bienvenido Taborite
guaranteed the appearance no firearm was taken from the possession of theof
who was killed by Reynaldo Divino. The complaint for murder was filed with
the accused in court whenever required.
the said MCTC and the accused was arrested but then filed a petition for bail.
In the case of Homicide against Nilo de Rivera, with respondents The hearing was set up but the PNP-CIG received no subpoena and on the
comment that the fixing of bail 2nd hearing they were notified but the public prosecutor was not. The
respondent Judge granted the petition for bail which resulted to the complaint
was in accordance with the guidelines set for in Section 9 of Admin. Circular that the release of the accused was without the requisite hearing and
12-94. As long as infixing the amount of bail, the court is guided by the purpose recommendation from the prosecutor. Court Administrator Velasco found that
for which bail is required, that is, tosecure the appearance of the accused to the bail was granted without notice to the prosecution depriving opportunity to
answer charges brought against him, the decision of thecourt to grant bail in oppose bail.
the sum it deems appropriate will not be interfered with.

Issue:

275
Whether or not respondent Judge erred in granting petition for bail without government prosecutor appeared for lack of notice. Indeed, there was no
recommendation from the prosecutor. opportunity on the part of the prosecution to show that the evidence of guilt
against the accused is strong.

Held:
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

Yes. Before a judge may grant an application for bail, the prosecutor must be
given reasonable notice of hearing or he must be asked to submit his 279. Felicidad Roque and Prudencio Mabanglo vs. Office of the
recommendation under Section 18 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Ombudsman
Criminal Procedure, as amended.
G.R. No. 129978 May 12, 1999

In Cortes vs. Catral, the court laid down the following rules outlining the duties
of the judge in case an application for bail is filed: Doctrine: It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the
preliminary investigation should not be deemed fatal, for even the complete
absence of a preliminary investigation does not warrant dismissal of the
1. In all cases whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, notify the information. But an undue delay in the conduct of a preliminary investigation
prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his cannot be corrected, for until now, man has not yet invented a device for
recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as setting back time.
amended);
Facts:

2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for Petitioner Felicidad M. Roque was a Schools Division Superintendent
bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), assigned in
to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the Koronadal, South Cotabato, until her compulsory retirement on May 17, 1991.
court to exercise its sound discretion (Sections 7 and 8, id.); Petitioner Prudencio N. Mabanglo was likewise a Schools Division
Superintendent of the DECS, assigned in Tagum, Davao Province, until his
compulsory retirement on May 8, 1997.
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution; On January 14, 1991, COA conducted an audit on the P9.36 million
allotment released by the DECS Regional Office No. XI to its division offices.
As a result of the audit, auditors Soriano and Enriquez found some major
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the deficiencies and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic
approval of the bail bond (Section 19, id); otherwise, the petition should be Act No. 3019), violations of COA Circular Nos. 78-84 and 85-55A, DECS Order
denied. No. 100 and Section 88 of Presidential Decree No. 1445 (ibid.).

Consequently, affidavits of complaint were filed before the Office of

In the present case, only the accused and his counsel, Atty. Bonifacio the Ombudsman-Mindanao against several persons, including petitioner
Pagunsan, were present during the hearing of the petition for bail. No Mabanglo on May 7, 1991, and against petitioner Roque on May 16, 1991. In
276
an Order dated June 11, 1991, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao found absence of a preliminary investigation does not warrant dismissal of the
the complaints proper for a preliminary investigation. information. True --- [for] the absence of a preliminary investigation can be
corrected by giving the accused such investigation. But an undue delay in the
On August 14, 1997, petitioners instituted the instant petition for conduct of a preliminary investigation cannot be corrected, for until now, man
mandamus premised on the allegation that [a]fter the initial Orders finding the has not yet invented a device for setting back time.
cases proper for preliminary investigation were issued on June[,] 1991 and the
subsequent submission of their counter-affidavits, until the present[,] or more 280. FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN, and
than six (6) years, no resolution has been issued by the Public Respondent THE TANODBAYAN, respondents.
[and no] case [has] been filed with the appropriate court against the herein
G.R. No. 72335-39 March 21, 1988
Petitioner (par. 3, p. 4, Petition).

On November 24, 1997, this Honorable Court issued a temporary

restraining order directing respondents to cease and desist from further DOCTRINE:Long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by
the Tanodbayan in the instant case found to be violative of the constitutional
proceeding with the cases filed against petitioners.
right of the accused to due process.Substantial adherence to the requirements
of the law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including
Issue: Whether or not there was undue and unjustifiable delay in resolving the
substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the
complaints against petitioners (respondents therein) which violated their
resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process
constitutional right to due process speedy disposition of cases constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law.

Held:
FACTS: Antonio de los Reyes filed with the Legal Panel of Presidential
Yes. Clearly, the delay of almost six years disregarded the Security Command charges of alleged violations of RA No. 3019, otherwise
ombudsmans duty, as mandated by the Constitution and Republic Act No. known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Apparently, no action was
6770, to act promptly on complaints before him. More important, it violated the taken on said report. Five years later, it became publicly known that petitioner
petitioners rights to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases filed had submitted his resignation. Antonio de los Reyes again filed a complaint
against them. Although respondents attempted to justify the six months with the same charges. The Tanodbayan acted on the complaint in April 1980
needed by Ombudsman Desierto to review the recommendation of Deputy by referring the complaint to the CIS, PSC, for investigation and report. In June
1980, the CIS report was submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending the
Ombudsman Gervasio, no explanation was given why it took almost six years
filing of charges for graft and corrupt practices against former Minister Tatad
for the latter to resolve the Complaints.
and Antonio L. Cantero. By October 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits
were in the case was already for disposition by the Tanodbayan. However, it
The Court is not persuaded by respondents argument that the Petition
was only in July 1985 that a resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan,
for Mandamus became moot and academic when the Complaints were
recommending the filing of the corresponding criminal informations against the
resolved by the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao and the Informations accused Francisco Tatad. Five (5) criminal informations were filed with the
were filed. The same contention was rejected in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan in June 1985, all against petitioner Tatad. Petitioner claims
Sandiganbayan, wherein the Court declared that the long and unexplained that the Tanodbayan culpably violated the constitutional mandate of "due
delay in the resolution of the criminal complaints against petitioners was not process" in unduly prolonging the termination of the preliminary investigation
corrected by the eventual filing of the Informations. The Court ruled: and in filing the corresponding informations only after more than a decade from
the alleged commission of the purported offenses.
It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the
preliminary investigation should not be deemed fatal, for even the complete

277
ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution’s long delay in the preliminary G.R. Nos. 71208-09 August 30, 1985
investigation had deprived petitioner of his constitutional right to due process
and the right to a speedy disposition of the cases against him.
Doctrine:
HELD: Yes. We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary
investigation by the Tanodbayan in the instant case to be violative of the Immunity statutes may be generally classified into two: one, which
constitutional right of the accused to due process. Substantial adherence to grants "use immunity"; and the other, which grants what is known as
the requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, "transactional immunity." The distinction between the two is as follows: "Use
including substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law immunity" prohibits use of witness' compelled testimony and its fruits in any
for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due manner in connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness. On the other
process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only under hand, "transactional immunity" grants immunity to the witness from
the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutionally prosecution for an offense to which his compelled testimony relates.
guarantee of "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the
Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate
delay is violative of the petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of close to Facts:
three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the
circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. We are not impressed by the Private respondents were charged as accessories for the killing of
attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by indulging in the Sen. Benigno Aquino and Rolando Galman. In the course of the joint trial, the
speculative assumption that "the delay may be due to a painstaking and prosecution offered in evidence their individual testimonies before the Agrava
grueling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented Board, the ad hoc Fact-Finding Board created under Presidential Decree 1886
during the preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high- to determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing.
ranking government official." In the first place, such a statement suggests a
Issue:
double standard of treatment, which must be emphatically rejected. Secondly,
three out of the five charges against the petitioner were for his alleged failure Whether or not their testimony before the Board made private
to file his sworn statement of assets and liabilities required by Republic Act respondents immune from prosecution by virtue of their right against self-
No. 3019, which certainly did not involve complicated legal and factual issues incrimination.
necessitating such "painstaking and grueling scrutiny" as would justify a delay
of almost three years in terminating the preliminary investigation. The other
two charges relating to alleged bribery and alleged giving of unwarranted
Ruling:
benefits to a relative, while presenting more substantial legal and factual
issues, certainly do not warrant or justify the period of three years, which it NO. PD 1886 grants merely immunity from use of any statement given
took the Tanodbayan to resolve the case. It has been suggested that the long before the Board, but not immunity from prosecution by reason or on the basis
delay in terminating the preliminary investigation should not be deemed fatal, thereof. Merely testifying and/or producing evidence do not render the witness
for even the complete absence of a preliminary investigation does not warrant immune from prosecution notwithstanding his invocation of the right against
dismissal of the information. True — but the absence of aa preliminary self-incrimination. He is merely saved from the use against him of such
investigation can be corrected by giving the accused such investigation. But statement and nothing more.
an undue delay in the conduct of a preliminary investigation cannot be
corrected, for until now, man has not yet invented a device for setting back
time. 282. Flores vs Ruiz

G.R. No. L-35707 May 31 1979

281. Galman vs. Pamaran

278
FACTS: Flores filed a petition for Habeas Corpus filed after he has been particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be
allegedly arrested and detained illegally by Order of Judge Ruiz finding him convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to
guilty of indirect contempt. Flores was actually arrested on August 28, 1972 establish his innocence and this can happen more easily to persons who are
and has since been detained in the Provincial Jail of Cagayan until his release ignorant or uneducated.”
by virtue of a bond of P500.00. The reason for the delayed arrest is that Flores
was given a period "to inform the court whether or not he relinquishes his Here, it cannot be disputed that the respondent court failed in its duty
possession over the land in question." designed to satisfy the constitutional right of an accused to counsel. Flores
does not appear to have been duly notified of the contempt charge, nor was
The land in question was levied upon and sold on execution to satisfy properly "arraigned," since he was not assisted by counsel during the hearing.
the award of damages against Flores in a civil case. Flores failed to redeem Admittedly with a counsel of record, Flores could not have willingly submitted
the property sold in the auction sale. Hence, Judge Ruiz ordered Flores to to go to trial when his counsel failed to appear. It is certainly much easier to
place in possession the heirs of Mandac (plaintiff in the civil case). For the believe that Flores asked for postponement, because of the absence of his
refusal of Flores to vacate the disputed land, contempt proceedings were counsel, but that Judge Ruiz denied the plea. Neither has Judge Ruiz denied
instituted against Flores which led to his arrest and detention. the allegation that there was a denial of right to due process for Flores was not
duly informed of the contempt charge, nor was his counsel furnished a copy
Flores questions the legality of the proceedings for not having been thereof, as Flores is entitled to one as a matter of right and as a matter-of duty
assisted by counsel during the hearing of the motion for contempt, and for not of the court. All that Judge Ruiz said in his comment is that "defendant Flores
having been duly informed of the contempt charge by being furnished a copy has been granted his day in court to defend himself from the charges
of the motion, or properly "arraigned" before trial. Flores claims to have been presented by reason of his contumacious acts."
deprived due process of law which voided the proceedings against him as for
lack of jurisdiction of the court to inflict the penalty imposed on him. Therefore, the proceedings on the contempt charge has been vitiated
by lack of due process, entitling petitioner to the writ of habeas corpus he
Judge Ruiz contends that Flores has waived his right to counsel as seeks.
evidenced by the transcript of the stenographic notes. Flores alleges that no
such proceedings took place, and that, in any event, the transcript was not Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ considered as an exceptional
signed by the stenographer. According to Flores, when Judge Ruiz learned remedy to release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained. Such defects
that he was without counsel, Ruiz told Flores to deliver possession of the results in the absence or loss of 'jurisdiction and therefore invalidates the trial
premises within 10 days. In spite of the plan of Flores that the hearing on that and the consequent conviction of the accused whose fundamental right was
date be postponed so that his counsel of record could appear for him or that a violated. That void judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral
new counsel would be hired to appear in his behalf, Judge Ruiz, however, attack, which precisely is the function of habeas corpus. This writ may issue
demurred, and with the assistance of a certain Atty. Pastores, Flores was even if another remedy which is less effective may be availed of by the
made to sign an understanding to deliver up the premises within the period defendant. 'No court of justice under our system of government has the power
indicated by the judge on pain of being imprisoned. to deprive him of that right. If the accused does not waive his right to be heard
but on the contrary invokes the right, and the court denies it to him, that court
no longer has jurisdiction to proceed; it has no power to sentence the accused
ISSUE: WON Flores was denied due process of law. without hearing him in his defense; and the sentence thus pronounced is void
and may be conaterany attacked in a habeas corpus proceeding.

HELD: YES. The right of the accused to counsel in criminal proceedings has
never been considered subject to waiver. The practice has always been for 283. Joseph Estrada vs Sandiganbayan
the trial court to provide the accused with a counsel de officio, if he has no G.R. No. 148560 November 19, 2001
counsel of his own choice, or cannot afford one. This is because “even the
most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law,
279
Doctrine: A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lack It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain, and ordinary acceptation and
guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute signification, unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or
is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects it violates due process for special legal meaning to those words.
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of
what conduct to avoid; and it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in Every provision of the law should be construed in relation and with
carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government reference to every other part.
muscle. There was nothing vague or ambiguous in the provisions of R.A. 7080

2. No. The legislature did not in any manner refashion the standard
Facts: quantum of proof in the crime of plunder. The burden still remains with the
prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element necessary
Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada), the highest-ranking official to be to constitute a crime.
prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of
Plunder) as amended by RA 7659. What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only
a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series which would
Estrada wishes to impress the Court that the assailed law is so constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There
defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the information to have
valid from the constitutionality infirm. That there was a clear violations of the been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme
fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth.
nature and cause of the accusation.
3. No. It is malum in se. The legislative declaration in RA No. 7659
that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the
acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se
Issues: and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially
(1) Whether or not the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague. since in the case of plunder that predicate crimes are mainly mala in se.

(2) Whether or not Plunder Law requires less evidence for providing Its abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject
the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context
to due process. in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its poor
and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule
(3) Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum. that bankrupted the government and impoverished the population, the
Philippine Government must muster the political will to dismantle the culture of
corruption, dishonesty, green and syndicated criminality that so deeply
Held: entrenched itself in the structures of society and the psyche of the populace.
[With the government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most
1. No. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because basic services to its people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication of
general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without government funds translates to an actual threat to the very existence of
defining them. There is no positive constitutional or statutory command government, and in turn, the very survival of people it governs over.
requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an enactment.
Congress’ inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not
necessary result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the
legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which 284. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. OMAR MAPALAO and REX
is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law. MAGUMNANG
280
 G.R. No. 92415 May 14, 1991 should not be afforded the right to appeal therefrom unless he voluntarily
submits to the jurisdiction of the court or is otherwise arrested, within fifteen
Doctrine: Under Section 8, Rule 122 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, (15) days from the notice of the judgment against him. While at large as above
the Court, may "upon motion of the appellee or on its own motion, dismiss the stated he cannot seek relief from the Court as he is deemed to have waived
appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or the same and he has no standing in court.
flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal." In this case,
appellant Magumnang remained at large even as his appeal was pending.
Hence, by analogy his appeal must be dismissed. RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

Facts:
285. Roger Chavez vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-29169 August 19, 1968

Appellants and two others were charged with the crime of highway robbery
with homicide. After the arraignment and during the trial, appellant Rex
Magumnang escaped from confinement and had not been apprehended since Doctrine: There is no waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination. To be
then. As to him, trial in absentia proceeded and thereafter the judgement of
effective, a waiver must be certain and unequivocal, and intelligently,
conviction was promulgated against the defendants. Rex Magumnang,
understandably, and willingly made; such waiver following only where liberty
unsatisfied with the decision of the trial court, appealed the decision while at
of choice has been fully accorded.
large.

Issue: Facts:

Whether or not an accused who is at large during and after his trial may An information was filed against the accused stating that on or about
appeal his conviction. the 14th day of November, 1962, in Quezon City, the accused conspired,
with intent of gain, abuse of confidence and without the consent of the owner
thereof, Dy Sun Hiok y Lim, in asporting the motor vehicle above-described.
Held:
The trial court freed all the accused except Roger Chavez who was
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft. The
Court of appeals dismissed the appeal.
No. Once an accused escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or
flees to a foreign country, he loses his standing in court and unless he The thrust of petitioner's case presented in his original and
surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have supplementary petitions invoking jurisdiction of this Court is that he is
waived any right to seek relief from the court. entitled, on habeas corpus, to be freed from imprisonment upon the ground
that in the trial which resulted in his conviction he was denied his
constitutional right not to be compelled to testify against himself.
Thus when as in this case he escaped from confinement during the trial on the
merits and after his arraignment, and so the trial in absentia proceeded and
the judgment against him was promulgated in accordance with Section 14(2) Issue: Whether or not the constitutional right of the accused against self-
Article III of the 1987 Constitution, nonetheless, as he remained at large, he
incrimination was violated
281
 G.R. No. L-25018, May 26, 1969

Held:

Yes.In the case, petitioner was called by the prosecution as the first DOCTRINE:The constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination extends to
witness in that case to testify for the People during the first day of trial thereof. administrative proceedings which possess a criminal or penal aspect.
Petitioner objected and invoked the privilege of self-incrimination. This he
broadened by the clear cut statement that he will not testify. But petitioner's
protestations were met with the judge's emphatic statement that it "is the right FACTS: This case stemmed from an administrative case filed against herein
of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the witness petitioner Arsenio Pascual, Jr. for alleged immorality being heard by the
stand including the accused," and that defense counsel "could not object to respondent Board of Medical Examiners (BEM). In this administrative case
have the accused called on the witness stand." The cumulative impact of all against petitioner, he was asked to be the first witness for the complainants –
these is that accused-petitioner had to take the stand. He was thus thus compelling him to be a witness against himself. Petitioner objected to the
said act of the complainants, hence the BEM required Pascual to secure a
peremptorily asked to create evidence against himself. For, in reality, the
restraining order from a competent authority so as he cannot be compelled to
purpose of calling an accused as a witness for the People would be to
be a witness against himself.
incriminate him.

With all these, the Court has no hesitancy in saying that petitioner was
forced to testify to incriminate himself, in full breach of his constitutional right The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed that it
to remain silent. It cannot be said now that he has waived his right. He did not could call petitioner to the witness stand and interrogate him, the right against
volunteer to take the stand and in his own defense; he did not offer himself as self-incrimination being available only when a question calling for an
a witness; on the contrary, he claimed the right upon being called to testify. If incriminating answer is asked of a witness. They likewise alleged that the right
petitioner nevertheless answered the questions inspite of his fear of being against self-incrimination cannot be availed of in an administrative hearing.
accused of perjury or being put under contempt, this circumstance cannot be
counted against him. His testimony is not of his own choice. To him it was a
case of compelled submission. He was a cowed participant in proceedings Petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea that he could not be
before a judge who possessed the power to put him under contempt had he compelled to be the first witness of the complainants, he being the party
chosen to remain silent. Nor could he escape testifying. The court made it proceeded against in an administrative charge for malpractice. Hence, this
appeal by respondent Board.
abundantly clear that his testimony at least on direct examination would be
taken right then and thereon the first day of the trial.

There is no waiver of the privilege. To be effective, a waiver must be ISSUE: Whether or not the right against self-incrimination may be invoked in
certain and unequivocal, and intelligently, understandably, and willingly made; administrative proceedings.
such waiver following only where liberty of choice has been fully accorded.
After a claim a witness cannot properly be held to have waived his privilege on
vague and uncertain evidence. HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of herein petitioner citing the
case of Cabal v. Kapunan. In that proceeding for certiorari and prohibition to
annul an order of Judge Kapunan, it appeared that an administrative charge
286. ARSENIO PASCUAL, JR., petitioner-appellee, vs. BOARD OF for unexplained wealth having been filed against petitioner under the Anti-Graft
MEDICAL EXAMINERS, respondent-appellant, SALVADOR Act, the complainant requested the investigating committee that petitioner be
GATBONTON and ENRIQUETA GATBONTON, intervenors-appellants. ordered to take the witness stand, which request was granted. Upon
petitioner’s refusal to be sworn as such witness, a charge for contempt was
282
filed against him in the sala of respondent Judge. He filed a motion to quash 19). Rondon came from his house, approximately one hundred and fifty (150)
and upon its denial, he initiated this proceeding. We found for the petitioner in meters distant from Malaki's store (Ibid., p. 24).
accordance with the well-settled principle that “the accused in a criminal case
may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the Meanwhile, Batin had just finished cooking and from the kitchen, he proceeded
witness stand.” directly to the store to ask his employer (Malaki) if supper is to be prepared.
As Batin stepped inside the store, he was taken aback when he saw appellant
coming out of the store with a bolo (TSN, June 9, 1992, p. 14), while his boss,
bathed in his own blood, was sprawled on the floor "struggling for his life"
It was noted in the opinion penned by the then Chief Justice that while the (hovering between life and death).
matter referred to an administrative charge of unexplained wealth, with the
Anti-Graft Act authorizing the forfeiture of whatever property a public officer or Rondon, who was outside and barely five (5) meters away from the store, also
employee may acquire, manifestly out of proportion to his salary and his other saw appellant Jose Malimit (or "Manolo") rushing out through the front door of
lawful income, there is clearly the imposition of a penalty. The proceeding for Malaki's store with a blood-stained bolo (TSN, May 22, 1992, p. 29). Aided by
forfeiture while administrative in character thus possesses a criminal or penal the illumination coming from a pressure lamp ("petromax") inside the store,
aspect. The case before us is not dissimilar; petitioner would be similarly Rondon clearly recognized Malimit.
disadvantaged. He could suffer not the forfeiture of property but the revocation
of his license as medical practitioner, for some an even greater deprivation. Batin immediately went out of the store to seek help. Outside the store, he met
Rondon (TSN, June 9, 1992, p. 15). After a brief conversation, both Batin and
287. People vs. Malimit Rondon rushed to the nearby house of Malaki's brother-in-law EutiquioBeloy
and informed Beloy of the tragic incident which befell Malaki. Batin, along with
G.R. No. 109775 November 14, 1996 Beloy, went back to the store. Inside, they saw the lifeless body of Malaki in a
pool of blood lying prostrate at the floor. Beloy readily noticed that the store's
drawer was opened and ransacked and the wallet of Malaki was missing from
Doctrine: his pocket.
The right against self-incrimination is simply a prohibition against legal
process to extract from the accused’s own lips, against his ill, admission of his
guilt. It does NOT apply when the evidence sought is NOT an incriminating Issue:
statement but an object evidence; Miranda rights – Whether or not trial court erred in admitting as evidence the wallet
covers only inadmissibility of extrajudicial confession or admission made and its contents although the circumstances which lead to its production was
during custodial investigation; other evidence (like IDs, wallet, keys, etc) is not obtained in violation of the constitutional rights of the accused.
affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation.

Ruling:
Facts:

On April 15, 1991, around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, [Onofre] Malaki
was attending to his store. Malaki's houseboy EdilbertoBatin, on the other NO. The right against self-incrimination guaranteed under our
hand, was busy cooking chicken for supper at the kitchen located at the back fundamental law finds no application in this case. This right, as put by Mr.
of the store. Justice Holmes in Holt vs. United States, ". . . is a prohibition of the use of
physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications from him . . ." It is
Soon thereafter, Florencio Rondon, a farmer, arrived at the store of Malaki. simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the [accused]'s own
Rondon was to purchase chemical for his rice farm (TSN, May 22, 1992, p. lips, against his will, admission of his guilt. It does not apply to the instant case

283
where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incriminating statement HELD: Yes. Under the above-quoted provisions, what is actually proscribed is
but an object evidence. the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the
accused-appellant and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may
288. People vs Rondera be material. For instance, substance emitted from the body of the accused
G.R. No. 125687 December 9 1999 may be received as evidence in prosecution for acts of lasciviousness and
morphine forced out of the mouth of the accused may also be used as
evidence against him. Consequently, although accused-appellant insists that
hair samples were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the NBI for forensic
FACTS: The accused was seen by the victim’s father with an ice pick and
examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him,
washing his bloodied hands at the well. The 9 year old victim was later found
for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence
dead and half naked with lacerations in her vagina but no sperm. He was
communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress.
convicted of homicide only. For his conviction, several circumstantial pieces of
evidence were submitted including strands of his hair for comparison with the
strands of hair found in the victim’s right hand at the scene of the crime as well
as blood-stained undershirt and short pants taken from his house. The On the other hand, the blood-stained undershirt and short pants taken from
accused-appellant avers the acquisition of his hair strands without his express the accused are inadmissible in evidence. They were taken without the proper
written consent and without the presence of his counsel, which, he contends search warrant from the police officers. Accused-appellant’s wife testified that
is a violation of his Constitutional right against self-incrimination under the police officers, after arresting her husband in their house, took the
Sections 12 and 17, Article III of the Constitution, to wit: garments from the clothesline without proper authority. This was never
rebutted by the prosecution. Under the libertarian exclusionary rule known as
the “fruit of the poisonous tree,” evidence illegally obtained by the state should
not be used to gain other evidence because the illegally obtained evidence
Sec. 12.
taints all evidence subsequently obtained. Simply put, accused-appellant’s
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have garments, having been seized in violation of his constitutional right against
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and illegal searches and seizure, are inadmissible in court as evidence.
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford
289. People of the Philippines vs Radel Gallarde
the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. G.R. No. 133025February 17, 2000
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. Doctrine: The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination
proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications
(3) Any confession or admission in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be
be inadmissible in evidence against him. material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the
accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
hand of counsel is not required.

ISSUE: WON the evidence gathered, particularly accused-appellant’s hair

Facts:
strands can be admitted as evidence against him.
In the evening of May 26, 1997, at the house of spouses, their
neighbors converged. Among them were appellant and others. Idling by was
Editha, 10 year old daughter of spouses Talan. A fluorescent lamp illuminated
284
them as they partook beer. Thereafter, Editha entered the kitchen and took accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding
hold of a kerosene lamp. Jaime followed her and asked where she was going. hand of counsel is not required.
Editha answered that she would look for appellant. Soon Editha left enroute to
where appellant. Moments later, Roger arrived and informed them that Editha The essence of the right against self-incrimination is testimonial
was missing. Roger asked the group to help look for her. The searchers found compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself through a
appellant squatting with his short pants. His hands and knees were covered testimonial act.
with soil. Asked where Editha was, appellant replied: “I do not know, I did not Hence, it has been held that a woman charged with adultery may be
do anything to her.” compelled to submit to physical examination to determine her pregnancy; and
The searchers, thereafter, noticed disheveled grasses. Along the way, an accused may be compelled to submit to physical examination and to have
they saw a wide hole among the disheveled grass. They found the dead body a substance taken from his body for medical determination as to whether he
of the victim. Mindful of appellant’s safety, Brgy. Captain Mendoza decided to was suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim; to expel
bring appellant to the municipal building. On their way though, they met morphine from his mouth; to have the outline of his foot traced to determine its
policemen on board a vehicle. He flagged them down and turned over the identity with bloody footprints; and to be photographed or measured, or his
person of appellant, saying that he is the suspect in the disappearance of the garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the
little girl. The policemen together with appellant proceeded to where the people foregoing things to be done.
found Editha. One of the policemen shoved more soil aside. The lifeless Editha
was completely naked when she was recovered. The cause of Editha’s death 290. TEODORO R. REGALA vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN
as revealed in the post-mortem examination showed “suffocation of the lungs
as a result from powerful covering of the nose and mouth, associated with G.R. No. 105938 September 20, 1996
laceration of the vagina and raptured hymen. The trial court found the appelant
guilty of homicide. Hence the appeal.
Doctrine: As a general rule, as a matter of public policy, a client’s identity
should not be shrouded in mystery. A lawyer may not invoke the privilege
Issues: and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client; however, there are
exceptions to this rule.
Whether the photographs taken of the accused immediately after the
incident is inadmissible as evidence in court on the ground that “the same were
taken while the accused was already under the mercy of the police.” and the
taking of pictures of an accused even without the assistance of counsel is a Facts:
violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination.

The Presidential Commission on Good Government raised a

Held: complaint before the Sandiganbayan against Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and
Teodoro Regala and his partners in the ACCRA law firm, for the recovery of
No, The taking of pictures of an accused even without the assistance alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the named
of counsel, being a purely mechanical act, is not a violation of his constitutional corporations in PCGG Case No. 33.
right against self-incrimination.

The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination

proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications During the course of the proceedings, PCGG filed a “Motion to Admit
from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be Third Amended Complaint” which excluded private respondent Raul Roco
material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the from the complaint on his undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the
285
principals for whom he acted as a stockholder. The PCGG offered the same would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual
treatment to the petitioners but the ACCRA lawyers refused to disclose the of a crime. (present in this case)
identities of their clinets.Petitioner refuses to provide information on fear that it 4. Relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which client
may implicate them in the very activity from which legal advice was sought seeks legal assistance. (present in this case)
from them and it may breach the fiduciary relationship of the petitioner with 5. Nature of atty-client relationship has been previously disclosed and it
their client. is the identity which is intended to be confidential.

291. Francisco Beltran vs Felix Samson

Issue: G.R. No. 32025 23 September 1929

Whether or not fiduciary duty may be asserted by petitioner on refusal to Doctrine: Writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the
disclose names of their clients. application of intelligence and attention.

Held:
Facts:

This is a petition for a writ of prohibition, wherein the petitioner

Yes. The court ruled that the petitioners had the right to refuse disclosure of complains that the respondent judge ordered him to appear before the
names of their clients under the pain of breach of fiduciary relationship with provincial fiscal to take dictation in his own handwriting from the latter. The
their clients. order was given upon petition of said fiscal for the purpose of comparing the
petitioner's handwriting and determining whether or not it is he who wrote
As a general rule, a lawyer may not invoke the privilege because:
certain documents supposed to be falsified. And the petitioner, in refusing to
The court has the right to know that the client whose privilege is sought to be perform what the fiscal demanded, seeks refuge in the constitutional provision
protected is flesh and blood. contained in the Jones Law and incorporated in General Orders, No. 58.

1. Privilege begins to exist only after the atty-client relationship has been
established. Issue: Whether or not the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for
2. Privilege generally pertains to be the subject matter of the relationship.
3. With due process consideration, the opposing party should know his the purpose of comparing the latter's handwriting and determining whether he
adversary. wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified, constitutes evidence against
himself within the scope and meaning of the constitutional provision under
Exception: lawyers may invoke the privilege when: examination

1. Strong probability exists that revealing the client’s name would

implicate the client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer’s Held:
advice.
2. Disclosure would open to civil liability of client. (present in this case) Yes. Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands,
3. Government lawyers have no case against the lawyer’s client unless or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the
by revealing the client’s name it would provide them the only link that application of intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing means
that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine whether or not he
286
is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states. Except COMELEC en banc dismissed the petition. When Lopez ran for re-election in
that it is more serious, we believe the present case is similar to that of 1995 elections, her opponent, Francisco Rabat, filed a petition for
producing documents or chattels in one's possession. disqualification, contesting her Filipino citizenship but the said petition was
likewise dismissed by the COMELEC.
For the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity
between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is
compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the The citizenship of private respondent was once again raised as an issue when
witness is required to furnish evidence against himself. The the present case she ran for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental in the May 11, 1998
is more serious than that of compelling the production of documents or elections. Her candidacy was questioned by the petitioner Cirilo Valles.
chattels, because here the witness is compelled to write and create, by means
of the act of writing, evidence which does not exist, and which may identify him
as the falsifier. The COMELEC, however, dismissed the petition, ruling that Lopez is a Filipino
citizen and therefore, qualified to run for a public office because (1) her father,
TelesforoYbasco, is a Filipino citizen, and by virtue of the principle of jus
VIII. CITIZENSHIP sanguinis she was a Filipino citizen under the 1987 Philippine Constitution; (2)
she was married to a Filipino, thereby making her also a Filipino citizen ipso
WHO ARE FILIPINO CITIZENS jure under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473; (3) and that, she renounced
her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the Department of
292. CIRILO R. VALLES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and her Australian passport was
and ROSALIND YBASCO LOPEZ, respondents. accordingly cancelled as certified to by the Australian Embassy in Manila; and
(4) furthermore, there are the COMELEC Resolutions in EPC No. 92-54 and
G.R. No. 137000, August 9, 2000
SPA Case No. 95-066, declaring her a Filipino citizen duly qualified to run for
the elective position of Davao Oriental governor.

