CBP SecurityHandbook PDF
CBP SecurityHandbook PDF
Procedures Handbook
HB1400-02B
August 13, 2009
VOLUME CONTENTS
1. Foreword. ...........................................................................v
2. Revision History. ..............................................................xvii
3. Physical Security Handbook.............................................vii
4. Information Security: Safeguarding Classified
and Sensitive But Unclassified Information Handbook.... 735
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20229
Commissioner
Foreword
The Office of Internal Affairs (IA) Security Management Division (SMD) is responsible for establishing
policies, standards, and procedures to ensure the safety and security of the U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) personnel, facilities, information, and assets. IA/SMD has developed the CBP
Security Policy and Procedures Handbook to provide CBP with uniform standards and procedures for
the proper administration of Physical Security; Safeguarding Classified and Sensitive but Unclassified
Information; and Badges, Credentials, and Official Identification. This handbook serves as mandatory
minimum requirements for CBP managers to implement and improve the security posture for their
designated CBP area of responsibilities.
This handbook implements security policies and standards published in a number of relevant source
documents including numerous Public Laws, Presidential Directives, regulations, rules, Interagency
Security Committee security design criteria, and U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Management Directives (MD) regarding integrating, managing, and governing various Security
functions. It is issued under the authority of DHS MD 11080; Security Line of Business Integration and
Management, January 3, 2006.
This handbook supersedes the CBP memorandum; Interim Physical Security Guidance for Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) Facilities, October 25, 2006; Customs Handbook (HB) 1400-02A, Physical
Security Handbook, April 2000; Customs Directive No. 5230-029A, Employee Badges and Credentials,
April 20, 2002; Customs HB 1400-03, Safeguarding Classified Information Handbook, February
15, 1991; U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), Security Officer’s Handbook (SOH),
September 2001; legacy U.S. Department of the Treasury, U.S. Customs Service, INS, U.S. Border
Patrol, and U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service security
policies and directives.
The CBP Security Policy and Procedures Handbook is effective immediately and applicable to
ALL CBP-owned, -leased or -occupied offices, facilities, installations, ports of entry, and stations.
Compliance with this handbook is mandatory and will ensure consistent standards and effectiveness
in executing security initiatives for the preservation of CBP’s mission to safeguard our Nation from
terrorists and the instruments of terror.
This handbook may be accessed through the CBPnet, Office of Internal Affairs website quick links at
http://cbpnet.cbp.dhs.gov/xp/cbpnet/ia/ or CBP’s Policy Online Document Search (PODS) website:
http://pods.cbp.dhs.gov/. To request further assistance or offer feedback regarding this handbook, contact
the Security Management Division at (202) 325-0110 or by submitting your comments through the SMD
Policy and Procedures Handbook Comment form.
Jayson P. Ahern
Acting Commissioner
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BACK Contents
1. Chapter 1: Purpose............................................................ 1
1.1. Purpose.................................................................................................... 2
2. Chapter 2: Policy............................................................... 3
2.1. Policy....................................................................................................... 4
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distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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7.7. Windows.................................................................................................. 38
7.9. Openings................................................................................................. 39
9.5. Keys........................................................................................................ 65
10. Chapter 10: Safes and Storage Equipment. ..................... 71
10.1. Physical Protection and Storage of Materials ..................................... 72
11.3. Authority................................................................................................ 86
11.4. General.................................................................................................. 86
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distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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11.5. Responsibilities....................................................................................... 86
11.10. Visitors................................................................................................... 92
11.17. National Capital Region DHS/CBP Photo Access Card (PAC) ........... 100
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13.6. Security Awareness, Training and Education (SATE) Plans. ............... 123
14. Chapter 14: Incident Response and
the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS)........... 125
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17.6. Responsible Care for Dissemination of SBU Building Information ....... 159
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distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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Revision
Revision History
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Chapter 1: Purpose
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1.1. Purpose
1.1.1. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Internal Affairs, Security Management
Division is responsible for providing operating policies, procedures, and practices for
the physical protection of personnel, infrastructures, and assets from deliberate or
unforeseen threats.
1.1.2. These standards shall be applied to all CBP facilities, owned, leased or occupied
space. Compliance is mandatory for all new construction, renovation, and relocation
projects. Existing CBP facilities are not required to be upgraded unless risk
assessment determines otherwise.
1.1.3. These standards shall be used by the Office of Internal Affairs, Security
Management Division (SMD) to serve as a guide for: Conducting security surveys
for the development of threat assessments; evaluating security conditions during
real estate market surveys and using the requirements guide for architectural and
engineering (A&E) design efforts. Nothing in this policy handbook shall be construed
as contrary to the provisions of any statute or other Federal regulation. In the event
of conflict, specific statutory provisions shall apply.
1.1.4. Physical Security Programs shall be administered within each Region, District, and
field activity based on the policy set forth in this handbook to ensure the protection of
CBP assets. These programs shall be continually and effectively administered and
monitored to ensure their integrity. At a minimum, a Physical Security Program shall
include those items outlined in Chapter 2.1: Policy.
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Chapter 2: Policy
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2.1. Policy
2.1.1. It is CBP policy that personnel, facilities, property, information and other agency
assets shall be provided a consistent minimum level of protection. The minimum
physical security standards provided in this Physical Security Handbook
ensure a safe and secure work environment that contributes to the successful
accomplishment of CBP’s mission to secure the U.S. border against persons or
agents of ill will and from dangerous or illegal goods. This policy includes, but is not
limited to:
●● Development of minimum physical security standards for CBP facilities, by
identifying requirements for all physical security systems, devices, and building
features. These requirements are to be applied to new construction, renovation,
and relocation projects, as well as projects involving security enhancements;
●● Conduct of periodic surveys, inspections, and other formal on-site threat and
vulnerability assessments; and
●● Participation in security projects managed by Headquarters and field offices. This
includes evaluating CBP compliance with federal government regulations and
standards for physical security requirements.
2.1.2. All new construction, relocation, and renovation projects must be coordinated
through CBP Internal Affairs, Security Management Division, to ensure compliance
with applicable regulations and policy.
2.1.3. Proposed Changes or Revisions. This handbook is intended to be a living document.
As such, users of this policy handbook are encouraged to submit recommended
changes and comments to SMD (Policy and Procedures Handbook Comment form).
Comments shall reference the specific chapter and paragraph, and shall include
a justification for the proposed change. Periodic revisions to this handbook will be
published as necessary and to the extent practicable.
2.1.4. Protection Criteria. The Federal Protective Services (FPS) and CBP/IA/SMD
determine the level of normal protective service on a case by-case basis.
The facility’s location, size, number of occupants and configuration; history of
criminal or disruptive incidents in the surrounding area-not primarily directed
toward the occupant agency’s mission-the extent of exterior lighting, presence of
physical barriers or other factors may be deemed pertinent and will be taken into
consideration in the assessment.
2.1.5. Physical Protection. FPS provides normal and special protection through mobile
patrol or fixed posts manned by contractually engaged uniformed personnel; security
systems and devices; locking building entrances and gates during other than normal
hours; cooperation of local law enforcement agencies; and a combination of these
physical safeguards, depending upon the facility and the degree of risk defined.
The degree of normal and special protection is determined by completion of a FPS
physical security assessment or crime prevention assessment and implementation
of CBP/IA/SMD minimum standards contained in this policy handbook.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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2.1.6. Crime Prevention. The FPS collects and disseminates information about criminal
activity on or against property under the charge and control of GSA, and provides
crime prevention awareness training to occupant agencies upon request.
2.1.7. Facility Protection. In facilities where GSA has delegated protection authority to
the agency or prime tenant, virtually all protection responsibilities are transferred to
the agency, including acquisition, installation, and maintenance of physical security
equipment and systems, and procurement and management of any guard contracts.
In cases such as this, CBP/IA/SMD remains the approving authority for all security-
related equipment and standards. CBP will not procure guard contracts on its own
and will continue to procure guard services through FPS on a reimbursable basis.
Normally, GSA/FPS will retain responsibility for mobile patrols, monitoring of alarms,
response to incidents, request for criminal investigations, fire and facility safety and
health inspections. GSA/FPS will provide such services at no charge to the agency
beyond the Basic Security Charge, which is included in the rent.
2.1.8. Design Factors. It is imperative that security systems and procedures are considered
from the start of the design phase so that conduit runs and alarm wiring, structural
requirements, reinforcing devices and other necessary construction requirements
are provided in the original plans.
2.2. Policy Exception Requirements
2.2.1. General. Only in rare situations where compelling operational requirements or
conditions necessitate deviation from the specific minimum requirements in this
handbook, the CBP Office shall:
●● Request in writing any necessary exceptions from the requirements in this
handbook prior to approval of the design concept;
●● Submit a waiver request which shall document all security vulnerabilities that
could arise if the waiver is granted;
●● Submit a waiver request which shall provide, if possible, a mitigation plan that
states what measures will be taken to minimize security vulnerabilities if a
waiver is granted. Document how the proposed mitigation plan reduces risk
to an acceptable level when compared to operational requirements; include
persuasive evidence that the security of Federal employees and facilities will not
be compromised by a less-than-standard facility;
●● Include justification, risk analysis, cost comparisons, criteria applied, and
other pertinent data. Lack of funds or cost savings do not justify an exception.
Exceptions are granted on a case-by-case basis and are not automatically
extended to cases which appear to have similar circumstances; and
●● Submit exception requests directly to the Director for Security Management
Division through [email protected].
2.2.2. Exceptions that are approved will be for fixed term, unless specifically noted all
exceptions will be granted for one fiscal year. At the close of term of the exception
the CBP office requesting the exception will be required to submit a new waiver
request.
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Chapter 3: Background
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3.1. Background
3.1.1. Perimeter Security. Perimeter security standards pertain to the areas outside
government control. Depending on the facility type, the perimeter may include
sidewalks, parking lots, outside walls of the building, a hallway, or an office door.
The elements of perimeter security are: parking, closed circuit television monitoring,
lighting, and physical barriers.
3.1.2. Entry Security. Entry security standards refer to security issues related to the entry
of persons and packages into a facility. The elements of entry security are: receiving/
shipping, access control, and entrances/exits.
3.1.3. Interior Security. Interior security standards refer to security issues associated
with prevention of criminal or terrorist activity within the facility. This area concerns
secondary levels of control after people or things have entered the facility. The
long-term elements of interior security are employee/visitor identification, utilities,
occupant emergency plans, and day care centers.
3.1.4. Security Planning. Security planning is the development of long-term plans that
incorporate requirements, standards, procedures, and processes to implement
preventive and responsive countermeasures in the event of a breach of facility
security.
3.1.5. Security planning also sets security standards addressing broader issues with
implications beyond security at a particular facility. The elements of security
planning are: intelligence sharing, security awareness training, tenant assignment,
administrative procedures, and construction/renovation.
3.1.6. A comprehensive security system provides protection against a defined set of
threats by informing the user of attempted intrusions and providing resistance to
the would-be intruder’s attack paths. This resistance must be consistent around the
entire perimeter of the protected area.
3.1.7. There are four main security elements that must be properly integrated to achieve a
proper balance of physical security. These are:
●● Detection. This is the process of detecting and locating intruders as far from the
protected areas as feasible. Early detection gives the user more time for effective
alarm assessment and execution of pre-planned response;
●● Assessment. Assessment is determining the cause of the alarm or recognizing
the activity. This must be done as soon as possible after detection to prevent the
intruder’s position from being lost;
●● Delay. Intruders must be delayed long enough to prevent them from achieving
their objectives before the response force can interdict them; and
●● Response. A response force must be available, equipped, and trained to prevent
the intruders from achieving their objective. The response time must be less
than the delay time if the response force is to intercept the intruders before they
achieve their objective.
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DHS MD 11030.1, Physical Protection of Facilities and Real Property, dated 21 Apr.
2003
DHS MD 11045, Protection of Classified National Security Information: Accountability,
Control, And Storage, dated 4 Oct. 2004
DHS MD 11046, Open Storage Area Standards for Collateral Classified Information,
dated 22 Feb. 2005
DHS MD 11047, Protection of Classified National Security Information Transmission &
Transportation, dated 3 Jun. 2005
DHS MD 11056.1, Sensitive Security Information (SSI), dated 3 Nov. 2006
DHS MD 11080, Security Line of Business Integration and Management, dated 3 Jan.
2006
4.6. Department of Homeland Security Delegations
DHS Delegation 7035.2, Delegation of the Chair of the Interagency Security Committee
to the Assistant Secretary of Infrastructure Protection, dated 15 Aug. 2007
DHS Delegation 8001, Delegation to the Chief, Office of Security, for Security
Clearances of DHS Personnel, dated 28 Feb. 2003
DHS Delegation 8100.3, Delegation of Original Classification Authority, dated 2 Jun.
2006
DHS Delegation 8150, Delegation to Chief, Office of Security, of Determination Authority
and Cognizant Security Authority, dated 17 Jun. 2003
DHS Delegation 12000, Delegation to Designate Officers and Agents, dated 14 Dec.
2005
DHS Delegation 12002, Delegation to Designate Officers and Agents on Behalf of
Mount Weather Police Department, dated 26 Jun. 2006
4.7. Customs and Border Protection Directives
CBP Directive 3290-010B, Physical Security Standard for Customs and Border
Protection Laboratories, dated Feb. 2008
CBP Directive 5230-032, Personal Property Management, dated 1 Jun. 2005
4.8. Customs and Border Protection Handbooks
CBP HB 5200-13B, Personal Property Management Handbook, dated Nov. 2005
4.9. Legacy
Immigration and Naturalization Service, Security Officer’s Handbook, dated Mar. 1997
Immigration and Naturalization Service, Personal Property Operations Handbook
CIS HB 1400-02A, U.S. Customs Service, Physical Security Handbook, dated Apr. 2000
CIS HB 4400-01A, U.S. Customs Service, Seized Asset Management and Enforcement
Procedures Handbook, dated Jan. 2002
CIS HB 3200-07A, U.S. Customs Service, Canine Enforcement Program Handbook,
dated Aug. 2002
4.10. Interagency Security Committee Standards
ISC Standard, Facility Security Level Determinations for Federal Facilities
ISC Standard, Security Design Criteria for New Federal Office Buildings and Major
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Modernization Projects
ISC Standard, Security Standards for Leased Spaces
4.11. Unified Facilities Criteria
UFC 4-010-01, DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings, dated 8 Oct. 2003
UFC 4-010-02, DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standoff Distances for Buildings, dated 8
Oct. 2003
UFC 4-022-01, Security Engineering: Entry Control Facilities / Access Control Points,
dated 25 May 2005
4.12. Unified Facilities Guide Specifications
UFGS-08 11 13, Steel Doors and Frames, dated Jul. 2006
UFGS-08 14 00, Wood Doors, dated Jul. 2006
UFGS-08 33 23, Overhead Coiling Doors, dated Jul. 2007
UFGS-08 34 59, Security Vault Door, dated Apr. 2006
UFGS-08 71 00, Door Hardware, dated Oct. 2007
UFGS-28 16 00.00 20, Basic Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), dated Apr. 2006
UFGS-28 23 23.00 10, Closed Circuit Television Systems, dated Apr. 2006
UFGS-32 31 13.53, High-Security Chain Link Fences and Gates, dated Apr. 2008
4.13. Federal and Military Specifications and Standards
AA-D-600D, Door, Vault, Security (with Amendment 1), dated 15 May 2000
FF-L-2740A, Locks, Combination (with Amendment 1), dated 12 Jan. 1997
4.14. Department of Justice
Vulnerability Assessment of Federal Facilities, dated 28 Jun. 1995
4.15. Department of Defense
DoDI 2000.16, DoD Antiterrorism (AT) Standards, dated 2 Oct. 2006
DoDI 5200.08, Security of DoD Installations and Resources, dated 10 Dec. 2005
DoD 5200.08-R, Physical Security Program, dated 9 Apr. 2007
DoD 5220.22-M, National Industry Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM),
dated 28 Feb. 2006
DoD 5220.22-M-Sup 1, National Industry Security Program Operating Manual
Supplement, dated Feb. 1995
MIL-HDBK-1013/1A, Design Guidelines for Physical Security of Facilities, dated 15 Dec.
1993
MIL-HDBK-1013/10, Design Guidelines for Security Fencing, Gates, Barriers, and
Guard Facilities, dated 14 May 1993
MIL-HDBK-1013/14, Selection and Application of Vehicle Barriers, dated 1 Feb. 1999
4.16. General Services Administration
PBS-P100, Facilities Standards for the Public Buildings Service, dated Mar. 2005
4.17. Office of Personnel Management
Dealing With Workplace Violence, a Guide for Agency Planners Handbook, dated Feb.
1998
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Chapter 5: Responsibilities
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6.1. General
6.1.1. The degree of facility protection shall be determined by the Regional or District
Security Officer based on the results of a comprehensive security assessment of the
facility.
6.1.2. Perimeter protection is the first line of defense in providing physical security for
personnel, property, and information at a facility.
6.1.3. The second line of defense, and perhaps the most important, is interior controls.
6.1.4. The cost of security controls above these minimum standards normally shall not
exceed the monetary value of the item or areas to be protected, unless necessitated
through an assessment.
6.2. Planning Facility Protection
6.2.1. The objective of planning facility protection is to ensure the integrity of operations
and the security of assets. Security planning must be an integral part of selecting,
designing, constructing, reconfiguring, or moving into a CBP facility.
6.2.2. The modification of a facility or addition of security measures after occupying a
facility can be costly and impractical. Therefore, the responsible Project Manager
and Designated Official (DO), as defined in the Federal Property Management
Regulation (FPMR), will coordinate from the outset, on any addition, alteration, or
new construction with CBP/IA/SMD. The coordination shall begin with the funding
and concept phase, including the designers and architects and continue through the
contracting process, actual construction, installation, and acceptance.
6.2.3. When CBP occupies General Services Administration (GSA)-leased facilities, it is
imperative that the CBP/IA/SMD Security Specialist and the Security Liaison (SL)
establish a working relationship with the GSA and local law enforcement officials.
The SL is required to participate and maintain an active role as a member of the
Building Security Committee (BSC).
6.2.4. Facility Protection in CBP-owned or leased Facilities. For buildings and grounds
owned or leased by the CBP, the DO having jurisdiction over the real property is
responsible for implementing additional security measures above the minimum
standards. The degree of protection to be provided for the space will be determined
by the physical security assessment conducted by CBP/IA/SMD. The assessment
will evaluate the security of that specific facility, taking into consideration the facility’s
location, size and configuration, history of criminal activity or disruptive incidents,
extent of exterior lighting, presence of physical barriers, and other factors that may
be deemed pertinent.
6.2.5. Facility Protection in GSA-Owned or Leased Facilities. For building and grounds for
which GSA has space assignment responsibility, GSA is responsible for furnishing
standard protection not less than the degree of protection provided by commercial
building operators of similar space for normal risk occupants. The degree of
protection is determined by a Federal Protective Service (FPS) physical security
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assessment and the minimum security standards contained in this policy handbook
This protection may include guards, access control, intrusion detection (alarms),
closed circuit television surveillance (CCTV), inspection of packages, etc., when the
FPS assessment determines that the security countermeasures are warranted for
general Government occupancy and not necessitated by special activities or specific
agencies. Special protection required due to the nature of the business conducted
within the space or unusual public reaction to an agency’s program and missions
(whether or not of a continuing nature) is determined jointly by the FPS, CBP/IA/
SMD, and the occupant agency or agencies and is provided on a reimbursable
basis.
6.2.6. Protection Criteria. The FPS and CBP/IA/SMD determine the level of normal
protective service on a case by-case basis. The facility’s location, size, number
of occupants and configuration, history of criminal or disruptive incidents in the
surrounding area, even those not primarily directed toward the occupant agency’s
mission; the extent of exterior lighting, presence of physical barriers or other factors
may be deemed pertinent and will be taken into consideration.
6.2.7. Physical Protection. FPS provides normal and special protection through mobile
patrol or fixed posts manned by contractually engaged uniformed personnel; security
systems and devices; locking building entrances and gates during other than normal
hours; cooperation of local law enforcement agencies; or a combination of these,
depending upon the facility and the degree of risk involved. The degree of normal
and special protection is determined by completion of a FPS physical security
assessment, crime prevention assessment, and CBP/IA/SMD minimum standards
outlined in this handbook.
6.2.8. Crime Prevention. The FPS collects and disseminates information about criminal
activity on or against property under the charge and control of GSA, and provides
crime prevention awareness training to occupant agencies upon request.
6.2.9. Facility Protection. In facilities where GSA has delegated protection authority to
the agency or prime tenant, virtually all protection responsibilities are transferred to
the agency, including acquisition, installation, and maintenance of physical security
equipment and systems, and procurement and management of any guard contracts.
In cases such as this, CBP/IA/SMD remains the approving authority for all security-
related equipment and standards. CBP will not procure guard contracts on its own
and will continue to procure guard services through FPS on a reimbursable basis.
Normally, GSA/FPS will retain responsibility for mobile patrols, monitoring of alarms,
response to incidents, request for criminal investigations, fire and facility safety and
health inspections. GSA/FPS will provide such services at no charge to the agency
beyond the Basic Security Charge, which is included in the rent.
6.2.10. Design Factors. It is imperative that security systems and procedures are considered
from the start of the design phase so that conduit runs and alarm wiring, structural
requirements, reinforcing devices, and other necessary construction requirements
are provided in the original plans.
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Federal holdings are divided into four out of the five security levels for this Physical Security
Handbook, based primarily on staffing size, number of employees, use, and the need
for public access.
●● See Appendix 6.3, CBP Minimum Standards, for detailed information on facility
security levels.
6.4. Building Security Levels
Sum of above
+/- 1 FSL
Intangible Justification
Adjustment
Final FSL
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●● “Higher Level Protection” to the facade shall result in minor damage, but
repairable. The facility or protected space may globally sustain minor damage
with some local significant damage possible. Occupants may incur some injury,
and assets may receive minor damage.
6.6. Special Requests
6.6.1. Building Permit
●● The lessor shall provide a copy of the building permit to the U.S. Customs and
Border Protection Office of Internal Affairs (IA), Security Management Division
(SMD).
6.6.2. Blueprints, AutoCAD, Floor Plans, Time Requirements
●● No later than 30 days after completion of the job, the contractor/lessor shall
provide IA/SMD with all blueprints of the space and all associated areas (i.e. roof,
garage) on AutoCAD and a hard copy of the floor plan;
●● The security system shall be included in the blueprints after the initial floor
design. The security system shall be on a separate layer. It shall not be included
on the same layer of the electrical system. The security system shall be treated
as sensitive information and shall not be given to any contractor who does
not have a need to know. A hardcopy of as -built of the Security System along
with the AutoCAD copy shall be provided to SMD no later than 30 days after
the completion of the job. (This shall include any changes made during the
construction phase).
Note: Security Plan shall include furniture layout.
6.6.3. Pre-Construction Meeting
●● A pre-construction meeting is required by the Security Management Division.
This meeting shall include representatives from GSA, FPS, Lessor, General
Contractor (GC), and the CBP/Security Management Division. At this meeting,
the GC shall provide a proposed project schedule for review and discussion.
Based on this discussion, the GC shall submit the final detail project schedule
before construction starts.
6.6.4. Security Requirements
●● The CBP/Security Management Division requires one business week after the
space has been totally built out (including carpet, painting, electrical, plumbing,
HVAC, communication cable, and video cable, except for the installation of the
ceiling tile) to complete our security and communication requirements. Once
these tasks are completed, an inspection may be needed before the ceiling
tiles are installed. After that, a final walk through shall take place by the SMD
and GSA to prepare a punch list to present to the contractor/lessor. No security
project shall be considered substantially complete.
6.7. Security Contractor Suitability
●● Any contractors working on this project shall be required to complete and
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●● The CBP Offices personnel must have 24-hour unrestricted access to the office
space and parking.
6.8.5. Parking
●● Parking within adjacent parking garage is the optimum situation. These buildings
shall be considered before other buildings that do not offer that alternative. A
building which sits above a parking garage shall also be considered, depending
upon access control to the parking garage and available secured storage of CBP
vehicles;
●● Special security requirements for the parking area for official vehicles shall
depend on local conditions, which shall be evaluated before the market survey.
If on site, or adjacent parking is available, parking shall be within a reasonable
walking distance of approximately one block of the office building; and
●● Protective and Investigative vehicles shall require secured parking
implementations. The parking area, or drop off point, must be within close
proximity to an elevator (preferably a service elevator) in order to expedite
prisoner/detainee handling and processing.
6.8.6. HVAC
●● A building that has an HVAC system, zoned floor to floor, or within a floor, and is
energy efficient, shall be given priority over other buildings that do not have these
capabilities;
●● Buildings with HVAC systems that are turned off over weekends MUST have the
capability to provide 24 hour heating/cooling when CBP personnel are working
after hours, or on the weekends. Certain areas such as labs, communications
equipment, security equipment, and Office of Internal Affairs technical equipment,
and duty desk, etc., shall require 24-hour cooling. If needed, an additional
independent HVAC system could be installed to provide mandatory 24-hour
cooling to these areas.
6.8.7. Elevators
●● A freight or public elevator that can be keyed off for exclusive use by CBP is
desirable when transporting prisoners/detainees. The elevator shall go from the
drop off point in the parking area to the floor on which processing is located;
●● Access to both the freight elevator and loading dock must be made available to
U.S. Customs and Border Protection personnel;
●● All other elevators that open into Office of Internal Affairs space shall grant
access only to the Visitor Waiting Lobby during normal working hours; and
●● All other elevators that open into Office of Internal Affairs space require access
control systems and devices.
6.8.8. Egress
●● Every effort shall be made to design IA space so that the IA office has two ways
of egress, a front door and a back door. Preferably, the doors shall not be located
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near each other and shall open out into different hallways.
6.8.9. Emergency Signaling Devices
●● Audio speakers shall not be installed inside private offices. Required speakers
shall be installed in the Office of Internal Affairs hallway immediately outside
the private offices. Required speakers shall be installed in the Office of Internal
Affairs hallway immediately outside the private offices with the volume adjusted
so that people inside these offices can hear the alarm;
●● All other audio signaling devices, such as fire alarms, are subject to testing
by CBP before they can be installed in the Office of Internal Affairs offices. No
equipment found capable of passing speech components shall be accepted. Fire
Alarm Strobe Lights located in Office of Internal Affairs areas are acceptable. All
fire alarm equipment shall meet all current local, fire, and life safety codes;
●● Emergency lighting shall be provided throughout the space. This can be achieved
either through stand alone emergency lighting fixtures, or by having the building
standard ceiling lights on an emergency lighting circuit that is supported by a
standby generator; and
●● Exit doors within our space need to be identified with illuminated exit signs that
are powered by the emergency lighting system. If required, additional signs shall
be placed throughout to direct employees to the exits from all interior corridors
within the Office of Internal Affairs space.
6.8.10. Perimeter Doors
6.8.11. Perimeter doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad, hollow core metal,
1¾-inches thick. Solid core wood doors are not authorized for use on the perimeter
of a facility. Door frames must be constructed of hollow metal that is equal in
strength to that of the door. For more information on Doors, refer to Appendix 7.6
Doors and Door Hardware.
●● Perimeter doors must be equipped with door stoppers and door closers. Double
doors, glass doors, and doors with louvers are unacceptable, unless these
doors open into the Waiting Room/Lobby from a public hallway. If doors must be
installed so that the hinge pins are exposed in the unsecured area, then non-
removable pins shall be installed. On out swinging doors, a steel astragal, which
precludes access to the latch bolt and deadbolt, must be installed on the door. In
addition to the public entry door, there shall be at least one more perimeter door
in all Office of Internal Affairs offices;
●● All perimeter doors shall be fitted with a Mortise lockset with deadbolt, which is
ANSI F20 compliant, unless otherwise noted. Doors utilizing electronic access
control devices shall use an electric Mortise lockset with power transfer hinge or
electric strike with a rating of 1200 foot pounds, or as specified by CBP/SMD on
a case by case basis. All exit doors must comply with local fire codes.
●● For more information, see Appendix 7.6, Doors and Door Hardware.
6.9. Fire Detection and Suppression (Sprinkler) Systems
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●● The U.S. Customs and Border Protection require a fire detection system that
provides 100% coverage of the controlled office area;
●● All detection systems used must meet or exceed local and NFP A national fire
detection codes. It is incumbent upon the contractor to ensure all doors, security
devices and access control systems meet or exceed local and national NFPA fire
codes;
●● In some offices, the installation of a suppression system may be required. The
use of a suppression system shall require modifications to the electrical and air
handling systems. If this installation is necessary, it shall be identified when floor
plans are prepared;
●● Installation, maintenance, and service of the fire detection and suppression
systems shall be the responsibility of building management; and
●● All problems with the systems protecting Office of Internal Affairs space shall be
reported to the appropriate agency supervisor.
6.9.1. Radio Communication Antennae and Base Stations(s)
●● It may be necessary to install radio communication antennae on the roof of the
building and radio communication base stations associated equipment in the
elevator equipment area or similar type area near the roof;
●● Coaxial cable(s) have to connect the antenna(s) to the base station(s). At a
minimum, a dedicated 20 amps, 120 VAC, duplex outlet shall be required for
power to each base station installed and telephone keying lines for remotely
controlling the base station(s). A building ground shall also be provided for the
radio base station(s). Every effort should be made to restrict access and secure
base stations.
6.9.2. Generator Service
●● Emergency power sources to critical systems (communications system, intrusion
detection system, Duty Agent room, Communication Equipment Room, and
Office of Internal Affairs Technical Support Division Closet) are required.
6.9.3. Cleaning
●● IA office cleaning must be performed during normal working hours. Maintenance
should be aware that name checks shall be conducted on cleaning and
maintenance personnel. If the facility is GSA-leased, GSA will provide the
appropriate documents identifying cleaning crew personnel that have been
properly adjudicated.
6.10. Secure Border Initiative (SBI)
6.10.1. The Department of Homeland Security’s Secure Border Initiative (SBI) addresses
the security challenges along the southern and northern land borders of the United
States. SBI, in coordination with the other border security missions conducted by
ICE, USCIS, USGC, Intelligence, and the Department of Justice works to address
our Nation’s immigration border security challenges. The scope of SBI provides
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DHS and CBP with the optimum mix of personnel, technology, infrastructure, and
response platforms to detect, identify, classify, and respond to illegal breaches of
borders shared with Canada and Mexico and thereby bring the situations to the
appropriate law enforcement resolution. SBI will employ next generation technology
in the area of cameras, ground-based radar, communications, unmanned aerial
vehicles, underground sensors, and sophisticated software packages for terrain
environments. SBI will bring together multiple state of the art systems as well as
traditional security infrastructure to create a comprehensive border security program.
6.10.2. For more information, see Appendix 6.10, Secure Border Initiative.
6.11. Security Survey Process
6.11.1. This is in development. When complete, this will contain the steps in conducting
the survey and a possible checklist which will include the Physical Security Project
Prioritization Tool:
●● Findings;
●● Requirements;
●● Source document(s); and
●● Response.
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7.1. General
7.1.1. Perimeter protection is the first line of defense in providing physical security for a
facility. This can be accomplished by installing fences or other physical barriers,
outside lighting, lockable gates, intrusion detectors, or a guard force. Perimeter
protection also includes, but is not limited to walls, lockable doors, windows, bars,
and grills.
7.1.2. A perimeter barrier defines the physical limits of a facility, controls access, and
creates a physical and psychological deterrent to unauthorized entry. It delays
intrusion into an area, making the possibility of detection and apprehension more
likely. It aids security forces in controlling access and assists in directing the flow of
persons and vehicles through designated entrances.
7.1.3. Every vulnerable point shall be protected to deter or prevent unauthorized access to
the facility. The roof, basement, and walls of a building may contain vulnerable points
of potential entry. A security assessment of the perimeter shall address manholes
and tunnels, gates leading to the basement, elevator shafts, ventilation openings,
fire escapes, skylights, and any opening 96 square inches or larger, that are within
18 feet of the ground.
7.1.4. The extent of any perimeter control levels above those outlined in this policy
handbook will be determined by the DO in conjunction with CBP/IA/SMD, based
upon a comprehensive security assessment. The assessment report shall
recommend perimeter countermeasures to the facility manager.
7.2. Physical Barriers
7.2.1. Physical barriers may be of two general types-natural and man-made. Natural
barriers include mountains, cliffs, canyons, rivers, or other terrain difficult to traverse.
Man-made barriers include items such as fences, walls, floors, roofs, grills, bars, or
other structures which deter penetration. If a natural barrier forms one side or any
part of the perimeter, it in itself shall not automatically be considered an adequate
perimeter barrier, since it may be overcome by a determined intruder. Man-made
barriers shall be provided for CBP perimeters.
7.3. Fencing
7.3.1. Fences are the most common perimeter barrier or control. A perimeter fence should
be Uninterruptible, kept free of plant growth, and maintained in good condition.
Fences are used to:
●● Demarcate property lines;
●● Impede unauthorized vehicular and pedestrian access;
●● Control and direct authorized vehicular and pedestrian access;
●● Impede natural nuisance alarms (used as a baseline wherever a perimeter
intrusion detection system is used); and
●● Segregate areas within a property such as parking lots and storage yards (not
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considered perimeter fences), and to control and direct the flow of authorized
visitors.
●● For more information, see Appendix 7.3, Fencing
7.3.2. Chain Link
●● The entire site must be contained by an 8’ (2.43 m) high perimeter fence;
●● Chain link fencing is low in maintenance cost, a minimal safety hazard, and has
openings small enough to discourage the passage of pilfered articles;
●● Chain link fencing shall be laid out in straight lines to permit unhampered
observation. It shall be constructed of 9-gauge or heavier mesh material (type
I, II, or IV as defined in Appendix 7.3, Fencing with mesh openings (two-inch-
square) and shall be no less than seven feet high and have a top guard for a total
of 8 feet;
●● Chain link fencing shall extend to within two inches of firm ground. It shall be taut
and securely fastened to rigid metal posts set in concrete;
●● The fabric height will be 7’ (2.13 m) and have twisted and barbed selvage at the
top and bottom. There must be a minimum 1’ (.305 m) top guard, for a total fence
height of no less than 8 feet (2.43 m);
●● Apply anti-erosion measures, such as surface priming, as necessary;
●● Where the fence traverses culverts, troughs, or other openings larger than 96
square inches in area, the openings shall be protected by fencing, iron grills, or
other barriers to prevent passage of intruders without impeding drainage; and
●● Pipes/culverts or openings through fence larger than 96 square inches shall be
secured.
7.3.3. Barbed Wire
●● Standard barbed wire is twisted, double strand, number 12-gauge wire, with four-
point barbs spaced four inches apart;
●● Barbed wire fencing, including gates intended to prevent trespassing, shall be
no less than seven feet in height plus a top guard, tightly stretched, and shall be
firmly affixed to posts not more than six feet apart; and
●● Distances between strands shall not exceed six inches.
7.4. Gates
7.4.1. For more information, see the section on Gates in Appendix 7.3, Fencing.
7.4.2. Gates provide a break in a perimeter fence or wall to allow entry. Gates are
protected by locks, intermittent guard patrols, fixed guard posts, contact alarms,
CCTV or a combination of these. The number of gates and perimeter entrances shall
be limited to those absolutely necessary, but shall be sufficient to accommodate the
peak flow of pedestrian and vehicular traffic.
7.4.3. Gates shall be adequately lighted. They shall be locked when not manned and
periodically inspected by a roving guard force. Utility openings in a fence that do not
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half-inch in diameter, round, and spaced apart six inches on center. If a grill is used,
the material shall be number nine gauge two-inch square mesh. Outside hinges on
windows shall have non-removable pins. The hinge pins shall be welded, peened,
flanged, or otherwise secured so they cannot be removed. Bars and grills must be
securely fastened to the window frame so they cannot be pried loose.
7.7.3. For more detailed information, see Appendix 7.7, Windows
7.8. Manholes, Grates, and Storm Drains
7.8.1. Many facilities have manholes and tunnels providing personnel service entrance
into buildings and other manholes may provide entrance to tunnels containing pipes
for heat, gas, water, and telephone. If a tunnel penetrates the interior of a building,
the manhole cover shall be secured. A chain or padlock can be used to secure a
manhole. Steel grates and doors flush with the ground level may provide convenient
access. These openings may be designed into the facility as they may provide light
and ventilation to the basement levels. If the frame is properly secured, the grates
or doors can be welded into place or they can be secured with a chain and padlock.
Sewers or storm drains which might provide an entrance shall be secured.
7.8.2. For more detailed information, see Appendix 7.8, Openings.
7.9. Openings
7.9.1. Operable Openings are doors, windows, transoms, skylights and all similar devices
that can be opened or closed to allow or prevent passage of people, air, or light.
Openings can also include, but are not limited to, elevators, penthouses, hatchways,
or doors to the roof. Roof doors are often overlooked because of infrequent use.
These openings are the usual points of entry for intruders especially at ground level
and in their concealed and semi-concealed locations. Operable openings are also
the hardest points to protect simply because they are designed for passage.
7.9.2. Protecting operable openings shall be based on the following criteria:
●● Is the opening really required?
●● Is the opening 96-square inches or larger?
●● Validate existing openings that may no longer be required. If not required:
o Is the opening less than 18 feet from the ground or less than 14 feet from
another structure? If yes, than it shall be covered with bars or grilles and
equipped with intrusion detection device;
o Permanently seal the wall in a manner that maintains the penetration
resistance of the wall containing the opening; and
o The door is eliminated from the brick wall, the door assembly will be removed
and the opening bricked up; properly anchoring new construction.
o For further information see Appendix 7.8, Openings.
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regulatory, or directory nature and with the lawful direction of security guards or other
authorized individuals.
7.14. Other Signs
7.14.1. Condition of Entry. Signs setting forth the conditions of entry to a CBP facility or area
shall be plainly posted at all principal entrances and shall be legible under normal
conditions at a distance not less than 50 feet from the point of entry. The signs shall
state that packages, briefcases, and other containers in the immediate possession
of visitors, employees, or other persons arriving on, working at, visiting, or departing
from CBP property, are subject to inspection. Any person and vehicle is subject to a
full search at any time and, if found to be in violation of federal, state or local laws, is
subject to arrest.
7.14.2. For more information, see Chapter 11, Access to Facilities.
7.14.3. Restricted Areas. Signs or notices legibly setting forth the designation of restricted
areas and conditions of entry shall be plainly posted at all entrances and at other
points along the perimeter as necessary.
7.14.4. Explosives. Signs or notices must clearly indicate that no person entering or on
Customs and Border Protection property shall carry or possess explosives, or items
intended to be used to fabricate explosives or incendiary devices, either openly or
concealed, except for official purposes. See 41 CFR §102-74.435
7.14.5. Weapons Prohibited. 18 USC §930 prohibits possession of a firearm or other
dangerous weapon in Federal facilities, unless authorized by law, and defines
“dangerous weapons” as a weapon, device, instrument, material, or substance,
animate or inanimate, that is used for, or is readily capable of, causing serious bodily
injury or death, except that such term does not include a pocket knife with a blade of
less than 2-1/2 inches in length.
●● Access control
o Complete a risk assessment of the facility. If it is determined that positive
accounting of personnel or assets is required, controlled egress will be part of
the access control system.
o The means of egress control will be at least equal to the access control for
that portal.
o Door control applications must meet local fire codes.
o Uncontrolled egress will likely be adequate for most area control points at the
majority of CBP/IA/SMD activities.
●● Screening
o All persons who are not CBP direct hire or full time contract employees, or do
not possess a valid building pass for a particular Service facility (if applicable)
will be considered as visitors;
o All visitors requesting access to locations where a threat assessment has
identified the need to screen for weapons, explosives, and incendiary devices
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will be screened;
o Threat assessment may indicate a need to screen packages for weapons,
explosives, and incendiary devices. Such packages may be transported by:
–– A visitor requesting access,
–– A freight carrier,
–– An express package delivery firm,
–– The U.S. Postal Service, and
–– U.S. Government courier.
7.15. Loading Docks and Service Access
7.15.1. Loading docks and service access areas are commonly required for a building and
are typically desired to be kept as invisible as possible. For this reason, special
attention should be devoted to these service areas in order to avoid undesirable
intruders.
●● Information on Loading Docks and Service Access may be found in Appendix
7.15, Loading Docks and Service Access.
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8.3.1. Pedestrians
●● Access control systems must be provided at public waiting and information
areas, visitor areas, sally ports, secure vestibule, loading docks, and entrances to
restricted areas.
o The access control system may be a personnel, hardware, or computer-
based system;
o A personnel-based access control system relies on a person to positively
identify individuals requesting access, determine if the access is authorized,
and secure the access point, ensuring that only authorized individual(s) have
gained access.
●● A hardware-based access control system uses mechanical push button or key
locks to control access. This type of system is most suitable for interior areas with
fewer than 25 users. Characteristics of this type of system are:
o One combination or the same key is used for all authorized individuals;
o No audit trail is available;
o No power is required; and
o A mechanical spring latch shall not be used as a lock-and-leave security
measure.
●● Automated access control systems are appropriate for large applications and
may be required for programs associated with a high threat level. Systems may
be in the form of stand-alone, one- or two-door units, small networks for 8 - 16
doors, or larger multi-door, multi-tasking systems. These types of systems are
ideal for areas with 25 or more users and large systems controlling interior and
exterior access control readers. Characteristics of this type of system are:
o All authorized users are provided with unique pass cards, tags or personal
identification numbers (pins);
o Audit trails are available;
o Electrical power is required at each control point; and
o Individual users can be deleted from the system without the need to recover
cards, tags, pins or keys.
●● Egress Control
o The decision to provide for controlled or uncontrolled egress will be based on
a risk assessment of the facility. If it is determined that positive accounting of
personnel or assets is required, controlled egress will be part of the access
control system;
o The means of egress control will be at least equal to the access control for
that portal;
o Door control applications must meet local fire codes; and
o Uncontrolled egress will likely be adequate for most area control points at the
majority of CBP/IA/SMD activities.
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●● Screening
o All persons who are not CBP direct hire or full time contract employees, or do
not possess a valid building pass for a particular Service facility (if applicable)
will be considered as visitors;
o All visitors requesting access to locations where a threat assessment has
identified the need to screen for weapons, explosives, and incendiary devices
will be screened; and
o Threat assessment may indicate a need to screen packages for weapons,
explosives, and incendiary devices. Such packages may be transported by:
–– A visitor requesting access;
–– A freight carrier;
–– An express package delivery firm
–– The U.S. Postal Service;
–– U.S. Government courier.
8.4. Routine Conditions
8.4.1. Basic requirements for admission to Federal property are contained in FPMR 101-
20.302. Accordingly, during business hours, CBP facilities are normally open to the
public and restricted to authorized individuals after business hours.
8.4.2. During business hours, property or portions thereof can be closed to the public only
when situations require this action to ensure the orderly conduct of Government
business. The decision to close the property or portions thereof to the public shall
be made by the designated official under the occupant emergency program after
consultation with the building manager and the responsible Security Officer. When
property or a portion thereof is closed to the public, admission shall be restricted
to authorized persons who will register upon entry to the property and, when
requested, display CBP or other identifying credentials when entering, leaving, or
while on the property. Property or portions thereof that are closed to the public shall
be designated as a restricted or closed area.
8.4.3. Emergency Conditions. During certain DHS-declared building security alert
conditions, the display of government identification and additional screening may be
required to enter the facility during all hours.
8.4.4. Public Use of Buildings. The occasional use of public areas within public buildings
for cultural, educational and recreational activities, is permitted by 41 CFR §102-74-
460 and FPMR 102-74. Any use of public facilities should go through the permitting
process described in those sections as coordinated with CBP/IA and the appropriate
GSA contact.
8.5. Area Designations
8.5.1. The decision to designate an area as either a “Controlled Area” or a “Restricted
Area” shall be made in conjunction with a decision to close the property or a portion
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All armory vault doors listed below are Class 5 and are fitted with a UL Standard 768al
combination lock. GSA approved armory vault doors can be purchased direct from the
manufacturers using the National Stock Numbers listed below. See the Order tab for
manufacturer information.
NSN Description
7110-01-475-9590 Double leaf, right opening swing active leaf, with optical device.
8.8. Strongrooms
8.8.1. A strongroom is an enclosed space constructed of solid building materials.
Strongrooms are normally used for the storage of classified material or sensitive
materials, such as firearms or evidence. Protection is normally supplemented by
guards or alarm systems. Rooms that have false ceilings and walls constructed
of fibrous materials, and other modular or lightweight materials cannot qualify as
strongroom.
8.8.2. For more information, see Appendix 8.8, Strongrooms.
8.9. Intrusion Detection Systems
8.9.1. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are alarm systems designed to alert security
personnel of an actual or attempted intrusion into an area while providing deterrence
to intrusion. These warning systems detect intrusion or attempts, not prevent them.
Any alarm system requires an assessment and a response capability to provide real
protection for an area. All systems have weak points by which their functioning can
be minimized or even completely interrupted or circumvented. The advantage and
limitations of a variety of detection systems are described below.
8.9.2. For more information, see Appendix 8.9, Intrusion Detection Systems
8.10. Hold Rooms
8.10.1. A hold room is a secure facility for the detention of aliens encountered and
processed by operational components of CBP.
8.10.2. For more information, see Appendix 8.10, Hold Rooms
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o Volumetric; and
o Proximity.
●● Perimeter protection is the first line of defense. The most common points
for sensing devices are doors, windows, vents and skylights. These may be
protected, with detectors sensing their opening or breaking. The major advantage
of perimeter-protection sensing devices is their simple design. The major
disadvantage is that they protect only openings such as doors or windows. If
intrusion occurs through a wall or ceiling, these devices are ineffective:
o Switches. These devices are usually magnetic operated switches affixed to
a door or window in such a way that opening the door or window removes
the magnetic field causing an alarm. High security switches are normally
balanced or biased magnetic switches;
o Screens. Openings such as vents, ducts, skylights, and similar openings can
be alarmed by thin wire filaments that signal an alarm if the screen is cut or
broken. Often the wire filaments are placed in a frame of wooden rods and
require little maintenance; and
o Glass Breakage. Electronic sensing devices used to detect a high-frequency
sound pattern within the glass when it is broken, or the shock wave a
substantial impact makes against the surface.
●● Volumetric protection sensors are designed to detect the presence or actions of
an intruder almost anywhere within an entire room, from floor to ceiling. A variety
of volumetric devices are available. Each kind of detector has some advantages
and limitations. Therefore, a device must be selected for a specific environment.
A major advantage of volumetric devices is that they provide a highly sensitive
and invisible means of detection in high-risk areas. The major disadvantage is
that an improper application can result in frequent false alarms.
o Infrared. Passive infrared sensors are part of the motion-detection group.
They sense the body heat of an intruder as he/she passes through the
protected area. Infrared detectors are relatively free of false alarms; however
items moved by air currents within the protected area can activate the alarm;
o Ultrasonic. Ultrasonic motion detectors generate a high frequency of sound
that is out of the normal range of human hearing. An intruder disrupting the
ultrasonic wave pattern initiates the alarm. Ultrasonic devices are prone
to false alarms, due to excessive air currents or ultrasonic noise from
mechanical equipment;
o Microwave. This kind of motion detector uses high-frequency radio waves, or
microwaves, to detect movement. Because microwaves penetrate materials
such as glass, and metal objects reflect them, they can detect motion outside
the protection area and cause false alarm problems if not properly installed;
and
o Photoelectric. Photoelectric devices transmit a beam across a protected area.
When an intruder interrupts this beam, the circuit is disrupted causing an
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alarm. Today’s photoelectric devices use diodes that emit an invisible infrared
light and usually pulses rapidly to prevent compromise by substitution. A
disadvantage is that they can be defeated relatively easily; the beams are
narrow and may be discovered or avoided.
●● Proximity protection provides direct security for individual items.
o Vibration. These seismic sensing devices use a piezoelectric crystal or
microphone to detect the sound pattern that a hammer-like impact on a rigid
surface would generate. These devices are attached directly to safes and
filing cabinets, or to the walls, ceiling, and floor of vaults. False alarms may
occur with these devices by passing vehicles or falling objects;
o Capacitance. A capacitance device is used to protect specific objects such
as security containers and safes. The capacitance alarm uses the metal
construction of the container and causes it to act as a capacitor or condenser.
When a change occurs in the electromagnetic field surrounding the metal
object, the balance is disturbed and the alarm is activated. The system can
only be applied to ungrounded equipment and accidental alarms can occur if
the container is carelessly touched when the alarm is activated.
8.12. Closed Circuit Television Systems
8.12.1. The Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) system is another core subsystem of an
overall Electronic Security System (ESS). It is a collection of cameras, recorders,
switches, keyboards, and monitors that allow viewing and recording of security
events. The CCTV system is normally integrated into the overall ESS and centrally
monitored from the Dispatch Center. Uses of CCTV systems for security services
include several different functions as described below.
●● Surveillance. CCTV cameras can be used to give a viewer the capability to be
made aware of, or view, visual events at multiple locations from a centralized
remote viewing area. CCTV camera technology makes visual information
available that would normally only be available through multiple (possibly roving)
human resources;
●● Detection. CCTV cameras when employed with video content analysis or motion-
path analysis, software and equipment, can be used as a means for intrusion
detection. Additional information on CCTV can be found in Chapter 11, Access to
Facilities;
●● Assessment. When alerted by an alarm notification, CCTV cameras allow
Dispatch Center operators or other viewers to assess the situation and make
a determination as to what type of response may or may not be required. An
example is an intrusion alarm at a remote facility. Visual assessment and other
confirmation may indicate an unannounced maintenance crew at work. If it is
determined that intrusion has occurred appropriate response would follow;
●● Deterrence. While more effective against unsophisticated burglars as opposed
to trained covert insurgents, CCTV cameras may deter burglary, vandalism, or
intrusion due to fear of discovery and prosecution;
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●● Upon completion of the survey package, the requesting CBP office will send
survey to IA/SMD/PSB via [email protected];
●● For Vaults, inform Seizures and Penalties Division of intent to conduct Physical
Security Open Storage Survey.
o PASS -If the office meets the requirements outlined in the survey package, IA/
SMD/PSB will schedule a physical security assessment of the facility to verify
compliance with Attachment A and implementation of SOP in place.
–– If the customer passes, a memorandum signed by the SMD Director will
be sent to CBP Office Director (Open Storage/Vault/HSDN room).
–– The memorandum will authorize a specific area being approved and will
specify the maximum level of material authorized for open storage.
–– A copy of the approval memorandum, Open Storage Survey Checklist,
and SOP shall be maintained by the CBP office.
o FAIL. If the customer fails the initial certification survey, SMD/PSB will send a
memorandum signed by the SMD Director outlining recommended corrective
actions that must be addressed prior to approval of certification.
8.13.9. Open storage area is not authorized until all corrective actions have been
implemented.
8.13.10. Upon verification of corrective actions, the Director of SMD will send a memorandum
to CBP Office Director (Open Storage/Vault/HSDN room) indicating approval.
8.13.11. A copy of the approval memorandum, Open Storage Survey Checklist, and SOP
shall be maintained by the CBP office.
8.13.12. The approval memorandum, Open Storage Survey Checklist, and SOP, shall be
maintained by SMD/PSB and within the approved open storage area.
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9.1. Locks
9.1.1. General
●● All exterior doors must have a lock with dead bolt or approved equal locking
capability. All locks with a latch bolt must be equipped with a deadlocking latch
feature. When specifying locks, use American National Standards Institute
(ANSI) series lock numbers to obtain the proper type of lock for the function
desired. The locks must meet all Federal handicap accessibility standards.
All mortise locksets, whether or not required for security, must be grade one,
commercial standard locks per ANSI/BHMA (Builders Hardware Manufacturers
Association) A156.13. Unless specified, all interior non-security locksets may be
cylindrical locks (bore lockset) as specified in ANSI/BHMA A156.2. The criteria
in ASM 273.44, Postal Service Locks, also apply. Appendix 7.6, Doors and Door
Hardware contains an approved list of panic-style entry and exit devices and high
security devices;
●● Technology advances in the 1980s made locks vulnerable to newly developed
opening techniques. In response, the Government prepared Federal
Specification FF-L-2740. FF-L-2740 addresses advances in combination lock
neutralization technology. Three locks, the X-07, X-08 and X-09, all electro-
mechanical locks, have met FF-L-2740;
●● Some locks have interchangeable cores, which allow the same key system to
include a variety of locks. Padlocks, door locks, cabinet locks, and electrical key
switches can all be operated by the same key system. Because these cores are
removable by a special key, this system allows for rapid re-keying of locks in the
event that the key is compromised; and
●● Locks are keyed in several different ways. When several locks are keyed
differently, each is operated by its own key. When they are keyed alike, one
key will open them all. Locks that are master-keyed are keyed differently, yet
have one key that will open them all. Master-keying is done for convenience
and represents the controlled loss of security. Master-keying is not used unless
permitted by regulation.
9.1.2. Locking Hardware
●● Locks are the most acceptable and widely-used security devices for protecting
facilities, classified materials, and property. All containers, rooms, and facilities
must be locked when not in actual use. Locking devices vary greatly in
appearance as well as function and application. Locks merely deter or delay
entry and shall be supplemented with other protection devices when a proper
balance of physical security is needed. Some locks require considerable time
and expert manipulation to open, but all locks can be defeated by force and with
the proper tools. Locks must never be considered as a stand-alone method of
security.
●● For further information on locks and locking hardware, see Appendix 7.6, Doors
and Door Hardware.
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locked by pushing or rotating a button on the inside knob. These locks are
suitable only for very low-security applications.
–– All CBP lock cylinders must be of a high security, pick resistant design
with angled key cuts, rotating tumblers, keyway side bitting, and a slider
mechanism. The cylinders must be Underwriters Laboratories (UL)
listed under UL437 and certified under American National Standards
Institute (ANSI)/Builder’s Hardware Manufacturer’s Association (BHMA)
certification A156.30, Levels MIAM and ANSI/BHMA A156.5, Grade 1.
–– All cylinders must incorporate three locking elements: a slider mechanism,
a sidebar mechanism with tumbler rotation, and a pin tumbler elevation.
All cylinders must be constructed of solid brass with hardened steel
inserts. The lock tumblers must combine a dual-axis action with one axis
utilized for pin tumbler rotation and the other axis utilized for positioning
key cuts. Randomly selected tumbler pins must incorporate a hardened
steel insert. The cylinders must be capable of being immediately re-keyed
to a new combination or a new system.
–– Interchangeable cores should be used to facilitate this process. A suitable
number of spare cores should be maintained to facilitate lock changes in
the event of a lost or stolen master key.
–– The manufacturer must have the capability of establishing a key system
with a minimum of six angle cuts in six possible pin positions with the
capability of two distinct positions of cut per pin chamber, if required by
the parameters of the system. The manufacturer must have the capability
of producing a keying system in either of two distinct and different keying
specifications and pinning specifications. The system must be capable
of incorporating a key, with each being capable of more than one bitting
per position to expand master keying and key changes. The key must
also incorporate the capacity to include twelve possible side bittings along
the key blade located on two different planes or surfaces of the key. The
system must also have the capability to provide a single master key with
over 1 million (1,000,000) usable, non-interchangeable change keys in
a single keyway. The key thickness must be no less than one hundred,
twenty-five thousandths (.125″) and must be made from a nickel silver
alloy. Each key must be custom coined for tracking and identification
purposes.
–– The locking system must be deemed proprietary information shared only
among authorized U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) entities and
the manufacturer. Security Specialists assigned to the Office of Internal
Affairs, Security Management Division (IA/SMD) and employees serving
as Collateral Security Liaison’s for IA/SMD, will have the authority to
request additional pinning materials and duplicate keys.
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●● Directives and guidance for the key management program include the following:
o The Homeland Security Act of 2002, PL 107-296, enacted 11/25/02;
o Department of Justice Vulnerability Assessment of Federal Facilities, June
1995;
o Department of Defense Lock Program, UG-2040-SHR, July 2000;
o MD 11000 Office of Security;
o MD 11030.1 Physical Security of Facilities and Real Property; and
o MD 11049 Security Violations and Infractions.
9.5.2. Key management and oversight helps protect life, property and provides a level
of security to facilities and all occupants. Keys are the property of DHS and a part
of physical security, which require strict control, management and accountability
through keying systems integrity. Locks are the most common mechanism for
access control on doors and security containers and often provide the primary
protection against intrusion and theft. When a key is affected and/or compromised,
the system is affected and compromised. Lack of an operational key control program
can result in the compromise of personnel, property, and information. A functional
key control program will ensure accountability; provide administrative oversight, and
continuity of security through key issuance, duplication and replacement. Although
a determined individual can open most key locks in a few minutes, they are used
primarily to delay, discourage, or deter theft or unauthorized access. Exterior door
locks shall at a minimum meet UL 437 standards.
9.5.3. The integrity of a key system is important to safeguarding property and controlling
access. The security officer shall ensure that responsible individuals maintain control
of the facility’s key system by storing, issuing, and accounting for all keys. Issuance
of keys must be kept to a minimum and only issued to persons who have an official
need. Master keys must be carefully controlled; successful compromise of a master
keyed installation can be very difficult and costly to remedy (assuming it is even
discovered). Master keying systems can also incorporate a lock with a removable
interchangeable lock core. Accurate accountability records must be kept and all key
records and documentation will be maintained for no less than one year. When keys
are no longer needed they will be destroyed and documentation verifying destruction
will be maintained.
9.5.4. A facility master key inventory and log will be maintained for the purpose of chain of
accountability and access control and will include as a minimum:
●● The number assigned to each key and lock;
●● How many keys per lock;
●● Location of each lock, to include but not limited to room, container, or cage no.;
and
●● Access list of persons authorized to use master keys.
9.5.5. Computerized systems may be used
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9.5.6. The Security Officer or Key Control Person will approve and monitor all requests
for issuance of new, duplicate, or replacement keys and ensure appropriate
documentation is completed.
9.5.7. Physical Protection of keys will include, but is not limited to:
●● Keys can only be stamped with blind control codes.
●● Blind codes must not be reflective of buildings, door numbers or offices.
●● Duplicate keys must be kept to a minimum, and when made the Master Key
Inventory will be updated with required information;
●● Non-issued keys must be safeguarded and controlled within a locked cabinet or
container accessed only by the Key Control Person; and
●● The key storage cabinet or container will be locked when not in use.
9.5.8. Employee Protection of Keys
●● DHS employees issued keys are to protect and secure them at all times,
ensuring keys are not left on desks, in unlocked drawers, or where they can be
easily taken and copied.
●● Employees shall only use their keys to access their assigned work areas and
shall lock doors when leaving any secured area;
●● DHS employees assigned keys are not authorized to lend keys to individuals not
specifically authorized;
●● No person shall knowingly alter duplicate, copy or make a facsimile of any key to
a lock of any building or property;
●● The unauthorized possession, use or reproduction of any DHS key is a security
violation; and
●● A penalty shall be incurred for multiple losses.
9.5.9. Protection of Cores
●● Excess cores will be secured in a locked cabinet or container and secured from
unauthorized access;
●● Excess cores will be inventoried; and
●● Cores must not be removed by construction or other maintenance personnel.
9.5.10. Key Issuance
●● A key issue form will be documented in every instance of a CBP key issue and
contain as a minimum:
o Building number, floor number, and room, container or cage number;
o Key serial number;
o Key identification code;
o Quantity of keys issued;
o Brief statement of key control responsibilities;
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●● Any employee issued official keys on a temporary basis shall promptly return
them as ensured by the Key Control Person.
9.5.12. Loss/Damage/Destruction of Keys (Key Replacement)
●● When a key to a designated controlled or restricted area is lost, the locks to
that area must be changed, depending on risk, as soon as possible as old locks
remain exposed until replaced;
●● Lost or stolen keys must be reported immediately to the Key Control Person;
●● Anyone reporting a lost or stolen key must provide written documentation to the
Key Control person. This will include; date, time, circumstances of the loss, any
key identification and any action taken to retrieve the key;
●● Locks shall be re-keyed in a timely manner and new keys issued when keys are
lost or stolen; and
●● If a master key is lost, every master lock must be replaced and, depending how
the keying is done, new keys distributed to the key holders.
9.5.13. Documentation
●● Key and excess core inventory logs will be developed and maintained for a
period of no less than one year after the life of the key system being used;
●● Key access logs will be developed and maintained for a period of one year;
●● A key issued form will be developed and utilized for key(s) issue and turn in. The
form will be maintained until the key(s) are returned and for a period of no less
than one year after the key(s) are returned; and
●● All keys and excess cores will be secured and annually inventoried and
documented.
●● The DoD Lock Program can be referenced for documentation guidance. See
Section 9.1, LOCKS, above.
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weapons, and other valuables, must be housed in areas that will provide security
from removal of containers and disclosure of information/material.
10.5. GSA-Approved Security Containers
10.5.1. GSA establishes and publishes minimum standards, specifications, and supply
schedules for all containers, vault doors, modular vaults, alarm systems, and
associated security devices suitable for the storage and protection of classified
information, material, and property.
10.5.2. GSA-approved security containers are primarily used to store classified documents,
components, materials, and equipment. They are also used to secure funds,
valuables, and weapons.
10.5.3. There are two classes of GSA-approved containers currently being manufactured:
Class 5, and Class 6.
10.5.4. Classified and non-classified materials shall never be stored together.
10.5.5. GSA-approved containers must have a GSA label affixed to the front of the door,
the front of the top drawer, or the front of the control drawer. If the container no
longer has the GSA label attached to it, it is no longer an approved container. If
your container is no longer approved, see “Container Recertification” section 10.13.
GSA-approved containers manufactured before October 1990 are identified by their
GSA label that has either black lettering on a silver background (or silver lettering
on a black background). Since October 1990, only Class 5, 6, and 7 containers
have been manufactured. GSA-approved Class 5 and 6 containers manufactured
after October 1990 have a silver label with red lettering (or red with silver lettering).
GSA-approved Class 7 containers have a silver label with green lettering. Class 7
containers were available in filing cabinet style only and are no longer manufactured.
Information Processing System (IPS) containers are GSA approved containers for
protection of computers. Their GSA approval labels have blue lettering.
10.5.6. Class 5 and 6 Approved GSA Containers
●● Class 5 Containers are typically used for the storage of weapons and sensitive
items such as funds, jewels, precious metals, etc. However, funds, jewels,
precious metals, etc. shall not be store in the same container as weapons.
Class 5 containers may also be used for the storage of classified documents,
components, materials, and equipment. They provide the same protection as
Class 6, plus ten minutes against forced entry attack. Class 5 containers come in
several types: file cabinet, map and plan, weapon storage, COMSEC, and (IPS);
●● Class 6 Containers are typically used for storage of classified information such as
documents, maps, drawings, and plans. They come in file cabinet and map and
plan styles.
10.6. Weapons Storage
10.6.1. Weapons shall be stored in Class 5 or 6 GSA-approved containers instead of vaults
or armories when authorized for storage.
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–– Drawer Liner
●● For more information on storage of weapons and ammunitions, see Chapter 16,
Weapons and Ammunition.
10.7. Record Safes Designed for Fire Protection
10.7.1. A labeling system has been established by the Underwriters Laboratory (UL) to
define the level of fire protection each safe can be expected to provide. Prior to
1972, the UL designations used an alpha designation that was the same as Safe
Manufacturers National Association (SMNA). Both the former UL and SMNA
designations are provided, along with the current equivalent UL designation. Fire
protection container manufacturers and prices of equipment approved by the GSA
are listed in FSS Group 71 Part III.
10.7.2. Burglary-Resistant Safes
●● Containers designed for burglary protection are classified in accordance with test
data and specifications that conform to requirements of the UL. burglary-resistant
equipment will resist an attack by tools, torch, or explosives in proportion to their
construction specifications. Burglary-resistant container manufacturers and prices
of equipment approved by the GSA are listed in the FSS Group 71 Part III.
10.8. Combination Locks
10.8.1. DHS/CBP uses two types of mounted combination locks, one for the protection
of classified materials and one for the protection of weapons and ammunition.
Combination locks that protect classified material must meet the requirements of
Federal specification FF-L-2740, Locks, Combination. Combination locks protecting
weapons and ammunition must meet the requirements of Underwriters Laboratories
Inc. Standard For Combination Locks UL 768, Group 1.
10.8.2. See Chapter 9.2 for CBP policy on when to reset combinations.
10.8.3. Three locks have been approved under FF-L-2740 for the protection of classified
materials.
●● The model X-07 lock was approved in November 1991;
●● The X-08 in March 1999; and
●● The X-09 in June 2002.
10.8.4. GSA-approved security containers and vault doors for the protection of classified
material have had FF-L-2740-compliant locks installed at the time of manufacture
since March 10, 1992.
10.8.5. GSA-approved weapons containers and armory vault doors are available for the
protection of arms, ammunition, and explosives. Mechanical combination locks that
resist manipulation attempts for 20 man-hours are UL-listed as Group 1.
10.8.6. Pedestrian door dead bolts covered by Federal specification FF-L-2890, Lock
Extension (Pedestrian Door, Dead bolt) are intended for use on interior pedestrian
doors used for normal entrance and egress during day-to-day operations. Three
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locks have been approved under FF-L-2890: the model CDX-07 door lock was
approved in November 1991, the CDX-08 in March 1999, and the CDX-09 in June
2002. While the CDX-07 and CDX-08 are still approved for securing classified
material, they are no longer being manufactured.
10.8.7. Combination padlocks under the FF-P-110, Padlock, Changeable Combination
Federal specification are intended for low level resistance to forced entry and high
level tell-tale manipulation or surreptitious action. The padlocks are intended for use
ashore and aboard ocean going vessels, indoors, or outdoors, semi-protected by a
structural overhang similar to eaves or a lean-to.
10.9. Replacement of Unapproved Storage Containers
10.9.1. No non-security filing cabinets or containers in use or presently on the market have
been approved for the storage of classified information. As cited in Executive Order
12958, Classified National Security Information, Directive on Safeguarding Classified
National Security Information, dated August 4, 1999, only GSA-approved Class 5 or
Class 6 security filing containers are authorized for the storage of classified National
Security Information.
10.9.2. In the past, a number of filing cabinets, equipped with locking bars and secured
with combination padlocks, and security storage containers equipped with built-
in combination locks, manufactured prior to the GSA-approval process, were
conditionally authorized for storing classified information. Executive Order 12958,
Classified National Security Information, Directive on Safeguarding Classified
National Security Information, dated August 4, 1999, rescinds all previous conditional
authorizations for containers storing classified information.
10.9.3. Security Officers and custodians must immediately replace these previously
approved containers with GSA-approved Class 5 or Class 6 security containers.
The expense of purchasing new security containers can be substantially lessened
by taking practical steps to reduce the need for classified storage containers, as
suggested below.
10.9.4. Conduct clean-out campaigns to remove unnecessary classified and other
unclassified documents from containers. Excess material shall be archived or
destroyed, as appropriate, and retained classified shall be moved into approved
containers.
●● In most offices, classified documents usually constitute a very small percentage
of the documents in a given container. Remove classified files from existing non-
approved containers and consolidate them in approved security cabinets. The
non-approved cabinets can still be used for storing unclassified files;
●● Explore the requisitioning of approved containers through surplus channels
before purchasing new equipment.
10.10. Defective GSA-Approved Security Filing Cabinets
10.10.1. After initially receiving GSA approval, a number of security containers have been
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identified that require either the removal of the GSA approval label or must be
repaired to eliminate a security hazard. The following Art Metal and Hamilton
products shall be handled as indicated below:
●● Art Metal Products Inc. The GSA-approval label must be removed from all two-
and four-drawer, Class 5 security filing cabinets made by the Art Metal Products
Inc. These containers shall not be used for storage of classified materials;
●● Hamilton Products Group, Inc. Four- and five-drawer, Class 6 security filing
cabinets made by this manufacturer prior to July 1988, are subject to defects.
The defects allow the control drawer to be locked while another drawer is
open. These cabinets must be checked without exerting excessive force on
the control drawer handle to ensure that it cannot be locked with other drawers
open. If it is possible to lock the cabinet with less than 10 foot-pounds of torque,
a modification to the cabinet is required. Security officers who determine it
necessary to retrofit a container must contact a local locksmith for repairs.
Cabinets that are found to allow the locking, but are not repaired shall have the
GSA-Approved label removed.
10.11. Maintaining GSA-Approved Security Containers
10.11.1. General maintenance on GSA-approved security containers is recommended every
5 years. A trained and certified locksmith should be retained to examine and service
security containers with built-in combination locks. Containers used for the storage
of classified materials will be examined and repaired only by a cleared locksmith or
under the constant supervision of a cleared person.
10.12. Repairing Approved Security Containers
10.12.1. This section establishes procedures for the neutralization and repair of GSA-
approved containers and vault doors; the information provided herein is derived
from FED-STD 809A, and details unclassified procedures to neutralize and repair
lockouts on GSA-approved security containers and vault doors in a manner allowing
retention of the GSA approval. The terms used in this section are commonly
understood by the technical community to which they apply, and are not used here in
such a way as to introduce new or limited meanings.
●● Individuals who repair or drill security containers, vault doors, and padlocks shall
be cleared for access to the highest level of classified information stored within
the container, or must be escorted and continuously watched while working on
the container. Individuals must also be properly trained and certified in repairing
GSA-approved containers.
10.12.2. General Requirements
●● Determine if products are under warranty before attempting neutralization
procedures on containers or vault doors. Only products with red or blue labels
may be under warranty; red or blue label products more than a year old are
not under warranty. Contact the manufacturer concerning warranty provisions;
provide the serial number and description of container. GSA contracts require
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10.13.9. More information on the GSA Security Equipment Inspection Program can be found
at the Department of Defense Lock Program site.
10.13.10. Contact the Lock Program Technical Support Hotline, (800) 290-7607, if you have
any questions about the inspection and recertification process.
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not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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11.1. General
11.1.1. This chapter establishes the policy for access to CBP facilities, and limits the
establishment of facility entry controls to those necessary for the safety of CBP
employees and the protection of Government property and information.
11.1.2. This standardized approach will address accessing CBP facilities utilizing
identification, cards, Photo Access Cards (PAC), other agency passes and
credentials, X-Ray, magnetometer, irradiation screening devices and admittance to
CBP facilities.
11.2. Definitions
11.2.1. Badge: An emblem (a small piece of plastic, cloth or metal) that signifies
the bearer’s status, rank or membership or affiliation. A device, patch, or
accoutrement which is presented or displayed to indicate some feat of service, a
special accomplishment, a symbol of authority (e.g., police), a simple means of
identification. Also referred to in FLETC policy as a badge.
11.2.2. CFR: Code of Federal Regulation
11.2.3. Credentials: Documentation usually consists of an identity card, badge or a
shield, etc., issued by a trusted third party after some form of identity verification.
Credentials are utilized as identification showing that an individual is entitled to
represent, or exercise official power as, part of a Unites States Government Agency.
11.2.4. Designated Official: The highest ranking official of the primary tenant agency of a
Federal facility or, alternatively, a designee selected by mutual agreement of tenant
agency officials. For facilities owned and leased by the U.S. General Services
Administration (GSA), the definition appears in 41 CFR §102-71.20, of the Code of
Federal Regulations.
11.2.5. FIPS 201: Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 201, entitled Personal
Identity Verification of Federal Employees and Contractors, was developed to satisfy
the requirements of HSPD 12, which is comprised of two (2) specific components
PIV-I and PIV-II. FIPS 201 requires that the PIV card be a smart card and the card
body is similar to a bank credit card conforming to the ISO/IEC 7810 specification.
11.2.6. The card must contain both contact and contactless interfaces, which may be
provided by two separate integrated circuit chips (ICC) or by one dual-interface ICC.
The contact interface must conform to the ISO/IEC 7816-4:2005 specification
11.2.7. The contactless interface must conform to the ISO/IEC 14443 specification.
11.2.8. In most cases, physical access applications will use the contactless interface,
although there are special cases in which the contact interface will be used for
physical access. This is according to the NIST FIPS 201 PDF, the Standard
Publication for Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and
Contractors.
11.2.9. HSPD-7: Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 instructs Federal departments
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and agencies to prepare plans for protecting physical and cyber critical infrastructure
and key resources (CI/KR), owned or operated, including leased facilities by July 31,
2004.
11.2.10. HSPD-12: Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 establishes a policy for
a common identification standard for Federal employees and contractors and
mandates the establishment of a “mandatory Government-wide standard for secure
and reliable forms of identification issued by the federal government to its employees
and contractors”.
11.2.11. IDMS: Personal Identity Verification Identity Management System. A system
comprised of one or more systems or applications used to manage the identity
verification, validation, and issuance processes. A DHS/HQ central data base used
to house personal identifiable information for all DHS employees and contractors.
11.2.12. Internal Affairs Background Investigation Database (IABI): A CBP database
utilized by CBP/PSD to input CBP personnel’s employment, suitability and clearance
status for verification purposes by CBP Security personnel.
11.2.13. Magnetometer: An electronic device used specifically to search personnel for
hidden metallic weapons (knives and guns) at entrances to airports, public schools,
courthouses, and other guarded spaces. When used with access control equipment,
they can perform two functions:
(1) Detect the presence of concealed metal objects;
(2) Determine the size of those objects.
●● Metal is detected by measuring the change in an established magnetic field when
dense metal or ferrous materials are moved through the field. The antenna of
a detector sets up a magnetic field around itself. As the antenna of the detector
is brought near metal or metal is moved past the antenna, the pitch from a tone
generator increases, thereby alerting the operator to the presence of metal.
Measurement capabilities are adjustable allowing for varying the amount of metal
desired to be detected.
11.2.14. Photo Access Card (PAC): A PAC is a physical artifact, a plastic card issued by
CBP to employees, contractors and detailees, which allow the bearers, authorized
access to CBP Facilities.
11.2.15. PIV-I: Specifies the minimum requirements for a Federal Personal Identification
Verification (PIV) system that meets control and security objectives of PIV-I,
including the personal identity proofing process. PIV was defined by NIST, the
National Institute of Standards and Technology, an agency of the U.S. Commerce
Department’s Technology Administration dealing with the performance of background
checks for employees and contractors.
11.2.16. PIV-II: Provides detailed technical specifications of components and processes
required for interoperability of PIV cards with personal authentication, access
control, and PIV card management systems across the Federal government and the
issuance of smartcards.
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11.2.17. Radiation Detector: An electronic device used specifically to search for radioactive
materials hidden in cargo or vehicles. Radiation detectors fall into two categories:
gross counters and energy sensitive. Gross counters count each event (gamma
or neutron) emission the same regardless of energy. Energy sensitive detectors
-- used in radio-isotope identification devices (RIIDs) -- analyze a radioactive
isotope’s distinct gamma energy emissions and attempt to identify the source of
the radiation. There are several manufacturers of radiation detectors and they use
various technologies to measure radiation from containers, objects or people. Some
radiation detectors are small hand-held electronic devices and others are large portal
monitors that scans vehicles and cargo as they pass through.
11.2.18. Security Liaison (SL): The individual responsible for coordinating compliance with
the implementation of CBP security programs through the District Security Officer/
Regional Security Officer and serve as the primary point of contact for all security
issues in the their facilities.
11.2.19. Visitor: Any person who is not a DHS or CBP Federal employee or DHS or CBP
contractor with current DHS or CBP suitability and issued a DHS or CBP Photo
Access Card (PAC).
11.2.20. X-ray system: A device or system that inspects the contents of a package or
container for concealed explosives or contraband. Some systems can only detect
objects made of materials possessing high atomic numbers, such as steel, tin,
aluminum, and iron. Other systems can detect materials with both high and low
atomic numbers. Some systems have two monitors, one for objects with high atomic
numbers and one for objects with low atomic numbers. Color systems presently
available use only one monitor to view both types of materials. Specific colors are
assigned to high and low atomic number materials.
