100% found this document useful (1 vote)

742 views

CBP SecurityHandbook PDF

Uploaded by

Mohamed Dawes

We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.

Available Formats

Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd

100% found this document useful (1 vote)

742 views

CBP SecurityHandbook PDF

Uploaded by

Mohamed Dawes

We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.

Available Formats

Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd

You are on page 1/ 912

CBP Security Policy and

Procedures Handbook
HB1400-02B
August 13, 2009

Security Never Sleeps

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
VOL TOC
BACK

VOLUME CONTENTS

1. Foreword. ...........................................................................v
2. Revision History. ..............................................................xvii
3. Physical Security Handbook.............................................vii
4. Information Security: Safeguarding Classified
and Sensitive But Unclassified Information Handbook.... 735

5. Badges, Credentials and Official Identification.............. 845

WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
iii of 890
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20229

Commissioner

Foreword

The Office of Internal Affairs (IA) Security Management Division (SMD) is responsible for establishing
policies, standards, and procedures to ensure the safety and security of the U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) personnel, facilities, information, and assets. IA/SMD has developed the CBP
Security Policy and Procedures Handbook to provide CBP with uniform standards and procedures for
the proper administration of Physical Security; Safeguarding Classified and Sensitive but Unclassified
Information; and Badges, Credentials, and Official Identification. This handbook serves as mandatory
minimum requirements for CBP managers to implement and improve the security posture for their
designated CBP area of responsibilities.

This handbook implements security policies and standards published in a number of relevant source
documents including numerous Public Laws, Presidential Directives, regulations, rules, Interagency
Security Committee security design criteria, and U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Management Directives (MD) regarding integrating, managing, and governing various Security
functions. It is issued under the authority of DHS MD 11080; Security Line of Business Integration and
Management, January 3, 2006.

This handbook supersedes the CBP memorandum; Interim Physical Security Guidance for Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) Facilities, October 25, 2006; Customs Handbook (HB) 1400-02A, Physical
Security Handbook, April 2000; Customs Directive No. 5230-029A, Employee Badges and Credentials,
April 20, 2002; Customs HB 1400-03, Safeguarding Classified Information Handbook, February
15, 1991; U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), Security Officer’s Handbook (SOH),
September 2001; legacy U.S. Department of the Treasury, U.S. Customs Service, INS, U.S. Border
Patrol, and U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service security
policies and directives.

The CBP Security Policy and Procedures Handbook is effective immediately and applicable to
ALL CBP-owned, -leased or -occupied offices, facilities, installations, ports of entry, and stations.
Compliance with this handbook is mandatory and will ensure consistent standards and effectiveness
in executing security initiatives for the preservation of CBP’s mission to safeguard our Nation from
terrorists and the instruments of terror.

This handbook may be accessed through the CBPnet, Office of Internal Affairs website quick links at
http://cbpnet.cbp.dhs.gov/xp/cbpnet/ia/ or CBP’s Policy Online Document Search (PODS) website:
http://pods.cbp.dhs.gov/. To request further assistance or offer feedback regarding this handbook, contact
the Security Management Division at (202) 325-0110 or by submitting your comments through the SMD
Policy and Procedures Handbook Comment form.

Jayson P. Ahern
Acting Commissioner
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Contents

1. Chapter 1: Purpose............................................................ 1
1.1. Purpose.................................................................................................... 2
2. Chapter 2: Policy............................................................... 3
2.1. Policy....................................................................................................... 4

2.2. Policy Exception Requirements................................................................. 5

3. Chapter 3: Background...................................................... 7
3.1. Background.............................................................................................. 8
4. Chapter 4: Authorities And References............................. 9
5. Chapter 5: Responsibilities............................................... 15
5.1. Component Head..................................................................................... 16

5.2. CBP Component Chief Security Officer................................................. 16

5.3. Associate Chief Security Officer . ......................................................... 16

5.4. Physical Security Branch (PSB) Chief................................................... 16

5.5. Field Security Operations Branch (FSOB) Chief................................... 16

5.6. Regional Security Officers (RSOs)........................................................ 16

5.7. District Security Officers (DSOs) ........................................................ 16

5.8. Designation of Security Officers and Officials...................................... 17

5.9. Physical Security Specialists (PSSs)..................................................... 17

5.10. IA/PSD Personnel Security Officers..................................................... 17

5.11. IA/SMD Information Security Officers................................................... 18

5.12. Classified Document Custodian, Classified Control Station ................. 18

5.13. Derivative Classifiers . ........................................................................... 18

5.14. Designated Official (DO)........................................................................ 18

5.15. Assessments . ......................................................................................... 18

6. Chapter 6: Facility Protection......................................... 19
6.1. General.................................................................................................. 20

6.2. Planning Facility Protection.................................................................. 20

6.3. Determining Building Security Level....................................................... 22

6.4. Building Security Levels. ....................................................................... 22

6.5. Facility Security Level Determinations for Federal Facilities................ 23

6.6. Special Requests.................................................................................... 28

6.7. Security Contractor Suitability............................................................. 28

6.8. General Office Requirements................................................................. 29

6.9. Fire Detection and Suppression (Sprinkler) Systems.............................. 31

6.10. Secure Border Initiative (SBI)................................................................ 32

6.11. Security Survey Process........................................................................ 33

7. Chapter 7: Exterior Protection....................................... 35
7.1. General.................................................................................................. 36

7.2. Physical Barriers................................................................................... 36

7.3. Fencing. .................................................................................................. 36

7.4. Gates ..................................................................................................... 37

7.5. Protective Lighting ................................................................................ 38

7.6. Doors .................................................................................................... 38

7.7. Windows.................................................................................................. 38

7.8. Manholes, Grates, and Storm Drains..................................................... 39

7.9. Openings................................................................................................. 39

7.10. Shafts, Vents, and Ducts. ...................................................................... 40

7.11. Fire Escapes and Building Walls............................................................ 40

7.12. Facilities in Remote Locations. ............................................................... 40

7.13. Exterior Signage . .................................................................................. 40

7.14. Other Signs............................................................................................ 41

7.15. Loading Docks and Service Access......................................................... 42

8. Chapter 8: Interior Protection........................................ 43
8.1. Interior Controls .................................................................................. 44

8.2. Access Control...................................................................................... 44

8.3. Vehicle ................................................................................................... 44

8.4. Routine Conditions.................................................................................. 46

8.5. Area Designations .................................................................................. 46

8.6. Security Vaults (Permanent Storage or More Than 72 Hours).............. 48

8.7. Vault Doors . ......................................................................................... 49

8.8. Strongrooms . ........................................................................................................50

8.9. Intrusion Detection Systems .................................................................. 50

8.10. Hold Rooms............................................................................................ 50

8.11. Planning Alarm Installations.................................................................. 51

8.12. Closed Circuit Television Systems.......................................................... 53

8.13. Open Storage Certification process....................................................... 54

9. Chapter 9: Locks and Keys.............................................. 59
9.1. Locks...................................................................................................... 60
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
ix of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK

9.2. Combination Locks.................................................................................. 63

9.3. Electronic Locks.................................................................................... 65

9.4. Biometric Systems................................................................................... 65

9.5. Keys........................................................................................................ 65
10. Chapter 10: Safes and Storage Equipment. ..................... 71
10.1. Physical Protection and Storage of Materials ..................................... 72

10.2. References . ........................................................................................... 72

10.3. Classified Information ............................................................................ 72

10.4. Supplemental Protection ....................................................................... 74

10.5. GSA-Approved Security Containers....................................................... 75

10.6. Weapons Storage................................................................................... 75

10.7. Record Safes Designed for Fire Protection........................................... 77

10.8. Combination Locks.................................................................................. 77

10.9. Replacement of Unapproved Storage Containers................................... 78

10.10. Defective GSA-Approved Security Filing Cabinets. ............................... 78

10.11. Maintaining GSA-Approved Security Containers.................................... 79

10.12. Repairing Approved Security Containers................................................ 79

10.13. Recertification of GSA-Approved Containers ....................................... 80

11. Chapter 11: Access To Facilities. .................................... 83
11.1. General.................................................................................................. 84

11.2. Definitions .............................................................................................. 84

11.3. Authority................................................................................................ 86

11.4. General.................................................................................................. 86
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
x of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK

11.5. Responsibilities....................................................................................... 86

11.6. Access Control...................................................................................... 88

11.7. GSA-Operated or Leased Facilities ....................................................... 90

11.8. Non-GSA Operated or Leased Facilities. ............................................... 91

11.9. Photo Access Cards (PAC).................................................................... 91

11.10. Visitors................................................................................................... 92

11.11. Escorts . ................................................................................................ 95

11.12. Visitor Parking....................................................................................... 95

11.13. Electronic Access Controls.................................................................. 96

11.14. Screening Procedures ........................................................................... 97

11.15. Prohibited Entry Notice ......................................................................... 99

11.16. Prohibited Items ..................................................................................... 99

11.17. National Capital Region DHS/CBP Photo Access Card (PAC) ........... 100

11.18. Signage ................................................................................................ 101

11.19. Photography......................................................................................... 101

11.20. Security Violations............................................................................... 102

11.21. Other.................................................................................................... 102

11.22. Reference............................................................................................. 102

12. Chapter 12: Services . ................................................... 107
12.1. Law Enforcement Protection ............................................................... 108

12.2. Contract Guard Services..................................................................... 108

12.3. Cost Factors ....................................................................................... 110

12.4. Guard Duties ....................................................................................... 111

12.5. Personnel Requirements....................................................................... 112

12.6. Responsibilities by Facility Type. .......................................................... 114

12.7. Federal Protective Services. ............................................................... 116

12.8. Other Law Enforcement....................................................................... 116

12.9. Authorities/References. ....................................................................... 117

13. Chapter 13: Program Development
and Strategic Planning................................................... 119

13.1. General................................................................................................ 120

13.2. Strategic Planning. .............................................................................. 120

13.3. Program Management and Administration. ............................................ 121

13.4. Personnel Development and Training.................................................... 122

13.5. Physical Security Training.................................................................... 122

13.6. Security Awareness, Training and Education (SATE) Plans. ............... 123
14. Chapter 14: Incident Response and
the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS)........... 125

14.1. Geneal.................................................................................................. 126

14.2. Incident Response. ................................................................................ 126

14.3. Reporting Procedure............................................................................ 127

14.4. Incident Reporting . .............................................................................. 128

14.5. Event Report Completion . ................................................................... 129

14.6. Emergency Preparedness Program ...................................................... 129

14.7. Emergency Communications................................................................... 131

14.8. Wireless Priority Service (WPS) ........................................................ 132

14.9. CBP Employee Emergency Check-In Procedures ................................. 133

14.10. Emergency Planning and Response ...................................................... 134

14.11. Definitions............................................................................................. 135

14.12. Procedures........................................................................................... 136

14.13. Responsibilities..................................................................................... 138

14.14. Best Practices. .................................................................................... 139

14.15. Protective Measures. ........................................................................... 140

14.16. Authorities/References . ...................................................................... 147

15. Chapter 15: Occupant Emergency Plan (OEP)............... 149
15.1. Purpose And Scope .............................................................................. 150

15.2. Authority/References........................................................................... 151

15.3. Responsibilities..................................................................................... 151

16. Chapter 16: Firearms and Ammunition . .......................... 153
16.1. General................................................................................................ 154

16.2. Assigned Firearms. ............................................................................... 154

16.3. Authorities. .......................................................................................... 154

17. Chapter 17: Protection of Building Documentation. ...... 155
17.1. General ............................................................................................... 156

17.2. Definitions ............................................................................................ 156

17.3. Types of Information for Document Security........................................ 157

17.4. Electronic media................................................................................... 158

17.5. Marking/Labeling of Information. ......................................................... 158

17.6. Responsible Care for Dissemination of SBU Building Information ....... 159

17.7. Reproduction of SBU information. ....................................................... 161

17.8. Storage................................................................................................ 161

17.9. Record Keeping . .................................................................................. 162

17.10. Notice of Disposal................................................................................ 163

17.11. Enforcement......................................................................................... 163

17.12. Training. ............................................................................................... 163

18. Chapter 18: Secure Items............................................... 165
18.1. General................................................................................................ 166

18.2. Access.................................................................................................. 168

18.3. Requisition and Shipment....................................................................... 169

18.4. Storage................................................................................................ 171

18.5. Inventory. ............................................................................................. 173

18.6. Destruction. ......................................................................................... 176

18.7. Reporting Requirements . ..................................................................... 177

19. Chapter 19: Procedural Security.................................. 181
19.1. General................................................................................................ 182

19.2. Workplace Security ............................................................................. 182

19.3. Random Security Awareness Measures (RSAMs) ................................ 184

20. Chapter 20: Workplace Violence................................... 187
20.1. General................................................................................................ 188

20.2. Security Planning................................................................................. 189

20.3. Security Assistance.............................................................................. 190

20.4. Physical Security Measures................................................................. 191

20.5. Sample Plan. ........................................................................................ 193

20.6. Federal Protective Service Information. .............................................. 193

20.7. FPS Contact Information . ................................................................... 194

21. Chapter 21: Office And Laboratory Equipment.............. 195
21.1. General................................................................................................ 196

21.2. Threat Determination............................................................................ 196

21.3. Special Security Considerations........................................................... 197

21.4. Kennel (K-9) Facilities.......................................................................... 197

21.5. Customs And Border Protection Laboratory (CBPL).......................... 197

22. Chapter 22: Maintenance. .............................................. 199
22.1. General................................................................................................ 200

22.2. Scope.................................................................................................... 200

22.3. Corrective Maintenance . ..................................................................... 200

22.4. Preventive Maintenance (PM)................................................................ 200

22.5. Maintenance Personnel Access Authorization...................................... 201

22.6. Record Keeping. ................................................................................... 201

23. Appendix 6.3: CBP Minimum Standards........................... 203
24. Appendix 6.10: Secure Border Initiative......................... 233
25. Appendix 7.2: Perimeter Security Barriers . .................. 245
26. Appendix 7.3: Fencing..................................................... 255

27. Appendix 7.5: Protective Lighting................................... 293

28. Appendix 7.6: Doors and Door Hardware....................... 311
29. Appendix 7.7: Windows. .................................................. 351
30. Appendix 7.8: Openings .................................................. 393
31. Appendix 7.15: Loading Docks and Service Access......... 417
32. Appendix 8.6: Vaults. ..................................................... 429
33. Appendix 8.8: Strongrooms............................................ 449
34. Appendix 8.9: Intrusion Detection Systems .................... 459
35. Appendix 8.10: Hold Rooms............................................ 491
36. Appendix 8.12: Closed Circuit Television (CCTV).......... 509
37. Appendix 10: Storage of Weapons and
Ammunition (Armory)....................................................... 545
38. Appendix 11.14: Screening Procedures.......................... 565
39. Appendix 14: Building-Specific Security Alert Plan....... 587
40. Occupant Emergency Plans: Guide................................. 597
41. Occupant Emergency Plan Template. ............................. 661
42. Appendix 20.5: Workplace Violent Behavior
Prevention Plan (Sample)............................................... 693
43. Appendix: SMD/Field Security
Operations Branch (Future)........................................... 705
44. Appendix: Glossary........................................................ 711
45. Additional CBP Security Links. ..................................... 729

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Return to Table of Contents
BACK

Revision History

Version Date Description

1.0 Original release for review

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BACK Return to Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Purpose

1.1. Purpose
1.1.1. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Internal Affairs, Security Management
Division is responsible for providing operating policies, procedures, and practices for
the physical protection of personnel, infrastructures, and assets from deliberate or
unforeseen threats.
1.1.2. These standards shall be applied to all CBP facilities, owned, leased or occupied
space. Compliance is mandatory for all new construction, renovation, and relocation
projects. Existing CBP facilities are not required to be upgraded unless risk
assessment determines otherwise.
1.1.3. These standards shall be used by the Office of Internal Affairs, Security
Management Division (SMD) to serve as a guide for: Conducting security surveys
for the development of threat assessments; evaluating security conditions during
real estate market surveys and using the requirements guide for architectural and
engineering (A&E) design efforts. Nothing in this policy handbook shall be construed
as contrary to the provisions of any statute or other Federal regulation. In the event
of conflict, specific statutory provisions shall apply.
1.1.4. Physical Security Programs shall be administered within each Region, District, and
field activity based on the policy set forth in this handbook to ensure the protection of
CBP assets. These programs shall be continually and effectively administered and
monitored to ensure their integrity. At a minimum, a Physical Security Program shall
include those items outlined in Chapter 2.1: Policy.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BACK Return to Table of Contents

Chapter 2: Policy

2.1. Policy
2.1.1. It is CBP policy that personnel, facilities, property, information and other agency
assets shall be provided a consistent minimum level of protection. The minimum
physical security standards provided in this Physical Security Handbook
ensure a safe and secure work environment that contributes to the successful
accomplishment of CBP’s mission to secure the U.S. border against persons or
agents of ill will and from dangerous or illegal goods. This policy includes, but is not
limited to:
●● Development of minimum physical security standards for CBP facilities, by
identifying requirements for all physical security systems, devices, and building
features. These requirements are to be applied to new construction, renovation,
and relocation projects, as well as projects involving security enhancements;
●● Conduct of periodic surveys, inspections, and other formal on-site threat and
vulnerability assessments; and
●● Participation in security projects managed by Headquarters and field offices. This
includes evaluating CBP compliance with federal government regulations and
standards for physical security requirements.
2.1.2. All new construction, relocation, and renovation projects must be coordinated
through CBP Internal Affairs, Security Management Division, to ensure compliance
with applicable regulations and policy.
2.1.3. Proposed Changes or Revisions. This handbook is intended to be a living document.
As such, users of this policy handbook are encouraged to submit recommended
changes and comments to SMD (Policy and Procedures Handbook Comment form).
Comments shall reference the specific chapter and paragraph, and shall include
a justification for the proposed change. Periodic revisions to this handbook will be
published as necessary and to the extent practicable.
2.1.4. Protection Criteria. The Federal Protective Services (FPS) and CBP/IA/SMD
determine the level of normal protective service on a case by-case basis.
The facility’s location, size, number of occupants and configuration; history of
criminal or disruptive incidents in the surrounding area-not primarily directed
toward the occupant agency’s mission-the extent of exterior lighting, presence of
physical barriers or other factors may be deemed pertinent and will be taken into
consideration in the assessment.
2.1.5. Physical Protection. FPS provides normal and special protection through mobile
patrol or fixed posts manned by contractually engaged uniformed personnel; security
systems and devices; locking building entrances and gates during other than normal
hours; cooperation of local law enforcement agencies; and a combination of these
physical safeguards, depending upon the facility and the degree of risk defined.
The degree of normal and special protection is determined by completion of a FPS
physical security assessment or crime prevention assessment and implementation
of CBP/IA/SMD minimum standards contained in this policy handbook.

2.1.6. Crime Prevention. The FPS collects and disseminates information about criminal
activity on or against property under the charge and control of GSA, and provides
crime prevention awareness training to occupant agencies upon request.
2.1.7. Facility Protection. In facilities where GSA has delegated protection authority to
the agency or prime tenant, virtually all protection responsibilities are transferred to
the agency, including acquisition, installation, and maintenance of physical security
equipment and systems, and procurement and management of any guard contracts.
In cases such as this, CBP/IA/SMD remains the approving authority for all security-
related equipment and standards. CBP will not procure guard contracts on its own
and will continue to procure guard services through FPS on a reimbursable basis.
Normally, GSA/FPS will retain responsibility for mobile patrols, monitoring of alarms,
response to incidents, request for criminal investigations, fire and facility safety and
health inspections. GSA/FPS will provide such services at no charge to the agency
beyond the Basic Security Charge, which is included in the rent.
2.1.8. Design Factors. It is imperative that security systems and procedures are considered
from the start of the design phase so that conduit runs and alarm wiring, structural
requirements, reinforcing devices and other necessary construction requirements
are provided in the original plans.
2.2. Policy Exception Requirements
2.2.1. General. Only in rare situations where compelling operational requirements or
conditions necessitate deviation from the specific minimum requirements in this
handbook, the CBP Office shall:
●● Request in writing any necessary exceptions from the requirements in this
handbook prior to approval of the design concept;
●● Submit a waiver request which shall document all security vulnerabilities that
could arise if the waiver is granted;
●● Submit a waiver request which shall provide, if possible, a mitigation plan that
states what measures will be taken to minimize security vulnerabilities if a
waiver is granted. Document how the proposed mitigation plan reduces risk
to an acceptable level when compared to operational requirements; include
persuasive evidence that the security of Federal employees and facilities will not
be compromised by a less-than-standard facility;
●● Include justification, risk analysis, cost comparisons, criteria applied, and
other pertinent data. Lack of funds or cost savings do not justify an exception.
Exceptions are granted on a case-by-case basis and are not automatically
extended to cases which appear to have similar circumstances; and
●● Submit exception requests directly to the Director for Security Management
Division through [email protected].
2.2.2. Exceptions that are approved will be for fixed term, unless specifically noted all
exceptions will be granted for one fiscal year. At the close of term of the exception
the CBP office requesting the exception will be required to submit a new waiver
request.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
5 of 890
C h3

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BACK Return to Table of Contents

Chapter 3: Background

3.1. Background
3.1.1. Perimeter Security. Perimeter security standards pertain to the areas outside
government control. Depending on the facility type, the perimeter may include
sidewalks, parking lots, outside walls of the building, a hallway, or an office door.
The elements of perimeter security are: parking, closed circuit television monitoring,
lighting, and physical barriers.
3.1.2. Entry Security. Entry security standards refer to security issues related to the entry
of persons and packages into a facility. The elements of entry security are: receiving/
shipping, access control, and entrances/exits.
3.1.3. Interior Security. Interior security standards refer to security issues associated
with prevention of criminal or terrorist activity within the facility. This area concerns
secondary levels of control after people or things have entered the facility. The
long-term elements of interior security are employee/visitor identification, utilities,
occupant emergency plans, and day care centers.
3.1.4. Security Planning. Security planning is the development of long-term plans that
incorporate requirements, standards, procedures, and processes to implement
preventive and responsive countermeasures in the event of a breach of facility
security.
3.1.5. Security planning also sets security standards addressing broader issues with
implications beyond security at a particular facility. The elements of security
planning are: intelligence sharing, security awareness training, tenant assignment,
administrative procedures, and construction/renovation.
3.1.6. A comprehensive security system provides protection against a defined set of
threats by informing the user of attempted intrusions and providing resistance to
the would-be intruder’s attack paths. This resistance must be consistent around the
entire perimeter of the protected area.
3.1.7. There are four main security elements that must be properly integrated to achieve a
proper balance of physical security. These are:
●● Detection. This is the process of detecting and locating intruders as far from the
protected areas as feasible. Early detection gives the user more time for effective
alarm assessment and execution of pre-planned response;
●● Assessment. Assessment is determining the cause of the alarm or recognizing
the activity. This must be done as soon as possible after detection to prevent the
intruder’s position from being lost;
●● Delay. Intruders must be delayed long enough to prevent them from achieving
their objectives before the response force can interdict them; and
●● Response. A response force must be available, equipped, and trained to prevent
the intruders from achieving their objective. The response time must be less
than the delay time if the response force is to intercept the intruders before they
achieve their objective.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Back Return to Table of Contents

Chapter 4: Authorities And References

4.1. Executive Orders

EO 10450, Security Requirements for Government Employment, dated 23 Apr. 1953
EO 12196, Occupational safety and health programs for Federal employees, dated 26
Feb. 1980
EO 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, dated 4 Dec. 1981
EO 13355, Strengthened Management of the Intelligence Community, dated 27 Aug.
2004
EO 12656, Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities, dated 18 Nov.
1988
EO 12829, National Industrial Security Program, dated 6 Jan. 1993
EO 12885, Amendment to EO 12829, dated 14 Dec. 1993
EO 12958, Classified National Security Information, dated 20 Apr. 1995
EO 12968, Access to Classified Information, dated 7 Aug. 1995
EO 12977, Interagency Security Committee, dated 19 Oct. 1995
EO 13228, Establishing the Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security
Council, dated 8 Oct. 2001
EO 13284, Amendment of Executive Orders, and Other Actions, in Connection With the
Establishment of the Department of Homeland Security, dated 23 Jan. 2003
EO 13286, Amendment of Executive Orders, and Other Actions, in Connection With the
Transfer of Certain Functions to the Secretary of Homeland Security, dated 5 Mar.
2003
4.2. Code of Federal Regulations/Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)
Homeland Security Acquisitions Manual, §3004.470-2, December 2006.
41 CFR §102-74, Facility Management, dated 1 Jul. 2007
48 CFR §1, Federal Acquisition Management Systems, March 2005.
4.3. Public Law
PL 91-596, Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970
PL 107-296, Homeland Security Act of 2002
4.4. Director of Central Intelligence Directives
DCID 6/1, Security Policy for Sensitive Compartmented Information, dated 1 Mar. 1995
DCID 6/3, Protecting Sensitive Compartmented Information within Information Systems,
and Appendices, dated 24 May 2000
DCID 6/4, Personnel Security Standards and Procedures Governing Eligibility for
Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information, dated 2 Jul. 1998
DCID 6/7, Intelligence Disclosure Policy, dated 20 Apr. 2001
DCID 6/9, Physical Security Standards for Sensitive Compartmented Information
Facilities, dated 18 Nov. 2002
4.5. Department of Homeland Security Management Directives
DHS MD 0565, Personal Property, dated 10 Dec. 2004
DHS MD 11000, Office of Security, dated 8 Sep. 2006
DHS MD 11005, Suspend Access to DHS Facilities, Sensitive Information and IT
Systems, dated 23 Mar. 2006
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
10 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Back Return to Table of Contents

DHS MD 11030.1, Physical Protection of Facilities and Real Property, dated 21 Apr.
2003
DHS MD 11045, Protection of Classified National Security Information: Accountability,
Control, And Storage, dated 4 Oct. 2004
DHS MD 11046, Open Storage Area Standards for Collateral Classified Information,
dated 22 Feb. 2005
DHS MD 11047, Protection of Classified National Security Information Transmission &
Transportation, dated 3 Jun. 2005
DHS MD 11056.1, Sensitive Security Information (SSI), dated 3 Nov. 2006
DHS MD 11080, Security Line of Business Integration and Management, dated 3 Jan.
2006
4.6. Department of Homeland Security Delegations
DHS Delegation 7035.2, Delegation of the Chair of the Interagency Security Committee
to the Assistant Secretary of Infrastructure Protection, dated 15 Aug. 2007
DHS Delegation 8001, Delegation to the Chief, Office of Security, for Security
Clearances of DHS Personnel, dated 28 Feb. 2003
DHS Delegation 8100.3, Delegation of Original Classification Authority, dated 2 Jun.
2006
DHS Delegation 8150, Delegation to Chief, Office of Security, of Determination Authority
and Cognizant Security Authority, dated 17 Jun. 2003
DHS Delegation 12000, Delegation to Designate Officers and Agents, dated 14 Dec.
2005
DHS Delegation 12002, Delegation to Designate Officers and Agents on Behalf of
Mount Weather Police Department, dated 26 Jun. 2006
4.7. Customs and Border Protection Directives
CBP Directive 3290-010B, Physical Security Standard for Customs and Border
Protection Laboratories, dated Feb. 2008
CBP Directive 5230-032, Personal Property Management, dated 1 Jun. 2005
4.8. Customs and Border Protection Handbooks
CBP HB 5200-13B, Personal Property Management Handbook, dated Nov. 2005
4.9. Legacy
Immigration and Naturalization Service, Security Officer’s Handbook, dated Mar. 1997
Immigration and Naturalization Service, Personal Property Operations Handbook
CIS HB 1400-02A, U.S. Customs Service, Physical Security Handbook, dated Apr. 2000
CIS HB 4400-01A, U.S. Customs Service, Seized Asset Management and Enforcement
Procedures Handbook, dated Jan. 2002
CIS HB 3200-07A, U.S. Customs Service, Canine Enforcement Program Handbook,
dated Aug. 2002
4.10. Interagency Security Committee Standards
ISC Standard, Facility Security Level Determinations for Federal Facilities
ISC Standard, Security Design Criteria for New Federal Office Buildings and Major

RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
11 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Back Return to Table of Contents
Modernization Projects
ISC Standard, Security Standards for Leased Spaces
4.11. Unified Facilities Criteria
UFC 4-010-01, DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings, dated 8 Oct. 2003
UFC 4-010-02, DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standoff Distances for Buildings, dated 8
Oct. 2003
UFC 4-022-01, Security Engineering: Entry Control Facilities / Access Control Points,
dated 25 May 2005
4.12. Unified Facilities Guide Specifications
UFGS-08 11 13, Steel Doors and Frames, dated Jul. 2006
UFGS-08 14 00, Wood Doors, dated Jul. 2006
UFGS-08 33 23, Overhead Coiling Doors, dated Jul. 2007
UFGS-08 34 59, Security Vault Door, dated Apr. 2006
UFGS-08 71 00, Door Hardware, dated Oct. 2007
UFGS-28 16 00.00 20, Basic Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), dated Apr. 2006
UFGS-28 23 23.00 10, Closed Circuit Television Systems, dated Apr. 2006
UFGS-32 31 13.53, High-Security Chain Link Fences and Gates, dated Apr. 2008
4.13. Federal and Military Specifications and Standards
AA-D-600D, Door, Vault, Security (with Amendment 1), dated 15 May 2000
FF-L-2740A, Locks, Combination (with Amendment 1), dated 12 Jan. 1997
4.14. Department of Justice
Vulnerability Assessment of Federal Facilities, dated 28 Jun. 1995
4.15. Department of Defense
DoDI 2000.16, DoD Antiterrorism (AT) Standards, dated 2 Oct. 2006
DoDI 5200.08, Security of DoD Installations and Resources, dated 10 Dec. 2005
DoD 5200.08-R, Physical Security Program, dated 9 Apr. 2007
DoD 5220.22-M, National Industry Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM),
dated 28 Feb. 2006
DoD 5220.22-M-Sup 1, National Industry Security Program Operating Manual
Supplement, dated Feb. 1995
MIL-HDBK-1013/1A, Design Guidelines for Physical Security of Facilities, dated 15 Dec.
1993
MIL-HDBK-1013/10, Design Guidelines for Security Fencing, Gates, Barriers, and
Guard Facilities, dated 14 May 1993
MIL-HDBK-1013/14, Selection and Application of Vehicle Barriers, dated 1 Feb. 1999
4.16. General Services Administration
PBS-P100, Facilities Standards for the Public Buildings Service, dated Mar. 2005
4.17. Office of Personnel Management
Dealing With Workplace Violence, a Guide for Agency Planners Handbook, dated Feb.
1998

4.18. National Fire Protection Association

NFPA 101, Life Safety Code, dated 2006

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BACK Return to Table of Contents

Chapter 5: Responsibilities

5.1. Component Head

5.1.1. The Component Head, defined as the highest-ranking individual within each
Component, is the Commissioner of CBP. The Component Head, in addition to other
duties, is responsible for ensuring that security management duties, as defined in
DHS MD 11080, are carried out effectively and effiiciently.
5.2. CBP Component Chief Security Officer
5.2.1. The Assistant Commissioner (AC) of the Office of Internal Affairs is the designated
CBP Chief Security Officer. The AC oversees a wide range of investigative
and security related functions including applicant and employee background
investigations, clearances, employee misconduct investigations, INFOSEC, OPSEC,
Physical Security, Industrial Security and management inspections.
5.3. Associate Chief Security Officer
5.3.1. The Director for CBP Office of Internal Affairs, Security Management Division (CBP/
IA/SMD), exercises the general authority delegated by the Assistant Commissioner
for the Office of Internal Affairs. Under the general supervision of the Assistant
Commissioner for Internal Affairs, the Director of CBP/IA/SMD, as the Associate
Chief Security Officer, has been appointed to discharge these responsibilities.
5.4. Physical Security Branch (PSB) Chief
5.4.1. The Physical Security Branch (PSB) Chief provides complete, effective, security
management oversight, policy formulation, and compliance and quality assurance
for the physical security program to include the protection of facilities/sites, property
assets to include mission-essential infrastructures, and personnel.
5.5. Field Security Operations Branch (FSOB) Chief
5.5.1. The Field Security Operations Branch (FSOB) Chief is responsible for ensuring
that national security programs are implemented, assigning adequate resources
to implement and maintain security programs, designating Regional Security
Officers (RSO) and other appropriately cleared security officials to discharge these
responsibilities.
5.6. Regional Security Officers (RSOs)
5.6.1. The Regional Security Officers (RSOs) are responsible for ensuring that security
programs are carried out within their respective regions, assigning adequate
resources to implement and maintain security programs, and designating a RSO
alternate, and other appropriately cleared security officials to discharge these
responsibilities.
5.7. District Security Officers (DSOs)
5.7.1. The District Security Officers (DSOs) are responsible for coordinating compliance
with CBP security programs through the RSO and serve as the primary point of
contact for all security issues within their districts.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
16 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

5.8. Designation of Security Officers and Officials

5.8.1. The responsible manager shall designate security officers and officials as required
or deemed appropriate. Each designation shall be in writing and a copy of the
designation provided to the RSO. The RSO shall include the names of individuals
designated as Security Liaisons (SLs) in the report of key security personnel which
is provided annually to the CBP Office of Internal Affairs, Security Management
Division.
5.9. Physical Security Specialists (PSSs)
5.9.1. Physical Security Specialists (PSSs). Personnel designated as PSSs are
responsible for familiarizing themselves with the applicable portions of this policy
handbook and the Federal, departmental, and CBP security directives referenced
herein, and for knowledgeably administering the security programs relevant to their
respective mission. Unless the specific organizational security officer designation
is used, the term security officer as used in this policy handbook shall apply to all
organizational security officers.
5.9.2. Personnel Security Officers (PSOs) are responsible for the suitability portion of the
personnel security system that encompasses the risk designation program, the
assignment of public trust position designations, initiating required entry background
investigations, and adjudicating suitability as delegated by the Office of Personnel
Management (OPM).
5.9.3. Security Liaisons (SLs) are responsible for coordinating compliance with the
implementation of CBP security programs through the DSO/RSO and serve as the
primary point of contact for all security issues within their facilities.
5.9.4. Qualifications. Only qualified individuals with sufficient grade and experience,
capable of performing the applicable duties set forth in this policy handbook, shall be
appointed as security Liaisons.
5.9.5. Security Clearance. Security Liaisons shall, at a minimum, possess a national
security clearance commensurate with that required for the highest national security
program relevant to their respective activity.
5.9.6. Training. For basic training, security Liaisons shall review and familiarize themselves
with the contents of this policy handbook and the applicable Federal, departmental,
and CBP security regulations referenced in this handbook. At the discretion of the
responsible manager, security Liaisons may attend training courses on a variety of
security subjects offered by a number of different agencies.
5.10. IA/PSD Personnel Security Officers
5.10.1. IA/PSD Personnel Security Officers, when designated, are responsible for
coordinating compliance with the implementation of all position-risk and -sensitive
position programs, which includes ensuring that the required background
investigations for sensitive positions are conducted. See the Personnel Security
Handbook for more detailed information.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
17 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

5.11. IA/SMD Information Security Officers

5.11.1. IA/SMD Information Security Officers, when designated, are responsible for
coordinating compliance with all regulations for safeguarding national security
information, proprietary information, sensitive information, or Privacy Act records.
5.11.2. Top Secret Control Officer (TSCO). The TSCO receives, dispatches, and maintains
an accountability register of Top Secret material in an approved Top Secret control
center.
5.12. Classified Document Custodian, Classified Control Station
5.12.1. The Classified Document Custodian of a Classified Control Station receives,
dispatches, and maintains an accountability register of Secret and Confidential
material in an approved classified control station.
5.13. Derivative Classifiers
5.13.1. The Agency Security Manager specifically designates employees who originate the
production or generation of classified information as Derivative Classifiers.
5.14. Designated Official (DO)
5.14.1. Designated Official (DO). The highest ranking official of the primary tenant agency
of a Federal facility or, alternatively, a designee selected by mutual agreement of
tenant agency officials. For facilities owned and leased by the U.S. General Services
Administration (GSA), the definition that appears in 41 CFR § 102-71.20 of the Code
of Federal Regulations protects personnel and property in the event of emergencies
such as fire, bomb threats, civil disturbances and natural disasters. The DO (as
defined in in 41 CFR § 102-71.20 is responsible for developing, implementing and
maintaining an Occupant Emergency Plan (OEP). For further detail on the OEP, see
Chapter 15, Occupant Emergency Plan.
5.15. Assessments
5.15.1. The assessment will be used by the DO of the facility, in conjunction with CBP/IA/
SMD, to determine the type and extent of security countermeasures. (A link to the
Physical Security Project Prioritization Tool will be established when that item is
made available.)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BACK Return to Table of Contents

Chapter 6: Facility Protection

6.1. General
6.1.1. The degree of facility protection shall be determined by the Regional or District
Security Officer based on the results of a comprehensive security assessment of the
facility.
6.1.2. Perimeter protection is the first line of defense in providing physical security for
personnel, property, and information at a facility.
6.1.3. The second line of defense, and perhaps the most important, is interior controls.
6.1.4. The cost of security controls above these minimum standards normally shall not
exceed the monetary value of the item or areas to be protected, unless necessitated
through an assessment.
6.2. Planning Facility Protection
6.2.1. The objective of planning facility protection is to ensure the integrity of operations
and the security of assets. Security planning must be an integral part of selecting,
designing, constructing, reconfiguring, or moving into a CBP facility.
6.2.2. The modification of a facility or addition of security measures after occupying a
facility can be costly and impractical. Therefore, the responsible Project Manager
and Designated Official (DO), as defined in the Federal Property Management
Regulation (FPMR), will coordinate from the outset, on any addition, alteration, or
new construction with CBP/IA/SMD. The coordination shall begin with the funding
and concept phase, including the designers and architects and continue through the
contracting process, actual construction, installation, and acceptance.
6.2.3. When CBP occupies General Services Administration (GSA)-leased facilities, it is
imperative that the CBP/IA/SMD Security Specialist and the Security Liaison (SL)
establish a working relationship with the GSA and local law enforcement officials.
The SL is required to participate and maintain an active role as a member of the
Building Security Committee (BSC).
6.2.4. Facility Protection in CBP-owned or leased Facilities. For buildings and grounds
owned or leased by the CBP, the DO having jurisdiction over the real property is
responsible for implementing additional security measures above the minimum
standards. The degree of protection to be provided for the space will be determined
by the physical security assessment conducted by CBP/IA/SMD. The assessment
will evaluate the security of that specific facility, taking into consideration the facility’s
location, size and configuration, history of criminal activity or disruptive incidents,
extent of exterior lighting, presence of physical barriers, and other factors that may
be deemed pertinent.
6.2.5. Facility Protection in GSA-Owned or Leased Facilities. For building and grounds for
which GSA has space assignment responsibility, GSA is responsible for furnishing
standard protection not less than the degree of protection provided by commercial
building operators of similar space for normal risk occupants. The degree of
protection is determined by a Federal Protective Service (FPS) physical security

assessment and the minimum security standards contained in this policy handbook
This protection may include guards, access control, intrusion detection (alarms),
closed circuit television surveillance (CCTV), inspection of packages, etc., when the
FPS assessment determines that the security countermeasures are warranted for
general Government occupancy and not necessitated by special activities or specific
agencies. Special protection required due to the nature of the business conducted
within the space or unusual public reaction to an agency’s program and missions
(whether or not of a continuing nature) is determined jointly by the FPS, CBP/IA/
SMD, and the occupant agency or agencies and is provided on a reimbursable
basis.
6.2.6. Protection Criteria. The FPS and CBP/IA/SMD determine the level of normal
protective service on a case by-case basis. The facility’s location, size, number
of occupants and configuration, history of criminal or disruptive incidents in the
surrounding area, even those not primarily directed toward the occupant agency’s
mission; the extent of exterior lighting, presence of physical barriers or other factors
may be deemed pertinent and will be taken into consideration.
6.2.7. Physical Protection. FPS provides normal and special protection through mobile
patrol or fixed posts manned by contractually engaged uniformed personnel; security
systems and devices; locking building entrances and gates during other than normal
hours; cooperation of local law enforcement agencies; or a combination of these,
depending upon the facility and the degree of risk involved. The degree of normal
and special protection is determined by completion of a FPS physical security
assessment, crime prevention assessment, and CBP/IA/SMD minimum standards
outlined in this handbook.
6.2.8. Crime Prevention. The FPS collects and disseminates information about criminal
activity on or against property under the charge and control of GSA, and provides
crime prevention awareness training to occupant agencies upon request.
6.2.9. Facility Protection. In facilities where GSA has delegated protection authority to
the agency or prime tenant, virtually all protection responsibilities are transferred to
the agency, including acquisition, installation, and maintenance of physical security
equipment and systems, and procurement and management of any guard contracts.
In cases such as this, CBP/IA/SMD remains the approving authority for all security-
related equipment and standards. CBP will not procure guard contracts on its own
and will continue to procure guard services through FPS on a reimbursable basis.
Normally, GSA/FPS will retain responsibility for mobile patrols, monitoring of alarms,
response to incidents, request for criminal investigations, fire and facility safety and
health inspections. GSA/FPS will provide such services at no charge to the agency
beyond the Basic Security Charge, which is included in the rent.
6.2.10. Design Factors. It is imperative that security systems and procedures are considered
from the start of the design phase so that conduit runs and alarm wiring, structural
requirements, reinforcing devices, and other necessary construction requirements
are provided in the original plans.

6.3. Determining Building Security Level

6.3.1. CBP/IA/SMD has determined that all CBP facilities shall meet the Level III security
requirements listed in the table below. A higher level of security may be assigned to
a facility based on the risk assessment conducted.
6.3.2. Determine the building security level in accordance with the criteria and process
used in determining the Facility Security Level (FSL) of a Federal facility. This
categorization serves as the basis for implementing protective measures under
other Interagency Security Committee (ISC) standards. Consistent with the authority
contained in Executive Order 12977, “Interagency Security Committee,” dated
October 19, 1995, this Standard is applicable to all buildings and facilities in the
United States occupied by Federal employees for non-military activities. These
include existing buildings; new construction; major modernizations; facilities owned,
to be purchased, or leased; stand-alone facilities, Federal campuses; and, where
appropriate, special-use facilities.
●● Use the “Facility Security Level Determinations for Federal Facilities—An
Interagency Security Committee Standard,” 2007;

Federal holdings are divided into four out of the five security levels for this Physical Security
Handbook, based primarily on staffing size, number of employees, use, and the need
for public access.
●● See Appendix 6.3, CBP Minimum Standards, for detailed information on facility
security levels.
6.4. Building Security Levels

FACTOR I II III IV SCORE

Mission Criticality LOW MEDIUM HIGH VERY HIGH
Symbolism LOW MEDIUM HIGH VERY HIGH

Facility Population <100 101-250 251-750 >750

10,000-100,000 100,000-250,000
Facility Size <10,000 sq. ft. >250,000 sq.ft
sq. ft. sq.ft.

Threat to Tenant LOW MEDIUM HIGH VERY HIGH

Agencies

Sum of above

Facility Security I II III IV

Preliminary FSL
Level 5-7 Points 8-12 Points 13-17 Points 18-20 Points

+/- 1 FSL
Intangible Justification
Adjustment
Final FSL

●● Facility Security Level Determinations for Federal Facilities—An Interagency

Security Committee Standard defines the criteria and process to be used in
determining the Facility Security Level (FSL) of a Federal facility:
o This categorization serves as the basis for implementing protective measures
under other ISC standards. Consistent with the authority contained in
Executive Order 12977, “Interagency Security Committee,” dated October 19,
1995, this Standard is applicable to all buildings and facilities in the United
States occupied by Federal employees for nonmilitary activities. These
include:
–– Existing buildings;
–– New construction, or major modernizations;
–– Facilities owned, to be purchased, or leased;
–– Stand-alone facilities;
–– Federal campuses;
–– Individual facilities on Federal campuses (where appropriate); and
–– Special-use facilities.
6.5. Facility Security Level Determinations for Federal Facilities
6.5.1. New Leases in Existing Buildings
●● The appropriate security level for each lease requirement should be determined
by a CBP/SMD Security Specialist (except in the case of GSA leases, whereby
FPS/DHS shall make this determination in consultation with CBP/SMD, based
on a risk assessment as an application of the recommendations set forth in the
Department of Justice “Vulnerability Assessment of Federal Facilities” (DOJ
study), dated June 28, 1995, the ISC Security Leasing Criteria, September 2004
and the new “Facility Security Level Determinations for Federal Facilities (FSL)
An Interagency Security Committee Standard,” 2007:
o Where CBP anticipates making a new lease in an existing building (including
succeeding lease actions), all of the ISC Lease Security Standards (operating
standards) listed for that security level must be met, with the exception of
those requirements specifically prescribed under “New Construction - Blast/
Setback Standards;
o The standards shall be considered minimum requirements; and it is the
intent that offerors unwilling or unable to meet the requirements should be
considered non-responsive. A distinction should be drawn between operating
standards and new construction standards;
–– Operating standards pertain to the operational and perhaps out-source
able nature of security, i.e., access control via guard service, CCTV
monitoring, magnetometers, x-ray machines and HVAC security, to name
a few. While the minimum operating standards must be met, existing
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
23 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

buildings are not required to meet the blast/setback standards required

for new construction. CBP, at their own expense, may increase (but not
decrease) the level of security required in the Lease
–– Security standards. As an example, a recommended security Level III
for an agency could be raised to a Level IV, at the agency’s request; or
perhaps only a specific, isolated standard could be added to the Level III
requirement.
6.5.2. Lease Construction Projects
●● When lease construction shall be sought (the SFO specifies a build-to-suit)
to satisfy a requirement, the Lease Security Standards (operating standards)
identified for the required security level shall be incorporated into lease
construction Solicitation For Offers (SFOs);
●● These projects shall incorporate the new construction-blast/setback standards
specified in Section III for the specified security level as well as new construction
design criteria contained in the “ISC Security Design Criteria”, dated May 28,
2004, or latest version. In some cases, lease construction may be offered
(although not specifically requested) in direct response to a solicitation for space
(i.e., the Government mayor may not be the anchor tenant). In this situation, the
proposal for new construction would be held to the higher standards than that of
potentially competing existing buildings under the same solicitation; and
●● The existing buildings shall be required to meet only the minimum lease security
standards (operating standards only) and shall not be subject to the new
construction-blast/setback requirements or the ISC Design Criteria.
6.5.3. Perimeter Security
●● Security control is required over public areas and building entry points. This
includes adjacent surface parking lots and structures under the building owner’s
control. Private tenancies shall be expected to comply. Security control means
(generally) the right to inspect at point of entry and at any time present in the
public space, the right to deny access and the right to remove vehicles from the
premises;
●● Security control is obtainable by any of 3 methods: lessor-furnished (turnkey),
operating agreement (shared-responsibility), or full leasehold control
(government-furnished) depending on how the owners propose. The Government
shall retain the right to provide control at anytime during the lease term;
●● Garage control does not require Government parkers, but may require
Government garage management. Implementation of a vehicle pass/ID system
for contract/monthly parkers, acceptable to the Government, is required. Signage
is required to alert parking patrons to inspection and towing policies and removal
of unauthorized vehicles;
●● Adequate lighting, with emergency power backup, for the exterior of the building
is required. Parking areas shall also be adequately lighted. 24-hour Closed
Circuit Television (CCTV) surveillance cameras with time lapse video recording
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
24 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

is required at lobbies and parking areas or as otherwise deemed necessary by a

Government Security Specialist;
●● Applications of shatter-resistant material, acceptable to the Government, shall be
applied on exterior windows in Government-occupied space;
NOTE: SHATTER-RESISTANT WINDOW PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS (as of November 2005) (BUILDING
SHELL)
●● The Lessor shall provide and install wet-glazed or mechanically attached,
shatter-resistant material not less than 0.18 millimeters (7-mil) thick on all exterior
windows in Government-occupied space. The offeror shall provide a description
of the shatter-resistant window system in the attached Lessor Building Security
Plan; and
●● Alternatively, the Lessor shall provide certification from a licensed professional
engineer that the window system conforms to a minimum glazing performance
condition of 3B for a high protection level and a low hazard level. Window
systems shall be certified as prescribed by WINGARD 4.1 or later or WINLAC
4.3 software to have satisfied the specified performance condition using the
test methods provided in the US General Services Administration Standard Test
Method for Glazing and Window Systems Subject to Dynamic Overpressure
Loadings or ASTM F1642-04 Standard Test Method for Glazing and Glazing
Systems Subject to air blast loadings.
6.5.4. Entry Security
●● Security Guards for public lobbies and public entrances shall be required for such
purposes as ID/pass control and manning x-ray and magnetometer equipment.
Guards can be lessor-furnished or via operating agreement or full leasehold
control methods. If guards are lessor furnished, they shall be trained and licensed
in accordance with Federal Government standards consistent with the Federal
Protective Service. Guards manning magnetometers and x-ray equipment shall
be armed. For more information, refer to Chapter 11: Access To Facilities;
●● Magnetometers, manned by armed Security Guards, are required at public
entrances as determined by the CBP/SMD Security Specialist. Guards shall
direct the building population and visitors through the magnetometers. All
government mail and packages entering the building shall be subject to x-ray
screening and visual inspection by armed Security Guards. This includes
packages and personal belongings of the building occupants and visitors, as well
as shipments brought into a loading dock;
●● The Government may divert large truck shipments to a secondary location for
screening purposes. The Government reserves the right to negotiate security
enhancements necessary for securing any unsecured non-federal block of space
with a separate entrance (e.g., ground floor retail) based on a Government
Building Security Assessment; and
●● Intrusion Detection System (IDS) with central monitoring capability is required
for the building perimeter. Internal IDS may be required as determined by a

Government Security Specialist. Exterior entrances shall have high security

locks. Leases shall state that the Government reserves the right to post
applicable Government rules and regulations at each public entrance in a
Federally occupied facility for such things as, but not limited to, barring the
unauthorized possession of firearms and dangerous weapons. For more
information on IDS, refer to Appendix 8.9 IDS.
6.5.5. Interior Security
●● Acceptable government-issued (e.g. driver’s license) photo ID for all building
occupants upon entry to the building is required. A visitor control/screening
system, acceptable to the Government, is required. At a minimum, the system
shall require Security Guards to screen visitors but could result in a level of
control that may require escorting them;
●● Utility areas shall be secured and only authorized personnel shall have
access. Emergency power sources to critical systems (alarm systems, radio
communications, computer facilities, CCTV monitoring, fire detection, entry
control devices, etc) are required;
●● Specific protection measures shall be required to protect the building
environment from airborne chemical, biological, or radiological attacks.
Accessible fresh air intakes shall be relocated, extended or secured to prevent
easy ground or roof access. Access to mechanical areas and building roofs shall
be strictly controlled. Dedicated Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC)
shall be required for lobbies, centrally-operated mail rooms (specifically required
by the government) and loading docks, to prevent widespread dispersion of a
contaminant released in those areas;
●● Procedures (should airborne hazards be suspected or found) are required for
the notification of the lessor’s building manager, building security guard desk,
local emergency personnel, or other Government emergency personnel, for the
possible shutdown of air handling units serving any possibly affected areas;
●● Securing accessible return-air grilles is required. Protection measures shall
not adversely affect the performance of the building HVAC system. Access to
building information, including mechanical, electrical, vertical transport, fire and
life safety, security system plans and schematics, computer automation systems,
and emergency operations procedures shall be required. Such information shall
be released to authorized personnel only. Names and locations of Government
tenants shall not be disclosed within any publicly accessed document or record;
and
●● A fire alarm system, with voice communication, is required for emergency
notification and instructions to building tenants, in the event of possible
contamination of the HVAC system or other emergency.
6.5.6. Administrative Procedures
●● Building managers and owners are required to cooperate with and participate in
the development and implementation of Government Occupant Emergency Plans
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
26 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

(OEP). Conduct background security checks and/or establish security control

procedures for contract service personnel as deemed necessary;
●● The Government reserves the right, at its own expense and manpower, to
temporarily upgrade security during heightened security conditions due to
emergency situations such as terrorist attacks, natural disaster and civil unrest.
The measures shall be in accordance with the latest version of the Homeland
Security Advisory System.
6.5.7. New Construction/New Construction -Lease
●● For any lease resulting in new construction (not existing buildings), in addition
to the above Minimum Lease Security Standards, the Interagency Security
Committee (ISC) Design Criteria, dated May 28, 2001 or latest version, shall also
apply as well as the following blast/setback standards shall be met;
6.5.8. Blast/Setback Standards
●● For non-law enforcement agencies (excluding childcare, but including the
U.S. Courts), a 50 foot setback guideline with appropriate window glazing, as
prescribed by WINGGARD 3.15 or later or WINLAC 4.3 software, to achieve a
glazing performance condition of 3b and a facade protection level of “medium”
given a blast load standard of 4 psi/28 psi-msec is required.
●● For some law enforcement agencies, a 100 foot setback guideline with
appropriate window glazing, as prescribed by WINGARD 3.15 or later or
WINLAC 4.3 software, to achieve a glazing performance condition of 2 and
a facade protection level of “higher” given a blast load standard of 10 psi/89
psi-msec is required. For more information on windows, refer to Appendix 7.7
Windows;
●● Setback refers to the distance from the face of the building’s exterior to the
protected/defended perimeter (i.e., any potential point of explosion). This would
mean the distance from the building to the curb or other boundary protected by
bollards, planters or other street furniture. Such potential points of explosion
may be, but no limited to, such areas that could be accessible by any motorized
vehicle (i.e. street, alley, sidewalk, driveway, parking lot);
●● Glazing Performance Condition 3b provides for a high protection level and a low
hazard level. For a blast of 4psi/28psi-msec, the glazing cracks and fragments
enter the space and land on the floor not further than 10ft. from the window;
●● “Medium Level Protection” to the facade shall result in moderate damage, but
repairable. The facility or protected space shall sustain a significant degree of
damage, but the structure should be reusable. Some casualties may occur and
assets may be damaged. Building elements other than major structural members
may require replacement;
●● Glazing Performance Condition 2 provides for a very high protection level and a
hazard level of “none”. For a blast of 4psi/28psi-msec or 1 Opsi/89 psi-msec, the
glazing cracks but is retained by the frame. Dusting or very small fragments near
the sill or on the floor are acceptable; and
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
27 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

●● “Higher Level Protection” to the facade shall result in minor damage, but
repairable. The facility or protected space may globally sustain minor damage
with some local significant damage possible. Occupants may incur some injury,
and assets may receive minor damage.
6.6. Special Requests
6.6.1. Building Permit
●● The lessor shall provide a copy of the building permit to the U.S. Customs and
Border Protection Office of Internal Affairs (IA), Security Management Division
(SMD).
6.6.2. Blueprints, AutoCAD, Floor Plans, Time Requirements
●● No later than 30 days after completion of the job, the contractor/lessor shall
provide IA/SMD with all blueprints of the space and all associated areas (i.e. roof,
garage) on AutoCAD and a hard copy of the floor plan;
●● The security system shall be included in the blueprints after the initial floor
design. The security system shall be on a separate layer. It shall not be included
on the same layer of the electrical system. The security system shall be treated
as sensitive information and shall not be given to any contractor who does
not have a need to know. A hardcopy of as -built of the Security System along
with the AutoCAD copy shall be provided to SMD no later than 30 days after
the completion of the job. (This shall include any changes made during the
construction phase).
Note: Security Plan shall include furniture layout.
6.6.3. Pre-Construction Meeting
●● A pre-construction meeting is required by the Security Management Division.
This meeting shall include representatives from GSA, FPS, Lessor, General
Contractor (GC), and the CBP/Security Management Division. At this meeting,
the GC shall provide a proposed project schedule for review and discussion.
Based on this discussion, the GC shall submit the final detail project schedule
before construction starts.
6.6.4. Security Requirements
●● The CBP/Security Management Division requires one business week after the
space has been totally built out (including carpet, painting, electrical, plumbing,
HVAC, communication cable, and video cable, except for the installation of the
ceiling tile) to complete our security and communication requirements. Once
these tasks are completed, an inspection may be needed before the ceiling
tiles are installed. After that, a final walk through shall take place by the SMD
and GSA to prepare a punch list to present to the contractor/lessor. No security
project shall be considered substantially complete.
6.7. Security Contractor Suitability
●● Any contractors working on this project shall be required to complete and
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
28 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

submit background information prior to starting any CBP/IA project. Refer

to the Homeland Security Acquisitions Manual, §3004.470-2, which states
that a contractor must complete a background investigation before work may
commence.
6.8. General Office Requirements
6.8.1. Planning Office Security
●● These general guidelines should be used in conjunction with the CBP Minimum
Standards in Appendix 6.3, CBP Minimum Standards.
6.8.2. Location of Office and Building Structure
●● The physical location of the Internal Affairs Offices must meet the criteria within
the guidelines of NEAP, FEMA, and OSHA safety regulations. In addition, the
Building shall meet all Interagency Security Committee, Security Design Criteria’s
for New Federal Office Buildings, and Major Modernization/and or ISC leasing
criteria projects.(i.e. HazMat, proximity to Industrial Facilities, pollutions- noise,
air, water, secured parking, floodplains, known disaster areas);
●● Due to the critical nature of the protective and investigative responsibilities of the
U.S. Customs and Border Protection Office of Internal Affairs, the following must
be considered prior to determining fixed site locations:
o Investigative Responsibilities (Prisoner Processing and Security, Evidence
Storage, Classified Storage, File Storage, Surveillance, Vehicle Storage,
Weapons & Munitions Storage);
o (See Section 6.11 for the GSA ISC Guidelines).
●● To reduce the vulnerabilities of window exposure to public areas, streets, and
parking facilities, the exact location of the office within a commercial or federal
facility, shall be determined by the Security Management Division Physical
Security Specialist with Federal Protective Service and General Services
Administration during market survey. The Building/Office must meet or exceed
local Fire & Safety codes. A complete re-inspection should be conducted prior to
the building being selected.
6.8.3. Location Within the Building
●● The Internal Affairs Offices shall not be located on the ground floor of any
building. Top floor locations shall be considered as an alternative to lower
exposed areas. Space should be located on the third to seventh floors:
o The offices shall be located in contiguous space on one or more floors.;
o The Internal Affairs Offices shall not be located in window space that
is adjacent to outside fire escapes, ledges, balconies, public parking,
mezzanines, or directly above the loading dock area.
6.8.4. Building Security
●● The building shall have a 24-hour security system;

●● The CBP Offices personnel must have 24-hour unrestricted access to the office
space and parking.
6.8.5. Parking
●● Parking within adjacent parking garage is the optimum situation. These buildings
shall be considered before other buildings that do not offer that alternative. A
building which sits above a parking garage shall also be considered, depending
upon access control to the parking garage and available secured storage of CBP
vehicles;
●● Special security requirements for the parking area for official vehicles shall
depend on local conditions, which shall be evaluated before the market survey.
If on site, or adjacent parking is available, parking shall be within a reasonable
walking distance of approximately one block of the office building; and
●● Protective and Investigative vehicles shall require secured parking
implementations. The parking area, or drop off point, must be within close
proximity to an elevator (preferably a service elevator) in order to expedite
prisoner/detainee handling and processing.
6.8.6. HVAC
●● A building that has an HVAC system, zoned floor to floor, or within a floor, and is
energy efficient, shall be given priority over other buildings that do not have these
capabilities;
●● Buildings with HVAC systems that are turned off over weekends MUST have the
capability to provide 24 hour heating/cooling when CBP personnel are working
after hours, or on the weekends. Certain areas such as labs, communications
equipment, security equipment, and Office of Internal Affairs technical equipment,
and duty desk, etc., shall require 24-hour cooling. If needed, an additional
independent HVAC system could be installed to provide mandatory 24-hour
cooling to these areas.
6.8.7. Elevators
●● A freight or public elevator that can be keyed off for exclusive use by CBP is
desirable when transporting prisoners/detainees. The elevator shall go from the
drop off point in the parking area to the floor on which processing is located;
●● Access to both the freight elevator and loading dock must be made available to
U.S. Customs and Border Protection personnel;
●● All other elevators that open into Office of Internal Affairs space shall grant
access only to the Visitor Waiting Lobby during normal working hours; and
●● All other elevators that open into Office of Internal Affairs space require access
control systems and devices.
6.8.8. Egress
●● Every effort shall be made to design IA space so that the IA office has two ways
of egress, a front door and a back door. Preferably, the doors shall not be located

near each other and shall open out into different hallways.
6.8.9. Emergency Signaling Devices
●● Audio speakers shall not be installed inside private offices. Required speakers
shall be installed in the Office of Internal Affairs hallway immediately outside
the private offices. Required speakers shall be installed in the Office of Internal
Affairs hallway immediately outside the private offices with the volume adjusted
so that people inside these offices can hear the alarm;
●● All other audio signaling devices, such as fire alarms, are subject to testing
by CBP before they can be installed in the Office of Internal Affairs offices. No
equipment found capable of passing speech components shall be accepted. Fire
Alarm Strobe Lights located in Office of Internal Affairs areas are acceptable. All
fire alarm equipment shall meet all current local, fire, and life safety codes;
●● Emergency lighting shall be provided throughout the space. This can be achieved
either through stand alone emergency lighting fixtures, or by having the building
standard ceiling lights on an emergency lighting circuit that is supported by a
standby generator; and
●● Exit doors within our space need to be identified with illuminated exit signs that
are powered by the emergency lighting system. If required, additional signs shall
be placed throughout to direct employees to the exits from all interior corridors
within the Office of Internal Affairs space.
6.8.10. Perimeter Doors
6.8.11. Perimeter doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad, hollow core metal,
1¾-inches thick. Solid core wood doors are not authorized for use on the perimeter
of a facility. Door frames must be constructed of hollow metal that is equal in
strength to that of the door. For more information on Doors, refer to Appendix 7.6
Doors and Door Hardware.
●● Perimeter doors must be equipped with door stoppers and door closers. Double
doors, glass doors, and doors with louvers are unacceptable, unless these
doors open into the Waiting Room/Lobby from a public hallway. If doors must be
installed so that the hinge pins are exposed in the unsecured area, then non-
removable pins shall be installed. On out swinging doors, a steel astragal, which
precludes access to the latch bolt and deadbolt, must be installed on the door. In
addition to the public entry door, there shall be at least one more perimeter door
in all Office of Internal Affairs offices;
●● All perimeter doors shall be fitted with a Mortise lockset with deadbolt, which is
ANSI F20 compliant, unless otherwise noted. Doors utilizing electronic access
control devices shall use an electric Mortise lockset with power transfer hinge or
electric strike with a rating of 1200 foot pounds, or as specified by CBP/SMD on
a case by case basis. All exit doors must comply with local fire codes.
●● For more information, see Appendix 7.6, Doors and Door Hardware.
6.9. Fire Detection and Suppression (Sprinkler) Systems
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
31 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

●● The U.S. Customs and Border Protection require a fire detection system that
provides 100% coverage of the controlled office area;
●● All detection systems used must meet or exceed local and NFP A national fire
detection codes. It is incumbent upon the contractor to ensure all doors, security
devices and access control systems meet or exceed local and national NFPA fire
codes;
●● In some offices, the installation of a suppression system may be required. The
use of a suppression system shall require modifications to the electrical and air
handling systems. If this installation is necessary, it shall be identified when floor
plans are prepared;
●● Installation, maintenance, and service of the fire detection and suppression
systems shall be the responsibility of building management; and
●● All problems with the systems protecting Office of Internal Affairs space shall be
reported to the appropriate agency supervisor.
6.9.1. Radio Communication Antennae and Base Stations(s)
●● It may be necessary to install radio communication antennae on the roof of the
building and radio communication base stations associated equipment in the
elevator equipment area or similar type area near the roof;
●● Coaxial cable(s) have to connect the antenna(s) to the base station(s). At a
minimum, a dedicated 20 amps, 120 VAC, duplex outlet shall be required for
power to each base station installed and telephone keying lines for remotely
controlling the base station(s). A building ground shall also be provided for the
radio base station(s). Every effort should be made to restrict access and secure
base stations.
6.9.2. Generator Service
●● Emergency power sources to critical systems (communications system, intrusion
detection system, Duty Agent room, Communication Equipment Room, and
Office of Internal Affairs Technical Support Division Closet) are required.
6.9.3. Cleaning
●● IA office cleaning must be performed during normal working hours. Maintenance
should be aware that name checks shall be conducted on cleaning and
maintenance personnel. If the facility is GSA-leased, GSA will provide the
appropriate documents identifying cleaning crew personnel that have been
properly adjudicated.
6.10. Secure Border Initiative (SBI)
6.10.1. The Department of Homeland Security’s Secure Border Initiative (SBI) addresses
the security challenges along the southern and northern land borders of the United
States. SBI, in coordination with the other border security missions conducted by
ICE, USCIS, USGC, Intelligence, and the Department of Justice works to address
our Nation’s immigration border security challenges. The scope of SBI provides

DHS and CBP with the optimum mix of personnel, technology, infrastructure, and
response platforms to detect, identify, classify, and respond to illegal breaches of
borders shared with Canada and Mexico and thereby bring the situations to the
appropriate law enforcement resolution. SBI will employ next generation technology
in the area of cameras, ground-based radar, communications, unmanned aerial
vehicles, underground sensors, and sophisticated software packages for terrain
environments. SBI will bring together multiple state of the art systems as well as
traditional security infrastructure to create a comprehensive border security program.
6.10.2. For more information, see Appendix 6.10, Secure Border Initiative.
6.11. Security Survey Process
6.11.1. This is in development. When complete, this will contain the steps in conducting
the survey and a possible checklist which will include the Physical Security Project
Prioritization Tool:
●● Findings;
●● Requirements;
●● Source document(s); and
●● Response.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BACK Return to Table of Contents

Chapter 7: Exterior Protection

7.1. General
7.1.1. Perimeter protection is the first line of defense in providing physical security for a
facility. This can be accomplished by installing fences or other physical barriers,
outside lighting, lockable gates, intrusion detectors, or a guard force. Perimeter
protection also includes, but is not limited to walls, lockable doors, windows, bars,
and grills.
7.1.2. A perimeter barrier defines the physical limits of a facility, controls access, and
creates a physical and psychological deterrent to unauthorized entry. It delays
intrusion into an area, making the possibility of detection and apprehension more
likely. It aids security forces in controlling access and assists in directing the flow of
persons and vehicles through designated entrances.
7.1.3. Every vulnerable point shall be protected to deter or prevent unauthorized access to
the facility. The roof, basement, and walls of a building may contain vulnerable points
of potential entry. A security assessment of the perimeter shall address manholes
and tunnels, gates leading to the basement, elevator shafts, ventilation openings,
fire escapes, skylights, and any opening 96 square inches or larger, that are within
18 feet of the ground.
7.1.4. The extent of any perimeter control levels above those outlined in this policy
handbook will be determined by the DO in conjunction with CBP/IA/SMD, based
upon a comprehensive security assessment. The assessment report shall
recommend perimeter countermeasures to the facility manager.
7.2. Physical Barriers
7.2.1. Physical barriers may be of two general types-natural and man-made. Natural
barriers include mountains, cliffs, canyons, rivers, or other terrain difficult to traverse.
Man-made barriers include items such as fences, walls, floors, roofs, grills, bars, or
other structures which deter penetration. If a natural barrier forms one side or any
part of the perimeter, it in itself shall not automatically be considered an adequate
perimeter barrier, since it may be overcome by a determined intruder. Man-made
barriers shall be provided for CBP perimeters.
7.3. Fencing
7.3.1. Fences are the most common perimeter barrier or control. A perimeter fence should
be Uninterruptible, kept free of plant growth, and maintained in good condition.
Fences are used to:
●● Demarcate property lines;
●● Impede unauthorized vehicular and pedestrian access;
●● Control and direct authorized vehicular and pedestrian access;
●● Impede natural nuisance alarms (used as a baseline wherever a perimeter
intrusion detection system is used); and
●● Segregate areas within a property such as parking lots and storage yards (not

considered perimeter fences), and to control and direct the flow of authorized
visitors.
●● For more information, see Appendix 7.3, Fencing
7.3.2. Chain Link
●● The entire site must be contained by an 8’ (2.43 m) high perimeter fence;
●● Chain link fencing is low in maintenance cost, a minimal safety hazard, and has
openings small enough to discourage the passage of pilfered articles;
●● Chain link fencing shall be laid out in straight lines to permit unhampered
observation. It shall be constructed of 9-gauge or heavier mesh material (type
I, II, or IV as defined in Appendix 7.3, Fencing with mesh openings (two-inch-
square) and shall be no less than seven feet high and have a top guard for a total
of 8 feet;
●● Chain link fencing shall extend to within two inches of firm ground. It shall be taut
and securely fastened to rigid metal posts set in concrete;
●● The fabric height will be 7’ (2.13 m) and have twisted and barbed selvage at the
top and bottom. There must be a minimum 1’ (.305 m) top guard, for a total fence
height of no less than 8 feet (2.43 m);
●● Apply anti-erosion measures, such as surface priming, as necessary;
●● Where the fence traverses culverts, troughs, or other openings larger than 96
square inches in area, the openings shall be protected by fencing, iron grills, or
other barriers to prevent passage of intruders without impeding drainage; and
●● Pipes/culverts or openings through fence larger than 96 square inches shall be
secured.
7.3.3. Barbed Wire
●● Standard barbed wire is twisted, double strand, number 12-gauge wire, with four-
point barbs spaced four inches apart;
●● Barbed wire fencing, including gates intended to prevent trespassing, shall be
no less than seven feet in height plus a top guard, tightly stretched, and shall be
firmly affixed to posts not more than six feet apart; and
●● Distances between strands shall not exceed six inches.
7.4. Gates
7.4.1. For more information, see the section on Gates in Appendix 7.3, Fencing.
7.4.2. Gates provide a break in a perimeter fence or wall to allow entry. Gates are
protected by locks, intermittent guard patrols, fixed guard posts, contact alarms,
CCTV or a combination of these. The number of gates and perimeter entrances shall
be limited to those absolutely necessary, but shall be sufficient to accommodate the
peak flow of pedestrian and vehicular traffic.
7.4.3. Gates shall be adequately lighted. They shall be locked when not manned and
periodically inspected by a roving guard force. Utility openings in a fence that do not
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
37 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

serve as gates shall be locked, guarded, or otherwise protected.

7.4.4. Intrusion detection devices may be desirable when the gate is used intermittently or
when a higher level of protection is desired. Alternatives to detection devices include
coded card keys, push button combination locks, and CCTV.
7.5. Protective Lighting
7.5.1. For more information, see Appendix 7.5, Protective Lighting.
7.5.2. Protective lighting is a valuable and inexpensive deterrent to crime. It improves
visibility for checking badges and people at entrances, inspecting vehicles,
preventing illegal entry, and detecting intruders both outside and inside buildings
and grounds. Locate protective lighting where it will illuminate shadowed areas and
be directed at probable routes of intrusion. Overlap lighting to prevent dark areas. If
justified, include emergency power for lighting.
7.6. Doors
7.6.1. Doors are vulnerable points in the security of any building. All doors shall be
installed so the hinges are on the inside, to preclude removal of the screws or the
use of chisels or cutting devices. Pins in exterior hinges shall be welded, flanged, or
otherwise secured, or hinge dowels shall be used to preclude the door’s removal.
Doors shall be 12-gauge hollow metal or 1 ¾” solid wood. Remember that locks,
doors, door frames, and accessory builders’ hardware are inseparable when
evaluating barrier value. Do not put a sturdy lock on a weak door. The best door is
of little value if there are exposed removable hinge pins, breakable vision panels, or
other weaknesses that would allow entry. Transoms and other windows near doors
shall be sealed permanently or locked from the inside with a sturdy sliding bolt lock
or other similar device, or equipped with bars or grills.
7.6.2. Overhead roll doors not controlled or locked by electric power shall be protected by
slide bolts on the bottom bar. Chain link crank-operated doors shall be provided with
an iron keeper and pin for securing the hand chain, and the shaft shall be secured.
A solid overhead, swinging, sliding, or accordion type garage door shall be secured
with a cylinder lock or padlock, with, a metal slide bar, bolt, or crossbar shall be
provided on the inside. Metal accordion grate or grill-type doors shall have a secured
metal guide tracks at the top and bottom and be secured with a cylinder lock or
padlock.
7.6.3. For more detailed information, see Appendix 7.6, Doors and Door Hardware.
7.7. Windows
7.7.1. Windows are another vulnerable point for gaining illegal access to a building.
Windows shall be secured on the inside using a lock, locking bolt, slide bar, or
crossbar with a padlock. The window frame must be securely fastened to the
building so that it cannot be pried loose.
7.7.2. Bars and steel grills can be used to protect a window. These shall be at least one

half-inch in diameter, round, and spaced apart six inches on center. If a grill is used,
the material shall be number nine gauge two-inch square mesh. Outside hinges on
windows shall have non-removable pins. The hinge pins shall be welded, peened,
flanged, or otherwise secured so they cannot be removed. Bars and grills must be
securely fastened to the window frame so they cannot be pried loose.
7.7.3. For more detailed information, see Appendix 7.7, Windows
7.8. Manholes, Grates, and Storm Drains
7.8.1. Many facilities have manholes and tunnels providing personnel service entrance
into buildings and other manholes may provide entrance to tunnels containing pipes
for heat, gas, water, and telephone. If a tunnel penetrates the interior of a building,
the manhole cover shall be secured. A chain or padlock can be used to secure a
manhole. Steel grates and doors flush with the ground level may provide convenient
access. These openings may be designed into the facility as they may provide light
and ventilation to the basement levels. If the frame is properly secured, the grates
or doors can be welded into place or they can be secured with a chain and padlock.
Sewers or storm drains which might provide an entrance shall be secured.
7.8.2. For more detailed information, see Appendix 7.8, Openings.
7.9. Openings
7.9.1. Operable Openings are doors, windows, transoms, skylights and all similar devices
that can be opened or closed to allow or prevent passage of people, air, or light.
Openings can also include, but are not limited to, elevators, penthouses, hatchways,
or doors to the roof. Roof doors are often overlooked because of infrequent use.
These openings are the usual points of entry for intruders especially at ground level
and in their concealed and semi-concealed locations. Operable openings are also
the hardest points to protect simply because they are designed for passage.
7.9.2. Protecting operable openings shall be based on the following criteria:
●● Is the opening really required?
●● Is the opening 96-square inches or larger?
●● Validate existing openings that may no longer be required. If not required:
o Is the opening less than 18 feet from the ground or less than 14 feet from
another structure? If yes, than it shall be covered with bars or grilles and
equipped with intrusion detection device;
o Permanently seal the wall in a manner that maintains the penetration
resistance of the wall containing the opening; and
o The door is eliminated from the brick wall, the door assembly will be removed
and the opening bricked up; properly anchoring new construction.
o For further information see Appendix 7.8, Openings.

7.10. Shafts, Vents, and Ducts

7.10.1. Ventilation shafts, vents, or ducts, and openings in the building to accommodate fans
or the air conditioning system, can be used to enter a facility.
●● A ventilation fan can be removed or the blade bent to make a sufficiently large
opening for entry;
●● Bars are recommended to deter such access.
7.10.2. For more detailed information, see Appendix 7.8, Openings.
7.11. Fire Escapes and Building Walls
7.11.1. Normally, outside fire escapes do not provide an entrance directly into the building.
However, they can provide easy access to the roof or openings high above the
ground level. Windows or other openings off the fire escape shall be capable of
being opened only from the inside. The exterior fire escape shall not extend all the
way to the ground.
7.11.2. Walls are not normally considered possible points of entry because of their usual
solid construction. However, they cannot be disregarded because intruders may be
able to break through them to gain entrance. Reinforcement at critical points may be
necessary to deter forced entry.
7.12. Facilities in Remote Locations
7.12.1. Large facilities located in sparsely inhabited areas have an inherent form of
protection by virtue of their isolation. Constructing a fence around the perimeter
usually will provide an adequate deterrent to entry. Occasional observation by a
roving guard force may be necessary depending on the sensitivity of the facility.
Warning signs or notices shall be posted to deter trespassing on government
property. CCTV systems can be especially helpful if guard force personnel are
available to monitor them.
7.13. Exterior Signage
7.13.1. Warning Signs. Warning signs or notices shall be posted to deter trespassing on
government property. Signs shall be plainly displayed and be legible from any
approach to the perimeter from a reasonable distance. The size and coloring of such
signs, lettering, and interval of posting must be appropriate to each situation.
7.13.2. Under 41 CFR §102-74.365, Conduct on Federal Property, the building rules and
regulations applicable to property under the authority of the U.S. General Services
Administration and to all persons entering in or on such property must be posted at
entrances. Signage such as Inspections, Admission to Property, and Conformity with
signs and directions, weapons and explosives and other regulations are covered
under subparts of 41 CFR §102-74.365.
7.13.3. Control Signs. Signs shall be erected where necessary to assist in control of
authorized entry, to deter unauthorized entry, and to preclude inadvertent entry.
Persons in or on CBP property shall at all times comply with signs of a prohibitory,
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
40 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

regulatory, or directory nature and with the lawful direction of security guards or other
authorized individuals.
7.14. Other Signs
7.14.1. Condition of Entry. Signs setting forth the conditions of entry to a CBP facility or area
shall be plainly posted at all principal entrances and shall be legible under normal
conditions at a distance not less than 50 feet from the point of entry. The signs shall
state that packages, briefcases, and other containers in the immediate possession
of visitors, employees, or other persons arriving on, working at, visiting, or departing
from CBP property, are subject to inspection. Any person and vehicle is subject to a
full search at any time and, if found to be in violation of federal, state or local laws, is
subject to arrest.
7.14.2. For more information, see Chapter 11, Access to Facilities.
7.14.3. Restricted Areas. Signs or notices legibly setting forth the designation of restricted
areas and conditions of entry shall be plainly posted at all entrances and at other
points along the perimeter as necessary.
7.14.4. Explosives. Signs or notices must clearly indicate that no person entering or on
Customs and Border Protection property shall carry or possess explosives, or items
intended to be used to fabricate explosives or incendiary devices, either openly or
concealed, except for official purposes. See 41 CFR §102-74.435
7.14.5. Weapons Prohibited. 18 USC §930 prohibits possession of a firearm or other
dangerous weapon in Federal facilities, unless authorized by law, and defines
“dangerous weapons” as a weapon, device, instrument, material, or substance,
animate or inanimate, that is used for, or is readily capable of, causing serious bodily
injury or death, except that such term does not include a pocket knife with a blade of
less than 2-1/2 inches in length.
●● Access control
o Complete a risk assessment of the facility. If it is determined that positive
accounting of personnel or assets is required, controlled egress will be part of
the access control system.
o The means of egress control will be at least equal to the access control for
that portal.
o Door control applications must meet local fire codes.
o Uncontrolled egress will likely be adequate for most area control points at the
majority of CBP/IA/SMD activities.
●● Screening
o All persons who are not CBP direct hire or full time contract employees, or do
not possess a valid building pass for a particular Service facility (if applicable)
will be considered as visitors;
o All visitors requesting access to locations where a threat assessment has
identified the need to screen for weapons, explosives, and incendiary devices
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
41 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

will be screened;
o Threat assessment may indicate a need to screen packages for weapons,
explosives, and incendiary devices. Such packages may be transported by:
–– A visitor requesting access,
–– A freight carrier,
–– An express package delivery firm,
–– The U.S. Postal Service, and
–– U.S. Government courier.
7.15. Loading Docks and Service Access
7.15.1. Loading docks and service access areas are commonly required for a building and
are typically desired to be kept as invisible as possible. For this reason, special
attention should be devoted to these service areas in order to avoid undesirable
intruders.
●● Information on Loading Docks and Service Access may be found in Appendix
7.15, Loading Docks and Service Access.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BACK Return to Table of Contents

Chapter 8: Interior Protection

8.1. Interior Controls

8.1.1. After exterior perimeter controls and access to the facility, the next line of defense
is interior controls. When an intruder is able to penetrate the perimeter controls and
the building exterior, the effectiveness of interior controls is tested. There are few
facilities where every employee has access to every area in the facility. Accordingly,
access to some areas is necessarily controlled. For example, interior controls are
necessary to protect classified information from unauthorized disclosure, to prevent
damage to the area or equipment, to prevent interference with operations, for safety
purposes, or for a combination of these and other reasons. Usually, interior controls
are applied to specific rooms or physical spaces within a building. The Designated
Official is responsible for determining whether interior controls are necessary. Office
area controls include key accountability systems, locking devices and access control
systems such as sign-in registers and identifying credentials. Determine the extent of
interior controls by considering the monetary value and mission criticality of the items
or areas to be protected, the vulnerability of the facility, and the cost of the controls.
Normally, the cost of security controls shall not exceed the value of the item or areas
to be protected.
8.2. Access Control
8.2.1. Vehicles and Traffic Control. If public vehicle entrances have gates, these will be
manually opened and closed. Vehicle entrances with restricted access at facilities
associated with a high threat level will be equipped with electrical or hydraulic
vehicle gates or movable barriers. Vehicle barriers may be controlled by:
●● Card readers;
●● Biometric devices;
●● Proximity tags;
●● Electronic keypads;
●● Line-of-site or using CCTV; and
●● One-way entry and exit lanes, created for high-traffic areas.
8.3. Vehicle
●● Vehicle loop detectors or other sensor systems may be used as request-to-exit
devices, but must be located so as to prevent unauthorized activation.
●● Vehicle screening may need to be conducted at locations associated with a
high threat level. Screening is most associated with delivery vehicles entering a
loading zone or dock area. If possible, the screening area shall:
o Be at least 100 feet from the building;
o Have a one-way restricted traffic lane;
o Have signs and barriers to control traffic; and
o Allow vehicles to exit the inspection area safely if denied access.

8.3.1. Pedestrians
●● Access control systems must be provided at public waiting and information
areas, visitor areas, sally ports, secure vestibule, loading docks, and entrances to
restricted areas.
o The access control system may be a personnel, hardware, or computer-
based system;
o A personnel-based access control system relies on a person to positively
identify individuals requesting access, determine if the access is authorized,
and secure the access point, ensuring that only authorized individual(s) have
gained access.
●● A hardware-based access control system uses mechanical push button or key
locks to control access. This type of system is most suitable for interior areas with
fewer than 25 users. Characteristics of this type of system are:
o One combination or the same key is used for all authorized individuals;
o No audit trail is available;
o No power is required; and
o A mechanical spring latch shall not be used as a lock-and-leave security
measure.
●● Automated access control systems are appropriate for large applications and
may be required for programs associated with a high threat level. Systems may
be in the form of stand-alone, one- or two-door units, small networks for 8 - 16
doors, or larger multi-door, multi-tasking systems. These types of systems are
ideal for areas with 25 or more users and large systems controlling interior and
exterior access control readers. Characteristics of this type of system are:
o All authorized users are provided with unique pass cards, tags or personal
identification numbers (pins);
o Audit trails are available;
o Electrical power is required at each control point; and
o Individual users can be deleted from the system without the need to recover
cards, tags, pins or keys.
●● Egress Control
o The decision to provide for controlled or uncontrolled egress will be based on
a risk assessment of the facility. If it is determined that positive accounting of
personnel or assets is required, controlled egress will be part of the access
control system;
o The means of egress control will be at least equal to the access control for
that portal;
o Door control applications must meet local fire codes; and
o Uncontrolled egress will likely be adequate for most area control points at the
majority of CBP/IA/SMD activities.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall not
be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
45 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

●● Screening
o All persons who are not CBP direct hire or full time contract employees, or do
not possess a valid building pass for a particular Service facility (if applicable)
will be considered as visitors;
o All visitors requesting access to locations where a threat assessment has
identified the need to screen for weapons, explosives, and incendiary devices
will be screened; and
o Threat assessment may indicate a need to screen packages for weapons,
explosives, and incendiary devices. Such packages may be transported by:
–– A visitor requesting access;
–– A freight carrier;
–– An express package delivery firm
–– The U.S. Postal Service;
–– U.S. Government courier.
8.4. Routine Conditions
8.4.1. Basic requirements for admission to Federal property are contained in FPMR 101-
20.302. Accordingly, during business hours, CBP facilities are normally open to the
public and restricted to authorized individuals after business hours.
8.4.2. During business hours, property or portions thereof can be closed to the public only
when situations require this action to ensure the orderly conduct of Government
business. The decision to close the property or portions thereof to the public shall
be made by the designated official under the occupant emergency program after
consultation with the building manager and the responsible Security Officer. When
property or a portion thereof is closed to the public, admission shall be restricted
to authorized persons who will register upon entry to the property and, when
requested, display CBP or other identifying credentials when entering, leaving, or
while on the property. Property or portions thereof that are closed to the public shall
be designated as a restricted or closed area.
8.4.3. Emergency Conditions. During certain DHS-declared building security alert
conditions, the display of government identification and additional screening may be
required to enter the facility during all hours.
8.4.4. Public Use of Buildings. The occasional use of public areas within public buildings
for cultural, educational and recreational activities, is permitted by 41 CFR §102-74-
460 and FPMR 102-74. Any use of public facilities should go through the permitting
process described in those sections as coordinated with CBP/IA and the appropriate
GSA contact.
8.5. Area Designations
8.5.1. The decision to designate an area as either a “Controlled Area” or a “Restricted
Area” shall be made in conjunction with a decision to close the property or a portion

thereof to the public.

8.5.2. Controlled Area. A controlled area is defined as a room, office, building or other
form of facility to which access is monitored, limited, or controlled. Admittance
to a controlled area is limited to persons who have official business within the
area. Responsible managers are authorized to designate an area as a controlled
area after adequate security measures are in place. The following areas shall be
designated as controlled areas:
●● Any area where classified information or highly sensitive information is handled,
processed, or stored;
●● Any area that houses equipment that is significantly valuable or critical to the
continued operations or provision of services;
●● Any area where uncontrolled access would interfere with or disrupt personnel
assigned to the area in carrying out their official duties;
●● Any area where equipment or operations constitute a potential safety hazard; and
●● Any area that is particularly sensitive, as determined by the responsible manager.
8.5.3. Restricted Area. A restricted area is a room, office, building, or other form of facility
to which access is strictly controlled. Admittance to a restricted area is limited to
personnel assigned to the area and persons who have been specifically authorized
access to the area. Visitors to a restricted area and uncleared personnel must be
escorted by personnel assigned to the area and all classified information must
be protected from observation, disclosure, or removal. The responsible manager
is authorized to designate an area as a restricted area after adequate security
measures are in place. The following areas shall be designated as restricted areas:
●● Any area approved by the CBP/IA/SMD for the storage of Top Secret Information;
●● Any area approved by the CBP/IA/SMD for the open storage of Secret or
Confidential classified information. This includes areas where classified
information is normally or frequently displayed, such as charts, maps, drawings,
photographs, equipment, or conference rooms where classified information is
being discussed. This does not include an office in which classified information
is discussed or displayed and action can be taken by occupants to prevent
disclosure;
●● Any area housing a Secure Telephone(s) [formerly known as Secure Telephone
Unit (STU-III), now referred to as Secure Terminal Equipment (STE)];
●● Any area where classified information is visually displayed on an approved
standalone office information system;
●● Any area that houses mainframe computers or designated Automated
Information System (AIS) sensitive systems; and
●● Any area that is highly critical or sensitive, as determined by the responsible
manager.
8.5.4. Special Access Program Area(s) (SAP). A program established for a specific class

of classified information that imposes safeguarding and access requirements that

exceed those normally required for information at the same classification level.
●● The Director of the Information Security Oversight Office shall be afforded
access to these programs, in accordance with the security requirements of each
program, in order to perform the functions assigned to the Information Security
Oversight Office;
●● An agency head may limit access to a special access program to the Director
and no more than one other employee of the Information Security Oversight
Office; or, for special access programs that are extraordinarily sensitive and
vulnerable, to the Director only;
●● Special Access Programs are required to be reviewed annually; and
●● The processes and standards are based upon criteria established by Executive
Order (EO) 12968, “Access to Classified Information,” Department of Defense
(DOD) Directive 0-5205.7, “Special Access Program (SAP) Policy” and Director
of Central Intelligence (DCID) Directive 6/4, “Personnel Security Standards
and Procedures Governing Eligibility for Access to Sensitive Compartmented
Information (SCI).”
8.5.5. Other Special Access Program Areas. Government agencies outside the intelligence
community may have special access programs which require stringent physical
security standards for working and storage areas. CBP/IA/SMD areas where
special access program information is stored, used, discussed, or processed will be
constructed in accordance with standards issued by the sponsoring agency.
8.6. Security Vaults (Permanent Storage or More Than 72 Hours)
8.6.1. A security vault is a completely enclosed space with a high degree of protection
against forced entry. Vaults are commonly used for storing Top Secret information,
special access program information, extremely valuable materials and seized
property.
8.6.2. General Requirements for Vaults. There are three classes of vaults for the storage
of classified material and equipment A, B and C. Class A vaults offer the maximum
protection against tool and torch attack. Class B vaults offer less than maximum
protection. A lightweight, portable “modular vault” meeting Federal Specification AA-
V-2737 may also be used to store classified material and equipment. The modular
vault is equivalent to a Class B vault. Class C vaults offer less than maximum
protection and may be used where unique structural circumstances do not permit
concrete vault construction. Utilization of any vault class, or the modular vault, is
dependent upon the physical location environment where the vault is to be erected.
The minimum construction requirements for each class of vault are described as
follows. Reference: FED-STD 832 (This document establishes minimum construction
requirements for high security vaults for storage of classified information and
weapons).
8.6.3. For more detailed information, see Appendix 8.6, Vaults.

8.7. Vault Doors

8.7.1. Vault door and frame shall conform to Federal Specification AA-D-600D,Class 5
Vault Door.
●● Armory vault doors and security vault doors are both manufactured according to
Federal Specification AA-D-600D, Door, Vault, Security. The difference between
the two doors is that armory vault doors, used to protect AA&E, are fitted with
UL Standard 768, Group 1, mechanical combination locks. Security vault doors,
used to protect classified information, are fitted with locks meeting Federal
Specification FF-L-2740, Locks, Combination. The armory vault door label
(silver with red letters) states that it is a “GSA Approved Armory Vault Door”. The
security vault door label reads “GSA Approved Security Vault Door” (label also
silver with red letters);
●● There are numerous GSA-approved Class 5 security vault doors being used
for the protection of weapons, which is authorized under (link), however It is
strongly recommend that locks be changed out to the UL Standard 768, Group
1, mechanical combination lock, when and if a failure occurs with an X-07, X-08
or X-09 lock. When that change is made it must be noted on the Optional Form
89 (Maintenance Record for Security Containers/Vault Doors). It shall also be
noted on the front of the armory door that is not authorized for the protection of
classified information.
Federal
AA-D-600D (see links below for documents)
Specification:
Title: Federal Specification Door, Vault, Security
Scope: This specification covers vault doors that are designed to conform to the minimum
standards for physical security equipment as required by the Information Security
Oversight Office Directive governing the safeguarding of national security
information. The doors provide protection against unauthorized entry for the periods
of time specified.
Classes: Class 5-V:
Security vault door shall be resistant to 20 man-hours surreptitious entry, 30 man-
minutes covert entry and 10 man-minutes forced entry.
Class 5-A:
Armory vault door shall be resistant to 30 man-minutes covert entry and 10 man-
minutes forced entry.
Class 5-B:
Ballistic vault door shall be resistant to 20 man-hours surreptitious entry, 30 man-
minutes covert entry, 10 man-minutes forced entry, ballistic resistant.
Document Date: 15 May 2000
Document Active
Status:
AA-600D Amendment 1, 25 May 2001
AA-600D base document, 15 May 2000
QPL-AA-D-600-7 14 May 2000

GSA-Approved Armory Vault Doors

All armory vault doors listed below are Class 5 and are fitted with a UL Standard 768al
combination lock. GSA approved armory vault doors can be purchased direct from the
manufacturers using the National Stock Numbers listed below. See the Order tab for
manufacturer information.

NSN Description

7110-01-475-9598 Left hand swing, without optical device.

7110-01-475-9596 Right hand swing, with optical device.

7110-01-475-9595 Right hand swing, without optical device.

7110-01-475-9593 Left hand swing, with optical device.

7110-01-475-9590 Double leaf, right opening swing active leaf, with optical device.

8.8. Strongrooms
8.8.1. A strongroom is an enclosed space constructed of solid building materials.
Strongrooms are normally used for the storage of classified material or sensitive
materials, such as firearms or evidence. Protection is normally supplemented by
guards or alarm systems. Rooms that have false ceilings and walls constructed
of fibrous materials, and other modular or lightweight materials cannot qualify as
strongroom.
8.8.2. For more information, see Appendix 8.8, Strongrooms.
8.9. Intrusion Detection Systems
8.9.1. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are alarm systems designed to alert security
personnel of an actual or attempted intrusion into an area while providing deterrence
to intrusion. These warning systems detect intrusion or attempts, not prevent them.
Any alarm system requires an assessment and a response capability to provide real
protection for an area. All systems have weak points by which their functioning can
be minimized or even completely interrupted or circumvented. The advantage and
limitations of a variety of detection systems are described below.
8.9.2. For more information, see Appendix 8.9, Intrusion Detection Systems
8.10. Hold Rooms
8.10.1. A hold room is a secure facility for the detention of aliens encountered and
processed by operational components of CBP.
8.10.2. For more information, see Appendix 8.10, Hold Rooms

8.11. Planning Alarm Installations

8.11.1. Alarms are used to detect approach or intrusion. Some alarms are intended for
exterior protection, and some are suitable only for indoor installations. The following
shall be addressed in determining the need for an alarm system:
●● Sensitivity or criticality of the operation;
●● Facility vulnerability to damage, interruption, alteration or other harm;
●● Sensitivity or value of the information or property stored at the facility;
●● Location of facility and accessibility to intruders;
●● Other forms of protection in place or available; and
●● Guard or law enforcement response capability.
8.11.2. Components of an Alarm System.
●● An alarm system is composed of three main parts:
o One or more sensors to detect the presence or actions of an intruder,
o A control unit that constantly monitors the sensors and transmits an alarm
signal when a sensor detects an intruder, and
o The alarm annunciator.
●● Perimeter protection alarm systems utilize point protection sensors almost
exclusively, while area protection (volumetric) sensors are used primarily in
interior alarm circuits to detect an individual within a building;
●● Object protection provides direct security for individual items and is often the final
stage of an in-depth protection system with perimeter and area-protection; and
●● Alarm systems can be designed so that various parts of a building have separate
sensor circuits, or zones, and it is not uncommon to have a separate duress or
holdup alarm circuit to enable employees to summon security personnel.
8.11.3. The installation of alarm system components is very important.
●● Individual sensors are designed to respond to specific stimuli that indicate the
presence of an intruder or an attempt to gain entry into a protected area;
●● Switch sensors must be mounted so that they detect the actual opening of a door
or window, but at the same time, the manner of installation shall not make them
so sensitive to movement that they actuate an alarm from vibrations caused by a
truck passing on the street or the wind rattling doors and windows; and
●● Care must be exercised in adjusting the sensitivity of the more complex sensors
in order to avoid false alarms. Some units can be actuated by a flickering
fluorescent light or a telephone bell. Electromagnetic interference from a mobile
radio or a thunderstorm can trigger some detectors.
8.11.4. Sensors.
●● The three basic types of sensors are:
o Perimeter;
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall not
be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
51 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

o Volumetric; and
o Proximity.
●● Perimeter protection is the first line of defense. The most common points
for sensing devices are doors, windows, vents and skylights. These may be
protected, with detectors sensing their opening or breaking. The major advantage
of perimeter-protection sensing devices is their simple design. The major
disadvantage is that they protect only openings such as doors or windows. If
intrusion occurs through a wall or ceiling, these devices are ineffective:
o Switches. These devices are usually magnetic operated switches affixed to
a door or window in such a way that opening the door or window removes
the magnetic field causing an alarm. High security switches are normally
balanced or biased magnetic switches;
o Screens. Openings such as vents, ducts, skylights, and similar openings can
be alarmed by thin wire filaments that signal an alarm if the screen is cut or
broken. Often the wire filaments are placed in a frame of wooden rods and
require little maintenance; and
o Glass Breakage. Electronic sensing devices used to detect a high-frequency
sound pattern within the glass when it is broken, or the shock wave a
substantial impact makes against the surface.
●● Volumetric protection sensors are designed to detect the presence or actions of
an intruder almost anywhere within an entire room, from floor to ceiling. A variety
of volumetric devices are available. Each kind of detector has some advantages
and limitations. Therefore, a device must be selected for a specific environment.
A major advantage of volumetric devices is that they provide a highly sensitive
and invisible means of detection in high-risk areas. The major disadvantage is
that an improper application can result in frequent false alarms.
o Infrared. Passive infrared sensors are part of the motion-detection group.
They sense the body heat of an intruder as he/she passes through the
protected area. Infrared detectors are relatively free of false alarms; however
items moved by air currents within the protected area can activate the alarm;
o Ultrasonic. Ultrasonic motion detectors generate a high frequency of sound
that is out of the normal range of human hearing. An intruder disrupting the
ultrasonic wave pattern initiates the alarm. Ultrasonic devices are prone
to false alarms, due to excessive air currents or ultrasonic noise from
mechanical equipment;
o Microwave. This kind of motion detector uses high-frequency radio waves, or
microwaves, to detect movement. Because microwaves penetrate materials
such as glass, and metal objects reflect them, they can detect motion outside
the protection area and cause false alarm problems if not properly installed;
and
o Photoelectric. Photoelectric devices transmit a beam across a protected area.
When an intruder interrupts this beam, the circuit is disrupted causing an
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall not
be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
52 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

alarm. Today’s photoelectric devices use diodes that emit an invisible infrared
light and usually pulses rapidly to prevent compromise by substitution. A
disadvantage is that they can be defeated relatively easily; the beams are
narrow and may be discovered or avoided.
●● Proximity protection provides direct security for individual items.
o Vibration. These seismic sensing devices use a piezoelectric crystal or
microphone to detect the sound pattern that a hammer-like impact on a rigid
surface would generate. These devices are attached directly to safes and
filing cabinets, or to the walls, ceiling, and floor of vaults. False alarms may
occur with these devices by passing vehicles or falling objects;
o Capacitance. A capacitance device is used to protect specific objects such
as security containers and safes. The capacitance alarm uses the metal
construction of the container and causes it to act as a capacitor or condenser.
When a change occurs in the electromagnetic field surrounding the metal
object, the balance is disturbed and the alarm is activated. The system can
only be applied to ungrounded equipment and accidental alarms can occur if
the container is carelessly touched when the alarm is activated.
8.12. Closed Circuit Television Systems
8.12.1. The Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) system is another core subsystem of an
overall Electronic Security System (ESS). It is a collection of cameras, recorders,
switches, keyboards, and monitors that allow viewing and recording of security
events. The CCTV system is normally integrated into the overall ESS and centrally
monitored from the Dispatch Center. Uses of CCTV systems for security services
include several different functions as described below.
●● Surveillance. CCTV cameras can be used to give a viewer the capability to be
made aware of, or view, visual events at multiple locations from a centralized
remote viewing area. CCTV camera technology makes visual information
available that would normally only be available through multiple (possibly roving)
human resources;
●● Detection. CCTV cameras when employed with video content analysis or motion-
path analysis, software and equipment, can be used as a means for intrusion
detection. Additional information on CCTV can be found in Chapter 11, Access to
Facilities;
●● Assessment. When alerted by an alarm notification, CCTV cameras allow
Dispatch Center operators or other viewers to assess the situation and make
a determination as to what type of response may or may not be required. An
example is an intrusion alarm at a remote facility. Visual assessment and other
confirmation may indicate an unannounced maintenance crew at work. If it is
determined that intrusion has occurred appropriate response would follow;
●● Deterrence. While more effective against unsophisticated burglars as opposed
to trained covert insurgents, CCTV cameras may deter burglary, vandalism, or
intrusion due to fear of discovery and prosecution;
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall not
be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
53 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

●● Evidentiary Archives. Retrieval of archived images may be helpful in identification

or prosecution of trespassers, vandals, or other intruders;
●● Facial Recognition. Cameras can be used for biometric facial recognition as
discussed in Chapter 11, Access to Facilities; and
●● Intrusion Detection. CCTV cameras, when employed with video content analysis
or motion path analysis software and equipment, are increasingly being used as
a means for intrusion detection as discussed in Appendix 8.9, Intrusion Detection
Systems.
●● For more detailed information, see Appendix 8.12, CCTV.
8.13. Open Storage Certification process
8.13.1. See MD 11046 Open Storage Area Standards
8.13.2. All CBP Open Storage Areas shall be certified as complying with DHS Management
Directive 11046 (Open Storage Area Standards for Collateral Classified Information).
8.13.3. CBP/IA/SMD is the security approval authority for CBP open storage areas.
8.13.4. Open Storage Area is defined as: A room or area constructed and operated pursuant
to DHS Management Directive 11046, for the purpose of safeguarding national
security information that, because of its size or nature, or operational necessity,
cannot be adequately protected by the normal safeguards or stored during
nonworking hours in approved containers.
8.13.5. Examples of CBP Open Storage Areas include:
●● Homeland Secure Data Network (HSDN) rooms: is the secret collateral network
for DHS and its components. See Figure 1;
●● Vaults: A security vault is a completely enclosed space with a high degree
of protection against forced entry. Vaults are commonly used for storing Top
Secret information, special access program information, and extremely valuable
materials.
8.13.6. General Requirements for Open Storage Area Certification. HSDN and Vault
Certification
●● Policy
o Construction and accreditation of a collateral-level, open-storage facility shall
be considered only when the volume or bulk of classified material, or the
functions associated with processing the classified material, make the use of
GSA-approved security containers impractical;
o DHS Management Directive (MD) 11046 prescribes the standards for openly
storing classified national security information. CBP Operational Division may
exceed the standards cited in MD 11046, but may not lessen them. If a CBP
office chooses to exceed the standards cited, sufficient justification must exist
to warrant any increased expenditures;
o Requests to waive requirements cited in MD 11046 shall be submitted, in
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall not
be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
54 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

writing, through the Security Officer/Security Liaison of the requesting office

to the Internal Affairs (IA), Security Management Division (SMD), Physical
Security Branch (PSB), via [email protected]. Waiver requests shall
include sufficient justification to support the request and identification of
compensatory measures that will be implemented to mitigate deficiencies;
and
o CBP offices that have open storage areas that were approved prior to the
publication of MD 11046, will not need to have their areas re-certified unless
a change has been made that affects the structure and measures in place
at the time of the original certification, or the standards used for approval of
the area are less than those required by this directive. In the latter instance,
offices shall bring the area(s) up to the standards cited herein within one year
of publication of this directive, and the area shall be recertified in accordance
with this directive.
8.13.7. CBP Office Procedures for Requesting for Open Storage Area(s) Certification
●● HSDN Certification: If a CBP office determines that an open storage area for
classified information is necessary for their facility, the office will submit a request
to CBP’s Office of Intelligence & Operations Coordination (OIOC) outlining the
justification to begin the process for Open Storage Area Certification. The OIOC
will verify whether funding is available for equipment and construction of the
Open Storage Area and initiate a HSDN account;
●● If funding is available, OIOC will send a request to the Internal Affairs (IA),
Security Management Division (SMD), Physical Security Branch (PSB), via
[email protected] to initiate the certification process for Open Storage Area;
and
●● Vault Certification: If a CBP office determines that an open storage area for
classified information is necessary for their facility, the office will submit a request
to CBP’s Office of Field Operations, Logistic Mission Support, Seizures and
Penalties Division outlining the justification to begin the process for Open Storage
Area Certification. The Seizures and Penalties Division will then notify request a
Vault Certification whether funding is available for equipment and construction of
the Open Storage Area.
●● For more information, see Appendix 8.6, Vaults.
8.13.8. Once SMD/IA/PSB receives the request, an Open Storage Certification Survey, MD
11046 with attachments A and B will be sent to the requesting office via email.
●● The requesting CBP office will complete the entire survey ensuring that they
meet the requirements outlined in Attachments A & B.
o Attachment A. Compliance with construction standards cited in MD 11046
shall be used to verify that the open storage area meets the minimum
required construction standards;
o Attachment B. The sample Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) shall be
modified and tailored to suit the specific open storage area to be certified.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall not
be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
55 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

●● Upon completion of the survey package, the requesting CBP office will send
survey to IA/SMD/PSB via [email protected];
●● For Vaults, inform Seizures and Penalties Division of intent to conduct Physical
Security Open Storage Survey.
o PASS -If the office meets the requirements outlined in the survey package, IA/
SMD/PSB will schedule a physical security assessment of the facility to verify
compliance with Attachment A and implementation of SOP in place.
–– If the customer passes, a memorandum signed by the SMD Director will
be sent to CBP Office Director (Open Storage/Vault/HSDN room).
–– The memorandum will authorize a specific area being approved and will
specify the maximum level of material authorized for open storage.
–– A copy of the approval memorandum, Open Storage Survey Checklist,
and SOP shall be maintained by the CBP office.
o FAIL. If the customer fails the initial certification survey, SMD/PSB will send a
memorandum signed by the SMD Director outlining recommended corrective
actions that must be addressed prior to approval of certification.
8.13.9. Open storage area is not authorized until all corrective actions have been
implemented.
8.13.10. Upon verification of corrective actions, the Director of SMD will send a memorandum
to CBP Office Director (Open Storage/Vault/HSDN room) indicating approval.
8.13.11. A copy of the approval memorandum, Open Storage Survey Checklist, and SOP
shall be maintained by the CBP office.
8.13.12. The approval memorandum, Open Storage Survey Checklist, and SOP, shall be
maintained by SMD/PSB and within the approved open storage area.