DOCTRINE:The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has

established the principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court,
Philippine citizenship, to wit: (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine
maintaining that the Lopez is an Australian citizen, placing reliance on the
Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution. (2) Those born in the
admitted facts that: a) In 1988, private respondent registered herself with the
Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this
Bureau of Immigration as an Australian national and was issued Alien
Constitution had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands. (3)
Certificate of Registration No. 404695 dated September 19, 1988; b) On even
Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. (4) Those whose mothers
date, she applied for the issuance of an Immigrant Certificate of Residence
are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect
(ICR), and c) She was issued Australian Passport No. H700888 on March 3,
Philippine citizenship. (5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
1988.
So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of
blood relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions.
ISSUES:

1. Whether respondent is a Filipino

FACTS: In 1992, private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez ran for and was 2. If she is, whether she renounced her citizenship by applying for ACR
elected governor of Davao Oriental. Her election was contested by her and ICR and being issued an Australian passport.
opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr., in a petition for quo warranto. However, finding no 3. Whether private respondent is disqualified to run for governor of
sufficient proof that respondent had renounced her Philippine citizenship, the Davao Oriental under Section 40 of Republic Act 7160
287
HELD: a. By naturalization in a foreign country;
b. By express renunciation of citizenship;
1. Yes. The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus c. By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of constitution or laws of a foreign country upon attaining twenty-
the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the one years of age or more;
doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the d. By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service
basis of place of birth. of a foreign country;
e. By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization;
Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 f. By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter
in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, of the Philippine armed forces in time of war, unless
TelesforoYbasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted:
Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. Historically, this was a and
year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that time, what g. In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by
served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic virtue of the laws in force in her husband’s country, she
acts by which the United States governed the country. These were acquires his nationality.
the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of
August 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law. In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation
must be express. The mere fact that private respondent Rosalind
Under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Jones Law, all inhabitants of the Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien
Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective
therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of
Private respondent’s father, TelesforoYbasco, was born on January 5, Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of
1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte, a fact duly evidenced by a certified citizenship, the same must be express. As held by this court in the
true copy of an entry in the Registry of Births. Thus, under the case of Aznar, an application for an alien certificate of registration
Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, TelesforoYbasco was does not amount to an express renunciation or repudiation of one’s
deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which citizenship. The application of the herein private respondent for an
were the laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforo’s daughter, alien certificate of registration, and her holding of an Australian
herein private respondent Rosalind YbascoLopez, is likewise a citizen passport, as in the case of Mercado vs. Manzano, were mere acts of
of the Philippines. assertion of her Australian citizenship before she effectively
renounced the same. Thus, at the most, private respondent had dual
The principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of citizenship - she was an Australian and a Filipino, as well.
blood relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973 and
1987 Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of Filipino
Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino parent/s was born in another country has not been included as a
father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her ground for losing one’s Philippine citizenship. Since private
losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus respondent did not lose or renounce her Philippine citizenship,
soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim Australian petitioner’s claim that respondent must go through the process of
citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship. repatriation does not hold water.

2. No. Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose his 3. In the case of Mercado vs. Manzano, the Court clarified “dual
citizenship: citizenship” as used in the Local Government Code and reconciled the
288
 same with Article IV, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution on dual Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the
allegiance. Recognizing situations in which a Filipino citizen may, citizenship of its mother, it did so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure a
without performing any act, and as an involuntary consequence of the Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the
conflicting laws of different countries, be also a citizen of another state, assumption that the mother had custody, would exercise parental authority
the Court explained that dual citizenship as a disqualification must and had the duty to support her illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not
refer to citizens with dual allegiance. The Court succinctly to prejudice or discriminate against him.
pronounced:“xxx the phrase ‘dual citizenship’ in R.A. No. 7160, xxx 40
(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, xxx 20 must be understood as referring to
‘dual allegiance’. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship
do not fall under this disqualification.” Facts:

Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did not Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino
automatically disqualify her from running for a public office. X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald
Furthermore, it was ruled that for candidates with dual citizenship, it is Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondents," initiated,
enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their on 09 January 2004, a petition docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the
certificate of candidacy, to terminate their status as persons with dual Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to deny due
citizenship. The filing of a certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ
foreign citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification as a dual made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming
citizen. This is so because in the certificate of candidacy, one declares to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his
that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that he/she will support and defend parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American,
the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo
allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is under oath, operates Pou, a Spanish subject.
as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. Therefore, when
In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19
the herein private respondent filed her certificate of candidacy in 1992,
January 2004, petitioner, in support of his claim, presented several
such fact alone terminated her Australian citizenship.
documentary exhibits - 1) a copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ, 2) a
Then, too, it is significant to note that on January 15 1992, private certified photocopy of an affidavit executed in Spanish by Paulita Poe y
respondent executed a Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Gomez attesting to her having filed a case for bigamy and concubinage
Citizenship, duly registered in the Department of Immigration and against the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, after discovering his bigamous
Ethnic Affairs of Australia on May 12, 1992. And, as a result, on relationship with Bessie Kelley, 3) an English translation of the affidavit
February 11, 1992, the Australian passport of private respondent was aforesaid, 4) a certified photocopy of the certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe, 5)
cancelled, as certified to by Second Secretary Richard F. Munro of the a certification issued by the Director of the Records Management and
Embassy of Australia in Manila. As aptly appreciated by the Archives Office, attesting to the fact that there was no record in the National
COMELEC, the aforesaid acts were enough to settle the issue of the Archives that a Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the
alleged dual citizenship of Rosalind Ybasco Lopez. Since her Philippines before 1907, and 6) a certification from the Officer-In-Charge of
renunciation was effective, petitioner’s claim that private respondent the Archives Division of the National Archives to the effect that no available
must go through the whole process of repatriation holds no water. information could be found in the files of the National Archives regarding the
birth of Allan F. Poe.
293. Tecson vs. COMELEC
The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 161824, would
G.R. No. 161434 March 3, 2004 include G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B.
Desiderio, Jr., vs. The Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe
(a.k.a. ‘Fernando Poe, Jr.’), and Victorino X. Fornier," and the other,
Doctrine: docketed G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio G. Velez, vs. Ronald
289
Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.," both challenging the jurisdiction 4. That she was entered as a legitimate child on her birth certificate when in
of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph fact, it should have been illegitimate. Both the trial court and Court of Appeals
7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and granted the respondent’s petition.
exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.

Issue:
Issue:
The Republic of the Philippines appealed the decision to the Supreme Court
Whether or not FPJ is a Filipino Citizen. on the following grounds:

1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the correction of the

citizenship of respondent Chule Y. Lim from “Chinese” to “Filipino” despite the
Ruling: fact that respondent never demonstrated any compliance with the legal
YES. But while the totality of the evidence may not establish requirements for election of citizenship.
conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, 2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in allowing respondent to continue using
the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold her father’s surname despite its finding that respondent is an illegitimate child.
that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in
his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74,
of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his
case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the Held:
parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not 1. No. The Republic avers that respondent did not comply with the
there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez- constitutional requirement of electing Filipino citizenship when she reached the
Marcos vs. COMELEC,48 must not only be material, but also deliberate and age of majority as mandated in Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution
willful. and Section 1 of the Commonwealth Act No. 625. The Supreme Court held
294. Republic vs Chule Lim that the two above provisions only apply to legitimate children. These do not
apply in the case of the respondent who was an illegitimate child considering
Facts: that her parents never got married. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino
mother, respondent automatically became a Filipino upon birth, and as such,
The respondent, Chule Y. Lim, is an illegitimate daughter of a Chinese father there was no more need for her to validly elect Filipino citizenship upon
and a Filipina mother, who never got married due to a prior subsisting marriage reaching the age of majority. Also, she registered as a voter inside the country
of her father. The respondent petitioned that there were few mistakes as to her when she reached 18 years old. The exercise of the right of suffrage and the
citizenship and identity, to wit: participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of
1. That her surname “Yu” was misspelled as “Yo”. She has been using “Yu” in Philippine citizenship.
all of her school records and in her marriage certificate. 2. No. The Republic’s submission was misleading. The Court of Appeals did
not allow respondent to use her father’s surname. What it did allow was the
2. That her father’s name in her birth record was written as “Yo Diu To (Co correction of her father’s misspelled surname which she has been using ever
Tian)” when it should have been “Yu Dio To (Co Tian).” since she can remember. The court held that prohibiting the respondent to use
her father’s surname would only sow confusion. Also, Sec. 1 of
3. That her nationality was entered as Chinese when it should have been
Commonwealth Act No. 142 which regulates the use of aliases as well as the
Filipino considering that her father and mother got married.
jurisprudence state that it is allowed for a person to use a name “by which he
has been known since childhood”. Even legitimate children cannot enjoin the
illegitimate children of their father from using his surname. While judicial
290
authority is required for a chance of name or surname, there is no such past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine
requirement for the continued use of a surname which a person has already citizenship.
been using since childhood.
The doctrine that disallows such change of name as would give the false Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. What is inimical is
impression of family relationship remains valid but only to the extent that the not dual citizenship per se, but with naturalized citizens who maintain their
proposed change of name would in great probability cause prejudice or future allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the
mischief to the family whose surname it is that is involved or to the community phrase “dual citizenship” in RA 7160 must be understood as referring to “dual
in general. In this case, the Republic has not shown that the Yu family in China allegiance”. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under
would probably be prejudiced or be the object of future mischief. this disqualification.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition brought by the

Republic is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. 296. EUSEBIO EUGENIO K. LOPEZ VS COMELEC & VILLANUEVA

G.R. No. 182701 July 23, 2008

DUAL CITIZENSHIP AND DUAL ALLEGIANCE FACTS

295. MERCADO VS MANZANO & COMELEC Petitioner Lopez, a dual citizen, was a candidate for the position of
Chairman of Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo City held on October 29,
G.R. No. 135083 May 26, 1999 2007. He was eventually declared the winner. On October 25, 2007,
FACTS respondent Villanueva filed a petition before the Provincial Election Supervisor
for the disqualification of Lopez because he was ineligible from running for any
Petition for disqualification was filed against Edu Manzano to hold public office.
elective office on the ground that he is both an American citizen and a Filipino
citizen, having been born in the United States of Filipino parents. COMELEC Lopez argued that he is a Filipino-American, by virtue of the Citizenship
granted the petition and disqualified Manzano for being a dual citizen pursuant Retention and Re-acquisition Act. He said, he possessed all the qualifications
to the Local Government Code RA 7160, that those with dual citizenship are to run for Barangay Chairman.
disqualified from running any public position. On February 6, 2008, COMELEC resolved to disqualify Lopez from running as
ISSUE: WON dual citizenship is a ground for disqualification to hold or run Barangay Chairman. To be able to qualify as a candidate in the elections,
office in the local position? Lopez should have made a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship.
HELD: NO
His MR having been denied, Lopez resorted to petition for certiorari, imputing
by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC for disqualifying him
that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he from running and assuming the office of Barangay Chairman.
will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith
and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private ISSUE: WON COMELEC WAS CORRECT?
respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively HELD: YES
repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said
before as a dual citizen. Lopez was born a Filipino but he deliberately sought American
citizenship and renounced his Filipino citizenship. He later on became a dual
On the other hand, private respondent's oath of allegiance to the Philippines, citizen by re-acquiring Filipino citizenship.
when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood,
received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in
291
R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the conditions before those who re- for the office he was appointed to. His appointment therefore remained
acquired Filipino citizenship may run for a public office in the Philippines. temporary.

Section 5 of the said law states: On March 16, 1976, private respondent Tito Dato was indefinitely suspended
by Governor Alfelor after criminal charges were filed against him and a prison
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. – Those who retain or re- guard for allegedly conniving and/or consenting to evasion of sentence of
acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political some detention prisoners who escaped from confinement. After a period, Dato
rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under was acquitted of the charges against him and requested the Governor for
existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions: reinstatement and back wages but was denied. As consequence, Dato filed an
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the action for mandamus before the Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur
qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and which renders decision in his favor.
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court’s decision. In due course, petitioner,
a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any Province of Camarines Sur appealed the said decision to the Court of Appeals.
public officer authorized to administer an oath.
ISSUE: WON respondent Tito Dato was a permanent employee of petitioner
Lopez was able to regain his Filipino Citizenship by virtue of the Dual Province of Camarines Sur thus entitled to benefits?
Citizenship Law when he took his oath of allegiance before the Vice Consul of
the Philippine Consulate General’s Office in Los Angeles, California; the same HELD: NO
is not enough to allow him to run for a public office.
The Court has defined the parameters within which the power of
Lopez’s failure to renounce his American citizenship as proven by the absence approval of appointments shall be exercised by the Civil Service Commission.
of an affidavit that will prove the contrary leads this Commission to believe that CSC has the power to approve or disapprove an appointment set before it. It
he failed to comply with the positive mandate of law. does not have the power to make the appointment itself or to direct the
appointing authority to change the employment status of an employee. The
CSC can only inquire into the eligibility of the person chosen to fill a position
and if it finds the person qualified it must so attest. If not, the appointment
IX. LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS must be disapproved. The duty of the CSC is to attest appointments and after
that function is discharged, its participation in the appointment process ceases.
MODES OF ACQUIRING TITLE TO PUBLIC OFFICE
Based on the foregoing, private respondent Tito Dato, being merely a
297. PROVINCE OF CAM SUR VS CA temporary employee, is not entitled to the relief he seeks, including his claim
for back wages for the entire period of his suspension.
G.R. No. 104639 July 14, 1995

FACTS
298. DE LEON VS CA
On October 12, 1972, private respondent Tito Dato was granted a
temporary appointment as Assistant Provincial Warden by then Governor Felix G.R. No. 127182 January 22, 2001
Alfelor, Sr which was renewed annually. On January 1, 1974, Governor Alfelor
FACTS
approved the change in Dato's employment status from temporary to
permanent upon the latter's representation that he passed the civil service respondent Atty. Jacob F. Montesa, who is not a Career Executive
examination for supervising security guards. Said change of status however, Service Officer (CESO) or a member of the Career Executive Service, was
was not favorably acted upon by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) appointed as "Ministry Legal Counsel - CESO IV in the Ministry of Local
reasoning that Tito Dato did not possess the necessary civil service eligibility Government" (DILG), by then Minister Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. Private
292
respondent's appointment was approved as permanent by the Civil Service appointment is merely temporary; hence, he could be transferred or
Commission. reassigned to other positions without violating his right to security of tenure.

He was replaced the following year by Patricio. Subsequently respondent filed

a petition for quo warranto, against then Secretary Luis T. Santos and Nicanor
Patricio. We ruled in favor of private respondent Montesa and ordered his 299. MATIBAG VS BENIPAYO ET. AL.
reinstatement to his former position. On 1994 respondent was relieved of his G.R. No. 149036 April 2, 2002
current duties and responsibilities and was reassigned as "Director III
(Assistant Regional Director), Region XI, respondent, however, did not report FACTS
to his new assigned position. Instead, he filed a 90-day sick leave, and upon
Herein petitioner Matibag was appointed by the COMELEC en banc
the expiration, he submitted a memorandum for then acting Secretary
as “Acting Director IV” of the EDUCATION AND INFORMATION
Alexander P. Aguirre, signifying his intention to re-assume his position as
DEPARTMENT and was reappointed twice for the same position in a
Department Legal Counsel/Chief, Legal Services. He was denied and told to
temporary capacity. Meanwhile, then PGMA also made appointments, ad
report to his new appointment.
interim, of herein respondents Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as COMELEC
Fidel V. Ramos, upon the recommendation of the Department droppED private Chairman and Commissioners, respectively. Their appointments were
respondent from the roster of public servants for serious neglect of duty and renewed thrice by PGMA, the last one during the pendency of the case, all due
absences without leave (AWOL). CA ruled in respondents favor. to the failure of the Commission of Appointments to act upon the confirmation
of their appointments.
ISSUE: WON his appointment is permanent or temporary?
Respondent Benipayo, acting on his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, issued
HELD: TEMPORARY a memorandum removing petitioner as Acting Director IV and reassigning her
Respondent's appointment did not attain permanency. Not having to the Law Department. Petitioner requested for reconsideration but was
taken the necessary Career Executive Service examination to obtain requisite denied. Thus, petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the appointment
eligibility, he did not at the time of his appointment and up to the present, and the right to remain in office of herein respondents, claiming that their ad
possess the needed eligibility for a position in the Career Executive Service. interim appointments violate the constitutional provisions on the independence
Consequently, his appointment as Ministry Legal Counsel – CESO IV/ of the COMELEC, as well as on the prohibitions on temporary appointments
Department Legal Counsel and/or Director III, was merely temporary. Such and reappointments of its Chairman and members.
being the case, he could be transferred or reassigned without violating the ISSUE:
constitutionally guaranteed right to security of tenure.
WON the ad interim appointments made by PGMA were prohibited under the
Private respondent capitalizes on his lack of CES eligibility by adamantly Constitution?
contending that the mobility and flexibility concepts in the assignment of
personnel under the Career Executive Service do not apply to him because he WON the ad interim appointments made by PGMA were temporary in
is not a Career Executive Service Officer. Obviously, the contention is without character?
merit. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, non-eligible holding
HELD: NO, NO
permanent appointments to CES positions were never meant to remain
immobile in their status. Otherwise, their lack of eligibility would be a premium (1) While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC “shall be
vesting them with permanency in the CES positions, a privilege even their independent”, this provision should be harmonized with the President’s power
eligible counterparts do not enjoy. to extend ad interim appointments. To hold that the independence of the
COMELEC requires the Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad
Then too, the cases on unconsented transfer invoked by private respondent
interim appointees before the appointees can assume office will negate the
find no application in the present case. To reiterate, private respondent's
President’s power to make ad interim appointments. This is contrary to the rule
293
on statutory construction to give meaning and effect to every provision of the (2) An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes
law. It will also run counter to the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution. effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the
The original draft of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution – on the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by
nomination of officers subject to confirmation by the Commission on the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The
Appointments – did not provide for ad interim appointments. The original Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by
intention of the framers of the Constitution was to do away with ad interim making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or
appointments because the plan was for Congress to remain in session until the next adjournment of Congress. The second paragraph of Section 16,
throughout the year except for a brief 30-day compulsory recess. However, Article VII of the Constitution provides as follows:
because of the need to avoid disruptions in essential government services, the
framers of the Constitution thought it wise to reinstate the provisions of the “The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess
1935 Constitution on ad interim appointments. Clearly, the reinstatement in of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments
the present Constitution of the ad interim appointing power of the President shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments
was for the purpose of avoiding interruptions in vital government services that or until the next adjournment of the Congress.”
otherwise would result from prolonged vacancies in government offices, Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or
including the three constitutional commissions. next adjournment, signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by
Evidently, the exercise by the President in the instant case of her constitutional the President.
power to make ad interim appointments prevented the occurrence of the very While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable except as
evil sought to be avoided by the second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of provided by law, an appointment or designation in a temporary or acting
the Constitution. This power to make ad interim appointments is lodged in the capacity can be withdrawn or revoked at the pleasure of the appointing power.
President to be exercised by her in her sound judgment. Under the second A temporary or acting appointee does not enjoy any security of tenure, no
paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, the President can matter how briefly. This is the kind of appointment that the Constitution
choose either of two modes in appointing officials who are subject to prohibits the President from making to the three independent constitutional
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. First, while Congress is in commissions, including the COMELEC.
session, the President may nominate the prospective appointee, and pending
consent of the Commission on Appointments, the nominee cannot qualify and In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners
assume office. Second, during the recess of Congress, the President may to fill the vacancies in the COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the
extend an ad interim appointment which allows the appointee to immediately Commission on Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were extended
qualify and assume office. Whether the President chooses to nominate the permanent appointments during the recess of Congress. They were not
prospective appointee or extend an ad interim appointment is a matter within appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. The ad interim
the prerogative of the President because the Constitution grants her that appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are expressly allowed by the
power. This Court cannot inquire into the propriety of the choice made by the Constitution which authorizes the President, during the recess of Congress, to
President in the exercise of her constitutional power, absent grave abuse of make appointments that take effect immediately.
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on her part, which has
not been shown in the instant case.
300. TOMALI VS CSC
In fine, we rule that the ad interim appointments extended by the President to
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as COMELEC Chairman and Commissioners, DEC 1 1994 G.R. No. 110598
respectively, do not constitute temporary or acting appointments prohibited by
Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. FACTS

Petitioner questions her "replacement" by private respondent in a

contested position in the Office on Muslim Affairs. Tomali was appointed
Development Management Officer II ("DMO II") in the Office on Muslim Affairs
294
("OMA"). She assumed the duties and functions of the office four months after 301. VELICARIA-GARAFIL VS OP
her appointment, at which point the appointment had not yet been transmitted
to ("CSC") for approval. Later the new Director of the OMA, revoked the JUNE 16 2015 G.R. No. 203372
previous incomplete appointment of petitioner, & appointed private respondent FACTS
Rocaina M. Lucman. Petitioner protested to OMA HR, Merit Systems
Protection Board, and the CSC which were all denied. The present consolidated cases involve four petitions. Prior to the
conduct of the May 2010 elections, then PGMA (President Macapagal-Arroyo)
ISSUE: WON Tomali’s appointment requires CSC approval? issued more than 800 appointments to various positions in several government
HELD: YES offices.

Sec 9 (h) provides for the rule: The ban on midnight appointments in Section 15, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution reads:
Approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to
positions in the civil service, except those of presidential appointees, members Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, police forces, firemen, and jailguards, to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make
and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess the appropriate appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions
eligibility or required qualifications. An appointment shall take effect when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
immediately upon issue by the appointing authority if the appointee assumes endanger public safety.
his duties immediately and shall remain effective until it is disapproved by the Thus, for purposes of the 2010 elections, 10 March 2010 was the cutoff date
Commission, if this should take place, without prejudice to the liability of the for valid appointments and the next day, 11 March 2010, was the start of the
appointing authority for appointments issued in violation of existing laws or ban on midnight appointments. Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
rules: Provided, finally, That the Commission shall keep a record of recognizes as an exception to the ban on midnight appointments only
appointments of all officers and employees in the civil service. All "temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
appointments requiring the approval of the Commission as herein provided, therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety."
shall be submitted to it by the appointing authority within thirty days from
issuance, otherwise the appointment becomes ineffective thirty days None of the petitioners claim that their appointments fall under this exception.
thereafter.
On 30 June 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III (President Aquino) took his
Compliance with the legal requirements for an appointment to a civil service oath of office as President of the Republic of the Philippines. On 30 July 2010,
position is essential in order to make it fully effective. Without the favorable President Aquino issued EO 2 recalling, withdrawing, and revoking
certification or approval of the Commission, in cases when such approval is appointments issued by President Macapagal-Arroyo which violated the
required, no title to the office can yet be deemed to be permanently vested in constitutional ban on midnight appointments.
favor of the appointee, and the appointment can still be recalled or withdrawn
ISSUE: WON petitioners' appointments violate Section 15, Article VII of the
by the appointing authority. Until an appointment has become a completed act,
1987 Constitution?
it would likewise be precipitate to invoke the rule on security of tenure.
HELD:
The tolerance, acquiescence or mistake of the proper officials, resulting in the
non-observance of the pertinent rules on the matter does not render the legal The following elements should always concur in the making of a valid (which
requirement, on the necessity of approval of the Commissioner of Civil Service should be understood as both complete and effective) appointment: (1)
of appointments, ineffective and unenforceable. The employee, whose authority to appoint and evidence of the exercise of the authority; (2)
appointment was not approved, may only be considered as a de facto officer. transmittal of the appointment paper and evidence of the transmittal; (3) a
vacant position at the time of appointment; and (4) receipt of the appointment
paper and acceptance of the appointment by the appointee who possesses all
295
the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. The concurrence of all Finding the petitioner better qualified than the respondent, the DECS
these elements should always apply, regardless of when the appointment is Secretary in a decision sustained the protest and revoked the appointment of
made, whether outside, just before, or during the appointment ban. These private respondent, and petitioner was issued a permanent appointment as
steps in the appointment process should always concur and operate as a Supply Officer by the DECS Regional Director. Said appointment was
single process. There is no valid appointment if the process lacks even one approved by the Civil Service Regional Office IV.
step.
In an appeal to the CSC, public respondent CSC found the appeal meritorious,
Petitioners have failed to show compliance with all four elements of a valid thus revoking the appointment of petitioner and restoring private respondent
appointment. They cannot prove with certainty that their appointment papers to her position under her previously approved appointment.
were transmitted before the appointment ban took effect. On the other hand,
petitioners admit that they took their oaths of office during the appointment In the case at bar, petitioner assailing the revocation of his appointment,
ban. invokes the rulings in previous jurisprudence that the CSC has no authority to
revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for
The petitions have no merit. All of petitioners' appointments are a particular position for that would have constituted an encroachment on the
midnight appointments and are void for violation of Section 15, Article VII of discretion vested solely in the appointing authority.
the 1987 Constitution. EO 2 is constitutional. This ponencia and the dissent
both agree that the facts in all these cases show that "none of the petitioners ISSUE: WON public respondent Civil Service Commission committed grave
have shown that their appointment papers (and transmittal letters) have been abuse of discretion in revoking the appointment of petitioner Victor A. Aquino
issued (and released) before the ban." The dates of receipt by the MRO, which as Supply Officer I in the DECS Division of San Pablo City as it found private
in these cases are the only reliable evidence of actual transmittal of the respondent Leonarda de la Paz better qualified?
appointment papers by PGMA, are dates clearly falling during the appointment HELD: NO
ban. Thus, this ponencia and the dissent both agree that all the appointments
in these cases are midnight appointments in violation of Section 15, Article VII We see no compelling reason to apply the same in the instant case.
of the 1987 Constitution. In the cases cited above, We ruled that the Civil Service Commission has no
authority to revoke an appointment simply because it (CSC) believed that
another person is better qualified than the appointee for it would constitute an
302. AQUINO VS CSC encroachment on the discretion solely vested on the appointing authority. The
situation is different as in the instant case, where the Civil Service Commission
GR 92403 April 22, 1992 revoked the appointment of the successful protestant, petitioner herein,
principally because the right to security of tenure of the prior appointee, private
FACTS respondent herein, to the contested position had already attached
Petitioner was designated as Officer-in-charge of the Division Supply It must be noted that public respondent CSC did not direct the appointment of
Office by the DECS Regional Director in view of the retirement of the Supply a substitute of its choice. It merely restored the appointment of private
Officer I. respondent who was first appointed to the contested position.
Two years thereafter, the Division Superintendent of City Schools issued a Generally the CSC has no authority to revoke an appointment on the
promotional appointment to private respondent as Supply Officer I in the DECS ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position for that
division. The Civil Service Regional Office IV approved her appointment as would have constituted an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the
permanent. appointing authority. The Civil Service Commission cannot exceed its power
Petitioner filed a protest with DECS Secretary questioning the qualification and by substituting its will for that of the appointing authority.
competence of private respondent for the position of Supply Officer I. Even on the assumption that the revocation of private respondent's
appointment was validly exercised by DECS Secretary Quisumbing, still the
296
appointment extended to petitioner was tainted with irregularity as it was authority includes the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus
issued before the finality of the decision on the protest in violation of CSC and offices. Control means the authority of an empowered officer to alter or
Resolution No. 83-343 which prohibits the issuance of an appointment to modify, or even nullify or set aside, what a subordinate officer has done in the
protestant (petitioner) if the protest case is not yet finally resolved, since there performance of his duties, as well as to substitute the judgment of the latter,
is no vacancy in the position pending resolution of the protest case. There can as and when the former deems it to be appropriate. Expressed in another way,
be no appointment to a non-vacant position. The incumbent must first be the President has the power to assume directly the functions of an executive
legally removed or his appointment validly terminated (Costin v. Quimbo, G.R. department, bureau and office. It can accordingly be inferred therefrom that
No. L-32271, January 27, 1983, 120 SCRA 159). An appointment to an office the President can interfere in the exercise of discretion of officials under him
which is not vacant is null and void ab initio (Morata v. Court of Appeals, G.R. or altogether ignore their recommendations.
No. L-18975, May 25, 1964, 11 SCRA 42).
The phrase upon recommendation of the Secretary, found in Section 9,
Chapter II, Title III, Book IV, of the Revised Administrative Code, should be
interpreted, as it is normally so understood, to be a mere advise, exhortation
303. BERMUDEZ VS ES or indorsement, which is essentially persuasive in character and not binding
AUG 4 1999 G.R. No. 131429 or obligatory upon the party to whom it is made. The recommendation is here
nothing really more than advisory in nature. The President, being the head of
FACTS the Executive Department, could very well disregard or do away with the action
of the departments, bureaus, or offices even in the exercise of discretionary
Bermudez, the First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac and
authority, and in so opting, he cannot be said as having acted beyond the
Officer-In-Charge of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, was a
scope of his authority.
recommendee of then Justice Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr., for the
position of Provincial Prosecutor. Quiaoit, on the other hand, would appear to In the instant case, the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice and the
have had the support of then Representative Jose Yap of the Second appointment of the President are acts of the Executive Department itself, and
Legislative District of Tarlac. Quiaoit emerged the victor when he was there is no sharing of power to speak of, the latter being deemed for all intents
appointed by President Ramos to the coveted office. Quiaoit took his oath and and purposes as being merely an extension of the personality of the President.
assumed office. Bermudez refused to vacate. Nonetheless, Quiaoit, performed
the duties and functions of the Office of Provincial Prosecutor.

Petitioner Bermudez filed a petition for prohibition and/or injunction, and 304. UP VS CSC
mandamus, challenging the appointment of Quiaoit primarily on the ground APR 3 2001 G.R. No. 132860
that the appointment lacks the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice
prescribed under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. Section 9, Chap. FACTS
II, Title III, Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code provides that “all
provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants shall be appointed by the Dr. Alfredo B. De Torres is an Associate Professor of the University of
President upon the recommendation of the Secretary.” the Philippines in Los Baños (UPLB) who went on a leave of absence without
pay from September 1, 1986 to August 30, 1989. During this period, he served
ISSUE: WON the absence of a recommendation of the Secretary of Justice as the Philippine Government’s official representative to the Centre on
can be held fatal to the appointment of respondent Conrado Quiaoit? Integrated Rural Development for Asia and [the] Pacific (CIRDAP).