11.3. Authority
●● Privacy Act of 1974
●● E-Government Act of 2002
●● Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 (HSPD-12), August 2004.
●● Federal Information Processing Standard 201: Policy for a Common Identification
Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors, February 2005.
11.4. General
11.4.1. Entry control facilities provide the first public impression of CBP. They will present
the proper appearance for visitors, employees, and DHS personnel. The layout,
landscaping, and architecture of the facilities are factors in this image. The
architectural design of the facilities will comply with CBP’s architectural design
standards.
11.5. Responsibilities
11.5.1. The Security Officer will ensure that all persons entering and exiting any CBP facility
will adhere to access and egress procedures established in this handbook.
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●● Employees
o All CBP Federal employees and contractors (including guards, maintenance,
and cleaners) will complete a favorable suitability-to-be-authorized and issued
a CBP identification prior to entering and/or performing any authorized work in
a CBP owned or leased facility:
–– The CBP office of security will conduct federal, state and local criminal
and warrant checks on cleaning force personnel and answering service
employees;
–– New cleaning personnel and answering service employees must be
checked prior to their utilization;
–– All names should be rechecked annually;
–– Cleaning personnel or answering service employees are to provide photo
identification each time they enter the premises to perform their duties;
and
–– The CBP office of security will issue standardized contractor PACs.
o Photo access card (PAC) identification carriers are responsible to:
–– Maintain control of the issued photo access card (PAC) identification.
–– Safeguarding the photo access card (PAC) identification badge from loss
or misuse,
–– Immediately report any lost or stolen photo access card identification
badge; and
–– Notify his/her supervisor in writing of the circumstances surrounding the
lost/stolen badge or credential. Follow OIA/CBP guidelines to report a lost/
stolen badge of credential; the guidelines can be found at the CBP web
page.
o Employees who have lost or forgotten their photo access card (PAC)
identification or other issued CBP facilities issued access badge will be
issued visitors identification after that employee has been verified in the CBP
personnel security database;
o Photo access card (PAC) identification will be relinquished by all employees,
who shall, prior to resignation, termination; retirement, transfer etc., Complete
Form CBP-242.PDF the issuing official will annotate the appropriate control
log or automated system indicating return of the CBP national region photo
access card (PAC) identification badge or other issued CBP facilities issued
access badge.
11.5.2. The Designated Official will:
●● Ensure compliance with minimum CBP security requirements as determined by
IA/SMD;
●● Establish additional protection requirements for facilities and space under their
control as long as these procedures conform to the policy established by this
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chapter;
●● Develop and implement adequate procedures to protect CBP employees and
property;
●● Determine normal working hours and non-working hours for the facility;
●● Determine if special access controls to the facility are necessary during normal
working and non-working hours, and if they are necessary, establish only the
minimum controls required;
●● Coordinate and establish these special access controls and other protection
requirements with GSA if the building is operated or leased by GSA; and
●● The Designated Official or Security Liaison will determine if it is necessary to
establish additional access controls to the facility during normal working hours:
o Access controls may be enhanced if the Designated Official or Security
Liaison determines that there is a threat to harm employees, to steal
Government property, or to gain unlawful access to information which is
protected against unauthorized access by Government rules or regulations.
11.5.3. Designated Officials and Security Liaisons are responsible to ensure that the
physical security policies and procedures applicable to individual program activities
are adhered to by all employees.
11.5.4. Designated Officials or Security Liaison of a CBP owned facility establish and
maintain physical security, predicated on programmatic requirements, if any, to
protect:
●● Government property;
●● Records; and
●● The well-being of service employees.
11.5.5. Designated officials or security officer of both CBP-owned and GSA-leased space
ensure staff compliance with all applicable policies and procedures in safeguarding
and protecting:
●● Government personal property;
●● Seized property (if applicable);
●● Government records (personnel, classified documents, etc.); and
●● ADP security requirements.
11.6. Access Control
11.6.1. At a minimum, access control systems will comply with HSPD-12, FIPS 201 policies,
Government Smart Card Interoperability Specification (GSC-IS V2.1) and Schedule
70 for Products and Service Components.
11.6.2. CBP/IA/SMD determines the necessary access control and systems for all CBP
facilities based on the requirements of HSPD 12 and FIPS 201. Planning is required
to include:
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be made by the designated official under the facility site security plan/program;
●● For buildings and grounds for which the GSA has space assignment
responsibility, GSA will furnish as normal protection not less than the degree of
protection provided by commercial building operators of similar space for normal
risk occupants, as determined by GSA; and
●● Occupants of GSA assigned space shall cooperate to the fullest extent
possible with all pertinent facility regulations and procedures, and shall make
recommendations for improving protection.
11.8. Non-GSA Operated or Leased Facilities
11.8.1. When CBP elements occupy facilities not under GSA control, the IA/SMD will
determine if access control procedures are in accordance with the policy of this
chapter.
11.8.2. Dissemination of Access Control Information: When access controls are
implemented, the Designated Official will:
●● Publicize access control procedures to all facility occupants;
●● Make procedures available at each access control point for review by those
wishing access to the facility;
●● Provide written access control procedures to each guard post or receptionist,
defining responsibilities and procedures; and
●● Install signs at all facility entrances announcing that access to the facility is
controlled.
11.8.3. CBP Offices
11.8.4. All CBP offices located outside the National Capital Region will utilize their own
distinct CBP access card or badge for their facilities. CBP employees and CBP
contractors and will:
●● Request approval from CBP/IA/SMD in writing to issue their facility access cards/
badges. At a minimum the request will:
o Provide detailed access card/badge description;
o Submit a copy of facilities access badge/pass procedures.
●● Receive authorization in writing to issue facility Access Card/badge from CBP/IA/
SMD.
11.8.5. CBP offices receiving authorization to issue access cards/badges will have written
procedures in place for the administration, issuance, reporting of lost, stolen or
destroyed of their facility access cards/badges.
11.9. Photo Access Cards (PAC)
11.9.1. The PAC should be kept in a safe place which is convenient enough to ensure
that it will be brought to work. A good rule of thumb is to afford the PAC the same
protection given to credit cards. DO NOT write Personal Identification Numbers on
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the PAC.
11.9.2. The CBP Photo Access Card (PAC), identification badge, or other CBP facilities
issued access card is not for official identification and will never be used outside of a
CBP or other government facility for the purpose of personal identification.
11.9.3. Blank stock of any CBP PACs will be secured in a locked container and remain
under the positive control of the issuing official.
11.9.4. Each issuing official will maintain detailed accountability records of all PACs, to
include:
●● Issuance;
●● Returns;
●● Loss;
●● Destruction;
●● Unused stock on hand; and
●● Confirmation of suitability.
11.9.5. Destroying CBP PACs
●● All CBP PACs will be returned to the issuing office for destruction;
●● All issuing offices are responsible to develop destruction control processes which
will include as a minimum:
o Maintain log with card holder’s name, card number and date returned and
date destroyed;
o Destruction logs will be maintained for a period of no less than 5 years;
o All identification pass/badges will be destroyed by shredding, utilizing a GSA
approved shredder.
11.10. Visitors
11.10.1. Control of the internal movements of personnel within a facility is necessary to
ensure that only authorized persons are permitted in secured areas and that visitors
do not wander through the facility unescorted.
11.10.2. All visitors will be issued a visitor’s badge/card or pass for the purpose of escorted or
unescorted authorization to visit in a CBP controlled facility/space/area. Each facility
will establish an internal Visitor Control procedures and criteria for visitor badging
and maintain positive control of all visitors, as a minimum:
●● A unique visitor’s temporary or hard badge/card or pass will be developed
indicating:
o Name of facility;
o Visitor badge/card or pass number; and
o Visitor escort or unescorted status.
●● Visitor badge/card will be strictly controlled and inventoried;
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not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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o Requirements will depend on assessment of the security level for each facility.
●● Digital video recordings (DVR) are also highly valuable as a source of evidence
and investigative leads; and
●● Where the facility is operated and managed by GSA, 41 CFR §101-20.104 will
apply.
●● For further information, see Chapter 8.12, CCTV.
11.13. Electronic Access Controls
11.13.1. For detailed information on access controls see Appendix (CCTV) and Appendix
(IDS) .
11.13.2. Plan for locking devices or controls at perimeter and interior doors, providing
effective key control. Plan for protection; cleaning, and maintenance personnel and
determine hours, locations, and levels of access for such personnel.
11.13.3. Vehicles and Traffic Control. If public vehicle entrances have gates, they will be
electronically opened and closed.
●● Accommodations for handicapped visitors will be provided.
11.13.4. Vehicle entrances with restricted access at facilities associated with a high threat
level will be equipped with electrical or hydraulic vehicle gates or movable barriers.
●● Vehicle barriers may be controlled by: (see Appendix 7.2, Perimeter Security
Barriers)
o Card readers;
o Biometric devices;
o Proximity tags;
o Electronic keypads;
o Remotely by line-of-sight or using CCTV; or
o For high traffic areas, one-way entry and exit lanes shall be created.
11.13.5. Access control systems will be provided at perimeter doors, public waiting and
information areas, visitation areas, processing areas, sally ports, secure vestibule,
loading docks, and entrances to restricted areas.
11.13.6. The access control system shall be HSPD-12 compliant, hardware, or computer
based system.
11.13.7. A personnel-based access control system relies on a person to:
●● Positively identify individuals requesting access;
●● Determine if the access is authorized; and
●● Secure the access port ensuring only the individual(s) authorized have gained
access.
11.13.8. GSA Schedule 70 approved automated access control systems are appropriate for
large applications and may be required for programs associated with a high threat
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level. Systems may be in the form of stand-alone, one or two door units, small
networks for 8-16 doors, or larger multi-door, multi-tasking systems. Characteristics
of this type of system are:
●● All authorized users are provided with unique pass cards, tags or personal
identification numbers (PINs);
●● Audit trails are available;
●● Electrical power is required at each control point;
●● Individual users can be deleted from the system without the need to recover
cards, tags, pins or keys; and
●● These types of systems are ideal for areas with 25 or more users and large
systems controlling interior and exterior access control readers.
11.14. Screening Procedures
11.14.1. Entry security must follow ISC Security Standards for Leased Space (Sept. 24,
2004):
●● A visitor control/screening system, acceptable to the Government, is required. At
a minimum, the system shall require Security Guards to screen visitors;
●● Security Guards for public lobbies and public entrances shall be required for such
purposes as:
o ID/pass control;
o Manning X-ray and magnetometer equipment.
●● Guards can be furnished via either:
o Lessor-furnished operating agreement or
o Full leasehold control methods.
●● If guards are lessor-furnished, they shall be trained and licensed in accordance
with Government standards;
●● Guards manning magnetometers and X-ray equipment will be armed; and
o Guards will direct the building population and visitors through the
magnetometers.
o See Appendix 11.14. Screening Procedures, for more information.
11.14.2. Facility Security Standards:
●● X-ray and magnetometer screening devices at all public entrances for the
screening of visitors, contractors, etc., and all of their purses, bags, briefcases,
packages, etc., are mandatory for Level IV facilities:
o A standard based on facility evaluation by the SL and/or the building security
committee for Level III facilities:
–– Is desirable for Level III facilities;
–– Is not applicable for Level I facilities.
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11.17.5. National Capital Region Photo Access Card (PAC) identification passes will be
returned to the SMD/IA badging office for destruction.
11.18. Signage
11.18.1. Interior and exterior signage is standardized by function; Information, Direction,
Identification and Regulation and is required at CBP facilities. All signage shall follow
the standards shown in the GSA Manual on the Design of Sign/Symbol Systems for
Federal Facilities and 18 USC §871
11.18.2. A well-designed site should use as few signs as possible. Signs should make the
site clear to the first-time user by identifying multiple site entrances, parking and the
main building entrance.
11.18.3. Conformity of signage and directions:
11.18.4. Signage should be clear to avoid confusion and direct users to their destination
efficiently. If an escort service is available, signs should inform users; and
11.18.5. Signage should conform to 41 CFR §102-74, Rules and Regulations Governing
Public Buildings and Grounds.
11.18.6. Generally, graphics and style of site signage should be in keeping with the signage
used inside the building. Signs integrated with architectural elements can also be
very effective. There shall be a consistency in the font style and color plus any
directional symbology used in site and building signage. Signage placement can be
an important detail element of the building design whether prominently displayed
and tooled into the exterior building wall materials or as a freestanding component
near the entrance to the facility.
11.18.7. Persons in and on property shall at all times comply with official signs of a
prohibitory, regulatory, or directory nature and with the lawful direction of Federal
Protective Officers and other authorized individuals.
11.19. Photography
11.19.1. Employees and visitors at CBP-controlled spaces are prohibited from using cameras
and video recording devices. The senior CBP official on site in coordination with the
site Security Officer may grant exceptions to this policy on a case-by-case basis in
writing. This includes, but is not limited to:
●● Television cameras;
●● Telecasting;
●● Video/audio tape equipment;
●● Motion picture;
●● Still analog or digital cameras;
●● Filming; and
●● Any other means of image capture.
11.19.2. See CBP Public Affairs Directive 5410-001a for further information on regulations
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regarding photography.
11.20. Security Violations
11.20.1. Violation of these procedures constitutes a security violation; the Security Officer will
comply with all required actions.
11.21. Other
11.21.1. Legal Name Change: Any CBP federal employee, or detailee requesting a new
identification badge/pass due to a legal name change (e.g. marriage, divorce, etc)
will:
●● Notify PSD/records management and mission support specialist of legal name
change;
●● Provide PSD/records management legal documentation of name change for IAIB
update; and
●● Be issued new identification only after IAIB reflects legal name change.
11.21.2. Legal Name Change: Any CBP contractor requesting a new identification badge/
pass due to a legal name change (e.g. marriage, divorce, etc) will:
●● Notify their company of the legal name change:
o Company will make notification to CBP/PSD.
●● Be issued new identification only after IAIB reflects legal name change.
11.21.3. Non National Capital Region CBP Federal employees, detailees or contractor
requesting National Capital Region PAC identification badges will:
●● Be assigned duties within the national Capital region for a period of 30 days or
longer;
●● Accomplish required PAC documentation;
●● IABI data base verification by SMD/IA PAC issuing authority;
●● Personnel not found in the IABI data base can utilize DHS form 11000-5
Personnel Security Data Verification Request for the transmission of their DHS
status into IABI;
●● Comply with PAC identification return policy for National Capital Region, detailed
above in Section 11.17, upon completion of detail or assignment.
11.22. Reference
●● e-CFR library
●● 18 USC §930
●● DHS Form 11000-5 Personnel Security Data Verification Request
●● CBP Public Affairs Directives 5410-001a
●● ISO/IEC 7810
●● ISO/IEC 7816-4:2005
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●● ISO/IEC 14443
●● FIPS 201
●● HSPD-7
●● Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 (HSPD-12), August 2004.
●● PIV-I
●● NIST
●● PIV-II
●● Privacy Act of 1974
●● E-Government Act of 2002
●● Federal Information Processing Standard 201: Policy for a Common Identification
Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors, February 2005.
●● CFR 41 §101-20.302.
●● 41 CFR §102-74.70 for the Rules & Regulations Governing Conduct on Federal
Property
●● Walk-through metal detector (WTMD)
●● Hand-held metal detector (HHMD)
●● OIA/CBP Guidelines to Report a Lost/Stolen Badge of Credential;
●● Photo Access Card (PAC) identification badge(s) Form CBP-242.pdf
●● CBP Form 346
●● (GSC-IS V2.1) Government Smart Card Interoperability Specification
●● Schedule 70 for Products and Service Components:
●● Lost Badge Or Credential, Customs Directive 5230-029a (2002)
●● 41 CFR §101-20.104
●● 41 CFR §102-74. Subpart C. Prosecution of offenders is appropriate. Also see:
●● 41 CFR §101-20.315 Penalties and other laws:
●● 41 CFR §101-20.305 Disturbances: Any loitering, disorderly conduct,
●● 18 USC §930
●● Signage should conform to 41 CFR §101-203.3,
●● CBP Public Affairs Directives 5410-001
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(2) The term “dangerous weapon” means a weapon, device, instrument, material, or
substance, animate or inanimate, that is used for, or is readily capable of, causing death
or serious bodily injury, except that such term does not include a pocket knife with a
blade of less than 21/2 inches in length.
(3) The term “Federal court facility” means the courtroom, judges’ chambers, witness
rooms, jury deliberation rooms, attorney conference rooms, prisoner holding cells,
offices of the court clerks, the United States attorney, and the United States marshal,
probation and parole offices, and adjoining corridors of any court of the United States.
(h) Notice of the provisions of subsections (a) and (b) shall be posted conspicuously at each
public entrance to each Federal facility, and notice of subsection (e) shall be posted
conspicuously at each public entrance to each Federal court facility, and no person shall be
convicted of an offense under subsection (a) or (e) with respect to a Federal facility if such
notice is not so posted at such facility, unless such person had actual notice of subsection
(a) or (e), as the case may be.
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also delegate most or all of its enforcement powers. Generally, GSA has reserved
its investigative and prospective powers;
●● When jurisdiction is delegated by the FPS, an agreement must be negotiated
with the local police to provide law enforcement response.
12.2.7. Determining Need
●● A guard force is an integral and effective element in a facility’s physical security
program. The effectiveness of alarm devices, physical barriers, and intrusion
detectors depends ultimately on a response by a skilled guard force;
●● Guard services, as delegated by DHS MOA, can be provided by FPS Federal
Police Officers; and
●● The Federal Protective Service is responsible for delivering a comprehensive
physical security and law enforcement program in all Federally-owned or leased
facilities.
12.2.8. Criteria for Determining Need
●● As cited in the handbook titled “Department of the Interior Facility Security
Standards Appendix B,” evaluating a facility for security guard requirements to
include a security guard patrol is desirable for security Level II facilities;
●● This evaluation may be a standard based on a Building Security Committee
facility evaluation for security Level III facilities, and is a minimum-security
standard for Level IV facilities.
12.2.9. The number of guards at any given time will depend on the size of the facility, the
hours of operation, and current risk factors. Guard services are recommended under,
but are not limited to, the following circumstances:
●● At Security Level III and IV facilities, to meet visitor control and screening
requirements;
●● The mission of the facility is particularly critical;
●● High level/volume of sensitivity of information handled at the facility, e.g., National
Security Information (NSI);
●● An in-house response capability is needed, e.g., the facility contains alarmed
vaults or other sensitive operations, and off-site guards or police are not close
enough for quick response;
●● The facility is vulnerable to theft or damage, e.g. a facility location is in a high
crime area;
●● Pedestrian or automobile traffic is heavy or congested and requires special
controls; and
●● Moderate to large volume of public functions and/or moderate to large volumes of
mail and packages, which require screening or inspection.
12.3. Cost Factors
12.3.1. As with any expenditure of funds for security, the annual costs of guard services
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normally should not exceed the monetary value, replacement or critical loss value of
the protected items.
12.3.2. Costs for guard services are recurring and funding sources must be obtained from
the beginning of the project for the duration of the contract.
12.3.3. A substantial expense for guard services may be required for crowd or traffic control,
for safeguarding highly classified or sensitive information, or for protecting material
or functions which have high intrinsic rather than monetary value.
12.3.4. This is especially true as applied to the safety of employees since it is impossible to
put a dollar value on human lives or peace of mind.
12.3.5. A guard post in a high crime area may yield substantial benefits in terms of improved
safety, higher employee morale, increased productivity, and a better image of DHS/
CBP.
12.4. Guard Duties
12.4.1. Any decision about whether to utilize a guard force of any size must consider the
following duties that guards may properly perform:
●● Entrance Control
o Operate and enforce a system of access control, including inspection and
identification of packages.
●● Roving Patrol
o Patrol routes or designated areas such as perimeters, buildings, vaults, and
public areas.
●● Traffic Control
o Direct traffic (vehicular and pedestrian), control parking, check permits, and
issue citations.
●● Key Control
o Receive, issue, and account for certain keys to the building and its internal
areas.
●● Security and Fire Systems
o Monitor, operate, and respond to triggered intrusion or fire alarm systems or
protective devices.
●● Utility Systems
o Monitor, record data, or perform minor operations for building utility systems.
●● Lost and Found
o Receive, process receipt for, and store found items.
●● Flying of the U.S. Flag
o Observe flag flying procedures.
●● Reports and Records
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contractor with providing properly selected and trained personnel and maintaining
appropriate level of performance and conduct standards. These factors apply
whether hiring guards directly or dealing with a contractor:
o Firearms training including judgment shooting and firearms safety;
o Knowledge of criminal activities and proper law enforcement response
procedures;
o Judgment and emotional stability;
o Experience and demonstrated ability to retain composure under pressure and
o A personal history free of arrests or other criminal activity.
12.5.3. Supervision
●● Supervision of contract guards is the responsibility of the Contracting Officer’s
Technical Representative (COTR). Agency Technical Representatives (ATR) are
to be appointed at every location where contract guards are assigned within a
CBP facility. ATRs are responsible to work with the COTR and ensure services
contracted are being preformed in a professional manner. Supervision is required
for all guard posts and is usually requested at a ratio of one hour of supervision
for each eight productive hours on post. COTRs are responsible for oversight of
this activity;
●● On small contracts with three or fewer posts or at isolated sites, the use of roving
supervisors may be the only practical or cost-effective method of supervising the
contract;
●● At sites where there will be eight or more posts, an on-site supervisor should be
required, at least during the hours of heaviest traffic and greatest productivity on
post. After-hours supervision can be performed at the one to eight ratio by roving
supervisors. Large forces and facilities generally require more supervision; a
contract with thirty or more shifts per week should have full time supervision; and
●● Supervision is required for all guard posts and is usually requested at a ratio of
one hour of supervision for each eight productive hours on post.
12.5.4. Federal Protective Services (FPS) Physical Security Responsibilities
●● FPS is responsible for delivering a comprehensive physical security and law
enforcement program in all Federally owned or leased facilities. This involves
providing law enforcement and security for more than a million Federal workers
and visitors at over 8,300 buildings nationwide. FPS enforces laws and
regulations governing public buildings, maintains law and order, and protects life
and property in Federally controlled work places;
●● FPS partners with other Federal, State and local agencies throughout the Nation
to develop specific solutions to challenges, assists with police emergency
and special security services, and offers police and security support to law
enforcement departments during high-profile National special security events.
To make Federal facilities safer, FPS also consults with building owners and
tenants to advise on physical security measures. FPS provides crime prevention
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FPS periodically offers guard contract management training for ATRs; and
●● FPS officials are responsible for security and suitability processing of all contract
guard personnel, as well as training and certification. It is advantageous for
the ATR to work closely with FPS officials to provide input as necessary and to
monitor the required processing. DHS and CBP suitability requirements must be
followed.
12.6.2. DHS Facilities with FPS Delegations of Authority
●● In DHS facilities where FPS has delegated protection authority to the agency
or prime tenant, some protection responsibilities are transferred to the agency,
including procurement and management of guard contracts. Normally, FPS will
retain responsibility for physical security surveys, mobile patrols, monitoring of
alarms, response to incidents, and requests for criminal investigations. FPS will
provide such services at no charge to the agency beyond the protection portions
of the rent. Under the delegation, the accepting agency is responsible for
providing services formerly administered by FPS.
12.6.3. Procurement and Management of Guard Services
●● The senior facility manager, in consultation with the FSO, is responsible for
working with the appropriate COs to procure and manage guard services.
12.6.4. Security Clearances
●● If the contract is to be classified, the guards will require security clearances. The
clearance request procedures are outlined in the Defense Industrial Security
Program regulation, as implemented by SM 440.3.11. DHS MD 11045.
12.6.5. Crime Prevention Assessments
●● The senior facility manager may elect to request FPS or a local law enforcement
agency to conduct these assessments.
12.6.6. Maintenance and Response to Security Systems in Place
●● Local contractors are generally available to perform such maintenance and
response, or FPS may be able to provide such services on a reimbursable basis
in metropolitan areas.
12.6.7. Reporting of all Serious Criminal Incidents to FPS
●● FPS requires that all serious criminal incidents be reported to the appropriate
FPS Office.
12.6.8. DHS-Owned and Leased Facilities
●● In DHS owned and leased facilities to include leased space from other Federal
agencies, many protection responsibilities are transferred to the agency. In
addition to those items listed above in 9.2.E(2), DHS will also be responsible
for physical security surveys and monitoring of alarms. Normally, FPS will
retain responsibility for mobile patrols, response to incidents, and requests for
criminal investigations. Many security services may be provided by FPS on a
reimbursable basis. Contact your regional FPS office as cited in Chapter 20.6,
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property. The USPIS investigates internal conditions and needs that may affect
its security and effectiveness; apprehends those who violate the postal laws; and
audits financial and non-financial operations.
12.8.7. State, County, and Municipal Agencies
●● Each State maintains agencies for the enforcement of its laws within its
jurisdiction. These may include State police and highway patrol as well as
investigative and enforcement entities at the State and local level;
●● The sheriff’s office or Police Department in each county normally has the
responsibility for enforcing county laws and in cooperation with State and
municipal agencies certain State penal laws, such as the State criminal code.
12.9. Authorities/References
●● The Homeland Security Act of 2002, PL 107-296, enacted November 25, 2002
●● Department of Justice Vulnerability Assessment of Federal Facilities, June 1995
●● US Code: 40 CFR §1315, Law Enforcement authority of Secretary of Homeland
Security Protection of Public Property
●● MD 11000 Office of Security
●● MD 11030.1 Physical Security of Facilities and Real Property
●● MD 11035 Industrial Security Program
●● MD 11042.1 Safeguarding Sensitive but Unclassified (For Official Use Only)
Information
●● MD 11044 Protection of Classified National Security Information Program
Management
●● MD 11049 Security Violations and Infractions
●● MD 11050.2 Personnel Security and Suitability Program
●● MD 11055 Interim Guidance- Suitability Screening Requirements for Contractors
●● FPMR 101-20.103-3
●● PBS P 5930.17C, Office of Federal Protective Service Policy Handbook,
February 28, 2000.
●● Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD-12), Policy for a Common
Identification Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors
●● Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of Homeland security and
the General Services Administration (MOA DHS/GSA), date June 1, 2006
●● Memorandum for The Heads of Departments and Agencies, Verifying the
Employment Eligibility of Federal Employees, dated August 10, 2007
●● Department of Homeland Security, Federal Protective Service, Security Guard
Information Manual (SGIM), July 2006 Revised
●● Memorandum For All DHS Components, Acquisition of Contract Guard Services,
dated July 2, 2007
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13.1. General
13.1.1. The work of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is vital to the Nation’s defense
and security. Accordingly, CBP must ensure appropriate levels of protection from
loss or theft of classified material or Government property, as well as prevent any
acts of unauthorized access, theft, diversion, sabotage, espionage, or other hostile
activities.
13.1.2. Security countermeasures are an integral system of physical protection. These
countermeasures are designed to deter, prevent, detect, and respond to
unauthorized possession, usage, or sabotage of property or information.
13.1.3. CBP uses security programs to define, develop and implement its responsibilities
under Federal statutes, Executive orders and other directives for the protection of
classified and sensitive information or materials, and for the protection of CBP and
CBP contractor facilities, property, information and personnel.
13.1.4. CBP offices designate in writing a Security Officer or Security Liaison in their
organization that will facilitate all the security and awareness training requirements.
13.1.5. Key Program Elements
●● Levels of protection appropriate to particular security interests are provided
through the development and execution of comprehensive security
countermeasures and security programs. This chapter establishes the
responsibilities for managing and implementing the protection of security
interests, and sets forth the framework for documents which define the policies,
baseline requirements and responsibilities specific to the major elements of the
Security Program. The key program elements are:
o Strategic Planning;
o Program Management and Administration;
o Personnel Development and Training; and
o Incident Reporting and Management.
13.2. Strategic Planning
13.2.1. Purpose
●● The purpose of strategic planning is to prepare comprehensive procedures,
processes and information allowing CBP to apply sound risk management
principles and enhance the protection of the people, facilities, property and
information.
13.2.2. Objectives
●● Strategic planning promotes sustainable improvements in physical security to
effectively protect the people, facilities, property, and information that make up
the CBP. CBP is dedicated to applying sound risk management principles and
implementing principles and security practices using applicable laws, regulations,
strategies, policies and guidelines.
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themselves with the contents of this handbook and the applicable Federal,
departmental, and CBP security regulations referenced herein.
●● In most Instances, formal basic security training will not be necessary. Should
basic physical security training be required, the responsible supervisor shall
make arrangements to provide this training;
●● At the discretion of the responsible supervisor the Security Officers/Security
Liaison are encouraged to attend training courses on a variety of security
subjects offered by a number of different agencies.
13.6. Security Awareness, Training and Education (SATE) Plans.
13.6.1. A Security Awareness, Training and Education plan is a critical factor in building and
maintaining a facility’s security defenses.
NOTE: A Security Awareness, Training and Education (SATE) plan is NOT the same as a Security
Education, Training and Awareness (SETA) program
13.6.2. Starting a SATE Program can be simple. Managing and maintaining the SATE
Program can often be the most challenging aspect of implementing any security
strategy.
●● The Security Officers/Security Liaison must plan an effective program of
Instruction, making efficient use of training material provided for specific training
purposes;
●● At a minimum all employees will be provided formal security awareness training
annually.
●● All DHS personnel who have not fulfilled the requirements of the SATE Program
are precluded or restricted from unescorted access to DHS security areas and/or
from access to classified information until the requirements are met; and
●● The Security Officers/Security Liaison may also tailor presentations to the
organization and solicit other security professionals to speak on their areas of
responsibility, training and expertise. For example, a local police representative
could address crime prevention. Also, the Federal Protective Services (FPS)
offers posters and pamphlets with helpful security hints and will provide on-site
crime prevention seminars.
13.6.3. Security Education, Training, and Awareness programs will include but are not
limited to dissemination of information concerning the following:
●● Applicable DHS security directives and procedures and an overview of DHS
security disciplines to include personnel security information security, and
physical security;
●● Site-specific (and/or operations-specific) security policy, procedures, and
requirements that include local access control procedures, escort requirements,
prohibited articles, along with reporting and notification requirements;
●● Criminal, civil, and administrative sanctions imposed for incurring a security
infraction or committing a violation;
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●● Other matters relating to security including but not limited to recent espionage
cases, approaches, and recruitment techniques employed by an adversary of any
nature, as well as foreign intelligence service threats to sensitive and classified
information;
●● Countermeasures against security threats and/or vulnerabilities to include
protection of Government property;
●● SETA programs will also include but are not limited to developing and presenting
four briefings:
o Security Orientation Briefing. The Training Briefing will be provided within the
first 30 days of assignment. All DHS personnel will attend a DHS Security
Orientation Briefing at the earliest possible date;
o Initial Security Briefing. All DHS personnel who are assigned to duty positions
that require a clearance, are in possession of a clearance, or are eligible or
in processing for a security clearance, will receive an initial security briefing.
Prior to being granted access to classified information, individuals shall
receive a comprehensive briefing to inform them of their specific safeguard
and security responsibilities. If relocated to a new building or position,
individuals will receive a new briefing;
o Refresher Briefing. All DHS personnel must receive annual refresher
briefings to reinforce and update awareness of security policies and their
responsibilities. Refresher briefings are mandatory for all DHS employees
and must be implemented each calendar year at approximately 12-month
intervals; and
o Termination Briefing. Personnel will receive termination briefings to
inform them of their continuing security responsibilities after their access
authorizations are terminated. A termination briefing shall be implemented on
the individual’s last day of employment, the last day the individual possesses
an access authorization, or the day it becomes known that the individual no
longer requires access to classified information.
●● Documentation Requirements
o Records will be maintained to identify all individuals who have received
briefings by type and date of briefing;
o The name and contact information of the person doing the briefing (or the
source of briefing information) will also be maintained;
o Record-keeping systems must provide an audit trail. Statistics pertaining to
total population and numbers that have received security briefings will be
maintained and provided to the DHS Office of Security when requested.
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14.1. Geneal
14.1.1. The purpose for developing emergency plans is to provide emergency management
guidelines for managers and employees to reduce the effects of incidents and
emergencies that could harm employees and/or deny access to or prevent damage
to a facility.
14.1.2. This is accomplished by providing a standardized approach to planning,
documenting, and implementing increased security measures for all CBP buildings
during heightened alert levels due to emergency situations such as terrorist attack,
natural disaster, or civil unrest.
14.1.3. All employees should be aware of the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS)
which uses color-coded alerts to indicate the general level of security. Specific
responses at each level will vary by locality and facility.
14.2. Incident Response
14.2.1. An incident reporting program is an essential element in any security program.
The timely reporting of thefts, losses, damage of property and the tampering or
unauthorized disclosure of information is crucial.
14.2.2. A timely report increases the possibility of recovering the property, minimizing
damage and apprehending the assailant.
14.2.3. Any employee who discovers, witnesses, or has knowledge of a criminal, dangerous,
or unauthorized practice or condition, or a violation of security regulations shall
immediately report the matter to the appropriate authorities.
14.2.4. Reporting serious incidents, unusual events and emergency conditions
●● The senior official at a facility is responsible for reporting serious incidents,
unusual events, or emergency conditions that affect CBP operations.
14.2.5. Reporting incidents to law enforcement agencies
●● FPMR 101-20.103-3 requires the prompt reporting of all crimes and suspicious
circumstances occurring on GSA-controlled property to the local Federal
Protective Service (FPS). In most cases, the FPS will dispatch a U.S. Federal
Police Officer to record the incident;
●● The FPS Form 3155, Offense/Incident Report, is the standard reporting form. The
Security Officer may use this form when FPS police officers are not available in
the general area. The form requests information such as date, time and location
of incident, details regarding lost stolen or damaged items, nature of the incident
and any suspects involved. Supplies of the form can be obtained from the FPS
Regional Office or building manager; and
●● Reports of theft or loss of explosive materials (blasting agents and detonators)
also shall be reported within 24 hours of discovery by telephone and in writing to
the nearest Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) office.
14.2.6. Administrative Reporting
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●● The incident reporting requirements stated herein are not a substitute for nor do
they eliminate the need for compliance with any additional reporting requirements
prescribed in Federal and Departmental Regulations and in the Administrative
Manual pertaining to motor vehicle incidents and to the loss, damage and
mishandling of Government property;
●● The Commissioner’s Situation Room serves as CBP’s 24-hour, 7 days a week,
reporting and information coordination center. It facilitates communication
between CBP Headquarters and the CBP field offices by serving as the entry
point for reporting of significant incidents from field offices. The Situation Room
provides complete, accurate, and timely reporting to the Commissioner and
senior CBP management and will provide connectivity to the Department of
Homeland Security, Homeland Security Operations Center and other interagency
entities for information on significant events impacting CBP operations.
14.3. Reporting Procedure
14.3.1. Initial notifications will be made to the Commissioner’s Situation Room prior to
other established reporting entities. This does not eliminate any office or divisional
reporting requirements. The Commissioner’s Situation Room is the primary point of
contact for significant incident reporting for all CBP field offices, to include ports of
entry, sectors, stations, air and marine branches, and international offices.
14.3.2. Keeping in mind the safety of our employees and the integrity of operations within
the different disciplines of CBP, the reporting procedures are as follows:
All CBP events related to terrorism or potentially related to terrorism must be
reported telephonically immediately and in writing immediately thereafter via
Significant Incident Report (SIR) to the Commissioner’s Situation Room. Section 7
of this Directive delineates types of incidents that should be considered related or
potentially related to terrorism;
All other incidents of a sensitive or timely nature will be reported telephonically to the
Commissioner’s Situation Room within 2 hours of occurrence and followed by written
notification within 4 hours. More serious events which occur over an extended time
period will require regular updates; and
●● Once a reference number has been provided to field personnel, a written report
must be filed with the Commissioner’s Situation Room within the time frame
specified above in 14.3.2.a. Failure by field offices to file written reports in the
required time frame will be tracked and reported to the relevant Headquarters
office for review and remedial action.
14.3.3. The telephone numbers for the Commissioner’s Situation Room are 1-877-748-
7666, 202-344-3886 and 202-344-3920. Reports are to be faxed directly to the
Commissioner’s Situation Room at 202-344-3886. For classified reports, fax directly
to 202-344-3911. For electronic submission of SIRs, SIR-HQBOR or cbp.sitroom@
dhs.gov should be used as appropriate
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
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–– http://redcross.tallytown.com/library/ShelterInPlaceAtYourOffice.pdf
–– http://www.fema.gov/plan/prevent/saferoom/index.shtm
–– http://www.ready.gov/business/plan/shelterplan.html
–– National terror alert.com-shelter in place (SIP)
–– http://www.opm.gov/emergency/
●● All Continuity of Operations (COOP) Plans, as well as office-specific COOP
Implementation Plans, shall be developed using the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) Continuity of Operations template and instructions available on
the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) website at: http://www.
fema.gov/government/coop/index;
●● COOP/Program/Plans, including office-specific COOP Implementation
Plans, shall be universal in outlining response and recovery strategies for
any catastrophic incident, to include pandemic, in compliance with Federal
Preparedness Circular (FPC-65); and
●● COOP/Programs/Plans as well as office-specific COOP Implementation Plans
shall be marked “For Official Use Only” (FOUO) and stored at the relevant
Headquarters or field office location, emergency relocation site (ERS), Tele-
work site and/or alternate work site (AWS) as appropriate to ensure continued
availability if the primary location is rendered inaccessible. A copy must also
be forwarded to the appropriate Headquarters Emergency Preparedness
Coordinator (EPC). Emergency Preparedness Program 5290-010B.
14.7. Emergency Communications
14.7.1. This subsection describes available methods of communication that the CBP will use
during an emergency.
14.7.2. Government Emergency Telecommunication Service (GETS). CBP GETS Cards
FAQs
●● A Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS) card is issued
to those individuals who perform essential functions to maintain continuity of
government posture before, during and after crisis situations;
●● The Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS) is a
White House-directed emergency phone service provided by the National
Communications System (NCS) in the Cyber Security & Communications
Division, National Protection and Programs of the Department of Homeland
Security. GETS supports Federal, State, local, and tribal government, industry,
and non-governmental organization (NGO) personnel in performing their
National Security and Emergency Preparedness (NS/EP) missions. GETS
provides emergency access and priority processing in the local and long distance
segments of the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN). It is intended to be
used in an emergency or crisis situation when the PSTN is congested and the
probability of completing a call over normal or other alternate telecommunication
means has significantly decreased;
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not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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14.12. Procedures
14.12.1. Agency-wide procedures. Notification of changes to Threat Conditions and the
implementation of Protective Measures will be made through the Office of the
Commissioner in consultation with the Assistant Commissioner (AC) of the Office of
Field Operations (OFO), the Chief, Office of Border Patrol (OBP), and other relevant
offices. When possible, offices should coordinate the appropriate set of Protective
Measures.
●● All CBP communication plans and communication activities with Federal,
State, and local law enforcement agencies and officials, the Congress, and the
private sector, must be undertaken with approval from or in accordance with a
determination by the Secretary, DHS, regarding dissemination of information
regarding the threat. Communication with external entities will be conducted in
accordance with CBP current policies.
14.12.2. Low Condition/Green (Agency): Under Low Condition, CBP may, at its discretion,
institute the following general Protective Measures:
●● Develop and deliver anti-terrorism training to CBP personnel;
●● Review, update, and distribute office occupant emergency and evacuation
plans; ensure compliance with Customs Directive 5290-010A, Emergency
Preparedness – Notification and Coordination (9/21/2001);
●● Assess and exercise joint standard operating procedures (SOPs) and support
agreements with appropriate external agency partners;
●● Review and revise security procedures and port or geographically specific (i.e.,
Northern Border, Atlantic Coast) threat assessments; and
●● Perform weekly communication checks to ensure maximum operational
capability.
14.12.3. Guarded Condition/Blue (Agency): In addition to the Protective Measures identified
in the preceding level, CBP at its discretion may institute the following general
Protective Measures:
●● Disseminate heightened Threat Condition status to all CBP assets;
●● Operate with a heightened awareness supported by focused intelligence
reporting as available; and
●● Plan for the potential deployment of personnel and other resources to critical
locations should the threat level escalate.
14.12.4. Elevated Condition/Yellow (Agency): In addition to the Protective Measures identified
in the preceding levels, CBP, at its discretion, may institute the following general
Protective Measures:
●● Coordinate Occupant Emergency Plans (OEPs) and Continuity of Operations
Plans (COOPs) with other Federal, State, and local entities as necessary;
●● Consider restrictions on nonessential travel by CBP employees;
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●● Coordination with BSCs and GSA with regard to implementing increased alert
levels absent a declaration by the Department of Homeland Security;
●● Notification of suppliers of services and equipment to be delivered upon
implementation (e.g., notifying guard companies of an increased staffing
requirement);
●● Notification of state and local agencies supporting the Plan;
●● Establishing appropriate contracting mechanisms to facilitate rapid delivery of
services in support of the Plan;
●● Providing other support as agreed to in the Plan to implement countermeasures
(i.e., increased K-9 patrols, etc.);
●● Verification that countermeasures have been implemented; and,
●● De-escalation once the Alert Level is reduced.
14.13.10. FPS Inspectors. Inspectors will work with BSCs to determine and document specific
actions that need to be taken at each building to implement the Alert Guidelines.
Inspectors may also be responsible for verifying increased countermeasures have
been implemented when the alert level is increased.
14.13.11. Building Security Committee (BSC). The BSC will work with the Inspector to develop
the Plan. The BSC is responsible for signing the Plan, indicating concurrence with
the actions to be taken. If the Plan requires funding to implement, such as increased
guard presence, the BSC will be responsible for coordinating funding among tenant
agencies in advance of implementation.
14.13.12. Delegation of responsibilities. The responsibility for development of these plans
may be delegated to an agency in writing upon request and with concurrence of the
region for a specific building or Headquarters for an agency-wide delegation.
14.13.13. Procedures. The following is guidance for countermeasures to be considered. As
appropriate, each countermeasure should be addressed in the Plan. Some actions
are minimum recommendations (X) for specific building security levels and others
should be applied as deemed appropriate (*) based on the threat and personnel
available.
14.13.14. Alert Level GREEN. Associated with the Low/Normal Condition identified by the
Homeland Security Advisory System. The following protective measures apply to
conditions involving a general threat of a possible emergency situation and warrant
only a routine security posture.
14.14. Best Practices
14.14.1. In conjunction with the above CBP HSAS policy IA/SMD has provided in-depth
facility protective measures based on the appropriate HSAS threat levels below. See
Section 14.15 for this detailed information.
14.14.2. Create a Building Specific Security Plan using this template as a guide along with
CBP Policy CBP DIRECTIVE NO. 3340-026B, CBP Threat Condition Protective
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Measures (HSAS).
14.14.3. Implement these best practices upon:
●● Automatically in response to change in the DHS HSAS Alert Level nationally,
locally, or with other respect to the facility (i.e., transportation sector);
●● By the Commissioner of the CBP nationally or regionally; and
●● At a specific facility(ies) upon recommendation of IA/SMD and with concurrence
of the BSC chairperson OR Designated Official (DO) upon receipt of specific
threat information regarding the building meriting its implementation (i.e., a
planned demonstration).
14.14.4. A copy of each Plan will be maintained by the DO. The Plan will be marked and
controlled as For Official Use Only, in accordance with DHS policy on Sensitive but
Unclassified Information. It will also be marked “Law Enforcement Sensitive,” which
although not a control mechanism, indicates the sensitivity and type of information in
the plan.
14.14.5. Initial Plans for each building will be developed as part of the next Building Security
Assessment (BSA) cycle following implementation of this policy. The plans will be
reviewed with the BSC and revised as necessary as part of each recurring BSA or
upon request of the BSC Chairperson.
14.15. Protective Measures
14.15.1. Alert Level Green
Building Security Level
Green Protective Measures
I II III IV
At regular intervals, remind agency representatives to be suspiscious and inquisitive about strangers,
particularly those carrying suitcases or other containers. Watch for suspicious vehicles on or adjacent X X X X
to CBP property. Watch for abandoned parcels or suitcases and any unusual activity.
Ensure the building manager or representative has access to building plans and occupant emergency
plans at all times. Ensure BSCs, property managers and tenant agencies periodically review and
X X X X
ensure the availability of building floor plans, Occupant Emergency Plans (OEPs), Continuity of
Operations Plans (COOPs) and other essential emergency information.
Recommend buildings, rooms, and storage areas not in regular use be secured. X X X X
Review all plans and requirements related to introduction of higher security level. X X X X
Require US Government picture identification for Federal employees, contractors, and a current valid
government picture identification (such as a drivers license, state identification card, passport, or * * * X
immigration card) system for visitors.
Inspect and search all packages, handbags, and other containers, except those persons displaying
* * * X
US Government credentials. Deny entrance to all persons who refuse this inspection.
Check basement, engineering spaces, heating and air conditioning ducts, shrubbery, and potential
* * * X
entry points such as roof openings, steam and other utility tunnels, doors and windows.
Refine and exercise preplanned proactive measures. Ensure personnel receive training on Homeland
Security Alert System (HSAS) and department or agency-specific protective measures. Regularly * * * X
assess facilities for vulnerabilities and take measures to reduce them.
Consult local authorities on the threat and mutual antiterrorism measures. * * * *
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Keep all persons involved with Counter-Terrorism contingency plans or in key positions on call. X X
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Building Security Committees (BSCs) and tenant agencies will review and verify all local Occupant
Emergency Plans (OEPs), Continuity Of Operations Plans (COOPs), and ensure that communications
X X
equipment and contact lists (i.e. radios, telephones, public address systems, and fax number lists) are
up-to-date and functioning properly.
Tenant agencies brief appropriate employees of actions required under procedures contained in
X X
agency-specific OEPs and COOPs.
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distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
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Building Security
Red Protective Measures Level
I II III IV
Continue, or introduce actions listed in Alert Level Orange. X X X X
Search all vehicles and their contents before allowing entrance to the building. * * * *
Control access and implement positive identification of all individuals with no exceptions. * * * *
Thoroughly search all suitcases, briefcases, and packages brought into the building. * * * *
Make frequent checks of the exterior of buildings and parking areas under GSA jurisdiction. * * * *
Coordinate the possible closing of public streets and facilities with local authorities. * * * *
Activate the facility OEP. * * * *
FPS should assign emergency response personnel and pre-position specialty trained teams. Monitor, redirect, * * * *
and/or constrain transportation systems.
Increase and/or redirect personnel to address critical emergency needs. * * * *
Consider closing of facility to visitors or entirely * * * *
Assign emergency response personnel and pre-position specially trained teams. X X
Monitor, redirect or constrain transportation systems. X X
Transport high-level employees to alternate work sites. X X
Augment security officers and/or security staff (guards) as necessary. X X
Allow only emergency vehicles into facility, and check those vehicles. X X
Control access and implement positive identification of all individuals (emergency essential at this point), no
X X
exceptions.
Cease processing additional visitors for entry. X X
All persons, including employees, shall walk through the metal detector. All packages, briefcases, handbags and
other containers being brought into the building shall be X-rayed or visually inspected to ensure no contraband
X X
enters the building. Packages not inspected shall not be left with Security Guards or receptionists; the carrier
shall remove such packages.
Activate the facility Occupancy Emergency Plan. X X
All persons shall sign in and out upon entering and leaving the building. In those facilities where card readers
X X
are installed, the record of the automated system will suffice.
All vehicle traffic to the garage will cease and the doors will be secured. X X
All loading dock activities (deliveries) will cease and the doors will be secured. X X
Site specific measures identified in the Site Security Plan/Program will be implemented. Other measures as
X X
identified by IA/SMD will be implemented as directed.
Security Guards shall visually check under and around all vehicles parked adjacent to the building. Security
Guards shall observe all vehicles for suspicious persons or situations. In those cases where the presence of
a vehicle can not be explained (owner is not present and the vehicle has no obvious affiliation), inspect the
vehicle for explosive, incendiary, chemical, biological devices, or other dangerous items and arrange to have the X X
vehicle removed from the vicinity of the facility, soft targets and other sensitive areas as soon as possible. If the
suspicious vehicle is parked in public space, Security Guards shall take appropriate action, which may include
requesting assistance from the appropriate law enforcement agency.
Require full access control and positive identification of all individuals with no exceptions. X X
Perform frequent checks of building exteriors and parking areas. X X
Mobilize or activate any specially trained teams or resources. Monitor, redirect, and/or constrain transportation
X X
systems as necessary.
As necessary, review and activate Safety and Security Plans. This includes but would not be limited to: Physical
Security Plans, Information Security Plans, Occupant Emergency Plans (OEPs), COOPs, Disaster Response X X
Plans and Emergency Responder Plans.
Consider closing the facility. X X
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14.16. Authorities/References
o Homeland Security Presidential Directive-3
o (HSPD) (Mar. 11, 2002) (as amended by HSPD-5, Feb.28, 2003);
o 19 USC 1318 (2002);
o Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-96, 116 Stat. 2135;
o Customs Directive 3340-021 Antiterrorism, 1/11/2000;
o Customs Directive 5290-010A Emergency Preparedness, 9/21/2001;
o Customs Directive 5410-001, Customs News Media Policy 10/10/1986;
o CIS HB 1400-05A, Information Systems Security Policy and Procedures
Handbook;
o 15 CFR §730-774;
o 18 U.S.C §831, §886, §841-848, §921-§922, §1028, §2331, §2332a-d, and
§2339 A-B;
o 19 USC§482, §318, §1461, §1581, §1582, §1644, and §2462 (b) (2) (F);
o 19 CFR §4, §18, §101, §122-§123;
o 22 U.S.C §401, §406, §408, §421-§422, §2349aa-2, §2349aa-8, §2349aa-9,
§2371, §2778, §2780, §2797, §2798, §2799aa, and §2797a-b;
o 26 USC §5801-§5802; 42 USC §262, §2077, §2099, §2111, §2122, §2133,
§2138, §2156, and §2157;
o 49 USC §44904 and §46312;
o 50 USC §1701-1706;
o 50 USC app.1-44.
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emergency, all employees must attempt to remain calm, exercise sound judgment,
follow emergency plans, and adhere to the orders of appropriate personnel,
including supervisors, properly identified Monitors, fire and emergency medical
personnel and security officers.
15.1.7. See the OEP Guide and OEP Template, which are included in this policy handbook.
15.2. Authority/References.
●● The Homeland Security Act of 2002, PL 107-296, enacted 11/25/02
●● Department of Justice Vulnerability Assessment of Federal Facilities, June 1995
●● 29 CFR §1910, Occupational Safety and Health Standards
●● 40 CFR §1315, Law Enforcement authority of Secretary of Homeland Security
Protection of Public Property
●● 41 CFR §101-20; Public Contracts and Property Management
●● 41 CFR §102-74.240 Facility Management
●● 41 CFR §102-74.360 Safety and Environmental Management
●● 41 CFR §102-80 Safety and Environmental Management
●● GSA Occupant Emergency Program Guide, Mar 2002
●● MD 11030.1 Physical Security of Facilities and Real Property
●● MD 11042.1 Safeguarding Sensitive but Unclassified (For Official Use Only)
Information
●● MD 11044 Protection of Classified National Security Information Program
Management
●● Federal Employee’s Family Preparedness Guide
●● The US Office of Personnel Management Emergency Preparedness Guide
15.3. Responsibilities
15.3.1. OEPs are developed at the facility level, specific to the geographic location and
structural design of the building. General Services Administration (GSA) owned
facilities maintain plans based on the GSA OEP template.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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16.1. General
16.1.1. Only those CBP employees who are authorized in writing and issued a credential to
bear firearms by the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
shall carry a firearm in the performance of their official duties. This authorization
is granted only after the employees have successfully completed approved basic
firearms training and have been issued the appropriate credential.
16.1.2. Physical Security Specialists, armed employees of the Security Management
Division, as well as employees who perform inspections or other related duties
(mixed tour, part-time, intermittent, seasonal, temporary and status quo), and
any other armed CBP employees who do not complete basic firearms training,
must attend an approved training course as specified by the Director, Firearms
and Tactical Training Division (FTTD), Office of Training and Development (OTD).
Authorization to carry a firearm cannot be granted until this requirement has been
met.
16.1.3. The statutory authority for CBP employees to carry service-issued or service-
authorized firearms is contained in 19 USC §1589a.
16.2. Assigned Firearms
16.2.1. All firearms shall be held in a secure, locked, and safe storage area when not
assigned to an employee, while awaiting repair, or other circumstance resulting in
the firearms being in the custody of a firearms custodian. The following minimum
guidelines should be followed when storing firearms and ammunition:
●● Firearms should be stored in GSA-approved security containers, vaults, or
Underwriters Laboratories (UL)-labeled safes or weapons cabinets;
●● Access to firearm storage containers should be limited to those employees
designated to issue such firearms. The firearm storage area should be
designated at least a controlled area to restrict unauthorized access to the area.
If more than 35 firearms are stored, an alarm with a guard or police response is
recommended. For further information, see Appendix 10, Storage of Weapons
and Ammunitions.
16.3. Authorities
●● Firearms and Use of Force Handbook (HB 4500-01A, December 2001);
●● U.S. Customs Firearms and Use of Force Training Policy (CD 4510-017A,
December 2001);
●● Land Border Inspectional Safety Policy (CD 5290-007A, June 2001); and
●● Airport and Seaport Inspectional Safety Policy (CD 5290-006, June 1999).
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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17.1. General
17.1.1. In order to reduce or minimize the risk that sensitive paper and electronic building
information will not be used for dangerous or illegal purposes, this chapter
covers CBP security polices, procedures and responsibilities for the protection of
Sensitive but Unclassified (SBU) paper and electronic building information and the
dissemination of SBU paper and electronic building information; owned, leased, or
delegated facilities.
17.1.2. Information Security (INFOSEC) programs and procedures already exist to protect
information assets. However, information generally available to the public as well
as certain detectable activities may reveal the existence of, and sometimes details
about, classified or sensitive information or undertakings. Such indicators may
assist those seeking to neutralize or exploit U.S. Government actions. For more
information, refer to:
●● CBP Website: Sensitive Security Information (SSI) – Directive, Regulations,
Quick Reference
●● CBP Website: Information Security/For Official Use Only (INFOSEC/FOUO)
●● National Security Decision Directive 298 - National Operations Security Program
17.1.3. OMB requires safeguarding data and documents that are sensitive enough to require
protection but that may not otherwise be designated as classified information.
“Protect government information commensurate with the risk and magnitude of harm
that could result from the loss, misuse, or unauthorized access to or modification of
such information.”
●● OMB Circular A-130, Management of Federal Information Resources
●● Laws and Regulations Governing the Protection of Sensitive But Unclassified
Information
17.2. Definitions
17.2.1. DUNS: Data Universal Numbering System (DUNS) is a unique nine-digit numbering
system that is used to identify a business.
17.2.2. For Official Use Only. The caveat “FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY” will be used to
identify sensitive but unclassified information within the DHS community that is
not otherwise specifically described and governed by statute or regulation. For
reference, see DHS Management Directive 11042.1, Safeguarding Sensitive But
Unclassified (For Official Use Only) Information
17.2.3. OMB. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is one of the agencies of the
Executive Branch of the U.S. Government. Its predominant mission is to assist the
President in overseeing the preparation of the Federal budget and to supervise its
administration in Executive Branch agencies.
17.2.4. Sensitive but Unclassified (SBU)
●● SBU is the formal designation for information that, by law or regulation, requires
some form of protection but is outside the formal system of classification, in
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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17.5.4. The following paragraph, as set by Public Buildings Services (PBS) order PBS
3490.1, will be included on the cover page of the information (such as the
cover page on the set of construction drawings and on the cover page of the
specifications) and on the label of all magnetic media:
17.5.5. The previous two statements will be prominently labeled in bold type in a size
appropriate for the document. On a set of construction drawings, for example, the
statements shall be in a minimum of 14-point bold type.
17.5.6. Blueprints, engineering drawings, charts, and maps containing sensitive information
will be marked “Sensitive But Unclassified - Building Information” or “SBU-BI” at
the top and bottom of each page. If the blueprints, drawings, charts, or maps are
large enough that they are likely to be rolled or folded, “Sensitive But Unclassified
- Building Information” will be placed so that the marking is visible when the item is
rolled or folded.
17.5.7. Materials being transmitted to recipients outside of DHS, for example, other Federal
agencies, State or local officials, etc. who may not be aware of what the FOUO
label represents, shall include the following additional notice on the front page of the
document(s):
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It contains information
that may be exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (5 USC
552). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted, distributed, and disposed of
in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information and is not to be released
to the public or other personnel who do not have a valid “need-to-know” without prior
approval of an authorized DHS official.
17.5.8. Electronic Media, Computer storage media, i.e., disks, tapes, removable drives, etc.,
containing FOUO information will be marked “FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.”
17.6. Responsible Care for Dissemination of SBU Building Information
17.6.1. CBP personnel or others authorized to disseminate SBU building information (which
includes flow down dissemination by prime/general contractors, subcontractors,
suppliers, architects/engineers, Federal agencies, lessors, private sector plan
rooms, State and local governments, print shops/reprographic firms, etc.) will obtain
a signed copy of the Document Security Notice by authorized users of SBU building
information agreeing to exercise reasonable care when handling SBU building
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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documents.
17.6.2. The Document Security Notice form may be found at the end of Public Buildings
Services (PBS) order PBS 3490.1.
17.6.3. “Reasonable care” is defined as:
●● Limiting Dissemination To Authorized Users. Dissemination of information shall
only be made upon determination that the recipient is authorized to receive it.
The need-to-know criteria determine whether authorization is granted. Those
with a need-to-know are other Federal Government agencies (who shall make
requests through their agency management), and non-Government entities that
are specifically granted access for the conduct of business on behalf of or with
CBP. This includes DHS or other Federal agencies, organizations or individuals
such as architects and engineers, consultants, contractors, subcontractors,
suppliers, plan rooms, and others that the contractor deems necessary in order
to submit an offer/bid or to complete the work or contract, as well as maintenance
and repair contractors and equipment service contractors.
Note: It is the responsibility of the person or firm disseminating the information to assure that the
recipient is an authorized user and to keep the Document Security Notice records of recipients.
17.6.4. Authorized users will provide identification as set forth below:
●● Valid Identification for Federal government users. Valid identification of authorized
government users receiving SBU building information shall be verification of
government employment;
●● Valid identification for non-government users. Authorized non-government
users shall provide valid identification to receive SBU building information.
Valid identification shall be all items (a) through (c), and including item (d), as
necessary:
(a) A copy of a valid business license or other documentation granted by the
state or local jurisdiction to conduct business;
(b) The license at a minimum will provide the name, address, phone number
of the company, state of incorporation, and the name of the individual
legally authorized to act for the company;
(d) A general contractor’s license may be substituted for the business license
in states that issue such licenses;
(e) In the rare cases where a business license is not available from the
jurisdiction, the information will be provided and testified to by the
submitter;
(h) A valid IRS tax ID number of the company requesting the information; and,
as necessary:
●● A valid picture state driver’s license will be required of person(s) picking up SBU
documents.
17.6.5. Prior to releasing any SBU building information the sender will verify that the
individual(s) receiving or picking up the documentation are authorized by the
company obtaining the documents.
17.6.6. SBU documents will not be released to any individual or firm who has not either
previously or at the time of pickup supplied the required documentation as outlined
above.
17.7. Reproduction of SBU information
17.7.1. SBU documents may be reproduced without the permission of the originator to the
extent necessary to carry out official CBP activities. Copies will be protected in the
same manner as originals. In the event of a copy machine malfunction, the copy
machine will be cleared and all paper paths checked for papers containing sensitive
information.
17.8. Storage
17.8.1. All sensitive information existing in hard copy will be stored within a locked container
in a limited or exclusion area, an access-controlled electronic environment or under
the physical control of an authorized individual.
17.8.2. On occasions when an individual is traveling within the U.S. and limited or exclusion
areas are not available, a locked container within a locked room will suffice (e.g.,
locked briefcase or suitcase within a locked hotel room or vehicle).
17.8.3. Sensitive information will not be taken outside the U.S., unless authorized by
component authority.
17.8.4. Information handled electronically and transmitted over the network is at a higher
risk of being released or altered. Sensitive information stored on the CBP network
will be protected at a level that can ensure that only those who are authorized to
view the information are allowed access (e.g., machine-generated passwords,
encryption).
17.8.5. The CBP network systems shall maintain a high level of electronic protection (i.e.,
firewalls, intrusion detection, defense-in-depth, isolation of sensitive information,
good practices network administration) to ensure the integrity of sensitive information
and to prevent unauthorized access into these systems. Regular review of the
protection methods used and system auditing are also critical to maintain protection
of these systems.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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17.8.6. The physical elements of the network systems that store and transmit sensitive
information or that have direct access to sensitive information will be secured within
a restricted area. The more central the information resource is (e.g., a network or
security system control room), the higher the level of access control that will be
applied.
17.9. Record Keeping
17.9.1. Individuals authorized to disseminate CBP SBU building information will require
a signed Document Security Notice from individuals authorized to receive the
information.
17.9.2. Records of the signed Document Security Notices will be maintained by the
disseminator for 5 years.
17.9.3. At the completion of work, secondary and other disseminators will be required to turn
over their Document Security Notice dissemination records to CBP.
17.9.4. Proprietary information owned by Architect/Engineers:
●● All professional services consultants shall sign the Document Security Notice
that documents containing SBU building information created under contract to
the Federal government will be handled according to the procedures under this
order;
●● The Document Security Notice form may be found at the end of Protective
Building Services’ Order PBS 3490.1.
17.9.5. Retaining and Destroying Documents
●● The efforts required above will continue throughout the entire term of the contract
and for whatever specific time thereafter as may be necessary;
●● Necessary record copies for legal purposes (i.e., retained by the architect,
engineer, or contractor) will be safeguarded against unauthorized use for the
term of retention;
●● Documents no longer needed will be destroyed:
o After contract award;
o After completion of any appeals process; and
o Completion of the work.
●● When a plan is revised, the old one is removed and destroyed and the current
plan is filed in its place;
●● Destruction will be accomplished by:
o Burning or shredding hardcopy;
–– Electronic storage media shall be sanitized appropriately by overwriting or
degaussing. Contact local it security personnel for additional guidance;
–– Deleting and removing files from the electronic recycling bins;
–– Removing material from computer hard drives using a permanent erase
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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throughout the executive branch for all information within the scope of that definition,
which includes most information heretofore referred to as ‘Sensitive But Unclassified’
(SBU) in the Information Sharing Environment…” Over the coming days and months
an inter-agency effort will commence under the leadership of the CUI Executive
Agent, (the National Archives and Records Administration), and in coordination with
a CUI Council consisting of senior representatives of all applicable Departments
and Agencies (to include DHS), to define the CUI standards as reflected in the
President’s memorandum, and publish CUI policy standards. Until such time as
these policy standards are developed and published, it is important to emphasize
that the manner in which we currently mark and safeguard information that is
sensitive but unclassified, such as the use of the marking “For Official Use Only” as
cited in DHS Management Directive 11042.1, will continue. The use of CUI and its
associated markings shall not begin until appropriate policies have been published
and those policies are supported by adequate training.
17.12.4. For further information on the Presidential Memorandum of May 9, 2008, see:
●● President’s Memorandum Defining the Designation and Sharing of Controlled
Unclassified Information (CUI) (May 9, 2008)
●● Background on the Controlled Unclassified Information Framework (May 20,
2008) (to Accompany Memorandum of May 9, 2008)
●● Memorandum: Establishment of the Controlled Unclassified Information Office
Update to Memorandum of May 9, 2008 (May 21, 2008)
●● DHS Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) Implementation Plan (April, 2008)
●● Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) Framework (Powerpoint Presentation).
Updated May 12, 2008 (Office of the Chief Security Officer)
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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18.1. General
18.1.1. CBP’s missions include: processing of applicants for admission; issuing documents
relating to the entry and status of an alien’s right to enter, work or reside in the
United States; and examining U.S. citizens. This chapter establishes CBP’s uniform
policy requirements for the physical security of items related to this mission.
18.1.2. Secure items include special formula inks, ink pads, stamps or any other designated
items needed to perform the tasks outlined in 18.1. If lost or stolen, these items
may intentionally be used to validate fraudulent entry into the United States. As
such, they require strict control and must be secured to prevent loss, theft, fraud or
counterfeiting.
18.1.3. It is the responsibility of every CBP employee to prevent or minimize the risk of loss,
theft, fraud, counterfeiting, or compromise by providing oversight of the receipt,
storage, issuance, and destruction of these secure items. It is the responsibility of
each individual with access to and control of secure items to ensure that they are
afforded the appropriate degree of protection as outlined in this chapter.
●● Responsibilities
o Headquarters Directors, Assistant Commissioners and Deputy Assistant
Commissioners are responsible for coordination with the Director of Security,
Internal Affairs/Security Management Division, on the development and
execution of security procedures to safeguard secure items developed and
used by their programs. In addition they are responsible for advising the IA/
SMD Director of Security of any changes to the status of secure items;
o The IA/SMD Director of Security is responsible for publication of procedures
that provide comprehensive instruction on the security of secure items and
oversight of the secure items program at all levels, to include locations and
personnel involved in the manufacturing of secure items;
o Directors of Field Operations (DFO) are responsible for the management and
administration of the secure items program within their respective regions and
ensuring resources are available to provide oversight at all subordinate levels.
o DFOs are responsible for:
–– Ensuring that a Security Liaison or if one is not assigned, a collateral
duty security officer is appointed to provide oversight of the secure items
program.
–– Ensuring that accountable employees and sufficient alternates are trained
and certification of appointments and training are maintained.
–– Providing IA/SMD and HQ OFO with designated authorized endorser and
authorized requester positions per section 18.3.1 of this chapter.
●● Regional Security Officer/ Security Liaison Responsibilities
o Regional Security Officers (RSOs) are responsible for:
–– Ensuring policies and procedures relating to secure item accountability are
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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–– Must comply with all policies and procedures, as stated in this chapter,
concerning the protection and control of the items and materials to which
they are authorized access;
–– Must properly account for and safeguard all items and materials for which
they are responsible, in accordance with the requirements of this chapter.
o May be subject to disciplinary action if, through negligence or willful disregard
of procedures, they fail to properly account for and protect the items and/
or materials to which they are authorized access, in accordance with the
requirements of this chapter.
18.2. Access
18.2.1. Prerequisites and Appointment of Accountable Employees
●● Access to stock supplies of secure items is limited to specifically appointed and
trained accountable employees that have a favorable adjudicated background
investigation commensurate with their duty position. They shall be sufficiently
trained on their responsibilities and officially appointed as the individual
responsible for the protection, custody, or use of secure items. The accountable
employees will ensure that all secure items issued, both used and unused, are
accounted for at the end of each duty day.
o Accountable employee(s) and alternates will be designated in writing by the
Director of Field Operations (DFO);
o An appropriately signed “Accountable Employee Certification” will be
maintained on file by the appointing official for each appointee;
o Accountable employees and alternates will be provided training on the
safeguarding and accountability aspects of secure items by the SL prior to
assumption of duties and receive on the job training from an experienced
accountable employee immediately upon assumption of duties;
o Accountable employees may issue a reasonable supply of items to the
designated CBP officials or other persons responsible for the actual
preparation of the items. The accountable employee will ensure that all
secure items issued, both used and unused, are accounted for at the end of
each duty day;
o Designated CBP officials and other persons issued secure items by the
accountable employee will safeguard the items and maintain accountability
until returned to the accountable employee;
o Security Liaisons will be afforded access in conjunction with the accountable
employee, in order to carry out periodic and annual reviews;
o Automated database systems are not authorized as a primary means for the
purpose of audit, tracking and inventory, but can be used in conjunction with
logbooks and must be consistent with all logbook entries;
o Accountable employees will take necessary precautions to prevent
unauthorized issuance, theft, or fraudulent use of the items and related
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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Registered Mail, as long as the Waiver of Signature and Indemnity block, item
11-B, on the U.S. Postal Service Express Mail Label shall not be completed; and
cleared commercial carriers or cleared commercial messenger services. The use
of street-side mail collection boxes is strictly prohibited;
●● Shipment of security ink:
o From the vendor:
–– Within the U.S. and to overseas possessions: Must be by a commercial
means which allows for tracking, i.e., U.S. Postal Service Express
Mail and U.S. Postal Service Registered Mail, as long as the Waiver of
Signature and Indemnity block, item 11-B, on the U.S. Postal Service
Express Mail Label shall not be completed; and cleared commercial
carriers or cleared commercial messenger services. The use of street-side
mail collection boxes is strictly prohibited;
–– To offices located in Embassies and Consulates overseas for which there
is an APO/FPO address, must be via U.S.
–– Registered Mail with return receipt:
–– To offices located overseas that are collocated with an Embassy or
Consulate, but that do not have access to an APO/FPO system, must be
via the responsible HQ program office for re-shipment via the Department
of State Diplomatic pouch.
o Shipment of security ink to offices that do not have access to a U.S. delivery
system must be shipped to the parent District/Sector office and hand carried
to the receiving office;
o Shipment of security ink between CBP offices must be via U.S. Registered
Mail with return receipt or diplomatic pouch.
–– Must contain an inventory receipt, CBP Form 148.
o Receiving office must sign the CBP Form 148 and fax it to the CBP National
Mail Management Program.
18.4. Storage
18.4.1. Secure Items Storage
●● Accountable Employee supply of secure items
o Only accountable employee and their designated alternates shall have
access to their supply of secure items. Containers used for the storage of
secure items must not be accessible by persons other than the accountable
employee or where the container is accessible by others, individual drawers
must not be accessible. Each accountable employee’s supply of secure items
must be stored in at a minimum, one of the following:
–– GSA approved storage container used for the storage of high value items.
(See Chapter 10, Safes and Storage Equipment of this handbook for more
information on GSA-approved containers.)
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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or
–– When the combination has otherwise been compromised.
●● Keys:
o Ensure the number of keys for each lock is entered in a log book;
o Ensure extra keys are stored in the same manner as the combinations for the
security containers.
●● Re-key locks:
o Whenever a key has been lost;
o Whenever there is a possibility the key has been compromised; or
o Upon change of accountable employee(s).
●● Passwords to automated systems used for the inventory, tracking, and audit of
secure items will be changed at a minimum every six months or when there has
been a compromise or suspected compromise.
18.5. Inventory
18.5.1. General Requirements
●● There is one acceptable method for maintaining an inventory of secure items,
related materials, and security items:
o Permanently bound book (logbook) consisting of manual, handwritten entries.
●● CBP approved automated audit, tracking and inventory system are only
authorized in conjunction with a permanently bound logbook and entries must be
consistent with the entries in the logbook;
●● A complete physical inventory of all secure items, secure stamps, security ink
and pads, log books, and binders will be conducted:
o Upon initial receipt of a shipment;
o Upon appointment of a new accountable employee;
o When loss, theft, abuse or misuse of the items is suspected; and
o Monthly.
●● Inventory
o Inventories will be conducted by the SL in conjunction with the accountable
employee(s) or alternate(s). Where the inventory is conducted due to a
change in accountable employee, the SL and accountable employee, shall
conduct the inventory;
o Inventories of bulk storage items shall be conducted: The inventory official will
inspect the box to ensure it has not been tampered with and place the date of
the inventory and their initials directly on the box. This type of inspection will
be completed with each subsequent inventory until the contents of the box
are transferred, the box shows evidence of tampering or the box has been
opened. In the latter instances a physical inventory by serial number of the
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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o Item number;
o Item serial number;
o Signatures of the Security Liaison (SL) destruction official and witness;
o Date of the destruction; and
o Method of destruction.
●● In the case of lifted/surrendered secure items include:
o Name of the individual to whom the item was issued.
18.6.4. Destruction Of Other Security Items
●● Special formula ink will be destroyed as follows:
o Bulk inventories of special formula ink will not be destroyed without
appropriate authorization of the accountable employee and SL;
o Destruction must be by dilution and disposing of the mixture in an
environmentally safe manner. Destruction officials must contact local
environmental officials to determine proper methods of disposal.
●● Stamps will be destroyed by complete obliteration of the face of the stamp that
renders the stamp unusable.
o Records of destruction will be maintained that include:
–– Brand name or manufacturer’s identification for special formula ink;
–– Ink color;
–– Volume (in fluid ounces) of ink;
–– Stamp type;
–– Stamp serial number;
–– Date of destruction; and
–– Signatures of destruction official and witness.
18.7. Reporting Requirements
18.7.1. Loss or Theft
●● Responsibilities of Discoverer:
o The loss or theft of secure items will be reported by the person discovering it
no later than the next duty day following discovery;
o The initial report will be made to the supervisor, the Security Liaison and the
Regional Security Officer; and
o The discoverer will provide as many details as known and will not delay
reporting in order to gather more information.
●● Fraud, Abuse, Misuse Of Secure Items:
o Instances of fraud, abuse, and/or misuse of secure items by CBP employees
must be reported to a supervisor, Security Liaison, Office of the Inspector
General, as soon as it is suspected;
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●● The procedures for reporting the loss or theft of security ink, special formula
pads, security stamps, and logbooks will be as stated above with the exception
that notification will not be made to the local office of the FBI unless directed by
CBP/IA/SMD.
18.7.2. Notification
●● The DFO that experienced loss or theft, in coordination with CBP/IA/SMD shall
immediately notify the (ICE) Office of Investigations 1-866-DHS-2-ICE and
CBP Office of Internal Affairs (202-325-0110) [email protected], of any
attempt of any unauthorized persons to obtain information regarding the security
features of the stamps or information on the stamps or process. The DFO and
Security Liaison shall assist with any civil or criminal investigation and agrees to
participate in Operation Bogus by immediately notifying ICE Forensic Document
Laboratory telephone number (703-285-2482) of all attempts by unauthorized
persons to obtain genuine stamps or similar reproductions;
●● Operation BOGUS (Block Orders to Generate Unauthorized Stamps/seals) was
initiated by the Forensic Document Lab (FDL) in 1988 to identify and prevent
individuals and other entities from manufacturing, possessing or otherwise
procuring fraudulent domestic and foreign stamps and seals relating to
immigration or for use in obtaining an immigration benefit. The ICE prosecutes
violations under 18 USC 1028, 18 USC 1546 and other applicable sections.
Vendors (stamp and seal manufacturers) participating in Operation Bogus
notify the FDL of any orders they receive that they suspect may be intended for
fraudulent purposes; and
●● The FDL is staffed 7 days-a-week (including holidays), Monday through Friday,
between the hours of 6:00am and 8:30pm (Eastern Time), on Saturday, Sunday,
and all Federal holidays from 10:00am to 6:30pm. For after-hours emergencies,
contact the ICE Operations Center at (866) 514-2423.
o You can phone or fax the FDL at:
–– Phone: (703) 285-2482
–– Fax : (703) 285-2208
18.7.3. Alert Notices
●● The Director of Field Operations (DFO) that experienced loss or theft, in
coordination with CBP/IA/SMD, is responsible for preparing and dispatching the
broadcast. A copy of the broadcast will be provided to CBP/IA/SMD for inclusion
in the inquiry report;
●● When deemed appropriate by CBP/IA/SMD, Alert Notices will be broadcast to all
CBP activities having an interest in the loss or theft of secure items;
●● At a minimum, the broadcast will identify the items that were lost or stolen, where
they were lost or stolen, the item type, the serial numbers or stamp numbers, and
total quantity.
o Provide copies of inquiry reports to the Joint intake Center (JIC)
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19.1. General
19.1.1. Purpose
●● Physical security encompasses real and personal property including buildings,
and the contents of a facility and its personnel. The provisions of this chapter
apply to all CBP facilities that are CBP owned, as well as for GSA-leased space.