Figure 1: HSDN Room - Example

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BACK Return to Table of Contents

Chapter 9: Locks and Keys

9.1. Locks
9.1.1. General
●● All exterior doors must have a lock with dead bolt or approved equal locking
capability. All locks with a latch bolt must be equipped with a deadlocking latch
feature. When specifying locks, use American National Standards Institute
(ANSI) series lock numbers to obtain the proper type of lock for the function
desired. The locks must meet all Federal handicap accessibility standards.
All mortise locksets, whether or not required for security, must be grade one,
commercial standard locks per ANSI/BHMA (Builders Hardware Manufacturers
Association) A156.13. Unless specified, all interior non-security locksets may be
cylindrical locks (bore lockset) as specified in ANSI/BHMA A156.2. The criteria
in ASM 273.44, Postal Service Locks, also apply. Appendix 7.6, Doors and Door
Hardware contains an approved list of panic-style entry and exit devices and high
security devices;
●● Technology advances in the 1980s made locks vulnerable to newly developed
opening techniques. In response, the Government prepared Federal
Specification FF-L-2740. FF-L-2740 addresses advances in combination lock
neutralization technology. Three locks, the X-07, X-08 and X-09, all electro-
mechanical locks, have met FF-L-2740;
●● Some locks have interchangeable cores, which allow the same key system to
include a variety of locks. Padlocks, door locks, cabinet locks, and electrical key
switches can all be operated by the same key system. Because these cores are
removable by a special key, this system allows for rapid re-keying of locks in the
event that the key is compromised; and
●● Locks are keyed in several different ways. When several locks are keyed
differently, each is operated by its own key. When they are keyed alike, one
key will open them all. Locks that are master-keyed are keyed differently, yet
have one key that will open them all. Master-keying is done for convenience
and represents the controlled loss of security. Master-keying is not used unless
permitted by regulation.
9.1.2. Locking Hardware
●● Locks are the most acceptable and widely-used security devices for protecting
facilities, classified materials, and property. All containers, rooms, and facilities
must be locked when not in actual use. Locking devices vary greatly in
appearance as well as function and application. Locks merely deter or delay
entry and shall be supplemented with other protection devices when a proper
balance of physical security is needed. Some locks require considerable time
and expert manipulation to open, but all locks can be defeated by force and with
the proper tools. Locks must never be considered as a stand-alone method of
security.
●● For further information on locks and locking hardware, see Appendix 7.6, Doors
and Door Hardware.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
60 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

9.1.3. Types of Locks

●● Key locks consist of but are not limited to the following:
o Dead bolt locks, sometimes called tubular dead bolts. These are mounted on
the door in a manner similar to cylindrical locksets. The primary difference
is in the bolt. When the bolt is extended (locked), the dead bolt projects into
the door frame at least one inch, and it cannot be forced back (unlocked) by
applying pressure to the end of the bolt. The dead-bolt lock has the potential
for providing acceptable levels of protection for storerooms and other areas
where more security is desired. In situations where there is a window in or
adjacent to the door, a double cylinder dead-bolt lock (one that requires a key
to open from either side) shall be used;
o Mortise locks, so named because the lock case is mortised or recessed
into the edge of the door. The most common variety of mortise locks has a
doorknob on each side of the door. Entrance doors often have an exterior
thumb latch rather than a doorknob. Mortise locks are desired due to flexibility
and can incorporate dead bolt without compromising fire or life safety
compliance. Mortise locks for security must adhere to ANSI/BHMA A156.13
standards and must have a dead bolt with a minimum throw of 1 inch;
o Stand-alone access-control electro-mechanical locksets are primarily
used to control entry into an area. Rather than using a key, these open by
pushing a series of numbered buttons. The locks can be either electrically
or mechanically activated. Some of the advantages of using these locks are
low cost, easy installation, easy combination changing, and simple operation.
These devices are used for access control and do not provide a high degree
of security when used alone. Some models have “time penalty” and error
alarm features and can be tied to an existing alarm system. The combination
or code used to activate an electro-mechanical door lock shall be changed
at least every two years and when any person having knowledge of the
combination no longer requires access to the area;
o Padlocks are detachable locks that are typically used with a hasp. Low
security padlocks, sometimes called secondary padlocks, are used to deter
unauthorized access, and they provide only minimal resistance to force. Low-
security locks are made with hardened steel shackles. Precautions must
be taken to avoid confusing these locks with similar brass or bronze locks.
The brass or bronze locks are commonly used but do not meet the security
requirements of the hardened shackled locks. High-security padlocks that
meet FF-P-2827A provide the maximum resistance to unauthorized entry
when used with a high security hasp;
o Cylindrical locksets, often called key-in-knob or key-in-lever locks. These are
normally used to secure offices and storerooms. The locking cylinder located
in the center of the doorknob distinguishes these locks. Some cylindrical
locksets have keyways in each of the opposing knobs that require a key on
either side to lock and unlock them. Others unlock with a key, but may be
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
61 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

locked by pushing or rotating a button on the inside knob. These locks are
suitable only for very low-security applications.
–– All CBP lock cylinders must be of a high security, pick resistant design
with angled key cuts, rotating tumblers, keyway side bitting, and a slider
mechanism. The cylinders must be Underwriters Laboratories (UL)
listed under UL437 and certified under American National Standards
Institute (ANSI)/Builder’s Hardware Manufacturer’s Association (BHMA)
certification A156.30, Levels MIAM and ANSI/BHMA A156.5, Grade 1.
–– All cylinders must incorporate three locking elements: a slider mechanism,
a sidebar mechanism with tumbler rotation, and a pin tumbler elevation.
All cylinders must be constructed of solid brass with hardened steel
inserts. The lock tumblers must combine a dual-axis action with one axis
utilized for pin tumbler rotation and the other axis utilized for positioning
key cuts. Randomly selected tumbler pins must incorporate a hardened
steel insert. The cylinders must be capable of being immediately re-keyed
to a new combination or a new system.
–– Interchangeable cores should be used to facilitate this process. A suitable
number of spare cores should be maintained to facilitate lock changes in
the event of a lost or stolen master key.
–– The manufacturer must have the capability of establishing a key system
with a minimum of six angle cuts in six possible pin positions with the
capability of two distinct positions of cut per pin chamber, if required by
the parameters of the system. The manufacturer must have the capability
of producing a keying system in either of two distinct and different keying
specifications and pinning specifications. The system must be capable
of incorporating a key, with each being capable of more than one bitting
per position to expand master keying and key changes. The key must
also incorporate the capacity to include twelve possible side bittings along
the key blade located on two different planes or surfaces of the key. The
system must also have the capability to provide a single master key with
over 1 million (1,000,000) usable, non-interchangeable change keys in
a single keyway. The key thickness must be no less than one hundred,
twenty-five thousandths (.125″) and must be made from a nickel silver
alloy. Each key must be custom coined for tracking and identification
purposes.
–– The locking system must be deemed proprietary information shared only
among authorized U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) entities and
the manufacturer. Security Specialists assigned to the Office of Internal
Affairs, Security Management Division (IA/SMD) and employees serving
as Collateral Security Liaison’s for IA/SMD, will have the authority to
request additional pinning materials and duplicate keys.

9.2. Combination Locks

●● Combination locks are classified as Group 1, Group 1 R, or Group 2
o GROUP 1 - Those locks that have a high degree of resistance to expert
or professional manipulation. The protection against expert manipulation
includes advanced design features not found in conventional designs;
o GROUP 1 R - Those locks that have a high degree of resistance to expert
manipulation, including use of radiological means; and
o GROUP 2 - Those locks that have a moderate degree of resistance to
unauthorized opening.
●● DHS/CBP uses two types of mounted combination locks, one for the protection
of classified material and one for the protection of weapons and ammunition.
Combination locks that protect classified material must meet the requirements of
Federal specification FF-L-2740, Locks, Combination. Combination locks that
protect weapons and ammunition must meet the requirements of Underwriters
Laboratories Inc. Standard For Combination Locks UL 768, Group 1;
●● These locks have been approved under FF-L-2740 for the protection of classified
material. The model X-07 lock was approved in November 1991, the X-08 in
March 1999, and the X-09 in June 2002. GSA-approved security containers and
vault doors for the protection of classified material have had FF-L-2740 compliant
locks installed at the time of manufacture since March 10, 1992;
●● GSA-approved weapons containers and armory vault doors are available for the
protection of arms, ammunition, and explosives. Mechanical combination locks
that resist manipulation attempts for 20 man-hours are UL-listed as Group 1.
o For further details, see Appendix 10, Storage of Weapons and Ammunition
(Armory).
●● Pedestrian door dead bolts covered by Federal specification FF-L-2890,
Lock Extension (Pedestrian Door, Dead bolt) are intended for use on interior
pedestrian doors used for normal entrance and egress during day-to-day
operations. These locks have been approved under FF-L-2890: the model
CDX‑07 door lock was approved in November 1991, the CDX-08 in March 1999,
and the CDX-09 in June 2002. While the CDX-07 and CDX-08 are still approved
for securing classified material, they are no longer being manufactured. The
Lockmaster LKM-7000 series also meets FF-L-2890; and
●● Combination padlocks under the FF-P-110, Padlock, Changeable Combination
Federal specification are intended for use as determined for low level resistance
to forced entry and high level tell-tale manipulation or surreptitious action. The
padlocks are intended for use ashore and aboard ocean going vessels, indoors,
or outdoors, semi-protected by a structural overhang similar to eaves or a
lean‑to.
9.2.1. Combinations to locks will not be the same throughout a CBP facility, e.g. doors,
vaults, etc.

9.2.2. Changing Combinations

●● Combinations to locks installed on security containers/safes, perimeter doors,
windows and any other openings should be changed by the responsible
individual, the Security Officer, or by a bonded contractor immediately when:
o The container is placed in use;
o An individual knowing the combination no longer requires access to the
container, unless other means of preventing access exist;
o The combination has been lost or is suspected to have been lost;
o At least 12 months have passed;
o As directed by the manufacturer; or
o The container is taken out of service.
●● Combinations to containers taken out of service must be reset to the standard
factory combination of 50-25-50 prior to removal from the office space
o Methods. Combination locks have either hand-change or key-change
capability. A number of combination locks produced by a variety of
manufacturers have been approved by GSA. These GSA-approved locks
along with the non-approved locks use slightly different operating instructions
and unique keys or particular hand change techniques for changing
combinations. Often the experience necessary, as well as change keys,
operating instructions, and changing procedures, are lost with the passing of
time;
o See the Department of Defense Lock Program for information on security
hardware selection, requirements, specifications, national stock numbers,
purchasing, training, and troubleshooting of equipment failures.
o For assistance, contact SMD ([email protected]).
9.2.3. Selecting Combinations
●● When selecting combination numbers avoid multiples of 5, ascending or
descending numbers, simple arithmetical series, and personal data such as birth
dates and Social Security Numbers. Use numbers that are widely separated. This
can be achieved by dividing the dial into three parts and using a number from
each third as one of the high-low-high or low-high-low sequences. Use a unique
combination for each container. Do not re-use this combination anywhere else
in the same office. Carefully follow any manufacturers’ instructions in installing
combination numbers.
9.2.4. Protecting Combinations
●● Combinations should be known only by those persons whose official duties
require access. The written combination should be protected at the highest
classification level of material in the container or be protected in a manner
commensurate with the value of the protected material;
o Combinations should be memorized. They must not be carried in wallets or
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
64 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

concealed on persons or written on calendars, desk pads, etc.; and

o When opening any kind of combination lock, be sure that no unauthorized
person can learn the combination by observing the sequence of numbers
being entered or dialed. It may be necessary to position your body so as to
block the dial from the view of anyone standing nearby.
9.2.5. Recording Combinations
●● Each Security Officer should assure that a record of the combination to each
vault, secure room, combination padlock, and security container is recorded
showing the location of the container or room, the name, home address, and
home telephone number of a person responsible for the container. Standard
Form (SF) 700, Security Container Information, has been designed for this
purpose;
●● A central repository, usually the most secure container, should be designated
to hold the sealed SF 700 for use during emergencies. Only appropriately
authorized employees should be given access to a combination. Combinations
shall be controlled in the same manner as keys.
9.3. Electronic Locks
9.3.1. Electronic lock access control systems use a card key programmed with a particular
code which is read by a card reader that communicates with an automated central
or local processor for access control. The card reader obtains data from the card by
reading punched holes, magnetic strips or spots, imbedded wires, or any of several
other methods. To open a door or activate a turnstile or lock, the card is typically
inserted into a slot or groove and the coded area is read by the reader. If the code
is an authorized one, the processor will direct the lock to open. Key cards shall be
voided in the system when lost, stolen, or when access is no longer required and the
card recovered.
9.4. Biometric Systems
9.4.1. Biometric locking systems are available that use neither keys nor combinations.
These include locks which open by using one of eight primary categories of
biometrics technology: fingerprints, hand geometry, retinal scan, signature dynamics,
voice verification, heat detection, facial recognition, or key stroke dynamics. These
biometrics systems are primarily designed to control access to extremely sensitive,
special-use areas where positive personal identification is an operational necessity.
9.5. Keys
9.5.1. General
●● This establishes the CBP policy and procedures for a standardized approach to
the key management program, including administrative oversight, accountability,
issue, receipt, duplication, replacement and documentation. This policy applies to
all keys, all spaces, office equipment, vehicles, padlocks, lockers or other assets
owned and operated by DHS/CBP;
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
65 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

●● Directives and guidance for the key management program include the following:
o The Homeland Security Act of 2002, PL 107-296, enacted 11/25/02;
o Department of Justice Vulnerability Assessment of Federal Facilities, June
1995;
o Department of Defense Lock Program, UG-2040-SHR, July 2000;
o MD 11000 Office of Security;
o MD 11030.1 Physical Security of Facilities and Real Property; and
o MD 11049 Security Violations and Infractions.
9.5.2. Key management and oversight helps protect life, property and provides a level
of security to facilities and all occupants. Keys are the property of DHS and a part
of physical security, which require strict control, management and accountability
through keying systems integrity. Locks are the most common mechanism for
access control on doors and security containers and often provide the primary
protection against intrusion and theft. When a key is affected and/or compromised,
the system is affected and compromised. Lack of an operational key control program
can result in the compromise of personnel, property, and information. A functional
key control program will ensure accountability; provide administrative oversight, and
continuity of security through key issuance, duplication and replacement. Although
a determined individual can open most key locks in a few minutes, they are used
primarily to delay, discourage, or deter theft or unauthorized access. Exterior door
locks shall at a minimum meet UL 437 standards.
9.5.3. The integrity of a key system is important to safeguarding property and controlling
access. The security officer shall ensure that responsible individuals maintain control
of the facility’s key system by storing, issuing, and accounting for all keys. Issuance
of keys must be kept to a minimum and only issued to persons who have an official
need. Master keys must be carefully controlled; successful compromise of a master
keyed installation can be very difficult and costly to remedy (assuming it is even
discovered). Master keying systems can also incorporate a lock with a removable
interchangeable lock core. Accurate accountability records must be kept and all key
records and documentation will be maintained for no less than one year. When keys
are no longer needed they will be destroyed and documentation verifying destruction
will be maintained.
9.5.4. A facility master key inventory and log will be maintained for the purpose of chain of
accountability and access control and will include as a minimum:
●● The number assigned to each key and lock;
●● How many keys per lock;
●● Location of each lock, to include but not limited to room, container, or cage no.;
and
●● Access list of persons authorized to use master keys.
9.5.5. Computerized systems may be used

9.5.6. The Security Officer or Key Control Person will approve and monitor all requests
for issuance of new, duplicate, or replacement keys and ensure appropriate
documentation is completed.
9.5.7. Physical Protection of keys will include, but is not limited to:
●● Keys can only be stamped with blind control codes.
●● Blind codes must not be reflective of buildings, door numbers or offices.
●● Duplicate keys must be kept to a minimum, and when made the Master Key
Inventory will be updated with required information;
●● Non-issued keys must be safeguarded and controlled within a locked cabinet or
container accessed only by the Key Control Person; and
●● The key storage cabinet or container will be locked when not in use.
9.5.8. Employee Protection of Keys
●● DHS employees issued keys are to protect and secure them at all times,
ensuring keys are not left on desks, in unlocked drawers, or where they can be
easily taken and copied.
●● Employees shall only use their keys to access their assigned work areas and
shall lock doors when leaving any secured area;
●● DHS employees assigned keys are not authorized to lend keys to individuals not
specifically authorized;
●● No person shall knowingly alter duplicate, copy or make a facsimile of any key to
a lock of any building or property;
●● The unauthorized possession, use or reproduction of any DHS key is a security
violation; and
●● A penalty shall be incurred for multiple losses.
9.5.9. Protection of Cores
●● Excess cores will be secured in a locked cabinet or container and secured from
unauthorized access;
●● Excess cores will be inventoried; and
●● Cores must not be removed by construction or other maintenance personnel.
9.5.10. Key Issuance
●● A key issue form will be documented in every instance of a CBP key issue and
contain as a minimum:
o Building number, floor number, and room, container or cage number;
o Key serial number;
o Key identification code;
o Quantity of keys issued;
o Brief statement of key control responsibilities;

o Printed full name of person issued key(s);

o Organizational identifier of person issued key(s);
o Signature of person issued key(s) acknowledging their key control
responsibilities;
o Printed name of person issuing key(s);
o Signature of person issuing key(s); and
o Date key(s) issued.
●● No person shall be issued multiple keys for the same area;
●● In no case shall the issuance of keys be authorized by the same person to whom
the key is to be issued;
●● Requirement for access does not constitute being issued a key, if other means
are available for access. I.e., intercoms, request for entry, guards etc.;
●● Keys shall be issued only to those individuals who have a legitimate and official
requirement for the key;
●● Keys are only issued to the occupant of the area, space or office or to a person
they designate in writing; and
●● Only the authorized recipient of an issued key may sign for that key and no other
person.
●● When assuming key control duties and responsibilities, the following minimum
actions will be taken:
o All keys will be jointly inventoried every time a new key control person
is assigned by both in-coming and out-going key control person and
documented ensuring accountability;
o Inventory will be documented and both persons will sign accountability
document; and
o Inventory will include both individual’s name and signature, date of inventory,
any discrepancies found and actions taken.
9.5.11. Key Return
●● Keys will be returned to the Key Control Person upon the departure or
reassignment of any person who was issued a key(s), and will not be given to
any other individual for use or turn-in;
●● Any person returning a key will complete their original key issued form which will
contain as a minimum:
o The printed name and signature of person returning the key(s) and date;
o The printed name and signature of key control person receiving key(s) and
date;
o Identification code of key(s) returned; and
o Identification of serial number(s) of key(s).

●● Any employee issued official keys on a temporary basis shall promptly return
them as ensured by the Key Control Person.
9.5.12. Loss/Damage/Destruction of Keys (Key Replacement)
●● When a key to a designated controlled or restricted area is lost, the locks to
that area must be changed, depending on risk, as soon as possible as old locks
remain exposed until replaced;
●● Lost or stolen keys must be reported immediately to the Key Control Person;
●● Anyone reporting a lost or stolen key must provide written documentation to the
Key Control person. This will include; date, time, circumstances of the loss, any
key identification and any action taken to retrieve the key;
●● Locks shall be re-keyed in a timely manner and new keys issued when keys are
lost or stolen; and
●● If a master key is lost, every master lock must be replaced and, depending how
the keying is done, new keys distributed to the key holders.
9.5.13. Documentation
●● Key and excess core inventory logs will be developed and maintained for a
period of no less than one year after the life of the key system being used;
●● Key access logs will be developed and maintained for a period of one year;
●● A key issued form will be developed and utilized for key(s) issue and turn in. The
form will be maintained until the key(s) are returned and for a period of no less
than one year after the key(s) are returned; and
●● All keys and excess cores will be secured and annually inventoried and
documented.
●● The DoD Lock Program can be referenced for documentation guidance. See
Section 9.1, LOCKS, above.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BACK Return to Table of Contents

Chapter 10: Safes and Storage Equipment

10.1. Physical Protection and Storage of Materials

10.1.1. GSA-approved security containers may be utilized for the physical protection of
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) information and property to include classified
documents, components, materials, equipment, funds, valuables, weapons, jewelry,
precious metals, etc. When such containers do not meet appropriate requirements
for protecting specific types of information and property, appropriate written guidance
shall be developed and approved by CBP Headquarters (HQ), Internal Affairs,
Security Management Division (CBP/IA/SMD). Nothing in this policy handbook shall
be construed to contradict or inhibit compliance with the law or building codes.
10.2. References
o Executive Order 12829, National Industrial Security Program;
o Executive Order 12958, as amended, Classified National Security
Information;
o FF-L-2740 Locks, Combination;
o FF-L-2937 Combination Lock, Mechanical;
o General Services Administration (GSA) Website (http://www.gsa.gov);
o AA-C-2737 Modular Vault Systems;
o Department of Defense Lock Program Website;
o AA-F-358 Filing Cabinets, Legal and Letter Size, Uninsulated, Security;
o AA-F363 Filing Cabinet, Security, Maps and Plans, General Filing, and
Storage
10.3. Classified Information
10.3.1. Classified information shall be secured under conditions adequate to prevent
access by unauthorized persons. Requirements specified in this section represent
acceptable security standards. Policy concerning the use of force for the protection
of classified information is specified in Chapter 12, Services, of this policy handbook.
Weapons or sensitive items such as funds, jewels, precious metals or drugs, etc.,
shall not be stored in the same container used to safeguard classified information
and property. Security requirements for Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)
are established by the Director of Central Intelligence Directives. Contact CBP/
IA/SMD for guidance on the storage of SCI and Special Access Program (SAP)
material. Current holdings of classified material shall be reduced to the minimum
required for mission accomplishment. Classified information that is not under the
personal control and observation of an authorized person is to be guarded or stored
ONLY in approved locked security containers, vaults, rooms or areas, as follows:
●● TOP SECRET Information
o TOP SECRET information shall be stored by one of the following methods:
–– In a GSA-approved security container with one of the following
supplementary controls:
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
72 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

–– The location housing the security container shall be subject to continuous

protection by cleared guard or duty personnel; or
–– Cleared guard or duty personnel shall inspect the security container once
every two hours.
o The location housing the container must be protected using one of the
following two methods:
o An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) meeting CBP/IA/SMD standards outlined
in Chapter 8, Interior Protection, with a personnel response time to alarm
within 15 minutes of the alarm annunciation or
o A Security-In-Depth Determination (a determination by CBP/IA/SMD,
that layered complementary controls are sufficient to deter and detect
unauthorized entry), when the GSA approved container is equipped with a
lock meeting Federal Specification FF-L-2740.
o With written approval from CBP/IA/SMD, Top Secret material may be stored
in a modular vault, vault, or a secure room (Open Storage) constructed
in accordance with Chapter 8, Vaults, and equipped with an IDS with
the personnel responding to the alarm within 15 minutes of the alarm
annunciation if the area is covered by Security-In-Depth, or a 5 minute alarm
response time if it is not.
10.3.2. SECRET Storage.
●● SECRET material shall be stored by one of the following methods:
o In the same manner as prescribed for Top Secret information;
o In a GSA-approved security container or vault without supplemental controls;
or
o Until October 1, 2012, in a safe, steel file cabinet or safe-type steel file
container that has an automatic unit locking mechanism.
●● All such receptacles will be accorded supplemental protection during non-working
hours.
o Until October 1, 2012, in any steel file cabinet that has four sides and a top
and bottom (all permanently attached by welding, rivets or peened bolts so
the contents cannot be removed without leaving visible evidence of entry)
and is secured by a rigid metal lock bar and an approved key operated or
combination padlock. The keepers of the rigid metal lock bar shall be secured
to the cabinet by welding, rivets, or bolts, so they cannot be removed and
replaced without leaving evidence of the entry. The drawers of the container
shall be held securely, so their contents cannot be removed with forcing open
the drawer. This type of cabinet will be accorded supplemental protection
during non-working hours.
10.3.3. CONFIDENTIAL Storage.
●● CONFIDENTIAL material shall be stored in a manner prescribed for the storage
of Top Secret or Secret, without supplementary controls.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
73 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

10.3.4. BULK Storage

●● Bulk Storage of classified material requires prior approval of the CBP/IA/SMD.
10.3.5. Storage of Sensitive-but-Unclassified Information
●● Sensitive and/or Limited Official Use (LOU) information must be stored in a room
or area affording sufficient physical and personnel access control and preventing
unauthorized access, such as a locked room. If a locked room does not afford
sufficient protection against unauthorized access, then at a minimum, materials
will be further secured in:
o Key-lock metal cabinets;
o Locked desk drawer
10.3.6. All unclassified information not otherwise designated as LOU shall be stored in
accordance with office policy and procedures, where applicable.
10.3.7. Storage of secure forms, stamps, ink and other related materials should refer to
Chapter 18, Secure Items.
10.3.8. Specialized Security Equipment
10.3.9. Specialized security equipment shall address unique requirements and may be
approved by CBP/IA/SMD in certain situations. When approved by CBP/IA/SMD the
following apply:
o One and two-drawer Service Approved Security Containers which are
securely fastened or guarded to prevent theft of the container, may only
be used in mobile facilities or in areas where small amounts of classified
information are stored;
o GSA-approved “Map and Plan” Service file container may be used for storage
of odd-sized items such as computer diskettes or tapes, maps, charts, plans,
and other media containing classified information; and
o GSA-approved modular vaults meeting Federal Specification AA-V-2737 may
be used to store classified information. See the Appendix 8.6, Vaults for more
detailed information.
10.4. Supplemental Protection
10.4.1. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), as described in Chapter 8, Interior Protection,
shall be used as supplemental protection.
10.4.2. Approved security guards may be utilized. When guards are authorized, the patrol
schedule is 2 hours for TOP SECRET material and, 4 hours for SECRET material.
10.4.3. GSA-approved security containers and approved vaults secured with a locking
mechanism meeting Federal specification FF-L-2740, located in an area of the
facility with in-depth security as determined by CBP/IA/SMD, do not require
supplemental protection.
10.4.4. All GSA containers used to secure classified materials, information, equipment,

weapons, and other valuables, must be housed in areas that will provide security
from removal of containers and disclosure of information/material.
10.5. GSA-Approved Security Containers
10.5.1. GSA establishes and publishes minimum standards, specifications, and supply
schedules for all containers, vault doors, modular vaults, alarm systems, and
associated security devices suitable for the storage and protection of classified
information, material, and property.
10.5.2. GSA-approved security containers are primarily used to store classified documents,
components, materials, and equipment. They are also used to secure funds,
valuables, and weapons.
10.5.3. There are two classes of GSA-approved containers currently being manufactured:
Class 5, and Class 6.
10.5.4. Classified and non-classified materials shall never be stored together.
10.5.5. GSA-approved containers must have a GSA label affixed to the front of the door,
the front of the top drawer, or the front of the control drawer. If the container no
longer has the GSA label attached to it, it is no longer an approved container. If
your container is no longer approved, see “Container Recertification” section 10.13.
GSA-approved containers manufactured before October 1990 are identified by their
GSA label that has either black lettering on a silver background (or silver lettering
on a black background). Since October 1990, only Class 5, 6, and 7 containers
have been manufactured. GSA-approved Class 5 and 6 containers manufactured
after October 1990 have a silver label with red lettering (or red with silver lettering).
GSA-approved Class 7 containers have a silver label with green lettering. Class 7
containers were available in filing cabinet style only and are no longer manufactured.
Information Processing System (IPS) containers are GSA approved containers for
protection of computers. Their GSA approval labels have blue lettering.
10.5.6. Class 5 and 6 Approved GSA Containers
●● Class 5 Containers are typically used for the storage of weapons and sensitive
items such as funds, jewels, precious metals, etc. However, funds, jewels,
precious metals, etc. shall not be store in the same container as weapons.
Class 5 containers may also be used for the storage of classified documents,
components, materials, and equipment. They provide the same protection as
Class 6, plus ten minutes against forced entry attack. Class 5 containers come in
several types: file cabinet, map and plan, weapon storage, COMSEC, and (IPS);
●● Class 6 Containers are typically used for storage of classified information such as
documents, maps, drawings, and plans. They come in file cabinet and map and
plan styles.
10.6. Weapons Storage
10.6.1. Weapons shall be stored in Class 5 or 6 GSA-approved containers instead of vaults
or armories when authorized for storage.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
75 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

●● Class 5 is preferred for weapons storage because of the different styles of

containers;
●● There are several styles of Class 5 containers that can be used for weapons
storage; and
●● The Class 5 GSA-approved container is available with various drawers,
adjustable shelves, and in weapons configurations for either rifles or handguns.
When selecting a container, the appropriate style shall be procured for adequate
safety and protection. A complete listing of types and styles of Class 5 and 6
GSA-approved containers can be found on the Federal Specifications and
Qualified Products Lists (QPLs) provided on the DoD’s Lock Program Web site.
10.6.2. Class 5 security containers authorized for weapons storage must be adequately
protected. The following factors must be considered for each container:
●● Vulnerability when left unattended for extended periods of time;
●● Vulnerability of the location where the container is placed;
●● Accessibility and ease of removal of the container;
●● Position where the container will be least vulnerable to unauthorized access by
heavy lifting equipment (e.g., forklifts or dollies);
●● Position from which unauthorized persons would find it extremely difficult to
remove the container;
●● The positive overall security of the arms stored in the container must be
achieved. Regional Security Officers will ensure that structure protection provided
by the storage container is adequately increased by the physical security
measures specified in this policy handbook.
●● Class 5 – Approved Weapons Container
o Class 5: - 53 1/4” H x 22 1/2” W x 39 1/4” D;
–– Standard colors are gray, black, and parchment;
–– Group 1 lock or X-09 lock;
–– Casterbase does not come standard;
o Interiors:
–– Weapon drawer
–– Correspondence drawer
–– 9MM Beretta Pistol rack
–– 45 & .38 Caliber Pistol rack
–– Adjustable shelf
–– Security lock
–– Universal and State Department rifle cart
–– Standard color is parchment
–– Drawer Dividers
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
76 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

–– Drawer Liner
●● For more information on storage of weapons and ammunitions, see Chapter 16,
Weapons and Ammunition.
10.7. Record Safes Designed for Fire Protection
10.7.1. A labeling system has been established by the Underwriters Laboratory (UL) to
define the level of fire protection each safe can be expected to provide. Prior to
1972, the UL designations used an alpha designation that was the same as Safe
Manufacturers National Association (SMNA). Both the former UL and SMNA
designations are provided, along with the current equivalent UL designation. Fire
protection container manufacturers and prices of equipment approved by the GSA
are listed in FSS Group 71 Part III.
10.7.2. Burglary-Resistant Safes
●● Containers designed for burglary protection are classified in accordance with test
data and specifications that conform to requirements of the UL. burglary-resistant
equipment will resist an attack by tools, torch, or explosives in proportion to their
construction specifications. Burglary-resistant container manufacturers and prices
of equipment approved by the GSA are listed in the FSS Group 71 Part III.
10.8. Combination Locks
10.8.1. DHS/CBP uses two types of mounted combination locks, one for the protection
of classified materials and one for the protection of weapons and ammunition.
Combination locks that protect classified material must meet the requirements of
Federal specification FF-L-2740, Locks, Combination. Combination locks protecting
weapons and ammunition must meet the requirements of Underwriters Laboratories
Inc. Standard For Combination Locks UL 768, Group 1.
10.8.2. See Chapter 9.2 for CBP policy on when to reset combinations.
10.8.3. Three locks have been approved under FF-L-2740 for the protection of classified
materials.
●● The model X-07 lock was approved in November 1991;
●● The X-08 in March 1999; and
●● The X-09 in June 2002.
10.8.4. GSA-approved security containers and vault doors for the protection of classified
material have had FF-L-2740-compliant locks installed at the time of manufacture
since March 10, 1992.
10.8.5. GSA-approved weapons containers and armory vault doors are available for the
protection of arms, ammunition, and explosives. Mechanical combination locks that
resist manipulation attempts for 20 man-hours are UL-listed as Group 1.
10.8.6. Pedestrian door dead bolts covered by Federal specification FF-L-2890, Lock
Extension (Pedestrian Door, Dead bolt) are intended for use on interior pedestrian
doors used for normal entrance and egress during day-to-day operations. Three
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
77 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

locks have been approved under FF-L-2890: the model CDX-07 door lock was
approved in November 1991, the CDX-08 in March 1999, and the CDX-09 in June
2002. While the CDX-07 and CDX-08 are still approved for securing classified
material, they are no longer being manufactured.
10.8.7. Combination padlocks under the FF-P-110, Padlock, Changeable Combination
Federal specification are intended for low level resistance to forced entry and high
level tell-tale manipulation or surreptitious action. The padlocks are intended for use
ashore and aboard ocean going vessels, indoors, or outdoors, semi-protected by a
structural overhang similar to eaves or a lean-to.
10.9. Replacement of Unapproved Storage Containers
10.9.1. No non-security filing cabinets or containers in use or presently on the market have
been approved for the storage of classified information. As cited in Executive Order
12958, Classified National Security Information, Directive on Safeguarding Classified
National Security Information, dated August 4, 1999, only GSA-approved Class 5 or
Class 6 security filing containers are authorized for the storage of classified National
Security Information.
10.9.2. In the past, a number of filing cabinets, equipped with locking bars and secured
with combination padlocks, and security storage containers equipped with built-
in combination locks, manufactured prior to the GSA-approval process, were
conditionally authorized for storing classified information. Executive Order 12958,
Classified National Security Information, Directive on Safeguarding Classified
National Security Information, dated August 4, 1999, rescinds all previous conditional
authorizations for containers storing classified information.
10.9.3. Security Officers and custodians must immediately replace these previously
approved containers with GSA-approved Class 5 or Class 6 security containers.
The expense of purchasing new security containers can be substantially lessened
by taking practical steps to reduce the need for classified storage containers, as
suggested below.
10.9.4. Conduct clean-out campaigns to remove unnecessary classified and other
unclassified documents from containers. Excess material shall be archived or
destroyed, as appropriate, and retained classified shall be moved into approved
containers.
●● In most offices, classified documents usually constitute a very small percentage
of the documents in a given container. Remove classified files from existing non-
approved containers and consolidate them in approved security cabinets. The
non-approved cabinets can still be used for storing unclassified files;
●● Explore the requisitioning of approved containers through surplus channels
before purchasing new equipment.
10.10. Defective GSA-Approved Security Filing Cabinets
10.10.1. After initially receiving GSA approval, a number of security containers have been

identified that require either the removal of the GSA approval label or must be
repaired to eliminate a security hazard. The following Art Metal and Hamilton
products shall be handled as indicated below:
●● Art Metal Products Inc. The GSA-approval label must be removed from all two-
and four-drawer, Class 5 security filing cabinets made by the Art Metal Products
Inc. These containers shall not be used for storage of classified materials;
●● Hamilton Products Group, Inc. Four- and five-drawer, Class 6 security filing
cabinets made by this manufacturer prior to July 1988, are subject to defects.
The defects allow the control drawer to be locked while another drawer is
open. These cabinets must be checked without exerting excessive force on
the control drawer handle to ensure that it cannot be locked with other drawers
open. If it is possible to lock the cabinet with less than 10 foot-pounds of torque,
a modification to the cabinet is required. Security officers who determine it
necessary to retrofit a container must contact a local locksmith for repairs.
Cabinets that are found to allow the locking, but are not repaired shall have the
GSA-Approved label removed.
10.11. Maintaining GSA-Approved Security Containers
10.11.1. General maintenance on GSA-approved security containers is recommended every
5 years. A trained and certified locksmith should be retained to examine and service
security containers with built-in combination locks. Containers used for the storage
of classified materials will be examined and repaired only by a cleared locksmith or
under the constant supervision of a cleared person.
10.12. Repairing Approved Security Containers
10.12.1. This section establishes procedures for the neutralization and repair of GSA-
approved containers and vault doors; the information provided herein is derived
from FED-STD 809A, and details unclassified procedures to neutralize and repair
lockouts on GSA-approved security containers and vault doors in a manner allowing
retention of the GSA approval. The terms used in this section are commonly
understood by the technical community to which they apply, and are not used here in
such a way as to introduce new or limited meanings.
●● Individuals who repair or drill security containers, vault doors, and padlocks shall
be cleared for access to the highest level of classified information stored within
the container, or must be escorted and continuously watched while working on
the container. Individuals must also be properly trained and certified in repairing
GSA-approved containers.
10.12.2. General Requirements
●● Determine if products are under warranty before attempting neutralization
procedures on containers or vault doors. Only products with red or blue labels
may be under warranty; red or blue label products more than a year old are
not under warranty. Contact the manufacturer concerning warranty provisions;
provide the serial number and description of container. GSA contracts require
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
79 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

manufacturers to provide warranties generally one year from the date of

manufacture. During that time, if a lockout occurs due to failure of the locking
system, the Government has the right to require the container manufacturer
to provide access to the container contents within 24 hours. This provision
applies in the continental US (CONUS) only. Contact GSA for further information
regarding warranty provisions at www.gsa.gov. Neutralization of lockouts or
repairs of any damage affecting the integrity of a security container approved for
storage of classified material shall be done only by authorized or continuously
escorted personnel specifically trained in the approved methods.
10.13. Recertification of GSA-Approved Containers
10.13.1. GSA-Approved Security Equipment Inspection/Recertification Training is now
available through the DoD’s Lock Program.
10.13.2. GSA-approved containers and vault doors are products that have been designed,
built, tested, and verified as meeting the requirements of Federal specifications.
GSA researches and develops those specifications for the Federal government.
Only products that have passed all GSA testing to the requirements of a designated
Federal specification may bear the label “General Services Administration
Approved.” The manufacturer attaches the label to the container.
10.13.3. Since the early 1960s, security equipment approved by GSA has had an external
label indicating approval. That label has been the designation of security equipment
authorized for storage of classified material and, more recently, of equipment for
storage of arms, ammunition, and explosives.
10.13.4. It is standard practice to remove the label if an approved container is opened,
repaired, or otherwise modified in an unauthorized manner. A missing label indicates
that a container may not have its original security integrity. However, the label may
be missing for another reason. The label may have fallen off or may have been
removed for a reason unrelated to the container’s security integrity.
10.13.5. All maintenance and service activity of a container, including the reason the approval
label is missing, shall be designated on the Security Container Records Form. If this
has not been done, the container’s security integrity may be vulnerable.
10.13.6. Containers modified from the original manufacturer’s product, or damaged or
improperly opened, may not be recertified unless returned to their original condition.
This may require replacement of parts with new or salvaged OEM parts, or repair in
accordance with Federal Standard 809.
10.13.7. This policy has been sent to all Federal agencies for incorporation into their relevant
security regulations.
10.13.8. The figure below is an example of recertification labels from MBA USA (top) and
Lockmasters (bottom). The container manufacturer’s name will appear on a sticker in
the center of the label. The color of the label will be indicated by a punch in the circle
above the appropriate word.

Figure 1: Recertified Container Labels

10.13.9. More information on the GSA Security Equipment Inspection Program can be found
at the Department of Defense Lock Program site.
10.13.10. Contact the Lock Program Technical Support Hotline, (800) 290-7607, if you have
any questions about the inspection and recertification process.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BACK Return to Table of Contents

Chapter 11: Access To Facilities

11.1. General
11.1.1. This chapter establishes the policy for access to CBP facilities, and limits the
establishment of facility entry controls to those necessary for the safety of CBP
employees and the protection of Government property and information.
11.1.2. This standardized approach will address accessing CBP facilities utilizing
identification, cards, Photo Access Cards (PAC), other agency passes and
credentials, X-Ray, magnetometer, irradiation screening devices and admittance to
CBP facilities.
11.2. Definitions
11.2.1. Badge: An emblem (a small piece of plastic, cloth or metal) that signifies
the bearer’s status, rank or membership or affiliation. A device, patch, or
accoutrement which is presented or displayed to indicate some feat of service, a
special accomplishment, a symbol of authority (e.g., police), a simple means of
identification. Also referred to in FLETC policy as a badge.
11.2.2. CFR: Code of Federal Regulation
11.2.3. Credentials: Documentation usually consists of an identity card, badge or a
shield, etc., issued by a trusted third party after some form of identity verification.
Credentials are utilized as identification showing that an individual is entitled to
represent, or exercise official power as, part of a Unites States Government Agency.
11.2.4. Designated Official: The highest ranking official of the primary tenant agency of a
Federal facility or, alternatively, a designee selected by mutual agreement of tenant
agency officials. For facilities owned and leased by the U.S. General Services
Administration (GSA), the definition appears in 41 CFR §102-71.20, of the Code of
Federal Regulations.
11.2.5. FIPS 201: Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 201, entitled Personal
Identity Verification of Federal Employees and Contractors, was developed to satisfy
the requirements of HSPD 12, which is comprised of two (2) specific components
PIV-I and PIV-II. FIPS 201 requires that the PIV card be a smart card and the card
body is similar to a bank credit card conforming to the ISO/IEC 7810 specification.
11.2.6. The card must contain both contact and contactless interfaces, which may be
provided by two separate integrated circuit chips (ICC) or by one dual-interface ICC.
The contact interface must conform to the ISO/IEC 7816-4:2005 specification
11.2.7. The contactless interface must conform to the ISO/IEC 14443 specification.
11.2.8. In most cases, physical access applications will use the contactless interface,
although there are special cases in which the contact interface will be used for
physical access. This is according to the NIST FIPS 201 PDF, the Standard
Publication for Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and
Contractors.
11.2.9. HSPD-7: Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 instructs Federal departments

and agencies to prepare plans for protecting physical and cyber critical infrastructure
and key resources (CI/KR), owned or operated, including leased facilities by July 31,
2004.
11.2.10. HSPD-12: Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 establishes a policy for
a common identification standard for Federal employees and contractors and
mandates the establishment of a “mandatory Government-wide standard for secure
and reliable forms of identification issued by the federal government to its employees
and contractors”.
11.2.11. IDMS: Personal Identity Verification Identity Management System. A system
comprised of one or more systems or applications used to manage the identity
verification, validation, and issuance processes. A DHS/HQ central data base used
to house personal identifiable information for all DHS employees and contractors.
11.2.12. Internal Affairs Background Investigation Database (IABI): A CBP database
utilized by CBP/PSD to input CBP personnel’s employment, suitability and clearance
status for verification purposes by CBP Security personnel.
11.2.13. Magnetometer: An electronic device used specifically to search personnel for
hidden metallic weapons (knives and guns) at entrances to airports, public schools,
courthouses, and other guarded spaces. When used with access control equipment,
they can perform two functions:
(1) Detect the presence of concealed metal objects;
(2) Determine the size of those objects.
●● Metal is detected by measuring the change in an established magnetic field when
dense metal or ferrous materials are moved through the field. The antenna of
a detector sets up a magnetic field around itself. As the antenna of the detector
is brought near metal or metal is moved past the antenna, the pitch from a tone
generator increases, thereby alerting the operator to the presence of metal.
Measurement capabilities are adjustable allowing for varying the amount of metal
desired to be detected.
11.2.14. Photo Access Card (PAC): A PAC is a physical artifact, a plastic card issued by
CBP to employees, contractors and detailees, which allow the bearers, authorized
access to CBP Facilities.
11.2.15. PIV-I: Specifies the minimum requirements for a Federal Personal Identification
Verification (PIV) system that meets control and security objectives of PIV-I,
including the personal identity proofing process. PIV was defined by NIST, the
National Institute of Standards and Technology, an agency of the U.S. Commerce
Department’s Technology Administration dealing with the performance of background
checks for employees and contractors.
11.2.16. PIV-II: Provides detailed technical specifications of components and processes
required for interoperability of PIV cards with personal authentication, access
control, and PIV card management systems across the Federal government and the
issuance of smartcards.

11.2.17. Radiation Detector: An electronic device used specifically to search for radioactive
materials hidden in cargo or vehicles. Radiation detectors fall into two categories:
gross counters and energy sensitive. Gross counters count each event (gamma
or neutron) emission the same regardless of energy. Energy sensitive detectors
-- used in radio-isotope identification devices (RIIDs) -- analyze a radioactive
isotope’s distinct gamma energy emissions and attempt to identify the source of
the radiation. There are several manufacturers of radiation detectors and they use
various technologies to measure radiation from containers, objects or people. Some
radiation detectors are small hand-held electronic devices and others are large portal
monitors that scans vehicles and cargo as they pass through.
11.2.18. Security Liaison (SL): The individual responsible for coordinating compliance with
the implementation of CBP security programs through the District Security Officer/
Regional Security Officer and serve as the primary point of contact for all security
issues in the their facilities.
11.2.19. Visitor: Any person who is not a DHS or CBP Federal employee or DHS or CBP
contractor with current DHS or CBP suitability and issued a DHS or CBP Photo
Access Card (PAC).
11.2.20. X-ray system: A device or system that inspects the contents of a package or
container for concealed explosives or contraband. Some systems can only detect
objects made of materials possessing high atomic numbers, such as steel, tin,
aluminum, and iron. Other systems can detect materials with both high and low
atomic numbers. Some systems have two monitors, one for objects with high atomic
numbers and one for objects with low atomic numbers. Color systems presently
available use only one monitor to view both types of materials. Specific colors are
assigned to high and low atomic number materials.
11.3. Authority
●● Privacy Act of 1974
●● E-Government Act of 2002
●● Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 (HSPD-12), August 2004.
●● Federal Information Processing Standard 201: Policy for a Common Identification
Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors, February 2005.
11.4. General
11.4.1. Entry control facilities provide the first public impression of CBP. They will present
the proper appearance for visitors, employees, and DHS personnel. The layout,
landscaping, and architecture of the facilities are factors in this image. The
architectural design of the facilities will comply with CBP’s architectural design
standards.
11.5. Responsibilities
11.5.1. The Security Officer will ensure that all persons entering and exiting any CBP facility
will adhere to access and egress procedures established in this handbook.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
86 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

●● Employees
o All CBP Federal employees and contractors (including guards, maintenance,
and cleaners) will complete a favorable suitability-to-be-authorized and issued
a CBP identification prior to entering and/or performing any authorized work in
a CBP owned or leased facility:
–– The CBP office of security will conduct federal, state and local criminal
and warrant checks on cleaning force personnel and answering service
employees;
–– New cleaning personnel and answering service employees must be
checked prior to their utilization;
–– All names should be rechecked annually;
–– Cleaning personnel or answering service employees are to provide photo
identification each time they enter the premises to perform their duties;
and
–– The CBP office of security will issue standardized contractor PACs.
o Photo access card (PAC) identification carriers are responsible to:
–– Maintain control of the issued photo access card (PAC) identification.
–– Safeguarding the photo access card (PAC) identification badge from loss
or misuse,
–– Immediately report any lost or stolen photo access card identification
badge; and
–– Notify his/her supervisor in writing of the circumstances surrounding the
lost/stolen badge or credential. Follow OIA/CBP guidelines to report a lost/
stolen badge of credential; the guidelines can be found at the CBP web
page.
o Employees who have lost or forgotten their photo access card (PAC)
identification or other issued CBP facilities issued access badge will be
issued visitors identification after that employee has been verified in the CBP
personnel security database;
o Photo access card (PAC) identification will be relinquished by all employees,
who shall, prior to resignation, termination; retirement, transfer etc., Complete
Form CBP-242.PDF the issuing official will annotate the appropriate control
log or automated system indicating return of the CBP national region photo
access card (PAC) identification badge or other issued CBP facilities issued
access badge.
11.5.2. The Designated Official will:
●● Ensure compliance with minimum CBP security requirements as determined by
IA/SMD;
●● Establish additional protection requirements for facilities and space under their
control as long as these procedures conform to the policy established by this
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
87 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

chapter;
●● Develop and implement adequate procedures to protect CBP employees and
property;
●● Determine normal working hours and non-working hours for the facility;
●● Determine if special access controls to the facility are necessary during normal
working and non-working hours, and if they are necessary, establish only the
minimum controls required;
●● Coordinate and establish these special access controls and other protection
requirements with GSA if the building is operated or leased by GSA; and
●● The Designated Official or Security Liaison will determine if it is necessary to
establish additional access controls to the facility during normal working hours:
o Access controls may be enhanced if the Designated Official or Security
Liaison determines that there is a threat to harm employees, to steal
Government property, or to gain unlawful access to information which is
protected against unauthorized access by Government rules or regulations.
11.5.3. Designated Officials and Security Liaisons are responsible to ensure that the
physical security policies and procedures applicable to individual program activities
are adhered to by all employees.
11.5.4. Designated Officials or Security Liaison of a CBP owned facility establish and
maintain physical security, predicated on programmatic requirements, if any, to
protect:
●● Government property;
●● Records; and
●● The well-being of service employees.
11.5.5. Designated officials or security officer of both CBP-owned and GSA-leased space
ensure staff compliance with all applicable policies and procedures in safeguarding
and protecting:
●● Government personal property;
●● Seized property (if applicable);
●● Government records (personnel, classified documents, etc.); and
●● ADP security requirements.
11.6. Access Control
11.6.1. At a minimum, access control systems will comply with HSPD-12, FIPS 201 policies,
Government Smart Card Interoperability Specification (GSC-IS V2.1) and Schedule
70 for Products and Service Components.
11.6.2. CBP/IA/SMD determines the necessary access control and systems for all CBP
facilities based on the requirements of HSPD 12 and FIPS 201. Planning is required
to include:

●● Establishment of a system for positive identification of personnel and equipment

authorized to enter and exit the facilities; and
●● Maintenance of adequate physical barriers that will be deployed to control the
facilities.
11.6.3. The number of entrances will be kept to a minimum and each entrance must be
controlled.
●● CCTV will provide surveillance of all access control operations to include the
access control area, vehicle search areas, final denial barriers, and pedestrian
access points.
o For further information, see Chapter 8, Interior Protection.
11.6.4. The senior CBP official where a badge system is implemented is responsible for
oversight and administration of the badge program. Personnel and equipment must
be provided to properly administer a badge system.
●● Planning will also include increasing vigilance and access restrictions during
higher threat levels.
11.6.5. Basic requirements for admission to Federal property are contained in 41 CFR §102-
74 et. seq. Accordingly, during business hours, areas of CBP facilities are normally
open to the public and only restricted to authorized individuals after business hours.
●● During business hours, property or portions thereof can be closed to the public
only when situations require this action to ensure the orderly conduct of CBP
business. The decision to close the property or portions thereof to the public will
be made by the designated official under the Occupant Emergency Program after
consultation with the building manager and the responsible Security Liaison.
●● When property or a portion thereof is closed to the public:
o Admission will be restricted to authorized persons who will register upon entry
to the property;
o Authorized persons will display a CBP photo access card (PAC) identification
badge or issued visitor’s identification while in the facility;
o It will be designated as a restricted or closed area:
–– The decision to designate areas as either a “controlled area” or a
“restricted area” will be made in conjunction with a decision to close the
property or a portion thereof to the public.
o Admittance to a controlled or restricted area will be limited to persons who
have official business within that specific area.
11.6.6. Public access control (PAC) points and entry control facilities (ECF) act as a
monitoring and clearance areas ensuring the proper level of access control for all
personnel, visitors, and commercial traffic. The objective of a PAC and ECF is to
ensure:
●● Only authorized personnel and/or vehicles have access to specific facilities and/
or areas;
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
89 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

●● A level of protection from unauthorized access is provided; and

●● Interception of contraband, such as weapons, explosives, drugs, classified
material, etc.
11.6.7. Public access areas are areas within the building where services are provided to the
general public:
●● Uncleared persons may enter these areas without escort but will be properly
screened prior to admittance;
●● The public access control area (normally in the main entrance lobby of the
building) will provide for screening of visitors and employees before admittance
into CBP controlled areas/space; and
●● The public access control operations can consist of a screening area, a walk-
through metal detector (WTMD) or hand-held metal detector (HHMD), a guard,
controlled doors, a controller, and a security receptionist.
11.6.8. All forms of issued DHS and CBP identification are the property of the U.S.
Government and may be retrieved at any time by the issuing official or security
authority for just cause including, but not limited to:
●● Any unauthorized use, including use for other than official or authorized
purposes;
●● Altering the badge/card or pass in any manner from original issued condition;
●● Repeated loss; and
●● Failure to display while in facility.
11.7. GSA-Operated or Leased Facilities
11.7.1. IA/SMD in conjunction with the Federal Protective Service (FPS) will determine the
normal level of protection necessary to control entry to GSA-operated facilities. If
access controls during normal working hours are necessary according to the policy
of this order; the access procedures will be developed in conjunction with GSA.
●● GSA will determine the security hours access control procedures in conjunction
with the Designated Official.
11.7.2. The FPS is responsible for providing facility perimeter physical security predicated
on programmatic needs at all facilities leased to Federal agencies.
11.7.3. Specific information and details pertaining to the administration of security in each of
these discrete security areas should be included in the Site Security Plan/Program.
●● General Services Administration’s (GSA) responsibilities for the protection of life
and property in federally owned and leased buildings and the responsibilities of
those occupying these facilities;
●● Except as otherwise ordered, property shall be closed to the public after normal
working hours. During normal working hours, property shall be closed to the
public only in emergency situations when reasonably necessary to ensure the
orderly conduct of government business. The decision to close a property shall
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
90 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

be made by the designated official under the facility site security plan/program;
●● For buildings and grounds for which the GSA has space assignment
responsibility, GSA will furnish as normal protection not less than the degree of
protection provided by commercial building operators of similar space for normal
risk occupants, as determined by GSA; and
●● Occupants of GSA assigned space shall cooperate to the fullest extent
possible with all pertinent facility regulations and procedures, and shall make
recommendations for improving protection.
11.8. Non-GSA Operated or Leased Facilities
11.8.1. When CBP elements occupy facilities not under GSA control, the IA/SMD will
determine if access control procedures are in accordance with the policy of this
chapter.
11.8.2. Dissemination of Access Control Information: When access controls are
implemented, the Designated Official will:
●● Publicize access control procedures to all facility occupants;
●● Make procedures available at each access control point for review by those
wishing access to the facility;
●● Provide written access control procedures to each guard post or receptionist,
defining responsibilities and procedures; and
●● Install signs at all facility entrances announcing that access to the facility is
controlled.
11.8.3. CBP Offices
11.8.4. All CBP offices located outside the National Capital Region will utilize their own
distinct CBP access card or badge for their facilities. CBP employees and CBP
contractors and will:
●● Request approval from CBP/IA/SMD in writing to issue their facility access cards/
badges. At a minimum the request will:
o Provide detailed access card/badge description;
o Submit a copy of facilities access badge/pass procedures.
●● Receive authorization in writing to issue facility Access Card/badge from CBP/IA/
SMD.
11.8.5. CBP offices receiving authorization to issue access cards/badges will have written
procedures in place for the administration, issuance, reporting of lost, stolen or
destroyed of their facility access cards/badges.
11.9. Photo Access Cards (PAC)
11.9.1. The PAC should be kept in a safe place which is convenient enough to ensure
that it will be brought to work. A good rule of thumb is to afford the PAC the same
protection given to credit cards. DO NOT write Personal Identification Numbers on

the PAC.
11.9.2. The CBP Photo Access Card (PAC), identification badge, or other CBP facilities
issued access card is not for official identification and will never be used outside of a
CBP or other government facility for the purpose of personal identification.
11.9.3. Blank stock of any CBP PACs will be secured in a locked container and remain
under the positive control of the issuing official.
11.9.4. Each issuing official will maintain detailed accountability records of all PACs, to
include:
●● Issuance;
●● Returns;
●● Loss;
●● Destruction;
●● Unused stock on hand; and
●● Confirmation of suitability.
11.9.5. Destroying CBP PACs
●● All CBP PACs will be returned to the issuing office for destruction;
●● All issuing offices are responsible to develop destruction control processes which
will include as a minimum:
o Maintain log with card holder’s name, card number and date returned and
date destroyed;
o Destruction logs will be maintained for a period of no less than 5 years;
o All identification pass/badges will be destroyed by shredding, utilizing a GSA
approved shredder.
11.10. Visitors
11.10.1. Control of the internal movements of personnel within a facility is necessary to
ensure that only authorized persons are permitted in secured areas and that visitors
do not wander through the facility unescorted.
11.10.2. All visitors will be issued a visitor’s badge/card or pass for the purpose of escorted or
unescorted authorization to visit in a CBP controlled facility/space/area. Each facility
will establish an internal Visitor Control procedures and criteria for visitor badging
and maintain positive control of all visitors, as a minimum:
●● A unique visitor’s temporary or hard badge/card or pass will be developed
indicating:
o Name of facility;
o Visitor badge/card or pass number; and
o Visitor escort or unescorted status.
●● Visitor badge/card will be strictly controlled and inventoried;
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
92 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

●● Visitor badge/card issuance shall not exceed 12 hours;

●● Visitor’s logs will be maintained indicating, as a minimum:
o Visitors’ time in and time out;
o Visitor’s full name printed and their signature;
o Visitor’s government-issued photo ID source for identification purpose;
o Visitor’s company/organization and contact number;
o Visitor badge/card or pass number;
o Sponsor’s full name printed and their signature; and
o Sponsor’s contact number.
11.10.3. The CBP Visitor’s identification badge/card or pass will be used for identification
purposes only within CBP facilities where it was issued. A visitor badge/card or
passes is required and the type utilized is based on the need of the facility and at
the discretion of the DO to facilitate the entrance of employees and visitors requiring
access into a CBP facility/space or area when the visitor is not authorized to receive
of a Photo Access Card (PAC) identification badge.
●● Types of visitors badges/cards or passes:
o Disposable badge/card or pass;
o Hard badge/card or pass;
o Unescorted badge/card or pass; and
o Escort required badge/card or pass
●● Persons who may require a visitor badge/card or pass may include, but are not
limited to:
o Employees;
o Visitors;
o Construction workers;
o Maintenance workers;
o Vendors;
o Friends, family; and
o Foreign nationals.
11.10.4. Only a CBP employee, detailee or contractor with a CBP National Capital Region
Photo Access Card (PAC) identification badge or other CBP facilities issued access
badge can sponsor a visitor into a CBP facility.
●● Sponsors are responsible for the control and conduct of their visitor(s) while the
visitor(s) is on site;
●● The CBP employee who signed the visitor in is ultimately responsible for
their visitor even if they have turned control of the visitor over to another CBP
employee, detailee or contractor.

11.10.5. If a disposable visitor badge/card or pass is issued, issuance will be maintained

either by manual or electronic means:
●● The badge/card or pass will have as a minimum the visitor’s full name and date
of expiration;
●● Identify visitor as requiring escort or unescorted status; and
●● Can be issued to employees who have lost or forgotten their National Capital
Region Photo Access Card (PAC) identification badge or other CBP facilities-
issued access badge:
o The Security Liaison will verify the individual in the CBP Personnel Security
Data Base (IABI):
–– Missing badge/card or pass (possibly due to loss or theft) must be
immediately reported to the Security Liaison
11.10.6. If a visitor’s hard badge/card or pass is used, a strict accounting of the issuance will
be maintained either by manual or electronic means and the visitor procedures will
include an exchange process for issuance for a piece of photographic government-
issued identification.
11.10.7. Visitors are responsible for safeguarding their visitor’s identification badge/card or
pass from loss or misuse.
11.10.8. Lost or stolen visitor identification badges/cards/passes:
●● Will be immediately reported to the Security Officer and the sponsor will provide
written documentation of the loss if requested by the Security Liaison.
11.10.9. The Security Liaison will:
●● Maintain documented records of lost visitor badges/cards or passes;
●● Complete a re-issuance of visitor badges/cards or passes when the number of
badges lost exceeds ten percent of the overall number of badges issued:
o If re-issuance is accomplished all obsolete badges/cards or passes will be
destroyed and a destruction documented.
11.10.10. Visitor identification badges are only issued for the purpose of authorizing a visitor
into a CBP facility, area or space for the purpose of meetings, briefs, etc or vendors
supporting CBP activities.
11.10.11. Visitor identification badges must not be issued in place of the National Capital
Region Photo Access Card (PAC) identification badge or other CBP facilities issued
access badge to any person for the purpose of daily work in a CBP facility, area
or space. The only exception to this is that a visitor’s identification badge can be
provided to CBP personnel who have reported their National Capital Region Photo
Access Card (PAC) identification badge or other CBP facilities-issued access badge
lost or stolen and submitted the required documentation.
11.10.12. See the Lost Badge or Credential Directive, CD 5230-029A (2002) for further details
of this documentation process.

●● Individuals denied a PAC based on suitability are not authorized access;

●● This includes short term visitor access.
11.11. Escorts
11.11.1. All DHS Federal employees and contractors assigned escort responsibilities will
have a valid CBP National Capital Region Photo Access Card (PAC) identification
badge or other issued CBP facilities issued access badge and authorized entry into
the areas in which they are performing escort duties.
11.11.2. All DHS Federal employees and contractors assigned escort duties are responsible
to:
●● Ensure visitors under escort have been properly screened and badged (IAW 11.7
& 11.8);
●● Not escort more than four (4) visitors at one time;
●● Ensure escorted visitors are under visual contact and positive control at all times;
●● Ensure escorted visitors return visitor identification upon departure (IAW 11.7);
●● Report any unauthorized activities by escorted visitors to the Security Liaison;
●● Never leave escorted required visitors unattended;
●● Never escort a visitor into a restricted, controlled or classified area unless prior
approval has been granted by the Security Liaison; and
●● Ensure visitors are aware of visitor identification safe keeping including:
o Report of loss of identification to sponsor;
o Proper display; and
o Return policy.
11.12. Visitor Parking
11.12.1. Where the facility is operated and managed by CBP the following will apply:
●● No unauthorized direct access into any facility from a parking lot or parking
structure by visitors;
●● Visitor spaces are not intended to accommodate the daily or personal needs of
employees who work in or near the CBP facility;
●● Post signage and arrange for towing unauthorized vehicles:
o Procedures should be established and implemented to alert the public to
towing policies and the removal of unauthorized vehicles.
●● Spaces will be designated for the exclusive use of visitors and handicap persons;
●● Utilize effective lighting to provide added safety and deter illegal or threatening
activities;
o For further information, see Chapter 7.5, Protective Lighting.
●● Twenty-four hour CCTV surveillance and recording is required at all locations as
a deterrent:
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
95 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

o Requirements will depend on assessment of the security level for each facility.
●● Digital video recordings (DVR) are also highly valuable as a source of evidence
and investigative leads; and
●● Where the facility is operated and managed by GSA, 41 CFR §101-20.104 will
apply.
●● For further information, see Chapter 8.12, CCTV.
11.13. Electronic Access Controls
11.13.1. For detailed information on access controls see Appendix (CCTV) and Appendix
(IDS) .
11.13.2. Plan for locking devices or controls at perimeter and interior doors, providing
effective key control. Plan for protection; cleaning, and maintenance personnel and
determine hours, locations, and levels of access for such personnel.
11.13.3. Vehicles and Traffic Control. If public vehicle entrances have gates, they will be
electronically opened and closed.
●● Accommodations for handicapped visitors will be provided.
11.13.4. Vehicle entrances with restricted access at facilities associated with a high threat
level will be equipped with electrical or hydraulic vehicle gates or movable barriers.
●● Vehicle barriers may be controlled by: (see Appendix 7.2, Perimeter Security
Barriers)
o Card readers;
o Biometric devices;
o Proximity tags;
o Electronic keypads;
o Remotely by line-of-sight or using CCTV; or
o For high traffic areas, one-way entry and exit lanes shall be created.
11.13.5. Access control systems will be provided at perimeter doors, public waiting and
information areas, visitation areas, processing areas, sally ports, secure vestibule,
loading docks, and entrances to restricted areas.
11.13.6. The access control system shall be HSPD-12 compliant, hardware, or computer
based system.
11.13.7. A personnel-based access control system relies on a person to:
●● Positively identify individuals requesting access;
●● Determine if the access is authorized; and
●● Secure the access port ensuring only the individual(s) authorized have gained
access.
11.13.8. GSA Schedule 70 approved automated access control systems are appropriate for
large applications and may be required for programs associated with a high threat
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
96 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

level. Systems may be in the form of stand-alone, one or two door units, small
networks for 8-16 doors, or larger multi-door, multi-tasking systems. Characteristics
of this type of system are:
●● All authorized users are provided with unique pass cards, tags or personal
identification numbers (PINs);
●● Audit trails are available;
●● Electrical power is required at each control point;
●● Individual users can be deleted from the system without the need to recover
cards, tags, pins or keys; and
●● These types of systems are ideal for areas with 25 or more users and large
systems controlling interior and exterior access control readers.
11.14. Screening Procedures
11.14.1. Entry security must follow ISC Security Standards for Leased Space (Sept. 24,
2004):
●● A visitor control/screening system, acceptable to the Government, is required. At
a minimum, the system shall require Security Guards to screen visitors;
●● Security Guards for public lobbies and public entrances shall be required for such
purposes as:
o ID/pass control;
o Manning X-ray and magnetometer equipment.
●● Guards can be furnished via either:
o Lessor-furnished operating agreement or
o Full leasehold control methods.
●● If guards are lessor-furnished, they shall be trained and licensed in accordance
with Government standards;
●● Guards manning magnetometers and X-ray equipment will be armed; and
o Guards will direct the building population and visitors through the
magnetometers.
o See Appendix 11.14. Screening Procedures, for more information.
11.14.2. Facility Security Standards:
●● X-ray and magnetometer screening devices at all public entrances for the
screening of visitors, contractors, etc., and all of their purses, bags, briefcases,
packages, etc., are mandatory for Level IV facilities:
o A standard based on facility evaluation by the SL and/or the building security
committee for Level III facilities:
–– Is desirable for Level III facilities;
–– Is not applicable for Level I facilities.

●● X-raying of all packages entering the building delivered by contractors, couriers,

etc., is mandatory for Level IV facilities:
o A standard based on facility evaluation by the SL and/or the Building Security
Committee for Level III facilities:
–– Is desirable for Level II facilities;
–– Is not applicable for Level I facilities.
11.14.3. Mail and packages entering the building will be:
●● Subject to X-ray screening;
●● Visual inspection by armed Security Guards:
o Packages, briefcases, and other containers in the immediate possession
of visitors, employees, or other persons arriving on, working at, visiting, or
departing from Federal property, are subject to inspection. A full search of a
person and any vehicle driven or occupied by the person may accompany an
arrest;
o The Government may divert large truck shipments to a secondary location for
screening purposes; and
o The Government reserves the right to negotiate security enhancements
necessary for securing any unsecured non-federal block of space with a
separate entrance (e.g., ground floor retail) based on a Government Building
Security Assessment.
11.14.4. Visitor screening procedures will be developed based on the facility security level
(see Chapter 6, Facility Protection, and Appendix 14: Building-Specific Security Alert
Plan.)
●● The procedures will:
o Consider the building design;
o Rate and flow of visitors;
o Threat level;
o Personnel available; and
o Types of technical equipment installed.
●● Screening procedures will:
o Maintain maximum desired security;
o Provide access only to persons with legitimate need.
11.14.5. The use of walk-through metal detectors (WTMD) or hand-held metal detectors
(HHMD), people-control barricades, and door controls will be incorporated into the
facility access procedure. The procedure will include:
●● Provisions for active inspection and thorough visual checks of the contents of all
packages, briefcases, handbags and similar items; such packages that may be
transported by:

o A visitor requesting access;

o A freight carrier;
o An express package delivery firm;
o The U.S. Postal Service; and
o U.S. Government courier.
●● Visual checks of carried items including passage utilizing a WTMD or inspection
using a HHMD before allowing access into any CBP space.
11.14.6. Additional:
●● Emergency power sources to critical systems (alarm systems, radio
communications, computer facilities, CCTV monitoring, fire detection, entry
control devices, etc) are required. See Appendix 11.14, Screening Procedures,
for more information.
11.15. Prohibited Entry Notice
11.15.1. The authority of a CBP Designated Official or Security Officer to take reasonable,
necessary and lawful measures to maintain law and order and to protect personnel
and property shall include the authority to issue a Prohibited Entry Notice:
●● That authority also includes the removal from or the denial of access to, any CBP
facility, site or space of individuals who threaten the orderly administration of the
installation or site;
●● That authority must not be exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory
manner; and
●● Removal or denial actions must be based on reasonable grounds and be
judiciously applied.
11.15.2. 41 CFR §102-74.450 allows for the fining and possible prosecution of individuals
who do not conduct themselves appropriately in Federal buildings. 41 CFR §102-
74.390 also outlines the appropriate policy for disturbances in public buildings,
stating:
●● All persons entering in or on Federal property are prohibited from loitering,
exhibiting disorderly conduct, or exhibiting other conduct on property that:
(a) Creates loud or unusual noise or a nuisance;
(b) Unreasonably obstructs the usual use of entrances, foyers, lobbies, corridors,
offices, elevators, stairways or parking lots;
(c) Otherwise impedes or disrupts the performance of official duties by Government
employees; or
(d) Prevents the general public from obtaining the administrative services provided
on the property in a timely manner.
11.16. Prohibited Items
11.16.1. Prohibited Articles. The following articles are prohibited from CBP facilities, unless
approved by the designated Agency/local authority for security:
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
99 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

●● Any dangerous weapon, explosive, or other dangerous instrument or material

likely to produce substantial injury or damage to persons or property;
●● (Reference 18 USC §930, Possession of Firearms and Dangerous Weapons in
Federal Facilities, and 41 CFR §102-74.440.) Sites shall, at a minimum, employ
administrative procedures to deter the introduction of explosives into facilities.
11.16.2. Leases shall state that the Government reserves the right to post applicable
Government rules and regulations at each public entrance in a Federally-occupied
facility for such things as, but not limited to, barring the unauthorized possession of
firearms and dangerous weapons.
11.16.3. Controlled Articles. The following privately owned articles are not permitted/
authorized in CBP facilities without prior written authorization from the DO.:
●● Recording equipment (audio, video, optical, or data);
●● Electronic equipment with a data exchange port capable of being connected to
automated information system equipment (portable computer drives or other data
storage devices);
●● Radio frequency transmitting equipment; and
●● Computers and associated media.
11.16.4. Controlled Substances (e.g., illegal drugs and associated paraphernalia, but not
prescription medicine) are not permitted/authorized.
11.16.5. Other items prohibited by law.
●● Alcoholic Beverages.
11.16.6. 18 USC §930 is reprinted at the end of this chapter for the convenience of the
Security Officer.
11.17. National Capital Region DHS/CBP Photo Access Card (PAC)
11.17.1. CBP National Capital Region Photo Access Card (PAC) identification badges or
other CBP facilities issued access badge are intended for official use only (FOUO)
and identify the bearer as a CBP Federal employee or contractor authorized
admittance into a DHS/CBP facility.
11.17.2. Only CBP/IA/SMD is authorized to issue DHS/CBP National Capital Region Photo
Access Card (PAC) identification badges.
11.17.3. CBP National Capital Region Photo Access Card (PAC) and visitor’s identification
badges/cards or passes will be visibly worn above the waist and below the neck with
the photograph, if applicable, visible while in any CBP facility servicing the public
and removed from public view upon departing the facility to avoid publicizing CBP
affiliation. This identification badge/card or pass must be fully visible, outside of
clothing, at all times.
11.17.4. The Designated Official (DO) is responsible for providing accurate and updated CBP
Form 346 identifying authorized signature authorities to SMD/IA.

11.17.5. National Capital Region Photo Access Card (PAC) identification passes will be
returned to the SMD/IA badging office for destruction.
11.18. Signage
11.18.1. Interior and exterior signage is standardized by function; Information, Direction,
Identification and Regulation and is required at CBP facilities. All signage shall follow
the standards shown in the GSA Manual on the Design of Sign/Symbol Systems for
Federal Facilities and 18 USC §871
11.18.2. A well-designed site should use as few signs as possible. Signs should make the
site clear to the first-time user by identifying multiple site entrances, parking and the
main building entrance.
11.18.3. Conformity of signage and directions:
11.18.4. Signage should be clear to avoid confusion and direct users to their destination
efficiently. If an escort service is available, signs should inform users; and
11.18.5. Signage should conform to 41 CFR §102-74, Rules and Regulations Governing
Public Buildings and Grounds.
11.18.6. Generally, graphics and style of site signage should be in keeping with the signage
used inside the building. Signs integrated with architectural elements can also be
very effective. There shall be a consistency in the font style and color plus any
directional symbology used in site and building signage. Signage placement can be
an important detail element of the building design whether prominently displayed
and tooled into the exterior building wall materials or as a freestanding component
near the entrance to the facility.
11.18.7. Persons in and on property shall at all times comply with official signs of a
prohibitory, regulatory, or directory nature and with the lawful direction of Federal
Protective Officers and other authorized individuals.
11.19. Photography
11.19.1. Employees and visitors at CBP-controlled spaces are prohibited from using cameras
and video recording devices. The senior CBP official on site in coordination with the
site Security Officer may grant exceptions to this policy on a case-by-case basis in
writing. This includes, but is not limited to:
●● Television cameras;
●● Telecasting;
●● Video/audio tape equipment;
●● Motion picture;
●● Still analog or digital cameras;
●● Filming; and
●● Any other means of image capture.
11.19.2. See CBP Public Affairs Directive 5410-001a for further information on regulations
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
101 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

regarding photography.
11.20. Security Violations
11.20.1. Violation of these procedures constitutes a security violation; the Security Officer will
comply with all required actions.
11.21. Other
11.21.1. Legal Name Change: Any CBP federal employee, or detailee requesting a new
identification badge/pass due to a legal name change (e.g. marriage, divorce, etc)
will:
●● Notify PSD/records management and mission support specialist of legal name
change;
●● Provide PSD/records management legal documentation of name change for IAIB
update; and
●● Be issued new identification only after IAIB reflects legal name change.
11.21.2. Legal Name Change: Any CBP contractor requesting a new identification badge/
pass due to a legal name change (e.g. marriage, divorce, etc) will:
●● Notify their company of the legal name change:
o Company will make notification to CBP/PSD.
●● Be issued new identification only after IAIB reflects legal name change.
11.21.3. Non National Capital Region CBP Federal employees, detailees or contractor
requesting National Capital Region PAC identification badges will:
●● Be assigned duties within the national Capital region for a period of 30 days or
longer;
●● Accomplish required PAC documentation;
●● IABI data base verification by SMD/IA PAC issuing authority;
●● Personnel not found in the IABI data base can utilize DHS form 11000-5
Personnel Security Data Verification Request for the transmission of their DHS
status into IABI;
●● Comply with PAC identification return policy for National Capital Region, detailed
above in Section 11.17, upon completion of detail or assignment.
11.22. Reference
●● e-CFR library
●● 18 USC §930
●● DHS Form 11000-5 Personnel Security Data Verification Request
●● CBP Public Affairs Directives 5410-001a
●● ISO/IEC 7810
●● ISO/IEC 7816-4:2005

●● ISO/IEC 14443
●● FIPS 201
●● HSPD-7
●● Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 (HSPD-12), August 2004.
●● PIV-I
●● NIST
●● PIV-II
●● Privacy Act of 1974
●● E-Government Act of 2002
●● Federal Information Processing Standard 201: Policy for a Common Identification
Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors, February 2005.
●● CFR 41 §101-20.302.
●● 41 CFR §102-74.70 for the Rules & Regulations Governing Conduct on Federal
Property
●● Walk-through metal detector (WTMD)
●● Hand-held metal detector (HHMD)
●● OIA/CBP Guidelines to Report a Lost/Stolen Badge of Credential;
●● Photo Access Card (PAC) identification badge(s) Form CBP-242.pdf
●● CBP Form 346
●● (GSC-IS V2.1) Government Smart Card Interoperability Specification
●● Schedule 70 for Products and Service Components:
●● Lost Badge Or Credential, Customs Directive 5230-029a (2002)
●● 41 CFR §101-20.104
●● 41 CFR §102-74. Subpart C. Prosecution of offenders is appropriate. Also see:
●● 41 CFR §101-20.315 Penalties and other laws:
●● 41 CFR §101-20.305 Disturbances: Any loitering, disorderly conduct,
●● 18 USC §930
●● Signage should conform to 41 CFR §101-203.3,
●● CBP Public Affairs Directives 5410-001

TITLE 18 - CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

CHAPTER 44 - FIREARMS
Section 930. Possession of firearms and dangerous weapons in Federal facilities

(a) Except as provided in subsection (d), whoever knowingly possesses or causes to be

present a firearm or other dangerous weapon in a Federal facility (other than a Federal
court facility), or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than 1 year, or both.
(b) Whoever, with intent that a firearm or other dangerous weapon be used in the commission
of a crime, knowingly possesses or causes to be present such firearm or dangerous
weapon in a Federal facility, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.
(c) A person who kills any person in the course of a violation of subsection (a) or (b), or in the
course of an attack on a Federal facility involving the use of a firearm or other dangerous
weapon, or attempts or conspires to do such an act, shall be punished as provided in
sections 1111, 1112, 1113, and 1117.
(d) Subsection (a) shall not apply to—
(1) the lawful performance of official duties by an officer, agent, or employee of the United
States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof, who is authorized by law to engage in
or supervise the prevention, detection, investigation, or prosecution of any violation of
law;
(2) the possession of a firearm or other dangerous weapon by a Federal official or a
member of the Armed Forces if such possession is authorized by law; or
(3) the lawful carrying of firearms or other dangerous weapons in a Federal facility incident
to hunting or other lawful purposes.
(e)
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), whoever knowingly possesses or causes to be
present a firearm in a Federal court facility, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under
this title, imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both.
(2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to conduct which is described in paragraph (1) or (2) of
subsection (d).
(f) Nothing in this section limits the power of a court of the United States to punish for contempt
or to promulgate rules or orders regulating, restricting, or prohibiting the possession of
weapons within any building housing such court or any of its proceedings, or upon any
grounds appurtenant to such building.
(g) As used in this section:
(1) The term “Federal facility” means a building or part thereof owned or leased by the
Federal Government, where Federal employees are regularly present for the purpose of
performing their official duties.

(2) The term “dangerous weapon” means a weapon, device, instrument, material, or
substance, animate or inanimate, that is used for, or is readily capable of, causing death
or serious bodily injury, except that such term does not include a pocket knife with a
blade of less than 21/2 inches in length.
(3) The term “Federal court facility” means the courtroom, judges’ chambers, witness
rooms, jury deliberation rooms, attorney conference rooms, prisoner holding cells,
offices of the court clerks, the United States attorney, and the United States marshal,
probation and parole offices, and adjoining corridors of any court of the United States.
(h) Notice of the provisions of subsections (a) and (b) shall be posted conspicuously at each
public entrance to each Federal facility, and notice of subsection (e) shall be posted
conspicuously at each public entrance to each Federal court facility, and no person shall be
convicted of an offense under subsection (a) or (e) with respect to a Federal facility if such
notice is not so posted at such facility, unless such person had actual notice of subsection
(a) or (e), as the case may be.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BACK Return to Table of Contents

Chapter 12: Services

12.1. Law Enforcement Protection

12.1.1. The Federal Protective Service (FPS), Police Officers and local law enforcement
officers, where response agreements are in effect, have primary responsibility for
responding to criminal occurrences, incidents, and life threatening events at DHS
facilities under the custody and control of GSA.
●● In addition to protecting Federal government buildings, FPS is also responsible
for the security and safety of Federal Government employees and visitors to
Federal buildings;
●● Occupants of facilities under the custody and control of GSA are responsible for
promptly reporting all crimes and suspicious circumstances occurring on GSA-
controlled property to the regional FPS Division (see Chapter 20, Workplace
Violence, for the address and phone number of FPS Regional Offices);
●● FPS Inspectors and/or Physical Security Specialists (PSS) usually determine
the placement and hours of operation of the guard posts in Federally-controlled
facilities. They develop Post Orders for each post in coordination with tenant
agencies and other key personnel;
●● The implementation of security countermeasures, to include contract guards, are
approved and paid for by the tenant agencies; and
●● Physical security programs shall be administered within each region, center, and
field activity based on CBP policy and guidance set forth in this handbook, to
ensure the protection of CBP assets. These programs should be continually and
effectively administered by the appropriate organizational security officer and
monitored to ensure their integrity.
12.2. Contract Guard Services
12.2.1. The U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Federal Protective Service (FPS)
shall “protect the buildings, grounds, and property that are owned, occupied, or
secured by the Federal Government.”
●● FPS is responsible for acquiring and monitoring contract guard services;
●● FPS law enforcement personnel are sworn Federal law enforcement officers and
can make arrests on and off Federally-controlled property; and
●● FPS law enforcement personnel exercise all the police powers of sheriffs and
constables, with the exception of serving civil processes.
12.2.2. The authority to engage contract guard services for CBP rests with FPS. Any
contract guard security must be coordinated with FPS. No CBP component
may engage any private contract guard service independently or without direct
coordination with FPS.
12.2.3. Non-uniformed Criminal Investigators (CIs) investigate crimes ranging from homicide
to theft of Government property. They also investigate allegations of security guard
misconduct on the job.
●● Information provided to FPS investigators could be important to the successful
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
108 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

outcome of a criminal investigation;

●● FPS uniformed and investigative personnel or local law enforcement will provide
primary law enforcement support services; and
●● Primary responsibilities of contract guard services are:
o To control access to Federal property;
o To assist in ensuring the safety of employees and visitors while on Federal
property; and
o To assist in ensuring the safety of Federal property.
12.2.4. Access control includes checking visitor and employee identification; operating
security equipment such as X-ray machines and Magnetometers to screen for
prohibited materials; operating or monitoring security cameras and/or alarms; and
reporting crimes and incidents to the FPS MegaCenter.
12.2.5. Security Guards
●● Help keep public order and prevent crime;
●● Can detain individuals who are being seriously disruptive, violent, or suspected
of committing a crime while on Federally controlled property, but they do not have
the authority to arrest a suspect as police. Their duties mainly concern preventing
and detecting crime rather than investigating and solving crimes;
●● As part of their assigned duties, security guards are expected to:
o Control access to specific areas of a facility;
o Enforce property rules and regulations;
o Detect and report criminal acts;
o Stop and if possible, detain persons engaging in criminal activities;
o Provide security against loss from fire or mechanical equipment failure;
o Respond to emergency situations involving the safety and security of the
facility; and
o Act occasionally as a crowd monitor to maintain order.
12.2.6. Delegations of GSA Authority
●● The Memorandum of Agreement dated June 2006 by and between the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) through U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement’s Federal Protective Service (ICE/FPS), and the General Services
Administration (GSA) charged DHS with protecting buildings, grounds, and
property that are owned, occupied, or secured by the Federal Government
(including any agency, instrumentality, or wholly owned or mixed-ownership
corporation) and the persons on the property. The Secretary of DHS further
delegated these functions to ICE/FPS. As outlined in the agreement DHS ICE/
FPS will provide security and law enforcement services to facilities under the
custody and control of GSA.
●● In facilities where GSA has delegated its authority to the occupant agency, it may
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
109 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

also delegate most or all of its enforcement powers. Generally, GSA has reserved
its investigative and prospective powers;
●● When jurisdiction is delegated by the FPS, an agreement must be negotiated
with the local police to provide law enforcement response.
12.2.7. Determining Need
●● A guard force is an integral and effective element in a facility’s physical security
program. The effectiveness of alarm devices, physical barriers, and intrusion
detectors depends ultimately on a response by a skilled guard force;
●● Guard services, as delegated by DHS MOA, can be provided by FPS Federal
Police Officers; and
●● The Federal Protective Service is responsible for delivering a comprehensive
physical security and law enforcement program in all Federally-owned or leased
facilities.
12.2.8. Criteria for Determining Need
●● As cited in the handbook titled “Department of the Interior Facility Security
Standards Appendix B,” evaluating a facility for security guard requirements to
include a security guard patrol is desirable for security Level II facilities;
●● This evaluation may be a standard based on a Building Security Committee
facility evaluation for security Level III facilities, and is a minimum-security
standard for Level IV facilities.
12.2.9. The number of guards at any given time will depend on the size of the facility, the
hours of operation, and current risk factors. Guard services are recommended under,
but are not limited to, the following circumstances:
●● At Security Level III and IV facilities, to meet visitor control and screening
requirements;
●● The mission of the facility is particularly critical;
●● High level/volume of sensitivity of information handled at the facility, e.g., National
Security Information (NSI);
●● An in-house response capability is needed, e.g., the facility contains alarmed
vaults or other sensitive operations, and off-site guards or police are not close
enough for quick response;
●● The facility is vulnerable to theft or damage, e.g. a facility location is in a high
crime area;
●● Pedestrian or automobile traffic is heavy or congested and requires special
controls; and
●● Moderate to large volume of public functions and/or moderate to large volumes of
mail and packages, which require screening or inspection.
12.3. Cost Factors
12.3.1. As with any expenditure of funds for security, the annual costs of guard services
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
110 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

normally should not exceed the monetary value, replacement or critical loss value of
the protected items.
12.3.2. Costs for guard services are recurring and funding sources must be obtained from
the beginning of the project for the duration of the contract.
12.3.3. A substantial expense for guard services may be required for crowd or traffic control,
for safeguarding highly classified or sensitive information, or for protecting material
or functions which have high intrinsic rather than monetary value.
12.3.4. This is especially true as applied to the safety of employees since it is impossible to
put a dollar value on human lives or peace of mind.
12.3.5. A guard post in a high crime area may yield substantial benefits in terms of improved
safety, higher employee morale, increased productivity, and a better image of DHS/
CBP.
12.4. Guard Duties
12.4.1. Any decision about whether to utilize a guard force of any size must consider the
following duties that guards may properly perform:
●● Entrance Control
o Operate and enforce a system of access control, including inspection and
identification of packages.
●● Roving Patrol
o Patrol routes or designated areas such as perimeters, buildings, vaults, and
public areas.
●● Traffic Control
o Direct traffic (vehicular and pedestrian), control parking, check permits, and
issue citations.
●● Key Control
o Receive, issue, and account for certain keys to the building and its internal
areas.
●● Security and Fire Systems
o Monitor, operate, and respond to triggered intrusion or fire alarm systems or
protective devices.
●● Utility Systems
o Monitor, record data, or perform minor operations for building utility systems.
●● Lost and Found
o Receive, process receipt for, and store found items.
●● Flying of the U.S. Flag
o Observe flag flying procedures.
●● Reports and Records

o Prepare reports on accidents, fires, thefts, and other building incidents.

●● Response to Emergencies
o In case of any emergency (fire, bomb threat, assault or civil disturbance),
respond, summon assistance, administer first aid, and assist public safety
personnel.
●● Law and Order
o Maintain law and order within the area of assignment.
●● Hazardous Conditions
o Report potentially hazardous conditions and items in need of repair;
o When necessary, supervisors and/or managers may be invited to participate
in Building Security Committee (BSC) and Occupant Emergency Plan (OEP)
Committee meetings.
12.5. Personnel Requirements
12.5.1. Manpower
●● The number of full-time guard posts for a facility is determined by the Security
Officer and the site manager. The decision should be based on a comprehensive
physical security survey. The number of guard posts will be determined by
the local crime rate, number of entrances, alarm systems requiring response,
and other factors particular to each facility. The Security Officer must calculate
the total number of posts and hours of coverage. The bidding contractor will
be responsible for calculating the total number of guards required, taking into
account the number and duration of shifts, reliefs, sick leave, training, vacation,
and other administrative factors.
12.5.2. Armed Guards
●● Guards operating magnetometer and X-ray screening devices are required to be
armed to appropriately respond to all possible threats and volatile situations. At
Level IV facilities, the use of magnetometer and X-ray screening devices at public
entrances is a mandated standard;
●● Guards should be armed only when there are compelling reasons. If guards are
armed for a deterrent effect, i.e., to prevent crime or other unauthorized activity,
responsible officials must weigh that advantage against such disadvantages as
the danger to innocent personnel if a firearm is used by a guards; the possibility
of an accidental discharge; and the possibility, no matter how remote, of irrational
behavior on the part of a guard in a weak moment or under pressure;
●● Firearms may be used only defensively and only for the protection of life and
property;
●● When making a decision as to whether guards at a facility should be armed,
the senior facility manager and the servicing Security Officer should give strong
consideration to the factors below. If contracting, every possible effort should be
made to include requirements in the contract Statement of Work that will task the
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
112 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

contractor with providing properly selected and trained personnel and maintaining
appropriate level of performance and conduct standards. These factors apply
whether hiring guards directly or dealing with a contractor:
o Firearms training including judgment shooting and firearms safety;
o Knowledge of criminal activities and proper law enforcement response
procedures;
o Judgment and emotional stability;
o Experience and demonstrated ability to retain composure under pressure and
o A personal history free of arrests or other criminal activity.
12.5.3. Supervision
●● Supervision of contract guards is the responsibility of the Contracting Officer’s
Technical Representative (COTR). Agency Technical Representatives (ATR) are
to be appointed at every location where contract guards are assigned within a
CBP facility. ATRs are responsible to work with the COTR and ensure services
contracted are being preformed in a professional manner. Supervision is required
for all guard posts and is usually requested at a ratio of one hour of supervision
for each eight productive hours on post. COTRs are responsible for oversight of
this activity;
●● On small contracts with three or fewer posts or at isolated sites, the use of roving
supervisors may be the only practical or cost-effective method of supervising the
contract;
●● At sites where there will be eight or more posts, an on-site supervisor should be
required, at least during the hours of heaviest traffic and greatest productivity on
post. After-hours supervision can be performed at the one to eight ratio by roving
supervisors. Large forces and facilities generally require more supervision; a
contract with thirty or more shifts per week should have full time supervision; and
●● Supervision is required for all guard posts and is usually requested at a ratio of
one hour of supervision for each eight productive hours on post.
12.5.4. Federal Protective Services (FPS) Physical Security Responsibilities
●● FPS is responsible for delivering a comprehensive physical security and law
enforcement program in all Federally owned or leased facilities. This involves
providing law enforcement and security for more than a million Federal workers
and visitors at over 8,300 buildings nationwide. FPS enforces laws and
regulations governing public buildings, maintains law and order, and protects life
and property in Federally controlled work places;
●● FPS partners with other Federal, State and local agencies throughout the Nation
to develop specific solutions to challenges, assists with police emergency
and special security services, and offers police and security support to law
enforcement departments during high-profile National special security events.
To make Federal facilities safer, FPS also consults with building owners and
tenants to advise on physical security measures. FPS provides crime prevention
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
113 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

education for agencies and individuals, and recommends strategies to keep

everyone safer, both on and off the job. The organization is comprised of the
Headquarters and eleven Regions. Services fall into eight components:
o Management;
o Law Enforcement;
o Criminal Investigations;
o Physical Security;
o Communications;
o Security Systems;
o Security Guard Services; and
o Administrative Support
●● FPS management, both at the Headquarters and at regional level, is responsible
for developing and providing programs, policies, leadership, guidance, and
oversight for FPS personnel;
●● In many facilities owned, operated or leased by GSA, the guard force may be
FPS Police Officers. FPS officials will work with the Facility Security Officer
representing the prime tenant (agency with the greatest number of employees in
a building or facility) to ensure the security needs of the occupants are met; and
●● FPS has developed a formula to determine the extent of guard services required
for a given building or facility based on a number of factors including building size
and population, sensitivity of operations, and crime rate in the building and the
surrounding area. The agency pays FPS for the determined amount of protective
services as a percentage of the rent (formerly Standard Level User Charge, or
SLUC) for the facility. In other words, the agency pays FPS a certain cost per
year, per square foot of usable space, for basic protective services. Additional
protective services must be reimbursed by the requesting agency. See Chapter
6,2, Planning Facility Protection, for facility protection in GSA-owned or leased
facilities. Ensure that reimbursements are issued to FPS and not to GSA.
12.6. Responsibilities by Facility Type
12.6.1. GSA-Owned, Operated or Leased Facilities
●● In facilities owned, operated, or leased by GSA, FPS officials may decide to
contract for guard services. In such cases, a Contracting Officer (CO) of the
appropriate FPS regional office will procure and maintain guard services for
each facility. The contract will normally be managed by a Contracting Officer’s
Technical Representative (COTR), an FPS official with physical security expertise
who maintains contact with the prime tenant’s security officials to determine their
needs and execute the terms of the contract;
●● In many larger facilities, a representative of the prime tenant agency, an Agency
Technical Representative (ATR) will work directly with FPS’ COTR and CO to
develop the contract, write post orders, and monitor performance of the contract.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
114 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

FPS periodically offers guard contract management training for ATRs; and
●● FPS officials are responsible for security and suitability processing of all contract
guard personnel, as well as training and certification. It is advantageous for
the ATR to work closely with FPS officials to provide input as necessary and to
monitor the required processing. DHS and CBP suitability requirements must be
followed.
12.6.2. DHS Facilities with FPS Delegations of Authority
●● In DHS facilities where FPS has delegated protection authority to the agency
or prime tenant, some protection responsibilities are transferred to the agency,
including procurement and management of guard contracts. Normally, FPS will
retain responsibility for physical security surveys, mobile patrols, monitoring of
alarms, response to incidents, and requests for criminal investigations. FPS will
provide such services at no charge to the agency beyond the protection portions
of the rent. Under the delegation, the accepting agency is responsible for
providing services formerly administered by FPS.
12.6.3. Procurement and Management of Guard Services
●● The senior facility manager, in consultation with the FSO, is responsible for
working with the appropriate COs to procure and manage guard services.
12.6.4. Security Clearances
●● If the contract is to be classified, the guards will require security clearances. The
clearance request procedures are outlined in the Defense Industrial Security
Program regulation, as implemented by SM 440.3.11. DHS MD 11045.
12.6.5. Crime Prevention Assessments
●● The senior facility manager may elect to request FPS or a local law enforcement
agency to conduct these assessments.
12.6.6. Maintenance and Response to Security Systems in Place
●● Local contractors are generally available to perform such maintenance and
response, or FPS may be able to provide such services on a reimbursable basis
in metropolitan areas.
12.6.7. Reporting of all Serious Criminal Incidents to FPS
●● FPS requires that all serious criminal incidents be reported to the appropriate
FPS Office.
12.6.8. DHS-Owned and Leased Facilities
●● In DHS owned and leased facilities to include leased space from other Federal
agencies, many protection responsibilities are transferred to the agency. In
addition to those items listed above in 9.2.E(2), DHS will also be responsible
for physical security surveys and monitoring of alarms. Normally, FPS will
retain responsibility for mobile patrols, response to incidents, and requests for
criminal investigations. Many security services may be provided by FPS on a
reimbursable basis. Contact your regional FPS office as cited in Chapter 20.6,
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
115 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

FPS Regional Offices, for additional information.