HELD: NO When the term of his leave was about to expire, CIRDAP requested the UPLB
for an extension of said leave of absence for another year, but was denied by
When the Constitution or the law clothes the President with the power the Director of the Agricultural Credit Corporation, Inc. (ACCI) of UPLB. In the
to appoint a subordinate officer, such conferment must be understood as same letter, Dr. Castillo advised Dr. De Torres to report for duty at UPLB not
necessarily carrying with it an ample discretion of whom to appoint. It should later than September 15, 1989; while the then UPLB Chancellor Raul P. de
be here pertinent to state that the President is the head of government whose
297
Guzman apprised him on the rules of the Civil Service on leaves and warned CSC is not a co-manager, or surrogate administrator of government offices
of the possibility of being considered on Absence Without Official Leave and agencies. Its functions and authority are limited to approving or reviewing
(AWOL) if he failed to return and report for duty as directed. appointments to determine their concordance with the requirements of the Civil
Service Law." In short, on its own, the CSC does not have the power to
Dr. De Torres wrote UPLB that he can only continue his commitment to terminate employment or to drop workers from the rolls.
CIRDAP.’ UPLB Chancellor warned De Torres, that if he fails to report ‘within
30 days UPLB would be forced to drop him from the rolls of personnel. Dr. De
Torres did not report to work.
305. LRTA VS VENUS
On January 3, 1994 or after almost five years of absence without leave, Dr. De
Torres wrote the incumbent Chancellor Ruben L. Villareal that he was MARCH 24 2006 G.R. No. 163782
reporting back to duty at ACCI-UPLB. Director of ACCI-UPLB informed De FACTS
Torres that in the absence of any approved application for leave of absence,
he [was] considered to be on AWOL. Thus, he was advised to re-apply with Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) and Metro Transit Organization,
UPLB. Inc. (METRO), seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals
directing them to reinstate private respondent workers. LRTA is a GOCC, while
Dr. De Torres sought reconsideration [of] the two aforementioned decisions . METRO, formerly Meralco Transit Organization, Inc., was a qualified
. . On July 4, 1994, Chancellor Villareal reversed his earlier stand and notified transportation corporation duly organized in accordance with the provisions of
De Torres that since records at UPLB [did] not show that he had been officially the Corporation Code, registered with the SEC, and existing under Philippine
dropped from the rolls he may report for duty effective January 3, 1994. laws. LRTA constructed a light rail transit system from Monumento to Baclaran
Members of Academic Personnel Committee, ACCI-UPLB, requested the Pursuant to the Agreement, petitioner METRO hired its own employees,
CSC regarding the employment status of Dr. De Torres, to which CSC including herein private respondents. Petitioner LRTA purchased the shares
responded that Dr. De Torres is considered to have been dropped from the of stocks in petitioner METRO. However, petitioners LRTA and METRO
service. continued with their distinct and separate juridical personalities. The union
later initiated a strike in light of a deadlock in the CBA. The respondents failed
Dr. De Torres and (UPLB) filed separate requests for reconsideration of to return to work despite NLRC order for them to do so and were considered
aforesaid CSC Resolution. CSC denied the motion, further stating that CSC dismissed by METRO and LRTA.
Resolution [stood] and that since separation from the service [was] non-
disciplinary in nature, the appointing authority may appoint Dr. De Torres to The suit against LRTA was dismissed since "LRTA is a GOCC created by
any vacant position pursuant to existing civil service law and rules. virtue of Executive Order No. 603 with an original charter" and it had no
participation whatsoever with the termination of complainants’ employment
ISSUE: WON CSC has the power to force the University of the Philippines to since they were employed by METRO." LRTA further contends that it is a
remove people from its faculty? GOCC with an original charter, Executive Order No. 603, Series of 1980, as
amended, and thus under the exclusive jurisdiction only of the CSC, not the
HELD: NO NLRC.
We hold that by opting to retain private petitioner and even promoting Private respondent workers, however, submit that petitioner METRO was not
him despite his absence without leave, the University was exercising its only fully-owned by petitioner LRTA, but all aspects of its operations and
freedom to choose who may teach or, more precisely, who may continue to administration were also strictly controlled, conducted and directed by
teach in its faculty. Even in the light of the provision of the Revised Civil Service petitioner LRTA. And since petitioner METRO is a mere adjunct, business
Law, the Respondent CSC had no authority to dictate to UP the outright conduit, and alter ego of petitioner LRTA, their respective corporate veils must
dismissal of its personnel. The former could not have done so without be pierced to satisfy the money claims of the illegally dismissed private
trampling upon the latter’s constitutionally enshrined academic freedom. respondent employees.
Moreover, in Chang v. Civil Service Commission, the Court stressed that" [t]he
298
ISSUE: WON it is CSC instead of NLRC which has jurisdiction over LRTA? Service of the Office of the Ombudsman. Acting thereon, the CSC issued
Opinion No. 44, s. 2004 dated January 23, 2004 disapproving the request.
HELD: CSC
ISSUE: What is the extent of CSC’s power of the personnel organization,
We agree with petitioner LRTA. Section 2 (1), Article IX – B, 1987 staffing and qualification over the employees of the Ombudsman?
Constitution, expressly provides that "[t]he civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including HELD:
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters."
Corporations with original charters are those which have been created by The CSC cannot substitute its own standards for those of the
special law and not through the general corporation law. Thus, in Philippine department or agency, especially in a case like this in which an independent
National Oil Company – Energy Development Corporation v. Hon. Leogrado, constitutional body is involved.
we held that "under the present state of the law, the test in determining whether Under the Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is an independent body.
a government-owned or controlled corporation is subject to the Civil Service As a guaranty of this independence, the Ombudsman has the power to appoint
Law is the manner of its creation such that government corporations created all officials and employees of the Office of the Ombudsman, except his
by special charter are subject to its provisions while those incorporated under deputies. This power necessarily includes the power of setting, prescribing and
the general Corporation Law are not within its coverage."12There should be administering the standards for the officials and personnel of the Office. To
no dispute then that employment in petitioner LRTA should be governed only further ensure its independence, the Ombudsman has been vested with the
by civil service rules, and not the Labor Code and beyond the reach of the power of administrative control and supervision of the Office. This includes the
Department of Labor and Employment, since petitioner LRTA is a government- authority to organize such directorates for administration and allied services
owned and controlled corporation with an original charter, Executive Order No. as may be necessary for the effective discharge of the functions of the Office,
603, Series of 1980, as amended. as well as to prescribe and approve its position structure and staffing pattern.
In contrast, petitioner METRO is covered by the Labor Code despite its later Necessarily, it also includes the authority to determine and establish the
acquisition by petitioner LRTA. We therefore hold that the employees of qualifications, duties, functions and responsibilities of the various directorates
petitioner METRO cannot be considered as employees of petitioner LRTA. and allied services of the Office. This must be so if the constitutional intent to
The employees hired by METRO are covered by the Labor Code and are establish an independent Office of the Ombudsman is to remain meaningful
under the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor and Employment, whereas and significant. Since the responsibility for the establishment, administration
the employees of petitioner LRTA, a government-owned and controlled and maintenance of qualification standards lies with the concerned department
corporation with original charter, are covered by civil service rules. Herein or agency, the role of the CSC is limited to assisting the department or agency
private respondent workers cannot have the best of two worlds, e.g., be with respect to these qualification standards and approving them.
considered government employees of petitioner LRTA, yet allowed to strike as
private employees under our labor laws. ELIGIBILITY AND QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS

307. FLORES VS DRILON

306. OMBUDSMAN v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JUNE 22 1993 G.R. No. 104732
G.R. NO. 162215 July 30, 2007
FACTS
FACTS
Respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was
The controversy traces its roots to Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo’s appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan
letter dated July 28, 2003 to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) requesting Authority (SBMA).
the approval of the amendment of qualification standards for Director II
positions in the Central Administrative Service and Finance and Management
299
Petitioners, who claim to be taxpayers, employees of the U.S. Facility at the While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the qualifications of the
Subic, Zambales, and officers and members of the Filipino Civilian Employees officer during the first year of operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor
Association in U.S. Facilities in the Philippines, challenge the constitutionality of Olongapo City, it is manifestly an abuse of congressional authority to
of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the “Bases Conversion prescribe qualifications where only one, and no other, can qualify. Accordingly,
and Development Act of 1992,”. while the conferment of the appointing power on the President is a perfectly
valid legislative act, the proviso limiting his choice to one is certainly an
They maintain that the proviso in par. (d) of Sec. 13 infringes on the following encroachment on his prerogative.
constitutional and statutory provisions:
Since the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains all
(a) Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that throughout his tenure or during his incumbency, he may however resign first
“[n]o elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in from his elective post to cast off the constitutionally-attached disqualification
any capacity to any public officer or position during his tenure,” before he may be considered fit for appointment.
because the City Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective official and the
subject posts are public offices; Consequently, as long as he is an incumbent, an elective official remains
ineligible for appointment to another public office.
(b) Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, which provides that “[t]he
President shall . . . appoint all other officers of the Government whose Consequently, the appointment pursuant thereto of the Mayor of Olongapo
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom City, respondent Richard J. Gordon, is INVALID, hence NULL and VOID.
he may be authorized by law to appoint”, since it was Congress
through the questioned proviso and not the President who appointed However, all per diems, allowances and other emoluments received by
the Mayor to the subject posts; and, respondent Gordon, if any, as such Chairman and Chief Executive Officer may
be retained by him, and all acts otherwise legitimate done by him in the
(c) Sec. 261, par. (g), of the Omnibus Election Code, for the reason exercise of his authority as officer de facto of SBMA are hereby UPHELD.
that the appointment of respondent Gordon to the subject posts made
by respondent Executive Secretary on 3 April 1992 was within the
prohibited 45-day period prior to the 11 May 1992 Elections. POWERS AND DUTIES OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

ISSUE: WON the proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 which states, 308. DE LOS SANTOS VS YATCO
“Provided, however, That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity
of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the G.R. No. L-13932 December 24, 1959
chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority,” violates the FACTS
constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective
officials to other government posts? Petitioner files a petition for certiorari to revoke the order of respondent
Judge Yatco for cancelling his previous order for execution on the parcel of
HELD: YES land owned by the petitioner. The said parcel of land is being occupied by
In the case before us, the subject proviso directs the President to Fernando Mendoñez with an agreement to pay in installment the said land to
appoint an elective official, i.e., the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other the petitioners and that he shall voluntarily vacate the land and the payments
government posts (as Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of he previously made shall be forfeited in favor of the plaintiff. A civil case was
SBMA). Since this is precisely what the constitutional proscription seeks to filed by the petitioner against Mendoñez for failure to pay as per their
prevent, it needs no stretching of the imagination to conclude that the proviso agreement. Petitioner later filed a motion for execution to take the land back.
contravenes Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. Here, the fact that Defendant Mendoñez moved for postponement to give both parties sufficient
the expertise of an elective official may be most beneficial to the higher interest time to come to an agreement which was allowed by the respondent judge. It
of the body politic is of no moment. was settled by both parties that Mendoñez will secure a GSIS loan. However
when he was ready to make the payment the petitioner refused to abide with
300
their agreement and was asking for a higher amount of money for payment. Petitioner, the duly elected Governor of the Province of Batangas,
Finding no justification on the issuance of the writ of execution, Judge Yatco appointed his brother, Benjamin Laurel, as Senior Executive Assistant in the
quashed said order hence this petition for certiorari based on lack of Office of the Governor, a non-career service position which belongs to the
jurisdiction or abuse of discretion. personal and confidential staff of an elective official. Upon the vacancy of the
position of Provincial Administrator of Batangas, petitioner designated his
ISSUE: WON judge Yatco acted in lack of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion? brother as Acting Provincial Administrator. Then, he issued Benjamin Laurel a
HELD: NO promotional appointment as Civil Security Officer which is a position which the
Civil Service Commission classifies as "primarily confidential" pursuant to P.D.
There is no question in this country that a judge has jurisdiction to No. 868.
quash a writ of execution issued by him, particularly where it was improvidently
issued. (Dimayuga v. Raymundo, 76 Phil., 143, 42 Off. Gaz., 2121). See also ISSUE: WON the prohibitive mantle on nepotism would include designation?
Garcia v. Muñoz, 103 Phil., 628. HELD: YES
Was there abuse of discretion? We think not. In the first place, there being The court ruled that petitioner could not legally and validly appoint his
opposition on the part of the defendant, who alleged and proved a subsequent brother Benjamin Laurel to said position because of the prohibition on
verbal agreement amending the compromise, execution could not validly be nepotism under Section 49 of P.D. No. 807. They are related within the third
decreed without a hearing. As we said in Co. v. Lucero, 100 Phil., 160, 52 Off. degree of consanguinity and the case does not fall within any of the
Gaz., (17), 7255, when under similar circumstances a breach of the exemptions provided therein. The exemption in the said section covering
compromise agreement is alleged, "there arises a cause of action which must confidential positions cannot be considered since the said position is not
be passed upon by the court requiring a hearing to determine whether such primarily confidential for it belongs to the career service.
breach had really taken place."
Petitioner’s contention that the designation of his brother is not covered by the
In the second place, the allegations proved by Mendoñez about their verbal prohibition cannot be accepted for by legal contemplation, the prohibitive
agreement, his having secured a loan from the GSIS and his consequent mantle on nepotism would include designation, because what cannot be done
ability to discharge his obligation seemingly justified the court’s refusal to eject directly cannot be done indirectly. His specious and tenuous distinction
defendant from the premises (on execution) with the consequent forfeiture in between appointment and designation is nothing more than either a ploy
favor of the plaintiffs of more than P12,000.00 already paid by defendant as ingeniously conceived to circumvent the rigid rule on nepotism or a last-ditch
previous instalments of the purchase price, not to mention the loss of maneuver to cushion the impact of its violation. Section 49 of P.D. No. 807
defendant’s use of the house and theatre erected on that parcel of land. Upon does not suggest that designation should be differentiated from appointment.
the other hand, the respondent judge’s action caused no irreparable or undue Reading the section with Section 25 of said decree, career service positions
harm to plaintiffs, because the latter still have the judgment that may be may be filled up only by appointment, either permanent or temporary; hence a
enforced upon any further default of defendant Mendoñez. Note particularly designation of a person to fill it up because it is vacant, is necessarily included
that their unpaid credit continuous to earn 10% interest. in the term appointment, for it precisely accomplishes the same purpose.
Wherefore, as the court had jurisdiction and has committed no grave abuse of
discretion, the writ of certiorari may not be issued. 310. CSC vs DACOYCOY
G.R. No. 135805 April 29, 1999

309. LAUREL VS CSC FACTS:

Pedro Dacoycoy is the Vocational School Administrator of Balicuatro
G.R. No. 71562 October 28, 1991 College of Arts and Trades, Allen, Northern Samar. George P. Suan, a Citizens
Crime Watch Vice-President, Allen Chapter, Northern Samar, filed with the
FACTS Civil Service Commission, Quezon City, a complaint against Pedro O.
Dacoycoy, for habitual drunkenness, misconduct and nepotism. The Civil
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Service commission dismissed the case on habitual drunkenness and Mr. Daclag recommended the appointment of respondent’s two sons and
misconduct for want of substantial evidence. He was still however dismissed placed them under respondent’s immediate supervision serving as driver and
for he was found guilty of nepotism on two counts as a result of the utility worker of the school. To our mind, the unseen but obvious hand of
appointment of his two sons, Rito and Ped Dacoycoy, as driver and utility respondent Dacoycoy was behind the appointing or recommending authority
worker, respectively, and their assignment under his immediate supervision in the appointment of his two sons. Clearly, he is guilty of nepotism.
and control as the Vocational School Administrator Balicuatro College of Arts
and Trades. Dacoycoy invoked the power of the Court of Appeals via a special RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL RELATION
reversed the decision of the Civil Service Commission ruling that respondent
did not appoint or recommend his two sons Rito and Ped, and, hence, was not 311 & 312. HON. R. GLORIA VS COURT OF APPEALS
guilty of nepotism. It stated that “the person who recommends or appoints who G.R. No. 131012, April 21, 1999
should be sanctioned, as it is he who performs the prohibited act.” Of course,
the Civil Service Commission did not take it sitting down. It duly filed an appeal FACTS:
via certiorari, hence the case. Dr. Bienvenido Icasiano was appointed Schools Division
Superintendent of Quezon City in 1989. Upon recommendation of DECS
ISSUE: Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria, Icasiano was reassigned as Superintendent of the
Is Dacoycoy guilty of nepotism? Marikina Institute of Science and Technology (MIST) to fill up the vacuum
created by the retirement of its Superintendent in 1994.
RULING: Icasiano filed a TRO and preliminary mandatory injuction enjoining the
YES. As per Sec. 59 of EO 292 “Nepotism. – implementation of his reassignment. The Court of Appeals granted the petition
(1) All appointments to the national, provincial, city and municipal holding that the indefinite reassignment is violative of Icasiano’s right to
governments or in any branch or instrumentality thereof, including government security of tenure.
owned or controlled corporations, made in favor of a relative of the appointing The DECS Secretary argued that the filing of the case is improper
or recommending authority, or of the chief of the bureau or office, or of the because the same attacks an act of the President, in violation of the doctrine
persons exercising immediate supervision over him, are hereby prohibited. “As of presidential immunity from suit.
used in this Section, the word “relative” and members of the family referred to
are those related within the third degree either of consanguinity or of affinity. ISSUES:
(2) The following are exempted from the operations of the rules on nepotism: 1. Whether or not the filing of the case violates the presidential
(a) persons employed in a confidential capacity, (b) teachers, (c) physicians, immunity from suit.
and (d) members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines: Provided, however, 2. Whether or not private respondent's reassignment is violative of his
That in each particular instance full report of such appointment shall be made security of tenure.
to the Commission.” Under the definition of nepotism, one is guilty of nepotism
if an appointment is issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of RULING:
consanguinity or affinity of any of the following: a) appointing authority; b) 1. Petitioners’ contention is untenable for the simple reason that the
recommending authority; c) chief of the bureau or office, and d) person petition is directed against petitioners and not against the President. The
exercising immediate supervision over the appointee. He may not have been questioned acts are those of petitioners and not of the President. Furthermore,
the one who appointed or recommended his two sons but he was the one who presidential decisions may be questioned before the courts where there is
recommended the appointment of the person who appointed his two sons. The grave abuse of discretion or that the President acted without or in excess of
law was circumvented. “Also, it was Dacoycoy who certified that “funds are jurisdiction.
available for the proposed appointment of Rito Dacoycoy” and even rated his 2. After a careful study, the Court upholds the finding of the respondent
performance as “very satisfactory”. On the other hand, his son Ped stated in court that the reassignment of petitioner to MIST "appears to be indefinite".
his position description form that his father was “his next higher supervisor”. The same can be inferred from the Memorandum of Secretary Gloria for
The circumvention of the ban on nepotism is quite obvious. Unquestionably, President Fidel V. Ramos to the effect that the reassignment of private
Mr. Daclag was a subordinate of respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy, who was the respondent will "best fit his qualifications and experience" being "an expert in
school administrator. He authorized Mr. Daclag to recommend the vocational and technical education." It can thus be gleaned that subject
appointment of first level employees under his immediate supervision. Then
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reassignment is more than temporary as the private respondent has been
described as fit for the (reassigned) job, being an expert in the field. Besides,
there is nothing in the said Memorandum to show that the reassignment of ISSUE:
private respondent is temporary or would only last until a permanent Whether or not petitioners were removed by virtue of a valid abolition
replacement is found as no period is specified or fixed; which fact evinces an of their office by Congress.
intention on the part of petitioners to reassign private respondent with no
definite period or duration. Such feature of the reassignment in question is RULING:
definitely violative of the security of tenure of the private respondent. As held
in Bentain vs. Court of Appeals (209 SCRA 644): Yes. Petitioners herein are members of the civil service, which
"Security of tenure is a fundamental and constitutionally guaranteed embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
feature of our civil service. The mantle of its protection extends not only to Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with
employees removed without cause but also to cases of unconsented transfers original charters. As such, they cannot be removed or suspended from office,
which are tantamount to illegal removals (Department of Education, Culture except for cause provided by law. The phrase "except for cause provided by
and Sports vs. Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 555; Ibanez vs. COMELEC, 19 law" refers to "reasons which the law and sound public policy recognize as
SCRA 1002; Brillantes vs. Guevarra, 27 SCRA 138). sufficient warrant for removal, that is, legal cause, and not merely causes
While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible which the appointing power in the exercise of discretion may deem sufficient."
even without the employee’s prior consent, it cannot be done when the transfer The creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative
is a preliminary step toward his removal, or is a scheme to lure him away from function. It is acknowledged that Congress may abolish any office it creates
his permanent position, or designed to indirectly terminate his service, or force without impairing the officers right to continue in the position held and that such
his resignation. Such a transfer would in effect circumvent the provision which power may be exercised for various reasons, such as the lack of funds or in
safeguards the tenure of office of those who are in the Civil Service (Sta. Maria the interest of economy. However, in order for the abolition to be valid, it must
vs. Lopez, 31 SCRA 651; Garcia vs. Lejano, 109 Phil. 116)." be made in good faith, not for political or personal reasons, or in order to
Having found the reassignment of private respondent to the MIST to circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of civil service employees.
be violative of his security of tenure, the order for his reassignment to the MIST An abolition of office connotes an intention to do away with such office
cannot be countenanced. wholly and permanently, as the word "abolished" denotes. Where one office is
abolished and replaced with another office vested with similar functions, the
313. ALEXIS C. CANONIZADO v. HON. ALEXANDER P. AGUIRRE abolition is a legal nullity.
G. R. No. 133132 January 25, 2000 RA 8551 did not expressly abolish petitioners positions. In order to
determine whether there has been an implied abolition, it becomes necessary
FACTS: to examine the changes introduced by the new law in the nature, composition
Petitioners were appointed Commissioners of the NAPOLCOM, and functions of the NAPOLCOM.’
created under RA 6975 entitled "An Act Establishing The Philippine National No bona fide reorganization of the NAPOLCOM having been
Police Under A Reorganized Department Of The Interior And Local mandated by Congress, RA 8551, insofar as it declares the terms of office of
Government, And For Other Purposes." the incumbent Commissioners, petitioners herein, as expired and resulting in
They assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8551 (RA 8551), their removal from office, removes civil service employees from office without
otherwise known as the "Philippine National Police Reform and legal cause and must therefore be struck down for being constitutionally infirm.
Reorganization Act of 1998," by virtue of which petitioners herein, were
separated from office. 314. BUKLOD NG KAWANI NG EEIB v ES
Section 8 of the said act provides that, “Upon the effectivity of this Act, July 10, 2001
the terms of office of the current Commissioners are deemed expired which
shall constitute a bar to their reappointment or an extension of their terms in FACTS:
the Commission except for current Commissioners who have served less than Petitioners seek that EO 191 (deactivation of EEIB) and EO 223 (all EEIB
two (2) years of their terms of office who may be appointed by the President personnel are separated from office) unconstitutional.
for a maximum term of two (2) years.”  1987 - Cory issued EO 127 creating the EEIB which gives it the
Petitioners argue that their removal from office by virtue of section 8 following tasks:
of RA 8551 violates their security of tenure.
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 o Receive, gather and evaluate intelligence reports and information o Same, sec 62 – Offices can be abolished only by law or by the
and evidence on the nature, modes and extent of illegal activities president
affecting the national economy, such as, but not limited to, o PD 1772 [order by marcos that was not repealed(considered
economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, and dollar-salting, active)] – allows the president to reorganize national
investigate the same and aid in the prosecution of cases; government
o Coordinate with external agencies in monitoring the financial and o RA 8745sec 77 (GAA 1999) (this is the most important)– used
economic activities of persons or entities, whether domestic or by respondent states that Unless otherwise provided by law
foreign, which may adversely affect national financial interest with or directed by the President of the Philippines, no changes in
the goal of regulating, controlling or preventing said activities; key positions or organizational units in any department or
o Provide all intelligence units of operating Bureaus or Offices under agency shall be authorized in their respective organizational
the Ministry with the general framework and guidelines in the structures and funded from appropriations provided by this
conduct of intelligence and investigating works; Act.
o Supervise, monitor and coordinate all the intelligence and  (2)Yes: petitioners say the reorganization was done in bad faith
investigation operations of the operating Bureaus and Offices because it was only done to make way for task force aduana. This is
under the Ministry; not the accurate.
o Investigate, hear and file, upon clearance by the Minister, anti- o RA 6656 gives the evidences for bad faith in removal from civil
graft and corruption cases against personnel of the Ministry and service
its constituents units;  there was increase in positions in an office
o Perform such other appropriate functions as may be assigned by  a similar office was created
the Minister or his deputies.  replacements by less qualified candidates were made
 1989 – cory issued Memorandum order 225 declaring that all  same functions as the abolished office was given to a
smuggling cases outside the sol jurisdiction of the BOC fall within new office
EEIB;  violated orders of suspension
 2000 – Erap issued EO191 with the reason that most of the EEIB’s o Task force Aduana was created for effieciency
functions are done by other bureaus and agencies. He transferred the  It hired no new employees since it employs only
functions of EEIB to BOC and NBI intelligence member s of the AFP and intelligence
 Erap also issued EO196 which is the presidential anti-smuggling task officers of other bureaus.
force ADUANA  Budget for Aduana is significantly lower (50M) as
 EO223 was issued opposed to EIIB (200M)
 It has more powers specifically that of search, seizure
and arrest as well as investigation of ill-gotten wealth
ISSUES: Wherefore the petition is denied EO 191 and 223 are VALID.
1. Whether or not the president can reorganize the executive department
2. Whether or not the reorganization was valid
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
RULING:
 (1) Yes. It is argued that the power to create and abolish government 315. FRANCISCO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
offices lies in the constitution, the legislature and the authority of law. G.R. No. 160261, 10 NOVEMBER 2003
However, multiple laws allow the president to reorganize the executive
department. FACTS:
o Firstly, reorganization was defined by EO 292 sec 31 (admin On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a
code of 1987) which is the power of the president to reduce, Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which
consolidate and abolish offices in the executive department directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of
o RA 7695 sec 48 (GAA 1993) – heads of bureaus can identify legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief
offices that can be scaled down, phased out or abolished Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On
June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment
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complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion
Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do
public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that
Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and
Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee. The House Committee (2) those which "are not truly political questions." Truly political questions are
on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation
"sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article
being insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee Report to this effect VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political
has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said in nature.
Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and three weeks
since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, 316. MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ v. THE HOUSE OF
a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second REPRESENTATIVES
impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by G.R. No. 193459 February 15, 2011
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of FACTS:
the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This On July 22, 2010, private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, et
second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of al. (Baraquel group) filed an impeachment complaint against petitioner based
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the on betrayal of public trust and culpable violation of the Constitution. On August
Members of the House of Representatives. 3, 2010, private respondents Renato Reyes, Jr., et al. filed the second
complaint based on the same offense. On August 11, 2010 at 4:47 p.m., during
ISSUES: its plenary session, the House of Representatives simultaneously referred
1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint both complaints to public respondent. On September 13, 2010, petitioner filed
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court seeking to
falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution. enjoin the Committee on Justice from proceeding with the impeachment
2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has resulted proceedings. The petition prayed for a temporary restraining order. The
in a political crisis. petitioner invoked the Court’s expanded certiorari jurisdiction to "determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
RULING: or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing Government. The public respondent contended that the petition is premature
of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, and not yet ripe for adjudication since petitioner has at her disposal a plain,
the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI speedy and adequate remedy in the course of the proceedings before public
becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the respondent. Public respondent argues that when petitioner filed the present
foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a petition on September 13, 2010, it had not gone beyond the determination of
one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, of form and substance of the two complaints. Hence, certiorari is unavailing.
considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former The following day or on September 14, 2010, the Court En Banc RESOLVED
President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven to direct the issuance of a status quo ante order suspending the impeachment
associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House proceedings against petitioner. Section 3(1) The House of Representatives
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment. 3(5) No
filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more
against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional than once within a period of one year.
prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same
impeachable officer within a one-year period. ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not petition is premature and not yet ripe for adjudication.
2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 (2) Whether or not the simultaneous complaints violate the one-year bar rule.
Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it
is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this RULING:
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 (First issue) The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public venue of an action for quo warranto, when commenced by the Solicitor
respondent two impeachment complaints presents a novel situation to invoke General, is either the Regional Trial Court in the City of Manila, in the Court of
judicial power. Petitioner cannot thus be considered to have acted Appeals, or in the Supreme Court. While the hierarchy of courts serves as a
prematurely when she took the cue from the constitutional limitation that only general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary
one impeachment proceeding should be initiated against an impeachable writs, a direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue
officer within a period of one year. such writs is allowed when there are special and important reasons therefor,
(Second issue) Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution clearly and specifically set out in the petition.In the instant case, direct resort
reads: “No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same to the Court is justified considering that the action for quo warranto questions
official more than once within a period of one year.” However, the term “initiate” the qualification of no less than a Member of the Court. The issue of whether
means to file the complaint and take initial action on it. The initiation starts with a person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office
the filing of the complaint which must be accompanied with an action to set the is a matter of public concern over which the government takes special interest
complaint moving. It refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled as it obviously cannot allow an intruder or impostor to occupy a public position.
with Congress’ taking initial action of said complaint. The initial action taken Quo warranto v. Impeachment
by the House on the complaint is the referral of the complaint to the Committee While both impeachment and quo warranto may result in the ouster of
on Justice. the public official, the two proceedings materially differ. At its most basic,
Petition is DISMISSED. impeachment proceedings are political in nature, while an action for quo
warranto is judicial or a proceeding traditionally lodged in the courts.
Impeachment is a proceeding exercised by the legislative, as
317. REPUBLIC v. SERENO representatives of the sovereign, to vindicate the breach of the trust reposed
G.R. No. 237428 by the people in the hands of the public officer by determining the public
officer's fitness to stay in the office. Meanwhile, an action for quo warranto,
Facts: involves a judicial determination of the eligibility or validity of the election or
The petition challenges respondent's right and title to the position of appointment of a public official based on predetermined rules.
Chief Justice. The Republic avers that respondent unlawfully holds her office Aside from the difference in their origin and nature, quo warranto and
because in failing to regularly declare her assets, liabilities and net worth as a impeachment may proceed independently of each other as these remedies
member of the career service prior to her appointment as an Associate Justice, are distinct as to (1) jurisdiction (2) grounds, (3) applicable rules pertaining to
and later as Chief Justice, of the Court, she cannot be said to possess the initiation, filing and dismissal, and (4) limitations.
requirement of proven integrity demanded of every aspiring member of the Impeachment proceeding v. impeachment case
Judiciary. The Republic thus prays that respondent's appointment as Chief As correctly cited by Respondent, “Impeachment proceeding" is
Justice be declared void. Respondent counters that, as an impeachable different from the "impeachment case". The former refers to the filing of the
officer, she may only be removed through impeachment by the Senate sitting complaint before the Committee on Justice while the latter refers to the
as an impeachment court. proceedings before the Senate. The difference bolsters the conclusion that
there can be no forum shopping. Indeed, the "impeachment proceeding"
ISSUE NO. 1 before the House Committee on Justice is not the "impeachment case" proper.
Whether or not the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due The impeachment case is yet to be initiated by the filing of the Articles of
course to the instant petition for quo warranto against respondent who Impeachment before the Senate. Thus, at the moment, there is no pending
is an impeachable officer and against whom an impeachment complaint impeachment case against the respondent.
has already been filed with the House of Representatives. Impeachment is not an exclusive
remedy by which an invalidly
RULING: appointed or invalidly elected
Yes. Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, in part, provides that the impeachable official may be removed
Supreme Court shall exercise original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, from office
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. This Court, the Even the PET Rules expressly provide for the remedy of either an
Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to election protest or a petition for quo warranto to question the eligibility of the
issue the extraordinary writs, including quo warranto. President and the Vice- President, both of whom are impeachable officers.
Relatedly, Section 7, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides that the Following respondent's theory that an impeachable officer can be removed
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only through impeachment means that a President or Vice President against when, for instance, he or she has been determined to be of foreign nationality
whom an election protest has been filed can demand for the dismissal of the or, in offices where Bar membership is a qualification, when he or she
protest on the ground that it can potentially cause his/her removal from office fraudulently represented to be a member of the Bar. Unless such an officer
through a mode other than by impeachment. To sustain respondent's position commits any of the grounds for impeachment and is actually impeached, he
is to render election protests under the PET Rules nugatory. The Constitution can continue discharging the functions of his office even when he is clearly
could not have intended such absurdity since fraud and irregularities in disqualified from holding it. Such would result in permitting unqualified and
elections cannot be countenanced, and the will of the people as reflected in ineligible public officials to continue occupying key positions, exercising
their votes must be determined and respected. The Court could not, therefore, sensitive sovereign functions until they are successfully removed from office
have unwittingly curtailed its own judicial power by prohibiting quo warranto through impeachment. This could not have been the intent of the framers of
proceedings against impeachable officers. Further, the PET Rules provide that the Constitution.
a petition for quo warranto, contesting the election of the President or Vice- We must always put in mind that public office is a public trust. Thus,
President on the ground of ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic of the the people have the right to have only qualified individuals appointed to public·
Philippines, may be filed by any registered voter who has voted in the election office. To construe Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution as proscribing a quo
concerned within ten (10) days after the proclamation of the winner. 161 warranto petition is to deprive the State of a remedy to correct a "public wrong"
Despite disloyalty to the Republic being a crime against public order162 arising from defective or void appointments. Equity will not suffer a wrong to
defined and penalized under the penal code, and thus may likewise be treated be without remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium. Where there is a right, there must be
as "other high crimes,"163 constituting an impeachable offense, quo warranto a remedy.
as a remedy to remove the erring President or Vice-President is nevertheless For the guidance of the bench and the bar, and to obliviate confusion
made expressly available. in the future as to when quo warranto as a remedy to oust an ineligible public
Furthermore, the language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution official may be availed of, and in keeping with the Court's function of
does not foreclose a quo warranto action against impeachable officers. The harmonizing the laws and the rules with the Constitution, the Court herein
provision reads: Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of demarcates that an act or omission committed prior to or at the time of
the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the appointment or election relating to an official's qualifications to hold office as
Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction to render such appointment or election invalid is properly the subject of a quo
of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, warranto petition, provided that the requisites for the commencement thereof
other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and are present. Contrariwise, acts or omissions, even if it relates to the
employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by qualification of integrity, being a continuing requirement but nonetheless
impeachment. (Emphasis ours) committed during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected
It is a settled rule of legal hermeneutics that if the language under official, cannot be the subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of something
consideration is plain, it is neither necessary nor permissible to resort to else, which may either be impeachment if the public official concerned is
extrinsic aids, like the records of the constitutional convention, for its impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an impeachable offense, or
interpretation. 165 The provision uses the permissive term "may" which, in disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.
statutory construction, denotes discretion and cannot be construed as having
a mandatory effect. 166 We have consistently held that the term "may" is ISSUE NO. 2
indicative of a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option. The grantee of that Whether the one-year limitation is equally applicable when the
opportunity is vested with a right or faculty which he has the option to exercise. petitioner is not a mere private individual pursuing a private interest, but
167 An option to remove by impeachment admits of an alternative mode of the government itself seeking relief for a public wrong and suing for
effecting the removal. public interest.
To subscribe to the view that appointments or election of impeachable
officers are outside judicial review is to cleanse their appointments or election RULING:
of any possible defect pertaining to the Constitutionally-prescribed No. Prescription does not lie against the State.
qualifications which cannot otherwise be raised in an impeachment Reference must necessarily be had to Section 2, Rule 66 which makes
proceeding. it compulsory for the Solicitor General to commence a quo warranto action:
The courts should be able to inquire into the validity of appointments SEC. 2. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor must commence action.
even of impeachable officers. To hold otherwise is to allow an absurd situation - The Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, when directed by the President
where the appointment of an impeachable officer cannot be questioned even of the Philippines, or when upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason
307
to believe that any case specified in the preceding section can be established officials and employees. It disregards the requirement of transparency as a
by proof must commence such action. (Emphasis supplied) deterrent to graft and corruption. For these reasons, a public official who has
In other words, when the Solicitor General himself commences the failed to comply with the requirement of filing the SALN cannot be said to be
quo warranto action either (1) upon the President's directive, (2) upon of proven integrity and the Court may consider him/her disqualified from
complaint or (3) when the Solicitor General has good reason to believe that holding public office.
there is proof that (a) a person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or The requirement to file a SALN is not a trivial or a formal requirement.
exercises· a public office, position or franchise; (b) a public officer does or Neither is it something over which public officials can exercise discretion. It is
suffers an act which is a ground for the forfeiture of his office; or ( c) an mandated by Our Constitution and laws. It is meant to forge transparency and
association acts as a corporation without being legally incorporated or without accountability in the government and as a measure meant to curb corruption.
lawful authority so to act, he does so in the discharge of his task and mandate Members of the Judiciary are bound by the qualifications of honesty,
to see to it that the best interest of the public and the government are upheld. probity, competence, and integrity. In ascertaining whether a candidate
In these three instances, the Solicitor General is mandated under the Rules to possesses such qualifications, the JBC in the exercise of its Constitutional
commence the necessary quo warranto petition. mandate, set certain requirements which should be complied with by the
Indeed, when the government is the real party in interest, and is candidates to be able to qualify. These requirements are announced and
proceeding mainly to assert its rights, there can be no defense on the ground published to notify not only the applicants but the public as well. Changes to
of laches or prescription.208 Indubitably, the basic principle that "prescription such set of requirements, as agreed upon by the JBC En Banc through a
does not lie against the State" which finds textual basis under Article 1108 proper deliberation, such as in this case when the JBC decided to allow
(4)209 of the Civil Code, applies in this case. substantial compliance with the SALN submission requirement, should also be
That prescription does not lie in this case can also be deduced from announced and published for the same purpose of apprising the candidates
the very purpose of an action for quo warranto. People v. City Whittier,210 and the public of such changes. At any rate, if a candidate is appointed despite
explains that the remedy of quo warranto is intended to prevent a continuing being unable to comply with the requirements of the JBC and despite the lack
exercise of an authority unlawfully asserted. Indeed, on point is People v. of the aforementioned qualifications at the time of application, the appointment
Bailey,211 when it ruled that because quo warranto serves to end a continuous may be the subject of a quo warranto provided it is filed within one year from
usurpation, no statute of limitations applies to the action. Needless to say, no the appointment or discovery of the defect.Only the Solicitor General may
prudent and just court would allow an unqualified person to hold public office, institute the quo warranto petition.
much more the highest position in the Judiciary. The willful non-filing of a SALN is an indication of dishonesty, lack of
ISSUE NO. 3 probity and lack of integrity. Moreso if the non-filing is repeated in complete
Whether or not the failure to comply with the SALN requirement disregard of the mandatory requirements of the Constitution and the law.
reflects on a person’s integrity Consistent with the SALN laws, however, SALNs filed need not be
retained after more than ten years by the receiving office or custodian or
RULING: repository unless these are the subject of investigation pursuant to the law.
Yes. To recapitulate, Section 7, Article VIII of the Constitution requires that a Thus, to be in keeping with the spirit of the law requiring public officers
member of the Judiciary must be of proven integrity. To be of proven integrity to file SALNs - to manifest transparency and accountability in public office - if
means that the applicant must have established a steadfast adherence to public officers cannot produce their SALNs from their personal files, they must
moral and ethical principles. The necessity of having integrity among the obtain a certification from the office where they filed and/or the custodian or
members of the judiciary is clearly discussed in the Commentary on the repository thereof to attest to the fact of filing. In the event that said offices
Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct certify that the SALN was indeed filed but could not be located, said offices
Integrity is the attribute of rectitude and righteousness. The must certify the valid and legal reason of their non availability, such as by
components of integrity are honesty and judicial morality. A judge should reason of destruction by natural calamity due to fire or earthquake, or by
always, not only in the discharge of official duties, act honourably and in a reason of the allowed destruction after ten years under Section 8 of R.A. No.
manner befitting the judicial office; be free from fraud, deceit and falsehood; 6713.
and be good and virtuous in behaviour and in character. There are no degrees In this case, it was found that respondent is ineligible to hold the Chief
of integrity as so defined. Integrity is absolute. In the judiciary, integrity is more Justice of the Supreme Court position for lack of integrity on account of her
than a virtue; it is a necessity. failure to file a substantial number of SALNs and also, her failure to submit the
Failure to file the SALN is clearly a violation of the law. The offense is required SALNs to the JBC during her application for the position. Again, one
penal in character and is a clear breach of the ethical standards set for public of the Constitutional duties of a public officer is to submit a declaration under
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oath of his or her assets, liabilities, and net worth upon assumption of office Whether CES eligibility is required for the subordinates of the Office of the
and as often thereafter as may be required by law. 335 When the Constitution Ombudsman
and the law exact obedience, public officers must comply and not offer RULING:
excuses. When a public officer is unable or unwilling to comply, he or she must CES eligibility not required. CSC is ordered to approve the
not assume office in the first place, or if already holding one, he or she must amendment of qualification.
vacate that public office because it is the correct and honorable thing to do. A Under EO 292 (The Administrative Code of 1987), the CES covers
public officer who ignores, trivializes or disrespects Constitutional and legal presidential appointees only. Under the Constitution, the Ombudsman is
provisions, as well as the canons of ethical standards, forfeits his or her right the appointing authority for all officials and employees of the Office of the
to hold and continue in that office. Ombudsman, except the Deputy Ombudsmen. Thus, a person occupying
the position of Director II in the Office of the Ombudsman is appointed by the
318. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION Ombudsman, not by the President. As such, he is neither embraced in the
G. R. No. 162215 July 30, 2007 CES nor does he need to possess CES eligibility.
To require CES eligibility for the positions of Director II in the Office of the
Ombudsman will lead to unconstitutional and unlawful consequences:
FACTS: 1. vesting the appointing power for said position in the President, in
One of the qualification standards for Director II positions under the violation of the Constitution
Office of the Ombudsman is Third Level (Career Executive Service, CES) 2. including in the CES a position not held by a presidential appointee,
eligibility. However, in the Supreme Court decision Inok vs. Civil Service contrary to the Administrative Code.
Commission, CES eligibility is only required in the Executive Branch. Under the Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is an independent
Ombudsman Marcelo then wrote to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) body. The appointing power of the Ombudsman is a guaranty of its
requesting the approval of the amendment of qualification standard for Director independence; it necessarily includes the power of setting, prescribing
II, from Third Level Eligibility to Second Level Eligibility. and administering the standards for the officials and personnel of the Office
The CSC issued Opinion No. 44, s. 2004 disapproving the request: (RA 6770, Ombudsman Act of 1989). To further ensure its independence, the
1. Nowhere does Inok exempt the Office of the Ombudsman or other Ombudsman has been vested with the power of administrative control and
constitutional agencies from the coverage of the Civil Service Law and supervision of the Office. This includes the authority to organize such
Rules. On the contrary, Inok declares that these bodies are covered directorates for administration and allied services as may be necessary.
by the civil service system. Necessarily, it also includes the authority to determine and establish the
2. To set aside the authority of the Commission to require third level qualifications, duties, functions and responsibilities of the various
eligibilities to said offices would be to nullify and strike down the very directorates.
core of the civil service, that is, the promotion of merit and fitness Qualification standards are used as guides in appointment and other
principle personnel actions, in determining training needs and as aid in the inspection
The Office of the Ombudsman, claiming that its constitutional and statutory and audit of the personnel work programs. They are intimately connected to
powers were unduly curtailed, now seeks to set aside and nullify the CSC the power to appoint as well as to the power of administrative supervision.
Opinion via this petition for certiorari: Thus, as a corollary to the Ombudsman’s appointing and supervisory powers,
1. Its specific, exclusive and discretionary constitutional and statutory he possesses the authority to establish reasonable qualification
power as an independent constitutional body to administer and standards for the personnel of the Office of the Ombudsman.
supervise its own officials and personnel, including the authority to The Administrative Code vests the establishment, administration and
administer competitive examinations and prescribe reasonable maintenance of qualification standards in the department or agency, with
qualification standards for its own officials, cannot be curtailed by the the assistance and approval of the Civil Service Commission and in
general power of the CSC to administer the civil service system consultation with the Wage and Position Classification Office.
2. Any unwarranted and unreasonable restriction on its discretionary The role of the CSC is limited to assisting the department or agency with
authority, such as what the CSC did when it issued Opinion No. 44, s. respect to these qualification standards and approving them. The CSC
2004, is constitutionally and legally infirm. cannot substitute its own standards for those of the department or agency,
especially in a case like this in which an independent constitutional body is
ISSUE; involved.