19.1.2. Scope
●● All CBP employees are responsible for ensuring that Government property
is safeguarded to the maximum extent feasible against damage, loss, or
destruction. In addition, Designated Officials, senior CBP officials at a facility and
Security Officers will institute security measures that they deem to be reasonable
and prudent in protecting the welfare of CBP employees in the workplace. These
security measures will be incorporated in Site Security Plans/Programs.
19.1.3. Objective
●● The objectives are to implement security measures to minimize the loss,
damage, or destruction of Government property to provide a safe and secure
working environment for CBP employees.
19.1.4. Jurisdiction
●● FPS is the primary law enforcement service for responding to incidents in Federal
facilities under the charge and control of the GSA as an owned or leased facility.
FPS offices are typically located in areas where there is a high concentration of
Federal employees and is capable of providing timely responses to GSA owned
or leased facilities in these areas. For immediate responses to GSA-owned or
leased facilities in rural areas and/or areas with a small Federal presence, law
enforcement officials from local jurisdictions should be contacted.
19.2. Workplace Security
19.2.1. All Government offices can be targets for unlawful entry, theft, kidnapping, bombing,
forcible occupation or sabotage. Security Officials and/or Designated Officials will
mitigate these threats through implementation of:
●● Written site security plans/programs;
●● Effective barriers, both physical and psychological;
●● Employee training and awareness programs; and
●● Annual program review and update.
19.2.2. Security Officials and/or Designated Officials are responsible to conduct a
comprehensive crime prevention security assessments to determine:
●● What is the target potential?
●● What is the prevailing attitude toward security?
●● How are security policies enforced?
●● How current are existing emergency preparedness plans (OEP, fire, power
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failure, disaster)?
●● What resources are available locally and how rapid are response times for fire,
police, and ambulance?
●● What kind and how effective are the physical security systems and controls
currently in place?
●● Do the available security resources, procedures and policies meet the potential
threat?
19.2.3. Effective site security plans/programs incorporate effective security information for
employees use and action. Information covered can include but is not limited to:
●● OEP (for further information, see Chapter 15, Occupant Emergency Plan);
●● Recall rosters;
●● Emergency contact numbers:
o Internal
o Local
●● Crisis communications;
●● Key control; (see Chapter 9, Locks and Keys);
●● Facility access; (see Chapter 11, Access to Facilities)
●● Identifying & protecting high value/high theft property:
o Cameras;
o Personal audio devices;
o Binoculars;
o Power tools;
o Televisions;
o Video cassette recorders;
o Laptop computers;
o Government transportation requests; and
o Postage stamps, etc.
●● Checklists:
o Bomb threats;
o Telephone threats;
o Fire;
o Chemical spills;
o Personnel injuries;
o Theft;
o Suicide;
o Workplace violence;
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20.1. General
20.1.1. Workplace violence is any physical assaults, threatening behavior or verbal abuse
occurring in the work setting. These acts originating from any employee, employer or
supervisor can cause a substantial risk of physical or emotional harm to individuals,
or damage to government resources or capabilities.
20.1.2. One of the most common types of workplace violence is that among coworkers.
Additionally, a high percentage of violent incidents are perpetrated by individuals
from outside the workplace. This includes situations such as domestic violence,
bomb threats, and violence by customers.
20.1.3. Studies indicate violent occurrences among coworkers rarely happen without some
warning. Before actually becoming violent, there are patterns of behavior or other
activities that may serve as warning signs of violence. The following are warning
indicators of potential workplace violence:
●● Intimidating, harassing, bullying, belligerent, or other inappropriate and
aggressive behavior;
●● Bringing a weapon to the workplace (unless necessary for the job), making
inappropriate references to guns, or making idle threats about using a weapon to
harm someone;
●● Direct or veiled threats of harm;
●● Numerous conflicts with supervisors and other employees;
●● Statements showing fascination with incidents of workplace violence, statements
indicating approval of the use of violence to resolve a problem, or statements
indicating identification with perpetrators of workplace homicides;
●● Substance abuse;
●● Extreme changes in behaviors; and
●● Statements indicating desperation (over family, financial, and other personal
problems) to the point of contemplating suicide.
20.1.4. Security Officers should be involved in all stages of the planning process during
the development of an effective workplace violence prevention plan. Planning
efforts should be coordinated with Employee Assistance Programs and personnel
programs, as they can play a critical role in prevention, intervention or response to
threatening situations.
20.1.5. This section will provide general ideas and considerations that can help those
charged with workplace violence responsibilities to gain an understanding of
some of the security issues such as jurisdiction. It is also intended to help those
Federal offices that do not have in-house security or law enforcement to identify the
appropriate organizations that can assist them.
20.1.6. For more information refer to DHS Memorandum - Department of Homeland Security
Workplace Violence Prevention Procedures and Office of Personnel Management
Publication – Dealing with Workplace Violence - A Guide for Agency Planners.
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21.1. General
21.1.1. This Section is specifically prepared for Property Coordinators (PCs), Local
Accountable Officers (LAOs), Local Property Coordinators (LPCs), Local Property
Officers (LPOs), managers, and supervisors. However, it applies to all CBP personnel
assigned property management duties and responsibilities.
21.1.2. This section provides information to establish appropriate physical security measures
and property management guidelines to protect and account for office and laboratory
equipment.
21.1.3. Equipment is defined as any property owned, leased, leased-to-own, borrowed,
donated, forfeited, and retained for official use or otherwise in the possession of CBP:
●● Office equipment includes office automation equipment, microcomputers, computer
terminals, calculators, audiovisual equipment, telephone, facsimile machines, etc.;
●● Laboratory equipment includes the wide variety of scientific instruments used in CBP
laboratories.
21.1.4. Local Accountable Officers (LAOs), Local Property Coordinators (LPCs), Local Property
Officers (LPOs) and Property Coordinators (PCs) must determine the level of security
needed, based on an assessment of threats to the equipment, to include a review of
past incidents of theft and vandalism in the office/laboratory, building, and surrounding
area.
21.1.5. For specific guidance on Property Management refer to CBP Directive No. 5230-
032, Personal Property Management; CIS Manual 5200-13B, Personal Property
Management Manual; and DHS Management Directive No. 0565, Personal Property
Management Directive.
equipment standards for the procurement of scales, pill counters, and money
counters.
●● For guidance on the management of seized property, refer to the Seized Asset
Management and Enforcement Procedures Manual, CIS HB 4400-01A.
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22.1. General
22.1.1. This directive establishes the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) policy
and procedure for the maintenance of security systems, related subsystems, and
components.
22.2. Scope
22.2.1. Security systems, related subsystems, and components shall be maintained in
operable condition according to manufacturer specifications.
22.2.2. A regularly scheduled testing and maintenance program is required for optimal
performance. Corrective and preventive maintenance should be balanced to provide
a high degree of confidence that equipment degradation is identified and corrected,
that equipment life is optimized, and that the maintenance program is cost effective.
22.2.3. System maintenance shall be applied in a graded fashion; consideration shall be
given to:
●● The interests/targets being protected;
●● The identified threat; and
●● Other protection measures afforded.
22.2.4. The physical protection program shall include a testing and maintenance program
that encompasses security related components and subsystems.
22.3. Corrective Maintenance
22.3.1. Corrective maintenance shall be initiated within 24 hours of the indication of
malfunction of system elements determined to be critical for the protection of vital
equipment, facilities and classified materials.
22.3.2. Compensatory measures shall be implemented immediately when any part of the
critical system is out of service and shall be continued until maintenance is complete
and the critical system is back in service.
22.3.3. Corrective maintenance of a non-critical system element protecting vital equipment,
facilities and classified matter shall be initiated within 24 hours of detection.
22.3.4. The local authority responsible for safeguards and security shall determine
corrective maintenance for a non-critical system protecting other assets. The local
authority shall also determine if compensatory measures are necessary.
22.4. Preventive Maintenance (PM)
22.4.1. Preventive maintenance is defined as a program in which wear, tear, and fatigue
are anticipated, and continuous corrective actions are taken to ensure peak
performance, efficiency, and minimize deterioration of equipment.
●● PM involves a scheduled and controlled program of systematic inspection,
adjustment, and replacement of components, as well as performance testing and
analysis;
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●● The result of a successful PM program extends the life of the critical safeguards,
security-related subsystems and components, and minimizes unscheduled
downtime.
22.4.2. A preventive maintenance program should include:
●● Non-destructive testing;
●● Periodic inspection;
●● Preplanned maintenance activities; and
●● Maintenance to correct deficiencies found through testing or inspections.
22.4.3. The following system elements shall be included in a preventative maintenance
program as prescribed by the manufacturer standards:
●● Intrusion Detection Systems (see Chapter 8.9, IDS);
●● Primary Alarm Station/Secondary Alarm Station alarm annunciators;
●● Protective force equipment;
●● Personnel access control and inspection equipment;
●● Package inspection equipment;
●● Vehicle inspection equipment (see Appendix 11.14, Screening Procedures;
●● Security lighting (see Chapter 7.5, Protective Lighting;
●● Security system-related emergency power or auxiliary power supplies; and
●● Any system, subsystem, or component not enumerated in this listing.
22.5. Maintenance Personnel Access Authorization
22.5.1. Personnel who test, maintain or service critical systems shall have access
authorization consistent with the category of vital equipment, facilities and/or
classified matter being protected. This level of authorization is not required when
such testing and maintenance is performed as bench services away from the
security area or is performed under the supervision of an appropriately cleared,
knowledgeable custodian of the system and/or critical component.
22.5.2. Systems or critical components bench tested or maintained away from a security
area by personnel without appropriate access authorization shall be inspected
and operationally tested by qualified and cleared personnel prior to being put into
service.
22.6. Record Keeping
22.6.1. Records of testing and maintenance performed shall be retained by the custodian of
the system or critical component for the effective life of the system or component.
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Site Signage
Description Levels of Protection
Min Low Medium High
Reduce Possible NA Reduce possible confusion over site circulation, parking, and entrance locations that can contribute to a
Confusion loss of site security by:
• Providing signage at entrances;
• Having on-site directional signs, parking signs, and cautionary signs for visitors, employees, service
vehicles, and pedestrians; and
• Not posting signs that identify sensitive areas unless required by other standards,.
Landscaping
Description Levels of Protection
Min Low Medium High
Landscaping Design NA • Plants can deter unwanted entry;
Elements • Ponds and fountains can block vehicle access;
• Site grading can limit access; and
• Avoid landscaping that would permit concealment of criminals or obstruct the view of security
personnel and CCTV.
Public Toilets and If required by risk assessment, do not locate public toilets, service spaces, or access to vertical circulation
Service Areas systems in any non-secure areas, including the queuing area before screening at the public entrance.
Refuge Provides When deemed appropriate in high rise buildings, areas of refuge must be identified during the programming
Safe Area For and design phases, with special consideration given to egress and related building support systems. Building’s
Occupants If They OEP must specifically cover the purpose and use of refuge areas during emergency.
Cannot Safely Exit
the Building.
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Planning
Description Levels of Protection
Min Low Medium High
Loading Docks If required by risk assessment, separate loading docks and receiving and shipping areas by at least 50 feet (15
and Shipping and m) in any direction from utility rooms, utility mains, and service entrances including electrical, telephone/data,
Receiving Areas. fire detection/alarm systems, fire suppression water mains, cooling and heating mains, etc. Locate loading
docks so that vehicles will not be driven into or parked under the building. If this is not possible, you must
harden the surface for blast.
Retail in the Lobby While important to the public nature of buildings, the presence of retail and other mixed uses may present a
risk to the building and its occupants and should be carefully considered on a project-specific basis during the
risk assessment process. Retail and mixed uses may be accommodated, as required, through such means as
separating entryways, controlling access, and hardening shared partitions, as well as through special security
operational countermeasures.
Stairwells Stairwells required for emergency egress must be designed to meet applicable codes and must serve as an
integral part of the OEP. Locate these stairwells as remotely as possible from areas where blast events might
occur. Wherever possible, do not have stairs discharge into lobbies, parking or loading areas.
Planning
Description Levels of Protection
Min Low Medium High
Mail room • Locate the mail room away from facility main entrances, areas containing critical services, utilities,
distribution systems, and important assets;
• Place it at the perimeter of the building with an outside wall or window designed for pressure relief; an area
near the loading dock;
• In some situations, an off-site location may be cost effective or several buildings may share one mail room;
and
• Provide adequate space for explosive disposal containers and equipment to examine incoming packages as
directed by your risk assessment.
Exterior Entrances
Description Levels of Protection
Min Low Medium High
Entrance Design • The entrance design must balance security, operational, and aesthetic considerations. One strategy to
reduce operational costs is to co-locate public and employee entrances, although this may make access
control more difficult (see the risk assessment for project-specific directions).
• Design entrances to avoid significant queuing. If queuing will occur within the building footprint, enclose the
area in blast-resistant construction. If queuing is expected outside the building, provide a rain cover.
• The following design measures can enhance protection at entrances:
o Minimizing the number of doors;
o Providing doors and skylights without transparent glazing;
o Using bullet resistant door assemblies (see Army TM 5-853-3); and
o If glazing in doors is required for other reasons, minimizing the size.
• For wall types see criteria below (Lobby Doors and Partitions).
Forced Entry For protection against limited hand tool attacks on the building, see swinging door, horizontal sliding door, wall
criteria and window criteria. See Appendix 7.6, Doors.
Equipment Space NA If required, provide space at public and employee entrances for immediate or possible future installation
of access control and screening equipment, including walk-through metal detectors and x-ray devices,
sensors, ID check, electronic access card, and turnstiles.
NA NA Space for equipment at public entrances and employee entrances (including space for
possible installation of detection equipment currently under development). Note: Space to add
equipment in times of heightened alert should also be provided for Low Protection.
Entrance Co-location Combine public and employee entrances if directed by your risk assessment.
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Exterior Entrances
Description Levels of Protection
Min Low Medium High
Garage and Vehicle If required by risk assessment, for all garage or service area entrances that are not otherwise protected by
Service Entrances site perimeter barriers, provide devices capable of arresting a vehicle of the designated threat size at the
designated speed. This criterion may be lowered if the access circumstances prohibit a vehicle from reaching
this speed.
Additional Features
Description Levels of Protection
Min Low Medium High
Areas of Potential If required by the risk assessment, reduce the potential for concealment of devices before screening points,
Concealment avoid installing features that can be used to hide devices. If mail or express boxes or trash receptacles are used,
restrict the size of the openings to prohibit insertion of packages.
Roof Access Design locking systems and other countermeasures to limit roof access to authorized personnel.
Interior Construction
Description Levels of Protection
Min Low Medium High
Lobby Doors Security procedures and Occupant Emergency Plans (OEPs) have a major impact on lobby design. Where screening
and Partitions and access control are performed, an adversary may bring a weapon into the pre-screening area. Consistent with
project-specific risk assessment, make doors and walls along the line of security screening ballistic resistant per UL
752, “Standard for Safety: Bullet-Resisting Equipment” as follows:
N/A UL Rating Level 3 UL Rating Level 8
Critical Building Increase the likelihood that emergency systems will remain operational during a disaster by locating critical building
Components components away from main entrance, vehicle circulation, parking, or maintenance area or if such a location is not
possible, critical components may need to be hardened. Examples of critical building components include:
• Emergency generator including fuel systems, day tank, fire sprinkler, and water supply;
• Normal fuel storage;
• Main switchgear and telephone distribution (LAN Room);
• Fire pumps;
• Building control centers and UPS systems controlling critical functions;
• Elevator machinery and controls;
• Shafts for stairs, elevators, and utilities; and
• Critical distribution feeders for emergency power.
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General Requirements
Description Levels of Protection
Min Low Medium High
Compliance Full compliance with the risk assessment and this chapter is expected. Specific requirements should be in
accordance with the findings of the facility risk assessment. Once the level of protection has been identified,
the risk assessment should be conducted as early in the process as possible and in advance of project
funding.
New Techniques Provided that the performance level is attained, alternative analysis and mitigation methods are permitted. New
and untested techniques must be evaluated and approved by Headquarters CBP/IA/SMD.
Methods and All building components requiring blast resistance must be designed using established methods and
References approaches for determining dynamic loads, structural detailing, and dynamic structural response.
Structural and Non- To address blast, base the priority for upgrades on the relative importance of a structural or non-structural
Structural Elements element, in the order below:
• Primary Structural Elements – the essential parts of the building’s resistance to catastrophic blast loads and
progressive collapse, including columns, girders, roof beams, and the main lateral resistance system;
• Secondary Structural Elements – all other load bearing members, such as floor beams, slabs, etc.;
• Primary Non-Structural Elements – elements (including their attachments) that are essential for life
safety systems, or elements that can cause substantial injury if failure occurs, including ceilings or heavy
suspended mechanical units; and
• Secondary Non-Structural Elements – all elements not covered in primary non-structural elements, such as
partitions, furniture, and light fixtures.
Priority should be given to the critical elements that are essential to mitigating progressive collapse. Designs
for secondary structural elements should minimize injury and damage. Consideration should also be given to
reducing damage and injury from primary as well as secondary non-structural elements. Your risk assessment
may specify protective measures for secondary, non-structural elements for Medium and High Protection.
Loads and Stresses NA NA Structures must be designed to resist blast loads. The demands on
the structure will be equal to the combined effects of dead, live, and
blast loads. Blast loads or dynamic rebound may occur in directions
opposed to typical gravity loads. For purposes of designing against
progressive collapse, loads shall be defined as dead load plus a
realistic estimate of actual live load. The value of the live load may be
as low as 25% of the code-prescribed live load. The design should use
ultimate strengths with dynamic enhancements based on strain rates.
Allowable responses are generally post elastic. Data on materials
properties and performance may be found in TM5-1300 and ASCE
Design for Physical Security.
Damage to the Major damage: Moderate damage, repairable: Minor damage, repairable:
Structure and • The facility or protected space will • The facility or protected space • The facility or protected
Exterior Wall sustain a high level of damage will sustain a significant degree of space may globally sustain
Systems For Each without progressive collapse; damage, but the structure should be minor damage with some
Protection Level. • Casualties will occur and assets reusable; local significant damage
will be damaged; and • Some casualties may occur and possible; and
• Building components, including assets may be damaged; and • Occupants may incur some
structural members, will require • Building elements other than major injury, and assets may
replacement, or the building may structural members may require receive minor damage.
be completely un-repairable, replacement.
requiring demolition and
replacement.
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General Requirements
Description Levels of Protection
Min Low Medium High
Good Engineering Practice Guidelines – The following are rules of thumb commonly
used to mitigate the effects of blast on structures. These guidelines are not meant to be
complete, but are provided to assist the designer in the initial evaluation and selection
of design approaches.
• For higher levels of protection from blast, cast-in-place reinforced concrete is normally the construction type of choice. Other types
of construction such as properly designed and detailed steel structures are also allowed. Several material and construction types,
while not disallowed by these criteria, may be undesirable and uneconomical for protection from blast.
• To economically provide protection from blast, inelastic or post elastic design is standard. This allows the structure to absorb the
energy of the explosion through plastic deformation while achieving the objective of saving lives. To design and analyze structures
for blast loads, which are highly nonlinear both spatially and temporally, it is essential that proper dynamic analysis methods be
used. Static analysis methods will generally result in unachievable or uneconomical designs;
• Recognize that components might act in directions for which they are not designed. This is due to the engulfment of structural
members by blast, the negative phase, the upward loading of elements, and dynamic rebound of members. Making steel
reinforcement (positive and negative faces) symmetric in all floor slabs, roof slabs, walls, beams and girders will address this issue.
Symmetric reinforcement also increases the ultimate load capacity of the members;
• Lap splices should fully develop the capacity of the reinforcement;
• Lap splices and other discontinuities should be staggered;
• Ductile detailing should be used for connections, especially primary structural member connections;
• There should be control of deflections around certain members, such as windows, to prevent premature failure. Additional
reinforcement is generally required;
• Balanced design of all building structural components is desired. For example, for window systems, the frame and anchorage must
be designed to resist the full capacity of the weakest element of the system;
• Special sheer reinforcement including ties and stirrups is generally required to allow large post-elastic behavior. You should
carefully balance the selection of small but heavily reinforced (i.e., congested) sections with larger sections with lower levels of
reinforcement;
• Connections for steel construction should be ductile and develop as much moment connection as practical. Connections for
cladding and exterior walls to steel frames shall develop the capacity of the wall system under blast loads;
• In general, single point failures that can cascade, producing wide spread catastrophic collapse, are to be avoided. A prime example
is the use of transfer beams and girders that, if lost, may cause progressive collapse and are therefore highly discouraged;
• Redundancy and alternative load paths are generally good in mitigating blast loads. One method of accomplishing this is to use two-
way reinforcement schemes where possible;
• In general, column spacing should be minimized so that reasonably sized members can be designed to resist the design loads and
increase the redundancy of the system. A practical upper level for column spacing is generally 9.1 m (30 ft.) for the levels of blast
loads described herein;
• In general, floor-to-floor heights should be minimized. Unless there is an overriding architectural requirement, a practical limit is
generally less than or equal to 4.9 m (16 ft.);
• It is recommended that you use fully grouted and reinforced CMU construction in cases where CMU is selected;
• It is essential that you actively coordinate structural requirements for blast with other disciplines including architectural and
mechanical;
• The use of one-way wall elements spanning from floor-to-floor is generally a preferred method to minimize blast loads imparted to
columns; and
• In many cases, the ductile detailing requirements for seismic design and the alternate load paths provided by progressive collapse
design assist in the protection from blast. You must bear in mind, however, that the design approaches are at times in conflict.
These conflicts must be worked out on a case-by-case basis.
Historic Buildings – Historic buildings are covered by these criteria in the same manner
as other existing buildings.
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Air System
Description Levels of Protection
Min Low Medium High
Air Intakes • Raising air intakes makes the building ventilation system less accessible and therefore less vulnerable to threats
that might introduce contaminates directly into the intakes;
• On buildings of more than 4 stories, locate intakes on the 4th floor or higher;
• On buildings of 3 stories or less, locate intakes on the roof or as high as practical;
• Locating intakes high on a wall is preferred over a roof location;
• When choosing secure locations for intakes in urban areas, take into consideration the vantage points offered to
threats by nearby buildings and roofs; and
• Results of analyses using air plume models related to CBR clouds could affect the placement of intakes. If
directed by your risk assessment, incorporate analysis results into your project’s design.
Utility Protection – Protecting utility systems, locating them away from vulnerable areas,
and restricting access helps assure that services will facilitate life safety and operations
support after an event.
Description Levels of Protection
Min Low Medium High
Utilities and NA NA If required, locate utility systems at least 15 meters (50 feet) from loading docks, front
Feeders entrances, and parking areas.
Incoming NA NA If required, within building and property lines, conceal incoming utility systems and
Utilities give them blast protection, including burial or proper encasement, wherever possible.
Water Supply If directed by the risk assessment, consider using off-the-shelf countermeasures to enhance protection of the water
supply that include: backflow preventers, central building water filtration and treatment systems, and point-of-use
filters.
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V. Electrical Engineering
Service and Distribution
Description Levels of Protection
Min Low Medium High
Distributed NA • Emergency and normal electric panels, conduits, and switch gear should be installed separately, at
Emergency Power different locations, and as far apart as possible;
• Electric distribution should also run at separate locations; and
• Emergency power is required for life safety, security systems, and critical components at a minimum,
for all CBP facilities.
Normal Fuel Storage These criteria increase the reliability of the building’s power distribution, fuel storage, generator, utilities, and
feeders during an emergency. The focus is on separating power sources and locating electrical systems away
from vulnerable areas.
NA • The main fuel storage should be located away from loading docks, entrances, and parking. Access
should be restricted and protected (e.g., locks on caps and seals).
Emergency Fuel NA • The day tank should be mounted near the generator, given the same protection as the generator
Storage and sized to store approximately 120 hours of fuel;
• A battery and/or UPS could serve a smaller building or leased facility.
Tertiary Power A tertiary power source is intended for High Protection in buildings where operational continuity is critical.
Conduit and line can be installed outside to allow a trailer-mounted generator to connect to the building’s
electrical system; if this option is used, an operations plan must address this issue. Other tertiary power
methods include generators and feeders from alternative substations.
Emergency NA • Locate the emergency generator away from loading docks, entrances, and parking. More secure
Generator locations include the roof, protected grade level, and protected interior areas;
• If the emergency generator is installed outdoors at grade, it should be protected by perimeter walls
and locked entrances. The generator should not be located in any areas that are prone to flooding;
and
• Provisions for refueling and shutoff values in fuel lines within the building must be addressed.
Utilities and Feeders NA • Utility systems should be located away from loading docks, entrances, and parking. Underground
service is preferred;
• Alternatively, they can be hardened.
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Security for Utility Closets, Mechanical Rooms, and Telephone Closets - Control access to
security system, emergency communication, and associated systems wiring and conduit,
preferably by routing them through separate and secure closets.
Description Levels of Protection
Min Low Medium High
Key System Use a key system with a method of recording times of entry and departure such as a watchman’s clock system.
For use with conventional keyed doors only.
Monitored Access NA NA Design for remote monitoring of access to mechanical, electrical, and telecommunication
rooms. Access should be authorized, programmed, and monitored by the CCC through pre-
identification of maintenance personnel. To design the doors, you may need details of the
security system.
Devices and Alarms
Description Levels of Protection
Min Low Medium High
Elevator Recall • Consistent with the facility OEP, provide a button on the Fire Control Center (FCC) to recall elevators to
an alternative floor if the elevators could safely be used to evacuate disabled persons or if the normal
evacuation route would involve traveling through a high risk area;
• Consider whether elevators should discharge personnel on the first floor (lobby) during some events.
Consider the requirements of the Safety Code for Elevators and Escalators, ASME Standard A17.1.
Elevator Emergency • In conjunction with the recall system, install a pre-recorded message in the elevator cab speakers, notifying
Message passengers of an emergency and explaining how to proceed;
• Provisions must be made for an override of recorded message with a live transmission with directions for the
specific emergency.
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Parking
Description Levels of Protection
Min Low Medium High
Parking Inside the Public parking withParking for Parking for selected Parking only for selected government
Building ID check government government employees with a need for security.
vehicles and employees only.
employees of the
building only.
On-Site Surface or As directed by the risk assessment, adjacent surface parking must maintain a minimum stand-off of X meters.
Structured Parking Parking within X meters of the building must be restricted to authorized vehicles.
Parking Facilities
Description Levels of Protection
Min Low Medium High
Natural Surveillance • Maximize visibility across, as well as into and out of, the parking facility and openness to the exterior;
• Use express or non-parking ramps that speeding the user to parking on flat surfaces;
• Plan pedestrian paths to concentrate activity to the extent possible;
• Limit vehicular entry/exits to a minimum number of locations;
• Use long-span construction and high ceilings to enhance openness and aid in lighting the facility;
• Avoid sheer walls, especially near turning bays and pedestrian travel paths. If they are required, improve
visibility using large holes in sheer walls;
• Eliminate dead-end parking areas, as well as nooks and crannies;
• Landscaping should be done judiciously so as not to provide hiding places. It is desirable to hold planting
away from the facility to permit observation of intruders; and
• Locate attended booths, parking offices, or security stations so that activity at pedestrian and vehicle entry
points to the facility can be monitored.
Perimeter Access NA NA • Design a system of fencing, grilles, doors, etc., to completely close down access to the
Control entire facility in unattended hours, or in some cases, all hours;
• Any ground level pedestrian exits that open into non-secure areas should be emergency
exits only and fitted with panic bar hardware for exiting movement only;
• An intercom/car reader/keypad station at vehicle and pedestrian entrances (with optional
installation at exit-only openings); and
• Devices to allow for an audit trail of cards, electronic vehicle tags, or keypad codes that
have been used to release electromechanical locks, activate roll-up service door motors, or
otherwise permit entrance to a controlled parking area.
• See Appendix 7.3, Fencing.
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Parking Facilities
Description Levels of Protection
Min Low Medium High
Stair Towers and NA NA • Stair tower and elevator lobby design must be as open as code permits. The ideal solution
Elevators is a stair and/or elevator waiting area totally open to the exterior and/or the parking areas.
Designs that ensure that people using these areas can be easily seen - and can see out -
should be encouraged;
• If a stair must be enclosed for code or weather protection purposes, glass walls will deter
both personal injury attacks and various types of vandalism;
• Potential hiding places below stairs should be closed off; nooks and crannies should be
avoided;
• Elevator cabs should have glass backs whenever possible;
• Elevator lobbies should be well lit and visible to both patrons in the parking areas and the
public out on the street;
• Where the means of egress must be protected, self-closing doors must be used; and
• Supporting systems (e.g., heat detectors or other sensors) should be considered.
Surface Finishes and NA • Paint interior walls a light color (i.e., white or light blue) to improve illumination;
Signage • Signage should be clear to avoid confusion and direct users to their destinations efficiently; and
• If an escort service is available, signs should inform users.
Lighting • The lighting level standards recommended by the Illuminations Engineering Society of North America
(IESNA) Subcommittee on Off-Roadway Facilities are the lowest acceptable lighting levels for any parking
facility;
• A point-by-point analysis should be done in accordance with the IESNA standards.
Emergency NA NA • Place emergency intercom/duress buttons or assistance stations on structure columns,
Communications fences, other posts, and/or freestanding pedestals and brightly mark them with stripping or
paint visible in low light. These stations are to be used in conjunction with – and not as an
alternative to – on-site monitoring;
• If CCTV coverage is available, automatic activation of corresponding cameras should be
provided, as well as dedicated communications with security or law enforcement stations;
• It is helpful to include flashing lights that can rapidly pinpoint the location of the calling
station for the response force, especially in very large parking structures;
• It should only be possible to re-set a station that has been activated at the station with a
security key. It should not be possible to re-set the station from any monitoring site; and
• The horizontal distance on a floor to reach an emergency communication station shall not
exceed 15 m (50 feet).
CCTV NA NA • Place color CCTV cameras with recording capability and pan-zoom-tilt drivers, if warranted,
at entrance and exit vehicle ramps. Auto-scanning units are not recommended. The
cameras should be oriented to record license plates of entering and departing vehicles, and
to record pedestrians exiting or entering via vehicle ramps;
• Place fixed-mount, fixed-lens color or monochrome cameras on at least one side of regular
use and emergency exit doors connecting to the building or leading outside. In order for
these cameras to capture scenes of violations, time-delayed electronic locking should be
provided at doors, if permitted by governing code authorities. Without features such as
time-delayed unlocking or video motion detection, these cameras may be ineffective.
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Sum of above
to all buildings and facilities in the United States occupied by Federal employees for
nonmilitary activities. These include:
οο Existing buildings;
οο New construction, or major modernizations;
οο Facilities owned, to be purchased, or leased;
οο Stand-alone facilities;
οο Federal campuses;
οο Individual facilities on Federal campuses (where appropriate); and
οο Special-use facilities.
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Facility
Entry Security Standards
Level
Receiving / Shipping (R/S) III IV V
Review Current R/S
Audit current standards for package entry and suggest ways to enhance security.
Procedures
Implement Modified R/S After auditing procedures for R/S, implement improved procedures for security
Procedures enhancements.
Access Control III IV V
Evaluate Facility
If security guards are required, the number of guards at any given time will depend
for Security Guard
on the size of the facility, the hours of operation, and current risk factors, etc.
Requirements
Security Guard Patrol
Intrusion Detection
System with Central See Appendix 8.9, Intrusion Detection Systems.
Monitoring Capability
Upgrade to Current Life
Life safety standards include: fire detection and fire suppression systems.
Safety Standards
Entrances/Exits III IV V
X-Ray and Magnetometer Level III and IV evaluations would focus on tenant agencies, public interface, and
at Public Entrances feasibility.
Require X-Ray Screening All packages entering building should be subject to x-ray screening and/or visual
of All Mail/Packages inspection.
Peep Holes Easy and effective visual recognition system for small offices.
Intercom Communication tool that can be used in combination with peephole.
Allows employees to view and communicate remotely with visitors before allowing
Entry Control with CCTV
access. Not applicable for larger Levels III and above because of entry screening
and Door Strikes
devices required at these Levels.
Any exterior entrance should have a high-security lock as determined by GSA
High Security Locks
specifications and/or agency requirements.
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Facility
Interior Security Standards
Level
Employee/Visitor Identification III IV V
Agency Photo
Displayed at all times by all personnel.
Identification
Visitors should be readily apparent in Level III facilities. Other facilities may ask
Visitor Control/Screening
visitors to sign-in with a receptionist or guard, or require an escort, or formal
System
identification badge.
Stringent methods of control over visitor badges will ensure that visitors wearing
Visitor Identification
badges have been screened and are authorized to be at the facility during the
Accountability System
appropriate time frame.
Established Issuing Develop procedures and establish authority for issuing employee and visitor
Authority identification.
Utilities III IV V
Smaller facilities may not have control over utility access, or locations of utility
Prevent Unauthorized
areas. Where possible, assure that utility areas are secure and that only authorized
Access to Utility Areas
personnel can gain entry.
CBP requires that all alarm systems, CCTV monitoring devices, fire protection
Provide Emergency Power systems, and entry control devices, etc., are required to be connected to
to Critical Systems emergency power sources. The tenant is responsible for determining which
computer or communication systems require backup power.
Occupant Emergency Plans (OEPs) III IV V
Examine OEP and
Review and update current OEP procedures for thoroughness. OEPs should
Contingency Procedures
reflect the current security climate.
Based on Threats
OEPs in Place, Updated
Annually, Periodic Testing See Chapter 15, Occupant Emergency Plans.
Exercise
Assignment based on GSA requirement that largest tenant in facility maintain
Assign and Train OEP OEP responsibility. Officials should be assigned, trained and a contingency plan
Officials established to provide for the possible absence of OEP officials in the event of
emergency activation of the OEP.
Annual Occupants All occupants should be aware of their individual responsibilities in an emergency
Training situation.
Day Care Centers III IV V
Evaluate Whether to
Locate Day Care Facility
Conduct a thorough review of security and safety standards.
in Buildings with High
Threat Activities
Compare Feasibility
of Locating Day Care If a facility is being considered for a day care center, an evaluation should be made
in Facilities Outside based on the risk factors associated with tenants and the location of the facility.
Locations
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Facility
Security Planning
Level
Intelligence Sharing III IV V
Intelligence sharing between law enforcement agencies and security organizations
Establish Law
should be established in order to facilitate the accurate flow of timely and relevant
Enforcement Agency/
information between appropriate government agencies. Agencies involved in
Security Liaisons
providing security must be part of the complete intelligence process.
Determine what procedures exist to ensure timely delivery of critical intelligence.
Review and improve procedures to alert agencies and specific targets of criminal/
Procedures for Intelligence
terrorist threats. Establish standard administrative procedures for response to
Receipt & Dissemination
incoming alerts. Review flow of information for effectiveness and time critical
dissemination.
To facilitate communication, standardized terminology for Alert Levels should be
Uniform Security & Threat
implemented (e.g., Normal, Low, Moderate, and High) See Chapter 14, Incident
Nomenclature
Response/HSAS.
Training III IV V
Provide security awareness training for all tenants. At a minimum, self-study
Annual Security programs utilizing videos, and literature, etc., should be implemented. These
Awareness Training materials should provide up-to-date information covering security practices,
employee security awareness, and personal safety, etc.
Armed/Unarmed Guard Liaison with the Federal Protective Service to ensure the standardized unarmed/
Qualifications and Training armed guard qualifications and training requirements are being met. No CBP entity
Requirements has contracting authority for guard service within DHS except FPS.
Tenant Assignment III IV V
Co-locate Agencies with To capitalize on efficiencies and economies, agencies with like security
Similar Security Needs requirements should be located in the same facility if possible.
Do Not Co-locate High/ Low risk agencies should not take on additional risk by being located with high-risk
Low Risk Agencies agencies.
Administrative Procedures III IV V
Establish flexible work schedule in high threat/high risk area to minimize employee
Flexible Work Schedules vulnerability to criminal activity. Flexible work schedules can enhance employee
safety by staggering reporting and departure times.
Arrange for Employee
Minimize exposure to criminal activity by allowing employees to park at or inside
Parking in or Near Building
the building after normal work hours.
after Normal Work Hours
Background Security
Conduct background security checks and/or establish security control procedures
Checks and Security
for service contract personnel.
Control Procedures
Construction/Renovation III IV V
Install shatter resistant
Application of shatter resistant material to protect personnel and citizens from
material On All Exterior
the hazards of flying glass as a result of impact or explosion. See Appendix 7.7,
Windows (Shatter
Windows.
Protection)
Designs and construction projects should be reviewed, to incorporate current
Review Current Projects technology and blast standards. Immediate review of ongoing projects may
for Blast Standards generate savings in the implementation of upgrading to higher blast standards
prior to completion of construction.
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Facility
Security Planning
Level
Review/Establish Uniform Review, establish, and implement uniform construction standards as it relates to
Construction Standards security consideration.
In smaller facilities or those that lease space, control over design standards may
Review/Establish Uniform
not be possible. However, future site selections should attempt to locate in facilities
New Design Standards for
that do meet standards. New construction of government-controlled facilities
Blast Resistance
should review, establish, and implement new design standards for blast resistance.
Every foot between a potential bomb and a building will dramatically reduce
Establish Street Set-Back damage and increase the survival rate. Street set-back is always desirable, but
for New Construction should be used in conjunction with barriers in Level IV and V facilities.
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Applicability
LEVEL III Facility Perimeter Security Standards
Lighting
Standard safety code requirement in virtually all areas. Provides for safe
Lighting with Emergency
evacuation of buildings in case of natural disaster, power outage or criminal/
Power Backup
terrorist activity.
Physical Barriers
This security measure will only be possible in locations where the Government
Extend Physical Perimeter
controls the property and where physical constraints are not present. Barriers
with Barriers
should be made of concrete and/or steel. See Appendix 7.2, Barriers.
Parking Barriers Desirable to prevent unauthorized vehicle access.
Applicability
LEVEL III FACILITY: Entry Security Standards
Receiving / Shipping
Review Receiving & Audit current standards for package entry and suggest ways to enhance
Shipping Procedures security.
Implement Receiving & After auditing procedures for receiving & shipping, implement improved
Shipping Procedures procedures for security enhancements.
Access Control
Evaluate Facility If security guards are required, the number of guards at any given time will
for Security Guard depend on the size of the facility, the hours of operation, and current risk
Requirements factors, etc.
Intrusion Detection
System with Central See Appendix 8.9, Intrusion Detection Systems
Monitoring Capability
Upgrade to Current Life
Life safety standards include: fire detection and fire suppression systems.
Safety Standards
Security Guard Patrol
Entrances/Exits
Any exterior entrance should have a high security lock as determined by GSA
High Security Locks
specifications and/or agency requirements.
X-Ray and Magnetometer Level III and IV evaluations will focus on tenant agencies, public interface, and
at Public Entrances feasibility.
Require X-Ray Screening All packages entering building should be subject to X-ray screening and/or
of All Mail/Packages visual inspection.
Peep Holes Easy and effective visual recognition system for small offices.
Intercom Communication tool that can be used in combination with peephole.
Allows employees to view and communicate remotely with visitors before
Entry Control with CCTV
allowing access. Not applicable for larger Levels III and above because of
and Door Strikes
entry screening devices required at these Levels (e.g., “Airphone”).
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Applicability
LEVEL III FACILITY: Interior Security Standards
Employee/Visitor Identification
Visitors should be readily apparent in smaller Level III facilities. Other facilities
Visitor Control/Screening
will make visitors sign-in with a receptionist or guard, or require an escort, and
System
formal identification badge.
Agency Photo
Displayed at all times by all personnel. May not be required in smaller facilities.
Identification
Stringent methods of control over visitor badges will ensure that visitors
Visitor Identification
wearing badges have been screened and are authorized to be at the facility
Accountability System
during the appropriate time frame.
Established Issuing Develop procedures and establish authority for issuing employee and visitor
Authority identification.
Utilities
Smaller facilities may not have control over utility access, or locations of utility
Prevent Unauthorized
areas. Where possible, assure that utility areas are secure and that only
Access to Utility Areas
authorized personnel can gain entry.
CBP requires that all alarm systems, CCTV monitoring devices, fire protection
Provide Emergency Power systems, and entry control devices, etc., are to be connected to emergency
to Critical Systems power sources. The tenant is responsible for determining which computer or
communication systems require backup power.
Occupant Emergency Plans (OEPs)
Examine OEP and
Review and update current OEP procedures for thoroughness. OEPs should
Contingency Procedures
reflect the current security climate.
Based on Threats
Oeps In Place, Updated
Annually, Periodic Testing
Exercise
Assignment based on GSA/FPS requirements that the largest tenant in
facility maintain OEP responsibility. Officials should be assigned, trained and
Assign and Train OEP
a contingency plan established to provide for the possible absence of OEP
Officials
officials in the event of emergency activation of the OEP. See Chapter 15,
Occupant Emergency Plans
All occupants should be aware of their individual responsibilities in an
Annual Occupant Training
emergency situation.
Day Care Centers
Evaluate Whether to
Locate Day Care Facility
Conduct a thorough review of security and safety standards.
in Buildings with High
Threat Activities
Compare Feasibility
If a facility is being considered for a day care center, an evaluation should be
of Locating Day Care
made based on the risk factors associated with tenants and the location of the
in Facilities Outside
facility.
Locations
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not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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Applicability
LEVEL III FACILITY: Security Planning
Intelligence Sharing
Intelligence sharing between law enforcement agencies and security
Establish Law organizations should be established in order to facilitate the accurate flow
Enforcement Agency/ of timely and relevant information among appropriate government agencies.
Security Liaisons Agencies involved in providing security must be part of the complete
intelligence process.
Determine what procedures exist to ensure timely delivery of critical
intelligence. Review and improve procedures to alert agencies and specific
Procedures for Intelligence
targets of criminal/terrorist threats. Establish standard administrative
Receipt & Dissemination
procedures for response to incoming alerts. Review flow of information for
effectiveness and time critical dissemination.
To facilitate communication, standardized terminology for Alert Levels should
Uniform Security & Threat
be implemented (e.g., Normal, Low, Moderate, and High - as recommended by
Nomenclature
Security Standards Committee).
Training
Provide security awareness training for all tenants. At a minimum, self-study
Annual Security programs utilizing videos, and literature, etc., should be implemented. These
Awareness Training materials should provide up-to-date information covering security practices,
employee security awareness, and personal safety, etc.
Unarmed Guard Liaison with the Federal Protective Service to ensure the standardized unarmed
Qualifications and Training guard qualifications and training requirements are being met. No CBP entity
Requirements has contracting authority for guard service within DHS except FPS.
Armed Guard Liaison with the Federal Protective Service to ensure the standardized unarmed
Qualifications and Training guard qualifications and training requirements are being met. No CBP entity
Requirements has contracting authority for guard service within DHS except FPS.
Tenant Assignment
Co-locate Agencies with To capitalize on efficiencies and economies, agencies with similar security
Similar Security Needs requirements should be located in the same facility if possible.
Do Not Co-locate High/ Low risk agencies should not take on additional risk by being located with high-
Low Risk Agencies risk agencies.
Administrative Procedures
Establish flexible work schedule in high threat/high risk area to minimize
Flexible Work Schedules employee vulnerability to criminal activity. Flexible work schedules can enhance
employee safety by staggering reporting and departure times.
Background Security
Conduct background security checks and/or establish security control
Checks and Security
procedures for service contract personnel.
Control Procedures
Construction/Renovation
Designs and construction projects should be reviewed to incorporate current
Review Current Projects technology and blast standards. Immediate review of ongoing projects may
for Blast Standards generate savings in the implementation of upgrading to higher blast standards
prior to completion of construction.
Review/Establish Uniform Review, establish, and implement uniform construction standards as it relates
Construction Standards to security consideration.
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distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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Applicability
LEVEL III FACILITY: Security Planning
In smaller facilities or those that lease space, control over design standards
Review/Establish Uniform may not be possible. However, future site selections should attempt to locate
New Design Standards for in facilities that do meet standards. New construction of government-controlled
Blast Resistance facilities should review, establish, and implement new design standards for
blast resistance.
Install Shatter resistant
Application of shatter resistant material to protect personnel and citizens from
materials on All Exterior
the hazards of flying glass as a result of impact or explosion. See Appendix 7.7,
Windows (Shatter
Windows.
Protection)
Every foot between a potential bomb and a building will dramatically reduce
Establish Street Set-Back
damage and increase the survival rate. Street set-back is always desirable, but
for New Construction
should be used in conjunction with barriers in Level IV and V facilities.
Applicability
LEVEL IV FACILITY: Perimeter Security Standards
Parking
Access to government parking should be limited where possible to government
Control of Facility Parking vehicles and personnel. At a minimum, authorized parking spaces and vehicles
should be assigned and identified.
Post Signs and Arrange
Procedures should be established and implemented to alert the public to
for Towing Unauthorized
towing policies and the removal of unauthorized vehicles.
Vehicles
Identification System and
Procedures should be established for identifying vehicles and corresponding
Procedures for Authorized
parking spaces (e.g., placard, decal, card key, etc.)
Parking
Adequate Lighting for Effective lighting provides added safety for employees and deters illegal or
Parking Areas threatening activities. See Appendix 7.5, Lighting.
Where feasible, parking areas adjacent to Federal space should also be
Control of Adjacent
controlled to reduce the potential for threats against Federal facilities and
Parking
employee exposure to criminal activity.
Avoid Leases Where Avoid leasing facilities where parking cannot be controlled. If necessary,
Parking Cannot Be relocate offices to facilities that do provide added security through regulated
Controlled parking.
Leases Should Provide
Security Control for Endeavor to negotiate guard services as part of lease through FPS.
Adjacent Parking
Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) Monitoring
Twenty-four-hour CCTV surveillance and recording is desirable at all locations
CCTV Surveillance
as a deterrent. Requirements will depend on assessment of the security level
Cameras with Time Lapse
for each facility. Time-lapse video recordings are also highly valuable as a
Video Recording
source of evidence and investigative leads.
Post Signs Advising of 24- Warning signs advising of twenty-four hour surveillance act as a deterrent in
hr Video Surveillance protecting employees and facilities.
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Applicability
LEVEL IV FACILITY: Perimeter Security Standards
Lighting
Standard safety code requirement in virtually all areas. Provides for safe
Lighting with Emergency
evacuation of buildings in case of natural disaster, power outage, or criminal/
Power Backup
terrorist activity.
Physical Barriers
This security measure will only be possible in locations where the government
Extend Physical Perimeter
controls the property and where physical constraints are not present. Barriers
with Barriers
should be made of concrete and/or steel.
Parking Barriers Desirable to prevent unauthorized vehicle access.
Applicability
LEVEL IV FACILITY: Entry Security Standards
Receiving / Shipping (R/S)
Review Current R/S Audit current standards for package entry and suggest ways to enhance
Procedures security.
Implement Modified R/S After auditing procedures for R/S, implement improved procedures for security
Procedures enhancements.
Access Control
Evaluate Facility If security guards are required, the number of guards at any given time will
for Security Guard depend on the size of the facility, the hours of operation, and current risk
Requirements factors, etc.
Intrusion Detection
System with Central See Appendix 8.9, Intrusion Detection Systems.
Monitoring Capability
Upgrade to Current Life
Life safety standards include: fire detection and fire suppression systems.
Safety Standards
Security Guard Patrol
Entrances/Exits
Require X-Ray Screening All packages entering building should be subject to x-ray screening and/or
of All Mail/Packages visual inspection.
Any exterior entrance should have a high security lock as determined by GSA
High Security Locks
specifications and/or agency requirements.
May be impractical for smaller Level III facilities, whereas, Larger Level III and
X-Ray and Magnetometer
IV evaluations would focus on tenant agencies, public interface, and feasibility.
at Public Entrances
Link to X-ray
Peep Holes Easy and effective visual recognition system for small offices.
Intercom Communication tool that can be used in combination with peephole.
Allows employees to view and communicate remotely with visitors before
Entry Control with CCTV
allowing access. Not applicable for Levels III and above because of entry
and Door Strikes
screening devices required at these Levels.
Applicability
LEVEL IV FACILITY: Interior Security Standards
Employee/Visitor Identification
Agency Photo
Displayed at all times by all personnel. May not be required in smaller facilities.
Identification
Visitor Control/Screening Visitors are required to sign-in with a receptionist or guard. Visitors are
System required to be escorted and wear a formal identification badge.
Stringent methods of control over visitor badges will ensure that visitors
Visitor Identification
wearing badges have been screened and are authorized to be at the facility
Accountability System
during the appropriate time frame.
Established Issuing Develop procedures and establish authority for issuing employee and visitor
Authority identification.
Utilities
Smaller facilities may not have control over utility access or locations of utility
Prevent Unauthorized
areas. Where possible, assure that utility areas are secure and that only
Access to Utility Areas
authorized personnel can gain entry.
CBP requires that all alarm systems, CCTV monitoring devices, fire protection
Provide Emergency Power systems, and entry control devices, etc., are required to be connected to
to Critical Systems emergency power sources. The occupant is responsible for determining which
computer or communication systems require backup power.
Occupant Emergency Plans (OEPs)
Examine OEP and
Review and update current OEP procedures for thoroughness. OEPs should
Contingency Procedures
reflect the current security climate.
Based on Threats
OEPs in Place, Updated
Annually, Periodic Testing See Chapter 15, Occupant Emergency Planning
Exercise
Assignment based on GSA requirement that largest tenant in facility maintain
Assign and Train OEP OEP responsibility. Officials should be assigned, trained and a contingency
Officials plan established for emergency activation of the OEP in the place of OEP
officials.
All occupants should be aware of their individual responsibilities in an
Annual Occupant Training
emergency situation.
Day Care Centers
Evaluate Whether to
Locate Day Care Facility
Conduct a thorough review of security and safety standards.
in Buildings with High
Threat Activities
Compare Feasibility
If a facility is being considered for a day care center, an evaluation should be
of Locating Day Care
made based on the risk factors associated with tenants and the location of the
in Facilities Outside
facility.
Locations
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distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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Applicability
LEVEL IV FACILITY: Security Planning
Intelligence Sharing
Intelligence sharing between law enforcement agencies and security
Establish Law organizations should be established in order to facilitate the accurate flow of
Enforcement Agency/ timely and relevant information between appropriate government agencies.
Security Liaisons Agencies involved in providing security must be part of the complete
intelligence process.
Determine what procedures exist to ensure timely delivery of critical
intelligence. Review and improve procedures to alert agencies and specific
Procedures for Intelligence
targets of criminal/terrorist threats. Establish standard administrative
Receipt & Dissemination
procedures for response to incoming alerts. Review flow of information for
effectiveness and time critical dissemination.
To facilitate communication, standardized terminology for Alert Levels should
Uniform Security & Threat
be implemented (e.g., Normal, Low, Moderate, and High -as recommended by
Nomenclature
Security Standards Committee).
Training
Provide security awareness training for all occupants. At a minimum, self-study
Annual Security programs utilizing videos, and literature, etc., should be implemented. These
Awareness Training materials should provide up-to-date information covering security practices,
employee security awareness, and personal safety, etc.
Unarmed Guard Liaison with the Federal Protective Service (FPS) to ensure the standardized
Qualifications and Training unarmed guard qualifications and training requirements are being met. No
Requirements CBP entity has contracting authority for guard service within DHS except FPS.
Armed Guard Liaison with the Federal Protective Service to ensure the standardized armed
Qualifications and Training guard qualifications and training requirements are being met. No CBP entity
Requirements has contracting authority for guard service within DHS except FPS.
Tenant Assignment
Co-locate Agencies with To capitalize on efficiencies and economies, agencies with like security
Similar Security Needs requirements should be located in the same facility if possible.
Do Not Co-locate High/ Low risk agencies should not take on additional risk by being located with
Low Risk Agencies high-risk agencies.
Administrative Procedures
Establish flexible work schedule in high threat/high risk area to minimize
Flexible Work Schedules employee vulnerability to criminal activity. Flexible work schedules can
enhance employee safety by staggering reporting and departure times.
Background Security
Conduct background security checks and/or establish security control
Checks and Security
procedures for service contract personnel.
Control Procedures
Arrange for Employee
Minimize exposure to criminal activity by allowing employees to park at or
Parking in or Near Building
inside the building after normal work hours.
after Normal Work Hours
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not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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Applicability
LEVEL IV FACILITY: Security Planning
Construction/Renovation
Install Shatter Resistant
Application of shatter resistant material to protect personnel and citizens from
materials On All Exterior
the hazards of flying glass as a result of impact or explosion. See Appendix
Windows (Shatter
7.7, Windows.
Protection)
Designs and construction projects should be reviewed, if possible, to
Review Current Projects incorporate current technology and blast standards. Immediate review of
for Blast Standards ongoing projects may generate savings in the implementation of upgrading to
higher blast standards prior to completion of construction.
Review/Establish Uniform Review, establish, and implement uniform construction standards as it relates
Construction Standards to security consideration.
In smaller facilities or those that lease space, control over design standards
Review/Establish Uniform may not be possible. However, future site selections should attempt to locate
New Design Standards for in facilities that do meet standards. New construction of government-controlled
Blast Resistance facilities should review, establish, and implement new design standards for
blast resistance.
Every foot between a potential bomb and a building will dramatically reduce
Establish Street Set-Back
damage and increase the survival rate. Street set-back is always desirable, but
for New Construction
shall be used in conjunction with barriers in Level IV and V facilities.
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SBI
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I. General
A. This chapter establishes the policy for minimum security requirements for Secure
Border Initiative (SBI) offices and SBInet Tower sites necessary for the safety of CBP
employees and the protection of Government property and information.
B. The following SBI Construction minimum security requirements apply to all new
construction, reconstruction, alterations, modifications, and repairs to existing SBI
offices and SBInet Tower sites. Overview of Secure Border Initiative:
D. The scope of SBI provides DHS and CBP with the optimum mix of personnel,
technology, infrastructure, and response platforms to detect, identify, classify, and
respond to illegal breaches of international borders with Canada and Mexico and
thereby bring the situations to the appropriate law enforcement resolution. SBI will
employ next generation technology in the area of cameras, ground based radar,
communications, unmanned aerial vehicles, underground sensors, and sophisticated
software packages for terrain environments. SBI will integrate multiple state of the
art systems and traditional security infrastructure into single comprehensive border
security for the department.
B. Walls
1. The perimeter walls, floors, and ceiling will be permanently constructed using
slab to slab construction. Slab to slab construction (true floor to the true ceiling) is
de-fined as walls that extend from the solid concrete floor to the underside of the
roof slab above. All construction must be done in a manner as to provide visual
evidence of unauthorized penetration.
2. Walls will be constructed using reinforced Concrete Masonry Units (CMU) not
less than 8 inches thick.
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(a) Masonry units will be solid brick or hollow type block and filled with
concrete and metal reinforcement bars.
(b) When using hollow type blocks, they will be filled with concrete and
reinforced with #5 rebar, a minimum of 5/8 inches in diameter. The
reinforcing is to be anchored into the ceiling and floor to a minimum depth
of one-half the thickness of the adjoining member.
3. Where a CMU wall is not feasible, the following alternate method can be used:
(a) The inside walls will be constructed of 5/8-inch fire rated gypsum board
and the outside walls with standard 5/8-inch gypsum board and a layer of
9-gauge expanded metal on the inside of the area.
(c) To view the specifications for expanded metal mesh, see Section VII,
Construction Standards: Expanded Metal Mesh Specifications.
C. Ceilings:
1. When walls are being constructed using the CMU method described above in
III.2(b), and they do not extend to the true ceiling and a suspended (false) ceiling
is created, the suspended (false) ceiling must be reinforced with a 9-gauge
expanded metal to serve as the true ceiling. When expanded metal is used, it
must overlap the adjoining walls and be secured in such a manner that removal
will show evidence of tampering.
(a) When metal studs are used to construct the walls, the expanded metal
must be spot welded at 6-inch intervals to the framing of the side panels
so that any attempted removal will show evidence of tampering.
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(b) When wooden studs are used to construct the walls, the expanded metal
must be securely anchored to the stud with stainless steel screws and
washers. The screws shall be no less that 3 inches in length and installed
at no more than 6-inch intervals.
3. When the walls of an area do extend from slab to slab and a false ceiling is
added it is not necessary to reinforce the false ceiling.
D. Floors:
1. For new construction, floors will consist of reinforced concrete with a minimum
thickness of 8 inches. The concrete mixture will have a minimum compressive
strength of at least 3,000 psi. Reinforcement will be accomplished with 2 grids
of #5 rebar, a minimum of 5/8-inch diameter, positioned centrally and spaced
horizontally and vertically 6 inches on center; rods will be tied or welded at
intersections.
E. Doors/Door Hardware:
1. Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal or of single
solid core wood, 1 ¾ inches thick, and hung in 12-gauge hollow metal frames.
3. Double doors must have one door secured with flush mount bolts at the top and
the bottom. Astragals (overlapping molding, preferably metal) must be used to
inhibit access to lock bolts.
4. Perimeter door hinge pins that are located outside the office area must be non-
removable (peened, pinned, or spot welded). If the door swings outward, hinge
side protection in the form of a dowel-pin and socket is required. Refer to Figure
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2 of Appendix 7.6: Doors and Door Hardware for details. All perimeter doors must
have a commercial grade pneumatic door closer and an anti-pry strip installed to
prevent the door from being pried open.
5. All door hardware (e.g., hinges, lock hardware) must be secured to door frame
with stainless steel screws at least 3 inches long.
6. For additional information on Doors and Door Hardware, refer to Appendix 7.6,
Doors and Door Hardware
F. Windows:
G. Miscellaneous Openings:
1. Where vents, ducts, registers, sewers, tunnels and other miscellaneous openings
are of such size and shape (in excess of 96 inches square) and enter or pass
through the area as to permit unauthorized entry, they should be protected with
either steel bars or wire mesh grills. If bars are used, they must be at least 3/8-
inch diameter hardened steel, welded vertically and horizontally, six inches on
center. If grilles are used, they must be of 9-gauge woven wire mesh.
2. The modular SBI facility design will be incorporating a composite wall, steel
security wall system design in the project. The wall design would be double
skinned, hollow metal panels with interlocking rabbeted edges that are
manufactured from heavy gauge galvanized steel. The walls “2” thick panels,
compared with 6” or 8” thick concrete wall systems, result in sizable weight
reduction for the facility, greatly reducing footing and foundation requirements.
3. The steel composite wall panel system achieves the same Sound Transmission
Class (STC) rating as an 8” block wall and meets the following ASTM
requirements: ASTM 2322 (Physical Assault on Fixed Horizontal Barriers for
Detention/Correction facilities), ASTM 1450-97 (Hollow Metal Swing Door), and
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A. Access Control
1. At a minimum, CCTV will monitor the entrance and perimeter areas. The
minimum components that the system must have is one color monitor and one
high resolution digital video recorder (DVR), capable of recording a minimum of
30 days and playing back any camera view. All camera views associated with an
alarm must be automatically recorded. CCTV images must be retrievable and
operable over weekends and holidays.
C. Duress Alarm
2. The duress/panic alarm should sound in the building control center, if one exists,
or at the local police station or at an approved Class A central station where
appropriate response is assured.
1. All SBI areas shall include an IDS and it shall be connected to a Class A Central
Monitoring Station. At a minimum the IDS should include a UL 634 high security
Level 2 balanced magnetic switch (BMS) on the door, motion detection sensors
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inside the room and a card reader/keypad to track users. There must be a
backup method of communication set up with the Central Monitoring Station (e.g.
a wireless phone link, such as cellular or an extra analog/digital telephone line),
so that if a telephone line is cut or otherwise interrupted, an alarm is activated at
the Central Monitoring Station. Acknowledgement of an alarm condition by the
Central Monitoring Station must take place within 30 seconds of the alarm. The
Central Monitoring Station must dispatch the correct response (law enforcement,
duty agent, CCC, etc.).
E. Sound Attenuation
1. Perimeter walls, ceilings and floors of the entire office space will have a Sound
Transmission Class (STC) rating of 45, or better. STC of 45 or better is defined
as loud speech that can be faintly heard, but not understood. Normal speech
is unintelligible. The 9 gauge expanded metal used above the perimeter and
other walls will have to be augmented with other building materials to ensure an
approved STC rating.
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B. SBInet Tower structures and support modular sheds shall be hardened against small
arms fire (UL 752) to minimum level III. (National Institute of Justice- A. Standard
0108.01).
2. All critical power, communications, and IDS lines should be well protected.
Standby E. power sources must be protected from sabotage by facility hardening
and IDS coverage.
D. Access Control: Install access control device or system at entry point. Ensure that
the access control device if keycard activated conforms to HSPD-12 compliancy.
Examples such as mechanical push-button locks, electronic push button locks,
digital touch pads with key override and proximity card readers may be utilized to
augment the deadbolt lock.
E. Closed Circuit Television: Install UL approved CCTV coverage to provide 360 degree
visual surveillance of the tower area upon alarm activation at outer fence perimeter.
Install closed circuit television coverage of the tower that “queues up” if an alarm
activates at the site providing immediate visual observation of the situation, and
digital recording at the monitoring center to review. Provide CCTV coverage at entry
points (pedestrian/vehicular). Ensure no blind spots exist for the CCTV operator.
1. Where IDS is employed and more than 15 minutes are required to (a) respond
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3. Personnel who visit unattended facilities should inspect for signs of (c) tampering,
or attempted penetration (physical check once every 24 hrs.).
I. Fence: Install a fence around the perimeter to delay unauthorized access. SBInet
Towers are Class III critical communication sites and will require above and beyond
the standard 12 foot impound lot fencing. SBInet Tower perimeter fencing will
incorporate anti-ram and fence sensors into their design and construction due to the
remote location of these critical assets and their critical mission.
1. SBInet Tower fence shall be minimum 12 foot impound lot fence as specified in
Appendix 7.3 - 12 foot impound lot fence.
2. Restricted Areas. The following criteria are in addition to the standard fence
installation requirements (a) listed above. Impoundment Lot Fence (Outside the
Perimeter) will be 12 ft.(3.65m) high with a vehicle gate system and will have
two outriggers installed at opposing 45-degree angles along the top of the fence
to form a “V” or a “Y” configuration with dual coil (24”-30”) concertina/razor wire
secured to the fence every 24”. The mesh will be a minimum 1 inches (25.4-
mm) per side. The gate shall have electronic intrusion detection, access control
system with audit capability and HSPD 12 FIPS 201 compliant.
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J. Fence detection sensors are used, the best application is to use a dual zone to cover
fence and buried in the ground leading to fence on the attack side. The fence having
a strain-sensitive cable taut wire on the fence, to include the gate, and Microwave
Fence Sensor (MFS) or Portal Coaxial Cable Sensor (PCCS) for detection with a
Closed Circuit Television (CCTV).
K. Gates will be provided with locking hardware conforming to RR-F-191/2. The locking
system is designed to provide an equal level penetration resistance when a gate
is closed and locked. Where locking hardware is not practicable, ½ inch (12.7 mm)
case hardened chains meeting the requirements of RR-C-271 will be used with a
padlock meeting the requirements of Federal Specification FF-P-2827A.
L. Fence Signage:
1. Install bilingual signage on all sides of the exterior fence line stating that the area
is restricted, enforced by intrusion detection and only authorized personnel are
admitted. Install appropriate (bilingual) signage. Fenced areas should have gate
areas posted with signs 3 feet by 3 feet with lettering of contrasting color to the
background and at least 1-inch high and ½ inch wide. At intervals of about 30-
feet, signs bearing the following must be posted on fences:
2. Perimeter security fences for restricted areas will be posted with signs. Signs will
be posted on security fences at no less than 200-foot (60.9-m) intervals along
the entire perimeter. Where a language other than English is prevalent, warning
signs will be posted in both languages.
U.S. GOVERNMENT PROPERTY
NO TRESPASSING
VIOLATORS WILL BE PROSECUTED
M. Clear Zones:
1. Unless otherwise specified, locate the perimeter security fence at least 30 feet
from enclosed structures (except guard shelters). Provide a clear zone not
less than 30 feet wide immediately outside the fence. Keep this area devoid of
buildings, parking areas, poles, guy line anchors, shrubs, trees, sign boards, and
any other object that could conceal personnel. Grass is permissible, provided
it is kept mowed. Provide a similar clear zone at least 30 feet wide immediately
inside the fence. Ensure this area meets the requirements of the exterior clear
zone, except for the installation of approved guard shelters and protective lighting
poles
within the dual fence clear zone, or wide area sensors that will detect in advance of
exterior fence of intruder presence. All critical power, communications, and IDS lines
should be well protected. Standby power sources must be protected from sabotage
by facility hardening and IDS coverage.
1. The SBI communications shelter shall be bullet resistant withstanding 30/06 rifle
fire at a distance of 15 feet per UL 752 standards. The shelter shall be vandal
resistant and be constructed of steel reinforced concrete. The shelter structure
shall provide a 2-hour fire rating as defined by the Uniform Building Code and
meet Zone 4 seismic requirements. The shelter shall be designed for the explicit
use of housing electronic equipment within a controlled atmosphere required for
the proper conditions for transmitting and receiving equipment.
2. Fuel Storage Tank: Installed buried fuel storage tank or purchase GSA approved
ballistic resistant above ground fuel storage tank to protect against small arms
fire (UL 752) to minimum level III. (National Institute of Justice- A. Standard
0108.01). ensure continuity of the cable system.
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Barriers
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I. General
A. Anti-ram perimeter security barriers, also known as vehicle impact rated barriers, are
designed to prevent the penetration of explosive-laden vehicles into the defended
perimeter. Department of State (DoS)-rated physical barriers are grouped into
several areas according to their function:
(a) Bollard
(b) Planters
(d) Fences
4. Although none of the non-rated passive vehicle barriers would stop a determined
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aggressor, the act of driving through or over them would attract attention. They
can also be placed with rated barriers such as bollards and planters for aesthetic
reasons.
B. Active anti-ram barriers fall into the perimeter tier of the DHS tiered defensive
system concept. Active anti-ram barriers protect the vehicular access/egress points
or Compound Access Controls (CACs), limiting perimeter vulnerability during the
passage of vehicular traffic. Performance criteria for vehicle barrier systems are
concerned with three areas:
3. Control circuits
C. Active anti-ram barriers shall be selected from the list of Department of State (DoS)
certified barriers. The Contractor shall also note that site adapted foundation designs
require Security Management Division (SMD) approval.
II. Abbreviations
• BPA Blanket Purchase Agreement
• Cm Centimeter(s)
• DIA Diameter
• DC Direct Current
• DHS Department of Homeland Security
• DoS Department of State
• CBP Customs and Border Protection
• FBO Foreign Buildings Operations
• GSO General Services Officer
• Hz Hertz
• IPS Iron Pipe Size
• IR Infrared
• Km/h Kilometers per Hour
• kN Kilonewton(s)
• LBS Pounds
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• MAX Maximum
• mm Millimeter(s)
• Mpa Megapascal(s)
• NPT National Pipe Thread
• OC On Center
• OD Outside Diameter
• PLCS Places
• Psi Pounds per Square Inch
• PVC Polyvinyl Chloride
• SMD Security Management Division
• SQ Square
• TYP Typical
• V Volts
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B. Impact Conditions
1. The standard categories differ only in the measured speed of the standardized
66.7 kN (15,000 Ibs) test vehicle. The following designations are used to specify
the impact conditions:
Impact Conditions Nominal Impact Speed
K4 30 mph/48.4 km/h
K8 40 mph/64.5 km/h
1. The vehicle barriers capability to arrest the crash vehicle is assessed according
to three performance levels. A vehicle barrier that does not perform within these
limits will not receive a rating and may be ineligible for procurement for DOS
facilities. The following designations are used to rate a barriers performance:
Performance Level Crash Test Assessment
L3.0 Vehicle and cargo are to be stopped although vehicle partial
penetration and/or barrier deflection of up to 1 meter are permitted.
L2.0 Vehicle and cargo are to be stopped although vehicle partial
penetration and/or barrier deflection of up to 6 meters are
permitted.
L1.0 Vehicle is disabled and does not travel more than 15 meters after
impact
.
D. Functional Requirements
1. Functional Requirements:
(a) The vehicle arrest system shall be provided with all of the functions and
accessories included in the DOS Blanket Purchase Agreement (BPA) with
the approved vendor. This includes, but is not limited to, a visible device
such as a signal light (indicating the barriers status to an approaching
driver) and emergency override.
(a) Early project coordination shall include selection of a proper barrier for
the site, review of site conditions, provision of surface area preparation
(including, but not limited to: special drainage/pumping, prevention of
freezing/icing, prevention of corrosion, etc.), provision of power and
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hydraulic lines, and provision of conduits and cable for barrier control
points, etc.
1. Systems approved for use by CBP shall meet the following requirements:
(a) ELECTRIC MOTORS: Voltage and phase must be compatible with the
local power supply. Dual-rated 50 or 60 Hz motors are acceptable if
warranted by the manufacturer for both conditions.
(b) CONTROL VOLTAGE: The system should be no more than 24 volts, direct
current.
(c) CONTROL SYSTEM: The system must be designed in such a way that
when power fails, the barriers automatically retain a status quo position;
i.e., they will be neither fail secure nor fail safe. The control system must
provide a manual operating capability for use in the event of power failure.
(e) CONTROL CIRCUITS: The system must have two standard controls
circuits: a slave or local control for the guard at the Perimeter Gate and
a master or remote control for the Security Guard Booth. Both sets of
controls will include status indicator lights for power and barrier position.
B. Local Control
1. The local guard control will have an emergency (fast operation) secure switch.
The emergency switch for the local guard control will not be equipped with reset
capability. The local guard control will include an annunciator, which will be
triggered whenever the barrier remains in the non-secure position for a range of
0 to 60 seconds. The local control will not be provided with a reset switch for this
feature.
C. Remote Control
1. A remote master control will be used at all posts. The remote master control
will have an override switch and reset button for the local emergency override
feature. The remote master control panel will have either an annunciator or a
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signal light triggered by the local control annunciator. The security guard booth
alarm, however, will include a silencer for the audible annunciator, if applicable.
The annunciator will disarm automatically when the override switch is used.
The remote master control will also have a reset switch for the local control
annunciator.
1. When power or hydraulic lines are not below ground, they will be protected
through the use of rigid conduit. Manufacturers shall provide fail-safe lock options
to the hydraulic reservoirs which will prevent the barrier from lowering in the
event of hydraulic failure. The use of this fail-in-place is encouraged. For the
most efficient operation, locate the pump/motor as close as possible to the barrier
and with a minimum of turns and bends in the hydraulic lines themselves.
C. Bollards
1. Steel bollards are an effective means to enhance security against vehicular bomb
attacks and are easily constructed locally.
(a) Approved bollards are constructed of structural steel pipe composed of,
or equal to, ASTM A-53, Grade B; or A-501, with a yield point of 250 MPa.
The pipe should be a minimum of 2.1 m (83 inches) in overall length,
have a minimum outside diameter of 200 mm (7.8 inches), and a wall
thickness of 12 mm (0.42 inches). Each bollard is to be filled with concrete
and topped with a grout wash. Spacing between bollards should be .90 m
(35 inches) on center. They should be embedded to a depth of 1.2 m (47
inches) below grade in a continuous concrete footing.
D. Concrete planters
(a) DIMENSIONS: In the plan view the individual units should be 2.75 m x 900
mm, with a support member located at each end and midway between the
two ends. A variation of the 2.75-m planter is the continuous planter, which
permits flexibility in length. The following specifications are consistent for
both the 2.75-m planter and the continuous planter. The wall thickness at
the attack side of the planter, at both ends and at the support member,
should be 300 mm. The wall thickness at the non-attack side should be at
least 150 mm.
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(b) HEIGHT: In the cross-sectional view of the planter, the outer wall should
extend 965 mm above grade. The center support member should extend
815 mm above grade. The entire unit should be embedded 915 mm below
grade. Thus, the overall height will be 1880 mm. If the footing depth below
grade causes problems with utility lines, bridge the lines with U-shaped
structural steel sleeves.
(e) REINFORCING BARS: Both faces of the planter on the attack side and
the center support member should be reinforced with 16mm diameter
bars at 200 mm on center each way. The haunch should feature the same
size and spacing as the reinforcement above with the reinforcing bars
positioned at a 45-degree angle.
(f) FOOTING: The footing shall be continuous for individual planters. The top
of the footing should be reinforced with 14-mm diameter bars at 200 mm
on center each way. The bottom of the footing should be reinforced with
16-mm diameter bars at 150 mm on center each way. The faces of the
planter on the non-attack side should be reinforced with 14mm diameter
bars at 200 mm on center each way.
(g) SPACING: The maximum spacing between individual planters is 915 mm.
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254 of 890
Fencing
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I. Fencing
A. General
(a) Perimeter
2. Perimeter fencing:
(a) The entire site must be contained by an 8 ft. (2.43 m) high perimeter
fence. The fabric height will be 7 ft. (2.13 m) and have twisted and barbed
selvage at the top and bottom. There must be a minimum 1 ft. (.305 m) top
guard, for a total fence height of no less than 8 feet (2.43 m). All perimeter
chain link fencing will be fabricated with 9-gauge (3.9-mm) steel wire mesh
material (type I, II, or IV as defined below, and before any coating) with
mesh openings not larger than 2 (50.8 mm) per side. Provide Type I or
Type II tension wire, Class 4 coating, in accordance with ASTM A 824.
Provide 7-gauge coil spring tension wire for top and bottom wire. All
fencing will be installed on the outside of the support posts. A clear zone
will be established no less then 20 feet from any structure or object inside
the fence and 10 feet from any structure or object outside the fence. The
use of residential grade is not permitted. The impact of snow and blowing
snow must be considered on the northern border in combination with the
gate types. Based on a CBP/IA/SMD vulnerability assessment additional
anti-ramming technology may be installed; see Penetrations-Resistant
Barriers, section II.A.6, below for detailed specifications.
(457.2 mm) to the normal 45-degree outward protection, but only for
sufficient distance along the fence line to open the gates adequately.
Outriggers will be permanently affixed to the fence posts with screws
or by spot welding.
3. Restricted Areas
(a) The following criteria are in addition to the standard fence installation requirements
listed above.
adequate ventilation for this area. A wall system with decorative openings
or screened grills should be considered. The fence does not need to extend
to the underside of the canopy, but must extend high enough to restrict
viewing or unauthorized entry. The gate must also restrict the viewing into
this area.
B. Maintenance Considerations
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1. Clear Zones:
(a) A clear zone will be established no less then 20 ft. from any structure or
object inside the fence and 10 ft. from any structure or object outside the
fence. Maintain unobstructed areas or clear zones on both sides of, and
between, physical barriers surrounding restricted and non-restricted areas.
These areas must be cleared of all vegetation and man-made or natural
obstructions that exceed 8 in.(203.2 mm) in height. All clear zones will be
clear of visual obstructions such as vines, shrubs, tree limbs, electrical and
telephone poles or junction boxes, steam pipes, fire hydrants, etc.
(b) Signage
●● Perimeter security fences for restricted areas will be posted with signs.
Signs will be posted on security fences at no less than 200 foot (60.9
m) intervals along the entire perimeter. Where a language other than
English is prevalent, warning signs will be posted in both languages.
U.S. GOVERNMENT PROPERTY
NO TRESPASSING
VIOLATORS WILL BE PROSECUTED
(c) Drainage Culverts and Utility Openings
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iii. The rim and grillwork will be fastened over the concrete pipe and
bolted or pinned to the rim of the concrete pipe as shown in Figure
2. As an alternative, the grill ends can be embedded in a concrete
headwall that encapsulates the concrete pipe. See Figure 7. Care
must be taken during design to assure that bars and grills across
culverts, sewers, storm drains, etc., are not susceptible to clogging.
This must be considered early during the security fence planning
phase.
●● Culverts, storm drains, and sewers must be designed with a debris
catcher to permit either rapid clearing or removal of grating for cleaning
when required.
i. If the inlet is outside the fence line, the debris catcher and grating
will be incorporated into the same structure.
ii. If the outlet is outside the fence line, the debris catcher will be on
the inlet side inside the fence line and the grating on the outlet side.