12.6.9. Guard Services Contracting
12.7. Federal Protective Services
12.7.1. In recent years, the basic FPS concept of protection has evolved from the guard on
a fixed post to a response mode using mobile patrols. As a result, GSA-owned or
operated buildings normally are not assigned guard posted at sentry doors. Instead
they are policed by roving patrols in the buildings or rely on FPS patrols for response
to incidents, at least in the 12 major cities with an FPS presence.
12.7.2. Crime Prevention Assessments. The senior facility manager may elect to request
FPS or local law enforcement agency to conduct these assessments.
●● Maintenance and Response to Security Systems in Place. Local contractors are
generally available to perform such maintenance and response, or GSA may be
able to provide such services on a reimbursable basis in metropolitan areas;
●● Reporting of all Serious Criminal Incidents to GSA. GSA requires that all such
incidents be reported to the appropriate Federal Protective Service office as
identified at http://www.ice.gov/about/fps/contact.htm#region11.
12.8. Other Law Enforcement
12.8.1. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
●● The FBI is the investigative arm of the Department of Justice (DOJ) whose
investigative authority is given by 28 USC §533. The FBI investigates crimes
such as those pertaining to civil rights, organized crime and other Federal crimes.
12.8.2. United States Marshal Service
●● The U.S. Marshals Service is the component of the DOJ charged with, among
other missions, judicial security, investigating fugitives, witness protection, and
administering the DOJ’s seized asset forfeiture program.
12.8.3. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
●● The DEA is the DOJ component charged with enforcing the controlled substance
laws and regulations.
12.8.4. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF)
●● ATF is the DOJ component charged with enforcing Federal laws regulating
firearms and explosives.
12.8.5. United States Secret Service
●● The Secret Service is a DHS component with the dual missions of protecting
national and foreign leaders or heads of state, and investigating financial crimes
such as counterfeiting.
12.8.6. United States Postal Inspection Service (USPIS)
●● Through its Inspection Service, the USPS protects the mail, postal funds, and

property. The USPIS investigates internal conditions and needs that may affect
its security and effectiveness; apprehends those who violate the postal laws; and
audits financial and non-financial operations.
12.8.7. State, County, and Municipal Agencies
●● Each State maintains agencies for the enforcement of its laws within its
jurisdiction. These may include State police and highway patrol as well as
investigative and enforcement entities at the State and local level;
●● The sheriff’s office or Police Department in each county normally has the
responsibility for enforcing county laws and in cooperation with State and
municipal agencies certain State penal laws, such as the State criminal code.
12.9. Authorities/References
●● The Homeland Security Act of 2002, PL 107-296, enacted November 25, 2002
●● Department of Justice Vulnerability Assessment of Federal Facilities, June 1995
●● US Code: 40 CFR §1315, Law Enforcement authority of Secretary of Homeland
Security Protection of Public Property
●● MD 11000 Office of Security
●● MD 11030.1 Physical Security of Facilities and Real Property
●● MD 11035 Industrial Security Program
●● MD 11042.1 Safeguarding Sensitive but Unclassified (For Official Use Only)
Information
●● MD 11044 Protection of Classified National Security Information Program
Management
●● MD 11049 Security Violations and Infractions
●● MD 11050.2 Personnel Security and Suitability Program
●● MD 11055 Interim Guidance- Suitability Screening Requirements for Contractors
●● FPMR 101-20.103-3
●● PBS P 5930.17C, Office of Federal Protective Service Policy Handbook,
February 28, 2000.
●● Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD-12), Policy for a Common
Identification Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors
●● Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of Homeland security and
the General Services Administration (MOA DHS/GSA), date June 1, 2006
●● Memorandum for The Heads of Departments and Agencies, Verifying the
Employment Eligibility of Federal Employees, dated August 10, 2007
●● Department of Homeland Security, Federal Protective Service, Security Guard
Information Manual (SGIM), July 2006 Revised
●● Memorandum For All DHS Components, Acquisition of Contract Guard Services,
dated July 2, 2007
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
117 of 890
Ch13

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BACK Return to Table of Contents

Chapter 13: Program Development and Strategic Planning

13.1. General
13.1.1. The work of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is vital to the Nation’s defense
and security. Accordingly, CBP must ensure appropriate levels of protection from
loss or theft of classified material or Government property, as well as prevent any
acts of unauthorized access, theft, diversion, sabotage, espionage, or other hostile
activities.
13.1.2. Security countermeasures are an integral system of physical protection. These
countermeasures are designed to deter, prevent, detect, and respond to
unauthorized possession, usage, or sabotage of property or information.
13.1.3. CBP uses security programs to define, develop and implement its responsibilities
under Federal statutes, Executive orders and other directives for the protection of
classified and sensitive information or materials, and for the protection of CBP and
CBP contractor facilities, property, information and personnel.
13.1.4. CBP offices designate in writing a Security Officer or Security Liaison in their
organization that will facilitate all the security and awareness training requirements.
13.1.5. Key Program Elements
●● Levels of protection appropriate to particular security interests are provided
through the development and execution of comprehensive security
countermeasures and security programs. This chapter establishes the
responsibilities for managing and implementing the protection of security
interests, and sets forth the framework for documents which define the policies,
baseline requirements and responsibilities specific to the major elements of the
Security Program. The key program elements are:
o Strategic Planning;
o Program Management and Administration;
o Personnel Development and Training; and
o Incident Reporting and Management.
13.2. Strategic Planning
13.2.1. Purpose
●● The purpose of strategic planning is to prepare comprehensive procedures,
processes and information allowing CBP to apply sound risk management
principles and enhance the protection of the people, facilities, property and
information.
13.2.2. Objectives
●● Strategic planning promotes sustainable improvements in physical security to
effectively protect the people, facilities, property, and information that make up
the CBP. CBP is dedicated to applying sound risk management principles and
implementing principles and security practices using applicable laws, regulations,
strategies, policies and guidelines.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
120 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

13.2.3. Required Timelines and Resources

●● Strategic Planning is long-range planning and not the type of operational
planning that most facility administrators are accustomed to doing. It is NOT
intended to answer such questions as “How many projects will each supervisor
have next year?” or “How much money should be budgeted?” The focus of
strategic planning is on answering the question, “Given the needs we serve and
the trends we see around us, what should we strive to become in the future?”
This raises two related considerations:
o Timelines: Strategic plans and budgets must be revisited annually so as to
adapt to changing priorities, unforeseen trends, opportunities, or challenges.
Focus is placed on the current role of the facility and its future level of
responsibilities within CBP;
o Resources: Practical and realistic plans are needed to account for multiple
contingencies. Sources of funding and resources may change on an
unpredictable basis.
13.3. Program Management and Administration
13.3.1. General
●● Risk Management identifies, assesses, communicates and addresses the risks
facing an organization, ensuring that objectives will be met. There is some level
of risk inherent in any activity which must be accepted. Determination of the
appropriate level of protection shall take into account:
o The nature of the threat;
o The vulnerability of the potential target; and
o The potential consequences of an adversarial act.
●● Site-specific countermeasures and security programs must be based on
vulnerability/risk analyses. A rational and responsible balance is obtained
through the planning and execution of comprehensive security programs. These
programs are designed to provide a high degree of assurance that threats will
be deterred, denied, contained, mitigated or neutralized as appropriate. Risk
associated with countermeasures and security vulnerabilities must be reduced
even where not mandated by specific requirements, when such reduction is
consistent with the CBP mission and when supported by appropriate cost/benefit
analyses;
●● Planning for security is an integral part of any function or project undertaken
within CBP. The most efficient and cost-effective method of instituting security
measures into any facility or operation is through advance planning and
continuous monitoring throughout the project or program. Selecting, constructing,
or modifying a facility without considering the security implications of employee
safety and protection of assets will result in costly modifications and lost time;
●● Site-specific programs must have individual countermeasures and security
programs tailored to address their specific characteristics. The site-specific
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
121 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

countermeasures and security planning process enables field managers working

with Directors of Security to design and implement protection programs tailored
to their respective operational needs, recognizing ongoing programs, current
threat guidance, current policy, technology, and unique site-specific requirements.
Site-specific protection programs must be documented in site security plans.
The residual risks to be accepted by CBP are identified through vulnerability/risk
analyses;
●● These security programs are based on policy set forth in this handbook. These
programs must be continually and effectively administered and monitored to
ensure their integrity. At a minimum a physical security program will include:
o A physical security survey of each facility occupied by CBP, to evaluate the
security conditions in place to protect CBP personnel and assets, including
classified or sensitive information;
o Periodic inspections of facilities to ascertain whether a security program
meets pertinent Federal, departmental, and CBP standards or regulations;
o A comprehensive and continuing awareness security training program to
ensure understanding of security awareness with employees, contractors,
consultants, and visitors;
o Procedures for taking immediate, positive and orderly action to safeguard life
and property during an emergency;
o Management reviews of security programs including:
–– Detailed briefings on the countermeasures and security posture of the
facilities in each individual’s area of responsibility;
–– Assessment of findings and recommendations from oversight activities
such as inspections and evaluations, security surveys, self-assessments,
General Accounting Office audits and other internal and external
evaluation functions.
o Reviews must provide sufficient data and information to permit a
determination of the current status of countermeasures and security baseline
throughout the organization by the individual assuming responsibility for the
organization.
●● On-site visits will be conducted in accordance with the strategic plan.
13.4. Personnel Development and Training
13.4.1. CBP will ensure their Security Education, Training and Awareness (SETA) programs
are in compliance with the DHS SETA Program DHS MD 11053.
13.4.2. The CBP SETA Coordinators will share resources with other organizational units as
necessary to increase the quality of security awareness.
13.5. Physical Security Training
13.5.1. For basic training, the Security Officers/Security Liaison will review and familiarize

themselves with the contents of this handbook and the applicable Federal,
departmental, and CBP security regulations referenced herein.
●● In most Instances, formal basic security training will not be necessary. Should
basic physical security training be required, the responsible supervisor shall
make arrangements to provide this training;
●● At the discretion of the responsible supervisor the Security Officers/Security
Liaison are encouraged to attend training courses on a variety of security
subjects offered by a number of different agencies.
13.6. Security Awareness, Training and Education (SATE) Plans.
13.6.1. A Security Awareness, Training and Education plan is a critical factor in building and
maintaining a facility’s security defenses.
NOTE: A Security Awareness, Training and Education (SATE) plan is NOT the same as a Security
Education, Training and Awareness (SETA) program
13.6.2. Starting a SATE Program can be simple. Managing and maintaining the SATE
Program can often be the most challenging aspect of implementing any security
strategy.
●● The Security Officers/Security Liaison must plan an effective program of
Instruction, making efficient use of training material provided for specific training
purposes;
●● At a minimum all employees will be provided formal security awareness training
annually.
●● All DHS personnel who have not fulfilled the requirements of the SATE Program
are precluded or restricted from unescorted access to DHS security areas and/or
from access to classified information until the requirements are met; and
●● The Security Officers/Security Liaison may also tailor presentations to the
organization and solicit other security professionals to speak on their areas of
responsibility, training and expertise. For example, a local police representative
could address crime prevention. Also, the Federal Protective Services (FPS)
offers posters and pamphlets with helpful security hints and will provide on-site
crime prevention seminars.
13.6.3. Security Education, Training, and Awareness programs will include but are not
limited to dissemination of information concerning the following:
●● Applicable DHS security directives and procedures and an overview of DHS
security disciplines to include personnel security information security, and
physical security;
●● Site-specific (and/or operations-specific) security policy, procedures, and
requirements that include local access control procedures, escort requirements,
prohibited articles, along with reporting and notification requirements;
●● Criminal, civil, and administrative sanctions imposed for incurring a security
infraction or committing a violation;

●● Other matters relating to security including but not limited to recent espionage
cases, approaches, and recruitment techniques employed by an adversary of any
nature, as well as foreign intelligence service threats to sensitive and classified
information;
●● Countermeasures against security threats and/or vulnerabilities to include
protection of Government property;
●● SETA programs will also include but are not limited to developing and presenting
four briefings:
o Security Orientation Briefing. The Training Briefing will be provided within the
first 30 days of assignment. All DHS personnel will attend a DHS Security
Orientation Briefing at the earliest possible date;
o Initial Security Briefing. All DHS personnel who are assigned to duty positions
that require a clearance, are in possession of a clearance, or are eligible or
in processing for a security clearance, will receive an initial security briefing.
Prior to being granted access to classified information, individuals shall
receive a comprehensive briefing to inform them of their specific safeguard
and security responsibilities. If relocated to a new building or position,
individuals will receive a new briefing;
o Refresher Briefing. All DHS personnel must receive annual refresher
briefings to reinforce and update awareness of security policies and their
responsibilities. Refresher briefings are mandatory for all DHS employees
and must be implemented each calendar year at approximately 12-month
intervals; and
o Termination Briefing. Personnel will receive termination briefings to
inform them of their continuing security responsibilities after their access
authorizations are terminated. A termination briefing shall be implemented on
the individual’s last day of employment, the last day the individual possesses
an access authorization, or the day it becomes known that the individual no
longer requires access to classified information.
●● Documentation Requirements
o Records will be maintained to identify all individuals who have received
briefings by type and date of briefing;
o The name and contact information of the person doing the briefing (or the
source of briefing information) will also be maintained;
o Record-keeping systems must provide an audit trail. Statistics pertaining to
total population and numbers that have received security briefings will be
maintained and provided to the DHS Office of Security when requested.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BACK Return to Table of Contents

Chapter 14: Incident Response and

the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS)

14.1. Geneal
14.1.1. The purpose for developing emergency plans is to provide emergency management
guidelines for managers and employees to reduce the effects of incidents and
emergencies that could harm employees and/or deny access to or prevent damage
to a facility.
14.1.2. This is accomplished by providing a standardized approach to planning,
documenting, and implementing increased security measures for all CBP buildings
during heightened alert levels due to emergency situations such as terrorist attack,
natural disaster, or civil unrest.
14.1.3. All employees should be aware of the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS)
which uses color-coded alerts to indicate the general level of security. Specific
responses at each level will vary by locality and facility.
14.2. Incident Response
14.2.1. An incident reporting program is an essential element in any security program.
The timely reporting of thefts, losses, damage of property and the tampering or
unauthorized disclosure of information is crucial.
14.2.2. A timely report increases the possibility of recovering the property, minimizing
damage and apprehending the assailant.
14.2.3. Any employee who discovers, witnesses, or has knowledge of a criminal, dangerous,
or unauthorized practice or condition, or a violation of security regulations shall
immediately report the matter to the appropriate authorities.
14.2.4. Reporting serious incidents, unusual events and emergency conditions
●● The senior official at a facility is responsible for reporting serious incidents,
unusual events, or emergency conditions that affect CBP operations.
14.2.5. Reporting incidents to law enforcement agencies
●● FPMR 101-20.103-3 requires the prompt reporting of all crimes and suspicious
circumstances occurring on GSA-controlled property to the local Federal
Protective Service (FPS). In most cases, the FPS will dispatch a U.S. Federal
Police Officer to record the incident;
●● The FPS Form 3155, Offense/Incident Report, is the standard reporting form. The
Security Officer may use this form when FPS police officers are not available in
the general area. The form requests information such as date, time and location
of incident, details regarding lost stolen or damaged items, nature of the incident
and any suspects involved. Supplies of the form can be obtained from the FPS
Regional Office or building manager; and
●● Reports of theft or loss of explosive materials (blasting agents and detonators)
also shall be reported within 24 hours of discovery by telephone and in writing to
the nearest Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) office.
14.2.6. Administrative Reporting
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
126 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

●● The incident reporting requirements stated herein are not a substitute for nor do
they eliminate the need for compliance with any additional reporting requirements
prescribed in Federal and Departmental Regulations and in the Administrative
Manual pertaining to motor vehicle incidents and to the loss, damage and
mishandling of Government property;
●● The Commissioner’s Situation Room serves as CBP’s 24-hour, 7 days a week,
reporting and information coordination center. It facilitates communication
between CBP Headquarters and the CBP field offices by serving as the entry
point for reporting of significant incidents from field offices. The Situation Room
provides complete, accurate, and timely reporting to the Commissioner and
senior CBP management and will provide connectivity to the Department of
Homeland Security, Homeland Security Operations Center and other interagency
entities for information on significant events impacting CBP operations.
14.3. Reporting Procedure
14.3.1. Initial notifications will be made to the Commissioner’s Situation Room prior to
other established reporting entities. This does not eliminate any office or divisional
reporting requirements. The Commissioner’s Situation Room is the primary point of
contact for significant incident reporting for all CBP field offices, to include ports of
entry, sectors, stations, air and marine branches, and international offices.
14.3.2. Keeping in mind the safety of our employees and the integrity of operations within
the different disciplines of CBP, the reporting procedures are as follows:
All CBP events related to terrorism or potentially related to terrorism must be
reported telephonically immediately and in writing immediately thereafter via
Significant Incident Report (SIR) to the Commissioner’s Situation Room. Section 7
of this Directive delineates types of incidents that should be considered related or
potentially related to terrorism;

All other incidents of a sensitive or timely nature will be reported telephonically to the
Commissioner’s Situation Room within 2 hours of occurrence and followed by written
notification within 4 hours. More serious events which occur over an extended time
period will require regular updates; and
●● Once a reference number has been provided to field personnel, a written report
must be filed with the Commissioner’s Situation Room within the time frame
specified above in 14.3.2.a. Failure by field offices to file written reports in the
required time frame will be tracked and reported to the relevant Headquarters
office for review and remedial action.
14.3.3. The telephone numbers for the Commissioner’s Situation Room are 1-877-748-
7666, 202-344-3886 and 202-344-3920. Reports are to be faxed directly to the
Commissioner’s Situation Room at 202-344-3886. For classified reports, fax directly
to 202-344-3911. For electronic submission of SIRs, SIR-HQBOR or cbp.sitroom@
dhs.gov should be used as appropriate

14.4. Incident Reporting

14.4.1. The Significant Incident Report (SIR) CBP Form 6 (01/05) is intended to be used to
transmit information pertaining to the partial, entire, temporary, or permanent loss
or potential loss of CBP assets. Assets for the Agency include information, property,
facilities and personnel (including lost-time injuries or other incidents). Activities
that have the potential for loss of assets such as violations of security policies,
procedures, and practices are included.
14.4.2. This form is to be used by Headquarters, Regional, District, Sector, and subordinate
component Security Officers, Collateral Duty Security Officers, Managers, and
security guards as an initial report of a loss. This report may also be shared with
logistics officers, property custodians, Federal and local law enforcement agencies,
and facility managers as necessary.
14.4.3. Reporting persons shall complete an Event Report for the following types of
occurrences: CBP Directive NO: 3340-025C,Commissioner’s Situation Room
Reporting, has an extensive list of reportable items.
TERRORIST RELATED SUICIDE ATTEMPT
EMPLOYEE ARRESTED MEDIA INTEREST
EMPLOYEE ASSAULTED CREW DESERTERS
EMPLOYEE DEATH ESCAPE
EMPLOYEE INJURED OTHER: NON-EMPLOYEE INJURY/DEATH
RADIATION DETECTION EVENT MISSING PROPERTY
SHOTS FIRED AT OR BY EMPLOYEE NATURAL DISASTER
CANINE INCIDENT OFFENSE AGAINST PERSON
SIGNIFICANT SEIZURE PROPERTY OFFENSE
SIGNIFICANT ARREST/DETENTION SECURITY POLICY/PROCEDURE
RESCUE VIOLATION
SIGNIFICANT AGRICULTURAL EVENT SERIOUS INJURY
CONVEYANCE/AIRCRAFT INCIDENT When directed by Post orders, General
FOREIGN MILITARY/POLICE INCURSION Orders, Special Orders, or as directed by the
BOMB THREAT COTR or their designated representative (for
FACILITY DISRUPTIONS Security Guards).
TECHNOLOGY DISRUPTIONS Any other event of a security concern

14.5. Event Report Completion

14.5.1. The following guidelines should be followed to the extent practical. The table below
provides instructions by field number and name for completing the Significant
Incident Report.
●● Instructions for Completing Significant Incident Report Form 6
o Provide the date, time and exact location of the significant incident. Provide
the date, time and name of person in the Commissioner’s Situation Room to
whom the incident was reported telephonically. When telephonically reporting
significant incidents to the Commissioner’s Situation Room, you must obtain a
Commissioner’s Situation Room (CSR) number. Place this number in the top
right hand box on the report form.
14.5.2. Once a CSR number has been provided to field personnel, a written report must
be filed with the Commissioner’s Situation Room within the time frame specified in
Section 4.4 of CBP Directive NO: 3340-025C. Failure by field offices to file written
reports in the required time frame will be tracked and reported to the relevant
Headquarters office for review and remedial action.
●● Provide the Designated Field Office, Port of Entry, Sector, Station, Air and Marine
Operations Branch, or International Office that is submitting the report. Provide
the name and telephone number of the person submitting the report. Provide a
point of contact and telephone number in the event additional information not
contained in the report is needed;
●● Check the appropriate box as to the type of incident and if it involved CBP
personnel, indicate whether it happened on or off duty;
●● Provide a brief synopsis of the incident to include the names of individuals
involved, commodity, weight, and value (if known) of items seized. If an arrest is
made, indicate the number, sex, and citizenship of those arrested. It is important
that the questions; who, what, where, when, and why are answered;
●● Indicate notifications made either telephonically, by fax or E-mail (i.e. telephonic
to Commissioner’s Situation Room, Office of Field Operations by fax). Provide
the date, time, and telephone number;
●● List the names of fatalities or those injured. Include, if known, the name of the
next of kin and the status of the notification process (planning/in progress/
completed); and
●● Indicate what action has been taken as a result of the incident (i.e., in the case of
a narcotic seizure, “turned over to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
for controlled delivery”). In the event of serious injury of employees, indicate the
name and phone number of the hospital involved.
14.6. Emergency Preparedness Program
14.6.1. General
●● The U. S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Emergency Preparedness
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
129 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

Program (EPP) provides requirements for a viable EPP in compliance with

Presidential Decision Directive 67 (PDD 67) and Federal Preparedness Circular
65 (FPC 65);
●● The Emergency Preparedness Program provides guidance to all CBP personnel
on emergency preparedness matters and establishes policy to facilitate the
orderly continuation of CBP essential functions in the event of a serious incident.
The Emergency Preparedness Program 5290-010B policy is applicable agency-
wide.
14.6.2. Policy
●● All CBP locations will perform the following:
o Maintain effective, coordinated, integrated, and responsive emergency
preparedness procedures and practices intended to maximize continuity of
priority mission essential functions and the safety of CBP personnel. As such,
all CBP facilities shall have a Continuity of Operations (COOP) Program/
Plan and an Occupant Emergency Program/Plan (OEP). See Chapter 15,
Occupant Emergency Plans, for more information;
o All office location Occupant Emergency Program/Plans (OEP) shall be in
accordance with established guidelines set forth by the Office of Finance and
compliant with state, local and tribal ordinances, as applicable.
●● Shelter-in-Place (SIP):
o One of the instructions you may be given in an emergency where hazardous
materials may have been released into the atmosphere is to shelter-in-place
(SIP). This is a precaution aimed to keep you safe while remaining indoors.
(This is not the same thing as going to a shelter in case of a storm.) Shelter-
in-place means selecting a small, interior room, with no or few windows, and
taking refuge there. It does not mean sealing off your entire home or office
building. If you are told to shelter-in-place, follow the instructions provided in
this Fact Sheet;
o Why you might need to shelter-in-place: Chemical, biological, or radiological
contaminants may be released accidentally or intentionally into the
environment. Should this occur, information will be provided by local
authorities on television and radio stations on how to protect you and your
family. Because information will most likely be provided on television and
radio, it is important to keep a TV or radio on, even during the workday. The
important thing is for you to follow instructions of local authorities and know
what to do if they advise you to shelter-in-place;
o Partnering with local authorities is critical because OEPs should not
conflict with the plans of local community first responder protocol. In many
locations, particularly outside major population centers, local officials may not
recommend SIP planning because the risks in these areas do not justify this
course of action.
o Shelter in place resource links:
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
130 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

–– http://redcross.tallytown.com/library/ShelterInPlaceAtYourOffice.pdf
–– http://www.fema.gov/plan/prevent/saferoom/index.shtm
–– http://www.ready.gov/business/plan/shelterplan.html
–– National terror alert.com-shelter in place (SIP)
–– http://www.opm.gov/emergency/
●● All Continuity of Operations (COOP) Plans, as well as office-specific COOP
Implementation Plans, shall be developed using the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) Continuity of Operations template and instructions available on
the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) website at: http://www.
fema.gov/government/coop/index;
●● COOP/Program/Plans, including office-specific COOP Implementation
Plans, shall be universal in outlining response and recovery strategies for
any catastrophic incident, to include pandemic, in compliance with Federal
Preparedness Circular (FPC-65); and
●● COOP/Programs/Plans as well as office-specific COOP Implementation Plans
shall be marked “For Official Use Only” (FOUO) and stored at the relevant
Headquarters or field office location, emergency relocation site (ERS), Tele-
work site and/or alternate work site (AWS) as appropriate to ensure continued
availability if the primary location is rendered inaccessible. A copy must also
be forwarded to the appropriate Headquarters Emergency Preparedness
Coordinator (EPC). Emergency Preparedness Program 5290-010B.
14.7. Emergency Communications
14.7.1. This subsection describes available methods of communication that the CBP will use
during an emergency.
14.7.2. Government Emergency Telecommunication Service (GETS). CBP GETS Cards
FAQs
●● A Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS) card is issued
to those individuals who perform essential functions to maintain continuity of
government posture before, during and after crisis situations;
●● The Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS) is a
White House-directed emergency phone service provided by the National
Communications System (NCS) in the Cyber Security & Communications
Division, National Protection and Programs of the Department of Homeland
Security. GETS supports Federal, State, local, and tribal government, industry,
and non-governmental organization (NGO) personnel in performing their
National Security and Emergency Preparedness (NS/EP) missions. GETS
provides emergency access and priority processing in the local and long distance
segments of the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN). It is intended to be
used in an emergency or crisis situation when the PSTN is congested and the
probability of completing a call over normal or other alternate telecommunication
means has significantly decreased;
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
131 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

●● GETS is necessary because of the increasing reliance on telecommunications.

The economic viability and technical feasibility of such advances as nationwide
fiber optic networks, high-speed digital switching, and intelligent features have
revolutionized the way we communicate. This growth has been accompanied by
an increased vulnerability to network congestion and system failures. Although
backup systems are in place, disruptions in service can still occur;
●● GETS uses these major types of networks:
o The local networks provided by Local Exchange Carriers (LECs) and wireless
providers, such as cellular carriers and personal communications services
(PCS);
o The major long-distance networks provided by Interexchange Carriers (IXCs)
- AT&T, MCI, and Sprint - including their international services; and
o Government-leased networks, such as the Federal Technology Service (FTS),
the Diplomatic Telecommunication Service (DTS), and the Defense Switched
Network (DSN).
●● GETS is accessed through a universal access number using common telephone
equipment such as a standard desk set, STE, STU-III, facsimile, modem, or
wireless phone. A prompt will direct the entry of your PIN and the destination
telephone number. Once you are authenticated as a valid user, your call is
identified as an NS/EP call and receives special treatment.
14.8. Wireless Priority Service (WPS)
14.8.1. A Wireless Priority Service (WPS) is provided to those individuals who perform
essential functions to maintain continuity of government posture before, during, and
after crisis situations.
14.8.2. Purpose:
●● The goal of the Wireless Priority Service (WPS) is to provide an end-to-end
nationwide wireless priority communications capability to key National Security
and Emergency Preparedness (NS/EP) personnel during natural or man-
made disasters or emergencies that cause congestion or outages in the Public
Switched Telephone Network (PSTN). Eligible users (see criteria at http://wps.
ncs.gov) are key Federal, State, local, and tribal government and critical industry
personnel who have NS/EP missions. WPS is complementary to, and can be
most effective when used in conjunction with, (GETS) to ensure a high probability
of call completions in both the wireline and wireless portions of the PSTN. WPS
serves NS/EP communications needs while minimizing impact on consumer
access to the public wireless infrastructure.
14.8.3. Background
●● In 2000, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) issued a Report and
Order (R&O) for Priority Access Service (PAS) authorizing wireless carriers to
offer the service on a voluntary basis and with much needed liability protections.
Following the September 11 attacks, the White House directed delivery of a
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
132 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

wireless priority service to NS/EP leadership during emergency situations. WPS

service began on a single carrier in limited areas in early 2002 and has since
expanded to full nationwide coverage on most of the major cellular networks.
The National Communications System has the responsibility for the day-to-day
administration of WPS, with oversight responsibilities residing with the FCC.
14.8.4. Key issues
●● Priority Treatment
o WPS is an enhancement to basic cellular service that allows NS/EP calls to
queue for the next available radio channel. Priority handling is provided from
call origination, through the cellular and public telephone networks, and to the
dialed destination.
●● Access Authorization
o WPS is invoked by dialing 272 prior to the destination number on cellular
devices with the WPS feature.
●● Ubiquitous Coverage: WPS is available nationwide in Global System for Mobile
Communications (GSM) and in Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) networks.
For the latest information on WPS carriers and coverage areas, see “Carriers” on
http://wps.ncs.gov.
●● Service Authorization
o To subscribe to WPS, see “First Time Requestor” on the WPS site shown
above.
●● Contact Information: Please e-mail [email protected] or
[email protected] for assistance.(Rebel McFetridge is the WPS
point of contact at 703-921-7712 and Linda Jenkins is the alternate point of
contact at 703-921-7474).
14.9. CBP Employee Emergency Check-In Procedures
14.9.1. See CBP Employee Emergency Check-in Procedures for detailed process
information.
14.9.2. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) continues to stand committed to
accounting for every employee and their immediate family and providing necessary
assistance as quickly as possible after any significant incident. In addition to
existing local reporting procedures and policies, CBP has developed a supplemental
emergency incident toll-free number and employee check-in website. (CBP Incident
Employee Check-In Online Submission Site) Through these procedures and
systems, CBP employees are able to check-in, provide current contact information
and report their availability to work. All affected CBP personnel are requested to
check-in within 72 hours of an incident.
14.9.3. If you are directed or forced to evacuate your residence of record and relocate to an
alternate site, please report your status and updated contact information as soon as
possible.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
133 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

14.9.4. During an incident, three options are available for check-in:

14.9.5. Local Reporting Procedures: Employees report their status utilizing existing
local reporting procedures and policies. Your local managers will coordinate with
headquarters to insure your information is populated into the master database.
Reporting in via locally established procedures is always the preferred method.
14.9.6. When reporting in via locally established procedures is not feasible or possible for
whatever reasons, you can now report your post incident status via the following
supplemental options:
●● Via CBP. gov “Employee Emergency Web Check-in”: (referenced above),
employees report their status via the website check-in system. This is accessible
24 hours a day, 7 days a week at the U.S. Customs and Border Protection
website (www.cbp.gov) and no special password is required. Online help is
available with detailed instructions on how to complete the form;
●● If the Internet is not available, please proceed to the next option:
●● Toll-Free Call-In Number: 1-877-CBP-4804 or (1-877-227-4804)
These systems are monitored only during a declared emergency incident
14.10. Emergency Planning and Response
14.10.1. The purpose of this section is to give guidelines for threat conditions at any Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) controlled facility.
●● A threat condition is defined as “an operating posture that dictates an increase
of the level of security.” The purpose of the threat condition system is to
establish standardized protective measures for a wide range of threats and to
facilitate disseminating appropriate, timely and standardized information for the
coordination and support of CBP crisis or contingency activities.
14.10.2. To provide guidance on the implementation of the U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) Threat Condition Protective Measures as they correlate to the
five Threat Conditions outlined in the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS).
Threat Condition Protective Measures as outlined below in Section 14.15.
14.10.3. Policy
●● It is the policy of CBP to thwart the operations of terrorist organizations by
detecting, disrupting, and preventing the cross-border travel of terrorists, terrorist
funding, and terrorist implements, including Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMD) and their precursors.
14.10.4. By Presidential Directive, the HSAS is binding on the Executive Branch. To
implement the HSAS, CBP has developed a detailed plan with five Threat
Conditions, related to the five Threat Conditions outlined below in Section 14.15, to
respond to security threats against the United States.
14.10.5. The five Threat Conditions identified in this manual are binding on all CBP offices.
Each office shall carry out a plan of protective measures in accordance with this
policy. These plans shall have several preplanned sets of responses to each
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
134 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

particular threat level to facilitate a rapid, appropriate, coordinated, and tailored

response.
14.10.6. Threat Conditions are to be assigned by the Secretary, Department of Homeland
Security (DHS).
14.10.7. Secretary DHS, is responsible for determining whether to publicly announce
Threat Conditions, for ensuring that State and local government officials and law
enforcement authorities are provided the most relevant and timely information, and
for establishing a process to convey relevant information to Federal, State, and local
government officials, law enforcement authorities, and the private sector.
14.10.8. The assignment of a Threat Condition shall prompt the implementation of an
appropriate set of Protective Measures to reduce CBP vulnerability or increase CBP
ability to respond during a period of heightened alert.
14.10.9. Each CBP office shall be responsible for taking all appropriate proactive steps to
reduce the vulnerability of its personnel and facilities within its specific jurisdiction
and increase ability to respond to specific and nonspecific threats.
14.10.10. By Presidential Directive, all Federal department and agency heads shall submit an
annual written report to the President, through the Secretary, DHS, describing the
steps they have taken to develop and implement appropriate Protective Measures
for each Threat Condition.
14.11. Definitions
14.11.1. The terms “Threat Condition Green” and “Low Condition” as used in the HSAS and
this manual, both refer to a Threat Condition in which there is a low risk of terrorist
attacks against the United States Homeland.
14.11.2. The terms “Threat Condition Blue” and “Guarded Condition” as used in the HSAS
and this manual, both refer to a Threat Condition in which there is a general risk of
terrorist attacks against the United States Homeland.
14.11.3. The terms “Threat Condition Yellow” and “Elevated Condition” as used in the HSAS
and this manual, both refer to a Threat Condition in which there is a significant risk of
terrorist attacks against the United States Homeland.
14.11.4. The terms “Threat Condition Orange” and “High Condition” as used in the HSAS and
this manual, both refer to a Threat Condition in which there is a high risk of terrorist
attacks against the United States Homeland.
14.11.5. The terms “Threat Condition Red” and “Severe Condition” as used in the HSAS
and this manual, both refer to a Threat Condition in which there is a severe risk of
terrorist attacks against the United States Homeland. It is not intended for Protective
Measures implemented at this threat level to be sustained for substantial periods of
time.
14.11.6. For the purpose of this manual, “anti-terrorism” is defined as preventative measures;
“counter-terrorism” is defined as investigative or proactive enforcement measures.

14.12. Procedures
14.12.1. Agency-wide procedures. Notification of changes to Threat Conditions and the
implementation of Protective Measures will be made through the Office of the
Commissioner in consultation with the Assistant Commissioner (AC) of the Office of
Field Operations (OFO), the Chief, Office of Border Patrol (OBP), and other relevant
offices. When possible, offices should coordinate the appropriate set of Protective
Measures.
●● All CBP communication plans and communication activities with Federal,
State, and local law enforcement agencies and officials, the Congress, and the
private sector, must be undertaken with approval from or in accordance with a
determination by the Secretary, DHS, regarding dissemination of information
regarding the threat. Communication with external entities will be conducted in
accordance with CBP current policies.
14.12.2. Low Condition/Green (Agency): Under Low Condition, CBP may, at its discretion,
institute the following general Protective Measures:
●● Develop and deliver anti-terrorism training to CBP personnel;
●● Review, update, and distribute office occupant emergency and evacuation
plans; ensure compliance with Customs Directive 5290-010A, Emergency
Preparedness – Notification and Coordination (9/21/2001);
●● Assess and exercise joint standard operating procedures (SOPs) and support
agreements with appropriate external agency partners;
●● Review and revise security procedures and port or geographically specific (i.e.,
Northern Border, Atlantic Coast) threat assessments; and
●● Perform weekly communication checks to ensure maximum operational
capability.
14.12.3. Guarded Condition/Blue (Agency): In addition to the Protective Measures identified
in the preceding level, CBP at its discretion may institute the following general
Protective Measures:
●● Disseminate heightened Threat Condition status to all CBP assets;
●● Operate with a heightened awareness supported by focused intelligence
reporting as available; and
●● Plan for the potential deployment of personnel and other resources to critical
locations should the threat level escalate.
14.12.4. Elevated Condition/Yellow (Agency): In addition to the Protective Measures identified
in the preceding levels, CBP, at its discretion, may institute the following general
Protective Measures:
●● Coordinate Occupant Emergency Plans (OEPs) and Continuity of Operations
Plans (COOPs) with other Federal, State, and local entities as necessary;
●● Consider restrictions on nonessential travel by CBP employees;

●● Consider canceling annual leave and placing personnel on “on-call” status;

●● Consider suspension of nonessential programs, duties, training, and surveys;
●● Coordinate heightened Protective Measures between CBP offices (i.e., OFO,
Office of Information and Technology (OIT), Office of Intelligence, Office of
Border Patrol (OBP)) and external agency partners (i.e., Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE), Transportation and Security Administration (TSA),
and the U.S Coast Guard (USCG));
●● Apply heightened security measures at CBP facilities commensurate with threat;
●● Ensure critical tactical communications systems are operational and technical
infrastructure is protected;
●● Engage international counterpart agencies (including Canadian and Mexican
counterparts) regarding heightened alert status and potential operational impact;
and
●● Institute Headquarters-directed, tailored communication plans to advise key
congressional members and staff, the trade, media, and public of the elevated
Threat Condition and the associated implications.
14.12.5. High Condition/Orange (Agency): In addition to the Protective Measures identified
in the preceding levels, CBP, at its discretion, may institute the following general
Protective Measures:
●● Identify ports for potential closing; close as ordered by the Commissioner
●● Restrict annual leave and nonessential travel as necessary;
●● Activate part-time employees commensurate with threat;
●● Restrict access to CBP facilities;
●● Increase coordination with Federal, State, and local entities, including placement
of temporary liaison assets with appropriate agencies;
●● Identify increased threat areas in order to deploy personnel and inspection
technology resources commensurate with the threat;
●● Implement plans to augment personnel with other agency resources;
●● Suspend nonessential programs, duties, training, and surveys;
●● Perform communications checks with the National Law Enforcement
Communication Center (NLECC)/SECTOR to ensure the integrity of the
communication systems, as necessary; and
●● Advise key congressional members and staff, the trade, media, and public of the
elevated Threat Condition and the associated implications.
14.12.6. Severe Condition/Red (Agency): In addition to the Protective Measures identified
in the preceding levels, CBP, at its discretion, may institute the following general
Protective Measures:
●● Close selected points of entry (POE) and potentially entire regions or borders (air,
land, and sea), as ordered by the Commissioner;
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
137 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

●● Implement maximum passenger inspections and cargo examinations-up to 100

percent of all passengers and cargo arriving and departing the U.S.;
●● Implement Occupant Emergency Plans (OEPs) and Continuity of Operations
Plan (COOPs) as appropriate;
●● Further restrict access to CBP facilities to necessary personnel only.
●● Redirect resources (personnel, tools & technology, and equipment) to high risk
offices and ports of entry;
●● Cancel annual leave for personnel; and
●● Maintain regular communication with NLECC/SECTOR, field staff, media, trade,
the Congress, and public to ensure all affected parties receive accurate and
timely information.
14.13. Responsibilities
14.13.1. The Commissioner shall have policy oversight regarding the CBP Threat Condition
policy and procedures.
14.13.2. Within CBP, the Commissioner is the sole authority for closing Customs and
Immigration ports of entry (POEs), unless otherwise delegated to appropriate
officials.
14.13.3. The Director, Office of Anti-Terrorism (OAT), is responsible for the coordination of the
CBP Threat Condition Protective Measures to achieve alignment with the HSAS.
14.13.4. The OAT will coordinate the annual review of CBP Protective Measures to the
national HSAS and prepare a report for the Commissioner to submit to the
President, through the Secretary, DHS.
14.13.5. The OAT will coordinate with relevant offices to develop specific Protective Measures
for each Threat Condition level for implementation of this Directive.
14.13.6. The Office of Intelligence will be the point of contact, in coordination with the OAT,
with the national intelligence community.
14.13.7. Designated Officials (DO) will ensure plans are initially developed in conjunction with
Building Security Committees (BSCs) and are reviewed, updated, and re-signed by
the Chair of the BSC at least as often as the periodic Building Security Assessment
(BSA) is conducted. Regional Headquarters will maintain copies of the plans in such
a manner as to facilitate and verify rapid implementation in case of an alert level
change.
14.13.8. In accordance with established policy on memorandums of agreement and
understanding, the DO may enter into informal and formal agreements with state and
local law enforcement agencies to support actions required by the Plans.
14.13.9. DO will develop procedures to ensure plans are implemented when the alert level
changes, including:
●● Notification to the BSC of changes to the Homeland Security Alert level and other
conditions which merit a corresponding change in security measures;
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
138 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

●● Coordination with BSCs and GSA with regard to implementing increased alert
levels absent a declaration by the Department of Homeland Security;
●● Notification of suppliers of services and equipment to be delivered upon
implementation (e.g., notifying guard companies of an increased staffing
requirement);
●● Notification of state and local agencies supporting the Plan;
●● Establishing appropriate contracting mechanisms to facilitate rapid delivery of
services in support of the Plan;
●● Providing other support as agreed to in the Plan to implement countermeasures
(i.e., increased K-9 patrols, etc.);
●● Verification that countermeasures have been implemented; and,
●● De-escalation once the Alert Level is reduced.
14.13.10. FPS Inspectors. Inspectors will work with BSCs to determine and document specific
actions that need to be taken at each building to implement the Alert Guidelines.
Inspectors may also be responsible for verifying increased countermeasures have
been implemented when the alert level is increased.
14.13.11. Building Security Committee (BSC). The BSC will work with the Inspector to develop
the Plan. The BSC is responsible for signing the Plan, indicating concurrence with
the actions to be taken. If the Plan requires funding to implement, such as increased
guard presence, the BSC will be responsible for coordinating funding among tenant
agencies in advance of implementation.
14.13.12. Delegation of responsibilities. The responsibility for development of these plans
may be delegated to an agency in writing upon request and with concurrence of the
region for a specific building or Headquarters for an agency-wide delegation.
14.13.13. Procedures. The following is guidance for countermeasures to be considered. As
appropriate, each countermeasure should be addressed in the Plan. Some actions
are minimum recommendations (X) for specific building security levels and others
should be applied as deemed appropriate (*) based on the threat and personnel
available.
14.13.14. Alert Level GREEN. Associated with the Low/Normal Condition identified by the
Homeland Security Advisory System. The following protective measures apply to
conditions involving a general threat of a possible emergency situation and warrant
only a routine security posture.
14.14. Best Practices
14.14.1. In conjunction with the above CBP HSAS policy IA/SMD has provided in-depth
facility protective measures based on the appropriate HSAS threat levels below. See
Section 14.15 for this detailed information.
14.14.2. Create a Building Specific Security Plan using this template as a guide along with
CBP Policy CBP DIRECTIVE NO. 3340-026B, CBP Threat Condition Protective

Measures (HSAS).
14.14.3. Implement these best practices upon:
●● Automatically in response to change in the DHS HSAS Alert Level nationally,
locally, or with other respect to the facility (i.e., transportation sector);
●● By the Commissioner of the CBP nationally or regionally; and
●● At a specific facility(ies) upon recommendation of IA/SMD and with concurrence
of the BSC chairperson OR Designated Official (DO) upon receipt of specific
threat information regarding the building meriting its implementation (i.e., a
planned demonstration).
14.14.4. A copy of each Plan will be maintained by the DO. The Plan will be marked and
controlled as For Official Use Only, in accordance with DHS policy on Sensitive but
Unclassified Information. It will also be marked “Law Enforcement Sensitive,” which
although not a control mechanism, indicates the sensitivity and type of information in
the plan.
14.14.5. Initial Plans for each building will be developed as part of the next Building Security
Assessment (BSA) cycle following implementation of this policy. The plans will be
reviewed with the BSC and revised as necessary as part of each recurring BSA or
upon request of the BSC Chairperson.
14.15. Protective Measures
14.15.1. Alert Level Green
Building Security Level
Green Protective Measures
I II III IV
At regular intervals, remind agency representatives to be suspiscious and inquisitive about strangers,
particularly those carrying suitcases or other containers. Watch for suspicious vehicles on or adjacent X X X X
to CBP property. Watch for abandoned parcels or suitcases and any unusual activity.

Ensure the building manager or representative has access to building plans and occupant emergency
plans at all times. Ensure BSCs, property managers and tenant agencies periodically review and
X X X X
ensure the availability of building floor plans, Occupant Emergency Plans (OEPs), Continuity of
Operations Plans (COOPs) and other essential emergency information.
Recommend buildings, rooms, and storage areas not in regular use be secured. X X X X
Review all plans and requirements related to introduction of higher security level. X X X X
Require US Government picture identification for Federal employees, contractors, and a current valid
government picture identification (such as a drivers license, state identification card, passport, or * * * X
immigration card) system for visitors.
Inspect and search all packages, handbags, and other containers, except those persons displaying
* * * X
US Government credentials. Deny entrance to all persons who refuse this inspection.
Check basement, engineering spaces, heating and air conditioning ducts, shrubbery, and potential
* * * X
entry points such as roof openings, steam and other utility tunnels, doors and windows.
Refine and exercise preplanned proactive measures. Ensure personnel receive training on Homeland
Security Alert System (HSAS) and department or agency-specific protective measures. Regularly * * * X
assess facilities for vulnerabilities and take measures to reduce them.
Consult local authorities on the threat and mutual antiterrorism measures. * * * *

Building Security Level

Green Protective Measures
I II III IV
Limit access points for vehicles and personnel commensurate with a reasonable flow of traffic. * * * *
After normal duty hours ensure exterior and parking areas floodlights are operating properly to
* * * *
discourage intruders.
Train personnel on Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS), and CBP specific protective
X X
measures.
Regularly assess facilities for vulnerabilities and apply countermeasures. X X
Ensure IA/SMD Regional, District Security Officers have fluid Security Surveys of CBP facilities. X X
Occupants should note any suspicious vehicles on, near or adjacent to INS property; and report any
X X
unattended vehicles or items in the immediate area.
Should actual or suspected explosives in these vehicles or items be discovered, personnel should be
X X
advised to REPORT and DO NOT TOUCH.
Encourage occupants to secure rooms, doors, and windows of office suites that are not regularly
X X
used.
Increase security spot-checks of vehicles and persons entering property. X X

14.15.2. Alert Level Blue

●● Alert Level BLUE is associated with the Guarded Threat Condition as identified
by the Homeland Security Advisory System. These measures apply when
there is a general threat of a possible emergency situation involving activity
against tenants, visitors, and facilities; the nature and extent of the situation is
unpredictable; and the circumstances do not justify full implementation of Alert
Level Yellow. It indicates a general risk of terrorist attacks. These measures must
be capable of being maintained indefinitely.

Building Security Level

Blue Protective Measures
I II III IV
Continue, or introduce, all measures listed in Alert Level Green. X X X X
Review all plans and requirements related to introduction of higher security level.
X X X X
Check communications with designated emergency response or command locations. Review and
update emergency response procedures and provide the public with necessary information. X X X X

Review and coordinate security measures for high-risk personnel as appropriate. X X X X

Increase security spot checks of vehicles and persons entering CBP property. * * * X
Continue to apply the previous Threat Condition measures.
X X
Check and/or establish communications with designated emergency response or command locations. X X
Review and update emergency response procedures. X X
Provide the CBP occupants with necessary information relative to the increase in security measures to
avoid panic derived from rumors. X X

Keep all persons involved with Counter-Terrorism contingency plans or in key positions on call. X X

Building Security Level

Blue Protective Measures
I II III IV
Increase scrutiny of visitors to CBP facilities. X X
Security Guards will: X X
• During normal duty hours, be alert for suspicious persons, packages and activity. X X
• During non-duty hours, deny access to persons who do not display appropriate Government
identification. X X

• Ensure all doors to the facility are secured.

X X
• Receive current threat information during guard mount. X X
• Enforce No Parking restrictions. X X
• Increase unannounced security spot checks (inspection of personal identification, vehicle
registration, and the contents of items i.e. suitcases, briefcases and other containers). X X

• Randomly conduct in-depth inspections of deliveries. X X

• Move unchecked vehicles and objects at least 100 feet from building. X X
• Advise personnel to report the following to Security:
X X
o Suspicious persons, specifically those carrying any type of container. X X
o Suspicious person surveilling, monitoring, photographing, or asking questions about facility
operations and/or security processes, procedures, countermeasures. X X

o Unidentified vehicles parked or operated in a suspicious manner on or in the vicinity of the

X X
facility.
• Abandoned parcels or containers. X X
• Throughout the workday, inspect the interior and exterior of the facility. X X
• Site specific measures identified by IA/SMD will be implemented as directed. X X
• At regular intervals, check basement, engineering spaces, heating and air conditioning ducts,
shrubbery, and potential entry points such as roof openings, steam and other utility tunnels, doors X X
and windows for signs of unauthorized entry, tampering or intrusion.
• Increase security operations commensurate with the threat and plan for the potential deployment of
personnel and other resources to critical locations should the threat level escalate. X X

Building Security Committees (BSCs) and tenant agencies will review and verify all local Occupant
Emergency Plans (OEPs), Continuity Of Operations Plans (COOPs), and ensure that communications
X X
equipment and contact lists (i.e. radios, telephones, public address systems, and fax number lists) are
up-to-date and functioning properly.
Tenant agencies brief appropriate employees of actions required under procedures contained in
X X
agency-specific OEPs and COOPs.

14.15.3. Alert Level Yellow

●● Alert Level YELLOW is associated with the Elevated Threat Condition as
identified by the Homeland Security Advisory System. These measures apply
when there is an increased and more predictable threat of an emergency
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
142 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

situation. It indicates a significant risk of terrorist attack.

Building Security Level

Yellow Protective Measures
I II III IV
Continue, or introduce, all measures listed in Alert Level Blue and warn tenants of any other potential form of X X X X
terrorist attack.
Keep all personnel involved in implementing antiterrorist contingency plans on call. X X X X
Check plans for implementation of the next alert level. X X X X
At the beginning and end of each workday, as well as at other regular and frequent intervals, inspect the X X X X
interior and exterior of buildings in regular use for suspicious packages.
In the early stage inform the Building Security Committees of actions to be taken. Explain reasons for actions. X X X X
Increase contacts with individuals responsible for activities such as child care centers, and agencies with a * X X X
high amount of personal threat reporting, to build confidence among staff.
Make tenants aware of the general situation in order to stop rumors and prevent unnecessary alarm. * X X X
Move unchecked cars and objects (e.g. crates, trash containers) at least 100 feet from buildings. Use other * * * X
measures where distance cannot be achieved.
Request personnel who handle mail and deliveries to scrutinize incoming material (above the regular * * * X
examination process) for letter or parcel bombs.
Implement additional security measures for high-risk personnel as appropriate. * * * X
Consult local authorities on threat and mutual antiterrorism measures. * * * X
Increase surveillance of critical facilities. * * * X
After normal duty hours require all employees and visitors sign the building register upon entering and leaving * * * X
the building.
Increase surveillance/counter-surveillance of critical locations. X X
Coordinate emergency plans with nearby jurisdictions. X X
Limit access points to the absolute minimum necessary for continued operations. X X
Access points to be determined by IA/SMD. X X
Increase security patrols to the maximum sustainable rate. X X
Place temporary barriers and obstacles to control traffic flow from persons and vehicles. X X
Verify the identity of all personnel entering the facility. X X
Inspect all building passes or identification for tampering or counterfeiting. X X
Visually inspect the interior of all vehicles and the exterior of all containers. X X
Increase frequency of detailed vehicle inspections (trunk, undercarriage, glove box). X X
Consult local authorities regarding street closures adjacent to facilities. X X
Restrict outside parking to 300 feet from building. X X
Visually inspect the interior of all vehicles parked within 30 yards of the CBP facilities. X X
Site-specific measures identified in the Site Security Plan/Program shall be implemented. X X
Other measures as identified by the Regional or Field Security Officer or CBP will be implemented as
X X
directed.
During all duty hours, CBP employees must personally escort visitors and will constantly remain responsible
X X
for their whereabouts for the duration of their visit.
Intensified vehicle and visitor inspections at all facilities as required by increased threat level. X X
Coordinate increased activities with Federal and local authorities and other area emergency agencies. X X
Review security procedures to ensure they are commensurate with the threat. X X
Inspect parking areas near the facility and instruct personnel to be alert to unattended vehicles, packages,
portable containers or suspicious objects. Instruct personnel to challenge all individuals lingering in the X X
vicinity of a facility to establish their purpose or determine if they have official business with building tenants.
Inform tenant agency representatives and Building Security Committees (BSCs) of actions to be taken. X X
Implement additional security measures for designated personnel as appropriate. X X

Building Security Level

Yellow Protective Measures
I II III IV
FPS and CBP implement their own contingency and emergency plans as appropriate. X X
BSCs and tenant representatives, provide tenants information relative to the increase in security measures to
X X
prevent unnecessary alarm derived from rumors.
Require that Identification cards of individuals being screened to be touched by security personnel as part of
X X
the screening process.
At frequent and irregular intervals, inspect the interior and exterior of occupied buildings for suspicious
X X
objects.
Place all personnel involved in implementation of antiterrorist contingency plans on call. X X

14.15.4. Alert Level Orange

●● Alert Level ORANGE is associated with the High Threat Condition as identified
by the Homeland Security Advisory System. These measures apply when an
emergency situation occurs and/or intelligence is received indicating that some
form of emergency situation against tenants and facilities is likely. Implementation
of measures in this alert level for more than a short period probably will create
hardship, affect the operations of our tenants, and significantly increase operating
costs. It indicates a high risk of terrorist attacks.

Building Security Level

Orange Protective Measures
I II III IV
Continue, or introduce, all measures listed in Alert Level Yellow. X X X X
All FPS personnel are subject to emergency recall. X X X X
Limit facility access points to the absolute minimum. X X X X
Protect all designated vulnerable points. X X X X
Strictly enforce control of entry. Randomly search vehicles. * * X X
Increase patrol tempo of security guards, police officers, and Inspectors. * * X X
Erect barriers and obstacles to control traffic flow. * * * X
Consult local authorities about closing public streets that might make facilities more vulnerable to attacks. * * * X
Restrict outside vehicular parking to 300 feet of the facility. Use other measures where distance cannot be * * * X
achieved.
Coordinate necessary security efforts with armed forces and other law enforcement agencies. * * X X
Coordinate necessary security efforts with armed forces and/or law enforcement agencies. X X
Prepare to continue operations at an alternate work site with a dispersed workforce. X X
Security Guards will: X X
Be alert for suspicious persons, packages and activities. X X
Deny building lobby access to persons who do not display an appropriate CBP building pass or suitable
X X
identification.
Visually check under and around all vehicles parked adjacent to any facility. X X

Building Security Level

Orange Protective Measures
I II III IV
Observe all vehicles for suspicious persons or activities. Suspicious vehicles where no persons are noted to
be in attendance or affiliation is established will be visually checked for evidence of explosives, incendiary, or X X
biological devices, or other dangerous items.
Make arrangements to have the vehicle removed from the vicinity of the facility. If the vehicle is parked and in
X X
a public space, the Security Guard will request assistance from the appropriate law enforcement agency.
Security Guards may be augmented with additional personnel. X X
All persons including employees will walk through the metal detector. X X
All packages, briefcases, purses, or other containers being brought into the facility will be X-rayed or visually
X X
inspected to ensure no contraband or dangerous substance enters the facility.
During all hours, all doors will be secured. X X
Restrict access to essential personnel only. X X
If at all possible, increase temporary physical barriers to the entire perimeter of the facility. X X
Restrict all vehicles from stopping at any time adjacent to the facility (with the exception of traffic
X X
enforcement).
Site-specific measures identified in the Site Security Plan/Program will be implemented. Other measures as
X X
identified by the IA/SMD will be implemented as directed.
That Building Security Committees (BSCs) or agency representatives with real property authority may restrict
X X
public access to essential facilities. Consider restricting public events to agency occupants only.
Federal and local authorities and other area emergency agencies be contacted to coordinate increases in
X X
security activities.
Patrol frequency of security guards and police officers be increased as appropriate. X X
All previously designated vulnerability points must receive additional security and further limit access points
X X
to the facility. Limit facility access points to the absolute minimum.
Erect barriers and obstacles to control both the flow of individuals (particularly visitors) and vehicle access
X X
where appropriate.
Consult local authorities about the feasibility of closing public streets to minimize risks posed by car bomb
X X
attacks.
Where possible, restrict outside vehicular parking to as far as possible from the facility. Use other measures
X X
(i.e. towing) where distance cannot be achieved.
Where possible, implement counter-surveillance. X X
Personnel who handle mail and deliveries will scrutinize incoming material (above the regular examination
X X
process) for letter or parcel explosive devices or other hazardous material.
Inspect facilities for means of surreptitious access that could bypass security checkpoints; secure or apply
X X
adequate countermeasures accordingly.
Search all vehicles and their contents before allowing entrance into the building. X X
Pre-position and prepare any specially trained teams or resources for possible deployment or mobilization.
X X
FPS will pre-position specially trained teams as appropriate.

14.15.5. Alert Level Red

●● Alert Level RED is associated with the Severe Threat Condition as identified by
the Homeland Security Advisory System. These actions apply in the immediate
area where an emergency situation has occurred and/or when intelligence has
been received that an emergency condition against a specific location or person
is imminent. It indicates a severe risk of terrorist attacks. Because these actions
are normally only declared as a localized condition, each action is listed below as
deemed appropriate based on the threat and personnel available.

Building Security
Red Protective Measures Level
I II III IV
Continue, or introduce actions listed in Alert Level Orange. X X X X
Search all vehicles and their contents before allowing entrance to the building. * * * *
Control access and implement positive identification of all individuals with no exceptions. * * * *
Thoroughly search all suitcases, briefcases, and packages brought into the building. * * * *
Make frequent checks of the exterior of buildings and parking areas under GSA jurisdiction. * * * *
Coordinate the possible closing of public streets and facilities with local authorities. * * * *
Activate the facility OEP. * * * *
FPS should assign emergency response personnel and pre-position specialty trained teams. Monitor, redirect, * * * *
and/or constrain transportation systems.
Increase and/or redirect personnel to address critical emergency needs. * * * *
Consider closing of facility to visitors or entirely * * * *
Assign emergency response personnel and pre-position specially trained teams. X X
Monitor, redirect or constrain transportation systems. X X
Transport high-level employees to alternate work sites. X X
Augment security officers and/or security staff (guards) as necessary. X X
Allow only emergency vehicles into facility, and check those vehicles. X X
Control access and implement positive identification of all individuals (emergency essential at this point), no
X X
exceptions.
Cease processing additional visitors for entry. X X
All persons, including employees, shall walk through the metal detector. All packages, briefcases, handbags and
other containers being brought into the building shall be X-rayed or visually inspected to ensure no contraband
X X
enters the building. Packages not inspected shall not be left with Security Guards or receptionists; the carrier
shall remove such packages.
Activate the facility Occupancy Emergency Plan. X X
All persons shall sign in and out upon entering and leaving the building. In those facilities where card readers
X X
are installed, the record of the automated system will suffice.
All vehicle traffic to the garage will cease and the doors will be secured. X X
All loading dock activities (deliveries) will cease and the doors will be secured. X X
Site specific measures identified in the Site Security Plan/Program will be implemented. Other measures as
X X
identified by IA/SMD will be implemented as directed.
Security Guards shall visually check under and around all vehicles parked adjacent to the building. Security
Guards shall observe all vehicles for suspicious persons or situations. In those cases where the presence of
a vehicle can not be explained (owner is not present and the vehicle has no obvious affiliation), inspect the
vehicle for explosive, incendiary, chemical, biological devices, or other dangerous items and arrange to have the X X
vehicle removed from the vicinity of the facility, soft targets and other sensitive areas as soon as possible. If the
suspicious vehicle is parked in public space, Security Guards shall take appropriate action, which may include
requesting assistance from the appropriate law enforcement agency.
Require full access control and positive identification of all individuals with no exceptions. X X
Perform frequent checks of building exteriors and parking areas. X X
Mobilize or activate any specially trained teams or resources. Monitor, redirect, and/or constrain transportation
X X
systems as necessary.
As necessary, review and activate Safety and Security Plans. This includes but would not be limited to: Physical
Security Plans, Information Security Plans, Occupant Emergency Plans (OEPs), COOPs, Disaster Response X X
Plans and Emergency Responder Plans.
Consider closing the facility. X X

14.16. Authorities/References
o Homeland Security Presidential Directive-3
o (HSPD) (Mar. 11, 2002) (as amended by HSPD-5, Feb.28, 2003);
o 19 USC 1318 (2002);
o Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-96, 116 Stat. 2135;
o Customs Directive 3340-021 Antiterrorism, 1/11/2000;
o Customs Directive 5290-010A Emergency Preparedness, 9/21/2001;
o Customs Directive 5410-001, Customs News Media Policy 10/10/1986;
o CIS HB 1400-05A, Information Systems Security Policy and Procedures
Handbook;
o 15 CFR §730-774;
o 18 U.S.C §831, §886, §841-848, §921-§922, §1028, §2331, §2332a-d, and
§2339 A-B;
o 19 USC§482, §318, §1461, §1581, §1582, §1644, and §2462 (b) (2) (F);
o 19 CFR §4, §18, §101, §122-§123;
o 22 U.S.C §401, §406, §408, §421-§422, §2349aa-2, §2349aa-8, §2349aa-9,
§2371, §2778, §2780, §2797, §2798, §2799aa, and §2797a-b;
o 26 USC §5801-§5802; 42 USC §262, §2077, §2099, §2111, §2122, §2133,
§2138, §2156, and §2157;
o 49 USC §44904 and §46312;
o 50 USC §1701-1706;
o 50 USC app.1-44.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BACK Return to Table of Contents

Chapter 15: Occupant Emergency Plan (OEP)

15.1. Purpose And Scope

15.1.1. All Department of Homeland Security (DHS) CBP facilities are required to have an
Occupant Emergency Plan (OEP) in place to provide for the safety and protection
of DHS/CBP personnel, contractors and visitors across a wide range of potential
emergencies. Emergency response guidelines also safeguard property, equipment,
classified information, and vital records and data, as well as focusing on the
continued execution of essential functions during a crisis. The OEP provides DHS/
CBP personnel, contractors and visitors with information on how to prepare for,
respond to, and recover from an emergency.
15.1.2. One common means of protection is evacuation to a predetermined area away from
the DHS/CBP facility. The main objective of an OEP is to minimize danger to life and
property during an emergency.
15.1.3. In GSA-controlled facilities, emergency procedures are normally provided by the
GSA Building Manager or local officials of the FPS. If the procedures have not
been provided, the DHS/CBP Designated Official (DO) and the facilities Occupant
Emergency Coordinator (OEC) is responsible for providing the procedures. In multi-
tenant buildings the organization will include representatives from all organizations.
GSA shall assist in the establishment and maintenance of such plans and
organizations. See the GSA’s Occupant Emergency Program Guide for in-depth
information.
15.1.4. In accordance with the Federal Property Management Regulations (FPMR) 101-
20.103-4, “Occupant Emergency Program,” immediate, positive and orderly
action must be taken to safeguard life and property in Federal facilities during
emergencies. An emergency can be any unexpected situation that requires prompt
action to protect life and property. Examples of emergencies can include, but are
not limited to: fires; explosions; bomb threats, civil disorders; chemical, biological,
and radiological incidents; medical emergencies; natural disasters; structural
failures; direct threat to a major computer facility; immediate threat of compromise of
classified information; and accidental or man-made disasters.
15.1.5. The OEP will apply to all DHS/CBP personnel and other CBP occupants such as
contractors and visitors occupying CBP space. The guidance in the OEP will cover
normal operating hours and non-operational hours and provide specific emergency
evacuation instructions to Federal building occupants. The OEP will provide a plan of
action for an immediate and short-term response to an emergency and allow building
occupants to evacuate quickly and safely. All buildings occupied by DHS/CBP
employees will have a designated Occupant Emergency Coordinator. The guidelines
provided within the facilities OEP will be reviewed and updated annually, as required
by 41 CFR § 102-74.240.
15.1.6. Ready.gov is an Internet site hosting a Federal Employee’s Emergency Guide, as is
A Federal Employee’s Family Preparedness Guide, and Federal Manager’s/Decision
Maker’s Emergency Guide; all of these are guides for preparing for deliberate,
accidental and natural emergencies at work and at home. In the event of an
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
150 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

emergency, all employees must attempt to remain calm, exercise sound judgment,
follow emergency plans, and adhere to the orders of appropriate personnel,
including supervisors, properly identified Monitors, fire and emergency medical
personnel and security officers.
15.1.7. See the OEP Guide and OEP Template, which are included in this policy handbook.
15.2. Authority/References.
●● The Homeland Security Act of 2002, PL 107-296, enacted 11/25/02
●● Department of Justice Vulnerability Assessment of Federal Facilities, June 1995
●● 29 CFR §1910, Occupational Safety and Health Standards
●● 40 CFR §1315, Law Enforcement authority of Secretary of Homeland Security
Protection of Public Property
●● 41 CFR §101-20; Public Contracts and Property Management
●● 41 CFR §102-74.240 Facility Management
●● 41 CFR §102-74.360 Safety and Environmental Management
●● 41 CFR §102-80 Safety and Environmental Management
●● GSA Occupant Emergency Program Guide, Mar 2002
●● MD 11030.1 Physical Security of Facilities and Real Property
●● MD 11042.1 Safeguarding Sensitive but Unclassified (For Official Use Only)
Information
●● MD 11044 Protection of Classified National Security Information Program
Management
●● Federal Employee’s Family Preparedness Guide
●● The US Office of Personnel Management Emergency Preparedness Guide
15.3. Responsibilities
15.3.1. OEPs are developed at the facility level, specific to the geographic location and
structural design of the building. General Services Administration (GSA) owned
facilities maintain plans based on the GSA OEP template.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BACK Return to Table of Contents

Chapter 16: Firearms and Ammunition

16.1. General
16.1.1. Only those CBP employees who are authorized in writing and issued a credential to
bear firearms by the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
shall carry a firearm in the performance of their official duties. This authorization
is granted only after the employees have successfully completed approved basic
firearms training and have been issued the appropriate credential.
16.1.2. Physical Security Specialists, armed employees of the Security Management
Division, as well as employees who perform inspections or other related duties
(mixed tour, part-time, intermittent, seasonal, temporary and status quo), and
any other armed CBP employees who do not complete basic firearms training,
must attend an approved training course as specified by the Director, Firearms
and Tactical Training Division (FTTD), Office of Training and Development (OTD).
Authorization to carry a firearm cannot be granted until this requirement has been
met.
16.1.3. The statutory authority for CBP employees to carry service-issued or service-
authorized firearms is contained in 19 USC §1589a.
16.2. Assigned Firearms
16.2.1. All firearms shall be held in a secure, locked, and safe storage area when not
assigned to an employee, while awaiting repair, or other circumstance resulting in
the firearms being in the custody of a firearms custodian. The following minimum
guidelines should be followed when storing firearms and ammunition:
●● Firearms should be stored in GSA-approved security containers, vaults, or
Underwriters Laboratories (UL)-labeled safes or weapons cabinets;
●● Access to firearm storage containers should be limited to those employees
designated to issue such firearms. The firearm storage area should be
designated at least a controlled area to restrict unauthorized access to the area.
If more than 35 firearms are stored, an alarm with a guard or police response is
recommended. For further information, see Appendix 10, Storage of Weapons
and Ammunitions.
16.3. Authorities
●● Firearms and Use of Force Handbook (HB 4500-01A, December 2001);
●● U.S. Customs Firearms and Use of Force Training Policy (CD 4510-017A,
December 2001);
●● Land Border Inspectional Safety Policy (CD 5290-007A, June 2001); and
●● Airport and Seaport Inspectional Safety Policy (CD 5290-006, June 1999).

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BACK Return to Table of Contents

Chapter 17: Protection of Building Documentation

17.1. General
17.1.1. In order to reduce or minimize the risk that sensitive paper and electronic building
information will not be used for dangerous or illegal purposes, this chapter
covers CBP security polices, procedures and responsibilities for the protection of
Sensitive but Unclassified (SBU) paper and electronic building information and the
dissemination of SBU paper and electronic building information; owned, leased, or
delegated facilities.
17.1.2. Information Security (INFOSEC) programs and procedures already exist to protect
information assets. However, information generally available to the public as well
as certain detectable activities may reveal the existence of, and sometimes details
about, classified or sensitive information or undertakings. Such indicators may
assist those seeking to neutralize or exploit U.S. Government actions. For more
information, refer to:
●● CBP Website: Sensitive Security Information (SSI) – Directive, Regulations,
Quick Reference
●● CBP Website: Information Security/For Official Use Only (INFOSEC/FOUO)
●● National Security Decision Directive 298 - National Operations Security Program
17.1.3. OMB requires safeguarding data and documents that are sensitive enough to require
protection but that may not otherwise be designated as classified information.
“Protect government information commensurate with the risk and magnitude of harm
that could result from the loss, misuse, or unauthorized access to or modification of
such information.”
●● OMB Circular A-130, Management of Federal Information Resources
●● Laws and Regulations Governing the Protection of Sensitive But Unclassified
Information
17.2. Definitions
17.2.1. DUNS: Data Universal Numbering System (DUNS) is a unique nine-digit numbering
system that is used to identify a business.
17.2.2. For Official Use Only. The caveat “FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY” will be used to
identify sensitive but unclassified information within the DHS community that is
not otherwise specifically described and governed by statute or regulation. For
reference, see DHS Management Directive 11042.1, Safeguarding Sensitive But
Unclassified (For Official Use Only) Information
17.2.3. OMB. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is one of the agencies of the
Executive Branch of the U.S. Government. Its predominant mission is to assist the
President in overseeing the preparation of the Federal budget and to supervise its
administration in Executive Branch agencies.
17.2.4. Sensitive but Unclassified (SBU)
●● SBU is the formal designation for information that, by law or regulation, requires
some form of protection but is outside the formal system of classification, in
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
156 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

accordance with Executive Order 12958, Classified National Security Information

as amended, and DHS MD 11042.1 Safeguarding Sensitive But Unclassified
(For Official Use Only) Information. This information may be exempt from public
disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (5 USC §552) and/or the
Privacy Act (5 USC §552a).
17.3. Types of Information for Document Security
17.3.1. Sensitive but Unclassified (SBU) Building Information
●● SBU includes but is not limited to paper and/or electronic documentation of
the physical facility information identified below. Building designs (such as
floor plans), construction plans (site drawings/ blueprints) and specifications,
renovation/alteration plans, equipment plans and locations, building operating
plans, information used for building service contracts and/or contract guard
services, or any other information considered a security risk, for all CBP-owned,
leased, or delegated facilities, shall be considered covered under this category.
Specifically (but not exclusively), it includes:
o Location of secure functions in the facility; detainees’ secure circulation paths
(both vertical and horizontal); cell blocks; sally ports; parking; security areas
and childcare; major computer processing areas or other customer sensitive
processing areas (e.g. major photo or computer labs, etc);
o Location of all utilities: heating, ventilation, air conditioning, information
technology (IT) systems, location of air intake vents, water sources, gas lines,
plumbing lines, building automation systems, power distribution systems,
emergency generation equipment, Uninterruptible power sources (UPS),
security and fire alarm systems, routes and annunciation panels;
o Location and type of structural framing for the building and any information
regarding structural analysis or building security, blast mitigation analysis,
counter terrorism methods taken to protect the occupants and building; and
o Information regarding security systems or strategies of any kind (i.e., CCTV,
IDS locations) or security guards (e.g. number and location).
17.3.2. Non-Sensitive Unclassified Building Information
●● Information regarding the building that may be made available for limited public
dissemination under the following conditions:
o Building elevation or other drawings of new or existing buildings will not show
or label information defined under the SBU categories given above and in the
Public Buildings Services (PBS) order PBS 3490.1, Document Security for
Sensitive But Unclassified Paper and Electronic Building Information;
o Interior photographs that are limited to publicly accessible space or have been
cleared for publication by CBP.
●● Conceptual space planning drawings with floor layouts may be made available
for:
o Presentations to professional designers (architect/engineers, etc.);
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
157 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

o Professional schools for educational purposes;

o Community planning groups participating in the design of new Federal space;
o Professional print publications if specific SBU building information (structural
columns, utilities, etc.) is not shown; and
o Secure circulation routes, secure elevator locations, etc. are shown as
generic space with no wall partitions (such as a block of unpartitioned space).
●● Generic concept (bubble) diagrams may be shown to convey information for a
non-specific building; and
●● Detailed floor layout drawings of any kind for specific buildings will not be made
available over the public internet or in public presentations or print media, such
as brochures, magazines, books, etc.
Note: It is the responsibility of the disseminator to use good judgment and to apply the principle that the
more open the forum, the more generic/conceptual the information must be.

17.4. Electronic media

17.4.1. Electronic media includes magnetic tape reels, disk packs, diskettes, compact discs,
removable hard disks, disk cartridges, optical disks, paper tape, reels, magnetic
cards, tape cassettes, micro cassettes, videotapes, and any other device on which
data are stored and that normally is removable from the system by the user or
operator.
17.5. Marking/Labeling of Information
17.5.1. In accordance with DHS MD 11042.1, information designated as FOUO will be
sufficiently marked so that persons having access to it are aware of its sensitivity
and protection requirements. The lack of FOUO markings on materials does not
relieve the holder from safeguarding responsibilities. Where the FOUO marking
is not present on materials known by the holder to be FOUO, the holder of the
material will protect it as FOUO. Other sensitive information protected by statute or
regulation, e.g., Protected Critical Information Infrastructure (PCII) and Sensitive
Security Information (SSI), etc., will be marked in accordance with the applicable
guidance for that type of information. Information marked in accordance with the
guidance provided for the type of information need not be additionally marked
FOUO.
17.5.2. Prominently mark the bottom of the front cover, first page, title page, back cover and
each individual page containing FOUO information with the caveat “FOR OFFICIAL
USE ONLY.”
17.5.3. All SBU building information, either in electronic or paper formats will have imprinted
on the top of every page the following information:

PROPERTY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Do not remove this notice
Properly destroy documents when no longer needed
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
158 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

17.5.4. The following paragraph, as set by Public Buildings Services (PBS) order PBS
3490.1, will be included on the cover page of the information (such as the
cover page on the set of construction drawings and on the cover page of the
specifications) and on the label of all magnetic media:

PROPERTY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

COPYING, DISSEMINATION, OR DISTRIBUTION OF THESE
DRAWINGS, PLANS, OR SPECIFICATIONS TO UNAUTHORIZED USERS IS PROHIBITED
Do not remove this notice
Properly destroy documents when no longer needed

17.5.5. The previous two statements will be prominently labeled in bold type in a size
appropriate for the document. On a set of construction drawings, for example, the
statements shall be in a minimum of 14-point bold type.
17.5.6. Blueprints, engineering drawings, charts, and maps containing sensitive information
will be marked “Sensitive But Unclassified - Building Information” or “SBU-BI” at
the top and bottom of each page. If the blueprints, drawings, charts, or maps are
large enough that they are likely to be rolled or folded, “Sensitive But Unclassified
- Building Information” will be placed so that the marking is visible when the item is
rolled or folded.
17.5.7. Materials being transmitted to recipients outside of DHS, for example, other Federal
agencies, State or local officials, etc. who may not be aware of what the FOUO
label represents, shall include the following additional notice on the front page of the
document(s):

WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It contains information
that may be exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (5 USC
552). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted, distributed, and disposed of
in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information and is not to be released
to the public or other personnel who do not have a valid “need-to-know” without prior
approval of an authorized DHS official.

17.5.8. Electronic Media, Computer storage media, i.e., disks, tapes, removable drives, etc.,
containing FOUO information will be marked “FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.”
17.6. Responsible Care for Dissemination of SBU Building Information
17.6.1. CBP personnel or others authorized to disseminate SBU building information (which
includes flow down dissemination by prime/general contractors, subcontractors,
suppliers, architects/engineers, Federal agencies, lessors, private sector plan
rooms, State and local governments, print shops/reprographic firms, etc.) will obtain
a signed copy of the Document Security Notice by authorized users of SBU building
information agreeing to exercise reasonable care when handling SBU building
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
159 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

documents.
17.6.2. The Document Security Notice form may be found at the end of Public Buildings
Services (PBS) order PBS 3490.1.
17.6.3. “Reasonable care” is defined as:
●● Limiting Dissemination To Authorized Users. Dissemination of information shall
only be made upon determination that the recipient is authorized to receive it.
The need-to-know criteria determine whether authorization is granted. Those
with a need-to-know are other Federal Government agencies (who shall make
requests through their agency management), and non-Government entities that
are specifically granted access for the conduct of business on behalf of or with
CBP. This includes DHS or other Federal agencies, organizations or individuals
such as architects and engineers, consultants, contractors, subcontractors,
suppliers, plan rooms, and others that the contractor deems necessary in order
to submit an offer/bid or to complete the work or contract, as well as maintenance
and repair contractors and equipment service contractors.
Note: It is the responsibility of the person or firm disseminating the information to assure that the
recipient is an authorized user and to keep the Document Security Notice records of recipients.
17.6.4. Authorized users will provide identification as set forth below:
●● Valid Identification for Federal government users. Valid identification of authorized
government users receiving SBU building information shall be verification of
government employment;
●● Valid identification for non-government users. Authorized non-government
users shall provide valid identification to receive SBU building information.
Valid identification shall be all items (a) through (c), and including item (d), as
necessary:
(a) A copy of a valid business license or other documentation granted by the
state or local jurisdiction to conduct business;

(b) The license at a minimum will provide the name, address, phone number
of the company, state of incorporation, and the name of the individual
legally authorized to act for the company;

(c) The business will be of the type required to do the work;

(d) A general contractor’s license may be substituted for the business license
in states that issue such licenses;

(e) In the rare cases where a business license is not available from the
jurisdiction, the information will be provided and testified to by the
submitter;

(f) Verification of a valid Data Universal Numbering System (DUNS) number

against the company name listed on the business license or certification;
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
160 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

(g) Verification may be obtained by calling Dun & Bradstreet at 1-800-333-

0505 0r 703-807-5078 or to set up an account;

(h) A valid IRS tax ID number of the company requesting the information; and,
as necessary:
●● A valid picture state driver’s license will be required of person(s) picking up SBU
documents.
17.6.5. Prior to releasing any SBU building information the sender will verify that the
individual(s) receiving or picking up the documentation are authorized by the
company obtaining the documents.
17.6.6. SBU documents will not be released to any individual or firm who has not either
previously or at the time of pickup supplied the required documentation as outlined
above.
17.7. Reproduction of SBU information
17.7.1. SBU documents may be reproduced without the permission of the originator to the
extent necessary to carry out official CBP activities. Copies will be protected in the
same manner as originals. In the event of a copy machine malfunction, the copy
machine will be cleared and all paper paths checked for papers containing sensitive
information.
17.8. Storage
17.8.1. All sensitive information existing in hard copy will be stored within a locked container
in a limited or exclusion area, an access-controlled electronic environment or under
the physical control of an authorized individual.
17.8.2. On occasions when an individual is traveling within the U.S. and limited or exclusion
areas are not available, a locked container within a locked room will suffice (e.g.,
locked briefcase or suitcase within a locked hotel room or vehicle).
17.8.3. Sensitive information will not be taken outside the U.S., unless authorized by
component authority.
17.8.4. Information handled electronically and transmitted over the network is at a higher
risk of being released or altered. Sensitive information stored on the CBP network
will be protected at a level that can ensure that only those who are authorized to
view the information are allowed access (e.g., machine-generated passwords,
encryption).
17.8.5. The CBP network systems shall maintain a high level of electronic protection (i.e.,
firewalls, intrusion detection, defense-in-depth, isolation of sensitive information,
good practices network administration) to ensure the integrity of sensitive information
and to prevent unauthorized access into these systems. Regular review of the
protection methods used and system auditing are also critical to maintain protection
of these systems.

17.8.6. The physical elements of the network systems that store and transmit sensitive
information or that have direct access to sensitive information will be secured within
a restricted area. The more central the information resource is (e.g., a network or
security system control room), the higher the level of access control that will be
applied.
17.9. Record Keeping
17.9.1. Individuals authorized to disseminate CBP SBU building information will require
a signed Document Security Notice from individuals authorized to receive the
information.
17.9.2. Records of the signed Document Security Notices will be maintained by the
disseminator for 5 years.
17.9.3. At the completion of work, secondary and other disseminators will be required to turn
over their Document Security Notice dissemination records to CBP.
17.9.4. Proprietary information owned by Architect/Engineers:
●● All professional services consultants shall sign the Document Security Notice
that documents containing SBU building information created under contract to
the Federal government will be handled according to the procedures under this
order;
●● The Document Security Notice form may be found at the end of Protective
Building Services’ Order PBS 3490.1.
17.9.5. Retaining and Destroying Documents
●● The efforts required above will continue throughout the entire term of the contract
and for whatever specific time thereafter as may be necessary;
●● Necessary record copies for legal purposes (i.e., retained by the architect,
engineer, or contractor) will be safeguarded against unauthorized use for the
term of retention;
●● Documents no longer needed will be destroyed:
o After contract award;
o After completion of any appeals process; and
o Completion of the work.
●● When a plan is revised, the old one is removed and destroyed and the current
plan is filed in its place;
●● Destruction will be accomplished by:
o Burning or shredding hardcopy;
–– Electronic storage media shall be sanitized appropriately by overwriting or
degaussing. Contact local it security personnel for additional guidance;
–– Deleting and removing files from the electronic recycling bins;
–– Removing material from computer hard drives using a permanent erase
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
162 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

utility or similar software.

17.10. Notice of Disposal
17.10.1. For all contracts using SBU building information, the contractor will notify the CBP
Contracting Officer that he and his subcontractors have properly disposed of the
SBU building documents with the exception of the contractor’s record copy at the
time of release of claims to obtain final payment.
17.11. Enforcement
17.11.1. A violation may result in the cancellation of a person’s conditional access to the
information covered by the DHS Non-Disclosure Agreement, Form 11000-6 (08/04).
17.11.2. A record of violation may serve as a basis for denying an individual conditional
access to other types of information, to include classified national security
information.
17.11.3. Sanctions may include reprimand, suspension without pay, removal, termination
of classification authority, loss or denial of access to classified information or other
sanctions in accordance with applicable law and agency regulation.
17.11.4. The agency head, senior agency official, or other supervisory official shall, at
a minimum, promptly remove the classification authority of any individual who
demonstrates reckless disregard or a pattern of error in applying the classification
standards of this order.
17.11.5. Incidents involving FOUO in DHS IT systems will be reported to the organizational
element Computer Security Incident Response Center in accordance with MD
11042.1.
17.11.6. Employees or contractors who observe or become aware of the loss, compromise,
suspected compromise or unauthorized disclosure of FOUO information will report it
immediately, but not later than the next duty day to the originator and to CBP Internal
Affairs (IA), [email protected].
17.12. Training
17.12.1. Although it is not mandatory, CBP offers a course on Awareness Training for
Safeguarding Sensitive But Unclassified/For Official Use Only Information. A
description of the training may be found on the CBP web site. The course
provides an overview for the safeguarding and handling of SBU information and
supports Department-wide compliance with DHS Management Directive 11042.1
“Safeguarding Sensitive But Unclassified (For Official Use Only) Information.”
17.12.2. Although not mandatory, CBP personnel who work with SBU are encouraged to
complete this training to ensure information safeguarding requirements.
17.12.3. CUI Update: On May 9, 2008, the President issued a memorandum to the heads
of all Executive Departments and Agencies titled “Designation and Sharing of
Controlled Unclassified Information [CUI].” In the memorandum the President has
ordered the adoption of CUI as the “…single, categorical designation henceforth
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
163 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

throughout the executive branch for all information within the scope of that definition,
which includes most information heretofore referred to as ‘Sensitive But Unclassified’
(SBU) in the Information Sharing Environment…” Over the coming days and months
an inter-agency effort will commence under the leadership of the CUI Executive
Agent, (the National Archives and Records Administration), and in coordination with
a CUI Council consisting of senior representatives of all applicable Departments
and Agencies (to include DHS), to define the CUI standards as reflected in the
President’s memorandum, and publish CUI policy standards. Until such time as
these policy standards are developed and published, it is important to emphasize
that the manner in which we currently mark and safeguard information that is
sensitive but unclassified, such as the use of the marking “For Official Use Only” as
cited in DHS Management Directive 11042.1, will continue. The use of CUI and its
associated markings shall not begin until appropriate policies have been published
and those policies are supported by adequate training.
17.12.4. For further information on the Presidential Memorandum of May 9, 2008, see:
●● President’s Memorandum Defining the Designation and Sharing of Controlled
Unclassified Information (CUI) (May 9, 2008)
●● Background on the Controlled Unclassified Information Framework (May 20,
2008) (to Accompany Memorandum of May 9, 2008)
●● Memorandum: Establishment of the Controlled Unclassified Information Office
Update to Memorandum of May 9, 2008 (May 21, 2008)
●● DHS Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) Implementation Plan (April, 2008)
●● Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) Framework (Powerpoint Presentation).
Updated May 12, 2008 (Office of the Chief Security Officer)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BACK Return to Table of Contents

Chapter 18: Secure Items

18.1. General
18.1.1. CBP’s missions include: processing of applicants for admission; issuing documents
relating to the entry and status of an alien’s right to enter, work or reside in the
United States; and examining U.S. citizens. This chapter establishes CBP’s uniform
policy requirements for the physical security of items related to this mission.
18.1.2. Secure items include special formula inks, ink pads, stamps or any other designated
items needed to perform the tasks outlined in 18.1. If lost or stolen, these items
may intentionally be used to validate fraudulent entry into the United States. As
such, they require strict control and must be secured to prevent loss, theft, fraud or
counterfeiting.
18.1.3. It is the responsibility of every CBP employee to prevent or minimize the risk of loss,
theft, fraud, counterfeiting, or compromise by providing oversight of the receipt,
storage, issuance, and destruction of these secure items. It is the responsibility of
each individual with access to and control of secure items to ensure that they are
afforded the appropriate degree of protection as outlined in this chapter.
●● Responsibilities
o Headquarters Directors, Assistant Commissioners and Deputy Assistant
Commissioners are responsible for coordination with the Director of Security,
Internal Affairs/Security Management Division, on the development and
execution of security procedures to safeguard secure items developed and
used by their programs. In addition they are responsible for advising the IA/
SMD Director of Security of any changes to the status of secure items;
o The IA/SMD Director of Security is responsible for publication of procedures
that provide comprehensive instruction on the security of secure items and
oversight of the secure items program at all levels, to include locations and
personnel involved in the manufacturing of secure items;
o Directors of Field Operations (DFO) are responsible for the management and
administration of the secure items program within their respective regions and
ensuring resources are available to provide oversight at all subordinate levels.
o DFOs are responsible for:
–– Ensuring that a Security Liaison or if one is not assigned, a collateral
duty security officer is appointed to provide oversight of the secure items
program.
–– Ensuring that accountable employees and sufficient alternates are trained
and certification of appointments and training are maintained.
–– Providing IA/SMD and HQ OFO with designated authorized endorser and
authorized requester positions per section 18.3.1 of this chapter.
●● Regional Security Officer/ Security Liaison Responsibilities
o Regional Security Officers (RSOs) are responsible for:
–– Ensuring policies and procedures relating to secure item accountability are

distributed and followed;

–– Conducting periodic audits for receipt, accountability, storage, and
disbursement of secure items; and
–– Developing and managing a method for tracking and monitoring the
conduct of other reviews, as provided below, conducted by the offices
within their jurisdiction.
–– Security Liaisons are responsible for:
–– Training newly appointed accountable employees and alternate
accountable employees;
–– Ensuring appropriate safeguards are in effect for the safeguarding of
secure items;
–– Ensuring appropriate audits and/or inventories as applicable, are
performed as required;
–– Conducting a minimum of two unannounced reviews of the local secure
items program during each fiscal year to ensure compliance with
procedures;
–– Conducting a formal review of the local secure items program no later than
September 30 of each year. The annual review will not count as one of the
unannounced reviews.
o Security Liaisons will ensure that instances of theft, loss, fraud, misuse,
abuse, and negligence with regards to secure items are reported and
investigated promptly, through channels, to IA/SMD. See section 18.7.1.
●● Accountable Employee (AE) Responsibilities
o Accountable employees and alternate accountable employees are
responsible for knowledge and compliance with the requirements of this
chapter and for maintaining the security and the integrity of the items for
which they are responsible;
o Accountable employees and alternates will immediately report to their
supervisor and the Regional Security Officer/ Security Liaison, any instance
or suspected instance of theft, loss, fraud, misuse, abuse, or negligence with
regards to the items they are responsible for or which are the responsibility of
a coworker.
●● Individual Responsibilities
o Supervisors are responsible for ensuring that all employees under their
supervision who are authorized access to secure items, log books, automated
auditing and tracking systems, databases, and other related materials, are
fully cognizant of the applicable policies and safeguarding procedures.
Supervisors are encouraged to include safeguarding of secure items as a
critical element in an applicable subordinate’s Performance Work Plan (PWP).
o Each employee authorized access to secure items, automated auditing and
tracking systems and related materials:
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
167 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

–– Must comply with all policies and procedures, as stated in this chapter,
concerning the protection and control of the items and materials to which
they are authorized access;
–– Must properly account for and safeguard all items and materials for which
they are responsible, in accordance with the requirements of this chapter.
o May be subject to disciplinary action if, through negligence or willful disregard
of procedures, they fail to properly account for and protect the items and/
or materials to which they are authorized access, in accordance with the
requirements of this chapter.
18.2. Access
18.2.1. Prerequisites and Appointment of Accountable Employees
●● Access to stock supplies of secure items is limited to specifically appointed and
trained accountable employees that have a favorable adjudicated background
investigation commensurate with their duty position. They shall be sufficiently
trained on their responsibilities and officially appointed as the individual
responsible for the protection, custody, or use of secure items. The accountable
employees will ensure that all secure items issued, both used and unused, are
accounted for at the end of each duty day.
o Accountable employee(s) and alternates will be designated in writing by the
Director of Field Operations (DFO);
o An appropriately signed “Accountable Employee Certification” will be
maintained on file by the appointing official for each appointee;
o Accountable employees and alternates will be provided training on the
safeguarding and accountability aspects of secure items by the SL prior to
assumption of duties and receive on the job training from an experienced
accountable employee immediately upon assumption of duties;
o Accountable employees may issue a reasonable supply of items to the
designated CBP officials or other persons responsible for the actual
preparation of the items. The accountable employee will ensure that all
secure items issued, both used and unused, are accounted for at the end of
each duty day;
o Designated CBP officials and other persons issued secure items by the
accountable employee will safeguard the items and maintain accountability
until returned to the accountable employee;
o Security Liaisons will be afforded access in conjunction with the accountable
employee, in order to carry out periodic and annual reviews;
o Automated database systems are not authorized as a primary means for the
purpose of audit, tracking and inventory, but can be used in conjunction with
logbooks and must be consistent with all logbook entries;
o Accountable employees will take necessary precautions to prevent
unauthorized issuance, theft, or fraudulent use of the items and related
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
168 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

materials under their control;

o No employee will concurrently have oversight, safeguarding, and processing
responsibilities for secure items; and
o Accountable employees and alternates will have sole access to the secure
items and related materials for which they are responsible with the exception
of those items and related items issued to CBP Designated Officials. (Refer to
section 18.4 for specific storage requirements.)
●● See DHS Personnel Security and Suitability Program
●● See CBP Personnel Security Handbook IA/PSD HB 1400-07 2006
18.3. Requisition and Shipment
18.3.1. Requisition of Secure Items
●● Only approved vendors identified by HQ Office of Field Operations (OFO) in
coordination with IA/SMD shall be authorized to produce secure stamps and
security ink;
●● All routine requests for secure items will be made directly by the accountable
employee using the CBP Form 148; and
●● The requisitioning officer will maintain copies on file of CBP Form 148, Request
for Property or Services from the accountable employee for all secure items and
related materials while the stamp is actively in use; the documentation will be
filed after the stamp is no longer actively in use.
18.3.2. Shipment Procedures - Secure Items
●● Shipment of secure items by the accountable employee:
o The accountable employee will coordinate shipment of the items with the
approved vendor and by including:
–– Item number;
–– Serial number sequence (from/to);
–– Date of shipment;
–– Quantity being shipped;
–– Total number of cartons in shipment;
–– Address to which the shipment was sent; and
–– Expected shipment arrival.
o Upon receipt of all packages in the shipment, and verification that all items
shipped were received, the accountable employee will ensure the packing slip
(receipt) is signed and returned in the pre-addressed/postage paid envelope
provided by the accountable employee;
o If a shipment is not received within 3 business days of the intended arrival
date, the vendor will be contacted for confirmation of shipment and tracking
action will be initiated with the shipping agent. Should a discrepancy exist,

refer to the reporting requirements provided in section 18.7.1; and

o If discrepancies exist, what was shipped and what was received must be
immediately reconciled with the vendor. Should a discrepancy exist, follow
reporting requirements provided in section18.7.1.
●● Shipment of secure items from an authorized and approved vendor:
o The accountable employee will fax a copy of CBP Form 148 marked
“Advanced Notice of Shipment” to the intended recipient with the following
information:
–– Item number
–– The serial number sequence (from/to)
–– Date of shipment
–– Quantity being shipped
–– Total number of cartons in shipment
–– Address to which the shipment was sent
–– Reasonable expectation of shipment time
o The vendor will include with the shipment the CBP Form 148, Request for
Property or Services. The CBP Form 148 will include the following:
–– Item number
–– Serial number sequence (from/to)
–– Quantity
–– Number of cartons in shipment
o Upon receipt of all packages in the shipment, and verification of contents
against the CBP Form 148 has been completed, the recipient initial
authorized requestor or endorser will sign the CBP Form 148 and return it to
the accountable employee within 5 duty days following receipt.
o Bulk shipments of secure items received in the mail room may be:
–– Directly receipted for by the accountable employee;
–– The accountable employee shall conduct inventory upon receipt and re-
seal shipment with a witness.
18.3.3. Shipment Methods
●● Secure items will be appropriately packaged and secured with reinforced
tape covering all seams to prevent inadvertent opening and provide evidence
of tampering. The use of pilfer indicating tape, self voiding tape, and other
chemically treated tamper indicating sealants is recommended;
●● Packages will have no exterior markings, such as the item numbers and/or serial
numbers that would provide an indication of the contents;
●● All shipments of secure items must be by Registered Mail with return receipt
requested, or U.S. Postal Service Express Mail and U.S. Postal Service

Registered Mail, as long as the Waiver of Signature and Indemnity block, item
11-B, on the U.S. Postal Service Express Mail Label shall not be completed; and
cleared commercial carriers or cleared commercial messenger services. The use
of street-side mail collection boxes is strictly prohibited;
●● Shipment of security ink:
o From the vendor:
–– Within the U.S. and to overseas possessions: Must be by a commercial
means which allows for tracking, i.e., U.S. Postal Service Express
Mail and U.S. Postal Service Registered Mail, as long as the Waiver of
Signature and Indemnity block, item 11-B, on the U.S. Postal Service
Express Mail Label shall not be completed; and cleared commercial
carriers or cleared commercial messenger services. The use of street-side
mail collection boxes is strictly prohibited;
–– To offices located in Embassies and Consulates overseas for which there
is an APO/FPO address, must be via U.S.
–– Registered Mail with return receipt:
–– To offices located overseas that are collocated with an Embassy or
Consulate, but that do not have access to an APO/FPO system, must be
via the responsible HQ program office for re-shipment via the Department
of State Diplomatic pouch.
o Shipment of security ink to offices that do not have access to a U.S. delivery
system must be shipped to the parent District/Sector office and hand carried
to the receiving office;
o Shipment of security ink between CBP offices must be via U.S. Registered
Mail with return receipt or diplomatic pouch.
–– Must contain an inventory receipt, CBP Form 148.
o Receiving office must sign the CBP Form 148 and fax it to the CBP National
Mail Management Program.
18.4. Storage
18.4.1. Secure Items Storage
●● Accountable Employee supply of secure items
o Only accountable employee and their designated alternates shall have
access to their supply of secure items. Containers used for the storage of
secure items must not be accessible by persons other than the accountable
employee or where the container is accessible by others, individual drawers
must not be accessible. Each accountable employee’s supply of secure items
must be stored in at a minimum, one of the following:
–– GSA approved storage container used for the storage of high value items.
(See Chapter 10, Safes and Storage Equipment of this handbook for more
information on GSA-approved containers.)
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
171 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

●● Bulk Storage (Field Locations)

o CBP offices that maintain a bulk storage supply of secure items where the
size and/or quantity make storage in containers as stated above unfeasible,
will store the items at a minimum in the following manner:
–– Multiple GSA approved containers within a secure area of a CBP facility
or a strongroom. The strongroom must meet the following minimum
standards: Please refer to Appendix 8.8 Strongrooms of this handbook for
strongroom details and construction standards.
o Storage of Other Security Items.
●● Storage of logbooks, discs, reports and other hard copy data produced from
an automated system; security ink; special formula stamp pads; and security
stamps:
o GSA approved storage container used for the storage of high value items.
(For more information on GSA approved containers see Chapter 10, Safes
and Storage Equipment.)
18.4.2. Stand-Alone Storage Lockers for Designated Officials Issued Secure Items.
●● Lockers and safes shall comply with the requirements of UL 1037 Anti-theft
Alarms and Devices Residential Secure Containers. Safes shall be double
walled minimum 20-gauge steel construction with a minimum 14-gauge steel
door. Tilt-out drawers may be used for spaces where the depth of the lockers is
a consideration. All secure items lockers shall have individual keyed dead bolt
locks with one master key for all locks for the SLO;
●● Safes may be securely mounted on the wall surface or recessed into the wall;
and
●● For items that must be secured in a desk or other location, a minimum 16-gauge
metal safe with a combination dead bolt lock or key lock must be provided.
18.4.3. Accountability And Control
●● The Security Liaison (SL) is responsible for storage of all security container
combinations
o Standard Form (SF) 700, Security Container Information, shall be used for
this purpose;
o Ensure the envelope is sealed and bears the accountable employee’s
signature and date across the seal;
o Ensure the sealed envelopes are stored in a security container per section
18.4.1 of this chapter;
o Ensure the combinations are changed:
–– Annually;
–– Whenever there is a change in accountable employee(s);
–– When it has been necessary to effect access to the secure items and/or
related materials in the case of an unforeseen absence of the employee;
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
172 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

or
–– When the combination has otherwise been compromised.
●● Keys:
o Ensure the number of keys for each lock is entered in a log book;
o Ensure extra keys are stored in the same manner as the combinations for the
security containers.
●● Re-key locks:
o Whenever a key has been lost;
o Whenever there is a possibility the key has been compromised; or
o Upon change of accountable employee(s).
●● Passwords to automated systems used for the inventory, tracking, and audit of
secure items will be changed at a minimum every six months or when there has
been a compromise or suspected compromise.
18.5. Inventory
18.5.1. General Requirements
●● There is one acceptable method for maintaining an inventory of secure items,
related materials, and security items:
o Permanently bound book (logbook) consisting of manual, handwritten entries.
●● CBP approved automated audit, tracking and inventory system are only
authorized in conjunction with a permanently bound logbook and entries must be
consistent with the entries in the logbook;
●● A complete physical inventory of all secure items, secure stamps, security ink
and pads, log books, and binders will be conducted:
o Upon initial receipt of a shipment;
o Upon appointment of a new accountable employee;
o When loss, theft, abuse or misuse of the items is suspected; and
o Monthly.
●● Inventory
o Inventories will be conducted by the SL in conjunction with the accountable
employee(s) or alternate(s). Where the inventory is conducted due to a
change in accountable employee, the SL and accountable employee, shall
conduct the inventory;
o Inventories of bulk storage items shall be conducted: The inventory official will
inspect the box to ensure it has not been tampered with and place the date of
the inventory and their initials directly on the box. This type of inspection will
be completed with each subsequent inventory until the contents of the box
are transferred, the box shows evidence of tampering or the box has been
opened. In the latter instances a physical inventory by serial number of the

contents will be conducted; and

o Upon receipt of bulk shipments and upon completion of an initial inspection to
determine that all boxes sent were received and each box retains its original
packing with no evidence of tampering, the boxes may be shrink-wrapped by
pallet. The shrink-wrap must completely envelop the contents and be of such
strength and resistance as to deter theft and show evidence of tampering
should it occur. Where a bulk shipment is shrink-wrapped, the inventory may
be done by pallet. Once the shrink-wrap is broken inventories will be done in
accordance with policy described above.
●● The date the inventory was conducted, the inventory results and the signature
of the persons conducting the inventory will be entered in an inventory control
logbook;
●● Any discrepancies noted during the inventory will be investigated immediately.
When discrepancies such as missing or illegible serial numbers are noted
upon initial opening of a box that has not been opened since shipment from
the approved authorized vendor, such as missing or illegible serial numbers,
notification will be made within 72 hours to the AE through the applicable
CBP office. Any discrepancy that can not be reconciled shall be reported in
accordance with section 18.7.1.
18.5.2. Accountability
●● Accountable employees will maintain a handwritten record (logbook) of all
secure items. The logbook requirements as stated below apply to user/issuance
locations only.
●● Logbook requirements system:
o Ensure logbooks are maintained in sequential order by each accountable
employee. At a minimum, each log book will be identified by the secure item it
pertains to and the time period covered.
o Ensure a separate book is maintained for:
–– Each type of secure item;
–– Security ink;
–– Special formula stamp pads; and
–– Each type of secure stamp.
●● Ensure entries in the logbook are legibly written with permanent ink.
●● All corrections must be initialed by the employee making the corrections.
●● Logbook entries should include the following:
o Records of receipt for secure items, on the left hand side of the page,
indicating:
–– Date received;
–– Quantity received;

–– Serial numbers, if applicable;

–– Total quantity in inventory; and
–– Source of item.
●● Records of receipt for security ink and special formula pads, on the left hand side
of the page, indicating:
o Date of receipt;
o Quantity received; and
o Source of shipment;
●● Records of receipt for secure stamps, on the left hand side of the page,
indicating:
–– Date of receipt;
o Quantity received;
o Source of shipment; and
o Stamp number.
●● Records of issuance of secure items, on the right hand side, indicating:
o Date of issue;
o To whom issued;
o A-file number (if available);
o Serial number of the item;
o Pertinent distinguisher “M/D/V” (“M” indicates mailed; “D” indicates delivery;
“V” indicates voided.); and
o A space for who verified the issuance.
●● Records of issuance of security ink and special formula pads, on the right hand
side, indicating:
o Date of issue;
o Quantity issued; and
o Recipient.
●● Records of issuance of secure stamps, on the right hand side, indicating:
o Date of issue;
o Quantity issued;
o Stamp number; and
o Recipient.
●● There should be a separate tab section in the back of the book for “Voids/
Destruction.”
18.5.3. Supervisory Verification
●● Supervisors will verify on a weekly basis in the presence of the accountable

employee who completed the work:

o Accuracy;
o Validity;
o Legibility of the information recorded in the logbook(s); and
o That completed items are accounted for and/or properly disposed of
●● Any discrepancies noted during the inventory will be investigated immediately.
When discrepancies such as missing or illegible serial numbers are noted
upon initial opening of a box that has not been opened since shipment from the
authorized vendor such as missing or illegible serial numbers, notification will
be made within 72 hours to the authorized employee through the applicable
CBP office. Any discrepancy that can not be reconciled shall be reported in
accordance with section 18.7.1.
18.6. Destruction
18.6.1. Destruction Of Logbooks And Automated Products
●● Logbooks will be considered active and will remain on site until every item
recorded is retired, completely used, destroyed or no longer used to prevent theft
or loss. Logbooks that no longer have any actively used item identified will be
archived for historical purposes and will not be destroyed;
18.6.2. Disks
●● Database inventory information is only utilized in conjunction with logbooks and
any printed data may be purged and destroyed;
●● See the NSA/CSS Evaluated Products List for High Security Crosscut Paper
Shredders.
o Discs containing secure items information and related materials data will
be stored in accordance with the storage requirements identified in section
18.4.1;
o Destruction of data bases, disc and hard drives will be destroyed, erased, or
overwritten in accordance with HB 1400-05C CBP HB 1400-05C Information
Systems Security Handbook.
o Witnessing and a record of destruction will be prepared as specified in the
following sections.
18.6.3. Destruction Of Secure Items
●● Secure items will be destroyed by:
o Shredding;
o Burning; and
o Pulping or pulverizing.
●● A record of the destruction will be maintained that includes:
o Name of the item;

o Item number;
o Item serial number;
o Signatures of the Security Liaison (SL) destruction official and witness;
o Date of the destruction; and
o Method of destruction.
●● In the case of lifted/surrendered secure items include:
o Name of the individual to whom the item was issued.
18.6.4. Destruction Of Other Security Items
●● Special formula ink will be destroyed as follows:
o Bulk inventories of special formula ink will not be destroyed without
appropriate authorization of the accountable employee and SL;
o Destruction must be by dilution and disposing of the mixture in an
environmentally safe manner. Destruction officials must contact local
environmental officials to determine proper methods of disposal.
●● Stamps will be destroyed by complete obliteration of the face of the stamp that
renders the stamp unusable.
o Records of destruction will be maintained that include:
–– Brand name or manufacturer’s identification for special formula ink;
–– Ink color;
–– Volume (in fluid ounces) of ink;
–– Stamp type;
–– Stamp serial number;
–– Date of destruction; and
–– Signatures of destruction official and witness.
18.7. Reporting Requirements
18.7.1. Loss or Theft
●● Responsibilities of Discoverer:
o The loss or theft of secure items will be reported by the person discovering it
no later than the next duty day following discovery;
o The initial report will be made to the supervisor, the Security Liaison and the
Regional Security Officer; and
o The discoverer will provide as many details as known and will not delay
reporting in order to gather more information.
●● Fraud, Abuse, Misuse Of Secure Items:
o Instances of fraud, abuse, and/or misuse of secure items by CBP employees
must be reported to a supervisor, Security Liaison, Office of the Inspector
General, as soon as it is suspected;
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
177 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

o Persons receiving reports of fraud, abuse, or misuse by CBP employees will

refer the complaint to the Joint Intake Center (JIC).
●● Responsibilities of the Security Liaison:
o The Security Liaison receiving the initial report will immediately notify the
following offices and initiate a preliminary inquiry. Immediate notification may
initially be telephonic or via e- Mail and shall be followed up by e-Mail (for
CBP notifications).
–– Head of the local CBP office;
–– Regional Security Officer;
–– CBP/IA/SMD;
–– Local FBI office; and
–– Local law enforcement authorities (Federal Protective Service (FPS) or
civil law enforcement authorities, as applicable), if circumstances warrant.
Circumstances that would warrant notification of local law enforcement
authorities includes evidence of forced entry or other criminal activity.
–– Other agencies or offices as deemed appropriate by the security officer or
as instructed by IA/SMD.
o Within 24 hours of the initial report, the Security Liaison will prepare a written
preliminary report detailing the circumstances surrounding the loss or theft;
notifications and contacts made since discovery of the loss or theft; and
detailed information on the type, quantity, and serial numbers of the items lost
or stolen, or missing;
o The Security Liaison will continue the preliminary inquiry until it has been
determined that further inquiry will provide no additional information. The
Security Liaison will prepare a final report and submit it to CBP/IA/SMD
through the regional security office.
●● Responsibilities of Regional Security Officers:
o If not conducting the preliminary inquiry, provide advice and assistance to the
Security Liaison conducting the inquiry;
o Coordinate any actions required at the regional level.
●● Responsibilities of CBP/IA/SMD:
o Provide advice and assistance to the Security Liaison conducting the inquiry;
o Review preliminary and final inquiry reports and coordinate further inquiry as
deemed necessary;
o Coordinate additional actions and notifications with applicable CBP
Headquarters program offices;
o Provide copies of inquiry reports to the Joint In Take Center (JIC); and
o Ensure CBP-wide Alerts are issued, per paragraph 2 below, by the
Headquarters element of the program office responsible for the item in
coordination with CBP/IA/SMD.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
178 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

●● The procedures for reporting the loss or theft of security ink, special formula
pads, security stamps, and logbooks will be as stated above with the exception
that notification will not be made to the local office of the FBI unless directed by
CBP/IA/SMD.
18.7.2. Notification
●● The DFO that experienced loss or theft, in coordination with CBP/IA/SMD shall
immediately notify the (ICE) Office of Investigations 1-866-DHS-2-ICE and
CBP Office of Internal Affairs (202-325-0110) [email protected], of any
attempt of any unauthorized persons to obtain information regarding the security
features of the stamps or information on the stamps or process. The DFO and
Security Liaison shall assist with any civil or criminal investigation and agrees to
participate in Operation Bogus by immediately notifying ICE Forensic Document
Laboratory telephone number (703-285-2482) of all attempts by unauthorized
persons to obtain genuine stamps or similar reproductions;
●● Operation BOGUS (Block Orders to Generate Unauthorized Stamps/seals) was
initiated by the Forensic Document Lab (FDL) in 1988 to identify and prevent
individuals and other entities from manufacturing, possessing or otherwise
procuring fraudulent domestic and foreign stamps and seals relating to
immigration or for use in obtaining an immigration benefit. The ICE prosecutes
violations under 18 USC 1028, 18 USC 1546 and other applicable sections.
Vendors (stamp and seal manufacturers) participating in Operation Bogus
notify the FDL of any orders they receive that they suspect may be intended for
fraudulent purposes; and
●● The FDL is staffed 7 days-a-week (including holidays), Monday through Friday,
between the hours of 6:00am and 8:30pm (Eastern Time), on Saturday, Sunday,
and all Federal holidays from 10:00am to 6:30pm. For after-hours emergencies,
contact the ICE Operations Center at (866) 514-2423.
o You can phone or fax the FDL at:
–– Phone: (703) 285-2482
–– Fax : (703) 285-2208
18.7.3. Alert Notices
●● The Director of Field Operations (DFO) that experienced loss or theft, in
coordination with CBP/IA/SMD, is responsible for preparing and dispatching the
broadcast. A copy of the broadcast will be provided to CBP/IA/SMD for inclusion
in the inquiry report;
●● When deemed appropriate by CBP/IA/SMD, Alert Notices will be broadcast to all
CBP activities having an interest in the loss or theft of secure items;
●● At a minimum, the broadcast will identify the items that were lost or stolen, where
they were lost or stolen, the item type, the serial numbers or stamp numbers, and
total quantity.
o Provide copies of inquiry reports to the Joint intake Center (JIC)

o JIC can be contacted:

o Via e-mail: [email protected]
o Toll Free: 1-877-246-8253
o Local DC area: (202) 344-1016
o Fax: (202) 344-3380 or 3390
o Ensure DHS and or CBP broadcasts are issued
●● When deemed appropriate, IA/SMD will request that the Commissioner’s
Situation Room send a CBP broadcast to all DFOs advising of the loss or theft of
the secure item(s).
o Prepare a Significant Incident Report (SIR) Form 6.
18.7.4. Final Inquiry Reports
●● The final inquiry report on the loss or theft of secure items, security ink, special
formula pads, secure stamps and logbooks will, at a minimum, include the
following:
o Serial number(s) of items, stamps, logbooks, as applicable;
o Date of the incident, if known;
o Date of discovery;
o Detailed narrative of the circumstances surrounding the loss or theft;
o Notifications made and actions taken by the inquiry officer and others involved
in the incident;
o Cause of the incident (if it can be determined); and
o Recommendations to prevent similar incidents from occurring in the future.
18.7.5. Recovery Of Lost/Stolen Secure Items:
●● Prepare an initial recovery report or a CBP SIR Form 6 containing:
o Date of recovery;
o Circumstance surrounding the recovery;
●● Immediately forward the initial recovery report to all offices originally notified;
●● Prepare a follow-up report containing detailed information to all offices originally
notified; and
●● If the recovery was by an organization other than those authorities originally
involved in investigation, obtain specific guidance regarding the handling of the
items as evidence from IA/SMD.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BACK Return to Table of Contents

Chapter 19: Procedural Security

19.1. General
19.1.1. Purpose
●● Physical security encompasses real and personal property including buildings,
and the contents of a facility and its personnel. The provisions of this chapter
apply to all CBP facilities that are CBP owned, as well as for GSA-leased space.
19.1.2. Scope
●● All CBP employees are responsible for ensuring that Government property
is safeguarded to the maximum extent feasible against damage, loss, or
destruction. In addition, Designated Officials, senior CBP officials at a facility and
Security Officers will institute security measures that they deem to be reasonable
and prudent in protecting the welfare of CBP employees in the workplace. These
security measures will be incorporated in Site Security Plans/Programs.
19.1.3. Objective
●● The objectives are to implement security measures to minimize the loss,
damage, or destruction of Government property to provide a safe and secure
working environment for CBP employees.
19.1.4. Jurisdiction
●● FPS is the primary law enforcement service for responding to incidents in Federal
facilities under the charge and control of the GSA as an owned or leased facility.
FPS offices are typically located in areas where there is a high concentration of
Federal employees and is capable of providing timely responses to GSA owned
or leased facilities in these areas. For immediate responses to GSA-owned or
leased facilities in rural areas and/or areas with a small Federal presence, law
enforcement officials from local jurisdictions should be contacted.
19.2. Workplace Security
19.2.1. All Government offices can be targets for unlawful entry, theft, kidnapping, bombing,
forcible occupation or sabotage. Security Officials and/or Designated Officials will
mitigate these threats through implementation of:
●● Written site security plans/programs;
●● Effective barriers, both physical and psychological;
●● Employee training and awareness programs; and
●● Annual program review and update.
19.2.2. Security Officials and/or Designated Officials are responsible to conduct a
comprehensive crime prevention security assessments to determine:
●● What is the target potential?
●● What is the prevailing attitude toward security?
●● How are security policies enforced?
●● How current are existing emergency preparedness plans (OEP, fire, power
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
182 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

failure, disaster)?
●● What resources are available locally and how rapid are response times for fire,
police, and ambulance?
●● What kind and how effective are the physical security systems and controls
currently in place?
●● Do the available security resources, procedures and policies meet the potential
threat?
19.2.3. Effective site security plans/programs incorporate effective security information for
employees use and action. Information covered can include but is not limited to:
●● OEP (for further information, see Chapter 15, Occupant Emergency Plan);
●● Recall rosters;
●● Emergency contact numbers:
o Internal
o Local
●● Crisis communications;
●● Key control; (see Chapter 9, Locks and Keys);
●● Facility access; (see Chapter 11, Access to Facilities)
●● Identifying & protecting high value/high theft property:
o Cameras;
o Personal audio devices;
o Binoculars;
o Power tools;
o Televisions;
o Video cassette recorders;
o Laptop computers;
o Government transportation requests; and
o Postage stamps, etc.
●● Checklists:
o Bomb threats;
o Telephone threats;
o Fire;
o Chemical spills;
o Personnel injuries;
o Theft;
o Suicide;
o Workplace violence;
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
183 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

o Suspicious mail/packages (see Chapter 15, Occupant Emergency Plan);

o Close of business practices:
–– Locking office doors;
–– Performing secure storage container checks;
–– Turning off electrical appliances;
–– Activating alarms; and
–– Checking for NSI left unsecured
●● Emergency reporting procedures:
o Security incidents:
–– Break-ins:
–– The incident must be reported immediately to the proper authorities by the
senior person-in-charge.
o Security violations; and
o Security incidents.
19.2.4. The Regional Security Officer will be notified of the circumstances pertaining to
all Security incidents and the corrective action instituted to prevent a recurrence
in accordance with the procedures outlined in Chapter 6.11, Security Survey &
Inspection Process, or a completed Security Assessment. [email protected]
will be notified of all physical security incidents in which program security has been
compromised in any division or office.
19.3. Random Security Awareness Measures (RSAMs)
19.3.1. The purpose of Random Security Awareness Measures (RSAM) is to identify a set
of protective measures extracted from a higher threat condition than is the current
posture of the facility and implement those measure(s) for a period of time.
●● As an example: under a threat condition Yellow (Elevated Level), moderate
posture, a protective measure identified under threat condition Red (severe risk
of terrorist attacks, the maximum), such as performing detailed searches of all
vehicles entering the facility, is implemented for all vehicles entering the facility
from 1400 to 1800. This became effective on Monday, July 1, 1999.
19.3.2. The implementation of RSAMs has three purposes:
●● They are used as a tool to test which measures have higher costs to a facility
in terms of productivity. A RSAM program can help identify those measures that
security personnel and the facility infrastructure are more capable of sustaining
and those that will be unduly stressful on human and material resources;
●● The RSAM program will provide security forces with training and simulation. By
keeping the security force focused and alert, RSAM programs ensure constant
preparation for any events; and
●● RSAM programs change the security atmosphere surrounding a facility. Such

programs, when implemented in a truly random fashion, alter the external

appearance or security “signature” of any facility.
19.3.3. Criteria for implementing a RSAM program are:
●● RSAMs are implemented in a strictly random manner, never using a set time
frame or day for a given measure;
●● The on-duty security force must be capable of implementing the measure without
the need for augmentation or special equipment;
●● No set patterns or times will be implemented when scheduling security activities
o Some RSAMs are only appropriate for implementation during certain time
periods. For instance, a 100-percent search of hand-carried items should not
be implemented during rush hours;
o Vary K-9 activities, daily, weekly and never the same time frame.
●● Flexibility must be maintained should an emergency arise where a RSAM cannot
be implemented, or would cause a major disruption to agency operations;
●● RSAMs should be tailored to ensure on duty security forces can accomplish them
without augmentation, during day-to-day operations;
●● Security forces are the key to implementing the RSAMs:
o They must comprehend the need for the program and understand how
effective application can confuse any surveillance activity and enhance
security awareness at the facility;
o Otherwise, the measures appear too casual and will not provide the effect
intended.
19.3.4. Sample random security awareness measures:
●● Search all hand-carried items including those carried by employees entering the
agency for illegal explosives/ weapons;
●● On a random basis, physically inspect hand carried items entering and/or exiting
the facility, (e.g., every fifth person departing the facility would be inspected);
●● Conduct random parking lot checks for suspicious or unauthorized vehicles;
●● All personnel expecting a guest/visitor to the facility will comply with the facilities
visitor procedures, this also includes deliveries, (see Chapter 11, Access to
Facilities);
o Encourage community security awareness by reminding personnel to
be suspicious and inquisitive about strangers particularly those carrying
suitcases or other containers or unusual activities;
o Be alert for unidentified vehicles on or in the vicinity of the facility and be alert
for abandoned parcels/packages;
o Implement 100-percent hands-on identification checks for all personnel
entering the facility;
o Randomly check facility exterior for suspicious packages and activities;
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
185 of 890
o Inspect all commercial deliveries; and
o Examine all incoming mail/parcels for obvious signs of explosives or
tampering.
Ch20

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BACK Return to Table of Contents

Chapter 20: Workplace Violence

20.1. General
20.1.1. Workplace violence is any physical assaults, threatening behavior or verbal abuse
occurring in the work setting. These acts originating from any employee, employer or
supervisor can cause a substantial risk of physical or emotional harm to individuals,
or damage to government resources or capabilities.
20.1.2. One of the most common types of workplace violence is that among coworkers.
Additionally, a high percentage of violent incidents are perpetrated by individuals
from outside the workplace. This includes situations such as domestic violence,
bomb threats, and violence by customers.
20.1.3. Studies indicate violent occurrences among coworkers rarely happen without some
warning. Before actually becoming violent, there are patterns of behavior or other
activities that may serve as warning signs of violence. The following are warning
indicators of potential workplace violence:
●● Intimidating, harassing, bullying, belligerent, or other inappropriate and
aggressive behavior;
●● Bringing a weapon to the workplace (unless necessary for the job), making
inappropriate references to guns, or making idle threats about using a weapon to
harm someone;
●● Direct or veiled threats of harm;
●● Numerous conflicts with supervisors and other employees;
●● Statements showing fascination with incidents of workplace violence, statements
indicating approval of the use of violence to resolve a problem, or statements
indicating identification with perpetrators of workplace homicides;
●● Substance abuse;
●● Extreme changes in behaviors; and
●● Statements indicating desperation (over family, financial, and other personal
problems) to the point of contemplating suicide.
20.1.4. Security Officers should be involved in all stages of the planning process during
the development of an effective workplace violence prevention plan. Planning
efforts should be coordinated with Employee Assistance Programs and personnel
programs, as they can play a critical role in prevention, intervention or response to
threatening situations.
20.1.5. This section will provide general ideas and considerations that can help those
charged with workplace violence responsibilities to gain an understanding of
some of the security issues such as jurisdiction. It is also intended to help those
Federal offices that do not have in-house security or law enforcement to identify the
appropriate organizations that can assist them.
20.1.6. For more information refer to DHS Memorandum - Department of Homeland Security
Workplace Violence Prevention Procedures and Office of Personnel Management
Publication – Dealing with Workplace Violence - A Guide for Agency Planners.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
188 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

20.2. Security Planning

●● Depending on the primary tenant, location of the office, and the type of
incident or situation, jurisdiction may vary. The agency’s own law enforcement
organization, the Federal Protective Service (FPS), or Federal, State or local
law enforcement, or a combination of these, may have jurisdiction. Gaps in
law enforcement coverage can occur when issues of workplace violence arise.
These gaps can be closed if the agency planning group (which would include
any in-house security organization) works with the various law enforcement
organizations in setting up workplace violence programs. The following are some
suggestions for involving law enforcement in agency efforts to prevent workplace
violence.
20.2.1. Jurisdiction
●● The agency planning group should identify which Federal or local law
enforcement agency or agencies have responsibility for its work-site. For
example, the FPS is the primary law enforcement service for responding to
incidents in Federal facilities under the charge and control of the GSA as an
owned or leased facility. FPS offices are typically located in areas where there is
a high concentration of Federal employees. This allows them to provide timely
responses to GSA owned or leased facilities in these areas. For immediate
responses to GSA owned or leased facilities in rural areas and/or areas with a
small Federal presence, law enforcement officials from local jurisdictions should
be contacted;
●● Some facilities have in-house security and/or law enforcement organizations.
Others have contracts with private security firms. It is not always clear who has
jurisdiction, and who should be contacted when the need arises; and
●● Sometimes meeting with the local police chief, county sheriff or state police is
necessary to establish a plan or procedure regarding law enforcement response
in the event of potential violence or hostile incidents. In remote locations,
arrangements can be made for local police to handle certain situations until the
appropriate Federal law enforcement officials arrive.
20.2.2. Liaison with Law Enforcement Agencies
●● Successful response to potential workplace violence depends upon effective
communications and preparedness with those law enforcement agencies
responsible for their work site. The agency planning group and incident response
teams should reach out to these law enforcement agencies to establish key
contacts to ensure effective communication during any workplace violence. The
agency should obtain the names and telephone numbers of law enforcement
personnel to contact during emergencies. To ensure that those designated
with coordinating and executing response to workplace violence are prepared,
the agency should hold periodic meetings to engage and establish community
network in promoting effective response.