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 319. EMILIO GONZALES v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT Committee (IIRC). It was tasked to determine accountability for the incident
G.R. No. 196231 February 26, 2014 through the conduct of public hearings and executive sessions.
The IIRC found Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and
These two petitions have been because they raise a common thread inexcusable negligence and gross violation of their own rules of procedure by
of issues relating to the President's exercise of the power to remove from office allowing Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to languish for more than nine
herein petitioners who claim the protective cloak of independence of the (9) months without any justification, in violation of the Ombudsman prescribed
constitutionally-created office to which they belong – the Office of the rules to resolve motions for reconsideration in administrative disciplinary cases
Ombudsman. within five (5) days from submission.
The cases, G.R. No. 196231 and G.R. No. 196232 The inaction is gross, considering there is no opposition thereto. The
Primarily seeks to declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of Republic prolonged inaction precipitated the desperate resort to hostage-taking.
Act (R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, which Petitioner was dismissed from service. Hence the petition.
gives the President the power to dismiss a Deputy Ombudsman of the Office G.R. No. 196232:
of the Ombudsman. Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman
charged Major General Carlos F. Garcia, his wife Clarita D. Garcia, their sons
FACTS: Ian Carl Garcia, Juan Paulo Garcia and Timothy Mark Garcia and several
A formal charge for Grave Misconduct (robbery, grave threats, robbery unknown persons with Plunder and Money Laundering before the
extortion and physical injuries) was filed before PNP-NCR against Manila Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan denied Major General Garcia’s urgent
Police District Senior Inspector (P/S Insp.) Rolando Mendoza and four others. petition for bail holding that strong prosecution evidence militated against the
Private complainant, Christian M.Kalaw, before the Office of the City grant of bail. However, the government, represented by petitioner, Special
Prosecutor, filed a similar charge. While said cases were still pending, the Prosecutor Barreras-Sulitand sought the Sandiganbayan's approval of a Plea
Office of the Regional Director of the National Police Commission (NPC) Bargaining Agreement ("PLEBARA") entered into with the accused. The
turned over, upon the request of petitioner Gonzales III, all relevant documents Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding the change of plea warranted and
and evidence in relation to said case to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman the PLEBARA compliant with jurisprudential guidelines.
for appropriate administrative adjudication. Subsequently a case for Grave Outraged by the backroom deal that could allow Major General Garcia
Misconduct was lodged against P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow to get off the hook with nothing but a slap on the hand notwithstanding the
police officers in the Office of the Ombudsman. prosecution's apparently strong evidence of his culpability for serious public
Meanwhile, the case filed before the Office of the city Prosecutor was offenses, the House of Representatives ‘Committee on Justice conducted
dismissed upon a finding that the material allegations made by the public hearings on the PLEBARA. At the conclusion of these public hearings,
complainant had not been substantiated "by any evidence at all to warrant the the Committee on Justice passed and adopted Committee Resolution No.
indictment of respondents of the offenses charged." Similarly, the Internal 3,recommending to the President the dismissal of petitioner Barreras-Sulit
Affairs Service of the PNP issued a Resolution recommending the dismissal from the service and the filing of appropriate charges against her Deputies and
without prejudice of the administrative case against the same police officers, Assistants before the appropriate government office for having committed acts
for failure of the complainant to appear in three (3) consecutive hearings and/or omissions tantamount to culpable violations of the Constitution and
despite due notice. However, upon the recommendation of petitioner Gonzales betrayal of public trust, which are violations under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
III, a Decision finding P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers Practices Act and grounds for removal from office under the Ombudsman Act.
guilty of Grave Misconduct was approved by the Ombudsman. Mendoza and Hence the petition.
his colleagues filed for a motion for reconsideration which was forwarded to ISSUE:
Ombudsman Gutierrez for final approval, in whose office it remained pending Whether the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise
for final review and action when P/S Insp.Mendoza hijacked a bus-load of administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy
foreign tourists on that fateful day of August 23, 2010 in desperate attempt to Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally-
have him reinstated in the police service. In the aftermath of the hostage-taking created Office of the Ombudsman.
incident, which ended in the tragic murder of eight Hong Kong Chinese
nationals, the injury of seven others and the death of P/S Insp. Rolando? RULING:
Mendoza, a public outcry against the blundering of government Yes. The Ombudsman's administrative disciplinary power over a
officials prompted the creation of the Incident Investigation and Review Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor is not exclusive.

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 While the Ombudsman's authority to discipline administratively is over the Deputy Ombudsman for the military and other law enforcement
extensive and covers all government officials, whether appointive or elective, offices.
with the exception only of those officials removable by impeachment such Granting the President the Power to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman
authority is by no means exclusive. Petitioners cannot insist that they should does not Diminish the Independence of the Office of the
be solely and directly subject to the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman. Ombudsman. he claim that Section 8(2) of R.A. No.6770 granting the
For, while Section 21 of R.A. 6770 declares the Ombudsman’s disciplinary President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman from office totally
authority over all government officials, Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants frustrates, if not resultantly negates the independence of the Office of the
the President express power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Ombudsman is tenuous. The independence which the Office of the
Special Prosecutor. A harmonious construction of these two apparently Ombudsman is vested with was intended to free it from political considerations
conflicting provisions in R.A. No.6770 leads to the inevitable conclusion that in pursuing its constitutional mandate to be a protector of the people. What the
Congress had intended the Ombudsman and the President to exercise Constitution secures for the Office of the Ombudsman is, essentially, political
concurrent disciplinary jurisdiction over petitioners as Deputy Ombudsman independence. This means nothing more than that "the terms of office, the
and Special Prosecutor, respectively. Indubitably, the manifest intent of salary, the appointments and discipline of all persons under the office" are
Congress in enacting both provisions - Section 8(2) and Section 21 - in the "reasonably insulated from the whims of politicians."
same Organic Act was to provide for an external authority, through the person Petitioner Gonzales may not be removed from office where the
of the President, that would exercise the power of administrative discipline over questioned acts, falling short of constitutional standards, do not constitute
the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without in the least betrayal of public trust. Petitioner's act of directing the PNP-IAS to endorse
diminishing the constitutional and plenary authority of the Ombudsman over P/S Insp. Mendoza's case to the Ombudsman without citing any reason
all government officials and employees. Such legislative design is simply a therefor cannot, by itself, is considered a manifestation of his undue interest in
measure of "check and balance" intended to address the lawmakers' real and the case that would amount to wrongful or unlawful conduct. After all, taking
valid concern that the Ombudsman and his Deputy may try to protect one cognizance of cases upon the request of concerned agencies or private parties
another from administrative liabilities. is part and parcel of the constitutional mandate of the Office of the
By granting express statutory power to the President to remove a Ombudsman to be the "champion of the people. “The factual circumstances
Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, Congress merely filled an that the case was turned over to the Office of the Ombudsman upon
obvious gap in the law. While the removal of the Ombudsman himself is also petitioner’s request; that administrative liability was pronounced against P/S
expressly provided for in the Constitution, which is by impeachment under Insp. Mendoza even without the private complainant verifying the truth of his
Section 2 of the same Article, there is, however, no constitutional provision statements; that the decision was immediately implemented; or that the motion
similarly dealing with the removal from office of a Deputy Ombudsman, or a for reconsideration thereof remained pending for more than nine months
Special Prosecutor, for that matter. By enacting Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770, cannot be simply taken as evidence of petitioner's undue interest in the case
Congress simply filled a gap in the law without running afoul of any provision considering the lack of evidence of any personal grudge, social ties or
in the Constitution or existing statutes. In fact, the Constitution itself, under business affiliation with any of the parties to the case that could have impelled
Section 2, authorizes Congress to provide for the removal of all other public him to act as he did. There was likewise no evidence at all of any bribery that
officers, including the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, who are took place, or of any corrupt intention or questionable motivation. The OP's
not subject to impeachment. pronouncement of administrative accountability against petitioner and the
The Power of the President to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman and imposition upon him of the corresponding penalty of dismissal must be
Special Prosecutors Implied from his Power to Appoint. In giving the President reversed and set aside, as the findings of neglect of duty or misconduct in
the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, Congress office do not amount to a betrayal of public trust. Hence, the President, while
simply laid down in express terms an authority that is already implied from the he may be vested with authority, cannot order the removal of petitioner as
President's constitutional authority to appoint the aforesaid officials in the Deputy Ombudsman, there being no intentional wrongdoing of the grave and
Office of the Ombudsman. The integrity and effectiveness of the Deputy serious kind amounting to a betrayal of public trust.
Ombudsman for the MOLEO as a military watchdog looking into abuses and
irregularities that affect the general morale and professionalism in the military The Office of the President is vested with statutory authority to
is certainly of primordial importance in relation to the President's own role as proceed administratively against petitioner Barreras-Sulit to determine the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. It would not be incongruous for existence of any of the grounds for her removal from office as provided for
Congress, therefore, to grant the President concurrent disciplinary authority under the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act.

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 social security providers and other government
X. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW instrumentalities; and
b) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent
POWER OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic
services.
320. BLAS OPLE v. RUBEN TORRES
293 SCRA 141 It is debatable whether these interests are compelling enough
to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not arguable is
FACTS: the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308
A.O. No. 308, or the ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED which if implemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear and
IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM, was issued by President Fidel V. present danger.
Ramos on December 12, 1996.
On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against (2) Yes. As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents
respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the raise the threshold issues relating to the standing to sue of the
government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating petitioner and the justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically,
Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, respondents aver that petitioner has no legal interest to uphold and
1997, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation. that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be
The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas promulgated.
F. Ople to prevent the shrinking of the right to privacy, which the revered Mr. These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear.
Justice Brandeis considered as "the most comprehensive of rights and the Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate. As a
right most valued by civilized men." Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit
Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of
entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference legislative power. As taxpayer and member of the Government
System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz: Service Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the
(1) it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate; and legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS
(2) it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of funds to implement A.O. No. 308.
privacy. We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and
by the petitioner need stronger barriers against further erosion. Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National
ISSUE: Computerized Identification Reference System" DECLARED null and
(1) WON the establishment of AO No 308 by the President is void for being unconstitutional.
unconstitutional as it is a usurpation of the legislative powers of
the Congress? 321. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COURT OF APPEALS
(2) WON the case calls for judicial review? In corollary, does G.R. No. 118712 October 6, 1995
petitioner have locus standing on the case?
FACTS:
RULING: The nature of the case is the consolidation of two separate petitions
(1) Yes. Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise for review filed by Department of Agrarian Reform and Land Bank of the
that the right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Philippines, assailing the Court of Appeal’s decision, which granted private
respondents' petition for Certiorari and Mandamus.
Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O.
No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is Pedro Yap, Heirs of Emiliano Santiago, Agricultural Management and
narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations: Development Corporation or AMADCOR (private respondents) are
landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR and subjected to
a) the need to provide our citizens and foreigners with the transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian
facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and Reform Law (RA 6657). Aggrieved by the alleged lapses of the DAR and the
Landbank with respect to the valuation and payment of compensation for their

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land, private respondents filed with the Supreme Court a petition questioning made in any other form. There is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to
the validity of DAR Administrative Order No. 6 (1992) and No. 9 (1990), and warrant an expanded construction of the term "deposit". The conclusive effect
sought to compel the DAR to expedite the pending summary administrative of administrative construction is not absolute. Action of an administrative
proceedings to finally determine the just compensation of their properties, and agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an
the Landbank to deposit in cash and bonds the amounts respectively error of law, a grave abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
"earmarked", "reserved" and "deposited in trust accounts" for private discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative
respondents, and to allow them to withdraw the same. The Supreme Court enactment.
referred the petition to CA for proper determination and disposition. The CA The function of promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately
found the following facts undisputed: exercised only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into effect.
Respondents argued that Admin. Order No. 9 (1990) was issued in The power of administrative agencies is thus confined to implementing the law
grave abuse of discretion amounting excess in jurisdiction because it permits or putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that administrative regulations cannot
the opening of trust accounts by the Landbank, in lieu of depositing in cash or extend the law and amend a legislative enactment, forsettled is the rule that
bonds in an accessible bank designated by the DAR, the compensation for the administrative regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law.
land before it is taken and the titles are cancelled as provided under Section And in case there is a discrepancy between the basic law and an implementing
16(e) of RA 6657. DAR and the Landbank merely "earmarked", "deposited in rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails.
trust" or"reserved" the compensation in their names as landowners despite the
clear mandate that before taking possession of the property, the compensation
must be deposited in cash or inbonds. On the other hand, petitioner DAR 2. YES. To withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate the
contended that Admin Order No. 9 is a valid exercise of its rule-making power amounts already deposited in their behalf as compensation for their properties
pursuant to Section 49 of RA 6657. simply because they rejected the DAR's valuation (P 1,455,207.31 Pedro L.
The issuance of the "Certificate of Deposit" by the Landbank was a Yap/ P 135,482.12 Heirs of Emiliano Santiago/ P 15,914,127.77 AMADCOR),
substantial compliance with Section 16(e) of RA 6657. Landbank averred that and notwithstanding that they have already been deprived of the possession
the issuance of the Certificates of Deposits is in consonance with Circular Nos. and use of such properties, is an oppressive exercise of eminent domain. It is
29, 29-A and 54 of the Land Registration Authority where the unnecessary to distinguish between provisional compensation under Section
words"reserved/deposited" were also used. 16(e) and final compensation under Section 18 for purposes of exercising the
landowners' right to appropriate the same. The immediate effect in both
ISSUES: situations is the same; the landowner is deprived of the use and possession of
1. Whether or not the CA erred in declaring as null and void DAR Admin his property for which he should be fairly and immediately compensated.
Order No. 9 (1990) insofar as it provides for the opening of trust Wherefore, petition is denied for lack of merit. Appealed decision is affirmed.
accounts in lieu of deposit in cash or in bonds
2. Whether or not the CA erred in holding that private respondents are 322. LEO ECHEGARAY v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL.,
entitled as a matter of right to the immediate and provisional release G.R. No. 132601 January 19, 1999
of the amounts deposited in trust pending the final resolution of the
cases it has filed for just compensation.
DOCTRINE:
RULING:
1. NO. Section 16 (e) of RA 6657 provides:
Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. (e) Upon receipt by the Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution is simply the source of power
landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no of the President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines
response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. It also provides the authority
designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in for the President to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the
accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land members of the Congress. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as
and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a TCT in the name of denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after
the Republic of the Philippines. their finality
It is explicit that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP
bonds". Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be FACTS:
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 Petitioner filed his Very Urgent Motion for Issuance of TRO on and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. He shall also
December 28, 1998 at about 11:30 p.m. When the Very Urgent Motion was have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the
filed, the Court was already in its traditional recess and would only resume members of the Congress.
session on January 18, 1999. Even then, Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr.
called the Court to a Special Session on January 4, 1991 at 10. a.m. to ISSUE:
deliberate on petitioner's Very Urgent Motion. Whether or not the Supreme Court has acted beyond its
jurisdiction by granting the TRO.
The Court hardly had five (5) hours to resolve petitioner's motion as
he was due to be executed at 3 p.m. Thus, the Court had the difficult problem RULING:
of resolving whether petitioner's allegations about the moves in Congress to No. The text and tone of this provision will not yield to the
repeal or amend the Death Penalty Law are mere speculations or not. interpretation suggested by the public respondents. The provision is simply the
source of power of the President to grant reprieves, commutations, and
To the Court's majority, there were good reasons why the Court should pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. It
not immediately dismiss petitioner's allegations as mere speculations and also provides the authority for the President to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress. The provision,
surmises. They noted that petitioner's allegations were made in a pleading
however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the
under oath and were widely publicized in the print and broadcast media. It was
enforcement of their decisions after their finality.
also of judicial notice that the 11th Congress is a new Congress and has no
In truth, an accused who has been convicted by final judgment still
less than one hundred thirty (130) new members whose views on capital
punishment are still unexpressed The present Congress is therefore different possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate
from the Congress that enacted the Death Penalty Law (R.A. No. 7659) and courts. For instance, a death convict who become insane after his final
conviction cannot be executed while in a state of insanity. As observed by
the Lethal Injection Law (R.A. No. 8177). Given these constraints, the Court's
Antieau, "today, it is generally assumed that due process of law will prevent
majority did not rush to judgment but took an extremely cautious stance by
the government from executing the death sentence upon a person who is
temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner. The suspension was
temporary — "until June 15, 1999, coeval with the constitutional duration of insane at the time of execution."
the present regular session of Congress, unless it sooner becomes certain that The suspension of such a death sentence is undisputably an exercise
of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve
no repeal or modification of the law is going to be made." The extreme caution
though its effects is the same — the temporary suspension of the execution of
taken by the Court was compelled, among others, by the fear that any error of
the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at
the Court in not stopping the execution of the petitioner will preclude any
any time amend R.A. No. 7659 by reducing the penalty of death to life
further relief for all rights stop at the graveyard.
imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like that of commutation of
sentence. But by no stretch of the imagination can the exercise by Congress
As life was at, stake, the Court refused to constitutionalize haste and of its plenary power to amend laws be considered as a violation of the power
the hysteria of some partisans. The Court's majority felt it needed the certainty of the President to commute final sentences of conviction.
that the legislature will not petitioner as alleged by his counsel. It was believed The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save
that law and equitable considerations demand no less before allowing the the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that
State to take the life of one its citizens. there is no higher right than the right to life

Public respondents' are contending that the "decision in this case 323. TAŇADA VS. TUVERA
having become final and executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit of G.R. No. L-63915 146 SCRA 446, April 24, 1985
authority of the executive department. By granting the TRO, the Honorable
Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function." 14 Public Petitioner seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public
respondents cite as their authority for this proposition, Section 19, Article VII officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of
of the Constitution which reads: various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation and administrative
Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this orders. Petitioners invoked the right of the people to be informed on matters of
Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, public concern as well as the principle that in order for laws to be valid and
314
enforceable, it must be published in the Official Gazette. Solicitor General bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class
representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must
that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition. invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to
Petitioners maintained that the petition is a publicright compelling the one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.
performance of a public duty. The legal capacity of a private citizen was All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
recognized by court to make the said petition for the reason that the right published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after
sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
less than the fundamental law of the land. Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before inform the public of the content of the law. Article 2 of the Civil Code provides
any law/statute becomes valid and that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not
Article 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not
publication in the Official Gazette even if the law itself provides for the date of called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds
its effectivity. This is to give the general public adequate notice of the various it impractical. The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as
laws, which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. The clause possible.
“otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement
of the publication itself. Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of
since its purpose is to inform. The provision in the Civil Code provides that skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious
publications of laws must be made in the Official Gazette. And not elsewhere, pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless
as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to
rule on the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify if it finds it impractical. The make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is
publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible. like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official is drawn.
Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances, which are of general
application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and 324. PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. v.
effect. TORRES
G.R. No. 101279 August 6, 1992
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April FACTS:
24, 1985. Respondent argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, As a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by
it was not so when it was “otherwise” as when the decrees themselves Filipino housemaids employed in Hong Kong, then DOLE Secretary Ruben
declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. Torres issued Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991, temporarily
suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of Filipino
ISSUES: domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. The DOLE itself, through the POEA
1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability took over the business of deploying such Hong Kong-bound workers. The
and laws which are not as to their publication; POEA Administrator also issued Memorandum Circular No. 37, Series of
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general 1991, on the processing of employment contracts of domestic workers for
circulation. Hong Kong.