A solution is shown in Figure 3 (note that the removable grate is
locked in place as an added security measure).
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(a) Ensure all posts for security fencing meet the requirements of Federal
Specification RR-F-191/3 for one of the following classes:
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(b) Accomplish bracing with steel truss rods not less than 5/16-inch
(7.9-millimeters (mm)) nominal diameter and a turnbuckle for tensioning,
conforming to RR-F-191/4. Use the following ASTM Standards to
supplement RR-F-191/3 and RRF-191/4:
●● ASTM A 120, Specification for Pipe, Steel, Black and Hot-Dipped Zinc-
Coated (Galvanized) Welded and Seamless, for Ordinary Uses.
(a) Ensure chain link fence fabric meets the requirements of RR-F-191/1 for
one of the following:
Fence Fabric.
E. Accessories:
Ensure accessories such as steel fittings and components used in the erection
of chain link fences meet the requirements of RR-F-191/4. Use ASTM F 626 to
supplement RR-F-191/4. Provide fittings electronically compatible with connecting
fittings, components, and the fence fabric to inhibit corrosion.
II. Installation
A. Requirements
1. The design of security fencing, using the above specified components, will
include the following provisions:
ASTM F567, Standard Practice for Installation of Chain link Fence, may be
used as installation guidance to supplement RR-F-191/GEN.
2. Fence Placement:
(a) Top rails will not be specified or allowed for fabrication of security fences.
Required bracing for posts will be accomplished with diagonal truss rods
and tubular horizontal or diagonal bracing.
(b) All posts and structural supports will be located on the inner side of the
fencing. Posts will be installed in concrete in accordance with ASTM F
567, as shown in Figure 10. Posts must be vertical within plus or minus 2
degrees in two planes. Each gate, terminal, and end post will be braced
with truss rods. Truss rods will be installed diagonally, from near ground
level of a gate, terminal, or end post to the top of the adjacent line post, no
higher than 6 in.(152.4 mm) down from the top of the fabric. There will be
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no more than a 50-degree angle between the truss rod and the ground.
Fence fabric will be mounted on steel posts. Tension wires will either be
interwoven or clipped along the top and bottom row of fabric diamonds. The
wire fabric will be secured to posts and tension wires as specified in RR-
F-191/4. When a more secure manner of attaching the fabric to posts is
desired, a power driven fabric and wire fastener, depicted in Figure 9, may be
used. If the ties or fasteners are coated or plated, the coating or plating must
be electrically compatible with the fence fabric to inhibit corrosion. Where
security fencing adjoins structures, the height of the fencing should be 12 ft.
(3.7 m) high from the connection point with a building to a point 12’(3.7 m)
away from the structure.
The bottom of the fabric will extend to within 2 inches (50.8 mm) of firm soil.
In unstable or shifting soil such as sand, the fabric should either be buried to
compensate for the shifting soil or a minimum of 2 inches (50.8 mm) of the
bottom selvage of the fence anchored in concrete curbs, sills, hooked steel
bars or similar types of anchoring devices extending below ground level as
recommended by the soil engineer. (Frost levels should also be considered
when placing curbs, sills, etc.) Even in unstable and shifting soil, the height of
fabric and posts must be designed to assure that the top of the fence fabric
will be maintained at 7 feet (2.1 m) above existing or anticipated ground level.
This often may require that the fabric be 8 feet (2.4 m) or greater, so that
sufficient material is buried below the surface or embedded in concrete sills.
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6. Penetrations-Resistant Barriers:
Recent terrorist incidents involving the use of suicide-type crash entry forces
the consideration of vehicle barriers capable of stopping large vehicles
traveling at high speed. Crash tests of chain link fences, similar to the
chain link fence required by this handbook, allowed full penetration with no
personnel injuries of both a 1-1/2-ton (1360.7-kg) and 2-ton (1814.4-kg)
vehicle traveling at 50 miles per hour (80.5 km per hour). An analysis of crash
test data indicates that, unless enhanced by the addition of cables, fences
offer little protection against penetration. Consequently, to meet a vehicle
threat, fence reinforcement measures may be required to maintain security of
a restricted area. Crash tests performed on a chain link fence reinforced with
a 3/4-inch (19.1-mm) aircraft cable restricted penetration of a 2-ton (1814.4-
kg) vehicle traveling at 50 mph (80.5 km/h) to 26 feet (7.9 m). When selecting
barriers for penetration resistance, the designer should choose active or
passive barriers based on their capacity to stop the threat vehicle at the
maximum speed it could attain in its approach.
●● Passive Barriers
Use passive barriers where unmovable barriers are needed, such
as along a perimeter chain link fence.
●● Active Barriers
Use active barriers where vehicles must be allowed passage, but
the capacity to stop them must also be maintained.
7. Reinforcement of Perimeter Chain link Fence:
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(b) Fasten the cable with 1/2-inch (12.7-mm) U-clamps (SAE Grade 3 or
better) at a height of approximately 30 inches (762 mm) from ground level.
Terminate each cable end with either three wire rope clamps (MS16842)
or a wire rope hydraulically swaged press fitting (MIL-P-80104). The
cable end will be attached to one end of a 3/4-inch (19.1-mm) round
turnbuckle (MS51561) with double eye ends which in turn will be attached
to the deadman eyebolt (MIL-B-45908) by a 3/4-inch (19.1-mm) anchor
shackle (SAE Grade 8 or ASTM A 490). The deadman anchor will be a
concrete cube, Approximately 3-by-3-by-3 feet (1-by-1-by 1 m). Eyebolts
captured in the deadman anchors will have either a welded “T” or “L” end
embedded in the concrete as shown in Figure 11.
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(c) At a minimum, 2 feet (0.610 m) of the eyebolt and its welded extension will
be captured within the concrete of the deadman. The shaft of the eyebolt
will be either in-line with the attached cable or the eye of the eyebolt will
be flush with the surface of the deadman.
(e) The top of the deadman will be either flush or buried below the surface as
long as the eye of the eyebolt is above ground level.
(g) When gates form a portion of the fence line being protected by a vehicle
restraint cable system, then the gate cable system described in Section
III.E.2 must be interconnected to the fence cable system to ensure
continuity of the cable system.
(h) The vehicle restraint cable system should not be used along portions of
the fence line that are otherwise protected by natural barriers, such as
large boulders, trees, natural ravines, ditches, and other natural barriers.
III. Gates
A. General
1. Gates facilitate control of authorized traffic and its flow. They establish specific
points of entrance and exit to an area defined by fences. They also function to
limit or prohibit free flow of pedestrian or vehicular traffic, while establishing a
traffic pattern for restricted areas. Gates, as a part of perimeter fences, must be
as effective as their associated fence in order to provide an equivalent deterrent.
Gates will normally require additional hardening features due to their location
across entrance roads and the inherent vulnerability of their requirements.
2. The number of gates and perimeter entrances must be the minimum required
for safe and efficient operation of the facility. Gates are protected by locks,
intermittent guard patrols, fixed guard posts, contact alarms, CCTV, or a
combination of these. Care must be afforded against the ability to crawl under
gates and shall be adequately lighted. They shall be locked when not staffed and
periodically inspected by a roving guard force. Utility openings in a fence that do
not serve as gates should be locked, guarded, or otherwise protected. Top guard
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B. Design
Materials used in fabricating and erecting chain link gates must be the same as the
materials used for the associated chain link fence. As for security fences, aluminum
pipe, poles, fabric, or accessories will not be used or specified for security gate
components. Use American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) standards to
supplement Federal specifications when further detail or criteria is desired.
C. Types of Gates
1. Federal Specification RR-F-191/2 is the basic criteria document for security fence
gate design. It provides specifications for the following eight types of chain link
fence gates:
(c) Type III - Single Cantilever Sliding Gates, Wheel Sliding Gates.
2. The gate types listed above are the most common gate configurations used for
perimeter fencing. These include single and double swing gates (Figures 12 and
13), single and double cantilevered gates (Figures 14 and 15), wheel-supported
(V-groove) sliding gates (Figure 16), and single 23 and double (bi-parting)
overhead supported gates (Figures 17 and 18). While any of these may be used
for pedestrian or vehicular traffic, generally single gates will be designed for
pedestrian traffic and double gates for vehicular traffic.
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3. The vertical lift gate (not shown), often referred to as a “guillotine” gate, is not
desirable and should only be used under extremely unusual circumstances.
Special gates, such as turnstile (rotational) gates (Figure 19), are designed either
for specific purposes or to accommodate unusual circumstances.
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D. Gate Descriptions
1. Personnel Gates:
(b) Automated access control systems will use weather-proof readers with
Dual Technology, Contact-less Smartcards, and Proximity or Long Range
readers for vehicle gates. When automated access is desired, CBP/
IA/SMD should be consulted for specific information concerning these
access control systems. While turnstile gates provide security personnel
with more positive access control and greater penetration resistance,
swing gates are a second alternative when turnstile personnel gates are
not practical. Swing type personnel gates may be more economical to
procure and fabricate from a hardware aspect. However, both operational
and guard personnel requirements should be considered to determine the
most economical long-term cost for the facility.
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2. Vehicle Gates:
3. Sliding Gates:
Sliding gates, when open, store parallel to the adjacent fence line, unlike the
large sweeping arc that swing gates require. When designing the roadbed at
the gate opening, the surface should be kept as straight as possible, allowing
for drainage by a slight incline to one side or the other of the entire roadbed.
When an existing road surface is encountered that is not essentially flat, the
designer should require asphalt or concrete fill to level the roadbed where the
gate will be installed.
4. Cantilever Gates:
Figures 14 and 15 Provide full support and suspension of the gate frame
by four rollers secured to two posts inside the restricted area. Since the
required length of a cantilever gate is 1-1/2 times the size of the opening,
there must be a straight, and essentially level, fence line adjacent to the gate
to accommodate this length when the gate is fully open. Cantilever gates
can compensate for a somewhat crowned or unleveled roadbed and do not
require a “V”-bar guide rail or trough across the roadbed. Cantilever sliding
gates are not recommended for openings exceeding 24 ft. (7.3 m), although
two bi-parting sliding cantilever gates can be used for openings up to 48 ft.
(14.6 m).
5. Wheel-Supported Gates:
fence line than the cantilever gate. Wheel-supported gates essentially are
not limited in the size of their opening except for the power requirements of
the gate operator. A variation of the wheel-supported gate is one using dual
pneumatic, hard rubber, or steel wheels to support the gate. These can be
identified by their lack of roadbed guides. They should only be used as a last
resort, and then only for manually opened sliding gates.
6. Overhead Gates:
7. Swing Gates:
Swing gates (Figures 12 and 13) should be designed so that they swing
inward, toward the secured area. The disadvantage of the swing gate is the
large arc of space required for operation. Swing gates can either be designed
to swing 90 degrees inward and 90 degrees outward or swing 180 degrees
inward only. An important consideration in selecting a single or double swing
gate design is maintaining clearance along the bottom of the gate as it swings
through its arc from the closed to the open position. If the grade is increasing
inside of the gate, grading will be required to allow clearance. The required
2-inch (50.8-mm) maximum clearance between the bottom of the fence and the
roadbed must be maintained when the gate is in the closed position. The swing
gate design places considerable weight on the hinge post and its foundation.
The longer the gate, the more load (movement arm) placed on the gate post.
ASTM F 900 provides design detail for single swing gates up to 24 ft. (7.3 m).
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Ideally, single swing gates should not exceed 14 ft. (4.3 m) and double swing
gates should not exceed 28 ft. (8.5 m). Since the weight of the gate must be
borne by the gate post, design of the gate post and its foundation is critical
to assure proper support of the swing gate. An undersized or improperly
installed gate post may shift and cause the gate to move out of plumb with the
ground. This may cause the gate to drag on the ground or change elevation
as the gate moves through its arc from the opened to closed position. The
fence cut sheets at the end of this chapter provides recommended concrete
foundation diameters for posts. At a minimum for swing gate posts, the
concrete foundation should be 3 ft. (1 m) deep.
Vertical lift (“guillotine”) gates should only be used when the gate location is
mandated, the site is so restricted, or the weather is so severe that a gate
must be placed in such a location where the only way to open it is upward.
Vertical lift gates should never be considered except as a last possible design
choice. When a vertical lift gate is required, a counterweight with a continuous
drive chain on each side (that pulls the gate both up and down) must be
specified.
9. Hinges:
The weight, size, and frequency of use are important factors in the selection
of gate hinges. Specific design guidance is not contained in the this
specification or associated ASTMs. Gate hinges must have adequate strength
to support the gate and have large bearing surfaces for clamping them into
position. Commercial hinges manufactured to fit increasing diameters of gate
posts also have increased mass and capability to support larger swing gates
and generally have been found acceptable. The hinges must be secured to
the gate post and the gate frame to assure they will not twist or turn under the
weight and action of the gate. Welding is recommended. Gate hardware must
conform to RR-F-191/2. ASTM F 900. Hinges must be made tamper-proof by
the addition of welded security plates or by reversing the direction of the hinge
pins (one up, the other down), thereby protecting the gate from being lifted
off. Bolts and other hardware associated with gate hinges must be welded or
peened (whenever possible on the inside) to prevent their removal by hand
tools.
The locking mechanism and the hinges on a security swing gate are the
weakest components of the gate system. These areas can be reinforced by
combining chain and wire rope (cable) to form a barrier across the opening.
Once the chain and wire rope has been installed as shown in Figure 22, the
energy of a vehicle crash attempt is transferred from the gate through wire
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rope links to the side gate posts, and further to the fence cable reinforcement
system and deadman concrete anchors. The fence reinforcement cable is
terminated with a swaged loop around the gate post to interconnect with the
gate cable barrier system. With the wire ropes linked together at the fence
posts as shown in Figure 23 and chained together at their point of closure as
shown in Figure 24, in effect there is a continuous barrier across the opening.
The system is simple, unobtrusive, and effective. When the chain is removed,
gates can be operated normally without restriction.
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1. To construct the gate barrier system, a 3/4-inch (19.1-mm) diameter aircraft wire
rope is looped around the gate post as shown in Figure 21, around the gate
frame upright, and through the fence cable loop. The wire rope is strung across
the inside of the gate leaf and fastened around the vertical gate frame upright
and fabric tension bar midway above the roadbed as shown in Figure 20. Where
gates have two leafs involved, a cable will be installed in the same manner on
the second leaf. All cable ends are looped and terminated with either three wire
rope clamps (MS16842) as shown in Figure 23 or hydraulically swaged wire rope
fittings (MIL-P-80104) as shown in Figure 24.
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2. The critical component of the gate reinforcement system is the chain used to
fasten the gates together. When the gates are closed, a 1/2-inch (12.7-mm)
diameter welded steel alloy chain conforming to RR-C-271 (Table 2, Type
1, Grade C, Class 1), is passed through each of the wire rope loops at the
opening and around the two upright gate posts, then snugly fastened together
with a Security Padlock as shown in Figure 22. There are times when a gate
reinforcement cable barrier system is desired but a cable reinforcement system
for the adjoining fence is not necessary since terrain, natural barriers, structures,
or other passive barrier features provide vehicle crash protection adjacent to
the gate. In such cases, the gate cable system can be terminated directly on
each side of the gate with deadman concrete anchors described for the vehicle
restraint cable system above.
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Figure 29: Chain and Wire Roping Reinforcing Vertical Lift Gate
Figure 30: Chain and Wire Roping Reinforcing Vertical Lift Gate, cont’d
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G. Locking System
2. Many power operators for sliding gates are designed to “lock-up” the gate motion
by means of an internal friction brake system that engages when the operator
is stopped. This type of locking device is not adequate to secure the gate when
it is not manned by security personnel; therefore, one of the locking or latching
methods discussed above must be provided.
H. Gate Power-Operators
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1. Power-operators for sliding gates are generally associated in three groups based
upon their method of operation:
1. Power-operators for swing gates can generally be placed in two groups based
upon their method of operation:
(a) Hydraulic Piston - A hydraulic piston is attached between the gate leaf and
an offset post. The piston is extended and contracted to operate the gate.
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2. Access control must be a primary consideration for the designer when designing
gate systems. Access control may be as simple as having a guard physically
open a gate to allow access, or as complex as a system that logs the activity of
individuals and the time of their access to specified areas by use of a designated
code number. Features, devices, and electronic equipment to automate or
expedite access control should be considered during the design of power-
operated gates. A number of issues must be addressed before an access control
system design can be considered complete. These include pedestrian traffic,
reversing devices to keep gates from closing on vehicles, traffic flow, number
of open and close cycles, and type of vehicular traffic. The designer needs
to analyze the operational site security plan and review the details of his on-
site inspection. Next, he should discuss access requirements for the restricted
area(s) consult with CBP/IA/SMD to determine the degree of access control
required. Electronic access control has a very broad spectrum of devices,
technology, and capabilities. CBP/IA/SMD should be consulted for specific
information concerning electronic access control systems. Additionally, technical
guidance may be obtained from CBP/IA/SMD at [email protected].
• For more information, see Chapter 11, Acccess to Facilities.
M. Select Peripheral Equipment
The following must be taken into account when selecting peripheral equipment to
activate gate power-operators:
(a) Who will be authorized to activate the power-operators and where are they
located? (Guard in Access Control Point, remote radio control, key switch,
push button, or card reader?)
(b) How will access control personnel communicate with personnel desiring
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entrance and exit from the restricted area? (Directly, intercom, telephone?)
(c) How will the gate be closed after the vehicle has gained entry? (Guard
personnel, automatic timer, infrared (IR) beam?)
(d) How will the gate be opened and closed to permit vehicle exit? (Guard
personnel, IR beam, button or keypad, remote radio control, roll-across
sensor, card reader?)
N. Study Terrain
Conduct a thorough study of the terrain in the general vicinity of a proposed gate to
determine the most suitable gate type and design for that specific location. Review
the site survey and access control plan during the gate selection process. Basically,
there is little security difference between gate types. While there are a number of
factors to consider in selecting the proper gate for a perimeter fence, the designer
will find that terrain and operational aspects are the driving forces in gate selection.
Basic Requirements
A fenced impoundment lot is required for the storage of seized vehicles and other
large items such as boats, trailers and recreational vehicles. Parking space for
oversized vehicles must be provided in the impoundment lot. It should be located as
far away from the border or public occupied areas as possible, yet still be observable
from the regularly staffed areas. Security cameras and additional lighting must be
provided.
Q. Paving
The impoundment lot should be paved, through 100-mm (4-inch) thick crushed
rock or gravel surface may be considered depending on climate conditions. It
must be surrounded by a 3000 mm (10 foot) high fence, with an outward sloping
cantilever top and crowned with 3 strands of barbed wire. The fence must be
continuously secured to grade. A storage building may be required for storage of
large non‑vehicle items. The entrance must be well lit and must have an intrusion
detection system.
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Minimum Requirements for a 12 Ft. Impound Lot (Outside) Fence Cut Sheet
Specification_ ______
Federal Specifications RR-F-191/GEN
Gauge/Material 9-Gauge (3.9-mm) or heavier Steel Wire Mesh (Before any coating)
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Lighting
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I. General
A. Physical Security Definitions
1. Physical Security:
system. While the level of protection may vary, the lighting must supplement and
facilitate all other measures taken to ensure the security of an asset.
2. These measures may include security forces at an entry control point, patrols
along a perimeter fence, or closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras. In all
cases, the lighting enhances visibility for either an individual or device and
facilitates their performance.
3. In the simplest form, security lighting provides a clear view of an area for security
personnel while reducing concealment opportunities for aggressors. A physical
security system must be able to detect a threat, assess the threat, and then
neutralize the threat.
C. Deterrent Value
1. Security lighting at a site may deter lesser threats and aggressors. While a
security lighting system will not deter sophisticated criminals or terrorists, it may
influence unsophisticated criminals or vandals from taking their planned actions.
The mere presence of light will increase the probability of detection or capture
and may influence these types of aggressors to look for an easier target.
2. Similarly, the effective use of lighting can enhance the perception of security,
which is important to the personnel who work within a secure area. This can be
accomplished through the definition of requirements. Defining the requirements
of a physical security system and its components involves an interdisciplinary
planning team. The team considers all interests relating to a project to determine
how security fits into the total project design. Developing the planning team will
be based on local considerations, but in general, the following functions should
be represented: facility user, antiterrorism officer, operations, security, logistics,
engineering, life safety, and others as required. That team will use the process
in UFC 4-020-01 to identify the design criteria, which includes the assets to be
protected, the threats to those assets (the Design Basis Threat), and the levels of
protection to be provided for the assets against the identified threats. In addition
to those criteria elements, the team must also identify user constraints such as
appearance, operational considerations, manpower requirements or limitations,
energy conservation, and operational costs.
3. In some areas where fence lines and water boundaries cannot be patrolled, the
use of effective lighting can be critical.
1. The security lighting system must aid in the detection of aggressors and assist
personnel in the assessment and response to potential threats. The type of site
lighting system provided depends on the installation environment and intended
use.
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E. Lighting Systems
(b) Standby
(c) Moveable
F. Controlled Lighting
1. Controlled lighting is best used when it is necessary to limit the width of the
lighted strip outside the perimeter due to adjoining property. Care should be
taken to minimize or eliminate silhouetting or illuminating security personnel on
patrol. Use full cutoff or fully shielded luminaires mounted in the horizontal plane.
Figures 2 - 4 show different configurations of controlled lighting.
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Figure 2: Example of controlled lighting with luminaire located outside the perimeter fence.
This illuminates and draws attention to the aggressor, but not the security personnel.
Figure 3: Example of controlled lighting located inside and adjacent to perimeter fence.
The luminaire location must not provide a means for access over the fence.
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G. Glare Projection.
1. One technique for glare projection lighting is to place lights slightly inside a
security perimeter and directed outward. This method is useful when the glare
of lights directed across surrounding territory will neither annoy nor interfere with
adjacent operations. It is a deterrent to potential intruders because it makes it
difficult to see inside the area being protected. It also protects security personnel
by keeping them in comparative darkness and enabling them to observe
intruders at a considerable distance beyond the perimeter.
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1. When designing a security lighting system, consider the viewer of the scene.
Conditions for adequate visibility may differ widely depending on how a particular
scene will be surveyed. The human eye sees quite differently from the lens of a
security camera. A camera may not require visible light at all or be hampered by
the addition of visible light. In many applications, the lighting will be for guards,
patrols, or other security personnel. The human eye responds to light to provide
two types of vision: off-axis and on-axis.
2. Off-axis detection refers to peripheral vision. This type of vision is very sensitive
to movement as well as glare. Its poor visual acuity does not allow off-axis vision
to distinguish details or recognize objects or people. Under low light levels, off-
axis vision is enhanced by white light. White light sources include metal halide,
fluorescent, and induction.
3. On-axis focus refers to viewing objects immediately within the field of view (or
straight ahead). The visual acuity is much higher for on-axis vision and it is not
as sensitive to glare. This type of vision allows for the identification of objects and
people.
1. For individuals, the color rendition index is vital to the threat identification
objective of security lighting and should be a minimum of 80. Guards must be
able to accurately describe and report the threat. White light sources such as
metal halide, induction, and fluorescent all render color much better than the
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L. Color Temperature
1. Color temperature is the color appearance of the lamp. A lower color temperature
refers to a warmer colored lamp while a higher temperature designates a cooler
color. While individuals typically prefer warmer colors, cooler colors may be
considered in security applications to improve visual acuity and help to maintain
alertness. A minimum color temperature of 3500 K should be specified.
1. Level of Protection (LOP) defines the degree to which the asset is protected from
the threat. Various facilities may require various levels of protection. The levels of
protection are established using UFC 4-020-01, and should be provided as part
of the design criteria. The LOP of any area determines the amount and type of
security lighting necessary.
(a) High Level of Protection (HLOP) requires MLOP criteria and illumination
of the area around the facility. This lighting may still be accomplished
with wall mounted lighting on the building. By using a different luminaire
distribution, light can be directed to the surrounding area rather than just
at the building. For larger areas, poles may be necessary to light further
from the building. With full-cutoff luminaires, a perimeter width of 2-3 times
the mounting height can be illuminated.
(a) Very High Level of Protection (VHLOP) requires HLOP criteria and lighting
of the perimeter fence. In some circumstances, glare projection strategies
may be employed to limit visibility into a secure area.
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N. Design Coordination
1. Architectural:
2. Site:
(a) Investigate ways that the lighting system may be integrated with the alarm
system. Are some lights automatically turned on when a zone goes into
alarm? How might the lighting change once an alarm has been initiated?
Design the lighting system so that luminaires are not in the field of view of
the camera. Verify the camera illumination requirements and limitations for
proper function and display.
4. Operational:
(a) Luminaires located along the fence perimeter provide uniform horizontal
and vertical illuminance. Use adjacent building facades or other structures
to mount area lighting. This can add brightness to the surrounding
environment and reduce the amount of equipment needed.
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●● Increasing the light level at the building entrance directs visitors and
other personnel to the appropriate building entry. It also serves as exit
lighting to guide individuals out of a building for life safety in case of
an emergency. The security lighting at these locations should protect
against forced-entry and provide enough light for threat assessment.
Building entrances and exits must be lighted for all levels of protection.
Use concealed, fully shielded or low brightness sources to limit glare
while still increasing brightness.
3. Perimeter Lighting
(a) Illumination of a restricted area perimeter includes the exterior and interior
clear zones adjacent to the fence, or in some applications, the area
between multiple fences. Provide poles, power circuits, and transformers
within the protected area. Coordinate pole locations with the user to
ensure that the applicable egress requirements and patrol routes of the
clear zone are not violated. The distance of poles from the fence will
not be less than 10 feet. Perimeter lighting can be either continuous or
standby, controlled or glare projection depending on the application.
4. Controlled Lighting
5. Glare Projection
(a) Glare Projection shall provide glare projection only to illuminate flat areas
which are free of obstructions for a minimum of 100 feet outside the
fence. Glare projection should only be utilized in isolated or expeditionary
locations in high threat environments. When designing for glare lighting,
the designer must check for light pollution ordinances of the local
jurisdiction.
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1. Refer to UFC 4-022-01 for Entry Control Facility Criteria. Entry Control Facilities
are separated into several zones. The lighting design for each zone is described
in the following paragraphs.
2. Approach Zone
(a) While the approach zone can vary significantly between locations, it
should be illuminated to lead motorists safely to the access zone. Full
cutoff or fully shielded luminaires mounted in the horizontal plane should
be used to minimize glare. To reduce adaptation issues for the motorist,
gradually increase (transitional lighting) lighting levels as the motorist
approaches the access zone. To reduce glare for security personnel,
provide signage to instruct motorists to turn off headlights as they
approach the access zone.
3. Access Zone
(a) Lighting in the access zone provides the highest light levels in the entry
control facility. The lighting system must provide for identification and
inspection. For most of the access zone, full cutoff or fully shielded
luminaires will provide adequate lighting for most of these visual tasks.
However, vertical illuminance on motorists’ faces can be improved with
the use of low brightness (less than 3500 lumen lamp output). Luminaires
mounted to the side and behind security personnel will improve
identification tasks.
●● Inside the guard station, task lighting must be provided for reviewing
identifications, paper work, and possibly computer tasks. However,
the interior light levels must be kept at a lower ambient light level
than the exterior. Otherwise, the security personnel will have reduced
visibility and those approaching the shack will have a clear view of the
interior. The location and shielding of interior lighting must minimize
the chance of veiling reflections on the glass which may limit visibility
to the outside. All luminaires must be dimmable to adjust inside lighting
levels. Colored light should not be used for task lighting when color is
to be distinguished.
B. CCTV camera
1. Vehicle Inspection
illuminance and fully shielded/full cutoff luminaires are vital to limit hot
spots and improve CCTV system performance. Any luminaire that falls
within the camera’s field of view at any time must be shielded. If a light
source can be seen directly by the camera, the glare and high contrast will
limit the visibility of the entire scene. Therefore, the source of illumination
is best located above the level of the camera.
(a) For color cameras, the color rendering index of the sources lighting the
area should be above 80. While color rendering is less important for
monochrome systems, high pressure sodium lamps should still be avoided
as their limited spectral distribution may render a fuzzy image.
(a) CCTV cameras typically record objects and people in elevation. Therefore,
the security lighting system must provide adequate and uniform vertical
illuminance. As in many security lighting applications, the amount
of vertical illuminance is far more important than horizontal. Vertical
illuminance should average 0.2 to 0.5 foot-candles at 5 feet above the
ground. Furthermore, it should have a very uniform coverage of 4:1
average to minimum. Color cameras may require higher light levels than
monochrome cameras. Review camera manufacturer recommendations
and coordinate with the security system designer when designing the
lighting system.
(a) IR cameras utilize IR sources to illuminate the field of view. Light in the
IR spectrum is not visible to the human eye. IR cameras then pick up the
reflections of these wavelengths from objects in the area.
5. Thermal Imaging
(a) Devices using thermal technology do not require any light source to
operate. They create images based on the heat differences between
humans, vehicles, the ground, and foliage. Unlike other camera
technologies, thermal imagery is not affected by glare from headlights or
light sources. While this technology can indicate the presence of people
and objects in complete darkness, it does not provide the detailed images
obtainable from visible light or IR cameras.
6. Waterfronts
(a) These areas are typically a combination of the entry control facilities, area,
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and perimeter lighting. However, approach zones are often very short and
additional control points are located at the entry to each pier. Full cutoff
area and structure lighting will limit both direct and reflected glare near
waterfronts for all of these areas.
(c) For example: when lighting facilities near sea turtle nesting areas, the
exterior lighting must be fully shielded and limited to reduce its impact
on turtle hatchlings, especially during hatching seasons. These seasons
typically fall between May and October although they may vary by
particular region. Hatchling turtles orient themselves with visual cues
including skylight reflected from the ocean. Each year, electrical exterior
lighting disorients thousands of sea turtles and draws them away from
the ocean – their best chance of survival. While researchers do not have
exact casualty figures, many states, including Florida maintain aggressive
lighting ordinances to limit exterior light during the nesting season.
7. Airfields
(a) Exterior lighting must meet all Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
and airfield operational regulations. These regulations may restrict the
height of poles located near an airfield. Coordinate security lighting
with installation’s airfield safety officer. Use full cutoff or fully shielded
luminaires to reduce glare which may affect airfield operations.
(a) The specific lighting criteria and design issues may vary with application.
For this reason, see the appropriate security lighting application in Chapter
7, Exterior Protection. Table 1 summarizes the minimum horizontal and
vertical illuminance levels for typical facility applications. It is important to
note however that over lighting can cause just as many visibility problems
as under lighting. In typical applications, the maximum light levels should
not be more than double the recommended average value.
9. Electrical Requirements
(a) Backup power is not required for all security lighting systems. The
assessment of risk and asset value will determine this need. For critical
security lighting systems, several different types of systems are available
for providing backup power in the event of a power outage. All offer
various advantages and disadvantages. They vary in amount of time that
they can provide power, amount of downtime between a power outage
and backup power, and cost. The back-up power system must also
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consider the re-strike time of some light sources. Metal halide and high
pressure sodium lamps both require a certain amount of time to cool-down
before they can be re-ignited. This time may reach up to fifteen minutes.
While these sources can still be used, an intermittent light source may be
required.
(a) Generators are commonly used to provide backup power but have some
downtime between the outage and when the generator restores power.
Minimum downtime can be as low as ten seconds. While this is one of
the least expensive solutions, operations must be able to sustain the
short period of darkness. Frequently, small battery packs power a few
luminaires during this downtime until the generator can restore power.
12. Flywheels
(a) Flywheels provide instantaneous power in the case of power loss in the
form of the kinetic energy in a constantly rotating wheel. This energy can
be harnessed immediately in the event of a power outage and used to
power critical lighting. These devices vary widely in price and capacity.
(a) Individual battery packs are available for some luminaires. In the event
of a power outage, these packs can power the lighting for times ranging
from five minutes to two hours, depending on the battery capacity. For
fluorescent or induction sources, the battery will power the ballast directly
although the lamp may not provide full light output.
(a) Light sources requiring a re-strike can be specified with a partial back-
up system such as quartz re-strike. In this case, the luminaire contains a
primary lamp, such as metal halide, and then a smaller quartz lamp. In the
event of a power outage, the metal halide source will require a cool down
time before it can be re-ignited. During this period the quartz lamp uses
generator-supplied power to light the area. The lighting level will not be as
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high, but interim lighting will be provided. When the primary source returns
to full brightness, the quartz lamp is extinguished. A separate, complete
back-up lighting system does not provide an economical or effective
design solution. Consider electrode less fluorescent (induction) lamp or
LED systems in lieu of light sources that require re-strike.
(a) Circuiting luminaires onto separate circuits in the same space will not
provide backup power but will limit vulnerabilities during a fault. If the
lighting system is divided onto two circuits, the loss of one will not affect
half of the lighting system. Multiple systems should be installed, except
where their use is clearly impracticable. The over current devices,
transformer, and wiring should be within the restricted area. Locate
circuits underground to minimize the possibility of sabotage or vandalism.
Equipment and design should provide for simplicity and economy in
system maintenance. To minimize security degradation during faults,
feeders may be 3-phase, 4-wire with single pole over current devices
at the service equipment. Consecutive luminaires will be connected to
alternate phases of 3-phase feeders.
C. Controls
(a) Automatic
(b) Manual
(c) Manual/Automatic
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Building Entry
Controlled LLOP - - 0.1-0.3 (1-3) 20:1
and Exits
Same as LLOP
Controlled MLOP - - and exterior 0.2-0.5 (2-5) 15:1
walls.
Building Same as
Lighting MLOP and
Controlled HLOP - - 0.5-1.0 (5-10) 10:1
perimeter area.
Same as HLOP
and lighting
Controlled VHLOP - - of perimeter 0.5-1.0 (5-10) 10:1
fence.
Parking or
Area Outside All - Entire Area 2 (20) 10:1
Storage
Areas
Area Covered All - Entire Area 5 (50) 10:1
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I. Exterior/Perimeter Doors
A. The number of doors to a facility should be limited to an absolute minimum. In cases
where more than one door exists, only one of these should be provided with outside-
mounted locks and entry hardware. All others should, if possible, present blank, flush
surfaces to the outside to reduce their vulnerability to attack.
B. Perimeter doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad, hollow core metal,
1¾-inches thick. Solid core wood doors are not authorized for use on the perimeter
of a facility. Door frames must be constructed of hollow metal that is equal in
strength to that of the door.
C. All exterior perimeter doors must be equipped with deadbolt locks equipped with UL
437 cylinder. The deadbolts must have at least a 1-inch throw. Coordination must be
made with the local fire marshal before construction to determine compliance with
building code(s) associated with National Fire Protection Association 101 (NFPA
101).
D. Double doors must have one door secured with Flush Mount Bolts (Door Hardware
H) at the top and the bottom. Astragals (Door Hardware A) must be used to inhibit
access to latches from the attack side of the door.
F. All perimeter doors must have a commercial grade automatic door closer installed
(Door Hardware K).
G. To prevent access to the latch/deadbolt, all perimeter doors will have anti-pry strips
installed. Refer to Figure 3 for minimum design specifications and illustrations.
H. Perimeter door hinge pins that are located on the outside of the facility must be non-
removable (Door Hardware J). Additionally, a dowel-pin and socket system should
be utilized. Refer to Figure 2 and Figure 4 for minimum design specifications and
sample illustrations.
I. All door hardware (e.g., hinges, lock hardware) must be secured to the door frame
with stainless steel screws that are at least 3 inches long.
1. Building Entrances
(a) Material:
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(b) Hardware:
●● Install Cylinder A.
1. Perimeter exits that provide emergency egress must generate a local audible/
visual alarm at the door, if it is breached. An alarm must also annunciate in the
Control Room. Depressing a door activation bar for more than two seconds will
initiate an alarm and activate the associated CCTV camera.
4. Emergency exits will be equipped with non-removable hinges with a set screw in
the barrel that is only accessible when the door is swung open.
(a) Material:
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(b) Hardware:
●● Install Lockset H.
1. Overhead doors will be the roll-up, flush-fitting type with a balanced magnetic
switch attached to the bottom of the door.
2. The doors are to be factory-fitted with a slide-bolt that can be extended through
each of the metal slide rails. Each slide-bolt will be fitted to the door within 6
inches of the floor and designed to accommodate the use of a high security
padlock.
3. The doors will be fitted with the appropriate electric motor system supplied by
the manufacturer. The motor system shall have a manual override feature in
the event the motor fails. Chains used to operate the door manually shall be of
such a length that the door can be easily operated from the floor. An eyebolt will
be affixed into the concrete in the area of the chain to allow the use of a high
security padlock as an additional security feature. The electric control buttons
and the manual override feature will be located so that they cannot be reached
by cutting a hole through the door.
(a) Material:
(b) Hardware:
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1. Material:
(a) Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal or of
single solid core wood, 1¾-inches thick, and hung in hollow metal frames.
2. Hardware:
B. Secondary Exam Podium and Baggage Belts Area (Port of Entry only)
1. Material:
(a) Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal or of
single solid core wood, 1¾-inches thick, and hung in hollow metal frames.
2. Hardware:
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C. CBP/APHIS Veterinary Services (VS) Bird Quarantine and Bird Holding Facilities
(Port of Entry only)
1. Material:
(a) Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal or of
single solid core wood, 1¾-inches thick, and hung in hollow metal frames.
2. Hardware:
D. Interview Rooms
1. Material:
(a) Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal or of
single solid core wood, 1¾-inches thick, and hung in hollow metal frames.
The upper half of the door must be equipped with a tempered-glass view
window. The door must swing 180-degrees in the direction of egress.
2. Hardware:
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1. Material:
(a) Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal
or of single solid core wood, 1¾-inches thick, and hung in hollow metal
frames. The door should have a 180-degree swing in direction of egress.
(The doors must swing out from the room so individuals can not barricade
themselves in when the officer steps out.)
2. Hardware:
(g) Install door-pull on ingress side and a push plate on egress side of door.
1. Material:
(a) Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal or of
single solid core wood, 1¾-inches thick, and hung in hollow metal frames.
2. Hardware:
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G. Search Room
1. Material:
(a) Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal or of
single solid core wood, 1¾ inches thick, and hung in hollow metal frames.
The doors must swing in the direction of egress.
2. Hardware:
(g) Install door-pull on ingress side and a push plate on egress side of door.
H. Hold Room
1. Material:
2. Hardware:
(b) Hinges: 41/2” X 41/2”, minimum 3 per door, heavy duty ball bearing type
with tamper-resistant screws and non-removable pins.
(c) Locks: Locks shall be detention dead bolt, heavy duty, mortised (MOGUL
Key on One Side) mechanical with ADA compliant lever handles; except
where suicide resistance is warranted, a substitute cone-shape handle
may be used. Locks with interchangeable cores are acceptable (obtain
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approval from COTR and Using Agency). It must deadlock in both locked
and unlocked positions.
(d) Door Pull: Raised pull on outside of door. Pushplate not required on inside
face.
(e) Door Stops/Wall Bumpers: Dome type 13/8” high or as required to meet
applicable conditions.
I. Fraudulent Document Analysis Room (Port of Entry only); Alien Baggage Storage;
and Joint Automated Booking System/Identification Room:
1. Material:
(a) Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal or of
single solid core wood, 1¾-inches thick, and hung in hollow metal frames.
2. Hardware:
1. Material:
(a) Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal or of
single solid core wood, 1¾-inches thick, and hung in hollow metal frames.
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2. Hardware:
1. Material:
(a) Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal or of
single solid core wood, 1¾-inches thick, and hung in hollow metal frames.
2. Hardware:
(a) Tamperproof with high security deadlock and no master key. Provide card
reader/keypad to track users, but not as a substitute for a deadlock. The
card reader shall be integrated to the locking mechanism. One shouldn’t
work without the other. Appropriately authorized card and key should be
necessary for access. The door must be fitted with a UL-437 approved
high security locking cylinder deadbolt lock (or equivalent). The keying
must be different from all other keys and must be keyed off a master key.
1. Material:
(a) Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal or of
single solid core wood, 1¾-inches thick, 40-42” wide and hung in hollow
metal frames.
2. Hardware:
1. Material:
(a) Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal or of
single solid core wood, 1¾ inches thick, 40-42” wide and hung in hollow
metal frames.
(b) Hinges and frame should be appropriate for door. Door may require
shoring.
2. Hardware:
1. Material:
(a) Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal,
1¾-inches thick, and hung in hollow metal frames.
2. Hardware:
O. CBP Chief Officer’s Office (OIC); Supervisor’s Office; Secondary Supervisor’s Office
1. Material:
(a) Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal or of
single solid core wood, 1¾ inches thick, and hung in hollow metal frames.
2. Hardware:
(a) Material:
(b) Hardware:
●● Install Lockset D.
1. Material:
(a) Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal
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2. Hardware:
(f) An access control device or system will be utilized to track users. A card
reader/keypad will be utilized to augment the deadbolt lock. During non-
working hours, the deadbolt lock will be engaged.
R. General Office
1. Material:
(a) Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal or of
single solid core wood, 1¾-inches thick, and hung in hollow metal frames.
2. Hardware:
(a) When entered from processing area, floor, or non-sterile side of terminal:
●● Install Lockset D.
●● Install Lockset B.
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S. Cashier’s Office
1. Material:
(a) Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal or of
single solid core wood, 1¾-inches thick, and hung in hollow metal frames.
2. Hardware:
1. Material:
(a) Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal or of
single solid core wood, 1¾-inches thick, and hung in hollow metal frames.
2. Hardware:
(b) Install Cylinder A, keyed like toilet rooms and physical training room under a
CBP master.
U. Conference/Muster/Training Room
1. Material:
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(a) Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal or of
single solid core wood, 1¾-inches thick, and hung in hollow metal frames.
2. Hardware:
1. Material:
(a) Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal or of
single solid core wood, 1¾-inches thick, and hung in hollow metal frames.
2. Hardware:
1. Material:
(a) Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal or of
single solid core wood, 1¾-inches thick, and hung in hollow metal frames.
2. Hardware:
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1. Material:
(a) Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal or of
single solid core wood, 1¾-inches thick, and hung in hollow metal frames.
2. Hardware:
●● Install Lockset D.
1. Material:
(a) Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal or of
single solid core wood, 1¾-inches thick, and hung in hollow metal frames.
2. Hardware:
(f) An access control device or system will be utilized to track users. A card
reader/keypad will be utilized to augment the deadbolt lock. During non-
working hours, the deadbolt lock will be engaged.
Z. Mechanical Room
1. Material:
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(a) Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal or of
single solid core wood, 1¾-inches thick, and hung in hollow metal frames.
Provide double doors, as required.
2. Hardware:
1. Material:
(a) Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal or of
single solid core wood, 1¾-inches thick, and hung in hollow metal frames.
2. Hardware:
letters).
B. At present, there are numerous GSA approved Class 5 security vault doors being
used for the protection of weapons. We strongly recommend that locks be changed
out to the UL Standard 768, Group 1, mechanical combination lock, when and if a
failure occurs with an X-07, X-08 or X-09 lock. When that change is made it must be
noted on the Optional Form 89 (Maintenance Record for Security Containers/Vault
Doors). It should also be noted on the front of the armory door that is not authorized
for the protection of classified information.
C. For further information on vault doors refer to Chapter 8.7 and Federal Qualified
Products List QPL-AA-D-600-8.
Hardware A1
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Hardware B3
Hardware B2
Hardware D
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Hardware E1
Hardware E2
Hes-1006
Hardware F
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Hardware H1
Hardware H2
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A device fastened to
the door or frame that
prevents access to
the latch/deadbolt and
cannot be pried or forced
back.
Hardware J
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Hardware L
Cylinder A
All CBP lock cylinders must be of a high security, pick resistant design with angled key cuts,
rotating tumblers, keyway side bitting, and a slider mechanism. The cylinders must be
Underwriters Laboratories (UL) listed under UL437 and certified under American National
Standards Institute (ANSI)/Builder’s Hardware Manufacturer’s Association (BHMA) certification
A156.30, Levels MIAM and ANSI/BHMA A156.5, Grade 1.
All cylinders must incorporate three locking elements: a slider mechanism, a sidebar
mechanism with tumbler rotation, and a pin tumbler elevation. All cylinders must be
constructed of solid brass with hardened steel inserts. The lock tumblers must combine a
dual-axis action with one axis utilized for pin tumbler rotation and the other axis utilized for
positioning key cuts. Randomly selected tumbler pins must incorporate a hardened steel insert.
The cylinders must be capable of being immediately re-keyed to a new combination or a new
system.
Interchangeable cores should be used to facilitate this process. A suitable number of spare
cores should be maintained to facilitate lock changes in the event of a lost or stolen master
key.
The manufacturer must have the capability of establishing a key system with a minimum
of six angle cuts in six possible pin positions with the capability of two distinct positions of
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cut per pin chamber, if required by the parameters of the system. The manufacturer must
have the capability of producing a keying system in either of two distinct and different keying
specifications and pinning specifications. The system must be capable of incorporating a key,
with each being capable of more than one bitting per position to expand master keying and key
changes. The key must also incorporate the capacity to include twelve possible side bittings
along the key blade located on two different planes or surfaces of the key. The system must
also have the capability to provide a single master key with over 1 million (1,000,000) usable,
non-interchangeable change keys in a single keyway. The key thickness must be no less than
one hundred, twenty-five thousandths (.125″) and must be made from a nickel silver alloy.
Each key must be custom coined for tracking and identification purposes.
The locking system must be deemed proprietary information shared only among authorized
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) entities and the manufacturer. Security Specialists
assigned to the Office of Internal Affairs, Security Management Division (IA/SMD) and
employees serving as Collateral Security Liaison’s for IA/SMD, will have the authority to
request additional pinning materials and duplicate keys.
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V. Locksets
Entrance Function
- For Doors 1 3/4” Minimum (1 1/4” armor front)
- For Doors 1 3/8” Minimum (1” armor front)
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A lockset where the outside lever is always fixed, (i.e., locked) and
the inside lever is always unlocked. Entrance is permitted by key
Lockset C1 only.
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Lockset F
A self-powered, tamper resistant lock where the bolt is retracted by dialing a combination.
The lock has audit trail capability and a limited view LCD display with indicator arrows.
5340-01-498-2759 CDX-09 Combination Deadbolt Lock For Pedestrian Doors With A Non-
Drill Resistant Mounting Plate.
5340-01-498-2760 CDX-09 Combination Deadbolt Lock For Pedestrian Doors With a Drill-
Resistant Mounting Plate.
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Lockset J
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Figure 4: Hinge Side Protection Plan for Using a Pin-in-Socket Technique
VII. References
●● MIL-HDBK-1013/1A, Design Guidelines for Physical Security of
Facilities
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VIII. Perimeter and Interior Doors
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AppWindows
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I. General
A. Glazing Design
D. The design criteria will help establish a common basis of communication between
security professionals and design engineers. Building functionality and various levels
of performance for glazing systems are defined below:
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E. Design Threats. For the above performance categories there may be a range of
possible threats. The threats are defined below.
1. Maximum Event. The largest explosive threat expressed as a net equivalent TNT
hemispherical charge at a specified standoff distance.
F. Based on the desired performance goals and threat, a structural engineer can
define a set of response limits for the structure. Designing for operable/repairable
construction can be very difficult and costly. Construction required protecting against
a large explosive threat at close range would take the form of fully blast-hardened,
bunker-type construction.
G. Placement of the explosive is another major concern and all possible locations must
be considered to find the critical location that produces the greatest damage to the
structure.
C. There are three types of glazing cross sections: monolithic, laminated, and insulated.
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D. Monolithic glass cross sections (not including polycarbonate) are very vulnerable to
blast loads. Once the glass fails, there is nothing to keep the broken fragments from
injuring personnel both inside and outside the structure.
1. The various types of materials available for use as monolithic glazing are:
(f) Polycarbonate
(g) Acrylic
2. Annealed Glass:
(a) Annealed glass is the most common form of glass available. Depending
on manufacturing techniques, it is also known as plate, float, or sheet
glass. During the manufacturing process, annealed glass is cooled slowly
without tight controls. This process yields a product that has very little
residual compressive surface stress and large variations in strength. When
compared to tempered glass, annealed glass has relatively low bending
strength.
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(a) Thermally Tempered Glass (TTG) is the most readily available tempered
glass on the market. It is manufactured from annealed glass (float,
polished, or plate) by heating to a high, uniform temperature and then
applying controlled, rapid cooling.
(b) Thermally tempered glass is typically four to five times stronger than
annealed glass.
(e) Due to the high strain energy stored by the prestressing, tempered glass
will eventually fracture into small cube-shaped fragments instead of the
razor-sharp, dagger-shaped fragments associated with the fracture pattern
of annealed glass. However, even if the tempered glass breaks up initially
into small fragments, high blast overpressures can propel these fragments
at velocities high enough to constitute a severe hazard to personnel. One-
quarter inch tempered glass typically fails at 0.8-psi overpressure.
(a) Glass can be tempered chemically using a bath process; however, the
fracture pattern resembles that of annealed glass. Most commercially
available, chemically tempered glass for architectural purposes is
manufactured from a soda-lime base. A common problem is surface flaws.
The resulting stress will often induce premature failure. One-quarter inch
chemically treated glass typically fails at 0.2-psi overpressure.
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6. Wire-Reinforced Glass:
7. Polycarbonate:
(d) Rated as a class CC-1 material, it is much less combustible than acrylic
plastic.
(f) Polycarbonate failure points are dependent on the thickness of the cross
section. Having an adequate frame bite of 1 inch or more and allowing
for expansion of the material are key factors in achieving satisfactory
performance.
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●● Interlayer materials
●● Glass-clad polycarbonate
●● Glass-clad ionomer
E. Interlayer Materials
2. PVB is used universally by the glazing industry for laminating glass products
together.
3. PVB is the most cost-effective interlayer material available. There are three
grades available: architectural, aircraft, and automotive. Architectural grade
PVB is the most widely used. Aircraft grade PVB is approximately twice as stiff
as the architectural grade but costs about four times more. Automotive grade
is the same cost and thickness as architectural grade PVB. The environmental
durability of PVB is a known and proven quantity. Long-term use in automotive
and aerospace industries indicates that few, if any, problems of environmental
degradation will be encountered.
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3. When subjected to blast overpressure, laminated TTG will exhibit strength and
behavior between that of a set of stacked glass sheets and a monolithic sheet,
depending on temperature and duration of load. Both the Government and
private industry use design strength of a PVB glass laminate at 75 percent that of
a monolithic plate of the same thickness. For this load condition, the laminate is
at ambient temperature.
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3. Aspect ratios (ratio of length to width) are an important consideration and must
be kept as close to one as possible. Avoid designing glazing “ribbons” (long,
narrow window openings) because they tend to create unbalanced stresses
relative to the long and short sides of a glazing, which can pull the laminate apart.
I. Glass-Clad Ionomer
J. Other Materials
1. Materials such as glass block could be substituted for traditional windows. Glass
block has a substantially higher resistance compared to conventional glass
panes. In this manner the windows can be upgraded to strengths at or near
conventional wall strengths. There is little data available on the performance of
glass block in resisting blast loads.
1. Thin plastic film that can be applied to standard annealed and tempered glass to
retain fragments during an explosion, FRF is an injury mitigation measure and
not intended to provide protection against the pressure effects of an explosion
other than to reduce exposure to glass fragments. FRF is one of the most
cost-effective methods for mitigating the effects of glass breakage in existing
structures during an explosion.
2. Select 10-mil film in a daylight (to the edge of frame) application regardless of
loading conditions if fragment retention is the primary goal.
3. Install a catch bar or single side (top) mechanical anchoring system for all
daylight applications.
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1. Window glazing frames provide a connection between the building envelope and
the glazing material. This connection must be strong enough to transfer the edge
load of the glazing into the building. A basic frame system consists of a main
frame, sub frame, removable stop, fasteners, glazing tape, and sealant. More
elaborate frame systems also include sub frames (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Typical Frame Cross-Section
B. Main Frame
1. A main frame can be made from aluminum, aluminum with steel inserts, or steel.
The frame must provide a system of drainage channels and flashing to allow
water accumulation discharge to the exterior.
2. Operable frame designs, which allow the window to be opened, are not
recommended for security applications where protection against explosive
threats is a concern. The frame bite should be at least 1 inch or the minimum
determined by the glazing manufacturer or design engineer. If the bite is
sufficient to hold the glazing and resist the blast load, all pressure is transferred
through the frame to the wall. This can be sizeable load acting on the wall, which
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C. Sub frame
1. A matching sub frame and outer frame are recommended to resist explosive
effects. Sub frames are mounted in the concrete formwork prior to pouring
concrete. Anchorage is embedded with studs welded directly to the building
reinforcing steel. After pouring the walls, outer frames and glazing can be
installed in the sub frames. A blast consultant is recommended for analyzing and
designing the sub frame and anchorage system.
D. Removable Stop
1. The removable stop is a component of the frame that holds the glazing in place.
The purpose of the removable stop is to allow installation of the glazing into the
frame.
2. Better security integrity is achieved when the removable stop is on the interior
side of the glazing. The removable stop must be capable of resisting the entire
load collected by the glazing, both in positive inward loading and in negative
rebound outward loading.
1. Glazing tape and sealant provide a cushion between frame material and glazing
to prevent glass breakage from thermal expansion, settling, and wind loads.
Glazing tape and sealant support the glazing laterally. They set and maintain
the face clearance between the frame bite and the glazing face. Setting blocks
are used to establish and maintain the edge clearance of a glazing. The window
seals should preclude the leakage of high blast pressures into the building.
F. Frame Anchorage
1. Blast resistant window framing must be capable of resisting the load transferred
from the glazing. This requirement translates to rigid frames and frame-to-wall
interfaces and flatness of the frame and glazing assembly. If the frame system
is skewed or out of plane, the glazing can develop unbalanced stresses when
loaded and fail prematurely.
2. Aluminum frames with steel sub frames can be used for small blast loads less
than 5 psi.
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(a) Above 5 psi, the entire frame system must be constructed from steel
members.
3. Some frame designs for concrete construction use anchor bolts for a dual
purpose. They serve to anchor the frame to the structure and as fasteners for
the removable stop. Since a glazing must be removable without destroying the
wall, careful consideration must be exercised when selecting the type of anchor
bolt. Sleeved anchors and compression bolts, which cannot be reinstalled, are
unacceptable.
G. Frame Design
1. The window frame must absorb the full load of the glazing pane (created by the
blast pressure) for reliable performance. Unless this is done, frame deflections
can induce higher tensile stresses in the glazing pane and reduce its ability
to resist blast loading. Frame members must also resist the blast load directly
applied on all exposed areas.
2. Selection and evaluation procedures for frames, anchorage, and walls are
complex engineering processes and beyond the scope of this Guide. The
assistance of a structural engineer with experience in blast overpressure analysis
and design to carry out a comprehensive analysis of these components is highly
recommended.
2. Movable glazing that is open when a blast occurs can leave assets and
personnel vulnerable to the forces resulting from the explosion. Acceptable
glazing material for blast resistance in new construction includes laminated
annealed glass, laminated thermally tempered glass, laminated chemically
tempered glass, monolithic polycarbonate and air gap polycarbonate, and glass
systems (polycarbonate laminates with glass on the outboard face separated by
an air gap).
1. Caliber – The caliber of a bullet refers to its diameter and is expressed in either
decimals of an inch (caliber) or in millimeters. Typical examples include the
0.303-caliber and 7.62-mm NATO Ball.
B. Bullet Characteristics
(a) Armor-Piercing (AP) - A bullet with a hardened metal core, a soft metal
envelope, and a copper bullet jacket. When the AP bullet strikes armor, the
envelope and jacket are stopped, but the armor-piercing core continues
forward to penetrate the armor. The AP bullet is characterized by high
accuracy in flight and high velocity.
(c) Full Metal Jacket - A copper outer shell that encapsulates the core and
increases accuracy and penetration characteristics.
C. Bullet Configurations
1. The different bullet designs are spire point (long, acutely pointed), round nose,
flat point, full metal jacket (completely copper coated), hollow point, short jacket
(copper coated at tip), cast bullet, and wad cutter. Ballistic performance during
flight and on impact is sensitive to a projectile’s shape and construction (e.g.,
whether or not the bullet is jacketed; the length, thickness, and hardness of the
jacketed material; the presence of a hollow nose, a cavity, and hollow base; and
the hardness of the lead).
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E. Projectile Energy
1. In security glazing, the initial impact layer must be hard to deform the projectile
on initial impact. This allows the tough polycarbonate layer behind to “catch” the
bullet before it penetrates the cross section.
F. Multiple Impacts
1. The effect of multiple hits depends on separation of the points of impact and the
degree to which the glazing material is damaged by preceding impacts. Where
a small area of dispersion of successive hits fall within the crater of the first
projectile, the possibility of penetration increases.
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B. Medium Threat Severity Level – The medium threat severity levels are ANSI/UL
Levels 2 & 3 described in ANSI/UL-752. This threat normally would be employed
when the attacker knows that ballistic resistant glazing is installed.
C. High Threat Severity Level –The high threat severity levels are ANSI/UL-752
Levels 4, 5, and 6. This threat would normally be employed for sniper situations
and conditions where 9-mm automatic weapons might be expected. ANSI/UL-752
also describes the high severity threat level as a 12-gauge 437-grain rifled slug and
double 0’s buckshot.
D. Very High Threat Severity Level – The very high threat severity level, 5 shots from a
5.56 or 7.62 NATO Ball Military round, is described in ANSI/UL-752 as Levels 7 and
8. This threat normally would be employed for locations where paramilitary attacks
are expected.
fractured that usually have rounded edges. The energy absorbing mechanics
of polycarbonate materials offer an advantage over glass, which will spall on
impact. Polycarbonate can often be used to reduce shatter. When combined
with glass as a spall shield or a laminated glass/plastic configuration (with
polycarbonate on the inside face), polycarbonate can inhibit the shattering of
the glass by containing the glass particles. The suppression of spallation is a
powerful method that can be used to increase the impact resistance of ballistic
resistant glazing. A laminated and bonded composite cross section consisting
of TTG and polycarbonate layers provides visual clarity and tested resistance to
small-arms projectiles.
2. Resistance - Use bullet resistant windows for a high level of protection. Bullet
resistant windows essentially constitute transparent armor. As for all attack
resistant construction, the degree of protection provided by a bullet resistant
window should equal that of the adjoining wall system.
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(b) Frames - Frames specified for ballistic resistant glazing systems must
be capable of resisting the same ballistic threat as the glazing and
surrounding wall system. Bullet resistant window frames are fabricated
from various types and grades of aluminum, carbon steel, or stainless
steel, and they are typically reinforced internally with armor-grade steel
shapes. Aluminum is also used by some manufacturers to improve
appearance or for corrosion resistance. Custom fabricated wood-clad or
wood-trimmed assemblies may be available from some manufacturers
when aesthetic concerns warrant the additional (and considerable)
expense. The frame, sash, mullions (vertical member between window
lites), and muntins, if used, must also be designed to resist the identified
threat.
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be detailed into a wall system such that the wall provides an integral
stop, although moisture entrapment is a concern with this approach.
Manufacturers of window assemblies recommend anchorage methods
that provide adequate support and protection for the window’s threat
resistance.
(e) Wall Systems - Wall systems described in Table 2 will provide equivalent
penetration resistance at the threat severity levels listed. When selecting
security glazing systems, it is important to consider the ability of the
surrounding wall system to resist the same level of threat. If this factor
is not considered, the value of an expensive glazing system could be
substantially reduced.
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Table 4: Typical Thickness for Medium Threat Severity Level Ballistic-Resistant Glazing Cross-Section
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Table 5: Typical Thickness for High Threat Severity Level Ballistic-Resistant Glazing Cross-Section
Table 6: Typical Thickness for Very High Threat Severity Level Ballistic-Resistant Glazing Cross-Section
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B. Test Standards
1. Clearly describe the test or performance standard that must be met. Because
most standards are subject to periodic revisions, the designer should obtain
the most recent revision and develop specifications accordingly. Although using
the threats listed in UL-752 is recommended, other design threats can also be
specified. When non-standard ballistic threats are specified, include information
on the:
(a) Weapon
(c) Velocity
C. Tested Windows
2. If the costs of such job-specific testing are prohibitive or unwarranted, inform the
facility user that only certain components will be certified as ballistic resistant.
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D. Installation
E. Markings
1. There are five threat levels normally associated with forced entry protection. Only
three of these threat levels are appropriate for security glazing systems: very low,
low, and medium. Moving from low to very high threat severity levels increases
the required technical skill or sophistication level of the adversary.
2. Very Low Level Threat. Aggressor uses quiet methods of entry such as saws and
hand drills, or a single blow to break the glass using rocks, etc.
4. Medium Level Threat. Aggressor uses unlimited hand tools (high and low
observable) and limited battery powered tools.
5. High Level Threat. Aggressor uses unlimited hand, power, and thermal tools.
Glazing systems are not available to protect against this level of attack.
6. Very High Level Threat. Aggressor uses unlimited hand, power, and thermal
tools, plus explosives. Glazing systems are not available to protect against this
level of attack. While security glazing systems will provide some resistance to
threat levels above medium, they are not recommended for these applications.
Specifying windows to resist the high or very high threat severity levels is not
possible because there are no glazing systems currently available that can
cost-effectively resist the combination of power and thermal tools, and powerful
explosive breaching charges associated with these threat levels.
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1. To specify a security glazing cross section, first identify the forced entry threat
severity level the window must resist (very low, low, or medium). As previously
mentioned, there is currently no security glazing system available that will cost
effectively withstand the high and very high threat levels.
1. Select a tested cross section from Table 7 that will provide protection against a
low threat severity level. Ensure the wall system for the structure is at least equal
to one of the wall cross sections listed in Table 8.
●● Specify a minimum 3/8-inch lag bolt with a 3-inch embedment into the
structure surrounding the frame.
●● Lag bolt spacing must be a minimum of 9 inches from the frame corner
to the first bolt on each side of the corner and a minimum of 18 inches
on center between all other bolts.
●● Spacing for stop anchor bolts will be a minimum of 9 inches from the
frame corner to the first bolt on each side of the corner and a minimum
of 18 inches on center between all other bolts.
1. Select a tested cross section from Table 9 that will provide protection against a
low threat severity level. Ensure the wall system for the structure is at least equal
to one of the wall cross sections listed in Table 10.
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●● Spacing for stop anchor bolts will be a minimum of 9 inches from the
frame corner to the first bolt on each side of the corner and a minimum
of 18 inches on center between all other bolts.
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Table 10: Minimum Wall Thickness for Medium Threat Severity Level
1. Fully grout frames to minimize access to anchors and make the frame more rigid,
or use anti-spreading frame reinforcements at maximum 8-inch intervals.
2. Provide heavy or reinforced sash, frames, and other elements rated for the
appropriate threat severity level and delay time.
C. Anchorage
1. Conceal fasteners from the exterior or use tamperproof fasteners, provide non-
removable exterior stops, grout frames to minimize access to anchors, and
provide a steel channel along the inside and out side of the window opening to
minimize access to anchors by thermal or power cutting tools.
1. Fragment Retention Film (FRF) is an optically clear tough film attached to the
inside of a glass surface with a strong, pressure-sensitive adhesive. Films are
composed of polyester, polyethylene terephthalate, or composite materials. FRF
is also known as shatter resistant film, safety film, or protective film.
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2. FRF offers a relatively inexpensive solution that can reduce the destructive
capability of glass fragments. FRF is particularly beneficial for retrofitting existing
glass windows. FRF provides no added value on polycarbonate glazing. FRF
provides some protection from glass hazards when subjected to ballistic attack
and added protection (delay time) when attacked with simple hand tools. It will
also provide protection against injury from glass fragments during earthquakes,
hurricanes, and other extreme weather conditions. When combined with solar
tinting, it can also provide ultraviolet protection and improved energy efficiency.
F. Ballistic Attack
1. When subjected to ballistic impact (or shrapnel), the projectile creates a hole
in the FRF reinforced glazing approximately the size of the projectile, leaving
the remainder of the glass intact. The glass around the impact area continues
to adhere to the FRF so fragmentation is minimized. FRF will not provide any
substantial resistance to ballistic resistance unless the entire glazing system is
designed to defeat the intended threat (i.e., 1/2- to 3/4-inch laminated glass with
10-mil FRF would be required to defeat an underwriters Laboratories (UL) Level I
threat).
H. Effects of Explosives
1. FRF is not intended to resist blast loads. Its only purpose is to retain fragments
of the shattered glass and minimize the number of fragments disbursed into a
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protected area.
2. Blast testing with very short duration blasts characterized by a small, close-in
explosion shows that FRF tends to hold the glass in position even though the
glass shatters. Under long duration blast loads characterized by large, distant
explosions, the fractured glass tends to be propelled as a single unit or as a
group of large fragments with little retention in the frame.
3. The use of a catch bar (Figures 2 and 3) attached to the inside is recommended
to reduce injury caused when the FRF system will not be retained in the frame.
Ten-mil FRF is the most practical and cost-effective alternative for retention of
glass fragments. Limited testing by manufacturers shows that under certain
explosive conditions (3 to 9 psi, 35 to 80 psi-ms impulse), 4-mil film retained
approximately 80 percent of the glass fragments, while 7-mil film retained 90
percent and 10-mil film retained 98 percent. Thicker films retained only slightly
higher fragment percentages. Thicker films retain about the same fragment
percentage as 10-mil film. Based on this information, 10-mil FRF appears to
provide a substantial increase in performance at an additional installed cost that
is only 50 percent more than the installed cost of 4-mil.
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1. Design factors for a FRF system include composition, thickness, and tint,
surrounding construction, and glazing materials.
B. Composition
C. Thickness
1. Based on limited testing, the use of 10-mil FRF appears to be the most cost-
effective choice for most applications. Ten-mil FRF appears to provide more
protection than lighter films from flying fragments of glass due to blast loads or
other threats. Heavier film provides about the same performance at greater cost.
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D. Tints
1. FRF is available in tinted versions. The most common has a silver tint and has
the added benefit of improving the thermal energy performance of a building
while providing a degree of obscuration from the outside. Although tinted film in
darker colors is available, this film can cause internal heat buildup and internal
stresses in the glazing, which can result in a weakened glazing system.
E. Surrounding Construction
1. When using 10-mil and thicker FRF that is anchored, the frame must have
sufficient strength to allow the FRF to perform at maximum capacity; a qualified
structural engineer should investigate building components adjacent to the frame
for adequate transfer of the blast load or other threats.
F. Glazing Materials
1. The film manufacturer must be provided with the type of glass to be reinforced as
well as information about gaskets, frame type, and configuration, depending on
the type of application selected.
G. Applications
1. There are a number of ways FRF is applied. They are described here and shown
in order of lowest to highest cost.
H. Daylight Applications
1. Daylight applications (film installed only on the area of glass that allows light
to pass, see Figure 4) are the least costly and serve only to hold the glazing
material together during an explosion. This application does not improve the blast
resistance of the glazing material. In a daylight application, the FRF is trimmed
back 1/16-inch from the edge of the frame. For all daylight applications, a catch
bar or blast curtains are recommended to restrict movement of the glass panel
when blown out of the frame.
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B. Minimum Performance
adhesion. These tests include samples that have a simulated 1-year exposure to
sunlight and UV radiation.
C. Test Sample
1. For the purpose of the test, the film should be attached to a piece of 1/4-inch
thick flat glass conforming to the requirements of ASTM C 1036, Type I, Class 1,
Quality q3.
D. Passing Criteria
1. After the impact portion of the test, satisfactory performance of the test specimen
is determined using ANSI Z97.l, on the interpretation of results. To be acceptable
for use as FRF, the manufacturer must provide a statement that the film
satisfactorily performed according to ANSI Z97.1.
E. Tensile Strength
F. Thickness
G. Peel Strength
1. The peel strength should be a minimum of 4.7 pounds/inch for 7-mil and thicker
films.
1. All film, regardless of color, should be optically clear from the inside to ensure
an undistorted view through the glass. Color, tint, and reflectivity, when required,
should be specified. The amount of reflectivity of solar radiation is specified as a
percentage.
1. When required by life safety or local building codes, specify a flame spread rating
and a smoke density rating for the film. The film should not exhibit a flame spread
index exceeding 25 and a smoke density index exceeding 100 when tested in
accordance with ASTM E 84. For the purpose of testing, the specimen should be
mounted to 1/2-inch thermally tempered glass.
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J. Manufacturer’s Qualifications
1. Specifications for FRF should require the manufacturer to have at least 3 years
of experience in the manufacture of FRF, and that the film be a standard product
of the manufacturer and intended for the purpose described in the specifications.
Only films designed for fragment retention will perform in an acceptable manner.
K. Cleaning Instructions
1. Always specify that the manufacturers provide cleaning instructions with the film
materials. Many cleaning compounds are not compatible with film.
XVI. Installation
A. New Construction
1. Quarter-inch laminated glass in a standard frame will perform about the same as
a daylight application of 10-mil film and will last for the life of the structure.
B. Retrofit Application
1. Film can be installed beyond the frame edge to improve retention characteristics
of the glass panel. However, any extension of the film past the inner frame edge
will require at least partial frame dismantling. For this application, the glazing
should be removed and the film applied to the outside edges of the glazing
material, which extend into the frame bite. If dismantling is too expensive, specify
a “daylight” application where the film is applied to within 1/16 inch of the edge of
the visible glazing. Although it is less likely the glazing will be retained in its frame
under a blast load, it is still a substantial improvement in fragment retention. If
this method is used, install a catch bar (Figure 3) to prevent the glass section
from penetrating the protected area.
C. Film Splice
1. The film may be spliced or lapped when a glazing dimension exceeds 60 inches
in either direction. All seams or splices will be applied with a butt joint. For
windows with seams, catch bars should be placed at 90 degrees to the seam
direction. For installations where “smash and grab” theft is also a concern, seams
should always be horizontal.
D. Visual Inspection
E. Application
1. This film is attached directly to the glass surface. FRF should be applied on
the interior of windows for protection from the effects of spalling. For double-
glazed units (insulated glass), apply the film to the room (protected) side of the
innermost frame. Specify that the film must be applied in strict accordance with
the manufacturer’s application instructions. If the film is used on double-glazed
units, film anchorage on two sides is strongly recommended to improve glass
retention of the unprotected outside glazing.
F. Qualifications of Personnel
G. Environmental Issues
1. The film will not be applied if there are visible dust particles in the air, if there is
frost on the glazing, or if any room conditions such as temperature or humidity
do not meet the manufacturer’s instructions. The manufacturer must be informed
about the environment the film must withstand, such as interior or exterior
atmosphere, solvents, chemicals, or excessive humidity. After film application,
room conditions should be kept as required by the manufacturer’s instructions
to allow proper curing of the adhesive. The manufacturer must also know the
characteristics of the glass being treated with the film to ensure compatibility.
B. Blast curtains, shades, and spall shields must be designed to withstand the loading
conditions anticipated.
C. Blast Curtains
2. The concept of a blast curtain is to allow sufficient fabric and strength to give
with the blast load and prevent glass fragments from flying into the occupied
space. Drapes should be treated to withstand fading, mildew, and soiling. Before
selecting a blast curtain for use, insist on independent testing of the product to
ensure it will perform as required. It is vitally important to have supporting test
data that will demonstrate the product’s effectiveness within the range of threats
anticipated. Drapes should allow light to enter the protected space and allow
some degree of visual access. Opaque drapes that must be opened for light and
vision will be useless during an explosive event.
D. Blast Shades
2. Commercially available blast shades are normally made with Kevlar or Spectra
polyethylene fiber. Before selecting blast shades for use, insist on independent
testing of the product to ensure it will perform as required. It is vitally important to
have supporting test data that will demonstrate the product’s effectiveness within
the range of threats anticipated. Shades should allow light to enter the protected
space and allow an acceptable degree of visual access from inside the room.
They should be permanently attached, but allow for access to the glazing system
for maintenance.
E. Spall Shields
2. Before selecting a spall shield for use, insist on independent testing of the
product to ensure it will perform as required. It is vitally important to have
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supporting test data that will demonstrate the product’s effectiveness within the
range of threats anticipated.
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(b) Certain temperature and humidity conditions, either interior or exterior, can
also cause a slight bowing in polycarbonate, usually in the direction of the
higher temperature or humidity. This bowing is reversible and flatness can
be restored to the sheet by equalization of the factors that cause bowing.
(c) Although bowing doesn’t affect visibility, it can cause distorted reflections.
Specifying thicker polycarbonate sheet and increasing the edge
engagement are ways of reducing distortion and bowing. The amount of
additional edge engagement needed for expansion or contraction depends
on the dimensions of the polycarbonate sheet. Edge engagement ranges
from 1/16 inch for a 24- inch sheet to 3/8 inch for a 120-inch sheet.
The exact requirement can be calculated by multiplying the length of
the sheet in inches times the temperature span (minimum to maximum
expected temperature) times 0.0000375 (coefficient of expansion). This
figure is added to the structural requirement for edge engagement, which
is normally 1 to 1-1/4 inches. When large variations of temperature
are expected, dry glazing (using silicone or neoprene gaskets) is
recommended over wet glazing (high-grade silicone sealants and fully
cured butyl tapes).
B. Physical Abuse
1. Polycarbonate:
2. Laminated Glass:
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AppOpenings
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I. Openings
A. Operable Openings are doors, windows, transoms, skylights and all similar devices
that can be opened or closed to allow or prevent passage of people, air, or light.
Openings can also include, but are not limited to, elevators, penthouses, hatchways,
or doors to the roof. Roof doors are often overlooked because of infrequent use.
These openings are the usual points of entry for intruders especially at ground level
and in their concealed and semi-concealed locations. Operable openings are also
the hardest points to protect simply because they are designed for passage.
(a) Is the opening less than 18 feet from the ground or less than 14 feet from
another structure? If yes, than it shall be covered with bars or grilles and
equipped with intrusion detection device.
(b) Permanently seal the wall in a manner that maintains the penetration
resistance of the wall containing the opening
(c) The door is eliminated from the brick wall, the door assembly will
be removed and the opening bricked up; properly anchoring new
construction.
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II. Manholes
A. Manholes can provide entrances into buildings for service purposes or provide
access to utility tunnels containing pipes for heat, gas, water, telephone transmission
conduits, cables, and other utilities.
C. A case-hardened chain and high security padlock can be used to secure a manhole
cover; the use of a heavy-duty hinged-steel dead bar secured with a high security
padlock and heavy-duty hasp is an alternative method.
D. Keyed bolts (which make removal by unauthorized personnel more difficult) are also
available. If very high security is required, manhole covers that resist shattering after
being artificially “frozen” by an aggressor should be considered.
B. The mounting frame must be properly secured. The grates or doors can be welded
into place, or they can be secured with a steel chain and high security padlock.
V. Roof Openings
A. Access to a building’s roof can allow entry to the building and access to air intakes
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and building Heating, Ventilating, and Air-Conditioning (HVAC) equipment (e.g., self-
contained HVAC units, laboratory or bathroom exhausts) located on the roof.
B. All glass skylights on the roof of any building or premises used for business
purposes and subject to the provisions hereof, shall be provided with:
1. Iron bars of at least 1/2-inch round or 1-inch by 1/4-inch inch flat steel material
under the skylight and securely fastened; or
2. Steel grill of at least one-eighth-inch material of two-inch mesh under the skylight
and securely fastened.
C. All hatchway openings on the roof of any building or premises used for business
purposes and subject to the provisions hereof shall be secured as follows:
2. The hatchway shall be secured from the inside with a slide bar or slide bolts.
D. All air duct or air vent openings exceeding eight (8) inches by twelve (12) inches on
the roof of any building or premises used for business purposes and subject to the
provisions hereof shall be secured by covering the same with either of the following:
1. Iron bars of at least 1/2-inch round or 1-inch by 1/4-inch flat steel material,
spaced no more than five inches apart and securely fastened.