20.3. Security Assistance

20.3.1. During the planning phase, Security Officers can:
●● Develop methods for threat assessment and processing;
●● Identify types of situations they can address and when and how they should be
notified of an incident;
●● Indicate whether their officers have arrest authority;
●● Identify their jurisdictional restrictions and alternative law enforcement agencies
that may be able to provide assistance;
●● Identify threat assessment professionals who can assist the agency in its efforts
to protect threatened employees;
●● Explain anti-stalking laws applicable in the agency’s jurisdiction and how and
when to obtain restraining orders;
●● Suggest security measures to be taken for specific situations such as cases
where Employee Assistance Program counselors or other mental health
professionals warn the agency that an individual has made a threat against an
agency employee;
●● Arrange for supervisor/employee briefings or training on specific workplace
violence issues such as:
o Personal safety and security measures;
o Types of incidents to report to law enforcement/security/authority;
o Types of measures law enforcement/security may take to protect employees
during a violent incident, e. g., Explanations of what it means to “secure the
area,” “secure the perimeter,” and “preserve evidence”;
o Recommended steps on how to react to an armed attacker;
o Suggestions for dealing with angry customers or clients;
o Responses to suspicious packages;
o Bomb threats;
o Hostage situations; and
o Telephone harassment and threats.
20.3.2. When potentially violent situations occur, Security Officers can work with the incident
response team to:
●● Provide an assessment of the information available to determine whether law
enforcement intervention is immediately necessary; response can include a
criminal investigation or consultation and threat assessment by a professional;
●● Identify appropriate response for each type of incident; and
o Determine who will gather what types of evidence.

20.4. Physical Security Measures

20.4.1. General
●● There are more than 1.2 million employees working in approximately 1,500
GSA owned buildings and 8,600 leased Federal buildings. GSA is the agency
responsible for ensuring the safety and security of people while on Federal
property that is owned or leased by GSA. This section contains recommendations
and requirements for agencies in GSA controlled or leased space.
20.4.2. Regulations
●● Federal Property Management Regulations 41 CFR §102-74 and Executive
Order 12656 Part 18 specifically require GSA to provide standard protection
services by coordinating a comprehensive Occupant Emergency Program (OEP),
which is a short-term emergency response program establishing procedures for
safeguarding lives and property during emergencies.
●● For more information regarding the OEP refer to Chapter 15, Occupant
Emergency Plan.
20.4.3. GSA-Designated Official
●● Each GSA owned or leased facility has a designated official who is the
highest ranking official of the primary occupant agency of a Federal facility, or
alternatively, a designee selected by mutual agreement of occupant agency
officials. The designated official is responsible for developing, implementing,
and maintaining an OEP, which consists of procedures developed to protect life
and property in a specific Federally occupied space under stipulated emergency
conditions. The designated official’s responsibilities include establishing, staffing,
and training an Occupant Emergency Organization, comprised of agency
employees who have been designated to perform the requirements established
by the OEP.
o According to the regulations, the GSA must assist in the establishment and
maintenance of such plans and organizations. All agencies occupying a
facility must fully cooperate with the designated official in the implementation
of the emergency plans and the staffing of the emergency organization.
GSA must provide emergency program policy guidance, review plans and
organizations annually, assist in training of personnel, and to ensure proper
administration of Occupant Emergency Programs. In leased space, GSA will
solicit the assistance of the lessor in the establishment and implementation of
plans.
●● According to the regulations, decisions to activate the Occupant Emergency
Organization shall be made by the designated official or by the designated
alternate official. Decisions to activate shall be based upon the best available
information including an understanding of local tensions, the sensitivity of target
agencies, and previous experience with similar situations. Advice shall be
solicited, when possible, from the GSA building manager, from the appropriate
Federal Protective Service official, and from Federal, State, and local law
enforcement agencies.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
191 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

20.4.4. Physical Security Survey

●● A major goal of the GSA’s Federal Protective Service (FPS) is to provide better
protection for Federal employees and visitors by identifying high-risk areas in
Federal buildings where potential problems or emergency situations might occur.
This is accomplished through a “Physical Security Survey” conducted by CBP/IA/
SMD. The survey is a comprehensive, detailed, technical on-site inspection and
analysis of the current security and physical protection conditions;
●● If your agency does not have up-to-date security procedures in place, the head
of your agency may want to ask a regional GSA FPS office or your agency’s
security office to conduct a physical security survey to ensure that employees are
working in a safe and secure environment. There is a listing of FPS offices at the
end of this section;
●● The following are some examples provided by the FPS of ways to improve
security in your office and/or building:
o Post a security guard at the main building entrance or at entrances to specific
offices;
o Install a metal detector or CCTV (closed-circuit television), cameras or other
device to monitor people coming in all building entrances;
o Issue all employees photo identification cards and assign temporary passes
to visitors who are required to sign in and out of the building. Under certain
conditions, contract guards should be required to call Federal offices to
confirm an appointment and/or to request an escort for all visitors;
o Brief employees on steps to take if a threatening or violent incident occurs.
Establish code words to alert coworkers and supervisors that immediate help
is needed; and
o Install silent, concealed alarms at reception desks.
●● The following are some examples provided by the FPS of ways to improve
security in “front-line” offices that serve the public:
o Ensure that officers (or guards) have a clear view of the customer service
area at all times;
o Arrange office furniture and partitions so that front-line employees in daily
contact with the public are surrounded by “natural” barriers (desks, counter
tops, partitions) to separate employees from customers and visitors;
o Provide an under-the-counter duress alarm system to signal a supervisor or
security officer if a customer becomes threatening or violent;
o Establish an area in the office for employees and/or customers to escape to if
they are confronted with violent or threatening people;
o Provide an access-control combination lock on access doors; and
o Mount closed circuit television cameras for monitoring customer service
activity from a central security office for the building.

20.5. Sample Plan

20.5.1. Refer to Appendix 20.5 to view a sample format of a Workplace Violence Prevention
Plan. The document in this appendix is provided as a reference only. It is the
responsibility of the Workplace Violence Planning Group to develop a Workplace
Violence Prevention Plan for your facility; the sample format is provided only to
assist in the preparation of a formal plan. Security Officers shall provide assistance
in completing the applicable security portions of the plan.
20.6. Federal Protective Service Information
20.6.1. For more information on coping with threats and violence in Federal Offices, other
crime prevention, security surveys, and protection assistance, write or call your
nearest Federal Protective Service Field Office at one of these regional addresses:

20.7. FPS Contact Information

Region 1-Boston, Massachusetts Region 6-Kansas City, Missouri
10 Causeway Street Federal Protective Service
Room 935 601 E. 12th Street
Boston, MA 02222 Room 1712
Phone: 617-565-5772 Kansas City, MO 64106
Area of Responsibility: Massachusetts, Vermont, Phone: 816-426-2155
New Hampshire, Maine, Rhode Island, and Area of Responsibility: Iowa, Kansas, Missouri
Connecticut and Nebraska

Region 2-New York, NY Region 7-Fort Worth, Texas

26 Federal Plaza 501 West Felix Building 3 (South End)
Room 17-130 Ft. Worth, TX 76115
New York, NY 10278 Phone: 817-900-5000
Phone: 212-264-4255 Area of Responsibility: Arkansas, Louisiana,
Area of Responsibility: New Jersey, New York, Texas, New Mexico, and Oklahoma
Puerto Rico, and Virgin Islands
Region 8-Denver, Colorado
Region 3-Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Denver Federal Center, Building 41
701 Market Street Room 258
Suite 4200 West 6th Avenue & Kipling Street
Philadelphia, PA 19106 Denver, CO 80225-0546
Phone: 215-521-2161 Phone: (303) 236-6707
Area of Responsibility: Delaware, Maryland, Area of Responsibility: Colorado, Wyoming, South
Virginia, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia Dakota, North Dakota, Montana, and Utah

Region 4-Atlanta, Georgia Region 9-San Francisco, California

Martin Luther King, Jr. Federal Building 450 Golden Gate Avenue, 5th Floor
Room 700 Room 5474
77 Forsyth St. San Francisco, CA 94102
Atlanta, GA 30303 Phone: 415-522-3440
Phone: 404-331-3153 Area of Responsibility: California, Arizona,
Area of Responsibility: Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Nevada, and Hawaii
Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Tennessee Region 10-Federal Way, Washington
32125 32nd Avenue, South
Region 5-Chicago, Illinois Federal Way, WA 98001
Kluczynski Federal Building Phone: (253) 815-4700
Room 3540 Area of Responsibility: Alaska, Washington, Idaho
230 South Dearborn Street and Oregon
DPN: 35-5, mail room
Chicago, IL 60604 National Capital Region (NCR-11)
Phone: 312-353-1496 1900 Half Street, SW
Area of Responsibility: Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Suite 5000
Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin Washington, DC 20536
Phone: 202-245-2300
Area of Responsibility: Washington DC, Virginia
and Maryland
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
194 of 890
C h1

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BACK Return to Table of Contents

Chapter 21: Office And Laboratory Equipment

21.1. General
21.1.1. This Section is specifically prepared for Property Coordinators (PCs), Local
Accountable Officers (LAOs), Local Property Coordinators (LPCs), Local Property
Officers (LPOs), managers, and supervisors. However, it applies to all CBP personnel
assigned property management duties and responsibilities.
21.1.2. This section provides information to establish appropriate physical security measures
and property management guidelines to protect and account for office and laboratory
equipment.
21.1.3. Equipment is defined as any property owned, leased, leased-to-own, borrowed,
donated, forfeited, and retained for official use or otherwise in the possession of CBP:
●● Office equipment includes office automation equipment, microcomputers, computer
terminals, calculators, audiovisual equipment, telephone, facsimile machines, etc.;
●● Laboratory equipment includes the wide variety of scientific instruments used in CBP
laboratories.
21.1.4. Local Accountable Officers (LAOs), Local Property Coordinators (LPCs), Local Property
Officers (LPOs) and Property Coordinators (PCs) must determine the level of security
needed, based on an assessment of threats to the equipment, to include a review of
past incidents of theft and vandalism in the office/laboratory, building, and surrounding
area.
21.1.5. For specific guidance on Property Management refer to CBP Directive No. 5230-
032, Personal Property Management; CIS Manual 5200-13B, Personal Property
Management Manual; and DHS Management Directive No. 0565, Personal Property
Management Directive.

21.2. Threat Determination

21.2.1. Studies indicate that valuable and portable office and laboratory equipment are most
commonly stolen or vandalized by semiskilled and unskilled burglars, employees or
visitors. However, the security measures outlined in this chapter may also applied to
mitigate illegal or unauthorized acts. For example, a lockable cabinet that protects a
computer against theft also helps prevent unauthorized use of the equipment.
21.2.2. During security evaluations, the security officer or responsible custodial property officer
should assess at the building and interior areas taking into consideration:
●● What items are most likely to be stolen?
●● How could entry be gained?
●● Where could property be concealed for later removal?
●● Can exit with property be easily accomplished unchallenged?
●● Has the activity experienced equipment thefts during business and after business
hours?
21.2.3. For specific guidance on Threat and Vulnerability Identification see Chapter 14, Incident
Response and the Homeland Security Advisory System of this handbook.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
196 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

21.3. Special Security Considerations

21.3.1. In addition to the various protection measures discussed in this handbook,
consideration should be given to provide additional protection to portable equipment.
The security measures outlined below will mitigate the risk of tampering or removal
of the equipment:
●● Lock unoccupied offices and laboratories, especially after business hours;
●● Lock small and valuable equipment in a cabinet or closet;
●● Maintain tight control and accountability of keys, and keep keys in a secure
place;
●● Do not store unused equipment in isolated areas;
●● Escort wandering or “lost” visitors to the right office;
●● Establish a system to ensure that the last person to leave at night checks that all
windows and doors are closed and locked;
●● Ensure building package control procedures and property removal permits are
strictly enforced;
●● Establish entry control procedures or install access control equipment in high-
risk environments commensurate with the sensitivity or value of the resources
involved; and
●● Install an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) that acts as a deterrent to intrusion
and alerts security personnel of an actual intrusion. See Chapter 8.9 for specific
guidance.
21.4. Kennel (K-9) Facilities
21.4.1. For information containing specific policies, procedures, responsibilities, and controls
that govern the operations of the National Canine Enforcement Program (NCEP)
refer to CIS HB 3200-07A, Canine Enforcement Program Manual and Customs
Directive No. 3290-015A, Canine Enforcement Program.
21.4.2. All explosive and chemical training materials (to include training materials used
for certification/evaluation and field proficiency training) will be issued, handled,
secured, stored, accounted for and returned or disposed of in accordance with
established standard operating procedures as issued and approved by the NCEP.
21.5. Customs And Border Protection Laboratory (CBPL)
21.5.1. The physical security of the CBPL shall be such that all seized property and
controlled substances stored in their custody are protected from tampering and theft
at all times.
●● For physical security standards of laboratories refer to CBP Directive No.
3290-010B, Physical Security Standard for Customs and Border Protection
Laboratories.
21.5.2. The Laboratory and Scientific Services (OLSS) analyzes samples of seized or
detained property. It also provides CBP Headquarters and Port Directors with
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
197 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

equipment standards for the procurement of scales, pill counters, and money
counters.
●● For guidance on the management of seized property, refer to the Seized Asset
Management and Enforcement Procedures Manual, CIS HB 4400-01A.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BACK Return to Table of Contents

Chapter 22: Maintenance

22.1. General
22.1.1. This directive establishes the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) policy
and procedure for the maintenance of security systems, related subsystems, and
components.
22.2. Scope
22.2.1. Security systems, related subsystems, and components shall be maintained in
operable condition according to manufacturer specifications.
22.2.2. A regularly scheduled testing and maintenance program is required for optimal
performance. Corrective and preventive maintenance should be balanced to provide
a high degree of confidence that equipment degradation is identified and corrected,
that equipment life is optimized, and that the maintenance program is cost effective.
22.2.3. System maintenance shall be applied in a graded fashion; consideration shall be
given to:
●● The interests/targets being protected;
●● The identified threat; and
●● Other protection measures afforded.
22.2.4. The physical protection program shall include a testing and maintenance program
that encompasses security related components and subsystems.
22.3. Corrective Maintenance
22.3.1. Corrective maintenance shall be initiated within 24 hours of the indication of
malfunction of system elements determined to be critical for the protection of vital
equipment, facilities and classified materials.
22.3.2. Compensatory measures shall be implemented immediately when any part of the
critical system is out of service and shall be continued until maintenance is complete
and the critical system is back in service.
22.3.3. Corrective maintenance of a non-critical system element protecting vital equipment,
facilities and classified matter shall be initiated within 24 hours of detection.
22.3.4. The local authority responsible for safeguards and security shall determine
corrective maintenance for a non-critical system protecting other assets. The local
authority shall also determine if compensatory measures are necessary.
22.4. Preventive Maintenance (PM)
22.4.1. Preventive maintenance is defined as a program in which wear, tear, and fatigue
are anticipated, and continuous corrective actions are taken to ensure peak
performance, efficiency, and minimize deterioration of equipment.
●● PM involves a scheduled and controlled program of systematic inspection,
adjustment, and replacement of components, as well as performance testing and
analysis;

●● The result of a successful PM program extends the life of the critical safeguards,
security-related subsystems and components, and minimizes unscheduled
downtime.
22.4.2. A preventive maintenance program should include:
●● Non-destructive testing;
●● Periodic inspection;
●● Preplanned maintenance activities; and
●● Maintenance to correct deficiencies found through testing or inspections.
22.4.3. The following system elements shall be included in a preventative maintenance
program as prescribed by the manufacturer standards:
●● Intrusion Detection Systems (see Chapter 8.9, IDS);
●● Primary Alarm Station/Secondary Alarm Station alarm annunciators;
●● Protective force equipment;
●● Personnel access control and inspection equipment;
●● Package inspection equipment;
●● Vehicle inspection equipment (see Appendix 11.14, Screening Procedures;
●● Security lighting (see Chapter 7.5, Protective Lighting;
●● Security system-related emergency power or auxiliary power supplies; and
●● Any system, subsystem, or component not enumerated in this listing.
22.5. Maintenance Personnel Access Authorization
22.5.1. Personnel who test, maintain or service critical systems shall have access
authorization consistent with the category of vital equipment, facilities and/or
classified matter being protected. This level of authorization is not required when
such testing and maintenance is performed as bench services away from the
security area or is performed under the supervision of an appropriately cleared,
knowledgeable custodian of the system and/or critical component.
22.5.2. Systems or critical components bench tested or maintained away from a security
area by personnel without appropriate access authorization shall be inspected
and operationally tested by qualified and cleared personnel prior to being put into
service.
22.6. Record Keeping
22.6.1. Records of testing and maintenance performed shall be retained by the custodian of
the system or critical component for the effective life of the system or component.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BACK Return to Table of Contents

Appendix 6.3: CBP Minimum Standards

I. Site Planning and Landscape Design

Vehicular Control
Description Levels of Protection
Min Low Medium High
Distance Minimum distance from a building to unscreened vehicles or parking is determined based on project-specific
threat. Vehicle access control countermeasures include:
• Perimeter barriers and street furniture;
• Structural hardening and parking restrictions;
• Relocation of vulnerable functions within or away from the building; and
• Operational procedures, such as tighter access control.
Site Perimeter NA NA Select a barrier that will stop the threat vehicle. Measures for the barrier system include:
Barriers • Use various types and designs of buffers and barriers such as walls, fences, trenches, berms,
ponds and water basins, plantings, trees, static barriers, sculpture, and street furniture;
• Design site circulation to prevent high speed approaches by vehicles;
• Offset vehicle entrances as necessary from the direction of a vehicle’s approach to force a
reduction in speed.
• See Appendix 7.2, Barriers.
Perimeter Vehicle NA NA If directed by the risk assessment, provide:
Inspection • Space for inspection at a location to be specified that is separated from the building as
much as practical (e.g., the curb line or outside the protected perimeter for gross amounts of
explosives);
• Design features for the vehicular inspection point that:
o Stop vehicles, to stop 15,000 lbs vehicle at 30-50 MPH (K-4 thru K-12) at a minimum;
o Prevent them from leaving the vehicular inspection area; and
o Prevent tailgating.
If screening space cannot be provided, other design features such as hardening, or other
operational procedures such as finding alternative space for inspection, may be required.
Site Lighting
Description Levels of Protection
Min Low Medium High
Design Site Lighting NA Effective site lighting levels include:
to Perform the • Vehicular and pedestrian entrances: (5 fc), horizontally maintained);
Required Functions. • Perimeter, vehicular, and pedestrian circulation areas: (5 fc), horizontally maintained.
In most circumstances, perimeter lighting should be:
• Continuous/on both sides of the perimeter barriers with minimal hot and cold spots (1-2 fc);
• Sufficient to support CCTV and other surveillance.
However, for safety reasons and/or for issues related to camera technology, lower levels may be
desirable.
Other codes or standards may restrict site lighting levels.
• Flag (20 fc);
• Building perimeter (2 fc up to 10’ high and 10’ from the building);
• Sally port – (20 fc);
• Parking areas (1-2 fc);
• Impound lots (5 fc);
• Fuel island (20 fc);
• Entry sign (20 fc);
• Storage area (1-2 fc);
• Site roadways (1-2 fc);
• Vehicle maintenance parking (1-2 fc).
Exterior lighting types should be assorted to prevent prolonged re-strike issues.

Site Signage
Description Levels of Protection
Min Low Medium High
Reduce Possible NA Reduce possible confusion over site circulation, parking, and entrance locations that can contribute to a
Confusion loss of site security by:
• Providing signage at entrances;
• Having on-site directional signs, parking signs, and cautionary signs for visitors, employees, service
vehicles, and pedestrians; and
• Not posting signs that identify sensitive areas unless required by other standards,.

Landscaping
Description Levels of Protection
Min Low Medium High
Landscaping Design NA • Plants can deter unwanted entry;
Elements • Ponds and fountains can block vehicle access;
• Site grading can limit access; and
• Avoid landscaping that would permit concealment of criminals or obstruct the view of security
personnel and CCTV.

II. Architecture and Interior Design

Planning
Description Levels of Protection
Min Low Medium High
Location of NA NA Place offices of vulnerable officials so that occupants cannot be seen from an uncontrolled
Vulnerable Functions public area such as a street; whenever possible, these offices should face courtyards, internal
sites or controlled areas. Alternative protective options for vulnerable functions include:
• Locating and orienting the building away from possible vantage points;
• Locating vulnerable functions further away from the exterior wall;
• Blocking sight lines with barriers, berms, and trees;
• Orienting windows and walls so they are oblique to the line of sight;
• Minimizing the number of windows; and
• Locating parking lots away from the building.
If such forms of protection are not possible, provide suitable obscuring glazing or window
treatment such as blast curtains, tinted glazing assemblies, film, or ballistic resistant glass.
On design drawings and lists, number offices rather than referring to them by name, and
provide a separate, protected key to room names.
Mixed Occupancies NA If high-risk and low-risk offices are housed together, separate publicly accessible areas from high-risk
offices and design additional solutions as required by the risk assessment.

Public Toilets and If required by risk assessment, do not locate public toilets, service spaces, or access to vertical circulation
Service Areas systems in any non-secure areas, including the queuing area before screening at the public entrance.

Refuge Provides When deemed appropriate in high rise buildings, areas of refuge must be identified during the programming
Safe Area For and design phases, with special consideration given to egress and related building support systems. Building’s
Occupants If They OEP must specifically cover the purpose and use of refuge areas during emergency.
Cannot Safely Exit
the Building.

Planning
Description Levels of Protection
Min Low Medium High
Loading Docks If required by risk assessment, separate loading docks and receiving and shipping areas by at least 50 feet (15
and Shipping and m) in any direction from utility rooms, utility mains, and service entrances including electrical, telephone/data,
Receiving Areas. fire detection/alarm systems, fire suppression water mains, cooling and heating mains, etc. Locate loading
docks so that vehicles will not be driven into or parked under the building. If this is not possible, you must
harden the surface for blast.
Retail in the Lobby While important to the public nature of buildings, the presence of retail and other mixed uses may present a
risk to the building and its occupants and should be carefully considered on a project-specific basis during the
risk assessment process. Retail and mixed uses may be accommodated, as required, through such means as
separating entryways, controlling access, and hardening shared partitions, as well as through special security
operational countermeasures.
Stairwells Stairwells required for emergency egress must be designed to meet applicable codes and must serve as an
integral part of the OEP. Locate these stairwells as remotely as possible from areas where blast events might
occur. Wherever possible, do not have stairs discharge into lobbies, parking or loading areas.
Planning
Description Levels of Protection
Min Low Medium High
Mail room • Locate the mail room away from facility main entrances, areas containing critical services, utilities,
distribution systems, and important assets;
• Place it at the perimeter of the building with an outside wall or window designed for pressure relief; an area
near the loading dock;
• In some situations, an off-site location may be cost effective or several buildings may share one mail room;
and
• Provide adequate space for explosive disposal containers and equipment to examine incoming packages as
directed by your risk assessment.
Exterior Entrances
Description Levels of Protection
Min Low Medium High
Entrance Design • The entrance design must balance security, operational, and aesthetic considerations. One strategy to
reduce operational costs is to co-locate public and employee entrances, although this may make access
control more difficult (see the risk assessment for project-specific directions).
• Design entrances to avoid significant queuing. If queuing will occur within the building footprint, enclose the
area in blast-resistant construction. If queuing is expected outside the building, provide a rain cover.
• The following design measures can enhance protection at entrances:
o Minimizing the number of doors;
o Providing doors and skylights without transparent glazing;
o Using bullet resistant door assemblies (see Army TM 5-853-3); and
o If glazing in doors is required for other reasons, minimizing the size.
• For wall types see criteria below (Lobby Doors and Partitions).
Forced Entry For protection against limited hand tool attacks on the building, see swinging door, horizontal sliding door, wall
criteria and window criteria. See Appendix 7.6, Doors.
Equipment Space NA If required, provide space at public and employee entrances for immediate or possible future installation
of access control and screening equipment, including walk-through metal detectors and x-ray devices,
sensors, ID check, electronic access card, and turnstiles.
NA NA Space for equipment at public entrances and employee entrances (including space for
possible installation of detection equipment currently under development). Note: Space to add
equipment in times of heightened alert should also be provided for Low Protection.
Entrance Co-location Combine public and employee entrances if directed by your risk assessment.

Exterior Entrances
Description Levels of Protection
Min Low Medium High
Garage and Vehicle If required by risk assessment, for all garage or service area entrances that are not otherwise protected by
Service Entrances site perimeter barriers, provide devices capable of arresting a vehicle of the designated threat size at the
designated speed. This criterion may be lowered if the access circumstances prohibit a vehicle from reaching
this speed.
Additional Features
Description Levels of Protection
Min Low Medium High
Areas of Potential If required by the risk assessment, reduce the potential for concealment of devices before screening points,
Concealment avoid installing features that can be used to hide devices. If mail or express boxes or trash receptacles are used,
restrict the size of the openings to prohibit insertion of packages.
Roof Access Design locking systems and other countermeasures to limit roof access to authorized personnel.
Interior Construction
Description Levels of Protection
Min Low Medium High
Lobby Doors Security procedures and Occupant Emergency Plans (OEPs) have a major impact on lobby design. Where screening
and Partitions and access control are performed, an adversary may bring a weapon into the pre-screening area. Consistent with
project-specific risk assessment, make doors and walls along the line of security screening ballistic resistant per UL
752, “Standard for Safety: Bullet-Resisting Equipment” as follows:
N/A UL Rating Level 3 UL Rating Level 8
Critical Building Increase the likelihood that emergency systems will remain operational during a disaster by locating critical building
Components components away from main entrance, vehicle circulation, parking, or maintenance area or if such a location is not
possible, critical components may need to be hardened. Examples of critical building components include:
• Emergency generator including fuel systems, day tank, fire sprinkler, and water supply;
• Normal fuel storage;
• Main switchgear and telephone distribution (LAN Room);
• Fire pumps;
• Building control centers and UPS systems controlling critical functions;
• Elevator machinery and controls;
• Shafts for stairs, elevators, and utilities; and
• Critical distribution feeders for emergency power.

III. Structural Engineering

General Requirements
Description Levels of Protection
Min Low Medium High
Designer For buildings designed to meet Medium or High Protection Levels, a blast engineer must be included as a
Qualifications member of the design team blast analysis are required in all new projects. He/she will have formal training in
structural dynamics, and demonstrated experience with accepted design practices for blast resistant design
and with referenced technical manuals.
Design Narratives A design narrative and copies of design calculations are required at each phase identifying the building-specific
implementation requirements. Security requirements will be integrated into the overall building design starting
with the concept and funding phases.

General Requirements
Description Levels of Protection
Min Low Medium High
Compliance Full compliance with the risk assessment and this chapter is expected. Specific requirements should be in
accordance with the findings of the facility risk assessment. Once the level of protection has been identified,
the risk assessment should be conducted as early in the process as possible and in advance of project
funding.
New Techniques Provided that the performance level is attained, alternative analysis and mitigation methods are permitted. New
and untested techniques must be evaluated and approved by Headquarters CBP/IA/SMD.
Methods and All building components requiring blast resistance must be designed using established methods and
References approaches for determining dynamic loads, structural detailing, and dynamic structural response.
Structural and Non- To address blast, base the priority for upgrades on the relative importance of a structural or non-structural
Structural Elements element, in the order below:
• Primary Structural Elements – the essential parts of the building’s resistance to catastrophic blast loads and
progressive collapse, including columns, girders, roof beams, and the main lateral resistance system;
• Secondary Structural Elements – all other load bearing members, such as floor beams, slabs, etc.;
• Primary Non-Structural Elements – elements (including their attachments) that are essential for life
safety systems, or elements that can cause substantial injury if failure occurs, including ceilings or heavy
suspended mechanical units; and
• Secondary Non-Structural Elements – all elements not covered in primary non-structural elements, such as
partitions, furniture, and light fixtures.
Priority should be given to the critical elements that are essential to mitigating progressive collapse. Designs
for secondary structural elements should minimize injury and damage. Consideration should also be given to
reducing damage and injury from primary as well as secondary non-structural elements. Your risk assessment
may specify protective measures for secondary, non-structural elements for Medium and High Protection.
Loads and Stresses NA NA Structures must be designed to resist blast loads. The demands on
the structure will be equal to the combined effects of dead, live, and
blast loads. Blast loads or dynamic rebound may occur in directions
opposed to typical gravity loads. For purposes of designing against
progressive collapse, loads shall be defined as dead load plus a
realistic estimate of actual live load. The value of the live load may be
as low as 25% of the code-prescribed live load. The design should use
ultimate strengths with dynamic enhancements based on strain rates.
Allowable responses are generally post elastic. Data on materials
properties and performance may be found in TM5-1300 and ASCE
Design for Physical Security.
Damage to the Major damage: Moderate damage, repairable: Minor damage, repairable:
Structure and • The facility or protected space will • The facility or protected space • The facility or protected
Exterior Wall sustain a high level of damage will sustain a significant degree of space may globally sustain
Systems For Each without progressive collapse; damage, but the structure should be minor damage with some
Protection Level. • Casualties will occur and assets reusable; local significant damage
will be damaged; and • Some casualties may occur and possible; and
• Building components, including assets may be damaged; and • Occupants may incur some
structural members, will require • Building elements other than major injury, and assets may
replacement, or the building may structural members may require receive minor damage.
be completely un-repairable, replacement.
requiring demolition and
replacement.

General Requirements
Description Levels of Protection
Min Low Medium High
Good Engineering Practice Guidelines – The following are rules of thumb commonly
used to mitigate the effects of blast on structures. These guidelines are not meant to be
complete, but are provided to assist the designer in the initial evaluation and selection
of design approaches.
• For higher levels of protection from blast, cast-in-place reinforced concrete is normally the construction type of choice. Other types
of construction such as properly designed and detailed steel structures are also allowed. Several material and construction types,
while not disallowed by these criteria, may be undesirable and uneconomical for protection from blast.
• To economically provide protection from blast, inelastic or post elastic design is standard. This allows the structure to absorb the
energy of the explosion through plastic deformation while achieving the objective of saving lives. To design and analyze structures
for blast loads, which are highly nonlinear both spatially and temporally, it is essential that proper dynamic analysis methods be
used. Static analysis methods will generally result in unachievable or uneconomical designs;
• Recognize that components might act in directions for which they are not designed. This is due to the engulfment of structural
members by blast, the negative phase, the upward loading of elements, and dynamic rebound of members. Making steel
reinforcement (positive and negative faces) symmetric in all floor slabs, roof slabs, walls, beams and girders will address this issue.
Symmetric reinforcement also increases the ultimate load capacity of the members;
• Lap splices should fully develop the capacity of the reinforcement;
• Lap splices and other discontinuities should be staggered;
• Ductile detailing should be used for connections, especially primary structural member connections;
• There should be control of deflections around certain members, such as windows, to prevent premature failure. Additional
reinforcement is generally required;
• Balanced design of all building structural components is desired. For example, for window systems, the frame and anchorage must
be designed to resist the full capacity of the weakest element of the system;
• Special sheer reinforcement including ties and stirrups is generally required to allow large post-elastic behavior. You should
carefully balance the selection of small but heavily reinforced (i.e., congested) sections with larger sections with lower levels of
reinforcement;
• Connections for steel construction should be ductile and develop as much moment connection as practical. Connections for
cladding and exterior walls to steel frames shall develop the capacity of the wall system under blast loads;
• In general, single point failures that can cascade, producing wide spread catastrophic collapse, are to be avoided. A prime example
is the use of transfer beams and girders that, if lost, may cause progressive collapse and are therefore highly discouraged;
• Redundancy and alternative load paths are generally good in mitigating blast loads. One method of accomplishing this is to use two-
way reinforcement schemes where possible;
• In general, column spacing should be minimized so that reasonably sized members can be designed to resist the design loads and
increase the redundancy of the system. A practical upper level for column spacing is generally 9.1 m (30 ft.) for the levels of blast
loads described herein;
• In general, floor-to-floor heights should be minimized. Unless there is an overriding architectural requirement, a practical limit is
generally less than or equal to 4.9 m (16 ft.);
• It is recommended that you use fully grouted and reinforced CMU construction in cases where CMU is selected;
• It is essential that you actively coordinate structural requirements for blast with other disciplines including architectural and
mechanical;
• The use of one-way wall elements spanning from floor-to-floor is generally a preferred method to minimize blast loads imparted to
columns; and
• In many cases, the ductile detailing requirements for seismic design and the alternate load paths provided by progressive collapse
design assist in the protection from blast. You must bear in mind, however, that the design approaches are at times in conflict.
These conflicts must be worked out on a case-by-case basis.
Historic Buildings – Historic buildings are covered by these criteria in the same manner
as other existing buildings.

IV. Mechanical Engineering

Protection Against Airborne Contaminants – Protection against airborne chemical/
biological/radiological (CBR) contaminants can be achieved by using the devices listed
below.
Description Levels of Protection
Min Low Medium High
Particulate filters • Remove airborne solid or liquid substances including biological substances that exist in the form of aggregated
molecules or particles;
• Radioactive particulates can also be removed;
• High efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters are capable of removing a higher percentage and finer particles; and
• Particulate filters produce life cycle benefits that may exceed life cycle costs.
Adsorption filters Remove certain gaseous chemicals from the air stream, primarily using activated carbon.
Some are also capable of exchanging radioactive isotopes for stable ones.
Biological or Adopt NIOSH document recommendations
Radiological NA Use MERV 13 Use HEPA filter or functional Use HEPA filter or
Contaminants filter or functional equivalent functional equivalent
equivalent
NA NA Design for future detection technology
Chemical or Adopt NIOSH document recommendations
Radiological
Contaminants
NA None Use gas absorber for outside air Use gas absorber for outside air and return air
NA NA Design for future detection technology

Air System
Description Levels of Protection
Min Low Medium High
Air Intakes • Raising air intakes makes the building ventilation system less accessible and therefore less vulnerable to threats
that might introduce contaminates directly into the intakes;
• On buildings of more than 4 stories, locate intakes on the 4th floor or higher;
• On buildings of 3 stories or less, locate intakes on the roof or as high as practical;
• Locating intakes high on a wall is preferred over a roof location;
• When choosing secure locations for intakes in urban areas, take into consideration the vantage points offered to
threats by nearby buildings and roofs; and
• Results of analyses using air plume models related to CBR clouds could affect the placement of intakes. If
directed by your risk assessment, incorporate analysis results into your project’s design.
Utility Protection – Protecting utility systems, locating them away from vulnerable areas,
and restricting access helps assure that services will facilitate life safety and operations
support after an event.
Description Levels of Protection
Min Low Medium High
Utilities and NA NA If required, locate utility systems at least 15 meters (50 feet) from loading docks, front
Feeders entrances, and parking areas.
Incoming NA NA If required, within building and property lines, conceal incoming utility systems and
Utilities give them blast protection, including burial or proper encasement, wherever possible.
Water Supply If directed by the risk assessment, consider using off-the-shelf countermeasures to enhance protection of the water
supply that include: backflow preventers, central building water filtration and treatment systems, and point-of-use
filters.

Ventilation Systems – Pressurization is not necessary in buildings lower than 23 meters

(75 feet) or six stories above or below grade, unless required by other criteria. For
ventilation systems to function, electrical power must be available.
Description Levels of Protection
Min Low Medium High
Smoke Removal • In the event of a blast or event-related fires, the ventilation system may be essential to smoke removal,
Systems particularly in large, open spaces;
• Locate ventilation equipment away from high-risk areas such as loading docks and garages, and protect the
system controls and power wiring to the equipment;
• Connect the ventilation system to emergency power to provide the ability to selectively run one or several
air-handling units for smoke removal;
• Your facility’s multidisciplinary team should consider having separate HVAC systems in lobbies, loading
docks, and other locations where the significant risk of internal event exists;
• Provide smoke removal equipment with stand-alone local control panels that can continue to individually
function in the event the control wiring is severed from the main control system; and
• It may be appropriate to locate the panels with a fire alarm control panel.
Pressurized NA NA • Stairway pressurization system should maintain positive pressure in stairways for
Stairways occupant refuge, safe evacuation, and access by fire fighters;
• The entry of smoke and hazardous gases into stairways must be minimized..

V. Electrical Engineering
Service and Distribution
Description Levels of Protection
Min Low Medium High
Distributed NA • Emergency and normal electric panels, conduits, and switch gear should be installed separately, at
Emergency Power different locations, and as far apart as possible;
• Electric distribution should also run at separate locations; and
• Emergency power is required for life safety, security systems, and critical components at a minimum,
for all CBP facilities.
Normal Fuel Storage These criteria increase the reliability of the building’s power distribution, fuel storage, generator, utilities, and
feeders during an emergency. The focus is on separating power sources and locating electrical systems away
from vulnerable areas.
NA • The main fuel storage should be located away from loading docks, entrances, and parking. Access
should be restricted and protected (e.g., locks on caps and seals).
Emergency Fuel NA • The day tank should be mounted near the generator, given the same protection as the generator
Storage and sized to store approximately 120 hours of fuel;
• A battery and/or UPS could serve a smaller building or leased facility.
Tertiary Power A tertiary power source is intended for High Protection in buildings where operational continuity is critical.
Conduit and line can be installed outside to allow a trailer-mounted generator to connect to the building’s
electrical system; if this option is used, an operations plan must address this issue. Other tertiary power
methods include generators and feeders from alternative substations.
Emergency NA • Locate the emergency generator away from loading docks, entrances, and parking. More secure
Generator locations include the roof, protected grade level, and protected interior areas;
• If the emergency generator is installed outdoors at grade, it should be protected by perimeter walls
and locked entrances. The generator should not be located in any areas that are prone to flooding;
and
• Provisions for refueling and shutoff values in fuel lines within the building must be addressed.
Utilities and Feeders NA • Utility systems should be located away from loading docks, entrances, and parking. Underground
service is preferred;
• Alternatively, they can be hardened.

Power and Lighting

Description Levels of Protection
Min Low Medium High
Site Lighting Site lighting should be coordinated with the closed-circuit television (CCTV) system. Although CCTV cameras
are available for low-light applications, operations are enhanced with higher uniform lighting levels. See
Appendix 7.5, Protective Lighting, for further information.
Restrooms NA NA • Emergency lighting in restrooms can facilitate evacuation and permit limited use during
power outages when sheltering-in-place is required;
• Otherwise, emergency power for exit lights should be provided.
Stairways and Exit NA NA • Self-contained battery lighting should be provided in stairwells and for exit signs as back up
Signs in case of emergency generator failure;
• As an alternative to battery powered lighting, handrails, stair treads, signs, and doors can
be painted with phosphorescent paint; and
• Floor-level evacuation lighting systems should also be considered since a design event
may fill corridors with dense smoke.
Communications and Security Systems
Description Levels of Protection
Min Low Medium High
Redundant NA NA Base radio communication system with antenna should be installed, consistent with building
Communications codes, and portable sets distributed on floors. This is the preferred alternative.
NA The facility could have a second telephone service to maintain
communications in case of an incident.
Radio Telemetry • Wireless data transmission minimizes the risk of communications breakdowns due to wiring damage.
• Radio telemetry can be used for non-secure data that support the life safety system and other critical
operations.
NA NA NA Distributed antennas could be located throughout the facility
if required for emergency communication through wireless
transmission of data.
Alarm and NA NA • Alarm and information systems should not be collected and mounted in a single conduit,
Information Systems or even co-located. Having circuits follow different paths reduces the risk of total system
failure during some events. Install circuits to various parts of the building in at least two
directions and/or risers;
• Low voltage signal and control copper conductors should not share conduit with high
voltage power conductors; and
• Fiber-optic conductors are generally preferred over copper.
Empty Conduits NA NA • Empty conduits and power outlets can be provided for possible future installation of
security control equipment. This would eliminate the need for major retrofits and facilitate
installing security equipment, including metal detectors, explosives detectors, sensors, and
X-ray machines, as the need arises and technology advances;
• This criterion does not require installation of equipment. Some future technology may not
require conduits
COMSEC Refer to Attachment Q of DHS MD 4300B.

VI. Fire Protection Engineering

Fire Analysis
Description Levels of Protection
Min Low Medium High
Fire Protection Perform a fire protection engineering analysis whenever a blast analysis is required. In addition, a fire
Engineering Analysis
protection engineer should coordinate with the blast engineer on issues affecting life safety and building
egress. Fire analysis is consistent with building codes and applies only to the design events of the Criteria.
Active System - Protecting the water supply, dual fire pumps, and standpipe connection
and/or locating them away from vulnerable areas helps ensure that services will provide
life safety and operations support after an event.
Description Levels of Protection
Min Low Medium High
Water Supply The water system should be protected from single point failure. The incoming line should be encased, buried,
or located 15 m (50 ft.) away from high threat areas. The exterior mains should be looped and sectionalized.
When supported by the risk assessment, the interior standpipes should be cross-connected on each floor.
Dual Fire Pumps: To increase the reliability of the fire protection system for High Level Protection, a dual pump arrangement
Electric and Diesel may be used, with one electric pump and one diesel pump. There should be a performance-based design to
address the type and magnitude of failures the sprinkler/standpipe systems must withstand, along with the
appropriate pump system in a building with multiple generators.
Egress Door Locks All security-locking arrangements on doors used for egress must comply with requirements of NFPA 101, Life
Safety Code. See Appendix 7.6, Doors and Door Hardware.
Operational System
Description Levels of Protection
Min Low Medium High
Guard and Employee • Create an OEP manual for use by security guards and employees that covers all locations in your facility;
Training • Guards and employees should receive emergency training in the proper reporting and response to fires and
other emergencies, and in the use of portable and built-in protection systems, including training in system
maintenance.
Building Documents Designate an area, preferably in the Operation Control Center, where the following building documents will be
readily available:
• Emergency instructions;
• OEP manuals (see Chapter 15, Occupant Emergency Plan); and
• Building plans for Medium and High Protection Levels.

VII. Electronic Security

Control Centers and Building Management Systems
Description Levels of Protection
Min Low Medium High
Operational Control • Centralizing control center information through co-location can improve the reliability and effectiveness of life
Center (OCC) safety systems, security systems, and building functions;
Fire Command • If the control centers are co-located, you must specify operational requirements, especially a pre-designated
Center (FCC) chain of command to ensure that the most qualified leadership is in control for specific types of events; and
Security Control • As an alternative to co-locating command centers for Minimum and Low Protection, provide secure
Center (SCC) information links between the SCC, OCC, and FCC.
Backup Control NA NA Provide a backup control workstation in a Install a fully redundant BCC.
Center (BCC) different location, such as a manager’s or
engineer’s office. If feasible, consider an off-site
location.

Security for Utility Closets, Mechanical Rooms, and Telephone Closets - Control access to
security system, emergency communication, and associated systems wiring and conduit,
preferably by routing them through separate and secure closets.
Description Levels of Protection
Min Low Medium High
Key System Use a key system with a method of recording times of entry and departure such as a watchman’s clock system.
For use with conventional keyed doors only.
Monitored Access NA NA Design for remote monitoring of access to mechanical, electrical, and telecommunication
rooms. Access should be authorized, programmed, and monitored by the CCC through pre-
identification of maintenance personnel. To design the doors, you may need details of the
security system.
Devices and Alarms
Description Levels of Protection
Min Low Medium High
Elevator Recall • Consistent with the facility OEP, provide a button on the Fire Control Center (FCC) to recall elevators to
an alternative floor if the elevators could safely be used to evacuate disabled persons or if the normal
evacuation route would involve traveling through a high risk area;
• Consider whether elevators should discharge personnel on the first floor (lobby) during some events.
Consider the requirements of the Safety Code for Elevators and Escalators, ASME Standard A17.1.
Elevator Emergency • In conjunction with the recall system, install a pre-recorded message in the elevator cab speakers, notifying
Message passengers of an emergency and explaining how to proceed;
• Provisions must be made for an override of recorded message with a live transmission with directions for the
specific emergency.

Intrusion Protection System

Description Levels of Protection
Min Low Medium High
Door Locks Special Security High security keying or card reader system with provisions for a pin number. Key
keying keying duplication should be made difficult and recorded.
system not or card Electronic locking such as electromagnetic locks for fire exits, consistent with
needed. reader NFPA 101 requirements.
Key lock system. A formal key control program shall be maintained. See Chapter 9, Keys and
when the Locks.
facility is
unoccupied
Intrusion Detection Provide basic intrusion detection for entrances into the facility
Generally by means of balanced magnetic reed switches
NA • Basic intrusion detection for entrances into the facility;
• Interior door protection should be by means of balanced magnetic contact
switch sets for locations at which magnet substitution is a vulnerability;
• Exterior door protection, especially at loading docks, should only be provided by
balanced magnetic contact switch sets, to include all overhead/roll-up doors;
• Glass-break sensors shall be provided; and
• Requirements for roof intrusion detection should be reviewed.

Intrusion Protection System

Description Levels of Protection
Min Low Medium High
Monitoring Monitoring provided by Security systems monitored by an Security systems monitored by an on-site,
a commercial central on-site, proprietary security control 24-hour proprietary security control center.
station. Under special center. Commercial central stations
circumstances, an on- may be used for after-hours or to
site security central supplement on-site monitoring.
control center may be
provided during normal
business hours for low
levels of protection.
Closed Circuit TV NA • Provide a color CCTV surveillance system with recording capability to view and
(CCTV) record activity at the perimeter of the building;
• A mix of monochrome cameras should be considered for areas that lack adequate
illumination for color cameras. Monitoring mainly at entrances, monitored exits,
vehicular entrances into parking garages, and loading docks;
• The CCTV systems should be primarily for alarm assessment and access control
automation purposes. The use of the CCTV system for general surveillance should
be discouraged, with the occasional exception of automated video guard tours;
• All CCTV cameras should be on real-time and time-lapsed video recorders; and
• For deterrence as well as to aid post-incident investigations, key exterior areas (for
Medium Protection) or most exterior areas (for High Protection), especially vehicle
routes close to the facility, should be video recorded. The use of digital video
systems should be considered by the designer.
• See Chapter 8.12, Closed Circuit Television Systems.
Duress Alarms or Provide call buttons at key public contact areas and as needed in the offices of managers and directors, in
Assistance Stations garages, and other areas that are identified as high risk locations by the project-specific risk assessment.
Alarms should • Duress alarms should report to the security command center;
report to the central • Duress alarms are required for all guard posts and command centers.
station during normal If CCTV coverage is available, automatic activation of corresponding cameras
business hours should be provided, as well as dedicated communications with security or law
enforcement stations.

VIII. Parking Security

Parking
Description Levels of Protection
Min Low Medium High
Parking on Adjacent Parking is often permitted in curb lanes, with a sidewalk between the lane and the building. Where the distance
Streets from the building to the nearest curb provides insufficient setback, and compensating design measures do
not sufficiently protect the building from the assessed threat, you must restrict parking as required by your risk
assessment as follows:
Unrestricted Government-owned and key employee Use the lane for stand-off; use structural
parking parking only. features to prevent parking. For typical
city streets, this may require negotiating to
close the curb lane.
Parking on Adjacent Adjacent public parking should be directed to more distant or better-protected areas, segregated from
Properties employee parking and away from the facility. One alternative to distance for blast is the acceptance of some
higher degree of risk.

Parking
Description Levels of Protection
Min Low Medium High
Parking Inside the Public parking withParking for Parking for selected Parking only for selected government
Building ID check government government employees with a need for security.
vehicles and employees only.
employees of the
building only.
On-Site Surface or As directed by the risk assessment, adjacent surface parking must maintain a minimum stand-off of X meters.
Structured Parking Parking within X meters of the building must be restricted to authorized vehicles.
Parking Facilities
Description Levels of Protection
Min Low Medium High
Natural Surveillance • Maximize visibility across, as well as into and out of, the parking facility and openness to the exterior;
• Use express or non-parking ramps that speeding the user to parking on flat surfaces;
• Plan pedestrian paths to concentrate activity to the extent possible;
• Limit vehicular entry/exits to a minimum number of locations;
• Use long-span construction and high ceilings to enhance openness and aid in lighting the facility;
• Avoid sheer walls, especially near turning bays and pedestrian travel paths. If they are required, improve
visibility using large holes in sheer walls;
• Eliminate dead-end parking areas, as well as nooks and crannies;
• Landscaping should be done judiciously so as not to provide hiding places. It is desirable to hold planting
away from the facility to permit observation of intruders; and
• Locate attended booths, parking offices, or security stations so that activity at pedestrian and vehicle entry
points to the facility can be monitored.
Perimeter Access NA NA • Design a system of fencing, grilles, doors, etc., to completely close down access to the
Control entire facility in unattended hours, or in some cases, all hours;
• Any ground level pedestrian exits that open into non-secure areas should be emergency
exits only and fitted with panic bar hardware for exiting movement only;
• An intercom/car reader/keypad station at vehicle and pedestrian entrances (with optional
installation at exit-only openings); and
• Devices to allow for an audit trail of cards, electronic vehicle tags, or keypad codes that
have been used to release electromechanical locks, activate roll-up service door motors, or
otherwise permit entrance to a controlled parking area.
• See Appendix 7.3, Fencing.

Parking Facilities
Description Levels of Protection
Min Low Medium High
Stair Towers and NA NA • Stair tower and elevator lobby design must be as open as code permits. The ideal solution
Elevators is a stair and/or elevator waiting area totally open to the exterior and/or the parking areas.
Designs that ensure that people using these areas can be easily seen - and can see out -
should be encouraged;
• If a stair must be enclosed for code or weather protection purposes, glass walls will deter
both personal injury attacks and various types of vandalism;
• Potential hiding places below stairs should be closed off; nooks and crannies should be
avoided;
• Elevator cabs should have glass backs whenever possible;
• Elevator lobbies should be well lit and visible to both patrons in the parking areas and the
public out on the street;
• Where the means of egress must be protected, self-closing doors must be used; and
• Supporting systems (e.g., heat detectors or other sensors) should be considered.
Surface Finishes and NA • Paint interior walls a light color (i.e., white or light blue) to improve illumination;
Signage • Signage should be clear to avoid confusion and direct users to their destinations efficiently; and
• If an escort service is available, signs should inform users.
Lighting • The lighting level standards recommended by the Illuminations Engineering Society of North America
(IESNA) Subcommittee on Off-Roadway Facilities are the lowest acceptable lighting levels for any parking
facility;
• A point-by-point analysis should be done in accordance with the IESNA standards.
Emergency NA NA • Place emergency intercom/duress buttons or assistance stations on structure columns,
Communications fences, other posts, and/or freestanding pedestals and brightly mark them with stripping or
paint visible in low light. These stations are to be used in conjunction with – and not as an
alternative to – on-site monitoring;
• If CCTV coverage is available, automatic activation of corresponding cameras should be
provided, as well as dedicated communications with security or law enforcement stations;
• It is helpful to include flashing lights that can rapidly pinpoint the location of the calling
station for the response force, especially in very large parking structures;
• It should only be possible to re-set a station that has been activated at the station with a
security key. It should not be possible to re-set the station from any monitoring site; and
• The horizontal distance on a floor to reach an emergency communication station shall not
exceed 15 m (50 feet).
CCTV NA NA • Place color CCTV cameras with recording capability and pan-zoom-tilt drivers, if warranted,
at entrance and exit vehicle ramps. Auto-scanning units are not recommended. The
cameras should be oriented to record license plates of entering and departing vehicles, and
to record pedestrians exiting or entering via vehicle ramps;
• Place fixed-mount, fixed-lens color or monochrome cameras on at least one side of regular
use and emergency exit doors connecting to the building or leading outside. In order for
these cameras to capture scenes of violations, time-delayed electronic locking should be
provided at doors, if permitted by governing code authorities. Without features such as
time-delayed unlocking or video motion detection, these cameras may be ineffective.

IX. Determining Building Security Level

• It has been determined by CBP/IA/SMD that all CBP facilities shall meet the Level
III security requirements listed in the table below. A higher level of security may be
assigned to a facility based on the risk assessment conducted.
• Determining the building security level in accordance with the ISC Standard, Facility
Security Level Determinations for Federal Facilities, dated 21 Feb 2008, ISC Security
Design Criteria, defines the criteria and process to be used in determining the Facility
Security Level (FSL) of a Federal facility. This categorization serves as the basis for
implementing protective measures under other ISC standards. Consistent with the
authority contained in Executive Order 12977, “Interagency Security Committee,” dated
October 19, 1995, this Standard is applicable to all buildings and facilities in the United
States occupied by Federal employees for non-military activities. These include existing
buildings; new construction; major modernizations; facilities owned, to be purchased, or
leased; stand-alone facilities, Federal campuses; and, where appropriate, special-use
facilities.
• Federal holdings are divided into four out of the five security levels for this Physical
Security Manual, based primarily on staffing size, number of employees, use, and the
need for public access.

X. Building Security Levels

Factor I II III IV Score
Mission Criticality LOW MEDIUM HIGH VERY HIGH

Symbolism LOW MEDIUM HIGH VERY HIGH

Facility Population <100 101-250 251-750 >750

10,000-100,000 100,000-250,000
Facility Size <10,000 sq.ft. >250,000sq.ft
sq. ft. sq.ft.
Threat to Tenant
LOW MEDIUM HIGH VERY HIGH
Agencies

Sum of above

Facility Security I II III IV

Preliminary FSL
Level 5-7 Points 8-12 Points 13-17 Points 18-20 Points

Intangible Justification +/- 1 FSL

Adjustment
Final FSL

• Facility Security Level Determinations for Federal Facilities—An Interagency Security

Committee Standard” (the Standard) defines the criteria and process to be used in
determining the Facility Security Level (FSL) of a Federal facility.
• This categorization serves as the basis for implementing protective measures under
other ISC standards. Consistent with the authority contained in Executive Order 12977,
“Interagency Security Committee,” dated October 19, 1995, this Standard is applicable
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
218 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

to all buildings and facilities in the United States occupied by Federal employees for
nonmilitary activities. These include:
οο Existing buildings;
οο New construction, or major modernizations;
οο Facilities owned, to be purchased, or leased;
οο Stand-alone facilities;
οο Federal campuses;
οο Individual facilities on Federal campuses (where appropriate); and
οο Special-use facilities.

XI. Security Standards and Layers of Security

• Security Standards. Security standards are discussed based on layers of security for a
facility. These include:
οο Perimeter Security. Perimeter security standards pertain to the areas outside
government control. Depending on the facility type, the perimeter may include
sidewalks, parking lots, outside walls of the building, a hallway, or simply an office
door. The elements of perimeter security are: parking, closed circuit television
monitoring, lighting, and physical barriers.
οο Entry Security. Entry security standards refer to security issues related to the entry
of persons and packages into a facility. The elements of entry security are: receiving/
shipping, access control, and entrances/exits.
οο Interior Security. Interior security standards refer to security issues associated
with prevention of criminal or terrorist activity within the facility. This area concerns
secondary levels of control after people or things have entered the facility. The
elements of interior security are: employee/visitor identification, utilities, occupant
emergency plans, and day care centers.
• Security Planning. Security planning standards refer to recommendations requiring
long-term planning and commitment, as well as security standards addressing broader
issues with implications beyond security at a particular facility. The elements of
security planning are: intelligence sharing, training, tenant assignment, administrative
procedures, and construction/renovation.
•
The following sections present security standards at each layer of security for the facility
security levels.

 = Minimum standard  = Desirable  = Standard based on facility evaluation

 = Not applicable  = CBP Minimum standard

XII. Security Standards by Layer of Security

Facility
Perimeter Security Standards
Level
Parking III IV V
Access to government parking should be limited where possible to government
Control of Facility Parking vehicles and personnel. At a minimum, authorized parking spaces and vehicles   
should be assigned and identified.
Where feasible, parking areas adjacent to Federal space should also be controlled
Control of Adjacent
to reduce the potential for threats against Federal facilities and employee exposure   
Parking
to criminal activity.
Avoid Leases Where
Avoid leasing facilities where parking cannot be controlled. If necessary, relocate
Parking Cannot Be   
offices to facilities that do provide added security through regulated parking.
Controlled
Leases Should Provide
Security Control for Endeavor to negotiate guard services as part of lease.   
Adjacent Parking
Post Signs and Arrange
Procedures should be established and implemented to alert the public to towing
for Towing Unauthorized   
policies and the removal of unauthorized vehicles.
Vehicles
Identification System and
Procedures should be established for identifying vehicles and corresponding
Procedures for Authorized   
parking spaces (e.g., placard, decal, card key, etc.)
Parking
Adequate Lighting for Effective lighting provides added safety for employees and deters illegal or
  
Parking Areas threatening activities.
Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) Monitoring III IV V
Twenty-four hour CCTV surveillance and recording is required at all locations as
CCTV Surveillance
a deterrent. Requirements will depend on assessment of the security level for
Cameras with Time Lapse   
each facility. Time-lapse video recordings are also highly valuable as a source of
Video Recording
evidence and investigative leads.
Post Signs Advising of 24- Warning signs advising of twenty-four hour surveillance act as a deterrent in
  
hr Video Surveillance protecting employees and facilities.
Lighting III IV V
Standard safety code requirement in virtually all areas. Provides for safe
Lighting with Emergency
evacuation of buildings in case of natural disaster, power outage, or criminal/   
Power Backup
terrorist activity.
Physical Barriers III IV V
This security measure will only be possible in locations where the Government
Extend Physical Perimeter
controls the property and where physical constraints are not present. Barriers   
with Barriers
should be made of concrete and/or steel.
Parking Barriers Desirable to prevent unauthorized vehicle access.   

 = Minimum standard  = Desirable  = Standard based on facility evaluation

 = Not applicable  = CBP Minimum standard

Facility
Entry Security Standards
Level
Receiving / Shipping (R/S) III IV V
Review Current R/S
Audit current standards for package entry and suggest ways to enhance security.   
Procedures
Implement Modified R/S After auditing procedures for R/S, implement improved procedures for security
Procedures enhancements.
  
Access Control III IV V
Evaluate Facility
If security guards are required, the number of guards at any given time will depend
for Security Guard   
on the size of the facility, the hours of operation, and current risk factors, etc.
Requirements
Security Guard Patrol   
Intrusion Detection
System with Central See Appendix 8.9, Intrusion Detection Systems.   
Monitoring Capability
Upgrade to Current Life
Life safety standards include: fire detection and fire suppression systems.   
Safety Standards
Entrances/Exits III IV V
X-Ray and Magnetometer Level III and IV evaluations would focus on tenant agencies, public interface, and
at Public Entrances feasibility.
  
Require X-Ray Screening All packages entering building should be subject to x-ray screening and/or visual
of All Mail/Packages inspection.
  
Peep Holes Easy and effective visual recognition system for small offices.   
Intercom Communication tool that can be used in combination with peephole.   
Allows employees to view and communicate remotely with visitors before allowing
Entry Control with CCTV
access. Not applicable for larger Levels III and above because of entry screening   
and Door Strikes
devices required at these Levels.
Any exterior entrance should have a high-security lock as determined by GSA
High Security Locks   
specifications and/or agency requirements.

 = Minimum standard  = Desirable  = Standard based on facility evaluation

 = Not applicable  = CBP Minimum standard

Facility
Interior Security Standards
Level
Employee/Visitor Identification III IV V
Agency Photo
Displayed at all times by all personnel.   
Identification
Visitors should be readily apparent in Level III facilities. Other facilities may ask
Visitor Control/Screening
visitors to sign-in with a receptionist or guard, or require an escort, or formal   
System
identification badge.
Stringent methods of control over visitor badges will ensure that visitors wearing
Visitor Identification
badges have been screened and are authorized to be at the facility during the   
Accountability System
appropriate time frame.
Established Issuing Develop procedures and establish authority for issuing employee and visitor
Authority identification.
  
Utilities III IV V
Smaller facilities may not have control over utility access, or locations of utility
Prevent Unauthorized
areas. Where possible, assure that utility areas are secure and that only authorized   
Access to Utility Areas
personnel can gain entry.
CBP requires that all alarm systems, CCTV monitoring devices, fire protection
Provide Emergency Power systems, and entry control devices, etc., are required to be connected to
to Critical Systems emergency power sources. The tenant is responsible for determining which
  
computer or communication systems require backup power.
Occupant Emergency Plans (OEPs) III IV V
Examine OEP and
Review and update current OEP procedures for thoroughness. OEPs should
Contingency Procedures   
reflect the current security climate.
Based on Threats
OEPs in Place, Updated
Annually, Periodic Testing See Chapter 15, Occupant Emergency Plans.   
Exercise
Assignment based on GSA requirement that largest tenant in facility maintain
Assign and Train OEP OEP responsibility. Officials should be assigned, trained and a contingency plan
Officials established to provide for the possible absence of OEP officials in the event of
  
emergency activation of the OEP.
Annual Occupants All occupants should be aware of their individual responsibilities in an emergency
Training situation.
  
Day Care Centers III IV V
Evaluate Whether to
Locate Day Care Facility
Conduct a thorough review of security and safety standards.   
in Buildings with High
Threat Activities
Compare Feasibility
of Locating Day Care If a facility is being considered for a day care center, an evaluation should be made
in Facilities Outside based on the risk factors associated with tenants and the location of the facility.
  
Locations

 = Minimum standard  = Desirable  = Standard based on facility evaluation

 = Not applicable  = CBP Minimum standard

Facility
Security Planning
Level
Intelligence Sharing III IV V
Intelligence sharing between law enforcement agencies and security organizations
Establish Law
should be established in order to facilitate the accurate flow of timely and relevant
Enforcement Agency/   
information between appropriate government agencies. Agencies involved in
Security Liaisons
providing security must be part of the complete intelligence process.
Determine what procedures exist to ensure timely delivery of critical intelligence.
Review and improve procedures to alert agencies and specific targets of criminal/
Procedures for Intelligence
terrorist threats. Establish standard administrative procedures for response to   
Receipt & Dissemination
incoming alerts. Review flow of information for effectiveness and time critical
dissemination.
To facilitate communication, standardized terminology for Alert Levels should be
Uniform Security & Threat
implemented (e.g., Normal, Low, Moderate, and High) See Chapter 14, Incident   
Nomenclature
Response/HSAS.
Training III IV V
Provide security awareness training for all tenants. At a minimum, self-study
Annual Security programs utilizing videos, and literature, etc., should be implemented. These
Awareness Training materials should provide up-to-date information covering security practices,
  
employee security awareness, and personal safety, etc.
Armed/Unarmed Guard Liaison with the Federal Protective Service to ensure the standardized unarmed/
Qualifications and Training armed guard qualifications and training requirements are being met. No CBP entity   
Requirements has contracting authority for guard service within DHS except FPS.
Tenant Assignment III IV V
Co-locate Agencies with To capitalize on efficiencies and economies, agencies with like security
Similar Security Needs requirements should be located in the same facility if possible.
  
Do Not Co-locate High/ Low risk agencies should not take on additional risk by being located with high-risk
Low Risk Agencies agencies.
  
Administrative Procedures III IV V
Establish flexible work schedule in high threat/high risk area to minimize employee
Flexible Work Schedules vulnerability to criminal activity. Flexible work schedules can enhance employee   
safety by staggering reporting and departure times.
Arrange for Employee
Minimize exposure to criminal activity by allowing employees to park at or inside
Parking in or Near Building   
the building after normal work hours.
after Normal Work Hours
Background Security
Conduct background security checks and/or establish security control procedures
Checks and Security   
for service contract personnel.
Control Procedures
Construction/Renovation III IV V
Install shatter resistant
Application of shatter resistant material to protect personnel and citizens from
material On All Exterior
the hazards of flying glass as a result of impact or explosion. See Appendix 7.7,   
Windows (Shatter
Windows.
Protection)
Designs and construction projects should be reviewed, to incorporate current
Review Current Projects technology and blast standards. Immediate review of ongoing projects may
for Blast Standards generate savings in the implementation of upgrading to higher blast standards
  
prior to completion of construction.

Facility
Security Planning
Level
Review/Establish Uniform Review, establish, and implement uniform construction standards as it relates to
Construction Standards security consideration.
  
In smaller facilities or those that lease space, control over design standards may
Review/Establish Uniform
not be possible. However, future site selections should attempt to locate in facilities
New Design Standards for   
that do meet standards. New construction of government-controlled facilities
Blast Resistance
should review, establish, and implement new design standards for blast resistance.
Every foot between a potential bomb and a building will dramatically reduce
Establish Street Set-Back damage and increase the survival rate. Street set-back is always desirable, but
for New Construction should be used in conjunction with barriers in Level IV and V facilities.
  

 = Minimum standard  = Desirable  = Standard based on facility evaluation

 = Not applicable =CBP Minimum standard

XIII. Security Standards by Facility Security Level

Applicability
LEVEL III Facility Perimeter Security Standards
   
Parking
Access to government parking should be limited where possible to
Control of Facility Parking government vehicles and personnel. At a minimum, authorized parking spaces 
and vehicles should be assigned and identified.
Post Signs and Arrange
Procedures should be established and implemented to alert the public to
for Towing Unauthorized 
towing policies and the removal of unauthorized vehicles.
Vehicles
Identification System and
Procedures should be established for identifying vehicles and corresponding
Procedures for Authorized 
parking spaces (e.g., placard, decal, card key, etc.).
Parking
Adequate Lighting for Effective lighting provides added safety for employees and deters illegal or
Parking Areas threatening activities.

Where feasible, parking areas adjacent to Federal space should also be
Control of Adjacent
controlled to reduce the potential for threats against Federal facilities and 
Parking
employee exposure to criminal activity.
Avoid Leases Where Avoid leasing facilities where parking cannot be controlled. If necessary,
Parking Cannot Be relocate offices to facilities that do provide added security through regulated 
Controlled parking.
Leases Should Provide
Security Control for Negotiate guard services through FPS as part of lease. 
Adjacent Parking
Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) Monitoring
Twenty-four hour CCTV surveillance and recording is desirable at the
CCTV Surveillance entrance and egress all locations as a deterrent. Requirements will depend
Cameras with Time Lapse on assessment for each facility. Time-lapse video recordings are also highly 
Video Recording valuable as a source of evidence and investigative leads. See Appendix 8.12,
CCTV.
Post Signs Advising of 24- Warning signs advising of twenty-four hour surveillance act as a deterrent in
hr Video Surveillance protecting employees and facilities.


Applicability
LEVEL III Facility Perimeter Security Standards
   
Lighting
Standard safety code requirement in virtually all areas. Provides for safe
Lighting with Emergency
evacuation of buildings in case of natural disaster, power outage or criminal/ 
Power Backup
terrorist activity.
Physical Barriers
This security measure will only be possible in locations where the Government
Extend Physical Perimeter
controls the property and where physical constraints are not present. Barriers 
with Barriers
should be made of concrete and/or steel. See Appendix 7.2, Barriers.
Parking Barriers Desirable to prevent unauthorized vehicle access. 

 = Minimum standard  = Desirable  = Standard based on facility evaluation

 = Not applicable =CBP Minimum standard

Applicability
LEVEL III FACILITY: Entry Security Standards
   
Receiving / Shipping
Review Receiving & Audit current standards for package entry and suggest ways to enhance
Shipping Procedures security. 
Implement Receiving & After auditing procedures for receiving & shipping, implement improved
Shipping Procedures procedures for security enhancements. 
Access Control
Evaluate Facility If security guards are required, the number of guards at any given time will
for Security Guard depend on the size of the facility, the hours of operation, and current risk 
Requirements factors, etc.
Intrusion Detection
System with Central See Appendix 8.9, Intrusion Detection Systems 
Monitoring Capability
Upgrade to Current Life
Life safety standards include: fire detection and fire suppression systems. 
Safety Standards
Security Guard Patrol 
Entrances/Exits
Any exterior entrance should have a high security lock as determined by GSA
High Security Locks 
specifications and/or agency requirements.
X-Ray and Magnetometer Level III and IV evaluations will focus on tenant agencies, public interface, and

at Public Entrances feasibility.
Require X-Ray Screening All packages entering building should be subject to X-ray screening and/or

of All Mail/Packages visual inspection.
Peep Holes Easy and effective visual recognition system for small offices. 
Intercom Communication tool that can be used in combination with peephole. 
Allows employees to view and communicate remotely with visitors before
Entry Control with CCTV
allowing access. Not applicable for larger Levels III and above because of 
and Door Strikes
entry screening devices required at these Levels (e.g., “Airphone”).

 = Minimum standard  = Desirable  = Standard based on facility evaluation

 = Not applicable =CBP Minimum standard

Applicability
LEVEL III FACILITY: Interior Security Standards
   
Employee/Visitor Identification
Visitors should be readily apparent in smaller Level III facilities. Other facilities
Visitor Control/Screening
will make visitors sign-in with a receptionist or guard, or require an escort, and 
System
formal identification badge.
Agency Photo
Displayed at all times by all personnel. May not be required in smaller facilities. 
Identification
Stringent methods of control over visitor badges will ensure that visitors
Visitor Identification
wearing badges have been screened and are authorized to be at the facility 
Accountability System
during the appropriate time frame.
Established Issuing Develop procedures and establish authority for issuing employee and visitor
Authority identification.

Utilities
Smaller facilities may not have control over utility access, or locations of utility
Prevent Unauthorized
areas. Where possible, assure that utility areas are secure and that only 
Access to Utility Areas
authorized personnel can gain entry.
CBP requires that all alarm systems, CCTV monitoring devices, fire protection
Provide Emergency Power systems, and entry control devices, etc., are to be connected to emergency
to Critical Systems power sources. The tenant is responsible for determining which computer or

communication systems require backup power.
Occupant Emergency Plans (OEPs)
Examine OEP and
Review and update current OEP procedures for thoroughness. OEPs should
Contingency Procedures 
reflect the current security climate.
Based on Threats
Oeps In Place, Updated
Annually, Periodic Testing 
Exercise
Assignment based on GSA/FPS requirements that the largest tenant in
facility maintain OEP responsibility. Officials should be assigned, trained and
Assign and Train OEP
a contingency plan established to provide for the possible absence of OEP 
Officials
officials in the event of emergency activation of the OEP. See Chapter 15,
Occupant Emergency Plans
All occupants should be aware of their individual responsibilities in an
Annual Occupant Training 
emergency situation.
Day Care Centers
Evaluate Whether to
Locate Day Care Facility
Conduct a thorough review of security and safety standards. 
in Buildings with High
Threat Activities
Compare Feasibility
If a facility is being considered for a day care center, an evaluation should be
of Locating Day Care
made based on the risk factors associated with tenants and the location of the 
in Facilities Outside
facility.
Locations

 = Minimum standard  = Desirable  = Standard based on facility evaluation

 = Not applicable =CBP Minimum standard

Applicability
LEVEL III FACILITY: Security Planning
   
Intelligence Sharing
Intelligence sharing between law enforcement agencies and security
Establish Law organizations should be established in order to facilitate the accurate flow
Enforcement Agency/ of timely and relevant information among appropriate government agencies. 
Security Liaisons Agencies involved in providing security must be part of the complete
intelligence process.
Determine what procedures exist to ensure timely delivery of critical
intelligence. Review and improve procedures to alert agencies and specific
Procedures for Intelligence
targets of criminal/terrorist threats. Establish standard administrative 
Receipt & Dissemination
procedures for response to incoming alerts. Review flow of information for
effectiveness and time critical dissemination.
To facilitate communication, standardized terminology for Alert Levels should
Uniform Security & Threat
be implemented (e.g., Normal, Low, Moderate, and High - as recommended by 
Nomenclature
Security Standards Committee).
Training
Provide security awareness training for all tenants. At a minimum, self-study
Annual Security programs utilizing videos, and literature, etc., should be implemented. These
Awareness Training materials should provide up-to-date information covering security practices,

employee security awareness, and personal safety, etc.
Unarmed Guard Liaison with the Federal Protective Service to ensure the standardized unarmed
Qualifications and Training guard qualifications and training requirements are being met. No CBP entity 
Requirements has contracting authority for guard service within DHS except FPS.
Armed Guard Liaison with the Federal Protective Service to ensure the standardized unarmed
Qualifications and Training guard qualifications and training requirements are being met. No CBP entity 
Requirements has contracting authority for guard service within DHS except FPS.
Tenant Assignment
Co-locate Agencies with To capitalize on efficiencies and economies, agencies with similar security
Similar Security Needs requirements should be located in the same facility if possible.

Do Not Co-locate High/ Low risk agencies should not take on additional risk by being located with high-
Low Risk Agencies risk agencies.

Administrative Procedures
Establish flexible work schedule in high threat/high risk area to minimize
Flexible Work Schedules employee vulnerability to criminal activity. Flexible work schedules can enhance 
employee safety by staggering reporting and departure times.
Background Security
Conduct background security checks and/or establish security control
Checks and Security 
procedures for service contract personnel.
Control Procedures

Arrange for Employee

Minimize exposure to criminal activity by allowing employees to park at or
Parking in or Near Building 
inside the building after normal work hours.
after Normal Work Hours

Construction/Renovation
Designs and construction projects should be reviewed to incorporate current
Review Current Projects technology and blast standards. Immediate review of ongoing projects may
for Blast Standards generate savings in the implementation of upgrading to higher blast standards

prior to completion of construction.
Review/Establish Uniform Review, establish, and implement uniform construction standards as it relates
Construction Standards to security consideration.


Applicability
LEVEL III FACILITY: Security Planning
   
In smaller facilities or those that lease space, control over design standards
Review/Establish Uniform may not be possible. However, future site selections should attempt to locate
New Design Standards for in facilities that do meet standards. New construction of government-controlled 
Blast Resistance facilities should review, establish, and implement new design standards for
blast resistance.
Install Shatter resistant
Application of shatter resistant material to protect personnel and citizens from
materials on All Exterior
the hazards of flying glass as a result of impact or explosion. See Appendix 7.7, 
Windows (Shatter
Windows.
Protection)
Every foot between a potential bomb and a building will dramatically reduce
Establish Street Set-Back
damage and increase the survival rate. Street set-back is always desirable, but 
for New Construction
should be used in conjunction with barriers in Level IV and V facilities.

 = Minimum standard  = Desirable  = Standard based on facility evaluation

 = Not applicable =CBP Minimum standard

Applicability
LEVEL IV FACILITY: Perimeter Security Standards
   
Parking
Access to government parking should be limited where possible to government
Control of Facility Parking vehicles and personnel. At a minimum, authorized parking spaces and vehicles 
should be assigned and identified.
Post Signs and Arrange
Procedures should be established and implemented to alert the public to
for Towing Unauthorized 
towing policies and the removal of unauthorized vehicles.
Vehicles
Identification System and
Procedures should be established for identifying vehicles and corresponding
Procedures for Authorized 
parking spaces (e.g., placard, decal, card key, etc.)
Parking
Adequate Lighting for Effective lighting provides added safety for employees and deters illegal or
Parking Areas threatening activities. See Appendix 7.5, Lighting.

Where feasible, parking areas adjacent to Federal space should also be
Control of Adjacent
controlled to reduce the potential for threats against Federal facilities and 
Parking
employee exposure to criminal activity.
Avoid Leases Where Avoid leasing facilities where parking cannot be controlled. If necessary,
Parking Cannot Be relocate offices to facilities that do provide added security through regulated 
Controlled parking.
Leases Should Provide
Security Control for Endeavor to negotiate guard services as part of lease through FPS. 
Adjacent Parking
Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) Monitoring
Twenty-four-hour CCTV surveillance and recording is desirable at all locations
CCTV Surveillance
as a deterrent. Requirements will depend on assessment of the security level
Cameras with Time Lapse 
for each facility. Time-lapse video recordings are also highly valuable as a
Video Recording
source of evidence and investigative leads.
Post Signs Advising of 24- Warning signs advising of twenty-four hour surveillance act as a deterrent in
hr Video Surveillance protecting employees and facilities.


Applicability
LEVEL IV FACILITY: Perimeter Security Standards
   
Lighting
Standard safety code requirement in virtually all areas. Provides for safe
Lighting with Emergency
evacuation of buildings in case of natural disaster, power outage, or criminal/ 
Power Backup
terrorist activity.
Physical Barriers
This security measure will only be possible in locations where the government
Extend Physical Perimeter
controls the property and where physical constraints are not present. Barriers 
with Barriers
should be made of concrete and/or steel.
Parking Barriers Desirable to prevent unauthorized vehicle access. 

 = Minimum standard  = Desirable  = Standard based on facility evaluation

 = Not applicable =CBP Minimum standard

Applicability
LEVEL IV FACILITY: Entry Security Standards
   
Receiving / Shipping (R/S)
Review Current R/S Audit current standards for package entry and suggest ways to enhance
Procedures security. 
Implement Modified R/S After auditing procedures for R/S, implement improved procedures for security
Procedures enhancements. 
Access Control
Evaluate Facility If security guards are required, the number of guards at any given time will
for Security Guard depend on the size of the facility, the hours of operation, and current risk 
Requirements factors, etc.
Intrusion Detection
System with Central See Appendix 8.9, Intrusion Detection Systems. 
Monitoring Capability
Upgrade to Current Life
Life safety standards include: fire detection and fire suppression systems. 
Safety Standards
Security Guard Patrol 
Entrances/Exits
Require X-Ray Screening All packages entering building should be subject to x-ray screening and/or
of All Mail/Packages visual inspection. 
Any exterior entrance should have a high security lock as determined by GSA
High Security Locks 
specifications and/or agency requirements.
May be impractical for smaller Level III facilities, whereas, Larger Level III and
X-Ray and Magnetometer
IV evaluations would focus on tenant agencies, public interface, and feasibility. 
at Public Entrances
Link to X-ray
Peep Holes Easy and effective visual recognition system for small offices. 
Intercom Communication tool that can be used in combination with peephole. 
Allows employees to view and communicate remotely with visitors before
Entry Control with CCTV
allowing access. Not applicable for Levels III and above because of entry 
and Door Strikes
screening devices required at these Levels.

 = Minimum standard  = Desirable  = Standard based on facility evaluation

 = Not applicable =CBP Minimum standard
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
229 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

Applicability
LEVEL IV FACILITY: Interior Security Standards
   
Employee/Visitor Identification
Agency Photo
Displayed at all times by all personnel. May not be required in smaller facilities. 
Identification
Visitor Control/Screening Visitors are required to sign-in with a receptionist or guard. Visitors are
System required to be escorted and wear a formal identification badge.

Stringent methods of control over visitor badges will ensure that visitors
Visitor Identification
wearing badges have been screened and are authorized to be at the facility 
Accountability System
during the appropriate time frame.
Established Issuing Develop procedures and establish authority for issuing employee and visitor
Authority identification.

Utilities
Smaller facilities may not have control over utility access or locations of utility
Prevent Unauthorized
areas. Where possible, assure that utility areas are secure and that only 
Access to Utility Areas
authorized personnel can gain entry.
CBP requires that all alarm systems, CCTV monitoring devices, fire protection
Provide Emergency Power systems, and entry control devices, etc., are required to be connected to
to Critical Systems emergency power sources. The occupant is responsible for determining which

computer or communication systems require backup power.
Occupant Emergency Plans (OEPs)
Examine OEP and
Review and update current OEP procedures for thoroughness. OEPs should
Contingency Procedures 
reflect the current security climate.
Based on Threats
OEPs in Place, Updated
Annually, Periodic Testing See Chapter 15, Occupant Emergency Planning 
Exercise
Assignment based on GSA requirement that largest tenant in facility maintain
Assign and Train OEP OEP responsibility. Officials should be assigned, trained and a contingency
Officials plan established for emergency activation of the OEP in the place of OEP

officials.
All occupants should be aware of their individual responsibilities in an
Annual Occupant Training 
emergency situation.
Day Care Centers
Evaluate Whether to
Locate Day Care Facility
Conduct a thorough review of security and safety standards. 
in Buildings with High
Threat Activities
Compare Feasibility
If a facility is being considered for a day care center, an evaluation should be
of Locating Day Care
made based on the risk factors associated with tenants and the location of the 
in Facilities Outside
facility.
Locations

 = Minimum standard  = Desirable  = Standard based on facility evaluation

 = Not applicable =CBP Minimum standard

Applicability
LEVEL IV FACILITY: Security Planning
   
Intelligence Sharing
Intelligence sharing between law enforcement agencies and security
Establish Law organizations should be established in order to facilitate the accurate flow of
Enforcement Agency/ timely and relevant information between appropriate government agencies. 
Security Liaisons Agencies involved in providing security must be part of the complete
intelligence process.
Determine what procedures exist to ensure timely delivery of critical
intelligence. Review and improve procedures to alert agencies and specific
Procedures for Intelligence
targets of criminal/terrorist threats. Establish standard administrative 
Receipt & Dissemination
procedures for response to incoming alerts. Review flow of information for
effectiveness and time critical dissemination.
To facilitate communication, standardized terminology for Alert Levels should
Uniform Security & Threat
be implemented (e.g., Normal, Low, Moderate, and High -as recommended by 
Nomenclature
Security Standards Committee).
Training
Provide security awareness training for all occupants. At a minimum, self-study
Annual Security programs utilizing videos, and literature, etc., should be implemented. These
Awareness Training materials should provide up-to-date information covering security practices,

employee security awareness, and personal safety, etc.
Unarmed Guard Liaison with the Federal Protective Service (FPS) to ensure the standardized
Qualifications and Training unarmed guard qualifications and training requirements are being met. No 
Requirements CBP entity has contracting authority for guard service within DHS except FPS.
Armed Guard Liaison with the Federal Protective Service to ensure the standardized armed
Qualifications and Training guard qualifications and training requirements are being met. No CBP entity 
Requirements has contracting authority for guard service within DHS except FPS.
Tenant Assignment
Co-locate Agencies with To capitalize on efficiencies and economies, agencies with like security
Similar Security Needs requirements should be located in the same facility if possible.

Do Not Co-locate High/ Low risk agencies should not take on additional risk by being located with
Low Risk Agencies high-risk agencies.

Administrative Procedures
Establish flexible work schedule in high threat/high risk area to minimize
Flexible Work Schedules employee vulnerability to criminal activity. Flexible work schedules can 
enhance employee safety by staggering reporting and departure times.
Background Security
Conduct background security checks and/or establish security control
Checks and Security 
procedures for service contract personnel.
Control Procedures
Arrange for Employee
Minimize exposure to criminal activity by allowing employees to park at or
Parking in or Near Building 
inside the building after normal work hours.
after Normal Work Hours

Applicability
LEVEL IV FACILITY: Security Planning
   
Construction/Renovation
Install Shatter Resistant
Application of shatter resistant material to protect personnel and citizens from
materials On All Exterior
the hazards of flying glass as a result of impact or explosion. See Appendix 
Windows (Shatter
7.7, Windows.
Protection)
Designs and construction projects should be reviewed, if possible, to
Review Current Projects incorporate current technology and blast standards. Immediate review of
for Blast Standards ongoing projects may generate savings in the implementation of upgrading to

higher blast standards prior to completion of construction.
Review/Establish Uniform Review, establish, and implement uniform construction standards as it relates
Construction Standards to security consideration.

In smaller facilities or those that lease space, control over design standards
Review/Establish Uniform may not be possible. However, future site selections should attempt to locate
New Design Standards for in facilities that do meet standards. New construction of government-controlled 
Blast Resistance facilities should review, establish, and implement new design standards for
blast resistance.
Every foot between a potential bomb and a building will dramatically reduce
Establish Street Set-Back
damage and increase the survival rate. Street set-back is always desirable, but 
for New Construction
shall be used in conjunction with barriers in Level IV and V facilities.

 = Minimum standard  = Desirable  = Standard based on facility evaluation

 = Not applicable =CBP Minimum standard

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BACK Return to Table of Contents

Appendix 6.10: Secure Border Initiative

SECURE BORDER INITIATIVE

I. General
A. This chapter establishes the policy for minimum security requirements for Secure
Border Initiative (SBI) offices and SBInet Tower sites necessary for the safety of CBP
employees and the protection of Government property and information.

B. The following SBI Construction minimum security requirements apply to all new
construction, reconstruction, alterations, modifications, and repairs to existing SBI
offices and SBInet Tower sites. Overview of Secure Border Initiative:

C. SBI is one component of the Department of Homeland Security’s Secure Border

Initiative that will address the security challenges along the southern and northern
land borders. SBI in coordination with the other border security missions conducted
by ICE, USCIS, USGC, Intelligence, and the Department of Justice works to address
our nation’s immigration border security challenges.

D. The scope of SBI provides DHS and CBP with the optimum mix of personnel,
technology, infrastructure, and response platforms to detect, identify, classify, and
respond to illegal breaches of international borders with Canada and Mexico and
thereby bring the situations to the appropriate law enforcement resolution. SBI will
employ next generation technology in the area of cameras, ground based radar,
communications, unmanned aerial vehicles, underground sensors, and sophisticated
software packages for terrain environments. SBI will integrate multiple state of the
art systems and traditional security infrastructure into single comprehensive border
security for the department.

II. SBI Suite/Intel Room Minimum Construction Standards

A. Heavy-duty builder’s hardware shall be used in construction. All screws, nuts, bolts,
hasps, clamps, bars hinges, and pins should be securely fastened to preclude
unwanted entry. Hardware accessible from outside the SBI Suite/Intel must be
peened, pinned, or spot-welded to preclude removal.

B. Walls

1. The perimeter walls, floors, and ceiling will be permanently constructed using
slab to slab construction. Slab to slab construction (true floor to the true ceiling) is
de-fined as walls that extend from the solid concrete floor to the underside of the
roof slab above. All construction must be done in a manner as to provide visual
evidence of unauthorized penetration.

2. Walls will be constructed using reinforced Concrete Masonry Units (CMU) not
less than 8 inches thick.

(a) Masonry units will be solid brick or hollow type block and filled with
concrete and metal reinforcement bars.

(b) When using hollow type blocks, they will be filled with concrete and
reinforced with #5 rebar, a minimum of 5/8 inches in diameter. The
reinforcing is to be anchored into the ceiling and floor to a minimum depth
of one-half the thickness of the adjoining member.

3. Where a CMU wall is not feasible, the following alternate method can be used:

(a) The inside walls will be constructed of 5/8-inch fire rated gypsum board
and the outside walls with standard 5/8-inch gypsum board and a layer of
9-gauge expanded metal on the inside of the area.

(b) The expanded metal shall be in a 1½-inch x 2-inch diamond pattern,

attached to metal studs and spot welded at 6-inch intervals. If wooden
studs are used to attach the expanded metal, the studs shall be no less
than 2 inches x 4 inches; otherwise it shall be securely anchored to the
stud with stainless steel screws and washers. The screws shall be no less
than 3 inches in length and installed at no more than 6-inch intervals. The
expanded metal shall be affixed in a manner to prevent tampering and to
show evidence of attempts at removal. Although less expensive to build
this is not the preferred method for securing arms and ammunition. See
Figure 1.

(c) To view the specifications for expanded metal mesh, see Section VII,
Construction Standards: Expanded Metal Mesh Specifications.

C. Ceilings:

1. When walls are being constructed using the CMU method described above in
III.2(b), and they do not extend to the true ceiling and a suspended (false) ceiling
is created, the suspended (false) ceiling must be reinforced with a 9-gauge
expanded metal to serve as the true ceiling. When expanded metal is used, it
must overlap the adjoining walls and be secured in such a manner that removal
will show evidence of tampering.

2. When constructing walls using the alternate method described above in

paragraph III.3(b), and the walls do not extend from slab to slab and a suspended
(false) ceiling is created, the suspended (false) ceiling must be reinforced with a
9-gauge expanded metal to serve as the true ceiling.

(a) When metal studs are used to construct the walls, the expanded metal
must be spot welded at 6-inch intervals to the framing of the side panels
so that any attempted removal will show evidence of tampering.

(b) When wooden studs are used to construct the walls, the expanded metal
must be securely anchored to the stud with stainless steel screws and
washers. The screws shall be no less that 3 inches in length and installed
at no more than 6-inch intervals.

3. When the walls of an area do extend from slab to slab and a false ceiling is
added it is not necessary to reinforce the false ceiling.

D. Floors:

1. For new construction, floors will consist of reinforced concrete with a minimum
thickness of 8 inches. The concrete mixture will have a minimum compressive
strength of at least 3,000 psi. Reinforcement will be accomplished with 2 grids
of #5 rebar, a minimum of 5/8-inch diameter, positioned centrally and spaced
horizontally and vertically 6 inches on center; rods will be tied or welded at
intersections.

2. Existing floors not meeting the standards of new construction (minimum

thickness of 8 inches) can be modified by the addition of steel plating, a minimum
of ¼-inch thick. The steel plates are to be welded at 6 inches on center, vertically
and horizontally, with 1-inch welds to supporting steel members of a minimum
thickness equal to that of the plate. If the supporting members are to be placed
in a contiguous floor and ceiling of reinforced concrete, they must be either firmly
anchored to and/or embedded into the floor and ceiling. If the floor and/or ceiling
construction contains less than 8 inches of reinforced concrete, then a steel liner,
a minimum ¼-inch thick, must be installed on the inside floor and/or ceiling.

E. Doors/Door Hardware:

1. Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal or of single
solid core wood, 1 ¾ inches thick, and hung in 12-gauge hollow metal frames.

2. All doors to unclassified area(s) will be equipped as a minimum with a card

reader/keypad and a Commercial Grade 1 – GSA approved High Security
Lockset. Doors to classified areas must be equipped as a minimum with an
FF-L-2890 com-pliant CDX-09 High Security Electromechanical Lock and a
Commercial Grade 1 – Mortise High Security Lever Lockset. Keys must be off the
building master in facilities that are not solely occupied by CBP.

3. Double doors must have one door secured with flush mount bolts at the top and
the bottom. Astragals (overlapping molding, preferably metal) must be used to
inhibit access to lock bolts.

4. Perimeter door hinge pins that are located outside the office area must be non-
removable (peened, pinned, or spot welded). If the door swings outward, hinge
side protection in the form of a dowel-pin and socket is required. Refer to Figure
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
236 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

2 of Appendix 7.6: Doors and Door Hardware for details. All perimeter doors must
have a commercial grade pneumatic door closer and an anti-pry strip installed to
prevent the door from being pried open.

5. All door hardware (e.g., hinges, lock hardware) must be secured to door frame
with stainless steel screws at least 3 inches long.

6. For additional information on Doors and Door Hardware, refer to Appendix 7.6,
Doors and Door Hardware

F. Windows:

1. SBI rooms shall have no exterior windows.

G. Miscellaneous Openings:

1. Where vents, ducts, registers, sewers, tunnels and other miscellaneous openings
are of such size and shape (in excess of 96 inches square) and enter or pass
through the area as to permit unauthorized entry, they should be protected with
either steel bars or wire mesh grills. If bars are used, they must be at least 3/8-
inch diameter hardened steel, welded vertically and horizontally, six inches on
center. If grilles are used, they must be of 9-gauge woven wire mesh.

2. For additional information on Miscellaneous Openings, refer to Appendix 7.8,

Openings. Incorporate a steel security wall system design in the project.

III. SBI Modular Design Standards Overview and Construction Method

1. The modular SBI facility is being constructed of steel framing in lieu of wood or
metal design to meet security The proposed construction will be steel framed
walls (in lieu of wood) for the modules. The proposed floor system will be a steel
panel system of a “sandwich type” panel of two steel plates with foam insulation
in between the plates. The panel is only 2 inches thick. Typical partition walls in
the main station administrative areas will be steel studs with drywall.

2. The modular SBI facility design will be incorporating a composite wall, steel
security wall system design in the project. The wall design would be double
skinned, hollow metal panels with interlocking rabbeted edges that are
manufactured from heavy gauge galvanized steel. The walls “2” thick panels,
compared with 6” or 8” thick concrete wall systems, result in sizable weight
reduction for the facility, greatly reducing footing and foundation requirements.

3. The steel composite wall panel system achieves the same Sound Transmission
Class (STC) rating as an 8” block wall and meets the following ASTM
requirements: ASTM 2322 (Physical Assault on Fixed Horizontal Barriers for
Detention/Correction facilities), ASTM 1450-97 (Hollow Metal Swing Door), and
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
237 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

ASTM 1592-01 (Detention Hollow Metal Vision Systems) security level 1.

A. Access Control

1. Cardkey access systems or similar personal identification verification systems

must be provided on all perimeter doors or doors leading from public areas
to staff-restricted areas. The security system should use balanced magnetic
switches, glass break sensors, balanced magnetic contact switch sets, a closed
circuit television (CCTV) monitoring station, a color/ monochrome CCTV system,
and a duress alarm. The access system must be designed in compliance with
the Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 201 Personal Identity
Verification (PIV) for Federal Employees and Contractors. Homeland Security
Presidential Directive (HSPD) 12 requires federal facilities to have secure
personal electronic identification access include card readers and proximity card
readers, as well as biometric readers.

B. Closed Circuit Television (CCTV)

1. At a minimum, CCTV will monitor the entrance and perimeter areas. The
minimum components that the system must have is one color monitor and one
high resolution digital video recorder (DVR), capable of recording a minimum of
30 days and playing back any camera view. All camera views associated with an
alarm must be automatically recorded. CCTV images must be retrievable and
operable over weekends and holidays.

2. For additional information on CCTV, refer to Appendix 8.12, CCTV.

C. Duress Alarm

1. Duress Alarms generate a separate and distinct audible/visual alarm in the

Control Center. Upon any activation of a duress alarm, a dedicated CCTV
camera must “queue-up” to the SBI room entrance door/s and provide the
Control Center with an immediate view of the situation. The duress button should
be placed in an area out of immediate view of suspect individual. They are to be
placed beneath workstations if possible. The duress button must be a recessed
type thus preventing accidental activations.

2. The duress/panic alarm should sound in the building control center, if one exists,
or at the local police station or at an approved Class A central station where
appropriate response is assured.

D. Intrusion Detection System (IDS)

1. All SBI areas shall include an IDS and it shall be connected to a Class A Central
Monitoring Station. At a minimum the IDS should include a UL 634 high security
Level 2 balanced magnetic switch (BMS) on the door, motion detection sensors

inside the room and a card reader/keypad to track users. There must be a
backup method of communication set up with the Central Monitoring Station (e.g.
a wireless phone link, such as cellular or an extra analog/digital telephone line),
so that if a telephone line is cut or otherwise interrupted, an alarm is activated at
the Central Monitoring Station. Acknowledgement of an alarm condition by the
Central Monitoring Station must take place within 30 seconds of the alarm. The
Central Monitoring Station must dispatch the correct response (law enforcement,
duty agent, CCC, etc.).

2. For additional information on IDS, refer to Appendix 8.9, Intrusion Detection

Systems.

E. Sound Attenuation

1. Perimeter walls, ceilings and floors of the entire office space will have a Sound
Transmission Class (STC) rating of 45, or better. STC of 45 or better is defined
as loud speech that can be faintly heard, but not understood. Normal speech
is unintelligible. The 9 gauge expanded metal used above the perimeter and
other walls will have to be augmented with other building materials to ensure an
approved STC rating.

F. Uninterrupted Power Source

1. All critical communications and monitoring equipment must have uninterrupted

power supply (UPS) and should be connected to emergency power generators to
maintain services during sustained power outages. Remote door release systems
must have battery back up to allow control during emergencies and power failure.
Emergency power systems must be adequate to sustain security lighting, CCTV,
communications requirements, and other essential services required within a
restricted and/or secured area, for a period of no less than 72 hours from the time
of power failure. Emergency power systems will be tested quarterly to ensure the
system will perform as needed and the test results will be recorded. Emergency
power sources will start automatically. Battery powered lights and essential
communications will be available at all times at key locations within a restricted
and/or secured area, in the event of complete failure of both the primary and
emergency sources of power. (SBI space is “mission critical” and thus will be on
100% emergency power. All electronics and computers will run through the UPS
system. The UPS system will provide uninterruptible power until the generator
starts and the UPS system also acts as a surge protector to provide smooth
transitional power to the computers and other electronic equipment).

IV. SBInet TOWERS

A. Locate towers on federally controlled property whenever possible. Design
considerations using the ANSI/TIA-222-Rev G Standard, Class III: structures. Class

III structures specifically designed for essential communications or structures that

represent a substantial hazard to human life and/or property. Examples of essential
communications would be: civil or national defense; emergency, rescue, or disaster
operations; military and navigation facilities. Loadings are increased for structures
of this classification compared to Class II structures (15% for wind, 25% for ice and
50%for earthquake).

B. SBInet Tower structures and support modular sheds shall be hardened against small
arms fire (UL 752) to minimum level III. (National Institute of Justice- A. Standard
0108.01).

C. Harden support systems:

1. Standby power sources, Electrical system conduits, Mechanical system conduits

for air conditioning, heating, and venting systems, Roof-mounted equipment, filter
banks, fuel systems, security systems and other openings must be protected
from sabotage.

2. All critical power, communications, and IDS lines should be well protected.
Standby E. power sources must be protected from sabotage by facility hardening
and IDS coverage.

D. Access Control: Install access control device or system at entry point. Ensure that
the access control device if keycard activated conforms to HSPD-12 compliancy.
Examples such as mechanical push-button locks, electronic push button locks,
digital touch pads with key override and proximity card readers may be utilized to
augment the deadbolt lock.

E. Closed Circuit Television: Install UL approved CCTV coverage to provide 360 degree
visual surveillance of the tower area upon alarm activation at outer fence perimeter.
Install closed circuit television coverage of the tower that “queues up” if an alarm
activates at the site providing immediate visual observation of the situation, and
digital recording at the monitoring center to review. Provide CCTV coverage at entry
points (pedestrian/vehicular). Ensure no blind spots exist for the CCTV operator.

F. Communications: Install alarm activated speaker (hailer) to immediately address

threat on site upon alarm activations. Security systems transmission lines shall be
encased in metal conduit and hardened against tampering. Intercom systems should
have the capacity to accommodate all remote access points.

G. COMSEC as per NSTISSI No. 4005 (1997) applies to Unattended 2.

Telecommunication Facilities: Unattended telecommunications facilities must be
protected by IDS or guarded in accordance with the requirements of paragraph # 32
of NSTISSI.

1. Where IDS is employed and more than 15 minutes are required to (a) respond
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
240 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

to an alarm, the COMSEC equipment in use should have remote zeroization

capability.

2. In cryptography, (b) zeroisation (also spelled zeroization) is the practice of

erasing sensitive parameters (especially keys) from a cryptographic module to
prevent their disclosure if the equipment is captured.

3. Personnel who visit unattended facilities should inspect for signs of (c) tampering,
or attempted penetration (physical check once every 24 hrs.).

H. Equipment: Install tamper/vandal resistant enclosures for equipment housing for

cameras, lights, cabling, and support systems. Ensure camera enclosures are
environmental proof to protect against weather elements associated with the specific
facility geographical area. IDS devices shall be selected and installed to be fully
functional under all environmental conditions for the specific location.

I. Fence: Install a fence around the perimeter to delay unauthorized access. SBInet
Towers are Class III critical communication sites and will require above and beyond
the standard 12 foot impound lot fencing. SBInet Tower perimeter fencing will
incorporate anti-ram and fence sensors into their design and construction due to the
remote location of these critical assets and their critical mission.

1. SBInet Tower fence shall be minimum 12 foot impound lot fence as specified in
Appendix 7.3 - 12 foot impound lot fence.

2. Restricted Areas. The following criteria are in addition to the standard fence
installation requirements (a) listed above. Impoundment Lot Fence (Outside the
Perimeter) will be 12 ft.(3.65m) high with a vehicle gate system and will have
two outriggers installed at opposing 45-degree angles along the top of the fence
to form a “V” or a “Y” configuration with dual coil (24”-30”) concertina/razor wire
secured to the fence every 24”. The mesh will be a minimum 1 inches (25.4-
mm) per side. The gate shall have electronic intrusion detection, access control
system with audit capability and HSPD 12 FIPS 201 compliant.

3. A reasonable approach to reinforce a standard chain link perimeter fence to

resist a vehicle attack is both simple and aesthetic. Place a 3/4-inch (19.1-mm)
diameter aircraft cable, Compliant with MIL-HDBK-1013/10 and conforming
to MIL-W-88020, along the fence line, between the fence posts and the chain
link fabric as per (Appendix 7.3 II.6 and 7 and shown in Figure 10 and 12 foot
impound lot cut sheet..