RULING: PASEI filed a petition for prohibition to annul the aforementioned

The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of DOLE and POEA circulars and to prohibit their implementation on the grounds
effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any that DOLE and POEA acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of
event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars; that the assailed DOLE
the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair
previous publication. “Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of and oppressive; and that the requirements of publication and filing with the
general application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate to the people in general Office of the National Administrative Register were not complied with.
albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any
315
RULING: “All statutes, including those of local application and private
The second and first grounds are unmeritorious. Article 36 of the laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall
Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict and regulate begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is
recruitment and placement activities. It reads: “The Secretary of Labor shall fixed by the legislature.
have the power to restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement activities
of all agencies within the coverage of this title [Regulation of Recruitment and Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive
Placement Activities] and is hereby authorized to issue orders and promulgate orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative
rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or,
of this title.” On the other hand, the scope of the regulatory authority of the at present, directly conferred by the Constitution: Administrative rules
POEA, which was created by Executive Order No. 797 to take over the and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce
functions of the Overseas Employment Development Board, the National or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.
Seamen Board, and the overseas employment functions of the Bureau of
Employment Services, is broad and far-ranging for among the functions Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature,
inherited by the POEA from the defunct Bureau of Employment Services was that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and
the power and duty to establish and maintain a registration and/or licensing the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of
system to regulate private sector participation in the recruitment and the so-called letter of instructions issued by the administrative
placement of workers, locally and overseas; it assumed from the defunct superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
Overseas Employment Development Board the power and duty to recruit and subordinates in the performance of their duties.”
place workers for overseas employment of Filipino contract workers on a
government to government arrangement and in such other sectors as policy
may dictate; and from the National Seamen Board, the POEA took over to 325. PEOPLE VS MACEREN
regulate and supervise the activities of agents or representatives of shipping No. L-32166. October 18, 1977
companies in the hiring of seamen for overseas employment; and secure the
best possible terms of employment for contract seamen workers and secure DOCTRINE: A penal statute is strictly construed. While an administrative
compliance therewith. agency has the right to make rules and regulations to carry into effect a law
already enacted, that power should not be confused with the power to enact a
Said administrative issuances merely restricted the scope or area of criminal statute. An administrative agency can have only the administrative or
PASEI’s business operations by excluding therefrom recruitment and policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it.
deployment of domestic helpers for Hong Kong till after the establishment of
the “mechanisms” that will enhance the protection of Filipino domestic helpers FACTS: This is a case involving the validity of a 1967 regulation, penalizing
going to Hong Kong. In fine, other than the recruitment and deployment of electro fishing in fresh water fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary of
Filipino domestic helpers for Hong Kong, PASEI may still deploy other class of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under
Filipino workers either for Hong Kong and other countries and all other classes the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission.
of Filipino workers for other countries. Said administrative issuances, are
intended to curtail, if not to end, rampant violations of the rule against It was alleged in the complaint that the five accused resorted to electro fishing
excessive collections of placement and documentation fees, travel fees and in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz by “using their own motor
other charges committed by private employment agencies recruiting and banca, equipped with motor; with a generator colored green with attached
deploying domestic helpers to Hong Kong. They are reasonable, valid and dynamo colored gray or somewhat white; and electrocuting device locally
justified under the general welfare clause of the Constitution, since the known as ‘senso’ with a somewhat webbed copper wire on the tip or other end
recruitment and deployment business, as it is conducted today, is affected with of a bamboo pole with electric wire attachment which was attached to the
public interest. dynamo direct and with the use of these devices or equipments catches fish
thru electric current, which destroy any aquatic animals within its currect reach,
Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for to the detriment and prejudice of the populace” (Criminal Case No. 5429).
lack of power publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative
Register. As announced in Tañada vs. Tuvera, Upon motion of the accused, the municipal court quashed the complaint. The
prosecution appealed. The Court of First Instance of Laguna affirmed the order
316
of dismissal (Civil Case No. SC-36). The lower court held that electro fishing The rule is that the violation of a regulation prescribed by an executive officer
cannot be penalized because electric current is not an obnoxious or poisonous of the government in conformity with and based upon a statute authorizing
substance as contemplated in section 11 of the Fisheries Law and that it is not such regulation constitutes an offense and renders the offender liable to
a substance at all but a form of energy conducted or transmitted by punishment in accordance with the provisions of the law. In other words, a
substances. The lower court further held that, since the law does not clearly violation or infringement of a rule or regulation validly issued can constitute a
prohibit electro fishing, the executive and judicial departments cannot consider crime punishable as provided in the authorizing statute and by virtue of the
it unlawful. latter. It has been held that “to declare what shall constitute a crime and how
it shall be punished is a power vested exclusively in the legislature, and it may
It is noteworthy that the Fisheries Law does not expressly punish “electro not be delegated to any other body or agency”. In the instant case the
fishing.” Notwithstanding the silence of the law, the Secretary of Agriculture regulation penalizing electro fishing is not strictly in accordance with the
and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the Commissioner of Fisheries Law, under which the regulation was issued, because the law itself
Fisheries, promulgated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84 (62 O.G. 1224), does not expressly punish electro fishing.
prohibiting electro fishing in all Philippine waters.
A penal statute is strictly construed. While an administrative agency has the
ISSUE: Whether the administrative regulation penalizing electro fishing is right to make rules and regulations to carry into effect a law already enacted,
valid? that power should not be confused with the power to enact a criminal statute.
HELD: No. We are of the opinion that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural An administrative agency can have only the administrative or policing powers
Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it.
issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those
orders are not warranted under the Fisheries Commission, Republic Act No. 326. CORONA VS UNITED HARBOR PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF THE
3512. The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro PHILIPPINES
fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of G.R. No. 111953. December 12, 1997
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are
powerless to penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and DOCTRINE: As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental
84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis. Had the requirements of procedural due process, are essential only when an
lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial function. In the performance of
effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. Nowhere in its executive or legislative functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an
that law is electro fishing specifically punished. Administrative Order No. 84, in administrative body need not comply with the requirements of notice and
punishing electro fishing, does not contemplate that such an offense falls hearing.
within the category of “other violations” because, as already shown, the
penalty for electro fishing is the penalty next lower to the penalty for fishing FACTS: The PPA was created by virtue of PD No. 505. The PPA promulgated
with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substances, fixed in section 76, and is PPA-AO 03-85 2 on March 21, 1985, which embodied the “Rules and
not the same as the penalty for “other violations” of the law and regulations Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage
fixed in section 83 of the Fisheries Law. Fees in Philippine Ports.” These rules mandate, inter alia, that aspiring pilots
must be holders of pilot licenses and must train as probationary pilots in
Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular outports for three months and in the Port of Manila for four months. It is only
department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be after they have achieved satisfactory performance that they are given
for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such permanent and regular appointments by the PPA itself to exercise harbor
regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended. An administrative pilotage until they reach the age of 70, unless sooner removed by reason of
agency cannot amend an act of Congress.The rule-making power must be mental or physical unfitness by the PPA General Manager. Subsequently,
confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect then PPA General Manager Rogelio A. Dayan issued PPA-AO No. 04-92 7 on
the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending July 15, 1992. This was implemented by providing therein that “all existing
or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by regular appointments which have been previously issued either by the Bureau
the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. of Customs or the PPA shall remain valid up to 31 December 1992 only” and
that “all appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall,
henceforth, be only for a term of one (1) year from date of effectivity subject to
317
yearly renewal or cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid petitioners correctly argued that, there being no matters of naval defense
evaluation of performance.” involved in the issuance of the administrative order, the Philippine Coast Guard
need to be consulted.
Respondents United Harbor Pilots Association and the Manila Pilots
Association, through Capt. Alberto C. Compas, questioned PPA-AO No. 04- Neither does the fact that the pilots themselves were not consulted in any way
92 before the Department of Transportation and Communication, but they taint the validity of the administrative order. As a general rule, notice and
were informed by then DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia that “the matter of hearing, as the fundamental requirements of procedural due process, are
reviewing, recalling or annulling PPA’s administrative issuances lies essential only when an administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial
exclusively with its Board of Directors as its governing body.” Respondents function. In the performance of its executive or legislative functions, such as
reiterated their request for the suspension of the implementation of PPA-AO issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body need not comply with the
No. 04-92, but Secretary Garcia insisted on his position that the matter was requirements of notice and hearing.
within the jurisdiction of the Board of Directors of the PPA. Compas appealed
this ruling to the Office of the President (OP), reiterating his arguments before Upon the other hand, it is also contended that the sole and exclusive right to
the DOTC. The OP issued an order directing the PPA to hold in abeyance the the exercise of harbor pilotage by pilots is a settled issue. Respondents aver
implementation of PPAAO No. 04-92. In its answer, the PPA countered that that said right has become vested and can only be “withdrawn or shortened”
said administrative order was issued in the exercise of its administrative control by observing the constitutional mandate of due process of law. Their argument
and supervision over harbor pilots under Section 6-a (viii), Article IV of P.D. has thus shifted from the procedural to one of substance. It is here where PPA-
No. 857, as amended, and it, along with its implementing guidelines, was AO No. 04-92 fails to meet the condition set by the organic law. There is no
intended to restore order in the ports and to improve the quality of port dispute that pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of a property
services. right. Even petitioner Corona recognized this when he stated in his March 17,
1993, decision that “(t)he exercise of one’s profession falls within the
The OP, through then Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato constitutional guarantee against wrongful deprivation of, or interference with,
C. Corona, dismissed the appeal/petition and lifted the restraining order issued property rights without due process.” He merely expressed the opinion that
earlier. 11 He concluded that PPA-AO No. 04-92 applied to all harbor pilots “(i)n the limited context of this case, PPA-AO 04-92 does not constitute a
and, for all intents and purposes, was not the act of Dayan, but of the PPA, wrongful interference with, let alone a wrongful deprivation of, the property
which was merely implementing Section 6 of P.D. No. 857, mandating it “to rights of those affected thereby, and that “PPA-AO 04-92 does not forbid, but
control, regulate and supervise pilotage and conduct of pilots in any port merely regulates, the exercise by harbor pilots of their profession.” However,
district.” such supposition is gravely erroneous and tends to perpetuate an
administrative order which is not only unreasonable but also superfluous.
On the alleged unconstitutionality and illegality of PPAAO No. 04-92 and its
implementing memoranda and circulars, Secretary Corona opined that PPA- It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor
AO 04-92 does not forbid, but merely regulates, the exercise by harbor pilots pilots to enjoy their profession before their compulsory retirement. In the past,
of their profession in PPA’s jurisdictional area. they enjoyed a measure of security knowing that after passing five
ISSUE: In issuing Administrative Order No. 04-92 (PPA-AO No. 04-92), examinations and undergoing years of on-the-job training, they would have a
limiting the term of appointment of harbor pilots to one year subject to yearly license which they could use until their retirement, unless sooner revoked by
renewal or cancellation, did the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) violate the PPA for mental or physical unfitness. Under the new issuance, they have
respondents’ right to exercise their profession and their right to due process of to contend with an annual cancellation of their license which can be temporary
law? or permanent depending on the outcome of their performance evaluation.
Veteran pilots and neophytes alike are suddenly confronted with one-year
HELD: YES. In the case at bar, respondents questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 terms which ipso facto expire at the end of that period. Renewal of their license
no less than four times before the matter was finally elevated to this Tribunal. is now dependent on a “rigid evaluation of performance” which is conducted
Their arguments on this score, however, fail to persuade. While respondents only after the license has already been cancelled. Hence, the use of the term
emphasize that the Philippine Coast Guard, “which issues the licenses of pilots “renewal.” It is this pre-evaluation cancellation which primarily makes PPA-AO
after administering the pilots’ examinations,” was not consulted, the facts show No. 04-92 unreasonable and constitutionally infirm. In a real sense, it is a
that the MARINA, which took over the licensing function of the Philippine Coast deprivation of property without due process of law. The Court notes that PPA-
Guard, was duly represented in the Board of Directors of the PPA. Thus, AO No. 04-92 and PPA-AO No. 08-92 are already covered by PPA-MO No.
318
03-85, which is still operational. Respondents are correct in pointing out that which can thus become effective without any prior need for notice and hearing,
PPA-AO No. 04-92 is a “surplusage” and, therefore, an unnecessary nor publication, and that its issuance is not discriminatory
enactment. since it would apply under similar circumstances to all locally manufactured
cigarettes.
327. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. COURT OF TAX APPEALS and FORTUNE TOBACCO ISSUE: Whether the RMC Bo. 37-93 is valid?
CORPORATION HELD: NO. It should be understandable that when an administrative rule is
G.R. No. 119761. August 29, 1996 merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further than its
bare issuance for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself
DOCTRINE: A ruling which is merely ‘interpretative’ in character may not has already prescribed. When, upon the other hand, the administrative rule
require prior notice to affected parties before its issuance as well as a hearing” goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render least
and “for this reason, in most instances, interpretative regulations are not given cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially adds to or
the force of law.” Indeed, “interpretative regulations and those merely internal increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at
in nature x x x need not be published.” And it is now settled that only legislative least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly
regulations and not interpretative rulings must have the benefit of public informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law.
hearing
FACTS: Fortune Tobacco Corporation (“Fortune Tobacco”) is engaged in the A reading of RMC 37–93, particularly considering the circumstances under
manufacture of different brands of cigarettes. On various dates, the Philippine which it has been issued, convinces us that the circular cannot be viewed
Patent Office issued to the corporation separate certificates of trademark simply as a corrective measure (revoking in the process the previous holdings
registration over “Champion,” “Hope,” and “More” cigarettes. of past Commissioners) or merely as construing Section 142(c) (1) of the
NIRC, as amended, but has, in fact and most importantly, been made in order
In a letter, of then Commissioner of Internal Revenue Bienvenido A. Tan, Jr., to place “Hope Luxury,” "(1). “Premium More” and “Champion” within the
to Deputy Minister Ramon Diaz of the Presidential Commission on Good classification of locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brands and to
Government, “the initial position of the Commission was to classify thereby have them covered by RA 7654. Specifically, the new law would have
‘Champion,’ ‘Hope,’ and ‘More’ as foreign brands since they were listed in the its amendatory provisions applied to locally manufactured cigarettes which at
World Tobacco Directory as belonging to foreign companies. However, the time of its effectivity were not so classified as bearing foreign brands. Prior
Fortune Tobacco changed the names of ‘Hope’ to ‘Hope Luxury’ and ‘More’ to to the issuance of the questioned circular, “Hope Luxury,” “Premium More,”
‘Premium More,’ thereby removing the said brands from the foreign brand and “Champion” cigarettes were in the category of locally manufactured
category. cigarettes not bearing foreign brand subject to 45% ad valorem tax.

RA 7654 was passed where it amended Section 142(c)(1) of the National Hence, without RMC 37–93, the enactment of RA 7654, would have had no
Internal Revenue Code. It was provided that 55% ad valorem tax will be new tax rate consequence on private respondent’s products. Evidently, in
imposed on local brands carrying a foreign name. Two days before the order to place “Hope Luxury,” “Premium More,” and “Champion” cigarettes
effectivity of RA 7654, the BIR issued Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37- within the scope of the amendatory law and subject them to an increased tax
93, in which Fortune was to be imposed 55% ad valorem tax on the three rate, the now disputed RMC 37–93 had to be issued. In so doing, the BIR not
brands classifying them as local brands carrying a foreign name. simply interpreted the law; verily, it legislated under its quasi-legislative
authority. The due observance of the requirements of notice, of hearing, and
In a letter, addressed to the appellate division of the BIR, Fortune Tobacco of publication should not have been then ignored.
requested for a review, reconsideration and recall of RMC 37–93. The request
was denied. The following day, or on 30 July 1993, the CIR assessed Fortune Article VI, Section 28, paragraph 1, of the 1987 Constitution mandates taxation
Tobacco for ad valorem tax deficiency amounting to P9,598,334.00. On 03 to be uniform and equitable. Uniformity requires that all subjects or objects of
August 1993, Fortune Tobacco filed a petition for review with the CTA. The taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike or put on equal footing both
CTA upheld the position of Fortune Tobacco. The CIR forthwith filed a petition in privileges and liabilities. 14 Thus, all taxable articles or kinds of property of
for review with the Court of Appeals, questioning the CTA’s resolution. the same class must be taxed at the same rate 15 and the tax must operate
petitioner opines that RMC 37–93 is merely an interpretative ruling of the BIR with the same force and effect in every place where the subject may be found.
Apparently, RMC 37–93 would only apply to “Hope Luxury,” “Premium More”
319
and “Champion” cigarettes and, unless petitioner would be willing to concede Order was issued in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution in-
to the submission of private respondent that the circular should, as in fact my asmuch as the petitioner was not given due notice and hearing before the said
esteemed colleague Mr. Justice Bellosillo so expresses in his separate Department Order was issued.
opinion, be considered adjudicatory in nature and thus violative of due process
following the Ang Tibay 16 doctrine, the measure suffers from lack of uniformity ISSUE: Whether or not the fixing of school fees through Department Order by
of taxation. DECS is a valid delegation of legislative power?

328. PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION, INC., vs. THE HELD: YES. The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency
SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS may be either a legislative or an adjudicative function. If it were a legislative
No. L-78385. August 31, 1987 function, the grant of prior notice and hearing to the affected parties is not a
requirement of due process. As regards rates prescribed by an administrative
DOCTRINE: The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function, prior notice and hearing
may be either a legislative or an adjudicative function. If it were a legislative are essential to the validity of such rates. When the rules and/or rates laid
function, the grant of prior notice and hearing to the affected parties is not a down by an administrative agency are meant to apply to all enterprises of a
requirement of due process. As regards rates prescribed by an administrative given kind throughout the country, they may partake of a legislative character.
agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function, prior notice and hearing Where the rules and the rates imposed apply exclusively to a particular party,
are essential to the validity of such rates. When the rules and/or rates laid based upon a finding of fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in character.
down by an administrative agency are meant to apply to all enterprises of a
given kind throughout the country, they may partake of a legislative character. Is Department Order No. 37 issued by the DECS in the exercise of its
Where the rules and the rates imposed apply exclusively to a particular party, legislative function? We believe so. The assailed Department Order prescribes
based upon a finding of fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in character. the maximum school fees that may be charged by all private schools in the
country for schoolyear 1987 to 1988. This being so, prior notice and hearing
FACTS: On February 21, 1987, the Task Force on Private Higher Education are not essential to the validity of its issuance. This observation
created by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports {hereinafter notwithstanding, there is a failure on the part of the petitioner to show clear
referred to as the DECS) submitted a report entitled "Report and and convincing evidence of such arbitrariness. As the record of the case
Recommendations on a Policy for Tuition and Other School Fees." The report discloses, the DECS is not without any justification for the issuance of the
favorably recommended to the DECS the courses of action with respect to the questioned Department Order. It would be reasonable to assume that the
Government's policy on increases in school fees for the schoolyear 1987 to report of the Task Force created by the DECS, on which it based its decision
1988. The DECS took note of the report of the Task Force and on the basis of to allow an increase in school fees, was made judiciously. Moreover, upon the
the same, the DECS, through the respondent Secretary of Education, Culture instance of the petitioner, as it so admits in its Petition, the DECS had actually
and Sports (hereinafter referred to as the respondent Secretary), issued an reduced the original rates of 15% to 20% down to 10% to 15%, accordingly.
Order authorizing, inter alia, the 15% to 20% increase in school fees as Under the circumstances peculiar to this case, We cannot consider the
recommended by the Task Force. assailed Department Order arbitrary. Under the Rules of Court, it is presumed
that official duty has been regularly performed. In the absence of proof to the
The petitioner sought a reconsideration of the said Order, apparently on the contrary, that presumption prevails. This being so, the burden of proof is on
ground that the increases were too high. Thereafter, the DECS issued the party assailing the regularity of official proceedings. In the case at bar, the
Department Order No. 37 dated April 10, 1987 modifying its previous Order petitioner has not successfully disputed the presumption.
and reducing the increases to a lower ceiling of 10% to 15%, accordingly.
Despite this reduction, the petitioner still opposed the increases. On April 23,
1987, the petitioner, through counsel, sent a telegram to the President of the 329. MACEDA VS ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD
Philippines urging the suspension of the implementation of Department Order G.R. Nos. 95119-21. December 18, 1990
No. 37. No response appears to have been obtained from the Office of the
President. Thus, the petitioner, allegedly on the basis of the public interest, DOCTRINE:
went to this Court and filed the instant Petition for prohibition, seeking that FACTS: On September 10, 1990, Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Pilipinas Shell
judgment be rendered declaring the questioned Department Order Petroleum Corporation, and Petron Corporation proferred separate
unconstitutional. The petitioner also maintains that the questioned Department applications with the Board for permission to increase the wholesale posted
320
prices of petroleum products, as follows: Caltex P 3.2697 per liter Shell 2.0338 We do not therefore find the challenged action of the Board to have been done
per liter Petron 2.00 per liter and meanwhile, for provisional authority to in violation of the due process clause. The petitioners may contest however,
increase temporarily such wholesale posted prices pending further the applications at the hearings proper.
proceedings. On September 21,1990, the Board, in a joint (on three
applications) Order granted provisional relief.
330. FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION VS ENERGY REGULATORY
The petitioners submit that the above Order had been issued with grave abuse COMMISSION, MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY
of discretion, tantamount to lack of jurisdiction, and correctible by certiorari. G.R. No. 161113. June 15, 2004
The petitioner, Senator Ernesto Maceda, also submits that the same was
issued without proper notice and hearing in violation of Section 3, paragraph DOCTRINE: Two postulates evidently flow from a reading of Section 4(e), Rule
(e), of Executive Order No. 172; that the Board, in decreeing an increase, had 3. First, the publication of the application itself is required, not merely the notice
created a new source for the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF), or otherwise of hearing issued by the ERC. Second, in granting a provisional authority, the
that it had levied a tax-, a power vested in the legislature, and/or that it had ERC must consider not only the evidence submitted by the applicant in support
"re-collected", by an act of taxation, ad valorem taxes on oil which Republic thereof, but also the comments of the consumers and the Local Government
Act No. 6965 had abolished. The petitioner, Atty. Oliver Lozano, likewise Units (LGUs) concerned.
argues that the Board's Order was issued without notice and hearing, and
hence, without due process of law. FACTS: The petition assails the Order of respondent Energy Regulatory
Commission (ERC), provisionally authorizing respondent Manila Electric
The intervenor, the Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services Company (MERALCO) to increase its rates by an average amount of 12
(TUPAS/FSM)-W.F.T.U., 6 argues on the other hand, that the increase can centavos per kilowatt hour. MERALCO filed with the ERC an Application for
not be allowed since the respondents oil companies had not exhausted their an increase in rates and also prayed ex parte for the grant of a provisional
existing oil stock which they had bought at old prices and that they can not be authority to implement the increase according to the schedule attached to its
allowed to charge new rates for stock purchased at such lower rates. Application. National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms, Inc.
(NASECORE), Mr. Genaro Lualhati and Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC)
ISSUE: Whether or not the Board’s order violates due process of law? assailed separately, in a letter addressed to the ERC Chairman Manuel R.
Sanchez (Sanchez), informed him of their intention to file an Opposition to
HELD: NO. There is no merit in the Senator's contention that the "applicable" MERALCO’s Application, seeking the dismissal of MERALCO’s Application
provision is Section 3, paragraph (e) of the Executive Order. What must be and expressed its intention to file an opposition to MERALCO’s Application,
stressed is that while under Executive Order No. 172, a hearing is respectively.
indispensable, it does not preclude the Board from ordering, ex parte, a
provisional increase, as it did here, subject to its final disposition of whether or ERC directed FDC, NASECORE and Lualhati to file the irrespective comments
not: (1) to make it permanent; (2) to reduce or increase it further; or (3) to deny on the Application within 15 days from their receipt thereof. NASECORE filed
the application. Section 3, paragraph (e) is akin to a temporary restraining a Motion for Production of Documents to enable it to evaluate MERALCO’s
order or a writ of preliminary attachment issued by the courts, which are given Application. ERC directed MERALCO to file its comment on NASECORE’s
ex parte, and which are subject to the resolution of the main case. Section 3, Motion for Production of Documents. ERC issued an Order directing
paragraph (e) and Section 8 do not negate each other, or otherwise, operate MERALCO to submit certain documents in connection with the evaluation of
exclusively of the other, in that the Board may resort to one but not to both at its Application. However, ERC, without first resolving the Motions for
the same time. Section 3(e) outlines the jurisdiction of the Board and the Production of Documents of NASECORE and FDC and apparently without
grounds for which it may decree a price adjustment, subject to the considering Lualhati’s Opposition, issued an Order provisionally approving
requirements of notice and hearing. Pending that, however, it may order, under MERALCO’s ex parte application for rate increases.
Section 8, an authority to increase provisionally, without need of a hearing,
subject to the final outcome of the proceeding. The Board, of course, is not Bayan Muna, Bayan, KMU, Gabriela, Kadamay, Agham, Gabriela Women’s
prevented from conducting a hearing on the grant of provisional authority— Party and AnakPawis argued that the Order is void for having been issued by
which is of course, the better procedure— however, it can not be stigmatized ERC with manifest bias in favor of MERALCO and without due regard for the
later if it failed to conduct one. rights of consumers, so they filed their Motion to Intervene and attached

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thereto their Petition-in-Intervention. Hence, this Instant Petition and Petition- the superfluity or needlessness of carrying over in the EPIRA the same
in-Intervention. provision found in the previous laws. The power to approve provisional rate
increases is included among the powers transferred to the ERC by virtue of
ISSUE: 1. Whether the ERC has legal authority to grant provisional rate Section 44 since the grant of that authority is not inconsistent with the EPIRA;
adjustments under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9136, otherwise known as the rather, it is in full harmony with the thrust of the law which is to strengthen the
“Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001” (EPIRA); and ERC as the new regulatory body.

2. Assuming that the ERC has the authority to grant provisional orders, 2. The Court is convinced of the meritoriousness of FDC’s position which is
whether the grant by the ERC of the provisional rate adjustment in question the same stance taken by the petitionersin-intervention and the OSG. Under
was committed with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of Section 16(c), C.A. No. 146 and Section 8, E.O. No. 172 in relation to Sections
jurisdiction 43 and 80 of the EPIRA, the ERC may grant provisional rate adjustments
without first conducting a hearing prior to such grant. However, it is required to
HELD: 1. YES. The ERC is endowed with the statutory authority to approve conduct a hearing on the propriety of the grant of provisional rate adjustments
provisional rate adjustments under the aegis of Sections 44 and 80 of the within 30 days from the issuance of the provisional order. 87 Section 4(e), Rule
EPIRA. It bears stressing that the conferment upon the ERC of the power to 3 of the IRR requires the ERC to resolve the motion for issuance of a
grant provisional rate adjustments is not inconsistent with any provision of the provisional order within seventy five (75) calendar days from the filing of the
EPIRA. The powers of the ERB transferred to the ERC under Section 44 are application or petition. If, within 30 days from the publication of the application
in addition to the new powers conferred upon the ERC under Section 43. or receipt of a copy thereof, an affected consumer or the Local Government
Section 80 of the EPIRA complements Section 44, as it mandates the Unit (LGU) concerned files with the ERC a comment on the prayed for
continued efficacy of the applicable provisions of the laws referred to therein. provisional rate adjustment and/or the application itself, the ERC is mandated
The material provisions of the Public Service Act which continue to be in full to consider such comment in its action on the prayer for provisional rate
force and effect are contained in Section 16(c), which states thus: adjustment.

Section 16. Proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing.—The Two postulates evidently flow from a reading of Section 4(e), Rule 3. First, the
Commission shall have power, upon proper notice and hearing in accordance publication of the application itself is required, not merely the notice of hearing
with the rules and provisions of this Act, subject to the limitations and issued by the ERC. Second, in granting a provisional authority, the ERC must
exceptions mentioned and saving provisions to the contrary: . . . consider not only the evidence submitted by the applicant in support thereof,
(c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, toll, charges, classifications, but also the comments of the consumers and the Local Government Units
or schedules thereof, as well as commutation, mileage, kilometrage, and other (LGUs) concerned. The challenged provisional rate increase transgresses
special rates which shall be imposed, observed, and followed thereafter by any Section 4(e), Rule 3 of the IRR in two major respects. The violations involve a
public service: Provided, That the Commission may, in its discretion, approve couple of new requirements prescribed by the IRR. These are, first, the need
rates proposed by public services provisionally and without necessity of any to publish the application in a newspaper of general circulation in the locality
hearing; but it shall call a hearing thereon within thirty days thereafter, upon where the applicant operates; and second, the need for ERC to consider the
publication and notice to the concerned parties operating in the territory comments or pleadings of the customers and LGU concerned in its action on
affected: Provided, further, That in case the public service equipment of an the application or motion for provisional rate adjustment.
operator is used principally or secondarily for the promotion of a private
business, the net profits of said private business shall be considered in relation The record shows that MERALCO failed to comply with the publication
with the public service of such operator for the purposes of fixing the rates. requirement prescribed by the IRR. What the IRR requires to be published is
the application itself. In fact, it even requires the applicant to submit the
Similarly, Sections 8 and 14 of E.O. No. 172 or the ERB Charter continue to “certification of the notice of publication” of the “application or petition for rate
be in full force by virtue of Sections 44 and 80 of the EPIRA. It cannot be adjustment” together with the application/petition to the ERC. For its part,
argued that the clause could not have referred to the provisions of the prior MERALCO alleges that it relied on the ERC’s interpretation that what had to
laws empowering the Public Service Commission (PSC) and the ERB to grant be published “is simply a notice of the intent to file an application”. So, it
provisional rate adjustments on the premise that the lawmakers deliberately “caused the publication of such notice before it filed the application.”
deleted the provisions in the crafting of the EPIRA. Such an argument begs
the question. What is clear from Sections 80 and 44 is that the legislators saw
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The ERC’s provisional approval of MERALCO’s application for rate increase
was based on MERALCO’s say-so alone, including the purported value of its DOCTRINE: The power to hold in contempt, it has time and again been held,
assets as of the year 2002 and its claimed financial difficulties, resulting must be exercised, not on the vindictive, but on the preservative principle. It is
according to it in its deferral of forty-two (42) major capital projects and failure not to be meted out of pique, or from an imperial sense of the nature and
to meet its maturing debt obligations. In the assailed Order, the Commission functions of judicial office.
held that MERALCO’s inability to construct its capital projects to meet the
growing demand of its customers and to ensure the reliability and efficiency of FACTS: On February 3, 1988, Datu Jamil Dimaporo was proclaimed by the
its existing system would ultimately be to the prejudice of the consumers. Board of Canvassers Mayor-elect of Marogong. The annulment of the
proclamation and the canvass on which it was based 4 was sought in two (2)
The provisional authority to impose increased rates was approved separate petitions filed by defeated mayoralty candidates: one filed on
notwithstanding the fact that soon after MERALCO filed its Application on February 15, 1988 by Datu Abdulmadid Panondiongan Maruhom (docketed
October 10, 2003, FDC and NASECORE expressed their intention to file their as SPC No. 88-646), and the other, on February 17, 1988, by Monabai
respective oppositions to the Application, and later their respective Motions for Panondiongan Balt. While these petitions were pending adjudgment by the
Production of Documents. Neither did the ERC consider the Letter dated COMELEC First Division, the Secretary of Local Governments issued on May
October 24, 2003 of Lualhati (a consumer), seeking the dismissal of the 19, 1988 a memorandum addressed to the Regional Director, Region XII of
Application. Although on November 13, 2003, the ERC issued an Order the Department of Local Governments, designating Maclis Balt “Officer-in-
requiring MERALCO to comment on NASECORE’s Motion for Production of Charge, Office of the Mayor of Marogong, Lanao del Sur vice Abdullah Imam.”
Documents, it failed to resolve the same, as well as FDC’s similar Motion, The memorandum precisely took account of said petitions. It stated that the
before issuing its November 27, 2003 Order. The motions filed by NASECORE designation of the OIC was made “(i)n view of the election controversy that
and FDC should have been acted upon by the ERC prior to resolving has arisen over the mayoralty race of Marogong, Lanao del Sur, and to ensure
MERALCO’s prayer for provisional rate increase, because NASECORE and that the democratic process is respected throughout the transition period.”
FDC would be able to express their agreement or opposition to MERALCO’s
Application only after perusing the documents presented, if their Motions were The petitions seeking annulment of Datu Dimaporo’s proclamation were
granted; or in case the Motions were denied, they could at least make known ultimately dismissed by the First Division of the COMELEC. Motions for
their respective positions on the Application on the basis of the documents reconsideration thereof were seasonably presented by both petitioners. These
submitted by MERALCO. Certainly, the spirit if not the language of the IRR were brought up to the Commission en banc for resolution. Datu Dimaporo lost
provision should have led ERC to treat the motions which are preludes to no time in seeking official recognition of his status as mayor-elect of Marogong,
active opposition to the application in a more favorable light and in a less as confirmed by the First Division’s Decision of July 11, 1988. His counsel,
cavalier fashion. Without even mentioning the motions in its Order, ERC Mangurun Batuampar, sent a formal communication to Provincial Governor
granted the motion for provisional rate increase. The foregoing clearly Saidamen B. Pangarungan, “transmitting x x the ‘RESOLUTION’ of the
establish that ERC failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 4(e), Rule 3 Honorable First Division of the Commission on Elections x x,” and praying “that
of the IRR publication and comment requirements of Rule 4(e), Rule 3 of the communications and other official matters involving the affairs of the
IRR. Municipality of Marogong, Lanao del Sur be accorded to DATU JAMIL DATU
MULOK DIMAPORO whose proclamation was affirmed by the Commission on
What makes the challenged Order particularly repugnant is that it involves a Elections as aforestated.
blatant and inexcusable breach of the very rules which the ERC is mandated
to observe and implement. The violated provision which is Section 4(e), Rule The Provincial Fiscal acted promptly on the request. The opinion sought was
3 of the IRR specifies how the ERC should exercise its power to issue communicated to the Vice Governor by 4th Indorsement. It was signed by 3rd
provisional orders pursuant to Section 44 in relation to Section 80 of the Assistant Provincial Fiscal Maranao C. Danganan, with the conformity of
EPIRA. Since the IRR was issued pursuant to the EPIRA, Section 4(e) of Rule Provincial Fiscal Salic B. Dumarpa. On learning of this legal opinion, Datu
3 as part of the IRR has the force and effect of law and thus should have been Dimaporo filed with the COMELEC en banc a motion to hold Fiscals Dumarpa
complied with. and Danganan, as well as Vice-Governor Alauya, in contempt. The motion
theorized that the act of Vice-Governor Alauya in seeking legal opinion of the
331. SALIC B. DUMARPA, MARANAO C. DANGANAN and SAADUDDIN Office of the Provincial Fiscal, and the formulation and communication of the
ALAUYA, VS JAMIL DIMAPORO and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS requested opinion by Fiscals Dumarpa and Danganan, constituted “indirect
G.R. Nos. 87014-16.September 13, 1989 contempt as it is clearly an improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to
323
impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justiceand is also an the time material to the inquiry, had been discharging the functions of mayor
unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of this Honorable of Marogong. It thus appears that the Resolution in question not only lacks
Commission en banc. Responses to the motion for contempt were separately factual foundation of any sort but is contradicted by such of the relevant facts
filed by the fiscals and by the Vice-Governor. as may be discerned from the record.