E. If the barrier is on the outside it shall be secured with rounded head flush bolts on
the outside.
B. Fencing or other barriers should restrict access from adjacent roofs. Access to roofs
should be strictly controlled through keyed locks, keycards or similar measures.
Skylights are another source of entry from the roof.
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B. For all new and existing buildings covered by these standards, access to roofs
must be controlled to minimize the possibility of aggressors placing explosives or
chemical, biological, or radiological agents in that area or that could threaten building
occupants or critical infrastructure.
C. For new buildings, all external roof access must be eliminated by providing access
from internal stairways or ladders, such as in mechanical rooms.
D. For existing buildings, external access must be eliminated where possible, otherwise
they must have secure external ladders or stairways with locked cages or similar
mechanisms.
1. Doors with glass panels and any glass panels that are adjacent to the door frame
shall be protected as follows: 1/4-inch
(a) The glass portion shall be covered with iron or steel grills of at least one-
eighth-inch material of no more than two-inch mesh securely fastened.
(b) If the door or glass panel barrier is on the outside, it shall be secured with
rounded head flush bolt on the outside.
(c) If the remaining portion of a door panel exceeds eight inches by twelve
(12) inches (excluding door frame) and is of wood, but not of solid core
construction, or is less than 1 3/8-inches thick, said portion shall be
covered on the inside with at least sixteen (16) gauge sheet steel attached
with screws.
2. Wood doors not of solid-core construction, or with panels therein less than 1 3/4
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inches thick, shall be covered on the inside with at least 16-gauge sheet-steel
attached with screws.
3. All roof doors shall be provided with a lock that will permit the door to be opened
from the inside without the use of a key or any special knowledge or effort.
Outside hinges on all roof doors shall be provided with non-removable pins. Such
hinge pins may be welded, flanged, or secured by non-removable screws.
X. Mechanical Areas
A. Mechanical system design standards address limiting damage to critical
infrastructure and protecting building occupants against CBR threats. The primary
goal of a mechanical system after a terrorist attack should be to continue to operate
key life safety systems. This can be accomplished by locating components in less
vulnerable areas, limiting access to mechanical systems, and providing a reasonable
amount of redundancy.
B. Critical infrastructure systems must be located away from high-risk areas (e.g.,
garages and loading docks). The system controls and power wiring to the equipment
should be protected, and the system should be connected to emergency power
to provide smoke removal. Smoke removal equipment should be provided with
standalone local control panels that can continue to individually function in the event
the control wiring is severed from the main control system.
1. Do not mount plumbing, electrical fixtures, or utility lines on the inside of exterior
walls, but, when this is unavoidable, mount fixtures on a separate wall at least 6
inches from the exterior wall face.
4. Reduce the number of utility openings, manholes, tunnels, air conditioning ducts,
filters, and access panels into the structure.
5. Locate utility systems away from likely areas of potential attack, such as loading
docks, lobbies, and parking areas.
6. Protect building operational control areas and utility feeds to lessen the negative
effects of a blast.
8. Use lockable systems for utility openings and manholes where appropriate.
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B. Main Building
6. Walls: 8” CMU.
8. Material: 1 ¾” 12 gauge steel clad hollow door and frame. Provide double doors,
as required.
C. Commercial Building
6. Walls: 8” CMU.
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8. Material: 1 ¾” 12 gauge steel clad hollow door and frame. Provide double doors,
as required.
2. Provide redundant utility systems to support site security, life safety, and rescue
functions.
3. Consider quick connects for portable utility backup systems if redundant sources
are not available.
4. Prepare vulnerability assessments for all utility services to the site, including all
utility lines, storm sewers, gas transmission lines, electricity transmission lines,
and other utilities that may cross the site perimeter.
5. Protect water treatment plants and storage tanks from waterborne contaminants
by securing access points, such as manholes; maintain routine water testing to
help detect waterborne contaminants.
6. Minimize the number of signs identifying critical utility complexes (e.g., power
plants and water treatment plants). Provide fencing to prevent unauthorized
access and use landscape planting to conceal above ground systems.
7. Locate petroleum, oil, and lubricant storage tanks and operations buildings
down slope from all other buildings. Site fuel tanks at an elevation lower than
operational buildings or utility plants. Locate fuel storage tanks at least 100 feet
from buildings.
8. Locate the main fuel storage away from loading docks, entrances, and parking.
Access should be restricted and protected (e.g., locks on caps and seals).
9. Provide utility systems with redundant or loop service, particularly in the case
of electrical systems. Where more than one source or service is not currently
available, provisions should be made for future connections. In the interim,
consider “quick connects” at the building for portable backup systems.
10. Decentralize a sites communications resource when possible; the use of multiple
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11. Place trash receptacles as far away from the building as possible; trash
receptacles should not be placed within 30 feet of a building.
12. Conceal incoming utility systems within building and property lines, and give
them blast protection, including burial or proper encasement, wherever possible.
14. Locate utility systems at least fifty (50) feet from loading docks, front entrances,
and parking areas.
15. Route critical or fragile utilities so that they are not on exterior walls or on walls
shared with mail rooms.
16. Where redundant utilities are required in accordance with other requirements
or criteria, ensure that the redundant utilities are not co-located or do not run in
the same chases. This minimizes the possibility that both sets of utilities will be
adversely affected by a single event.
17. Where emergency backup systems are required, ensure they are located away
from the systems components for which they provide backup.
18. Mount all overhead utilities and other fixtures weighing 31 pounds (14 kilograms)
or more to minimize the likelihood that they will fall and injure building occupants.
Design all equipment mountings to resist forces of 0.5 times the equipment
weight in any direction and 1.5 times the equipment weight in the downward
direction. (This standard does not preclude the need to design equipment
mountings for forces required by other criteria such as seismic standards.)
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allow intruder access. Provide intrusion detection sensors and consider overt
or covert visual surveillance systems if warranted by the sensitivity of assets
requiring protection.
2. Drainage ditches, culverts, vents, ducts, and other openings that pass through
a perimeter and that have a cross-sectional area greater than 96 sq. in. and
whose smallest dimension is greater than 6 inches shall be protected by securely
fastened welded bar grilles.
4. Ensure that any addition of grills or pipes to culverts or other drainage structures
is coordinated with the engineers so that they can compensate for the diminished
flow capacity and additional maintenance that will result from the installation.
1. CBP stores and dispenses a large quantity of fuel for its patrol vehicle fleet.
At many locations, CBP maintains fueling stations. CBP also performs its
own maintenance on much of this fleet and requires lubricant oils for this
maintenance. CBP has above ground fuel storage tanks, and mobile fuel
dispensing trucks used in its operations to fuel its patrol and transport vehicles,
aircraft, construction equipment and boats. This handbook identifies general
physical security requirements for aboveground fuel storage tanks. The tank shall
meet requirements herein or be a CBP/IA/SMD pre-approved equal.
B. Site Location
1. Fuel Storage Tanks shall be located on federally controlled property. The main
fuel storage shall be located away from loading docks, entrances, and parking.
Access shall be restricted and protected (e.g., locks on caps and seals).
Aboveground fuel storage tanks should be no closer than 50 ft in any direction to
any entrance, vehicle circulation, and parking or maintenance area and no closer
than 100-150 feet from a building.
C. UL/ULC Listing
1. The tank shall be tested to and listed (and carry UL/ULC labels) for the following:
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●● UL – 2085, two hour furnace fire test and two hour simulated pool fire
test for insulated tank.
D. General Requirements For Both Ballistic Resistant And Non Ballistic Aboveground
Tanks
1. Access Control
(a) Automated access control systems may be used. The system shall be
capable of maintaining a record of who accessed the fuel tank. Access
control systems may use a keypad, card reader, or a combination of both.
2. Bullet Resistance
(a) The tank shall withstand bullet resistance tests in compliance with UFC
Section (79-7), Appendix #A-II-F-1.
(a) Portable fire extinguishers must be provided for the suppression of fires in
accordance with NFPA 10 and UFC for high hazard area. Fire extinguisher
and clean-up kit shall be sized and provided by the tank manufacturer. Fire
extinguisher shall be mounted on the exterior of the generator enclosure
with 316 stainless steel bracket and fasteners. Clean-up kit shall be
similarly mounted inside the generator enclosure.
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4. Flame Arrestors
5. Fuel Piping
(a) All fuel piping shall be schedule 40, 316 stainless steel (screwed or
welded).
6. Overfill Protection
(a) The tank shall be provided with the following methods to protect against
overfill:
●● Direct reading level gauge at the tank which is visible from fill pipe
location;
7. Security Fence
(a) Provide security fencing around all petroleum facilities to ensure safety
and prevent unauthorized access. For storage tanks within fenced
perimeter provide standard 8ft. fence and if stand alone provide 12 foot
impound lot fence. For more information on fencing refer to Appendix 7.3
Fencing.
8. Uplift Restraints
9. Venting
(a) The tank system shall be furnished with a 2 inch normal vent and an
emergency pressure relief system. The standard emergency relief
system furnished with the tank shall open if the tank pressure exceeds
½ psi. The tank system shall conform to code requirements and UL/ULC
Standards for venting. All vents and fittings utilized on the fuel tank shall
be constructed of stainless steel.
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(a) Minimum level III on housing wall requirements. NIJ Standard 0108.01
(b) Fuel Storage Tanks shall be hardened against small arms fire (UL 752).
F. Installation
G. Foundation
1. The foundation for the tank must be designed (and approved by tank
manufacturer) to support the tank plus the weight of the maximum amount
of product the tank will be storing. The foundation design must also include
provision for draining surface water away from the tank to minimize the risk of
fuel accumulation under the tank from the overfill or spills.
2. For more information, visit the EPA’s Source Water Protection Practices Bulletin.
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the perceived risk associated with the facility and its tenants, engineering and
architectural feasibility, and cost. Specific physical security measures to consider for
the protection of the building HVAC system are cited below. HVAC systems must be
capable of operating on emergency power (generators).
1. Placing intakes at the highest practical level on the building is beneficial. For
protection against malicious acts, the intakes should also be covered by screens
so that objects cannot be tossed into the intakes or into air wells from the ground.
2. Such screens should be sloped to allow thrown objects to roll or slide off the
screen, away from the intake. Many existing buildings have air intakes that are
located at or below ground level.
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3. For those that have wall-mounted or below-grade intakes close to the building,
the intakes can be elevated by constructing a plenum or external shaft over
the intake. An extension height of 12 feet will place the intake out of reach of
individuals without some assistance.
4. For existing, buildings with air intakes below grade at ground level or wall-
mounted outside secure areas, some protection can be gained with physical
security measures (e.g., placing fencing, surveillance cameras, and motion
detectors around the intakes to facilitate monitoring by security personnel).
6. Public access to building roofs should be prevented. Access to the roof may
allow entry to the building and access to air intakes and HVAC equipment (e.g.,
self-contained HVAC units, laboratory or bathroom exhausts) located on the
roof. From a physical security perspective, roofs are like other entrances to
the building and should be secured appropriately. Roofs with HVAC equipment
should be treated like mechanical areas. Fencing or other barriers should restrict
access from adjacent roofs.
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(a) An extension height of 12 feet (3.7 m) will place the intake out of reach of
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(b) Also, the entrance to the intake should be covered with a sloped metal
mesh to reduce the threat of objects being tossed into the intake. A
minimum slope of 45 degrees is generally adequate.
1. Physically inaccessible outdoor air intakes are the preferred protection strategy.
When outdoor air intakes are publicly accessible and relocation or physical
extensions are not viable options, perimeter barriers that prevent public access to
outdoor air intake areas may be an effective alternative.
2. Iron fencing or similar see-through barriers that will not obscure visual detection
of terrorist activities or a deposited CBR source are preferred. The restricted area
should also include an open buffer zone between the public areas and the intake
louvers. Thus, individuals attempting to enter these protective areas will be more
conspicuous to security personnel and the public. Monitoring the buffer zone
by physical security, CCTV, security lighting, or intrusion detection sensors will
enhance this protective approach.
Figure 5: Minimum Recommended Inlet Angle
1. Similar to the outdoor-air intake, HVAC return-air grilles that are publicly
accessible and not easily observed by security may be vulnerable to targeting for
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CBR contaminants. Public access facilities may be the most vulnerable to this
type of CBR attack. A building-security assessment can help determine, which, if
any, protective measures to employ to secure return-air grilles. Take caution that
a selected measure does not adversely affect the performance of the building
HVAC system.
(d) Removing furniture and visual obstructions from areas near return-air
grilles.
1. All exterior openings larger than 96 square inches which are less than 18 ft
above the ground or an adjacent roof must have protection against intrusion. This
may consist of special louvers or grids of 15 mm reinforcing bars, placed at 150
mm on center and welded at intersections.
1. Also see United Facilities Criteria (UFC) DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards
for Buildings and GSA’s Guidelines for Safe Mail Centers.
1. Provide dedicated exhaust systems within mail rooms to maintain slight negative
air pressures with respect to the remainder of the buildings in which the mail
rooms are located so that the flow of air is into and contained in the mail rooms.
Though the airflow into the mail rooms will not eliminate the potential spread of
contamination by personnel leaving the mail room, it will limit the migration of
airborne contaminants through openings and open doorways.
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1. Provide mail room ventilation system outside air intakes and exhausts with low
leakage isolation dampers that can be closed to isolate the mail rooms.
D. Isolation Controls
1. Utility systems can suffer significant damage when subjected to the shock of an
explosion. Some of these utilities may be critical for safely evacuating personnel
from the building or their destruction could cause damage that is disproportionate
to other building damage resulting from an explosion. To minimize the possibility
of the above hazards, apply the following measures.
C. Utility Routing
1. For all new inhabited buildings, route critical or fragile utilities so that they are
not on exterior walls or on walls shared with mail rooms. This requirement is
recommended, but not mandatory, for existing buildings.
D. Redundant Utilities
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1. Windows or other openings leading off fire escapes should meet both security
standards and life safety code requirements if they provide potential access
points for an intruder. Measures taken to secure windows must be coordinated
with the appropriate fire and safety officials to ensure that they do not impede
safety processes.
2. To promote security, the fire escape should not extend all the way to the ground.
If the fire escape must reach all the way to the ground for safety reasons,
alternative security safeguards that meet life safety requirements may be
needed.
3. Coordination with fire and safety officials is necessary in relation to any security
measures directly affecting the fire and safety systems and procedures.
B. Wall Safeguards
3. See Whole Building Design Guide (WBDG) Building Types and the DoD
Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings.
1. This is often possible when the vulnerability is caused by a wall that does not
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extend entirely from floor to ceiling providing the potential for illicit access over
the top of the wall.
D. Reinforced Wall
1. Covering the entire wall with 9-gauge expanded metal may be appropriate to
control identified risks.
E. Intrusion-Detection Sensors
1. If the primary concern is that entry may be possible by forcible means without
detection, as might be the case in a storage room or similar area, the use of
intrusion-detection sensors can be an effective solution.
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415 of 890
AppLoadDocks
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A. General
1. Loading docks and service access areas are commonly required for a building
and are typically desired to be kept as invisible as possible. For this reason,
special attention should be devoted to these service areas in order to avoid
undesirable intruders. Design criteria for loading docks and service access
include the following:
(a) Separate (by at least 50 feet) loading docks and shipping and receiving
areas in any direction from utility rooms, utility mains, and service
entrances, including electrical, telephone/data, fire detection/alarm
systems, fire suppression water mains, cooling and heating mains, etc.
●● Locate loading docks so that vehicles will not be allowed under the
building. If this is not possible, the service should be hardened for
blast. Loading dock design should limit damage to adjacent areas and
vent explosive forces to the exterior of the building;
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Also, a metal slide bar, bolt or crossbar should be provided on the inside. Metal
accordion grate or grill-type doors should have a secured metal guide track at the
top and bottom and be secured with a cylinder lock or padlock.
1. A card reader should be provided at the personnel door of the loading dock. A
balanced magnetic switch interlocked with a CCTV camera should be provided.
The interlock should automatically train the TV camera on the inside of the door
when the door is open. A local alarm should be set off at the same time.
2. Loading docks and receiving and shipping areas should be separated by at least
50 feet in any direction from utility rooms, utility mains, and service entrances
including electrical, telephone/data, fire detection/alarm systems, fire suppression
water mains, cooling and heating mains, etc. Loading docks should be located
so that vehicles will not be driven into or parked under the building. If this is not
possible, the service shall be hardened for blast.
(a) Emergency generator including fuel systems, day tank, fire sprinkler, and
water supply;
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E. Additional Features
1. CBP requires that all alarm systems, CCTV monitoring devices, fire protection
systems, public address systems and access control devices, etc., be connected
to emergency power sources. The tenant is responsible for determining which
computer or communication systems require backup power.
2. Regardless of the quality of design and installation, most access control systems
are vulnerable to electric power losses. Some systems may not be able to
reset automatically and would require operator intervention to restore. Potential
intruders may be aware of these vulnerabilities and may seek to cut or interrupt
power if they cannot circumvent the system by other means. It is critical that all
elements of the system have backup power systems incorporated into the design
and operation to guarantee the system’s uninterrupted integrity, alarm reporting,
situation assessment, and the response force’s reaction.
3. Consultations during the design phase of an access control system are the
best time to define power, line conditioning, and battery or other backup power
requirements. Backup power for fixed systems may be from uninterruptible power
supplies (UPS), generators, or automatic bus power transfer switches.
B. Commercial Power
C. Emergency Generators
grade levels (building exterior) and protected interior areas. The generator
should not be located in any areas that are prone to flooding. Emergency backup
generators must be designed in compliance with UFC 3-540-04N. Emergency
generators should be located at least 100 feet from communications frame
equipment to avoid radio frequency interference and they must provide 150% of
the present design loads of the facility.
2. The generators shall serve distribution panel boards in the main electrical room
through a 4-pole automatic transfer switch (ATS). This emergency system shall
provide power for the life safety/security systems and other essential loads upon
failure of the normal electrical power service for a minimum of 72 hours (120
hours for remote locations) continuous operation prior to re-fueling.
F. Generator Doors
1. Material:
(a) Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal, and
hung in hollow metal frames.
2. Hardware:
(a) Tamperproof with high security deadlock and no master key. Provide card
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(b) For further information on generator door hardware, see Appendix 7.6,
Doors and Door Hardware.
G. The electrical load of the Emergency Generator should include the following critical
building systems/functions (this list is not all inclusive):
3. Generator auxiliaries;
5. Fire pump;
6. Lighting;
7. Telephone switch;
8. Security systems;
(c) Power and lighting for Fire Control Center and Security Control Center;
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(d) Lighting for main electrical room, electrical closets, and communications
closets;
1. All electrical and electronic equipment shall be powered from a UPS provided as
specified in UFGS-26 32 33.00 10
3. The UPS shall be sized to provide at least 24 hours battery back-up in the event
of primary failure. Batteries will be of the sealed non-gassing type.
4. If batteries are used as auxiliary electrical power, they will be maintained at full
electrical charge by automatic charging circuits
(b) Intrusion detection system (IDS) and duress alarm control equipment;
2. It is the intent that if normal power is interrupted the state of the microprocessor
will not be altered, nuisance and false indication alarms are not generated, and
volatile memory will not be lost.
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(a) The security of the facility is not compromised for any period of time due to
an unlocked condition, and
J. Locking Systems
2. It is the intent that if normal power is interrupted the security of the facility is not
compromised for any period of time due to an unlocked condition, and access
through electrically controlled locks may be affected.
1. Security Lighting Systems that use high intensity discharge lamps to provide
illumination to critical areas will be provided UPS service if incandescent or
fluorescent lamps are not used as backup lighting.
A. Description
2. A card reader/keypad must be provided in addition to, but not as a substitute for,
the deadlock allowing CBP to track access by users. All necessary cabling and
conduit must be provided to support the equipment furnished and installed by the
government.
1. IDS:
(a) Provide IDS and alarm with UPS backup monitored on a 24-hour basis by
the security office. Provide keypad control inside room adjacent to entry
door.
2. Walls:
(a) 3/4-in. fire resistant painted plywood over 9-gauge diamond mesh (1 1/2-
in. X 2-in. maximum diamond) expanded metal securely fastened to metal
studs. 3/4-in. plywood over 8-in. CMU is also acceptable.
3. Ceiling:
(a) 5/8-in. gypsum board over 9-gauge diamond mesh (1½-in. X 2-in. max.
diamond) expanded metal. Overlap joints.
4. Material:
(a) 1 ¾-inch solid core wood or 12-gauge steel clad hollow metal door and
frame.
5. Hardware:
6. Provide all necessary cabling and conduit to support the equipment furnished
and installed by the government.
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A. Description
1. The general storage / file room is required for the storage of CBP supplies,
equipment, files and other miscellaneous items required for CBP operations.
Eighteen inch deep heavy-duty adjustable metal shelving and filing cabinets are
required as specified by CBP.
1. Fixed Security Equipment 18-in. deep heavy-duty adjustable metal shelving, filing
cabinets as specified by CBP.
2. Walls:
3. Ceiling:
4. Material:
(a) 1 ¾-in. wood or hollow metal, 40-42 inches wide, in hollow metal frame.
5. Hardware:
A. Description
1. The Secure Storage Room is specified by CBP for the secure storage of
documents, seized narcotics, and other contraband. In addition to provisions
for IDS that provides perimeter and volumetric protection/detection of
unauthorized access, special construction details are required for this room
including the installation of 9-gauge diamond mesh expanded metal wall / ceiling
reinforcement or 8-in. CMU. The installation of 9-gauge diamond mesh expanded
metal must be inspected by CBP prior to covering.
1. IDS: For each secure room, provide IDS and alarm with
2. Floor:
3. Walls:
(a) 5/8-in. gypsum board over 9-gauge diamond mesh (1 1/2-in. X 2-in. max.
diamond) expanded metal securely fastened to metal studs. Overlap
joints. 8-in. concrete masonry units are also acceptable.
4. Ceiling:
5. Material:
(a) 1 ¾-in. solid-core wood or 12-gauge steel clad hollow metal door and
frame.
6. Hardware:
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Vaults
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3. For more information on temporary storage only, please refer to the Strong Room
Construction Standards in Appendix 8.8, Strongrooms.
B. Scope
C. Referenced Documents
1. Government Publications:
●● FED-STD 832
2. Vault Systems:
3. Vault Door:
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4. Locks:
(a) There are three classes of vaults for the storage of classified material
and equipment A, B and C. Class A vaults offer the maximum protection
against tool and torch attack. Class B vaults offer less than maximum
protection. A lightweight, portable “modular vault” meeting Federal
Specification AA-V-2737 may also be used to store classified material
and equipment. The modular vault is equivalent to a Class B vault Class
C vaults offer less than maximum protection and may be used where
unique structural circumstances do not permit construction of concrete
vault construction. Utilization of any vault class, or the modular vault, is
dependent upon the physical location environment where the vault is to be
erected. Reference: FED-STD 832 (This document establishes minimum
construction requirements for all Federal agencies for high security vaults
for storage of classified information and weapons).
D. The minimum construction requirements for each class of vault are described as
follows.
1. Detailed Requirements:
above. When vault walls are adjacent to the exterior walls, the vault
wall must be set back from the exterior part of the exterior wall to allow
4 inches (100 mm) for the normal wall facing to cover the vault wall.
Wall reinforcement shall be tied into floors and ceilings;
●● Vault Door. Vault door and frame shall conform to Federal Specification
AA-D-600;
●● Class B vaults are GSA approved modular vaults and shall be six (6)
sided (floor, ceiling, and four sides) as specified in AA-V-2737.
●● Vault door. Vault door and frame shall conform to Federal Specification
AA-D-600, Class 5 vault door.
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●● Vault Ceiling and Floor. If the floor and/or ceiling construction is less
than six inches of reinforced concrete, a steel liner is to be constructed
the same as the walls to form the floor and ceiling of the vault. Seams
where the steel plates meet horizontally and vertically are to be welded
together;
●● Vault Door. Vault door and frame shall conform to Federal Specification
AA-D-600, Class 5 vault door; and
1. Vault door and frame shall conform to Federal Specification AA-D-600, Class 5
vault door.
2. Armory vault doors and security vault doors are both manufactured according to
Federal Specification AA-D-600, Door, Vault, Security. The difference between
the two doors is that armory vault doors, used to protect AA&E, are fitted with
UL Standard 768, Group 1, mechanical combination locks. Security vault doors,
used to protect classified information, are fitted with locks meeting Federal
Specification FF-L-2740, Locks, Combination. The armory vault door label
(silver with red letters) states that it is a “GSA Approved Armory Vault Door.” The
security vault door label reads “GSA Approved Security Vault Door” (label also
silver with red letters).
3. There are numerous GSA-approved Class 5 security vault doors being used for
the protection of weapons, which is authorized under (AA-D-600D), however It is
strongly recommend that locks be changed out to the UL Standard 768, Group
1, mechanical combination lock, when and if a failure occurs with an X-07, X-08
or X-09 lock. When that change is made it must be noted on the Optional Form
89 (Maintenance Record for Security Containers/Vault Doors). It shall also be
noted on the front of the armory door that is not authorized for the protection of
classified information.
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Federal
AA-D-600D
Specification:
Title: Federal Specification Door, Vault, Security
Scope: This specification covers vault doors that are designed to conform to the
minimum standards for physical security equipment as required by
the Information Security Oversight Office Directive governing the safe-
guarding of national security information. The doors provide protection
against unauthorized entry for the periods of time specified.
Classes: Class 5-V:
Class 5-A:
Class 5-B:
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NSN Description
7110-01-475-9590 Double leaf, right opening swing active leaf, with optical device.
(b) Certification label. A certified label shall be affixed to the inside face of the
door bearing the following certification:
6. Day Gate. Vaults shall have self‑closing class 5 metal day gate with an automatic
locking device controlled by key on the outside of gate. The gate shall be
constructed of expanded mesh or solid bars finished to match vault door and
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frame. The day gate must have a key lock that is manipulation resistant (UL-437),
high security, and is keyed off-master. The thumb throw latch release shall be on
the inside of the gate, with thumb throw accessible only to the inside.
(a) For large vaults, an overhead door leading from the vestibule to the
exterior may be installed.
●● Overhead doors will be the roll up, flush fitting type. The door will be
metal, dual slat manufactured with 12, 14, or 16-gauge exterior slats
and 18, 20, 22, or 24-gauge interior slats with insulated centers. The
doors are to be factory fitted with a slide bolt that can be extended
through each of the metal slide rails. Each slide bolt will be fitted to
the door within 6 inches of the floor and designed to accommodate
the use of a high security padlock. A dealer after-market, manufacturer
approved slide bolt locking system will be acceptable. The doors will
be fitted with the appropriate electric motor system supplied by the
manufacturer. The motor system shall have a manual override feature
in the event the motor fails. Chains used to operate the door manually
shall be of such a length that the door can be easily operated from
the floor. An eyebolt will be affixed into the concrete in the area of
the chain to allow the use of a high security padlock as an additional
security feature. The electric control buttons and the manual override
feature will be located so that they cannot be reached by cutting a hole
through the door.
8. Physical Segregation Within the Vault. The vault must be segmented into High
Risk vs. Low Risk. High Risk must further be segmented into Drugs vs. Currency
and Monetary Instruments vs. all other High Risk Seizures. Finally Drugs
must be segmented into Hard vs. Soft. Although not mandated, many vaults
have included a staging segment for contraband that is to be destroyed. Each
storage segment must have a separate zone in the IDS. The method of physical
segregation will be accomplished with the use of metal cage structures with the
caging running true-floor to true-ceiling with sliding cage doors. Cages are to
be constructed of 9-gauge mesh. The mesh opening must be small enough to
preclude anyone reaching in with a hand or even a finger and manipulating the
lock or removing stored material. The color of the mesh will be in accordance
with industry standard. All anchoring bolts to the floor, wall(s) and ceiling must
be torqued down in keeping with the manufacturer’s specifications and spot
welded so that the anchoring bolts cannot easily be removed. Each cage door
will be secured by a lock meeting UL-437. As stated earlier the placing of the
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(a) Storage Cage Construction: Separate storage areas in the room must
be provided for hard narcotics (heroin and similar drugs), soft narcotics
(vegetative drugs such as marijuana) and items of value (currency, jewelry
and weapons). Separate 9 gauge expanded metal cages must be used
for narcotics with a separate cage for soft and hard narcotics each. The
cages shall be constructed of 9 gauge expanded metal mesh securely
welded to 42 mm (1.75 inch) steel angle structural frame on 450 mm (18
inch) on center, with 3mm (1/8 inch wide) 50 mm (2 inch long) welds at
every 400 mm (16 inches) on center at all seams and joints. The partition
shall have an integral gate. The gate shall have a single padlock meeting
the requirements of Federal Specification FF-P-2827A . The lock shall be
protected from tampering by a 6 mm (0.25) metal plate. Gate hinge pins
shall be non removable.
(b) Items of value must be stored in a GSA Class VI storage container located
inside the permanent seizure storage room. All storage containers must
be protected with intrusion detection system. Each cage or cabinet door
must have balanced magnetic switches indicating if the door is open and
the lock is engaged. Access control system must be provided on storage
containers for hard and soft narcotics. The cage or cabinet doors must be
under camera video surveillance.
11. Closed Circuit Television (CCTV). The entire exterior and interior of the vault
must be monitored by the CCTV system. The contractor is responsible to ensure
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(a) Vault
●● All cameras must provide usable images of the exterior of the entire
vault door and its frame. The image captured must be sufficient to
identify anyone tampering with or opening the vault door;
●● Cameras must provide usable images of the interior of the entire vault
door and its frame so that identifiable images of persons entering the
vault are captured; and
●● Cameras must provide images of the entire interior area of the vault.
The images must be of sufficient quality so that person(s) in the area
are identifiable and any activity in the area is captured.
(c) Exterior
(b) Wiring
●● The vault is a six-sided structure (floor walls, roof & floor) that requires
full camera coverage. Cameras are to be placed and lenses set so that
each camera will produce a usable image of any person inside or in
the immediate vicinity of the outside walls or on the roof. The cameras
must also provide clear images of operations inside the vault areas and
at the overhead and pedestrian entry doors;
●● The exterior of the pedestrian entry door and the overhead door must
be covered and the camera must produce clear images of all persons
and operations in that area (loading, unloading, etc.) The camera(s)
must also provide a clear image of anyone at the pedestrian door so
that CBP personnel can identify them before opening the pedestrian
door to admit any person who does not have access;
including weighing and packaging, etc. are produced. The entire vault
door and doorjamb must be monitored so that anyone tampering with
the door can be identified;
●● All camera wiring is to be run through EMT metal conduit. The size of
the conduit is to be determined by the vendor, but is to be of sufficient
size so that the wiring will not be chafed or otherwise damaged as it is
drawn through the conduit;
●● The cameras (shall be whatever model works for space, variable lens)
are to be event activated;
●● The system shall be placed inside a lockable rack designed for the
purpose of securing such equipment. The keys to the rack shall be
given to the responsible Officer;
●● The affected CBP employees should determine how often the DVR is
downloaded. The DVR will probably have the capacity to hold up to 30
days in memory. Employees should be cautious in determining the time
span because looking for a certain time frame inside a thirty-day period
can be time consuming.
(b) Please note that Seized Property personnel are not to download or
administer the CCTV system. The separation of duties must be provided
for, generally this is accomplished by having an employee or the CBP
Officer manage the system.
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15. Intrusion Detection System (IDS). The purpose of an alarm system is to detect an
intrusion or attempted intrusion and to notify appropriate personnel.
●● All control units will be located within the area protected by the alarm
system;
(b) Volumetric sensors employed in the alarm system must be placed so that
the most likely intruder motions are detected.
(c) All perimeter sensors and control units will be equipped with tamper
detection.
(e) All alarm wiring leaving the controlled area shall be equipped with
electronic line supervision.
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II. Attachment 1
A. Intrusion detection monitoring requirements and services provided by the Federal
Protective Service (FPS) through GSA leases. FPS has designed and built four
Mega-Centers located in Suitland, Maryland, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Battle
Creek, Michigan and Denver, Colorado.
1. Among other tasks, these centers monitor intrusion/duress alarm systems, fire
detection systems, environmental systems and elevator emergency telephones
for multi-regional areas. In order to take full advantage of the Mega-Centers’
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) monitoring capabilities; FPS mandates
that all installations and upgrades of the above referenced systems in both
leased and government facilities are standardized on a national basis, are fully
compatible with the standardized alarm receiving equipment existing in the
Mega-Centers, and are capable of being remotely programmed with software
from the approved panel manufacturers A national decision was made that FPS
would only recommend and support alarm systems that fully interfaced with
the control center’s equipment and software. Therefore, FPS requires that only
remote-programmable alarm systems are specified when designing or upgrading
alarm systems that are monitored at the Mega-Center. Additionally all remote-
programmable alarm systems must be able to easily communicate with the
Mega-Centers’ monitoring equipment.
2. Currently, the FPS list of approved alarm control panels include those
manufactured by ADEMCO, CADDX, DMP, ITI, & Radionics/Bosch. Additionally,
approved alarm panels must communicate via the Mega-Centers’ alarm
receivers using one of the following panel signaling protocols: ADEMCO Contact
ID, Radionics/Bosch Modem II, Modem IIE and Modem IIIA; and Security
Industry Association (SIA). The Mega-Centers can also accept most digital
communicators for Fire Detection Systems that transmit one of the following
industry standard formats (communications protocol): ADEMCO Contact ID,
Radionics / Bosch Modem II, Modem IIE and Modem IIIA or SIA.
3. The current standard alarm control panels for Federal buildings and larger leased
sites are the ADEMCO model numbers Vista 50PUL, Vista 128FB or FBP & 250
FB or FBP; the CADDX model number NX8E; the DMP model number XR200;
and the Radionics/Bosch model number 9412G. These alarm control panels
are commercial UL, compatible with Fire Detection and most Access Control
Systems. For smaller leased space and office applications contact your local
Mega-Center for acceptable alternatives supplied by approved manufacturers.
All alarm systems must have tampered devices, cabinets and junction boxes.
All devices will report as one point as a zone description that can be used when
reporting an alarm condition to the responding authority. FPS cannot monitor
any alarm system that does not fully comply with the above referenced criteria.
If a system does not meet these criteria, either the customer or GSA will have to
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B. Additional Specifications - Vault area will be equipped with one of the following:
1. An emergency escape which meets applicable building and safety codes. The
escape device will be designed and installed so that it will not be activated by the
exterior locking device nor actuated by drilling or rapping on the door from the
outside.
4. An emergency light.
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AppStrongrooms
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I. General
A. A strongroom is an enclosed space constructed of solid building materials.
Strongrooms are normally used for the storage of classified or sensitive materials,
such as firearms. Protection is supplemented by guards and or Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDS). Rooms that have false ceilings and walls constructed of fibrous
materials, or other modular or lightweight materials, do not qualify as strongrooms.
5. Mail rooms;
8. LAN/TELCOM; and
B. Walls:
1. The perimeter walls, floors, and ceiling will be permanently constructed using
slab to slab construction. Slab to slab construction (true floor to the true ceiling) is
defined as walls that extend from the solid concrete floor to the underside of the
roof slab above. All construction must be done in a manner as to provide visual
evidence of unauthorized penetration.
2. Walls will be constructed using reinforced Concrete Masonry Units (CMU) not
less than 8 inches thick.
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(a) Masonry units will be solid brick or hollow type block and filled with
concrete and metal reinforcement bars.
●● When using hollow type blocks, they will be filled with concrete and
reinforced with #5 rebar, a minimum of 5/8 inches in diameter. The
reinforcing is to be anchored into the ceiling and floor to a minimum
depth of one-half the thickness of the adjoining member.
3. Where a CMU wall is not feasible, the following alternate method can be used:
(a) The inside walls will be constructed of 5/8-inch fire rated gypsum board
and the outside walls with standard 5/8-inch gypsum board and a layer of
9-gauge expanded metal on the inside of the area.
(c) To view the specifications for expanded metal mesh, see Section VII,
Construction Standards: Expanded Metal Mesh Specifications.
C. Ceilings:
1. When walls are being constructed using the CMU method described above in
II.B.2, and they do not extend to the true ceiling and a suspended (false) ceiling
is created, the suspended (false) ceiling must be reinforced with a 9-gauge
expanded metal to serve as the true ceiling. When expanded metal is used, it
must overlap the adjoining walls and be secured in such a manner that removal
will show evidence of tampering.
(a) When metal studs are used to construct the walls, the expanded metal
must be spot welded at 6-inch intervals to the framing of the side panels
so that any attempted removal will show evidence of tampering.
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(b) When wooden studs are used to construct the walls, the expanded metal
must be securely anchored to the stud with stainless steel screws and
washers. The screws shall be no less that 3 inches in length and installed
at no more than 6-inch intervals.
3. When the walls of an area do extend from slab to slab and a false ceiling is
added it is not necessary to reinforce the false ceiling.
D. Floors:
1. For new construction, floors will consist of reinforced concrete with a minimum
thickness of 8 inches. The concrete mixture will have a minimum compressive
strength of at least 3,000 psi. Reinforcement will be accomplished with 2 grids
of #5 rebar, a minimum of 5/8-inch diameter, positioned centrally and spaced
horizontally and vertically 6 inches on center; rods will be tied or welded at
intersections.
E. Doors/Door Hardware:
1. Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal or of single
solid core wood, 1 ¾ inches thick, and hung in 12-gauge hollow metal frames.
3. Double doors must have one door secured with flush mount bolts at the top and
the bottom. Astragals (overlapping molding, preferably metal) must be used to
inhibit access to lock bolts.
4. Perimeter door hinge pins that are located outside the office area must be non-
removable (peened, pinned, or spot welded). If the door swings outward, hinge
side protection in the form of a dowel-pin and socket is required. Refer to Figure
2 of Appendix 7.6: Doors and Door Hardware for details. All perimeter doors must
have a commercial grade pneumatic door closer and an anti-pry strip installed to
prevent the door from being pried open.
5. All door hardware (e.g., hinges, lock hardware) must be secured to door frame
with stainless steel screws at least 3 inches long.
6. For additional information on Doors and Door Hardware, refer to Appendix 7.6.
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F. Windows:
G. Miscellaneous Openings:
1. Where vents, ducts, registers, sewers, tunnels and other miscellaneous openings
are of such size and shape (in excess of 96 inches square) and enter or pass
through the area as to permit unauthorized entry, they should be protected with
either steel bars or wire mesh grills. If bars are used, they should be at least 3/8-
inch diameter hardened steel, welded vertically and horizontally, six inches on
center. If grilles are used, they must be of 9-gauge woven wire mesh.
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V. References
• Expanded Metal Manufacturers Association, EMMA 557-99, Standards for Expanded
Metals
• National Concrete Masonry Association
• Customs and Border Protection Lock Hardware Requirements
• GSA Advantage (Manufacturers)
• GSA Schedule
VI. Graphics
Figure 1: Strongroom Wall Detail - 9-Gauge Expanded Metal Mesh
1. Expanded metal mesh shall meet ASTM F1267-89 type, Class 1 standard and
shall have the following characteristics:
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(f) Dimensions: 3.20 inch maximum (long opening) (LWD) and 1.33 inch
maximum (short opening) (SWD); and
B. Mesh shall be fastened to steel stud and top and bottom runners using either screw
or weld attachment. Screws or weld shall be spaced at 6” on center maximum, with
all corners fastened to the framing. Mesh splice shall occur at studs only. Splice
between supports is not permitted unless: a) such splice is welded continuously top
to bottom; b) mesh is overlapped three inches, and fastened or welded every six
inches.
E. Welds shall be 1/8” x ½” long fillet type excepting at unsupported splices where the
weld must be continuous.
F. There can be no gap in coverage. Gaps may be closed with steel studding or flat
metal welded (or fasted where welding is not permitted) to the secure side of the
expanded metal.
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1. The Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is an essential part of the physical security
system. As defined in the United Facilities Criteria (UFC) UFC 4-021-02NF, an
IDS consists of the combination of electronic components, including sensors,
control units, transmission lines, and monitoring units integrated to be capable of
detecting one or more types of intrusion into a protected area.
B. Uses of IDS
1. IDS can include both interior and exterior systems. These are utilized to provide:
(a) The earliest practical warning of any attempted penetration into protected
areas;
(e) A substitute for other physical security measures that cannot be used
because of safety issues, operational requirements, building layout, cost
or similar issues.
D. To maximize the effectiveness of an IDS, the design should utilize both the
“Protection In-Depth” (tiered defensive system) principle and the concept of
complementary devices. Protection In-Depth first identifies an asset requiring
protection and then configures layers of unbroken defensive rings protecting that
item. The first detection layer is located at the outermost defensive rings necessary
to provide the required delay needed to timely stop the aggressor.
(a) A control unit used to arm/disarm the system as well as edit system
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1. Alarms are used to detect approach or intrusion. Some are intended for exterior
protection, and some are suitable only for indoor installations. The following
should be addressed in determining the need for an alarm system:
(a) It is important to remember that this technique is not infallible. Each type
of device still retains its inherent weakness. A determined intruder with
the proper intelligence, resources and capabilities can still bypass/defeat
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this type of setup by analyzing the composition of the total system and
then developing a response to each individual device. In this example
the intruder bridges the fence without touching it, landing as closely as
possible to the microwave transmitter where the cone of protection is the
smallest. Then, depending upon the construction of the microwave, the
intruder can either climb onto and over the transmitter or crawl underneath
its cone of protection.
3. Choosing the proper system, installing it correctly, and routine maintenance are
also very important issues concerning the effectiveness of the IDS.
C. Sensors
1. The three basic types of sensors are perimeter, volumetric, and proximity. The
following are general definitions and each will be covered more in depth in
attached interior and exterior use sections.
(a) Perimeter. Perimeter protection is the first line of defense. The most
common points for sensors are doors, windows, vents and skylights.
These may be protected, with detectors sensing their opening or breaking.
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(c) Proximity. Object protection provides direct security for individual items.
1. Exterior sensors without frequent and proper maintenance are prone to false/
nuisance alarms which can result in a lack of confidence in these devices. In
addition, because of the harsh environmental conditions in which they function,
they generally are more expensive than comparable interior sensors. These
same environmental conditions can influence the detection capabilities of these
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(a) Rain and snow can reduce the viewing distances of CCTV cameras
and can potentially create a gap in coverage. Conversely, these same
environmental conditions can increase the likelihood of intruder detection
by having the rain or snow impact raise the “irritation” factor of the device
close to the threshold alarm level. The result is a reduced window of
opportunity for the intruder to exploit.
2. One advantage exterior sensors have over interior sensors is that the exterior
devices are left in the secure mode at all times offering no opportunity for the
intruder to disable the device when the system is disarmed.
V. Exterior Fences
A. Planning
1. Studies have shown that fences and walls provide less than 15 seconds of
penetration resistance. They do serve to accomplish one or more of the following
functions. They serve the purpose of being a demarcation line indicating the
perimeter dimensions of the protected area. They also serve as a debris catcher,
especially in a two-fence system, minimizing the potential of false alarms caused
by stray animals, blowing branches, papers, etc. (In a two fence system, the
interior fence is used for detection purposes and to provide some delay.) This
barrier also causes an intruder to overtly declare his intentions to violate the
protected area. The exterior fence line can also serve as a platform for CCTV
cameras and can with the proper adjustments have IDS devices attached.
B. Installation
1. Perimeter sensors are normally installed directly on the fences, walls, or gates.
Penetration attempts (such as climbing, cutting, or lifting) generate mechanical
vibrations and stresses in fence fabric and posts that are usually different than
those caused by natural phenomena like wind and rain. In general, if the fence is
part of the IDS system it is activated in one of two ways -by touch, or a threshold
change in the fence’s electric field or capacitance. The emanation field projects
approximately 6 feet (3 feet on each side of the fence) from the fence.
(a) The U.S. Navy’s Interim Technical Guidance (ITG) 03-3, Entry Control
Facilities.
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1. Strain-Sensitive Cable
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2. Taut-Wire Sensor
3. With sensors that use mechanical switches as detectors, the switches in a single
sensor-post assembly are wired in parallel and are connected directly to the
alarm-annunciation system. Pulse-count circuitry is not used because a single
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switch closure, such as that caused by an intruder moving or cutting one wire,
is indicative of an intrusion attempt. Strain-gauge detectors in a sensor post
are monitored by a signal processor. When the signal from one or more strain
gauges satisfies the processor’s criteria, an alarm is triggered.
(a) Fiber-optic cable sensors are functionally equivalent to the strain sensitive
cable sensors previously discussed. However, rather than electrical
signals, modulated light is transmitted down the cable and the resulting
received signals are processed to determine whether an alarm should
be initiated. Since the cable contains no metal and no electrical signal
is present, fiber-optic sensors are generally less susceptible to electrical
interference from lightning or other sources.
6. Electric-Field Sensors
(b) Several different field- and sense-wire configurations are available. They
range from one field wire and one sense wire to as many as four field
wires and one sense wire or four field wires and four sense wires. Figure
4 shows the detection pattern produced by vertical three-wire (one field
and two sense wires) configurations. The three-wire system has a wider
detection envelope and is less costly (one less field wire and associated
hardware). However, because of the tighter coupling between wires,
the four-wire system is less susceptible to nuisance alarms caused by
extraneous noise along the length of the zone.
(c) A signal processor monitors the signals produced by the sense wires. The
processor usually contains a band-pass filter that rejects high-frequency
signals such as those caused by objects striking the wires. Additional
criteria that must be satisfied before the processor initiates an alarm
include signal amplitude and signal duration. By requiring the signal to be
present for a preset amount of time, false alarms (such as those caused
by birds flying through the detection pattern) can be minimized.
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8. Buried-Line Sensors
(b) The ported-coax cable sensor consists of two coax cables buried in
the ground parallel to each other. A radio frequency (RF) transmitter is
connected to one cable and a receiver to the other. The outer conductor
of each cable is ported (fabricated with small holes or gaps in the shield).
The transmitter cable radiates RF energy into the medium surrounding
the cables. A portion of this energy is coupled into the receiver cable
through its ported shield. (Because of the ported shields, these cables are
frequently referred to as leaky cables.) When an intruder enters the RF
field, the coupling is disturbed, resulting in a change of signal monitored
by the receiver, which then generates an alarm.
(c) Two basic types of ported-coax sensors are available: pulse and
continuous wave.
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(e) Although usually buried in soil, ported cables can also be used with
asphalt and concrete. If the asphalt or concrete pavement area is relatively
small and only a few inches thick (such as a pedestrian pavement
crossing the perimeter), the ported cables can be routed under the
pavement. However, for the large and deep pavements, slots must be cut
into the asphalt or concrete to accept the cable.
(a) The LOS sensors, which are mounted above ground, can be either active
or passive. Active sensors generate a beam of energy and detect changes
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(b) A bistatic system uses a transmitter and a receiver that are typically
separated by 100 to 1,200 feet and that are within direct LOS with each
other. The signal picked up by the receiver is the vector sum of the directly
transmitted signal and signals that are reflected from the ground and
nearby structures. Detection occurs when an object (intruder) moving
within the beam pattern causes a change in net vector summation of
the received signals, resulting in variations of signal strength. The same
frequency bands allocated by the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) for interior microwave sensors are also used for exterior sensors.
Because high-frequency microwave beams are more directive than low-
frequency beams and the beam pattern is less affected by blowing grass
in the area between the transmitter and the receiver, most exterior sensors
operate at the next to highest allowable frequency, 10.525 gigahertz
(GHz). The shape of the microwave beam and the maximum separation
between the transmitter and the receiver are functions of antenna size
and configuration. Various antenna configurations are available, including
parabolic-dish arrays, strip-line arrays, and slotted arrays.
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(a) Infra-red (IR) sensors are available in both active and passive models.
An active sensor generates one or more near-IR beams that generate an
alarm when interrupted. A passive sensor detects changes in thermal IR
radiation from objects located within its field of view.
(b) The signal processor usually provides an adjustable window that can be
positioned anywhere on the video image. Available adjustments permit
changing the window’s horizontal and vertical sizes, its position, and its
sensitivity. More sophisticated units provide several adjustable windows
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(c) The use of video motion-detection systems for exterior applications has
been limited, primarily because of difficulties with uncontrolled exterior
environments. Lighting variations caused by cloud movement and
shadows of slow-moving objects, birds and animals moving within the
camera’s field of view, camera motion and moving vegetation during windy
conditions, and severe weather conditions have traditionally caused a
multitude of unwanted alarms in this type of system. Systems using more
advanced signal-processing algorithms have improved motion-detection
capability and nuisance-alarm rejection; however, they are still subject to
high unwanted-alarm rates under certain conditions and should be used
with due caution and extreme care.
C. Structural-Vibration Sensors
D. Glass-Breakage Sensors
1. Glass-breakage sensors detect the breaking of glass. The noise from breaking
glass consists of frequencies in both the audible and ultrasonic range. Glass-
breakage sensors use microphone transducers to detect the glass breakage. The
sensors are designed to respond to specific frequencies only, thus minimizing
such false alarms as may be caused by banging on the glass.
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F. Detection Transducer
G. Ultrasonic Sensors
1. Passive ultrasonic sensors detect ultrasonic energy that results from the
breaking of glass, the snipping of bolt cutters on metal barriers, the hissing of
an acetylene torch, and the shattering of brittle materials (such as concrete
or cinderblock). However, the sensors will not reliably detect drilling through
most material nor attacks against soft material such as wallboard. Their
effective detection range depends largely on the barrier material, the method of
attempted penetration, and the sensitivity adjustment of the sensor. Examples of
maximum detection distances for a typical sensor for different types of attempted
penetration are shown in Table 1.
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1. Balanced magnetic switches (BMS) are typically used to detect the opening of
a door. These sensors can also be used on windows, hatches, gates, or other
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structural devices that can be opened to gain entry. When using a BMS, mount
the switch mechanism on the door frame and the actuating magnet on the door.
Typically, the BMS has a three-position reed switch and an additional magnet
(called the bias magnet) located adjacent to the switch. When the door is closed,
the reed switch is held in the balanced or center position by interacting magnetic
fields. If the door is opened or an external magnet is brought near the sensor in
an attempt to defeat it, the switch becomes unbalanced and generates an alarm.
A BMS must be mounted so that the magnet receives maximum movement
when the door or window is opened. Figure 11 shows several configurations for
mounting BMS.
I. Grid-Wire Sensors
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1. Volumetric motion sensors are designed to detect intruder motion within the
interior of a protected volume. Volumetric sensors may be active or passive.
Active sensors (such as microwave) fill the volume to be protected with an
energy pattern and recognize a disturbance in the pattern when anything
moves within the detection zone. Whereas active sensors generate their own
energy pattern to detect an intruder, passive sensors (such as IR) detect energy
generated by an intruder. Some sensors, known as dual technology sensors, use
a combination of two different technologies, usually one active and one passive,
within the same unit. If CCTV assessment or surveillance cameras are installed,
video motion sensors can be used to detect intruder movement within the area.
Since ultrasonic motion sensors are seldom used, they will not be discussed
here. See FM 3-19.30, Physical Security, for further information.
1. Interior microwave motion sensors are typically monostatic; the transmitter and
the receiver are housed in the same enclosure (transceiver). They may each be
provided with a separate antenna or they may share a common antenna. The
high-frequency signals produced by the transmitter are usually generated by a
solid-state device, such as a gallium arsenide field-effect transistor. The power
generated is usually less than 10 milliwatts, but it is sufficient to transmit the
signal for distances up to about 100 feet. The shape of the transmitted beam is
a function of the antenna configuration. The range of the transmitted beam can
be controlled with a range adjustment. A variety of detection patterns can be
generated (see Figure 12). The frequency of the transmitted signal is compared
with the frequency of the signal reflected back from objects in the protected area.
If there is no movement within the area, the transmitted and received frequencies
will be equal and no alarm will be generated. Movement in the area will generate
a Doppler frequency shift in the reflected signal and will produce an alarm if the
signal satisfies the sensor’s alarm criteria. The Doppler shift for a human intruder
is typically between 20 and 120 hertz (Hz). Microwave energy can pass through
glass doors and windows as well as lightweight walls or partitions constructed of
plywood, plastic, or fiberboard.
2. As a result, false alarms are possible because of the reflection of the microwave
signals from the movement of people or vehicles outside of the protected area.
The designer can sometimes take advantage of this when the protected area is
large and contains a number of partitions.
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1. Passive Infrared (PIR) motion sensors detect a change in the thermal energy
pattern caused by a moving intruder and initiate an alarm when the change in
energy satisfies the detector’s alarm criteria. These sensors are passive devices
because they do not transmit energy; they monitor the energy radiated by the
surrounding environment.
2. All objects with temperatures above absolute zero radiate thermal energy. The
wavelengths of the IR energy spectrum lie between 1-1,000 microns. Because
the human body radiates thermal energy of between 7-14 microns, PIR motion
sensors are typically designed to operate in the far IR wavelength range of 4-20
microns.
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O. Dual-Technology Sensors
2. Also, ultrasonic and microwave motion sensors have the highest probability
of detecting movement directly toward or away from the sensor, whereas PIR
motion sensors have the highest probability of detecting movement across the
detection pattern. Therefore, the DP of sensors combined in a single unit is less
than that obtainable if the individual sensors are mounted perpendicular to each
other with overlapping detection patterns. Because of the lower false alarm rate,
the reduced DP can be somewhat compensated for by increasing the sensitivity
or detection criteria of each individual sensor.
1. Point sensors are used to protect specific objects within a facility. These sensors
(sometimes referred to as proximity sensors) detect an intruder coming in close
proximity to, touching, or lifting an object. Several different types are available
including capacitance sensors, pressure mats, and pressure switches. Other
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C. Monitoring
2. FPS has designed and built four Mega-Centers to provide monitoring and
related services. These centers are located in Suitland, Maryland; Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania; Battle Creek, Michigan; and Denver, Colorado. Among other tasks,
these centers monitor intrusion/duress alarm systems, fire detection systems,
environmental systems, and elevator emergency telephones for multi-regional
areas. In order to take full advantage of the Mega-Centers’ IDS monitoring
capabilities, FPS mandates that all installations and upgrades of the IDS in
both leased and government facilities are standardized on a national basis, are
fully compatible with the standardized alarm-receiving equipment existing in the
Mega-Centers, and are capable of being remotely programmed with software
from the approved panel manufacturers.
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3. A national decision was made that FPS would only recommend and support
alarm systems that fully interfaced with the control center’s equipment and
software. Therefore, FPS requires that only remote-programmable alarm systems
are specified when designing or upgrading alarm systems that are monitored at
the Mega-Center. Additionally, all remote-programmable alarm systems must be
able to easily communicate with the Mega-Centers’ monitoring equipment.
5. All alarm systems/IDS must have tampered devices, cabinets, and junction
boxes. All devices will report as one point as a zone description that can be used
when reporting an alarm condition to the responding authority.
6. FPS cannot monitor any alarm system that does not fully comply with the above
referenced criteria. If a system does not meet these criteria, either the customer
or GSA shall assume the cost of commercial monitoring.
8. All IDS shall be installed in accordance with UL Guidelines for Burglary Intrusion
Detection Systems. The Security System installer/vendor must properly complete
and communicate the FPS Mega-Center Alarm Requirements (MAR) Document
to the respective FPS Mega-Center. The MAR document includes the following
information:
Detection System, and until the IDS system is 100% operational and being
actively monitored by the respective FPS Mega-Center.
10. The installed IDS shall be fully integrated with the Security Management System
and be capable of having all alarm situations simultaneously report to both the on
site Security Management System and the FPS Mega-Center.
11. FPS cannot monitor any alarm system that does not fully comply with the above
referenced criteria or does not have an active dedicated analog phone line for
each alarm panel installed. Therefore, it is imperative that there is no deviation
from the IDS requirements listed above.
2. Scroll down to, and click on, “14 Physical Security Enhancement Equipment”;
C. To request the complete IDS Handbook, follow this link to the SAVER Document
Request Form. Enter your e-mail address and choose the format for the document
(e-mail, mailed CD, or mailed hard copy). This link leads only to the request form
for the full IDS Handbook. To view the project highlights or assessment summary
documents, follow the instructions above.
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I. Hold Rooms
A. General
1. A hold room is a secure facility for the detention of aliens encountered and
processed by operational components of CBP.
2. The hold room is used for detainees and is located within the access-controlled
secure and violator processing area. All access control equipment will be HSPD-
12/FIPS 201 compliant systems and will only be installed by approved GSA
Schedule 70 vendors.
5. The nature and circumstances of detentions are governed by existing CBP policy,
including CBP Directives No. 3340-030 and 3340-030B:
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(b) Males and females must be kept in separate hold rooms (including
juveniles)
(a) Interview Rooms must be located adjacent to the hold rooms, and either
within or outside a secure perimeter zone. They must be under 24X7
surveillance and detainees are required to be secured with handcuffs. If
located within the violator processing area, the interview room must have
the same construction criteria as the hold room. Asylum seekers must be
placed in a separate interview room.
(b) Search Rooms must be located adjacent to hold rooms within a secure
perimeter zone. It has the same specifications as a hold room, except
there are no windows, toilets and floor drains.
(c) Alien Property Storage Rooms must be located within a security perimeter,
securely constructed for high attack resistance and they require a door
lock and an Intrusion Detection System.
(a) The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) requires that public and
common use toilet facilities must be accessible to the disabled. The
following provisions apply to hold rooms:
●● A grab bar must be installed inside the toilet stall designated for the
disabled.
●● The toilet stall and toilet fixture must have the proper dimensions.
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C. “Medium” security walls shall be constructed using one of the following methods:
1. Concrete masonry unit walls shall be a minimum nominal 8” (200 mm) wide units
reinforced with #4 (No. 13 metric) vertical reinforcing bar at 16” (400 mm) on
center. All cells of concrete masonry units shall be fully grouted with 3,000 psi (21
Mpa) grout.
4. Steel wall panels shall be 0.093 in. (12-gauge) minimum thickness A-60
galvanneal steel conforming to ASTM A 653-CS requirements. All structural
or stiffening members shall be 0.058 in. (16-gauge) minimum thickness A-60
galvanneal steel conforming to ASTM A 653-LFQ requirements. All structural
tubing stall be 0.115 in. (11-gauge) minimum thickness steel conforming to ASTM
A 653-CS and ASTM A-525, G-90 galvanized requirements.
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1. Cast-in-place concrete slabs shall be a minimum of 6” (150 mm) thick, 3,000 psi
(21 Mpa) concrete with #4 (No. 13 metric) reinforcing bars at 16” (400 mm) on
center in one direction. Cast-in-place concrete slabs that are less than 6” (150
mm) thick, but no less than 4” (100 mm) thick shall have a minimum strength of
5,000 psi (35 Mpa) reinforced with W4 (MW26) welded wire fabric at 4” (100 mm)
on center in both directions.
2. Composite metal ceiling shall be a minimum of 4” (100 mm) total depth, 3,000
psi (21 Mpa) concrete, #4 (No. 13 metric) bars 16” (400 mm) on center in one
direction.
3. Prestressed concrete tees or hollow core slabs shall have a concrete topping to
give adequate cover for #4 (No. 13 metric) bars 16” (400 mm) on center in one
direction.
4. Solid concrete planks shall have #4 (No. 13 metric) reinforcing bars at 16” (400
mm) on center in one direction. No concrete topping is required.
5. Metal acoustical ceiling panel shall be maximum security double skin metal
0.125” (3.2 mm) thick with perforations.
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II. LAYOUT
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B. Security bars must be continuous at all intersections; the bars must go around the
corners and continue into adjacent slabs or secure ceiling construction. When this
cannot be accomplished, a continuous #4 (No. 13 metric) reinforcing bar shall be
cast no more than 1 ½” (38 mm) from the edge of the concrete unit where it meets
other concrete or masonry members. These requirements must be coordinated with
masonry horizontal reinforcing, and dissimilar concrete materials; i.e. masonry and
cast-in-place concrete.
1. Penetrations
(a) Security barriers are required on all penetrations in “high” and “medium”
secure walls, floors, and ceilings where opening is larger than 8” x 8”
(200 mm x 200 mm) or larger than 5” (125 mm) slit. Security barriers are
required on all penetrations 5” (125 mm) wide which exceed 24” (600 mm)
in length.
(b) Security barriers shall be constructed of 7/8” (22 mm) diameter round bars
or 2” x 2” x ¼” (50 mm x 50 mm x 6 mm) structural steel tubing. Space
between bars or tubing shall not exceed 5” (125 mm). Bars longer than
24” (600 mm) shall be reinforced with an intermediate flat bar, 2 ½” x 3/8”
(63.5 mm x 9.5 mm), welded to the barrier frame and tack welded to each
bar. The flat stock is installed perpendicular to the bars and at the midpoint
of the bars to prevent spreading.
2. Windows
(a) The preferred location for hold rooms is an interior space without an
exterior window.
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(b) All exposed fasteners shall have countersunk, vandal-proof heads. Three
silencers on strike jamb of frame and three wall anchors per jamb at hinge
and strike levels.
(c) Door width – 3 feet 2inches for masonry opening. The door must be
detention hollow metal 2 inches thick in flush panel design. It must be
mortised, reinforced, drilled, and tapped to receive mortise hardware.
Provide institutional, full mortise hinges with tamper-resistant fasteners
and non-removable pins. Provide four hinges for doors 85 inches or more
tall and 37 inches wide.
(f) Doors should swing out of hold room and a door pull should be placed on
the door face outside the hold room.
(g) Access doors located inside the hold room must meet the security
requirements of the trades needing access to concealed equipment.
Provide 2 inch exposed flange around the perimeter frames installed in
masonry and finished frames with adjustable metal masonry anchors.
Install a concealed piano hinge set to open 175 degrees. Furnish two keys
per lock. Standard access doors may be used when located outside the
hold room.
4. Door Hardware
(b) Hinges: 41/2” X 41/2”, minimum 3 per door, heavy duty ball bearing type
with tamper-resistant screws and non-removable pins.
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(c) Locks: Locks shall be detention dead bolt, heavy duty, mortised (MOGUL
Key on One Side) mechanical with ADA compliant lever handles; except
where suicide resistance is warranted, a substitute cone-shape handle
may be used. Locks with interchangeable cores are acceptable (obtain
approval from COTR and Using Agency). It must deadlock in both locked
and unlocked positions.
(d) Door Pull: Raised pull on outside of door. Pushplate not required on inside
face.
(e) Door Stops/Wall Bumpers: Dome type 13/8” high or as required to meet
applicable conditions.
IV. Plumbing
A. General
1. When possible, all plumbing fixtures shall be wall-mounted and securely fastened
from the rear. This requires an accessible pipe chase in the back of the fixture.
Valves and flow controls must be accessible to provide service from the pipe
chase without disturbing the connecting piping. Install water service valve in all
water lines (hot and cold) to the fixture. Each water closet of each back-to-back
pair of water closets shall be provided with an accessible cleanout.
3. All fixtures must be totally vandal-proof. There can be no attachments to the wall
that can be fashioned into weapons.
5. Drainage from hold rooms shall be isolated from that of other areas until passing
through a trash trap.
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(a) Within holding rooms a combination water closet and lavatory units shall
be a minimum of 12 or 14-gauge, Type 304 stainless steel with satin finish.
Construction shall be welded with no seams.
(b) Toilet shall be blowout jet type with an elongated bowl, self-draining
flushing rim, and an integral contoured seat with a sanitary high polish
finish.
(c) Countertop shall have a self-draining soap dish. Fixture shall be “off the
floor” type.
(e) Where required for handicapped accessibility, special ADA units may
be used or separate stainless steel fixtures. Where these fixtures are
replacing existing toilets, most manufacturers produce “replacement”
fixtures which allow the use of custom floor outlet locations.
(a) Within holding rooms where combination units are not used, water closets
shall be a minimum of 12 or 14-gauge, Type 304 stainless steel with satin
finish. Construction shall be seamless welded.
(b) Toilet shall be blowout jet type with an elongated bowl, self-draining
flushing rim, and an integral contoured seat with a sanitary high polish
finish.
(c) Fixture shall be wall mounted at ADA height. Fixtures withstand 3,000 lb.
loadings without permanent damage.
(d) Flush valve shall be concealed and serviced from the rear. Where these
fixtures are replacing existing toilets, most manufacturers produce
“replacement” fixtures which allow the use of custom floor outlet locations.
(a) Within holding rooms where combination units are not used, lavatories
shall be 14-gauge, Type 304 stainless steel and ADA compliant.
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(d) Pneumatic or electronic push button controls shall be used and mounted
at ADA compliant height. Where these fixtures are replacing existing
lavatories, most manufacturers produce “replacement” fixtures which allow
the use of custom drain outlet locations.
4. Floor Drains
(a) Floor drains shall be cast iron with bronze grates and vandal resistant
fasteners. Floor drains shall be not less than 4 inches in diameter.
(c) Installation of all floor drains shall be closely coordinated with the
structural design of the building.
(d) The floor surface shall slope in all directions toward the floor drain.
(e) The screws holding the cover shall be ground down and filled with lead.
5. Hose Bibbs
(a) Provide a recessed, stainless steel hose bibb box with a locking cover,
outside the hold room for routine cleaning of the floor.
6. Security Mirrors
(a) Mirrors shall be 20 gauge chrome-plated steel with 1/2 inch thick
fiberboard backing.
7. Sprinkler System
(a) Sprinkler heads in hold rooms shall be coordinated with the building
sprinkler system.
(b) The hold room system shall be isolated from the building system with a
shut off valve, clearly labeled, serving the hold room zone.
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V. Mechanical Systems
A. Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning
1. Registers and grilles shall be designed and constructed specifically for use in
correction and detention facilities. The face shall be fabricated using cold rolled
steel, 3/16” thick steel face with 5/16” diameter holes on 7/16” staggered centers.
A 3/16” thick steel sleeve shall be stitch welded to the face and along the entire
length of all sleeve seams. All shall meet or exceed ANSI or ASTM Standard
Specifications for Detention Area Use.
2. Provide barrier grilles within all ducts penetrations in walls of hold rooms where
one dimension is larger than 5” (125 mm) and the other dimension is larger than
8” (200 mm). Barrier grilles shall also be placed within all ductwork to and from
rooftop air handling equipment.
VI. Electrical
A. General
1. The electrical system required for hold rooms shall be coordinated with the
building’s electrical system. The following will be the basis for the electrical
system design:
(b) Light fixtures are to be controlled from outside the hold rooms with a high-
security key-operated switch.
(c) Electrical outlets, light switches or thermostats shall not be placed inside
hold rooms.
B. Lighting
1. Hold Rooms must have maximum-security type ceiling surface mounted light
fixtures. They are described below:
(a) Housing, back, and door shall be 14-gauge steel with continuous exterior
welds that are ground smooth and reinforced at the corners. The housing
shall have a continuous steel piano hinge spot-welded and bolted to door
frame for hinged door or spot welded to housing and back for hinged
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housing. The hinge pin shall be welded to hinge to prevent removal. Grind
all welds smooth. Outer lens shall be 0.375” clear polycarbonate backed
with an inner lens of 0.125” prismatic polycarbonate. Lens retention to
be by means of continuous 14 gauge L-angle along lens for length of
lens opening. The inside and outside of housing shall be white polyester
powder paint, 1.4 to 1.7 mil thick, with minimum reflectance of 85%. Cell
illumination level is to be a minimum of 215 lux (20 foot candle) throughout
the entire cell area. Particular attention shall be given to providing the 215-
lux illumination level at the desk level and in the personal grooming area.
VII. Power
1. Emergency Generation
(a) Emergency power shall be derived from a 480/277 volt, 3-phase, 4-wire
diesel engine driven generator sent sized to carry the required loads,
along with a second, equally-sized generator for back-up.
(b) The generators shall serve distribution panel boards in the main electrical
room through a 4-pole automatic transfer switch (ATS). This emergency
system shall provide power for the life safety/security systems and other
essential loads upon failure of the normal electrical power service for a
minimum of 72 hours continuous operation prior to re-fueling.
●● Security equipment
●● Emergency lighting
●● Alarm systems
●● Communications equipment
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(a) Uninterruptible power supplies (UPS) shall be provided for all security
system components. The UPS shall be sized to provide backup power
for the full load of the security system for a minimum period of ten (10)
minutes.
(b) This system is designed to handle all security systems in the event of a
primary power loss until such time as the emergency generator takes over.
3. Power Outlets
(b) For cleaning and other activities, cords can be run in from the corridors.
(a) All communication, video, and data equipment shall be protected against
surges induced on all control, communication, video, sensor and data
cables.
(b) All cables and conductors that serve as control, audio, video, sensor or
data conductors that leave the building (including devices mounted on
building exterior) shall have surge protection circuits. Fuses shall not be
used for surge protection.
(c) All systems and components shall be equipped with lightning protection
devices. Lighting protection system shall be designed to meet the
requirements of NFPA 780.
(a) A complete CATV system shall be provided, which will include all devices,
cable, splitters, line taps, equipment, and conduit from each CATV outlet
to the location of the CATV interior backboard with extension of conduit
to location of satellite dish. CATV system shall be star typology with each
outlet connected to head-end equipment with the drop cable. System
shall provide high quality TV signals to all outlets with a return path for
interactive television and cable modem access. Downstream bandwidth
shall be 50 – 750 MHz minimum. Upstream bandwidth shall be 5 – 40
MHz minimum.
(b) Each termination for a TV receiver must have a minimum signal level of
0 decibel millivolts (dBmV) (1000 microvolt) at 55 MHz and 0 dBmV (100
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(a) Provide electric power for door locks, where required by design, by
extending a conduit from the control room through the hold room ceiling,
extending to a point above the door. Locks must be on battery backup
emergency power and emergency generator power.
(b) Provide panic buttons in hold rooms with a disable high-security key
or switch from outside the hold rooms. The button should be a large
mushroom design.
2. Due to the critical nature of these facilities, contractors who perform the
electronic security work must be pre-qualified to meet requirements such as:
4. Prior to final acceptance of the systems, the electronic security contractor shall
provide evidence of system tests, complete documentation manuals, and shall
conduct training in the use of the systems.
B. CCTV: Fixed CCTV camera with motion detection capability, detention grade
housing and wide-angle lens. Connect to monitor at secondary waiting / processing
counter or in secondary supervisor’s office (if included) or other CBP designated
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location. Position the camera to observe activity in room, but not degrade privacy
afforded by toilet area modesty screen. Do not mount over fixtures in room.
C. Duress System: Provide detention grade duress alarm button interior side adjacent
to entry door with keyed reset / disable control outside of room. Connect to CCC
(CBP Coordination Center) and / or other CBP designated locations as required.
D. Access Control: See Section II.B.3, Doors and Frames for access requirements.
E. For large detention facilities, refer to the Technical Specifications, Section 13800
of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Processing Center Detention
Construction Standards, dated 01 November 2004.
2. U.S. Customs and Border Protection Airport Technical Design Standards 2006
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507 of 890
AppCCTV
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I. General
A. The CCTV system is a core subsystem of an overall Electronic Security System
(ESS). It is the collection of cameras, recorders, switches, keyboards, and monitors
that allow viewing and recording of security events. The CCTV system is normally
integrated into the overall ESS and centrally monitored at the Dispatch Center.
Uses of CCTV systems for security services include several different functions as
described below.
1. Surveillance
(a) CCTV cameras can be used to give a viewer the capability to be made
aware of or view visual events at multiple locations from a centralized
remote viewing area. CCTV camera technology makes visual information
available that would normally only be available through multiple (possibly
roving) human resources.
2. Assessment
3. Deterrence
4. Evidentiary Archives
6. Facial Recognition
7. Intrusion Detection
(a) CCTV cameras when employed with video content analysis or motion path
analysis software and equipment are increasingly being used as a means
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1. Requirements
1. Requirements
(a) All cable, except fiber optic cable, used for sync or video signal
transmission shall include protective devices to safeguard the CCTV
equipment against surges. The surge suppression device shall not
attenuate or reduce the video or sync signal under normal conditions.
The surge suppression device shall be capable of dissipating not less
than 1500 watts for 1 millisecond, and the response time from zero volts
to clamping shall not be greater than 5 nanoseconds. Fuses shall not be
used for surge protection.
1. Requirements
(a) All cables and conductors, except fiber optic cables, which serve as
communication, control, or signal lines shall be protected against surges
and shall have surge protection installed at each end. Protection shall
be furnished at the equipment and additional triple electrode gas surge
protectors rated for the application on each wire line circuit shall be
installed within 1 m 3 feet of the building cable entrance. Fuses shall not
be used for surge protection.
1. Requirements
(a) A power line conditioner shall be furnished for the security console CCTV
equipment. The power line conditioner used for the CCTV equipment
shall be the same one as provided for Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
ESS. The power line conditioner shall be of the ferro-resonant design,
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●● At 85-percent load, the output voltage shall not deviate by more than
plus or minus 1 percent of nominal when the input voltage fluctuates
between minus 20 percent to plus 10 percent of nominal;
●● During load changes of zero to full load, the output voltage shall
not deviate by more than plus or minus 3 percent of nominal. Full
correction of load switching disturbances shall be accomplished within
5 cycles, and 95 percent correction shall be accomplished within 2
cycles of the onset of the disturbance.
F. Environmental Conditions
1. Field Equipment
(a) The cameras and all other field equipment shall be rated for continuous
operation under ambient environmental conditions of minus 10.0 to 55
degrees C 14 to 120 degrees F using no auxiliary heating or cooling
equipment. Equipment shall be rated for continuous operation under the
ambient environmental temperature, humidity, wind loading, ice loading,
and vibration conditions specified or encountered for the installed location.
3. Hazardous Environment
4. Electrical Requirements
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(a) All electrical and electronic equipment in the console shall be powered
from an UPS provided as specified in Section 26 32 33.00 10
Uninterruptible Power Supply (Ups) System Above 15 Kva Capacity. The
UPS shall be sized to provide at least 6 hours battery back-up in the event
of primary failure. Batteries will be of the sealed non-gassing type.
NOTE: All Security equipment will connect to the emergency backup generator.
B. Manufacturers’ Data
1. The data package shall include manufacturers’ data for all materials and
equipment and security center equipment provided.
1. The data package shall include complete system descriptions, analyses and
calculations used in sizing the equipment required. Descriptions and calculations
shall show how the equipment will operate as a system to meet the performance.
The data package shall include the following:
D. Software Data
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(a) The data package shall consist of descriptions of the operation and
capability of system and application software as specified.
1. The data package shall include all manufacturer’s reliability data and calculations
required to show compliance with the specified reliability. The calculations shall
be based on all CCTV equipment associated with one camera circuit and the
console CCTV equipment, excluding the data transmission media (DTM).
F. Certifications
G. Site Conditions
1. The project security consultant shall verify that site conditions are in agreement
with the design package. The CBP project manager shall submit redline
drawings/report to the project security consultants documenting changes to the
site, or conditions that affect performance of the system to be installed. For those
changes or conditions which affect system installation or performance, provide
(with the report) specification sheets, or written functional requirements to
support the findings, and a cost estimate to correct the deficiency.
1. A draft copy of the operation and maintenance manuals shall be delivered to the
Government prior to beginning the performance verification test for use during
site testing.
I. Data Entry
1. The contractor shall enter all data needed to make the system operational;
2. The contractor shall deliver the data to the Government on data entry forms,
utilizing data from the contract documents, Contractor’s field surveys, and all
other pertinent information in the contractor’s possession required for complete
installation of the data base. The contractor shall identify and request from the
Government, any additional data needed to provide a complete and operational
CCTV system. The completed forms shall be delivered to the Government for
review and approval at least 90 days prior to the contractor’s scheduled need
date.