4. Digging under fence deterrent

●● Fence will be buried 1’ below grade (Bottom 12” of fence material

buried by 12” of soil composite grade).

●● Rail pipe underneath grade to prevent peeling up

J. Fence detection sensors are used, the best application is to use a dual zone to cover
fence and buried in the ground leading to fence on the attack side. The fence having
a strain-sensitive cable taut wire on the fence, to include the gate, and Microwave
Fence Sensor (MFS) or Portal Coaxial Cable Sensor (PCCS) for detection with a
Closed Circuit Television (CCTV).

K. Gates will be provided with locking hardware conforming to RR-F-191/2. The locking
system is designed to provide an equal level penetration resistance when a gate
is closed and locked. Where locking hardware is not practicable, ½ inch (12.7 mm)
case hardened chains meeting the requirements of RR-C-271 will be used with a
padlock meeting the requirements of Federal Specification FF-P-2827A.

L. Fence Signage:

1. Install bilingual signage on all sides of the exterior fence line stating that the area
is restricted, enforced by intrusion detection and only authorized personnel are
admitted. Install appropriate (bilingual) signage. Fenced areas should have gate
areas posted with signs 3 feet by 3 feet with lettering of contrasting color to the
background and at least 1-inch high and ½ inch wide. At intervals of about 30-
feet, signs bearing the following must be posted on fences:

2. Perimeter security fences for restricted areas will be posted with signs. Signs will
be posted on security fences at no less than 200-foot (60.9-m) intervals along
the entire perimeter. Where a language other than English is prevalent, warning
signs will be posted in both languages.
U.S. GOVERNMENT PROPERTY
NO TRESPASSING
VIOLATORS WILL BE PROSECUTED
M. Clear Zones:

1. Unless otherwise specified, locate the perimeter security fence at least 30 feet
from enclosed structures (except guard shelters). Provide a clear zone not
less than 30 feet wide immediately outside the fence. Keep this area devoid of
buildings, parking areas, poles, guy line anchors, shrubs, trees, sign boards, and
any other object that could conceal personnel. Grass is permissible, provided
it is kept mowed. Provide a similar clear zone at least 30 feet wide immediately
inside the fence. Ensure this area meets the requirements of the exterior clear
zone, except for the installation of approved guard shelters and protective lighting
poles

N. Intrusion Detection System: Install UL approved Intrusion Detection System on inner

perimeter fence line (microwave/ported coaxial), entry contacts (balanced magnetic
switches/motion detection) of support systems structures, in ground (buried) sensors
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
242 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

within the dual fence clear zone, or wide area sensors that will detect in advance of
exterior fence of intruder presence. All critical power, communications, and IDS lines
should be well protected. Standby power sources must be protected from sabotage
by facility hardening and IDS coverage.

O. Security Lighting: Install perimeter protective security lighting to support threat

detection and assessment function in the event intruders approach the exterior fence
line. Install a safety beacon on the tower to alert low flying aircraft in the vicinity for
safety reasons. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) standard
requires critical areas to be illuminated 8 feet in height with 2-foot candle power.

P. Uninterrupted Power Source

1. All critical communications and monitoring equipment must have uninterrupted

power supply (UPS) and should be connected to emergency power generators to
maintain services during sustained power outages. Remote door release systems
must have battery back up to allow control during emergencies and power failure.
Emergency power systems must be adequate to sustain security lighting, CCTV,
communications requirements, and other essential services required within a
restricted and/or secured area, for a period of no less than 72 hours from the time
of power failure. Emergency power systems will be tested quarterly to ensure the
system will perform as needed and the test results will be recorded. Emergency
power sources will start automatically. Battery powered lights and essential
communications will be available at all times at key locations within a restricted
and/or secured area, in the event of complete failure of both the primary and
emergency sources of power. (SBI space is “mission critical” and thus will be on
100% emergency power. All electronics will run through the UPS system. The
UPS system will provide uninterruptible power until the generator starts and the
UPS system also acts as a surge protector to provide smooth transitional power
to the electronic equipment).

Q. Special Security Feature:

1. The SBI communications shelter shall be bullet resistant withstanding 30/06 rifle
fire at a distance of 15 feet per UL 752 standards. The shelter shall be vandal
resistant and be constructed of steel reinforced concrete. The shelter structure
shall provide a 2-hour fire rating as defined by the Uniform Building Code and
meet Zone 4 seismic requirements. The shelter shall be designed for the explicit
use of housing electronic equipment within a controlled atmosphere required for
the proper conditions for transmitting and receiving equipment.

2. Fuel Storage Tank: Installed buried fuel storage tank or purchase GSA approved
ballistic resistant above ground fuel storage tank to protect against small arms
fire (UL 752) to minimum level III. (National Institute of Justice- A. Standard
0108.01). ensure continuity of the cable system.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BACK Return to Table of Contents

Appendix 7.2: Perimeter Security Barriers

I. General
A. Anti-ram perimeter security barriers, also known as vehicle impact rated barriers, are
designed to prevent the penetration of explosive-laden vehicles into the defended
perimeter. Department of State (DoS)-rated physical barriers are grouped into
several areas according to their function:

1. Active anti-ram barriers:

(a) Retractable bollards

(b) Deep foundation crash beam systems

(c) Cable based systems

(d) Drop arm/bar

(e) Cantilever sliding gates

(f) Interlocking steel beam gates

(g) Wedge barriers

2. Passive anti-ram barriers:

(a) Bollard

(b) Planters

(c) Cable based systems

(d) Fences

3. Non-rated passive anti-ram barriers:

(a) Trees and shrubs

(b) Shallow bodies of water

(c) Low berms

(d) Shallow ditches

(e) Unreinforced fences

(f) High curbs

4. Although none of the non-rated passive vehicle barriers would stop a determined

aggressor, the act of driving through or over them would attract attention. They
can also be placed with rated barriers such as bollards and planters for aesthetic
reasons.

5. For further details see:

(a) DoS and DoD Barrier Anti-Ram Vehicle Barrier Certification

(b) UFC Criteria for Security Engineering: Entry Control Facilities/Access

Control Points

(c) Chapter 7.3 Fencing

B. Active anti-ram barriers fall into the perimeter tier of the DHS tiered defensive
system concept. Active anti-ram barriers protect the vehicular access/egress points
or Compound Access Controls (CACs), limiting perimeter vulnerability during the
passage of vehicular traffic. Performance criteria for vehicle barrier systems are
concerned with three areas:

1. Impact conditions and performance levels

2. Functional requirements and power systems

3. Control circuits

C. Active anti-ram barriers shall be selected from the list of Department of State (DoS)
certified barriers. The Contractor shall also note that site adapted foundation designs
require Security Management Division (SMD) approval.

II. Abbreviations
• BPA Blanket Purchase Agreement
• Cm Centimeter(s)
• DIA Diameter
• DC Direct Current
• DHS Department of Homeland Security
• DoS Department of State
• CBP Customs and Border Protection
• FBO Foreign Buildings Operations
• GSO General Services Officer
• Hz Hertz
• IPS Iron Pipe Size
• IR Infrared
• Km/h Kilometers per Hour
• kN Kilonewton(s)
• LBS Pounds

• MAX Maximum
• mm Millimeter(s)
• Mpa Megapascal(s)
• NPT National Pipe Thread
• OC On Center
• OD Outside Diameter
• PLCS Places
• Psi Pounds per Square Inch
• PVC Polyvinyl Chloride
• SMD Security Management Division
• SQ Square
• TYP Typical
• V Volts

III. Active Anti-Ram Barriers

A. Impact Conditions and Performance Levels

1. DoS Certification Program:

(a) The Department of State (DoS) has developed performance criteria

and a testing procedure for Active Anti-Ram Vehicle Barrier systems:
SD-STD-02.01, Revision A, March 2003, titled Specification for Vehicle
Crash Test of Perimeter Barriers and Gates. This document specifies the
testing procedure required for DoS certification of vehicle barriers. This
program establishes a series of vehicle barrier classifications based on
given impact conditions and performance levels. The rating of the barrier
is determined when a 15,000 lb. (6810 kg) gross-weight vehicle impacts a
barrier from a perpendicular direction. A K12 rating is achieved when the
vehicle traveling at 50 mph is successfully arrested by the barrier. A K8
rating is achieved for a speed of 40 mph; and a K4 rating is achieved at
30 mph. In order to receive the highest DoS certification, the penetration
of the vehicles cargo bed must not exceed 1 meter beyond the pre-impact
inside edge of the barrier. Only vehicle barriers rated for the highest anti-
ram level –K12/L3- may be used unless the designer can obtain CBP/
SMD permission to use a lower rated vehicle barrier.

2. For further details see:

(a) DoS and DoD Barrier Anti-Ram Vehicle Barrier Certification

(b) UFC Criteria for Security Engineering: Entry Control Facilities/Access

Control Points

B. Impact Conditions

1. The standard categories differ only in the measured speed of the standardized
66.7 kN (15,000 Ibs) test vehicle. The following designations are used to specify
the impact conditions:
Impact Conditions Nominal Impact Speed

K4 30 mph/48.4 km/h

K8 40 mph/64.5 km/h

K12 50 mph/ 81.0 km/h

C. Performance Levels

1. The vehicle barriers capability to arrest the crash vehicle is assessed according
to three performance levels. A vehicle barrier that does not perform within these
limits will not receive a rating and may be ineligible for procurement for DOS
facilities. The following designations are used to rate a barriers performance:
Performance Level Crash Test Assessment
L3.0 Vehicle and cargo are to be stopped although vehicle partial
penetration and/or barrier deflection of up to 1 meter are permitted.
L2.0 Vehicle and cargo are to be stopped although vehicle partial
penetration and/or barrier deflection of up to 6 meters are
permitted.
L1.0 Vehicle is disabled and does not travel more than 15 meters after
impact
.
D. Functional Requirements

1. Functional Requirements:

(a) The vehicle arrest system shall be provided with all of the functions and
accessories included in the DOS Blanket Purchase Agreement (BPA) with
the approved vendor. This includes, but is not limited to, a visible device
such as a signal light (indicating the barriers status to an approaching
driver) and emergency override.

2. Coordination and Surface Preparation:

(a) Early project coordination shall include selection of a proper barrier for
the site, review of site conditions, provision of surface area preparation
(including, but not limited to: special drainage/pumping, prevention of
freezing/icing, prevention of corrosion, etc.), provision of power and
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
249 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

hydraulic lines, and provision of conduits and cable for barrier control
points, etc.

IV. Power System and Control Circuits

A. Power System and Control Circuits

1. Systems approved for use by CBP shall meet the following requirements:

(a) ELECTRIC MOTORS: Voltage and phase must be compatible with the
local power supply. Dual-rated 50 or 60 Hz motors are acceptable if
warranted by the manufacturer for both conditions.

(b) CONTROL VOLTAGE: The system should be no more than 24 volts, direct
current.

(c) CONTROL SYSTEM: The system must be designed in such a way that
when power fails, the barriers automatically retain a status quo position;
i.e., they will be neither fail secure nor fail safe. The control system must
provide a manual operating capability for use in the event of power failure.

(d) DEPENDABILITY: The system must provide maximum dependability

and ease of maintenance. System design considerations should include,
and their reliability will be assessed in light of, worst-known conditions;
i.e., frequent power surges, brownouts and failures, absence of locally-
available skilled labor, adverse climatic conditions, poor drainage, etc.

(e) CONTROL CIRCUITS: The system must have two standard controls
circuits: a slave or local control for the guard at the Perimeter Gate and
a master or remote control for the Security Guard Booth. Both sets of
controls will include status indicator lights for power and barrier position.

B. Local Control

1. The local guard control will have an emergency (fast operation) secure switch.
The emergency switch for the local guard control will not be equipped with reset
capability. The local guard control will include an annunciator, which will be
triggered whenever the barrier remains in the non-secure position for a range of
0 to 60 seconds. The local control will not be provided with a reset switch for this
feature.

C. Remote Control

1. A remote master control will be used at all posts. The remote master control
will have an override switch and reset button for the local emergency override
feature. The remote master control panel will have either an annunciator or a
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
250 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

signal light triggered by the local control annunciator. The security guard booth
alarm, however, will include a silencer for the audible annunciator, if applicable.
The annunciator will disarm automatically when the override switch is used.
The remote master control will also have a reset switch for the local control
annunciator.

D. Power and Hydraulic Lines

1. When power or hydraulic lines are not below ground, they will be protected
through the use of rigid conduit. Manufacturers shall provide fail-safe lock options
to the hydraulic reservoirs which will prevent the barrier from lowering in the
event of hydraulic failure. The use of this fail-in-place is encouraged. For the
most efficient operation, locate the pump/motor as close as possible to the barrier
and with a minimum of turns and bends in the hydraulic lines themselves.

V. Maintenance for Active Anti-Ram Vehicle Barriers

A. The philosophy for the maintenance of active vehicle barriers is as follows:

1. Inspection/Maintenance Program: The importance of adequate maintenance

cannot be overemphasized. Malfunction of an active vehicle barrier may
seriously compromise the security of the perimeter. An inspection/maintenance
program must be established to ensure that active vehicle barriers will function
as intended and as rapidly as the situation demands.

2. Local Responsibility: for the inspection/maintenance of installed active barrier

systems must be established. Normally, the General Services Officer (GSO) will
be responsible.

3. System Documentation: Provided locally at the time of system installation, must

be reviewed to establish written inspection/maintenance guidance for use by
local personnel. Some systems come with separate component manuals and
maintenance data which must also be reviewed.

(a) The resulting guide should include as a minimum:

●● Inspection/maintenance procedures (what to check, locations, what

steps to follow, etc.).

●● Special safety precautions.

●● A listing of parts/components requiring inspection/maintenance

together with frequency of the inspection/maintenance.

●● Identification of specific maintenance materials or products (e.g., type

or grade of oil and other fluids, size and types of filters, etc.).
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
251 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

●● Identification of any special tool that must be available before

inspection/maintenance can be performed.

VI. Bollards And Planters

A. Bollards and planters fall into the perimeter tier of DHS/CBP’s tiered defense
system concept. Bollards and planters are designed to prevent the penetration of an
explosive-laden vehicle into the compound. They are easily constructed and require
low maintenance. They are effective in channeling vehicular traffic and reducing
vehicular velocity.

B. Passive Perimeter Barriers

1. Passive anti-ram perimeter security barriers are designed to prevent the

penetration of explosive-laden vehicles. Properly located and constructed
bollards and planters are highly effective types of passive barriers. Where
required, passive barriers shall be of a construction design approved by DHS/
CBP/SMD to meet anti-ram standards K12 L3 (effectively arrest a 6810-kg
(15000-lb.) gross weight vehicle traveling at a maximum of 80 kph perpendicular
to the barrier) and shall raise a minimum of 915 mm (36 inches) above grade.
This is intended to prevent a large-tired or high-axle vehicle such as a truck from
rolling over the barrier.

2. Non-proprietary barriers such as bollards and planters can be effective

supplements to existing substandard walls or fence lines in areas where it is
not feasible to construct new walls or fences. Properly located and constructed,
these barriers can reduce access size, provide traffic channelization and
substantially reduce vehicular velocity.

C. Bollards

1. Steel bollards are an effective means to enhance security against vehicular bomb
attacks and are easily constructed locally.

(a) Approved bollards are constructed of structural steel pipe composed of,
or equal to, ASTM A-53, Grade B; or A-501, with a yield point of 250 MPa.
The pipe should be a minimum of 2.1 m (83 inches) in overall length,
have a minimum outside diameter of 200 mm (7.8 inches), and a wall
thickness of 12 mm (0.42 inches). Each bollard is to be filled with concrete
and topped with a grout wash. Spacing between bollards should be .90 m
(35 inches) on center. They should be embedded to a depth of 1.2 m (47
inches) below grade in a continuous concrete footing.

●● CONCRETE FOOTING: Shall be installed with minimum 28 day

strength of 20.5 MPa. The footing should be continuous for maximum
resistance. The minimum width for the continuous footing is .60m and
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
252 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

the minimum depth is 1.20m.

●● STRUCTURAL STEEL CHANNEL: The bollards should be reinforced

with a structural steel channel of, or equal to, ASTM A-36. Use a 250 x
30 mm channel. The channel should be located on the attack side and
attached to each bollard with a minimum of two 20-mm anchor bolts
and nuts welded onto each channel after installation. The top flange of
the channel should be 750 mm above grade.

●● CORROSION: The portion of the bollard at grade is susceptible to

corrosion from exposure to standing water. Additionally, it is difficult to
achieve a good quality paint system in this location.
i. Therefore, measures must be taken to inhibit corrosion of the steel
pipe. The most effective method is to apply a minimum 0.10mm
thickness of Scotchcoat or X-Tru Coat along the entire length of the
pipe. These coatings are extremely hard resin-based epoxies, and
can last up to 20 years. An alternative is a rubber type shrink sleeve
which is slipped over the pipe and heated with a low temperature
flame to shrink the sleeve tightly around the bollard. The sleeve is
an excellent insulator against electrolytic corrosion.
●● RATING: Bollards described above are capable of stopping the
perpendicular impact of a 6810 kg vehicle traveling at 80 kph with 915
mm (or less) of penetration.

D. Concrete planters

1. Planters serve as vehicular barricades, and are an attractive means of

channeling traffic.

2. The planters should be constructed of reinforced concrete with a minimum 28

day strength of 20.5 MPa. The quality of construction is to be in accordance with
American Concrete Institute (ACI) codes or the equivalent. All steel reinforcing
bars are to be lapped a minimum of 300 mm where discontinuous or where
splices occur.

(a) DIMENSIONS: In the plan view the individual units should be 2.75 m x 900
mm, with a support member located at each end and midway between the
two ends. A variation of the 2.75-m planter is the continuous planter, which
permits flexibility in length. The following specifications are consistent for
both the 2.75-m planter and the continuous planter. The wall thickness at
the attack side of the planter, at both ends and at the support member,
should be 300 mm. The wall thickness at the non-attack side should be at
least 150 mm.

(b) HEIGHT: In the cross-sectional view of the planter, the outer wall should
extend 965 mm above grade. The center support member should extend
815 mm above grade. The entire unit should be embedded 915 mm below
grade. Thus, the overall height will be 1880 mm. If the footing depth below
grade causes problems with utility lines, bridge the lines with U-shaped
structural steel sleeves.

(c) HAUNCH: Configured as an isosceles triangle with 150-mm legs, is

situated at the intersection of the inside face of the attack side wall and the
top of the concrete footing. The haunch is integrally poured with the rest of
the planter. The legs of the haunch coincide with the intersecting concrete
surfaces.

(d) DRAINAGE: In order to provide adequate drainage of the planter, a 50-

mm PVC drainage pipe is located on center, every 1200 mm. The outlet
of the drain should be located just above grade to avoid below surface
seepage and/or erosion.

(e) REINFORCING BARS: Both faces of the planter on the attack side and
the center support member should be reinforced with 16mm diameter
bars at 200 mm on center each way. The haunch should feature the same
size and spacing as the reinforcement above with the reinforcing bars
positioned at a 45-degree angle.

(f) FOOTING: The footing shall be continuous for individual planters. The top
of the footing should be reinforced with 14-mm diameter bars at 200 mm
on center each way. The bottom of the footing should be reinforced with
16-mm diameter bars at 150 mm on center each way. The faces of the
planter on the non-attack side should be reinforced with 14mm diameter
bars at 200 mm on center each way.

(g) SPACING: The maximum spacing between individual planters is 915 mm.

(h) RATING: These concrete planters described above are capable of

stopping the perpendicular impact of a 6810-kg vehicle traveling at 80 kph
with 915 mm or less of penetration.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BACK Return to Table of Contents

Appendix 7.3: Fencing

I. Fencing
A. General

1. Requirements for security fencing generally fall into two categories:

(a) Perimeter

(b) Restricted Areas

2. Perimeter fencing:

(a) The entire site must be contained by an 8 ft. (2.43 m) high perimeter
fence. The fabric height will be 7 ft. (2.13 m) and have twisted and barbed
selvage at the top and bottom. There must be a minimum 1 ft. (.305 m) top
guard, for a total fence height of no less than 8 feet (2.43 m). All perimeter
chain link fencing will be fabricated with 9-gauge (3.9-mm) steel wire mesh
material (type I, II, or IV as defined below, and before any coating) with
mesh openings not larger than 2 (50.8 mm) per side. Provide Type I or
Type II tension wire, Class 4 coating, in accordance with ASTM A 824.
Provide 7-gauge coil spring tension wire for top and bottom wire. All
fencing will be installed on the outside of the support posts. A clear zone
will be established no less then 20 feet from any structure or object inside
the fence and 10 feet from any structure or object outside the fence. The
use of residential grade is not permitted. The impact of snow and blowing
snow must be considered on the northern border in combination with the
gate types. Based on a CBP/IA/SMD vulnerability assessment additional
anti-ramming technology may be installed; see Penetrations-Resistant
Barriers, section II.A.6, below for detailed specifications.

(b) Top Guard/Outriggers

●● Top guard will consist of 1 ft. (.305 m) outward slanting (45-degree

angle). Provide barbed wire conforming to ASTM A 121 zinc-coated,
Type Z, Class 3, or aluminum-coated, Type A, with 12.5-gauge wire
with 14-gauge, round, 4 point barbs spaced no more than 5 inches
(125 mm) apart.

●● Steel outriggers will be installed to conform with RR-F-191/4 with their

overhang facing outward (away from the protected site), except where
the fence must be mounted directly on the property line (instead of
at least 18 inches (457.2 mm) back), in which case outriggers can
be modified (with exception approval by CBP/IA/SMD) to be vertical
or angle into the site. At a minimum, the outriggers will provide an
additional 12 inches (305 mm) to the fence height. The top guard
fencing adjoining gates may range from a vertical height of 18 inches
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
256 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

(457.2 mm) to the normal 45-degree outward protection, but only for
sufficient distance along the fence line to open the gates adequately.
Outriggers will be permanently affixed to the fence posts with screws
or by spot welding.

(c) See the fencing cut sheets for specific requirements.

3. Restricted Areas

(a) The following criteria are in addition to the standard fence installation requirements
listed above.

●● Impoundment Lot Fence (Outside the Perimeter)

Will be 12 ft.(3.6 m) high with a vehicle gate system and will have two
outriggers installed at opposing 45-degree angles along the top
of the fence to form a “V” or a “Y” configuration with dual coil (24”-
30”) concertina/razor wire secured to the fence every 24”. The mesh
will be a minimum 1 inches (25.4-mm) per side. The gate shall have
an electronic intrusion detection and access control system with audit
capability.

●● Seizure Storage Fence

When the seizure storage facility is a stand alone structure, it must be
protected by a security fencing system in compliance with the impound lot
fence requirements.

●● Visitor Parking Fence

When visitor parking and the employee parking are either next to each
other or in close proximity to each other, provide a fence with fabric
measuring 7 ft.(2.13-m) high fence with an additional 1 ft. (.305 m)
outrigger, separating the two parking areas. When located directly adjacent
to each other, two outriggers installed at opposing 45-degree angles
along the top of the fence to form a “V” or a “Y” configuration with
dual coil (24”-30”) concertina/razor wire secured to the fence every 24
in.along the common side.

●● Employee Parking Fence

Provide an 8 ft. (2.43-m) high fence with a vehicle and pedestrian gate (see
Gates) system with outrigger for a total height of 8 ft. (2.43-m).
●● Inspection Lift Fence (Hard Secondary)
This fence (barrier) must restrict the viewing of the vehicle while in the lift
area. As such, use more appropriate fencing material such as masonry
or other more solid material. However, care must be given to also provide
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
257 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

adequate ventilation for this area. A wall system with decorative openings
or screened grills should be considered. The fence does not need to extend
to the underside of the canopy, but must extend high enough to restrict
viewing or unauthorized entry. The gate must also restrict the viewing into
this area.

●● Kennel Holding Cages and Runs

Galvanized chain link at front, rear, and top of runs set at 6 ft. above
finished floors (AFF). Outside fence needs a block wall or vinyl slats
attached.
●● Lockable Gate
Separate runs with masonry systems to 6 ft. AFF
●● Emergency generator fence must meet perimeter fence requirements
consider the use of privacy slats.

●● Other internal fences must meet the perimeter fence requirements at a

minimum.

B. Maintenance Considerations

Consider the following when designing chain link fencing:

●● Fence components may require additional protective coatings in salt-

laden and highly corrosive areas, e.g., plastic coating over galvanized
steel fabric.

●● Rapid growth of vegetation in fertile areas and rainy climates may

justify paving the area under the fence and a portion or all of the clear
zones.

●● Consideration should be given for equipment, i.e., mowers, tractors,

etc., required to maintain vegetation below 8 inches (203.2 mm) and to
broadcast defoliants or sterilizing agents.

●● Take particular attention in areas with harsh environments to determine

if Type IV chain link fabric (which provides a plastic coating over
zinc-coated steel) material is desirable. ASTM A 90, Standard Test
Method for Weight of Coating on Zinc-Coated Galvanized Iron or Steel
Articles, or ASTM A 428, Standard Test Method for Weight of Coating
on Aluminum-Coated Iron or Steel Articles may be used to assure
adequate protection for chain link fence components. Use ASTM
standards where supplemental criteria are either required or desired.

C. Special Security Features

1. Clear Zones:

(a) A clear zone will be established no less then 20 ft. from any structure or
object inside the fence and 10 ft. from any structure or object outside the
fence. Maintain unobstructed areas or clear zones on both sides of, and
between, physical barriers surrounding restricted and non-restricted areas.
These areas must be cleared of all vegetation and man-made or natural
obstructions that exceed 8 in.(203.2 mm) in height. All clear zones will be
clear of visual obstructions such as vines, shrubs, tree limbs, electrical and
telephone poles or junction boxes, steam pipes, fire hydrants, etc.

(b) Signage

●● Perimeter security fences for restricted areas will be posted with signs.
Signs will be posted on security fences at no less than 200 foot (60.9
m) intervals along the entire perimeter. Where a language other than
English is prevalent, warning signs will be posted in both languages.
U.S. GOVERNMENT PROPERTY
NO TRESPASSING
VIOLATORS WILL BE PROSECUTED
(c) Drainage Culverts and Utility Openings

●● Special protective measures must be designed for culverts, storm

drains, sewers, air intakes, exhaust tunnels, and utility openings that:
i. Pass through cleared areas.
ii. Traverse under or through security fences.
iii. Have a cross-section area of 96 square inches (61,939 square
mm) or greater, with the smallest dimension being more than 6
inches (152.4 mm). Such openings and barrier penetrations will be
protected by securely fastened grills, locked manhole covers, or
other equivalent means that prevent entry.
●● Grills are fabricated for this purpose by cross-hatching 3/8 in.(9.5-mm)
steel bars 9 in.(228.6 mm) on center. The bars will be welded at their
intersections. Grills used for culverts will always be placed outside the
secure area.
i. For steel pipe, the grill ends will be welded to the pipe as shown in
Figure 1.
ii. For concrete pipe, the grill ends will be welded to a steel rim that fits
snugly over the concrete pipe.

iii. The rim and grillwork will be fastened over the concrete pipe and
bolted or pinned to the rim of the concrete pipe as shown in Figure
2. As an alternative, the grill ends can be embedded in a concrete
headwall that encapsulates the concrete pipe. See Figure 7. Care
must be taken during design to assure that bars and grills across
culverts, sewers, storm drains, etc., are not susceptible to clogging.
This must be considered early during the security fence planning
phase.
●● Culverts, storm drains, and sewers must be designed with a debris
catcher to permit either rapid clearing or removal of grating for cleaning
when required.
i. If the inlet is outside the fence line, the debris catcher and grating
will be incorporated into the same structure.
ii. If the outlet is outside the fence line, the debris catcher will be on
the inlet side inside the fence line and the grating on the outlet side.
A solution is shown in Figure 3 (note that the removable grate is
locked in place as an added security measure).

Figure 1: Steel Culvert Grill

Figure 2: Concrete Culvert Grill

Figure 3: Removable Grating for Culverts

●● Removable Grating for Culverts

As an alternative, drainage structures may be constructed of
multiple pipes, each pipe having a diameter of 10 in.(254 mm)
or less, joined to each other and to the drainage crossing. An
economical solution to secure metal drainage structures is to weld
short (approximately 6 in.(152.4 mm) long) multiple pipes, with
diameters less than 10 in.(254 mm), in the “in-flow” end of the
drainage culvert as shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4: Large Culvert with Short Honeycomb Pipes

Figure 5: Swale Crossing with Ground Stakes

Figure 6: Swale Crossing Embedded in Concrete

Figure 7: Bar Grill Embedded in Concrete

Figure 8: Chain link Fence Embedded in Concrete Sill

●● Chain Link Fence Embedded in Concrete Sill (see Figure 8).

Special Requirements for Fences Equipped with Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDS) Sensors:
o IDS sensors are often placed on security fences and clear
zones to detect aggressors attempting to gain access to an
asset.
●● Exterior sensors
Exterior sensors consist of four major types: beam, fence
disturbance, seismic sensors, and video motion detectors. If
exterior IDS sensors are to be included in the construction and
installation of security fences coordination with CBP/IA/SMD is
required.
D. Design

1. Posts and Bracing

(a) Ensure all posts for security fencing meet the requirements of Federal
Specification RR-F-191/3 for one of the following classes:

●● Class 1 - Steel pipe

●● Class 3 - Formed steel sections

●● Class 4 - Steel H-sections

●● Class 6 - Steel square sections

(b) Accomplish bracing with steel truss rods not less than 5/16-inch
(7.9-millimeters (mm)) nominal diameter and a turnbuckle for tensioning,
conforming to RR-F-191/4. Use the following ASTM Standards to
supplement RR-F-191/3 and RRF-191/4:

●● ASTM A 120, Specification for Pipe, Steel, Black and Hot-Dipped Zinc-
Coated (Galvanized) Welded and Seamless, for Ordinary Uses.

●● ASTM F 626, Standard Specification for Fence Fittings (particularly

evaluation of corrosion resistance and material compatibility).

●● ASTM F 669, Specification for Strength Requirements of Metal Posts

and Rails for Industrial Chain link Fence.

●● ASTM F 1083, Specification for Pipe, Steel, Hot-Dipped Zinc-Coated

(Galvanized) Welded, for Fence Structures.

2. Chain Link Fence Fabric

(a) Ensure chain link fence fabric meets the requirements of RR-F-191/1 for
one of the following:

●● Type I - Zinc-coated steel.

●● Type II - Aluminum-coated steel.

●● Type IV - Polyvinyl Chloride (PVC) coated over zinc- or aluminum-

coated steel.

●● Perimeter fences will be fabricated with 9-gauge (3.9-mm) steel wire

mesh material (before any coating) with mesh openings not larger than
2 inches (50.8 mm) per side.
Ensure that the fabric height is 7 feet (2.13 m) and has twisted and
barbed selvage at the top and bottom.
(b) The designer may use the following ASTM Standards to supplement RR-
F-191/1 for chain link fabric:

●● ASTM A 116, Specification for Zinc-Coated (Galvanized) Steel Woven

Wire Fence Fabric.

●● ASTM A 392, Specification for Zinc-Coated Steel Chain link Fence

Fabric.

●● ASTM A 491, Specification for Aluminum-Coated Steel Chain link

Fence Fabric.

●● ASTM A 817, Standard Specification for Metallic-Coated Steel Wire for

Chain link Fence Fabric.

●● ASTM F 668, Standard Specification for Poly Vinyl Chloride (PVC)-

Coated Steel Chain link Fence Fabric.

E. Accessories:

Ensure accessories such as steel fittings and components used in the erection
of chain link fences meet the requirements of RR-F-191/4. Use ASTM F 626 to
supplement RR-F-191/4. Provide fittings electronically compatible with connecting
fittings, components, and the fence fabric to inhibit corrosion.

II. Installation
A. Requirements

1. The design of security fencing, using the above specified components, will
include the following provisions:

ASTM F567, Standard Practice for Installation of Chain link Fence, may be
used as installation guidance to supplement RR-F-191/GEN.

2. Fence Placement:

Security fencing for restricted areas will consist of a single-line fence

surrounding the restricted area. When specified by the CBP/IA/SMD, two
single-line fences may be used to provide additional deterrence. The two
fences shall be separated by a minimum of 30 ft. (9.1 m) and a maximum of
not more than 150 ft. (45.7 m).

3. Posts, Top Rails, and Bracing:

(a) Top rails will not be specified or allowed for fabrication of security fences.
Required bracing for posts will be accomplished with diagonal truss rods
and tubular horizontal or diagonal bracing.

(b) All posts and structural supports will be located on the inner side of the
fencing. Posts will be installed in concrete in accordance with ASTM F
567, as shown in Figure 10. Posts must be vertical within plus or minus 2
degrees in two planes. Each gate, terminal, and end post will be braced
with truss rods. Truss rods will be installed diagonally, from near ground
level of a gate, terminal, or end post to the top of the adjacent line post, no
higher than 6 in.(152.4 mm) down from the top of the fabric. There will be

no more than a 50-degree angle between the truss rod and the ground.

4. Chain Link Fence Fabric Mounting:

Fence fabric will be mounted on steel posts. Tension wires will either be
interwoven or clipped along the top and bottom row of fabric diamonds. The
wire fabric will be secured to posts and tension wires as specified in RR-
F-191/4. When a more secure manner of attaching the fabric to posts is
desired, a power driven fabric and wire fastener, depicted in Figure 9, may be
used. If the ties or fasteners are coated or plated, the coating or plating must
be electrically compatible with the fence fabric to inhibit corrosion. Where
security fencing adjoins structures, the height of the fencing should be 12 ft.
(3.7 m) high from the connection point with a building to a point 12’(3.7 m)
away from the structure.

Figure 9: Wire and Wire Fastener, Power Driven

5. Anchoring/Fabric and Wire Fastener, Power Driven:

The bottom of the fabric will extend to within 2 inches (50.8 mm) of firm soil.
In unstable or shifting soil such as sand, the fabric should either be buried to
compensate for the shifting soil or a minimum of 2 inches (50.8 mm) of the
bottom selvage of the fence anchored in concrete curbs, sills, hooked steel
bars or similar types of anchoring devices extending below ground level as
recommended by the soil engineer. (Frost levels should also be considered
when placing curbs, sills, etc.) Even in unstable and shifting soil, the height of
fabric and posts must be designed to assure that the top of the fence fabric
will be maintained at 7 feet (2.1 m) above existing or anticipated ground level.
This often may require that the fabric be 8 feet (2.4 m) or greater, so that
sufficient material is buried below the surface or embedded in concrete sills.

6. Penetrations-Resistant Barriers:

Recent terrorist incidents involving the use of suicide-type crash entry forces
the consideration of vehicle barriers capable of stopping large vehicles
traveling at high speed. Crash tests of chain link fences, similar to the
chain link fence required by this handbook, allowed full penetration with no
personnel injuries of both a 1-1/2-ton (1360.7-kg) and 2-ton (1814.4-kg)
vehicle traveling at 50 miles per hour (80.5 km per hour). An analysis of crash
test data indicates that, unless enhanced by the addition of cables, fences
offer little protection against penetration. Consequently, to meet a vehicle
threat, fence reinforcement measures may be required to maintain security of
a restricted area. Crash tests performed on a chain link fence reinforced with
a 3/4-inch (19.1-mm) aircraft cable restricted penetration of a 2-ton (1814.4-
kg) vehicle traveling at 50 mph (80.5 km/h) to 26 feet (7.9 m). When selecting
barriers for penetration resistance, the designer should choose active or
passive barriers based on their capacity to stop the threat vehicle at the
maximum speed it could attain in its approach.

●● Passive Barriers
Use passive barriers where unmovable barriers are needed, such
as along a perimeter chain link fence.
●● Active Barriers
Use active barriers where vehicles must be allowed passage, but
the capacity to stop them must also be maintained.
7. Reinforcement of Perimeter Chain link Fence:

(a) A reasonable approach to reinforce a standard chain link perimeter fence

to resist a vehicle attack is both simple and aesthetic. Place a 3/4-inch
(19.1-mm) diameter aircraft cable, conforming to MIL-W-83420, along the
fence line, between the fence posts and the chain link fabric as shown in
Figure 10.

Figure 10: Steel Cable-Reinforced Chain link Fence

(b) Fasten the cable with 1/2-inch (12.7-mm) U-clamps (SAE Grade 3 or
better) at a height of approximately 30 inches (762 mm) from ground level.
Terminate each cable end with either three wire rope clamps (MS16842)
or a wire rope hydraulically swaged press fitting (MIL-P-80104). The
cable end will be attached to one end of a 3/4-inch (19.1-mm) round
turnbuckle (MS51561) with double eye ends which in turn will be attached
to the deadman eyebolt (MIL-B-45908) by a 3/4-inch (19.1-mm) anchor
shackle (SAE Grade 8 or ASTM A 490). The deadman anchor will be a
concrete cube, Approximately 3-by-3-by-3 feet (1-by-1-by 1 m). Eyebolts
captured in the deadman anchors will have either a welded “T” or “L” end
embedded in the concrete as shown in Figure 11.

Figure 11: Deadman Anchor

(c) At a minimum, 2 feet (0.610 m) of the eyebolt and its welded extension will
be captured within the concrete of the deadman. The shaft of the eyebolt
will be either in-line with the attached cable or the eye of the eyebolt will
be flush with the surface of the deadman.

(d) Anchors shall be placed at a minimum of 200-foot (60.9-m) intervals and a

maximum of 1,000-foot (304.8-m) intervals on the inside of the perimeter
fence with the front edge of the deadman flush with the fence fabric.

(e) The top of the deadman will be either flush or buried below the surface as
long as the eye of the eyebolt is above ground level.

(f) Cables must overlap as shown in Figure 10 before terminating at a

deadman so that no voids in the cable occur along the perimeter. If
additional hardening is desired, a second cable should be placed about 5
inches (127 mm) above the first cable and attached as described above. It
may be anchored to the same deadmen used by the first cable system.

(g) When gates form a portion of the fence line being protected by a vehicle
restraint cable system, then the gate cable system described in Section
III.E.2 must be interconnected to the fence cable system to ensure
continuity of the cable system.

(h) The vehicle restraint cable system should not be used along portions of
the fence line that are otherwise protected by natural barriers, such as
large boulders, trees, natural ravines, ditches, and other natural barriers.

III. Gates
A. General

1. Gates facilitate control of authorized traffic and its flow. They establish specific
points of entrance and exit to an area defined by fences. They also function to
limit or prohibit free flow of pedestrian or vehicular traffic, while establishing a
traffic pattern for restricted areas. Gates, as a part of perimeter fences, must be
as effective as their associated fence in order to provide an equivalent deterrent.
Gates will normally require additional hardening features due to their location
across entrance roads and the inherent vulnerability of their requirements.

2. The number of gates and perimeter entrances must be the minimum required
for safe and efficient operation of the facility. Gates are protected by locks,
intermittent guard patrols, fixed guard posts, contact alarms, CCTV, or a
combination of these. Care must be afforded against the ability to crawl under
gates and shall be adequately lighted. They shall be locked when not staffed and
periodically inspected by a roving guard force. Utility openings in a fence that do
not serve as gates should be locked, guarded, or otherwise protected. Top guard
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
270 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

is required and may be vertical where necessary.

B. Design

Materials used in fabricating and erecting chain link gates must be the same as the
materials used for the associated chain link fence. As for security fences, aluminum
pipe, poles, fabric, or accessories will not be used or specified for security gate
components. Use American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) standards to
supplement Federal specifications when further detail or criteria is desired.

C. Types of Gates

1. Federal Specification RR-F-191/2 is the basic criteria document for security fence
gate design. It provides specifications for the following eight types of chain link
fence gates:

(a) Type I - Single Swing Gates.

(b) Type II - Double Swing Gates.

(d) Type IV - Double Cantilever Sliding Gates.

(e) Type V - Single Overhead Sliding Gates.

(f) Type VI - Double Overhead Sliding Gates.

(g) Type VII - Vertical Lift Gates.

(h) Type VIII - Special Gates.

2. The gate types listed above are the most common gate configurations used for
perimeter fencing. These include single and double swing gates (Figures 12 and
13), single and double cantilevered gates (Figures 14 and 15), wheel-supported
(V-groove) sliding gates (Figure 16), and single 23 and double (bi-parting)
overhead supported gates (Figures 17 and 18). While any of these may be used
for pedestrian or vehicular traffic, generally single gates will be designed for
pedestrian traffic and double gates for vehicular traffic.

Figure 12: Single Swing Gate

Figure 13: Double Swing Gate

Figure 14: Single Cantilevered Gate

Figure 15: Double Cantilevered Gate

Figure 16: Single Wheel-Supported (V-Groove) Sliding Gate

Figure 17: Single Overhead Supported Gate

Figure 18: Double Overhead Supported (Biparting) Gate

3. The vertical lift gate (not shown), often referred to as a “guillotine” gate, is not
desirable and should only be used under extremely unusual circumstances.
Special gates, such as turnstile (rotational) gates (Figure 19), are designed either
for specific purposes or to accommodate unusual circumstances.

Figure 19: Turnstile (Rotational) Gate

D. Gate Descriptions

1. Personnel Gates:

(a) Where controlled access to a restricted area is required, turnstile gates

are recommended for controlling pedestrian traffic, as shown in Figure
19. Turnstile gates are also very helpful in relieving guard requirements
for controlling personnel exiting a secured area since they can be set to
revolve only in the exiting direction, thereby reducing the amount of guard
supervision required.

(b) Automated access control systems will use weather-proof readers with
Dual Technology, Contact-less Smartcards, and Proximity or Long Range
readers for vehicle gates. When automated access is desired, CBP/
IA/SMD should be consulted for specific information concerning these
access control systems. While turnstile gates provide security personnel
with more positive access control and greater penetration resistance,
swing gates are a second alternative when turnstile personnel gates are
not practical. Swing type personnel gates may be more economical to
procure and fabricate from a hardware aspect. However, both operational
and guard personnel requirements should be considered to determine the
most economical long-term cost for the facility.

2. Vehicle Gates:

Either wheel-supported or cantilever sliding gates are the best selection

for vehicle security gates followed by overhead sliding gates. Swing gates
are a third alternative and lastly, by far the least desirable, are overhead
(“guillotine”) gates.

3. Sliding Gates:

Sliding gates, when open, store parallel to the adjacent fence line, unlike the
large sweeping arc that swing gates require. When designing the roadbed at
the gate opening, the surface should be kept as straight as possible, allowing
for drainage by a slight incline to one side or the other of the entire roadbed.
When an existing road surface is encountered that is not essentially flat, the
designer should require asphalt or concrete fill to level the roadbed where the
gate will be installed.

4. Cantilever Gates:

Figures 14 and 15 Provide full support and suspension of the gate frame
by four rollers secured to two posts inside the restricted area. Since the
required length of a cantilever gate is 1-1/2 times the size of the opening,
there must be a straight, and essentially level, fence line adjacent to the gate
to accommodate this length when the gate is fully open. Cantilever gates
can compensate for a somewhat crowned or unleveled roadbed and do not
require a “V”-bar guide rail or trough across the roadbed. Cantilever sliding
gates are not recommended for openings exceeding 24 ft. (7.3 m), although
two bi-parting sliding cantilever gates can be used for openings up to 48 ft.
(14.6 m).

5. Wheel-Supported Gates:

Figure 16, Single Wheel-Supported (V-Groove) Sliding Gate, requires either

a guide rail (“V”-groove) or trough across the roadbed. With the “V”-groove
design, the gate’s leading edge utilizes a wheel that has a deep groove cut
into its outside circumference. This wheel travels on inverted angle iron that is
secured across the roadbed on the ground. The rear of the gate travels with
two wheels riding in “C” channels as shown in Figure 16. The trough design
utilizes a metal wheel with a convex diameter that rides down in a groove
extending across the roadbed. While the trough provides a smoother surface
for vehicular traffic, it is not recommended due to typical debris buildup in
the groove causing the wheel to ride up out of the groove onto the roadbed
surface. In both styles, the upper portion of the gate is supported laterally by
additional vertical rollers. Since wheel-supported gates are not cantilevered,
they only need to be somewhat longer than the actual size of the gate
opening, requiring one-third less straight and level storage length along the
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
276 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

fence line than the cantilever gate. Wheel-supported gates essentially are
not limited in the size of their opening except for the power requirements of
the gate operator. A variation of the wheel-supported gate is one using dual
pneumatic, hard rubber, or steel wheels to support the gate. These can be
identified by their lack of roadbed guides. They should only be used as a last
resort, and then only for manually opened sliding gates.

6. Overhead Gates:

Overhead gate design requires either an I-beam or an enclosed track, as

shown in Figures 17 and 18, suspended over the width of the opening and
extending equidistant on one side or the other of the gate opening to store the
gate when it is opened. Similar to wheel-supported and cantilever gates, the
gate must store parallel to the adjacent fence line. The gate storage area must
be in line with the gate opening and either be level or have a decreasing grade
to accommodate the gate when it is fully open. The gate is suspended from
the I-beam or enclosed track by a pair of rollers attached to posts extending
upward from the leading and trailing edge of the gate. The overhead beam
or track height must allow clearance for anticipated truck or rail traffic. The
gate will be suspended above the ground from the overhead beam or track
and supported laterally near the ground by vertical rollers. The enclosed track
design incorporates the best of the overhead gate designs, and is well suited
for automatic operators. The tracking system provides the convenience of a
wheel-supported or cantilever-type installation, but with a much more efficient
means to roll the gate. The amount of force to operate gates with these designs
is significantly less than that of comparable gates. High-cycle demands, large
opening sizes, or heavy gate construction may require strengthening the
overhead I-beam design. Additional upright posts extending upward from the
center of the gate will also allow the enclosed track to carry heavier loads.

7. Swing Gates:

Swing gates (Figures 12 and 13) should be designed so that they swing
inward, toward the secured area. The disadvantage of the swing gate is the
large arc of space required for operation. Swing gates can either be designed
to swing 90 degrees inward and 90 degrees outward or swing 180 degrees
inward only. An important consideration in selecting a single or double swing
gate design is maintaining clearance along the bottom of the gate as it swings
through its arc from the closed to the open position. If the grade is increasing
inside of the gate, grading will be required to allow clearance. The required
2-inch (50.8-mm) maximum clearance between the bottom of the fence and the
roadbed must be maintained when the gate is in the closed position. The swing
gate design places considerable weight on the hinge post and its foundation.
The longer the gate, the more load (movement arm) placed on the gate post.
ASTM F 900 provides design detail for single swing gates up to 24 ft. (7.3 m).

Ideally, single swing gates should not exceed 14 ft. (4.3 m) and double swing
gates should not exceed 28 ft. (8.5 m). Since the weight of the gate must be
borne by the gate post, design of the gate post and its foundation is critical
to assure proper support of the swing gate. An undersized or improperly
installed gate post may shift and cause the gate to move out of plumb with the
ground. This may cause the gate to drag on the ground or change elevation
as the gate moves through its arc from the opened to closed position. The
fence cut sheets at the end of this chapter provides recommended concrete
foundation diameters for posts. At a minimum for swing gate posts, the
concrete foundation should be 3 ft. (1 m) deep.

8. Vertical Lift Gates:

Vertical lift (“guillotine”) gates should only be used when the gate location is
mandated, the site is so restricted, or the weather is so severe that a gate
must be placed in such a location where the only way to open it is upward.
Vertical lift gates should never be considered except as a last possible design
choice. When a vertical lift gate is required, a counterweight with a continuous
drive chain on each side (that pulls the gate both up and down) must be
specified.

9. Hinges:

The weight, size, and frequency of use are important factors in the selection
of gate hinges. Specific design guidance is not contained in the this
specification or associated ASTMs. Gate hinges must have adequate strength
to support the gate and have large bearing surfaces for clamping them into
position. Commercial hinges manufactured to fit increasing diameters of gate
posts also have increased mass and capability to support larger swing gates
and generally have been found acceptable. The hinges must be secured to
the gate post and the gate frame to assure they will not twist or turn under the
weight and action of the gate. Welding is recommended. Gate hardware must
conform to RR-F-191/2. ASTM F 900. Hinges must be made tamper-proof by
the addition of welded security plates or by reversing the direction of the hinge
pins (one up, the other down), thereby protecting the gate from being lifted
off. Bolts and other hardware associated with gate hinges must be welded or
peened (whenever possible on the inside) to prevent their removal by hand
tools.

10. Reinforcement of Swing Gates:

The locking mechanism and the hinges on a security swing gate are the
weakest components of the gate system. These areas can be reinforced by
combining chain and wire rope (cable) to form a barrier across the opening.
Once the chain and wire rope has been installed as shown in Figure 22, the
energy of a vehicle crash attempt is transferred from the gate through wire
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
278 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

rope links to the side gate posts, and further to the fence cable reinforcement
system and deadman concrete anchors. The fence reinforcement cable is
terminated with a swaged loop around the gate post to interconnect with the
gate cable barrier system. With the wire ropes linked together at the fence
posts as shown in Figure 23 and chained together at their point of closure as
shown in Figure 24, in effect there is a continuous barrier across the opening.
The system is simple, unobtrusive, and effective. When the chain is removed,
gates can be operated normally without restriction.

Figure 20: Chain and Wire Rope Reinforced Gate

Figure 21: Wire Rope Interwoven at Gate Post

Figure 22: Chain and Wire Rope Locking System

E. Chain and Wire Rope Reinforced Gate

1. To construct the gate barrier system, a 3/4-inch (19.1-mm) diameter aircraft wire
rope is looped around the gate post as shown in Figure 21, around the gate
frame upright, and through the fence cable loop. The wire rope is strung across
the inside of the gate leaf and fastened around the vertical gate frame upright
and fabric tension bar midway above the roadbed as shown in Figure 20. Where
gates have two leafs involved, a cable will be installed in the same manner on
the second leaf. All cable ends are looped and terminated with either three wire
rope clamps (MS16842) as shown in Figure 23 or hydraulically swaged wire rope
fittings (MIL-P-80104) as shown in Figure 24.

Figure 23: Wire Rope Clamps

Figure 24: Hydraulically Swaged Wire Rope Fitting

2. The critical component of the gate reinforcement system is the chain used to
fasten the gates together. When the gates are closed, a 1/2-inch (12.7-mm)
diameter welded steel alloy chain conforming to RR-C-271 (Table 2, Type
1, Grade C, Class 1), is passed through each of the wire rope loops at the
opening and around the two upright gate posts, then snugly fastened together
with a Security Padlock as shown in Figure 22. There are times when a gate
reinforcement cable barrier system is desired but a cable reinforcement system
for the adjoining fence is not necessary since terrain, natural barriers, structures,
or other passive barrier features provide vehicle crash protection adjacent to
the gate. In such cases, the gate cable system can be terminated directly on
each side of the gate with deadman concrete anchors described for the vehicle
restraint cable system above.

F. Reinforcement of Sliding and Vertical Lift Gates

1. While there is no “generic” or standard design method for hardening

configurations of sliding and vertical lift gates, solutions for hardening various
reinforcement materials used for swing gates above may be used effectively by
the designer to reinforce either sliding or vertical lift gates. For example, a 3/4-
inch (19.1-mm) wire rope (cable) (MIL-W-83420) could be attached along the
length of a sliding gate as shown in Figure 25 or a vertical lift gate as shown
in Figure 26. The cable ends are then looped securely around the gate frame
uprights at each end as shown in Figure 27. The end of the fence reinforcement
cable system should be looped around the terminal posts on each side of the
gate opening as shown for gate posts for swing gates in Figure 22. A 1/2-inch
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
281 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

(12.7-mm) diameter welded steel alloy chain conforming to RR-C-271 (Table

2, Type 1, Grade C, Class 1), can then be passed around the fence terminal
post and the gate frame upright, passing through both the fence and gate cable
loops as shown in Figures 29 and 30. Again, all cable ends are looped and
terminated with either three wire rope clamps (MS16842) as shown in Figure 25
or hydraulically swaged wire rope fittings (MIL-P-80104) as shown in Figure 26. A
security padlock is used to snugly fasten the chain together as shown in Figures
29 and 30.

Figure 25: Cable Reinforcement for a Sliding Gate

Figure 26: Cable Reinforcement of a Vertical Lift Gate

Figure 27: Chain and Wire Rope Reinforcing Sliding Gate

Figure 28: Chain and Wire Rope Reinforcing Sliding Gate

Figure 29: Chain and Wire Roping Reinforcing Vertical Lift Gate

Figure 30: Chain and Wire Roping Reinforcing Vertical Lift Gate, cont’d

G. Locking System

1. Gates will be provided with locking hardware conforming to RR-F-191/2. The

locking system is designed to provide an equal level of penetration resistance
when a gate is closed and locked. Where locking hardware is not practicable,
1/2-inch (12.7-mm) case hardened chains meeting the requirements of RR-C-
271 (Table 2, Type 1, Grade C, Class 1) will be used with a padlock meeting the
requirements of Federal Specification FF-P-2927A. See Appendix 7.6: Doors
and Door Hardware for more information. Vehicle entry sally-port(s), personnel
swing gates, and turnstiles, each with its associated gate latching system(s),
will be designed in accordance with the associated design guide. All pedestrian
and vehicle gates incorporate an automatic electrical latching feature when
closed. The remotely controlled gates are operated from a central location.
An emergency override will be provided to allow both gates to be opened
simultaneously for emergency vehicles.

2. Many power operators for sliding gates are designed to “lock-up” the gate motion
by means of an internal friction brake system that engages when the operator
is stopped. This type of locking device is not adequate to secure the gate when
it is not manned by security personnel; therefore, one of the locking or latching
methods discussed above must be provided.

H. Gate Power-Operators

1. As noted above, gate power-operators with automatic latching (locking) systems

are required for vehicular gates and must be operated by the Command Center.
With the requirements of access control becoming more sophisticated and
involved, the use of power-operators for gates at other types of restricted areas is
more compelling for active vehicular security gate operation. The designer should
analyze the facility access control procedures and anticipated traffic flow through
each proposed vehicular gate.

2. From this analysis, the potential effectiveness of a power-operator in improving

access control operations for gates can be evaluated. When vertical lift gates
are designed, gate power-operators are mandatory except in rare circumstances
when the gate will seldom be used and manual operation of the gate is
reasonable.

3. Gate power-operator controls must be located so they cannot be reached or

tampered with from outside the security fence. Most gates will require site-
specific operating accessories, warning devices, or safety systems in addition
to the actual operator. Gate power-operators shall be connected to emergency
power and must work manually in case of power failure The designer should
coordinate the design of gate power-operators with CBP/IA/SMD.

I. Gate Power-Operator Design

1. A manufacturer’s design (using similar components), the standard features

provided, and optional accessories available are what primarily separate one
manufacturer’s products from another. Some manufacturers provide a full line
of power-operators for gates in all horsepowers, voltages, and phases, while
others limit selection to one or two models which may provide inadequate
horsepower and improper voltages for the gate being designed. Gate power-
operator capabilities are of particular concern when cantilever gates are installed,
particularly when the grade increases from side to side of the opening.

J. Sliding Gate Power-Operators

1. Power-operators for sliding gates are generally associated in three groups based
upon their method of operation:

(a) Electromechanical Chain Driven - An electric motor drives a series of

reduction and worm gears, chains, and sprockets which in turn drive a
chain attached to the gate thereby operating the gate.

(b) Electromechanical Rack and Pinion - An electric motor, through gear

reduction, operates a rack and pinion gear arrangement attached to the
gate thereby operating the gate.

(c) Hydraulic Compression Rail - An electric motor operates a hydraulic pump

which in turn drives two hydraulic motors. The drive wheel mounted on
each motor is compressed and runs on opposing sides of a rail (leg of
angle iron), with the other angle iron leg attached to the gate to operate
the gate.

K. Swing Gate Power-Operators

1. Power-operators for swing gates can generally be placed in two groups based
upon their method of operation:

(a) Hydraulic Piston - A hydraulic piston is attached between the gate leaf and
an offset post. The piston is extended and contracted to operate the gate.

(b) Electromechanical Swing Arm - An electric motor, through gear reduction,

operates a primary arm that travels in an arc parallel to the ground. A
second arm is attached between the gate leaf and the primary arm thereby
operating the gate. While an independent life-cycle cost analysis for swing
gate power-operators has not been made, preliminary analysis indicates
that the hydraulic piston type of swing gate power-operator has a greater
degree of reliability, particularly in areas of measurable snowfall. Greater
reliability generally relates to lower maintenance cost. With the acquisition

cost of swing gate power-operators being comparable, the hydraulic piston

type of swing gate power-operator is recommended for swing-gates.

L. Gate Power-Operator Peripherals

1. The means of activating gate power-operators can be as simple as push buttons

to open, close, and stop the gate or can be a very complex electronic automated
system. The requirements of controlling the motion, direction, braking, and
locking of the gate and gate power-operator are increasingly more demanding.
Manufacturers can provide many additional features as standard equipment such
as “pause to reverse” and “maximum run time.” (“Pause to reverse” delays the
gate from immediately reversing from an open cycle to a close cycle, thereby
avoiding the shock load on the gate power-operator’s mechanics; “Maximum run
time” prevents the gate power-operator from continuing to run after a preset time
if the gate is obstructed.)

2. Access control must be a primary consideration for the designer when designing
gate systems. Access control may be as simple as having a guard physically
open a gate to allow access, or as complex as a system that logs the activity of
individuals and the time of their access to specified areas by use of a designated
code number. Features, devices, and electronic equipment to automate or
expedite access control should be considered during the design of power-
operated gates. A number of issues must be addressed before an access control
system design can be considered complete. These include pedestrian traffic,
reversing devices to keep gates from closing on vehicles, traffic flow, number
of open and close cycles, and type of vehicular traffic. The designer needs
to analyze the operational site security plan and review the details of his on-
site inspection. Next, he should discuss access requirements for the restricted
area(s) consult with CBP/IA/SMD to determine the degree of access control
required. Electronic access control has a very broad spectrum of devices,
technology, and capabilities. CBP/IA/SMD should be consulted for specific
information concerning electronic access control systems. Additionally, technical
guidance may be obtained from CBP/IA/SMD at [email protected].
• For more information, see Chapter 11, Acccess to Facilities.
M. Select Peripheral Equipment

The following must be taken into account when selecting peripheral equipment to
activate gate power-operators:

(a) Who will be authorized to activate the power-operators and where are they
located? (Guard in Access Control Point, remote radio control, key switch,
push button, or card reader?)

(b) How will access control personnel communicate with personnel desiring

entrance and exit from the restricted area? (Directly, intercom, telephone?)

(c) How will the gate be closed after the vehicle has gained entry? (Guard
personnel, automatic timer, infrared (IR) beam?)

(d) How will the gate be opened and closed to permit vehicle exit? (Guard
personnel, IR beam, button or keypad, remote radio control, roll-across
sensor, card reader?)

N. Study Terrain

Conduct a thorough study of the terrain in the general vicinity of a proposed gate to
determine the most suitable gate type and design for that specific location. Review
the site survey and access control plan during the gate selection process. Basically,
there is little security difference between gate types. While there are a number of
factors to consider in selecting the proper gate for a perimeter fence, the designer
will find that terrain and operational aspects are the driving forces in gate selection.

O. Protection for Overhead-Supported and Vertical-Lift Gates

For overhead-supported and vertical-lift gates, the designer needs to provide

additional protection for the upright posts, protruding above the nominal fence height
that can be used as an advantage by an intruder.

P. Impound Lot (Outside) Fence

Basic Requirements

A fenced impoundment lot is required for the storage of seized vehicles and other
large items such as boats, trailers and recreational vehicles. Parking space for
oversized vehicles must be provided in the impoundment lot. It should be located as
far away from the border or public occupied areas as possible, yet still be observable
from the regularly staffed areas. Security cameras and additional lighting must be
provided.

Q. Paving

The impoundment lot should be paved, through 100-mm (4-inch) thick crushed
rock or gravel surface may be considered depending on climate conditions. It
must be surrounded by a 3000 mm (10 foot) high fence, with an outward sloping
cantilever top and crowned with 3 strands of barbed wire. The fence must be
continuously secured to grade. A storage building may be required for storage of
large non‑vehicle items. The entrance must be well lit and must have an intrusion
detection system.

R. Minimum lighting level shall be 32–54 lx (3 - 5 FC).

Figure 31: Perimeter Fence with Concertina Wire

Minimum Requirements for an 8-Ft. Perimeter Fence Cut Sheet

Perimeter, Employee parking, Securing equipment within the

Component
perimeter

Specification Federal Specifications RR-F-191/GEN

9-Gauge (3.9-mm) or heavier Steel Wire Mesh (Before any

Gauge/Material
coating)

Mesh Minimum 2 inches (50.8-mm) per side

Fabric height is 7 feet (2.13-m) and has twisted and barbed

Fabric
selvage at the top and bottom

Zinc coated, aluminum coated, or polyvinyl chloride (PVC) over

Coating
zinc or aluminum coated

Provide Type I or Type II tension wire, Class 4 coating, in

Tension Wires accordance with ASTM A 824. Provide 7-gauge coil spring wire
for top and bottom wire

Steel pipe formed sections, H-Sections, square sections (See

Federal Specs RR-F-191/GEN). Accomplish bracing with steel
Line Posts and Bracing
truss rods not less than 5/16-inch (7.9-mm) nominal diameter and
a turnbuckle for tensioning, conforming to RR-F-191/GEN

Steel outriggers and barbed wire will be installed to conform to

RR-F-191/4 with their overhang facing outward (away from the
Outriggers
protected site). As a minimum, the outriggers will provide an
additional 12 inches (304.8 mm) to the fence height

Provide barbed wire conforming to ASTM A 121 zinc-coated, Type

Z, Class 3, or aluminum-coated, Type A, with 12.5-gauge wire
Barbed Wire
with 14-gauge, round, 4-point barbs spaced no more than 125
mm (5 inches) apart

Height of Fence with

8 Feet (2.44-m)
Outriggers

Pole Reinforcement Buried, encased in concrete

Build to your local building code. Terminal post footings should
be 12 inches (300 mm) wide and 36 inches (1 m) deep. Line post
Concrete Footing
footings should be 10 inches (250 mm) wide and 36 inches (1 m)
deep
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
290 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

Minimum Requirements for a 10 Ft. Impound Lot Fence Cut Sheet

Component Impound Lots within the perimeter

Specification Federal Specifications RR-F-191/GEN

9-Gauge (3.9-mm) or heavier Steel Wire Mesh (Before any

Gauge/Material
coating)
Mesh Minimum 2 inches (50.8-mm) per side

Fabric height is 9 feet (2.73-m) and has twisted and barbed

Fabric
selvage at the top and bottom
Zinc coated, aluminum coated, or polyvinyl chloride (PVC) over
Coating
zinc or aluminum coated

Provide Type I or Type II tension wire, Class 4 coating, in

Tension Wires accordance with ASTM A 824. Provide 7-gauge coil spring wire
for top and bottom wire

Steel pipe formed sections, H-Sections, square sections (See

Line Posts and Federal Specs RR-F-191/3). Accomplish bracing with steel truss
Bracing rods not less than 5/16-inch (7.9-mm) nominal diameter and a
turnbuckle for tensioning, conforming to RR-F-191/4
Steel outriggers and barbed wire will be installed to conform to
RR-F-191/4 with double V of two 45-degree arms for six strands
Outriggers of wire, one set for each post where barbed wire is indicated. As
a minimum, the outriggers will provide an additional 12 inches
(304.8 mm) to the fence height

Provide barbed wire conforming to ASTM A 121 zinc-coated,

Type Z, Class 3, or aluminum-coated, Type A, with 12.5-gauge
Barbed Wire
wire with 14-gauge, round, 4-point barbs spaced no more than 5
inches (125 mm) apart

Height of fence with

10 Feet (3.66-m)
Outriggers

Pole Reinforcement Buried, encased in concrete

Build to your local building code. Terminal post footings should

be 12 inches (300 mm) wide and 36 inches (1 m) deep. Line post
Concrete Footing footings should be 10 inches (250 mm) wide and 36 inches (1 m)
deep

Minimum Requirements for a 12 Ft. Impound Lot (Outside) Fence Cut Sheet

Component Impound Lots and remote sites outside the perimeter

Specification_ ______
Federal Specifications RR-F-191/GEN

Gauge/Material 9-Gauge (3.9-mm) or heavier Steel Wire Mesh (Before any coating)

Mesh Minimum 1 inches (25.4-mm) per side

Fabric height is 11 feet (3.35-m) and has twisted and barbed

Fabric selvage at the top and bottom

Zinc coated, aluminum coated, or polyvinyl chloride (PVC) over zinc

Coating or aluminum coated

Provide Type I or Type II tension wire, Class 4 coating, in

Tension Wires accordance with ASTM A 824. Provide 7-gauge coil spring wire for
top and bottom wire

Steel pipe formed sections, H-Sections, square sections (See

Line Posts and Federal Specs RR-F-191/3). Accomplish bracing with steel truss
Bracing rods not less than 5/16-inch (7.9-millimeters (mm)) nominal
diameter and a turnbuckle for tensioning, conforming to RR-F-191/4

Steel outriggers and barbed wire will be installed to conform to RR-

F-191/4 with double V of two 45-degree arms for six strands of wire,
Outriggers one set for each post where barbed wire is indicated. As a minimum,
the outriggers will provide an additional 12 inches (304.8 mm) to the
fence height

Provide barbed wire conforming to ASTM A 121 zinc-coated, Type

Barbed Wire Z, Class 3, or aluminum-coated, Type A, with 12.5-gauge wire with
14-gauge, round, 4-point barbs spaced no more than 125 mm 5
inches apart

Height of fence with 12 Feet (3.66-m)

Outriggers

Pole Reinforcement Buried, encased in concrete

Build to your local building code. Terminal post footings should

be 12 inches (300 mm) wide and 36 inches (1 m) deep. Line post
Concrete Footing
footings should be 10 inches (250 mm) wide and 36 inches (1 m)
deep

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BACK Return to Table of Contents

Appendix 7.5: Protective Lighting

I. General
A. Physical Security Definitions

1. Physical Security:

(a) That part of security concerned with physical measures designed to

safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment,
installations, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against
espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft.

2. Physical Security System:

(a) A system comprised of people, equipment, and operational procedures

that control access to critical facilities or assets. Security lighting is one
of the elements that comprise the equipment component of a physical
security system. Figure 1 diagrams some of the components of a physical
security system.
Figure 1: Physical Security System Functions

3. Security lighting provides illumination during periods of darkness or in areas of

low visibility to aid in the detection, assessment, and interdiction of aggressors by
security forces. Security lighting is sometimes referred to as protective lighting.
It enhances the Deter, Detect, Assess, and Respond functions of a physical
security system.

B. Security Lighting Objectives

1. Security lighting is one of many components of an in-depth physical security

system. While the level of protection may vary, the lighting must supplement and
facilitate all other measures taken to ensure the security of an asset.

2. These measures may include security forces at an entry control point, patrols
along a perimeter fence, or closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras. In all
cases, the lighting enhances visibility for either an individual or device and
facilitates their performance.

3. In the simplest form, security lighting provides a clear view of an area for security
personnel while reducing concealment opportunities for aggressors. A physical
security system must be able to detect a threat, assess the threat, and then
neutralize the threat.

C. Deterrent Value

1. Security lighting at a site may deter lesser threats and aggressors. While a
security lighting system will not deter sophisticated criminals or terrorists, it may
influence unsophisticated criminals or vandals from taking their planned actions.
The mere presence of light will increase the probability of detection or capture
and may influence these types of aggressors to look for an easier target.

2. Similarly, the effective use of lighting can enhance the perception of security,
which is important to the personnel who work within a secure area. This can be
accomplished through the definition of requirements. Defining the requirements
of a physical security system and its components involves an interdisciplinary
planning team. The team considers all interests relating to a project to determine
how security fits into the total project design. Developing the planning team will
be based on local considerations, but in general, the following functions should
be represented: facility user, antiterrorism officer, operations, security, logistics,
engineering, life safety, and others as required. That team will use the process
in UFC 4-020-01 to identify the design criteria, which includes the assets to be
protected, the threats to those assets (the Design Basis Threat), and the levels of
protection to be provided for the assets against the identified threats. In addition
to those criteria elements, the team must also identify user constraints such as
appearance, operational considerations, manpower requirements or limitations,
energy conservation, and operational costs.

3. In some areas where fence lines and water boundaries cannot be patrolled, the
use of effective lighting can be critical.

D. Security Lighting Design

1. The security lighting system must aid in the detection of aggressors and assist
personnel in the assessment and response to potential threats. The type of site
lighting system provided depends on the installation environment and intended
use.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
295 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

E. Lighting Systems

1. There are three types of systems used for security lighting:

(a) Continuous Lighting

●● The most common security lighting system is a series of fixed lights

arranged to illuminate a given area continuously.

(b) Standby

●● With this system, the luminaires are either automatically or manually

turned on at times when suspicious activity is detected by security
personnel or an intrusion detection system. A standby system creates
the impression of activity and may offer a deterrent value while also
achieving energy conservation. Consider electrode-less fluorescent
(induction) lamp systems in lieu of light sources that require re-strike.

●● Moveable lighting (stationary or portable) consists of manually

operated searchlights that may be lighted during hours of darkness or
as needed. This system is normally used to supplement continuous or
standby lighting. This system will not be discussed in these criteria.

2. Each lighting type may be designed with a particular strategy or technique.

F. Controlled Lighting

1. Controlled lighting is best used when it is necessary to limit the width of the
lighted strip outside the perimeter due to adjoining property. Care should be
taken to minimize or eliminate silhouetting or illuminating security personnel on
patrol. Use full cutoff or fully shielded luminaires mounted in the horizontal plane.
Figures 2 - 4 show different configurations of controlled lighting.

Figure 2: Example of controlled lighting with luminaire located outside the perimeter fence.
This illuminates and draws attention to the aggressor, but not the security personnel.

Figure 3: Example of controlled lighting located inside and adjacent to perimeter fence.
The luminaire location must not provide a means for access over the fence.

Figure 4: Example of Controlled Lighting

G. Glare Projection.

1. One technique for glare projection lighting is to place lights slightly inside a
security perimeter and directed outward. This method is useful when the glare
of lights directed across surrounding territory will neither annoy nor interfere with
adjacent operations. It is a deterrent to potential intruders because it makes it
difficult to see inside the area being protected. It also protects security personnel
by keeping them in comparative darkness and enabling them to observe
intruders at a considerable distance beyond the perimeter.

Figure 5: Example of Glare Projection

H. Conditions for Visibility

1. When designing a security lighting system, consider the viewer of the scene.
Conditions for adequate visibility may differ widely depending on how a particular
scene will be surveyed. The human eye sees quite differently from the lens of a
security camera. A camera may not require visible light at all or be hampered by
the addition of visible light. In many applications, the lighting will be for guards,
patrols, or other security personnel. The human eye responds to light to provide
two types of vision: off-axis and on-axis.

2. Off-axis detection refers to peripheral vision. This type of vision is very sensitive
to movement as well as glare. Its poor visual acuity does not allow off-axis vision
to distinguish details or recognize objects or people. Under low light levels, off-
axis vision is enhanced by white light. White light sources include metal halide,
fluorescent, and induction.

3. On-axis focus refers to viewing objects immediately within the field of view (or
straight ahead). The visual acuity is much higher for on-axis vision and it is not
as sensitive to glare. This type of vision allows for the identification of objects and
people.

I. Integration With Other Security Measures

1. When possible, consider integrating the lighting equipment with other

architectural or landscape features. For example, some manufacturers offer
hardened light poles which offer the strength of a bollard at the base while
providing a mounting location for the luminaire.

J. Security Lighting Criteria

1. Acceptable ranges of illuminance, luminance, and uniformity should be provided

for security tasks. Illuminance values appropriate for security personnel may
range from an average of 1 lux (0.1 fc) for large open areas to an average of 100
lux (10 fc) in area of ID checks for entry control points. If guards must perform
any written task (such as inside a guardhouse), the illuminance on the task
plane may reach an average 300 lux (30fc). However, this value should not be
exceeded and should also be limited to the task plane only. Illuminance values
in excess of this may inhibit the individual’s ability to adapt to lower lighted areas
outside. See Table 1 for more detail.

K. Color Rendition Index

1. For individuals, the color rendition index is vital to the threat identification
objective of security lighting and should be a minimum of 80. Guards must be
able to accurately describe and report the threat. White light sources such as
metal halide, induction, and fluorescent all render color much better than the
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
299 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

yellow light of sources such as high pressure sodium.

L. Color Temperature

1. Color temperature is the color appearance of the lamp. A lower color temperature
refers to a warmer colored lamp while a higher temperature designates a cooler
color. While individuals typically prefer warmer colors, cooler colors may be
considered in security applications to improve visual acuity and help to maintain
alertness. A minimum color temperature of 3500 K should be specified.

M. Level of Protection (LOP)

1. Level of Protection (LOP) defines the degree to which the asset is protected from
the threat. Various facilities may require various levels of protection. The levels of
protection are established using UFC 4-020-01, and should be provided as part
of the design criteria. The LOP of any area determines the amount and type of
security lighting necessary.

2. Low Level of Protection (LLOP)

(a) Low Level of Protection (LLOP) requires Illumination at building entries

and exits. The luminaires should be low brightness and well shielded so
that it does not become a glare source in the much darker surroundings.

3. Medium Level of Protection (MLOP)

(a) Medium Level of Protection (MLOP) requires LLOP criteria and

illumination of the building exterior. Full cutoff or fully shielded luminaires
mounted on the building wall can illuminate the exterior of the building
without adding light to the surrounding area or cause light trespass to
neighboring properties.

4. High Level of Protection (HLOP)

(a) High Level of Protection (HLOP) requires MLOP criteria and illumination
of the area around the facility. This lighting may still be accomplished
with wall mounted lighting on the building. By using a different luminaire
distribution, light can be directed to the surrounding area rather than just
at the building. For larger areas, poles may be necessary to light further
from the building. With full-cutoff luminaires, a perimeter width of 2-3 times
the mounting height can be illuminated.

5. Very High Level of Protection (VHLOP)

(a) Very High Level of Protection (VHLOP) requires HLOP criteria and lighting
of the perimeter fence. In some circumstances, glare projection strategies
may be employed to limit visibility into a secure area.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
300 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

N. Design Coordination

1. Architectural:

(a) Coordinate luminaire locations with building entries, building surfaces,

and mounting locations. Building-mounted luminaires can provide surface
brightness and eliminate the cost of a pole.

2. Site:

(a) Coordinate locations of luminaires with gates, fences, standoff

requirements, trees and shrubs. Avoid locations which will result in
shadows that could be used by aggressors for hiding.

3. Electronic Security Systems:

(a) Investigate ways that the lighting system may be integrated with the alarm
system. Are some lights automatically turned on when a zone goes into
alarm? How might the lighting change once an alarm has been initiated?
Design the lighting system so that luminaires are not in the field of view of
the camera. Verify the camera illumination requirements and limitations for
proper function and display.

4. Operational:

(a) Determine how a facility will be secured. Coordinate security lighting

strategies, lighting controls, and timers with planned patrol routes,
schedules and operational procedures.

II. Security Lighting Applications

A. General strategies or providing good visibility in an energy efficient manner include
controlling glare, providing good lighting uniformity, and addressing other issues
such as surface brightness and controls. The following specific strategies pertain to
security lighting.

1. General Area Security Lighting

(a) Luminaires located along the fence perimeter provide uniform horizontal
and vertical illuminance. Use adjacent building facades or other structures
to mount area lighting. This can add brightness to the surrounding
environment and reduce the amount of equipment needed.

2. Building Security Lighting

(a) Entrances and Exits

●● Increasing the light level at the building entrance directs visitors and
other personnel to the appropriate building entry. It also serves as exit
lighting to guide individuals out of a building for life safety in case of
an emergency. The security lighting at these locations should protect
against forced-entry and provide enough light for threat assessment.
Building entrances and exits must be lighted for all levels of protection.
Use concealed, fully shielded or low brightness sources to limit glare
while still increasing brightness.

(b) Building Exterior

●● Lighting of the building frequently includes some area lighting as well.

By using full cutoff or fully shielded, wall mounted luminaires; both the
building and the adjacent area can be illuminated. Mounting luminaires
at the top of the facade and aiming the light down will increase the
facade brightness and also reduce light trespass and light pollution.

3. Perimeter Lighting

(a) Illumination of a restricted area perimeter includes the exterior and interior
clear zones adjacent to the fence, or in some applications, the area
between multiple fences. Provide poles, power circuits, and transformers
within the protected area. Coordinate pole locations with the user to
ensure that the applicable egress requirements and patrol routes of the
clear zone are not violated. The distance of poles from the fence will
not be less than 10 feet. Perimeter lighting can be either continuous or
standby, controlled or glare projection depending on the application.

4. Controlled Lighting

(a) Illumination levels for controlled lighting shall be adequate to detect a

moving aggressor, either visually or by use of CCTV. Provide full cutoff or
fully shielded luminaires mounted in the horizontal plane to minimize glare.
Glare may hinder security personnel visibility and interfere with authorized
activities or activities outside the installation.

5. Glare Projection

(a) Glare Projection shall provide glare projection only to illuminate flat areas
which are free of obstructions for a minimum of 100 feet outside the
fence. Glare projection should only be utilized in isolated or expeditionary
locations in high threat environments. When designing for glare lighting,
the designer must check for light pollution ordinances of the local
jurisdiction.

III. Entry Control Facilities

A. Entry Control Facility Criteria

1. Refer to UFC 4-022-01 for Entry Control Facility Criteria. Entry Control Facilities
are separated into several zones. The lighting design for each zone is described
in the following paragraphs.

2. Approach Zone

(a) While the approach zone can vary significantly between locations, it
should be illuminated to lead motorists safely to the access zone. Full
cutoff or fully shielded luminaires mounted in the horizontal plane should
be used to minimize glare. To reduce adaptation issues for the motorist,
gradually increase (transitional lighting) lighting levels as the motorist
approaches the access zone. To reduce glare for security personnel,
provide signage to instruct motorists to turn off headlights as they
approach the access zone.

3. Access Zone

(a) Lighting in the access zone provides the highest light levels in the entry
control facility. The lighting system must provide for identification and
inspection. For most of the access zone, full cutoff or fully shielded
luminaires will provide adequate lighting for most of these visual tasks.
However, vertical illuminance on motorists’ faces can be improved with
the use of low brightness (less than 3500 lumen lamp output). Luminaires
mounted to the side and behind security personnel will improve
identification tasks.

(b) Response Zone

●● From the access point, roadway lighting should gradually return to

lower light levels (transitional lighting) while still providing adequate
uniformity.

(c) Cutoff and Shielded Luminaires

●● Provide full cutoff or fully shielded luminaires mounted in the horizontal

plane to minimize glare for motorists and security personnel in the
response zone. In addition, provide signage to instruct motorists to turn
headlights back on after leaving the access zone.

(d) Pedestrian Access Control Point (ACP)

●● Pedestrian zones must provide light for both pedestrians and

security personnel. Pedestrians must have a clear view of gates and
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
303 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

card access readers and security personnel must be able to see

pedestrians approaching the ACP. Provide full cutoff or fully shielded
luminaires mounted in the horizontal plane to minimize glare.

(e) Guard Station

●● Inside the guard station, task lighting must be provided for reviewing
identifications, paper work, and possibly computer tasks. However,
the interior light levels must be kept at a lower ambient light level
than the exterior. Otherwise, the security personnel will have reduced
visibility and those approaching the shack will have a clear view of the
interior. The location and shielding of interior lighting must minimize
the chance of veiling reflections on the glass which may limit visibility
to the outside. All luminaires must be dimmable to adjust inside lighting
levels. Colored light should not be used for task lighting when color is
to be distinguished.

(f) Over Watch Position

●● These locations must maintain an unobstructed view through the

access and response zones. Additionally, inside the over watch itself,
lighting must be kept to extremely low levels or eliminated entirely
to prevent the lighting of the security personnel. All luminaires must
be dimmable to adjust lighting levels. While red colored light has
been used in such applications to maintain the eye’s dark adaptation,
colored light should not be used for task lighting when color is to be
distinguished in the task.

B. CCTV camera

1. Vehicle Inspection

(a) In areas where a security personnel must identify visitors, check

credentials, and read shipping manifests, lighting must not interfere with
the operations while vehicles approach, stop for inspection, and proceeds.
Having to continually adapt to different illuminance and brightness levels
could lead to eyestrain and reduced performance by security personnel.
Additional task lighting should come from behind the guard and light the
person to identify or the vehicle to inspect.

(b) Cameras respond to a luminous environment differently than the human

eye. The field of view of a camera refers to the extent of the scene that
can be viewed at one time. Some devices may use motorized swivels to
pan across a scene and increase the viewing area. Cameras adjust the
view based on the brightest point in this field. If it must adjust for a hot
spot, areas under low illuminance levels may not be visible at all. Uniform
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
304 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

illuminance and fully shielded/full cutoff luminaires are vital to limit hot
spots and improve CCTV system performance. Any luminaire that falls
within the camera’s field of view at any time must be shielded. If a light
source can be seen directly by the camera, the glare and high contrast will
limit the visibility of the entire scene. Therefore, the source of illumination
is best located above the level of the camera.

2. Color Rendition Index

(a) For color cameras, the color rendering index of the sources lighting the
area should be above 80. While color rendering is less important for
monochrome systems, high pressure sodium lamps should still be avoided
as their limited spectral distribution may render a fuzzy image.

3. Uniform Vertical Illuminance

(a) CCTV cameras typically record objects and people in elevation. Therefore,
the security lighting system must provide adequate and uniform vertical
illuminance. As in many security lighting applications, the amount
of vertical illuminance is far more important than horizontal. Vertical
illuminance should average 0.2 to 0.5 foot-candles at 5 feet above the
ground. Furthermore, it should have a very uniform coverage of 4:1
average to minimum. Color cameras may require higher light levels than
monochrome cameras. Review camera manufacturer recommendations
and coordinate with the security system designer when designing the
lighting system.

4. Infrared (IR) Cameras

(a) IR cameras utilize IR sources to illuminate the field of view. Light in the
IR spectrum is not visible to the human eye. IR cameras then pick up the
reflections of these wavelengths from objects in the area.

5. Thermal Imaging

(a) Devices using thermal technology do not require any light source to
operate. They create images based on the heat differences between
humans, vehicles, the ground, and foliage. Unlike other camera
technologies, thermal imagery is not affected by glare from headlights or
light sources. While this technology can indicate the presence of people
and objects in complete darkness, it does not provide the detailed images
obtainable from visible light or IR cameras.

6. Waterfronts

(a) These areas are typically a combination of the entry control facilities, area,

and perimeter lighting. However, approach zones are often very short and
additional control points are located at the entry to each pier. Full cutoff
area and structure lighting will limit both direct and reflected glare near
waterfronts for all of these areas.

(b) Be aware of environmental issues, such as impact of lighting on

indigenous wildlife, when planning exterior lighting near waterfronts.

(c) For example: when lighting facilities near sea turtle nesting areas, the
exterior lighting must be fully shielded and limited to reduce its impact
on turtle hatchlings, especially during hatching seasons. These seasons
typically fall between May and October although they may vary by
particular region. Hatchling turtles orient themselves with visual cues
including skylight reflected from the ocean. Each year, electrical exterior
lighting disorients thousands of sea turtles and draws them away from
the ocean – their best chance of survival. While researchers do not have
exact casualty figures, many states, including Florida maintain aggressive
lighting ordinances to limit exterior light during the nesting season.

7. Airfields

(a) Exterior lighting must meet all Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
and airfield operational regulations. These regulations may restrict the
height of poles located near an airfield. Coordinate security lighting
with installation’s airfield safety officer. Use full cutoff or fully shielded
luminaires to reduce glare which may affect airfield operations.

8. Specific Lighting Criteria

(a) The specific lighting criteria and design issues may vary with application.
For this reason, see the appropriate security lighting application in Chapter
7, Exterior Protection. Table 1 summarizes the minimum horizontal and
vertical illuminance levels for typical facility applications. It is important to
note however that over lighting can cause just as many visibility problems
as under lighting. In typical applications, the maximum light levels should
not be more than double the recommended average value.

9. Electrical Requirements

(a) Backup power is not required for all security lighting systems. The
assessment of risk and asset value will determine this need. For critical
security lighting systems, several different types of systems are available
for providing backup power in the event of a power outage. All offer
various advantages and disadvantages. They vary in amount of time that
they can provide power, amount of downtime between a power outage
and backup power, and cost. The back-up power system must also
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
306 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

consider the re-strike time of some light sources. Metal halide and high
pressure sodium lamps both require a certain amount of time to cool-down
before they can be re-ignited. This time may reach up to fifteen minutes.
While these sources can still be used, an intermittent light source may be
required.

10. Backup Generators

(a) Generators are commonly used to provide backup power but have some
downtime between the outage and when the generator restores power.
Minimum downtime can be as low as ten seconds. While this is one of
the least expensive solutions, operations must be able to sustain the
short period of darkness. Frequently, small battery packs power a few
luminaires during this downtime until the generator can restore power.

11. Uninterruptible Power Supply

(a) An Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) is a battery source that provides

instantaneous power in case of a power loss. UPS systems have a high
initial cost and are expensive to maintain. Therefore, only provide a UPS
for security lighting systems associated with the protection of critical
assets or operations when continuous, full brightness lighting is required.

12. Flywheels

(a) Flywheels provide instantaneous power in the case of power loss in the
form of the kinetic energy in a constantly rotating wheel. This energy can
be harnessed immediately in the event of a power outage and used to
power critical lighting. These devices vary widely in price and capacity.

13. Integral Batteries

(a) Individual battery packs are available for some luminaires. In the event
of a power outage, these packs can power the lighting for times ranging
from five minutes to two hours, depending on the battery capacity. For
fluorescent or induction sources, the battery will power the ballast directly
although the lamp may not provide full light output.

14. Partial Back-up Systems

(a) Light sources requiring a re-strike can be specified with a partial back-
up system such as quartz re-strike. In this case, the luminaire contains a
primary lamp, such as metal halide, and then a smaller quartz lamp. In the
event of a power outage, the metal halide source will require a cool down
time before it can be re-ignited. During this period the quartz lamp uses
generator-supplied power to light the area. The lighting level will not be as

high, but interim lighting will be provided. When the primary source returns
to full brightness, the quartz lamp is extinguished. A separate, complete
back-up lighting system does not provide an economical or effective
design solution. Consider electrode less fluorescent (induction) lamp or
LED systems in lieu of light sources that require re-strike.

15. Circuiting Techniques

(a) Circuiting luminaires onto separate circuits in the same space will not
provide backup power but will limit vulnerabilities during a fault. If the
lighting system is divided onto two circuits, the loss of one will not affect
half of the lighting system. Multiple systems should be installed, except
where their use is clearly impracticable. The over current devices,
transformer, and wiring should be within the restricted area. Locate
circuits underground to minimize the possibility of sabotage or vandalism.
Equipment and design should provide for simplicity and economy in
system maintenance. To minimize security degradation during faults,
feeders may be 3-phase, 4-wire with single pole over current devices
at the service equipment. Consecutive luminaires will be connected to
alternate phases of 3-phase feeders.

C. Controls

1. On/Off control will be automatic, manual, or manual/automatic as appropriate.

(a) Automatic

●● Perimeter and area lighting On/Off control will be automatic and

will be activated during periods of darkness or at other times when
visibility is reduced or by electronic security systems. In expeditionary
environments, automatic on-off control must be capable of being
deactivated which may require either manual/automatic or manual on-
off control depending upon the site.

(b) Manual

●● Wherever manual On/Off control is appropriate, on-off controls will be

accessible to and operable only by authorized personnel. Systems
which are designed to remain off until needed, will have on-off control
at the surveillance location and will meet instant-on requirements.
Electrode-less fluorescent (induction) or LED would be the appropriate
luminaire choice for this type of application.

●● In some applications, motion sensors can be used to turn on lights

when someone approaches. This alerts patrols or other personnel that

activity is taking place in a particular area and should be assessed.
Such control strategies will reduce energy consumption and may also
startle and deter unsophisticated criminals.

Table 1: Minimum Lighting Criteria for Unaided Guard Visual Assessment.

TABLE 1: CBP SECURITY LIGHTING
Illuminated Width Average Illuminance
Application Feet (m) (All Lighted Areas) Uniformity
Locations to Foot-candles
Type Lighting Area Inside Outside Light (lux)a (Max : Min)
Outer lighted
Glare Isolated 25 (7.6) 150 (46) 0.2 (2)b 20:1
edge
At fence Outer
Controlled Semi-isolated 10 (3.0) 70 (21) lighted edge 0.4 (4) 0.2 (2) 20:1
Perimeter
At fence Outer
20-30 30-40 (9.1-
Controlled Non-isolated lighted edge 0.4 (4) 0.4 (4) 10:1
(6.1-9.1) 12)

Inner Area Area General All - Entire Area 0.2-0.5 10:1

Building Entry
Controlled LLOP - - 0.1-0.3 (1-3) 20:1
and Exits

Same as LLOP
Controlled MLOP - - and exterior 0.2-0.5 (2-5) 15:1
walls.
Building Same as
Lighting MLOP and
Controlled HLOP - - 0.5-1.0 (5-10) 10:1
perimeter area.

Same as HLOP
and lighting
Controlled VHLOP - - of perimeter 0.5-1.0 (5-10) 10:1
fence.

Pedestrian 25 (7.6) 25 (7.6) Entry 2 (20) 10:1

Vehicular
Entry (Approach
Pavement and
Control Controlled and 50 (15) 50 (15) 1 (10) 10:1
sidewalk
Facility Response
Zones)
ID Verification All - Guard station 20 (200) 10:1

Parking or
Area Outside All - Entire Area 2 (20) 10:1
Storage
Areas
Area Covered All - Entire Area 5 (50) 10:1

a Horizontal plane at ground level unless otherwise

noted. b Vertical plane, 3 feet (0.9 m) above grade. c Use
higher value for more sensitive areas.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
309 of 890
Doors

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BACK Return to Table of Contents

Appendix 7.6: Doors and Door Hardware

I. Exterior/Perimeter Doors
A. The number of doors to a facility should be limited to an absolute minimum. In cases
where more than one door exists, only one of these should be provided with outside-
mounted locks and entry hardware. All others should, if possible, present blank, flush
surfaces to the outside to reduce their vulnerability to attack.

B. Perimeter doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad, hollow core metal,
1¾-inches thick. Solid core wood doors are not authorized for use on the perimeter
of a facility. Door frames must be constructed of hollow metal that is equal in
strength to that of the door.

C. All exterior perimeter doors must be equipped with deadbolt locks equipped with UL
437 cylinder. The deadbolts must have at least a 1-inch throw. Coordination must be
made with the local fire marshal before construction to determine compliance with
building code(s) associated with National Fire Protection Association 101 (NFPA
101).

D. Double doors must have one door secured with Flush Mount Bolts (Door Hardware
H) at the top and the bottom. Astragals (Door Hardware A) must be used to inhibit
access to latches from the attack side of the door.

E. A Balanced Magnetic Alarm Switch (Door Hardware G) must be installed on each

perimeter door to detect the opening/closing of the door. The application of this
type of door alarm is utilized due to its application of two magnetic poles rather than
one on standard alarm systems. This reduces the risk of the alarm switch being
compromised. For more information on Intrusion Detection Systems, see Appendix
8.9, IDS.

F. All perimeter doors must have a commercial grade automatic door closer installed
(Door Hardware K).

G. To prevent access to the latch/deadbolt, all perimeter doors will have anti-pry strips
installed. Refer to Figure 3 for minimum design specifications and illustrations.

H. Perimeter door hinge pins that are located on the outside of the facility must be non-
removable (Door Hardware J). Additionally, a dowel-pin and socket system should
be utilized. Refer to Figure 2 and Figure 4 for minimum design specifications and
sample illustrations.

I. All door hardware (e.g., hinges, lock hardware) must be secured to the door frame
with stainless steel screws that are at least 3 inches long.

1. Building Entrances

(a) Material:

●● Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal,

1¾-inches thick, and hung in hollow metal frames. Wood Doors will not
be used on the perimeter of a facility.

●● Other than in a secure reception area, there will be no windows.

(b) Hardware:

●● Install Lockset D or H (as applicable).

●● Install Cylinder A.

●● Install Door Hardware F.1, if door is equipped with a card reader/

keypad.

●● Install Door Hardware E.

●● Install Door Hardware G.

●● Install Door Hardware L, if door swings outward.

●● Install Door Hardware J, if door swings outward.

●● Install Door Hardware K.

J. Perimeter door designated as an emergency exit

1. Perimeter exits that provide emergency egress must generate a local audible/
visual alarm at the door, if it is breached. An alarm must also annunciate in the
Control Room. Depressing a door activation bar for more than two seconds will
initiate an alarm and activate the associated CCTV camera.

2. A High-Security Emergency Exit device with deadbolt should be installed. It is

distinguishable from other exit devices in the following ways: (1) it is labeled for
both fire and emergency and (2) it has no means of locking the deadbolt or latch
in a retracted position.

3. Emergency exits should be equipped with special locking devices approved by

the National Fire Prevention Association (NFPA), that provide opening delays
of 5-15 seconds. The installation of breakable devices or niches over door
activation bars can often deter misuse. In consultation with local code officials,
design a system that assures safety and also satisfies CBP requirements.

4. Emergency exits will be equipped with non-removable hinges with a set screw in
the barrel that is only accessible when the door is swung open.

(a) Material:

●● Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal,

1¾-inches thick, and hung in hollow metal frames.

(b) Hardware:

●● Install Lockset H.

●● Install Door Hardware E.

●● Install Door Hardware G.

●● Install Door Hardware L, if door swings outward.

●● Install Door Hardware J, if door swings outward.

●● Install Door Hardware K.

K. Overhead Coiling Doors:

1. Overhead doors will be the roll-up, flush-fitting type with a balanced magnetic
switch attached to the bottom of the door.

2. The doors are to be factory-fitted with a slide-bolt that can be extended through
each of the metal slide rails. Each slide-bolt will be fitted to the door within 6
inches of the floor and designed to accommodate the use of a high security
padlock.

3. The doors will be fitted with the appropriate electric motor system supplied by
the manufacturer. The motor system shall have a manual override feature in
the event the motor fails. Chains used to operate the door manually shall be of
such a length that the door can be easily operated from the floor. An eyebolt will
be affixed into the concrete in the area of the chain to allow the use of a high
security padlock as an additional security feature. The electric control buttons
and the manual override feature will be located so that they cannot be reached
by cutting a hole through the door.

(a) Material:

●● Doors must be metal, dual-slat, manufactured with 12-, 14-, or

16-gauge exterior slats and 18-, 20-, 22-, or 24-gauge interior slats with
insulated centers.

(b) Hardware:

●● Install Door Hardware G.

●● Install High Security Padlock

II. Interior Doors

A. Counter-Terrorism Response Suite (CTR), Rover Coordination Center (RCC),
CBP Coordination Center (CCC)

1. Material:

(a) Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal or of
single solid core wood, 1¾-inches thick, and hung in hollow metal frames.

2. Hardware:

(a) Install Lockset D or H.

(b) Install Cylinder A, keyed individually under a CBP master.

(c) Install Door Hardware F.1.

(d) Install Door Hardware G.

(e) Install Door Hardware L, if door swings outward.

(f) Install Door Hardware J, if door swings outward.

(g) Install Door Hardware K.

(h) Provide access control/card reader.

B. Secondary Exam Podium and Baggage Belts Area (Port of Entry only)

1. Material:

(a) Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal or of
single solid core wood, 1¾-inches thick, and hung in hollow metal frames.

2. Hardware:

(a) Install Lockset D.

(b) Install Cylinder A, keyed individually under a CBP master.

(c) Install Door Hardware F.1.

(d) Install Door Hardware J, if door swings outward.

(e) Install Door Hardware K.

C. CBP/APHIS Veterinary Services (VS) Bird Quarantine and Bird Holding Facilities
(Port of Entry only)

1. Material:

(a) Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal or of
single solid core wood, 1¾-inches thick, and hung in hollow metal frames.

2. Hardware:

(a) Install Lockset D.

(b) Install Cylinder A, keyed individually under a CBP master.

(c) Install Door Hardware B.

(d) Install Door Hardware D.

(e) Install Door Hardware E.

(f) Install Door Hardware J, if door swings outward.

(g) Install Door Hardware K.

(h) Install door seal around frame.

D. Interview Rooms

1. Material:

(a) Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal or of
single solid core wood, 1¾-inches thick, and hung in hollow metal frames.
The upper half of the door must be equipped with a tempered-glass view
window. The door must swing 180-degrees in the direction of egress.

2. Hardware:

(a) Install Lockset B.

(b) Install Cylinder A, key interview rooms alike.

(c) Install Door Hardware B.

(d) Install Door Hardware D.

(e) Install Door Hardware E.

E. Violator Waiting Area (Port of Entry only)

1. Material:

(a) Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal
or of single solid core wood, 1¾-inches thick, and hung in hollow metal
frames. The door should have a 180-degree swing in direction of egress.
(The doors must swing out from the room so individuals can not barricade
themselves in when the officer steps out.)

2. Hardware:

(a) Install Lockset E2.

(b) Install Cylinder A, keyed individually under a CBP master.

(c) Install Door Hardware B.

(d) Install Door Hardware D.

(e) Install Door Hardware E.

(f) Install Door Hardware J.

(g) Install door-pull on ingress side and a push plate on egress side of door.

F. Violator Processing Area (Port of Entry only)

1. Material:

(a) Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal or of
single solid core wood, 1¾-inches thick, and hung in hollow metal frames.

2. Hardware:

(a) Install Lockset D.

(b) Install Cylinder A, keyed individually under a CBP master.

(c) Install Door Hardware D.

(d) Install Door Hardware F1.

(e) Install Door Hardware K.

(f) Provide access control/card reader.

G. Search Room

1. Material:

(a) Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal or of
single solid core wood, 1¾ inches thick, and hung in hollow metal frames.
The doors must swing in the direction of egress.

2. Hardware:

(a) Install Lockset E2.

(b) Install Cylinder A, key search rooms alike.

(c) Install Door Hardware B.

(d) Install Door Hardware D.

(e) Install Door Hardware E.

(f) Install Door Hardware J.

(g) Install door-pull on ingress side and a push plate on egress side of door.

H. Hold Room

1. Material:

(a) Doors must be constructed of 2-inch thick, detention-grade, 12-gauge

steel that swings in the direction of egress. The door frames must be
12-gauge steel and grouted into the surrounding wall. The door must be
equipped with security glass or a barred window, 12-inches x 12-inches
and installed at the standard height for convenient visual checks. Security
glass and bars must be of appropriately sturdy construction to prevent
escape. Do not install a door closer on hold room doors.

2. Hardware:

(a) Detention –type hardware is required, as indicated below. Finish of visible

parts must match finish of other building hardware.

(b) Hinges: 41/2” X 41/2”, minimum 3 per door, heavy duty ball bearing type
with tamper-resistant screws and non-removable pins.

(c) Locks: Locks shall be detention dead bolt, heavy duty, mortised (MOGUL
Key on One Side) mechanical with ADA compliant lever handles; except
where suicide resistance is warranted, a substitute cone-shape handle
may be used. Locks with interchangeable cores are acceptable (obtain
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
318 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

approval from COTR and Using Agency). It must deadlock in both locked
and unlocked positions.

(d) Door Pull: Raised pull on outside of door. Pushplate not required on inside
face.

(e) Door Stops/Wall Bumpers: Dome type 13/8” high or as required to meet
applicable conditions.

(f) Door Closers: No closers or self-closing hinges on hold rooms. Closers

are required on doors to a secure perimeter.

(g) Additional information about specifications for Electro-Mechanical Locks

can be found in the following UL Listings: UL1034 listed as Burglary-
Resistant Mechanisms, and UL10B listed as Fire Door Accessories.

I. Fraudulent Document Analysis Room (Port of Entry only); Alien Baggage Storage;
and Joint Automated Booking System/Identification Room:

1. Material:

(a) Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal or of
single solid core wood, 1¾-inches thick, and hung in hollow metal frames.

2. Hardware:

(a) Install Lockset D.

(b) Install Cylinder A, keyed individually under a CBP master.

(c) Install Door Hardware B.

(d) Install Door Hardware D.

(e) Install Door Hardware E.

(f) Install Door Hardware J, if door swings outward.

(g) Install Door Hardware K.

J. Alien Documentation, Identification & Telecommunications Room (ADIT) (Port of

Entry only)

1. Material:

(a) Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal or of
single solid core wood, 1¾-inches thick, and hung in hollow metal frames.

2. Hardware:

(a) Install Lockset D.

(b) Install Cylinder A, keyed individually NOT under a CBP master.

(c) Install Door Hardware B.

(d) Install Door Hardware D.

(e) Install Door Hardware E.

(f) Install Door Hardware J, if door swings outward.

(g) Install Door Hardware K.

K. Seizure Processing Area (Port of Entry only)

1. Material:

(a) Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal or of
single solid core wood, 1¾-inches thick, and hung in hollow metal frames.

2. Hardware:

(a) Tamperproof with high security deadlock and no master key. Provide card
reader/keypad to track users, but not as a substitute for a deadlock. The
card reader shall be integrated to the locking mechanism. One shouldn’t
work without the other. Appropriately authorized card and key should be
necessary for access. The door must be fitted with a UL-437 approved
high security locking cylinder deadbolt lock (or equivalent). The keying
must be different from all other keys and must be keyed off a master key.

L. General Storage/File Room

1. Material:

(a) Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal or of
single solid core wood, 1¾-inches thick, 40-42” wide and hung in hollow
metal frames.

2. Hardware:

(a) Install Lockset D.

(b) Install Cylinder A, keyed individually under a CBP master.

(c) Install Door Hardware D.

(d) Install Door Hardware J, if door swings outward.

(e) Install Door Hardware K.

M. Secure Storage Room

1. Material:

(a) Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal or of
single solid core wood, 1¾ inches thick, 40-42” wide and hung in hollow
metal frames.

(b) Hinges and frame should be appropriate for door. Door may require
shoring.

2. Hardware:

(a) Install Lockset D.

(b) Install Cylinder A, keyed individually, NOT under a CBP master.

(c) Install Door Hardware B.

(d) Install Door Hardware D.

(e) Install Door Hardware J, if door swings outward.

(f) Install Door Hardware K.

N. Temporary Seized Property Storage Vault (Evidence Storage)

1. Material:

(a) Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal,
1¾-inches thick, and hung in hollow metal frames.

2. Hardware:

(a) Install Lockset D.

(b) Install Cylinder A, keyed individually under a CBP master.

(c) Install Lockset G.

(d) Install Door Hardware J.

(e) Provide Access Control/Card Reader

NOTE: A card reader/keypad will be utilized to augment the deadbolt lock. During non-working hours, the
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
321 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

deadbolt lock will be engaged.

O. CBP Chief Officer’s Office (OIC); Supervisor’s Office; Secondary Supervisor’s Office

1. Material:

(a) Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal or of
single solid core wood, 1¾ inches thick, and hung in hollow metal frames.

2. Hardware:

(a) Install Lockset B.

(b) Install Cylinder A, keyed individually under a CBP master.

(c) Install Door Hardware B.

(d) Install Door Hardware D.

(e) Install Door Hardware E.

P. Anti-Terrorism Contraband Enforcement Team (AT-CET) Office; Passenger Analysis

Unit (PAU)/Intelligence Office

(a) Material:

●● Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal

or of single solid core wood, 1¾ inches thick, and hung in hollow metal
frames.

(b) Hardware:

●● Install Lockset D.

●● Install Cylinder A, keyed individually under a CBP master.

●● Install Door Hardware B.

●● Install Door Hardware D.

●● Install Door Hardware E.

●● Install Door Hardware K.

Q. Weapons and Ammunition Storage

1. Material:

(a) Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
322 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

1¾-inches thick, and hung in hollow metal frames.

2. Hardware:

(a) Install Lockset J (recommended)

(b) Install Lockset G.

(c) Install Cylinder A, keyed individually NOT under a CBP master.

(d) Install Lockset D.

(e) Installation of one of the following types of Door Hardware may be

recommended: F, J, K, B, or E

(f) An access control device or system will be utilized to track users. A card
reader/keypad will be utilized to augment the deadbolt lock. During non-
working hours, the deadbolt lock will be engaged.

R. General Office

1. Material:

(a) Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal or of
single solid core wood, 1¾-inches thick, and hung in hollow metal frames.

2. Hardware:

(a) When entered from processing area, floor, or non-sterile side of terminal:

●● Install Lockset D.

●● Install Cylinder A, keyed individually under a CBP master.

●● Install Door Hardware B or D.

●● Install Door Hardware J, if door swings outward.

●● Install Door Hardware K.

●● Provide access control/card reader.

(b) When entered from a secure corridor:

●● Install Lockset B.

●● Install Cylinder A, keyed individually under a CBP master.

●● Install Door Hardware D.

●● Install Door Hardware K.

S. Cashier’s Office

1. Material:

(a) Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal or of
single solid core wood, 1¾-inches thick, and hung in hollow metal frames.

2. Hardware:

(a) Install Lockset D.

(b) Install Cylinder A, keyed individually NOT under a CBP master.

(c) Install Door Hardware B or D.

(d) Install Door Hardware J, if door swings outward.

(e) Install Door Hardware K.

(f) Provide access control/card reader.

T. Break Room; Male & Female Staff Toilets/Showers/Locker Rooms; Document/Copy/

Shredder/Fax Room;

1. Material:

(a) Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal or of
single solid core wood, 1¾-inches thick, and hung in hollow metal frames.

2. Hardware:

(a) Install Lockset B.

(b) Install Cylinder A, keyed like toilet rooms and physical training room under a
CBP master.

(c) Install Door Hardware D.