In its Resolution of October 28, 1988 anent the contempt incident, the The power to hold in contempt, it has time and again been held, must be
Commission en banc condemned the fiscal’s conception of “the First Division’s exercised, not on the vindictive, but on the preservative principle. It is not to be
jurisdiction of the pre-proclamation controversy” as a “distortion of the law and meted out of pique, or from an imperial sense of the nature and functions of
jurisprudence. Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. By Resolution, judicial office. What appears to be an honest difference of opinion has been
the COMELEC en bancnot only denied the motion for reconsideration, but also blown up into something that it is not—a direct and confrontational challenge
“rebuked” the movants “for insisting upon an erroneous legal position. to the puissance and prerogatives of the Commission. In a word, petitioners
have been found in contempt because, to put it baldly, their opinion did not sit
ISSUE: well with the Commission and failed to conform to its own views. Judicial
sensibilities should not become too tender or selfprotective. All things
HELD: The Court is constrained to nullify and set aside the conviction by the considered, the contempt ruling here cannot be justified on the preservative
COMELEC en banc of the petitioners for contempt. The essential accusation principle, there being no clear showing, either in the terms of the allegedly
against the petitioners was that the rendition by the petitioner fiscals of a legal contumacious opinion or from the circumstances that led to its issuance, of
opinion upon request of petitioner Vice Governor had caused “chaos and any intent to denigrate the authority of the respondent Commission or erode
confusion among the National, Provincial, Municipal officials and the general the faith and respect due its decisions, orders or other actuations.
public on who is really the legal Mayor of Marogong, Lanao del Sur,
considering the conflict of the defendants’ legal opinion and the ‘Resolution’ of 332. Philippine Bank of Communications vs. Commissioner of Internal
the COMELEC Division, as aforesaid, resulting to damage, injury and Revenue
prejudice not only upon the complainant but to public service, particularly the G.R. No. 112024, January 28, 1999
people of Marogong, Lanao del Sur.”
DOCTRINE: Administrative issuances are merely interpretations and not
The trouble is, there is nothing in the challenged Resolutions of the COMELEC expansions of the provisions of law, thus, in case of inconsistency, the law
en banc, or anywhere else in the record, for that matter, to demonstrate the prevails over them. Administrative agencies have no legislative power.
actuality of the alleged (1) “chaos and confusion among the National,
Provincial, Municipal officials and the general public,” or (2) “suspension of the Facts: Petitioner, Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom), a commercial
effects of the proclamation of intervenor Dimaporo x x (in order to) pave the banking corporation duly organized under Philippine laws, filed its quarterly
way for the appointment of or assumption to office by an Officer-inCharge,” or income tax returns for the first and second quarters of 1985, reported profits,
(3) that the latter “is the wife of one of the parties to the instant petitions;” or and paid the total income tax of P5,016,954.00 by applying PBCom's tax credit
(4) that the legal opinion was “a deliberate contrivance x x meant to undermine memos for P3,401,701.00 and P1,615,253.00, respectively. Subsequently,
the efficacy of official acts of the Commission from the municipal board of however, PBCom suffered net loss of P25,317,228.00, thereby showing no
canvassers to the First Division of the Commission and even the Commission income tax liability in its Annual Income Tax Returns for the year-ended
en banc which had not in any way issued any restraining order to suspend the December 31, 1985. For the succeeding year, ending December 31, 1986, the
proclamation of the winning candidate.” petitioner likewise reported a net loss of P14,129,602.00, and thus declared
no tax payable for the year. But during these two years, PBCom earned rental
On the other hand, there are the facts asserted by the petitioners—never income from leased properties. The lessees withheld and remitted to the BIR
denied or disputed by respondents— that as of the time that the fiscal’s opinion withholding creditable taxes of P282,795.50 in 1985 and P234,077.69 in 1986.
was solicited and even thereafter, Datu Dimaporo had never yet “enjoyed the On August 7, 1987, petitioner requested the Commissioner of Internal
powers and functions appurtenant to the Office of the mayor,” had never been Revenue, among others, for a tax credit of P5,016,954.00 representing the
paid his salary as mayor, and had not as yet “been accorded recognition as overpayment of taxes in the first and second quarters of 1985.
elected mayor x x by the provincial and national government;” and that indeed,
“long before the query for legal opinion was lodged, (Maclis) Balt x x (had Thereafter, on July 25, 1988, petitioner filed a claim for refund of creditable
been) already designated as Officerin-Charge” and since then and during all
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taxes withheld by their lessees from property rentals in 1985 for P282,795.50 of Internal Revenue is an administrative interpretation which is not in harmony
and in 1986 for P234,077.69. with Sec. 230 of 1977 NIRC, for being contrary to the express provision of a
statute. Hence, his interpretation could not be given weight for to do so would,
Pending the investigation of the respondent Commissioner of Internal in effect, amend the statute.
Revenue, petitioner instituted a Petition for Review on November 18, 1988
before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). The CTA decided in favor of the BIR 333. Board of Commissioners (CID) vs. Dela Rosa
on the ground that the Petition was filed out of time as the same was filed G.R. Nos. 95122-23. May 31, 1991
beyond the two-year reglementary period. A motion for Reconsideration was
denied and the appeal to Court of Appeals was likewise denied. Thus, this DOCTRINE: The doctrine of res judicata does not apply to questions of
appeal to Supreme Court. Petitioner argues that its claims for refund and tax citizenship. Res Judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship only if the
credits are not yet barred by prescription relying on the applicability of Revenue following requisites are present; 1) a person’s citizenship must be raised as a
Memorandum Circular No. 7-85 issued on April 1, 1985. The circular states material issue in a controversy where said person is a party; 2) the Solicitor
that overpaid income taxes are not covered by the two-year prescriptive period General took active part in the resolution thereof; and 3) the finding of
under the tax Code and that taxpayers may claim refund or tax credits for the citizenship is affirmed by this Court
excess quarterly income tax with the BIR with ten (10) years under Article 1144
of the Civil Code. FACTS: On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William
Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a native born
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying the plea for tax Filipino citizen following the citizenship of his natural born mother, Marciana
refund or tax credits on the ground of prescription, despite petitioner’s reliance Gatchalian. In 1961, William Gatchalian, then a twelve-year old minor, arrived
on RMC No. 7-85, changing the prescriptive period of two years to ten years? in Manila from Hongkong together with Gloria, Francisco and Johnson
Gatchalian. They had with them Certificate of Registration and Identity issued
HELD: No. Administrative issuances are merely interpretations and not by the Philippine Consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the
expansions of the provisions of law, thus, in case of inconsistency, the law signature of the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and
prevails over them. Administrative agencies have no legislative power. sought admission as Filipino citizens. After investigation, the Board of Special
Inquiry No. 1 rendered a decision dated July 5, 1961, admitting William
When the Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued RMC 7-85, Gatchalian and his companions as Filipino citizens and was issued
changing the prescriptive period of two years to ten years on claims of excess Identification Certificates.
quarterly income tax payments, such circular created a clear inconsistency
with the provision of Sec. 230 of 1977 NIRC. In so doing, the BIR did not simply In 1962, the then Secretary of Justice issued Memorandum No. 9 setting aside
interpret the law; rather it legislated guidelines contrary to the statute passed all decisions purporting to have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners
by Congress. on appeal or on review motu proprio of decisions of the Board of Special
Inquiry. The same memorandum directed the Board of Commissioners to
It bears repeating that Revenue memorandum-circulars are considered review all cases where entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was
administrative rulings (in the sense of more specific and less general a Philippine citizen. Among those cases was that of William and others. The
interpretations of tax laws) which are issued from time to time by the new Board of Commissioners, reversed the decision of the Board of Special
Commissioner of Internal Revenue. It is widely accepted that the interpretation Inquiry and ordered the exclusion of, among others, respondent Gatchalian.
placed upon a statute by the executive officers, whose duty is to enforce it, is Sometime in 1973, respondent Gatchalian, as well as the others covered by
entitled to great respect by the courts. Nevertheless, such interpretation is not the July 6, 1961 warrant of exclusion, filed a motion for re-hearing with the
conclusive and will be ignored if judicially found to be erroneous. Thus, courts Board of Special Inquiry where the deportation case against them was
will not countenance administrative issuances that override, instead of assigned.
remaining consistent and in harmony with, the law they seek to apply and
implement. Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an order reaffirming the July 6, 1961
decision of the Board of Special Inquiry thereby admitting respondent
Further, fundamental is the rule that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the Gatchalian as a Filipino citizen and recalled the warrant of arrest issued
mistakes or errors of its officials or agents. As pointed out by the respondent against him. On June 7, 1990, the acting director of the National Bureau of
courts, the nullification of RMC No. 7-85 issued by the Acting Commissioner Investigation wrote the Secretary of Justice recommending that the
325
respondent Gatchalian along with the other applicants covered by the warrant Neither can it be argued that the Board of Commissioners’ decision (dated July
of exclusion be charged with violation against the Immigration Act of 1940. The 6, 1962) finding respondent’s claim to Philippine citizenship not satisfactorily
Secretary of Justice indorsed the recommendation of the NBI to the proved, constitute res judicata. For one thing, said decision did not make any
Commissioner of Immigration for investigation and immediate action. categorical statement that respondent Gatchalian is a Chinese. Secondly, the
Petitioner, Domingo of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation issued doctrine of res judicata does not apply to questions of citizenship.
a mission order commanding the arrest of respondent William Gatchalian. The
latter appeared before Commissioner Domingo on August 20, 1990 and was An exception to the above rule was laid by this Court in Burca vs. Republic,
released on the same day upon posting P200,000.00 cash bond. viz: “We declare it to be a sound rule that where the citizenship of a party in a
case is definitely resolved by a court or by an administrative agency, as a
On August 29, 1990, William Gatchalian filed a petition for certiorari and material issue in the controversy, after a full-blown hearing with the active
prohibition with injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, presided participation of the Solicitor General or his authorized representative, and this
by respondent Judge dela Rosa. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the case finding or the citizenship of the party is affirmed by this Court, the decision on
alleging that respondent judge has no jurisdiction over the Board of the matter shall constitute conclusive proof of such party’s citizenship in any
Commissioners and/or the Board of Special Inquiry. Respondent’s wife and other case or proceeding. But it is made clear that in no instance will a decision
minor children filed before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela for injunction on the question of citizenship in such cases be considered conclusive or
with writ of preliminary injunction. That petitioners acted without or in excess binding in any other case or proceeding, unless obtained in accordance with
of jurisdiction in the institution of deportation proceedings against William. the procedure herein stated.”
Respondent Capulong issued the questioned temporary restraining order
restraining petitioners from continuing with the deportation proceedings Thus, in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of
against William Gatchalian. citizenship, the following must be present: 1) a person’s citizenship must be
raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party; 2) the
Petitioners invoke that this Court’s decision in Arocha vs. Vivo and Vivo vs. Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the
Arca ( supra ), has already settled respondent’s alienage. Hence, the need for resolution thereof; and 3) the finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
a judicial determination of respondent’s citizenship specially so where the Gauged by the foregoing. We find the pre-conditions set forth in Burca
latter is not seeking admission, but is already in the Philippines (for the past inexistent in the Arocha and Vivo cases relied upon by petitioners. Indeed,
thirty [30] years) and is being expelled. According to petitioners, respondent’s respondent William Gatchalian was not even a party in said cases.
alienage has been conclusively settled by this Court in the Arocha and Vivo
cases
JUDICIAL RECOURSE AND REVIEW
ISSUE: Whether or not Arocha vs. Vivo and Vivo vs. Arca already settled
respondent’s alienage? 334. ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE COCONUT DESICCATORS vs.
PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY
HELD: No. It must be noted that in said cases, the sole issue resolved therein G.R. No. 110526. February 10, 1998
was the actual date of rendition of the July 6, 1962 decision of the then board
of Commissioners, i.e., whether the decision was rendered on July 6, 1962 or DOCTRINE: The rule of requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies
on July 20, 1962 it appearing that the figure (date) “20” was erased and over before a party may seek judicial review, so strenuously urged by the Solicitor
it was superimposed the figure “6” thereby making the decision fall within the General on behalf of respondent, has obviously no application here. The
one-year reglementary period from July 6, 1961 within which the decision may resolution in question was issued by the PCA in the exercise of its rule-making
be reviewed. This Court did not squarely pass upon any question of or legislative power. However, only judicial review of decisions of
citizenship, much less that of respondent’s who was not a party in the aforesaid administrative agencies made in the exercise of their quasi-judicial function is
cases. The said cases originated from a petition for a writ of habeas corpus subject to the exhaustion doctrine.
filed on July 21, 1965 by Macario Arocha in behalf of Pedro Gatchalian. Well
settled is the rule that a person not party to a case cannot be bound by a FACTS: Seven desiccated coconut processing companies belonging to the
decision rendered therein. Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators (APCD) brought suit in the
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region in Makati, Metro Manila,
to enjoin the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) from issuing permits to certain
326
applicants for the establishment of new desiccated coconut processing plants. of the PCA which requires rules and regulations issued by it to be approved
Petitioner alleged that the issuance of licenses to the applicants would violate by the President before they become effective.
PCA’s Administrative Order No. 02, series of 1991, as the applicants were
seeking permits to operate in areas considered “congested” under the In any event, although the APCD has appealed the resolution in question to
administrative order. On November 6, 1992, the trial court issued a temporary the Office of the President, considering the fact that two months after they had
restraining order and, on November 25, 1992, a writ of preliminary injunction, sent their first letter on April 26, 1993 they still had to hear from the President’s
enjoining the PCA from processing and issuing licenses to Primex Products, office, meanwhile respondent PCA was issuing certificates of registration
Inc., Coco Manila, Superstar (Candelaria) and Superstar (Davao) upon the indiscriminately to new coconut millers, we hold that petitioner was justified in
posting of a bond in the amount of P100,000.00. filing this case on June 25, 1993. Indeed, after writing the Office of the
President on April 26, 1993 6 petitioner sent inquiries to that office not once,
Subsequently and while the case was pending in the RTC, the Governing but twice, on May 26, 1993 7 and on June 2, 1993, 8 but petitioner did not
Board of the PCA issued Resolution No. 018-93, providing for the withdrawal receive any reply.
of the PCA from all regulation of the coconut product processing industry.
While it continues the registration of coconut product processors, the 335. Smart Communications, Inc. (SMART) vs. National
registration would be limited to the “monitoring” of their volumes of production Telecommunications Commission (NTC)
and administration of quality standards. The PCA then proceeded to issue G.R. No. 152063. August 12, 2003
“certificates of registration” to those wishing to operate desiccated coconut
processing plants, prompting petitioner to appeal to the Office of the President DOCTRINE: In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or
of the Philippines not to approve the resolution in question. Despite follow-up regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust
letters sent, petitioner received no reply. The “certificates of registration” administrative remedies before going to court. This principle applies only
issued in the meantime by the PCA has enabled a number of new coconut where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant
mills to operate. Hence this petition. to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-
making or quasi-legislative power.
Respondent PCA alleges that this petition should be denied on the ground that
petitioner has a pending appeal before the Office of the President. Respondent FACTS: The National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) issued on
accuses petitioner of forum-shopping in filing this petition and June 16, 2000 Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000, promulgating rules and
of failing to exhaust available administrative remedies before coming to this regulations on the billing of telecommunications services. The Memorandum
Court. Respondent anchors its argument on the general rule that one who Circular provided that it shall take effect 15 days after its publication in a
brings an action under Rule 65 must show that one has no appeal nor any newspaper of general circulation and three certified true copies thereof
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. furnished the UP Law Center. It was published in the newspaper, The
Philippine Star, on June 22, 2000. Meanwhile, the provisions of the
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner failed to exhaust available administrative Memorandum Circular pertaining to the sale and use of prepaid cards and the
remedies before filing this petition? unit of billing for cellular mobile telephone service took effect 90 days from the
effectivity of the Memorandum Circular.
HELD: No. The rule of requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before
a party may seek judicial review, so strenuously urged by the Solicitor General On August 30, 2000, the NTC issued a Memorandum to all cellular mobile
on behalf of respondent, has obviously no application here. The resolution in telephone service (CMTS) operators which contained measures to minimize if
question was issued by the PCA in the exercise of its rule-making or legislative not totally eliminate the incidence of stealing of cellular phone units. This was
power. However, only judicial review of decisions of administrative agencies followed by another Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 addressed to all
made in the exercise of their quasi-judicial function is subject to the exhaustion public telecommunications entities.
doctrine. The exhaustion doctrine stands as a bar to an action which is not yet
complete and it is clear, in the case at bar, that after its promulgation the Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino Telephone Corporation filed
resolution of the PCA abandoning regulation of the desiccated coconut against the National Telecommunications Commission, Commissioner Joseph
industry became effective. To be sure, the PCA is under the direct supervision A. Santiago, Deputy Commissioner Aurelio M. Umali and Deputy
of the President of the Philippines but there is nothing in P.D. No. 232, P.D. Commissioner Nestor C. Dacanay, an action for declaration of nullity of NTC
No. 961, P.D. No. 1468 and P.D. No. 1644 defining the powers and functions Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the Billing Circular) and the NTC
327
Memorandum dated October 6, 2000, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of 22 and July 5, 2000, 23 asking for the suspension and reconsideration of the
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. socalled Billing Circular. These letters were not acted upon until October 6,
2000, when respondent NTC issued the second assailed Memorandum
Petitioners alleged that NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of implementing certain provisions of the Billing Circular. This was taken by
consumer goods such as the prepaid call cards since such jurisdiction belongs petitioners as a clear denial of the requests contained in their previous letters,
to the Department of Trade and Industry under the Consumer Act of the thus prompting them to seek judicial relief.
Philippines; that the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and violative of
the constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property without due 336. PROSECUTOR LEO C. TABAO vs. JUDGE FRISCO T. LILAGAN,
process of law; that the Circular will result in the impairment of the viability of A.M. No. RTJ-01-1651. September 4, 2001
the prepaid cellular service by unduly prolonging the validity and expiration of
the prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the requirements of identification of DOCTRINE: Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the courts cannot take
prepaid card buyers and call balance announcement are unreasonable. cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies of special
Hence, they prayed that the Billing Circular be declared null and void ab initio. competence. Also, the plaintiff in the replevin suit who seeks to recover the
shipment from the DENR had not exhausted the administrative remedies
Globe Telecom, Inc and Smart Communications, Inc. filed a joint Motion for available to him. Prudent thing for the respondent judge to do was to dismiss
Leave to Intervene and to Admit Complaint-in-Intervention and this was the replevin outright.
granted by the trial court. Respondent NTC and its co-defendants filed a
motion to dismiss the case on the ground of petitioners' failure to exhaust FACTS: A water craft M/L Hadja, from Bongao, Tawi-tawi, was docked at the
administrative remedies. Likewise, Globe and Islacom filed a petition for port area of Tacloban City with a load of 100 tons of tanbark. Robert
review. Hernandez was the consignee to said cargo. While the cargo was being
unloaded, the NBI decided to verify the shipment's accompanying documents
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies? where it was found to be irregular and incomplete. Consequently, the NBI
HELD: No. In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation ordered the unloading of the cargo stopped. As a result, the tanbark, the boat,
issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative and three cargo trucks were seized and impounded.
remedies before going to court. This principle applies only where the act of the
administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial NBI-EVRO Regional Director Carlos S. Caabay filed a Criminal Complaint for
function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi- the violation of Section 68 (now Section 78) of P.D. 705, The Forestry Code of
legislative power. the Philippines as amended, against the captain and crew of the M/L Hadja,
Robert Hernandez, Tandico Chion, Alejandro K. Bautista, a forster, and
In Association of Philippine Coconut Dessicators v. Philippine Coconut Marcial A. Dalimot, a Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer
Authority, it was held: The rule of requiring exhaustion of administrative of the DENR. Bautista and Dalimot were also charged with violation of Section
remedies before a party may seek judicial review, so strenuously urged by the 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, along with
Solicitor General on behalf of respondent, has obviously no application here. Habi A. Alih and Khonrad V. Mohammad of the CENRO-Bongao, Tawi-tawi.
The resolution in question was issued by the PCA in the exercise of its rule- The complaint was docketed as I.S. No. 98-296 at the Prosecutor's Office of
making or legislative power. However, only judicial review of decisions of Tacloban City.
administrative agencies made in the exercise of their quasi-judicial function is
subject to the exhaustion doctrine. On March 10, 1998, DENR took possession of the cargo, the boat and the
three trucks, through the previous direction of the complainant. Due notice
Even assuming arguendo that the principle of exhaustion of administrative were issued to the consignee, Robert Hernandez and the NBI Regional
remedies apply in this case, the records reveal that petitioners sufficiently Director. Hernandez filed in the RTC of Leyte a case for replevin to recover
complied with this requirement. Even during the drafting and deliberation the items seized by the DENR. On March 16, 1998, subpoenas were issued
stages leading to the issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000, to the respondents in I.S. No. 98-296 and on March 17, 1998, confiscation
petitioners were able to register their protests to the proposed billing proceedings were conducted by the PENRO-Leyte, with both Hernandez and
guidelines. They submitted their respective position papers setting forth their his counsel present.
objections and submitting proposed schemes for the billing circular. 21 After
the same was issued, petitioners wrote successive letters dated July 3, 2000
328
On March 19, 1998, respondent Judge Frisco T. Lilagan issued a writ of Under Section 78-A of the Revised Forestry Code, the DENR secretary or his
replevin and directed Sheriff IV Leonardo V. Aguilar to take possession of the representatives may order the confiscation of forest products illegally cut,
items seized by the DENR and to deliver them to Hernandez after the gathered, removed, possessed or abandoned, including the conveyances
expiration of five days. Respondent Sheriff served a copy of the writ to the involved in the offense.
Philippine Coast Guard station in Tacloban City. Thus, the filing of this
Administrative complaint against respondent. The complaint avers that It was declared by the Court in Paat vs. Court of Appeals the that enforcement
replevin is not available when properties sought to be recovered are involved of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection, development and
in criminal proceedings. He also submits that respondent judge is either management of forest lands fall within the primary and special responsibilities
grossly ignorant of the law and jurisprudence or purposely disregarded them. of the DENR. The DENR should be given free hand unperturbed by judicial
Complainant states that the respondent sheriff had the duty to safeguard M/L intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The
Hadja and to prevent it from leaving the port of Tacloban City, after he had court held that the assumption of the trial court of the replevin suit constitutes
served a writ of seizure therefor on the Philippine Coast Guard. an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the administrative ageny's
prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to
Respondent judge claim that the charge of gross ignorance of the law was arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over
premature since there is a pending motion to dismiss filed by the defendants which is initially lodged within an administrative body of special competence.
in the replevin case. Further, he claimed that he was unaware of the existence
of I.S. No. 98-296 and upon learning of the same, he issued an order dated The respondent judge's act of taking cognizance of the subject replevin suit
March 25, 1998, suspending the transfer to Hernandez of possession of the clearly demonstrates ignorance of the law. He has fallen short of the standard
subject items, pending resolution of an urgent manifestation by the set forth in Canon 1 Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, that a judge
complainant. Respondent sheriff submits that he served the writ of replevin on must be an embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. To
the Coast Guard to prevent the departure of subject vessel since he does not measure up to this standard, justices are expected to keep abreast of all laws
have the means to physically prevent the vessel from sailing. He further and prevailing jurisprudence. Failure to follow basic legal commands
claimed that he verified the status of the cargo with DENR and that it came constitutes gross ignorance of the law from which no one may be excused, not
from a legitimate source except that the shipment documents were not in even a judge. On the charges against respondent sheriff, the Court agreed
order. Respondent sheriff contends that it was his ministerial duty to serve the with the OCA that they should be dismissed. Respondent sheriff merely
writ of replevin, absent any instruction to the contrary. complied with his material duty to serve the writ with reasonable celerity and
to execute it promptly in accordance with the mandates.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge was grossly ignorant of the law
and jurisprudence for issuing the writ of replevin. 337. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA)
(PSLINK-TUCP), petitioner, vs. PERLITA BATHAN-VELASCO, Officer in
HELD: Yes. The complaint for replevin states that the shipment of tanbark and Charge, Bureau of Labor Relations, ALERT AND CONCERNED
the vessel on which it was loaded were seized by the NBI for verification of EMPLOYEES FOR BETTER SSS (ACCESS), SOCIAL SECURITY
supporting documents. It also stated that the NBI turned over the seized items SYSTEM, respondents.
to the DENR "for official disposition and appropriate action". These allegations G.R. No. 108765. August 27, 1999
would have been sufficient to alert the respondent judge that the DENR had
custody of the seized items and that administrative proceedings may have DOCTRINE: The rule is well-entrenched that a party must exhaust all
already been commenced concerning the shipment. administrative remedies before resorting to the courts. The premature
invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to one’s cause of action. This
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the courts cannot take cognizance rule would not only give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide the
of cases pending before administrative agencies of special competence. Also, matter by itself correctly, but would also prevent the unnecessary and
the plaintiff in the replevin suit who seeks to recover the shipment from the premature resort to courts. Absent a showing that petitioner had availed itself
DENR had not exhausted the administrative remedies available to him. of and exhausted the appropriate administrative remedies, a premature resort
Prudent thing for the respondent judge to do was to dismiss the replevin to the courts would result in the dismissal of the petition.
outright.
FACTS: Respondent Alert and Concerned Employees for Better Social
Security System (ACCESS) filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations a petition
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for certification election to determine the sole and exclusive bargaining ACCESS as the winner of the election. Unfortunately for petitioner, factual
representative of the rank and file employees of respondent Social Security issues are not proper subjects of an original petition for certiorari before the
System (SSS). On August 24, 1990, the Bureau of Labor Relations ordered a Supreme Court, as its power to review is limited to questions of jurisdiction or
certification election to be conducted among the rank and file employees of grave abuse of discretion of judicial or quasijudicial tribunals or officials.
the SSS in its main office and regional branches. Petitioner Social Security Judicial review does not extend to an evaluation of the sufficiency of the
System Employees Association (SSSEA) (PSLINK-TUCP) was one of the evidence upon which the proper labor officer or office based his or its
contending parties in the certification election, with respondent Alert and determination.
Concerned Employees for Better SSS (ACCESS) as the other party. On
October 11, 1991, the certification elections were held, with ACCESS XI. ELECTION LAW
garnering 1,378 votes, SSSEA obtaining 1,116 votes, and “No Union”
collecting 40 votes. SUFFRAGE
SSSEA filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations, an election protest and/or 338. ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, petitioner vs. COMMISSION ON
motion to annul the certification Election. Director Calleja of the Bureau of ELECTIONS, HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, in his official capacity as
Labor Relations denied the protest and/or motion. SSSEA filed an Election Executive Secretary, and HON. EMILIA T. BONCODIN, Secretary of the
Protest and/or Motion to Nullify Certification Elections in the SSS Regional Department of Budget and Management, respondents.
Office. Respondent Velasco denied the Election Protest and/or Motion to G.R. No. 157013. July 10, 2003
Nullify Certification Elections in the Regional Offices After October 11, 1991,
declared ACCESS the winner in the certification election, and certified DOCTRINE:
ACCESS as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the rank
and file employees of SSS for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with FACTS: Petitioner sought to declare certain provisions of RA No. 9189 as
the latter. unconstitutional, contending that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional being in
violation of Sec. 1, Art. V of the 1987 Constitution requiring that the voter must
ISSUE: Whether or not SSSEA failed to exhaust all administrative remedies be a resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he
before resorting to the courts? proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding an election.
Petitioner cited the ruling of the Court in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals to support
HELD: Yes. The rule is well-entrenched that a party must exhaust all his claim. In that case, the Court held that a “green card” holder immigrant to
administrative remedies before resorting to the courts. The premature the United States is deemed to have abandoned his domicile and residence in
invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to one’s cause of action. This the Philippines.
rule would not only give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide the
matter by itself correctly, but would also prevent the unnecessary and ISSUE: Does section 5(d) of rep. act no. 9189 allowing the registration of
premature resort to courts. voters who are immigrants or permanent residents in other countries by their
mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their intention to return to the
In this case, petitioner failed to take an appeal from the order of the Director, philippines, violate the residency requirement in section 1 of article v of the
Bureau of Labor Relations to the Secretary of Labor, pursuant to Article 259 of constitution?
the Labor Code. Absent a showing that petitioner had availed itself of and
exhausted the appropriate administrative remedies, a premature resort to the HELD: No. Section 5(d) provides:
courts would result in the dismissal of the petition.
Sec. 5. Disqualifications. — The following shall be disqualified from voting
Moreover, the issues raised by petitioner call for a review of the factual findings under this Act:
of public respondent. Petitioner argues that the certification election should not xxx
have proceeded because of the pendency of a formal charge of a company- d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the
initiated, dominated, or supported union with the Bureau of Labor Relations. 8 host country, unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared
Petitioner further contends that no certification election was held in the regional for the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual
offices of respondent SSS on October 11, 1991, resulting in incomplete physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years
certification election, thereby rendering null and void the proclamation of
330
from approval of his/her registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also its statutory construction and intent of the framers, which is to grant Filipino
state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to immigrants and permanent residents abroad the unquestionable right to
return shall be cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or exercise the right of suffrage (Section 1 Article V) the Court finds that Section
permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and 5 of RA No. 9189 is not constitutionally defective.
his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.
Section 5 of RA No. 9189 enumerates those who are disqualified voting under REGISTRATION OF VOTERS
this Act. It disqualifies an immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized
as such in the host country. However, an exception is provided i.e. unless 339. Akbayan-Youth vs. Commission on Elections
he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by G.R No. 147066, March 26, 2001
the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent
residence in the Philippines not later than 3 years from approval of registration. DOCTRINE: The right of suffrage ardently invoked by herein petitioners, is not
Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in at all absolute. Needless to say, the exercise of the right of suffrage, as in the
another country. Failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the name enjoyment of all other rights, is subject to existing substantive and procedural
of the immigrant or permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee requirements embodied in our Constitution, statute books and other
Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia. repositories of law.

Petitioner claims that this is violative of the residency requirement in Section 1 FACTS: Petitioners—representing the youth sector—seek to direct the
Article V of the Constitution which requires the voter must be a resident in the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to conduct a special registration before
Philippines for at least one yr, and a resident in the place where he proposes the May 14, 2001 General Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21. According
to vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding an election. to petitioners, around four million youth failed to register on or before the
December 27, 2000 deadline set by the respondent COMELEC under
However, OSG held that ruling in said case does not hold water at present, Republic Act No. 8189. 2 Acting on the clamor of the students and civic
and that the Court may have to discard that particular ruling. Panacea of the leaders, Senator Raul Roco, Chairman of the Committee on Electoral
controversy: Affidavit for without it, the presumption of abandonment of Phil Reforms, Suffrage, and People’s Participation, through a Letter invited the
domicile shall remain. The qualified Filipino abroad who executed an affidavit COMELEC to a public hearing for the purpose of discussing the extension of
is deemed to have retained his domicile in the Philippines and presumed not the registration of voters to accommodate those who were not able to register
to have lost his domicile by his physical absence from this country. Section 5 before the COMELEC deadline. Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco
of RA No. 9189 does not only require the promise to resume actual physical and Ralph C. Lantion, together with Consultant Resurreccion Z. Borra (now
permanent residence in the Philippines not later than 3 years after approval of Commissioner) attended the public hearing called by the Senate Committee
registration but it also requires the Filipino abroad, WON he is a green card headed by Senator Roco.
holder, a temporary visitor or even on business trip, must declare that he/she
has not applied for citizenship in another country. Thus, he/she must return to Commissioners Tancangco and Lantion submitted Memorandum No. 2001-
the Philippines otherwise consequences will be met according to RA No. 9189. 027 on the Report on the Request for a Two-day Additional Registration of
New Voters Only. Immediately, Commissioner Borra called a consultation
Although there is a possibility that the Filipino will not return after he has meeting among regional heads and representatives, and a number of senior
exercised his right to vote, the Court is not in a position to rule on the wisdom staff headed by Executive Director Mamasapunod Aguam. It was the
of the law or to repeal or modify it if such law is found to be impractical. consensus of the group, with the exception of Director Jose Tolentino, Jr. of
However, it can be said that the Congress itself was conscious of this the ASD, to disapprove the request for additional registration of voters on the
probability and provided for deterrence which is that the Filipino who fails to ground that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 explicitly provides that no registration shall
return as promised stands to lose his right of suffrage. Accordingly, the votes be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before
he cast shall not be invalidated because he was qualified to vote on the date a regular election and that the Commission has no more time left to accomplish
of the elections. all pre-election activities.