J. Graphics
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The contractor shall create and install all required graphics needed to make the system
operational. Graphics shall have sufficient level of detail for the system operator to assess the
alarm. The contractor shall supply hard copy, color examples at least 8-by-10 inches in size,
of each type of graphic to be used for the completed CCTV system. If the video switcher does
not use a monitor for display of system information, the contractor shall provide examples of
the video annotation used for camera identification. The graphics examples shall be delivered
to the Government for review and approval at least 90 days prior to the contractor’s scheduled
need date.
K. Technical Data Package
1. The functional design manual shall identify the operational requirements for
the system and explain the theory of operation, design philosophy, and specific
functions. A description of hardware and software functions, interfaces, and
requirements shall be included for all system operating modes.
M. Hardware Manual
N. Software Manual
1. The software manual shall describe the functions of all software, and shall
include all other information necessary to enable proper loading, testing and
operation, including:
2. Operator’s Manual
(a) The operator’s manual shall explain all procedures and instructions for
operation of the system including:
O. Maintenance Manual
1. The maintenance manual shall describe maintenance for all equipment including
inspection, periodic preventive maintenance, fault diagnosis, and repair or
replacement of defective components.
P. As-Built Drawings
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1. The contractor shall perform pre-delivery testing, site testing, and adjustment
of the completed CCTV system. The contractor shall provide all personnel,
equipment, instrumentation, and supplies necessary to perform all testing.
(a) Written notification of planned testing shall be given to the project security
consultants at least 14 days prior to the test and in no case shall notice be
given until after the contractor has received written approval of the specific
test procedures.
(a) Test procedures shall explain, in detail, step-by-step actions and expected
results demonstrating compliance with the requirements. Test reports shall
be used to document results of the tests. Reports shall be delivered to the
Government within 7 days after completion of each test.
B. Training
1. The contractor will conduct training courses for designated personnel in the
maintenance and operation of the procured CCTV system as specified in the
procurement contract and in the “owners” manual.
(a) The training will be oriented to the specific system procured and installed
under the contract;
(b) Training manuals will be delivered for each trainee, along with three
additional manuals delivered: two (2) manuals for archiving at the project
site and one (1) manual for the procurement office;
●● Class agenda;
(c) Where the contractor presents portions of the course through the use of
audio-visual material, copies of the audio-visual materials will be delivered
to the Government, either as a part of the printed training manuals or on
the same media as that used during the training sessions.
4. Approval for the training content and class scheduled will be obtained from the
Government by the vendor no less than 30 days prior to the training.
C. Operator Training
1. Course training:
(a) The course shall be taught at the project site for five consecutive training
days during or after the contractor’s field testing and government
acceptance of the system;
(c) No part of the training given during this course will be counted toward
completion of the performance verification test;
●● Classroom instruction;
●● Hands-on training;
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(a) Prepare and insert additional training material in the training manuals
when the need for additional material becomes apparent during
instruction;
(c) List in the report the times, dates, attendees and material covered at each
training session;
(d) Describe the skill level of each student at the end of this course; and
(e) Submit the report before the end of the performance verification test.
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D. Training Documentation
1. Lesson plans and training manuals for the training phases shall be delivered for
approval. These will include type of training to be provided, along with a sample
training report and a list of reference material.
1. The contractor will provide all services required and equipment necessary to
maintain the entire CCTV system in an operational state as specified for a period
of 1 year after the manufacturer’s factory warranty period, and shall provide all
necessary material required for the work. Impacts on facility operations shall be
minimized when performing scheduled adjustments or other unscheduled work.
The vendor will provide a quote for an extended warranty.
B. Description of Work
1. The adjustment and repair of the CCTV system includes all computer equipment,
software updates, signal transmission equipment, and video equipment. Provide
the manufacturer’s required adjustments and all other work necessary.
C. Personnel
D. Schedule of Work
2. This work shall be performed during regular working hours, Monday through
Friday, excluding legal holidays;
(a) Conduct visual checks and operational tests of the CPU, switcher,
peripheral equipment, interface panels, recording devices, monitors, video
equipment electrical and mechanical controls, and a check of the picture
quality from each camera;
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(b) Run system software and correct all diagnosed problems; and
E. Emergency Service
1. The Government will initiate service calls when the CCTV system is not
functioning properly. Qualified personnel shall be available to provide service
to the complete CCTV system. The Government shall be furnished with a
telephone number where the service supervisor can be reached at all times.
Service personnel shall be at the site within 24 hours after receiving a request for
service. The CCTV system shall be restored to proper operating condition within
3 calendar days after receiving a request for service.
F. Operation
1. The contractor will keep records and logs of each task, and shall organize
cumulative records for each major component and for the complete system
chronologically. A continuous log will be maintained for all devices.
2. The log shall contain calibration, repair, warranties, serial number, bar code data,
installation date, major repair dates, and programming data. Complete logs shall
be kept and shall be available for inspection on site, demonstrating that planned
and systematic adjustments and repairs have been accomplished for the CCTV
system.
3. Work Requests
(a) The contractor shall separately record each service call request, as
received. The form shall include the serial number identifying the
component involved, its location, date and time the call was received,
nature of trouble, names of the service personnel assigned to the task,
instructions describing what has to be done, the amount and nature of
the materials to be used, the time and date work started, and the time
and date of completion. The contractor shall deliver a record of the work
performed within 5 days after work is completed.
H. System Modifications
parameters and control settings, shall be made without prior approval of the
Government. Any modifications made to the systems shall be incorporated into
the operations and maintenance manuals, and other documentation affected.
2. Software
(a) The contractor will recommend all software updates, including middleware
if needed to allow multiple processes running on one or more machines to
interact across a network, to the Government for approval. Upon approval,
updates will be:
3. Operation in the system will be verified and incorporated into the operations and
maintenance manuals, and software documentation. There shall be a minimum
of one scheduled update near the end of the first year’s warranty period, at which
time the contractor will install and validate the latest released version of the
manufacturer’s software.
B. Soldering
C. Enclosures
1. The contractor shall provide metallic enclosures as needed for equipment not
housed in racks or supplied with a housing. The enclosures shall be as specified
or shown.
D. Interior
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E. Exposed-to-Weather
2. Corrosion-Resistant
F. Wiring
(a) All wiring will be marked in accordance with industry standards and
correlate with the wiring diagram.
3. Locks shall be either a round-key type, with three dual, one mushroom, and three
plain pin tumblers; or conventional key type lock having a combination of five
cylinder pin and five-point three position side bar; and
4. Keys shall be stamped “U.S. GOVT. DO NOT DUP.” The locks shall be so
arranged that the key can only be withdrawn when in the locked position. All
maintenance locks shall be keyed alike and only two keys shall be furnished for
all of these locks.
B. Key-Lock-Operated Switches
C. System Integration
1. When the CCTV system is installed in conjunction with an IDS, the CCTV system
shall be interfaced to the IDS and shall provide automatic, alarm-actuated call-up
of the camera associated with the alarm zone. Equipment shall be supplied with
all adapters, terminators, cables, mainframes, card cages, power supplies, rack
mounts, and appurtenances as needed.
VIII. Cameras
A. Solid State Cameras
(b) Lighting ratios of 5:1 or less (highlight to shadow ratio) will ensure shadow
detail in the video picture;
(c) All electronic components and circuits shall be solid state; and
(a) The camera shall have a solid state imager, and the picture produced by
the camera shall be free of blemishes. The camera shall provide not less
than 550 lines of horizontal resolution, and resolution shall not vary over
the life of the camera.
3. Sensitivity
(a) Camera shall provide full video output with the infrared cut-off filter
installed, without camera automatic gain, and a scene reflectance of 75
percent using an f/1.2 lens giving a camera faceplate illumination at 2850K
of 1.0 lx 0.1 foot candle.
4. Connectors
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(a) Cameras with lenses having auto iris, manual iris, or zoom and focus
functions shall be supplied with connectors and wiring as needed for
lens operation. Video signal output connector shall be a Bayonet Neill-
Concelman (BNC) connector. Cameras with integral fiber optic video
transmitters shall have straight-tip bayonet type fiber optic video output
connectors. I.P. cameras may utilize fiber or RJ45 connectors.
5. Automatic Circuits
(a) The camera shall have circuitry to establish a reference black level, and
an automatic white clipper and automatic gain control circuits.
(a) An interior dome camera system shall be provided with integral camera
installed and integrated into the dome housing;
(b) The camera shall meet the requirements of paragraph VII Cameras as
specified; and
(c) The dome housing shall be nominally 160 mm 6 inches and shall be
furnished in a pendant mount or ceiling mount as shown. The lower
dome shall be tinted acrylic and shall have a light attenuation factor of
not more that 1 f-stop. The housing shall be equipped with integral pan/
tilt complete with wiring, wiring harnesses, connectors, receiver/driver,
pan/tilt control system, pre-position cards, or any other hardware and
equipment as needed to provide a fully functional pan/tilt dome. The pan/
tilt shall be permanently lubricated. The motors shall be thermally or
impedance protected against overload damage. Pan movement shall be
360 degrees and tilt movement shall not be less than plus and minus 90
degrees. Pan speed shall not be less than 20 degrees per second, and
tilt speed shall not be less than 10 degrees per second. There shall not
be less than 64 preset positions, with positioning speeds of at least 360
degrees per second in the automatic mode, and not less than 120 degrees
pre second in the manual positioning mode, with a positioning accuracy
of plus or minus 1/2 degree. Each set of preset position data shall include
auto focus, auto iris, pan, tilt, and zoom functions. The system shall be
able to automatically scan between any two electronically-set limits, and
shall be able to operate in the “tour” mode covering up to all presets in a
user defined sequence. The dome system shall withstand temperature
ranges from minus 10 to 50 degrees C minus 22 to 122 degrees F over a
humidity range of 0 to 90 percent, non-condensing. Pan movement shall
be 360 degrees and tilt movement shall not be less than plus and minus
90 degrees. Pan speed shall not be less than 20 degrees per second, and
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(a) An exterior dome camera system shall be provided with integral camera
installed and integrated into the dome housing. The camera shall
have a minimum horizontal resolution of 425 lines (color) or 500 lines
(monochrome);
(b) The dome housing shall be nominally 160 mm 6 inches and shall be
furnished in a NEMA 4 pendant mount, pole mount, ceiling mount, surface
mount, or corner mount as shown. The housing shall be constructed to
be dust and water tight, and fully operational in 100 percent condensing
humidity. The housing shall be equipped with supplementary camera
mounting blocks or supports as needed to position the specified camera
and lens to maintain the proper optical centerline. All electrical and signal
connections required for operation of the camera and lens shall be
supplied. The housing shall protect the internal drives, positioners, and
camera from the environment encountered for camera operation;
(c) The lower dome shall be tinted acrylic and shall have a light attenuation
factor of not more than 1 f-stop. An integral heater, sized to maintain the
lower dome above the dew point, shall be part of the camera system. The
housing shall be equipped with integral pan/tilt complete with wiring, wiring
harnesses, connectors, receiver/driver, pan/tilt control system, pre-position
cards, or any other hardware and equipment as needed to provide a fully
functional pan/tilt dome. The pan/tilt shall be permanently lubricated.
The motors shall be thermally or impedance protected against overload
damage; and
(d) Pan movement shall be 360 degrees and tilt movement shall not be less
than plus and minus 90 degrees. Pan speed shall not be less than 20
degrees per second, and tilt speed shall not be less than 10 degrees per
second. There shall not be less than 99 preset positions, with positioning
speeds of at least 360 degrees per second in the automatic mode, and
not less than 120 degrees pre second in the manual positioning mode,
with a positioning accuracy of plus or minus 1/2 degree. Each set of
preset position data shall include auto focus, auto iris, pan, tilt, and zoom
functions. The system shall be able to automatically scan between any
two electronically-set limits, and shall be able to operate in the “tour” mode
covering up to all presets in a user defined sequence. The dome system
shall withstand temperature ranges from minus 40 to 50 degrees C
minus 40 to 122 degrees F over a humidity range of 0 to 90 percent, non-
condensing. When designing CCTV surveillance, consideration needs to
be given to lost coverage within the camera sweep field-of-view when the
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C. Camera Lenses
1. Camera lenses shall be all glass with coated optics. The lens mount shall be
a C or CS mount, compatible with the cameras selected. The lens shall be
supplied with the camera, and shall have a maximum f-stop opening of f/1.2 or
the maximum available for the focal length specified. The lens shall be equipped
with an auto-iris mechanism unless otherwise specified. Lenses having auto
iris, manual iris, or zoom and focus functions shall be supplied with connectors,
wiring, receiver/drivers, and controls as needed to operate the lens functions.
Lenses shall have sufficient circle of illumination to cover the image sensor
evenly. Lenses shall not be used on a camera with an image format larger than
the lens is designed to cover. Lens focal lengths shall be as shown or specified in
the manufacturer’s lens selection tables.
2. The housing shall be equipped with a sunshield, and both the housing and the
sunshield shall be white. A mounting bracket which can be adjusted to center
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the weight of the housing and camera assembly shall be provided as part of the
housing.
1. The housing shall be designed to provide a tamper resistant enclosure for indoor
camera operation. The housing shall be equipped with tamper proof latches, and
shall be supplied with the proper mounting brackets for the specified camera and
lens. The housing and appurtenances shall be a color that does not conflict with
the building interior color scheme.
G. Interior Mount
1. The camera mount shall be suitable for either wall or ceiling mounting and shall
have an adjustable head for mounting the camera. The wall mount and head
shall be constructed of aluminum or steel with a corrosion-resistant finish. The
head shall be adjustable for 360 degrees of pan, and not less than 90 degrees of
tilt.
1. A tamperproof ceiling housing shall be provided for the camera. The housing
shall be low profile and shall be suitable for replacement of 610 by 610 mm, 2
by 2 foot ceiling tiles. The housing shall be equipped with a camera mounting
bracket and shall allow a 360-degree viewing setup.
1. An interior dome housing shall be provided for each camera as shown. The dome
housing shall be a pendant mount, pole mount, ceiling mount, surface mount,
or corner mount as shown. The lower dome shall be black opaque acrylic and
shall have a light attenuation factor of not more that 1 f-stop. The housing shall
be equipped fixed or integral pan/tilt complete with wiring, wiring harnesses,
connectors, receiver/driver, pan/tilt control system, pre-position cards, or any
other hardware and equipment as needed to provide a fully functional pan/tilt
dome. The pan/tilt shall be permanently lubricated. The motors shall be thermally
or impedance protected against overload damage. Pan movement shall be 360
degrees and tilt movement shall not be less than plus and minus 90 degrees.
Pan speed shall not be less than 20 degrees per second, and tilt speed shall not
be less than 10 degrees per second.
1. An exterior dome housing shall be provided for each camera as shown. The
dome housing shall be a pendant mount, pole mount, ceiling mount, surface
mount, or corner mount as shown. The housing shall be constructed to be
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dust- and water-tight, and fully operational in 100 percent condensing humidity.
The housing shall be equipped with supplementary camera mounting blocks
or supports as needed to position the specified camera and lens to maintain
the proper optical centerline. All electrical and signal connections required for
operation of the camera and lens shall be supplied. The housing shall provide
the environment needed for camera operation The lower dome shall be black
opaque acrylic and shall have a light attenuation factor of not more that 1 f-stop.
The housing shall be equipped with fixed or integral pan/tilt complete with
wiring, wiring harnesses, connectors, receiver/driver, pan/tilt control system,
pre-position cards, or any other hardware and equipment as needed to provide
a fully functional pan/tilt dome. The pan/tilt shall be permanently lubricated. The
motors shall be thermally or impedance protected against overload damage. Pan
movement shall be 360 degrees and tilt movement shall not be less than plus
and minus 90 degrees. Pan speed shall not be less than 20 degrees per second,
and tilt speed shall not be less than 10 degrees per second.
1. There are lengths most commonly used for wall mounts. The exterior camera
wall mount will be in the range of 16, 24 or 36 inches long, and shall have
an adjustable head for mounting the camera. If another length is required,
the person responsible for the installation should review catalogs of CCTV
equipment manufacturers to find a mount in current production that will fulfill
the requirement. The wall mount and head shall be constructed of aluminum,
stainless steel, or steel with a corrosion-resistant finish. The head shall be
adjustable for not less than plus and minus 90 degrees of pan, and not less than
plus and minus 45 degrees of tilt. If the bracket is to be used in conjunction with a
pan/tilt, the bracket shall be supplied without the adjustable mounting head, and
shall have a bolt-hole pattern to match the pan/tilt base.
1. The pan/tilt mount shall be capable of supporting the camera, lens and
housing specified. If the pan/tilt is to be mounted outdoors, the pan/tilt shall
be weatherproof, and sized to accommodate the camera, lens and housing
weight plus maximum wind loading encountered at the installation site. Pan/tilt
shall be permanently lubricated. The motors shall be thermally or impedance
protected against overload damage. Pan movement shall not be less than 0 to
350 degrees; tilt movement shall not be less than plus and minus 90 degrees.
Pan speed shall not be less than 6 degrees per second, and tilt speed shall not
be less than 3 degrees per second. The pan/tilt shall be supplied complete with
wiring, wiring harnesses, connectors, receiver/driver, pan/tilt control system, pre-
position cards, or any other hardware and equipment as needed to provide a fully
functional pan/tilt mount to fulfill the site design requirements. Pan movement
shall be 360 degrees and tilt movement shall not be less than plus and minus 90
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degrees. Pan speed shall not be less than 20 degrees per second, and tilt speed
shall not be less than 10 degrees per second.
Figure 2: Fixed-camera field-of-view
M. Explosion-Proof Housing
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1. All electronic components and circuits shall be solid state except for the
picture tube. The monitor shall have a stabilized high voltage power supply,
and regulated low voltage power supplies. The monitor shall have automatic
frequency control (AFC) and horizontal resolution not less than 420 lines at
the center of the picture tube. The number of lines in the video produced by
the security camera is a measure of picture resolution (sharpness). The larger
the number of lines, the better the resolution and hence, overall picture quality.
Over 380 Lines is generally considered good resolution while over 700 lines is
considered high resolution. The video input shall allow switchable loop-through
or 75 ohm termination. The monitor shall have circuitry for automatic degaussing.
The monitor shall operate on 50/60 Hz, and shall be capable of operating at a
voltage of 105 to 130,205 to 240 AC Volts;
B. Controls
1. Front panel controls shall be provided for power on/off, horizontal hold, vertical
hold, contrast, and brightness. The monitor shall have switchable DC restoration.
D. Video Switcher/Controller
1. The switcher shall conform to CEA 170 specifications, and shall be a vertical
interval switcher. Electronic components, subassemblies, and circuits of the
switcher shall be solid state. The switcher shall be microprocessor based and
software programmable. The switcher shall be a modular system that shall allow
for expansion or modification of inputs, outputs, alarm interfaces, and secondary
control stations by addition of the appropriate modules. Switcher components
shall operate on 120V or 230V, 50/60 Hz. The switcher central processor unit
shall be capable of being interfaced to a master security computer for integrated
operation and control. The video switcher central processing unit (CPU) shall
have the capability of accepting time from a master clock supplied in ASCII
format through a TIA-232-F input. All components, modules, cables, power
supplies, software, and other items needed for a complete and operable CCTV
switching system shall be provided. Switcher equipment shall be rack mounted
unless otherwise specified.
E. Switcher Software
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1. The switcher shall be software programmable, and the software shall be supplied
as part of the switcher. The software shall be installed in the switcher CPU,
and shall be configured as required by the site design. Changes or alterations
of features under software control shall be accomplished through software
programming without changes in hardware or system configuration. The switcher
shall retain the current program for at least 6 hours in the event of power loss,
and shall not require reprogramming in order to restart the system.
1. An alarm interface shall be furnished with the switcher. The interface shall be
compatible with the ESS alarm annunciation system. The alarm interface shall
monitor alarm closures for processing by the switcher CPU or video server. Alarm
Inputs may be configured for supervised or unsupervised mode. See Figure 3 for
an example of an ESS display dimensions;
2. Alarm inputs to the alarm interface shall be relay contact or through other
interface. The alarm interface shall be modular and shall allow for system
expansion. The alarm interface to be installed at the site shall be configured to
handle 64 alarm points, and shall have an expansion capability of not less than
25 percent. An output shall be provided to actuate a video recorder.
1. The switcher response time shall not be greater than 200 milliseconds from
the time the alarm is sensed at the switcher alarm interface, until the picture is
displayed on the monitor. The switcher shall continue to process subsequent
alarms and shall display or place them in a queue. The operator shall be able to
view the alarms in queue by operating an alarm release function which switches
the subsequent alarms to the monitor in the order of occurrence.
1. Control and programming keyboards shall be supplied for the video switcher or
video server at the security station, and control keyboards shall be supplied for
any control/monitoring stations as shown. The control keyboard shall provide the
interface between the operator and the CCTV system, and shall relay commands
from the operator to the switcher CPU. The keyboard shall provide control of
the video switcher functions needed for operation and programming of the video
switcher. Controls shall include, but not be limited to: programming the switcher,
switcher control, lens function control, pan/tilt/zoom (PTZ) control, control of
environmental housing accessories, and annotation programming. If the switcher
CPU requires an additional text keyboard for system management functions, the
keyboard shall be supplied as part of the video switcher.
1. The video switcher shall be equipped with signal distribution units, preposition
cards, expansion units, cables, software or any other equipment needed to
ensure that the CCTV system is complete and fully operational;
(a) Video signal input and output shall be by BNC connectors, fiber
connectors, or RJ45 connectors.
J. Video Annotation
1. Video annotation equipment shall be provided for the video switcher. The
annotation shall be alphanumeric and programmable for each video source.
Annotation to be generated shall include, but not be limited to: individual
video source identification number, time (hour, minute, second) in a 24-hour
format, date (month, day, year), and a unique, user-defined title with at least 8
characters. The annotation shall be inserted onto the source video so that both
shall appear on a monitor or recording. The lines of annotation shall be movable
for horizontal and vertical placement on the video picture. The annotation shall
be automatically adjusted for date. Programmed annotation information shall be
retained in memory for at least 4 hours in the event of power loss.
1. A digital video recorder (DVR) is a device that records video in a digital format
to a disk drive or other medium. DVR CCTV system provides a multitude of
advanced functions over VCR technology including video searches by event,
time, date and camera. There is also much more control over quality and frame
rate allowing disk space usage to be optimized and the DVR can also be set to
overwrite the oldest security footage should the disk become full. In some DVR
security systems remote access to security footage using a PC can also be
achieved by connecting the DVR to a Local Area Network (LAN) network or the
internet;
(a) 16 channels, minimum of 120 ips/fps capture card, to provide no less than
7.5 images per second, per camera;
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(b) Ability to view images directly from the DVR, onto the monitor; if a
multiplexer or live display card is needed, it should be included;
(d) Installed server remote software and include remote access software, with
unlimited licenses, so it can be viewed in the field via the network;
(f) Rack mount chassis with adequate cooling for both DVR and Raid (locking
model with keys if PC based);
(h) Enough memory installed to allow for recording, playback, etc. without
skipping/delays/errors, etc. due to low memory problems;
(i) Internal storage with enough capacity to store 2 images per second x 16
cameras x 7 days minimum, with the largest picture size possible, in case
of RAID failure;
(j) External RAID 5 (distributes parity among the drives) storage with enough
capacity to store 2 images per second x 16 cameras x 30 days minimum
with the largest picture size possible. All hard drives must be rated to
withstand continuous use in a RAID environment;
(k) Include a keyboard, video, mouse (KVM) switch to share the keyboard,
monitor, and mouse between the RAID and DVR (if PC based);
(l) 3-year complete warranty on parts and labor - onsite service included OR
advance replacement shipped overnight prior to return of defective unit
and a 30 day “no questions asked” return policy.;
(m) The DVR(s) shall operate on 100-230 VAC ±10%, 50/60 Hz. The signal
system shall be NTSC/PAL with an adjustable recording resolution from
320x240 to 704x480m; and
(n) The DVR(s) shall be a high-resolution unit with a minimum of thirty (30)
days recording capability of all channels.
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(a) The ground loop corrector shall eliminate the measured ground loop
interference (common mode voltage) in wire line or coaxial video
transmission lines. The ground loop corrector shall pass the full
transmitted video bandwidth with no signal attenuation or loss. Clamping
ground loop correctors shall be capable of rejecting at least an 8 volt peak-
to-peak 60 Hz common mode signal. Ground isolation transformers shall
be capable of rejecting at least a 10-volt peak-to-peak 60-Hz common
mode signal. Ground isolation amplifiers shall be capable of rejecting
at least a 30-volt peak-to-peak 60-Hz common mode signal. Differential
ground loop correctors shall be capable of rejecting at least a 100-volt
peak-to-peak 60-Hz common mode signal.
(a) The video distribution amplifier shall have four independent video outputs
from a single video input. The video distribution amplifier shall have solid-
state circuitry consisting of four identical video amplifiers in parallel provide
four equal 75-ohm loads, which allow the video outputs to be viewed
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the incoming electronic signal lines and AC power line. The pole shall
have a weatherproof, AC power service outlet that is surge protected and
has a ground fault interruption device. Separate circuit breakers shall be
provided for camera AC power and service outlet AC power.
(a) The pan/tilt mounting pole shall be a straight steel or aluminum pole. The
pole shall be (manufactures specifications) m/feet high and shall have a
mounting plate at the top for the pan/tilt. The pole and mounting plate shall
have a corrosion-resistant finish. The mounting plate shall have a bolt hole
pattern to match the base of the pan/tilt to be mounted on the pole. Under
maximum loading, the total pole deflection shall not exceed 0.1 of one
degree. A cable conduit shall be provided from the base of the pole to the
mounting plate of the pan/tilt. The conduit shall be sized to accommodate
all wiring needed for the camera and pan/tilt.
XII. Accessories
A. The designer will provide a drawing showing the amount of rack space needed
for the rack mounted CCTV equipment, and placement of the equipment in the
rack. Coordinate the CCTV equipment rack layout in conjunction with the ESS
rack mounted equipment. Standard 482.6 mm 19 inch electronic rack cabinets
conforming to CEA-310-E shall be provided for the CCTV system at the security
center and remote control/monitoring sites as shown.
gauge wire, so long as the cable meets the specified testing standards. When
used as a patch cable, Cat-6 is normally terminated in 8P8C modular connectors.
Cat-6 connectors are made to higher standards that help reduce noise caused
by crosstalk and system noise installed in metal conduit to preclude damage; the
conduit shall be sized to accommodate all wiring.
1. Video Multiplexer
(a) The video multiplexer shall be a multi-channel record and playback system
with the capability of color real time multi-screen viewing. Electronic
components, sub assemblies, and circuits of the multiplexer shall be
solid state. The multiplexer, using time division multiplexing, shall permit
up to 16 camera inputs to be recorded simultaneously on a single video
cassette recorder (VCR). All 16 camera inputs shall be capable of being
viewed on a video monitor either live or recorded. The multiplexer shall
allow for viewing of either live video or input from the DVR/VCR (Simplex
Operation). The multiplexer shall allow for simultaneous viewing, recording
playback, and multiplexing (Duplex Operation). The inputs shall be
capable of simultaneous viewing on the monitor or full screen individually
and in other multi-screen modes such as 2x2, 3x3, 4x4 or other
configurations. The viewing format shall also permit 2x dynamic zoom
capability, full screen. The multiplexer shall be compatible with EIA/NTSC/
PAL video cameras. External camera synchronization shall not be required
for proper operation of the video multiplexer. Control of all functions of the
multiplexer shall be provided either by a full function keyboard or by push-
button selection with on-screen menu driven set-up. The multiplexer shall
retain the current program for at east 6 hours in the event of power loss.
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The video multiplexer will have a built-in video loss detection that alerts
the operators or technicians of camera failure. Logical camera numbering
provides the ability to assign any camera number to the physical input. An
integral color bar generator allows the user to adjust monitor settings.
2. Predelivery Testing
(a) General
●● The contractor shall provide the equipment needed for the test setup
and shall configure it to provide alarm actuated camera call-up and
alarm recording as required to emulate the installed system. The test
setup shall consist of at least 4 complete camera circuits. The alarm
signal input to the CCTV test setup shall be by the same method that
is used in the installed system. The video switcher shall be capable of
switching any camera to any monitor and any combination of cameras
to any combination of monitors;
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vii. Pan/tilt mount and pan/tilt controller if the installed system includes
cameras on pan/tilt mounts;
viii. Any ancillary equipment associated with a camera circuit such as
equalizing amplifiers, video loss/presence detectors, terminators,
ground loop correctors, surge protectors or other in-line video
devices; and
ix. Cabling for all components.
2. Scroll down to, and click on, “14 Physical Security Enhancement Equipment”;
C. To request the complete CCTV Technology Report, fill out the SAVER Document
Request Form. Enter your e-mail address and the format in which you’d prefer to
receive the document – e-mail, mailed CD, or mailed hard copy. This link leads
only to the request form for the full CCTV Technology Report. To view the project
highlights or assessment summary documents, follow the instructions above.
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I. General
A. Armories provide space within the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
law enforcement and detention facilities for the storage, issuance, and upkeep
of weaponry, ammunition, and chemical agents. Armory spaces can include the
issuing area, weapons maintenance area, ammunition storage area, and sensitive
equipment storage.
B. Armories shall be located where the entrance is under the direct visual control of a
manned post with the entrance not being visible to the public. If the armory is located
in a facility with secure detention areas, the armory shall be accessible through a
secure vestibule or sally port to prevent either detained individuals or individuals
from the outside from accessing the armory. Armory doors and issues windows will
be monitored by closed-circuit television (CCTV).
B. The armory needs to be divided into separate areas with a secure area or safes for
high-powered and fully automatic weapons. The armory may have a separate space
for chemical storage with its own 100% exhaust ventilation. The armory shall also
have a separate area for issuing and servicing weapons. This area will be located
outside the primary vault perimeter in a vestibule at the front of the armory. Access
to the armory shall be through this vestibule by authorized individuals. Figure 1 is an
example of an armory layout.
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C. Provide a counter area for cleaning and servicing weapons. Weapons can generate
hazardous residue through the lead contaminates from firing. The areas provided
for the cleaning and care of weapons shall allow for the proper cleanup and disposal
of any materials that become contaminated with lead. Safe storage shall also be
provided for the solvents and equipment used in the cleaning process.
D. Building mechanical rooms and emergency generators shall not be located directly
contiguous with armory rooms to avoid any sparks ignition of inventory.
Figure 1: Armory Layout
1. New construction
(a) For new construction, armory walls shall be constructed to meet Class
M – 15-minute attack resistance as defined in ASTM F 1247 Standard
Specifications for Intrusion Resistant Generic Vault Structures.
(b) Formed concrete walls (Figure 2) will be a minimum of 8 inches wide and
poured with concrete that has compression strength of 3000 psi. Formed
concrete walls will extend from slab to slab and will be reinforced with
either 2 grids of #5 rebar (5/8-inch) spaced at 4 inches on center or 2 grids
of 9 gauge expanded metal. Reinforcing must be firmly anchored to the
structural decks.
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2. Existing Construction
(a) For existing structures with limited floor loading capability, other wall
construction may be considered. For existing walls (Figure 3), a layer of
steel plate of 1/4-inch thickness may be added. The steel plate must be
firmly anchored with steel supporting members at 16 inches on center
that are secured to building structural members. All seams shall be
continuously welded.
B. Floors
1. Armories may receive inventory for a full year at one time. This can impose a
substantial amount of weight on the armory floor. The inventory stored in the
armory combined with the armory construction and furnishings, can exceed
the allowable structural floor load capacity of existing buildings or the loading
limit required by code for business occupancies. The dead (building material
weight) and live (imposed weight of storage items) loads must be calculated for
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each armory installation to assure that the structure is adequate to support the
inventory and also meet code requirements.
2. For existing structures that have floor load limitations, careful consideration
of armory construction must be taken to reduce, to the most feasible extent
possible, the dead loads created by partitions. To control concentrated live loads
under these conditions, shelving heights must be limited to that supportable by
the structure, and signs must be posted limiting the height that material may be
stacked. If possible, the floor and structural frame shall be further reinforced to
increase the load capacity.
3. Armory floors must be designed to resist entry from cavities above ceilings and
walls.
5. For armories installed on existing floors with less than 8 inches of reinforced
concrete; an additional layer of 1/4-inch metal plate shall be placed over the floor.
(All seams and joints need to be continuously welded.)
6. Floors shall be finished with anti-static material and have an oil- and solvent-
resistant finish. Flooring must be resistant to impacts from dropped items or
heavy pallets.
C. Ceilings
1. The ceiling shall be designed to thwart entry into the vault area with equivalent
protection as provided by the partitions. The armory may either have an
exposed ceiling with the structural deck above providing the secure barrier or a
constructed ceiling creating a plenum between the ceiling and the structural deck
above. When the surrounding armory partitions are secure to the structural deck
above, the constructed ceiling does not have to be a secure element and may be
a standard suspended acoustical tile ceiling system. For constructed ceilings that
form part of the secure enclosure of the armory, ceilings may either be exposed
reinforced concrete, pre-cast concrete, reinforced plaster, or a metal ceiling
system.
2. Formed concrete ceilings will consist of 8-inch concrete, reinforced with two grids
of #4 rebar placed on 4-inch centers or two grids of 9-gauge expanded metal.
Concrete shall have compression strength of 3000 psi. Reinforcing must be firmly
anchored to the surrounding walls.
3. Pre-cast concrete ceilings may consist of standard concrete “T” members with
minimum flange dimensions of 6 inches. Pre-cast concrete members must be
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7. Provide access panels, with dead bolt keyed locks in constructed ceilings, to
plenum space above the ceiling. The access panel must be of 1/4-inch steel
plate. Non-removable hinges shall be located on the inside of the armory. Provide
a dead bolt lock keyed from the bottom side of the access panel. The lock shall
be protected from tampering on the outside by a 1/4-inch metal plate. The access
panel frame shall be 1/4-inch steel.
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D. Doors
1. Armories will be fitted with GSA Class 5-A vault doors as defined in Federal
Specification AA-D-600D.
2. Each vault door furnished by contract or order under Federal Specification AA-D-
600D shall bear metallic labels as specified below.
(e) Identification label. An identification label shall be affixed to the inside face
of the door frame. The label shall show the door model and serial number,
date of manufacture, and Government contract number.
(f) Certification label. A certification label shall be affixed to the inside face of
the door bearing the following certification:
(g) This is a U.S. Government Class 5-A vault door which has been tested
and approved by the Government under Federal Specification AA-D-600.
It affords the following security protection:
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(h) The protection certified above applies only to the door and not to the vault
proper.
(i) Number label. All vault doors shall have a number label securely affixed to
the front face. Regardless of the method used, the label attachment shall not
degrade the door security. The label shall be mounted on the door frame,
above or to the left side of the door. The label shall be nominal 0.5 mm thick,
satin finished aluminum and shall be 63-65 mm by 17-20 mm. The label
numbering system shall be established by the manufacturer to provide non-
repetitive numbers. The label numbers shall be not less than 4.5 mm high and
shall be embossed.
(j) New vault door construction may be 3/8-inch metal front face with a 14-gauge
thick back face, and an overlapping lip covering the frame joint (Figure 6).
3. Large vaults that may receive pallet shipments of ammunition can be equipped with
double leaf entrance vault doors. The doors shall be constructed to GSA Class 5-A
Standards and an astragal will be provided between the two leafs. The inactive leaf
will have dead bolts keyed from the inside of the armory that engage the head and
sill of the door frame. The active leaf will be equipped as per a single leaf vault door,
with door leaf lips overlapping jamb joints and combination locks.
E. Door Frames
2. The frame and door shall be mounted so that there will not be more than 3 mm
clearance between the door and the door frame. The frame shall be designed so that
when attached to the wall, the wall clamping bolts will be exposed only on the inside
of the vault. The frame shall have leveling and adjusting screws to compensate for
building sag which may occur at any time in the future; and
3. The frames and locks will be securely installed to prevent removal of the frame or
disengagement of the lock from outside the vault area by welding to a continuous
steel imbed with a minimum 6-inch Neilson stud imbedded in a formed concrete
partition (Figure 6).
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F. Door Hardware
1. Locks
(b) The lock’s dial ring shall be mounted so as to be flush to the surface
of the door. The attachment of the dial ring shall be firm and secure
without movement or side play. The lock case shall be firmly and securely
attached to the door by suitable and effective means to prevent movement
or side play to the lock case. The lock shall not be modified in any manner
from the formation supplied by the lock manufacturer, except that the
spindle may be cut to proper length.
2. Hinges. The door shall be mounted to the frame by not less than two anti-friction
bearing hinges, so designed to allow the door to be opened approximately 180
degrees. The hinges shall be removable from the outside;
3. Door stop. A door stop to prevent the door’s face hardware from striking wall
surfaces will be installed. The stop shall be designed to be wall mounted unless
otherwise specified. The stop shall be able to withstand hard usage and shall not
scratch or scar the door’s painted finish when the door is swung open against it;
4. Door striker. The door shall have a striker on both the front and hinged edges to
minimize play or shake in the door when in the locked condition. The fit of the
door to the striker on both the front and hinged edges shall be such that there is
not more than 1 mm play or shake in the door when the bolts are thrown to the
locked position;
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5. Door threshold. The door threshold shall be designed to provide a ramp at the
door threshold of approximately 1/4-inch to permit free swing of the door after its
installation. If receptive cups, ports, or grooves are used, they shall be recessed
not less than 1/2-inch below the bolt in its extended position to prevent dirt or
other substances from obstructing the locking mechanism.
1. For new construction, armories shall have no windows or other access openings
directly inside of the armory;
2. For existing construction with windows or openings, they must be protected with
Class IV ballistic resistant glazing and a tool resistant barrier grille with screening
to prevent direct views into the armory;
3. Any opening directly from the armory larger than 96 sq. in. shall be protected by
the following barriers:
(b) All ducts, piping, and wiring conduits passing through the walls, ceiling,
or floor of the vault will pass through snug fitting sleeves at the time of
construction; and
(c) All minor openings between pipes, conduit, and sleeves will be caulked.
4. Issuing windows will have an overhead roll-up metal shutter, coiling grille and
stainless steel counter (Figure 8).
(a) Manual operation with overhead counter-balance device. The shutter shall
consist of flat slats formed from 14-gauge stainless steel with stainless
steel end blocks welded to each end of alternate slats. The bottom of the
shutter will be reinforced with a stainless steel angle. (Provide proper
mounting members to meet building construction requirements.);
(c) The shutter will be equipped with bars that cross the door from jamb
to jamb and prevent any movement of the door. The bars shall rest
in brackets welded to the jambs and have a locking hasp to prevent
unauthorized removal of the bars;
(d) Provide slide bolt locks on the coil side of shutters with hasps suitable for
a high security padlock;
(e) Provide neoprene resilient type seals located along the jamb edges,
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(f) For additional protection, provide a coiling grille which will open from the
inside. A pocket will be provided on one side to stack the grilles and on
the other side the locking device needs to be concealed, secured, and not
accessible to the outside.
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1. Armories will be equipped with a minimum of a fire and smoke detection alarm
system plus a sprinkler fire suppression system. The fire alarm system will
provide notification to emergency response agencies. Specific requirements
include the following:
(b) Fire and smoke detection sensors must be present in every area of the
armory.
1. All CBP armory locations will have intrusion detection systems to protect
against unauthorized access. These systems will include: sensors; control units;
transmission lines; and monitoring units integrated to be capable of detecting all
breaches in security;
2. The system shall report directly to an alarm monitoring station, either on-site or
off-site for unmanned facilities. Security systems will also activate an audio signal
at the armory;
3. The intrusion detection system will include a central control station where alarms
will sound and a response force can be dispatched (an alarm bell located at the
armory is not acceptable). The intrusion detection system will be designed to
cause an alarm to sound at the central control panel and at the armory whenever
the system is turned off or malfunctions. On/Off, access, and secure switches not
located at a central control station will be located within the alarmed area;
5. A sign shall be placed prominently at the entry to the armory indicating the use of
an IDS;
6. The armory will be equipped with a dual technology volumetric motion sensor
that detects the presence of individuals within the armory. Separate sensors must
be provided for each area of the armory;
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8. Transmission lines for the alarm circuits from the armory to the central control
station will have either two independent means of alarm signal transmission or
line supervision with connecting lines electronically supervised to detect evidence
of tampering or malfunction. If two independent means are used, then one must
have either a radio or cellular telephone link. The system must be able to seize
control of the communication link. All links will be physically and electronically
secure. All cable lines need to be encased in metallic conduit. All equipment must
be mounted in tamper-resistant enclosures. Key control for the enclosures will be
the same as for the armory itself. For more information on IDS, refer to Appendix
8.9, Intrusion Detection Systems.
J. Communication Systems
2. The armory must also have a telephone connection, either in the armory or in the
issuing area, which is tied into the facility phone system for use by staff working
in the armory.
K. Access Control. At a minimum, all armories will be equipped with door and lock
position indicators with magnetic contacts. Automated access control systems may
be used. The system shall be capable of maintaining a record of who accessed
the armory room. Access control systems may use a keypad, card reader, or a
combination of both.
V. Mechanical Equipment
A. Environment Requirements. Weapons and ammunition shall be kept in a cool, dry
environment. Room dehumidifiers need to be installed in the armory. Install small
heating elements in the gun vaults.
B. Ventilation
during robberies).
(b) The port shall not be able to be rendered inoperable from outside of the
armory;
(c) The port will be equipped with a visual indicator showing the location of
the port to a person in the vault, and if the port is in the open or closed
position;
(d) The ventilator port shall allow for voice communication to someone outside
the vault and also allow the passage of small tools and food items to a
person inside the vault;
(e) The ventilator ports will allow for the supply of 10 cubic feet (0.28 cubic
meters) of fresh air per minute per 9 square meters (100 square feet) of
area;
(f) The ventilator port shall provide a minimum of 2 square inches (1250
square mm) of open area in case of a power failure;
(g) The port will be protected as described in paragraph IV.G.3. above; and
(h) The ventilator ports shall be placed so that cabinets or equipment cannot
be placed to obstruct the opening, both inside and outside the armory.
C. Air Inlets
1. Grilles, registers, and diffusers will be designed and fabricated similar to those
used in penal/detention facilities. The face shall be cold-rolled steel 3/16 of an
inch thick. Each unit shall be of welded construction and meet the requirements
of the American Society for Testing of Materials. Supply units shall be 1-, 2-, 3-,
or 4-way directional throw, as required, to provide a uniform air supply free of
drafts throughout the area.
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D. Electrical
1. Provide standard fluorescent light fixtures, switched inside the armory with some
fixtures circulated to an emergency power source. Place switches immediately
inside the armory. Provide continuous light at the exterior of the vault door;
2. Two duplex receptacles must be available inside each area of the armory.
Provide duplex electrical outlets at 3 feet on center and at 3.6 feet above the floor
at weapon maintenance counters. Provide a dedicated electrical circuit for the
pneumatic air cleaning system.
E. Plumbing
1. The equipment service area shall have access to a hand wash sink for use by
the staff. The sink area provides: hot and cold running water with lever fixtures, a
soap dispenser, mirror, paper towel dispenser, and waste receptacle;
2. If chemical storage is required, then the area will be provided with an emergency
eye wash station.
VI. Storage
A. The armory will be equipped with housing cabinets for specialized high value
equipment, weapons, ammunition, and chemical agents. The type of housing for
weapons varies in size, shape, level of security, and material used. Generically, they
take the following forms, depending on the type of weapons being used:
1. Cabinet;
2. Lockers;
4. Lock boxes.
B. Cabinets
1. Provide a 14-gauge welded double wall metal shell or body, with two-coat
epoxy finish, vents with flash arrestors, and a leak-proof sill. Provide 14-gauge
doors, with continuous piano type hinges, integral key dead bolt lock or hasp for
padlock. Locks shall be recessed into the door, with a 1/8-inch protective plate.
Provide combination or key operation. If key operation is used, design for armory
master key operation. Provide metal or wood shelves, adjustable to 1/2-inch on
center. Provide leveling legs and wall anchor to secure cabinet to the wall and
prevent cabinet from tipping over or being removed by unauthorized individuals.
Install security and safety warning labels as required. If chemical agents are to
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2. Cabinets may be equipped with pull out drawers constructed with slides designed
to support a minimum of 150 pounds. Each drawer shall have a combination
dead bolt lock. (Provide drawer inserts to accommodate specific weapon and
gear inventory.)
C. Lockers
1. Provide a 14-gauge welded double wall metal shell, or body, with two-coat epoxy
finish and sloped roof; having 14-gauge doors, continuous piano type hinges,
and integral dead bolt lock or hasp for padlock with combination or key operation.
If key operation is used, tie in to armory master key. Provide one to two metal
shelves and hooks for hanging items. Include leveling legs plus wall anchors to
secure locker to the partition to prevent locker from tipping over or being removed
by unauthorized individuals. Provide locker numbers and security and safety
warning labels as required by type of inventory.
D. Gun Rack
2. Gun racks need to be constructed of 14-gauge welded steel. They should have
felt-cushioned butt support and barrel rests; and
3. Gun racks will be secured to walls and have either a bar that locks the weapons
in place, or a cable that can be threaded through the weapons to secure them in
place.
E. Ammunition. Ammunition may be stored on open shelf systems within the armory.
Shelf units may be constructed of either wood or metal. Shelf units shall be secured
to armory partitions to keep the shelf units from falling over.
F. Lock Boxes. Cabinets configured with lock boxes may be used to store restricted
inventory in the armory. Lock boxes shall be constructed to comply with the
requirements of UL 1037 Anti-theft Alarms and Devices Residential Secure
Containers. Lock boxes will be double walled minimum 14-gauge steel construction
with a minimum 14-gauge steel door; and secured to the partition or floor. They shall
have individual keyed dead bolt locks, and a key for all other locks.
G. Other Storage Devices. The armory shall have coat hooks and pegs for storage of
gear and leather goods in the open air or in vented cabinets to allow moisture to
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escape. Armory wall surfaces need to have pegboard finishes to allow for hanging
inventory.
B. Areas for servicing weapons and equipment will include counters at 42 inches above
the floor. The counters may be plastic laminate or stainless steel. The counters
need to have knee space, and may have equipment drawers, pedestals, and upper
cabinets for storage of equipment, cleaning supplies, and solvents. Storage space
must also be provided for safety devices, such as goggles and gloves.
C. A hazardous material storage container shall be provided in the gun service area
for disposal of contaminated rags. Signage must be placed on the container
indicating the presence of lead contaminates and at the counter instructing that all
contaminated materials must be disposed of properly.
D. The gun service area may also contain power tools and other equipment such as
grinders, lathes, milling machines, drill presses, and refinishing equipment.
1. If the armory is located in a separate structure and will contain large quantities
of ammunition on pallets, it shall be equipped with a receiving dock having an
elevated platform 4 feet above the vehicle parking surface. The vehicle parking
surface shall extend 120 feet beyond the dock edge to accommodate tractor-
trailer delivery vehicles. The dock shall have a 50-foot by 12-foot area for
unloading of delivery vehicle contents;
2. The armory located in a separate structure may require an office space for range
master duties with views to the issue window and receiving dock; and
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B. Armories located in separate structures need to have perimeter security fences. The
fences shall be located a minimum of 20 feet (6 meters) from the structure, providing
a buffer zone for security monitoring. It will be a minimum of 10 feet (2.4 meters)
high and have a sloped top or include concertina wire integrated to the top of the
fence.
1. Requirements. Space may be required for the storage of: clothing articles; fire
and medical emergency response equipment; communication equipment; and
other gear used by officers to respond to special situations. Ready rooms are not
for the storage of weapons, ammunition, or chemical agents. They do not need to
be designed to the same level of security as armory rooms;
2. Location. Ready rooms may be placed in public or staff corridor areas where
officers can immediately access equipment;
3. Walls. Either core filled concrete masonry unit (CMU) walls, or expanded steel
mesh reinforced gypsum wallboard and metal stud partitions may be used.
Concrete masonry walls may be constructed with the cores and kerfs filled with
concrete. No steel reinforcing is need for security purposes;
4. Gypsum wall board partitions with steel mesh shall be constructed of: one layer
of gypsum wall board on each face, over 9-gauge expanded metal mesh under
the outside face, on 3 5/8-inch metal studs. The partitions shall extend from
structural floor to structural deck above;
5. Ceilings. Ready rooms may have standard suspended acoustical tile ceiling
or be exposed to underside of the structure. When existing conditions prevent
extension of partitions to the structural deck above, provide a secure ceiling
consisting of 1.5 inches of plaster on metal lath or 14-gauge perforated metal pan
screwed on metal runners;
6. Doors. Provide 12-gauge hollow metal doors 1 3/4 inches and a 12-gauge hollow
metal frame. Non-removable pin hinges must be provided. A keypad or cipher
lock will be included in order that officers can access the ready room without
having to obtain keys during an emergency. The lockset shall allow emergency
egress from inside the ready room;
7. Windows and Openings. Ready rooms in new construction shall not have
windows. Existing windows shall be protected with tempered glass, fixed glazing
panels, or a wire mesh barrier grille. Exposed openings shall have a 14-gauge
steel barrier grille;
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8. Security. Ready rooms shall have balanced magnetic door switches and an
electric strike connected to a central monitoring station and to audio alarms at the
ready room;
9. Fire Detection and Suppression. Ready rooms need fire and smoke detection
sensors. The system shall be connected to a central monitoring station and audio
alarms at the ready room. Ready rooms shall be provided with sprinklers based
on building occupancy requirements;
10. Mechanical System and Ventilation. The ready room shall have standard
mechanical service with a minimum supply of 20 cubic feet of fresh air per minute
per 9 square 100 square feet;
11. Electrical and Lighting. The ready room shall have standard fluorescent
light fixtures switched inside the ready room. Occupancy sensors shall be
incorporated that turn the light off after extended periods of time when the room
is unoccupied. A duplex electrical outlet needs to be provided on each wall of the
ready room where they are not obstructed by cabinets or stored items; and
12. Equipment. The ready rooms shall be equipped with shelving units, cabinets,
cabinet drawers, lockers, hooks, and pegboards for storage of equipment with
a minimum 20-gauge steel construction. Individual units do not require key or
combination locks. These units need to be provided with floor leveling devices,
and shall be secured to partitions to prevent tipping over of loaded units.
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564 of 890
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I. Public Entrances/Exits
A. X-ray machines are used to scan bags, briefcases, purses, packages, boxes,
mail trails and parcels for the detection of weapons, explosives, narcotics, and
flammables using X-ray technology.
B. Magnetometers are used to scan individuals for the detection of metal using
electromagnetic technology.
C. Facility security standards indicate that the placement of X-ray and magnetometer
screening devices at all public entrances for the screening of visitors, contractors,
etc., and all of their purses, bags, briefcases, packages, etc., is:
5. Radiation screening devices are only for use in Level IV facilities based on a
facility evaluation and determination made by CBP.
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(a) X-ray;
(c) Spectrometry;
Figure 1: Mobile VACIS - Gamma Ray Imaging Figure 2: Mobile Search Advanced X-ray
System Portable Inspection System
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E. Irradiation Devices
1. Irradiation devices are used to attempt to render safe a biological device that may
have been maliciously placed in mail. Irradiation devices are a standard for use
in Level IV and III facilities based on a facility evaluation and determination made
by CBP. Irradiation devices are desirable in Level II and I facilities.
B. Specifications and planning guidance must be obtained from CBP. However, the
overall design of the Secondary X-ray Processing Workstations must protect the
officer from physical assault and provide an immediate means of egress in case of
an emergency.
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C. All entry-control systems control passage by using one or more of three basic
techniques: Coded, credential, and biometric.
D. CBP often stations mobile X-ray equipment at select airports based on operational
requirements. These vehicles must be housed in a secure enclosure when not in use.
1. The enclosure should provide shelter from the elements as well as protection from
acts of vandalism and theft. A garage or space within the airport terminal building,
accessible from the airfield operations area (AOA), is acceptable. Enclose this area
with solid walls or floor to ceiling 11-gauge chain link fencing with tension cables
top and bottom. Provide vehicle gates with locks keyed individually to a CBP
master. The enclosure must have a minimum ceiling height of 9 feet. No special
HVAC is required.
E. For continuous daily operation, the X-ray vans/units will require adequate dedicated
electrical service (120VAC 20AMP) from weatherproof outlets or by an onboard
gasoline generator if necessary.
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2. The design of the large vehicle inspection station should be based on the usage
of large vehicle inspection equipment;
3. Since many of these devices are not currently deployed, the design should
include space for vehicle inspection equipment and provide utility conduits to the
anticipated location for future use. The inspection equipment may be a mobile or
stationary. It should be noted that some detection equipment is built-in to a large,
drive-through structure. If this type of equipment is anticipated, then this could
be coordinated and incorporated into the inspection office and overhead canopy
facilities;
6. Some installations may also consider the use of vehicle inspection pits, although
this type of facility is not recommended due to commonly encountered soil
conditions and anticipated operational safety issues. The following sections
contain information on various inspection-related devices in order to facilitate
the layout of the truck inspection facility and the determination of the required
infrastructure to support inspection equipment.
(a) If installed below grade, is the enclosure waterproof? Is the vault and
equipment designed to support large vehicle loading?
2. Install the system far enough in advance of the access control point so that the
largest vehicle can pass over the equipment without entering the installation;
3. Drainage should be established such that water drains away from the equipment.
(a) When providing drains from the equipment enclosure, provide backflow
prevention valves to prevent water from entering the vault. Ensure any
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water that may be captured in the vault will not drain through control
conduit to the control center.
4. The electrical circuit serving the equipment should be a ground fault interrupt
(GFI) circuit;
6. Vehicle speed should be kept below 15 mph (24.1 km/h) to ensure adequate
performance; and
C. There are many types of automated inspection equipment for large vehicle or cargo
inspection. Some of those available, including X-ray and gamma ray inspection
systems, provide an image of the contents of a vehicle or container. Due to the wide-
ranging requirements for the different manufactured systems, it is not possible to
provide detailed guidance that will support all types of this equipment. However, this
section will identify the important infrastructure considerations associated with both
mobile and fixed X-ray/gamma ray inspection systems.
1. These systems offer the ability to inspect vehicles or containers without removing
the cargo. The equipment typically consists of a transmitter (X-ray or gamma ray)
and a detector on the opposite side of the target vehicle;
(a) This data is then translated into an image of the contents of the vehicle
or container. X-ray systems typically utilize electro-mechanical equipment
to generate X-rays to penetrate the object. Detectors on the opposite
side then record the X-ray transmission, which is then translated into
an image. The Mobile Search and Shaped Energy ISO Search systems
(discussed below) also include a detector on the transmission side of the
unit that detects the X-ray reflections which occur from organic materials,
producing a second type of image of the contents.
D. Due to the use of gamma or X-ray radiation, there are safety and regulatory
considerations in the use of these systems. The requirements vary depending on
the system. Normally an exclusion zone, an area where personnel are not permitted
during operation of the equipment, is established within and around the inspection
equipment. The region outside of the exclusion zone is considered safe for
personnel during scanning operations. The size of the exclusion zone varies greatly
depending on the type of equipment.
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F. There are several truck-based, mobile large vehicle or container inspection systems
currently available. Two examples are illustrated in Figure 3. These systems utilize a
boom type arm to form an inspection tunnel.
G. In no case are vehicle operators to remain in the vehicle during a scan. The operator
is either to exit the vehicle or the vehicle is positioned such that the operator is
outside the scan area prior to the scan initiating.
H. In order to properly plan the required space for this type of equipment, the detailed
operational procedures must be reviewed.
J. The Mobile Search system is capable of scanning only on the “driver’s side” of the
Mobile Search vehicle.
K. The maximum height of the boom is 16 ft 6 in (5.03 m), with a maximum scanned
vehicle dimension of 8 ft 6 in (2.59m) wide x 14 ft (4.27 m) high. The width of the
equipment with boom and stairs deployed is 25 ft (7.62 m).
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B. The system can conduct operations on either side of the VACIS vehicle.
C. The vehicle requires a clear height of 20 ft (6.1 m) and a surface grade of less than
5%. The exclusion zone for each system is illustrated in Figure 4.
D. Exclusion zones are based on the 2mR in any one-hour dose limit. The 100 mR per
year limit may govern the location of a permanent facility.
1. Provide a 35-ft (10.7 m) wide x 110-ft (33.5 m) long paved inspection area for use
by the portable equipment. This provides enough width for the inspection system
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and the travel lane for the vehicles to be inspected. The length is sufficient to
allow the inspection system to scan a large stationary vehicle and maneuver;
3. Provide no canopy over the inspection area planned or dedicated for use by the
portable equipment unless the clear height is a minimum of 22 ft (6.7 m);
4. Site all permanent facilities or guard posts such that they would remain outside
of the exclusion zone. A shielding wall may be required if there are occupied
buildings or areas near the detector;
5. Situate all permanent facilities such that they are not in the direction of travel of
the radiation beam unless the distance between the inspection vehicle and the
facility is at least 300 ft (90m.) The intent is to ensure that the 100 mR / year
radiation dose limit is not exceeded for personnel who may be in the direction of
travel of the radiation. This distance can be reduced to 75.5 ft (23 m) if a 12 in
(305 mm) wide x 8 ft (2.4 m) high (minimum) concrete shielding wall is provided
between the radiation source and any facility of concern; and
6. The determination of exclusion zones should also consider oblique scan angles,
which some inspection systems can implement.
G. There is a wide range of fixed vehicle inspection systems. The systems operate in a
manner very similar to the mobile systems. The types of systems can be categorized
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as follows:
1. Stationary Target Vehicle - transmission source and detector travel past the
target on a rail system or similar platform;
3. A Portal system - with a fixed inspection system where vehicles pass-through the
equipment
H. Examples of these systems are illustrated in Figure 5, Figure 6, and Figure 7. The
space requirements vary from minimal for the portal system to significant for a
transport or stationary vehicle system.
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I. As outlined for the mobile inspection systems, exclusion zones may be required for
the fixed systems. For illustration purposes, the exclusion zones and/or radiation
levels associated with the VACIS II and AS&E Shaped Energy ISO Search systems
are provided in Figures 8-10. Note that the VACIS II exclusion zones depend on the
type of radioactive isotope used and the presence of a shielding wall. Some systems
have no exclusion zone outside of the actual scan area. In no case are the vehicle
operators to remain in the vehicle during a scan. The operator is either to exit the
vehicle or the vehicle is positioned such that the operator is outside the scan area
prior to the scan initiating.
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1. Systems that require a stationary vehicle or move the vehicle on a rail or platen
system past fixed detectors require the most space;
1. Provide a 35-ft (10.7-m) wide x 110-ft (33.5-m) long paved inspection area for
use by the fixed equipment. This provides enough width for the inspection system
and the length of travel for the equipment or a platen/gantry system. The length
is sufficient to allow the inspection system to scan a large stationary vehicle and
maneuver;
2. Provide a longer inspection lane for operation of a portable system that scans
stationary vehicles, allowing the system to scan several vehicles at one time and
increasing throughput;
5. Position all permanent facilities or guard posts such that they would remain
outside of the exclusion zone. A shielding wall may be required if there are
occupied buildings or areas near the detector; and
6. Locate all permanent facilities such that they are not in the direction of travel of
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the transmission beam unless the distance between the inspection vehicle and
the facility is at least 300 ft (90m.) The intent is to ensure that the 100 mR/year
radiation dose limit is not exceeded for personnel who may be in the direction of
travel of the radiation. This distance can be reduced if a shielding wall meeting
manufacturer’s guidance is provided between the radiation source and any
facility of concern.
G. The layout of the large vehicle inspection facility is extremely important to ensure the
facility will function properly.
H. The civil design should consider the turning radius and other operating
characteristics of the expected vehicle types.
I. The facility should have multiple lanes of inspection to support different vehicle types
or varying inspection levels.
J. The design should have adequate stacking distances for the anticipated queue and
parking for vehicles to be inspected and security vehicles.
K. Parking areas should be sized for the range and volume of expected vehicles to be
inspected.
2. These barriers are intended to confine the vehicle during inspection until it is
determined that the vehicle is authorized to proceed or if the vehicle is denied
admission to the installation; and
3. The barriers can be used to aid in positioning the vehicle relative to inspection
equipment.
M. Some installations may require screening of the inspection operations from the
remaining portions of the Entry Control Facility (ECF).
N. Screening may increase safety and shields the inspection procedures from public
view to prevent visual surveillance from unauthorized personnel.
P. If the installation specifies the anticipated inspection systems, then the layout can be
customized.
Q. If the specific system is not identified, but the use of imaging or related inspection
equipment is anticipated, the layout should facilitate the future incorporation of this
equipment.
XIII. Width
A. The minimum lane width should be 16 ft (4.9 m) in the inspection area. A preferred
lane width of 18 ft (5.5 m) is recommended. The increased lane widths are required
to facilitate manual inspection procedures and to support the potential for future
automated inspection technology. Outside of the inspection area, the minimum lane
width facilitating the flow of traffic and other operations is 12 ft (3.6 m).
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3. Contain electronic control panels for all current or anticipated future automated
gates or barriers;
5. Include an electrical room for the main electric panel boards and electronic
controls;
6. Include locker storage for traffic control devices, weapons, and personnel
equipment including vehicle inspection kits and the pre-positioning of personal
protective equipment for CBR exposure;
7. Develop space for storing and charging batteries for communication and/or
inspection equipment;
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3. Secure a Type III Barricade to the gate horizontally in accordance with Manual
Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD) (3 per lane). This configuration enables
a reduced potential penetration and maximizes stand-off when the ECF is not in
use;
4. Secure a centralized truck inspection facility located off installation with a security
fence in accordance with service regulations; and
5. Include a gate enabling the inspection facility to be closed at the perimeter of the
site when not in use.
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Appendix14
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I. General
B. Definitions
1. Designated official. The highest ranking official of the primary customer agency or
the alternate highest ranking official or designee selected by mutual agreement
by other customer agency officials is responsible for developing, implementing
and maintaining a current Occupant Emergency Plan (OEP) for each facility. See
Chapter 15, Occupant Emergency Plan, for more information on the OEP.
4. Emergency Situation. For the purpose of these guidelines, this will include:
bombings, bomb threats, explosions and other hostile or destructive acts, civil
disturbances, natural disasters, etc.
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C. Implementation
1. This security plan was developed by FPS in conjunction with and approved
by the Building Security Committee (BSC). No countermeasures will be
implemented as part of these plans without the concurrence of the BSC.
(a) A change in the HSAS Alert Level nationally, locally or with other respect
to the facility (i.e., transportation sector);
3. The security plan is to be controlled as For Official Use Only, in accordance with
DHS policy on Sensitive but Unclassified Information. It is also marked “Law
Enforcement Sensitive,” which although not a control mechanism indicates the
sensitivity and type of information contained herein.
4. This security plan will be reviewed with the BSC and revised as necessary as
part of each recurring BSA or upon request of the BSC Chairperson.
D. Responsibilities
(a) FPS will ensure Plans are developed in conjunction with BSCs and are
reviewed and updated at least as often as the periodic BSA is conducted.
(b) FPS will notify the BSC of changes to the Homeland Security Alert Level
and other conditions that merit a corresponding change in security
measures.
(c) FPS will coordinate with the BSC and GSA with regard to implementing
increased alert levels absent a declaration by the DHS.
(d) FPS will notify suppliers of services and equipment to be delivered upon
implementation (i.e., notifying guard companies of an increased staffing
requirement).
(f) FPS will provide other support as agreed to in the plan to implement
countermeasures (i.e., increased K-9 patrols, etc.).
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(h) FPS will take appropriate steps for de-escalation once the Alert Level is
reduced.
(a) The BSC will work with the Inspector to develop the security plan for the
building.
●● In signing the plan, the BSC indicates concurrence with the actions to
be taken.
____________________________________ _________________
FPS Regional Director date
____________________________________ _________________
Building Security Committee Chairperson date
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OEPGuide
In the post-911 world, emergency preparedness at work, at home, and in the community is
everyone’s responsibility. Planning for workplace emergencies is critical to reducing risk to
personnel and property. Individuals need to understand what emergencies could occur and
what actions to take if something happens. Life safety, communication, efficiency, and roles
and responsibilities are critical components to accomplishing facility safety and preparedness.
Emergencies can be handled routinely if building occupants are familiar with established
procedures and know pertinent emergency contact information.
●● Emergency plans are required for virtually all buildings. The Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) requires that an emergency action plan1 be developed and
implemented if fire extinguishers are required or provided in the workplace and if anyone
will be evacuating during a fire or other emergency. The Federal Management Regulations
41 FMR 102-74 requires that all Federal departments and agencies comply with the
occupational safety and health standards established in the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970 and develop and implement occupant emergency plans.
To be most effective at protecting life and property, all emergency plans should:
●● Provide clear instruction on roles and responsibilities for all aspects of the preparedness
spectrum from prevention and protection to response and recovery.
●● Use an all-hazards approach that includes procedures to handle a wide range of hazards
and threats that could affect a building such as medical emergencies, bomb threats,
suspicious packages, and natural disasters.
●● Meet the specific characteristics, needs, and criteria for each facility2. For example,
location-specific procedures are added to address unique threats or hazards such as
hazardous materials spills or releases of radioactive materials.
●● Involve coordination with local emergency responders and law enforcement to address
multi-jurisdictional issues regarding mass care, sheltering, and evacuation.
This Occupant Emergency Plan Guide is a tool that should be used in the construction and
update of OEPs. It provides assistance in the planning, development, and implementation
of facility-specific OEPs. Pairing this OEP Plan Guide with the OEP Template, emergency
planners should establish a foundation from which an OEP directly addresses protection goals
and objectives.
1 Refer to OSHA’s website for detailed information and instructions for preparation of emergency action plans.
http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/e-tools/evacuation/index.
html
2 For small, one-level facilities with fewer than 500 employees, emergency information may be entered on GSA Form 3415, Occupant Emergency Plan (abbreviated).
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Table of Contents
Attachments
4. Additional Resources
Acronyms
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Command Center.
●● Floor Team Coordinator – supervises and expedites the planned and controlled movement
of all building occupants in an emergency.
●● Damage Control Team Coordinator – controls dangerous conditions until further help
arrives to assess potential and real damage.
●● Medical Coordinator – the head of the Health and First Aid Unit and is responsible for
training and equipping all employees assigned to perform first aid in an emergency.
●● Administrative Officer – records emergency procedures and activities.
●● Technical Advisors – occupants familiar with the building’s utilities and mechanical systems
or other areas of expertise who advise the DO and OEC.
In a small facility, some positions, such as Administrative Officer, Medical Coordinator, and
Floor Team Coordinator, may not be needed or one person could perform several functions.
1.2 Floor Teams
Floor Teams are assigned to each floor of a facility. In a large facility, a typical Floor Team
would include:
●● Floor Monitors – supervisory personnel selected by the individual Tenant Agency. During a
supervisor’s absence, there should be an acting supervisor who should assume the Floor
Monitor responsibility. In agencies where the supervisory employee is frequently assigned
outside the office, a responsible, conscientious, non‑supervisory staff employee may be
selected. Floor monitors act in several different capacities, depending on the emergency.
●● Floor Area or Wing Monitors – assigned for each major area of the floor.
●● Stairwell Monitors – support the Area/Wing Monitors by controlling movement of persons on
stairways.
●● Elevator Monitors – support the Area/Wing Monitors; one is assigned for each floor where
elevators may be captured.
●● Exit Monitors – support floor monitors for street and ground level.
●● Monitors for Disabled – employees appointed by the floor wardens to assist people with
special needs during emergencies. Where possible, two monitors should be assigned to
each person. In an emergency, monitors are responsible for remaining with the person
throughout the emergency and assisting in their evacuation, following the instructions of the
command center and/or the floor warden.
1.3 Damage Control Team
The Damage Control Team consists of the Property Manager and other individuals familiar with
the facility’s construction, equipment, and overall operating system. Team members report to
the Damage Control Coordinator.
●● The Property Manager provides information, guidance, and advice on establishing and
maintaining the OEO; assists the Designated Official in recruiting qualified personnel
for technical services; and is responsible for designating and supervising the building
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maintenance supervisor.
●● Building maintenance supervisor controls building utilities during an emergency. Under the
direction of the Property Manager, the building maintenance supervisor:
○○ Establishes a plan to attend mechanical devices; ventilation, water, gas, and steam
valves; power switches, elevators, etc., during an emergency.
○○ Provides training for emergency situations and coordinates training for bomb searches
for building mechanical personnel.
●● Ensures that building mechanical personnel know procedures for all emergency situations.
What are nearby facilities or structures that could add to the threat level of a facility?
Examples include:
●● Federal/State/local government offices; post offices, law enforcement stations, fire/rescue,
town/city hall, and local mayor/governor’s residences; judicial offices and courts.
●● Recreation facilities including sports arenas, theaters, malls, and special interest group
facilities.
●● Military installations.
●● Chemical plants, industrial complexes, utilities, nuclear plants, or rail yards that
manufacture, use, transport, store, or dispose of large amounts of hazardous materials.
●● Road, rail, or water transportation arteries on which hazardous materials are transported
within a mile from the facility. For example:
○○ Traffic - Roads/tunnels/bridges carry large volumes of traffic; points of congestion that
could impede response or place citizens in a vulnerable area and time of day and day of
week this activity occurs.
○○ Trucking and Transport Activity - Location of hazardous materials cargo loading/
unloading facilities; vulnerable areas such as weigh stations and rest areas this cargo
may transit.
○○ Waterways - Pipelines and process/treatment facilities; berths and ports for cruise ships,
roll-on/roll-off cargo vessels, and container ships; international (foreign) flagged vessels
(and cargo they carry) that conduct business in the area.
○○ Airports - Carriers, flight paths, and airport layout; location of air traffic control tower,
runways, passenger terminal, and parking areas.
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Does the geographical location (city, state) increase the threat to the facility from
natural hazards?
Examples include: Fault lines - earthquakes; coastal locations - hurricanes/tsunamis; tornado
alley, etc.
What police, rescue, and hazardous materials response is available to the facility?
Examples include:
●● Location and response time of the nearest fire department and hazardous materials team.
●● Local rescue, detection, identification, and decontamination capabilities.
●● Potential of a chemical, biological, or radiological incident that could affect the facility from
internal sources. Examples include: Laboratory areas and storage areas.
Are there services provided within the building that could contribute to overall risk or
require specialized considerations? Examples include: CHildcare centers and retail space.
What are facility critical products, services, and operations? Examples include:
●● Products and services provided by suppliers.
●● Services such as electrical power, water, sewer, gas, telecommunications, transportation;
●● Operations equipment, and personnel vital to continued functioning of facility.
●● Once all the information is gathered and analyzed, assess available resources and ability to
respond to each potential emergency:
○○ Do we have the needed resources and capabilities to respond?
○○ Will external resources be able to respond to use for this emergency as quickly as we
may need them, or will they have other priority areas to serve?
●● If the answer is no, identify what can be done to correct the problem. Examples include:
○○ Develop additional emergency procedures
○○ Conduct additional training
○○ Acquire additional equipment
○○ Establish mutual aid agreements
○○ Establish agreements with specialized contractors
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Discuss coordination and development of the facility OEP with appropriate external groups.
While their official approval may not be required, they will likely have valuable insights and
information to offer. Some considerations for external coordination include:
●● What are their plans and available resources for preparedness and response to potential
emergencies?
●● What are State and local requirements for reporting emergencies?
●● Determine protocols for turning control of a response over to outside agencies. For
example:
○○ Establish lines of communication with outside responders
○○ Decide gate or entrance for responding units use; where they will go and to whom they
will report
○○ Determine what kind of identification authorities will require from key personnel to allow
entrance during an emergency
○○ Under the Incident Command System (ICS) and National Incident Management System
(NIMS), who becomes the official in charge and when
○○ In an Incident of National Significance, what external agency is responsible for
emergency support under the National Response Plan (NRP)
Coordination with internal contacts is equally as important. Examples of internal resources and
capabilities include:
●● Personnel – fire brigade, HAZMAT response team, emergency medical services, security,
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A primary and alternate means of communications must be available to activate the occupant
emergency organization, inform building occupants of the nature of an emergency and what
actions to take, to coordinate activities during an emergency.
●● All building occupants must understand how to operate and respond to the alarm system to
avoid confusion and delay in reporting fire or other emergencies. The fire alarm system is
used to initiate immediate evacuation of the building. Drills are scheduled to test the OEP
functions and familiarize plan members with emergency procedures of the Plan. These
systems are tested on a regular schedule to ensure that the equipment is working properly.
An oral announcement may be used to warn of other emergency or non-emergency
situations. These could be, but not limited to: earthquakes, floods, and windstorms,
explosions, civil disturbances, bomb threats, demonstrations and hostage situations.
●● In most cases, the building’s fire alarm system may not be used as a means of notifying
the organization and the occupants without approval of the Building Manager and or the
Fire Department. As such, appropriate use of telephones, public address systems, and/
or messengers may prove more feasible. If telephones are used, a Communications
Coordinator should be appointed by the Administrative Officer to set up a system of
contacting all members of the emergency organization. The Administrative Officer/person
should also be responsible for updating lists of telephone numbers. Multilevel buildings may
have emergency telephone systems for coordinating emergency activities. However, most
buildings must rely on the normal telephone system, the public address system, the fire
alarm, and messengers.
4.4 Child Care Centers
The Designated Official and FPS Inspectors should work with the director of a childcare center
in a Federal facility to develop and post emergency response procedures. Center staff should
know whom to contact in the event of a medical emergency, how the center will be notified
of a fire or other danger that may require evacuation, the location of fire alarm boxes and fire
extinguishers, the primary and secondary evacuation routes, and the locations of safe areas.
4.5 Disabled Occupants
Occupants with disabilities who need assistance during an emergency should be involved
in planning to inform appropriate personnel of their needs, including exactly what kind of
assistance is required. Consider the following when evaluating the facility’s capacity to address
occupants with disabilities during an emergency:
●● More time may be needed to evacuate disabled individuals.
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●● Audible warnings and emergency instructions are not effective for deaf or hard of hearing
occupants and, as such, other notification means are needed.
●● Blind or partially sighted occupants need to depend on others to lead them during an
evacuation.
●● Occupants in wheelchairs may require assistance to evacuate the building.
●● Persons with mental disabilities may be unable to understand the emergency and could
become disoriented or confused about the proper way to react.
●● Respiratory illnesses may become aggravated by stress.
●● Emergency, oxygen and respiratory equipment may not be readily available.
●● Medication regimen of occupants with serious conditions may be interrupted.
Other examples of people who do not fit the legal definition of a person with a disability, but
who may need assistance or special planning for emergencies include the elderly, pregnant
women, and people who are obese. There may also be people with temporary or intermittent
needs. Contact local emergency services to determine what evacuation equipment (such as
evacuation chairs) they can offer. It is important to provide instruction on the use of evacuation
chairs to affected occupants in an actual emergency.
4.6 Protocols for Nights/Weekends/Holidays
●● In the event of an emergency at night, over the weekend, or on a holiday, the senior
Federal official present should act as the DO and initiate appropriate action. This person
will need to coordinate with the senior FPS Officer, contract guard on the premises and/or
with appropriate maintenance personnel.
●● Procedures must also be spelled out and responsibilities assigned for handling
emergencies that occur during nights, weekends, and holidays. The OEO’s members and
their titles and telephone numbers should be noted on forms.
4.7 Emergency Telework
Telework4 is simply a way of getting work done from a different location. It can serve multiple
purposes – and have multiple benefits – when it is implemented effectively in an organization
and, as such, should be part of agency emergency planning. The National Strategy for
Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan references the benefits of using telework to slow the
spread of disease by keeping face-to-face contact to a minimum (often referred to as “social
distancing”) while maintaining operations as close to normal as possible. Telework can also
help agencies retain functionality as infrastructure issues and other challenges make the main
work site difficult to access.