(d) Install Door Hardware K.

U. Conference/Muster/Training Room

1. Material:

(a) Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal or of
single solid core wood, 1¾-inches thick, and hung in hollow metal frames.

2. Hardware:

(a) Install Lockset A.

(b) Install Cylinder A, keyed individually under a CBP master.

(c) Install Door Hardware B.

(d) Install Door Hardware D.

(e) Install Door Hardware E.

(f) Install Door Hardware K.

V. Canine Unit Office with General Storage

1. Material:

(a) Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal or of
single solid core wood, 1¾-inches thick, and hung in hollow metal frames.

2. Hardware:

(a) Install Lockset D.

(b) Install Cylinder A, keyed individually under a CBP master.

(c) Install Door Hardware B.

(d) Install Door Hardware D.

(e) Install Door Hardware E.

(f) Provide access control/card reader.

W. CBP Agricultural Laboratory & Disposal Room

1. Material:

(a) Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal or of
single solid core wood, 1¾-inches thick, and hung in hollow metal frames.

2. Hardware:

(a) Door Hardware K

X. Emergency Generator Room

1. Material:

(a) Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal or of
single solid core wood, 1¾-inches thick, and hung in hollow metal frames.

2. Hardware:

●● Install Lockset D.

●● Install Cylinder A, keyed individually under a CBP master.

●● Install Door Hardware C.

●● Install Door Hardware D.

●● Install Door Hardware J, if door swings outward.

●● Install Door Hardware K.

Y. Local Area Network/Telephone Communications Room; Communications Room

(Radio)

1. Material:

(a) Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal or of
single solid core wood, 1¾-inches thick, and hung in hollow metal frames.

2. Hardware:

(a) Install Lockset D.

(b) Install Cylinder A, keyed individually NOT under a CBP master.

(c) Install Door Hardware D.

(d) Install Door Hardware J, if door swings outward.

(e) Install Door Hardware K.

Z. Mechanical Room

1. Material:
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
326 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

(a) Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal or of
single solid core wood, 1¾-inches thick, and hung in hollow metal frames.
Provide double doors, as required.

2. Hardware:

(a) Install Lockset D.

(b) Install Cylinder A, keyed individually under a CBP master.

(c) Install Door Hardware C.

(d) Install Door Hardware D.

(e) Install Door Hardware J, if door swings outward.

(f) Install Door Hardware K.

AA. Electrical Closet

1. Material:

(a) Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal or of
single solid core wood, 1¾-inches thick, and hung in hollow metal frames.

2. Hardware:

(a) Install Lockset D.

(b) Install Cylinder A, keyed individually under a CBP master.

(c) Install Door Hardware D.

(d) Install Door Hardware J, if door swings outward.

(e) Install Door Hardware K.

III. Vault Doors

A. Armory vault doors and security vault doors are both manufactured according to
Federal Specification AA-D-600 Door, Vault, and Security. The difference between
the two doors is that armory vault doors, used to protect AA&E, are fitted with UL
Standard 768, Group 1, mechanical combination locks. Security vault doors, used to
protect classified information, are fitted with locks meeting Federal Specification FF-
L-2740 (with Amendment 1), Locks, Combination. The armory vault door label (silver
with red letters) states that it is a “GSA Approved Armory Vault Door.” The security
vault door label reads “GSA Approved Security Vault Door” (label also silver with red
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
327 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

letters).

B. At present, there are numerous GSA approved Class 5 security vault doors being
used for the protection of weapons. We strongly recommend that locks be changed
out to the UL Standard 768, Group 1, mechanical combination lock, when and if a
failure occurs with an X-07, X-08 or X-09 lock. When that change is made it must be
noted on the Optional Form 89 (Maintenance Record for Security Containers/Vault
Doors). It should also be noted on the front of the armory door that is not authorized
for the protection of classified information.

C. For further information on vault doors refer to Chapter 8.7 and Federal Qualified
Products List QPL-AA-D-600-8.

IV. Door Hardware Descriptions

Door Hardware A: Astragal

A metal molding attached to the face of the active leaf

of a pair of doors and overlapping the inactive leaf. See
Figure A1.

(CBP Policy: Astragals must be installed on all double

doors leading into CBP space)

Hardware A1

Door Hardware B: Automatic Door Bottom

A movable plunger, in the form of a horizontal

bar (B1) at the bottom of a door, which drops
automatically when the door is closed; when
closed, a horizontal protruding operating rod
(B2) strikes the door jamb, thereby actuating the
plunger, sealing the threshold (B3) and reducing
noise transmission. This device is also known as
Hardware B1 an automatic threshold closer

Hardware B3

Hardware B2

Door Hardware C: Door Coordinator

A door coordinator is used
on double doors when
Hardware C1
the inactive door needs
to close earlier than the
active door. This prevents
the active door from
closing before the inactive
door thus preventing an
Hardware C2 unsecured situation.

Door Hardware D: Door Stop

A rubber-tipped projection attached to a wall

or floor to protect it from the impact of an
opening door.

Hardware D

Door Hardware E: Door Threshold (Saddle)

A horizontal piece of metal that forms the bottom of a doorway and provides a visual and
mechanical transition between the bottom of the door and the floor.

Hardware E1
Hardware E2

Door Hardware F: Electric Strike

A strike used with a lock and designed to be actuated by

a remotely controlled electromagnet to permit the door
to be opened without retracting the latch.

(CBP Policy: All electric door strikes must be 24 Volts

AC and be centrally powered from a Communications
closet.)

Hes-1006
Hardware F

Door Hardware F-1: Electric Strike for Deadbolt Lock Doors

An electric strike must be utilized that can accommodate a mortise lock having up to
a ¾ inch throw latch bolt with a 1-inch deadbolt where the strike does not release the
deadbolt. The strike must be tamper resistant, will be of heavy duty stainless steel
construction, and must have a horizontally adjustable keeper or other horizontal adjustment
to allow for door and frame misalignment. The strike must be Fail Secure.

Door Hardware F-2: Electric Strike for Non-Deadbolt Lock Doors

An electric strike must be utilized that can accommodate a non-deadbolt lock, e.g., bored
lock, mortise lock, or mortise exit device having up to a ¾-inch throw latch bolt. The
strike must be tamper resistant, be of heavy duty stainless steel construction, and have a
horizontally adjustable keeper to allow for door and frame misalignment. The strike must be
Fail Secure.

Door Hardware G: Balanced Magnetic Alarm Switch (BMS)

A two-part sensor that generates an alarm condition when a
change in the magnetic field between the parts is detected. A
BMS is usually mounted on a door and door frame to detect
opening of the door. The application of this type of door alarm
is utilized due to its application of two magnetic poles rather
than one on standard alarm systems. This reduces the risk of
alarm switch compromise.
The BMS must meet UL 637 (Level II) requirements.
(CBP Policy: A BMS must be installed on each perimeter
Hardware G door to detect the opening/closing of the door.)

Door Hardware H: Flush Bolt

A bolt that is mortised into the

edge of a door that will lock either
or both the top and bottom of the
door

Hardware H1
Hardware H2

Door Hardware I: Latch Protector

A device fastened to
the door or frame that
prevents access to
the latch/deadbolt and
cannot be pried or forced
back.

(CBP Policy: Latch

Figure I1
Figure I2
Figure I3 Protectors must be
installed on all out
swinging doors)
Door Hardware J: Non-Removable Hinges (NRPs)

A hinge equipped with a set screw in the barrel that is only

accessible when the door is swung open. Must be installed to
door frame with stainless steel screws at least 3 inches long.

(CBP Policy: NRP Hinges must be installed on all perimeter and

out swinging doors)

Hardware J

Door Hardware K: Pneumatic Door Closer - Commercial Grade

A device that automatically controls the closing or

positioning of a door.

(CBP Policy: Automatic Door Closers must be

installed on all perimeter doors and card reader
doors.)
Hardware K

Door Hardware L: Anti-Pry Strip

A strip of 7-gauge steel, a minimum of 1¾-inches-wide that is

installed on the outside of the door on the lock side. Used to
prevent the door from being pried open.

(CBP Policy: All perimeter doors are required to have anti-pry

strips installed.)

Hardware L

Cylinder A: UL 437 Compliant

Cylinder A

All CBP lock cylinders must be of a high security, pick resistant design with angled key cuts,
rotating tumblers, keyway side bitting, and a slider mechanism. The cylinders must be
Underwriters Laboratories (UL) listed under UL437 and certified under American National
Standards Institute (ANSI)/Builder’s Hardware Manufacturer’s Association (BHMA) certification
A156.30, Levels MIAM and ANSI/BHMA A156.5, Grade 1.

All cylinders must incorporate three locking elements: a slider mechanism, a sidebar
mechanism with tumbler rotation, and a pin tumbler elevation. All cylinders must be
constructed of solid brass with hardened steel inserts. The lock tumblers must combine a
dual-axis action with one axis utilized for pin tumbler rotation and the other axis utilized for
positioning key cuts. Randomly selected tumbler pins must incorporate a hardened steel insert.
The cylinders must be capable of being immediately re-keyed to a new combination or a new
system.

Interchangeable cores should be used to facilitate this process. A suitable number of spare
cores should be maintained to facilitate lock changes in the event of a lost or stolen master
key.

The manufacturer must have the capability of establishing a key system with a minimum
of six angle cuts in six possible pin positions with the capability of two distinct positions of
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
333 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

cut per pin chamber, if required by the parameters of the system. The manufacturer must
have the capability of producing a keying system in either of two distinct and different keying
specifications and pinning specifications. The system must be capable of incorporating a key,
with each being capable of more than one bitting per position to expand master keying and key
changes. The key must also incorporate the capacity to include twelve possible side bittings
along the key blade located on two different planes or surfaces of the key. The system must
also have the capability to provide a single master key with over 1 million (1,000,000) usable,
non-interchangeable change keys in a single keyway. The key thickness must be no less than
one hundred, twenty-five thousandths (.125″) and must be made from a nickel silver alloy.
Each key must be custom coined for tracking and identification purposes.

The locking system must be deemed proprietary information shared only among authorized
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) entities and the manufacturer. Security Specialists
assigned to the Office of Internal Affairs, Security Management Division (IA/SMD) and
employees serving as Collateral Security Liaison’s for IA/SMD, will have the authority to
request additional pinning materials and duplicate keys.

V. Locksets

Lockset A: Commercial Grade 1 - Mortise Lever Lockset - Classroom Function

- For Doors 1 3/4” Minimum (1 1/4” armor front)
- For Doors 1 3/8” Minimum (1” armor front)
Latch Bolt By Key outside and lever either side unless
outside lever is locked by key outside
Auxiliary latch deadlocks latch bolt
(CBP Policy: This lock is not permitted on perimeter doors
or doors equipped with a card reader and electric strike.)
Lockset A

Lockset B: Commercial Grade 1 - Mortise Lever Lockset with Thumb Turn

Entrance Function
- For Doors 1 3/4” Minimum (1 1/4” armor front)
- For Doors 1 3/8” Minimum (1” armor front)

Latch Bolt By Key Outside and lever either side unless

outside lever is locked by toggle action stop
Lockset B Deadbolt by key outside and turn piece inside
Turning inside lever retracts latch and deadbolt
simultaneously
Outside lever remains locked.

(CBP Policy: This lock is not permitted on perimeter doors

or doors equipped with a card reader and electric strike.)

Mortise Lockset: Details

Lockset C: Commercial Grade 1 - Cylindrical Lever Lockset - Storeroom Function

A lockset where the outside lever is always fixed, (i.e., locked) and
the inside lever is always unlocked. Entrance is permitted by key
Lockset C1 only.

Lockset D: Commercial Grade 1 –

Mortise High Security Lever Lockset with Deadbolt - Storeroom Function

A lockset where the latch bolt has a

minimum ¾-inch throw that is retracted
by a key outside or by a lever inside and
the outside lever is always fixed (i.e.,
locked). The deadbolt must have a 1-inch
minimum throw which can only be thrown
or retracted by a key outside or a thumb
turn inside. By turning the inside lever, it
simultaneously retracts both the deadbolt
and latch bolt. Auxiliary latch deadlocks
Lockset D1 Lockset D2
latch the bolt when the door is closed

FOR PERIMETER DOORS

TRANSFORMATION INSTRUCTIONS
(BELOW) MUST BE STRICTLY
OBSERVED FOR LOCKSET D.

DO NOT INSTALL THUMBTURN UNIT

ON INSIDE OF LOCKSET D SO THAT
THE Deadbolt CAN ONLY BE THROWN
OR RETRACTED BY THE KEY
OUTSIDE.
Lockset E: Commercial Grade 1 -
Mortise High Security Institutional Deadbolt Lever Lock (i.e., Double Cylinder Lock)
Lockset E2
A lock where a deadbolt is installed on both
sides of the door and must have a minimum
1-inch throw that is retracted by a key
outside or inside
Lockset E1

Lockset F: Commercial Grade 1 - Deadbolt/Dead Latch

A lockset where the outside handle is stationary. The hook

shaped deadbolt is thrown or retracted by a 360-degree turn of
the key. Turning the key 120-degrees further retracts the latch
bolt.

Lockset F

Lockset G: CDX-09 High Security Electromechanical Lock

A self-powered, tamper resistant lock where the bolt is retracted by dialing a combination.
The lock has audit trail capability and a limited view LCD display with indicator arrows.

5340-01-498-2759 CDX-09 Combination Deadbolt Lock For Pedestrian Doors With A Non-
Drill Resistant Mounting Plate.

5340-01-498-2760 CDX-09 Combination Deadbolt Lock For Pedestrian Doors With a Drill-
Resistant Mounting Plate.

CDX-09 must meet FF-L-2890.

Lockset H: High Security Exit Device with Deadbolt

An exit device which may legally be installed on a fire door.

It is distinguishable from other exit devices for the following
reasons: (1) it is labeled for both fire and panic and (2) it has
no means of locking the deadbolt and latch in a retracted
position.
Lockset H
(CBP policy: This device must be installed on all CBP doors
designated as perimeter emergency exits. The device must
accept a large format interchangeable core (LFIC) for key
override purpose.)

Lockset I: Panic Exit Device

An exit device which may legally be installed on a fire

door. It is distinguishable from other exit devices for
the following reasons: (1) it is labeled for both fire and
Lockset “I” panic and (2) it has no means of locking the latch in a
retracted position.

(CBP policy: This device must be installed on all

CBP doors designated as interior emergency exits.)

Audible alarm requires key reset.

Lockset J: UL Group 1, Mechanical Combination Lock

A mechanical combination lock able
to withstand 20 man-hours of expert
manipulation as well as other specifications
listed in UL 768.

Lockset J

VI. Additional Information

Figure 1: Perimeter Door Hinge Side Protection – Medium-Severity Threat

Figure 2: Perimeter Door, Medium-Security Hinge-Side Protection

Figure 3: Perimeter Door Anti-Pry Strips for Medium-Security Applications

VII. References
●● MIL-HDBK-1013/1A, Design Guidelines for Physical Security of
Facilities

●● Land Port of Entry Design Guide

●● Customs and Border Protection Lock Hardware Requirements for all

Ports of Entry

●● AA-D-600D, Door, Vault, Security (with Amendment 1)

●● FF-L-2740A, Locks, Combination (with Amendment 1)

Figure 5: Basic Perimeter Door

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents
Figure 5: Basic Perimeter Door

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BACK Return to Table of Contents

Appendix 7.7: Windows

I. General
A. Glazing Design

B. A necessary phase in designing glazing systems is developing the design criteria to

describe what will happen when a bomb detonates near the structure. In this phase,
it is important to define:

C. Performance goals to establish how the glazing will perform include:

1. Expected range of threats to establish the blast loading requirements.

2. Amount of damage allowed ensuring that he performance goals are met.

D. The design criteria will help establish a common basis of communication between
security professionals and design engineers. Building functionality and various levels
of performance for glazing systems are defined below:

1. Collapse Possible – Buildings designed for no protection against an explosive

threat. Standard glazing and frame systems will be completely destroyed at this
performance level.

2. Non-Repairable – Buildings designed for minimal protection against an explosive

threat. The building will be heavily damaged but will not undergo “progressive
collapse,” which has a dramatic impact on loss of life. This design allows for full
disruption of the building functions and a high probability that the building will
not be repairable. Standard glazing and frame systems will most likely fail at this
performance level.

3. Extended Disruption – Repairable. Buildings designed for moderate protection

against an explosive threat. The building will be damaged, but damage will be
controlled and limited. The building will be out of service for an extended time
(months to years) but probably will be repairable. All glazing systems will fail but
fragments will be retained. Some frame failure will also occur at this performance
level.

4. Repairable – Buildings designed for a high level of protection against an

explosive threat. The building will be damaged but damage will be controlled
and limited so that the building will be repairable in a matter of weeks to a few
months. Most of the glazing systems will fail, but will remain anchored to the
frame and wall.

5. Quickly Repairable – Buildings designed for a very high level of protection

against an explosive threat. The damage will be very limited. Most functions will
be restored in a brief time and the building will be fully operational in a matter of
weeks. Some glazing systems will fail, but all will remain in place and resist the

effects of the design basis threat.

6. Essentially Operable – Buildings designed for maximum protection against

an explosive threat. The damage will be of a superficial nature. All functions
operable without significant interruption. Glazing systems are designed to
withstand the applied pressures without failure.

E. Design Threats. For the above performance categories there may be a range of
possible threats. The threats are defined below.

1. Maximum Event. The largest explosive threat expressed as a net equivalent TNT
hemispherical charge at a specified standoff distance.

2. Controlling Event. An explosive threat source, expressed as a net equivalent TNT

hemispherical charge at a standoff distance and location, which produces the
most damage to the target. The controlling event may not be the largest event
but is a function of explosive size, standoff distance, and location which produces
the most damage.

3. Design Events. A combination of explosive threats, expressed as net equivalent

TNT hemispherical charge at a separation distance, which comprise a range of
possible attack scenarios. This includes a variety of events of different sizes and
locations.

F. Based on the desired performance goals and threat, a structural engineer can
define a set of response limits for the structure. Designing for operable/repairable
construction can be very difficult and costly. Construction required protecting against
a large explosive threat at close range would take the form of fully blast-hardened,
bunker-type construction.

G. Placement of the explosive is another major concern and all possible locations must
be considered to find the critical location that produces the greatest damage to the
structure.

II. Glazing Material Characteristics

A. Glazing design is applicable to three performance levels: repairable, quickly
repairable, and essentially operable.

B. Glazing failure is a complex function dependent not only on the pressure-time

loading but the glazing thickness, size, shape, type, and age. Flaws in the glazing
material will cause the glazing to respond in an unpredictable manner, requiring the
use of experiential procedures for glazing design.

C. There are three types of glazing cross sections: monolithic, laminated, and insulated.

1. Monolithic cross sections consist of a single piece of glass or polycarbonate.

2. Laminated cross sections consist of two or more plies of material bonded

together with a tough interlayer material.

3. Insulated cross sections consist of two or more sheets separated by a sealed

airspace.

D. Monolithic glass cross sections (not including polycarbonate) are very vulnerable to
blast loads. Once the glass fails, there is nothing to keep the broken fragments from
injuring personnel both inside and outside the structure.

1. The various types of materials available for use as monolithic glazing are:

(a) Annealed glass

(b) Heat strengthened glass

(c) Thermally tempered glass

(d) Chemically treated glass

(e) Wire-reinforced glass

(f) Polycarbonate

(g) Acrylic

2. Annealed Glass:

(a) Annealed glass is the most common form of glass available. Depending
on manufacturing techniques, it is also known as plate, float, or sheet
glass. During the manufacturing process, annealed glass is cooled slowly
without tight controls. This process yields a product that has very little
residual compressive surface stress and large variations in strength. When
compared to tempered glass, annealed glass has relatively low bending
strength.

(b) Upon failure, annealed glass fractures into razor-sharp, dagger-shaped

fragments. One-quarter inch annealed glass typically fails at 0.2-psi
overpressure. Annealed glass should conform to American Society of
Testing Materials (ASTM) Standard C1036.

3. Heat Strengthened Glass:

(a) Heat-strengthened, heat-treated, or semi-tempered glass exhibits neither

the higher tensile strength nor the small cube-shaped fracture pattern

associated with thermally tempered glass. The cooling process of heat

strengthened glass is controlled more tightly than annealed glass, but less
than thermally tempered glass. These results in large variations in the
strength of heat strengthened glass as precompression levels vary. Heat
strengthened glass is recommended for use in fire and environmental
protection applications.

(b) One-quarter inch heat strengthened glass typically fails at 0.4-psi

overpressure. Heat strengthened glass should conform to ASTM C1048,
Type HS.

4. Thermally Tempered Glass:

(a) Thermally Tempered Glass (TTG) is the most readily available tempered
glass on the market. It is manufactured from annealed glass (float,
polished, or plate) by heating to a high, uniform temperature and then
applying controlled, rapid cooling.

(b) Thermally tempered glass is typically four to five times stronger than
annealed glass.

(c) Only tempered glass meeting the minimum fragment specifications of

American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Z97.1-1984, American
National Standard for Safety Glazing Materials Used in Buildings - Safety
Performance Specifications and Methods of Test, or certified by the Safety
Glazing Council (SGC), should be used.

(d) The fracture characteristics of tempered glass are superior to those of

annealed glass.

(e) Due to the high strain energy stored by the prestressing, tempered glass
will eventually fracture into small cube-shaped fragments instead of the
razor-sharp, dagger-shaped fragments associated with the fracture pattern
of annealed glass. However, even if the tempered glass breaks up initially
into small fragments, high blast overpressures can propel these fragments
at velocities high enough to constitute a severe hazard to personnel. One-
quarter inch tempered glass typically fails at 0.8-psi overpressure.

5. Chemically Treated Glass:

(a) Glass can be tempered chemically using a bath process; however, the
fracture pattern resembles that of annealed glass. Most commercially
available, chemically tempered glass for architectural purposes is
manufactured from a soda-lime base. A common problem is surface flaws.
The resulting stress will often induce premature failure. One-quarter inch
chemically treated glass typically fails at 0.2-psi overpressure.

6. Wire-Reinforced Glass:

(a) Wire-reinforced glass is a common glazing material. It consists of

annealed glass with an embedded layer of wire mesh. Its primary use is
as a fire resistant barrier. Wire-reinforced glass has the fracture and low
strength characteristics of annealed glass and, although the wire binds
some fragments, it still ejects a considerable amount of sharp glass and
metal fragments. One-quarter-inch wire-reinforced glass typically fails at
0.2-psi overpressure.

7. Polycarbonate:

(a) Thermoplastic polycarbonates are suitable for glazing systems

designed to resist the effects of an explosion. Polycarbonate is available
monolithically in thicknesses up to 1/2 inch. It can be fused together
to obtain any thickness needed. In the 1/2-inch range of thickness,
polycarbonate is twice as expensive as TTG glass but a third of the
weight. Other than cost, polycarbonate’s main disadvantage is that it is
subjected to greater environmental degradation than glass, especially the
effects of abrasion and degradation from ultraviolet radiation exposure.

(b) Chemical coatings are available to protect polycarbonates from both

abrasion and ultraviolet radiation. All exposed polycarbonates should
have one of these surface coatings. With these coatings, a service life
expectancy of 10 years or longer on externally exposed polycarbonate can
be expected.

(c) Polycarbonate is subject to high heat damage and tends to soften.

Polycarbonate will burn when a flame is held to it; however, it will tend to
extinguish when the flame is removed.

(d) Rated as a class CC-1 material, it is much less combustible than acrylic
plastic.

(e) Local building codes should be consulted before polycarbonate is

specified. Since polycarbonate can be difficult to break, local fire codes
may require a percentage of polycarbonate glazing to pop out for
emergency egress and venting.

(f) Polycarbonate failure points are dependent on the thickness of the cross
section. Having an adequate frame bite of 1 inch or more and allowing
for expansion of the material are key factors in achieving satisfactory
performance.

8. Laminated Cross Sections:

(a) Combining interlayer bonding materials with plies of glass, polycarbonate,

or both, produces cross sections that perform well against blast loading.
Laminated cross sections can include the following materials and
combinations:

●● Interlayer materials

●● Thermally tempered laminated glass

●● Laminated and fused polycarbonate

●● Glass-clad polycarbonate

●● Glass-clad ionomer

E. Interlayer Materials

1. Compatibility issues and cost drive selection of interlayer material. Consideration

must be given to incompatibilities when bonding no homogeneous materials. As
a consequence, only Plasticized Polyvinyl Butyral (PVB) and Aliphatic Urethane
are used for the lamination of security glazing.

2. PVB is used universally by the glazing industry for laminating glass products
together.

3. PVB is the most cost-effective interlayer material available. There are three
grades available: architectural, aircraft, and automotive. Architectural grade
PVB is the most widely used. Aircraft grade PVB is approximately twice as stiff
as the architectural grade but costs about four times more. Automotive grade
is the same cost and thickness as architectural grade PVB. The environmental
durability of PVB is a known and proven quantity. Long-term use in automotive
and aerospace industries indicates that few, if any, problems of environmental
degradation will be encountered.

4. Polyether urethane interlayer material can also be used to laminate glass or

polycarbonate materials. Urethane material has better viscoelastic (remain
flexible) behavior at low temperatures than PVB material. Currently, there are
only two interlayer materials that are compatible with polycarbonate for use in
the lamination process. These materials are urethane and Copal_ (available only
with General Electric polycarbonate glazing laminates). Polyether urethane is the
only type of interlayer material that is commercially available to all laminators for
laminating polycarbonate.

F. Thermally Tempered Glass (TTG)

1. TTG laminates use PVB or urethane for lamination.

2. Frame compatibility and light transmissibility establish a laminated glass

thickness of 2.5 inches as a practical upper bound. However, if special
circumstances warrant, thicknesses up to 5 inches are available.

3. When subjected to blast overpressure, laminated TTG will exhibit strength and
behavior between that of a set of stacked glass sheets and a monolithic sheet,
depending on temperature and duration of load. Both the Government and
private industry use design strength of a PVB glass laminate at 75 percent that of
a monolithic plate of the same thickness. For this load condition, the laminate is
at ambient temperature.

4. A laminated, blast resistant glazing cross section offers a significant fragment

retention advantage over monolithic glass. If glass failure does occur (which
could happen if blast loads exceed the initial design), the interlayer material will
retain most of the glass fragments. If catastrophic failure occurs from excessive
blast overpressure, increased fragment retention can be obtained by installing a
catch bar or fragmentation curtains on the interior of the glazing system.

G. Laminated and Fused Polycarbonate

1. Thickness of polycarbonate glazing exceeding 1/2 inch can be achieved

by lamination or fusion (melting together). Whenever large thicknesses of
polycarbonate are anticipated, a design review should be considered to
determine if the frame and building will accept the design.

2. Polycarbonate is a moderate temperature insulator, and a large temperature

differential can lead to delamination of a laminate or stress hardening of the
monolithic material. This results in a phenomenon known as crazing or small
cracks on the surface. Polycarbonate and urethane under blast overpressure
loading are similar enough for a laminated cross section to be considered
monolithic for design purposes.

H. Glass-Clad Polycarbonate (GCP)

1. Glass-clad polycarbonates are primarily designed to protect against forced entry

and ballistic attacks. If a glass-clad polycarbonate was intended to resist a bomb
attack, a conservative approach would be to calculate the resistance for either
the glass or polycarbonate material, but not a combination of both. There are two
configurations for glass-clad polycarbonate glazing cross sections, symmetrical
and asymmetrical. Symmetrical cross sections are more environmentally stable.

2. Environmental conditions are an important consideration for laminates

incorporating a polycarbonate core thickness greater than 5/8 inch. Because

polycarbonate has a coefficient of expansion eight times that of glass, the
interlayer material at the glass-polycarbonate interface must be thick enough to
allow for movement. The de facto industry standard at the glass polycarbonate
interface is 0.050 inch.

3. Aspect ratios (ratio of length to width) are an important consideration and must
be kept as close to one as possible. Avoid designing glazing “ribbons” (long,
narrow window openings) because they tend to create unbalanced stresses
relative to the long and short sides of a glazing, which can pull the laminate apart.

I. Glass-Clad Ionomer

1. Glass-clad ionomer cross sections are produced only in a symmetrical

arrangement. They are designed primarily for ballistic and forced entry
resistance. There is little data available on the performance of glass-clad ionomer
in resisting blast loads.

J. Other Materials

1. Materials such as glass block could be substituted for traditional windows. Glass
block has a substantially higher resistance compared to conventional glass
panes. In this manner the windows can be upgraded to strengths at or near
conventional wall strengths. There is little data available on the performance of
glass block in resisting blast loads.

K. Fragment Retention Film (FRF)

1. Thin plastic film that can be applied to standard annealed and tempered glass to
retain fragments during an explosion, FRF is an injury mitigation measure and
not intended to provide protection against the pressure effects of an explosion
other than to reduce exposure to glass fragments. FRF is one of the most
cost-effective methods for mitigating the effects of glass breakage in existing
structures during an explosion.

2. Select 10-mil film in a daylight (to the edge of frame) application regardless of
loading conditions if fragment retention is the primary goal.

3. Install a catch bar or single side (top) mechanical anchoring system for all
daylight applications.

4. For insulated (air-gap) glass installations and conditions where maximum

retention of fragments is required, use a frame anchoring system (two-sided) for
the film if existing frame conditions permit.

(a) See Uses of Fragment Retention Film for greater detail.

III. Window Frames

A. Framing System

1. Window glazing frames provide a connection between the building envelope and
the glazing material. This connection must be strong enough to transfer the edge
load of the glazing into the building. A basic frame system consists of a main
frame, sub frame, removable stop, fasteners, glazing tape, and sealant. More
elaborate frame systems also include sub frames (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Typical Frame Cross-Section

B. Main Frame

1. A main frame can be made from aluminum, aluminum with steel inserts, or steel.
The frame must provide a system of drainage channels and flashing to allow
water accumulation discharge to the exterior.

2. Operable frame designs, which allow the window to be opened, are not
recommended for security applications where protection against explosive
threats is a concern. The frame bite should be at least 1 inch or the minimum
determined by the glazing manufacturer or design engineer. If the bite is
sufficient to hold the glazing and resist the blast load, all pressure is transferred
through the frame to the wall. This can be sizeable load acting on the wall, which
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
360 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

is additionally weakened by the presence of the opening. For high pressures,

additional structural reinforcing around the window may be required.

C. Sub frame

1. A matching sub frame and outer frame are recommended to resist explosive
effects. Sub frames are mounted in the concrete formwork prior to pouring
concrete. Anchorage is embedded with studs welded directly to the building
reinforcing steel. After pouring the walls, outer frames and glazing can be
installed in the sub frames. A blast consultant is recommended for analyzing and
designing the sub frame and anchorage system.

D. Removable Stop

1. The removable stop is a component of the frame that holds the glazing in place.
The purpose of the removable stop is to allow installation of the glazing into the
frame.

2. Better security integrity is achieved when the removable stop is on the interior
side of the glazing. The removable stop must be capable of resisting the entire
load collected by the glazing, both in positive inward loading and in negative
rebound outward loading.

E. Glazing Tape and Sealant

1. Glazing tape and sealant provide a cushion between frame material and glazing
to prevent glass breakage from thermal expansion, settling, and wind loads.
Glazing tape and sealant support the glazing laterally. They set and maintain
the face clearance between the frame bite and the glazing face. Setting blocks
are used to establish and maintain the edge clearance of a glazing. The window
seals should preclude the leakage of high blast pressures into the building.

2. A sealant provides resistance to environmental degradation effects around the

edge of a glazing. Security laminates should be wet sealed with silicone sealant
to obtain optimum performance in security applications.

F. Frame Anchorage

1. Blast resistant window framing must be capable of resisting the load transferred
from the glazing. This requirement translates to rigid frames and frame-to-wall
interfaces and flatness of the frame and glazing assembly. If the frame system
is skewed or out of plane, the glazing can develop unbalanced stresses when
loaded and fail prematurely.

2. Aluminum frames with steel sub frames can be used for small blast loads less
than 5 psi.

(a) Above 5 psi, the entire frame system must be constructed from steel
members.

3. Some frame designs for concrete construction use anchor bolts for a dual
purpose. They serve to anchor the frame to the structure and as fasteners for
the removable stop. Since a glazing must be removable without destroying the
wall, careful consideration must be exercised when selecting the type of anchor
bolt. Sleeved anchors and compression bolts, which cannot be reinstalled, are
unacceptable.

G. Frame Design

1. The window frame must absorb the full load of the glazing pane (created by the
blast pressure) for reliable performance. Unless this is done, frame deflections
can induce higher tensile stresses in the glazing pane and reduce its ability
to resist blast loading. Frame members must also resist the blast load directly
applied on all exposed areas.

2. Selection and evaluation procedures for frames, anchorage, and walls are
complex engineering processes and beyond the scope of this Guide. The
assistance of a structural engineer with experience in blast overpressure analysis
and design to carry out a comprehensive analysis of these components is highly
recommended.

H. Security Glazing Installation Notes and Recommendations

1. All security glazing cross sections should be fixed to maximize their

effectiveness.

2. Movable glazing that is open when a blast occurs can leave assets and
personnel vulnerable to the forces resulting from the explosion. Acceptable
glazing material for blast resistance in new construction includes laminated
annealed glass, laminated thermally tempered glass, laminated chemically
tempered glass, monolithic polycarbonate and air gap polycarbonate, and glass
systems (polycarbonate laminates with glass on the outboard face separated by
an air gap).

3. Annealed glass, monolithic thermally tempered glass, heat-treated (semi-

tempered) glass, wire-reinforced glass, soda-lime-based chemically tempered
glass, and acrylic sheets are unacceptable glazing materials for new construction
where explosive blast loading is a concern. Insulated or air gap glazing systems
provide significant heat transfer benefits and associated cost savings. Typically,
an air gap glazing can reduce the temperature gradient inside a structure by as
much as 50 percent. This is an important consideration for security applications
requiring larger thicknesses of polycarbonate, where thermal stresses can
significantly reduce the life of a product.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
362 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

IV. Ballistic Threat Characteristics

A. A ballistic threat depends on caliber, type, shape and weight, impact velocity, angle
of impact, muzzle energy, multiple versus single impact, and target range. The most
probable threat is from pistol, rifle, submachine gun, shotgun, or automatic weapons
fire.

1. Caliber – The caliber of a bullet refers to its diameter and is expressed in either
decimals of an inch (caliber) or in millimeters. Typical examples include the
0.303-caliber and 7.62-mm NATO Ball.

B. Bullet Characteristics

1. Bullet characteristics vary as follows:

(a) Armor-Piercing (AP) - A bullet with a hardened metal core, a soft metal
envelope, and a copper bullet jacket. When the AP bullet strikes armor, the
envelope and jacket are stopped, but the armor-piercing core continues
forward to penetrate the armor. The AP bullet is characterized by high
accuracy in flight and high velocity.

●● If AP is considered a threat, windows should be eliminated since they

cannot cost-effectively defeat this threat.

(b) Ball - A non-armor-piercing bullet having a lead or mild steel core.

(c) Full Metal Jacket - A copper outer shell that encapsulates the core and
increases accuracy and penetration characteristics.

C. Bullet Configurations

1. The different bullet designs are spire point (long, acutely pointed), round nose,
flat point, full metal jacket (completely copper coated), hollow point, short jacket
(copper coated at tip), cast bullet, and wad cutter. Ballistic performance during
flight and on impact is sensitive to a projectile’s shape and construction (e.g.,
whether or not the bullet is jacketed; the length, thickness, and hardness of the
jacketed material; the presence of a hollow nose, a cavity, and hollow base; and
the hardness of the lead).

2. A pointed projectile will initiate fracture of the target. By comparison, a flat-nosed

projectile would favor plugging of the target around the projectile as it advances
into the target. A lighter bullet will slow down quickly on impact while a heavier
bullet will penetrate further into the target. An AP-type bullet has a greater
capacity to penetrate than the ball type because the AP bullet has a hardened
steel core that resists deformation on impact.

D. Oblique Attack Effect

1. Penetration resistance is affected by the angle at which a projectile strikes the

target. A projectile impacting the surface at an angle approaching parallel to the
surface must travel through more material to penetrate.

E. Projectile Energy

1. In security glazing, the initial impact layer must be hard to deform the projectile
on initial impact. This allows the tough polycarbonate layer behind to “catch” the
bullet before it penetrates the cross section.

F. Multiple Impacts

1. The effect of multiple hits depends on separation of the points of impact and the
degree to which the glazing material is damaged by preceding impacts. Where
a small area of dispersion of successive hits fall within the crater of the first
projectile, the possibility of penetration increases.

Table 1: Ballistic Tactic Threat Ballistic Severity Levels

V. Threat Severity Levels

A. Low Threat Severity Level – The low threat severity level is ANSI/Underwriters
Laboratories (UL) Level 1 described in ANSI/UL-752. This threat normally would be
employed against facilities when the main objective of the attacker is to persuade
someone to turn over items of high value, such as cash or drugs.

B. Medium Threat Severity Level – The medium threat severity levels are ANSI/UL
Levels 2 & 3 described in ANSI/UL-752. This threat normally would be employed
when the attacker knows that ballistic resistant glazing is installed.

C. High Threat Severity Level –The high threat severity levels are ANSI/UL-752
Levels 4, 5, and 6. This threat would normally be employed for sniper situations
and conditions where 9-mm automatic weapons might be expected. ANSI/UL-752
also describes the high severity threat level as a 12-gauge 437-grain rifled slug and
double 0’s buckshot.

D. Very High Threat Severity Level – The very high threat severity level, 5 shots from a
5.56 or 7.62 NATO Ball Military round, is described in ANSI/UL-752 as Levels 7 and
8. This threat normally would be employed for locations where paramilitary attacks
are expected.

VI. Design Of Ballistic Resistant Glazing

A. Ballistic Resistance

1. The term “ballistic resistance” denotes protection against complete penetration,

passage of projectiles, or spallation (chip or splinter off the backside) of the
protective material to the degree that injury would be caused to a person
standing directly behind the bullet-resisting barrier. This definition is set forth
in the ANSI/UL-752, “Standard for Bullet-Resisting Equipment.” The ANSI/UL
definition of bullet-resisting glazing material specifies that there should be no
penetration of the projectile. Fragments of the projectile or fragments should not
penetrate the glazing assembly with sufficient force to embed into or damage
1/8-inch-thick corrugated cardboard indicators placed a distance of 18 inches
behind the protected side of the test sample.

B. Ballistic Resistant Glazing

1. Ballistic resistant glazing is composed of materials with the dual properties of

being virtually transparent while having a resistance to penetration of small-arms
projectiles and fragments. In general, ballistic glazing is a laminated composite
of glass and elastomers. A potential disadvantage of glass is breakup on
projectile impact and the subsequent shattering and formation of sharp, needle-
like splinters. Safety glass, which consists of two or more sheets of tempered
glass bonded together by synthetic resin, produces cube-shaped pieces when
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
366 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

fractured that usually have rounded edges. The energy absorbing mechanics
of polycarbonate materials offer an advantage over glass, which will spall on
impact. Polycarbonate can often be used to reduce shatter. When combined
with glass as a spall shield or a laminated glass/plastic configuration (with
polycarbonate on the inside face), polycarbonate can inhibit the shattering of
the glass by containing the glass particles. The suppression of spallation is a
powerful method that can be used to increase the impact resistance of ballistic
resistant glazing. A laminated and bonded composite cross section consisting
of TTG and polycarbonate layers provides visual clarity and tested resistance to
small-arms projectiles.

VII. Glazing Selection Strategies

A. Selection of security glazing systems for ballistic resistance can include several
strategies either alone or in combination, including concealment of the asset,
providing resistance to the anticipated threat using glazing systems, or using
alternative ballistic resistant systems.

1. Concealment - The strategy for the low level of protection is concealment of

assets by elimination of sight lines. Concealment provides a low-cost and
effective solution. Concealment can be achieved by arranging windows or
locating assets in visually inaccessible places and the using window-obscuring
treatments such as reflective Mylar film, blinds, or draperies. Concealment can
also be achieved through the use of standoff walls that shield the target from
direct line-of-sight fire. Wall systems selected from Table 2 can be used for this
purpose. The benefit of concealment is that aggressors usually will not fire at
targets they can not see.

2. Resistance - Use bullet resistant windows for a high level of protection. Bullet
resistant windows essentially constitute transparent armor. As for all attack
resistant construction, the degree of protection provided by a bullet resistant
window should equal that of the adjoining wall system.

3. Alternate Systems - Components such as bullet resistant window shutters can be

combined with obscuring window treatments and used on conventional windows.
This allows the building occupant to control the level of protection.

B. Design Considerations for Bullet Resistant Windows:

1. If bullet resistance is required for a window, select a manufactured unit or design

an assembly using tested materials that are manufactured, marketed, and
certified as ballistic resistant. The various materials available and issues that
should be considered in selecting or designing a bullet resistant window are
discussed below.

(a) Glazing Materials - Ballistic resistant glazing systems can provide

protection for all threat severity levels, although glazing which resists
armor-piercing rounds may not be available from all manufacturers.
The most significant considerations for the glazing include cost; weight,
thickness, and early replacement from environmental considerations or
abuse. When selecting a security glazing system to defeat an identified
threat, it is important to also consider the frame and surrounding wall
systems.

(b) Frames - Frames specified for ballistic resistant glazing systems must
be capable of resisting the same ballistic threat as the glazing and
surrounding wall system. Bullet resistant window frames are fabricated
from various types and grades of aluminum, carbon steel, or stainless
steel, and they are typically reinforced internally with armor-grade steel
shapes. Aluminum is also used by some manufacturers to improve
appearance or for corrosion resistance. Custom fabricated wood-clad or
wood-trimmed assemblies may be available from some manufacturers
when aesthetic concerns warrant the additional (and considerable)
expense. The frame, sash, mullions (vertical member between window
lites), and muntins, if used, must also be designed to resist the identified
threat.

●● Fixed windows may be fabricated of steel channels or angles to

provide integral anchorage, but the steel must be specified as bullet
resistant. Specify bullet resistant frame and sash material either by the
tested threat severity level or by an actual material designation. Sills for
exterior use should be designed to allow drainage. Coordinate window
design with glazing manufacturers to ensure adequate size, bite,
glazing bead, and sealant compatibility. Eliminate weak areas in the
assembly such as visible connectors or hardware. Sashes and glazing
stops should not be removable from the outside. Where possible, use
fixed sashes to eliminate hinge and lock components. Mullions and
muntins are rarely used in bullet resistant windows because to be
effective, particularly against higher ballistics threats, the sections must
be extremely heavy, which may detract from the window design.

●● Also, when the glazing is bullet resistant glass, it has a tendency to

completely disintegrate when struck by bullets. For best performance,
eliminate mullions and muntins and size lites in accordance with the
manufacturer’s recommendations.

(c) Anchorage - Methods of anchorage depends upon the type of window

frame and the wall construction in which the window is anchored. Methods
include masonry anchors, wood or steel stud anchors, silicone adhesives,
gasket systems, and curtain wall glazing systems. Windows may also

be detailed into a wall system such that the wall provides an integral
stop, although moisture entrapment is a concern with this approach.
Manufacturers of window assemblies recommend anchorage methods
that provide adequate support and protection for the window’s threat
resistance.

(d) Construction - Manufacturers use different thicknesses of glazing

materials and vary the frame and sash details to meet the same threat
levels. Because design details, structure to support the increased weight
of bullet resistant materials, and anchorage requirements influence wall
construction, consult at least three manufacturers for specific information
on specific window designs to meet job-specific criteria. Detail the window
installation accordingly and include governing characteristics in window
specifications (such as the maximum weight of the window). Consider
the weight of bullet resistant windows designed to meet a specific threat
severity level when designing the surrounding wall structure.

(e) Wall Systems - Wall systems described in Table 2 will provide equivalent
penetration resistance at the threat severity levels listed. When selecting
security glazing systems, it is important to consider the ability of the
surrounding wall system to resist the same level of threat. If this factor
is not considered, the value of an expensive glazing system could be
substantially reduced.

Table 2: Minimum Thickness for Ballistic-Resistant Walls

VIII. Typical Thicknesses For Ballistic Resistant Glazing

A. Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6 provide information on typical cross sections that would normally
be required to resist specific threat levels. These tables should be used for reference
and cost estimating purposes only. Any material must be independently tested to UL
standards before use to ensure performance of the cross section at the desirable
level.
Table 3: Typical Thickness for Low Threat Severity Level Ballistic-Resistant Glazing Cross Sections

Table 4: Typical Thickness for Medium Threat Severity Level Ballistic-Resistant Glazing Cross-Section

Table 5: Typical Thickness for High Threat Severity Level Ballistic-Resistant Glazing Cross-Section

Table 6: Typical Thickness for Very High Threat Severity Level Ballistic-Resistant Glazing Cross-Section

IX. Specifying Ballistic Glazing

A. Performance Specifications

1. Use performance-based specifications whenever possible. Include all relevant

performance criteria such as ballistic resistance, thermal transmission, and sound
transmission. Glazing should be specified for exterior or interior use, depending
upon the specific application. Indicate which specific ballistics test standard and
threat severity level must be met.Terminology

2. Specify “bullet-resistant glazing,” because specifying “bullet-resisting glass”

precludes the use of plastics, composites, and multi-layer systems. Do not use

the term “bulletproof” as a performance requirement because no glazing systems

are bulletproof.

B. Test Standards

1. Clearly describe the test or performance standard that must be met. Because
most standards are subject to periodic revisions, the designer should obtain
the most recent revision and develop specifications accordingly. Although using
the threats listed in UL-752 is recommended, other design threats can also be
specified. When non-standard ballistic threats are specified, include information
on the:

(a) Weapon

(b) Bullet type

(d) Distance between the weapon and the test material

(e) Number of shots required

(f) Interval between each shot

(g) Temperature requirements of the sample

(h) Angle at which the bullet is to strike the sample

(i) Failure criteria when using non-standard threats, it is recommended that

an independent testing laboratory be required to test the window and
that the manufacturer be required to submit certified test results to the
designer.

C. Tested Windows

1. Specify windows tested to a recognized standard (such as UL-752) when

possible. Not all test standards require complete testing of all window
components. Some standards test only the glazing. Some do not designate
where specific rounds are to be placed in the tests. Carefully review selected
test standards before using them. Verify that the standard meets the design
criteria required. If not, add additional testing or certification requirements to the
specification.

2. If the costs of such job-specific testing are prohibitive or unwarranted, inform the
facility user that only certain components will be certified as ballistic resistant.

D. Installation

1. Indicate anchorage into surrounding construction and coordinate instructions for

window installation with the manufacturer.

E. Markings

1. Some ballistics test standards require that each manufactured unit be

permanently and legibly marked or labeled with the manufacturer’s name,
date of manufacture, ballistics rating, strike face (if any), and exterior/interior
application. Bullet resistant windows should be checked for required markings in
the field prior to installation. Markings or labels may be omitted or installed to be
visible only from the protected side, if required by specification, so the window’s
resistance level will not be divulged. Consult the facility user for a preference as
to whether or not marks or labels are required.

X. Window Systems Designed to Resist Forced Entry

A. Levels of Threat for Forced Entry

1. There are five threat levels normally associated with forced entry protection. Only
three of these threat levels are appropriate for security glazing systems: very low,
low, and medium. Moving from low to very high threat severity levels increases
the required technical skill or sophistication level of the adversary.

2. Very Low Level Threat. Aggressor uses quiet methods of entry such as saws and
hand drills, or a single blow to break the glass using rocks, etc.

3. Low Level Threat. Aggressor uses low-observable hand tools.

4. Medium Level Threat. Aggressor uses unlimited hand tools (high and low
observable) and limited battery powered tools.

5. High Level Threat. Aggressor uses unlimited hand, power, and thermal tools.
Glazing systems are not available to protect against this level of attack.

6. Very High Level Threat. Aggressor uses unlimited hand, power, and thermal
tools, plus explosives. Glazing systems are not available to protect against this
level of attack. While security glazing systems will provide some resistance to
threat levels above medium, they are not recommended for these applications.
Specifying windows to resist the high or very high threat severity levels is not
possible because there are no glazing systems currently available that can
cost-effectively resist the combination of power and thermal tools, and powerful
explosive breaching charges associated with these threat levels.

B. Selection of Glazing Systems for Forced Entry Protection

1. To specify a security glazing cross section, first identify the forced entry threat
severity level the window must resist (very low, low, or medium). As previously
mentioned, there is currently no security glazing system available that will cost
effectively withstand the high and very high threat levels.

2. Very Low Forced Entry Threat Severity Level

(a) Install 10-mil fragment retention film (FRF) as described.

C. Low Forced Entry Threat Severity Level

1. Select a tested cross section from Table 7 that will provide protection against a
low threat severity level. Ensure the wall system for the structure is at least equal
to one of the wall cross sections listed in Table 8.

2. Specify the following minimum frame requirements:

(a) Frame Thickness = 1/4-inch steel

(b) Removable Stop Thickness = 3/16-inch steel

(c) Bite Depth = 1-inch

(d) Glazing Rabbet Depth = 1-1/4 inches

(e) Width Between Frame Members = 42 inches

●● Specify a minimum 3/8-inch lag bolt with a 3-inch embedment into the
structure surrounding the frame.

●● Lag bolt spacing must be a minimum of 9 inches from the frame corner
to the first bolt on each side of the corner and a minimum of 18 inches
on center between all other bolts.

●● Removable stop anchor bolts shall be 3/8-inch, shouldered at least two

per side.

●● Spacing for stop anchor bolts will be a minimum of 9 inches from the
frame corner to the first bolt on each side of the corner and a minimum
of 18 inches on center between all other bolts.

D. Medium Forced Entry Threat Severity Level

1. Select a tested cross section from Table 9 that will provide protection against a
low threat severity level. Ensure the wall system for the structure is at least equal
to one of the wall cross sections listed in Table 10.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
375 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

2. Specify the following minimum frame requirements:

(a) Frame Thickness = 1/4-inch steel

(b) Removable Stop Thickness = 3/16-inch steel

(c) Bite Depth = 1 inch

(d) Glazing Rabbet Depth = 1-1/4 inches

(e) Width Between Frame Members = 42 inches

●● Specify either a 1/2-inch, one-piece expansion sleeve with a 3-inch

embedment into the structure surrounding the frame; or a 3/8-inch
taper bolt with a 3-inch embedment into the structure surrounding the
frame.

●● Bolt spacing must be a minimum of 6 inches from the frame corner to

the first bolt on each side of the corner and a minimum of 12 inches on
center between all other bolts.

●● Removable stop anchor bolts shall be 3/8-inch, shouldered at least two

per side.

●● Spacing for stop anchor bolts will be a minimum of 9 inches from the
frame corner to the first bolt on each side of the corner and a minimum
of 18 inches on center between all other bolts.

Table 7: Minimum Glazing Requirements for Low Threat Severity Level

Table 8: Minimum Wall Thickness for Low Threat Severity Level

Table 9: Minimum Glazing Requirements for Medium Threat Severity Level

Table 10: Minimum Wall Thickness for Medium Threat Severity Level

XI. Installation of Security Glazing Systems for Forced Entry

A. Frames, Sash, Mullions, and Muntins

1. Fully grout frames to minimize access to anchors and make the frame more rigid,
or use anti-spreading frame reinforcements at maximum 8-inch intervals.

2. Provide heavy or reinforced sash, frames, and other elements rated for the
appropriate threat severity level and delay time.

3. Conceal exterior fasteners or use tamper-proof fasteners.

4. Use non-removable exterior stops.

B. Operators and Hardware

1. Where possible, use fixed sash (inoperable) windows. If windows must be

operable, provide key-operated dead bolt locking devices on the inside face.

C. Anchorage

1. Conceal fasteners from the exterior or use tamperproof fasteners, provide non-
removable exterior stops, grout frames to minimize access to anchors, and
provide a steel channel along the inside and out side of the window opening to
minimize access to anchors by thermal or power cutting tools.

D. Fragment Retention Film

1. Fragment Retention Film (FRF) is an optically clear tough film attached to the
inside of a glass surface with a strong, pressure-sensitive adhesive. Films are
composed of polyester, polyethylene terephthalate, or composite materials. FRF
is also known as shatter resistant film, safety film, or protective film.

E. Uses of Fragment Retention Film

1. Airborne glass fragments produced during an explosion or other type of attack

pose a significant danger to occupants of a building. Tests on annealed glass
subjected to explosion show that a large number of small, sharp fragments are
disbursed throughout the test area at high velocity. Tests on thermally tempered
glass show similar results, although there are typically more fragments that are
not quite as sharp, but just as deadly.

2. FRF offers a relatively inexpensive solution that can reduce the destructive
capability of glass fragments. FRF is particularly beneficial for retrofitting existing
glass windows. FRF provides no added value on polycarbonate glazing. FRF
provides some protection from glass hazards when subjected to ballistic attack
and added protection (delay time) when attacked with simple hand tools. It will
also provide protection against injury from glass fragments during earthquakes,
hurricanes, and other extreme weather conditions. When combined with solar
tinting, it can also provide ultraviolet protection and improved energy efficiency.

F. Ballistic Attack

1. When subjected to ballistic impact (or shrapnel), the projectile creates a hole
in the FRF reinforced glazing approximately the size of the projectile, leaving
the remainder of the glass intact. The glass around the impact area continues
to adhere to the FRF so fragmentation is minimized. FRF will not provide any
substantial resistance to ballistic resistance unless the entire glazing system is
designed to defeat the intended threat (i.e., 1/2- to 3/4-inch laminated glass with
10-mil FRF would be required to defeat an underwriters Laboratories (UL) Level I
threat).

G. Forced Entry Attacks

1. A substantial increase in forced entry resistance can be gained by using a

10-mil FRF for protection against very low level forced entry threats. When
glass reinforced with FRF is struck with an ax or other impact tool, the hole will
approximate the size of the tool used. Multiple impacts will be necessary to
enlarge the hole to a size large enough for entry. FRF for forced entry protection
should be limited to situations where nominal additional delay and sound will
deter an attack (smash and grab situations such as storefronts). The use of FRF
specifically to resist forced entry threats is not recommended. Ten-mil FRF is
recommended as the most cost-effective film thickness for protection against
thrown objects or simple weapons.

H. Effects of Explosives

1. FRF is not intended to resist blast loads. Its only purpose is to retain fragments
of the shattered glass and minimize the number of fragments disbursed into a
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
379 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

protected area.

2. Blast testing with very short duration blasts characterized by a small, close-in
explosion shows that FRF tends to hold the glass in position even though the
glass shatters. Under long duration blast loads characterized by large, distant
explosions, the fractured glass tends to be propelled as a single unit or as a
group of large fragments with little retention in the frame.

3. The use of a catch bar (Figures 2 and 3) attached to the inside is recommended
to reduce injury caused when the FRF system will not be retained in the frame.
Ten-mil FRF is the most practical and cost-effective alternative for retention of
glass fragments. Limited testing by manufacturers shows that under certain
explosive conditions (3 to 9 psi, 35 to 80 psi-ms impulse), 4-mil film retained
approximately 80 percent of the glass fragments, while 7-mil film retained 90
percent and 10-mil film retained 98 percent. Thicker films retained only slightly
higher fragment percentages. Thicker films retain about the same fragment
percentage as 10-mil film. Based on this information, 10-mil FRF appears to
provide a substantial increase in performance at an additional installed cost that
is only 50 percent more than the installed cost of 4-mil.

Figure 2: Catch Bar Sequence During an Explosion

Figure 3: Catch Bar Detail

XII. Design of Fragment Retention Film Systems (FRF)

A. Design

1. Design factors for a FRF system include composition, thickness, and tint,
surrounding construction, and glazing materials.

B. Composition

1. Films are composed of polyester, polyethylene terephthalate, or composite

materials.

C. Thickness

1. Based on limited testing, the use of 10-mil FRF appears to be the most cost-
effective choice for most applications. Ten-mil FRF appears to provide more
protection than lighter films from flying fragments of glass due to blast loads or
other threats. Heavier film provides about the same performance at greater cost.

D. Tints

1. FRF is available in tinted versions. The most common has a silver tint and has
the added benefit of improving the thermal energy performance of a building
while providing a degree of obscuration from the outside. Although tinted film in
darker colors is available, this film can cause internal heat buildup and internal
stresses in the glazing, which can result in a weakened glazing system.

E. Surrounding Construction

1. When using 10-mil and thicker FRF that is anchored, the frame must have
sufficient strength to allow the FRF to perform at maximum capacity; a qualified
structural engineer should investigate building components adjacent to the frame
for adequate transfer of the blast load or other threats.

F. Glazing Materials

1. The film manufacturer must be provided with the type of glass to be reinforced as
well as information about gaskets, frame type, and configuration, depending on
the type of application selected.

G. Applications

1. There are a number of ways FRF is applied. They are described here and shown
in order of lowest to highest cost.

H. Daylight Applications

1. Daylight applications (film installed only on the area of glass that allows light
to pass, see Figure 4) are the least costly and serve only to hold the glazing
material together during an explosion. This application does not improve the blast
resistance of the glazing material. In a daylight application, the FRF is trimmed
back 1/16-inch from the edge of the frame. For all daylight applications, a catch
bar or blast curtains are recommended to restrict movement of the glass panel
when blown out of the frame.

Figure 4: Daylight Application for FRF

XIII. Wet Glazing

A. Wet glazing (film installed beyond the “daylight” area and secured along the edges
with silicone “wet” glazing, see Figure 5) is used when the film can not be installed
under the frame stops or various gaskets. This application is normally selected
only when some additional fragment retention of the panel is desirable. For this
application, the gasket is trimmed back as far as possible and the film embedded
as deeply as possible beyond the frame edge. The gap between the frame and
glass is then filled with an approved structural silicone caulking material. If trimming
the gasket is not possible or adequate, an aluminum angle can be installed along
the frame edge to form a reservoir for the structural silicone. For all wet glazing
applications, a catch bar (Figures 2 and 3) or blast curtains are recommended to
restrict movement of the glass panel when blown out of the frame.

Figure 5: Wet Glazing Application for FRF

XIV. Mechanical Anchoring Systems

A. These mechanical anchoring systems (Figure 6) are used to improve the
performance of FRF. They can be either one-sided (along the top edge) or two-sided
(on the long sides of the window). For this application, the film is brought past the
edge of the glass and down along the frame. Using a steel or aluminum anchor bar
with rounded edges, double-sided foam tape, and adequate anchor bolts, the film is
normally wrapped around the anchor bar that is then bolted to the frame (depending
on the manufacturer). The mechanical anchor holds the film to the frame and allows
the film to retain a maximum percentage of fragments. Mechanical anchoring
systems should be used only with 10-mil or thicker film material.

B. When considering the use of a mechanical anchoring system, always require

independent testing that will show performance characteristics under the loading
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
383 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

conditions anticipated. If expected blast loads will exceed the performance

capabilities of the installed system, always include a catch bar or blast curtains to
restrict movement of the glass panel.

C. Two-sided mechanical anchoring is strongly recommended for insulated glass. Two-

sided anchoring will provide a higher level of glass retention for the unprotected
outer glazing system than “daylight” or single side anchoring.
Figure 6: Mechanical Anchoring for FRF

XV. Film Specification

A. Minimum Requirements

(a) The FRF will be optically clear polyester, polyethylene terephthalate,

or a composite. It must be multi-layered or factory laminated. The film
will include an abrasion resistant coating on the exposed surface. The
film will be supplied with an optically clear, weather resistant, pressure-
sensitive adhesive. The adhesive will contain ultraviolet (UV) inhibitors
that prevent 95 percent of the radiation between 300 and 380 nanometers.
The adhesive will not be water activated. A water-soluble detackifier and/
or release liner may be used over the adhesive to make film application
easier.

B. Minimum Performance

1. As a minimum level of performance, film must pass American National Standards

Institute (ANSI) Z97.1 or 16 CFR § 1201, Category II impact tests. These
standards set a minimum level of performance for FRF on reinforced glass
(termed organic-coated glass) based on impact strength, tensile strength, and
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
384 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

adhesion. These tests include samples that have a simulated 1-year exposure to
sunlight and UV radiation.

C. Test Sample

1. For the purpose of the test, the film should be attached to a piece of 1/4-inch
thick flat glass conforming to the requirements of ASTM C 1036, Type I, Class 1,
Quality q3.

D. Passing Criteria

1. After the impact portion of the test, satisfactory performance of the test specimen
is determined using ANSI Z97.l, on the interpretation of results. To be acceptable
for use as FRF, the manufacturer must provide a statement that the film
satisfactorily performed according to ANSI Z97.1.

E. Tensile Strength

1. The tensile strength of the film should be 25,000 psi minimum.

F. Thickness

1. Minimum thickness should be based upon design requirements. Ten-mil film is

recommended for most applications.

G. Peel Strength

1. The peel strength should be a minimum of 4.7 pounds/inch for 7-mil and thicker
films.

H. Optics and Tint

1. All film, regardless of color, should be optically clear from the inside to ensure
an undistorted view through the glass. Color, tint, and reflectivity, when required,
should be specified. The amount of reflectivity of solar radiation is specified as a
percentage.

I. Flame Spread and Smoke Density

1. When required by life safety or local building codes, specify a flame spread rating
and a smoke density rating for the film. The film should not exhibit a flame spread
index exceeding 25 and a smoke density index exceeding 100 when tested in
accordance with ASTM E 84. For the purpose of testing, the specimen should be
mounted to 1/2-inch thermally tempered glass.

J. Manufacturer’s Qualifications

1. Specifications for FRF should require the manufacturer to have at least 3 years
of experience in the manufacture of FRF, and that the film be a standard product
of the manufacturer and intended for the purpose described in the specifications.
Only films designed for fragment retention will perform in an acceptable manner.

K. Cleaning Instructions

1. Always specify that the manufacturers provide cleaning instructions with the film
materials. Many cleaning compounds are not compatible with film.

XVI. Installation
A. New Construction

1. Quarter-inch laminated glass in a standard frame will perform about the same as
a daylight application of 10-mil film and will last for the life of the structure.

B. Retrofit Application

1. Film can be installed beyond the frame edge to improve retention characteristics
of the glass panel. However, any extension of the film past the inner frame edge
will require at least partial frame dismantling. For this application, the glazing
should be removed and the film applied to the outside edges of the glazing
material, which extend into the frame bite. If dismantling is too expensive, specify
a “daylight” application where the film is applied to within 1/16 inch of the edge of
the visible glazing. Although it is less likely the glazing will be retained in its frame
under a blast load, it is still a substantial improvement in fragment retention. If
this method is used, install a catch bar (Figure 3) to prevent the glass section
from penetrating the protected area.

C. Film Splice

1. The film may be spliced or lapped when a glazing dimension exceeds 60 inches
in either direction. All seams or splices will be applied with a butt joint. For
windows with seams, catch bars should be placed at 90 degrees to the seam
direction. For installations where “smash and grab” theft is also a concern, seams
should always be horizontal.

D. Visual Inspection

1. Within 30 days of application, the adhesive should be 95-percent cured. No water

bubbles, foreign particles, or excessive distortion should be visible when viewed
by the unaided eye from a distance of up to 10 feet from the interior room side at
angles up to 45 degrees.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
386 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

E. Application

1. This film is attached directly to the glass surface. FRF should be applied on
the interior of windows for protection from the effects of spalling. For double-
glazed units (insulated glass), apply the film to the room (protected) side of the
innermost frame. Specify that the film must be applied in strict accordance with
the manufacturer’s application instructions. If the film is used on double-glazed
units, film anchorage on two sides is strongly recommended to improve glass
retention of the unprotected outside glazing.

F. Qualifications of Personnel

1. Specify that personnel applying or supervising the application of the FRF be

trained and certified by the film manufacturer.

G. Environmental Issues

1. The film will not be applied if there are visible dust particles in the air, if there is
frost on the glazing, or if any room conditions such as temperature or humidity
do not meet the manufacturer’s instructions. The manufacturer must be informed
about the environment the film must withstand, such as interior or exterior
atmosphere, solvents, chemicals, or excessive humidity. After film application,
room conditions should be kept as required by the manufacturer’s instructions
to allow proper curing of the adhesive. The manufacturer must also know the
characteristics of the glass being treated with the film to ensure compatibility.

XVII. Blast Curtains, Shades, And Spall Shields

A. There are several types and styles of blast curtains, shades, and spall shields that
are commercially available that can be used in situations where film and laminated
glass are not suitable, such as on windows with multiple panes or where film would
be subject to excessive abuse. Blast curtains and shades are manufactured from
tough fiber materials such as Kevlar or Spectra, which have strong tear resistance.
They can also be used in conjunction with Fragment Retention Film (FRF) in place
of a catch bar or mechanical anchoring. Spall shields are rigid barriers usually made
with thin sheet (1/8-inch to 1/4-inch) polycarbonate, intended to absorb fragments
before they enter an occupied space.

B. Blast curtains, shades, and spall shields must be designed to withstand the loading
conditions anticipated.

C. Blast Curtains

1. Commercially available blast curtains (Figure 7) are made of various materials

such as Kevlar- or Spectra-polyethylene fiber or knitted polyester. Blast curtains
allow venting of the blast wave while at the same time “catching” any fragments
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
387 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

resulting from an explosive blast.

2. The concept of a blast curtain is to allow sufficient fabric and strength to give
with the blast load and prevent glass fragments from flying into the occupied
space. Drapes should be treated to withstand fading, mildew, and soiling. Before
selecting a blast curtain for use, insist on independent testing of the product to
ensure it will perform as required. It is vitally important to have supporting test
data that will demonstrate the product’s effectiveness within the range of threats
anticipated. Drapes should allow light to enter the protected space and allow
some degree of visual access. Opaque drapes that must be opened for light and
vision will be useless during an explosive event.

Figure 7: Blast Curtain Detail

D. Blast Shades

1. Blast shades (Figure 8) are also intended to prevent or minimize injuries to

occupants of buildings in the event of a terrorist bombing. Blast shades are rigidly
mounted to the interior wall of the structure, in back of the glazing system. They
are most commonly used for retrofit installation where Fragment Retention Film
would not be effective (such as multi-pane glass lites). Blast shades should be
treated to resist fading, mildew, and soiling.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
388 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

2. Commercially available blast shades are normally made with Kevlar or Spectra
polyethylene fiber. Before selecting blast shades for use, insist on independent
testing of the product to ensure it will perform as required. It is vitally important to
have supporting test data that will demonstrate the product’s effectiveness within
the range of threats anticipated. Shades should allow light to enter the protected
space and allow an acceptable degree of visual access from inside the room.
They should be permanently attached, but allow for access to the glazing system
for maintenance.

Figure 8: Blast Shade Detail

E. Spall Shields

1. A spall shield (Figure 9) is a secondary glazing system mounted behind and

away from the existing glazing system. A spall shield will effectively absorb glass
fragments generated during an explosive event. The spall shield is constructed
with clear polycarbonate and has its own frame and mounting system (four-sided
attachment).

2. Before selecting a spall shield for use, insist on independent testing of the
product to ensure it will perform as required. It is vitally important to have
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
389 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

supporting test data that will demonstrate the product’s effectiveness within the
range of threats anticipated.

Figure 9: Spall Shield

XVIII. Effect Of The Environment On Glazing

A. Exterior Environments

1. Polycarbonate and Glass-Clad Polycarbonate:

(a) If a polycarbonate cross section is exposed to conditions of high humidity

or salt air, consider hard-coating the surface of the polycarbonate
to protect it from abrasion and contaminant penetration. Extreme
temperature differentials and large thicknesses of polycarbonate can
produce bending stresses that will eventually lead to delamination.
Glass-clad polycarbonate systems are particularly prone to this effect
because of the 8:1 difference in coefficient of expansion between glass
and polycarbonate materials. If thick cross sections of polycarbonate
(greater than 5/8 inch) are exposed to temperature swings greater than
70°F, use an air gap system and adequate ventilation to reduce moisture
accumulation. An air gap will minimize the temperature impact on the
polycarbonate material.

(b) Certain temperature and humidity conditions, either interior or exterior, can
also cause a slight bowing in polycarbonate, usually in the direction of the
higher temperature or humidity. This bowing is reversible and flatness can
be restored to the sheet by equalization of the factors that cause bowing.

(c) Although bowing doesn’t affect visibility, it can cause distorted reflections.
Specifying thicker polycarbonate sheet and increasing the edge
engagement are ways of reducing distortion and bowing. The amount of
additional edge engagement needed for expansion or contraction depends
on the dimensions of the polycarbonate sheet. Edge engagement ranges
from 1/16 inch for a 24- inch sheet to 3/8 inch for a 120-inch sheet.
The exact requirement can be calculated by multiplying the length of
the sheet in inches times the temperature span (minimum to maximum
expected temperature) times 0.0000375 (coefficient of expansion). This
figure is added to the structural requirement for edge engagement, which
is normally 1 to 1-1/4 inches. When large variations of temperature
are expected, dry glazing (using silicone or neoprene gaskets) is
recommended over wet glazing (high-grade silicone sealants and fully
cured butyl tapes).

B. Physical Abuse

1. Polycarbonate:

(a) If a polycarbonate cross section is exposed to high traffic conditions or

conditions where the material can be physically abused by occupants of
the building, consider hard-coating the surface of the polycarbonate to
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
391 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

protect it from abrasion and scratching. If a serious condition exists, a

laminated cross section with annealed glass facing the inside will protect
the polycarbonate against abuse. Glass has 30 times the resistance
to abrasion than uncoated polycarbonate and 3 times better abrasion
resistance than coated polycarbonate.

2. Laminated Glass:

(a) Laminated glass is not vulnerable to normal scratching and abrasion.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BACK Return to Table of Contents

Appendix 7.8: Openings

I. Openings
A. Operable Openings are doors, windows, transoms, skylights and all similar devices
that can be opened or closed to allow or prevent passage of people, air, or light.
Openings can also include, but are not limited to, elevators, penthouses, hatchways,
or doors to the roof. Roof doors are often overlooked because of infrequent use.
These openings are the usual points of entry for intruders especially at ground level
and in their concealed and semi-concealed locations. Operable openings are also
the hardest points to protect simply because they are designed for passage.

B. Protecting operable openings shall be based on the following criteria:

1. Is the opening really required?

2. Is the opening 96 square inches or larger?

3. Validate existing openings that may no longer be required. If not required:

(a) Is the opening less than 18 feet from the ground or less than 14 feet from
another structure? If yes, than it shall be covered with bars or grilles and
equipped with intrusion detection device.

(b) Permanently seal the wall in a manner that maintains the penetration
resistance of the wall containing the opening

(c) The door is eliminated from the brick wall, the door assembly will
be removed and the opening bricked up; properly anchoring new
construction.

●● Miscellaneous Openings. Any miscellaneous openings, open ducts,

pipes, registers, sewers in excess of 96 square inches (619.2
centimeters) in area and over 6 inches (15.24 centimeters) in its
smallest dimension shall be equipped with barriers. Acceptable barriers
are 9 gauge expanded metal mesh, or rigid metal (steel) bars at least
one-half inch in diameter, welded vertically and horizontally 6 inches
on center. The rigid metal bars shall be securely fastened at both ends
to preclude removal. Crossbars shall be used to prevent spreading of
the bars. Solid caulking shall be used between the sleeve or conduit to
give evidence of surreptitious entry attempt. Access for inspection of
barriers should be in accordance with agency policies. Note Figure 1.

Figure 1: Manbar Barrier

Figure 2: Security Bar Detail

II. Manholes
A. Manholes can provide entrances into buildings for service purposes or provide
access to utility tunnels containing pipes for heat, gas, water, telephone transmission
conduits, cables, and other utilities.

B. Manhole covers 10 inches or more in diameter must be secured to prevent

unauthorized opening. They may be secured with locks and hasps by welding them
shut or by bolting them to their frame. Ensure that hasps, locks, and bolts are made
of materials that resist corrosion.

C. A case-hardened chain and high security padlock can be used to secure a manhole
cover; the use of a heavy-duty hinged-steel dead bar secured with a high security
padlock and heavy-duty hasp is an alternative method.

D. Keyed bolts (which make removal by unauthorized personnel more difficult) are also
available. If very high security is required, manhole covers that resist shattering after
being artificially “frozen” by an aggressor should be considered.

E. If a tunnel penetrates the interior of a building, the manhole cover should be

secured. A chain or padlock can be used to secure a manhole. Steel grates and
doors flush with the ground level may provide convenient access. If the frame is
properly secured, the grates or doors can be welded into place or they can be
secured with a chain and padlock. Sewers or storm drains which might provide an
entrance should be secured.

III. Accessible Steel Grates and Doors

A. Grates and doors on ground level are other potential access points into a facility.
These types of openings often serve as service entrances or exterior elevator
entrances or they may simply provide light and air to the basement level of the
building.

B. The mounting frame must be properly secured. The grates or doors can be welded
into place, or they can be secured with a steel chain and high security padlock.

IV. Sewers and Storm Drains

A. Accessible openings to sewers and storm drains shall be secured if the areas of the
openings associated with them are larger than 96 sq. in. (619.4 sq. cm) and more
than 6 inches (15.2 cm) in any one dimension.

V. Roof Openings
A. Access to a building’s roof can allow entry to the building and access to air intakes
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
397 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

and building Heating, Ventilating, and Air-Conditioning (HVAC) equipment (e.g., self-
contained HVAC units, laboratory or bathroom exhausts) located on the roof.

B. All glass skylights on the roof of any building or premises used for business
purposes and subject to the provisions hereof, shall be provided with:

1. Iron bars of at least 1/2-inch round or 1-inch by 1/4-inch inch flat steel material
under the skylight and securely fastened; or

2. Steel grill of at least one-eighth-inch material of two-inch mesh under the skylight
and securely fastened.

C. All hatchway openings on the roof of any building or premises used for business
purposes and subject to the provisions hereof shall be secured as follows:

1. If the hatchway is of wooden material, it shall be covered on the inside with at

least sixteen (16)-gauge sheet steel attached with screws.

2. The hatchway shall be secured from the inside with a slide bar or slide bolts.

3. Outside hinges on all hatchway openings shall be provided with non-removable

pins. Such hinge pins may be welded, flanged, or secured by non-removable
screws.

D. All air duct or air vent openings exceeding eight (8) inches by twelve (12) inches on
the roof of any building or premises used for business purposes and subject to the
provisions hereof shall be secured by covering the same with either of the following:

1. Iron bars of at least 1/2-inch round or 1-inch by 1/4-inch flat steel material,
spaced no more than five inches apart and securely fastened.

2. Steel grill of at least one-eighth-inch material of two-inch mesh and securely

fastened.

E. If the barrier is on the outside it shall be secured with rounded head flush bolts on
the outside.

VI. Roof Access

A. Design locking systems to meet the requirements of the International Building Code
and limit roof access to authorized personnel. Skylights are another source of entry
from the roof. These openings can be protected with bars or mesh.

B. Fencing or other barriers should restrict access from adjacent roofs. Access to roofs
should be strictly controlled through keyed locks, keycards or similar measures.
Skylights are another source of entry from the roof.

VII. Roof Security Barriers

A. Barbed wire fencing, razor wire fencing, chain link fencing or any other like security
barrier shall not be installed at roof level in such a manner as to obstruct egress or
access in the event of fire or other emergencies.

VIII. Building Access Control Devices

A. Access control devices must be approved by the CBP/IA/SMD. These include bars,
grates, gates, electric or magnetic locks or similar devices that would inhibit rapid fire
department emergency access to the building.

B. For all new and existing buildings covered by these standards, access to roofs
must be controlled to minimize the possibility of aggressors placing explosives or
chemical, biological, or radiological agents in that area or that could threaten building
occupants or critical infrastructure.

C. For new buildings, all external roof access must be eliminated by providing access
from internal stairways or ladders, such as in mechanical rooms.

D. For existing buildings, external access must be eliminated where possible, otherwise
they must have secure external ladders or stairways with locked cages or similar
mechanisms.

IX. Roof Doors Security Measures Locking Devices

A. All doors that exit onto the roof of any building or premises used for business
purposes and subject to the provisions hereof shall comply with the following
requirements:

1. Doors with glass panels and any glass panels that are adjacent to the door frame
shall be protected as follows: 1/4-inch

(a) The glass portion shall be covered with iron or steel grills of at least one-
eighth-inch material of no more than two-inch mesh securely fastened.

(b) If the door or glass panel barrier is on the outside, it shall be secured with
rounded head flush bolt on the outside.

(c) If the remaining portion of a door panel exceeds eight inches by twelve
(12) inches (excluding door frame) and is of wood, but not of solid core
construction, or is less than 1 3/8-inches thick, said portion shall be
covered on the inside with at least sixteen (16) gauge sheet steel attached
with screws.

2. Wood doors not of solid-core construction, or with panels therein less than 1 3/4
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
399 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

inches thick, shall be covered on the inside with at least 16-gauge sheet-steel
attached with screws.

3. All roof doors shall be provided with a lock that will permit the door to be opened
from the inside without the use of a key or any special knowledge or effort.
Outside hinges on all roof doors shall be provided with non-removable pins. Such
hinge pins may be welded, flanged, or secured by non-removable screws.

X. Mechanical Areas
A. Mechanical system design standards address limiting damage to critical
infrastructure and protecting building occupants against CBR threats. The primary
goal of a mechanical system after a terrorist attack should be to continue to operate
key life safety systems. This can be accomplished by locating components in less
vulnerable areas, limiting access to mechanical systems, and providing a reasonable
amount of redundancy.

B. Critical infrastructure systems must be located away from high-risk areas (e.g.,
garages and loading docks). The system controls and power wiring to the equipment
should be protected, and the system should be connected to emergency power
to provide smoke removal. Smoke removal equipment should be provided with
standalone local control panels that can continue to individually function in the event
the control wiring is severed from the main control system.

C. Designers should consider the following:

1. Do not mount plumbing, electrical fixtures, or utility lines on the inside of exterior
walls, but, when this is unavoidable, mount fixtures on a separate wall at least 6
inches from the exterior wall face.

2. Avoid placing plumbing on the roof slab.

3. Avoid suspending plumbing fixtures and piping from the ceiling.

4. Reduce the number of utility openings, manholes, tunnels, air conditioning ducts,
filters, and access panels into the structure.

5. Locate utility systems away from likely areas of potential attack, such as loading
docks, lobbies, and parking areas.

6. Protect building operational control areas and utility feeds to lessen the negative
effects of a blast.

7. Design operational redundancies to survive all kinds of attack.

8. Use lockable systems for utility openings and manholes where appropriate.

D. Infrequently-used utility covers/manholes can be tack-welded to lock tamper-

resistant covers.

XI. Mechanical Area Design Standards

A. The mechanical room provides space for the HVAC and domestic hot water
equipment, the water treatment system, and the heater serving the main building. It
is located adjacent to the main building support spaces.

B. Main Building

1. Power: Normal convenience power standards and as required by mechanical

equipment.

2. Lighting: General fluorescent, 50 FC.

3. HVAC: Normal ASHRAE HVAC standards.

4. Plumbing: As required by mechanical equipment and floor drain.

5. Floor: Sealed concrete sloped to drain.

6. Walls: 8” CMU.

7. Ceiling: No finished ceiling required Voice Communications.

8. Material: 1 ¾” 12 gauge steel clad hollow door and frame. Provide double doors,
as required.

9. Hardware: Standard lockset keyed individually and to a CBP master key.

C. Commercial Building

1. Power: Normal convenience power standards and as required by mechanical

equipment.

2. Lighting: General fluorescent, 50 FC.

3. HVAC: Normal ASHRAE HVAC standards.

4. Plumbing: As required by mechanical equipment and floor drain.

5. Floor: Sealed concrete sloped to drain.

6. Walls: 8” CMU.

7. Ceiling: No finished ceiling required Voice Communications.

8. Material: 1 ¾” 12 gauge steel clad hollow door and frame. Provide double doors,
as required.

9. Hardware: Standard lockset keyed individually and to a CBP master key.

XII. Site Utilities

A. Utility systems can suffer significant damage when subjected to the shock of an
explosion. Some of these utilities may be critical for safely evacuating people
from the building. To minimize the possibility of such hazards, apply the following
measures:

1. Where possible, provide underground, concealed, and protected utilities.

2. Provide redundant utility systems to support site security, life safety, and rescue
functions.

3. Consider quick connects for portable utility backup systems if redundant sources
are not available.

4. Prepare vulnerability assessments for all utility services to the site, including all
utility lines, storm sewers, gas transmission lines, electricity transmission lines,
and other utilities that may cross the site perimeter.

5. Protect water treatment plants and storage tanks from waterborne contaminants
by securing access points, such as manholes; maintain routine water testing to
help detect waterborne contaminants.

6. Minimize the number of signs identifying critical utility complexes (e.g., power
plants and water treatment plants). Provide fencing to prevent unauthorized
access and use landscape planting to conceal above ground systems.

7. Locate petroleum, oil, and lubricant storage tanks and operations buildings
down slope from all other buildings. Site fuel tanks at an elevation lower than
operational buildings or utility plants. Locate fuel storage tanks at least 100 feet
from buildings.

8. Locate the main fuel storage away from loading docks, entrances, and parking.
Access should be restricted and protected (e.g., locks on caps and seals).

9. Provide utility systems with redundant or loop service, particularly in the case
of electrical systems. Where more than one source or service is not currently
available, provisions should be made for future connections. In the interim,
consider “quick connects” at the building for portable backup systems.

10. Decentralize a sites communications resource when possible; the use of multiple

communications networks will strengthen the communications system’s ability to

withstand the effects of a terrorist attack. Careful consideration should be made
in locating, concealing, and protecting key network resources such as network
control centers.

11. Place trash receptacles as far away from the building as possible; trash
receptacles should not be placed within 30 feet of a building.

12. Conceal incoming utility systems within building and property lines, and give
them blast protection, including burial or proper encasement, wherever possible.

13. Consider incorporating low impact development practices to enhance security,

such as retaining storm water on site in a pond to create stand-off, instead of
sending into the sewer system.

14. Locate utility systems at least fifty (50) feet from loading docks, front entrances,
and parking areas.

15. Route critical or fragile utilities so that they are not on exterior walls or on walls
shared with mail rooms.

16. Where redundant utilities are required in accordance with other requirements
or criteria, ensure that the redundant utilities are not co-located or do not run in
the same chases. This minimizes the possibility that both sets of utilities will be
adversely affected by a single event.

17. Where emergency backup systems are required, ensure they are located away
from the systems components for which they provide backup.

18. Mount all overhead utilities and other fixtures weighing 31 pounds (14 kilograms)
or more to minimize the likelihood that they will fall and injure building occupants.
Design all equipment mountings to resist forces of 0.5 times the equipment
weight in any direction and 1.5 times the equipment weight in the downward
direction. (This standard does not preclude the need to design equipment
mountings for forces required by other criteria such as seismic standards.)

B. All utility penetrations of a site’s perimeter barrier, including penetrations in fences,

walls or other perimeter structures, should be sealed or secured to eliminate
openings large enough to pass through the barrier. Typical penetrations could be for
storm sewers, water, electricity, or other site utility services. Specific requirements of
various openings are discussed below:

1. All utility penetrations of the site’s perimeter should be screened, sealed, or

secured to prevent their use as access points for unauthorized entry into the
site. If access is required for maintenance of utilities, secure all penetrations with
screening, grating, latticework, or other similar devices so that openings do not

allow intruder access. Provide intrusion detection sensors and consider overt
or covert visual surveillance systems if warranted by the sensitivity of assets
requiring protection.

2. Drainage ditches, culverts, vents, ducts, and other openings that pass through
a perimeter and that have a cross-sectional area greater than 96 sq. in. and
whose smallest dimension is greater than 6 inches shall be protected by securely
fastened welded bar grilles.

3. As an alternative, drainage structures may be constructed of multiple pipes, with

each pipe having a diameter of 10 inches or less. Multiple pipes of this diameter
may also be placed and secured in the inflow end of a drainage culvert to prevent
intrusion into the area.

4. Ensure that any addition of grills or pipes to culverts or other drainage structures
is coordinated with the engineers so that they can compensate for the diminished
flow capacity and additional maintenance that will result from the installation.

XIII. PROTECTING ABOVEGROUND FUEL STORAGE TANKS

A. General

1. CBP stores and dispenses a large quantity of fuel for its patrol vehicle fleet.
At many locations, CBP maintains fueling stations. CBP also performs its
own maintenance on much of this fleet and requires lubricant oils for this
maintenance. CBP has above ground fuel storage tanks, and mobile fuel
dispensing trucks used in its operations to fuel its patrol and transport vehicles,
aircraft, construction equipment and boats. This handbook identifies general
physical security requirements for aboveground fuel storage tanks. The tank shall
meet requirements herein or be a CBP/IA/SMD pre-approved equal.

B. Site Location

1. Fuel Storage Tanks shall be located on federally controlled property. The main
fuel storage shall be located away from loading docks, entrances, and parking.
Access shall be restricted and protected (e.g., locks on caps and seals).
Aboveground fuel storage tanks should be no closer than 50 ft in any direction to
any entrance, vehicle circulation, and parking or maintenance area and no closer
than 100-150 feet from a building.

C. UL/ULC Listing

1. The tank shall be tested to and listed (and carry UL/ULC labels) for the following:

●● UL – 142, aboveground tanks for flammable and combustible liquids.

●● UL – 2085, two hour furnace fire test and two hour simulated pool fire
test for insulated tank.

●● UL – 2085, insulated and protected secondary containment

aboveground tanks for flammable and combustible liquids.

●● UL – 2085 and UFC SECTION (79-7) APPENDIX #A-II-F-1, ballistic

and vehicle impact test for protected tank.

●● UL – 2085 Non-Metallic Secondary Containment and Venting by Form

of Construction.

D. General Requirements For Both Ballistic Resistant And Non Ballistic Aboveground
Tanks

1. Access Control

(a) Automated access control systems may be used. The system shall be
capable of maintaining a record of who accessed the fuel tank. Access
control systems may use a keypad, card reader, or a combination of both.

●● Closed Circuit Television (CCTV). For manned facilities, provide a

CCTV L. system with cameras viewing the exterior entrance and all
areas of the aboveground fuel tank. The system must be continuously
monitored at a staffed central control position. For more information on
CCTV refer to Appendix 8.12: CCTV.

●● Intrusion Detection System (IDS). For more information on IDS, refer

to Appendix 8.9 IDS and Appendix 7.15 Loading Docks and Service
Access.

2. Bullet Resistance

(a) The tank shall withstand bullet resistance tests in compliance with UFC
Section (79-7), Appendix #A-II-F-1.

3. Fire Extinguisher and Clean-up Kit

(a) Portable fire extinguishers must be provided for the suppression of fires in
accordance with NFPA 10 and UFC for high hazard area. Fire extinguisher
and clean-up kit shall be sized and provided by the tank manufacturer. Fire
extinguisher shall be mounted on the exterior of the generator enclosure
with 316 stainless steel bracket and fasteners. Clean-up kit shall be
similarly mounted inside the generator enclosure.

4. Flame Arrestors

(a) Approved flame arrestors or pressure vacuum breather valves shall be

installed in normal vents.

5. Fuel Piping

(a) All fuel piping shall be schedule 40, 316 stainless steel (screwed or
welded).

6. Overfill Protection

(a) The tank shall be provided with the following methods to protect against
overfill:

●● Direct reading level gauge at the tank which is visible from fill pipe
location;

●● Valve located within fill pipe access to close automatically at a

specified fill level; and,

●● Audible high level alarm activated by a float switch at a specified fill

level.

7. Security Fence

(a) Provide security fencing around all petroleum facilities to ensure safety
and prevent unauthorized access. For storage tanks within fenced
perimeter provide standard 8ft. fence and if stand alone provide 12 foot
impound lot fence. For more information on fencing refer to Appendix 7.3
Fencing.

8. Uplift Restraints

(a) The tank shall be supplied with flood-resistant tie-down brackets/hurricane

hold-down restraints.

9. Venting

(a) The tank system shall be furnished with a 2 inch normal vent and an
emergency pressure relief system. The standard emergency relief
system furnished with the tank shall open if the tank pressure exceeds
½ psi. The tank system shall conform to code requirements and UL/ULC
Standards for venting. All vents and fittings utilized on the fuel tank shall
be constructed of stainless steel.

E. Additional Requirements For Non-Ballistic Resistant Aboveground Tanks

1. BALLISTIC RESISTANT ENCLOSURES shall be constructed for aboveground

fuel storage tanks that do not meet ballistic resistant requirements in UFC
Section (79-7), Appendix #A-II-F-1.

(a) Minimum level III on housing wall requirements. NIJ Standard 0108.01

(b) Fuel Storage Tanks shall be hardened against small arms fire (UL 752).

(c) Harden support systems (standby power sources, electrical system

conduits, mechanical system conduits and roof-mounted equipment) to
protect them from sabotage.

F. Installation

1. Tank shall be installed as per manufacturer’s requirements and as per the

drawings. Tank shall be installed by qualified personnel who have been
approved by the manufacturer and who have knowledge of, and possess the
skills and equipment necessary, to install this type of aboveground storage tank
properly and safely. Do not handle or move the tank unless it is empty. Under
no circumstances should a tank containing petroleum product be moved. Do not
drop or drag the tank.

2. Installation, operation and maintenance of the tank must be carried out in

accordance with the applicable codes and regulations. Aboveground storage
tanks are intended for installation in accordance with NFPA 30, 30A, 31 and UFC
Appendix II-F.

G. Foundation

1. The foundation for the tank must be designed (and approved by tank
manufacturer) to support the tank plus the weight of the maximum amount
of product the tank will be storing. The foundation design must also include
provision for draining surface water away from the tank to minimize the risk of
fuel accumulation under the tank from the overfill or spills.

2. For more information, visit the EPA’s Source Water Protection Practices Bulletin.

XIV. Building HVAC Systems

A. Ventilation shafts, vents, or ducts, and openings in the building to accommodate
ventilating fans or the air conditioning system can be used to introduce Chemical,
Biological, and Radiological (CBR) agents into a facility.

B. Decisions concerning protective measures should be implemented based on

the perceived risk associated with the facility and its tenants, engineering and
architectural feasibility, and cost. Specific physical security measures to consider for
the protection of the building HVAC system are cited below. HVAC systems must be
capable of operating on emergency power (generators).

C. Windows should be blocked in or hardened to provide the same level of protection

as walls. Accordingly, the ventilation system must be designed to support spaces
that will be accommodating higher-than-average numbers of personnel without direct
openings to the outside.

D. Physical security for mechanical rooms to prevent the direct introduction of

hazardous materials into the system of ducts that distributes air to the building
should be maintained. This includes locking and controlling the access to all
mechanical rooms containing HVAC equipment.

XV. Key HVAC System Considerations

A. The following HVAC design measures should be considered to mitigate the risk of
CBR threats for high security buildings.

1. Placing intakes at the highest practical level on the building is beneficial. For
protection against malicious acts, the intakes should also be covered by screens
so that objects cannot be tossed into the intakes or into air wells from the ground.

2. Such screens should be sloped to allow thrown objects to roll or slide off the
screen, away from the intake. Many existing buildings have air intakes that are
located at or below ground level.

Figure 3: Example of Elevated Air Intake

3. For those that have wall-mounted or below-grade intakes close to the building,
the intakes can be elevated by constructing a plenum or external shaft over
the intake. An extension height of 12 feet will place the intake out of reach of
individuals without some assistance.

4. For existing, buildings with air intakes below grade at ground level or wall-
mounted outside secure areas, some protection can be gained with physical
security measures (e.g., placing fencing, surveillance cameras, and motion
detectors around the intakes to facilitate monitoring by security personnel).

5. Physical security for mechanical rooms to prevent the direct introduction of

6. Public access to building roofs should be prevented. Access to the roof may
allow entry to the building and access to air intakes and HVAC equipment (e.g.,
self-contained HVAC units, laboratory or bathroom exhausts) located on the
roof. From a physical security perspective, roofs are like other entrances to
the building and should be secured appropriately. Roofs with HVAC equipment
should be treated like mechanical areas. Fencing or other barriers should restrict
access from adjacent roofs.

Figure 4: Example of Protecting Outdoor Air Intake

7. Access to building operation systems by outsiders should be restricted. A

building staff member should escort maintenance workers throughout their
service visit and should visually inspect their work before final acceptance of the
service.

B. Prevent Access to Outdoor Air Intakes

1. One of the most important steps in protecting a building’s indoor environment is

the security of the outdoor air intakes. Outdoor air enters the building through
these intakes and is distributed throughout the building by the HVAC system.
Publicly accessible outdoor air intakes located at or below ground level are at
most risk – due partly to their accessibility (which also makes visual or audible
identification easier) and partly because most CBR agent releases near a
building will be close to the ground and may remain there

C. Relocate Outdoor Air Intake Vents

1. Relocating accessible air intakes to a publicly inaccessible location is preferable.

Ideally, the intake should be located on a secure roof or high sidewall. The lowest
edge of the outdoor air intakes should be placed at the highest feasible level
above the ground or above any nearby accessible level (i.e., adjacent retaining
walls, loading docks, and handrail).

D. Extend Outdoor Air Intakes

1. If relocation of outdoor air intakes is not feasible, intake extensions can be

constructed without creating adverse effects on HVAC performance. In general,
this means the higher the extension, the better – as long as other design
constraints (excessive pressure loss, dynamic and static loads on structure) are
appropriately considered.

(a) An extension height of 12 feet (3.7 m) will place the intake out of reach of
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
410 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

individuals without some assistance.

(b) Also, the entrance to the intake should be covered with a sloped metal
mesh to reduce the threat of objects being tossed into the intake. A
minimum slope of 45 degrees is generally adequate.

(c) Extension height should be increased where existing platforms or building

features (i.e., loading docks, retaining walls) might provide access to the
outdoor air intakes.

E. Establish a Security Zone around Outdoor Air Intakes

1. Physically inaccessible outdoor air intakes are the preferred protection strategy.
When outdoor air intakes are publicly accessible and relocation or physical
extensions are not viable options, perimeter barriers that prevent public access to
outdoor air intake areas may be an effective alternative.

2. Iron fencing or similar see-through barriers that will not obscure visual detection
of terrorist activities or a deposited CBR source are preferred. The restricted area
should also include an open buffer zone between the public areas and the intake
louvers. Thus, individuals attempting to enter these protective areas will be more
conspicuous to security personnel and the public. Monitoring the buffer zone
by physical security, CCTV, security lighting, or intrusion detection sensors will
enhance this protective approach.
Figure 5: Minimum Recommended Inlet Angle

F. Secure Return-Air Grilles

1. Similar to the outdoor-air intake, HVAC return-air grilles that are publicly
accessible and not easily observed by security may be vulnerable to targeting for
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
411 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

CBR contaminants. Public access facilities may be the most vulnerable to this
type of CBR attack. A building-security assessment can help determine, which, if
any, protective measures to employ to secure return-air grilles. Take caution that
a selected measure does not adversely affect the performance of the building
HVAC system.

2. Some return-air grille protective measures include:

(a) Relocating return-air grilles to inaccessible, yet observable locations.

(b) Increasing security presence (human or CCTV) near vulnerable return-air

grilles.

(c) Directing public access away from return-air grilles.

(d) Removing furniture and visual obstructions from areas near return-air
grilles.

G. Other Accessible Exterior Openings

1. All exterior openings larger than 96 square inches which are less than 18 ft
above the ground or an adjacent roof must have protection against intrusion. This
may consist of special louvers or grids of 15 mm reinforcing bars, placed at 150
mm on center and welded at intersections.

XVI. Mail room Ventilation

A. To ensure airborne chemical, biological, and radiological agents introduced into
mail rooms do not migrate into other areas of buildings in which the mail rooms are
located, provide separate, dedicated air ventilation systems for mail rooms. Refer to
the DoD Security Engineering Design Manual for additional guidance, specifically
Appendix B, page B16, B-3.4 Standard 13 “Mail Rooms” and page B17, B-4.2
Standard B-17 “Mail Room Ventilation”.

1. Also see United Facilities Criteria (UFC) DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards
for Buildings and GSA’s Guidelines for Safe Mail Centers.

B. Dedicated Exhaust Systems

1. Provide dedicated exhaust systems within mail rooms to maintain slight negative
air pressures with respect to the remainder of the buildings in which the mail
rooms are located so that the flow of air is into and contained in the mail rooms.
Though the airflow into the mail rooms will not eliminate the potential spread of
contamination by personnel leaving the mail room, it will limit the migration of
airborne contaminants through openings and open doorways.

C. Outside Intakes and Exhausts

1. Provide mail room ventilation system outside air intakes and exhausts with low
leakage isolation dampers that can be closed to isolate the mail rooms.

D. Isolation Controls

1. Provide separate switches or methods of control to isolate mail rooms in the

event of a suspected or actual chemical, biological, or radiological release.

XVII. Emergency Air Distribution Shutoff

A. For all new and existing inhabited buildings, provide an emergency shutoff switch in
the HVAC control system that can immediately shut down air distribution throughout
the building except where interior pressure and airflow control would more efficiently
prevent the spread of airborne contaminants and/or ensure the safety of egress
pathways. Locate the switch (or switches) to be easily accessible by building
occupants. Providing such a capability will allow the facility manager or building
security manager to limit the distribution of airborne contaminants that may be
introduced into the building.

B. Utility Distribution and Installation

1. Utility systems can suffer significant damage when subjected to the shock of an
explosion. Some of these utilities may be critical for safely evacuating personnel
from the building or their destruction could cause damage that is disproportionate
to other building damage resulting from an explosion. To minimize the possibility
of the above hazards, apply the following measures.

C. Utility Routing

1. For all new inhabited buildings, route critical or fragile utilities so that they are
not on exterior walls or on walls shared with mail rooms. This requirement is
recommended, but not mandatory, for existing buildings.

D. Redundant Utilities

1. Where redundant utilities are required in accordance with other requirements

or criteria, ensure that the redundant utilities are not collocated or do not run in
the same chases. This minimizes the possibility that both sets of utilities will be
adversely affected by a single event.

E. Emergency Backup Systems

1. Where emergency backup systems are required in accordance with requirements

or criteria, ensure that they are located away from the system components for

which they provide backup.

XVIII. Fire Escapes And Building Walls

A. Exterior fire escapes usually do not provide access directly into a building. If a fire
escape is not properly designed it can provide a potential intruder with easy access
to the roof or to openings high above ground level. Physical security safeguards
must be coordinated with appropriate fire and safety officials to ensure they do not
interfere with emergency systems, procedures, or equipment. In some instances, it
may not be possible to reduce completely the physical security hazard posed by a
fire escape or similar safety feature. In these cases, alternative security measures
are necessary to control identified risks, such as CCTV, IDS, and guard patrols.

1. Windows or other openings leading off fire escapes should meet both security
standards and life safety code requirements if they provide potential access
points for an intruder. Measures taken to secure windows must be coordinated
with the appropriate fire and safety officials to ensure that they do not impede
safety processes.

2. To promote security, the fire escape should not extend all the way to the ground.
If the fire escape must reach all the way to the ground for safety reasons,
alternative security safeguards that meet life safety requirements may be
needed.

3. Coordination with fire and safety officials is necessary in relation to any security
measures directly affecting the fire and safety systems and procedures.

B. Wall Safeguards

1. Wall structures and masonry barriers present potential vulnerabilities for

restricting access at a facility, particularly where light construction or improper
securing of structural elements would enable an intruder to gain access. A
common example is a shared wall between adjacent rooms, one of which is a
restricted area.

2. When a vulnerable wall separating controlled space from an adjacent non-

controlled space is identified, countermeasures to reduce risk to an acceptable
level are needed. The objective is to secure the wall with a level of physical
security to match the value of the assets being protected and the threats.

3. See Whole Building Design Guide (WBDG) Building Types and the DoD
Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings.

C. Extending Interior Wall Construction to Ceiling or Roof Deck

1. This is often possible when the vulnerability is caused by a wall that does not
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
414 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

extend entirely from floor to ceiling providing the potential for illicit access over
the top of the wall.

2. Possible solutions include extending the wall to the ceiling or constructing an

expanded metal barrier to close the intervening space between the top of the
existing wall and the ceiling.

3. When the primary concern is merely to detect unauthorized access attempts,

lightweight construction such as plasterboard can be used. When lightweight
materials are used, consider installation of an intrusion-detection sensor in the
ceiling space to detect attempts at forced entry.

D. Reinforced Wall

1. Covering the entire wall with 9-gauge expanded metal may be appropriate to
control identified risks.

E. Intrusion-Detection Sensors

1. If the primary concern is that entry may be possible by forcible means without
detection, as might be the case in a storage room or similar area, the use of
intrusion-detection sensors can be an effective solution.

2. Vibration detectors placed on a wall surface is one way of sensing attempts at

forcible entry through a wall.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BACK Return to Table of Contents

Appendix 7.15: Loading Docks and Service Access

I Loading Docks And Service Access

A. General

1. Loading docks and service access areas are commonly required for a building
and are typically desired to be kept as invisible as possible. For this reason,
special attention should be devoted to these service areas in order to avoid
undesirable intruders. Design criteria for loading docks and service access
include the following:

(a) Separate (by at least 50 feet) loading docks and shipping and receiving
areas in any direction from utility rooms, utility mains, and service
entrances, including electrical, telephone/data, fire detection/alarm
systems, fire suppression water mains, cooling and heating mains, etc.

●● Locate loading docks so that vehicles will not be allowed under the
building. If this is not possible, the service should be hardened for
blast. Loading dock design should limit damage to adjacent areas and
vent explosive forces to the exterior of the building;

●● Monitor any necessary loading zones or drive-through areas and

restrict height to keep out large vehicles;

●● Avoid having driveways within or under buildings;

●● Provide adequate design to prevent extreme damage to loading docks.

Significant structural damage to the walls and ceiling of the loading
dock may be acceptable; however, the areas adjacent to the loading
dock should not experience severe structural damage or collapse.
The floor of the loading dock does not need to be designed for blast
resistance if the area below is not occupied and/or does not contain
critical utilities; and

●● Provide signage to clearly mark separate entrances for deliveries.

B. Loading Dock Roll-up Doors

1. Roll-up doors should be equipped with a balanced magnetic switch interlocked

with a CCTV camera to automatically train the TV camera on the area inside the
door when the door is open.

2. Overhead roll doors not controlled or locked by electric power should be

protected by slide bolts on the bottom bar. Chain link doors should be provided
with an iron keeper and pin for securing the hand chain, and the shaft on a
crank operated door should be secured. A solid overhead, swinging, sliding, or
accordion type garage door should be secured with a cylinder lock or padlock.

Also, a metal slide bar, bolt or crossbar should be provided on the inside. Metal
accordion grate or grill-type doors should have a secured metal guide track at the
top and bottom and be secured with a cylinder lock or padlock.

C. Loading Dock Personnel Doors

1. A card reader should be provided at the personnel door of the loading dock. A
balanced magnetic switch interlocked with a CCTV camera should be provided.
The interlock should automatically train the TV camera on the inside of the door
when the door is open. A local alarm should be set off at the same time.

2. Loading docks and receiving and shipping areas should be separated by at least
50 feet in any direction from utility rooms, utility mains, and service entrances
including electrical, telephone/data, fire detection/alarm systems, fire suppression
water mains, cooling and heating mains, etc. Loading docks should be located
so that vehicles will not be driven into or parked under the building. If this is not
possible, the service shall be hardened for blast.

D. Critical Building Components

1. The following critical building components should be located no closer than

50 feet in any direction to any main entrance, vehicle circulation, parking, or
maintenance area (project-specific information to be provided). If this is not
possible, harden as appropriate:

(a) Emergency generator including fuel systems, day tank, fire sprinkler, and
water supply;

(b) Normal fuel storage;

(c) Main switchgear;

(d) Telephone distribution and main switchgear;

(e) Fire pumps;

(f) Building control centers;

(g) UPS systems controlling critical functions;

(h) Main refrigeration systems if critical to building operation;

(i) Elevator machinery and controls;

(j) Shafts for stairs, elevators, and utilities; and

(k) Critical distribution feeders for emergency power.

E. Additional Features

1. Areas of Potential Concealment

(a) To reduce the potential for concealment of devices before screening

points, avoid installing features such as trash receptacles and mail boxes
that can be used to hide devices. If mail or express boxes are used, the
size of the openings should be restricted to prohibit insertion of packages.

II. Power for Critical Building Components and Security Systems

A. General

1. CBP requires that all alarm systems, CCTV monitoring devices, fire protection
systems, public address systems and access control devices, etc., be connected
to emergency power sources. The tenant is responsible for determining which
computer or communication systems require backup power.

2. Regardless of the quality of design and installation, most access control systems
are vulnerable to electric power losses. Some systems may not be able to
reset automatically and would require operator intervention to restore. Potential
intruders may be aware of these vulnerabilities and may seek to cut or interrupt
power if they cannot circumvent the system by other means. It is critical that all
elements of the system have backup power systems incorporated into the design
and operation to guarantee the system’s uninterrupted integrity, alarm reporting,
situation assessment, and the response force’s reaction.

3. Consultations during the design phase of an access control system are the
best time to define power, line conditioning, and battery or other backup power
requirements. Backup power for fixed systems may be from uninterruptible power
supplies (UPS), generators, or automatic bus power transfer switches.

B. Commercial Power

1. Primary electrical power for non-portable security equipment should be

commercial alternating or direct current.

2. If a risk assessment determines that commercial electrical power distribution

hubs need to be secured, strongroom standards are to be applied to electrical
vaults, rooms and closets. For further information, see Appendix 8.8,
Strongrooms.

C. Emergency Generators

1. Emergency backup generators must be located away from loading docks,

entrances, and parking areas. More secure locations include roofs, protected
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
420 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

grade levels (building exterior) and protected interior areas. The generator
should not be located in any areas that are prone to flooding. Emergency backup
generators must be designed in compliance with UFC 3-540-04N. Emergency
generators should be located at least 100 feet from communications frame
equipment to avoid radio frequency interference and they must provide 150% of
the present design loads of the facility.