Expressum facit cessare tacitum: where a law sets down plainly its whole Commissioners Rufino S.B. Javier and Mehol K. Sadain voted to deny the
meaning, the Court is prevented from making it mean what the Court pleases. request while Commissioners Luzviminda Tancangco and Ralph Lantion voted
In fine, considering that underlying intent of the Constitution, as is evident in
331
to accommodate the students’ request. With this impasse, the Commission Under these circumstances, we rule that the COMELEC in denying the request
construed its Resolution as having taken effect. Aggrieved by the denial, of petitioners to hold a special registration, acted within the bounds and
petitioners AKBAYAN-Youth, SCAP, UCSC, MASP, KOMPIL II (YOUTH), et confines of the applicable law on the matter—Section 8 of RA 8189. In issuing
al. filed before this Court the instant Petition the assailed Resolution, respondent COMELEC simply performed its
constitutional task to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative
ISSUE: Whether or not this Court can compel respondent COMELEC, through to the conduct of an election, inter alia, questions relating to the registration of
the extraordinary writ of mandamus, to conduct a special registration of new voters; evidently, respondent COMELEC merely exercised a prerogative that
voters during the period between the COMELEC’s imposed December 27, chiefly pertains to it and one which squarely falls within the proper sphere of
2000 deadline and the May 14, 2001 general elections. its constitutionally- mandated powers. Hence, whatever action respondent
takes in the exercise of its wide latitude of discretion, specifically on matters
HELD: The right of suffrage ardently invoked by herein petitioners, is not at all involving voters’ registration, pertains to the wisdom rather than the legality of
absolute. Needless to say, the exercise of the right of suffrage, as in the the act.
enjoyment of all other rights, is subject to existing substantive and procedural
requirements embodied in our Constitution, statute books and other
repositories of law. INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION PROCEEDINGS

Section 8 of R.A. 8189, which provides a system of continuing registration, is 340. Lokin vs. COMELEC
explicit, to wit: G.R. Nos. 179431-32, June 22, 2010
SEC. 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters.—The Personal filing of
application of registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the FACTS:
Election Officer during regular office hours. No registration shall, however, be
The Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), a duly registered
conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a
party-list organization, manifested their intent to participate in the May 14, 2004
regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election.”
synchronized national and local elections. They submitted a list of five
nominees from which its representatives would be chosen should CIBAC
Likewise, Section 35 of R.A. 8189, which among others, speaks of a prohibitive
obtain the number of qualifying votes. Prior to the elections, the list of
period within which to file a sworn petition for the exclusion of voters from the
nominees was amended. The nominations of the petitioner Lokin, Sherwin
permanent voter’s list, provides: “SEC. 35. Petition for Exclusion of Voters from
Tugna and Emil Galang were withdrawn. Armi Jane Borje was substituted.
the List—Any registered voter, representative of a political party x x x may file
Emmanuel Joel Villanueva and Chinchona Cruz-Gonzales were retained.
x x x except one hundred (100) days prior to a regular election x x x.”
Election results showed that CIBAC was entitled to a second seat and
In light of the foregoing doctrine, we hold that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 applies that Lokin, as second nominee on the original list, to a proclamation, which
in the present case, for the purpose of upholding the assailed COMELEC was opposed by Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales. The COMELEC resolved the
Resolution and denying the instant petitions, considering that the aforesaid law matter on the validity of the amendment of the list of nominees and the
explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted during the period withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang. It approved the
starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election. Corollarily, it amendment of the list of nominees. The COMELEC en banc proclaimed Cruz-
is specious for herein petitioners to argue that respondent COMELEC may Gonzales as the official second nominee of CIBAC. Cruz-Gonzales took her
validly and legally conduct a two-day special registration, through the oath of office as a Party-List Representative of CIBAC.
expedient of the letter of Section 28 of R.A. 8436. To this end, the provisions
of Section 28, R.A. 8436 would come into play in cases where the pre-election A petition for certiorari was filed assailing Section 13 of Resolution No.
acts are susceptible of performance within the available period prior to election 7804 alleging that it expanded Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 by allowing CIBAC
day. In more categorical language, Section 28 of R.A. 8436 is, to our mind, to change its nominees.
anchored on the sound premise that these certain “pre-election acts” are still
capable of being reasonably performed vis-a-vis the remaining period before
the date of election and the conduct of other related pre-election activities ISSUE:
required under the law.

332
 Whether Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; and (3) when the nominee
violates the Party-List System Act; and whether or not the COMELEC becomes incapacitated. When the statute enumerates the exception to the
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction application of the general rule, the exceptions are strictly but reasonably
in approving the withdrawal of the nominees of CIBAC and allowing the construed.
amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC without any basis in fact or law
and after the close of polls. Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded the exceptions under
Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 when it provided four instances by adding
“nomination is withdrawn by the party” as statutory ground for substituting a
nominee. COMELEC had no authority to expand, extend, or add anything to
RULING: law it seeks to implement. An IRR should remain consistent with the law it
Election protest is a contest between the defeated and the winning intends to carry out not override, supplant or modify it. An IRR adopted
candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds and irregularities, to pursuant to the law is itself law but in case of conflict between the law and the
determine who obtained the higher number of votes entitling them to hold the IRR, the law prevails.
office. On the other hand, a special civil action for quo warranto questions the Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was declared invalid and of no
ineligibility of the winning candidate. This is a special civil action for certiorari effect to the extent that it authorizes a party-list organization to withdraw its
against the COMELEC to seek the review of the resolution of the COMELEC nomination of a nominee once it has submitted the nomination to the
in accordance with Section 7 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution. COMELEC.
The Court held that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was invalid.
The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7804 as an implementing rules and
regulations in accordance with the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code 341. Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC
and the Party-List System Act. As an administrative agency, it cannot amend
an act of Congress nor issue IRRs that may enlarge, alter or restrict the G.R. No. 203766
provisions of the law it administers and enforces. Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 FACTS:
provides that: Each registered party, organization or coalition shall submit to
the COMELEC not later than forty-five (45) days before the election a list of Approximately 280 groups and organizations manifested their desire
names, not less than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be to participate in the party-list elections in line with the then upcoming national
chosen in case it obtains the required number of votes. elections in May 2013. 52 of these groups were subsequently disqualified by
COMELEC, including some that were duly registered and accredited as
A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who political parties. The reasons for their exclusion were based on the contention
have given their consent in writing may be named in the list. The list shall not that said groups failed to establish they were representatives of marginalized
include any candidate of any elective office or a person who has lost his bid and underrepresented sectors and that their nominees were indeed members
for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. No change of of the sectors they were seeking to represent.
names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same
shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the
nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated
in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the ISSUE:
list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who
Whether COMELEC erred in disqualifying 52 party list groups from
are nominated in the party-list system shall not be considered resigned.
participating in the May 2013 elections.
There is no room for interpretation or construction but only for
application. Section 8 clearly prohibits the change of nominees and alteration
of the order in the list of nominees’ names after submission of the list to the RULING:
COMELEC. It enumerates only three instances in which an organization can
substitute another person in place of the nominee whose name has been No, COMELEC merely followed existing jurisprudence set forth by the
submitted to the COMELEC : (1) when the nominee dies; (2) when the Supreme Court in its earlier rulings. For purposes of setting uniform standards
and understanding of the party-list system in the Philippines, the Court
333
provides a lengthy account of the history and dynamics of the party-list system Constitution. The recommendation of the head of the legal group of
as embodied in the 1987 Constitution and as envisioned by the Framers, and COMELEC’s national board of canvassers to declare the petition moot and
institutes new guidelines to be used in resolving issues of similar nature in the academic was approved by the COMELEC en banc and declared further in a
future. resolution that the winning party list will be resolved using the Veterans ruling.
The party-list system can be found in Section 5, Art. VI; Sections 7
and 8, Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution. The rationale behind the party-list
system is to democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot ISSUE:
win in legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the House of Whether the 20% allocation for party-list representatives provided in
Representatives. The party-list system is not synonymous with sectoral Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling; and whether
representation. Under the party-list system, all voters get to have two votes: the 2% threshold and “qualifier” votes prescribed by the same Sec 11(b) of RA
one for their choice of legislative district representative, and another for their 7941 constitutional.
choice of party-list representative. But under sectoral representation, majority
of the electorate will only have one vote, which is for their choice of legislative
district representative. In contrast, members of sectoral communities (e.g. RULING:
farmers, laborers, indigenous cultural communities, etc.) will have two votes:
one for their district representative and another for their choice of sectoral Neither the Constitution nor R.A. 7941 mandates the filling up of the
representative. entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution.
The Constitution left the determination of the number of the members of the
The party-list system is open to both sectoral and non-sectoral groups. House of Representatives to Congress. The 20% allocation of party-list
The framers intended sectoral groups to constitute a part, but not the entirety, representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more
of the party-list system. then 20% of the members of the House of Representatives. In computing the
allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent
As per Section 5(1) of Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, any of the following can threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second
take part in party-list elections: national parties and organizations, regional clause of Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 is unconstitutional.
parties and organizations, and sectoral parties and organizations.
The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution
of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that
In BANAT v. COMELEC, the Court held that party-list nominees must 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-
come from the sector they seek to represent. Thus, a party-list representing list representatives. The Court strike down the two percent threshold only in
farmers should have farmer nominees, too. This was one of COMELEC's relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause
bases in disqualifying the 52 petitioners. However, the Court reverses its ruling of Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted
in BANAT v. COMELEC by instituting new parameters, including the obstacle to the full implementation of Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution and
guidelines for the choice of nominees. Under the new parameters, a nominee prevents the attainment of “the broadest possible representation of party,
may either be a member of the sector he seeks to represent or at the very sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.” The framers of
least, should have a track record of advocacy for such sector. the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in
party-list elections through their sectoral wings. By vote of 8-7, the Court
decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties
from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
342 & 343. Banat v. Comelec
GR 179271 (2009) FILING OF CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY
FACTS:
344. MAYOR BARBARA RUBY C. TALAGA v. COMELEC
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency
(BANAT) filed before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition to GR No. 196804, 2012-10-09
proclaim the full number of party list representatives provided by the
334
 Castillo petition in SPA 09-029 (DC) was in the nature of a petition to deny due
course to or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus
FACTS: Election Code. Ramon himself specifically admitted his ineligibility when he
Ramon Talaga (Ramon) and Philip M. Castillo (Castillo) respectively filed his Manifestation with Motion to Resolve on December 30, 2009 in the
filed their certificates of candidacy (CoCs) for the position of Mayor of Lucena COMELEC. That sufficed to render his Certificate of Candidacy invalid,
City. Castillo filed with the COMELEC a petition to Deny Due Course to or considering that for all intents and purposes the COMELEC's declaration of
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. as Mayor for Having his disqualification had the effect of announcing that he was no candidate at
Already Served Three (3) Consecutive Terms as a City Mayor of Lucena. all. A non-candidate like Ramon had no right to pass on to his substitute.
Notwithstanding his express recognition of his disqualification to run as Mayor
of Lucena City in the May 10, 2010 national and local elections, Ramon did
not withdraw his Certificate of Candidacy. Barbara Ruby filed her own 345. RENATOM. FEDERICO v. COMELEC
Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Lucena City in substitution of Ramon,
attaching thereto the Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance (CONA) issued GR No. 199612, 2013-01-22
by Lakas-Kampi-CMD. On election day on May 10, 2010, the name of Ramon
remained printed on the ballots but the votes cast in his favor were counted in
favor of Barbara Ruby as his substitute candidate, resulting in Barbara Ruby FACTS:
with 44,099 votes as against Castillo's 39,615 votes. He alleged that Barbara
Ruby could not substitute Ramon because his Certificate of Candidacy had Edna Sanchez (Edna) and private respondent Osmundo M. Maligaya
been cancelled and denied due course; and Barbara Ruby could not be (Maligaya) were candidates for the position of municipal mayor of Sto. Tomas,
considered a candidate because the COMELEC En Banc had approved her Batangas. Armando Sanchez, husband of Edna and the gubernatorial
substitution three days after the elections; hence, the votes cast for Ramon candidate for the province of Batangas, died. Two days later, Edna withdrew
should be considered stray. her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of mayor. She then filed a
new Certificate of Candidacy for the position of governor as substitute
candidate for her deceased husband.
ISSUES: Maligaya sought to have Federico declared ineligible to run as
substitute candidate for Edna because the period to file the Certificate of
Whether the substitution by Barbara Ruby as candidate for the Candidacy for substitute candidates had already lapsed. COMELEC En Banc
position of Mayor of Lucena City in lieu of Ramon, her husband is valid. gave due course to the COC of Edna as substitute gubernatorial candidate in
the Batangas province and to that of Federico as substitute mayoralty
candidate in Sto. Tomas. On the day of elections, the name "SANCHEZ, Edna
RULING: P." was retained in the list of candidates for Mayor of Sto. Tomas, and
garnered the highest number of votes against Maligaya.
Existence of a valid Certificate of Candidacy is a condition sine qua
non for a valid substitution. The filing within the period provided by law is a Maligaya filed his Petition to Annul Proclamation of Respondent Renato M.
mandatory requirement for any person to be considered a candidate in a Federico. Meanwhile, Maligaya's petition to deny due course and to cancel the
national or local election. This is clear from Section 73 of the Omnibus Election COC of Federico was denied by the Comelec.
Code. A person's declaration of his intention to run for public office and his
affirmation that he possesses the eligibility for the position he seeks to assume,
followed by the timely filing of such declaration, constitute a valid Certificate of ISSUE:
Candidacy that render the person making the declaration a valid or official
candidate. Whether Federico could validly substitute Edna who withdrew her
candidacy for the mayoralty position and whether he should be succeeded by
Declaration of Ramon's disqualification rendered his Certificate of Intervenor Silva under the Local Government Code or replaced by Maligaya.
Candidacy invalid. He was not a valid candidate to be properly substituted.
The Court concurs with the conclusion of the COMELEC En Banc that the

335
RULING: elected and serving for more than three consecutive terms for the same
position.
Federico's substitution of Edna Sanchez as mayoralty candidate was
not valid. Comelec En Banc annulled Federico's proclamation as mayor on the Lonzanida's motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En
ground that his substitution of Edna was invalid, the substitute COC and CONA Banc remained pending during the May 2010 elections, Lonzanida and Efren
having been filed after the deadline provided for under Section 13 of Comelec Racel Aratea (Aratea) garnered the highest number of voles and were
Resolution No. 8678. The substitute for a candidate who withdrew may file his respectively proclaimed Mayor and Vice-Mayor.
certificate of candidacy as herein provided for the office affected not later than
December 14, 2009. Considering that the deadline for substitution in case of Aratea took his oath of office as Acting Mayor before Regional Trial
withdrawal had already lapsed, no person could substitute her as mayoralty Court (RTC) Judge Raymond C. Viray of Branch 75, Olongapo City on 5 July
candidate. The sudden death of then Governor Armando Sanchez and the 2010. On the same date, Aratea wrote the Department of Interior and Local
substitution by his widow in the gubernatorial race could not justify a belated Government (DILG) and requested for an opinion on whether, as Vice-Mayor,
substitution in the mayoralty race. he was legally required to assume the Office of the Mayor in view of
Lonzanida's disqualification. DILG Legal Opinion No. 117, S. 2010 stated that
Lonzanida was disqualified to hold office by reason of his criminal conviction.
As a consequence of Lonzanida's disqualification, the Office of the Mayor was
The Court agrees with the OSG that Resolution No. 8889 was void as deemed permanently vacant. Thus, Aratea should assume the Office of the
it was in contravention of the guidelines set forth under Resolution No. 8678. Mayor in an acting capacity without prejudice to the COMELEC's resolution of
With respect to Federico, it cannot be regarded as a valid source of any right, Lonzanida's motion for reconsideration.
like the right to be voted for public office. Indeed, a void judgment can never
be final and executory and may be assailed at any time "Where a proclamation
is null and void, the proclamation is no proclamation at all and the proclaimed
candidate's assumption of office cannot deprive the Comelec of the power to ISSUE:
declare such nullity and annul the proclamation." The votes garnered by Edna Whether Lonzanida was disqualified under Section 68 of the Omnibus
could not be credited to Federico as he was never a legitimate candidate. Election Code, or made a false material representation under Section 78 of
the same Code that resulted in his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio,
is determinative of whether Aratea or Antipolo is the rightful occupant to the
346. ARATEA VS. COMELEC Office of the Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.
G.R. No. 195229, October 09, 2012
RULING:
FACTS: Antipolo, the alleged "second placer," should be proclaimed Mayor
because Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was void ab initio. In short,
Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida) and Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) Lonzanida was never a candidate at all. All votes for Lonzanida were stray
were candidates for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010 National votes. Thus, Antipolo, the only qualified candidate, actually garnered the
and Local Elections. On 8 December 2009, Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo (Rodolfo) highest number of votes for the position of Mayor.
filed a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to disqualify
Lonzanida and to deny due course or to cancel Lonzanida's certificate of
candidacy on the ground that Lonzanida was elected, and had served, as
mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for four (4) consecutive terms immediately A petition for disqualification tinder Section 68 clearly refers to "the
prior to the term for the May 2010 elections. Rodolfo asserted that Lonzanida commission of prohibited acts and possession of a permanent resident status
made a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy when in a foreign country." All the offenses mentioned in Section 68 refer to election
Lonzanida certified under oath that he was eligible for the office he sought offenses under the Omnibus Election Code, not to violations of other penal
election. Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and Section 43(b) of the laws. There is absolutely nothing in the language of Section 68 that would
Local Government Code both prohibit a local elective official from being justify including violation of the three-term limit rule, or conviction by final
judgment of the crime of falsification under the Revised Penal Code, as one of
336
the grounds or offenses covered under Section 68. Clearly, the violation by candidacy on 5 January 2004, the COMELEC had the ministerial duty to
Lonzanida of the three-term limit rule, or his conviction by final judgment of the receive and acknowledge receipt of Hans Roger's certificate of candidacy.
crime of falsification under the Revised Penal Code, does not constitute a Thus, the COMELEC had the ministerial duty to give due course to Hans
ground for a petition under Section 68. Roger's certificate of candidacy. Section 77 of the Election Code prescribes
the rules on substitution of an official candidate of a registered political party
The conviction of Lonzanida by final judgment, with the penalty who dies, withdraws, or is disqualified for any cause after the last day for the
of prision mayor, disqualifies him perpetually from holding any public office, or filing of certificate of candidacy. Hans Roger withdrew his certificate of
from being elected to any public office. This perpetual disqualification took candidacy and the COMELEC found that Luna complied with all the procedural
effect upon the finality of the judgment of conviction, before Lonzanida filed his requirements for a valid substitution, Luna can validly substitute for Hans
certificate of candidacy. Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was cancelled Roger. In this case, there was no petition to deny due course to or cancel the
because he was ineligible or not qualified to run for Mayor. Whether his certificate of candidacy of Hans Roger. The COMELEC only declared that
certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial Hans Roger did not file a valid certificate of candidacy and, thus, was not a
because the cancellation on such ground means he was never a candidate valid candidate in the petition to deny due course to or cancel Luna's certificate
from the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. There of candidacy. In effect, the COMELEC, without the proper proceedings,
was only one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 2010 elections. Antipolo, cancelled Hans Roger's certificate of candidacy and declared the substitution
who therefore received the highest number of votes. by Luna invalid.

347. JOY CHRISMA B. LUNA v. COMELEC 348 & 350. Jalosjos v. COMELEC
GR NO. 165983, 2007-04-24 G.R. No. 191970 April 24, 2012
FACTS:
FACTS: Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He Migrated to
Luna filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of vice-mayor of Australia and acquired Australian citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at age
Lagayan, Abra as a substitute for Hans Roger, who withdrew his certificate of 35, he returned to the Philippines and lived with his brother in Barangay
candidacy. Ruperto Blanco, Election Officer of Lagayan, Abra removed the Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Upon his return, he took an oath
name of Hans Roger from the list of candidates and placed the name of Luna. of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and was issued a Certificate of
Private respondents alleged that Luna made a false material representation in Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. He then renounced his Australian
her certificate of candidacy because Luna is not a registered voter of Lagayan, citizenship in September 2009. He acquired residential property where he lived
Abra but a registered voter of Bangued, Abra. and applied for registration as voter in the Municipality of Ipil. His application
was opposed by the Barangay Captain of Veterans Village, Dan Erasmo, Sr.
but was eventually granted by the ERB.

ISSUES:
Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it Jalosjos filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Governor of Zamboanga
ruled that there was no valid substitution by Luna for Hans Roger. Sibugay Province. Erasmo filed a petition to deny or cancel said COC on the
ground of failure to comply with R.A. 9225 and the one year residency
requirement of the local government code.
RULING:
ISSUE:
Substitution of Luna for Hans Roger was Valid. When a candidate files
his certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC has a ministerial duty to receive Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion
and acknowledge its receipt. Section 76 of the Omnibus Election Code amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that Jalosjos failed to
(Election Code). In this case, when Hans Roger filed his certificate of
337
present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his
Zamboanga Sibugay. domicile in Ipil since he has merely been staying at his brother’s house. But
this circumstance alone cannot support such conclusion. Indeed, the Court
has repeatedly held that a candidate is not required to have a house in a
RULING: community to establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is
The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the sufficient that he should live there even if it be in a rented house or in the house
position of provincial governor to be a resident of the province for at least one of a friend or relative. To insist that the candidate own the house where he
year before the election. For purposes of the election laws, the requirement of lives would make property a qualification for public office. What matters is that
residence is synonymous with domicile, meaning that a person must not only Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an
intend to reside in a particular place but must also have personal presence in intention of making it his domicile.
such place coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.

349. LABO VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 105111, July 03, 1992
The question of residence is a question of intention. Jurisprudence
has laid down the following guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or
residence somewhere; (b) where once established, that domicile remains until Shortly after petitioner Labo filed his certificate of candidacy, petitioner
he acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a time. Ortega filed on March 26, 1992, a disqualification proceeding against Labo
before the Commission on Elections (Comelec), docketed as SPA No. 92-029,
seeking to cancel Labo's certificate of candidacy on the ground that Labo
It is inevitable under these guidelines and the precedents applying made a false representation when he stated therein that he (Labo) is a
them that Jalosjos has met the residency requirement for provincial governor "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines. Summons in the disqualification case
of Zamboanga Sibugay. Quezon City was Jalosjos’ domicile of origin, the place was issued by the Comelec on March 27, 1992 to petitioner Labo followed by
of his birth. It may be taken for granted that he effectively changed his domicile a telegram dated April 1, 1992, requiring him to file his Answer within three (3)
from Quezon City to Australia when he migrated there at the age of eight, non-extendible days but the latter failed to respond. The Comelec issued
acquired Australian citizenship, and lived in that country for 26 years. Australia another order directing the Election Registrar of Baguio City to personally
became his domicile by operation of law and by choice. When he came to the deliver the summons.
Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay,
it is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile for good. He
left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance ISSUE:
to that country. In addition, he reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued a The validity of the citizenship and/or Labo's alienage - the very
Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of essence which strikes at the very core of petitioner Labo's qualification to
Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, assume the contested office, he being an alien and not a Filipino citizen.
clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has since lived Whether the disqualification of petitioner Labo entitles the candidate (Ortega)
nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. receiving the next highest number of votes to be proclaimed as the winning
candidate for mayor of Baguio City.

To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga

Sibugay despite the loss of his domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his RULING:
domicile of choice and by operation of law (Australia) would violate the settled The disqualification of petitioner Labo does not necessarily entitle
maxim that a man must have a domicile or residence somewhere. petitioner Ortega as the candidate with the next highest number of votes to
proclamation as the mayor of Baguio City.

338
 While Ortega may have garnered the second highest number of votes dispersed soon after the completion of such filing. The COMELEC disqualified
for the office of city mayor, the fact remains that he was not the choice of the Penera but absolved the other candidates from Penera’s party from violation
sovereign will. Petitioner Labo was overwhelmingly voted by the electorate for of section 80 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.
the office of mayor in the belief that he was then qualified to serve the people
of Baguio City and his subsequent disqualification does not make respondent
Ortega the mayor-elect. In the earlier case of Labo v. Comelec, held: "Finally, ISSUE:
there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the
quo warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The Whether or not the new definition of the term “candidate” in Section 15
simple reason is that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes of RA 8436 as amended by RA 9369 is in conflict with Section 80 of the
in the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City." Omnibus Election Code such that premature campaigning may no longer be
committed.

CAMPAIGN
RULING:
351. Penera vs. COMELEC and Andanar
G.R. No. 181613, September 11, 2009 In denying Penera’s petition, the Supreme Court, through Associate
Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario, found that Penera and her witnesses admitted
FACTS:
that the vehicles, consisting of two jeepneys and ten motorcycles, were
Congress has laid down the law — a candidate is liable for election festooned with multi-colored balloons; the motorcade went around three
offenses only upon the start of the campaign period. This Court has no power barangays in Sta. Monica; and Penera and her partymates waved their hands
to ignore the clear and express mandate of the law that “any person who files and threw sweet candies to the crowd. Thus, for violating Section 80 of the
his certificate of candidacy within [the filing] period shall only be considered a Omnibus Election Code, proscribing election campaign or partisan political
candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate activity outside the campaign period, Penera was disqualified from holding the
of candidacy.” Neither can this Court turn a blind eye to the express and clear office of Mayor of Sta. Monica. The Court declared that “there is no absolute
language of the law that “any unlawful act or omission applicable to a and irreconcilable incompatibility between Section 15 of Republic Act No.
candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period.” The 8436, as amended, and Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, which
ultimate winner in this case is Mayor Rosalinda Penera after the Supreme defines the prohibited act of premature campaigning. “True, that pursuant to
Court promulgated its November 25, 2009 Decision overturning its earlier Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, even after the filing of the
decision (September 11, 2009 Decision) after a Motion for Reconsideration COC but before the start of the campaign period, a person is not yet officially
was filed by aggrieved Mayor Penera. considered a candidate. Nevertheless, a person, upon the filing of his/her
COC, already explicitly declares his/her intention to run as a candidate in the
Penera and private respondent Edgar T. Andanar were mayoralty coming elections. The commission by such a person of any of the acts
candidates in Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte during the 14 May 2007 enumerated under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code (i.e., holding
elections. On 2 April 2007, Andanar filed before the Office of the Regional rallies or parades, making speeches, etc.) can, thus, be logically and
Election Director (ORED), Caraga Region (Region XIII), a Petition for reasonably construed as for the purpose of promoting his/her intended
Disqualification against Penera, as well as the candidates for Vice-Mayor and candidacy.
Sangguniang Bayan who belonged to her political party, for unlawfully
engaging in election campaigning and partisan political activity prior to the When the campaign period starts and said person proceeds with
commencement of the campaign period. Andanar claimed that on 29 March his/her candidacy, his/her intent turning into actuality, we can already consider
2007 – a day before the start of the authorized campaign period on 30 March his/her acts, after the filing of his/her COC and prior to the campaign period,
2007 – Penera and her partymates went around the different barangays in Sta. as the promotion of his/her election as a candidate, hence, constituting
Monica, announcing their candidacies and requesting the people to vote for premature campaigning, for which he/she may be disqualified. Also,
them on the day of the elections. Penera alone filed an Answer denying the conversely, if said person, for any reason, withdraws his/her COC before the
charges but admitted that a motorcade did take place and that it was simply in campaign period, then there is no point to view his/her acts prior to said period
accordance with the usual practice in nearby cities and provinces, where the as acts for the promotion of his/her election as a candidate. In the latter case,
filing of certificates of candidacy (COCs) was preceded by a motorcade, which
339
there can be no premature campaigning as there is no candidate, whose printing the ballots. On 29 March 2007, the law still did not consider Penera a
disqualification may be sought, to begin with. candidate for purposes other than the printing of ballots. Acts committed by
Penera prior to 30 March 2007, the date when she became a “candidate,” even
A person, after filing his/her COC but prior to his/her becoming a if constituting election campaigning or partisan political activities, are not
candidate (thus, prior to the start of the campaign period), can already commit punishable under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Such acts are
the acts described under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code as within the realm of a citizen’s protected freedom of expression. Acts committed
election campaign or partisan political activity. However, only after said person by Penera within the campaign period are not covered by Section 80 as
officially becomes a candidate, at the beginning of the campaign period, can Section 80 punishes only acts outside the campaign period.
said acts be given effect as premature campaigning under Section 80 of the
Omnibus Election Code. Only after said person officially becomes a candidate,
at the start of the campaign period, can his/her disqualification be sought for
acts constituting premature campaigning. 352. HENRY P. LANOT v. COMELEC

As explained by the Supreme Court in the case of Lanot vs. GR NO. 164858, 2006-11-16
COMELEC, a person who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate FACTS:
until the start of the campaign period. Thus, the essential elements for violation
of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code are: (1) a person engages in an On 19 March 2004, Henry P. Lanot ("Lanot"), Vener Obispo
election campaign or partisan political activity; (2) the act is designed to ("Obispo"), Roberto Peralta ("Peralta"), Reynaldo dela Paz ("dela Paz"),
promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates; (3) the Edilberto Yamat ("Yamat"), and Ram Alan Cruz ("Cruz") (collectively,
act is done outside the campaign period. "petitioners"), filed a petition for disqualification under Sections 68 and 80 of
the Omnibus Election Code against Eusebio before the COMELEC. Peralta,
The second element requires the existence of a “candidate.” Under dela Paz, Yamat, and Cruz were candidates for Pasig City Councilor in the 10
Section 79(a), a candidate is one who “has filed a certificate of candidacy” to May 2004 elections. On election day itself, Chairman Abalos issued the first of
an elective public office. Unless one has filed his certificate of candidacy, he the three questioned COMELEC issuances. In a memorandum, Chairman
is not a “candidate.” The third element requires that the campaign period has Abalos enjoined Director Ladra from implementing the COMELEC First
not started when the election campaign or partisan political activity is Division's 5 May 2004 resolution due to Eusebio's motion for reconsideration.
committed.
On 11 May 2004, the day after the elections, petitioners Lanot, Peralta,
Assuming that all candidates to a public office file their certificates of dela Paz, Yamat, and Cruz filed before the COMELEC En Banc a motion to
candidacy on the last day, which under Section 75 of the Omnibus Election suspend the counting and canvassing of votes and the proclamation of the
Code is the day before the start of the campaign period, then no one can be winning mayoral candidate for Pasig City.
prosecuted for violation of Section 80 for acts done prior to such last day.
Before such last day, there is no “particular candidate or candidates” to
campaign for or against. On the day immediately after the last day of filing, the
campaign period starts and Section 80 ceases to apply since Section 80 ISSUES:
covers only acts done “outside” the campaign period.
Petitioners alleged that Eusebio engaged in an election campaign in
Thus, if all candidates file their certificates of candidacy on the last various forms on various occasions outside of the designated campaign
day, Section 80 may only apply to acts done on such last day, which is before period, such as (1) addressing a large group of people during a medical
the start of the campaign period and after at least one candidate has filed his mission sponsored by the Pasig City government; (2) uttering defamatory
certificate of candidacy. This is perhaps the reason why those running for statements against Lanot; (3) causing the publication of a press release
elective public office usually file their certificates of candidacy on the last day predicting his victory; (4) installing billboards, streamers, posters, and stickers
or close to the last day. printed with his surname across Pasig City; and (5) distributing shoes to
schoolchildren in Pasig public schools to induce their parents to vote for him.
The campaign period for local officials began on 30 March 2007 and
ended on 12 May 2007. Penera filed her certificate of candidacy on 29 March
2007. Penera was thus a candidate on 29 March 2009 only for purposes of
RULING:
340
 Consequently, pursuant to Section 68 (a) and (e) of the Omnibus ISSUE:
Election Code, respondent VICENTE P. EUSEBIO shall be DISQUALIFIED to
run for the position of Mayor, Pasig City for violation of Section 80 of the Whether the COMELEC has the authority to deputize the regular
Omnibus Election Code. Ruling of the COMELEC disqualification of prosecution arms of the Government for the investigation and prosecution of
respondent VICENTE P. EUSEBIO from being a candidate for mayor of Pasig election offenses.
City in the May 10, 2004 elections.