4 The Office of Personnel Management defines telework as “work arrangements in which an employee regularly performs officially assigned duties at home or other work sites geographically
convenient to the residence of the employee.”
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●● Administrative actions include many that are covered by a well written, coordinated, and
implemented OEP. For example:
○○ Maintain training records
○○ Maintain all written communications
○○ Document drills and exercises and their critiques
○○ Acquire equipment
○○ Stockpile supplies
○○ Designate emergency facilities
○○ Establish training facilities
○○ Establish mutual aid agreements
○○ Prepare a resource inventory
Emergency Notification Numbers - All building occupants should know whom to contact in
case of emergency. Enter building-specific emergency notification numbers. Note that for GSA
owned or leased facilities, the Federal Protective Service must be notified of any emergency
situation. Other department/agency facilities may replace this with another provider as
appropriate.
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Responsible Officials’ Sign-Off Sheet - OEO officials (e.g., the designated official and the
occupant emergency coordinator) must certify their participation in the OEP development and
verify their understanding of emergency procedures affecting the facility and employees within
for which they are responsible.
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Occupant Emergency Organization (OEO) – provides an overview of the structure and purpose
of the OEO and an overview of responsibilities of the various components of the OEO.
●● Replace highlighted text with facility specifics as follows:
○○ [Insert what is used…colored safety hats and/or armbands].
Throughout this section, modify or delete text to reflect facility-specific structure.
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Facility Emergency Contact Information - Replace highlighted text with name, title, desk and
mobile telephone numbers for facility contacts as follows:
●● General Services Administration
●● Federal Protective Service
●● Command Center Team (CCT)
●● Floor Team (FT)
●● Damage Control Team (DCT)
Throughout this section, modify or delete text to reflect facility-specific structure.
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●● OEO members and other identified occupants may be the fastest source of first aid/
cardiopulmonary resuscitation. All FPS officers are qualified in first aid/CPR.
●● The facility’s health unit, if there is one, can usually provide immediate medical attention.
Local physicians and emergency medical unites are normally closer than a hospital; the
area should be surveyed to determine their availability, and their telephone numbers
should be on the Emergency Call List. Local police, fire, and rescue squads can provide
ambulance services and paramedics; police and fire department personnel can also
maintain order during an emergency requiring large-scale medical services.
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●● All occupants should know the locations of fire alarm boxes and extinguishers, as well
as how/when to use them, and the procedures to follow when the alarm is sounded.
Occupants should know whom to notify after an alarm as been sounded so the Command
Center Team can be activated.
●● FPS officers and typically members of the Disaster Control Team are trained in fighting
small fires. Once the fire department arrives, the fire official in charge will assume
command.
●● Orderly evacuation is the simplest and most reliable action, and is used as a response
to relatively common incidents such as fire drills and alarms, and also to more serious
emergencies such as bomb threats. In most situations where an airborne release originates
from a source inside a building, evacuation follows. Evacuation considerations include:
Evacuation may lead to other risks, by taking the occupants from the physically secure
environment of the building into the streets. Evacuation routes may also be hazardous in that
they may expose individuals to contaminated areas as they exit the facility.
Properly trained Floor Team Coordinators, Area/Wing Monitors, Stairway Monitors, and
Elevator Monitors can lead the safest and fastest evacuation of a building.
FPS officers and/or local police can control traffic and crowds during an evacuation. If
evacuation is ordered because of a fire, the local fire department official in charge will assume
command.
●● For childcare center evacuation:
○○ Become familiar with the location of all stairways and exits, and the nearest building fire
alarm manual pull stations, duress alarms and their operation.
○○ All personnel members must be trained on the proper fire protection and evacuation
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practices.
○○ Personnel should not attempt to secure or recover items of clothing or personal property
after an alarm has sounded. The facility should not be reentered until the incident
commander gives the all clear.
○○ In case of emergency or drill, all personnel should leave the building in an orderly
manner - Walk, Don’t Run. The personnel should search their rooms in the Center,
closing all doors before leaving. Additionally, the Director or other assigned personnel
will search all areas within the Center and ensure that all occupants have been safely
evacuated.
○○ Take attendance and immediately proceed to the Safe Haven (enter appropriate,
detailed address/location) as directed by the Center Director or designee
○○ Determine if parents should be notified and/or asked to pickup children. The decision
to have parents pick up their children will be made based on expected time out of the
Center or the nature of the emergency.
○○ Physically challenged children will be provided with assistance to help them exit the
building. Infants will be evacuated in designated evacuation cribs.
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●● Supervisors are required to label all hazardous chemicals in their workplaces and list them
on Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDSs), and to develop, publish, and implement a hazard
communication program, inclusive of employee training.5
●● The Designated Official must maintain an inventory of hazardous materials used in
chemical laboratories and hazardous material storage areas in the building. This inventory
should include the following information for each chemical that poses a potential health or
physical hazard:
○○ Substance name and trade name
○○ National Stock Number/Chemical Abstracts Service Number, if applicable
○○ Name and location of user
○○ Container size
○○ Quantity of chemical normally in use and stored
●● The Chemical Transportation Center provides 24-hour information on handling accidents in
the transportation of chemicals, as the official “Hotline” for this type of emergency at 1-800-
424-9300.
●● Most bomb threats are received by phone. Bomb threats are serious until proven otherwise.
Provide occupants with instruction and a checklist positioned by the telephone so that they
may act quickly, but remain calm and obtain appropriate information.
●● FPS officers and local police can help in training for bomb searches and provide leadership
during a search. The bomb disposal unit of the local police would, in most instances,
provide the quickest response for defusing or otherwise disposing of a bomb. A sample
bomb threat checklist is also included in Attachment 2-4.
●● The evacuation of occupants may be necessary.
5 The Hazard Communication Standard (29 CFR 1910.1200) establishes uniform requirements for evaluation of all hazardous chemicals used in U.S. workplaces and communication of this
information to the appropriate personnel. This Standard was designed to ensure that (1) employers receive the information they need to inform and train employees properly and to design and put in
place employee protection programs, and (2) that employees receive necessary hazard information so they can participate in the development of protective measures in their workplaces and support
them once they are in place.
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●● Because of their familiarity with the space where they work, occupants can most easily
spot something that does not belong there. They should be warned, however, not to touch
suspicious objects, and to report them immediately upon discovery to the FPS.
●● The evacuation of occupants may be necessary.
●● Prepare announcements to be used if necessary as follows:
○○ May I have your attention please? May I have your attention please? May I have your
attention please?
○○ We have identified a suspicious package on the ___ floor.
○○ Occupants of the ___, ___, and ___ floor(s) (1 above and 1 below) are required to
evacuate until the emergency is over. (REPEAT)
○○ Please walk to the nearest exit and report to your floor’s designated evacuation area.
○○ Only the affected floors need to evacuate.
○○ Do not use the elevators, please proceed to stairways. (REPEAT)
●● When the “All Clear” is given:
○○ May I have your attention please? May I have your attention please? May I have your
attention please?
○○ The emergency on the ____ floor is now over.
○○ Occupants of the ___, ___, and ___ floors may return to their work areas.
●● It is important to develop the building’s proactive SIP plan with employees and other
authorities to maximize the cooperation of employees with the SIP plan. It is recommended
that a group consisting of key representatives be formed to develop building-specific SIP
plans based on the following considerations/steps.
Step 1 Review Building’s Vulnerability Assessment Reports - Review the executive summary of the building’s Vulnerability
Assessment reports, related security Threat Assessment reports, and the building’s OEP.
Step 2 Identify Building Features - The purpose of identifying the existing features is to gather information about the ventilation
system and the characteristics that determine the building’s protective capability. This information is required for the
development of each building’s SIP plan by Property Management (PM) and building operating personnel. This assists in the
development of HVAC control protocols for airborne contaminant releases. This plan should describe the operation of the
building’s heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems during a SIP event.
Step 3 Identify Features Increasing Building Vulnerability - Identify features that make the building vulnerable to airborne
contaminant releases originating from outside the building.
Step 4 Identify SIP Safe Zones - Based on the above SIP information, building authorities should identify a list of possible SIP
safe zones. A SIP safe zone might be (a) designated room(s), the entire building, or a safe area. This document uses the
term SIP in its general term, which indicates a safe zone inside the building where people can stay safely in the event of an
outdoor release.
Step 5 Develop a Communications Plan - An effective communications plan for SIP should be developed based on building-
specific OEP procedures.
Step 6 Conduct SIP Training and Drills - Practice drills using the SIP procedures among building occupants should be
performed as part of routine OEP drills. Train and familiarize those who are occupants in the building on awareness and the
procedures to be taken in an airborne toxic release initiated outdoors. Training plans should be developed by the DO with
input from the BSC, Property Management (PM), FPS, and other law enforcement entities.
Step 7 Reactive Guidelines for SIP -Once notification has been received from the local authorities, the following reactive
measures are recommended based on the information gathered in the proactive review and building system evaluations.
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●● Implementation is more than simply exercising the OEP during an emergency. It means
acting on recommendations made during the vulnerability analysis, integrating the plan into
company operations, training employees, and evaluating the plan.
●● During an event, the decision to activate the OEP shall be based upon the best available
information, including an understanding of local tensions, the sensitivity of target
agency(ies), and previous experience with similar situations. Advice shall be solicited, when
possible, from the GSA building manager, appropriate FPS officials, and Federal, State,
and local law enforcement agencies.
●● When there is immediate danger to persons or property, such as fire, explosion, or the
discovery of an explosive device (not including a threat), occupants shall be evacuated
or relocated in automatic accordance with the plan. This shall be accomplished by
sounding the fire alarm system or by other appropriate means. A warning message
should be prepared beforehand for each of the protective actions that are practical for the
building. This will ensure that the actions can be taken as rapidly as possible and that the
instructions will be clearly understood. The messages should be worded to be effective
without causing panic.
●● Integrate the Plan into Facility Operations
Emergency planning must become apart of the building’s corporate culture:
●● Look for opportunities to build awareness
●● Educate and train personnel
●● Test procedures
●● Involve all levels of management, all departments, and the community in the planning
process
●● Make emergency management part of what personnel do on a day-to-day basis
1.0 Test the OEP to ensure:
●● Everyone who works at or visits the facility requires some form of training. Consider how to
involve community responders in training activities, and conduct reviews after each training
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activity to identify areas for improvement and record best practices. Involve both personnel
and community responders in the evaluation process.
2.1 Planning Considerations
●● Assign responsibilities for developing a training plan. Consider the training and information
needs for employees, contractors, visitors, managers, and those with an emergency
response role identified in the OEP and OEO. General training for all employees should
address:
○○ Individual roles and responsibilities
○○ Information on the subject of threats, hazards, and protective actions
○○ Notification, warning, and communications procedures
○○ Means for locating family members in an emergency
○○ Emergency response procedures
○○ Evacuation, shelter, and accountability procedures
○○ Location and use of common emergency equipment
○○ Emergency shutdown procedures
2.2 Training Activities
The following training activities should be incorporated into the training plan:
●● Orientation and Education sessions – are regularly scheduled discussion sessions to
provide information, answer questions, an identify needs and concerns.
●● Tabletop Exercises – members of the emergency management group meet in a conference
room setting to discuss their responsibilities and how they would react to emergency
scenarios. Using floor plans and building schematics, each key position ensures that they
know where to go, what to do, and have the opportunity to discuss “what ifs”. This is a cost-
effective and efficient way to identify areas of overlap and confusion before conducting
more demanding training activities.
●● Walk-Through Drills – The emergency management group and response teams actually
perform their emergency response functions. This activity generally involves more people
and is more thorough than a tabletop exercise.
●● Functional Drills – These drills test specific functions such as medical response, emergency
notifications, warning, and communications procedures and equipment. These tests may
be performed singularly or collectively. Personnel are asked to evaluate the systems and
identify problem areas.
●● Evacuation Drills – Personnel walk the evacuation route to a designated area where
procedures for accounting for all personnel are tested. Conditions of drills should be varied
so that occupants are prepared to know how to respond to varying conditions. For example,
use of alternate exits because primary exits are blocked. Participants are asked to make
notes as they investigate potential hazards during emergencies (e.g. stairways cluttered
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●● Distribute the first draft to group members for review. Revise as needed. For a second
review, conduct a tabletop exercise with management and personnel who have a key
emergency management responsibility. In a conference room setting, describe an
emergency scenario and have participants discuss their responsibilities and how they
would react to the situation. Based on this discussion, identify areas of confusion and
overlap, and modify the plan accordingly.
●● Capabilities and hazards must be analyzed after a vulnerability analysis is conducted.
The single most important determination for a facility and security managers to make
in determining the needs for an occupant emergency plan is a comprehensive risk
assessment for the facility.
3.0 Evaluate and Modify the OEP
●● Conduct an evaluation of the entire plan at least once a year. Attachment 3-1 provides
checklists that can be used to evaluate OEP procedures. Evaluation and modification of
OEPs should take place after each training drill, exercise, and emergency. OEP review is
also relevant when personnel or responsibilities change, alongside facility layout, design,
policy and procedure changes. Each modification requires that personnel and OEO
individuals be briefed. Some issues to consider are:
○○ Methods to involve all levels of management in evaluating and updating the plan
○○ Ways to sufficiently address problem areas and resource shortfalls identified in the
vulnerability analysis
○○ Inclusion of lessons learned from drills and actual events
○○ Review emergency management group and ERT to understand respective
responsibilities as well as to provide training for new members
○○ Reflection of changes in the physical layout of the facility
○○ Specification of any new facility processes
○○ Updated photographs and other records of facility assets
○○ Assessment of the facility training objectives
○○ Changes of hazards to the facility
○○ Citing names, titles, and telephone numbers in OEP, and ensuring they are kept current
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●● Assures that all building occupants, including members of the organization, comply with
procedures indicated by the alarm signal as specified by the plan.
●● Coordinates bomb search of office space.
●● Is a member of the Emergency Command Center during emergencies.
●● Advises Designated Official of the progress of evacuation and/or bomb searches.
Damage Control Team Coordinator - Under the direction of the designated official, the damage
control coordinator serves as head of the utilities controls group as follows:
●● Establish a plan to control mechanical devices such as: ventilation equipment, water, gas,
and electrical distribution systems at the direction of the Fire Chief or Designated Official.
●● During emergency situations the Utility Officer immediately proceeds to the Emergency
Command Center to await instructions from the Fire Chief or Designated Official.
●● Dispatches individuals or mechanical teams to operate building utilities or assist emergency
personnel in the control of building utility systems.
Medical Coordinator - The medical coordinator is head of the Health and First Aid Unit and
is responsible for training and equipping all employees assigned to perform first aid in an
emergency.
●● Arranging with the American Red Cross or other sources for first aid and medical self-help
training for all organizational personnel as requested by members of the organization.
●● Supervising the selection of first aid or medical treatment areas as required.
●● Directing first aid or medical self‑help operations and controlling access to medical
supplies, as required, to ensure their proper use, conservation and availability for
emergency use.
●● Establish policy and rules governing emergency treatment of the ill and injured. The
maintenance of adequate sanitation and hygienic standards, and other matters relating to
emergency health, hygiene and medical activities during emergencies.
Administrative Officer – The administrative officer must administer actions during and after an
emergency which include:
●● Maintain telephone logs
●● Keep a detailed record of events
●● Maintain a record of injuries and follow-up actions
●● Account for personnel
●● Coordinating notification of family members
●● Issue press releases
●● Maintain sampling records
●● Manage finances
●● Coordinate personnel services
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●● Document incident investigations and recovery operations
Technical Advisors – Occupants familiar with the building’s utilities and mechanical systems
or other areas of expertise who advise the DO and OEC such as: Building/Property Manager,
Maintenance Manager, and Physical Security Specialist.
Attachment 2: Sample Emergency Procedures
Emergency procedures and considerations are provided for the following that can be tailored
to specific facility needs:
2-1 Medical– localized and widespread
2-2 Evacuation
2-3 Hazardous Substance
2-4 Bomb Threat
2-5 Suspicious Object
2-6 Sheltering In Place
2-7 Explosion
2-8 Natural Disaster – with advance notice and without
2-9 Demonstrations
2-10 Missing Child – Code Adam
2-11 Enhanced Protection due to Increased Threat
2-12 Post-Emergency Recovery
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2-1 MEDICAL
Position ACTIONS
Limited Widespread with Multiple Injuries
ALL Building Occupants
All Building • CALL 911 [or other emergency number]
Occupants • If First Aid/CPR trained, provide assistance until medical personnel arrive.
Command Center Team
DO/OEC • Notify Floor Monitor • Go to Primary Command Center
• Notify Medical Coordinator • Activate Command Center Team
Medical • Go to scene • Go to scene
Coordinator • Ensure that appropriate • Advise regarding medical assistance and ensure that appropriate
assistance has been called assistance has been summoned
• Recommend follow-up action • Report to DO
• Report to DO
All other CCT NA • Go to Primary Command Center
members • Notify or activate teams as appropriate.
Floor Team
Floor Team NA • Provide first aid/CPR
Members • Obtain medical assistance (see emergency call list)
• Notify OEC
• Notify Federal Protective Service
• Reserve elevators for emergency use
• Meet responding emergency unit at ground floor
• Verify medical assistance response
• Report to Floor Team Monitor
Damage Control Team
Damage Control NA • Provide first aid/CPR and rescue services.
Team Members • Report to Damage Control Coordinator.
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2-2 Evacuation
Evacuation policies and procedures should:
●● Determine conditions under which an evacuation would be necessary.
●● Establish a clear chain of command.
●● Identify personnel with the authority to order an evacuation.
●● Designate “evacuation wardens” who will assist others in an evacuation and account for
personnel.
●● Establish a system for accounting personnel.
●● Consider employees’ transportation needs for community-wide evacuations.
●● Establish procedures for assisting persons with disabilities and those who do not speak
English.
●● Consider evacuation procedures for Child Care Centers.
●● Include post evacuation procedures:
○○ Designate personnel to continue or shut down critical operations while an evacuation
is underway. They must be capable of recognizing when to abandon the operation and
evaluate themselves.
○○ Coordinate plans with the local emergency management office.
○○ Final decision for personnel (e.g. resume work, go home, etc.) will be made by the DO
and communicated to everyone along appropriate communication channels.
Designate primary and secondary evacuation routes and exits. Have routes and exits within
the facility clearly marked, well lit, and announced with appropriate signage. Evacuation
routes, exits, location destinations, etc., must be discreet outside the facility to ensure proper
protection of building occupants.
Be reviewed and approved through:
○○ Distribute the first draft to group members for review – Revise as necessary
○○ During second review, conduct tabletop exercise with management and personnel
with key emergency management responsibility. In conference room setting, describe
an emergency scenario and have participants discuss their responsibilities and how
they would react to the situation. Based on discussion, identify areas of confusion and
overlap, and modify plan accordingly.
○○ Arrange a briefing for the DO, chief executive officer, and senior management – obtain
written approval.
○○ Install emergency lighting in case a power outage occurs during an evacuation.
○○ Ensure that evacuation routes and emergency exits are:
Wide enough to accommodate the number of evacuating personnel
○○ Clear and unobstructed at all times
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2-2 EVACUATION
Position ACTIONS
ALL Building Occupants
• Activate the nearest fire alarm pull box then dial [insert number] to notify [insert title] and provide specifics.
All Building Occupants
• Follow instructions provided by the Command Center Team.
Command Center Team
• Go to Primary Command Center and activate the Command Center Team
DO/OEC • Verify fire department notification and response and brief responding personnel
• Coordinate activities
Medical Coordinator • Go to Primary Command Center and advise regarding medical assistance
• Go to Primary Command Center and activate Floor Teams and coordinate Floor Team activities and verify
Floor Team Coordinator
occupant status
Damage Control • Go to Primary Command Center and activate the Damage Control Team
Coordinator • Determine building conditions (e.g., environmental, structural, etc.)
Administrative Officer • Go to Primary Command Center and record activities
Other
Floor Team Fire Floor First Floor
Floors
• Activate fire alarm (if not already done).
Floor Monitors • Supervise and verify evacuation. • Lead fire department to control
• Report to Floor Team Coordinator. center.
• Evacuate area occupants • Restrict building access.
Area Monitors • Inspect area to ensure total evacuation • Assist with occupant evacuation
• Report status to Floor Monitor. • If floor is to be
• Direct occupants to the nearest safe • Report to First Floor Monitor evacuated,
stairwell. • Capture assigned elevators. follow Fire
Elevator Moni-
• Assist in elevator evacuation of the disabled • Use of elevators can be authorized Floor Team
tors if elevator use of this purpose has been only by the fire department, DO, instructions.
authorized. or OEC. • If not, stand by
• Inspect stairway for smoke or other for instructions
Stairway Moni- obstruction and report status to Area Monitor. • Lead fire department to control
tors • Keep occupants moving in a single file down center.
the stairway. • Restrict building access.
Monitors for Dis- • Evacuate disabled to safe area. • Assist with occupant evacuation
abled Report status to Area Monitor
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2-2 EVACUATION
Position ACTIONS
• Activate fire alarm (if not already done).
• Supervise evacuation.
Floor Monitors
• Verify evacuation. • Lead fire department to control
• Report to FTC. center.
• Evacuate area occupants • Restrict building access.
• Inspect area to ensure total evacuation • Assist with occupant evacuation
Area Monitors
• Report status to Floor Monitor (including
relocation of disabled).
• Report to First Floor Monitor
• If floor is to be
• Capture assigned elevators
• Direct occupants attempting to use evacuated,
(either automatically or using
elevators to the nearest safe stairwell. follow Fire
required special key or the regular
Elevator Monitors • Assist in elevator evacuation of the Floor Team
call button).
disabled if elevator use of this purpose instructions.
• After capture, use of elevators
has been authorized. • If not, stand by
can be authorized only by the fire
for instructions
department, DO, or OEC.
• Inspect stairway for smoke or other
obstruction, if obstructed direct occupants
to another stairway. • Lead fire department to control
Stairway Monitors
• Keep occupants moving in a single file center.
down the stairway. • Restrict building access.
• Report status to Area Monitor. • Assist with occupant evacuation
Monitors for • Evacuate disabled to safe area.
Disabled • Report status to Area Monitor
Damage Control Team
• Report to Damage Control Coordinator
Damage Control
• Activate emergency systems: Alarm systems, Smoke control, Fire extinguishment, and Emergency
Team Members
power
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2-6 SHELTERING-IN-PLACE
This information on sheltering-in-place (SIP) provides a general guideline for developing a plan
for SIP with tenant agency and other building occupant cooperation.
Step 1 - Review Building Vulnerability Assessment Reports and OEP
●● If the building has mechanical ventilation with a duct system, record the location of all
fresh-air intakes that are at ground level and accessible to the public or next to a street or
roadway.
6 Buildings constructed after 1970 tend to be more airtight than older buildings, due to increased energy conservation
standards.
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●● List the locations of mechanical rooms having air handlers, whether each mechanical room
is kept locked, and which have outside entrances.
●● Determine where the lobby and any public access areas of the building share an air-
handling unit with office areas.
●● Determine if security-screening procedures are in place to prevent hazardous materials
from being brought into the building.
Step 4 – Identify SIP Safe Zones
In general, a SIP safe zone should:
●● Be identified based on the features that make a building vulnerable to the outside airborne
contaminant releases.
●● Have the least air infiltration when the HVAC and other ventilation systems are shut off.
●● Have sufficient space for all building occupants. In some situations, the SIP zone may
consist of the entire building or significant portions of the building. If the safe zone is a
number of designated room(s), then it is preferred to be located in the inner part of the
building (no windows to the outside). The rooms should have doors that are fairly effective
at preventing airflow from the hallways: at least there should be no gap around the edges
of the door, and preferably there should be a gasket to completely seal the room. Opening
and closing a conventional door can pump significant amounts of air into the safe zone.
Safe rooms are best located on mid floors and in interior rooms away from outside walls.
●● Have a shelter kit. The identified safe zone should have enough space for all building
occupants. Before an incident occurs, your SIP safe zone should have a shelter kit.
●● Not be bathrooms, kitchens, and other unsafe spaces with exhausted ducts to outside.
Bathrooms are typically a bad choice for a SIP location because they often have an
exhaust duct that leads directly outside. If the exhaust fan is turned off, then the duct can
allow contaminants to enter the facility from outside. Additionally, the stack effect can draw
air into the bathroom from within the building, eventually contaminating the building during
an indoor release. If the exhaust fan is left on, then air will be drawn into the bathroom from
other parts of the building, which will eventually contaminate the bathroom.
●● Have a Knox Box key repository with all necessary keys and cards needed for the fire and
hazardous materials team responders to gain access to your safe areas.
Step 5 – Develop a Communication Plan
The plan should suggest how to:
●● Receive timely information on the threat of airborne contaminant releases outside of the
building and effectively communicate the information to building authorities.
●● Activate the organization in response to a threat.
●● Inform building occupants of the nature of an emergency and what action to take.
●● Coordinate activities during the SIP.
●● Use all available resources to get word out (e-mail, voice-mail system, telephone, OEP
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●● Discuss and take necessary actions with authorities related to special needs that may be
required by some building occupants.
●● Train building occupants on water conservation for the duration of the SIP.
●● Train property managers for SIP conditions.
●● Train contractors and contract employees.
●● Identify and mark safe SIP zones (locations and accountability for them)
●● Ensure guards are familiar with SIP procedures in alignment with post orders.
●● Assign duties to specific employees with backups.
●● Coordinate actions with local emergency responders including ensuring familiarization with
where safe rooms are, number of people within, and other safety measures in place.
Stages of OEP integration.
●● Conduct orientation drills and meetings where ERT becomes acquainted with local
responders in preparation for an emergency.
●● Facility “Walk Through” exercises, with Fire Department officials and EMS responders to
preplan facility OEPs.
●● Participate in, or observe tabletop exercises for emergency managers to allow decision
makers to learn what will happen when an emergency occurs and how to integrate the
internal response within the operational framework.
●● Offer to host and participate in Functional and Full-Scale exercises.
●● Allow local emergency responders to conduct Walkthroughs to determine multiple routes to
and from safe areas.
●● Determine various possible upgrade and up wind decontamination sites that would be used
by local responders in an emergency.
Step 7 – Reactive Guidelines for SIP
Once notification has been received from local authorities, the following guidelines are
recommended if SIP is required:
●● Inform building occupants of SIP conditions, direct them to SIP safe zone(s), and account
for people;
●● Notify the Building Security Committee (BSC) members, Federal Security Authorities,
property management personnel, and all other occupants of the building about the incident
and SIP requirements;
●● Minimize the rate of air exchange with the outside as to keep indoor concentration as low
as possible for as long as possible by closing all windows and doors to the outside, and
closing all necessary doors;
●● Shut-off all HVAC fans and close all HVAC dampers, including exhaust dampers. Shut off
other fans such as kitchen and bathroom exhausts. If shutting off these systems takes more
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time due to the building condition, then shutting off the whole electrical system should be
evaluated during SIP proactive planning;
●● Do not use elevators – they create a piston effect and can pump air into or out of the
building;
●● Seal the doors, windows, and vents if necessary;
●● Establish communication with outside through a TV, radio, cell phone, or others and ensure
that emergency responders know your location(s);
●● Once the threat has passed and the authority having jurisdiction gives an “all clear,”
evacuate the building and flush it with outdoor air. When leaving, be aware and cognizant of
signs and symptoms of contamination in the event evacuee pass through a contamination
pocket in the structure or outside. SIP requires two distinct actions be taken without delay
to maximize the passive protection;
●● Reduce indoor/outdoor air exchange rate before hazardous plume arrives. Close all
windows and doors and turn off all fans, air conditioners, HVAC, elevators and combustion
heathers.
●● Increase indoor/outdoor air exchange rate as soon as hazardous plume has passed. Open
all windows and doors and turn on all fans to ventilate the building. Though tightly sealed, a
building does not prevent contaminated air from entering; it minimizes the rate of infiltration.
Outside air enters more slowly, and once the external hazard has passed, the building
releases the contaminated air slowly as long as it remains closed. If there is a release close
to the ground near a tall building, and if the building’s air intakes are on the roof or upper
floors of the building far from the release areas, operating the HVAC so as to pressurize the
building with air taken-in through the HVAC system will usually be better than shutting off
the HVAC entirely. Actions such as this can only be taken if there is a very good knowledge
of the release location and the dispersion of the contamination and if the designated
official authorizes it. This decision should be made in consultation with local emergency
responders if available as the weather; contaminant chemical and physical properties can
cause variable reactions with the contaminant’s behavior.
The amount of protection varies with the following:
●● Duration of exposure. Protection varies with time, diminishing as the time of exposure
increases. SIP is therefore suitable only for exposures of short duration, generally three
hours or less, depending upon building conditions and the nature of the incident.
●● Natural filtering. Some filtering occurs when an airborne agent is deposited in the building
shell or upon interior surfaces as air respires through the building. This filtering effect is
greatest in tight-fitted buildings.
Distribution of the SIP
●● Place the final plan in three-ring binders and number all copies and pages.
●● Each individual receiving a copy should be required to sign for it and be responsible for
posting subsequent changes.
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●● Determine which sections of the plan would be appropriate to share with other government
agencies (some section may refer to classified information or include private listings of
names, telephone numbers, or radio frequencies) and emergency response agencies
(appropriate sections).
2-7 EXPLOSION
Position Actions
ALL Building Occupants
All Building • Dial [insert number] to notify [insert title] and provide specifics.
Occupants • Follow instructions provided by the Command Center Team.
Command Center Team
• Go to Primary Command Center.
DO/OEC
• Activate Command Center Team.
All Other CCT • Go to Primary Command Center.
Members • Notify or activate appropriate teams as appropriate.
First & Ground
Floor Team Affected Floors Unaffected Floors
Floors
• Notify Floor Team.
• Supervise evacuation, first aid, and
Floor Monitors rescue.
• Report conditions to Floor Team • Inform occupants.
Coordinator. Control access to the building • Maintain control of
• Coordinate area evacuation, first aid, occupants.
and rescue. • Control egress.
Area Monitors
• Inspect area to determine conditions. • Maintain
• Report to Floor Monitor. communication
• Capture elevators. with Floor Team
• Hold until determined safe Coordinator.
Elevator Monitors NA
for use. • Evacuate to a safe
• Assist emergency teams. area if instructed to
• Inspect assigned stairwell. do so by Floor Team
• Report conditions to Area Monitors. Coordinator.
Stairwell Monitors
• Lead occupants to safe area if NA
required.
Monitors for Disabled • Move disabled occupants to safe area.
Damage Control Team
• Assist in rescue.
Damage Control • Control access.
Team Members • Inspect elevators, fire protection systems, and utilities.
• Report conditions to Damage Control Team Coordinator. Make required repairs.
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2-9 DEMONSTRATIONS
Position ACTIONS
Advance Notice No Advance Notice
ALL Building Occupants
All Building Occupants Follow instructions provided by the Command Center Team.
Command Center Team
DO/OEC • Go to Primary Command Center
• Notify Federal Protective Service – if FPS not in area, notify local police department.
• Notify Floor Team Coordinator.
Medical Coordinator • Go to scene
• Ensure that appropriate assistance has been called
• Report to DO
• Advise regarding medical assistance
Floor Team Coordinator • Go to Primary Command Center
• Activate Ground Level Floor Team
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not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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This section provides code requirements and industry practices for emergency action plans to
distinguish areas of conformance and shortfalls. The three columns on the right of the tables
are provided for agency analysis.
Employee Emergency Plans and Fire Prevention Plans Compliance with Requirement or
[OSHA 29 CFR § 1910.38] Standard
Yes No Comments
Emergency escape procedures
Escape routes
Procedures to be followed by employees who remain to operate
critical plant operations before they evacuate
Procedures to account for all employees after evacuation has
been completed
Duties for employees designated to perform rescue and medical
functions
The preferred means of reporting fires and other emergencies
The names or regular job titles of people or departments that can
be contacted for further information or explanation of duties under
the plan.
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Under NFPA 1, emergency action drills are required for those buildings containing more than
500 occupants. A building may also be required to conduct drill exercises if it contains less than
500 occupants but it houses 100 or more individuals above or below street level. In addition to
requiring drills NFPA 1 also requires the following:
●● Drills will be conducted periodically
●● Drills will be conducted as needed to familiarize occupants with procedures
●● Drills will be conducted at both planned and unexpected times
●● Drills will vary conditions to address unusual conditions
●● All building personnel will participate in drills
●● NFPA 1 also requires the establishment of emergency plans covering all building
occupants. These plans are to be updated and reviewed on an annual basis.
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distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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Telephone Hotlines
●● Under 41 CFR § 102-74.250, the decision to activate the OEP must be made by the
Designated Official, or by the designated alternate official. After normal duty hours, the
senior officer in the Operations Center on duty will represent the Designated Official or his/
her alternates and must initiate action to cope with emergencies in accordance with the
OEP.
●● Code requirements for fire drills, which address emergency evacuation planning, are found
in several national standards:
○○ Code of Federal Regulations, Title 41, Chapter 102 Federal Management Regulations,
Part 102-71, Subpart 102-74.230, Occupant Emergency Program (41 CFR § 102-
74.230).
○○ Code of Federal Regulations, Title 29, Part 1904 Recording and Reporting Occupational
Injuries and Illnesses, Section 39 Reporting Fatality and Multiple Hospitalization
Incidents to OSHA (29 CFR § 904.39).
○○ Code of Federal Regulations, Title 29, Chapter 1910 Occupational Safety and Health
Standards, Section 38 Employee Emergency Plans and Fire Prevention Rules (29 CFR
§ 1910.38)
○○ Code of Federal Regulations, Title 29, Part 1910 Occupational Safety and Health
Standards, Section 120 Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response (29
CFR § 1910.120).
○○ Code of Federal Regulations, Title 29, Part 1910 Occupational Safety and Health
Standards, Section 165 Employee Alarm Systems (29 CFR § 1910.165).
○○ Code of Federal Regulations, 29 CFR § 1960 Basic Program Elements for Federal
Employee Occupational Safety and Health Matters, Section 16 Compliance with
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Occupational Safety and Health Administration Standards (29 CFR §1960.70), and 29
CFR § 1960, Reporting of Serious Accidents.
○○ The General Services Administration Accident and Fire Prevention Handbook PBS P
5900.2C.
○○ U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Fact Sheet on Obtaining and Using
Employee Medical Information as Part of Emergency Evacuation Procedures, dated
October 31, 2001.
○○ Emergency Preparedness Guide, National Organization on Disability: http://www.nod.
org/emergency
○○ The Property Professional’s Guide to Emergency Preparedness, BOMA International:
http://www.boma.org/pubs/property_gep.htm
○○ Protecting Buildings And Their Occupants From Airborne Hazards, U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers Technical Instruction, October 2001: http://www.fema.gov/fima/antiterrorism/
resources.shtm
○○ Emergency Preparedness in the Built Environment, International Facility Management
Association (IFMA), November 2001: http://www.ifma.org/profdev/seminar/catalog/
ep.cfm/actionbig=7
○○ GSA Occupant Emergency Program (OEP) Guide, U.S. General Services
Administration, March 2002: http://www.usda.gov/oo/beprepared/OEPplans.htm
○○ Shelter-In-Place at Your Office: A general guide for preparing a shelter-in-place plan in
the workplace, National Institute for Chemical Studies: http://www.nicsinfo.org/OEP%20
plan%20for%20offices%20NICS%20feb2003.pdf
○○ Planning Protective Action Decision-Making: Evacuate or Shelter-in-Place, Oak Ridge
National Laboratory, June 2002.http://www.ornl.gov/
○○ Protecting Buildings From a Biological or Chemical Attack: actions to take before
or during a release, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, January 2003: http://
securebuildings.lbl.gov/images/BldgAdvice.pdf
○○ Guidance for Protecting Building Environments from Airborne Chemical, Biological,
or Radiological Attacks; CDC and NIOSH, May 2002 (http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/
bldvent/2002-139.html)
○○ Risk Management Guidance for Health, Safety and Environmental Security under
Extraordinary Incidents, ASHRAE, January 2003 (http://xp20.ashrae.org/ABOUT/Task_
Force_Rpt_12Jan02.pdf)
○○ Emergency Management Guide for Business and Industry, FEMA (http://www.fema.gov/
business/guide/toc.shtm)
○○ Critical Incident Protocol, Michigan State University: http://www.cj.msu.edu/~outreach/
CIP/CIP PDF
○○ Evacuation Plans and Procedures e-Tool, OSHA: http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/e-tools/
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distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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evacuation/index.html
○○ Small Business Disaster Planning Guide, Small Business Association, Institute for
Business & Home Safety: http://www.ibhs.org/docs/openforbusiness.pdf
○○ Developing a Preparedness Plan and Conducting Emergency Evacuation Drills,
National Fire Protection Association: http://www.nfpa.org/Research/nfpafactsheets/
emergency/emergency.asp
○○ Model Shelter-in-Place Plan for Businesses, National Institute for Chemical Studies:
http://www.nicsinfo.org/OEP%20plan%20for%20offices%20NICS%20feb2003.pdf
○○ Shelter-in-Place in an Emergency, American Red Cross: http://www.redcross.org/
services/disaster/beprepared/shelterinplace.html
○○ Business and Industry Preparedness Guide, American Red Cross: http://www.redcross.
org/services/disaster/beprepared/busi_industry.html#fema
○○ Army Training Support Center (http://www.atsc.army.mil) provides a digital library
with approved training and doctrine information. Files include Field Manuals, Mission
Training Plans, Soldier Training Pubs, and more.
○○ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) (http://www.bt.cdc.gov) information
regarding infectious diseases
○○ CBIAC: Chemical and Biological Defense Information and Analysis Center (http://www.
cbiac.apgea.army.mil) Collects, reviews, analyzes, and summarizes chemical warfare/
contraband detection (CW/CBD) information.
○○ Chemical and Biological Warfare – Health and Safety (http://www.ntis.gov/hs/prep-
response.aspx) Department of Commerce National Technical Information Service
(NTIS) site has information on chemical and biological agents, Government research,
detoxification and decontamination studies, developing immunizations, and drug
theories.
○○ Chemical Accident Prevention Provisions Overview (CAPPO) (http://www.epa.gov/
emergencies/content/lawsregs/rmpover.htm) information on the CEPPO office,
upcoming events, publications, legislation and regulations, and links to outside
resources Also contains information on accident prevention and risk management
planning
○○ Chemical Transportation Emergency Center (CHEMTREC) (http://www.chemtrec.com/
Chemtrec/) source of technical assistance from chemical product safety specialists,
emergency response coordinators, toxicologists and other hazardous materials
(HazMat) specialists
○○ FEMA – Guide for Terrorism Emergency Management (http://www.city.waltham.ma.us/
lepcweb/cterr/FEMA_Guide_for_Terrorism.htm) Currently 35 links to various emergency
management-related bibliographies. At least 10 of these relate to WMD.
○○ Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/AEOD/
FRERP/downld.html)
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○○ U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (CHPPM) (http://
chppm-www.apgea.army.mil) Home Page providing links especially requests for
CHPPM services. Links connect to Directorates of Environmental Health Engineering,
Health Promotion and Wellness, Laboratory Sciences, Occupational Health, and
Toxicology.
○○ U.S. Army Medical Research and Development (R&D) Command (http://MRMC-www.
army.mil) Links include military infectious disease, chemical and biological links,
scientific and technical reports, and Web site links.
○○ U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense (http://chemdef.apgea.
army.mil) provides data links to open literature for medical management of chemical
casualties and assay techniques for chemical agents.
○○ U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (http://www.usamriid.army.
mil) provides links to Medical Command (MEDCOM), Ebola site, outbreak reporting site,
CDC, Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), U.S. Army, and more.
Cross-Reference Websites
●● EPA’s Chemical Emergency and Prevention Office (CEPPO). CEPPO provides leadership,
advocacy, and assistance to prevent and prepare for chemical emergencies, respond to
environmental crises, and inform the public about chemical hazards in their community.
●● EPA’s Environmental Response Team (ERT) The ERT is a group of skilled experts in
environmental emergencies who provide on-scene assistance on a “round-the-clock” basis
to deal with environmental disasters.
●● EPA’s Role in Counterterrorism. This Web site describes EPA’s counterterrorism efforts and
shares relevant counterterrorism information and resources.
Department of Defense (DoD)
●● DoD’s Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center. This Web site is
DoD’s focal point for chemical and biological warfare information.
●● DoD’s Counter proliferation: Chem Bio Defense. This is a DoD “web network” on nuclear,
biological, and chemical (NBC) defense.
●● DoD’s Hazardous Technical Information Services (HTIS) HTIS is a service of the Defense
Logistics Agency, located in Richmond, Virginia.
●● DoD’s Medical (Army Surgeon General). This Web site contains extensive medical
documents, training materials, audiovisual clips, a search engine, and links to other sites.
Department of Justice (DOJ)
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not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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“public voice” of the FBI for espionage, cyber and physical infrastructure protection.
●● National Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO). The NDPO Web site provides a location
for information regarding the available Federal training and programs intended to enhance
the capabilities of the public safety community in dealing with weapons of mass destruction
(WMD). The NDPO mission, members, services, newsletter, and recommended links are
contained on this site.
●● Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support (OSLDPS). OSLDPS provides
technical assistance to States and local jurisdictions to enhance their ability to develop,
plan, and implement a program for WMD preparedness.
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
●● Background: Terrorism. This FEMA Web site provides basic background information on
terrorism-related issues.
●● Terrorism Annex to the Federal Response Plan. The site includes the full text of the Annex
in PDF format that can be downloaded and reproduced.
●● National Fire Academy. The National Fire Academy homepage provides links to the course
catalog and to specific courses and job aids relating to terrorism preparedness.
●● FEMA’s Emergency Response to Terrorism Self-Study Course - This Web site provides
a link to a self-study course designed to provide basic awareness training to prepare first
responders to respond safely and effectively to incidents of terrorism.
Department of Health and Human Services
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Acronyms
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Fire
Medical Emergency
Building Security
Federal Protective Service 1 – 877 – 437 – 7411
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AppOEP
Designated
Title Title
Official
Signature Signature
Name Name
Occupant
Emergency Title Title
Coordinator
Signature Signature
Name Name
Title Title
Signature Signature
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1. The best way to protect against the potentially harmful effects of both man-made
incidents and natural disasters is to ensure that all building occupants know how
to respond in an emergency. This involves pre-planning, training, and rehearsal.
B. Scope
2. The facility is a
located at .
C. Effective Date
D. Facility-Specific Information
1. Information on the facility, its occupants, and command center is included in the
following tables.
Federal Management Regulations (FMR), Subpart 102-74.230A requires Federal agencies that occupy Federal property to develop Occupant Emergency Plans with technical
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GSA for establishing and maintaining them.
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Street
Primary Location
City, State
Telephone
Street
Alternate Location
City, State
Telephone
F. Facility Characteristics
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G. Occupants
1. Begin with the lowest floor and work upward. Upon moving, agencies must
update sheet accordingly.
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(a) The Command Center Team (CCT) directs all emergency operations from
the building’s Command Center. CCT members in a large facility, would
include:
o Designated Official (DO) – The highest-ranking official of the primary
occupant agency; or alternatively, a designee selected by mutual agreement
of occupant agency officials. Responsible for activating the plan in all
emergencies during normal duty hours.
o Occupant Emergency Coordinator (OEC) – An official appointed by the
Designated Official and serves as the primary assistant to the Designated
Official to ensure the continued viability of the OEP and its organization.
During emergencies the OEC operates the Command Center.
o Floor Team Coordinator – Supervises and expedites the planned and
controlled movement of all building occupants in an emergency.
o Damage Control Team Coordinator – Controls dangerous conditions until
further help arrives to assess potential and real damage.
o Medical Coordinator – The head of the Health and First Aid Unit and is
responsible for training and equipping all employees assigned to perform first
aid in an emergency.
o Administrative Officer – Records emergency procedures and activities.
o Technical Advisors – Occupants familiar with the building’s utilities and
mechanical systems or other areas of expertise who advise the DO and OEC.
2. In a small facility, some positions, such as Administrative Officer, Medical
Coordinator, and Floor Team Coordinator, may not be needed; or one person
could perform several functions.
(a) Floor Teams are assigned to each floor of a facility. In a large facility, a
typical Floor Team would include:
●● Floor Area or Wing Monitors – one is assigned for each major area of
the floor.
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●● Exit Monitors – support floor monitors for street and ground level.
(b) The Damage Control Team consists of the Property Manager and
other individuals familiar with the facility’s construction, equipment, and
overall operating system. Team members report to the Damage Control
Coordinator.
3. OEO personnel are provided with the following visual identifiers to be used during
activation of the OEP:
Visual Identifier
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(b) After Normal Duty Hours - The senior official on duty will represent the
Designated Official or his/her alternates and must initiate action to cope
with emergencies in accordance with the OEP.
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Floor Number
FLOOR TEAM:
Position Primary Alternate
Name Name
Floor Monitor Phone Phone
Mobile Mobile
Name Name
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NOTE: DUPLICATE THE FLOOR TEAM TABLE SO THAT THERE IS ONE FOR EACH FLOOR IN THE
BUILDING
2. Evacuation
3. Hazardous Substance
4. Bomb Threat
5. Suspicious Object
6. Explosion
8. Demonstrations
11. Shelter-in-Place
Medical
Position ACTIONS
Limited Widespread with Multiple Injuries
ALL Building Occupants
All Building • CALL 911 [or ]
Occupants • If First Aid/CPR trained, provide assistance until medical personnel arrive.
Floor Team
Floor Team NA • Provide first aid/CPR
Members • Obtain medical assistance (see emergency call list)
• Notify OEC
• Notify Federal Protective Service
• Reserve elevators for emergency use
• Meet responding emergency unit at ground floor
• Verify medical assistance response
• Report to Floor Team Monitor
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Evacuation
Position ACTIONS
ALL Building Occupants
All Building • Activate the nearest fire alarm pull box then dial to notify and provide specifics.
Occupants • Follow instructions provided by the Command Center Team.
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Hazardous Substance
Position ACTIONS
ALL Building Occupants
All Building • Dial to notify and provide specifics.
Occupants • Follow instructions provided by the Command Center Team.
Floor Team
Floor Monitors • Activate Floor Teams.
• Supervise evacuation.
• Report to Floor Team Coordinator at relocation site Alternate Command Center.
Area Monitors • Coordinate area evacuation.
• Report conditions to Floor Monitors.
• Accompany area occupants to relocation site.
• Hold occupants and await instructions.
Stairwell Monitors • Control evacuation via stairways.
• Report to Area Monitors.
Monitors for the • Assist individuals requiring assistance to relocation site.
Disabled • Remain with disabled.
• Report to Area Monitors when possible.
Elevator Monitors • Go to relocation site.
• Report to Floor Monitor.
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Bomb Threat
Position ACTIONS
ALL Building Occupants
All Building • Dial to notify and provide specifics.
Occupants • Follow instructions provided by the Command Center Team.
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Date
Time
Why?
Estimated age
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Other Points:
Caller’s Voice
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Suspicious Object
Signs of a Suspicious
Position ACTIONS Package
ALL Building Occupants No Return Address
All Building • Do not touch suspicious objects Excessive Postage
Occupants • Report them immediately upon discovery.
• Dial to notify Stains
• Provide specifics. Strange Odor
• Follow instructions provided by the Command Center Team.
Strange Sounds
Command Center Team Unexpected Delivery
DO/OEC • Go to Primary Command Center Poorly Handwritten
• Activate Command Center Team
• Verify fire department notification and response Misspelled Words
• Brief responding personnel Incorrect Titles
• Evacuate or relocate occupants
• Building Manager to put elevators in Phase I Service. Foreign Postage
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Explosion
Position ACTIONS
ALL Building Occupants
All Building • Dial to notify and provide specifics.
Occupants • Follow instructions provided by the Command Center Team.
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Natural Disaster
Position ACTIONS
Advance Notice No Advance Notice
ALL Building Occupants
All Building • Follow instructions provided by the Command Center Team.
Occupants
Floor Team
Elevator Monitors NA • Capture assigned elevators.
• Restrict use until determined safe (mechanical safety
inspection may be required).
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Demonstrations
Position ACTIONS
Advance Notice No Advance Notice
ALL Building Occupants
All Building Occupants • Follow instructions provided by the Command Center Team.
Floor Team
Ground Level • Secure perimeter doors.
• Avoid any interaction with demonstrators.
• Prevent any occupant interaction with demonstrators.
• Follow instructions in responding to FPS officers and/or local police.
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Floor Team
Floor Team • Conduct a thorough search of the building to positively identify all children located in the building
Members • Search all potential hiding places, offices, common areas, and exterior areas of the property
• If a CCTV system is in place, monitor it closely for the missing child
• If CCTV system has capabilities of viewing without interrupting ongoing recording, review video to identify
the last time child was seen
1 A child’s clothes may be changed, but an abductor does not usually remove or change shoes
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Severe Condition (Red): Severe risk of terrorist attack. Under most circumstances, the
protective measures for a Severe Condition are not intended to be sustained for substantial
periods of time. In addition to the protective measures taken in the previous threat condition,
security partners should consider the following general measures in addition to the facility-
specific protective measures they develop and implement:
Increase or redirect personnel to address critical emergency needs
Assign emergency response personnel and pre-positioning and mobilizing specially trained
teams or resources
Monitor, redirect, or constrain transportation systems
Close public and government facilities
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Shelter-In-Place (SIP)
Position ACTIONS
ALL Building Occupants
All Building Occupants
Floor Team
Floor Team Members •
A complete procedure should be established for Shelter In Place (SIP) at each facility. The
following are sample actions to consider in development of a procedure:
• Notification is received from various sources that there is an outdoor hazard and that
SIP is in effect
• Inform building occupants of SIP conditions, direct them to SIP safe zone(s), and
account for people
• Notify the Building Security Committee (BSC) members, Federal Security Authorities,
property management personnel, and all other occupants of the building about the
incident and SIP requirements
• Minimize the rate of air exchange with the outside as to keep indoor concentration as
low as possible for as long as possible by closing all windows and doors to the outside,
and closing all necessary doors
• Shut-off all HVAC fans and close all HVAC dampers, including exhaust dampers. Shut
off other fans such as kitchen and bathroom exhausts. If shutting off these systems
takes more time due to the building condition, then shutting off the whole electrical
system should be evaluated during SIP proactive planning.
• Do not use elevators – they create a piston effect and can pump air into or out of the
building.
• Seal the doors, windows, and vents if necessary.
• Establish communication with outside through a TV, radio, cell phone, or others and
ensure that emergency responders know your location(s).
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Post-Incident Recovery
Immediately after an emergency, take steps to resume operations:
• As soon as possible, report to the OEP Team following notification of an incident/
emergency.
• Maintain contact with all members of the OEP Team and facilitate the flow of
information between members of the OEP Team.
• Identify the required support personnel who may be needed.
• Dispatch, as required, members of the OEP Team, to assist in the incident/emergency.
• Assist in the coordination and movement of personnel away from impacted area.
• Advise, in consultation with members of the OEP Team and local authorities, when the
building is safe for reoccupation when the incident has concluded sound the All Clear.
• Upon arrival of FPS and/or local authorities, the OEC shall brief emergency
responders of the existing emergency.
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Post-Incident Recovery
• Account for all damage-related costs. Establish special job order numbers and charge
codes for purchases and repair work.
• Follow notification procedures. Notify employees’ families about the status of
personnel on the property. Notify off-duty personnel about work status. Notify
insurance carriers and appropriate government agencies.
• Protect undamaged property. Close up building openings. Remove smoke, water and
debris.
• Protect equipment against moisture. Restore sprinkler systems. Physically secure the
property. Restore power.
• Conduct an investigation. Coordinate actions with appropriate government agencies.
• Conduct salvage operations. Segregate damaged from undamaged property. Keep
damaged goods on hand until an insurance adjuster has visited the premises, but you
can move material outside if it’s seriously in the way and exposure to the elements
won’t make matters worse.
• Take an inventory of damaged goods.
• Restore equipment and property. For major repair work, review restoration plans with
the insurance adjuster and appropriate government agencies.
• Assess the value of damaged property. Assess the impact of business interruption.
• Maintain contact with customers and suppliers.
Position Responsibilities
Designated Official • Selects and trains CCT members
• Coordinates with all tenants and develops, applies, and maintains an OEP.
• Initiates activities to prepare occupants for emergencies and inform them of response procedures.
• Ensures that appropriate procedures are followed during emergencies.
• Identifies and establishes working relationships with Federal, State, and local agencies that might respond
to an emergency in the facility.
• Activates the plan if experience warrants doing so, if people or property is in immediate danger, or if the
official gets advance notice of an emergency.
• Sits on the facility’s Emergency Response Team and Building Security Committee.
Occupant • Assists the DO and performs delegated duties as appropriate.
Emergency • Serves as liaison between DO and other members of the CCT.
Coordinator
Floor Team • Assists in the development of the OEP.
Coordinator • Coordinates planning of occupant movement between floors during an emergency.
• Coordinates floor, wing, stairwell, elevator, and other monitor activities.
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Position Responsibilities
Technical Advisors • Building Manager (GSA or Lessor) - Works with the OEC and provides information about the building and
the operation of its mechanical systems.
• Physical Security Specialist and/or FPS Inspector - Works with the OEC; provides advice on security and
law enforcement matters; and serves as liaison with Federal and local law enforcement agencies.
• Other occupants familiar with the building’s utilities and mechanical systems.
Damage Control • Assists the OEC.
Coordinator • Identifies utilities, alarm systems, communications equipment, and other pertinent systems and equipment
in the building.
• Makes recommendations on the use of facilities and equipment.
• Maintains emergency call list for utilities and hazardous substances.
• Directs Damage Control Team activities.
Medical • Assists the OEC.
Coordinator • Identifies available medical emergency services.
• Maintains first aid equipment.
• Arranges CPR, first aid, and other paramedical training.
• Maintains list of personnel with CPR and paramedical training.
• Maintains the list of disabled occupants as provided by Floor Monitors.
Administrative • Assists the OEC.
Officer • Records enacted emergency procedures.
• Maintains organization records and updates them monthly.
• Provides required administrative services (phones, faxes, radios, etc.) and prepares reports.
B. Floor Teams
Position Responsibilities
Floor Monitor • Assist FTC
(FM) • Maintain communication with CC during an emergency; provide progress reports on evacuation; notify CC when
floor is completely cleared
• Designate exact boundaries of floor areas and assign responsibilities for these areas
• Make necessary changes in floor organization with approval of the FTC and OECs
• Ensure that evacuation routes are clearly identified and posted on bulletin boards, corridor intersections, and
office exits and are known to occupants
• Maintain a list of disabled occupants and communicate the list to the CC.
Area or Wing • Work with FM; notify FM when area has been completely cleared
Monitors • Ensure that evacuation routes are clearly identified and made known to occupants
• Direct orderly flow of occupants during drills and emergencies, along the prescribed evacuation routes
• Ensure that area or wing is completely vacated, when required
• Ensure that windows and doors are closed lights on, and electrical appliances off during fire evacuations
• Leave windows and doors open and lights on during bomb threat evacuations
• Assign Monitors for the disabled, one per disabled person
• Supervise Stairwell Monitors and Monitors for the disabled
• Maintain list of disabled occupants including name, telephone extension, room number, and type of disability
within area of responsibility; provide revisions to the FM.
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Position Responsibilities
Stairwell • Support the Area/Wing Monitor
Monitors • If evacuating because of a bomb threat, search stairwell
• Control movement of occupants on stairways, keeping them in single file and moving steadily at a walking pace;
instruct occupants to grasp handrails
• Keep door open to stairway until the area/wing is clear
• Restrict and monitor use of stairwells and escalators as necessary
Elevator • Assist and Support Area/Floor Monitors
Monitors • Be familiar with the provisions of GSA Bulletins covering emergency plans for using elevators to evacuate
disabled occupants
• Be familiar with manual operation of elevators
• Capture assigned elevator and permit use only as directed by FM
• During fire evacuation, direct occupants attempting to use elevator to appropriate stairway; relinquish control of
elevator to firefighting personnel when they arrive
• If emergency personnel are arriving by elevator, meet them and direct them to the scene of the emergency
• Assist the evacuation of disabled occupants by elevator if elevator has been approved for use
Exit Monitors • Work with FMs
• Ensure the exits are open and free of hindrances
• Deny unauthorized access to the building
• Direct orderly movement of occupants to safety areas
• Assist in evacuation of disabled occupants
Monitors for • Know locations and telephone numbers of the disabled occupants to be assisted, types of disabilities, and the
Disabled location of crutches, wheelchairs, and other support devices
• Know which elevators may be used for evacuation of disabled occupants
• Assist disabled occupants from their workplaces to the elevator, down, and out of the building. If elevator cannot
be used, assist person to an area adjacent to the nearest safe stairway and get or await help.
• Coordinate with the Area and Floor Monitors to ensure that this information is up-to-date
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Note: This document should be revised and edited to assure that it describes the Workplace Violent
Behavior Prevention Plan at your facility. The portions of the document that are underlined must be
revised such that the appropriate information is provided. This appendix is provided as a reference only.
I. Purpose
A. Workplace Violent Behavior Prevention Plans:
II. Background
A. Violent behavior of visitors and/or employees in insert name of facility and other
locations where facility employees are required to perform their duties is an
occupational health hazard. Workplace violence is preventable and most acts of
violence in the workplace have warning signs (verbal and non-verbal). Prevention
of violence in the workplace greatly enhances services provided by allowing staff to
safely interact with visitors and other employees. Additionally, preventive measures
reduce costs associated with work-related injuries.
B. Insert name of facility is required by Federal law (Public Law 91-596 and Executive
Order 12196) to provide a place of employment free from recognized hazards that
are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm. The Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has cited Federal facilities for failing to
protect its workers from violent behavior in accordance with Executive Order 12196,
“Occupational Safety and Health Programs for Federal Employees,” paragraph
1-201a.
III. Policy
A. Violent behavior will not be tolerated at this facility. Persons committing acts of
violence will be reported to the appropriate authorities and prosecuted to the fullest
extent of the law. Appropriate disciplinary action will be instituted against employees,
customers and visitors who are verbally or physically aggressive.
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IV. Responsibilities
A. The Facility Director is responsible for:
1. Assuring that employees are provided a safe and healthful work environment;
B. Insert appropriate title will serve as the facility Workplace Violent Behavior
Prevention Plan Coordinator and is responsible for:
2. Assuring that all employees are provided violent behavior prevention training;
3. Reviewing the facility’s Plan annually to assure that it is current, relevant, and
addresses the facility’s needs;
2. Assisting and supporting the coordinator and the Facility Safety Committee
when implementing an effective Workplace Violent Behavior Prevention Plan
throughout the facility; and
3. Assisting with counseling of staff that have been exposed to violent behavior in
the workplace, as appropriate.
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Note: The following responsibilities should be assigned to the Police and Security Service or other
appropriate organization.
4. Assisting and supporting the coordinator and the Facility Safety Committee in
implementing an effective Workplace Violent Behavior Prevention Plan throughout
the facility.
Note: The following responsibilities should be assigned to the Facility Safety Office or other appropriate
organization.
4. Assisting and supporting the coordinator and the Facility Safety Committee in
implementing an effective Workplace Violent Behavior Prevention Plan throughout
the facility; and
5. Assuring that employees under their supervision receive prompt and appropriate
medical attention in the event of injury;
8. Assuring that employees who are verbally or physically assaulted, who witness
violent behavior in the workplace, or who have demonstrated warning signs
associated with potential violent behavior, are provided counseling, professional
support, and critical incident stress debriefings;
9. Asking for support from the Employee Assistance Program (EAP). The EAP
is available to offer professional counseling to those who seek it, and to
provide debriefings to individuals and groups affected by trauma. Encouraging
employees to take advantage of the EAP as a way of preserving health, not as a
sign of sickness;
11. Assuring that all employees complete appropriate violent behavior prevention
training (see paragraph 7).
1. Following safe work practices (those that minimize the potential for violent
behavior);
1. Providing assistance and support for the facility Workplace Violent Behavior
Prevention Plan and serving as the focal point for facility-wide violent behavior
prevention initiatives;
J. Other Appropriate Officials: This Section should be revised to include insert other
facility officials that have responsibilities assigned to them as part of the facility’s
Workplace Violent Behavior Prevention Plan, as appropriate.
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4. Priorities: Each CBP facility should identify where potential sources of violent
behavior are located at the facility. Priority should be given to locations where
money is handled; entrances (e.g., facility access by visitors and relatives);
isolated areas; poorly lit areas; and security posts.
(a) As Victims - Employees working in the cashier’s office, the cafeteria, and
the main reception area interact with customers continually. Employees
must notify their respective Security Office or police immediately if they
suspect that anyone may have a weapon;
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F. Assessment Training:
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VI. Controls
A. Building Access: Insert appropriate summary of initiatives implemented to prevent
violent behavior related to building access.
1. Building Access: This section should summarize all controls related to building
access that have been implemented to prevent violent behavior or to limit the
impact of such behavior. A summary of facility regulations concerning building
access should be included in this section. All employees should be aware of
these procedures, which must be discussed during training.
VII. Training
A. Employees:
OSHA website.
2. Customer Service Training: All employees and supervisors of employees
that provide services to customers must complete customer service training
that addresses methods to recognize potential violent behavior, appropriate
responses, methods to obtain assistance, procedures to summon CBP Security
or appropriate law enforcement, etc. This training must emphasize prevention,
early intervention, and methods to minimize exposure of visitors and employees
to violent behavior. Warning signs, response procedures, prevention techniques,
and defensive techniques must be addressed by this training.
Note: This training can be included as part of other customer service enhancement training or can be
presented separately. Employees should complete this training before being placed in positions where
they may be exposed to potentially violent behavior.
B. Supervisors: All supervisors must complete a training program that enables them
to identify warning signs of potential violent behavior and learn what to do once
violent behavior is detected. The supervisor also needs to be knowledgeable on the
counseling services available to an employee.
time frame. Counseling and debriefings are provided at no charge by the Employee
Assistance Program (EAP). The EAP will provide initial counseling/assessment and
refer the employee to community based resources for further treatment, if additional
counseling is required. After critical incidents, stress debriefing sessions that include
interpersonal support techniques will be provided by insert appropriate title and
location.
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I. General
A. The Security Management Division (SMD) plans to expand operations to support
Field Elements at Regional and District Office locations with the establishment of the
Field Security Operations Branch.
1. The FSOB will be required to provide ongoing support and guidance to all the
field security staff;
2. The FSOB Staffing Plan will enhance SMD’s capability to meet internal and
external customer requirements;
5. The FSOB, Regional Security Offices (RSOs) and District Security Offices
(DSOs) will support the overarching SMD area of responsibility; and
6. The FSOB will provide security program oversight to all RSOs and DSOs which
have been designated by the CBP Chief Security Officer for each of the field
locations.
1. Three (3) Regional Security Offices (RSOs) will be established near, or co-
located with, each of the CBP National Logistics Centers (NLCs). The Regional
Security Office is focused on servicing CBP field locations’ needs in all disciplines
of security, ensuring that CBP maintains a strong security posture that is
consistent with departmental and agency security regulations and in compliance
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2. The SMD will provide the initial staffing of the Regional Security Offices through
temporary duty assignments. The Regional Security Officer is to maintain a
multidisciplinary security team that is proactive, flexible, embodies the highest
level of professionalism, supported by information technology, and viewed as a
model for excellence by other Federal agencies.
1. District Security Offices (DSOs) will be co-located with Office of Internal Affairs
field offices. The FSOB will work with the Office of Field Operations, Office of
Border Patrol, Air and Marine and Port Security Office to ensure the locations
of the DSOs are established in cities which are in close proximity to high-profile
ports of entry.
B. Security specialist will need to be appointed to fill the roles identified below and
designated in writing for each of the RSOs and DSOs as appropriate areas of
responsibility.
●● Badge System/Operation.
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(d) Self-Inspections.
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Glossary
Appendix: Glossary
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APPENDIX: GLOSSARY
Access. (1) A condition or equipment mode that allows authorized entry into a protected area
without alarm by electronically or mechanically deactivating a sensor or sensors. (2) The
ability and means to approach, store or retrieve data, or to communicate with or make use
of Information Technology resources. (3) The ability and opportunity to obtain knowledge of
classified information. An individual, in fact, may have access to classified information by being
in a place where such information is kept if the security measures which are in force are not
sufficient to prevent gaining knowledge of the classified information.
Access Code. A group of numbers and/or letters that when properly entered into a specific
device allow authorized into a specific area without causing alarm or activating sensors.
Access Control. (1) An aspect of security that utilizes hardware systems and specialized
procedures to control and monitor the movement of individuals, vehicles, or materials into, out
of, or within secured areas. Access to various points may be a function of authorization level
or time, or a combination of the two. (2) The use of physical security as a means of controlling
movement into or out of secured areas.
Access Control Card. A card containing coded information that is read by an access control
system; access is granted if the card is valid for that specific parameter; ie – date, time, place.
Alarm. (1) an alarm device or an alarm signal. (2) One or more detection devices connected
to a control device that indicate unauthorized intrusion. (3) An audible or visual warning device
triggered by the presence of abnormal conditions in a machine or system.
Alarm Station. (1) A manually actuated device installed at a fixed location to transmit an alarm
signal in response to an alarm condition, such as a concealed holdup button in a bank teller’s
cage. (2) A well-marked emergency control unit, installed a fixed location usually accessible to
the public, used to summon help in response to an alarm condition. The control unit contains
either a manually actuated switch or telephone connection to fire or police headquarters, or a
telephone answering service.
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Alarm Zone. Smaller subdivisions into which larger areas are divided to permit selective
access to some areas while maintaining other areas secure and to permit pinpointing the
specific location from which an alarm signal is transmitted.
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Federal act requiring individuals with disabilities be
reasonably accommodated.
Annealed. To subject glass or metal to a process of heating and slow cooling in order to
toughen, strengthen or harden and reduce brittleness.
Annunciator. (1) A device that signals a change of protection zone status in a security system.
An annunciator may log alarms or display a continuous status for each alarm sensor in a
system. Annunciators include Cathode Ray Tube displays; sometimes called an alarm receiver,
alarm monitor or alarm device. (2) The component of an alarm system that announces a
change of status of the systems, usually in the form of audible and/or visual signals.
Armory. An armory is a space within CBP law enforcement and detention facilities for the
storage, issuance, and upkeep of weaponry, ammunition, and chemical agents. Armory spaces
can include the issuing area, weapons maintenance area, leather storage area, ammunition
storage area, and high-powered weapons and ammunition storage area.
Audit Trail. A sequential record of system activities that is sufficient to enable the
reconstruction, review, and examination of the sequence of states and activities surrounding or
leading to each event in the path of a transaction from its inception to output of final results.
Authorized Persons. Those persons who have a need-to-know for the classified information
involved, and have been cleared for the receipt of such information. Responsibility for
determining whether a person’s duties require that he/she possess, or have access to, any
classified information, and whether he/she is authorized to receive it, rests upon the individual
who has possession, knowledge, or control of the information involved, and not upon the
prospective recipient. Also includes persons approved to enter a controlled or restricted area.
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Badge. An emblem (a small piece of plastic, cloth or metal) that signifies the bearer’s status,
rank or membership or affiliation. A device, patch, or accoutrement which is presented or
displayed to indicate some feat of service, a special accomplishment, a symbol of authority
(e.g., police), a simple means of identification. Also referred to in FLETC policy as a badge.
Balanced Magnetic Switch. A two-part sensor that generates an alarm condition when a
change in the magnetic field between the parts is detected. Usually mounted on a door and
doorframe to detect opening of the door. A balanced magnetic switch provides better protection
against a defeat attempt than a standard magnetic contact.
Bar Lock. (1) A type of rim lock in which metal bars slide out from a central point on the door
and into receivers on both sides of the door frame. Turning a key or bolt on the center element
retracts the bars enough to let the door open. A door with a bar lock cannot be pulled out of its
frame even if the hinge pins are removed. (2) a metal rod or tube which slides through fittings
affixed to the front of a file cabinet, bent at the top and secured with a combination lock, which
holds the drawers closed.
Battery Backup. A standby battery that is kept fully charged for use during a primary
power failure. An essential element in all electrically operated security systems. Also called
Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS).
Biometric Access Control. A method of access verification in which the person seeking entry
is identified by finger print, retinal eye pattern, palm pattern, hand geometry, voice analysis and
similar features.
BNC Connector (Bayonet Neil-Concelman). A standard CCTV coaxial cable connector with
a bayonet locking mechanism.
Bolt. The part of a lock which, when actuated, is projected (or “thrown”) from the lock into a
retaining member, such as a strike plate, to prevent a door or window from moving or opening.
See also dead bolt, flush bolt, and latch.
Camera Dome. Spherical high-impact plastic dome that covers a camera to protect it from the
environment or conceals it from view.
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Camera Housing. An enclosure designed to protect the CCTV camera from undue
environmental exposure, tampering, or theft.
Candela. The unit of luminous intensity in a given direction. One candela is commonly called
one candle power.
Capacitance. The property of two or more objects, which enables them to store electrical
energy in an electric field between them. The basic measurement unit is the Farad.
Capacitance varies inversely with the distance between the objects, so the change in
capacitance with relative motion is greater when one object is nearer to the other.
Capacitance Sensor. An electric condenser that radiates energy and detects changes in the
capacitive coupling between an antenna and a ground. When an intruder enters the energy
field the balance between the antenna and ground is disrupted, causing an alarm.
Card Access. A type of access control system that uses a card with a coded area or strip,
on or inside the card, to actuate a lock or other access control device. To activate the device,
the card is inserted into or through a slot where the data in the coded area is read. If the code
is accepted, a signal will be transmitted to unlock the device or perform some other access
control function. See definition of Card Reader for more information on types.
Card Key. A card, usually plastic, that contains encoded information to open a locking device.
Card Reader. A device that reads the information on a card key. Card readers may obtain
data from access cards by reading punched holes, magnetic spots, stripes or wires, or any of
several other methods that use punched, embossed, or embedded information. The reader
may be an integral part of the lock, or it can be located in the immediate vicinity. Card readers
fall in one of two categories, on-line or intelligent. On-line readers must communicate with
a central processor that makes the entry/exit decision and transmits a signal back to the
locking device. The intelligent card reader compares the data on the card with preprogrammed
parameters and entry or exit is granted or denied by the card reader itself at the reader
location. Intelligent readers are also called stand-alone or off-line readers.
Central Station. (1) An organization or business established for the purpose of monitoring
subscribers’ alarm systems from a centralized monitoring location rather than at the individual
sites. Communication with subscriber alarm systems is generally by telephone line, but may be
by wireless or direct wire. The central station notifies police or fire services immediately upon
receipt of alarm. All alarms are recorded and investigated. Central stations may utilize WATS
lines to extend services on a regional or national basis. (2) The control point of a monitoring
system that is normally supervised by security personnel.
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Central Station Alarm System. An alarm system that uses a central station, as distinguished
from a proprietary alarm system where the alarm monitoring is done on-site.
Change Key. A key that will operate only one lock or group of keyed-alike locks, as
distinguished from a master key.
Classified Information. Official information that has been identified and marked as Top
Secret, Secret, or Confidential in the interests of National Security.
Cognizant Security Authority. The Central Intelligence Agency has been designated by
the National Foreign Intelligence Board to maintain cognizance over the Department of the
Interior’s security program relating to approvals for access to, and the receipt, handling,
storage, and destruction of Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI).
Combination. The group of numbers that represent the bitting of a key and/or the tumblers of
a lock or cylinder.
Combination Lock. A keyless lock which requires the turning of a numbered dial to a preset
sequence of numbers for the lock to open. It is usually a three position, manipulation resistant,
dial type lock, although cipher locks with push buttons are also referred to as combination
locks.
Controlled Area. A room, office, building, or facility to which access is monitored, limited or
controlled. Admittance to a controlled area is limited to persons who have official business
within the area.
Control Unit. The nerve center of the alarm system located on the premises.
CS-Mount. A CCTV industry standard for lens mounting, consisting of a 1-inch diameter
threaded barrel with 32 threads per inch. The distance from the lens mounting surface to the
sensor surface is 0.492 inches (12.497 mm).
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Custodian. An individual who is designated the responsibility for maintaining the Classified
Document Register (DI Form 1834) and the centralized storage for a given functional area, and
is charged with the responsibility for safeguarding and accounting for classified information.
Cylinder. A housing that contains a tumbler mechanism and a keyway plug that can only be
turned by the correct key. It includes a cam or spindle to transmit rotary action to a lock or latch
mechanism.
Dead Bolt. A type of bolt that is moved in and out of the strike mechanically without spring
action, as by a thumb latch knob. Dead bolt locks are available in single and double
configuration; single throw/cylinder dead bolts have an actuating thumb switch on the interior
side of the door; double dead bolts utilize a key on both sides of the lock to actuate the lock.
Dead Latch. A spring-actuated latch bolt having a beveled end and incorporating a feature that
automatically locks the projected latch bolt against return by end pressure.
Dedicated Line. (1) A power or transmission line with a single function, such as data
transmission, or to a single source such as an outlet for a computer. (2) A non-shared
telephone line to an individual subscriber from a central station.
Dedicated Mode. Operation of an Automated Information System (AIS) when each user with
direct or indirect access to the AIS, its peripherals, remote terminals, or remote hosts, has all of
the following: a) a valid personnel clearance for all information on the system, b) formal access
approval for and has signed nondisclosure agreements for all the information stored and/or
processed (including all compartments, sub compartments and/or special access programs),
and c) a valid need-to-know for all information contained in the system.
Delay. A time interval, measured by an electronic circuit, used to provide a desired alarm
feature such as entry/exit delay.
Designated Official. The highest ranking official of the primary tenant agency of a Federal
facility or, alternatively, a designee selected by mutual agreement of tenant agency officials.
For facilities owned and leased by the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA), the
definition appears in Title 41, Section 102-71.20, of the Code of Federal Regulations (41 CFR
102-71.20).
Detector. Any device that senses the presence of an intruder, an intrusion attempt, fire, etc.
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Deterrent. Any physical or psychological device or method that discourages action. In the
physical security arena, locks or window grills are physical deterrents and the presence of a
guard or surveillance camera are psychological deterrents.
Door Closer. A device used to control the closing of a door by means of a spring and either
hydraulic or air pressure or by electronic means. Multi-stage closers provide for adjustments of
swing, latch, and back swing.
Doppler Effect. The change in the frequency of a wave, as a light wave or sound wave,
resulting from relative motion of the source and the receiver.
Dual Technology Sensor. A sensor using two types of sensing technology (e.g. PIR and
acoustic sensors) to reduce false alarms.
DUNS. The Data Universal Numbering System (DUNS) is a unique nine-digit numbering
system that is used to identify a business.
Duress Alarm. (1) An alarm condition that signals a dangerous situation, such as an intruder.
Often unobtrusive sensors so as to not place the victim in greater danger trigger these alarms.
Duress alarms are usually designed to silently initiate an alarm, which is annunciated at a
remote station or guard post. (2) A sensor used in a duress-sensing capacity.
Egress Button. A switch used near an access controlled door that, when pushed, sends a
signal to the controller to release the door locking device. (See also REX)
Electromagnetic Lock. A door lock that uses an electrically actuated magnetic attraction to
secure the door. Magnetic locks use no moving parts.
End Device. Any device at the end of an operating network, such as an alarm sensor, access
control reader, electrical lock, or hydraulic device.
Entry Function Lockset. A mortise or cylindrical lockset with the outside or both knobs locked
or unlocked by an inside thumb turn and unlocked or unlatched by an outside key.
Expanded Metal. An open mesh formed by slitting and drawing sheet metal. It is made in
various patterns and metal thickness, with either a flat or irregular surface.
Fail Safe. A condition whereby an electromechanical door lock reverts to the unlocked position
in the event of a power failure. This feature may be necessary for compliance with life safety
requirements in certain hardware applications.