2. The generators shall serve distribution panel boards in the main electrical room
through a 4-pole automatic transfer switch (ATS). This emergency system shall
provide power for the life safety/security systems and other essential loads upon
failure of the normal electrical power service for a minimum of 72 hours (120
hours for remote locations) continuous operation prior to re-fueling.

D. Generators Located Outdoors

1. If the emergency generator is to be installed outdoors, it should be housed in

a structure that is constructed to strongroom standards and have provisions to
ensure reliable starting in cold weather. For more information refer to Appendix
8.8, Strongrooms.

2. Physical access to the emergency generator must incorporate an access control

system and be monitored with CCTV to protect it from sabotage. For more
information refer to Chapter 11, Access to Facilities or Appendix 8.12, CCTV.

3. Provide security fencing around all enclosures housing emergency generators

to ensure safety and prevent unauthorized access. For enclosures within fenced
perimeter provide standard 8ft. fence and if stand alone provide 12-foot impound
lot fence. For more information refer to Appendix 7.3, Fencing.

E. Generators Located Indoors

1. Emergency generators that are installed indoors will be housed in rooms

constructed to strongroom standards.

2. To prevent unauthorized access to the generator, incorporate an access control

system and CCTV.

F. Generator Doors

1. Material:

(a) Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal, and
hung in hollow metal frames.

2. Hardware:

(a) Tamperproof with high security deadlock and no master key. Provide card
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
421 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

reader/keypad to track users, but not as a substitute for a deadlock. The

card reader shall be integrated to the locking mechanism. One shouldn’t
work without the other. Appropriately authorized card and key should be
necessary for access. The door must be fitted with a UL 437 approved
high security locking cylinder dead bolt lock (or equivalent). The keying
must be different from all other keys and must be keyed off a master key.

(b) For further information on generator door hardware, see Appendix 7.6,
Doors and Door Hardware.

G. The electrical load of the Emergency Generator should include the following critical
building systems/functions (this list is not all inclusive):

1. Egress and exit lighting;

2. Fire alarm system;

3. Generator auxiliaries;

4. Smoke control systems (if required by code);

5. Fire pump;

6. Lighting;

7. Telephone switch;

8. Security systems;

9. Mechanical control systems;

10. Building Automation System (BAS);

11. Elevators (one per bank);

12. Sump pumps;

13. Sewage ejector pumps;

14. Exhaust fans removing toxic, explosive or flammable fumes; and

15. Uninterruptible power systems (UPS) serving computer rooms

(a) Air conditioning systems for computer and UPS rooms;

(b) Exhaust fan in UPS battery rooms;

(c) Power and lighting for Fire Control Center and Security Control Center;
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
422 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

(d) Lighting for main electrical room, electrical closets, and communications
closets;

(e) Air conditioning systems for communications closets;

(f) Emergency power receptacles;

(g) Horizontal sliding doors; and

(h) Other associated equipment designated by code.

H. Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS)

1. All electrical and electronic equipment shall be powered from a UPS provided as
specified in UFGS-26 32 33.00 10

(a) Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) System above 15 KVA Capacity

2. Battery power units must comply with Underwriters Laboratories (UL)

(a) National Industrial Security Systems (UL 2050)

3. The UPS shall be sized to provide at least 24 hours battery back-up in the event
of primary failure. Batteries will be of the sealed non-gassing type.

4. If batteries are used as auxiliary electrical power, they will be maintained at full
electrical charge by automatic charging circuits

I. Microprocessor Based Systems

1. Uninterruptible power supply systems shall be furnished and installed to supply

power to all microprocessor based systems. This shall include, but not be limited
to:

(a) Communication systems;

(b) Intrusion detection system (IDS) and duress alarm control equipment;

(c) Automated access control multiplexers, controllers, and central processing

units;

(d) Closed circuit television (CCTV) multiplexers, switchers, recorders; and

(e) Alarm signal transmission equipment.

2. It is the intent that if normal power is interrupted the state of the microprocessor
will not be altered, nuisance and false indication alarms are not generated, and
volatile memory will not be lost.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
423 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

3. Systems controlled by the microprocessor are not required to remain in a fully

operational state during the power transition period, provided that:

(a) The security of the facility is not compromised for any period of time due to
an unlocked condition, and

(b) Power shall be interrupted to all electrified locking hardware in a fire or

smoke alarm zone that is in an alarm condition.

J. Locking Systems

1. Uninterruptible power supply systems shall be furnished and installed to supply

power to all fail safe electromechanical locking systems. This shall include, but
not be limited to:

(a) Magnetic locks;

(b) Electric strikes;

(c) Electrified spring and dead bolts.

2. It is the intent that if normal power is interrupted the security of the facility is not
compromised for any period of time due to an unlocked condition, and access
through electrically controlled locks may be affected.

K. Security Lighting Systems

1. Security Lighting Systems that use high intensity discharge lamps to provide
illumination to critical areas will be provided UPS service if incandescent or
fluorescent lamps are not used as backup lighting.

2. Uninterruptible power will be supplied until a transfer to emergency back up

power can be completed.

III Communications Room (Telephone and Radio)

A. Description

1. A communications room, separate from the computer room, is required to house

and support CBP telecommunications and radio equipment and connections.
In addition to provisions for an IDS that provides perimeter and volumetric
protection/detection of unauthorized access, special construction details are
required for this room including the installation of 9-gauge diamond mesh
expanded metal wall/ceiling reinforcement or 8-in. concrete masonry units
(CMU). The installation of 9-gauge diamond mesh expanded metal must be
inspected by CBP prior to covering. Provide tamperproof hardware with a UL-437
compliant cylinder or equal high security deadlock with no master key.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
424 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

2. A card reader/keypad must be provided in addition to, but not as a substitute for,
the deadlock allowing CBP to track access by users. All necessary cabling and
conduit must be provided to support the equipment furnished and installed by the
government.

B. Communications Room Technical Design Standards

1. IDS:

(a) Provide IDS and alarm with UPS backup monitored on a 24-hour basis by
the security office. Provide keypad control inside room adjacent to entry
door.

2. Walls:

(a) 3/4-in. fire resistant painted plywood over 9-gauge diamond mesh (1 1/2-
in. X 2-in. maximum diamond) expanded metal securely fastened to metal
studs. 3/4-in. plywood over 8-in. CMU is also acceptable.

3. Ceiling:

(a) 5/8-in. gypsum board over 9-gauge diamond mesh (1½-in. X 2-in. max.
diamond) expanded metal. Overlap joints.

4. Material:

(a) 1 ¾-inch solid core wood or 12-gauge steel clad hollow metal door and
frame.

5. Hardware:

(a) Tamperproof hardware with a UL-437 compliant cylinder or equal high

security deadlock. No master key. At mid-size and large airports, also
provide a card reader / keypad in addition to, but not as a substitute for,
the deadlock allowing CBP to track.

6. Provide all necessary cabling and conduit to support the equipment furnished
and installed by the government.

7. Special construction note:

(a) Installation of 9-gauge diamond mesh expanded metal wall / ceiling

reinforcement must be inspected by CBP prior to covering.

IV General Storage/File Room

A. Description

1. The general storage / file room is required for the storage of CBP supplies,
equipment, files and other miscellaneous items required for CBP operations.
Eighteen inch deep heavy-duty adjustable metal shelving and filing cabinets are
required as specified by CBP.

B. General Storage/File Room Technical Design Standards

1. Fixed Security Equipment 18-in. deep heavy-duty adjustable metal shelving, filing
cabinets as specified by CBP.

2. Walls:

(a) 5/8-in. gypsum board over metal studs.

3. Ceiling:

(a) 5/8-in. gypsum board. Acoustical tile not permitted.

4. Material:

(a) 1 ¾-in. wood or hollow metal, 40-42 inches wide, in hollow metal frame.

5. Hardware:

(a) Standard lockset keyed individually and to a CBP master.

V Secure Storage Room(s)

A. Description

1. The Secure Storage Room is specified by CBP for the secure storage of
documents, seized narcotics, and other contraband. In addition to provisions
for IDS that provides perimeter and volumetric protection/detection of
unauthorized access, special construction details are required for this room
including the installation of 9-gauge diamond mesh expanded metal wall / ceiling
reinforcement or 8-in. CMU. The installation of 9-gauge diamond mesh expanded
metal must be inspected by CBP prior to covering.

B. Secure Storage Room(s) Technical Design Standards

1. IDS: For each secure room, provide IDS and alarm with

(a) Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS):

●● UPS backup monitored on a 24-hour basis by the airport security

office. Provide keypad control inside room adjacent to entry door.

(b) Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV):

●● Fixed CCTV camera w/wide-angle lens in room to be monitored and

recorded at the CCC or other CBP designated location.

2. Floor:

(a) Resilient tile over concrete slab.

3. Walls:

(a) 5/8-in. gypsum board over 9-gauge diamond mesh (1 1/2-in. X 2-in. max.
diamond) expanded metal securely fastened to metal studs. Overlap
joints. 8-in. concrete masonry units are also acceptable.

4. Ceiling:

(a) 5/8-in. gypsum board over 9-gauge expanded metal.

5. Material:

(a) 1 ¾-in. solid-core wood or 12-gauge steel clad hollow metal door and
frame.

6. Hardware:

(a) Tamper-proof hardware with a UL-437 compliant cylinder or equal high

security deadlock. No master key. At mid-size and large airports, also
provide a card reader/keypad in addition to, but not as a substitute for, the
deadlock thus allowing CBP to track users.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BACK Return to Table of Contents

Appendix 8.6: Vaults

I. CBP Vault Minimum Standards

A. General

1. A vault is a completely enclosed space with a high degree of protection against

forced entry. Vaults are commonly used for storing Top Secret information,
special access program information, and extremely valuable materials.

2. This appendix pertains to the permanent or temporary storage of seized drugs

(narcotics/controlled substances), weapons, ammunition, and other high-value
items. Temporary storage refers to storage of 72 hours or less. Permanent
storage refers to a length of storage greater than 72 hours.

3. For more information on temporary storage only, please refer to the Strong Room
Construction Standards in Appendix 8.8, Strongrooms.

B. Scope

1. This document establishes minimum construction requirements for CBP Vaults,

for Armory standards refer to Appendix 10: Storage of Weapons and Ammunition.
The following vault standards apply to all new construction, reconstruction,
alterations, modifications, and repairs to existing vaults. All vaults shall have
an Intrusion Detection System ((IDS), see Chapter 8.9, IDS; a Closed Circuit
Television System ((CCTV), see Chapter 8.12, CCTV); and an Access Control
System (see Chapter 11, Access to Facilities).

C. Referenced Documents

1. Government Publications:

(a) The following documents outline vault minimum standards:

●● Federal Standard Construction Methods and Materials for Vaults

●● FED-STD 832

2. Vault Systems:

(a) AA-V-2737, Modular Vault Systems, 25 April 1990

(b) AA-V-2737 Amendment 2, Modular Vault Systems, 30 October 2006

(c) QPL-AA-V-2737-5, Modular Vault Systems, 17 October 2007

(d) AA-V-2940, Vault System, Armory, Assembled, 20 February 2008

3. Vault Door:

(a) AA-D-600D, Door, Vault, Security, 15 May 2000

(b) AA-D-600D Amendment 2, Door, Vault, Security, 20 April 2007

(c) QPL-AA-D-600-8, Door, Vault, Security, 20 May 2008

4. Locks:

(a) FF-L-2740 Locks, Combination

(b) QPL-FF-L-2740-8 Products Qualified Under Federal Specification FF-L-

2740

(c) FF-L-2937 Combination Lock, Mechanical 05

(d) FF-L-2937 Combination Lock, Mechanical Amendment 2

(e) CIS HB 4400-01A Seized Asset Management & Enforcement Procedures

Handbook 2002

5. General Requirements for Vaults:

(a) There are three classes of vaults for the storage of classified material
and equipment A, B and C. Class A vaults offer the maximum protection
against tool and torch attack. Class B vaults offer less than maximum
protection. A lightweight, portable “modular vault” meeting Federal
Specification AA-V-2737 may also be used to store classified material
and equipment. The modular vault is equivalent to a Class B vault Class
C vaults offer less than maximum protection and may be used where
unique structural circumstances do not permit construction of concrete
vault construction. Utilization of any vault class, or the modular vault, is
dependent upon the physical location environment where the vault is to be
erected. Reference: FED-STD 832 (This document establishes minimum
construction requirements for all Federal agencies for high security vaults
for storage of classified information and weapons).

D. The minimum construction requirements for each class of vault are described as
follows.

1. Detailed Requirements:

(a) Class A Vaults. Minimum Construction. Required for New Construction

●● Vault Walls. The walls of class A vaults shall be constructed of 8-inch

thick (200 mm) reinforced concrete. Concrete reinforcement shall
consist of 5/8-inch (16m)re-bm,6 inches on center each way, staggered
each frame. The walls are to extend to the underside of the roof slab
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
431 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

above. When vault walls are adjacent to the exterior walls, the vault
wall must be set back from the exterior part of the exterior wall to allow
4 inches (100 mm) for the normal wall facing to cover the vault wall.
Wall reinforcement shall be tied into floors and ceilings;

●● Vault Floor. The floor of class A vaults shall be constructed of 8 inch

thick (200 mm) reinforced concrete. Concrete reinforcement shall
consist of # 5 rebar (5/8 inch-16 mm), 6 inches on center each way,
staggered each frame;

●● Vault Ceiling. The ceiling of class A vaults shall be constructed of

monolithic reinforced concrete 8 inch thick (200 mm). Concrete
reinforcement shall consist of # 5 rebar (5/8 inch-16 mm), 6 inches on
center each way, staggered each frame;

●● Vault Door. Vault door and frame shall conform to Federal Specification
AA-D-600;

●● Miscellaneous Openings. Any miscellaneous openings, open ducts,

●● For further information, see Vault Door Guidance.

(b) Class B Vaults. Minimum Construction.

●● Construction. Class B vault shall conform to Federal Specification AA-

V-2737.

●● Class B vaults are GSA approved modular vaults and shall be six (6)
sided (floor, ceiling, and four sides) as specified in AA-V-2737.

●● Vault door. Vault door and frame shall conform to Federal Specification
AA-D-600, Class 5 vault door.

(c) Class C Vaults. Minimum construction for steel-lined vaults.

●● Vault construction. Where unique structural circumstances do not

permit construction of concrete vault, construction will be of steel alloy-

type of 1/4 inch thick, having characteristics of high yield and tensile
strength. The metal plates are to be continuously welded to load-
bearing steel members of a thickness equal to that of the plates. If the
load-bearing steel members are being placed in a continuous floor or
ceiling of reinforced concrete, they must be firmly affixed to a depth of
one-half the thickness of the floor and ceiling. If the floor and/or ceiling
construction is less than six inches of reinforced concrete, a steel
liner is to be constructed the same as the walls to form the floor and
ceiling of the vault. Seams where the steel plates meet horizontally and
vertically are to be continuously welded together;

●● Vault Ceiling and Floor. If the floor and/or ceiling construction is less
than six inches of reinforced concrete, a steel liner is to be constructed
the same as the walls to form the floor and ceiling of the vault. Seams
where the steel plates meet horizontally and vertically are to be welded
together;

●● Vault Door. Vault door and frame shall conform to Federal Specification
AA-D-600, Class 5 vault door; and

E. See Chapter 8.7, Vault Doors, for more information.

F. Vault door guidance for all vault types follow:

1. Vault door and frame shall conform to Federal Specification AA-D-600, Class 5
vault door.

2. Armory vault doors and security vault doors are both manufactured according to
Federal Specification AA-D-600, Door, Vault, Security. The difference between
the two doors is that armory vault doors, used to protect AA&E, are fitted with
UL Standard 768, Group 1, mechanical combination locks. Security vault doors,
used to protect classified information, are fitted with locks meeting Federal
Specification FF-L-2740, Locks, Combination. The armory vault door label
(silver with red letters) states that it is a “GSA Approved Armory Vault Door.” The
security vault door label reads “GSA Approved Security Vault Door” (label also
silver with red letters).

3. There are numerous GSA-approved Class 5 security vault doors being used for
the protection of weapons, which is authorized under (AA-D-600D), however It is
strongly recommend that locks be changed out to the UL Standard 768, Group
1, mechanical combination lock, when and if a failure occurs with an X-07, X-08
or X-09 lock. When that change is made it must be noted on the Optional Form
89 (Maintenance Record for Security Containers/Vault Doors). It shall also be
noted on the front of the armory door that is not authorized for the protection of
classified information.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
433 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

4. Miscellaneous Openings. Any miscellaneous openings, open ducts, pipes,

registers, sewers in excess of 96 square inches (619.2 centimeters) in area and
over 6 inches (15.24 centimeters) in its smallest dimension shall be equipped
with barriers. Acceptable barriers are 9 gauge expanded metal mesh, or rigid
metal (steel) bars at least one-half inch in diameter, welded vertically and
horizontally 6 inches on center. The rigid metal bars shall be securely fastened
at both ends to preclude removal. Crossbars shall be used to prevent spreading
of the bars. Solid caulking shall be used between the sleeve or conduit to give
evidence of surreptitious entry attempt. Access for inspection of barriers should
be in accordance with agency policies. Note Figures 1 and 2.

Figure 1: Manbar Barrier

Figure 2: Security Bar Detail

Federal
AA-D-600D
Specification:
Title: Federal Specification Door, Vault, Security
Scope: This specification covers vault doors that are designed to conform to the
minimum standards for physical security equipment as required by
the Information Security Oversight Office Directive governing the safe-
guarding of national security information. The doors provide protection
against unauthorized entry for the periods of time specified.
Classes: Class 5-V:

Security vault door shall be resistant to 20 man-hours surreptitious entry, 30

man-minutes covert entry and 10 man-minutes forced entry.

Class 5-A:

Armory vault door shall be resistant to 30 man-minutes covert entry and 10

man-minutes forced entry.

Class 5-B:

Ballistic vault door shall be resistant to 20 man-hours surreptitious entry, 30

man-minutes covert entry, 10 man-minutes forced entry, ballistic resis-
tant.

GSA Approved Armory Vault Doors

All armory vault doors listed below are Class 5 and are fitted with a UL Standard 768
combination lock. GSA approved armory vault doors can be purchased direct from the
manufacturers using the National Stock Numbers listed below. See the Order tab for
manufacturer information.

NSN Description

7110-01-475-9598 Left hand swing, without optical device.

7110-01-475-9596 Right hand swing, with optical device.

7110-01-475-9595 Right hand swing, without optical device.

7110-01-475-9593 Left hand swing, with optical device.

7110-01-475-9590 Double leaf, right opening swing active leaf, with optical device.

CLASS SPECIFICATIONS INSULATED AVAILABLE PROTECTION

10 Minutes forced entry; 30

5 AA-D-600 No Yes minutes covert entry; 20 hours
surreptitious entry
Nor forced entry requirement;
6 AA-D-600 No No 30 minutes covert entry; 20
hours surreptitious entry
15 Minutes forced entry; 30
8 AA-D-2757 No No minutes covert entry; 20 hours
surreptitious entry
5. General Services Administration label. The label shall be affixed to the outside
face of the door. The label shall have a silver background and red letters not less
than 3 mm in height. The label shall show the following:
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
APPROVED SECURITY VAULT DOOR
MANUFACTURER’S NAME
(a) Identification label. The label shall be affixed to the inside face of the door
frame. The label shall show the door model and serial number, date of
manufacture, and Government contract number.

(b) Certification label. A certified label shall be affixed to the inside face of the
door bearing the following certification:

6. Day Gate. Vaults shall have self‑closing class 5 metal day gate with an automatic
locking device controlled by key on the outside of gate. The gate shall be
constructed of expanded mesh or solid bars finished to match vault door and

frame. The day gate must have a key lock that is manipulation resistant (UL-437),
high security, and is keyed off-master. The thumb throw latch release shall be on
the inside of the gate, with thumb throw accessible only to the inside.

7. Vault Vestibule. A vestibule is required in a vault when access to the vault or

secured area is in public view. If a vault contains a vestibule, the entrance
portal shall contain a 12-gauge hollow metal door and frame. The door shall be
equipped with a tamper resistant UL-437 dead bolt and keyed lock set.

(a) For large vaults, an overhead door leading from the vestibule to the
exterior may be installed.

●● Overhead doors will be the roll up, flush fitting type. The door will be
metal, dual slat manufactured with 12, 14, or 16-gauge exterior slats
and 18, 20, 22, or 24-gauge interior slats with insulated centers. The
doors are to be factory fitted with a slide bolt that can be extended
through each of the metal slide rails. Each slide bolt will be fitted to
the door within 6 inches of the floor and designed to accommodate
the use of a high security padlock. A dealer after-market, manufacturer
approved slide bolt locking system will be acceptable. The doors will
be fitted with the appropriate electric motor system supplied by the
manufacturer. The motor system shall have a manual override feature
in the event the motor fails. Chains used to operate the door manually
shall be of such a length that the door can be easily operated from
the floor. An eyebolt will be affixed into the concrete in the area of
the chain to allow the use of a high security padlock as an additional
security feature. The electric control buttons and the manual override
feature will be located so that they cannot be reached by cutting a hole
through the door.

8. Physical Segregation Within the Vault. The vault must be segmented into High
Risk vs. Low Risk. High Risk must further be segmented into Drugs vs. Currency
and Monetary Instruments vs. all other High Risk Seizures. Finally Drugs
must be segmented into Hard vs. Soft. Although not mandated, many vaults
have included a staging segment for contraband that is to be destroyed. Each
storage segment must have a separate zone in the IDS. The method of physical
segregation will be accomplished with the use of metal cage structures with the
caging running true-floor to true-ceiling with sliding cage doors. Cages are to
be constructed of 9-gauge mesh. The mesh opening must be small enough to
preclude anyone reaching in with a hand or even a finger and manipulating the
lock or removing stored material. The color of the mesh will be in accordance
with industry standard. All anchoring bolts to the floor, wall(s) and ceiling must
be torqued down in keeping with the manufacturer’s specifications and spot
welded so that the anchoring bolts cannot easily be removed. Each cage door
will be secured by a lock meeting UL-437. As stated earlier the placing of the

steel plates to accommodate the keypads is acceptable. Additionally, there will

be sufficient CCTV coverage for each storage area (e.g. in the aisles between
shelving). CCTV coverage will depend on the configuration and layout of the
vault.

(a) Storage Cage Construction: Separate storage areas in the room must
be provided for hard narcotics (heroin and similar drugs), soft narcotics
(vegetative drugs such as marijuana) and items of value (currency, jewelry
and weapons). Separate 9 gauge expanded metal cages must be used
for narcotics with a separate cage for soft and hard narcotics each. The
cages shall be constructed of 9 gauge expanded metal mesh securely
welded to 42 mm (1.75 inch) steel angle structural frame on 450 mm (18
inch) on center, with 3mm (1/8 inch wide) 50 mm (2 inch long) welds at
every 400 mm (16 inches) on center at all seams and joints. The partition
shall have an integral gate. The gate shall have a single padlock meeting
the requirements of Federal Specification FF-P-2827A . The lock shall be
protected from tampering by a 6 mm (0.25) metal plate. Gate hinge pins
shall be non removable.

(b) Items of value must be stored in a GSA Class VI storage container located
inside the permanent seizure storage room. All storage containers must
be protected with intrusion detection system. Each cage or cabinet door
must have balanced magnetic switches indicating if the door is open and
the lock is engaged. Access control system must be provided on storage
containers for hard and soft narcotics. The cage or cabinet doors must be
under camera video surveillance.

9. Independent Storage Structure. If the permanent seizure storage is located in a

separate structure more than 150 meters (500 feet) from other occupied facilities,
or is larger than 28 square meters (300 square feet), then the building must
be equipped with male and female toilet facilities. Permanent seizure storage
located in a separate structure will require mechanical, electrical, telephone and
janitor closet space. Physical plant equipment spaces must not open directly
into storage areas. Exhaust and air supply vents must be located remote from
any direct exhaust from storage areas. Permanent seizure storage located
in separate structures must be surrounded by security fences. The fences
must be located a minimum of 6 meters (20 feet) from the structure, providing
a buffer zone for security monitoring. The fence must be a minimum of 2.4
meters (10 feet) high, and have a sloped top or be topped with concertina wire.
The perimeter of the permanent seizure storage must be under camera video
surveillance with adequate site lighting.

10. Windows. No newly constructed vaults shall have windows.

11. Closed Circuit Television (CCTV). The entire exterior and interior of the vault
must be monitored by the CCTV system. The contractor is responsible to ensure
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
440 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

that what CBP requires be monitored by a camera or group of cameras is what

results from the installation. Therefore, it is up to the contractor to choose the
appropriate camera/lens combinations and to mount the cameras so that the
required coverage is provided. If the placement of multiple cameras can provide
coverage of more than one for the requirements listed below and the image
captured is sufficient to identify any person(s) in the frame, multiple cameras will
suffice for both requirements, Cameras must be capable of recording identifiable
images of people in darkness.

12. Camera Coverage Requirements:

(a) Vault

●● All cameras must provide usable images of the exterior of the entire
vault door and its frame. The image captured must be sufficient to
identify anyone tampering with or opening the vault door;

●● Cameras must provide usable images of the interior of the entire vault
door and its frame so that identifiable images of persons entering the
vault are captured; and

●● Cameras must provide images of the entire interior area of the vault.
The images must be of sufficient quality so that person(s) in the area
are identifiable and any activity in the area is captured.

(b) Processing Area

●● Cameras must provide images of the entire interior of the processing

area including the interior of the door. The images must be of sufficient
quality so that person(s) in the area are identifiable and any activity
in the area is captured. One camera must be positioned to observe
someone working at the narcotics scale.

●● Sufficient cameras are to be placed to provide usable images of the

exterior walls, exterior entrance and exterior roof of the vault. Camera
placement needs to be coordinated with exterior lighting to maximize
quality of images captured during darkness.

13. Ancillary Equipment:

(a) DVR, Multiplexer, Monitor, etc.

●● The Digital Video Recorder (DVR), multiplexer and other related

equipment are not to be located in the Vault or the processing area.
This equipment is to be located in a secure room away from the
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
441 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

vault. The equipment is to be housed in a lockable rack type cabinet

designed for housing such equipment. The cabinet must also house
the Uninterruptible power supply (UPS). A CCTV color monitor with a
minimum 21” screen is to be placed in close proximity to this cabinet.

(b) Wiring

●● Fiber Optic video transmission cable is preferred if it is compatible with

the system components. Copper coaxial cable may be used, however,
copper clad aluminum, aluminum, or foil based coaxial cable is not
acceptable. All wiring is to be run through metal conduit.

(c) Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS)

●● An Uninterruptible power supply must be a component of the system.

Having the CCTV system connected to the generator distribution panel
is the ideal.

14. Additional CCTV Camera System Requirements:

(a) Closed Circuit Television System (CCTV) – Performance Requirements

(this is an example of performance requirements – you will need to modify
to meet the specific needs of the facility you are working on):

●● The vault is a six-sided structure (floor walls, roof & floor) that requires
full camera coverage. Cameras are to be placed and lenses set so that
each camera will produce a usable image of any person inside or in
the immediate vicinity of the outside walls or on the roof. The cameras
must also provide clear images of operations inside the vault areas and
at the overhead and pedestrian entry doors;

●● The entire roof area must be covered. Usually this is accomplished

using two mast-mounted cameras on opposite corners of the roof using
wide-angle lenses. The camera/lens combination is such so that there
is an overlap in the coverage;

●● All four exterior walls must be covered;

●● The exterior of the pedestrian entry door and the overhead door must
be covered and the camera must produce clear images of all persons
and operations in that area (loading, unloading, etc.) The camera(s)
must also provide a clear image of anyone at the pedestrian door so
that CBP personnel can identify them before opening the pedestrian
door to admit any person who does not have access;

●● The entire administration area must be covered and the cameras

placed and the lenses adjusted so that clear images of all operations,
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
442 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

including weighing and packaging, etc. are produced. The entire vault
door and doorjamb must be monitored so that anyone tampering with
the door can be identified;

●● The entire interior of the vault must be covered. One camera is to be

so positioned that it provides a clear picture of the interior of the vault
door and doorjamb. The camera shall be positioned so that no one can
enter through the vault door that cannot be identified from the image
provided by this camera. One camera must also provide the same
level of coverage at the entry door to the caged area. Anyone entering
the cage should be easily identifiable from the image produced by
the camera. One camera must provide usable images system located
inside the vault;
NOTE: If a camera can be placed so that it provides coverage for two of the performance requirements
noted above, one camera would suffice. For instance if a camera can be placed so that it meets the
requirement for capturing the image of a person entering the vault and the same camera provides a
usable image of some amount of the storage space, it is not necessary to use another camera to just look
at the vault door and jamb.

●● All camera wiring is to be run through EMT metal conduit. The size of
the conduit is to be determined by the vendor, but is to be of sufficient
size so that the wiring will not be chafed or otherwise damaged as it is
drawn through the conduit;

●● The cameras (shall be whatever model works for space, variable lens)
are to be event activated;

●● The system shall be placed inside a lockable rack designed for the
purpose of securing such equipment. The keys to the rack shall be
given to the responsible Officer;

●● One color monitor is to be placed with the system equipment to allow

authorized personnel the ability to review the images from all the
cameras that are stored on the DVR or being played back from the
download library; and

●● The affected CBP employees should determine how often the DVR is
downloaded. The DVR will probably have the capacity to hold up to 30
days in memory. Employees should be cautious in determining the time
span because looking for a certain time frame inside a thirty-day period
can be time consuming.

(b) Please note that Seized Property personnel are not to download or
administer the CCTV system. The separation of duties must be provided
for, generally this is accomplished by having an employee or the CBP
Officer manage the system.

15. Intrusion Detection System (IDS). The purpose of an alarm system is to detect an
intrusion or attempted intrusion and to notify appropriate personnel.

(a) General Requirements:

●● Equipment shall be UL-2050 approved (certified);

●● Balanced Magnetic Switches (BMSs) on all perimeter doors;

●● All control units will be located within the area protected by the alarm
system;

●● All components shall be installed in a manner to prevent access or

removal from a location external to the protected zone; and

●● All alarm systems shall be capable of operating from commercial

AC power. In the event of commercial power failure, provisions will
be made for automatic switchover to emergency power, and back to
commercial power without causing an alarm. A signal will be presented
to the monitoring location indicating when the system has lost power.
When batteries are used for emergency power, they will be maintained
at full charge by automatic circuits. Emergency power must be capable
of operating the system for a minimum of twenty-four hours. For more
information on emergency power, see Appendix 7.15, Loading Docks
and Service Access.

(b) Volumetric sensors employed in the alarm system must be placed so that
the most likely intruder motions are detected.

(d) Depending on facility operations, a duress/panic alarm may be installed.

If a duress/panic alarm is used it must be connected to a Class A Central
Monitoring Station.

(e) All alarm wiring leaving the controlled area shall be equipped with
electronic line supervision.

(f) Class A - Pseudo-Random digital and tone-wire transmitted preferred.

Exceeds previous “High Line Security” Requirement.

●● These systems will transmit over wire a pseudo-random generated

tone or tones or digital type modulation. These systems will use either
an interrogation and reply scheme or a synchronization scheme. The
signal between the protected premises and the monitor location shall
not repeat itself within a six-month period. A line supervision alarm
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
444 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

signal shall cause a lock-in condition, which shall be transmitted to the

monitor location in not more than 30 seconds. If the above conditions
cannot be met, then a UL approved system with commercial Grade
A service and Grade AA transmission will be acceptable. It shall not
be possible to compromise Class A systems by the use of resistance,
voltage or current substitution techniques. See Attachment 1.

II. Attachment 1
A. Intrusion detection monitoring requirements and services provided by the Federal
Protective Service (FPS) through GSA leases. FPS has designed and built four
Mega-Centers located in Suitland, Maryland, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Battle
Creek, Michigan and Denver, Colorado.

1. Among other tasks, these centers monitor intrusion/duress alarm systems, fire
detection systems, environmental systems and elevator emergency telephones
for multi-regional areas. In order to take full advantage of the Mega-Centers’
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) monitoring capabilities; FPS mandates
that all installations and upgrades of the above referenced systems in both
leased and government facilities are standardized on a national basis, are fully
compatible with the standardized alarm receiving equipment existing in the
Mega-Centers, and are capable of being remotely programmed with software
from the approved panel manufacturers A national decision was made that FPS
would only recommend and support alarm systems that fully interfaced with
the control center’s equipment and software. Therefore, FPS requires that only
remote-programmable alarm systems are specified when designing or upgrading
alarm systems that are monitored at the Mega-Center. Additionally all remote-
programmable alarm systems must be able to easily communicate with the
Mega-Centers’ monitoring equipment.

2. Currently, the FPS list of approved alarm control panels include those
manufactured by ADEMCO, CADDX, DMP, ITI, & Radionics/Bosch. Additionally,
approved alarm panels must communicate via the Mega-Centers’ alarm
receivers using one of the following panel signaling protocols: ADEMCO Contact
ID, Radionics/Bosch Modem II, Modem IIE and Modem IIIA; and Security
Industry Association (SIA). The Mega-Centers can also accept most digital
communicators for Fire Detection Systems that transmit one of the following
industry standard formats (communications protocol): ADEMCO Contact ID,
Radionics / Bosch Modem II, Modem IIE and Modem IIIA or SIA.

3. The current standard alarm control panels for Federal buildings and larger leased
sites are the ADEMCO model numbers Vista 50PUL, Vista 128FB or FBP & 250
FB or FBP; the CADDX model number NX8E; the DMP model number XR200;
and the Radionics/Bosch model number 9412G. These alarm control panels
are commercial UL, compatible with Fire Detection and most Access Control
Systems. For smaller leased space and office applications contact your local
Mega-Center for acceptable alternatives supplied by approved manufacturers.
All alarm systems must have tampered devices, cabinets and junction boxes.
All devices will report as one point as a zone description that can be used when
reporting an alarm condition to the responding authority. FPS cannot monitor
any alarm system that does not fully comply with the above referenced criteria.
If a system does not meet these criteria, either the customer or GSA will have to

assume the cost of commercial monitoring.

III. Additional Guidance

A. Concrete compressive strength. Concrete shall have a minimum 28 day
compressive strength of 3000 psi. when tested in accordance with the applicable
sections of the American Concrete Institute Standard ACI318 – (Building Code
Requirement for Reinforced Concrete).

B. Additional Specifications - Vault area will be equipped with one of the following:

1. An emergency escape which meets applicable building and safety codes. The
escape device will be designed and installed so that it will not be activated by the
exterior locking device nor actuated by drilling or rapping on the door from the
outside.

2. A decal containing procedures to be followed in an emergency and for operating

the escape device will be permanently affixed to the inside of the door.

3. Communications facilities and an alarm system or other signaling device which

will permit a person in the vault area to communicate with someone on the
outside to obtain release.

4. An emergency light.

5. At least one approved fire extinguisher installed near the door.

C. For additional IDS guidance refer to Appendix 8.9, IDS.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BACK Return to Table of Contents

Appendix 8.8: Strongrooms

I. General
A. A strongroom is an enclosed space constructed of solid building materials.
Strongrooms are normally used for the storage of classified or sensitive materials,
such as firearms. Protection is supplemented by guards and or Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDS). Rooms that have false ceilings and walls constructed of fibrous
materials, or other modular or lightweight materials, do not qualify as strongrooms.

B. Construction of strongrooms may be necessary for bulk storage or where use of

GSA-approved security containers are not adequate or not practical. Possible
applications for strongrooms are:

1. Open storage of classified National Security Information (NSI);

2. Closed storage of NSI in a non-controlled facility;

3. Weapons and ammunition rooms;

4. Evidence storage rooms/Temporary seized property held less than 72 hours;

5. Mail rooms;

6. Rooms used to store high value tools and equipment;

7. Funds and valuables storage;

8. LAN/TELCOM; and

9. Other sensitive assets.

II. Construction Standards

A. Heavy-duty builder’s hardware shall be used in construction. All screws, nuts, bolts,
hasps, clamps, bars hinges, and pins should be securely fastened to preclude
unwanted entry. Hardware accessible from outside the strongroom must be peened,
pinned, or spot-welded to preclude removal.

B. Walls:

1. The perimeter walls, floors, and ceiling will be permanently constructed using
slab to slab construction. Slab to slab construction (true floor to the true ceiling) is
defined as walls that extend from the solid concrete floor to the underside of the
roof slab above. All construction must be done in a manner as to provide visual
evidence of unauthorized penetration.

2. Walls will be constructed using reinforced Concrete Masonry Units (CMU) not
less than 8 inches thick.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
450 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

(a) Masonry units will be solid brick or hollow type block and filled with
concrete and metal reinforcement bars.

●● When using hollow type blocks, they will be filled with concrete and
reinforced with #5 rebar, a minimum of 5/8 inches in diameter. The
reinforcing is to be anchored into the ceiling and floor to a minimum
depth of one-half the thickness of the adjoining member.

3. Where a CMU wall is not feasible, the following alternate method can be used:

(a) The inside walls will be constructed of 5/8-inch fire rated gypsum board
and the outside walls with standard 5/8-inch gypsum board and a layer of
9-gauge expanded metal on the inside of the area.

(b) The expanded metal shall be in a 1½-inch x 2-inch diamond pattern,

attached to metal studs and spot welded at 6-inch intervals. If wooden
studs are used to attach the expanded metal, the studs shall be no less
than 2 inches x 4 inches; otherwise it shall securely anchored to the stud
with stainless steel screws and washers. The screws shall be no less
than 3 inches in length and installed at no more than 6-inch intervals. The
expanded metal shall be affixed in a manner to prevent tampering and to
show evidence of attempts at removal. Although less expensive to build
this is not the preferred method for securing arms and ammunition. See
Figure 1.

(c) To view the specifications for expanded metal mesh, see Section VII,
Construction Standards: Expanded Metal Mesh Specifications.

C. Ceilings:

1. When walls are being constructed using the CMU method described above in
II.B.2, and they do not extend to the true ceiling and a suspended (false) ceiling
is created, the suspended (false) ceiling must be reinforced with a 9-gauge
expanded metal to serve as the true ceiling. When expanded metal is used, it
must overlap the adjoining walls and be secured in such a manner that removal
will show evidence of tampering.

2. When constructing walls using the alternate method described above in

paragraph II.B.3 and the walls do not extend from slab to slab and a suspended
(false) ceiling is created, the suspended (false) ceiling must be reinforced with a
9-gauge expanded metal to serve as the true ceiling.

3. When the walls of an area do extend from slab to slab and a false ceiling is
added it is not necessary to reinforce the false ceiling.

D. Floors:

2. Existing floors will consist of reinforced concrete based on structural/floor loading.

E. Doors/Door Hardware:

1. Doors must be constructed of 12-gauge steel clad hollow core metal or of single
solid core wood, 1 ¾ inches thick, and hung in 12-gauge hollow metal frames.

2. All doors to unclassified area(s) will be equipped as a minimum with a card

reader/keypad and a Commercial Grade 1 – GSA approved High Security
Lockset. Doors to classified areas must be equipped as a minimum with a Kaba
Mas CDX-09 High Security Electromechanical Lock and a Commercial Grade
1 – Mortise High Security Lever Lockset. Keys must be off the building master in
facilities that are not solely occupied by CBP.

3. Double doors must have one door secured with flush mount bolts at the top and
the bottom. Astragals (overlapping molding, preferably metal) must be used to
inhibit access to lock bolts.

4. Perimeter door hinge pins that are located outside the office area must be non-
removable (peened, pinned, or spot welded). If the door swings outward, hinge
side protection in the form of a dowel-pin and socket is required. Refer to Figure
2 of Appendix 7.6: Doors and Door Hardware for details. All perimeter doors must
have a commercial grade pneumatic door closer and an anti-pry strip installed to
prevent the door from being pried open.

5. All door hardware (e.g., hinges, lock hardware) must be secured to door frame
with stainless steel screws at least 3 inches long.

6. For additional information on Doors and Door Hardware, refer to Appendix 7.6.

F. Windows:

1. Strongrooms shall have no exterior windows.

2. Interior vision panels may be approved on a case-by-case basis.

G. Miscellaneous Openings:

1. Where vents, ducts, registers, sewers, tunnels and other miscellaneous openings
are of such size and shape (in excess of 96 inches square) and enter or pass
through the area as to permit unauthorized entry, they should be protected with
either steel bars or wire mesh grills. If bars are used, they should be at least 3/8-
inch diameter hardened steel, welded vertically and horizontally, six inches on
center. If grilles are used, they must be of 9-gauge woven wire mesh.

2. For additional information on Miscellaneous Openings, refer to Appendix 7.8,

Openings.

III. Intrusion Detection System (IDS)

A. All strongrooms shall include an IDS and it shall be connected to a Class A Central
Monitoring Station. At a minimum the IDS should include a balanced magnetic
switch (BMS) on the door, motion detection sensors inside the room and a card
reader/keypad to track users. There should be a backup method of communication
set up with the Central Monitoring Station (e.g. a wireless phone link, such as
cellular or an extra analog/digital telephone line), so that if a telephone line is cut
or otherwise interrupted, an alarm is activated at the Central Monitoring Station.
Acknowledgement of an alarm condition by the Central Monitoring Station must take
place within 30 seconds of the alarm. The Central Monitoring Station must dispatch
the correct response (law enforcement, duty agent, etc.).

B. For additional information on IDS, refer to Appendix 8.9, Intrusion Detection

Systems.

IV. Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV)

A. All strongrooms will use CCTV. At a minimum, CCTV will monitor the entrance and
perimeter areas. The minimum components that the system must have is one color
monitor and one high resolution digital video recorder (DVR), capable of recording a
minimum of 30 days and playing back any camera view. All camera views associated
with an alarm must be automatically recorded. CCTV images must be retrievable
and operable over weekends and holidays.

B. For additional information on CCTV, refer to Appendix 8.12, CCTV.

V. References
• Expanded Metal Manufacturers Association, EMMA 557-99, Standards for Expanded
Metals
• National Concrete Masonry Association
• Customs and Border Protection Lock Hardware Requirements
• GSA Advantage (Manufacturers)
• GSA Schedule

VI. Graphics
Figure 1: Strongroom Wall Detail - 9-Gauge Expanded Metal Mesh

VII. Construction Standards

A. Expanded Metal Mesh Specifications

1. Expanded metal mesh shall meet ASTM F1267-89 type, Class 1 standard and
shall have the following characteristics:

(a) Strand thickness: No. 9 - 10-gauge minimum (flattened);

(b) Weight: 195 lbs/csf minimum;

(c) Material: Carbon Steel;

(d) Shape: Flattened;

(e) Pattern: Diamond;

(f) Dimensions: 3.20 inch maximum (long opening) (LWD) and 1.33 inch
maximum (short opening) (SWD); and

(g) Recommended mesh: 3/4” #9 (10 ga).

B. Mesh shall be fastened to steel stud and top and bottom runners using either screw
or weld attachment. Screws or weld shall be spaced at 6” on center maximum, with
all corners fastened to the framing. Mesh splice shall occur at studs only. Splice
between supports is not permitted unless: a) such splice is welded continuously top
to bottom; b) mesh is overlapped three inches, and fastened or welded every six
inches.

C. Steel framing receiving metal mesh shall be 16 gauge minimum.

D. Screws shall be self-drilling #8 shank minimum (1/4” minimum penetration into

steel framing.) Fasteners must be used from the secure side of the mesh. 1/2-inch
washers must be installed when using screws to deter ability to pull mesh over tops
of screw heads.

E. Welds shall be 1/8” x ½” long fillet type excepting at unsupported splices where the
weld must be continuous.

F. There can be no gap in coverage. Gaps may be closed with steel studding or flat
metal welded (or fasted where welding is not permitted) to the secure side of the
expanded metal.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BACK Return to Table of Contents

Appendix 8.9: Intrusion Detection Systems

I. Intrusion Detection Systems

A. General

1. The Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is an essential part of the physical security
system. As defined in the United Facilities Criteria (UFC) UFC 4-021-02NF, an
IDS consists of the combination of electronic components, including sensors,
control units, transmission lines, and monitoring units integrated to be capable of
detecting one or more types of intrusion into a protected area.

B. Uses of IDS

1. IDS can include both interior and exterior systems. These are utilized to provide:

(a) The earliest practical warning of any attempted penetration into protected
areas;

(b) A greater defense capability to detect and defeat intruder attacks;

(c) Additional controls at critical areas or points;

(d) Insurance against human error;

(e) A substitute for other physical security measures that cannot be used
because of safety issues, operational requirements, building layout, cost
or similar issues.

C. The primary function of an IDS is to detect intruders. The detection of an intruder

is the first of a four-phase process. This detection phase starts the clock on the
“Detect, Assess, Delay and Respond” timeline. To be effective these actions must
be less than the time it would take an aggressor to cause damage or to complete his
mission.

D. To maximize the effectiveness of an IDS, the design should utilize both the
“Protection In-Depth” (tiered defensive system) principle and the concept of
complementary devices. Protection In-Depth first identifies an asset requiring
protection and then configures layers of unbroken defensive rings protecting that
item. The first detection layer is located at the outermost defensive rings necessary
to provide the required delay needed to timely stop the aggressor.

II. Alarm Components

A. Components of an alarm system

1. An alarm system is composed of four main parts:

(a) A control unit used to arm/disarm the system as well as edit system
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
460 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

capabilities and responses;

(b) One or more sensors to detect the presence or actions of an intruder;

(c) A central processing unit (CPU), or remote monitoring station dedicated to

constantly monitoring the sensors and transmits an alarm signal when a
sensor detects an intruder; and

(d) The alarm annunciator, which signals an activation of the system.

III. Alarm Installation

A. Planning Alarm Installations

1. Alarms are used to detect approach or intrusion. Some are intended for exterior
protection, and some are suitable only for indoor installations. The following
should be addressed in determining the need for an alarm system:

(a) Sensitivity or criticality of the operation;

(b) Facility vulnerability to damage, interruption, alteration or other harm;

(c) Sensitivity or value of the information or property stored at the facility;

(d) Location of facility and accessibility to intruders;

(e) Other forms of protection in place or available;

(f) Guard or law enforcement response capability.

B. Tiered Defensive System Concept

1. As shown in Figure 1 the Protection in-Depth principle has one potential

weakness. Once an asset has been identified for protection, the methods
selected to protect that asset have to be similar or identical to an aggressor’s
method of attack. This requires that every possible method of attack be taken into
consideration.

2. Combining a ”Line” device such as a vibration activated fence, with a volumetric

device such as an exterior bistatic microwave detector is a good example of
complementary protection. Each device provides protection assistance to the
other type of device in the overall coverage of that area. Bridging over a fence
still subjects the aggressor to the capabilities of the microwave system.

(a) It is important to remember that this technique is not infallible. Each type
of device still retains its inherent weakness. A determined intruder with
the proper intelligence, resources and capabilities can still bypass/defeat
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
461 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

this type of setup by analyzing the composition of the total system and
then developing a response to each individual device. In this example
the intruder bridges the fence without touching it, landing as closely as
possible to the microwave transmitter where the cone of protection is the
smallest. Then, depending upon the construction of the microwave, the
intruder can either climb onto and over the transmitter or crawl underneath
its cone of protection.

3. Choosing the proper system, installing it correctly, and routine maintenance are
also very important issues concerning the effectiveness of the IDS.

4. Laziness, lack of knowledge, programming weaknesses, confusion, and

improper placement of sensors system can be exploited by the knowledgeable
intruder. Improper maintenance procedures resulting in multiple false alarms
and causing a lack of confidence in the system are also pathways for bypassing
the system. This is especially true of exterior sensors where environmental
conditions mandate that devices be maintained regularly for their proper function.

Figure 1: Tiered Defensive System Concept

C. Sensors

1. The three basic types of sensors are perimeter, volumetric, and proximity. The
following are general definitions and each will be covered more in depth in
attached interior and exterior use sections.

(a) Perimeter. Perimeter protection is the first line of defense. The most
common points for sensors are doors, windows, vents and skylights.
These may be protected, with detectors sensing their opening or breaking.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
462 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

The major advantages of perimeter-protection sensors are their simple

design and reliability. The major disadvantage is that they protect only
openings such as doors or windows. If intrusion occurs through a wall or
ceiling, these devices are bypassed and the intrusion goes undetected.

●● Switches. These devices are usually magnetic operated switches

affixed to a door or window in such a way that opening the door or
window removes the magnetic field causing an alarm. High security
switches are normally balanced or biased magnetic switches. Another
type of switch is the plunger or roller switch which is compressed
when the door or window is closed. Once the door or window is
opened pressure on the device is released, the alarm circuit is broken
and an alarm results;

●● Screens. Openings such as vents, ducts, skylights, and similar

openings can be alarmed by thin wire filaments that signal an alarm
if the screen is cut or broken. Often the wire filaments are placed in a
frame of wooden rods and require little maintenance; and

●● Glass Breakage. Electronic sensing devices used to detect high-

frequency sound patterns within the glass when it is broken, or the
shock wave a substantial impact makes against the surface.

(b) Volumetric. Volume protection sensors are designed to detect the

presence or actions of an intruder almost anywhere within an entire
room from floor to ceiling. A variety of volumetric devices are available.
Each kind of detector has some advantages and limitations. Therefore,
a device must be selected for a specific environment. A major advantage
of volumetric devices is that they provide a highly sensitive and invisible
means of detection in high-risk areas. The major disadvantage is that an
improper application can result in frequent false alarms.

●● Infrared. Passive infrared sensors are part of the motion-detection

group. They sense the rapid change in temperature caused by
body heat of an intruder compared to the room’s normally stable
environment as the intruder passes through the protected area.
Infrared detectors are relatively free of false alarms; however, items
moved by air currents within the protected area can activate the alarm.
Passive Infrared Detectors are most effective when deployed in a
manner where the intruder’s movement crosses in front of the device;

●● Ultrasonic. Ultrasonic motion detectors generate a high frequency of

sound that is out of the normal range of human hearing. An intruder
disrupting the ultrasonic wave pattern initiates the alarm. Ultrasonic
devices are prone to false alarms, due to excessive air currents or
ultrasonic noise from mechanical equipment. Ultrasonic devices
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
463 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

are most effective in detecting movements towards or away from the

device;

●● Microwave. This kind of motion detector uses high-frequency radio

waves, or microwaves, to detect movement. Because microwaves
penetrate materials such as glass, and metal objects reflect them,
they can detect motion outside the protection area causing false alarm
problems if not properly installed; and

●● Photoelectric. Photoelectric devices transmit a beam across a

protected area. When an intruder interrupts this beam, the circuit
is disrupted causing an alarm. Today’s photoelectric devices use
diodes that emit an invisible infrared light and usually pulses rapidly
to prevent compromise by substitution. A disadvantage is that they
can be defeated relatively easily; the beams are narrow and may
be discovered or avoided. They can be utilized effectively at “choke
points” where the intruder is forced to pass.

●● Capacitance. A capacitance device is used to protect specific objects

such as security containers and safes. The capacitance alarm uses the
metal construction of the container and causes it to act as a capacitor
or condenser. When a change occurs in the electromagnetic field
surrounding the metal object the balance is disturbed and the alarm is
activated. The system can only be applied to ungrounded equipment
and accidental alarms can occur if the container is carelessly touched
when the alarm is activated;

●● These seismic sensing devices use a piezoelectric crystal or

microphone to detect the sound pattern that a hammer-like impact on
a rigid surface would generate. These devices are attached directly
to safes and filing cabinets, or to the walls, ceiling, and floor of vaults.
False alarms may occur with these devices by passing vehicles or
falling objects.

IV. Exterior Sensors

A. Planning

1. Exterior sensors without frequent and proper maintenance are prone to false/
nuisance alarms which can result in a lack of confidence in these devices. In
addition, because of the harsh environmental conditions in which they function,
they generally are more expensive than comparable interior sensors. These
same environmental conditions can influence the detection capabilities of these

devices in two different manners:

(a) Rain and snow can reduce the viewing distances of CCTV cameras
and can potentially create a gap in coverage. Conversely, these same
environmental conditions can increase the likelihood of intruder detection
by having the rain or snow impact raise the “irritation” factor of the device
close to the threshold alarm level. The result is a reduced window of
opportunity for the intruder to exploit.

2. One advantage exterior sensors have over interior sensors is that the exterior
devices are left in the secure mode at all times offering no opportunity for the
intruder to disable the device when the system is disarmed.

V. Exterior Fences
A. Planning

1. Studies have shown that fences and walls provide less than 15 seconds of
penetration resistance. They do serve to accomplish one or more of the following
functions. They serve the purpose of being a demarcation line indicating the
perimeter dimensions of the protected area. They also serve as a debris catcher,
especially in a two-fence system, minimizing the potential of false alarms caused
by stray animals, blowing branches, papers, etc. (In a two fence system, the
interior fence is used for detection purposes and to provide some delay.) This
barrier also causes an intruder to overtly declare his intentions to violate the
protected area. The exterior fence line can also serve as a platform for CCTV
cameras and can with the proper adjustments have IDS devices attached.

B. Installation

1. Perimeter sensors are normally installed directly on the fences, walls, or gates.
Penetration attempts (such as climbing, cutting, or lifting) generate mechanical
vibrations and stresses in fence fabric and posts that are usually different than
those caused by natural phenomena like wind and rain. In general, if the fence is
part of the IDS system it is activated in one of two ways -by touch, or a threshold
change in the fence’s electric field or capacitance. The emanation field projects
approximately 6 feet (3 feet on each side of the fence) from the fence.

2. For further information, see:

(a) The U.S. Navy’s Interim Technical Guidance (ITG) 03-3, Entry Control
Facilities.

(b) Chapter 7.3, Fencing.

C. Types of Fence Sensors

1. Strain-Sensitive Cable

(a) Strain-sensitive cables are transducers that are uniformly sensitive

along their entire length. They generate an analog voltage when subject
to mechanical distortions or stress resulting from fence motion. Strain-
sensitive cables are sensitive to both low and high frequencies. The signal
processor usually has a band-pass filter that passes only those signals
characteristic of fence-penetration actions. An alarm is initiated when
the signal’s frequency, amplitude, and duration characteristics satisfy the
processor’s criteria.

(b) Strain-sensitive cable acts like a microphone; some manufacturers offer

an option that allows the operator to listen to fence noises causing the
alarm. Operators can then determine whether the noises are naturally
occurring sounds from wind or rain or are from an actual intrusion attempt.
This feature is relatively costly to implement because it requires additional
cable from each signal processor to the security center and, if CCTV is
being used, it may be of limited benefit. Strain-sensitive cable is attached
to a chain-link fence about halfway between the bottom and top of the
fence fabric with plastic ties. One end of the cable is terminated at the
signal processor and the other end with a resistive load. The DC through
the cable provides line supervision against cutting or electrically shorting
the cable or disconnecting it from the processor.

(c) A typical installation is shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Typical Strain-Sensor Cable

2. Taut-Wire Sensor

(a) A taut-wire sensor combines a physically taut-wire barrier with an

intrusion-detection sensor network. The taut-wire sensor consists of a
column of uniformly spaced horizontal wires up to several hundred feet in
length and securely anchored at each end. Typically, the wires are spaced
4-8 inches apart. Each is individually tensioned and attached to a detector
located in a sensor post. Two types of detectors are commonly used:
mechanical switches and strain gauges:

●● The mechanical switch consists of a specially designed switch

mechanism that is normally open. The tensioned wires are
mechanically attached to the switch and movement of the wire beyond
a preset limit causes the switch to close. To counteract small gradual
movements of a wire (such as that caused by settling of the fence or
by freezing or thawing of soil) switches are usually supported in their
housing by a soft plastic material. This material allows the switch to
self-adjust when acted upon by gradual external forces and wire effects
or contraction.

●● Strain-gauge detectors are attached to the taut wire with a nut on a

threaded stud. When a force is applied to the taut wire, the resulting
deflection is converted by the strain gauge into a change in electrical
output that is monitored by a signal processor.

3. With sensors that use mechanical switches as detectors, the switches in a single
sensor-post assembly are wired in parallel and are connected directly to the
alarm-annunciation system. Pulse-count circuitry is not used because a single
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
467 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

switch closure, such as that caused by an intruder moving or cutting one wire,
is indicative of an intrusion attempt. Strain-gauge detectors in a sensor post
are monitored by a signal processor. When the signal from one or more strain
gauges satisfies the processor’s criteria, an alarm is triggered.

4. The taut-wire sensor can be installed as a freestanding fence or can be mounted

on an existing fence or wall. Figure 3 shows a freestanding configuration.

Figure 3: Typical Taut-Wire Installation

5. Fiber-Optic Cable Sensors

(a) Fiber-optic cable sensors are functionally equivalent to the strain sensitive
cable sensors previously discussed. However, rather than electrical
signals, modulated light is transmitted down the cable and the resulting
received signals are processed to determine whether an alarm should
be initiated. Since the cable contains no metal and no electrical signal
is present, fiber-optic sensors are generally less susceptible to electrical
interference from lightning or other sources.

6. Electric-Field Sensors

(a) Electric-field sensors consist of an alternating-current (AC) field generator,

one or more field wires, one or more sense wires, and a signal processor.
The generator excites the field wires around which an electrostatic field
pattern is created. The electrostatic field induces electrical signals in the
sensor cable sense wires, which are monitored by the signal processor.
Under normal operating conditions, the induced signals are constant.
However, when an intruder approaches the sensor, the induced electrical
signals are altered, causing the signal processor to generate an alarm
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
468 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

(b) Several different field- and sense-wire configurations are available. They
range from one field wire and one sense wire to as many as four field
wires and one sense wire or four field wires and four sense wires. Figure
4 shows the detection pattern produced by vertical three-wire (one field
and two sense wires) configurations. The three-wire system has a wider
detection envelope and is less costly (one less field wire and associated
hardware). However, because of the tighter coupling between wires,
the four-wire system is less susceptible to nuisance alarms caused by
extraneous noise along the length of the zone.

(c) A signal processor monitors the signals produced by the sense wires. The
processor usually contains a band-pass filter that rejects high-frequency
signals such as those caused by objects striking the wires. Additional
criteria that must be satisfied before the processor initiates an alarm
include signal amplitude and signal duration. By requiring the signal to be
present for a preset amount of time, false alarms (such as those caused
by birds flying through the detection pattern) can be minimized.

(d) As with taut-wire sensors, electric-field sensors can be freestanding

(mounted on their own posts) or attached by standoffs to an existing
fence. They can also be configured to follow contours of the ground. The
area under the sensor must be clear of vegetation, since vegetation near
or touching sense wires can cause false alarms. These sensors can also
be installed on the walls and roof of a building.

Figure 4: Typical Electric-Field-Sensor Detection Patterns

7. Capacitance Proximity Sensors

(a) Capacitance proximity sensors measure the electrical capacitance

between the ground and an array of sense wires. Any variations in
capacitance, such as that caused by an intruder approaching or touching
one of the sense wires, initiates an alarm. These sensors usually
consist of two or three wires attached to outriggers along the top of an
existing fence, wall, or roof edge. To minimize environmental alarms,
the capacitance sensor is divided into two arrays of equal length. The
signal processor monitors the capacitance of each array. Changes in
capacitance common to both arrays (such as produced by wind, rain,
ice, fog, and lightning) are canceled within the processor. However, when
changes occur in one array and not the other because of an intruder, the
processor initiates an alarm.

8. Buried-Line Sensors

(a) A buried-line sensor system consists of detection probes or cable buried

in the ground, typically between two fences that form an isolation zone.
These devices are wired to an electronic processing unit. The processing
unit generates an alarm if an intruder passes through the detection field.
Buried line sensors have several significant features:

●● They are hidden, making them difficult to detect and circumvent.

●● They follow the terrain’s natural contour.

●● They do not physically interfere with human activity, such as grass

mowing or snow removal.

●● They are affected by certain environmental conditions, such as running

water and ground freeze/thaw cycles. (Seismic, seismic/magnetic,
magnetic, and balanced pressure sensors are seldom used and will
not be discussed here.)

(b) The ported-coax cable sensor consists of two coax cables buried in
the ground parallel to each other. A radio frequency (RF) transmitter is
connected to one cable and a receiver to the other. The outer conductor
of each cable is ported (fabricated with small holes or gaps in the shield).
The transmitter cable radiates RF energy into the medium surrounding
the cables. A portion of this energy is coupled into the receiver cable
through its ported shield. (Because of the ported shields, these cables are
frequently referred to as leaky cables.) When an intruder enters the RF
field, the coupling is disturbed, resulting in a change of signal monitored
by the receiver, which then generates an alarm.

●● Pulse-type sensors transmit a pulse of RF energy down one cable

and monitor the received signal on the other. The cables can be up
to 10,000 feet long. The signal processor initiates an alarm when the
electromagnetic field created by the pulse is disturbed and identifies
the disturbance’s approximate location.

●● Continuous-wave sensors apply continuous RF energy to one

cable. The signal received on the other cable is monitored for
electromagnetic-field disturbances that indicate an intruder’s presence.
Cable lengths are limited to 300 to 500 feet. Additionally, the sensor
is available in a single-cable configuration as well as two separate
cables. The pattern typically extends 2-4 feet above the ground
and can be 5-13 feet wide, depending on cable spacing and soil
composition. Figure 5 represents a typical cross-section of a detection
pattern created by a ported-cable sensor.

Figure 5: Typical Ported-Cable Detection Pattern

(d) Sensor performance depends on properties of the medium surrounding

the cables. Velocity and attenuation of the RF wave that propagates
along the cables and the coupling between the cables are functions
of the dielectric constant of the soil and its conductivity which, in turn,
depends on its moisture content. For example, the velocity is greater and
the attenuation is less for cables buried in dry, low-loss soil than in wet,
conductive soil. Freeze/ thaw cycles in the soil also affect the sensor’s
performance. When wet soil freezes, the wave velocity and the cable
coupling increase and the attenuation decreases, resulting in greater
detection sensitivity. Seasonal sensitivity adjustments may be necessary
to compensate for changing ground conditions.

(e) Although usually buried in soil, ported cables can also be used with
asphalt and concrete. If the asphalt or concrete pavement area is relatively
small and only a few inches thick (such as a pedestrian pavement
crossing the perimeter), the ported cables can be routed under the
pavement. However, for the large and deep pavements, slots must be cut
into the asphalt or concrete to accept the cable.

(f) A portable ported-coax sensor can be rapidly deployed and removed.

The cables are placed on the surface of the ground rather than buried.
This sensor is useful for temporary perimeter detection coverage for small
areas or objects (such as vehicles or aircraft). They are affected by certain
environmental conditions, such as running water and ground freeze/thaw
cycles (seismic, seismic/magnetic, magnetic, and balanced pressure
sensors are seldom used and will not be discussed here).

9. Line Of Sight (LOS) Sensors

(a) The LOS sensors, which are mounted above ground, can be either active
or passive. Active sensors generate a beam of energy and detect changes
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
472 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

in the received energy that an intruder causes by penetrating the beam.

Each sensor consists of a transmitter and a receiver and can be in a
monostatic or bistatic configuration. Passive sensors generate no beam of
energy; they simply look for changes in the thermal characteristics of their
field of view. For effective detection, the terrain within the detection zone
must be flat and free of obstacles and vegetation.

10. Microwave Sensors

(a) Microwave intrusion-detection sensors are categorized as bistatic or

monostatic. Bistatic sensors use transmitting and receiving antennas
located at opposite ends of the microwave link, whereas monostatic
sensors use the same antenna.

(b) A bistatic system uses a transmitter and a receiver that are typically
separated by 100 to 1,200 feet and that are within direct LOS with each
other. The signal picked up by the receiver is the vector sum of the directly
transmitted signal and signals that are reflected from the ground and
nearby structures. Detection occurs when an object (intruder) moving
within the beam pattern causes a change in net vector summation of
the received signals, resulting in variations of signal strength. The same
frequency bands allocated by the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) for interior microwave sensors are also used for exterior sensors.
Because high-frequency microwave beams are more directive than low-
frequency beams and the beam pattern is less affected by blowing grass
in the area between the transmitter and the receiver, most exterior sensors
operate at the next to highest allowable frequency, 10.525 gigahertz
(GHz). The shape of the microwave beam and the maximum separation
between the transmitter and the receiver are functions of antenna size
and configuration. Various antenna configurations are available, including
parabolic-dish arrays, strip-line arrays, and slotted arrays.

●● The parabolic antenna uses a microwave-feed assembly located at the

focal point of a metallic parabolic reflector. A conical beam pattern is
produced (see Figure 6). A strip-line antenna configuration produces
a nonsymmetrical beam that is higher than its height. Larger antenna
configurations generally produce narrower beam patterns.

Figure 6: Stacked Microwave Configuration

(c) Monostatic microwave sensors use the same antenna or virtually

coincident antenna arrays for the transmitter and receiver, which are
usually combined into a single package. Two types of monostatic sensors
are available. Amplitude-modulated (AM) sensors detect changes in
the net-vector summation of reflected signals similar to bistatic sensors.
Frequency-modulated (FM) sensors operate on the Doppler principle
similar to interior microwave sensors. The detection pattern is typically
shaped like a teardrop (see Figure 7). Monostatic sensors can provide
volumetric coverage of localized areas, such as in corners or around the
base of critical equipment.

Figure 7: Typical Monostatic-Microwave-Sensor Detection Pattern

11. Infra-Red Sensors

(a) Infra-red (IR) sensors are available in both active and passive models.
An active sensor generates one or more near-IR beams that generate an
alarm when interrupted. A passive sensor detects changes in thermal IR
radiation from objects located within its field of view.

(b) Active sensors consist of transmitter/receiver pairs. The transmitter

contains an IR light source such as a gallium arsenide light-emitting diode
(LED) that generates an IR beam. The light source is usually modulated
to reduce the sensor’s susceptibility to unwanted alarms resulting from
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
474 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

sunlight or other IR light sources. The receiver detects changes in the

signal power of the received beam. To minimize nuisance alarms from
birds or blowing debris, the alarm criteria usually require that a high
percentage of the beam be blocked for a specific interval of time.

(c) Active sensors can be single- or multiple-beam systems. Because single-

beam sensors can be easily bypassed, multiple-beam systems are
generally used in perimeter applications. There are two basic types of
multiple-beam configurations. One type uses all transmitters on one post
and all receivers on the other post; the second type uses one transmitter
and several receivers on each post. Both types are illustrated in Figure 8.

Figure 8: Typical IR-Sensor Beam Patterns

(d) The spacing between transmitters and receivers can be as great as

1,000 feet when operation is under good weather conditions. However,
conditions such as heavy rain, fog, snow, or blowing dust particles
attenuate the IR energy, reducing its effective range to 100 to 200 feet or
less.

12. Video Motion Sensors - Exterior

(a) A video motion sensor generates an alarm whenever an intruder enters a

selected portion of a CCTV camera’s field of view. The sensor processes
and compares successive images from the camera and generates an
alarm if differences between the images satisfy predefined criteria. Digital
devices convert selected portions of the analog video signal into digital
data that are compared with data converted previously; if differences
exceed preset limits, an alarm is generated.

(b) The signal processor usually provides an adjustable window that can be
positioned anywhere on the video image. Available adjustments permit
changing the window’s horizontal and vertical sizes, its position, and its
sensitivity. More sophisticated units provide several adjustable windows
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
475 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

that can be individually sized and positioned. Multiple windows permit

concentrating on several specific areas of an image while ignoring others.
For example, in a scene that contains several critical assets and multiple
sources of nuisance alarms (such as large bushes or trees), the sensor
can be adjusted to monitor only the assets and ignore the areas that
contain the nuisance alarm sources.

(c) The use of video motion-detection systems for exterior applications has
been limited, primarily because of difficulties with uncontrolled exterior
environments. Lighting variations caused by cloud movement and
shadows of slow-moving objects, birds and animals moving within the
camera’s field of view, camera motion and moving vegetation during windy
conditions, and severe weather conditions have traditionally caused a
multitude of unwanted alarms in this type of system. Systems using more
advanced signal-processing algorithms have improved motion-detection
capability and nuisance-alarm rejection; however, they are still subject to
high unwanted-alarm rates under certain conditions and should be used
with due caution and extreme care.

(d) For further information, see Appendix 8.12, CCTV.

VI. Interior Intrusion Detection Sensors

A. Planning

1. Interior intrusion-detection sensors are devices used to detect unauthorized entry

into specific areas or volumetric spaces within a building.

2. These sensors are usually not designed to be weatherproof or rugged enough

to survive an outdoor environment. Therefore, this type of sensor should not be
used outdoors unless described by the manufacturer as suitable for outdoor use.

3. Interior intrusion-detection sensors generally perform one of three detection

functions—detection of an intruder penetrating the boundary of a protected area,
detection of intruder motion within a protected area, and detection of an intruder
touching or lifting an asset within a protected area.

4. Interior sensors are commonly classified as boundary-penetration sensors,

volumetric motion sensors, and point sensors. Although duress switches are not
intrusion-detection sensors, they are included in this discussion because they are
usually wired to the same equipment that monitors the interior intrusion-detection
sensors.

B. Boundary Penetration Sensors

1. Boundary penetration sensors are designed to detect penetration or attempted

penetration through perimeter barriers. These barriers include walls, ceilings,

duct openings, doors, and windows.

C. Structural-Vibration Sensors

1. Structural-vibration sensors detect low-frequency energy generated in an

attempted penetration of a physical barrier (such as a wall or a ceiling) by
hammering, drilling, cutting, detonating explosives or employing other forcible
methods of entry. A piezoelectric transducer senses mechanical energy and
converts it into electrical signals proportional in magnitude to the vibrations.
To reduce false alarms from single accidental impacts on the barrier, most
vibration sensors use a signal processor that has an adjustable pulse-counting
accumulator in conjunction with a manual sensitivity adjustment. The count circuit
can be set to count a specific number of pulses of specific magnitude within a
predefined time interval before an alarm is generated. However, the circuitry is
usually designed to respond immediately to large pulses, such as those caused
by an explosion. The sensitivity adjustment is used to compensate for the type of
barrier and the distance between transducers. Typically, several transducers can
be connected together and monitored by one signal processor. Figure 9 shows
an example of wall-mounted, structural-vibration sensors.

D. Glass-Breakage Sensors

1. Glass-breakage sensors detect the breaking of glass. The noise from breaking
glass consists of frequencies in both the audible and ultrasonic range. Glass-
breakage sensors use microphone transducers to detect the glass breakage. The
sensors are designed to respond to specific frequencies only, thus minimizing
such false alarms as may be caused by banging on the glass.

E. Passive Ultrasonic Sensors

1. Passive ultrasonic sensors detect acoustical energy in the ultrasonic frequency

range, typically between 20-30 kilohertz (kHz). They are used to detect an
attempted penetration through rigid barriers (such as metal or masonry walls,
ceilings, and floors). They also detect penetration through windows and vents
covered by metal grilles, shutters, or bars if these openings are properly sealed
against outside sounds.

Figure 9: Wall-Mounted, Structural-Vibration Sensors

F. Detection Transducer

1. The detection transducer is a piezoelectric crystal that produces electrical

signals proportional to the magnitude of the vibrations. A single transducer
provides coverage of an area about 15 by 20 feet in a room with an 8- to 12-
foot ceiling. A typical detection pattern is shown in Figure 10. Ten or more
transducers can be connected to a signal processor. As with vibration sensors,
the signal processor for a passive ultrasonic sensor has manual sensitivity
adjustment and an adjustable pulse counting accumulator.

G. Ultrasonic Sensors

1. Passive ultrasonic sensors detect ultrasonic energy that results from the
breaking of glass, the snipping of bolt cutters on metal barriers, the hissing of
an acetylene torch, and the shattering of brittle materials (such as concrete
or cinderblock). However, the sensors will not reliably detect drilling through
most material nor attacks against soft material such as wallboard. Their
effective detection range depends largely on the barrier material, the method of
attempted penetration, and the sensitivity adjustment of the sensor. Examples of
maximum detection distances for a typical sensor for different types of attempted
penetration are shown in Table 1.

Figure 10: Typical Passive-Ultrasonic-Sensor Detection Pattern

Table 1: Max. Detection Distances for Typical Sensors

Penetration Distance (in Feet)
Cut ¼-inch-thick expanded metal with bolt cutters 55
Cut 5/8-inch reinforcing bar with bolt cutters 45
Use acetylene cutting torch 39
Cut wood with circular saw 30
Cut 5/8-inch reinforcing bar with hacksaw 19
Drill through brick 15
Drill through 1/8-inch steel plate 6
Cut 1/8-inch steel plate with hacksaw 4
Drill through cinderblock 3

H. Balanced Magnetic Switches

1. Balanced magnetic switches (BMS) are typically used to detect the opening of
a door. These sensors can also be used on windows, hatches, gates, or other
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
479 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

structural devices that can be opened to gain entry. When using a BMS, mount
the switch mechanism on the door frame and the actuating magnet on the door.
Typically, the BMS has a three-position reed switch and an additional magnet
(called the bias magnet) located adjacent to the switch. When the door is closed,
the reed switch is held in the balanced or center position by interacting magnetic
fields. If the door is opened or an external magnet is brought near the sensor in
an attempt to defeat it, the switch becomes unbalanced and generates an alarm.
A BMS must be mounted so that the magnet receives maximum movement
when the door or window is opened. Figure 11 shows several configurations for
mounting BMS.

I. Grid-Wire Sensors

1. The grid-wire sensor consists of a continuous electrical wire arranged in a

grid pattern. The wire maintains an electrical current. An alarm is generated
when the wire is broken. The sensor detects forced entry through walls, floors,
ceilings, doors, windows, and other barriers. An enamel-coated Number 24 or
26 American wire gauge (AWG) solid-copper wire typically forms the grid. The
grid’s maximum size is determined by the spacing between the wires, the wire’s
resistance, and the electrical characteristics of the source providing the current.
The grid wire can be installed directly on the barrier, in a grille or screen that is
mounted on the barrier, or over an opening that requires protection. The wire can
be stapled directly to barriers made of wood or wallboard. Wood panels should
be installed over the grid to protect it from day-to-day abuse and to conceal it.
When used on cinder, concrete, and masonry surfaces, these surfaces must first
be covered with plywood or other material to which the wire can be stapled. An
alternative method is to staple the wire grid to the back side of a panel and install
the panel over the surface.

Figure 11: BMS Mounting Configurations

J. Volumetric Motion Sensors

1. Volumetric motion sensors are designed to detect intruder motion within the
interior of a protected volume. Volumetric sensors may be active or passive.
Active sensors (such as microwave) fill the volume to be protected with an
energy pattern and recognize a disturbance in the pattern when anything
moves within the detection zone. Whereas active sensors generate their own
energy pattern to detect an intruder, passive sensors (such as IR) detect energy
generated by an intruder. Some sensors, known as dual technology sensors, use
a combination of two different technologies, usually one active and one passive,
within the same unit. If CCTV assessment or surveillance cameras are installed,
video motion sensors can be used to detect intruder movement within the area.
Since ultrasonic motion sensors are seldom used, they will not be discussed
here. See FM 3-19.30, Physical Security, for further information.

K. Microwave Motion Sensors

1. With microwave motion sensors, high-frequency electromagnetic energy is used

to detect an intruder’s motion within the protected area. Interior or sophisticated
microwave motion sensors are normally used.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
481 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

L. Interior Microwave Motion Sensors

1. Interior microwave motion sensors are typically monostatic; the transmitter and
the receiver are housed in the same enclosure (transceiver). They may each be
provided with a separate antenna or they may share a common antenna. The
high-frequency signals produced by the transmitter are usually generated by a
solid-state device, such as a gallium arsenide field-effect transistor. The power
generated is usually less than 10 milliwatts, but it is sufficient to transmit the
signal for distances up to about 100 feet. The shape of the transmitted beam is
a function of the antenna configuration. The range of the transmitted beam can
be controlled with a range adjustment. A variety of detection patterns can be
generated (see Figure 12). The frequency of the transmitted signal is compared
with the frequency of the signal reflected back from objects in the protected area.
If there is no movement within the area, the transmitted and received frequencies
will be equal and no alarm will be generated. Movement in the area will generate
a Doppler frequency shift in the reflected signal and will produce an alarm if the
signal satisfies the sensor’s alarm criteria. The Doppler shift for a human intruder
is typically between 20 and 120 hertz (Hz). Microwave energy can pass through
glass doors and windows as well as lightweight walls or partitions constructed of
plywood, plastic, or fiberboard.

2. As a result, false alarms are possible because of the reflection of the microwave
signals from the movement of people or vehicles outside of the protected area.
The designer can sometimes take advantage of this when the protected area is
large and contains a number of partitions.

Figure 12: Typical Detection Patterns for Microwave Motion Sensors

M. Sophisticated Microwave Motion Sensors

1. Sophisticated microwave motion sensors may be equipped with electronic range

gating. This feature allows the sensor to ignore the signals reflected beyond
the settable detection range. Range gating may be used to effectively minimize
unwanted alarms from activity outside the protected area.

N. PIR Motion Sensors

1. Passive Infrared (PIR) motion sensors detect a change in the thermal energy
pattern caused by a moving intruder and initiate an alarm when the change in
energy satisfies the detector’s alarm criteria. These sensors are passive devices
because they do not transmit energy; they monitor the energy radiated by the
surrounding environment.

2. All objects with temperatures above absolute zero radiate thermal energy. The
wavelengths of the IR energy spectrum lie between 1-1,000 microns. Because
the human body radiates thermal energy of between 7-14 microns, PIR motion
sensors are typically designed to operate in the far IR wavelength range of 4-20
microns.

3. The IR energy must be focused onto a sensing element, somewhat as a

camera lens focuses light onto a film. Two techniques are commonly used. One
technique uses reflective focusing; parabolic mirrors focus the energy. The other
uses an optical lens. Of the various types of optical lenses, Fresnel lenses are
preferred because they can achieve short focal lengths with minimal thickness.
Because IR energy is severely attenuated by glass, lenses are usually made of
plastic.

4. The sensor’s detection pattern is determined by the arrangement of lenses or

reflectors. The pattern is not continuous but consists of a number of rays or
fingers, one for each mirror or lens segment. Numerous detection patterns are
available, several of which are shown in Figure 13. The PIR is not provided with a
range adjustment, but the range can be adjusted somewhat by manipulating the
sensor’s position; therefore, careful selection of the appropriate detection pattern
is critical to proper sensor performance.

Figure 13 Typical Detection Patterns for a PIR Detector

5. Most manufacturers use a pyroelectric material as the thermal sensing element.

This material produces a change in electric charge when exposed to changes
in temperature. To minimize false alarms caused by changes in ambient
temperature, most manufacturers use a dual-element sensor. The sensing
element is split into halves, one that produces a positive voltage pulse and the
other a negative pulse when a change in temperature changes. An intruder
entering one of the detection fingers produces an imbalance between the two
halves, resulting in an alarm condition. Quad-element sensors that combine
and compare two dual-element sensors are also in use. Pulse-count activation,
a technique in which a predefined number of pulses within a specific interval of
time must be produced before an alarm is generated, is also used.

O. Dual-Technology Sensors

1. To minimize the generation of alarms caused by sources other than intruders,

dual-technology sensors combine two different technologies in one unit. Ideally,
this is achieved by combining two sensors that individually have a high DP and
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
484 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

do not respond to common sources of false alarms. Available dual-technology

sensors combine an active ultrasonic or microwave sensor with a PIR sensor. he
alarms from each sensor are logically combined in an “and” configuration; that
is, nearly simultaneous alarms from both active and passive sensors are needed
to produce a valid alarm. Although combined technology sensors have a lower
false-alarm rate than individual sensors, the DP is also reduced. For example, if
each individual sensor has a DP of 0.95, the DP of the combined sensors is the
product of individual probabilities (0.9).

2. Also, ultrasonic and microwave motion sensors have the highest probability
of detecting movement directly toward or away from the sensor, whereas PIR
motion sensors have the highest probability of detecting movement across the
detection pattern. Therefore, the DP of sensors combined in a single unit is less
than that obtainable if the individual sensors are mounted perpendicular to each
other with overlapping detection patterns. Because of the lower false alarm rate,
the reduced DP can be somewhat compensated for by increasing the sensitivity
or detection criteria of each individual sensor.

P. Interior Video Motion Sensors

1. A video motion sensor generates an alarm when an intruder enters a selected

portion of a CCTV camera’s field of view. The sensor processes and compares
successive images between the images against predefined alarm criteria.
There are two categories of video motion detectors—analog and digital. Analog
detectors generate an alarm in response to changes in a picture’s contrast.
Digital devices convert selected portions of the analog video signal into digital
data that are compared with data converted previously; if differences exceed
preset limits, an alarm is generated. The signal processor usually provides
an adjustable window that can be positioned anywhere on the video image.
Available adjustments permit changing horizontal and vertical window size,
window position, and window sensitivity. More sophisticated units provide several
adjustable windows that can be individually sized and positioned. Multiple
windows permit concentrating on several specific areas of an image while
ignoring others. For example, in a scene containing six doorways leading into
a long hallway, the sensor can be set to monitor only two critical doorways. For
further information, see Chapter 8.12, CCTV Systems

VII. Point Sensors

A. Planning

1. Point sensors are used to protect specific objects within a facility. These sensors
(sometimes referred to as proximity sensors) detect an intruder coming in close
proximity to, touching, or lifting an object. Several different types are available
including capacitance sensors, pressure mats, and pressure switches. Other
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
485 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

types of sensors can also be used for object protection.

B. Duress Alarm Devices

1. Duress-alarm devices may be fixed or portable. Operations and security

personnel use them to signal a life-threatening emergency. Activation of a duress
device will generate an alarm at the alarm-monitoring station. Because of the
nature of the alarm, duress devices should never annunciate at the point of
threat. These devices are customarily manually operated.

2. Fixed duress devices are mechanical switches permanently mounted in an

inconspicuous location, such as under a counter or desk. They can be simple
push-button switches activated by the touch of a finger or hand or foot operated
switches attached to the floor.

3. Portable duress devices are wireless units consisting of a transmitter and a

receiver. The transmitter is portable and small enough to be conveniently carried
by a person. The receiver is mounted in a fixed location within the facility. Either
ultrasonic or RF energy can be used as the communication medium. When
activated, the transmitter generates an alarm that is detected (within range) by
the receiver. The receiver then activates a relay that is hardwired to the alarm-
monitoring system.

C. Monitoring

1. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 provides the Secretary of Homeland

Security with the authority and responsibility to “protect the buildings, grounds,
and property that are owned, occupied, or secured by the Federal Government
(including any agency instrumentally or wholly owned or mixed-ownership
corporations thereof) and the persons on the property.” This responsibility
has been delegated to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Federal
Protective Service (FPS). As such, FPS also offers IDS monitoring and services
through GSA leases.

2. FPS has designed and built four Mega-Centers to provide monitoring and
related services. These centers are located in Suitland, Maryland; Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania; Battle Creek, Michigan; and Denver, Colorado. Among other tasks,
these centers monitor intrusion/duress alarm systems, fire detection systems,
environmental systems, and elevator emergency telephones for multi-regional
areas. In order to take full advantage of the Mega-Centers’ IDS monitoring
capabilities, FPS mandates that all installations and upgrades of the IDS in
both leased and government facilities are standardized on a national basis, are
fully compatible with the standardized alarm-receiving equipment existing in the
Mega-Centers, and are capable of being remotely programmed with software
from the approved panel manufacturers.

3. A national decision was made that FPS would only recommend and support
alarm systems that fully interfaced with the control center’s equipment and
software. Therefore, FPS requires that only remote-programmable alarm systems
are specified when designing or upgrading alarm systems that are monitored at
the Mega-Center. Additionally, all remote-programmable alarm systems must be
able to easily communicate with the Mega-Centers’ monitoring equipment.

4. Approved alarm panels must communicate via the Mega-Center’s alarm

receivers. The Mega-Centers can also accept most digital communicators for Fire
Detection Systems that transmit one of the standard formats. (communications
protocol): ADEMCO Contact ID, Radionics / Bosch Modem II, Modem IIE and
Modem IIIA or SIA.

5. All alarm systems/IDS must have tampered devices, cabinets, and junction
boxes. All devices will report as one point as a zone description that can be used
when reporting an alarm condition to the responding authority.

6. FPS cannot monitor any alarm system that does not fully comply with the above
referenced criteria. If a system does not meet these criteria, either the customer
or GSA shall assume the cost of commercial monitoring.

7. In order to ensure necessary standardization, full compatibility, and coordination

of effort, designs for all installations and upgrades of intrusion / duress alarm
systems must be coordinated with the serving Mega-Center.

8. All IDS shall be installed in accordance with UL Guidelines for Burglary Intrusion
Detection Systems. The Security System installer/vendor must properly complete
and communicate the FPS Mega-Center Alarm Requirements (MAR) Document
to the respective FPS Mega-Center. The MAR document includes the following
information:

(a) A record of the alarm account data

(b) A list of all devices and a sketch of the device locations

(c) The emergency telephone list

(d) User codes

(e) A test of the alarm panel and system

9. The Security System installer/vendor must have documented experience

installing IDS that are monitored by the Federal Protective Service or the United
States Federal government. The Security System installer/vendor is not to be
released of their contractual obligations until the CBP Office of Internal Affairs
Security Management Division identified personnel have received a minimum
of 4 hours training to properly operate, maintain, and troubleshoot the Intrusion
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
487 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

Detection System, and until the IDS system is 100% operational and being
actively monitored by the respective FPS Mega-Center.

10. The installed IDS shall be fully integrated with the Security Management System
and be capable of having all alarm situations simultaneously report to both the on
site Security Management System and the FPS Mega-Center.

11. FPS cannot monitor any alarm system that does not fully comply with the above
referenced criteria or does not have an active dedicated analog phone line for
each alarm panel installed. Therefore, it is imperative that there is no deviation
from the IDS requirements listed above.

VIII. System Validation Assessment for Emergency Responders (SAVER)

A. DHS has established the System Assessment and Validation for Emergency
Responders (SAVER) program to assist with procurement decisions. The SAVER
Program conducts unbiased operational tests on commercial equipment and
systems, and provides those results along with other relevant equipment information
to the community in an operationally useful form. SAVER provides information on
equipment that falls within the categories listed in the DHS Authorized Equipment
List (AEL).

B. Follow these steps to reach the SAVER Project Library Index.

1. Go to the Project Library Index link;

2. Scroll down to, and click on, “14 Physical Security Enhancement Equipment”;

3. Select “14SW Surveillance, Warning, Access Intrusion Control”;

4. Click on “14SW-01 General”;

5. Select “14SW-01-Sensors and Alarms, Alarms”;

6. Click on “14SW-01-IDS”; and

7. Chose the appropriate IDS assessment project document.

C. To request the complete IDS Handbook, follow this link to the SAVER Document
Request Form. Enter your e-mail address and choose the format for the document
(e-mail, mailed CD, or mailed hard copy). This link leads only to the request form
for the full IDS Handbook. To view the project highlights or assessment summary
documents, follow the instructions above.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BACK Return to Table of Contents

Appendix 8.10: Hold Rooms

RETURN TO TOP

WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
491 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

I. Hold Rooms
A. General

1. A hold room is a secure facility for the detention of aliens encountered and
processed by operational components of CBP.

2. The hold room is used for detainees and is located within the access-controlled
secure and violator processing area. All access control equipment will be HSPD-
12/FIPS 201 compliant systems and will only be installed by approved GSA
Schedule 70 vendors.

3. Hold rooms for detainees must be constructed to hardened construction

standards and must be situated in a secure area to ensure the safety of
both officers and the traveling public. Hold rooms should be co-located and
rectangular in shape with no dividing walls or partitions. All fixtures must meet
detention-grade standards.

4. Hold Rooms are located in the following CBP facilities:

(a) Border Patrol Stations

(b) Border Patrol Sector Headquarters

(c) Border Patrol Check Points

(d) District Offices

(e) Service Processing Centers

(f) Ports of Entry (Air, Land, Sea)

(g) Anti-Smuggling Units

(h) Staging and Alien Detention Removal Facilities

5. The nature and circumstances of detentions are governed by existing CBP policy,
including CBP Directives No. 3340-030 and 3340-030B:

6. Minimum square footage per occupant of hold rooms is determined by the

following method:

(a) 25 sq. ft of common space for wheelchair turnaround circulation as

required by ADA

(b) 5 sq. ft for toilet and lavatory fixtures

RETURN TO TOP

WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
492 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

(c) 7 sq. ft of unencumbered for each detainee (Unencumbered is usable

space that is not encumbered by fixtures or furnishings)

(d) A single occupant hold room for detainees is therefore a minimum of 37

Sq. ft. Multiple occupancy rooms shall be 37 Sq. ft for the first occupant
and 7 sq. ft of unencumbered space for each additional occupant.

7. Other space related requirements include:

(a) 1 toilet per 15 detainees

(b) Males and females must be kept in separate hold rooms (including
juveniles)

(c) Young children must remain with their mothers

8. Associated spaces include:

(a) Interview Rooms must be located adjacent to the hold rooms, and either
within or outside a secure perimeter zone. They must be under 24X7
surveillance and detainees are required to be secured with handcuffs. If
located within the violator processing area, the interview room must have
the same construction criteria as the hold room. Asylum seekers must be
placed in a separate interview room.

(b) Search Rooms must be located adjacent to hold rooms within a secure
perimeter zone. It has the same specifications as a hold room, except
there are no windows, toilets and floor drains.

(c) Alien Property Storage Rooms must be located within a security perimeter,
securely constructed for high attack resistance and they require a door
lock and an Intrusion Detection System.

9. ADA and Toilet Facilities

(a) The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) requires that public and
common use toilet facilities must be accessible to the disabled. The
following provisions apply to hold rooms:

●● Hold rooms shall be ADA-Compliant.

●● A grab bar must be installed inside the toilet stall designated for the
disabled.

●● The toilet stall and toilet fixture must have the proper dimensions.

●● Where an independent drinking fountain or lavatory is indicated, the

RETURN TO TOP

WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
493 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

top must have the proper height from the floor.

B. Physical Security Requirements of a Hold Room

1. In general, all hold rooms must have the following requirements:

(a) Located within a security perimeter

(b) Securely constructed for high attack resistance

(c) Minimum space as defined above

(d) No beds; a hold room is not designed for sleeping

(e) Furniture must be of solid construction and secure to wall or floor

2. According to the Service Processing Center Detention Construction Standards

(SPC Detention Construction Standards, Dated 01 November 2004), hold rooms
are classified as having a Medium Security Level.

C. “Medium” security walls shall be constructed using one of the following methods:

1. Concrete masonry unit walls shall be a minimum nominal 8” (200 mm) wide units
reinforced with #4 (No. 13 metric) vertical reinforcing bar at 16” (400 mm) on
center. All cells of concrete masonry units shall be fully grouted with 3,000 psi (21
Mpa) grout.

2. Pre-cast concrete panel walls shall be a minimum nominal 4” (100 mm)

wide, minimum strength of 5,000 psi (35 Mpa) and reinforced with minimum
W4 (MW26) welded wire fabric at 4” (100 mm) on center in both directions,
conforming to ASTM A185.

3. Cast-in-place concrete walls shall be a minimum 6” (150 mm) wide, minimum

strength of 3,000 psi (21 Mpa) reinforced with #4 (No. 13 metric) reinforcing
bars at 8” (200 mm) on center in one direction. Cast-in-place concrete walls that
are less than 6” (150 mm) wide, but no less than 4” (100 mm) wide shall have a
minimum strength of 5,000 psi (35 Mpa) reinforced with W4 (MW26) welded wire
fabric at 4” (100 mm) on center in both directions.

4. Steel wall panels shall be 0.093 in. (12-gauge) minimum thickness A-60
galvanneal steel conforming to ASTM A 653-CS requirements. All structural
or stiffening members shall be 0.058 in. (16-gauge) minimum thickness A-60
galvanneal steel conforming to ASTM A 653-LFQ requirements. All structural
tubing stall be 0.115 in. (11-gauge) minimum thickness steel conforming to ASTM
A 653-CS and ASTM A-525, G-90 galvanized requirements.

RETURN TO TOP

WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
494 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

D. “Medium” security roof/ceiling construction shall be constructed of the following:

1. Cast-in-place concrete slabs shall be a minimum of 6” (150 mm) thick, 3,000 psi
(21 Mpa) concrete with #4 (No. 13 metric) reinforcing bars at 16” (400 mm) on
center in one direction. Cast-in-place concrete slabs that are less than 6” (150
mm) thick, but no less than 4” (100 mm) thick shall have a minimum strength of
5,000 psi (35 Mpa) reinforced with W4 (MW26) welded wire fabric at 4” (100 mm)
on center in both directions.

2. Composite metal ceiling shall be a minimum of 4” (100 mm) total depth, 3,000
psi (21 Mpa) concrete, #4 (No. 13 metric) bars 16” (400 mm) on center in one
direction.

3. Prestressed concrete tees or hollow core slabs shall have a concrete topping to
give adequate cover for #4 (No. 13 metric) bars 16” (400 mm) on center in one
direction.

4. Solid concrete planks shall have #4 (No. 13 metric) reinforcing bars at 16” (400
mm) on center in one direction. No concrete topping is required.

5. Metal acoustical ceiling panel shall be maximum security double skin metal
0.125” (3.2 mm) thick with perforations.

6. Metal roof ceilings shall be a minimum of 12-gauge. No additional reinforcing

is required, however the ceiling must be securely tied to the “medium” security
walls.

RETURN TO TOP

WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
495 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

II. LAYOUT

RETURN TO TOP

WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
496 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

RETURN TO TOP

WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
497 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

III. Intersections of Horizontal and Vertical Surfaces

A. Continuity of materials is preferred to facilitate a continuous security enclosure.
Where dissimilar materials occur, provide sufficient connections to prevent deflection
of materials; or continuously weld ceiling to a steel member anchored to wall or
foundation.

B. Security bars must be continuous at all intersections; the bars must go around the
corners and continue into adjacent slabs or secure ceiling construction. When this
cannot be accomplished, a continuous #4 (No. 13 metric) reinforcing bar shall be
cast no more than 1 ½” (38 mm) from the edge of the concrete unit where it meets
other concrete or masonry members. These requirements must be coordinated with
masonry horizontal reinforcing, and dissimilar concrete materials; i.e. masonry and
cast-in-place concrete.

1. Penetrations

(a) Security barriers are required on all penetrations in “high” and “medium”
secure walls, floors, and ceilings where opening is larger than 8” x 8”
(200 mm x 200 mm) or larger than 5” (125 mm) slit. Security barriers are
required on all penetrations 5” (125 mm) wide which exceed 24” (600 mm)
in length.

(b) Security barriers shall be constructed of 7/8” (22 mm) diameter round bars
or 2” x 2” x ¼” (50 mm x 50 mm x 6 mm) structural steel tubing. Space
between bars or tubing shall not exceed 5” (125 mm). Bars longer than
24” (600 mm) shall be reinforced with an intermediate flat bar, 2 ½” x 3/8”
(63.5 mm x 9.5 mm), welded to the barrier frame and tack welded to each
bar. The flat stock is installed perpendicular to the bars and at the midpoint
of the bars to prevent spreading.

(c) Bars on security barriers at central control or housing control must be

horizontal (to provide visibility). Bars on all other security barriers must be
vertical. Bars on security barriers at central control or housing control are
not required to have an intermediate reinforcement at 24” (600 mm).

2. Windows

(a) The preferred location for hold rooms is an interior space without an
exterior window.

(b) Maximum size required to view detainees for suicide prevention,

vandalism and other behaviors. Tinting is allowed with adjustable light
levels to control visibility.

(c) Glazing must be all polycarbonate laminates, glass clad polycarbonates,

RETURN TO TOP

WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
498 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

or all glass laminates in accordance with local building codes.

3. Doors and Frames

(a) Door frames shall be fabricated from a minimum of 12 or 14-gauge welded

steel and have an integral stop and trim. All corners shall be mitered and
welded. Fabricate with concealed stiffeners, reinforcement, and edge
channels.

(b) All exposed fasteners shall have countersunk, vandal-proof heads. Three
silencers on strike jamb of frame and three wall anchors per jamb at hinge
and strike levels.

(c) Door width – 3 feet 2inches for masonry opening. The door must be
detention hollow metal 2 inches thick in flush panel design. It must be
mortised, reinforced, drilled, and tapped to receive mortise hardware.
Provide institutional, full mortise hinges with tamper-resistant fasteners
and non-removable pins. Provide four hinges for doors 85 inches or more
tall and 37 inches wide.

(d) Doors and frames must have a factory-applied rust-inhibitive primer.

(e) Vision panel should be polycarbonate laminate, glass-clad polycarbonate

or glass laminate. The dimensions should be 4 feet x 10 inches, either
square centered or rectangle off-center. Secure glazing stop with tamper-
resistant screws.

(f) Doors should swing out of hold room and a door pull should be placed on
the door face outside the hold room.

(g) Access doors located inside the hold room must meet the security
requirements of the trades needing access to concealed equipment.
Provide 2 inch exposed flange around the perimeter frames installed in
masonry and finished frames with adjustable metal masonry anchors.
Install a concealed piano hinge set to open 175 degrees. Furnish two keys
per lock. Standard access doors may be used when located outside the
hold room.

4. Door Hardware

(a) Detention –type hardware is required, as indicated below. Finish of visible

parts must match finish of other building hardware.

(b) Hinges: 41/2” X 41/2”, minimum 3 per door, heavy duty ball bearing type
with tamper-resistant screws and non-removable pins.

RETURN TO TOP

WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
499 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

(d) Door Pull: Raised pull on outside of door. Pushplate not required on inside
face.

(e) Door Stops/Wall Bumpers: Dome type 13/8” high or as required to meet
applicable conditions.

(f) Door Closers: No closers or self-closing hinges on hold rooms. Closers

are required on doors to a secure perimeter.

(g) Additional information about specifications for Electro-Mechanical Locks

can be found in the following UL Listings: UL1034 listed as Burglary-
Resistant Mechanisms, and UL10B listed as Fire Door Accessories.

IV. Plumbing
A. General

1. When possible, all plumbing fixtures shall be wall-mounted and securely fastened
from the rear. This requires an accessible pipe chase in the back of the fixture.
Valves and flow controls must be accessible to provide service from the pipe
chase without disturbing the connecting piping. Install water service valve in all
water lines (hot and cold) to the fixture. Each water closet of each back-to-back
pair of water closets shall be provided with an accessible cleanout.

2. Hot water supply to lavatories shall be thermostatically remote controlled to limit

water temperature to 110 degrees Fahrenheit.

3. All fixtures must be totally vandal-proof. There can be no attachments to the wall
that can be fashioned into weapons.

4. Hold room plumbing requirements shall be coordinated with the building

plumbing system, including supply, waste, and vent piping.

5. Drainage from hold rooms shall be isolated from that of other areas until passing
through a trash trap.

B. Plumbing Design and Fixture Selection

1. Stainless Steel Combination Water Closet/Lavatory Unit

RETURN TO TOP

WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
500 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

(a) Within holding rooms a combination water closet and lavatory units shall
be a minimum of 12 or 14-gauge, Type 304 stainless steel with satin finish.
Construction shall be welded with no seams.

(b) Toilet shall be blowout jet type with an elongated bowl, self-draining
flushing rim, and an integral contoured seat with a sanitary high polish
finish.

(d) Lavatory shall have pneumatically operated, push-button valve. A roof

mounted penal bubbler shall be provided. Integral recessed toilet paper
holder shall be provided. Fixture shall withstand 3,000 lb. loadings without
permanent damage.

(e) Where required for handicapped accessibility, special ADA units may
be used or separate stainless steel fixtures. Where these fixtures are
replacing existing toilets, most manufacturers produce “replacement”
fixtures which allow the use of custom floor outlet locations.

2. Stainless Steel Water Closet

(a) Within holding rooms where combination units are not used, water closets
shall be a minimum of 12 or 14-gauge, Type 304 stainless steel with satin
finish. Construction shall be seamless welded.

(b) Toilet shall be blowout jet type with an elongated bowl, self-draining
flushing rim, and an integral contoured seat with a sanitary high polish
finish.

(d) Flush valve shall be concealed and serviced from the rear. Where these
fixtures are replacing existing toilets, most manufacturers produce
“replacement” fixtures which allow the use of custom floor outlet locations.

3. Stainless Steel Lavatory

(a) Within holding rooms where combination units are not used, lavatories
shall be 14-gauge, Type 304 stainless steel and ADA compliant.

(b) Lavatory shall be wall hung and totally enclosed.

(c) Countertop shall have an air-circulating, self-draining soap dish. A

separate ceiling mounted bubbler shall be provided with separate push
RETURN TO TOP

WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
501 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

button for drinking water.

(d) Pneumatic or electronic push button controls shall be used and mounted
at ADA compliant height. Where these fixtures are replacing existing
lavatories, most manufacturers produce “replacement” fixtures which allow
the use of custom drain outlet locations.

4. Floor Drains

(a) Floor drains shall be cast iron with bronze grates and vandal resistant
fasteners. Floor drains shall be not less than 4 inches in diameter.

(b) The trap shall be equipped with a trap primer.

(d) The floor surface shall slope in all directions toward the floor drain.

(e) The screws holding the cover shall be ground down and filled with lead.

5. Hose Bibbs

(a) Provide a recessed, stainless steel hose bibb box with a locking cover,
outside the hold room for routine cleaning of the floor.

6. Security Mirrors

(a) Mirrors shall be 20 gauge chrome-plated steel with 1/2 inch thick
fiberboard backing.

(b) Frame shall be seamless 14-gauge , Type 304 stainless steel.

7. Sprinkler System

(a) Sprinkler heads in hold rooms shall be coordinated with the building
sprinkler system.

(b) The hold room system shall be isolated from the building system with a
shut off valve, clearly labeled, serving the hold room zone.

(c) Sprinkler heads designed specifically for detention facilities shall be

specified.

8. Liquid Soap System

RETURN TO TOP

WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
502 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

(a) A centralized, pressurized liquid soap system designed for correctional

use shall be used.

V. Mechanical Systems
A. Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning

1. Registers and grilles shall be designed and constructed specifically for use in
correction and detention facilities. The face shall be fabricated using cold rolled
steel, 3/16” thick steel face with 5/16” diameter holes on 7/16” staggered centers.
A 3/16” thick steel sleeve shall be stitch welded to the face and along the entire
length of all sleeve seams. All shall meet or exceed ANSI or ASTM Standard
Specifications for Detention Area Use.

2. Provide barrier grilles within all ducts penetrations in walls of hold rooms where
one dimension is larger than 5” (125 mm) and the other dimension is larger than
8” (200 mm). Barrier grilles shall also be placed within all ductwork to and from
rooftop air handling equipment.

VI. Electrical
A. General

1. The electrical system required for hold rooms shall be coordinated with the
building’s electrical system. The following will be the basis for the electrical
system design:

(a) Use only tamper resistant detention-type fluorescent light fixtures.

(b) Light fixtures are to be controlled from outside the hold rooms with a high-
security key-operated switch.

(d) Light fixtures shall have emergency power backup

B. Lighting

1. Hold Rooms must have maximum-security type ceiling surface mounted light
fixtures. They are described below:

(a) Housing, back, and door shall be 14-gauge steel with continuous exterior
welds that are ground smooth and reinforced at the corners. The housing
shall have a continuous steel piano hinge spot-welded and bolted to door
frame for hinged door or spot welded to housing and back for hinged
RETURN TO TOP

WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
503 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

housing. The hinge pin shall be welded to hinge to prevent removal. Grind
all welds smooth. Outer lens shall be 0.375” clear polycarbonate backed
with an inner lens of 0.125” prismatic polycarbonate. Lens retention to
be by means of continuous 14 gauge L-angle along lens for length of
lens opening. The inside and outside of housing shall be white polyester
powder paint, 1.4 to 1.7 mil thick, with minimum reflectance of 85%. Cell
illumination level is to be a minimum of 215 lux (20 foot candle) throughout
the entire cell area. Particular attention shall be given to providing the 215-
lux illumination level at the desk level and in the personal grooming area.

VII. Power
1. Emergency Generation

(a) Emergency power shall be derived from a 480/277 volt, 3-phase, 4-wire
diesel engine driven generator sent sized to carry the required loads,
along with a second, equally-sized generator for back-up.

(b) The generators shall serve distribution panel boards in the main electrical
room through a 4-pole automatic transfer switch (ATS). This emergency
system shall provide power for the life safety/security systems and other
essential loads upon failure of the normal electrical power service for a
minimum of 72 hours continuous operation prior to re-fueling.

(c) Emergency generators shall be located outside the secure perimeter.

Items that must be on the emergency generator include:

●● Security equipment

●● Emergency lighting

●● Alarm systems

●● Communications equipment

●● Computer database (UPS system)

●● Ventilation and heating system to maintain habitable conditions during

emergency periods

●● Essential food service equipment to allow continued operation during

emergency periods

2. Uninterruptible Power Supply

RETURN TO TOP

WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
504 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

(a) Uninterruptible power supplies (UPS) shall be provided for all security
system components. The UPS shall be sized to provide backup power
for the full load of the security system for a minimum period of ten (10)
minutes.

(b) This system is designed to handle all security systems in the event of a
primary power loss until such time as the emergency generator takes over.

3. Power Outlets

(a) Electrical outlets shall not be provided in areas generally accessible to

groups of detainees. Holding rooms shall not have electrical or special
systems outlets (except for group holding cells equipped with TV in a
security enclosure where the outlet will not be exposed to the detainee).

(b) For cleaning and other activities, cords can be run in from the corridors.

4. Lighting Protection/Surge Protection

(a) All communication, video, and data equipment shall be protected against
surges induced on all control, communication, video, sensor and data
cables.

(b) All cables and conductors that serve as control, audio, video, sensor or
data conductors that leave the building (including devices mounted on
building exterior) shall have surge protection circuits. Fuses shall not be
used for surge protection.