RULING:
Under Section 11 of RA 8436, Eusebio became a "candidate," for While Section 265 of the Code vests "exclusive power" to conduct
purposes of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, only on 23 March 2004, preliminary investigation of election offenses and to prosecute the same upon
the last day for filing certificates of candidacy. Applying the facts - as found by the COMELEC, it at the same time authorizes the COMELEC to avail itself of
Director Ladra and affirmed by the COMELEC First Division - to Section 11 of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the Government. Section 2 of
RA 8436, Eusebio clearly did not violate Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Article IX-C of the 1 987 Constitution clearly envisage that the COMELEC
Code which requires the existence of a "candidate," one who has filed his would not be compelled to carry out all its functions directly and by itself alone.
certificate of candidacy, during the commission of the questioned acts.
The contention of private respondents that the deputation by the
COMELEC of the prosecuting arms of the Government would be warranted
only before the elections and only to ensure tree, honest, orderly, peaceful and
credible elections, that is, to perform the peace-keeping functions of
JURISDICTION policemen, lack substance. There is nothing in Section 2 (4) of Article IX-C of
the Constitution which requires such a pinched niggardly interpretation of the
353. People vs. Basilla authority of the COMELEC to appoint as its deputies, officials or employees of
other agencies and instrumentalities of the government. The prompt
G.R. Nos. 83938-40 November 6, 1989 investigation and prosecution and disposition of election offenses constitute
an indispensable part of the task of securing free, orderly, honest, peaceful
FACTS:
and credible elections. The investigation and prosecution of election offenses
The Provincial Fiscal filed three separate criminal complaints against are, in an important sense, more important than the maintenance of physical
the three accused but respondent Judge Henry Basilla motu proprio dismissed order in election precinct. 'without the assistance of provincial and city fiscals
it on the ground that the complainant filed the complaint with the fiscal and not and their assistants and staff members, and of the state prosecutors of the
with the COMELEC and the COMELEC did not investigate the case which Department of Justice, the prompt and fair investigation and prosecution of
violates Sec. 2(6) of Art. IX (C) which states that The Commission on Election election offenses committed before or in the course of nationwide elections
shall “investigate and, when appropriate prosecute cases of violation of would simply not be possible, unless, perhaps, the COMELEC had a
election laws, including acts or omissions, constituting election frauds bureaucracy many times larger than what it actually has. Moreover, the
offenses, malpractices." prosecution officers designated by the COMELEC become deputies or agents
of the COMELEC and pro tanto subject to the authority, control and
The private complainants alleged that the act of Respondent Judge supervision of the COMELEC in respect of the particular functions covered by
dismissing the three criminal information constitute grave abuse of discretion such deputation. The acts of such deputies within the lawful scope of their
amounting to lack of jurisdiction since the COMELEC has authority to deputize delegated authority are, in legal contemplation, the acts of the COMELEC
the chief state prosecutors, provincial and city fiscals and their assistants, itself. The only limitation the Constitution itself places upon the COMELEC’s
under Sections 2 (4) and (8 ), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, and that authority over its deputies relates to the enforcement of such authority through
the COMELEC did deputize such prosecution officers to conduct preliminary administrative sanctions.
investigation of complaints for alleged violation of election laws and to institute
criminal information thereof.
354. ARROYO v. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

341
 G.R. No. 199082 : July 23, 2013 investigate and prosecute cases under Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 or the
Omnibus Election Code, the Court pointed out that the framers of the 1987
FACTS: Constitution did not have such intention. This exclusivity is thus a legislative
On August 15, 2011, the Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. enactment that can very well be amended by Section 43 of RA 9369.
001-2011 creating and constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team Therefore, under the present law, the Comelec and other prosecuting arms of
(referred to as Joint Panel) on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral the government, such as the DOJ, now exercise concurrent jurisdiction in the
fraud and manipulation cases. The Fact-Finding Team concluded that investigation and prosecution of election offenses.
manipulation of the results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial elections in the
provinces of North and South Cotabato, and Maguindanao was indeed
perpetrated. The Fact-Finding Team recommended, among others, that In Comelec Resolution No. 3467, the Comelec maintained the
petitioner Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. (Abalos) be subjected to preliminary continuing deputation of prosecutors and the Comelec Law Department was
investigation for electoral sabotage for conspiring to manipulate the election tasked to supervise the investigatory and prosecutory functions of the task
results in North and South Cotabato; that GMA and Abalos be subjected to force pursuant to the mandate of the Omnibus Election Code. However, with
another preliminary investigation for manipulating the election results in the amendment, the Comelec likewise changed the tenor of the later
Maguindanao; and, that Mike Arroyo be subjected to further investigation. resolutions to reflect the new mandate of the Comelec and other prosecuting
arms of the government now exercising concurrent jurisdiction. Thus, the
The Comelec resolved, among others, that an information for electoral Comelec Law Department and the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor of the
sabotage be filed against GMA and Abalos, while the charges against Mike DOJ were tasked to jointly supervise the investigatory and prosecutory
Arroyo be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. The RTC issued a Warrant functions of the Comelec-DOJ Task Force.
for GMAs arrest which was duly served. GMA was later arraigned and she
entered a plea of "not guilty." She was, for some time, on hospital arrest but
was able to obtain temporary liberty when her motion for bail was granted. At XII. LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
present, she is again on hospital arrest by virtue of a warrant issued in another
criminal case. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION
Mike Arroyo reiterates his arguments on the independence of the 355. TAN VS. COMELEC
Comelec as basis in nullifying the subject joint DOJ-Comelec resolutions. Mike
Arroyo also maintains that the DOJ should conduct preliminary investigation 142 SCRA 727
only when deputized by the Comelec but not exercise concurrent jurisdiction.
Finally, as has been repeatedly pointed out in his earlier pleadings before the DOCTRINE: A plebiscite for creating a new province should include the
Court, Mike Arroyo claims that the proceedings involving the electoral participation of the residents of the mother province for the plebiscite to
sabotage case were rushed because of pressures from the executive branch conform to the constitutional requirements.
of the government. FACTS: B.P. 885 took effect in December 3, 1985, the said B.P. was enacted
for the purpose of creating the new province of Negros del Norte. Petitioners
here are residents of the various municipalities of Negros Occidental filed a
ISSUE: petition for prohibition enjoining the COMELEC from conducting a plebiscite,
as they contends that Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is unconstitutional and is not
Whether or not the creation of Joint Panel is valid. in complete accord with the Local Government Code.

The Constitution provides that “Art. XI Sec. 3. No province, city,

RULING: municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
In Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by
(BANAT) Party-List v. Commission on Elections, the constitutionality of a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.”
Section 43 of RA 9369 had already been raised by petitioners therein and
addressed by the Court. While recognizing the Comelec’s exclusive power to
342
The OSG Solicitor General, filed their Comment, arguing therein that the Comelec issued a proclamation resolving that registered residents of
questioned Batas Pambansa 885, should be accorded the presumption of Cabanatuan City should participate in the said plebiscite.
legality and claimed that Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 does not infringe the
Constitution because the requisites of the Local Government Code have been The governor of Nueva Ecija filed a motion for reconsideration maintaining that
complied with. Furthermore, the case is now become moot and academic with the qualified voters of the province should be included in the said plebiscite.
the proclamation of the new Province of Negros del Norte. The phrase "qualified voters therein" used in Sec. 453 of the LGC should then
be interpreted to refer to the qualified voters of the units directly affected by
ISSUE: WON THE PLEBISCITE CREATING NEGROS DEL NORTE IS the conversion and not just those in the component city proposed to be
VALID? upgraded.
ISSUE: WON the qualified registered voters of the entire province of
RULING: NO, the plebiscite creating Negros Del Norte is not valid. Nueva Ecija or only those in Cabanatuan City can participate in the
plebiscite called for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a
A plebiscite for creating a new province should include the participation of the component city into an HUC
residents of the mother province for the plebiscite to conform to the
constitutional requirements. RULING: QUALIFIED REG, VOTERS OF N.E CAN PARTICIPATE. NOT
ONLY CABANATUAN. - All the qualified registered voters of Nueva Ecija
When the law says the “plebiscite shall be conducted in the areas/unit/units should then be allowed to participate in the plebiscite called for that purpose;
affected” this means that residents of the political entity who stand to be To limit the plebiscite to only the voters of the areas to be partitioned and
economically dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof have the right seceded from the province is as absurd and illogical as allowing only the
to participate in said plebiscite. secessionists to vote for the secession that they demanded against the wishes
of the majority and to nullify the basic principle of majority rule.
In the case at bar, plebiscite was confined only to the inhabitants of the territory
of Negros del Norte, namely: the Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos, and “by the qualified voters therein” in Sec. 453 to mean the qualified voters not
the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, only in the city proposed to be converted to an Highly Urbanized City (HUC)
E.B. Magalona and Don Salvador Benedicto, it did not include the inhabitants but also the voters of the political units directly affected by such conversion in
of other municipalitites in the province of Negros Occidental which is the order to harmonize Sec. 453 with Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution
mother province to be affected by the creation of the new province of Negros
In identifying the Local Government Unit (LGU) or LGUs that should be allowed
Del Norte.
to take part in the plebiscite, what should primarily be determined is whether
or not the unit or units that desire to participate will be “directly affected” by the
356. UMALI VS. COMELEC change. The conversion into a Highly Urbanized City (HUC) carries the
accessory of substantial alteration of boundaries and that the province of
723 SCRA 170 Nueva Ecija will, without a doubt, suffer a reduction in territory because of the
severance of Cabanatuan City. This reduction in both taxing jurisdiction and
DOCTRINE: By the qualified voters it means the qualified voters not only in shares poses a material and substantial change to the province’s economic
the city proposed to be converted to an Highly Urbanized City (HUC) but also rights, warranting its participation in the plebiscite.
the voters of the political units directly affected by such conversion.
FACTS: The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cabanatuan City passed a
resolution requesting the President to declare the conversion of Cabanatuan PRINCIPLES OF LOCAL AUTONOMY
City from a component city of the province of Nueva Ecija into a highly
urbanized city (HUC). Acceding to the request, the President issued a 357. BASCO VS. PAGCOR
Presidential Proclamation proclaiming the City of Cabanatuan as an HUC 197 SCRA 52
subject to ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein, as provided
for in Section 453 of the Local Government Code of 1991. DOCTRINE: The principle of local autonomy does not make local
governments sovereign within the state, it simply means decentralization.

343
FACTS: Petitioners filed a petition to annul the Philippine Amusement and an original charter, and all of its shares of stocks are owned by the National
Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter, because it is allegedly contrary to Government.
morals, public policy and order, and because, that the law creating PAGCOR
P.D. 1869 intrudes into the local government's right to impose local taxes and
license fees. This, in contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle 358. MAGTAJAS VS, PRYCE PROPERTIES
of local autonomy, it also violates the equal protection clause since it legalizes
gambling. 234 SCRA 255
Respondent questioned the legal personality of petitioners to file the instant DOCTRINE: Municipal governments are only agents of the national
petition. government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers
conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate
ISSUE: WON THE LAW CREATING PAGCOR VIOLATES THE PRINCIPLE cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the
OF LOCAL AUTONOMY? latter.

RULING: NO. there is no violation of the principle of Local Autonomy, since FACTS: In 1992 due to the success of PAGCOR business in several cities,
the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means PAGCOR decided to expand its operation in Cagayan De Oro City. Thus, it
decentralization. leased a building/property belonging to the respondent, and they renovated
the said building and prepared it for opening of the Casino during the
The power of local government to impose taxes and fees is always subject to Christmas of 1992.
limitations which Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an
operative law until amended, repealed or revoked, its exemption clause Upon learning of the said intention of Pagcor, the Sangguniang Panglungsod
remains as an exception to the exercise of the power of local governments to of Cagayan De Oro, made an ordinance prohibiting the issuance of business
impose taxes and fees. It cannot therefore be violative, but rather is consistent permit to any establishment for allowing its property to be use for casino
with the principle of local autonomy, since the principle of local autonomy operations. In 1993 it made another ordinance prohibiting the operation of
under the 1987 Constitution simply means decentralization. casino and provides for penalty for such violation.

In the case at bar, City of Manila's power to impose license fees on gambling, Respondent questioned such ordinance in the CA, the CA thus declared that
has long been revoked. As early as 1975, the power of local governments to the said ordinance as invalid and prohibited its enforcement.
regulate gambling thru the grant of franchise, licenses or permits was
Petitioner then files this instant petition to the Supreme Court, and argued that
withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was vested exclusively on the National
the Sangguniang Panlungsod may prohibit the operation of casinos because
Government.
they involve games of chance, which are detrimental to the people. According
Hence, only the National Government has the power to issue licenses or to the petitioner gambling is not allowed by general law and even by the
permits for the operation of gambling. Necessarily, the power to demand or Constitution itself and that the government of Cagayan de Oro City has the
collect license fees which is a consequence of the issuance of licenses or authority to prohibit them within its territory pursuant to the authority entrusted
permits is no longer vested in the City of Manila. to it by the Local Government Code

PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. ISSUE: WON THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO MAY PROHIBIT THE
PAGCOR role is governmental, which places it in the category of an agency OPERATIONS OF PAGCOR IN ITS AREA?
or instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentality of the
RULING: NO. the city of Cagayan de Oro may not prohibit the operations of
Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes.
PAGCOR. Since the Ordinance issued by the Sangguniang panglungsod
Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control
violates P.D. 1869.
by a mere Local government.
To be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following substantive
Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National
requirements:1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute. 2) It
Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with
must not be unfair or oppressive. 3) It must not be partial or discriminatory. 4)

344
It must not prohibit but may regulate trade. 5) It must be general and consistent dictating a uniform amount that a local government unit can disburse as
with public policy. and 6) It must not be unreasonable. additional allowances to judges stationed therein.
The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a ISSUE: WON THE DBM CIRCULAR (LBC 55) INFRINGE ON THE LOCAL
statute is obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of the national AUTONOMY OF MANDAUE CITY?
government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers
conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate RULING: YES, Local Budget Circular No. 55 (LBC 55) infringes on the local
cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the autonomy of Mandaue City.
latter. Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and Section 458, par. (a)(l)(xi), of RA 7160 (Local Government Code) allows the
rights wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life without grant of additional allowances to judges “when the finances of the city
which they cannot exist. This basic relationship between the national government allow.” The said provision does not authorize setting a definite
legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the new maximum limit to the additional allowances granted to judges.
provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy.
Congress retains control of the local government units although in significantly Setting a uniform amount for the grant of additional allowances is an
reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions. inappropriate way of enforcing the criterion found in Section 458, par. (a)(l)(xi),
of RA 7160.
In the case at bar, the power of PAGCOR to centralize and regulate all games
of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction In the case at bar, the DBM over-stepped its power of supervision over local
of the Philippines, remains unimpaired. P.D. 1869 has not been modified by government units by imposing a prohibition that did not correspond with the
the Local Government Code, which empowers the local government units to law it sought to implement
prevent or suppress only those forms of gambling prohibited by law.

360. NATIONAL LIGA NG MGA BRGY. VS. PAREDES

359. DADOLE VS. CA
439 SCRA 130
393 SCRA 262
DOCTRINE: The Liga ng mga Barangay is not subject to control by the Chief
DOCTRINE: Any directive by the President or any of his or her alter egos Executive or his alter ego. The President’s power of the general supervision,
seeking to alter the wisdom of a law—conforming judgment on local affairs of as exercised by the DILG Secretary as his alter ego extends to the Liga ng
a local government unit is a patent nullity because it violates the principle of mga Barangay.
local autonomy and separation of powers of the executive and legislative
departments in governing municipal corporations. FACTS: Sometime in 1997 respondent Manuel A. Rayos Punong Barangay of
Barangay 52 in Caloocan City, filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus,
FACTS: In 1986, the RTC and MTC judges of Mandaue City started receiving with preliminary injunction andTRO in the RTC of Caloocan, alleging that
monthly allowances of P1,260 each through the yearly appropriation ordinance petitioner Alex David Punong Barangay of Barangay 77,Caloocan City and
enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaue City. In 1991, it was then president of the Liga Chapter of Caloocan City and the President Liga ng
increased to P1,500. In 1994, the Department of Budget and Management mga Barangay National Chapter, committed some irregularities in the conduct
(DBM) issued the Local Budget Circular No. 55 (LBC 55) which provided that synchronized Liga ng mga Barangay elections in 1997.
additional allowances should not exceed P1,000 in provinces and cities and
P700 in municipalities. As a result of these alleged irregularities he failed to meet said deadline and
was not able to obtain a certified true copy of the COMELEC Certificate of
As a result of the DBM directive, the auditor of Mandaue City reduced the Canvas and Proclamation of Winning Candidate, which were needed to be a
allowances of the petitioners to P1,000 and were asked to reimbursed the delegate, to vote and be voted for in the Liga election.
amount they received in excess.
A TRO was issued, effective for seventy-two (72) hours, enjoining the holding
The Petitioners protested such disallowances to the COA, and argued that the of the general membership and election meeting of Liga Chapter of Caloocan
LBC 55 is void for infringing on the local autonomy of Mandaue City by City.
345
However, the TRO was allegedly not properly served on herein petitioner In the case at bar, when respondent judge appointed the DILG as interim
David, and so the election for the officers of the Liga-Caloocan was held as caretaker to manage and administer the affairs of the Liga, she effectively
scheduled. Petitioner David was proclaimed President of the Liga- Caloocan, removed the management from the National Liga Board and vested control of
and thereafter took his oath and assumed the position of ex-officio member of the Liga on the DILG. The Acts of the DILG went beyond the sphere of general
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Caloocan City. supervision and constituted direct interference with the political affairs, not only
of the Liga, but more importantly, of the barangay as an institution.
On 17 July 1997, respondent Rayos filed a second petition, this time for quo
warranto, mandamus and prohibition, preliminary injunction and TRO against What the DILG wielded was the power of control which even the President
David. Rayos alleged that he was elected President of the Liga Caloocan does not have. The DILG’s authority over the Liga is limited to seeing to it that
Chapter in the elections held on 14 June 1997 by the members of the the rules are followed, but it cannot lay down such rules itself, nor does it have
Caloocan. The TRO was granted, enjoining therein petitioners from the discretion to modify or replace them.
proceeding with the synchronized elections for the Provincial and Metropolitan
Chapters of the Liga, but only for the purpose of maintaining the status quo
within 72 hours.
POWERS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
The DILG through Sec. Barbers field an Urgent Motion invoking the President’s
power of general supervision over all local government unit and prays that That 361. DRILON VS. LIM
the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), pursuant to its
delegated power of general supervision, be appointed as the Interim Caretaker 235 SCRA 135
to manage and administer the affairs of the Liga, until such time that the new DOCTRINE: Where the Secretary of Justice reviews, pursuant to law, a tax
set of National Liga Officers shall have been duly elected and assumed office. measure enacted by a local government unit to determine if the officials
Petitioner David opposed the DILG’s Urgent Motion and alleged that the performed their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed
DILG’s request to be appointed interim caretaker constitutes undue procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers under
interference in the internal affairs of the Liga, since the Liga is not subject to the Local Government Code, the same is an act of mere supervision, not
DILG control and supervision. control.

The RTC granted the Urgent Motion of the DILG as Caretaker of the Liga. FACTS: The City of Manila enacted Ordinance 7794, otherwise known as
Hence, this petition. Manila Revenue Code. The four (4) major oil companies during that time
questioned the said ordinance and appealed to the then Secretary of Justice
ISSUE: WON THE DILG SECRETARY AS ALTER EGO OF THE Drilon (Petitioner) for being non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in
PRESIDENT HAS THE POWER OF CONTROL OVER THE LIGA? the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary
to law and public policy.
RULING: NO, the DILG secretary as alter ego of the President has no power
of control over the liga. The Liga ng mga Barangay is not subject to control by The Petitioner set aside the Manila Revenue Code and issued the assailed
the Chief Executive or his alter ego. Resulution on the ground that there were no written notices of public hearings
on the proposed Manila Revenue Code that were sent to interested parties as
Art. 10 Sec. 4 of the Philippine Constitution provides that: “The President required by Art. 276(b) of the Implementing Rules of the Local Government
of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Code nor were copies of the proposed ordinance published in three
Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation pursuant to Art. 276(a)
municipalities with respect to component barangays, shall ensure that the acts and on the basis of Section 187 of the Local Government Code which
of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or
functions.” legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of
these grounds.
From the foregoing provision it means that The Liga ng mga Barangay is not
subject to control by the Chief Executive or his alter ego, It only gives the The City of Manila appealed to the RTC, the RTC ruled and revoked the
President the power of general supervision, as exercised by the Department resolution issued by the petitioner and sustained the ordinance, holding inter
of Interior and Local Government (DILG) Secretary as his alter ego. alia that the procedural requirements had been observed. More importantly, it
346
declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional The RTC of Makati issued a resolution granting the complaint of Petitioner and
because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the power of control over authorizing petitioner to take possession of the subject property upon deposit
local governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the of an amount equivalent to 15 percent of its fair market value of the property
Constitution and of the specific provision therein conferring on the President based on its tax declaration.
of the Philippines only the power of supervision over local governments.
Respondents filed their answer alleging that the complaint failed to state a
On appeal the petitioner argued that the Section 187 is constitutional and that cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an
the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as specified ordinance as required by RA 7160 (Local Government Code)
in the Local Government Code had indeed not been observed.
As a result the RTC dismissed the complaint of the petitioner.
ISSUE: WON THE PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS IN THE ENACTMENT
OF ORDINANCE 7794 (MANILA REVENUE CODE) HAVE BEEN On Appeal to the CA, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Hence, this
OBSERVED? petition.

RULING: Yes, the procedural requirements in the enactment of Ordinance ISSUE: WON THE MUNICIPALITY OF PARAÑAQUE CAN EXERCISE ITS
7794 (Manila Revenue Code) have been observed. POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN PURSUANT TO A RESOLUTION BY ITS
LAW-MAKING BODY?
In the case at bar, it shows that the proposed ordinances were published in
the Balita and the Manila Standard on April 21 and 25, 1993, respectively, and RULING: No, the municipality of Parañaque cannot exercise its power of
the approved ordinance was published in the July 3, 4, 5, 1993 issues of the eminent domain pursuant to a resolution.
Manila Standard and in the July 6, 1993 issue of Balita. The only exceptions A Local Government Unit (LGU) may exercise the power to expropriate private
are the posting of the ordinance as approved but this omission does not affect property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latter’s control
its validity, considering that its publication in three successive issues of a and restraints, imposed through the law conferring the power or in other
newspaper of general circulation will satisfy due process. It has also not been legislations.
shown that the text of the ordinance has been translated and disseminated,
but this requirement applies to the approval of local development plans and An LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain: 1. An ordinance is
public investment programs of the local government unit and not to tax enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in
ordinances. behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue
expropriation proceedings over a particular private property. 2. The power of
eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the
362. MUN. OF PARAÑAQUE VS. V.M. REALTY benefit of the poor and the landless. 3. There is payment of just
compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and
292 SCRA 676 other pertinent laws. 4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made
to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not
DOCTRINE: A Local Government Unit (LGU), like the Municipality of accepted.
Parañaque, cannot authorize an expropriation of private property through a
mere resolution of its lawmaking body. In the case at bar, there was no compliance with the first requisite that the
mayor be authorized through an ordinance; RA 7160, the present Local
FACTS: Sometime in 1991, the Sangguniang Bayan of Mun. of Parañaque Government Code which was already in force when the Complaint for
issued Resolution No. 577, for purposes of entering into a negotiated sale of expropriation was filed, explicitly required an ordinance for the purpose.
the property with private respondent, which the latter did not accept. In 1993,
the Municipality of Paranaque filed a complaint for expropriation against the A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but
respondent over two parcels of land, with a combined area of about 10,000 a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking
square meters, located at Wakas, San Dionisio, Parañaque, Metro Manila. the body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent
purpose of the expropriation is to alleviate the living conditions of the character, but a resolution is temporary in nature.
underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless through a socialized
housing project. 363. MALINAO VS. REYES

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 255 SCRA 616 meantime he is reelected, because his reelection results in a condonation of
whatever misconduct he might have committed during his previous term.
DOCTRINE: Every administrative offense. On the other hand, any
administrative disciplinary proceeding against respondent is abated if in the
meantime he is reelected, because his reelection results in a condonation of 364. ABUNDO V. COMELEC
whatever misconduct he might have committed during his previous term. 688 SCRA 149
FACTS: Petitioner is the Human Resource Manager of Sta. Cruz, Marinduque. DOCTRINE: To be considered as interruption of service, the law contemplates
Respondent the then Mayor of Sta. Cruz, Marinduque filed a case against her a rest period during which the local elective official steps down from office and
in the Ombudsman for gross negligence of duty, inefficiency and ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial
incompetence. While the case was pending respondent hired a replacement. jurisdiction of a particular local government unit.
As a result the petitioner filed an administrative case against the respondent
before the Sanguniang Panlalawigan of Marinduque for abuse of authority and FACTS: For four successive regular elections, Abelardo Abundo vied for the
denial of due process. position of municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. In the 2004 electoral derby,
The Sanguniang Panlalalwigan found the respondent guilty of the chanrge and the Viga municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one
imposed a penalty of suspension against the respondent. The respondent Torres, who, in due time, performed the functions of the office of mayor.
questioned the decision of the Sanguniang on the ground that it was only Abundo protested and was eventually declared the winner of the 2004
signed by the presiding chairman of the Sanguniang. Thereafter, respondent mayoralty electoral contest. In the 2010 elections Abundo and Torres again
wrote to the DILG Secretary regarding the validity of the decision of the opposed each other and Torres lost no time in seeking the former’s
Sanguniang. The DILG secretary opined that the decision of the sanguninag disqualification to run, predicated on the three-consecutive term limit rule.
does not appear to be in accordance with Section 66 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 and settled jurisprudence. The COMELEC ruled in favor of Abundo. Respondent Vega filed a quo
warranto petition in the RTC to unseat Abundo on essentially the same
The Petitioner then wrote to the Governor demanding the suspension of grounds Torres raised.
respondent Mayor without any further delay, the Governor informed the
Sanggunian that he agreed with the opinion of the DILG for which reason he The RTC declared Abundo ineligible to serve as municipal mayor because he
could not implement the ruling of the Sanguninan. Thereafter the Sangunian has already served three consecutive terms. Petitioner then appealed to the
acquitted the respondent of the charges against him. COMELEC En Banc which affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Hence, this petition ISSUE: WON THE PETITIONER IS DEEMED TO HAVE SERVED THREE
CONSECUTIVE TERMS?
ISSUE: WON THE SANGUNIAN RENDERED A VALID DECISION?
RULING: NO, the Sangunian did not rendered a decision. RULING: NO, the petitioner has not served 3 consecutive terms.

In order to render a decision in administrative cases involving elective local Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution as well as in Sec. 43(b) of the Local
officials, the decision of the Sanggunian must thus be “in writing stating clearly Government Code provides that, voluntary renunciation of the office by the
and distinctly the facts and the reasons for such decision. incumbent elective local official for any length of time shall not, in determining
service for three consecutive terms, be considered an interruption in the
In the case at bar, what the Sanggunian, did on August 12, 1994 was not to
continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned
render a decision, they merely took a vote on the administrative case against
was elected.
the respondent Mayor. In addition it also lacks the signature of the majority.
Pursuant to Section 66(b) of the Local Government Code, the penalty of To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office, the following
suspension cannot exceed the unexpired term of the respondent or a period requisites must concur: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for
of six (6) months for every administrative offense. On the other hand, any three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and (2) that he
administrative disciplinary proceeding against respondent is abated if in the has fully served three consecutive terms.

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In the case at bar, Abundo actually held the office and exercised the functions and patrimony. When the Constitution speaks of “national patrimony,” it refers
as mayor only upon his declaration, following the resolution of the protest, as not only to the natural resources of the Philippines but also to the cultural
duly elected candidate for only a little over one year and one month. The reality heritage of the Filipinos.
on the ground is that Abundo actually served less. The almost 2 year period
during which Abundo’s opponent actually served as Mayor is and ought to be When the Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges, and
considered an involuntary interruption of Abundo’s continuity of service. An concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
involuntary interrupted term, cannot, in the context of the disqualification rule, preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that qualified Filipinos shall be
be considered as one term for purposes of counting the three-term threshold. preferred. The term “qualified Filipinos” simply means that preference shall be
given to those citizens who can make a viable contribution to the common
good, because of credible competence and efficiency. The term “qualified
XIII. NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY Filipinos” as used in the Constitution also includes corporations at least 60%
of which is owned by Filipinos.
NATIONALIST AND CITIZENS REQUIREMENT

365. MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS 366. GAMBOA V. FINANCE SECRETARY
267 SCRA 408
652 SCRA 690
DOCTRINE: The term “qualified Filipinos” simply means that preference shall DOCTRINE: No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the
be given to those citizens who can make a viable contribution to the common operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines
good, because of credible competence and efficiency. or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines,
FACTS: The respondent GSIS, pursuant to the privatization program of the at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens.
Government under the Proclamation 50, decided to sell Manila Hotel in a
public bidding. The Petitioner a Filipino corporation offered to buy 51% of the
Manila Hotel at P41.58 per share, also another group, a Malaysian firm, bids The constitutional requirement of at least 60 percent Filipino ownership applies
for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the not only to voting control of the corporation but also to the beneficial ownership
bid of petitioner. of the corporation. It is therefore imperative that such requirement apply
uniformly and across the board to all classes of shares, regardless of
Under the GSIS bidding rules the highest bidder is the winner, and it is clear nomenclature and category, comprising the capital of a corporation.
that the Malaysian Firm is the highest bidder, pending the declaration of the
Malaysian Firm as the winning bidder, the petitioner wrote a letter to the GSIS
that they will match the offer of the Malaysian firm, and the petitioner send a FACTS: The petitioner Wilson P. Gamboa, is a stockholder of Philippine Long
manager’s check as a security to match the bid of the Malaysian firm, but it Distance Telephone, he claimed that PLDT was granted a franchise to engage
was not accepted by the GSIS. in telecommunications business. In 1969, General Telephone and Electronics
Corporation (GTE), an American company and a major PLDT stockholder,
As a result of the non-acceptance, petitioner then filed prohibition and sold 26 percent of the outstanding common shares of PLDT to Philippine
mandamus to the Supreme Court, and invoked petitioner invokes Sec. 10, Telecommunications Investment Corporation (PTIC). In 1977, Prime Holdings,
second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel Inc. (PHI) was incorporated by several persons, subsequently PHI became the
has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a owner of 111,415 shares of stock of PTIC by virtue of Deeds of Assignment.
historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and In 1986, the 111,415 shares of stock of PTIC held by PHI were sequestered
culture and it has became part of national patrimony. Hence, this petition. by the PCGG. The 111,415 PTIC shares, which represent about 46.125
percent of the outstanding capital stock of PTIC, were later declared by this
ISSUE: WON MANILA HOTEL FALLS UNDER THE NATIONAL
Court to be owned by the Republic of the Philippines. Since PTIC is a
PATRIMONY?
stockholder of PLDT, the sale by the Philippine Government of 46.125 percent
RULING: YES, Manila Hotel has become a landmark a living testimonial of of PTIC shares is actually an indirect sale of 12 million shares or about 6.3
Philippine heritage. Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy percent of the outstanding common shares of PLDT. With the sale, First
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Pacific's common shareholdings in PLDT increased from 30.7 percent to 37 Constitution has expressly reserved to Filipinos for that would be a betrayal of
percent, thereby increasing the common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT the Constitution and of the national interest.
to about 81.47 percent.
As a result, petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, injunction, declaratory EXPLORATION, DEVELOPMENT, AND UTILIZATION OF
relief, and declaration of nullity of sale of the 111,415 PTIC shares. On the
NATURAL RESOURCES
ground that it violates Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
which limits foreign ownership of the capital of a public utility to not more than 367. LA BUGAL B’LAAN vs. RAMOS
40 percent.
G.R. 127882, December 1, 2004
ISSUE: WON THE SALE OF COMMON SHARES TO FOREIGNERS IN
EXCESS OF 40 PERCENT OF THE ENTIRE SUBSCRIBED COMMON Doctrine: The State, being the owner of the natural resources, is accorded
CAPITAL STOCK VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMIT ON FOREIGN the primary power and responsibility in the Exploration, Development and
OWNERSHIP OF A PUBLIC UTILITY? Utilization thereof.

RULING: YES, the sale of common shares to foreigners violates the FACTS: In 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order
constitutional limit on foreign ownership rule of a public utility. (EO) No.279, authorizing the secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources(DENR) to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from
Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides that: foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements
involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
“No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation
development, and utilization of minerals. In 1995, then President Fidel V.
of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to
Ramos approved Republic Act (RA) No. 7942 which governs the exploration,
corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at
development, utilization and processing of all mineral resources and its
least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. xxxxx
Implementing rules and regulations was embodied in the DENR Administrative
The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility Order 96-40 series of 1996.
enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its capital, and all the
Thereafter President Ramos entered into a financial and technical assistance
executive and managing officers of such corporation or association must be
agreement (FTAA) with Western Mining Corporation Philippines, Inc. (WMCP)
citizens of the Philippines.”
an Australian Mining Company, covering 99,387 hectares of land in South
The term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato.
shares of stock that can vote in the election of directors. Mere legal title is
In 1997, the Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of RA 7942 and DENR
insufficient to meet the 60 percent Filipino-owned "capital" required in the
Dept. Order, they alleged that RA 7942 and DENR Admin. Order was
Constitution. Full beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital
unconstitutional, because it allowed fully foreign-owned corporations to
stock, coupled with 60 percent of the voting rights, is required. The legal and
explore, develop and exploit mineral resources in a manner contrary to Section
beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock must rest
2 (paragraph 4) of Article XII of the Constitution. Petitioners also claimed that
in the hands of Filipino nationals in accordance with the constitutional
the FTAA between the President of the Republic of the Philippines and WMCP
mandate. Otherwise, the corporation is "considered as non-Philippine
was illegal and unconstitutional.
national[s]."
WMCP in their manifestation claimed they had already sold all its shares to
In the case at bar, Filipinos hold less than 60 percent of the voting stock, and Sagittarius Mines, a corporation 60% Filipino owned.
earn less than 60 percent of the dividends, of PLDT. This directly contravenes
the express provision of Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution that "no ISSUE: WON RA 7942 IS UNCONSTITITIONAL?
franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a
public utility shall be granted except to x x x corporations x x x organized under RULING: Yes, R.A. 7942 is unconstitutional. The FTAA between he WMCP
the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned and the Philippine government is likewise unconstitutional since the
by such citizens. The Court should never open to foreign control what the agreement itself is a service contract.

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Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution provides that: “All lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural
lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration,
development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control
and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities
or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty
per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may
be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than
twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided
by law.”
“President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations
involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country.”
In the case at bar, R.A. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional
since it permits foreign owned corporation to engage in mining activities, the
WMCP is an Australian-Indonesian Mining Company.
The FTAA is likewise unconstitutional since it grants WMCP a fully foreign
owned corporation, the exclusive right to explore, exploit, utilize and dispose
of all minerals, which is contrary to the Constitution since FTAAs should be
limited to technical or financial assistance only. It does not extend to the
foreign-owned corporation’s management and operation of the mining activity.

351