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Fail Secure. A condition whereby an electromechanical door lock reverts to a locked position
when there is a power failure.
False Alarm. An alarm signal that does not represent a dangerous or unwanted condition,
usually caused by some fault or problem in the system.
FIPS 201. Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 201, entitled Personal Identity
Verification of Federal Employees and Contractors, was developed to satisfy the requirements
of HSPD 12, which is comprised of two (2) specific components PIV-I and PIV-II. FIPS 201
requires that the PIV card be a smart card and the card body is similar to a bank credit card
conforming to the ISO/IEC 7810 specification.
• The card must contain both contact and contactless interfaces, which may be provided
by two separate integrated circuit chips (ICC) or by one dual-interface ICC. The contact
interface must conform to the ISO/IEC 7816-4:2005 specification.
• The contactless interface must conform to the ISO/IEC 14443 specification.
• In most cases, physical access applications will use the contactless interface, although
there are special cases in which the contact interface will be used for physical access.
This is according to the NIST FIPS 201 PDF, the Standard Publication for Personal
Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and Contractors.
Floor Master Key. A master key which operates all or most lock cylinders on a particular floor
of a building.
Foil. An electrically conductive ribbon used for a sensing circuit. Foil is normally between
0.001 and 0.0003 inch in thickness, and from 0.125 to 1.0 inch in width. It is commonly used
on windows and other glass applications. The metal strip completes an electrical circuit that if
broken, causes an alarm condition. Also called tape.
Foot Candle. A unit of illumination, one foot-candle is the amount of light emitted by one
candle in one square foot. Abbreviated as fc. In the International Systems of Units, the unit
is lux (lumens per square meter). One foot-candle is equal to 10.76 lux; typically this is
approximated as 1 foot-candle being equal to 10 lux.
For Official Use Only (FOUO). The term used within DHS to identify unclassified information
of a sensitive nature, not otherwise categorized by statute or regulation, the unauthorized
disclosure of which could adversely impact a person’s privacy or welfare, the conduct
of Federal programs, or other programs or operations essential to the national interest.
Information impacting the National Security of the United States and classified Confidential,
Secret, or Top Secret under Executive Order 12958, “Classified National Security Information,”
as amended, or its predecessor or successor orders, is not to be considered FOUO. FOUO is
not to be considered classified information.
Grand Master Key. The key that operates two or more separate groups of locks, which are
each operated by different master keys.
Hinge. A type of bearing that connects two solid objects such as a door and a door frame.
There are many types of door hinges. Four main types include:
• Pivot Hinges, which pivot in openings in the floor and the top of the door frame. Also
referred to as a double-acting floor hinge. This type is found already in ancient dry stone
buildings;
• Butt/Mortise Hinges, usually in threes or fours, which are inset (mortised) into the door
and frame. Most residential hinges found in the U.S. are made of steel, although mortise
hinges for out swing doors are often made of brass or stainless steel base to prevent
corrosion;
• Continuous Hinges, which run the entire length of the door (also known as “Piano
Hinges”); and
• Concealed Hinges, used for furniture doors (with or without self-closing feature, and
with or without dampening systems). They are made of 2 parts: One part is the hinge
cup and the arm; the other part is the mounting plate.
Hinge Dowel. A dowel or pin which projects from a door jamb into an opening in the edge of a
door at its hinge which prevents removal of the locked door even if the hinges or hinge pins are
removed.
Holdup Alarm. An alarm that originates from a point where holdup protection is required, such
as a bank teller window or store cash register. It is usually a silent alarm to protect the cashier.
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Industrial Security. That portion of internal security that is concerned with the protection of
classified information in the hands of U.S. industry.
Infrared Motion Detector. A passive, low power, area protection device that detects a change
in ambient temperature within the coverage pattern caused by the movement of a body.
Sensor circuitry generates an alarm when a moving object causes a change in radiated energy
levels within the coverage area. These units are more sensitive to objects moving across the
beam pattern than to objects moving toward the sensor. Also called Passive Infrared.
Infrared Sensor. (1) Passive: detects an intruder by body heat (Infrared Energy), (2) Active: a
photoelectric beam that emits infrared to detect an intruder.
Initial Briefing. The initial indoctrination on the national security information provided to
personnel prior to being authorized access to classified information and the execution of the
Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement form.
Intrusion Detection System. An alarm system comprised of intrusion sensors and alarm
annunciation devices for the purpose of detecting intruders. Typical intrusion detectors include
balanced magnetic contact switches and ultrasonic, infrared, or microwave motion or intrusion
sensors.
Latch Guard. A plate, such as an astragal, applied to an out swinging door that covers a
portion of the door leaf and the door frame at the area where a spring latch or dead bolt enters
a strike plate.
Light Meter. A device used to measure the amount of light in a given area.
Line Supervision. A means where a known current is present on the line to the central station.
Cutting or shorting the line changes this current, which results in an alarm.
Local Alarm. An alarm that annunciates at the location of a locking device, to discourage
or announce intrusion attempts. The alarm usually uses a bell, siren, lighting system or
combination of such devices. It usually turns off automatically after a pre-set time, although
some require a manual shutoff. A local alarm may also be linked to a central station or other
remote location.
Lux. Abbreviation for unit of illuminance set by the International System of Units (SI); lumens
per square meter. A measurement of 10 Lux is equal to 1 foot-candle.
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Magnetic Contact. A magnetically operated switch, typically used on doors and windows to
detect opening.
Magnetic Lock. A type of door lock consisting of an electromagnet and opposing strike plate.
When current is applied the strength of the electromagnet secures the door to the strike plate.
Magnetometer. An electronic device used specifically to search personnel for hidden metallic
weapons (knives and guns) at entrances to airports, public schools, courthouses, and other
guarded spaces. When used with access control equipment, they can perform two functions:
Microwave Sensor. An active intrusion sensor that detects the movement of a person or
object through a pattern of microwave energy. Microwave sensors are classified as monostatic,
bistatic, or terrain following. Generally, they use the Doppler Effect to recognize movement
within a protected area. Bistatic sensors operate on a beam break principle. Terrain-following
microwave sensors are essentially bistatic sensors with antenna configurations that are not
overall line-of-sight. Monostatic sensors are typically designated for indoor use; bistatic and
terrain-following sensors are normally used for outdoor applications.
Mogul Lock. A high-security lock that incorporates a number of features designed to defeat
attempts to pick or destroy it. The lock cylinder assembly employs multiple arrays of pass key
pins, making picking of the lock much more difficult. The arrangement of the pass key pins
in separate arrays requires that multiple cuts would have to be made into the lock housing
or cylinder in order to defeat the lock cylinder assembly. The lock cylinder assembly may
incorporate multiple sets of hardened dowel pins to prevent drilling through the lock housing in
the area of the driver pins.
Mortis Lock. A lock with its case is mortised or recessed into the edge of the door. The most
common variety of mortise lock has a door knob on each side of the door; however, entrance
doors often have an exterior thumb-latch, rather than a door knob, to open the door. The
mortise lock can be locked from the inside by a thumb turn, or by a button on the edge of the
lock case. A key is required to lock or unlock it from the outside.
Multiplexer. A device that allows the simultaneous communication of two or more signals for
transmission to a remote annunciator or central station. In video, a device that allows a camera
to be electronically switched to a variety of image projection and recording devices.
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OMB. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is one of the agencies of the Executive
Branch of the U.S. Government. Its predominant mission is to assist the President in
overseeing the preparation of the Federal budget and to supervise its administration in
Executive Branch agencies.
Passive Infrared Sensor (PIR). A sensor that is sensitive changes in infrared energy. It is
designed to detect motion by sensing the change in infrared energy as a human passes in
front of its normal background target.
Peened Hinge. A peened hinge is a metal hinge that has had its pins improved by peening.
Peening is the process of working a metal’s surface usually by mechanical means such as
hammer blows or by blasting with shot (shot peening). Peening expands the pins head surface
total area and precludes easy removal. Other methods of securing hinge pins include: spot
welding, door pinning, and non-removable hinge pins (NRP) which use a set screw to secure
the hinge pin; the set screw is accessible only with the door in the open position.
Perimeter Protection. A scheme of protection that uses devices to detect intrusion at points of
entry into a protected area such as doors, windows, skylights, etc.
Photo Access Card (PAC). A PAC is a physical artifact, a plastic card issued by CBP to
employees, contractors and detailees, which allow the bearers, authorized access to CBP
Facilities.
Photoelectric Alarm. A kind of motion detector that uses a focused beam of light (usually
ultraviolet) to detect an intruder. Any interruption in the light path will set off the alarm. The
beam is usually aimed so that an intruder would have to break the beam in order to move
through the protected area. Sometimes called an electric eye.
PIV-I. Specifies the minimum requirements for a Federal Personal Identification Verification
(PIV) system that meets control and security objectives of HSPD-12, including the personal
identity proofing process. PIV was defined by NIST, the National Institute of Standards and
Technology, an agency of the U.S. Commerce Department’s Technology Administration dealing
with the performance of background checks for employees and contractors.
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Propellant-Activated Device. Any tool or special mechanized device or gas generator system
that is activated by a propellant or releases or directs work through a propellant charge.
Proximity Card. An identification card containing a microcircuit. When place in close proximity
to a card reader, the card will activate the reader’s circuitry and register its assigned unique
code.
Radiation Detector. A small electronic device about the size of a pager (Personal Radiation
Detector) or a hand held electronic device (Radiation Isotope Identification Device) or a large
portal (Radiation Portal Monitor) that is capable of detecting gamma and neutron emissions
from radioactive isotopes.
The Personal Radiation Detector (PRD) is worn on the Border Protection Officer’s utility belt
while he/she is on duty. The Radiation Isotope Identification Device (RIID) is used by Border
Protection Officers to determine the exact source of a radiation alarm. The Radiation Portal
Monitor (RPM) provides a passive, non-intrusive means to screen cars, trucks and other
conveyances for the presence of radioactive and nuclear materials.
Refresher Briefing. The periodic reindoctrination on the national security information program
provided to personnel with continuing authorized access to classified information.
Restricted Area. A room, office, building, or facility to which access is strictly and tightly
controlled. Admittance to a restricted area is limited to personnel assigned to the area or
persons who have been specifically authorized access to the area. Visitors to a restricted area
and uncleared personnel must be escorted by personnel assigned to the area and all classified
and sensitive information must be protected from observation, disclosure or removal.
Risk Analysis. An analytical tool used to minimize risk by applying security measures
commensurate with the threats, vulnerabilities, and values of the asset(s) to be protected.
Risk Assessment. A detailed study of the vulnerabilities, threats, likelihood, loss or impact of
loss and theoretical effectiveness of security measures.
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Risk Management. The process of factoring the criticality of assets with the vulnerability to a
threat, and determining the threshold of acceptable risk.
Screens. An array of wires or electrified screening that protects areas or openings, such as
skylights and crawl spaces. It may use broken circuit or capacitance techniques to sense
intrusion.
Security Liaison (SL). The individual responsible for coordinating compliance with the
implementation of CBP security programs through the District Security Officer/Regional
Security Officer and serve as the primary point of contact for all security issues in the their
facilities.
Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) Building Information. SBU includes but is not limited to
paper and/or electronic documentation of the physical facility information.
SBU is the formal designation for information that, by law or regulation, requires some form
of protection but is outside the formal system of classification, in accordance with Executive
Order 12958, Classified National Security Information as amended, and DHS MD 11042.1
Safeguarding Sensitive But Unclassified (For Official Use Only) Information.
Small Arms Ammunition. Any shotgun, rifle or pistol cartridge and any cartridge for
propellant-activated devices. This definition does not include military ammunition containing
bursting charges or incendiary, tracer, spotting or pyrotechnic projectiles.
Special Access Program. Any program imposing access controls beyond those normally
provided for access to Confidential, Secret, or Top Secret. Such programs include special
clearances, investigative requirements, or special access lists of persons determined to require
special access. Special access programs pertaining to intelligence activities, or intelligence
sources or materials exercised by the Director of Central Intelligence.
Special Security Officer (SSO). An individual who is designated the responsibility for the
secure operation of a SCIF and insuring the secure handling, storage, destruction and
transmittal of foreign intelligence material.
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Spring Latch. A beveled, spring loaded bolt of a rim, mortise, or cylindrical lockset that is
retracted by a knob, lever,or key, and is depressed by a strike plate lip. The bolt is extended by
the spring pressure.
Strongroom. A reinforced interior space enclosed by or separated from other similar spaces
by four walls, a ceiling and a floor, constructed of solid building materials, and used for storage
of classified materials.
Supervised Lines. Interconnecting lines in alarm systems that are electrically supervised
against tampering. See also Line Supervision.
Surreptitious Entry. The unauthorized entry into a facility or security container in a manner in
which evidence of such entry is not discernable under normal circumstances.
Tamper Switch. A switch, usually mechanically operated, used to detect opening of alarm
equipment.
Termination Briefing. The briefing provided to personnel upon termination of authorization for
access to classified information and their acknowledgement of their continuing responsibilities
by executing a Debriefing Acknowledgement.
Threat. Acts or conditions which may result in the compromise of information, loss of life,
damage, loss or destruction of property or the disruption of the mission of an organization.
Top Guard. Anti-personnel device, usually of barbed or concertina wire, installed at the tops of
fences and along roof edges.
Ultrasonic Detector. A device that senses motion in a protected area by a Doppler shift in the
transmitted ultrasonic energy. The device operates by filling a space with a pattern of ultrasonic
waives; the modulation of these waves by a moving object is detected and initiates an alarm
signal.
Unauthorized Person. Any person who is not authorized to have access to specific classified
information. Regardless of the degree of clearance, an individual is not authorized access to
classified information of any degree without a demonstrated need-to-know.
Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS). UPS systems provide backup power. They monitor
the incoming power lines and provide continuous electrical current in the event of a change in
voltage. The UPS provides a certain amount of battery backup.
Vault. A windowless enclosure of heavy, reinforced construction with walls, floor, roof and
door(s) designed and constructed to delay penetration sufficiently to enable the timely arrival of
response forces.
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Vibration Detection. An alarm system that employs one or more contact microphones and
vibration sensors, which are fastened to the surfaces of the area or object being protected to
detect excessive levels of vibration. The contact microphone system consists of microphones,
a control unit containing an amplifier and an accumulator, and a power supply. The unit’s
sensitivity is adjustable so that ambient noises or normal vibrations will not initiate an alarm
signal.
Visitor. Any person who is not a DHS or CBP Federal employee or DHS or CBP contractor
with current DHS or CBP suitability and issued a DHS or CBP Photo Access Card (PAC).
Volumetric Alarm. A system that detects movement through the interior of an alarmed area,
as opposed to the detection of perimeter penetrations.
Vulnerability. The probability that a threat will result in the compromise of information, loss of
life, damage, loss or destruction of property or the disruption of the mission of an organization.
Walk Test. A procedure of actually walking through the area protected by a motion detector to
determine the limits of its coverage.
X-ray System. A device or system that inspects the contents of a package or container for
concealed explosives or contraband. Some systems can only detect objects made of materials
possessing high atomic numbers, such as steel, tin, aluminum, and iron. Other systems can
detect materials with both high and low atomic numbers. Some systems have two monitors,
one for objects with high atomic numbers and one for objects with low atomic numbers. Color
systems presently available use only one monitor to view both types of materials. Specific
colors are assigned to high and low atomic number materials. Such systems can detect and
discriminate among plastics, metals, and explosives in firearms and bombs.
Zone. Large protected premises are divided into areas or zones, each having its own
identification and/or annunciation.
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I. CBP Information Security (INFOSEC)
CBP Protection of Classified Information (INFOSEC)
Awareness Training for Safeguarding Sensitive But Unclassified/For Official Use Only
Information - 11/29/2007
Keith Booker
CBP COMSEC COR Program Manager
Supervisory COMSEC
Desk: 540-542-2430
Blackberry: 571-271-9653
Fax: 540-542-2994
[email protected]
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Chuck Lamb
COMSEC Specialist
Desk: 540-665-5312
Blackberry: 202-528-9388
Fax: 540-542-2994
[email protected]
The Office of Information Technology (OIT) Network and Security Operations (NSO) and
the Security and Technology Policy (STP) Branch spearheaded a newly formed COMSEC
Working Group to unify all Communications Security (COMSEC) under an OIT sponsored
centralized program. The COMSEC Working Group includes representation from all CBP
COMSEC stakeholders to include Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination (OIOC),
Office of Internal Affairs (OIA), Office of Field Operations (OFO), Office of Border Patrol (OBP)
and Office of Air & Marine (OAM). COMSEC services include identification of equipment to
be procured, start-up of new secure communications equipment, inventory services, and
coordination of service and maintenance. It is critical that CBP maintains its current system
for transmitting time-sensitive classified communications from CBP Headquarters to the
field offices. This working group was established to charter the CBP COMSEC program
governance, structure and operational capabilities.
Though the COMSEC Account will not be authorized for open storage, the DHS Management
Directive (MD) No. 11046 Open Storage Area Standards for Collateral Classified Information
(issued 2/22/2005) be used in the certification process. This is in addition to verifying that the
minimum physical security standards set forth in NSTISSI No. 4005 has been met for the room
where the COMSEC Account will be established.
Physical security certification of the room where a COMSEC Account is located can only be
approved by the Office of Internal Affairs. If Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) will be
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in the COMSEC Account, then the request must be coordinated through the Office of Internal
Affairs, to the DHS Office of Security for physical security certification of the room. The Office
of Internal Affairs will coordinate the request for the physical security certification for a SCI level
COMSEC Account room with the DHS Office of Security.
Request for physical security certification of COMSEC Account room is to be submitted to cbp.
[email protected].
For securing a crypto card and or a secure telephone device in a government office, the
COMSEC User must comply with the DHS Secure Telephone User Guide, Attachment Q3 to
the DHS MD 4300B.
Physical security certification of a private residence for securing a crypto card and or a
secure telephone device can only be approved by the Office of Internal Affairs. If Top Secret
is involved, then the request must be coordinated through the Office of Internal Affairs, to the
DHS Office of Security for physical security certification of the residence.
Request for physical security certification of a private residence for securing a crypto card and
or a secure telephone device is to be submitted to [email protected]. Upon receipt of the
request, the Office of Internal Affairs will provide the required documents.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Foreword........................................................................ 745
1. Chapter 1: Introduction..........................................747
1.1. Policy............................................................................................ 747
10.8. RECEIPTS.....................................................................................803
11. Chapter 11: Security Violations and Infractions.....805
11.1. POLICY.........................................................................................805
11.2. DEFINITIONS................................................................................805
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14.6. DURATION OF SSI AND SSI REVIEWS ....................................828
16.1. POLICY.........................................................................................839
16.2. RESPONSIBILITIES.....................................................................839
16.4. SELF-INSPECTIONS....................................................................840
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17. Appendix A - Security Forms....................................841
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Foreword
U.S. Customs and Border Protection Safeguarding Classified and Sensitive But
Unclassified Handbook.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) are charged with securing America’s
borders to protect American people and our economy. CBP ensures border security
against terrorist, other criminals and weapons of mass destruction, while facilitating
legitimate trade and travel.
CBP achieves critical missions while working with critical information such as Classified
National Security Information, For Official Use Only/Law Enforcement Sensitive
Information and Sensitive Security Information.
Safeguarding classified and sensitive but unclassified information is vital to our mission
and operations. I fully support the Office of Internal Affairs in their program oversight
activities of CBP’s Information Security Program.
Deputy Commissioner
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
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1. Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1. Policy
1.1.1. This security handbook implements the Executive Order 12958, as amended,
Classified National Security Information and Department of Homeland
Security Management Directives, 11000 series. It is applicable to all persons
who are permanently or temporarily assigned, detailed to, employed or
under contract with Customs and Border Protection (CBP). It establishes
safeguarding, classifying, declassifying, and downgrading of official
information requiring protection in the interest of national security.
1.1.2. This handbook also establishes safeguards for sensitive but unclassified
information within CBP. DHS departmental policy states, that all sensitive but
unclassified information generated within DHS and it’s components, that is not
regulated by statute, shall be referred to as “For Official Use Only,” (FOUO).
DHS MD 11042.1, provides specific guidance for the safeguarding of such
information.
1.1.3. The provisions of this handbook set forth the minimum security standards and
safeguards to ensure the protection of classified and sensitive but unclassified
information within CBP.
1.2. Authorities
1.2.1. Executive Order 12333, as amended 46 F.R. 59941 (Dec 8, 1981); 68
F.R. 4075 (Jan. 23, 2003); 73 F.R. 45325 (July 30, 2008), United States
Intelligence Activities
1.2.2. Executive Order 12829, as amended 58 F.R. 3470 (Jan 6, 1993); 58 F.R.
65863 (Dec 14, 1993), National Industrial Security Information.
1.2.3. Executive Order 12958, as amended, 68 F.R. 15315 (Mar 28, 2003),
Classified National Security Information
1.2.4. Executive Order 13284, Amendment of Executive Orders, and Other Actions,
in Connection with the Establishment of the Department of Homeland Security
1.2.5. 6 CFR §7, Department of Homeland Security, Classified National Security
Information
1.2.6. 32 CFR §2001, Part Implementing Directive for E.O. 12958, as amended
1.2.7. 44 USC Chapters 21, 31, 33, Federal Records Act
1.2.8. 49 USC §114(s), Nondisclosure of Security Activities
1.2.9. 49 CFR §1.520, Protection of Sensitive Security Information, May 18, 2004
1.2.10. Homeland Security Act, Pub L. 107-296, 116 Stat 2135 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 6 USC §101 et seq).
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1.2.11. 96-456, “Classified Information Procedures Act”
1.2.12. PL 107-71, 115, Stat. 597 (2001) “Aviation and Transportation Security Act”
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2. Chapter 2: Responsibilities
2.1. THE COMMISSIONER, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION (CBP)
2.1.1. Shall designate the Assistant Commissioner, Office of Internal Affairs, as the
Component Chief Security Officer (CSO).
2.2. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF INTERNAL
AFFAIRS AS THE DESIGNATED CSO
2.2.1. Shall serve as the principal advisor to the CBP Deputy Commissioner
regarding CBP’s Information Security Program;
2.2.2. Shall ensure sufficient resources are in place to implement and manage
CBP’s Information Security Program and the requirements of this handbook;
and
2.2.3. Shall designate the Director, Security Management Division to implement and
manage the CBP Information Security Program.
2.3. THE DIRECTOR, SECURITY MANAGEMENT DIVISION
2.3.1. Shall direct and administer CBP’s Information Security Program under which
information is classified, safeguarded, and declassified;
2.3.2. Shall issue any necessary written procedures required for the effective
implementation of this handbook.
2.4. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONERS, DIRECTORS, AND OTHERS
WITH EQUIVALENT AUTHORITY
2.4.1. CBP may choose to exceed the standards as cited within this handbook,
but may not lessen them, per DHS MD 11044. If the choice is to exceed
the minimum requirements, sufficient justification must exist to warrant any
increased expenditures
2.4.2. Shall appoint in writing a Designated Security Officer (DSO) for their
respective areas of responsibility to ensure procedures set forth in this
handbook are followed.
2.5. DESIGNATED SECURITY OFFICERS
2.5.1. Shall provide assistance and support to regional CBP personnel and serve as
a liaison to the Office of Internal Affairs for applicable matters relating to the
implementation and compliance with the provisions of this handbook.
2.6. THE OFFICE OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS, PERSONNEL SECURITY
DIVISION
2.6.1. Shall develop policy and procedures which implement and administer the
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not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
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not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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in this handbook. As such, the Office of Internal Affairs will conduct periodic
program reviews of CBP offices that store and handle classified information to
assess compliance and provide guidance and assistance as necessary.
3.3.28. Self-Inspections. Each CBP office that creates stores or handles classified
information must participate in the Self Inspection Program (SIP). The Office
of Internal Affairs will evaluate results and ensure that deficiencies cited are
resolved appropriately.
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4.4.1. Customs and Border Protection officials who are delegated OCA by DHS will
be officially announced in the form of a DHS management directive. CBP
officials who have been delegated original classification authority cannot
further delegate this authority. However, if an appropriately cleared individual
is designated to act on behalf of a delegated OCA, that individual has the
authority to classify eligible information.
4.4.2. Persons delegated OCA at a specified level are also authorized to classify
information at a lower level.
4.4.3. CBP office heads may request OCA delegation where an operational need
exists. Request for OCA delegations shall be submitted to DHS Office of
Security through the Assistant Commissioner, Office of Internal Affairs using
the DHS Form 1401-1 “Request for Original Classification Authority.” OCA
delegation requests shall be based on justification of a demonstrated and
continuing need for such authority.
4.4.4. CBP Officials serving in OCA delegated positions:
●● Shall be trained on OCA responsibilities, methods, and procedures, within
sixty (60) days of occupying a delegated position. The Office of Internal
Affairs is responsible for providing this training.
●● Are encouraged to consult with the Office of Internal Affairs for assistance
when classifying information.
●● Shall communicate original decisions either through use of a classification
guide and/or through markings placed directly on the materials.
●● Shall ensure record systems are designed and maintained to optimize the
safeguarding of classified information, and to facilitate the declassification
of records under the provisions of Chapter 5, Declassification, and as
defined in EO 12958, as amended, when such information no longer
meets the standards for continued classification.
4.5. ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION PROCESS
4.5.1. Original classification is the initial determination that an item of information
requires protection against unauthorized disclosure in the interest of nation
security. Information may be originally classified under the terms of EO
12958, as amended if all of the following conditions are met.
●● An Original Classification Authority (OCA) classifies the information;
●● The information is owned by, produced by or for, or is under the control of
the U.S. Government; (for purposes of this handbook, “control” means the
authority of CBP to regulate access to the information.)
●● The information falls within one or more of the categories of information
listed in section 4.7 below as defined in EO 12958, as amended;
●● The OCA determines that the unauthorized disclosure of the information
reasonably could be expected to cause in damage to the national security
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distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
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confidential sources;
o 1.4 (e) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national
security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism;
o 1.4 (f) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials
or facilities;
o 1.4 (g) vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations,
infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to
the national security, which includes defense against transnational
terrorism; or
o 1.4 (h) weapons of mass destruction.
4.8. DURATIONS OF CLASSIFICATION UNDER EO 12958
4.8.1. At the time of original classification under EO 12958, as amended, the OCA
will assign a date or event at which time the information will be downgraded
and/or declassified. At the time of classification, original classifiers shall:
●● Attempt to determine a specific date or event within ten years of the
date of origination, upon which the information can be automatically
declassified. If that is not possible, OCAs shall attempt to:
●● Assign a date ten years (10) from the date of origination at which the
information can be automatically declassified. Should the sensitivity of the
information warrant classification beyond a 10-year period, they shall:
4.8.2. Assign a date no longer than 25 years from the date of origination at which
the information will be automatically declassified, unless it is reclassified.
4.8.3. OCA cannot classify information beyond the 25 years unless such information
has been specifically approved for exemption from declassification pursuant
to EO 12958, as amended and Chapter 5, Declassification of this handbook.
The only exception to this rule is when disclosure of the information could
be expected to reveal the identity of a confidential human source or human
intelligence source. In this instance, the “Declassify On” line may be marked
25X-Human. This marking is not authorized for use when the information
pertains to non-human intelligence sources or intelligence methods.
4.9. COMMUNICATING ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION DECISIONS
4.9.1. Classification decisions will be communicated either through publication of
a security classification guide (see 4.10) or markings placed directly on the
materials by the authorized OCA.
4.10. CBP CLASSIFICATION GUIDES
4.10.1. Classification guides are a documentary form of classification issued by
an Original Classification Authority. The guide identifies the elements
of information regarding a specific subject that must be classified and
establishes the level and duration of classificaction for each element.
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4.10.2. CBP offices and/or programs that develop classification guides will coordinate
the development of such guides with the CBP, Office of Internal Affairs, Office
of Intelligence and Operations Coordination, and DHS Office of Security.
●● CBP classification guides will be prepared consistent with the standard
DHS format. See EO 12958, Classified National Security Information, as
amended, and DHS MD 11041 Protection of Classified National Security
Information Program Management.
●● CBP classification guides must be coordinated through the DHS Office
of Security prior to the appropriate CBP delegated OCA signing the CBP
classification guides.
●● Final copies of CBP classification guides shall be submitted to the DHS
Office of Security for file in the central DHS-wide classification guide
repository.
4.10.3. Original classification authority is not required for individuals using
classification guides. CBP personnel who generate information that requires
classification based on the guide are authorized to “classify” the information
by citing the applicable item in the guide and applying the classification level.
This action is derivative classification from a classification guide.
4.11. CLASSIFICATION PROHIBITIONS
4.11.1. Information shall not be classified to:
●● Conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error;
●● Prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency;
●● Restrain competition; or
●● Prevent or delay the release of information that does not require protection
4.11.2. Classify basic scientific research information not clearly related to the national
security.
4.12. CLASSIFICATION BY COMPILATION
4.12.1. Compilations of items of information that are individually unclassified
may be classified in certain circumstances if the compilation reveals an
additional association or relationship that meets the standards and criteria
for classification under EO 12958, as amended; the additional association
or relationship is not otherwise evident or revealed in the individual items of
information; and the information is classified by an OCA. In this instance, the
additional association or relationship is what is considered for classification,
not the individual items of unclassified information. Careful consideration must
be taken when determining the need for classification by compilation. When
the determination is made that classification by compilation is necessary, the
OCA must provide explicit instructions as to what elements of the compilation
when combined, constitute classification and the addition association or
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of Internal Affairs. The Office of Internal Affairs will submit one component
report to the DHS Office of Security as part of the annual reporting
requirements defined in EO 12958, as amended.
4.23. DERIVATIVE CLASSIFICATION SPECIALIZED TRAINING
4.23.1. Persons performing, or who plan to perform, derivative classification actions
should attend specialized training for the proper procedures and marking
of materials. The Office of Internal Affairs is responsible for providing such
training.
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5. Chapter 5: Declassification
5.1. POLICY
5.1.1. Information that continues to meet the classification requirements of
Executive Order 12958, Classified National Security Information, requires
continued protection; all Customs and Border Protection information to
include legacy Customs and Immigration and Naturalization information shall
be declassified as soon as it no longer meets the standards for classification
under this executive order.
5.1.2. CBP personnel shall coordinate with the CBP Records Manager before
reviewing records in their holdings to ensure that appropriate procedures are
established for maintaining the integrity of the records and that the National
Archives and Records Administration (NARA) receives accurate information
about CBP declassification actions when records are transferred to NARA.
5.1.3. CBP senior officials who have reason to believe that the public interest in
disclosure of information outweighs the need for continued classification shall
refer the matter to the Office of Internal Affairs, who will further coordinate with
the appropriate original classification authority or DHS Senior Official.
5.1.4. None of the provisions cited in this directive apply to information classified in
accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Restricted Data
and Formerly Restricted Data).
5.2. DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY
5.2.1. Information may be declassified or downgraded by:
●● The Secretary of Homeland Security;
●● The DHS Cheif Security Officeer as defined in DHS MD 8100.3;
●● Officials who have been delegated Original Classification Authority, their
current successor in function, or a supervisory official of either;
●● Officials who have been delegated declassification authority, in writing by
the Secretary or DHS Senior Agency Official; and
●● CBP Declassification Authorities identified by appropriate delegation order.
5.2.2. CBP officials with declassification authority shall develop and issue
declassification guides to facilitate effective review and declassification of
CBP information (which includes legacy the U.S. Customs Service and the
Immigration and Naturalization Service information) not previously covered
by a classification or declassification guide, and for information exempt from
automatic declassification.
5.2.3. Declassification Authority is not required for simply canceling or changing
classification markings in accordance with declassification or downgrading
instructions cited on a document, directions found in a security classification
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●● If the requester files an appeal through the DHS/CAP, and the appeal is
denied, the requester shall be notified of the right to appeal the denial to
the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP).
5.7.6. Foreign Government Information
●● The declassification agency is the agency that initially received or
classified the information. When foreign government information is being
considered for declassification or appears to be subject to automatic
declassification, the declassifying agency shall determine whether the
information is subject to a treaty or international agreement that would
prevent its declassification at that time. The declassifying agency or the
Department of State, as appropriate, should consult with the foreign
government prior to declassification.
5.7.7. Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act Requests
●● If a requester submits a request under both the mandatory declassification
review provisions cited in this handbook and the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA), 5 USC §552, the requester shall be advised to elect one
process or the other. If the requester fails to elect one or the other, the
request will be treated as a FOIA request.
5.7.8. Systematic Declassification Review
●● CBP shall conduct systematic declassification review for classified
information that is exempted from automatic declassification which:
o Contain information that has been identified to have significant value
for historical or scientific research or for promoting the public welfare;
and
o Have reasonable likelihood of being declassified upon review.
●● CBP personnel shall contact the Office of Internal Affairs for further
systematic declassification review guidance.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
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not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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6.1.9. A concise reason for classification which, at a minimum, cites the applicable
classification category as defined in Chapter 4.6.
●● Example
Classified By: Commissioner,
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
●● When the reason for classification is not apparent from the content of the
information (e.g., classification by compilation) the classifier shall provide
a more detailed explanation of the reason for classification.
6.1.10. Declassification Instruction. Note: the X1 through X8 exemption categories
formerly used to exempt information from 10-year declassification can no
longer be used. The duration of the original classification decision shall
be placed on the “Declassify On” line. All classified materials shall have a
declassification date and/or instruction. One of the following instructions shall
apply:
●● A date or event for declassification less than 10 years, or if unable to
identify such a date or event;
–– A date 10 years from the date of the document for declassification;
–– A date greater than 10 and less than 25 years from the date of the
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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document; or
–– A date 25 years from the date of the document.
6.1.11. The following information may be exempt from automatic declassification as
defined below, if approved pursuant to 5.4.2.
●● Reveal the identity of a confidential human source, or a human intelligence
source, or reveal information about the application of an intelligence
source or method;
●● Reveal information that would assist in the development or use of
weapons of mass destruction;
●● Reveal information that would impair U.S. cryptologic systems or activities;
●● Reveal information that would impair the application of state of the art
technology within a U.S. weapon system;;
●● Reveal actual U.S. military war plans that remain in effect;
●● Reveal information, including foreign government information, that would
seriously and demonstrably impair relations between the United States
and a foreign government, or seriously and demonstrably undermine
ongoing diplomatic activities of the United States;
●● Reveal information that would clearly demonstrably impair the current
ability of United States Government officials to protect the President, Vice
President, and other protectees from whom protection services, in the
interest of the national security, are authorized;
●● Reveal information that would seriously and demonstrably impair current
national security emergency preparedness plans or reveal current
vulnerabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, or projects relating
to the national security; or
●● Violate a statute, treaty, or international agreement.
6.1.12. Derivative Classification Markings
6.1.13. The Information Security Oversight Office Directive No.1 “Marking Classified
Information Pamphlet” sets forth the uniform security classification system
for standard markings that are applied to classified information, original or
derivative.
6.1.14. The DHS Standard Security Classification Guide, also describes the markings
that shall be uniformly and conspicuously applied to classified information.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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7.3.1. CBP employees who have a need to certify their security clearance
information to another government agency or contracting facility must initiate
the CBP Form 6101, Classified Visit Request Security Clearance Certification
as defined in the Personnel Security Handbook, HB 1400-07. Some agencies
or government facilities require the use of their own form for visits to their
facilities. The individual coordinating the security clearance certification
should verify the method acceptable to other agencies prior to the visit. For
policy regarding outside CBP employee visit certification of security clearance
refer to Section 7.6.10.
7.4. DISSEMINATION OF CBP CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.
7.4.1. Each CBP Office head, Director, or Program Manager is responsible for
providing specific procedures for dissemination of classified information
originated by his or her office. Procedures must include but not be limited
to the guidance cited in Section 7.2.1 and Sections 7.5-7.7.6.11 and must
otherwise be consistent with this Directive.
7.5. DISSEMINATION OF OTHER AGENCY INFORMATION
7.5.1. Also commonly known as the “Third Agency Rule.” Classified information
originated by another agency and furnished to DHS and DHS components
shall not be further distributed outside of DHS without the prior consent of the
originating agency. Unless limitations have been imposed by the originator,
this restriction does not apply to further distribution to authorized personnel
within DHS and components of DHS, or distribution to cleared contractors
who require the information in performance of a DHS contract.
7.6. DISSEMINATION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
7.6.1. Outside the Executive Branch
●● Classified information can be made available to persons outside the
Executive Branch provided that such information is necessary for
performance of a function for which the U.S. Government will derive
a benefit or advantage, and that such release is not prohibited by the
originating department or agency.
7.6.2. Judicial
●● The CBP Chief Counsel will be consulted whenever a litigation request
or demand is made upon CBP personnel for official CBP information
for testimony concerning such information. The personnel upon whom
the request or demand was made shall immediately notify the Office of
Chief Counsel or servicing regional Associate or Assistant Chief Counsel.
The CBP Office of Chief Counsel will consult with the DHS Office of the
General Counsel accordingly with all requests. Classified information
entered into the Judicial System shall be handled in accordance with the
Classified Information Procedures Act (PL 96-456). Justices of the U.S.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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Supreme Court and Judges of the U.S. Courts of Appeals and District
Courts do not require an investigation and determination of eligibility for
access to classified information. All other members must be appropriately
investigated and granted a security clearance.
7.6.3. Congress
●● Access to classified information or material by Congress, its committee,
members, and staff representatives shall be coordinated with the CBP
Office of Congressional Affairs. The CBP Office of Congressional Affairs
will further coordinate with the DHS Office of Legislative Affairs. Any
CBP employee testifying before a Congressional committee in executive
session, in relation to a classified matter, shall obtain the assurance of
the committee that the individuals present have a security clearance
commensurate with the highest classification of information that may be
discussed. Members of Congress, by virtue of their elected positions, do
not require an investigation and determination of eligibility for access to
classified information. All other congressional staff members and other
associated officials must be appropriately investigated and granted a
security clearance.
7.6.4. State, Local, Tribal, and Private Sector Officials
●● State Governors, by virtue of their elected positions, do not require an
investigation and determination for eligibility for access to collateral
classified information. Other State, Local, Tribal and Private Sector
Officials must be appropriately investigated and granted a security
clearance by DHS or other Federal government agencies.
7.6.5. Foreign Nationals
●● U.S. Intelligence information and classified information may be shared
with foreign nationals only when consistent with U.S. national security and
foreign policy objectives and when an identifiable benefit can be expected
for the United States. For requirements of sharing of such information
with foreign nationals and security clearance verification, refer to the CBP
Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination who further coordinates
with the DHS Foreign Disclosure Office.
7.6.6. Representatives of the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
●● Representatives of the GAO may be granted access to classified
information when such information is relevant to the performance of
the statutory responsibilities of that office. Certifications of security
clearances, and the basis thereof, shall be accomplished pursuant to
arrangements between GAO and CBP Office of Internal Affairs.
7.6.7. Government Printing Office (GPO)
●● Documents and material of all classification may be processed by the
GPO, which protects the information in accordance with the guidelines
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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with the interest of national security in view of the intended use of the
material to which access is granted, and by certifying that the requester
has been determined to be trustworthy based on such investigation as
determined by the CSO.
o Limit access to specific categories of information over which DHS
has classification jurisdiction and to any other category of information
for which the former appointee obtains the written consent of a non-
DHS Department or Agency that has classification jurisdiction over
information contained in or revealed by documents within the scope of
the proposed access.
o Retain custody of the classified material at a DHS installation or
activity, or authorizes access to documents in the custody of the
National Archives and Records Administration.
o Obtain the former Presidential appointee’s agreement, through the
execution of a non-disclosure agreement, to safeguard the information
and to submit any notes and manuscripts for review by DHS or non-
DHS departments or agencies with classification jurisdiction for a
determination that no classified information is contained therein.
7.6.10. Security Clearance Certification CBP Visit Notification
●● For personnel visiting CBP facilities for meetings/projects where classified
information is shared, security clearance verification shall be submitted
from the Security Office of the parent organization to the Office of Internal
Affairs (IA), Personnel Security Division (PSD). CBP personnel shall not
disclose any classified information to visitors until notification from Internal
Affairs/ Personnel Security Division (IA/PSD) that security clearance has
been verified.
7.6.11. Emergency Release of Classified Information
●● In an emergency situation, in which there is an imminent threat to life
or defense of the homeland, the Secretary of Homeland Security has
delegated the authority to release such information in the custody of CBP
to the Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Under these
conditions the Commissioner shall follow the provisions of the Department
of Homeland Security Delegation of Emergency Authority to Disseminate
Classified Information, DHS Delegation No. 12001.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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o Each Top Secret document in the TSCA will have attached to it a Top
Secret Signature Record, DHS Form 11000-04. Each person having
access to the Top Secret information will sign and date the form
indicating they had access.
o The TSCO shall maintain a copy of the DHS Form 11000-11.1 and
DHS Form 11000-04.
o If a signed receipt is not received within 30 days, the TSCO shall follow
up with a second receipt or contact the recipient to determine the
status.
8.4.5. Reproduction of Top Secret information. Reproduction of Top Secret
Information will be coordinated with the TSCO.
●● The DHS Form 11000-03 shall reflect any additional copies of reproduced
Top Secret information.
8.4.6. Top Secret Information Annual Inventory. No later than December 31 of each
year, a hands-on inventory of Top Secret material maintained in a Top Secret
Control Account will be conducted. Inventory records will be maintained on file
and submitted to the Office of Internal Affairs no later than January 31 of each
year.
8.5. ACCOUNTABILITY OF SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMATION
8.5.1. Except as required by the originator or as specified for certain categories
of SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL information, there is no requirement to
maintain accountability records or inventories for SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL
information. However, Assistant Commissioners, Directors, and alike may
mandate the use of accountability records within their respective offices at
their discretion.
8.6. RECEIPTS FOR CLASSIFIED TRANSMISSION
8.6.1. When transport or transmission of classified information occurs external to a
program office, the custodian of the information is responsible for the proper
transmission in accordance with Chapter 10 of this handbook and obtaining
signed receipts as set forth below.
8.6.2. Transmission of Top Secret information requires a receipt, DHS Form 11000-
11.1 and coordination with the assigned Top Secret Control Officer as defined
in Section 8.4.4.
8.6.3. A receipt is required for the transmission of SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL
information internal or external to CBP.
8.6.4. Pending Receipts for Classified Transmission
●● Receipts of classified information shall be received in a timely manner.
The holder or Classified Document Custodian shall maintain a suspense
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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(c) The location selected for the meeting is under the secure control of a
U.S. Gov-ernment Agency or a U.S. contractor having an appropriate facility
clearance.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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8.8.5. Copier Security Procedures. The following are procedures for reproducing
classified information.
●● Reproduction of classified information is done on an approved copier
machine. Refer to Section 8.8.2.
●● Cleared individuals (security clearance) will remain at the copier until
classified reproduction is complete.
●● Before leaving the copier, cleared individuals must check the copier for
any copies or originals that may be left in or around the copier.
8.8.6. Additional copies not needed or rejected copies must be destroyed in
accordance with the procedures in Section 8.10.
●● If the copier malfunctions and the copy or original cannot be retrieved, the
Office of Internal Affairs and/or the DSO shall be notified to ensure that
the copier is removed from approved service until the certification of the
malfunction has been properly cleared.
●● Scheduled Maintenance. The Office of Internal Affairs and/or DSO shall
be notified prior to a scheduled service visit and arrange for a cleared
individual to be present. Any documents, image retaining drum sheets,
or memory chips removed from the machine must be collected by a
cleared individual and submitted to the Office of Internal Affairs or DSO.
No maintenance person shall be allowed to service any reproduction
equipment used for the reproduction of classified materials without a
cleared escort.
8.9. ANNUAL INVENTORY OF CLASSIFIED HOLDINGS
8.9.1. CBP offices maintaining classified information must conduct an annual
inventory and review their classified holdings to reduce the amount necessary
for operational and program purposes. All classified documents shall be
reviewed upon initial receipt and during the annual inventory. The inventory
shall include a review to determine possible downgrade, declassification or
destruction of classified holdings. For documents that meet the requirements
for downgrading or declassifying, refer to Chapter 5, Declassification, of this
handbook. Documents which are no longer required for operational purposes
must be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Records
Act and CBP records retention policy. For classified information that meets
the requirements for destruction, refer to Section 8.10.
8.10. DESTRUCTION OF CLASSIFIED MATERIALS
8.10.1. When no longer needed as identified in Section 8.9.1, classified information
shall be destroyed completely to preclude recognition or reconstruction of
the classified information. Methods and equipment approved for destroying
classified information include burning, cross-cut shredding, wet-pulping,
mutilation, chemical decomposition or pulverizing. The most common
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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9.15.1. Security containers no longer used for the storage of classified information
may be transferred to other areas where they are needed or stored as
surplus. Prior to removing any container, the container shall be thoroughly
searched to ensure all classified information has been removed. Areas to be
searched include: between, behind and beneath the container and behind,
under, and on the sides of all drawers. The person who conducts the search
must declare the container empty by placing a written statement on the
outside front of the container indicating the date of the inspection, the person
who conducted the inspection, and the office that last used the container. In
addition, prior to removing any security container with a built-in combination
dial, the combination shall be reset to the standard combination of 50-25-50.
The written statement on the outside of the container shall identify that the
combination has been reset. The security contact must remove and destroy
Part 1 of the SF-700 located inside the control drawer. No security container
shall be relocated or taken out of service without first notifying the Office of
Internal Affairs (IA) and/or the DSO.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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10.6.2. The request, with justification, will be submitted to the Office of Internal Affairs
using the DHS Form 11000-2. The justification section will clearly state that
the courier will be transporting classified information via commercial air.
10.6.3. If information technology equipment, e.g., a laptop computer, computer
media, etc., containing classified information is to be transported, it must
be encrypted prior to transport. Refer to DHS National Security Systems
Handbook for additional information.
10.6.4. The CBP Office of Internal Affairs will approve or disapprove the request
based on the justification provided.
10.6.5. If approved, a courier authorization letter (see sample at Attachment D) shall
be prepared and issued by the CBP Office of Internal Affairs.
10.7. TRANSPORT OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL WITHIN AN
ACTIVITY OR OFFICE
10.7.1. If required to transport classified material from one building to another via a
public street or road, courier authorization is required, and the material shall
be packaged in accordance with the requirements of this directive.
10.7.2. If required to transport classified material within the same building or
compound, an appropriate cover sheet (SF 703, Top Secret; SF 704, Secret;
and SF 705, Confidential) shall be affixed to the document and the document
shall be placed in an unmarked envelope or folder to avoid undue attention.
Courier authorization is not required.
10.8. RECEIPTS.
10.8.1. Receipts for Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential materials transmitted or
transferred outside of CBP are required. DHS Form 11000-11, Document
Record of Transmittal or a similar transmittal form may be used for this
purpose.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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Office Directors and alike with jurisdiction where the security incident
occurred and responsibility over the person(s) involved, for further action as
appropriate.
11.6.12. If the preliminary inquiry report contains classified information, it will be
handled and marked accordingly. At a minimum, the preliminary inquiry report
will be marked and handled as “For Official Use Only (FOUO).”
11.6.13. Persons who are suspected or found to have committed a security incident
shall be afforded the opportunity to provide a written statement disputing the
facts or identifying mitigating circumstances. Such written statements shall be
included as an attachment to the preliminary inquiry report.
11.6.14. A copy of the preliminary inquiry report shall be retained by the Office of
Internal Affairs. Where a person(s) is suspected or found to have committed
a security violation or infraction, a copy of the preliminary inquiry report and
all other supporting documentation shall also be included in the individual’s
personnel security file.
11.6.15. Reports pertaining to contract employees shall be provided to the applicable
Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative or equivalent Federal
employee having oversight of the contract. In addition, further reporting
relative to contractors shall be made in accordance with the National
Industrial Security Program (NISP) directives.
11.6.16. Preliminary inquiry and/or subsequent inquiry report will be sufficient to close
the incident if it determines that:
●● The loss or compromise of classified information has not occurred or its
likelihood is remote;
●● The compromise of classified information has occurred but there is no
indication of knowing, willful, or negligent behavior or significant security
weaknesses;
●● There is no evidence of employee misconduct, criminal behavior, or
espionage;
●● No additional information will be gained by conducting a formal
investigation.
11.7. FORMAL INVESTIGATION
11.7.1. The decision to conduct a formal investigation in lieu of or subsequent to a
preliminary inquiry shall be made by the Assistant Commissioner, Office of
Internal Affairs.
11.7.2. Upon determination that a formal investigation is appropriate, the Office of
Internal Affairs, Investigative Operations Division will conduct the investigation
accordingly. Should the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG), the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) or another agency assume investigative
responsibility, CBP will coordinate all further actions with that investigative
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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agency.
11.7.3. Reports of Investigations may be forwarded to the DHS, Office of Security.
11.8. OVERSEAS SECURITY VIOLATIONS AND INFRACTIONS
11.8.1. Security incidents occurring at overseas locations are under the purview of
the Department of State (DOS). If a security incident is observed by CBP
personnel at an overseas location, the DOS Regional Security Officer(s),
United States Marine Corps (USMC) Security Guard(s) or other designated
person(s) shall be notified.
11.8.2. Security incidents occurring at overseas locations involving CBP personnel
are reported by DOS using an Optional Form (OF) 117, “Notice of Security
Violation” through the DHS Office of Security.
11.8.3. Upon receipt of OF 117, IA/SMD shall forward the notice, with a cover letter,
to the INFOSEC Branch for conducting a preliminary inquiry.
11.9. OTHER AGENCY SECURITY VIOLATIONS AND INFRACTIONS
11.9.1. CBP personnel who observe or learn of a security incident committed by a
visiting or detailed employee or contractor of another agency shall follow the
guidelines provided in Section 11.6 for reporting and conducting a preliminary
inquiry or formal investigation.
11.9.2. The Office of Internal Affairs, Assistant Commissioner shall send a
memorandum to the security office of the visiting or detailed individual’s
agency with a description of the incident.
11.10. SANCTIONS
11.10.1. When an individual is found to be responsible for the commission of a security
violation or infraction, he/she may be subject to administrative, disciplinary
or criminal sanctions as defined in the U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Table of Offenses and Penalties. The type of sanctions imposed shall be
under the purview and authority of appropriate supervisory/management
officials and based on several considerations, including the following:
●● Severity of the incident;
●● Intent of the person committing the security violation or infraction;
●● Extent of training the person(s) has received; and
●● Frequency of which the individual has been found responsible in the•
commission of other such security violations or infractions.
11.10.2. Sanctions may include, but are not limited to, verbal or written counseling,
reprimand, suspension without pay, removal, suspension or revocation
of security clearance, loss or denial of access to classified information or
termination of classification authority or criminal penalties.
11.10.3. These sanctions will be assessed in accordance with established policies and
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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entities and related activities. Any offices and contractors desiring to enter
into international agreements will report their intentions to DHS Office of
Security. The report shall contain:
o Name of Country
o Name and address of government entity issuing contract
o Contract/RFP number
o Name of U.S. contractor/name of any subcontractors involved
o Contract/RFP issue and response date
●● Contractors are still required to report their activities to DSS per the
NISPOM.
12.2.4. DHS Office of Security shall use this report to issue proper guidance to CBP
and contractors to ensure compliance with governing export control laws: the
Export Administration Regulation and the Arms Export Control Act, before
executing any agreement with a foreign interest that involves access to DHS
classified information by a foreign national. Contractors are still required to
comply with foreign ownership, control, or influence (FOCI) requirements
per the NISPOM. Prior to the execution of such agreements, review and
approval are required by the State Department and release of the classified
information must be approved by DHS. Failure to comply with Federal
licensing requirements may render a contractor ineligible for a facility security
clearance.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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the CBP SSI Program Manager, IA/SMD to the Director of the TSA SSI Office,
for review and determination as to whether or not the information warrants
protection as SSI. Such information shall be marked and protected as SSI
on an interim basis in accordance with policies and procedures issued or
approved by the TSA SSI Office, pending a final assessment by the Director
of the TSA SSI Office.
14.4.3. A record shall be maintained of each original SSI designation made. The
record shall include the date, title or subject of the document, and a detailed
synopsis of the information. A copy of the record and the information to be
protected shall be transmitted to the TSA SSI Office within 30 days following
designation. Whenever possible, to maintain consistency, such designations
should be done in consultation with the TSA SSI Office prior to designation.
14.4.4. Information designated as SSI shall be marked in accordance with 49 C.F.R.
§1520.13. To the extent practicable, the front page, title page, and/or the
first page shall include the notation “Designated SSI Pursuant to 49 C.F.R.
§1520.5(b)(16),” or, “Designated SSI Pursuant to 49 C.F.R. §1520.5(b)(9)
(iii),” as applicable. Where the official marking is not otherwise evident, the
additional notation “Designated by (name and position of authorized official)”
shall be added.
14.4.5. Once information is properly designated as SSI under 49 C.F.R. §§1520.5(b)
(9)(iii) or 1520.5(b)(16), the designation must be communicated to appropriate
parties with a need-to-know.
14.5. MARKING SSI
14.5.1. A CBP covered person shall mark information as SSI if it meets the criteria
for SSI as cited in 49 C.F.R. §1520.5(b) and MD 11056.1. Mark the record by
placing the protective marking conspicuously on the top, and the distribution
limitation statement on the bottom, of (1) The outside of any front and back
cover, including a binder cover or folder, if the document has a front and back
cover; (2) Any title page; and (3) Each page of the document. In addition, the
protective marking “SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION and the following
limitation statement will be identified:
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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office SSI Coordinator or CBP SSI Program Manager for final assessment. If
the information is believed to warrant protection as SSI but is not governed
by a category of information under 49 C.F.R. §§1520.5(b)(1) through (15),
the SSI Program Manager shall refer the information as cited in MD 11056.1,
VI.C.3 or the DHS Administrative Security Operating Manual.
14.5.3. Information meeting the SSI criteria shall be marked in accordance with 49
C.F.R. §1520.13. Additionally, the following markings shall be applied:
●● Subjects, titles, paragraphs, subparagraphs, charts, graphs, and similar
portions (portion markings) need not be portion marked unless (1) the
record contains other types of information that requires portion marking,
e.g., classified information; or (2) the information is to be transmitted
outside of DHS to Congress, or Congressional Committees. All SSI
records submitted by DHS to Congress or Congressional Committees
must be portion-marked. When used, such portion markings shall be
reviewed by the CBP SSI Program Manager prior to dissemination. The
parenthetical abbreviation (SSI) shall be used.
●● Portion markings will be applied to unclassified portions of a record within
a classified record that contain SSI. The parenthetical abbreviation (SSI)
shall be used.
14.6. DURATION OF SSI AND SSI REVIEWS
14.6.1. Information designated or appropriately marked as SSI will remain SSI unless
determined releasable by the Assistant Secretary for the Transportation
Security Administration, the Commandant of the United States Coast Guard
(USCG), the Director of the TSA SSI Office, or other authorized officials, in
accordance with policies and procedures issued or approved by the TSA SSI
Office.
14.6.2. SSI information that is over three years old or older will be subject to release
upon request, unless the DHS Office of Security, TSA SSI Office, or CBP SSI
Program Manager determines that one of the following conditions applies:
●● The information is incorporated in a current transportation security
directive, security plan, contingency plan, or information circular.
●● The information contains current information in one of the following
SSI categories: equipment or personnel performance specifications;
vulnerability assessments; security inspection or investigative information;
threat information; security measures; security screening information;
security training materials; identifying information or designated
transportation security personnel; critical aviation or maritime infrastructure
asset information; systems security information; confidential business
information; or research and development information
●● The information is otherwise exempt from disclosure under applicable law,
i.e. the Privacy Act
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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●● If the SSI does not fall under a category cited in MD 11056.1 or the DHS
Administrative Security Operating Manual, then the request for release
may only be denied in whole or in part, if the Secretary or the Assistant
Secretary for the Transportation Security Administration, makes a written
determination that identifies a rational reason why the information must
remain SSI. Such written determination shall be provided to the party that
made the request within twenty (20) business days after the determination
has been made. Additionally, each written determination shall be provided
to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of
Representatives as part of the annual reporting requirement.
14.6.3. Pursuant to 49 C.F.R. §1520.5(c), the Director of the TSA SSI office shall
coordinate with the USCG and the DHS SSI Oversight Committee to
develop and implement policy and procedures relating to the loss of an SSI
designation from information that no longer meets the criteria set forth in 49
C.F.R. §1520.5(a).
14.6.4. In accordance with 49 C.F.R. §1520.15(a) and (b), the CBP SSI Program
Manager or other authorized CBP offices may review and redact SSI records
upon requests for public release under the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) in accordance with policies and procedures issued or approved by
the Director of the TSA SSI office and Chapter 14.10, CBP SSI FOIA Review
Process in this handbook.
14.6.5. CBP offices may also redact SSI records in response to other requests, in
accordance with MD 11056.1 or the DHS Administrative Security Operating
Manual, and policies and procedures issued or approved by the Director of
the TSA SSI office.
14.7. CHALLENGING SSI
14.7.1. Any authorized holder of SSI who believes the information has been
improperly or erroneously marked as SSI is encouraged to challenge the
marking. Such challenges may be done either formally or informally.
14.7.2. Informal challenges may be made directly by the holder of the information
to the person that applied the SSI marking who shall reevaluate the marking
against the criteria cited in 49 C.F.R. §1520.5(b)(1) through (15) and
implementing guidance published or approved by the Director of the TSA SSI
Office.
14.7.3. A formal challenge may be submitted in writing to the person that applied
the SSI marking through the applicable office SSI Coordinator and the CBP
SSI Program Manager, IA/SMD to the TSA SSI Office, or the DHS Office of
Security. An appeal of the decision made by the recipient of the challenge
may be filed with the Director of the TSA SSI Office. A further appeal of the
decision made by the Director of the TSA SSI Office may be made to the
Assistant Secretary for TSA. The decision of the Assistant Secretary for the
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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Information:”
●● As defined in Executive Order 12958, as amended, all CBP personnel
who have undergone a complete favorable background investigation
for access to classified and require a security clearance as defined in
Chapter 7.1 are required to have Initial Security Training on the proper
safeguarding of classified information prior to being granted a final security
clearance. Individuals shall receive a comprehensive briefing to inform
them of their safeguard and security responsibilities for the protection of
Classified National Security Information and penalties associated with
the mishandling of this information. At this time personnel will also be
required to execute the Standard Form (SF) 312, Classified Information
Nondisclosure Agreement, and the Department of Homeland Security,
Customs and Border Protection Reporting Foreign Contacts Form. The
Office of Internal Affairs, Personnel Security Division is responsible for
providing this training.
15.3.5. Refresher Security Training “Safeguarding Classified National Security
Information:”
●● All CBP personnel who have been granted a security clearance are
required to undergo annual refresher training on the safeguarding and
handling of classified information as defined in Executive Order 12958,
as amended. This training is required to ensure the individual’s continued
access to classified information.
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distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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16.3.4. The compliance review team will prepare a draft report that documents
preliminary findings and recommendations. A final report will be provided to
the relevant CBP program activity through the appropriate CBP Office head.
16.4. SELF-INSPECTIONS
16.4.1. CBP offices are required to conduct self-inspections for the safeguarding
of classified and sensitive but unclassified information on an annual basis.
The Office of Internal Affairs, Security Management Division receives and
analyzes SIP results in this area.
16.5. UNANNOUNCED REVIEWS
16.5.1. The Office of Internal Affairs may conduct an unannounced review of a CBP
program office without the benefit of advance notification. An unannounced
review is conducted when issues or circumstances arise, which raise
concerns relative to the effective and efficient management of classified or
sensitive but unclassified information within a CBP program office.
16.6. EXTERNAL REVIEWS AND INSPECTIONS
16.6.1. CBP offices may be subject to reviews and inspections from outside entities
such as the DHS Chief Security Office, DHS Office of Inspector General or
the National Archives Records Administration, Information Security Oversight
Office.
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distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
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5.4. Assistant Commissioners, Chief of the Border Patrol, and Chief Counsel.
������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 861
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distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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1. Chapter 1: Definitions
1.1. Definitions
1.1.1. Electronic Badge Inventory and Control System (BICS). BICS is the data base
system that maintains the CBP badge and credentials life cycle data.
1.1.2. Credentials. Forms of identification that describe the authority of the bearer and
identify that individual’s right to exercise specific responsibilities for official and legal
purposes. .
1.1.3. Credential Holder. Two-section plain black leather or vinyl wallet sized item used to
display and protect a two-part credential independent of a badge.
1.1.4. Badge. A metallic emblem that is presented or displayed by the authorized bearer
to indicate and serve as a sign and representative symbol of specific authority. CBP
Badges are a uniform size and made of heavy gauged metal; and have a primarily
gold electroplated finish appearance with dark navy blue enameled background, and
the Department of Homeland Security Seal.
1.1.5. Commissioning Book. Three-section plain black leather or vinyl wallet size item
used to display and protect a two-part credential and badge.
1.1.6. Law Enforcement Officer. As defined in 5 USC §§ 8331(20);8331(17), and includes
DHS employees whose primary duties are the investigation, apprehension, and
detention of individuals suspected or convicted of offenses against the criminal laws
of the United States, or the protection of officials of the United States against threats
to personal safety; an employee who transfers from performing the aforementioned
duties for at least three years to a supervisory or administrative position; and certain
employees who have frequent and direct contact with convicted criminals.
1.1.7. Good Standing. A CBP employee or an employee from an agency whose functions
were merged into CBP, shall be deemed to have retired in good standing, unless at
the time of their retirement:
●● A determination made or action initiated to remove or proposing to remove the
employee from federal employment;
●● Employee’s security clearance was suspended or revoked or a proposal to
suspend or revoke the clearance had been issued;
●● Employee was the subject of a pending psychological fitness for duty evaluation
or had been found to be not fit for duty; or
●● An unadjudicated charge of misconduct against the employee or the employee
was subject to an adverse disciplinary action resulting from a substantiated claim
of misconduct.
1.1.8. Qualified Retired Law Enforcement Officer. A qualified retired law enforcement
officer is an individual who:
●● Retired in good standing from service with a public agency as a law enforcement
officer, other than for reasons of mental instability;
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distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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3. Chapter 3: Policy
3.1. Policy
3.1.1. The Office of Internal Affairs (IA) is responsible for the oversight, functional, and
operational control of CBP identification(s).
3.1.2. This publication mandates that badges and credentials will be issued only to
authorized employees as evidence of their authority when having contact with the
public and in dealings with Federal, State, local or foreign officials under purposes
authorized by law, statute or CBP policy. Changes to this policy shall be authorized
by the Commissioner and will be added as an addendum as required.
3.1.3. Badges and credentials are controlled and accountable CBP property. Every
employee issued badges and/or credentials is required to sign a receipt for issuance,
and is responsible for the proper use, safeguarding, accountability, and return of
their issued badges and/or credentials in accordance with this publication.
3.1.4. Employees must not display any badge or credential associating them with CBP that
has not been officially issued to them. All CBP offices, officials, and employees will
comply with the policy and procedures.
3.1.5. Badges and credentials signify that the bearer is authorized to perform specific
official functions under the law, statute or position of assignment.
3.1.6. No employee, office, organization or unit may privately purchase, obtain or produce
CBP badges or credentials. Employees may not alter, deface, change or mark a
badge or credential in any manner.
3.2. New Badges, Credentials, and/or Methods of Use or Display
3.2.1. Development, use or display of new badges or credentials will be coordinated
in advance with the Assistant Commissioner of Internal Affairs, concurred by the
Assistant Commissioner of the functional area concerned, and approved in writing
by the Commissioner of CBP.
3.3. Use of Badges and Credentials
3.3.1. Badges and/or credentials will be issued on a selective and/or restricted basis.
Badges and/or credentials authorize the bearer to perform specific official functions
as mandated by law, statute or position of assignment.
3.3.2. Credentials shall identify whether an employee is authorized to:
●● Carry a firearm;
●● Conduct investigations; and
●● Make arrests.
3.3.3. Issued badges and credentials are used only for official purposes related to CBP
duties and must be displayed with discretion. The use of a badge and/or credential
to coerce, intimidate, deceive, or obtain directly or indirectly, any privilege, favor,
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distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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3.5.10. It shall be within the discretion of CBP to issue a qualified retired law enforcement
officer a retiree identification card as described in this chapter. Should CBP
determine that the subject is not qualified, or enter into an agreement in which the
subject agrees that he or she is not qualified, the subject shall not be issued the
retiree identification card described above.
3.5.11. With respect to the requirement that a qualified retired law enforcement officer
“is not under the influence of alcohol or another intoxicating or hallucinatory drug
or substance,” in addition to any applicable Federal regulations or requirements,
each former CBP employee seeking such State certification annually must meet
State standards, if any, regarding alcohol or drug use by law enforcement officers
authorized to carry a firearm.
3.5.12. Individuals who meet the definition of a qualified law enforcement officer under 18
USC §926B, §926C may or may not meet the definition of a law enforcement officer
under the Civil Service Retirement System or the Federal Employee Retirement
System. No provision of credentials or identification should be constituted as having
bearing on qualifications for any other Federal program.
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distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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7.1.6. An employee must turn in the assigned badge and/or credential when:
●● Employment with CBP has been terminated;
●● Resigned from CBP;
●● Retired from CBP;
●● Transferred to a position that no longer requires badge and/or credentials;
●● Badge or credential is damaged and no longer presentable or serviceable;
●● No longer meeting CBP requirements to retain the badge and/or credential;
●● Law Enforcement Officers on authorized sick leave or leave without pay status
for an entire qualification period;
●● Suspended from their positions (badge and/or credentials must be turned in prior
to suspension);
●● Placed on administrative leave during the course of an internal investigation/
inquiry;
●● Recalled/mobilized for active military duty for 30 days or more; or
●● Determined by the Commissioner that it is in the best interest of CBP.
7.1.7. All employees who no longer meet CBP requirements in 7.1.6 will:
●● Return their badge and/or credentials to the Badge and Credentialing Office until
final disposition on the employee is determined.
●● When final disposition is made on these employees, the Badge and Credentialing
Officer will be notified and the badge and/or credentials will be processed as
required.
7.1.8. Employees who have terminated, retired, resigned or transferred from CBP will
return their badge and/or credentials to their immediate supervisor prior to being
granted final clearance. A completed CBP Form 241, Separation Clearance Form,
will be sent with the badge and credentials so final disposition of the badges and/
or credentials can be implemented according to this publication. The Field Badge
Coordinator will take the appropriate action to ensure that badge and/or credentials
are returned to the Badge and Credentialing Office pursuant to this publication within
10 days after completion of the personnel action.
7.1.9. Employees who have resigned or are terminated from CBP may not retain their
badge and/or credential as a memento. Exceptions to this policy will be granted
on a case-by-case basis with a waiver approved through the respective Assistant
Commissioner of the functional area and approved in writing by the Commissioner.
7.1.10. CBP badges and/or credentials that have been confiscated and are being held by
the U.S. Attorneys Office, Federal, State or local law enforcement agencies will be
reported to the Badge and Credentialing Office. The Field Badge Coordinator will
prepare memorandum with the contact information of the individual who will be the
primary point of contact for the confiscated badge and/or credentials. A copy of
this memorandum will be maintained with the local records and a copy sent to the
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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Badge and Credentialing Office. The badge and/or credentials will be placed into
a pending status at the Badge and Credentialing Office. Confiscated badge and/or
credentials are required to be inventoried on an annual basis. Once the badge and/
or credentials are no longer required for legal proceedings they will be returned to
the Badge and Credentialing Office for final disposition.
7.2. Inventory
7.2.1. Badge and Credential Inventory. The Badge and Credentialing Office will conduct an
annual, CBP-wide, inventory of issued and un-issued badges and issued credentials.
7.2.2. All Field Badge Coordinators will ensure that every badge and credential within
their geographic area of responsibility is physically inventoried. A signed and
dated copy of the inventory will be returned to the Badge and Credentialing Office.
Documentation for any discrepancies will be forwarded to the CBP Badge and
Credentialing Office.
7.2.3. The Badge and Credentialing Office is responsible for reviewing all inventoried
records received from all CBP offices and initiating any necessary actions to address
discrepancies annotated or not identified during the annual inventory.
7.2.4. The Badge and Credentialing Office will conduct an annual inventory of all badges
and credentials stored in the Badge and Credentialing Office(s). Representatives of
the Badge and Credentialing Office will conduct the annual inventory.
7.3. Storage and Physical Security of Badges and Credentials
7.3.1. Badges and credentials that are not assigned to an employee will be retained at the
CBP Badge and Credentialing Office or other physically secure areas authorized as
satellite CBP Badge and Credentialing Offices. Unassigned badges and credentials
are not authorized to be stored at field offices for any purpose.
7.3.2. Badges, credentials, laminate, and credential stock paper will be stored in a
physically secured area with controlled access to the CBP Badge and Credentialing
Office employees.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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credentials.
8.2.6. Contractors and other temporary CBP employees will not be issued CBP badges or
credentials.
8.2.7. The Badge and Credentialing Office will review the CBP Form 56 for accuracy, the
required photo, and signature prior to issuing a badge and/or credential.
8.2.8. Only the employee’s legal name is authorized to appear on a credential. Any
discrepancies will be resolved by verifying the employee’s identification with a
driver’s license, social security card, birth certificate or passport.
8.2.9. All CBP employees authorized to carry a badge and/or credential will be issued:
●● One commissioning book or credential case;
●● Badge(s) (if required);
●● One two-part credential that reflects the employee’s authority and title (if
applicable); or
●● Replacement commissioning books or credential cases will not be issued by the
Badge and Credentialing Office.
8.2.10. Credentials Authorizing Firearms
●● A request for a credential authorizing the carrying of firearms for an employee
who has not carried a firearm previously must:
o Be signed by an Assistant Commissioner of the functional area or Chief of the
Border Patrol prior to forwarding the request to the Badge and Credentialing
Office;
o If the employee is in a job series that does not authorize or usually does not
have a firearm associated with it, a written memorandum authorizing the
employee to carry a firearm from the Assistant Commissioner of the function
area must accompany the request.
●● Subsequent requests for replacement credentials can be requested by the Field
Badge Coordinator;
●● Prior to the issuance of a credential authorizing an employee to carry a firearm:
o Certification(s) will be made by the appropriate Assistant Commissioner that
the employee has qualified with a primary duty weapon;
o Has a need to carry a firearm; and
o Date of the most current qualification of the employee will be placed on the
CBP Form 56.
●● The Field Badge Coordinator will ensure:
o Prior to issuing a firearms credential to an employee whose job title/series is
not authorized to carry a firearm that a copy of the Assistant Commissioner’s
waiver for approval for the individual/position to carry a firearm is attached to
CBP Form 56;
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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sealed with tape and marked in such a manner that will prevent unauthorized
access and secured in the Badge and Credentialing Office until shipped or
transported to an authorized destruction facility; and
●● All records of the badge destruction will be maintained in the Badge and
Credentialing Office. Records will be updated with the proper destruction code
and date of destruction.
9.2.3. Destruction of Credentials
●● Credentials that have been returned by employees, damaged, obsolete or for
any reason removed from the credential inventory will be destroyed and certified
on the Order to Destroy and Record of Destruction of Forfeited, Abandoned, or
Unclaimed Merchandise, CBP Form 4613;
●● Each credential will be listed by credential form number and serial number
on the Report of Excess Personal Property, SF 120. The credentials will be
inventoried and verified by another CBP employee and annotated with the
date of the inventory and employees name and signature on the SF 120. Once
the credentials are inventoried they will be locally shredded in the presence of
the BCOM or their designee and one witness. CBP employees witnessing the
credential destruction will sign the CBP Form 4613; and
●● All records of the credential destruction will be maintained in the Badge and
Credentialing Office. Records will be updated with the proper destruction code
and date of destruction.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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●● Employees who were promoted or changed positions within CBP and are
authorized may have one of their assigned badges preserved by being encased
in Lucite and returned to the employee. This is mandatory to limit such use to
exhibition purposes and to ensure distinction from active badges; and
●● The CBP Badge and Credentialing Office will provide approved vendor
information, costs, and options for badge preservation.
10.2.6. Credential Preservation
●● Retirees are authorized to have their credentials retired. Credentials will
be marked in a visible manner as to designate the Retired Status. New or
replacement credentials are not authorized to be issued to retirees or persons
previously separated from CBP; and
●● Retired credentials issued by CBP meet the requirements of LEOSA.
●● Additional information on the LEOSA retiree identification card can be found in
Chapter 3.5.1.
10.2.7. Deceased CBP Employees
●● Families and/or co-workers are authorized to request to have the badges and/or
credentials of a CBP employee who has died while employed by CBP preserved
as a memento. The CBP Badge and Credentialing Office will provide approved
vendor information, costs, and options. The badge and credentials will be
embossed with an “FOR HONORABLE SERVICE” emblem. This is mandatory
to limit such use to exhibition purposes and to ensure distinction from active
badges and/or credentials. Funds through the CBP National Awards Program are
authorized for payment of badges and/or credentials of a CBP employee who is
deceased.
10.2.8. Requesting Retirement and/or Preservation of CBP Badges and Credentials
●● All authorized requests for the retirement and/or preservation of CBP badges and
credentials must use the Request for Retirement/Preservation of CBP Badges
and Credentials (Appendix 10.1). Requests for the retirement and/or preservation
of badges and/or credentials will include documentation indicating the employee
has retired from CBP or been promoted or transferred within CBP. All items
must be filled out and the request, supporting documentation and badge and/
or credentials forwarded to the Badge and Credentialing Office through their
respective Field Badge Coordinator; and
●● CBP employees who are requesting retirement and/or preservation of their
badges and credentials and who were employed as a law enforcement officer for
an aggregate of 15 years or more before retirement or retired due to a service-
connected disability (after completing any applicable probationary period) will be
required to provide documentation of their law enforcement officer service with
the Request for Retirement/Preservation of CBP Badges and Credentials.
10.3. Commemorative Badges
10.3.1. Commemorative badges are unofficial and are not administered by the Badge and
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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Credentialing Office. Because of the potential for misuse when badges imitations are
distributed, the manufacture and purchase of commemorative badges is prohibited
without the direct written approval of the Commissioner of CBP. These unofficial
badges appear similar to official CBP badges and therefore, must be embedded in
Lucite.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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FROM:
E-Mail:
Phone #:
Employee: NAME:
SSN:
BADGE#’s:
BADGE TYPE:
CREDENTIAL #:
CREDENTIAL TITLE:
Retiring from Federal Service employed as a LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER WITH
15 YEARS OR MORE years of service.
Attach copy of SF52 or clearing papers and copies of SF50’s documenting 15 years of service
as a Law Enforcement Officer.
Retiring from Federal Service employed as a Law Enforcement Officer due to a service-
connected disability.
Attach copy of SF52 or clearing papers and copies of SF50’s documenting Law Enforcement
Officer service and service-connected disability.
Retiring from Federal Service with less than 15 year of service as a Law Enforcement
Officer.
Attach copies of SF52 or clearing papers and copy of SF50 documenting Law Enforcement
Officer service at time of retirement.
Being promoted and/or new position and does not require same type of badge and/or
credential.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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OPTIONS: (Refer to CBP Law Enforcement Badge and Credential Policy for further details of
options.) PLACE AN X IN FRONT OF CHOICE.
R
etiring from Federal Service employed as a Law Enforcement Officer due to a
service-connected disability.
Retiring from Federal Service with less than 15 year of service as a Law
Enforcement Officer.
BADGE : EMBED IN LUCITE DO NOT WISH TO RETAIN BADGE
Retiring from Federal Service or promoted/new position or resigned from CBP with
waiver.
BADGE: EMBED IN LUCITE
DO NOT WISH TO RETAIN BADGE
APPROVING OFFICIAL:________________________________________________________
SIGNATURE: ________________________________________________________________
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
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