(c) All systems and components shall be equipped with lightning protection
devices. Lighting protection system shall be designed to meet the
requirements of NFPA 780.

5. Community Antenna Television (CATV) System

(a) A complete CATV system shall be provided, which will include all devices,
cable, splitters, line taps, equipment, and conduit from each CATV outlet
to the location of the CATV interior backboard with extension of conduit
to location of satellite dish. CATV system shall be star typology with each
outlet connected to head-end equipment with the drop cable. System
shall provide high quality TV signals to all outlets with a return path for
interactive television and cable modem access. Downstream bandwidth
shall be 50 – 750 MHz minimum. Upstream bandwidth shall be 5 – 40
MHz minimum.

(b) Each termination for a TV receiver must have a minimum signal level of
0 decibel millivolts (dBmV) (1000 microvolt) at 55 MHz and 0 dBmV (100
RETURN TO TOP

WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
505 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

microvolt) at 750 MHz and a maximum signal of 15 dBmV or a level not to

overload the receiver for the entire system bandwidth.

6. Additional Electrical Items

(a) Provide electric power for door locks, where required by design, by
extending a conduit from the control room through the hold room ceiling,
extending to a point above the door. Locks must be on battery backup
emergency power and emergency generator power.

(b) Provide panic buttons in hold rooms with a disable high-security key
or switch from outside the hold rooms. The button should be a large
mushroom design.

VIII. ELECTRONIC SECURITY

A. General Requirements

1. The electronic security system shall be a completely integrated system which

coordinates with gate operators, electric locks and other detention hardware,
detention equipment, fire alarms, and provides electronic door controls, video
touch screen controls, intercom and paging, video surveillance/CCTV, staff
duress system, and perimeter alarm system.

2. Due to the critical nature of these facilities, contractors who perform the
electronic security work must be pre-qualified to meet requirements such as:

(a) Relevant experience in similar projects

(b) Company financial soundness

(c) Payment and performance bondable

(d) Relevant experience of assigned key personnel

3. Security electronic equipment must be coordinated with detention equipment,

including but not limited to: security fasteners, security access panels, electric
locks.

4. Prior to final acceptance of the systems, the electronic security contractor shall
provide evidence of system tests, complete documentation manuals, and shall
conduct training in the use of the systems.

B. CCTV: Fixed CCTV camera with motion detection capability, detention grade
housing and wide-angle lens. Connect to monitor at secondary waiting / processing
counter or in secondary supervisor’s office (if included) or other CBP designated
RETURN TO TOP

WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
506 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

location. Position the camera to observe activity in room, but not degrade privacy
afforded by toilet area modesty screen. Do not mount over fixtures in room.

C. Duress System: Provide detention grade duress alarm button interior side adjacent
to entry door with keyed reset / disable control outside of room. Connect to CCC
(CBP Coordination Center) and / or other CBP designated locations as required.

D. Access Control: See Section II.B.3, Doors and Frames for access requirements.

E. For large detention facilities, refer to the Technical Specifications, Section 13800
of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Processing Center Detention
Construction Standards, dated 01 November 2004.

F. The following Legacy Documents were used to develop this Appendix:

1. INS Hold Room Construction Standards 1999

2. U.S. Customs and Border Protection Airport Technical Design Standards 2006

3. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Service Processing Center

Detention Construction Standards (SPC-Detention Construction Stds. 2004)

RETURN TO TOP

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BACK Return to Table of Contents

Appendix 8.12: Closed Circuit Television (CCTV)

I. General
A. The CCTV system is a core subsystem of an overall Electronic Security System
(ESS). It is the collection of cameras, recorders, switches, keyboards, and monitors
that allow viewing and recording of security events. The CCTV system is normally
integrated into the overall ESS and centrally monitored at the Dispatch Center.
Uses of CCTV systems for security services include several different functions as
described below.

1. Surveillance

(a) CCTV cameras can be used to give a viewer the capability to be made
aware of or view visual events at multiple locations from a centralized
remote viewing area. CCTV camera technology makes visual information
available that would normally only be available through multiple (possibly
roving) human resources.

2. Assessment

(a) When alerted by an alarm notification, CCTV cameras allow Dispatch

Center operators or other viewers to assess the situation and make a
determination as to what type of response may or may not be required.
An example would be an intrusion alarm at a remote facility. Visual
assessment and other confirmation may indicate an unannounced
maintenance crew at work. Symptoms of intrusion would lead to a
response.

3. Deterrence

(a) While more effective against unsophisticated burglars as opposed to

trained covert agents, CCTV cameras may deter burglary, vandalism, or
intrusion due to fear of discovery and prosecution.

4. Evidentiary Archives

5. Retrieval of archived images may be helpful in identification or prosecution of

trespassers, vandals, or other intruders.

6. Facial Recognition

(a) Cameras can be used for biometric facial recognition as discussed in

Chapter 11.

7. Intrusion Detection

(a) CCTV cameras when employed with video content analysis or motion path
analysis software and equipment are increasingly being used as a means
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
510 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

for intrusion detection as discussed in Chapter 11, Access to Facilities.

Figure 1: CCTV System

II. System Overall Requirements

A. Requirements

1. Major components of the CCTV system must be capable of full color

transmission, although day/night cameras are commonly utilized in areas
requiring light sensitivity. Pan, tilt, zoom (PTZ) cameras are to be utilized to
supplement fixed cameras, permitting more accurate coverage in critical areas.
All camera views associated with an alarm must be automatically recorded.
A color monitor and high resolution DVR with a minimum 30 day recording
capability must be employed to store video footage; the DVR shall also be
capable of playing back any camera view Cameras in hold rooms and interview
rooms will have detention-grade housings and, to deter tampering, cannot be
mounted over fixtures in the rooms. CCTV cameras will not be installed in search
rooms. Questions or concerns about the adequacy of an existing or proposed
CCTV system or component should be addressed to CBP/IA/SMD at cbp.
[email protected];

2. The system, including all components and appurtenances, shall be configured

and installed to yield a mean-time-between-failure (MTBF) of at least 10,000
hours, and shall be calculated based on the configuration specified in the section
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
512 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

titled “Overall System Reliability Calculations.”

B. Power Line Surge Protection

1. Requirements

(a) All equipment connected to AC power shall be protected from surges.

Equipment protection shall withstand surge test waveforms described in
IEEE C62.41.1 and IEEE C62.41.2. Fuses shall not be used for surge
protection.

C. Video Line Surge Protection

1. Requirements

(a) All cable, except fiber optic cable, used for sync or video signal
transmission shall include protective devices to safeguard the CCTV
equipment against surges. The surge suppression device shall not
attenuate or reduce the video or sync signal under normal conditions.
The surge suppression device shall be capable of dissipating not less
than 1500 watts for 1 millisecond, and the response time from zero volts
to clamping shall not be greater than 5 nanoseconds. Fuses shall not be
used for surge protection.

D. Control Line Surge Protection

1. Requirements

(a) All cables and conductors, except fiber optic cables, which serve as
communication, control, or signal lines shall be protected against surges
and shall have surge protection installed at each end. Protection shall
be furnished at the equipment and additional triple electrode gas surge
protectors rated for the application on each wire line circuit shall be
installed within 1 m 3 feet of the building cable entrance. Fuses shall not
be used for surge protection.

E. Power Line Conditioners

1. Requirements

(a) A power line conditioner shall be furnished for the security console CCTV
equipment. The power line conditioner used for the CCTV equipment
shall be the same one as provided for Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
ESS. The power line conditioner shall be of the ferro-resonant design,

with no moving parts and no tap switching, while electrically isolating

the secondary from the power line side. The power line conditioner shall
be sized for no less than 125 percent of the actual connected kVA load.
Characteristics of the power line conditioner shall be as follows:

●● At 85-percent load, the output voltage shall not deviate by more than
plus or minus 1 percent of nominal when the input voltage fluctuates
between minus 20 percent to plus 10 percent of nominal;

●● During load changes of zero to full load, the output voltage shall
not deviate by more than plus or minus 3 percent of nominal. Full
correction of load switching disturbances shall be accomplished within
5 cycles, and 95 percent correction shall be accomplished within 2
cycles of the onset of the disturbance.

F. Environmental Conditions

1. Field Equipment

(a) The cameras and all other field equipment shall be rated for continuous
operation under ambient environmental conditions of minus 10.0 to 55
degrees C 14 to 120 degrees F using no auxiliary heating or cooling
equipment. Equipment shall be rated for continuous operation under the
ambient environmental temperature, humidity, wind loading, ice loading,
and vibration conditions specified or encountered for the installed location.

2. Security Center Equipment

(a) The Security Center and remote control/monitoring station equipment

shall, unless designated otherwise, be rated for continuous operation
under ambient environmental conditions of 15.6 to 29.4 degrees C 60 to
85 degrees F and a relative humidity of 20 to 80 percent.

3. Hazardous Environment

(a) All system components located in areas designated “Hazardous

Environment,” where fire or explosion hazards may exist because of
flammable gases or vapors, flammable liquids, combustible dust, or
ignitable fibers or flyings, shall be rated Class II, Division I, Group F, and
installed according to Chapter 5 of the NFPA 70 .

4. Electrical Requirements

(a) Electrically powered IDS equipment shall operate on 120- or 240-volt

[60] [50] Hz AC sources as shown. Equipment shall be able to tolerate

variations in the voltage source of plus or minus 10 percent, and variations

in the line frequency of plus or minus 2 percent with no degradation of
performance.

5. Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS)

(a) All electrical and electronic equipment in the console shall be powered
from an UPS provided as specified in Section 26 32 33.00 10
Uninterruptible Power Supply (Ups) System Above 15 Kva Capacity. The
UPS shall be sized to provide at least 6 hours battery back-up in the event
of primary failure. Batteries will be of the sealed non-gassing type.
NOTE: All Security equipment will connect to the emergency backup generator.

See UFGS 26 32 33.00 10 (October 2007)

III. Technical Data Package (System Documentation)

A. The contractor shall supply a CCTV system data package. The data package shall
include the following:

B. Manufacturers’ Data

1. The data package shall include manufacturers’ data for all materials and
equipment and security center equipment provided.

C. System Description and Analyses

1. The data package shall include complete system descriptions, analyses and
calculations used in sizing the equipment required. Descriptions and calculations
shall show how the equipment will operate as a system to meet the performance.
The data package shall include the following:

(a) Switcher matrix size;

(b) Camera call-up response time;

(c) System start up and shutdown operations;

(d) Switcher programming instructions;

(e) Switcher operating and maintenance instructions;

(f) Manuals for CCTV equipment; and

(g) Data entry forms.

D. Software Data
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
515 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

(a) The data package shall consist of descriptions of the operation and
capability of system and application software as specified.

E. Overall System Reliability Calculations

1. The data package shall include all manufacturer’s reliability data and calculations
required to show compliance with the specified reliability. The calculations shall
be based on all CCTV equipment associated with one camera circuit and the
console CCTV equipment, excluding the data transmission media (DTM).

F. Certifications

1. All specified manufacturer’s certifications shall be included with the data

package. This includes the IT Certification and Accreditations (C&A) via DHS
4300-A and B).

G. Site Conditions

1. The project security consultant shall verify that site conditions are in agreement
with the design package. The CBP project manager shall submit redline
drawings/report to the project security consultants documenting changes to the
site, or conditions that affect performance of the system to be installed. For those
changes or conditions which affect system installation or performance, provide
(with the report) specification sheets, or written functional requirements to
support the findings, and a cost estimate to correct the deficiency.

H. Operation and Maintenance Manuals

1. A draft copy of the operation and maintenance manuals shall be delivered to the
Government prior to beginning the performance verification test for use during
site testing.

I. Data Entry

1. The contractor shall enter all data needed to make the system operational;

2. The contractor shall deliver the data to the Government on data entry forms,
utilizing data from the contract documents, Contractor’s field surveys, and all
other pertinent information in the contractor’s possession required for complete
installation of the data base. The contractor shall identify and request from the
Government, any additional data needed to provide a complete and operational
CCTV system. The completed forms shall be delivered to the Government for
review and approval at least 90 days prior to the contractor’s scheduled need
date.

J. Graphics

The contractor shall create and install all required graphics needed to make the system
operational. Graphics shall have sufficient level of detail for the system operator to assess the
alarm. The contractor shall supply hard copy, color examples at least 8-by-10 inches in size,
of each type of graphic to be used for the completed CCTV system. If the video switcher does
not use a monitor for display of system information, the contractor shall provide examples of
the video annotation used for camera identification. The graphics examples shall be delivered
to the Government for review and approval at least 90 days prior to the contractor’s scheduled
need date.
K. Technical Data Package

1. Final copies of each of the manufacturer’s commercial manuals arranged as

specified bound in hardback, loose-leaf binders and as electronic data, shall
be delivered to the Government within 30 days after completing the endurance
test. The draft copy used during site testing shall be updated prior to final
delivery of the manuals. Each manual’s contents shall be identified on the
cover. The manual shall include names, addresses, and telephone numbers
of each subcontractor installing equipment and systems, and nearest service
representatives for each item of equipment for each system. The manuals
shall have a table of contents and tab sheets. Tab sheets shall be placed at the
beginning of each chapter or section and at the beginning of each appendix.
The final copies delivered after completion of the endurance test shall include all
modifications made during installation, checkout, and acceptance. The number of
copies of each manual to be delivered shall be as specified in writing.

L. Functional Design Manual

1. The functional design manual shall identify the operational requirements for
the system and explain the theory of operation, design philosophy, and specific
functions. A description of hardware and software functions, interfaces, and
requirements shall be included for all system operating modes.

M. Hardware Manual

1. The manual shall describe all equipment furnished, including:

(a) General hardware description and specifications;

(b) Installation and checkout procedures;

(c) Equipment electrical schematics and layout drawings;

(d) System schematics and wiring lists;

(e) System setup procedures;

(f) Manufacturer’s repair parts list indicating sources of supply; and

(g) Interface definition.

N. Software Manual

1. The software manual shall describe the functions of all software, and shall
include all other information necessary to enable proper loading, testing and
operation, including:

(a) Definitions of terms and functions;

(b) Procedures for system boot-up;

(c) Description of using the programs;

(d) Description of required operational sequences;

(e) Directory of all disk files; and

(f) Description of all communications protocols, including data formats,

command characters, and a sample of each type of data transfer.

2. Operator’s Manual

(a) The operator’s manual shall explain all procedures and instructions for
operation of the system including:

(b) Video switcher;

(c) Video multiplexer;

(d) Cameras and video recording equipment;

(e) Use of the software;

(f) Operator commands;

(g) System start-up and shut-down procedures; and

(h) Recovery and restart procedures.

O. Maintenance Manual

1. The maintenance manual shall describe maintenance for all equipment including
inspection, periodic preventive maintenance, fault diagnosis, and repair or
replacement of defective components.

P. As-Built Drawings

1. The contractor shall maintain a separate set of drawings, elementary diagrams,

and wiring diagrams of the CCTV system to be used for as-built drawings. This
set shall be accurately updated by the contractor with all changes and additions
to the CCTV system and shall be delivered to the Government with the final
endurance test report. In addition to being complete and accurate, this set of
drawings shall be kept neat and shall not be used for installation purposes.
Upon completion of the final system drawings, the project security consultants
will review the final system work with the contractor. If the final system work
is not complete, the contractor will be so advised and shall complete the work
as required. Final drawings submitted with the endurance test report shall be
finished drawings on Mylar or vellum, and created using AutoCAD.

IV. Testing and Training

A. Group IV Technical Data Package ---Systems Acceptance Test (SAT)

1. The contractor shall perform pre-delivery testing, site testing, and adjustment
of the completed CCTV system. The contractor shall provide all personnel,
equipment, instrumentation, and supplies necessary to perform all testing.

(a) Written notification of planned testing shall be given to the project security
consultants at least 14 days prior to the test and in no case shall notice be
given until after the contractor has received written approval of the specific
test procedures.

2. Test Procedures and Reports

(a) Test procedures shall explain, in detail, step-by-step actions and expected
results demonstrating compliance with the requirements. Test reports shall
be used to document results of the tests. Reports shall be delivered to the
Government within 7 days after completion of each test.

B. Training

1. The contractor will conduct training courses for designated personnel in the
maintenance and operation of the procured CCTV system as specified in the
procurement contract and in the “owners” manual.

(a) The training will be oriented to the specific system procured and installed
under the contract;

(b) Training manuals will be delivered for each trainee, along with three
additional manuals delivered: two (2) manuals for archiving at the project
site and one (1) manual for the procurement office;

(c) The manuals shall include:

●● Class agenda;

●● Class objectives defined for each lesson; and

●● Detailed description of the subject matter for each lesson.

2. The contractor is responsible for:

(a) Furnishing all audio-visual equipment;

(b) All other training materials and supplies.

(c) Where the contractor presents portions of the course through the use of
audio-visual material, copies of the audio-visual materials will be delivered
to the Government, either as a part of the printed training manuals or on
the same media as that used during the training sessions.

3. A training day will:

(a) Take place Monday through Friday;

(b) Occur during normal operational hours;

(c) Not exceed an 8-hour duty day; and

(d) Incorporate breaks and lunch period.

4. Approval for the training content and class scheduled will be obtained from the
Government by the vendor no less than 30 days prior to the training.

C. Operator Training

1. Course training:

(a) The course shall be taught at the project site for five consecutive training
days during or after the contractor’s field testing and government
acceptance of the system;

(b) A minimum of 3 personnel will attend the course;

(c) No part of the training given during this course will be counted toward
completion of the performance verification test;

(d) The course shall consist of:

●● Classroom instruction;

●● Hands-on training;
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
520 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

●● Instruction on the specific hardware configuration of the installed

system; and

●● Specific instructions for operating the installed system.

2. The course shall demonstrate:

(a) System start-up;

(b) System operation;

(c) System shutdown;

(d) System recovery after a failure;

(e) Specific hardware configuration; and

(f) Operation of the system and its software.

3. The contractor will:

(a) Prepare and insert additional training material in the training manuals
when the need for additional material becomes apparent during
instruction;

(b) Prepare a written report after the completion of the course;

(d) Describe the skill level of each student at the end of this course; and

(e) Submit the report before the end of the performance verification test.

4. The course shall include:

(a) General CCTV hardware, installed system architecture and configuration;

(b) Functional operation of the installed system and software;

(c) Operator commands;

(d) Alarm interfaces;

(e) Alarm reporting;

(f) Fault diagnostics and correction;

(g) General system maintenance; and

(h) Replacement of failed components and integration of replacement;

components into the operating CCTV system.

D. Training Documentation

1. Lesson plans and training manuals for the training phases shall be delivered for
approval. These will include type of training to be provided, along with a sample
training report and a list of reference material.

V. Maintenance and Service

A. General Requirements

1. The contractor will provide all services required and equipment necessary to
maintain the entire CCTV system in an operational state as specified for a period
of 1 year after the manufacturer’s factory warranty period, and shall provide all
necessary material required for the work. Impacts on facility operations shall be
minimized when performing scheduled adjustments or other unscheduled work.
The vendor will provide a quote for an extended warranty.

B. Description of Work

1. The adjustment and repair of the CCTV system includes all computer equipment,
software updates, signal transmission equipment, and video equipment. Provide
the manufacturer’s required adjustments and all other work necessary.

C. Personnel

1. Service personnel will be qualified to accomplish all work promptly and

satisfactorily. The Government shall be advised in writing of the name of the
designated service representative, and of any changes in personnel.

D. Schedule of Work

1. The contractor will perform two inspections at 6-month intervals or less;

2. This work shall be performed during regular working hours, Monday through
Friday, excluding legal holidays;

3. During these inspections, the contractor will:

(a) Conduct visual checks and operational tests of the CPU, switcher,
peripheral equipment, interface panels, recording devices, monitors, video
equipment electrical and mechanical controls, and a check of the picture
quality from each camera;
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
522 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

(b) Run system software and correct all diagnosed problems; and

(c) Resolve any previous outstanding problems.

E. Emergency Service

1. The Government will initiate service calls when the CCTV system is not
functioning properly. Qualified personnel shall be available to provide service
to the complete CCTV system. The Government shall be furnished with a
telephone number where the service supervisor can be reached at all times.
Service personnel shall be at the site within 24 hours after receiving a request for
service. The CCTV system shall be restored to proper operating condition within
3 calendar days after receiving a request for service.

F. Operation

1. Performance of scheduled adjustments and repair shall verify operation of the

CCTV system as demonstrated by the applicable portions of the performance
verification test.

G. Records and Logs

1. The contractor will keep records and logs of each task, and shall organize
cumulative records for each major component and for the complete system
chronologically. A continuous log will be maintained for all devices.

2. The log shall contain calibration, repair, warranties, serial number, bar code data,
installation date, major repair dates, and programming data. Complete logs shall
be kept and shall be available for inspection on site, demonstrating that planned
and systematic adjustments and repairs have been accomplished for the CCTV
system.

3. Work Requests

(a) The contractor shall separately record each service call request, as
received. The form shall include the serial number identifying the
component involved, its location, date and time the call was received,
nature of trouble, names of the service personnel assigned to the task,
instructions describing what has to be done, the amount and nature of
the materials to be used, the time and date work started, and the time
and date of completion. The contractor shall deliver a record of the work
performed within 5 days after work is completed.

H. System Modifications

1. The contractor shall make any recommendations for system modification

in writing to the Government. No system modifications, including operating
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
523 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

parameters and control settings, shall be made without prior approval of the
Government. Any modifications made to the systems shall be incorporated into
the operations and maintenance manuals, and other documentation affected.

2. Software

(a) The contractor will recommend all software updates, including middleware
if needed to allow multiple processes running on one or more machines to
interact across a network, to the Government for approval. Upon approval,
updates will be:

●● Accomplished in a timely manner;

●● Fully coordinated with the CCTV system operators.

3. Operation in the system will be verified and incorporated into the operations and
maintenance manuals, and software documentation. There shall be a minimum
of one scheduled update near the end of the first year’s warranty period, at which
time the contractor will install and validate the latest released version of the
manufacturer’s software.

VI. Materials And Equipment

A. All system hardware and software components shall be produced by manufacturers
regularly engaged in the production of CCTV equipment. Units of the same type of
equipment shall be products of a single manufacturer. All material and equipment
shall be new and currently in production. Each major component of equipment shall
have the manufacturer’s name and address, and the model and serial number in a
conspicuous place. Equipment located at the security center or a remote control/
monitoring station shall be rack mounted as shown in Figure 1. Both Television and
Computing devices shall comply with 47 CFR § 15(B).

B. Soldering

1. All soldering shall be done in accordance with standard industry practices.

C. Enclosures

1. The contractor shall provide metallic enclosures as needed for equipment not
housed in racks or supplied with a housing. The enclosures shall be as specified
or shown.

D. Interior

1. Enclosures to house equipment in an interior environment shall meet the

requirements of NEMA 250 Type 12.

E. Exposed-to-Weather

1. Enclosures to house equipment in an outdoor environment shall meet the

requirements of NEMA 250 Type 4X.

2. Corrosion-Resistant

3. Enclosures to house equipment in a corrosive environment shall meet the

requirements of NEMA 250 Type 4X.

4. Hazardous Environment Equipment

(a) All system electronics to be used in a hazardous environment shall be

housed in a metallic enclosure which meets the requirements of paragraph
“Hazardous Environment.”

F. Wiring

(a) All wiring will be marked in accordance with industry standards and
correlate with the wiring diagram.

VII. Locks And Key-Lock Operated Switches

A. Locks

1. Locks shall be provided on system enclosures for maintenance purposes;

2. Locks shall be Underwriters Laboratory (UL) listed;

3. Locks shall be either a round-key type, with three dual, one mushroom, and three
plain pin tumblers; or conventional key type lock having a combination of five
cylinder pin and five-point three position side bar; and

4. Keys shall be stamped “U.S. GOVT. DO NOT DUP.” The locks shall be so
arranged that the key can only be withdrawn when in the locked position. All
maintenance locks shall be keyed alike and only two keys shall be furnished for
all of these locks.

B. Key-Lock-Operated Switches

1. All key-lock-operated switches required to be installed on system components

shall be UL listed, [with three dual, one mushroom, and three plain pin tumblers]
[or] [conventional key type lock having a combination of five cylinder pin and
five-point three position side bar]. Keys shall be stamped “U.S. GOVT. DO NOT
DUP.” Key-lock-operated switches shall be two position, with the key removable
in either position. All key-lock-operated switches shall be keyed differently and
only two keys shall be furnished for each key-lock-operated-switch.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
525 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

C. System Integration

1. When the CCTV system is installed in conjunction with an IDS, the CCTV system
shall be interfaced to the IDS and shall provide automatic, alarm-actuated call-up
of the camera associated with the alarm zone. Equipment shall be supplied with
all adapters, terminators, cables, mainframes, card cages, power supplies, rack
mounts, and appurtenances as needed.

VIII. Cameras
A. Solid State Cameras

1. High Resolution Day/Night Camera

(a) The designer should determine if additional lighting is required;

(b) Lighting ratios of 5:1 or less (highlight to shadow ratio) will ensure shadow
detail in the video picture;

(d) Signal-to-noise ratio shall not be less than 48 dB unweighted. The

camera shall exhibit no geometric distortion. The lens mount shall be a C
or CS-mount, and the camera shall have a back focus adjustment. The
camera shall operate from minus 20.0 to plus 55 degrees C minus 4 to
131 degrees F without auxiliary heating or cooling, and with no change in
picture quality or resolution. The camera shall operate on [60][50] Hz AC
power, and shall be capable of operating at a voltage of 105 to 130/205 to
240/12 Volts DC or 24 Volts AC.

2. Solid State Image Array

(a) The camera shall have a solid state imager, and the picture produced by
the camera shall be free of blemishes. The camera shall provide not less
than 550 lines of horizontal resolution, and resolution shall not vary over
the life of the camera.

3. Sensitivity

(a) Camera shall provide full video output with the infrared cut-off filter
installed, without camera automatic gain, and a scene reflectance of 75
percent using an f/1.2 lens giving a camera faceplate illumination at 2850K
of 1.0 lx 0.1 foot candle.

4. Connectors

(a) Cameras with lenses having auto iris, manual iris, or zoom and focus
functions shall be supplied with connectors and wiring as needed for
lens operation. Video signal output connector shall be a Bayonet Neill-
Concelman (BNC) connector. Cameras with integral fiber optic video
transmitters shall have straight-tip bayonet type fiber optic video output
connectors. I.P. cameras may utilize fiber or RJ45 connectors.

5. Automatic Circuits

(a) The camera shall have circuitry to establish a reference black level, and
an automatic white clipper and automatic gain control circuits.

B. Interior Dome PTZ Cameras

1. Interior Dome PTZ Camera System

(a) An interior dome camera system shall be provided with integral camera
installed and integrated into the dome housing;

(b) The camera shall meet the requirements of paragraph VII Cameras as
specified; and

(c) The dome housing shall be nominally 160 mm 6 inches and shall be
furnished in a pendant mount or ceiling mount as shown. The lower
dome shall be tinted acrylic and shall have a light attenuation factor of
not more that 1 f-stop. The housing shall be equipped with integral pan/
tilt complete with wiring, wiring harnesses, connectors, receiver/driver,
pan/tilt control system, pre-position cards, or any other hardware and
equipment as needed to provide a fully functional pan/tilt dome. The pan/
tilt shall be permanently lubricated. The motors shall be thermally or
impedance protected against overload damage. Pan movement shall be
360 degrees and tilt movement shall not be less than plus and minus 90
degrees. Pan speed shall not be less than 20 degrees per second, and
tilt speed shall not be less than 10 degrees per second. There shall not
be less than 64 preset positions, with positioning speeds of at least 360
degrees per second in the automatic mode, and not less than 120 degrees
pre second in the manual positioning mode, with a positioning accuracy
of plus or minus 1/2 degree. Each set of preset position data shall include
auto focus, auto iris, pan, tilt, and zoom functions. The system shall be
able to automatically scan between any two electronically-set limits, and
shall be able to operate in the “tour” mode covering up to all presets in a
user defined sequence. The dome system shall withstand temperature
ranges from minus 10 to 50 degrees C minus 22 to 122 degrees F over a
humidity range of 0 to 90 percent, non-condensing. Pan movement shall
be 360 degrees and tilt movement shall not be less than plus and minus
90 degrees. Pan speed shall not be less than 20 degrees per second, and
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
527 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

tilt speed shall not be less than 10 degrees per second

2. Exterior PTZ Dome Camera System

(a) An exterior dome camera system shall be provided with integral camera
installed and integrated into the dome housing. The camera shall
have a minimum horizontal resolution of 425 lines (color) or 500 lines
(monochrome);

(b) The dome housing shall be nominally 160 mm 6 inches and shall be
furnished in a NEMA 4 pendant mount, pole mount, ceiling mount, surface
mount, or corner mount as shown. The housing shall be constructed to
be dust and water tight, and fully operational in 100 percent condensing
humidity. The housing shall be equipped with supplementary camera
mounting blocks or supports as needed to position the specified camera
and lens to maintain the proper optical centerline. All electrical and signal
connections required for operation of the camera and lens shall be
supplied. The housing shall protect the internal drives, positioners, and
camera from the environment encountered for camera operation;

(c) The lower dome shall be tinted acrylic and shall have a light attenuation
factor of not more than 1 f-stop. An integral heater, sized to maintain the
lower dome above the dew point, shall be part of the camera system. The
housing shall be equipped with integral pan/tilt complete with wiring, wiring
harnesses, connectors, receiver/driver, pan/tilt control system, pre-position
cards, or any other hardware and equipment as needed to provide a fully
functional pan/tilt dome. The pan/tilt shall be permanently lubricated.
The motors shall be thermally or impedance protected against overload
damage; and

(d) Pan movement shall be 360 degrees and tilt movement shall not be less
than plus and minus 90 degrees. Pan speed shall not be less than 20
degrees per second, and tilt speed shall not be less than 10 degrees per
second. There shall not be less than 99 preset positions, with positioning
speeds of at least 360 degrees per second in the automatic mode, and
not less than 120 degrees pre second in the manual positioning mode,
with a positioning accuracy of plus or minus 1/2 degree. Each set of
preset position data shall include auto focus, auto iris, pan, tilt, and zoom
functions. The system shall be able to automatically scan between any
two electronically-set limits, and shall be able to operate in the “tour” mode
covering up to all presets in a user defined sequence. The dome system
shall withstand temperature ranges from minus 40 to 50 degrees C
minus 40 to 122 degrees F over a humidity range of 0 to 90 percent, non-
condensing. When designing CCTV surveillance, consideration needs to
be given to lost coverage within the camera sweep field-of-view when the

camera zooms to a fixed location. Refer to Figure 2 below.

C. Camera Lenses

1. Camera lenses shall be all glass with coated optics. The lens mount shall be
a C or CS mount, compatible with the cameras selected. The lens shall be
supplied with the camera, and shall have a maximum f-stop opening of f/1.2 or
the maximum available for the focal length specified. The lens shall be equipped
with an auto-iris mechanism unless otherwise specified. Lenses having auto
iris, manual iris, or zoom and focus functions shall be supplied with connectors,
wiring, receiver/drivers, and controls as needed to operate the lens functions.
Lenses shall have sufficient circle of illumination to cover the image sensor
evenly. Lenses shall not be used on a camera with an image format larger than
the lens is designed to cover. Lens focal lengths shall be as shown or specified in
the manufacturer’s lens selection tables.

D. Camera Housings And Mounts

1. The camera and lens shall be enclosed in a tamper resistant housing as

specified below. Any ancillary housing mounting hardware needed to install the
housing at the camera location shall be provided as part of the housing. The
camera and lens contained in a camera housing shall be installed on a camera
support as shown. Any ancillary mounting hardware needed to install the support
and to install the camera on the support shall be provided as part of the support.
The camera support shall be capable of supporting the equipment to be mounted
on it including wind and ice loading normally encountered at the site.

E. Environmentally Sealed Camera Housing

1. The housing shall be designed to provide a condensation-free environment for

camera operation. The housing shall be constructed to be dust and water tight,
and fully operational in 100 percent condensing humidity. The housing shall be
purged of atmospheric air and pressurized with dry nitrogen, shall be equipped
with a fill valve, overpressure valve, and shall have a humidity indicator visible
from the exterior. Housing shall not have a leak rate greater than 13.8 kPa 2
psi at sea level within a 90 day period. The housing shall be equipped with
supplementary camera mounting blocks or supports as needed to position the
specified camera and lens to maintain the proper optical centerline. All electrical
and signal connections required for operation of the camera and lens shall
be supplied. The housing shall provide the environment needed for camera
operation, and shall keep the viewing window free of fog, snow, and ice;

2. The housing shall be equipped with a sunshield, and both the housing and the
sunshield shall be white. A mounting bracket which can be adjusted to center

the weight of the housing and camera assembly shall be provided as part of the
housing.

F. Indoor Camera Housing

1. The housing shall be designed to provide a tamper resistant enclosure for indoor
camera operation. The housing shall be equipped with tamper proof latches, and
shall be supplied with the proper mounting brackets for the specified camera and
lens. The housing and appurtenances shall be a color that does not conflict with
the building interior color scheme.

G. Interior Mount

1. The camera mount shall be suitable for either wall or ceiling mounting and shall
have an adjustable head for mounting the camera. The wall mount and head
shall be constructed of aluminum or steel with a corrosion-resistant finish. The
head shall be adjustable for 360 degrees of pan, and not less than 90 degrees of
tilt.

H. Low Profile Ceiling Mount

1. A tamperproof ceiling housing shall be provided for the camera. The housing
shall be low profile and shall be suitable for replacement of 610 by 610 mm, 2
by 2 foot ceiling tiles. The housing shall be equipped with a camera mounting
bracket and shall allow a 360-degree viewing setup.

I. Interior Dome Housing

1. An interior dome housing shall be provided for each camera as shown. The dome
housing shall be a pendant mount, pole mount, ceiling mount, surface mount,
or corner mount as shown. The lower dome shall be black opaque acrylic and
shall have a light attenuation factor of not more that 1 f-stop. The housing shall
be equipped fixed or integral pan/tilt complete with wiring, wiring harnesses,
connectors, receiver/driver, pan/tilt control system, pre-position cards, or any
other hardware and equipment as needed to provide a fully functional pan/tilt
dome. The pan/tilt shall be permanently lubricated. The motors shall be thermally
or impedance protected against overload damage. Pan movement shall be 360
degrees and tilt movement shall not be less than plus and minus 90 degrees.
Pan speed shall not be less than 20 degrees per second, and tilt speed shall not
be less than 10 degrees per second.

J. Exterior Dome Housing

1. An exterior dome housing shall be provided for each camera as shown. The
dome housing shall be a pendant mount, pole mount, ceiling mount, surface
mount, or corner mount as shown. The housing shall be constructed to be

dust- and water-tight, and fully operational in 100 percent condensing humidity.
The housing shall be equipped with supplementary camera mounting blocks
or supports as needed to position the specified camera and lens to maintain
the proper optical centerline. All electrical and signal connections required for
operation of the camera and lens shall be supplied. The housing shall provide
the environment needed for camera operation The lower dome shall be black
opaque acrylic and shall have a light attenuation factor of not more that 1 f-stop.
The housing shall be equipped with fixed or integral pan/tilt complete with
wiring, wiring harnesses, connectors, receiver/driver, pan/tilt control system,
pre-position cards, or any other hardware and equipment as needed to provide
a fully functional pan/tilt dome. The pan/tilt shall be permanently lubricated. The
motors shall be thermally or impedance protected against overload damage. Pan
movement shall be 360 degrees and tilt movement shall not be less than plus
and minus 90 degrees. Pan speed shall not be less than 20 degrees per second,
and tilt speed shall not be less than 10 degrees per second.

K. Exterior Wall Mount

1. There are lengths most commonly used for wall mounts. The exterior camera
wall mount will be in the range of 16, 24 or 36 inches long, and shall have
an adjustable head for mounting the camera. If another length is required,
the person responsible for the installation should review catalogs of CCTV
equipment manufacturers to find a mount in current production that will fulfill
the requirement. The wall mount and head shall be constructed of aluminum,
stainless steel, or steel with a corrosion-resistant finish. The head shall be
adjustable for not less than plus and minus 90 degrees of pan, and not less than
plus and minus 45 degrees of tilt. If the bracket is to be used in conjunction with a
pan/tilt, the bracket shall be supplied without the adjustable mounting head, and
shall have a bolt-hole pattern to match the pan/tilt base.

L. Pan/Tilt Mount “non dome system” or “PTZ base mount system”

1. The pan/tilt mount shall be capable of supporting the camera, lens and
housing specified. If the pan/tilt is to be mounted outdoors, the pan/tilt shall
be weatherproof, and sized to accommodate the camera, lens and housing
weight plus maximum wind loading encountered at the installation site. Pan/tilt
shall be permanently lubricated. The motors shall be thermally or impedance
protected against overload damage. Pan movement shall not be less than 0 to
350 degrees; tilt movement shall not be less than plus and minus 90 degrees.
Pan speed shall not be less than 6 degrees per second, and tilt speed shall not
be less than 3 degrees per second. The pan/tilt shall be supplied complete with
wiring, wiring harnesses, connectors, receiver/driver, pan/tilt control system, pre-
position cards, or any other hardware and equipment as needed to provide a fully
functional pan/tilt mount to fulfill the site design requirements. Pan movement
shall be 360 degrees and tilt movement shall not be less than plus and minus 90

degrees. Pan speed shall not be less than 20 degrees per second, and tilt speed
shall not be less than 10 degrees per second.
Figure 2: Fixed-camera field-of-view

M. Explosion-Proof Housing

1. The explosion-proof housing shall meet the requirements of NEMA 4 for

hazardous locations. The housing shall be designed to provide a tamper resistant
enclosure and shall be equipped with tamper proof latches. It shall be supplied
with the proper mounting brackets for the specified camera and lens.

IX. Video Monitor

Figure 3: Dimensions of a 9-inch ESS Display

A. Color Video Monitor

1. All electronic components and circuits shall be solid state except for the
picture tube. The monitor shall have a stabilized high voltage power supply,
and regulated low voltage power supplies. The monitor shall have automatic
frequency control (AFC) and horizontal resolution not less than 420 lines at
the center of the picture tube. The number of lines in the video produced by
the security camera is a measure of picture resolution (sharpness). The larger
the number of lines, the better the resolution and hence, overall picture quality.
Over 380 Lines is generally considered good resolution while over 700 lines is
considered high resolution. The video input shall allow switchable loop-through
or 75 ohm termination. The monitor shall have circuitry for automatic degaussing.
The monitor shall operate on 50/60 Hz, and shall be capable of operating at a
voltage of 105 to 130,205 to 240 AC Volts;

2. LCD monitor minimums:1280×720 (720 lines or greater).

B. Controls

1. Front panel controls shall be provided for power on/off, horizontal hold, vertical
hold, contrast, and brightness. The monitor shall have switchable DC restoration.

C. Connectors for Video Monitor

1. Video signal input and output shall be by BNC connectors.

D. Video Switcher/Controller

1. The switcher shall conform to CEA 170 specifications, and shall be a vertical
interval switcher. Electronic components, subassemblies, and circuits of the
switcher shall be solid state. The switcher shall be microprocessor based and
software programmable. The switcher shall be a modular system that shall allow
for expansion or modification of inputs, outputs, alarm interfaces, and secondary
control stations by addition of the appropriate modules. Switcher components
shall operate on 120V or 230V, 50/60 Hz. The switcher central processor unit
shall be capable of being interfaced to a master security computer for integrated
operation and control. The video switcher central processing unit (CPU) shall
have the capability of accepting time from a master clock supplied in ASCII
format through a TIA-232-F input. All components, modules, cables, power
supplies, software, and other items needed for a complete and operable CCTV
switching system shall be provided. Switcher equipment shall be rack mounted
unless otherwise specified.

E. Switcher Software

1. The switcher shall be software programmable, and the software shall be supplied
as part of the switcher. The software shall be installed in the switcher CPU,
and shall be configured as required by the site design. Changes or alterations
of features under software control shall be accomplished through software
programming without changes in hardware or system configuration. The switcher
shall retain the current program for at least 6 hours in the event of power loss,
and shall not require reprogramming in order to restart the system.

F. Alarm Interface Unit

1. An alarm interface shall be furnished with the switcher. The interface shall be
compatible with the ESS alarm annunciation system. The alarm interface shall
monitor alarm closures for processing by the switcher CPU or video server. Alarm
Inputs may be configured for supervised or unsupervised mode. See Figure 3 for
an example of an ESS display dimensions;

2. Alarm inputs to the alarm interface shall be relay contact or through other
interface. The alarm interface shall be modular and shall allow for system
expansion. The alarm interface to be installed at the site shall be configured to
handle 64 alarm points, and shall have an expansion capability of not less than
25 percent. An output shall be provided to actuate a video recorder.

G. Switcher or Video Server Response Time and Alarm Processing

1. The switcher response time shall not be greater than 200 milliseconds from
the time the alarm is sensed at the switcher alarm interface, until the picture is
displayed on the monitor. The switcher shall continue to process subsequent
alarms and shall display or place them in a queue. The operator shall be able to
view the alarms in queue by operating an alarm release function which switches
the subsequent alarms to the monitor in the order of occurrence.

H. Control Keyboards or Video Monitoring Stations

1. Control and programming keyboards shall be supplied for the video switcher or
video server at the security station, and control keyboards shall be supplied for
any control/monitoring stations as shown. The control keyboard shall provide the
interface between the operator and the CCTV system, and shall relay commands
from the operator to the switcher CPU. The keyboard shall provide control of
the video switcher functions needed for operation and programming of the video
switcher. Controls shall include, but not be limited to: programming the switcher,
switcher control, lens function control, pan/tilt/zoom (PTZ) control, control of
environmental housing accessories, and annotation programming. If the switcher
CPU requires an additional text keyboard for system management functions, the
keyboard shall be supplied as part of the video switcher.

I. Accessory Control Equipment

1. The video switcher shall be equipped with signal distribution units, preposition
cards, expansion units, cables, software or any other equipment needed to
ensure that the CCTV system is complete and fully operational;

2. Connectors for Video Switcher or Video Server

(a) Video signal input and output shall be by BNC connectors, fiber
connectors, or RJ45 connectors.

J. Video Annotation

1. Video annotation equipment shall be provided for the video switcher. The
annotation shall be alphanumeric and programmable for each video source.
Annotation to be generated shall include, but not be limited to: individual
video source identification number, time (hour, minute, second) in a 24-hour
format, date (month, day, year), and a unique, user-defined title with at least 8
characters. The annotation shall be inserted onto the source video so that both
shall appear on a monitor or recording. The lines of annotation shall be movable
for horizontal and vertical placement on the video picture. The annotation shall
be automatically adjusted for date. Programmed annotation information shall be
retained in memory for at least 4 hours in the event of power loss.

X. Digital Video Equipment

A. Digital Video Recorder (DVR)

1. A digital video recorder (DVR) is a device that records video in a digital format
to a disk drive or other medium. DVR CCTV system provides a multitude of
advanced functions over VCR technology including video searches by event,
time, date and camera. There is also much more control over quality and frame
rate allowing disk space usage to be optimized and the DVR can also be set to
overwrite the oldest security footage should the disk become full. In some DVR
security systems remote access to security footage using a PC can also be
achieved by connecting the DVR to a Local Area Network (LAN) network or the
internet;

2. Security DVRs may be categorized as being either PC based or embedded. A

PC based DVR’s architecture is a classical personal computer with video capture
cards designed to capture video images. An embedded type DVR is specifically
designed as a digital video recorder with its operating hardware and application
software contained in firmware or read only memory. A CCTV system may
provide analog or digital video to the DVR. See Figure 4.

(a) 16 channels, minimum of 120 ips/fps capture card, to provide no less than
7.5 images per second, per camera;

(b) Ability to view images directly from the DVR, onto the monitor; if a
multiplexer or live display card is needed, it should be included;

(c) An installed network card in both DVR and Redundant Array of

Inexpensive Disks (RAID), to facilitate hook-up to the network;

(d) Installed server remote software and include remote access software, with
unlimited licenses, so it can be viewed in the field via the network;

(e) Included playback software needed to allow for playback, if not

automatically included on the export media when exporting video;

(f) Rack mount chassis with adequate cooling for both DVR and Raid (locking
model with keys if PC based);

(g) Internal DVD-R/RW and CD-R/RW burner combo drive;

(h) Enough memory installed to allow for recording, playback, etc. without
skipping/delays/errors, etc. due to low memory problems;

(i) Internal storage with enough capacity to store 2 images per second x 16
cameras x 7 days minimum, with the largest picture size possible, in case
of RAID failure;

(j) External RAID 5 (distributes parity among the drives) storage with enough
capacity to store 2 images per second x 16 cameras x 30 days minimum
with the largest picture size possible. All hard drives must be rated to
withstand continuous use in a RAID environment;

(k) Include a keyboard, video, mouse (KVM) switch to share the keyboard,
monitor, and mouse between the RAID and DVR (if PC based);

(l) 3-year complete warranty on parts and labor - onsite service included OR
advance replacement shipped overnight prior to return of defective unit
and a 30 day “no questions asked” return policy.;

(m) The DVR(s) shall operate on 100-230 VAC ±10%, 50/60 Hz. The signal
system shall be NTSC/PAL with an adjustable recording resolution from
320x240 to 704x480m; and

(n) The DVR(s) shall be a high-resolution unit with a minimum of thirty (30)
days recording capability of all channels.

Figure 4: DVR CCTV System Combining Serial, Analog

and Ethernet/Internet Capabilities

XI. Video Signal Equipment

A. The following video signal equipment shall conform to CEA 170. Electrically powered
equipment shall operate on 120 Volts 60 Hz AC power. All video signal inputs and
outputs shall be by BNC connectors.

1. Ground Loop Corrector

(a) The ground loop corrector shall eliminate the measured ground loop
interference (common mode voltage) in wire line or coaxial video
transmission lines. The ground loop corrector shall pass the full
transmitted video bandwidth with no signal attenuation or loss. Clamping
ground loop correctors shall be capable of rejecting at least an 8 volt peak-
to-peak 60 Hz common mode signal. Ground isolation transformers shall
be capable of rejecting at least a 10-volt peak-to-peak 60-Hz common
mode signal. Ground isolation amplifiers shall be capable of rejecting
at least a 30-volt peak-to-peak 60-Hz common mode signal. Differential
ground loop correctors shall be capable of rejecting at least a 100-volt
peak-to-peak 60-Hz common mode signal.

2. Video Distribution Amplifier

(a) The video distribution amplifier shall have four independent video outputs
from a single video input. The video distribution amplifier shall have solid-
state circuitry consisting of four identical video amplifiers in parallel provide
four equal 75-ohm loads, which allow the video outputs to be viewed

without distortion or loss of clarity. The distribution amplifier shall have

not less than plus or minus 3 dB of gain adjustment for the video output.
Output isolation shall be 40 dB or greater at 5 MHz. Bandwidth shall be 10
MHz or greater, and frequency response to 8 MHz shall be plus or minus
0.5 dB or less. Hum and noise shall be 55 dB below 1 volt peak-to-peak or
better. Operating power will be 120 VAC, 50/60 Hz or 230 VAC. The video
distribution amplifier will comply will these certification/ratings: CE, Class B
(DA104DT/220), UL Listed (DA104DT), FCC, Class B (DA104DT), Meets
NEMA Type 1 standards.

B. Best practices for CCTV Camera Poles

1. Cantilever Camera Pole

(a) The camera mounting pole shall be a [non-hinged] [hinged] cantilever

aluminum pole with [counterweights] [and] mounting base. All fittings shall
be stainless steel. The camera mounting plate shall locate the camera
4.6 m (180 inches) 180 inches vertically from the base, and 2.7 m 105
inches horizontally from the centerline of the pole to the centerline of the
camera. The camera mount shall be adjustable with a minimum of 40
degrees pan away from the pole and 6 degrees pan toward the pole, and
plus and minus 90 degrees of tilt. The pole shall have an internal wiring
harness that routes [video,] [video, sync,] and power between the pole
base and the camera mount. The wiring harness shall be compatible with
the model camera to be mounted on the pole and the video DTM. Surge
protection shall be provided at the pole between the wiring harness, and
the incoming electronic signal lines and AC power line. The pole shall
have a weatherproof, AC power service outlet that is surge protected and
has a ground fault interruption device. Separate circuit breakers shall be
provided for camera AC power and service outlet AC power.

2. Straight Camera Pole

(a) The camera mounting pole shall be a non-hinged/hinged straight

aluminum pole with [counterweights] [and] mounting base. All fittings
shall be stainless steel. The camera mounting plate shall locate the
camera 4.6 m 180 inches vertically from the base, and 508.0 mm 20
inches horizontally from the centerline of the pole to the centerline of
the camera. The camera mount shall be adjustable with a minimum
of 40 degrees pan away from the pole and 6 degrees pan toward the
pole, and plus and minus 90 degrees of tilt. The pole shall have an
internal wiring harness that routes video and power between the pole
base and the camera mount. The wiring harness shall be compatible
with the camera to be mounted on the pole and the video DTM. Surge
protection shall be provided at the pole between the wiring harness, and

the incoming electronic signal lines and AC power line. The pole shall
have a weatherproof, AC power service outlet that is surge protected and
has a ground fault interruption device. Separate circuit breakers shall be
provided for camera AC power and service outlet AC power.

3. Pan/Tilt Mounting Pole

(a) The pan/tilt mounting pole shall be a straight steel or aluminum pole. The
pole shall be (manufactures specifications) m/feet high and shall have a
mounting plate at the top for the pan/tilt. The pole and mounting plate shall
have a corrosion-resistant finish. The mounting plate shall have a bolt hole
pattern to match the base of the pan/tilt to be mounted on the pole. Under
maximum loading, the total pole deflection shall not exceed 0.1 of one
degree. A cable conduit shall be provided from the base of the pole to the
mounting plate of the pan/tilt. The conduit shall be sized to accommodate
all wiring needed for the camera and pan/tilt.

XII. Accessories
A. The designer will provide a drawing showing the amount of rack space needed
for the rack mounted CCTV equipment, and placement of the equipment in the
rack. Coordinate the CCTV equipment rack layout in conjunction with the ESS
rack mounted equipment. Standard 482.6 mm 19 inch electronic rack cabinets
conforming to CEA-310-E shall be provided for the CCTV system at the security
center and remote control/monitoring sites as shown.

XIII. Wire And Cable

A. All wire and cable components shall be able to withstand the environment the wire or
cable is installed in for a minimum of 20 years.

B. CCTV Equipment Video Signal Wiring

1. The coaxial cable shall have a characteristic impedance of 75 ohms plus or

minus 3 ohms. RG 59/U coaxial signal cable shall have shielding which provides
a minimum of 95 percent coverage, a solid copper center conductor of not
less than 23 AWG. RG 6/U coaxial cable shall have shielding which provides a
minimum of 95 percent coverage, with center conductor of 18 AWG;

2. Category 6 cable, commonly referred to as Cat 6, is a cable standard for Gigabit

Ethernet and other network protocols that is backward compatible with the
Category 5/5e and Category 3 cable standards. The cable contains four twisted
copper wire pairs, just like earlier copper cable standards. Although Cat-6 is
sometimes made with 23 gauge wire, this is not a requirement; the ANSI/TIA-
568-B.2-1 specification states the cable may be made with 22- to 24- AWG-
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
539 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

gauge wire, so long as the cable meets the specified testing standards. When
used as a patch cable, Cat-6 is normally terminated in 8P8C modular connectors.
Cat-6 connectors are made to higher standards that help reduce noise caused
by crosstalk and system noise installed in metal conduit to preclude damage; the
conduit shall be sized to accommodate all wiring.

C. Low Voltage Control Wiring

1. Plenum or riser cables shall be IEEE C2 CL2P certified.

D. Digital Data Interconnection Wiring

1. Interconnecting cables carrying digital data between equipment located at the

security center or at a secondary control/monitoring site shall be not less than
20 AWG and shall be stranded copper wire for each conductor. The cable or
each individual conductor within the cable shall have a shield that provides 100
percent coverage. Cables with a single overall shield shall have a tinned copper
shield drain wire. Plenum or riser cables shall be IEEE C2 CL2P certified.

XIV. LEGACY OFFICES

A. For CBP Offices that have not upgraded to fully digital CCTV systems, the following
will apply.

1. Video Multiplexer

(a) The video multiplexer shall be a multi-channel record and playback system
with the capability of color real time multi-screen viewing. Electronic
components, sub assemblies, and circuits of the multiplexer shall be
solid state. The multiplexer, using time division multiplexing, shall permit
up to 16 camera inputs to be recorded simultaneously on a single video
cassette recorder (VCR). All 16 camera inputs shall be capable of being
viewed on a video monitor either live or recorded. The multiplexer shall
allow for viewing of either live video or input from the DVR/VCR (Simplex
Operation). The multiplexer shall allow for simultaneous viewing, recording
playback, and multiplexing (Duplex Operation). The inputs shall be
capable of simultaneous viewing on the monitor or full screen individually
and in other multi-screen modes such as 2x2, 3x3, 4x4 or other
configurations. The viewing format shall also permit 2x dynamic zoom
capability, full screen. The multiplexer shall be compatible with EIA/NTSC/
PAL video cameras. External camera synchronization shall not be required
for proper operation of the video multiplexer. Control of all functions of the
multiplexer shall be provided either by a full function keyboard or by push-
button selection with on-screen menu driven set-up. The multiplexer shall
retain the current program for at east 6 hours in the event of power loss.

The video multiplexer will have a built-in video loss detection that alerts
the operators or technicians of camera failure. Logical camera numbering
provides the ability to assign any camera number to the physical input. An
integral color bar generator allows the user to adjust monitor settings.

2. Predelivery Testing

(a) General

●● The contractor shall assemble the test CCTV system as specified,

and perform tests to demonstrate that the performance of the system
complies with the contract requirements in accordance with the
approved pre-delivery test procedures. The tests shall take place
during regular daytime working hours on weekdays. Model numbers
of equipment tested shall be identical to those to be delivered to
the site. Original copies of all data produced during pre-delivery
testing, including results of each test procedure, shall be delivered
to the Government at the conclusion of pre-delivery testing prior to
Government approval of the test. The test report shall be arranged
so that all commands, stimuli, and responses are correlated to allow
logical interpretation.

(b) Test Setup

●● The contractor shall provide the equipment needed for the test setup
and shall configure it to provide alarm actuated camera call-up and
alarm recording as required to emulate the installed system. The test
setup shall consist of at least 4 complete camera circuits. The alarm
signal input to the CCTV test setup shall be by the same method that
is used in the installed system. The video switcher shall be capable of
switching any camera to any monitor and any combination of cameras
to any combination of monitors;

●● The minimum test setup shall include:

i. Four video cameras and lenses, including dome cameras if
required for the installed system;
ii. Three video monitors;
iii. Video recorder/DVR if it is required for the installed system;
iv. Video switcher including video input modules, video output
modules, and control and applications software;
v. Video multiplexer, if required for the installed system;
vi. Alarm input panel if required for the installed system;

XV. System Validation Assessment for Emergency Responders (SAVER)

A. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has established the System
Assessment and Validation for Emergency Responders (SAVER) program to assist
emergency responders making procurement decisions. The SAVER Program
conducts unbiased operational tests on commercial equipment and systems,
and provides those results along with other relevant equipment information to
the community in an operationally useful form. SAVER provides information on
equipment that falls within the categories listed in the DHS Authorized Equipment
List (AEL).

B. Follow these steps to reach the SAVER Project Library Index.

1. Go to the Project Library Index site;

2. Scroll down to, and click on, “14 Physical Security Enhancement Equipment”;

3. Select “14 SW Surveillance, Warning, Access Intrusion Control”;

4. Click on “14SW-01 General”;

5. 14SW-01-VIDA Systems, Video Assessment, Security”;

6. Click on “14SW-01-VIDA CCTV Technology”; and

7. Chose the appropriate IDS assessment project document.

C. To request the complete CCTV Technology Report, fill out the SAVER Document
Request Form. Enter your e-mail address and the format in which you’d prefer to
receive the document – e-mail, mailed CD, or mailed hard copy. This link leads
only to the request form for the full CCTV Technology Report. To view the project
highlights or assessment summary documents, follow the instructions above.

XVI. Further Information

A. For more information, see The United Facilities Guide Specifications for Closed
Circuit Television Systems

B. For questions contact [email protected]

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BACK Return to Table of Contents

Appendix 10: Storage of Weapons and Ammunition (Armory)

I. General
A. Armories provide space within the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
law enforcement and detention facilities for the storage, issuance, and upkeep
of weaponry, ammunition, and chemical agents. Armory spaces can include the
issuing area, weapons maintenance area, ammunition storage area, and sensitive
equipment storage.

B. Armories may be constructed as part of new construction or installed in existing

facilities. Armory construction will include the structural floor deck, partitions,
ceiling, door, door frame and locking mechanism, issuance window shutter system,
ventilation openings, lighting, fire detection and suppression, security monitoring
intrusion detection systems, storage shelving and racks, counter work surfaces,
pneumatic system, and hazardous material storage containers.

C. Armories will not be used for the storage of classified information.

II. Placement within a Facility

A. Armories shall be located within the secure perimeter of a building. The public
shall not have access to the exterior face of any portion of the armory. The armory
shall not be placed contiguous to spaces where individuals can make attempts to
compromise the armory without detection such as: equipment rooms, physical plant
space, infrequently accessed storage rooms, or shell space.

B. Armories shall be located where the entrance is under the direct visual control of a
manned post with the entrance not being visible to the public. If the armory is located
in a facility with secure detention areas, the armory shall be accessible through a
secure vestibule or sally port to prevent either detained individuals or individuals
from the outside from accessing the armory. Armory doors and issues windows will
be monitored by closed-circuit television (CCTV).

III. Armory Layout

A. A clearing barrel shall be located at the staff entrance to the facilities to assure the
weapons are void of bullets after they are worn on duty.

B. The armory needs to be divided into separate areas with a secure area or safes for
high-powered and fully automatic weapons. The armory may have a separate space
for chemical storage with its own 100% exhaust ventilation. The armory shall also
have a separate area for issuing and servicing weapons. This area will be located
outside the primary vault perimeter in a vestibule at the front of the armory. Access
to the armory shall be through this vestibule by authorized individuals. Figure 1 is an
example of an armory layout.

C. Provide a counter area for cleaning and servicing weapons. Weapons can generate
hazardous residue through the lead contaminates from firing. The areas provided
for the cleaning and care of weapons shall allow for the proper cleanup and disposal
of any materials that become contaminated with lead. Safe storage shall also be
provided for the solvents and equipment used in the cleaning process.

D. Building mechanical rooms and emergency generators shall not be located directly
contiguous with armory rooms to avoid any sparks ignition of inventory.
Figure 1: Armory Layout

IV. Minimum Construction Requirements for Armories

A. Walls

1. New construction

(a) For new construction, armory walls shall be constructed to meet Class
M – 15-minute attack resistance as defined in ASTM F 1247 Standard
Specifications for Intrusion Resistant Generic Vault Structures.

(b) Formed concrete walls (Figure 2) will be a minimum of 8 inches wide and
poured with concrete that has compression strength of 3000 psi. Formed
concrete walls will extend from slab to slab and will be reinforced with
either 2 grids of #5 rebar (5/8-inch) spaced at 4 inches on center or 2 grids
of 9 gauge expanded metal. Reinforcing must be firmly anchored to the
structural decks.

(c) Class B Vaults (Minimum Construction) shall conform to Federal

Specification AA-V-2737.Class B vaults are GSA approved modular vaults
and shall be six (6) sided (floor, ceiling, and four sides) as specified in AA-
V-2737.

2. Existing Construction

(a) For existing structures with limited floor loading capability, other wall
construction may be considered. For existing walls (Figure 3), a layer of
steel plate of 1/4-inch thickness may be added. The steel plate must be
firmly anchored with steel supporting members at 16 inches on center
that are secured to building structural members. All seams shall be
continuously welded.

Figure 2: Poured Concrete Figure 3: Metal Plate

3. In weapon maintenance areas, provide two layers of ½-inch wood surface

or other sacrificial material to prevent bullet ricochet on wall and hard ceiling
surfaces.

4. Internal areas of armories such as high powered weapons storage can be

separated from other armory areas. Use 9-gauge expanded metal mesh securely
welded to a 1 3/4-inch steel angle structural frame with vertical supports placed
at 18 inches on center. Welds will be 1/8-inch wide by 2-inches long and placed
at all seems and joints every 16 inches. The partition shall have an integral
gate. The gate will have a single padlock meeting the requirements of Federal
Specification FF-P-2827A . The lock shall be protected from tampering by a
¼-inch metal plate. Gate hinge pins shall be non-removable.

B. Floors

1. Armories may receive inventory for a full year at one time. This can impose a
substantial amount of weight on the armory floor. The inventory stored in the
armory combined with the armory construction and furnishings, can exceed
the allowable structural floor load capacity of existing buildings or the loading
limit required by code for business occupancies. The dead (building material
weight) and live (imposed weight of storage items) loads must be calculated for

each armory installation to assure that the structure is adequate to support the
inventory and also meet code requirements.

2. For existing structures that have floor load limitations, careful consideration
of armory construction must be taken to reduce, to the most feasible extent
possible, the dead loads created by partitions. To control concentrated live loads
under these conditions, shelving heights must be limited to that supportable by
the structure, and signs must be posted limiting the height that material may be
stacked. If possible, the floor and structural frame shall be further reinforced to
increase the load capacity.

3. Armory floors must be designed to resist entry from cavities above ceilings and
walls.

4. Floors are to be a minimum of 8-inch concrete, reinforced with two grids of #4

rebar placed on 9-inch centers. Concrete shall have compression strength of
3000 psi.

5. For armories installed on existing floors with less than 8 inches of reinforced
concrete; an additional layer of 1/4-inch metal plate shall be placed over the floor.
(All seams and joints need to be continuously welded.)

6. Floors shall be finished with anti-static material and have an oil- and solvent-
resistant finish. Flooring must be resistant to impacts from dropped items or
heavy pallets.

C. Ceilings

1. The ceiling shall be designed to thwart entry into the vault area with equivalent
protection as provided by the partitions. The armory may either have an
exposed ceiling with the structural deck above providing the secure barrier or a
constructed ceiling creating a plenum between the ceiling and the structural deck
above. When the surrounding armory partitions are secure to the structural deck
above, the constructed ceiling does not have to be a secure element and may be
a standard suspended acoustical tile ceiling system. For constructed ceilings that
form part of the secure enclosure of the armory, ceilings may either be exposed
reinforced concrete, pre-cast concrete, reinforced plaster, or a metal ceiling
system.

2. Formed concrete ceilings will consist of 8-inch concrete, reinforced with two grids
of #4 rebar placed on 4-inch centers or two grids of 9-gauge expanded metal.
Concrete shall have compression strength of 3000 psi. Reinforcing must be firmly
anchored to the surrounding walls.

3. Pre-cast concrete ceilings may consist of standard concrete “T” members with
minimum flange dimensions of 6 inches. Pre-cast concrete members must be

securely attached to walls or other building structural members. When pre-cast

ceilings are insufficient in depth, 1/4-inch metal plate shall be secured over the
ceiling.

4. Plaster ceilings (Figure 4) shall be constructed of a minimum of 9-gauge

expanded metal in 2-inch diamond pattern covered on both sides by 1 ¼ inch
cement plaster. The ceiling shall be supported by no less than a 3-inch steel
angle at 18 inches on center. The expanded metal must be securely welded to
the angle supports.

5. Steel plate ceilings (Figure 5) shall be constructed of 1/4-inch metal plate

securely welded to a metal deck that is supported by a 3-inch steel angle
structural frame at 18 inches on center. Welds will be 1/8-inch wide by 2 inches
long and placed at all seams and joints every 16 inches. Place epoxy sealant
between welds at all seams and joints.

6. In weapon maintenance areas, provide two layers of 1/2-inch wood surface

or other sacrificial material to prevent bullet ricochet on wall and hard ceiling
surfaces.

7. Provide access panels, with dead bolt keyed locks in constructed ceilings, to
plenum space above the ceiling. The access panel must be of 1/4-inch steel
plate. Non-removable hinges shall be located on the inside of the armory. Provide
a dead bolt lock keyed from the bottom side of the access panel. The lock shall
be protected from tampering on the outside by a 1/4-inch metal plate. The access
panel frame shall be 1/4-inch steel.

Figure 4: Plaster Security Ceiling

Figure 5: Steel Plate Security Ceiling

D. Doors

1. Armories will be fitted with GSA Class 5-A vault doors as defined in Federal
Specification AA-D-600D.

2. Each vault door furnished by contract or order under Federal Specification AA-D-
600D shall bear metallic labels as specified below.

(a) General Services Administration label. The General Services

Administration Label shall be affixed to the outside of the door. The label
shall be silver background and red letters not less than 3mm in height. The
label shall show the following:

(b) GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

(c) APPROVED SECURITY VAULT DOOR

(d) MANUFACTURER’S NAME

(e) Identification label. An identification label shall be affixed to the inside face
of the door frame. The label shall show the door model and serial number,
date of manufacture, and Government contract number.

(f) Certification label. A certification label shall be affixed to the inside face of
the door bearing the following certification:

(g) This is a U.S. Government Class 5-A vault door which has been tested
and approved by the Government under Federal Specification AA-D-600.
It affords the following security protection:

●● 30 man-minutes against covert entry;

●● 10 man-minutes against forced entry;

(h) The protection certified above applies only to the door and not to the vault
proper.

(i) Number label. All vault doors shall have a number label securely affixed to
the front face. Regardless of the method used, the label attachment shall not
degrade the door security. The label shall be mounted on the door frame,
above or to the left side of the door. The label shall be nominal 0.5 mm thick,
satin finished aluminum and shall be 63-65 mm by 17-20 mm. The label
numbering system shall be established by the manufacturer to provide non-
repetitive numbers. The label numbers shall be not less than 4.5 mm high and
shall be embossed.

(j) New vault door construction may be 3/8-inch metal front face with a 14-gauge
thick back face, and an overlapping lip covering the frame joint (Figure 6).

3. Large vaults that may receive pallet shipments of ammunition can be equipped with
double leaf entrance vault doors. The doors shall be constructed to GSA Class 5-A
Standards and an astragal will be provided between the two leafs. The inactive leaf
will have dead bolts keyed from the inside of the armory that engage the head and
sill of the door frame. The active leaf will be equipped as per a single leaf vault door,
with door leaf lips overlapping jamb joints and combination locks.

E. Door Frames

1. Door frames shall be a minimum of 1/4-inch metal construction;

2. The frame and door shall be mounted so that there will not be more than 3 mm
clearance between the door and the door frame. The frame shall be designed so that
when attached to the wall, the wall clamping bolts will be exposed only on the inside
of the vault. The frame shall have leveling and adjusting screws to compensate for
building sag which may occur at any time in the future; and

3. The frames and locks will be securely installed to prevent removal of the frame or
disengagement of the lock from outside the vault area by welding to a continuous
steel imbed with a minimum 6-inch Neilson stud imbedded in a formed concrete
partition (Figure 6).

Figure 6: Vault Door Jamb at Concrete Partition

F. Door Hardware

1. Locks

(a) Doors shall be equipped with a three-wheel tumbler, key-change

combination lock, Group 1R lock as defined by UL 768 Standard for
Combination Locks;

(b) The lock’s dial ring shall be mounted so as to be flush to the surface
of the door. The attachment of the dial ring shall be firm and secure
without movement or side play. The lock case shall be firmly and securely
attached to the door by suitable and effective means to prevent movement
or side play to the lock case. The lock shall not be modified in any manner
from the formation supplied by the lock manufacturer, except that the
spindle may be cut to proper length.

2. Hinges. The door shall be mounted to the frame by not less than two anti-friction
bearing hinges, so designed to allow the door to be opened approximately 180
degrees. The hinges shall be removable from the outside;

3. Door stop. A door stop to prevent the door’s face hardware from striking wall
surfaces will be installed. The stop shall be designed to be wall mounted unless
otherwise specified. The stop shall be able to withstand hard usage and shall not
scratch or scar the door’s painted finish when the door is swung open against it;

4. Door striker. The door shall have a striker on both the front and hinged edges to
minimize play or shake in the door when in the locked condition. The fit of the
door to the striker on both the front and hinged edges shall be such that there is
not more than 1 mm play or shake in the door when the bolts are thrown to the
locked position;

5. Door threshold. The door threshold shall be designed to provide a ramp at the
door threshold of approximately 1/4-inch to permit free swing of the door after its
installation. If receptive cups, ports, or grooves are used, they shall be recessed
not less than 1/2-inch below the bolt in its extended position to prevent dirt or
other substances from obstructing the locking mechanism.

G. Windows and Openings

1. For new construction, armories shall have no windows or other access openings
directly inside of the armory;

2. For existing construction with windows or openings, they must be protected with
Class IV ballistic resistant glazing and a tool resistant barrier grille with screening
to prevent direct views into the armory;

3. Any opening directly from the armory larger than 96 sq. in. shall be protected by
the following barriers:

(a) 1/2-inch steel bars a maximum of 6 inches on center, vertically and

horizontally and spot welded at each intersection (Figure 7);

(b) All ducts, piping, and wiring conduits passing through the walls, ceiling,
or floor of the vault will pass through snug fitting sleeves at the time of
construction; and

4. Issuing windows will have an overhead roll-up metal shutter, coiling grille and
stainless steel counter (Figure 8).

(a) Manual operation with overhead counter-balance device. The shutter shall
consist of flat slats formed from 14-gauge stainless steel with stainless
steel end blocks welded to each end of alternate slats. The bottom of the
shutter will be reinforced with a stainless steel angle. (Provide proper
mounting members to meet building construction requirements.);

(b) The shutter housing shall be formed of 14-gauge steel;

(c) The shutter will be equipped with bars that cross the door from jamb
to jamb and prevent any movement of the door. The bars shall rest
in brackets welded to the jambs and have a locking hasp to prevent
unauthorized removal of the bars;

(d) Provide slide bolt locks on the coil side of shutters with hasps suitable for
a high security padlock;

(e) Provide neoprene resilient type seals located along the jamb edges,
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
554 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

bottom of shutter, and within the housing; and

(f) For additional protection, provide a coiling grille which will open from the
inside. A pocket will be provided on one side to stack the grilles and on
the other side the locking device needs to be concealed, secured, and not
accessible to the outside.

Figure 7: Manbar Barrier

Figure 8: Overhead Counter Shutter

H. Fire and Smoke Detection and Suppression System

1. Armories will be equipped with a minimum of a fire and smoke detection alarm
system plus a sprinkler fire suppression system. The fire alarm system will
provide notification to emergency response agencies. Specific requirements
include the following:

(a) Provide and install an enunciator panel to operate in conjunction with

the fire alarm system. The panel is to be located in the control room at a
location to be selected. Must meet appropriate NFPA codes;

(b) Fire and smoke detection sensors must be present in every area of the
armory.

I. Intrusion Detection System (IDS)

1. All CBP armory locations will have intrusion detection systems to protect
against unauthorized access. These systems will include: sensors; control units;
transmission lines; and monitoring units integrated to be capable of detecting all
breaches in security;

2. The system shall report directly to an alarm monitoring station, either on-site or
off-site for unmanned facilities. Security systems will also activate an audio signal
at the armory;

3. The intrusion detection system will include a central control station where alarms
will sound and a response force can be dispatched (an alarm bell located at the
armory is not acceptable). The intrusion detection system will be designed to
cause an alarm to sound at the central control panel and at the armory whenever
the system is turned off or malfunctions. On/Off, access, and secure switches not
located at a central control station will be located within the alarmed area;

4. Response force shall react to an active alarm as soon as possible, but in no

case may arrival at the scene exceed 15 minutes. Unmanned facilities will make
arrangements to connect alarms to The Federal Protective Service Mega Center,
or comparable Class A Monitoring Station with local police response, In the case
of an unmanned station, the alarm system shall have an automatic dialer to alert
the patrol agent in charge or the local Port Director or sub-office in case of an
intrusion when no one is in the office;

5. A sign shall be placed prominently at the entry to the armory indicating the use of
an IDS;

6. The armory will be equipped with a dual technology volumetric motion sensor
that detects the presence of individuals within the armory. Separate sensors must
be provided for each area of the armory;

7. The intrusion detection system will be equipped with an independent backup

power supply that provides a minimum of 4 hours of Uninterruptible power or
other duration as determined by a security analysis of the facility; and

8. Transmission lines for the alarm circuits from the armory to the central control
station will have either two independent means of alarm signal transmission or
line supervision with connecting lines electronically supervised to detect evidence
of tampering or malfunction. If two independent means are used, then one must
have either a radio or cellular telephone link. The system must be able to seize
control of the communication link. All links will be physically and electronically
secure. All cable lines need to be encased in metallic conduit. All equipment must
be mounted in tamper-resistant enclosures. Key control for the enclosures will be
the same as for the armory itself. For more information on IDS, refer to Appendix
8.9, Intrusion Detection Systems.

J. Communication Systems

1. An intercom or telephone link must be provided at the armory entrance

connected to the central control station to coordinate status changes;

2. The armory must also have a telephone connection, either in the armory or in the
issuing area, which is tied into the facility phone system for use by staff working
in the armory.

K. Access Control. At a minimum, all armories will be equipped with door and lock
position indicators with magnetic contacts. Automated access control systems may
be used. The system shall be capable of maintaining a record of who accessed
the armory room. Access control systems may use a keypad, card reader, or a
combination of both.

L. Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV). For armories in manned facilities, provide a CCTV

system with cameras viewing the exterior entrance and all areas of the interior. The
system must be continuously monitored at a staffed central control position. For
more information on CCTV refer to Appendix 8.12, Closed Circuit Television.

V. Mechanical Equipment
A. Environment Requirements. Weapons and ammunition shall be kept in a cool, dry
environment. Room dehumidifiers need to be installed in the armory. Install small
heating elements in the gun vaults.

B. Ventilation

1. Armories must have 15-minute Class M emergency vault ventilators and

ventilator ports per UL 680 Emergency Vault Ventilators and Ports (emergency
vault ventilators provide fresh air to persons locked in the armory by accident or
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
558 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

during robberies).

(a) The vault ventilating port is intended to be connected to an outside

ventilating system that provides circulating air while the vault is open;

(b) The port shall not be able to be rendered inoperable from outside of the
armory;

(c) The port will be equipped with a visual indicator showing the location of
the port to a person in the vault, and if the port is in the open or closed
position;

(d) The ventilator port shall allow for voice communication to someone outside
the vault and also allow the passage of small tools and food items to a
person inside the vault;

(e) The ventilator ports will allow for the supply of 10 cubic feet (0.28 cubic
meters) of fresh air per minute per 9 square meters (100 square feet) of
area;

(f) The ventilator port shall provide a minimum of 2 square inches (1250
square mm) of open area in case of a power failure;

(g) The port will be protected as described in paragraph IV.G.3. above; and

(h) The ventilator ports shall be placed so that cabinets or equipment cannot
be placed to obstruct the opening, both inside and outside the armory.

2. Ductwork for chemical storage room exhausts shall be of stainless steel

construction. Supply ducting shall be wrapped or lined to conserve energy,
eliminate condensation, and reduce noise;

3. In the issue vestibule, provide adequate ventilation air exchange of 50 cubic

feet (1.4 cubic meters) per minute of outside air in order to ensure the removal
of fumes and odors associated with solvents that are used in the cleaning of
firearms. Chemical storage rooms shall have 100% exhaust ventilation. Exhaust
vents shall be located away from air intake vents or equipment generating
sparks.

C. Air Inlets

1. Grilles, registers, and diffusers will be designed and fabricated similar to those
used in penal/detention facilities. The face shall be cold-rolled steel 3/16 of an
inch thick. Each unit shall be of welded construction and meet the requirements
of the American Society for Testing of Materials. Supply units shall be 1-, 2-, 3-,
or 4-way directional throw, as required, to provide a uniform air supply free of
drafts throughout the area.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
559 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

D. Electrical

1. Provide standard fluorescent light fixtures, switched inside the armory with some
fixtures circulated to an emergency power source. Place switches immediately
inside the armory. Provide continuous light at the exterior of the vault door;

2. Two duplex receptacles must be available inside each area of the armory.
Provide duplex electrical outlets at 3 feet on center and at 3.6 feet above the floor
at weapon maintenance counters. Provide a dedicated electrical circuit for the
pneumatic air cleaning system.

E. Plumbing

1. The equipment service area shall have access to a hand wash sink for use by
the staff. The sink area provides: hot and cold running water with lever fixtures, a
soap dispenser, mirror, paper towel dispenser, and waste receptacle;

2. If chemical storage is required, then the area will be provided with an emergency
eye wash station.

VI. Storage
A. The armory will be equipped with housing cabinets for specialized high value
equipment, weapons, ammunition, and chemical agents. The type of housing for
weapons varies in size, shape, level of security, and material used. Generically, they
take the following forms, depending on the type of weapons being used:

1. Cabinet;

2. Lockers;

3. Gun racks; and

4. Lock boxes.

B. Cabinets

1. Provide a 14-gauge welded double wall metal shell or body, with two-coat
epoxy finish, vents with flash arrestors, and a leak-proof sill. Provide 14-gauge
doors, with continuous piano type hinges, integral key dead bolt lock or hasp for
padlock. Locks shall be recessed into the door, with a 1/8-inch protective plate.
Provide combination or key operation. If key operation is used, design for armory
master key operation. Provide metal or wood shelves, adjustable to 1/2-inch on
center. Provide leveling legs and wall anchor to secure cabinet to the wall and
prevent cabinet from tipping over or being removed by unauthorized individuals.
Install security and safety warning labels as required. If chemical agents are to

be housed, provide an anti-static grounding system;

2. Cabinets may be equipped with pull out drawers constructed with slides designed
to support a minimum of 150 pounds. Each drawer shall have a combination
dead bolt lock. (Provide drawer inserts to accommodate specific weapon and
gear inventory.)

C. Lockers

1. Provide a 14-gauge welded double wall metal shell, or body, with two-coat epoxy
finish and sloped roof; having 14-gauge doors, continuous piano type hinges,
and integral dead bolt lock or hasp for padlock with combination or key operation.
If key operation is used, tie in to armory master key. Provide one to two metal
shelves and hooks for hanging items. Include leveling legs plus wall anchors to
secure locker to the partition to prevent locker from tipping over or being removed
by unauthorized individuals. Provide locker numbers and security and safety
warning labels as required by type of inventory.

D. Gun Rack

1. Open gun racks must be designed to accommodate rifles, shotguns, and

automatic weapons. They should allow for height adjustment up to a minimum of
38 inches;

2. Gun racks need to be constructed of 14-gauge welded steel. They should have
felt-cushioned butt support and barrel rests; and

3. Gun racks will be secured to walls and have either a bar that locks the weapons
in place, or a cable that can be threaded through the weapons to secure them in
place.

E. Ammunition. Ammunition may be stored on open shelf systems within the armory.
Shelf units may be constructed of either wood or metal. Shelf units shall be secured
to armory partitions to keep the shelf units from falling over.

F. Lock Boxes. Cabinets configured with lock boxes may be used to store restricted
inventory in the armory. Lock boxes shall be constructed to comply with the
requirements of UL 1037 Anti-theft Alarms and Devices Residential Secure
Containers. Lock boxes will be double walled minimum 14-gauge steel construction
with a minimum 14-gauge steel door; and secured to the partition or floor. They shall
have individual keyed dead bolt locks, and a key for all other locks.

G. Other Storage Devices. The armory shall have coat hooks and pegs for storage of
gear and leather goods in the open air or in vented cabinets to allow moisture to

escape. Armory wall surfaces need to have pegboard finishes to allow for hanging
inventory.

VII. Weapons Service Equipment

A. Guns produce lead dust during use. When cleaned, the lead dust can contaminate
solvents, rags, and other items used while cleaning the gun; therefore, gun service
areas must be designed to control lead contaminates.

B. Areas for servicing weapons and equipment will include counters at 42 inches above
the floor. The counters may be plastic laminate or stainless steel. The counters
need to have knee space, and may have equipment drawers, pedestals, and upper
cabinets for storage of equipment, cleaning supplies, and solvents. Storage space
must also be provided for safety devices, such as goggles and gloves.

C. A hazardous material storage container shall be provided in the gun service area
for disposal of contaminated rags. Signage must be placed on the container
indicating the presence of lead contaminates and at the counter instructing that all
contaminated materials must be disposed of properly.

D. The gun service area may also contain power tools and other equipment such as
grinders, lathes, milling machines, drill presses, and refinishing equipment.

VIII. Independent Armory Magazine Structures

A. If the armory is located in a separate structure more than 500 feet from other
occupied facilities or is larger than 300 square feet, the building housing the function
must be equipped with male and female toilet facilities. (These facilities must be
accessible for individuals with disabilities.)

1. If the armory is located in a separate structure and will contain large quantities
of ammunition on pallets, it shall be equipped with a receiving dock having an
elevated platform 4 feet above the vehicle parking surface. The vehicle parking
surface shall extend 120 feet beyond the dock edge to accommodate tractor-
trailer delivery vehicles. The dock shall have a 50-foot by 12-foot area for
unloading of delivery vehicle contents;

2. The armory located in a separate structure may require an office space for range
master duties with views to the issue window and receiving dock; and

3. Armories in an independent structure will require mechanical, electrical,

telephone, and janitor closet space. Physical plant equipment spaces shall not
open directly into armory storage areas. Exhaust and air supply vents need to be
located remotely from any direct exhaust from storage areas.

B. Armories located in separate structures need to have perimeter security fences. The
fences shall be located a minimum of 20 feet (6 meters) from the structure, providing
a buffer zone for security monitoring. It will be a minimum of 10 feet (2.4 meters)
high and have a sloped top or include concertina wire integrated to the top of the
fence.

IX. Additional Considerations

A. Ready Rooms

1. Requirements. Space may be required for the storage of: clothing articles; fire
and medical emergency response equipment; communication equipment; and
other gear used by officers to respond to special situations. Ready rooms are not
for the storage of weapons, ammunition, or chemical agents. They do not need to
be designed to the same level of security as armory rooms;

2. Location. Ready rooms may be placed in public or staff corridor areas where
officers can immediately access equipment;

3. Walls. Either core filled concrete masonry unit (CMU) walls, or expanded steel
mesh reinforced gypsum wallboard and metal stud partitions may be used.
Concrete masonry walls may be constructed with the cores and kerfs filled with
concrete. No steel reinforcing is need for security purposes;

4. Gypsum wall board partitions with steel mesh shall be constructed of: one layer
of gypsum wall board on each face, over 9-gauge expanded metal mesh under
the outside face, on 3 5/8-inch metal studs. The partitions shall extend from
structural floor to structural deck above;

5. Ceilings. Ready rooms may have standard suspended acoustical tile ceiling
or be exposed to underside of the structure. When existing conditions prevent
extension of partitions to the structural deck above, provide a secure ceiling
consisting of 1.5 inches of plaster on metal lath or 14-gauge perforated metal pan
screwed on metal runners;

6. Doors. Provide 12-gauge hollow metal doors 1 3/4 inches and a 12-gauge hollow
metal frame. Non-removable pin hinges must be provided. A keypad or cipher
lock will be included in order that officers can access the ready room without
having to obtain keys during an emergency. The lockset shall allow emergency
egress from inside the ready room;

7. Windows and Openings. Ready rooms in new construction shall not have
windows. Existing windows shall be protected with tempered glass, fixed glazing
panels, or a wire mesh barrier grille. Exposed openings shall have a 14-gauge
steel barrier grille;

8. Security. Ready rooms shall have balanced magnetic door switches and an
electric strike connected to a central monitoring station and to audio alarms at the
ready room;

9. Fire Detection and Suppression. Ready rooms need fire and smoke detection
sensors. The system shall be connected to a central monitoring station and audio
alarms at the ready room. Ready rooms shall be provided with sprinklers based
on building occupancy requirements;

10. Mechanical System and Ventilation. The ready room shall have standard
mechanical service with a minimum supply of 20 cubic feet of fresh air per minute
per 9 square 100 square feet;

11. Electrical and Lighting. The ready room shall have standard fluorescent
light fixtures switched inside the ready room. Occupancy sensors shall be
incorporated that turn the light off after extended periods of time when the room
is unoccupied. A duplex electrical outlet needs to be provided on each wall of the
ready room where they are not obstructed by cabinets or stored items; and

12. Equipment. The ready rooms shall be equipped with shelving units, cabinets,
cabinet drawers, lockers, hooks, and pegboards for storage of equipment with
a minimum 20-gauge steel construction. Individual units do not require key or
combination locks. These units need to be provided with floor leveling devices,
and shall be secured to partitions to prevent tipping over of loaded units.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BACK Return to Table of Contents

Appendix 11.14: Screening Procedures

I. Public Entrances/Exits
A. X-ray machines are used to scan bags, briefcases, purses, packages, boxes,
mail trails and parcels for the detection of weapons, explosives, narcotics, and
flammables using X-ray technology.

B. Magnetometers are used to scan individuals for the detection of metal using
electromagnetic technology.

C. Facility security standards indicate that the placement of X-ray and magnetometer
screening devices at all public entrances for the screening of visitors, contractors,
etc., and all of their purses, bags, briefcases, packages, etc., is:

1. Mandatory for Level IV facilities, a standard based on facility evaluation by CBP

for Level III facilities;

2. Desirable for Level II facilities;

3. Not applicable for Level I facilities.

4. Additionally, the X-raying of all packages entering the building delivered by

contractors, couriers, etc., is mandatory for Level IV facilities, a standard based
on facility evaluation by CBP for Level III facilities, desirable for Level II facilities,
and not applicable for Level I facilities; and

5. Radiation screening devices are only for use in Level IV facilities based on a
facility evaluation and determination made by CBP.

II. Receiving and Shipping

A. Facility security standards require that X-raying all incoming packages and mail is
mandatory for Level IV facilities, a standard based on facility evaluation by CBP for
Level III facilities, and desirable for Level II and I facilities. At a minimum, appropriate
security precautions must be established for all deliveries to include controlled bulk
freight arriving at a facility loading dock if it is not X-rayed.

III. Lighting Requirements

A. Illumination of 70 foot-candles at minimum must be provided at the workstations
and must afford visibility without shadows or glare. Additional task lighting is to be
provided directly over these examination work areas.

1. CBP Mobile X-ray Vans/Units (Parcel X-ray and Personal X-ray)

2. Large Commercial Vehicle and Truck Inspection Facilities

(a) X-ray;

(b) Ion mobility;

(d) Gamma ray imaging; and

(e) Neutron analysis.

Figure 1: Mobile VACIS - Gamma Ray Imaging Figure 2: Mobile Search Advanced X-ray
System Portable Inspection System

IV. Under-Vehicle Lighting System

A. These are systems used to illuminate the underside or other areas of a vehicle.
In addition to providing a sufficient amount of lighting, the quality of lighting must
be good enough to allow thorough screening. The system should aim to eliminate
shadows and create contrast.

1. Cargo and Vehicle Inspection Systems;

2. Safety and Regulatory Considerations; and

3. Mobile Vehicle Inspection Systems (Imaging).

Table 1: Sample Power Requirements for Fixed Inspection Systems

Inspection System Power Requirements Notes

AS&E Shaped Energy

Includes power to inspection equipment and
ISO Search X-ray 100 kVA site power
power for gantry transport
Inspection System

SAIC Portal VACIS 3 kVA per lane 120/240 VAC

SAIC VACIS II (track 30A , 220-240 VAC Documentation indicates 5kW of backup
system) power is sufficient for the VACIS II system
components, additional power required for
operating booth, HVAC, etc.

V. Geometric Design of Roadways Facilities

A. Develop facilities in accordance with the guidelines provided above except as
modified in the following sections.

B. X-ray and Magnetometer Screening Devices

C. Radiation Screening Devices

D. X-ray Screening Devices

E. Irradiation Devices

1. Irradiation devices are used to attempt to render safe a biological device that may
have been maliciously placed in mail. Irradiation devices are a standard for use
in Level IV and III facilities based on a facility evaluation and determination made
by CBP. Irradiation devices are desirable in Level II and I facilities.

VI. Construction Requirements

A. Detailed drawings of the Secondary X-ray Processing Workstations are included in
the appendix and should be used in conjunction with the provided specifications.
Each CBP Secondary X-ray Processing Workstations houses a personal computer
(CPU, monitor, and keyboard), a document reader, a printer, and ancillary lighting
and equipment.

B. Specifications and planning guidance must be obtained from CBP. However, the
overall design of the Secondary X-ray Processing Workstations must protect the
officer from physical assault and provide an immediate means of egress in case of
an emergency.

VII. Electronic Vehicle Entry Control

A. The function of an entry-control system is to ensure that only authorized personnel
are permitted into or out of a controlled area. Entry can be controlled by locked fence
gates, locked doors to a building or rooms within a building or specially designed
portals.

B. These means of entry control can be applied manually by guards or automatically

by using entry-control devices. In a manual system, guards verify that a person
is authorized to enter an area, usually by verifying the photograph and personal
characteristics of the individual requesting entry. In an automated system, the entry-
control device verifies that a person is authorized to enter or exit. The automated
system usually interfaces with locking mechanisms on doors or gates that open
momentarily to permit passage. Mechanical hardware (such as locking mechanisms,
electric door strikes, and specially designed portal hardware) and equipment used
to detect contraband (such as metal detectors, X-ray baggage-search systems,
explosives detectors, and special nuclear-material monitors) are described in other
documentation.

C. All entry-control systems control passage by using one or more of three basic
techniques: Coded, credential, and biometric.

D. CBP often stations mobile X-ray equipment at select airports based on operational
requirements. These vehicles must be housed in a secure enclosure when not in use.

1. The enclosure should provide shelter from the elements as well as protection from
acts of vandalism and theft. A garage or space within the airport terminal building,
accessible from the airfield operations area (AOA), is acceptable. Enclose this area
with solid walls or floor to ceiling 11-gauge chain link fencing with tension cables
top and bottom. Provide vehicle gates with locks keyed individually to a CBP
master. The enclosure must have a minimum ceiling height of 9 feet. No special
HVAC is required.

E. For continuous daily operation, the X-ray vans/units will require adequate dedicated
electrical service (120VAC 20AMP) from weatherproof outlets or by an onboard
gasoline generator if necessary.

F. A large vehicle inspection facility may be a separate, centralized facility or combined

into the functions of a commercial/large vehicle. The following guidelines are intended
to provide general considerations in the design of such an inspection facility.

1. An installed large vehicle inspection facility is intended to be the single point of

inspection for all large commercial and truck traffic intending to pass through the
installation. Once a vehicle is inspected and authorized to access an installation,
that vehicle may be tracked and monitored until it enters and exits the installation;

2. The design of the large vehicle inspection station should be based on the usage
of large vehicle inspection equipment;

3. Since many of these devices are not currently deployed, the design should
include space for vehicle inspection equipment and provide utility conduits to the
anticipated location for future use. The inspection equipment may be a mobile or
stationary. It should be noted that some detection equipment is built-in to a large,
drive-through structure. If this type of equipment is anticipated, then this could
be coordinated and incorporated into the inspection office and overhead canopy
facilities;

4. Installations planning closed-circuit television (CCTV) inspection of the top and

underside of vehicles should mount these cameras on the overhead canopy and
in the pavement below the vehicle;

5. At a minimum, the inspection facility should possess the infrastructure to support

the installation of CCTV inspection equipment, to include adequate lighting to
illuminate the underside of the vehicles during inspection; and

6. Some installations may also consider the use of vehicle inspection pits, although
this type of facility is not recommended due to commonly encountered soil
conditions and anticipated operational safety issues. The following sections
contain information on various inspection-related devices in order to facilitate
the layout of the truck inspection facility and the determination of the required
infrastructure to support inspection equipment.

VIII. CCTV Under Vehicle Search Systems (UVSS)

A. The effectiveness of these systems has not been fully assessed and results of
initial testing vary. Therefore, the use of CCTV UVSS should be in accordance with
Service guidelines.

B. If a CCTV UVSS is utilized, evaluate the following considerations and guidelines:

1. Consider maintenance requirements. Is the equipment self-cleaning?

(a) If installed below grade, is the enclosure waterproof? Is the vault and
equipment designed to support large vehicle loading?

2. Install the system far enough in advance of the access control point so that the
largest vehicle can pass over the equipment without entering the installation;

3. Drainage should be established such that water drains away from the equipment.

(a) When providing drains from the equipment enclosure, provide backflow
prevention valves to prevent water from entering the vault. Ensure any
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
570 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

water that may be captured in the vault will not drain through control
conduit to the control center.

4. The electrical circuit serving the equipment should be a ground fault interrupt
(GFI) circuit;

5. Monitoring area should be free of glare;

6. Vehicle speed should be kept below 15 mph (24.1 km/h) to ensure adequate
performance; and

7. Where exposed to freezing temperatures, the equipment installation should

include heaters.

C. There are many types of automated inspection equipment for large vehicle or cargo
inspection. Some of those available, including X-ray and gamma ray inspection
systems, provide an image of the contents of a vehicle or container. Due to the wide-
ranging requirements for the different manufactured systems, it is not possible to
provide detailed guidance that will support all types of this equipment. However, this
section will identify the important infrastructure considerations associated with both
mobile and fixed X-ray/gamma ray inspection systems.

1. These systems offer the ability to inspect vehicles or containers without removing
the cargo. The equipment typically consists of a transmitter (X-ray or gamma ray)
and a detector on the opposite side of the target vehicle;

2. Gamma ray systems utilize a low-level, gamma-ray radiation source to generate

a beam of gamma rays to penetrate the object. The detectors on the opposite
side then measure the amount of gamma ray absorption:

(a) This data is then translated into an image of the contents of the vehicle
or container. X-ray systems typically utilize electro-mechanical equipment
to generate X-rays to penetrate the object. Detectors on the opposite
side then record the X-ray transmission, which is then translated into
an image. The Mobile Search and Shaped Energy ISO Search systems
(discussed below) also include a detector on the transmission side of the
unit that detects the X-ray reflections which occur from organic materials,
producing a second type of image of the contents.

D. Due to the use of gamma or X-ray radiation, there are safety and regulatory
considerations in the use of these systems. The requirements vary depending on
the system. Normally an exclusion zone, an area where personnel are not permitted
during operation of the equipment, is established within and around the inspection
equipment. The region outside of the exclusion zone is considered safe for
personnel during scanning operations. The size of the exclusion zone varies greatly
depending on the type of equipment.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
571 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

E. Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations State that radiation dose limits in

Public-Uncontrolled areas are 2 mR in any hour or 100 mR in any year. Therefore,
depending on the characteristics of the source, the frequency of scans, and the
expected occupancies, the exclusion zone can vary. Additionally, a shielding wall can
be constructed to reduce the dose substantially. Some X-ray systems have qualified
as a “cabinet X-ray system” in accordance with Food and Drug Admnistration (FDA)
regulations or similar standards, meaning minimal shielding is required and the
exclusion zone does not extend outside of the footprint of the inspection area. In
order to qualify for this designation, FDA regulations require an emission limit of
0.5 mR per hour at 2 in (5 cm) from the surface of the cabinet. Other regulatory
considerations are that systems utilizing radioactive sources may require operation
under a radiation materials license held and administered by the owner of the
equipment (the installation) and a permit for operation may be required.

F. There are several truck-based, mobile large vehicle or container inspection systems
currently available. Two examples are illustrated in Figure 3. These systems utilize a
boom type arm to form an inspection tunnel.

G. In no case are vehicle operators to remain in the vehicle during a scan. The operator
is either to exit the vehicle or the vehicle is positioned such that the operator is
outside the scan area prior to the scan initiating.

H. In order to properly plan the required space for this type of equipment, the detailed
operational procedures must be reviewed.

I. The Mobile Search system is designed to acquire images by traveling at a constant

velocity past any number of parked vehicles in a line. This is accomplished using an
electric secondary drive motor that propels the vehicle at a constant velocity.

J. The Mobile Search system is capable of scanning only on the “driver’s side” of the
Mobile Search vehicle.

K. The maximum height of the boom is 16 ft 6 in (5.03 m), with a maximum scanned
vehicle dimension of 8 ft 6 in (2.59m) wide x 14 ft (4.27 m) high. The width of the
equipment with boom and stairs deployed is 25 ft (7.62 m).

Figure 3: Two Truck-Based, Mobile Large Vehicle or Container Inspection System

IX. Mobile VACIS

A. The Mobile Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System (VACIS) is designed to acquire
images by either traveling past a stationary vehicle or in a pass-through mode as a
moving vehicle passes through the scan area.

B. The system can conduct operations on either side of the VACIS vehicle.

C. The vehicle requires a clear height of 20 ft (6.1 m) and a surface grade of less than
5%. The exclusion zone for each system is illustrated in Figure 4.

D. Exclusion zones are based on the 2mR in any one-hour dose limit. The 100 mR per
year limit may govern the location of a permanent facility.

E. Self-contained portable units require no land based power or other facilities.

F. If an entry control facility or truck inspection station design is to incorporate a

portable vehicle inspection system similar to those illustrated above, but no system
specification exists, the following recommendations regarding site development
should be followed:

1. Provide a 35-ft (10.7 m) wide x 110-ft (33.5 m) long paved inspection area for use
by the portable equipment. This provides enough width for the inspection system

and the travel lane for the vehicles to be inspected. The length is sufficient to
allow the inspection system to scan a large stationary vehicle and maneuver;

2. To increase throughput, provide a longer inspection lane for operation of a

portable system that scans stationary vehicles. This will allow the system to scan
several vehicles at one time;

3. Provide no canopy over the inspection area planned or dedicated for use by the
portable equipment unless the clear height is a minimum of 22 ft (6.7 m);

4. Site all permanent facilities or guard posts such that they would remain outside
of the exclusion zone. A shielding wall may be required if there are occupied
buildings or areas near the detector;

5. Situate all permanent facilities such that they are not in the direction of travel of
the radiation beam unless the distance between the inspection vehicle and the
facility is at least 300 ft (90m.) The intent is to ensure that the 100 mR / year
radiation dose limit is not exceeded for personnel who may be in the direction of
travel of the radiation. This distance can be reduced to 75.5 ft (23 m) if a 12 in
(305 mm) wide x 8 ft (2.4 m) high (minimum) concrete shielding wall is provided
between the radiation source and any facility of concern; and

6. The determination of exclusion zones should also consider oblique scan angles,
which some inspection systems can implement.

Figure 4: Exclusion Zones for Mobile Inspection Systems

G. There is a wide range of fixed vehicle inspection systems. The systems operate in a
manner very similar to the mobile systems. The types of systems can be categorized
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
574 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

as follows:

1. Stationary Target Vehicle - transmission source and detector travel past the
target on a rail system or similar platform;

2. Controlled Target Vehicle - vehicle is moved through a fixed inspection system on

a platen or gantry transport, on a rail system, or similar device; and

3. A Portal system - with a fixed inspection system where vehicles pass-through the
equipment

H. Examples of these systems are illustrated in Figure 5, Figure 6, and Figure 7. The
space requirements vary from minimal for the portal system to significant for a
transport or stationary vehicle system.

Top: Figure 5: Fixed / Portable Vehicle X-ray Inspection Systems (Imaging)

Bottom: Figure 6: Portal VACIS – Gamma Ray Imaging System

Figure 7: VACIS II Gamma Ray Imaging System

I. As outlined for the mobile inspection systems, exclusion zones may be required for
the fixed systems. For illustration purposes, the exclusion zones and/or radiation
levels associated with the VACIS II and AS&E Shaped Energy ISO Search systems
are provided in Figures 8-10. Note that the VACIS II exclusion zones depend on the
type of radioactive isotope used and the presence of a shielding wall. Some systems
have no exclusion zone outside of the actual scan area. In no case are the vehicle
operators to remain in the vehicle during a scan. The operator is either to exit the
vehicle or the vehicle is positioned such that the operator is outside the scan area
prior to the scan initiating.

Figure 8: Shaped Energy ISO Search X-ray Inspection System

Figure 9: VACIS II – Gamma Ray Imaging System Exclusion Zones

(Cesium Source with and without Shielding Wall)

Figure 10: VACIS II – Gamma Ray Imaging System Exclusion Zones

(Cobalt Source with and without Shielding Wall)

X. Space Requirements For Fixed/Portable System Layout

Figure 11: Large Vehicle Inspection Facility – Mobile Imaging Systems

Figure 12: Large Vehicle Assessment Facility – Fixed Imaging System

XI. Fixed/Portable Systems

A. The power requirements of fixed/portable systems vary widely depending on
the system type. Gamma-ray systems use a radioactive source to generate the
transmission rays. This requires less power compared to an X-ray system, which
generates the X-ray transmission using electro-mechanical means. Table 1
illustrates the potential power requirements.

B. If an inspection system is specified, consult with the manufacturer concerning

the latest requirements for power. If no inspection system is specified, and the
future inclusion of a system is likely, the design of the electrical power system
should consider an allowance to provide sufficient site power to support this future
requirement.

C. The space requirements of imaging systems vary greatly.

1. Systems that require a stationary vehicle or move the vehicle on a rail or platen
system past fixed detectors require the most space;

2. A portal system requires minimal space.

D. Design of an entry control facility or truck inspection station is to incorporate a fixed

vehicle inspection system similar to those illustrated above.

E. If the system is unspecified the following recommendations regarding site

development should be followed:

1. Provide a 35-ft (10.7-m) wide x 110-ft (33.5-m) long paved inspection area for
use by the fixed equipment. This provides enough width for the inspection system
and the length of travel for the equipment or a platen/gantry system. The length
is sufficient to allow the inspection system to scan a large stationary vehicle and
maneuver;

2. Provide a longer inspection lane for operation of a portable system that scans
stationary vehicles, allowing the system to scan several vehicles at one time and
increasing throughput;

3. A minimum clear height of 22 ft (6.7 m) is required for a canopy over inspection

lanes dedicated for use by the fixed equipment. This is conservative since some
systems will operate with a clear height of 15 feet (4.57 m) and could be installed
under a canopy;

4. Consider provisions for automated inspection equipment to be installed prior

to the main inspection area. It is often desirable to complete any automated
inspection such as under vehicle screening system (UVSS) or imaging prior
to arriving at the main, covered inspection area for identification and further
inspection tasks. Therefore these functions should precede the final inspection
area. Most inspection systems are designed to be outside and do not require
shelter from the weather;

5. Position all permanent facilities or guard posts such that they would remain
outside of the exclusion zone. A shielding wall may be required if there are
occupied buildings or areas near the detector; and

6. Locate all permanent facilities such that they are not in the direction of travel of
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
582 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

the transmission beam unless the distance between the inspection vehicle and
the facility is at least 300 ft (90m.) The intent is to ensure that the 100 mR/year
radiation dose limit is not exceeded for personnel who may be in the direction of
travel of the radiation. This distance can be reduced if a shielding wall meeting
manufacturer’s guidance is provided between the radiation source and any
facility of concern.

F. Provide channelization islands a minimum of 5 ft (1.5 m) wide to support the future

installation of a portal inspection system.

G. The layout of the large vehicle inspection facility is extremely important to ensure the
facility will function properly.

H. The civil design should consider the turning radius and other operating
characteristics of the expected vehicle types.

I. The facility should have multiple lanes of inspection to support different vehicle types
or varying inspection levels.

J. The design should have adequate stacking distances for the anticipated queue and
parking for vehicles to be inspected and security vehicles.

K. Parking areas should be sized for the range and volume of expected vehicles to be
inspected.

L. Consider providing a sally port in the inspection area:

1. A sally port configuration is created through the use of vehicle barricades or

traffic gates;

2. These barriers are intended to confine the vehicle during inspection until it is
determined that the vehicle is authorized to proceed or if the vehicle is denied
admission to the installation; and

3. The barriers can be used to aid in positioning the vehicle relative to inspection
equipment.

M. Some installations may require screening of the inspection operations from the
remaining portions of the Entry Control Facility (ECF).

N. Screening may increase safety and shields the inspection procedures from public
view to prevent visual surveillance from unauthorized personnel.

O. As discussed above in Space Requirements for Fixed/Portable System, the

inspection equipment can have a significant impact on the layout of a truck
inspection facility. It is difficult to develop a layout that can support all potential types
of automated inspection equipment.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
583 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

P. If the installation specifies the anticipated inspection systems, then the layout can be
customized.

Q. If the specific system is not identified, but the use of imaging or related inspection
equipment is anticipated, the layout should facilitate the future incorporation of this
equipment.

R. Figures 11 and 12 illustrate the incorporation of several types of inspection

equipment into the layout of a large vehicle inspection facility. As illustrated, it is
possible to provide areas for future equipment or as a minimum reserve space for
the equipment when developing the site plan for an inspection facility. The following
sections provide further detailed design guidance.

1. Design roadways in a Large Vehicle Inspection Facility in accordance with the

guidelines provided. Consider following the requirements to support oversized,
atypical vehicles such as those frequently encountered during construction
operations.

XII. Channelization Islands

A. The minimum raised channelization island should be 5 ft (1.5 m) wide, 6 in (152 mm)
high and 50 ft (15.2 m) long. A channelization island should be provided between
each incoming traffic lane. These islands provide a safe position for security
personnel and a location to mount present/future vehicle inspection devices.

XIII. Width
A. The minimum lane width should be 16 ft (4.9 m) in the inspection area. A preferred
lane width of 18 ft (5.5 m) is recommended. The increased lane widths are required
to facilitate manual inspection procedures and to support the potential for future
automated inspection technology. Outside of the inspection area, the minimum lane
width facilitating the flow of traffic and other operations is 12 ft (3.6 m).

B. Inspection areas should be a minimum of 18 x 80 ft (5.5 x 24.4 m) x 17 feet 6 in (5.4

m) high that can be enclosed to protect inspection equipment in the event of bad
weather.

XIV. Vertical Clearances

A. In order to support potential over height vehicles or future pavement overlays, a
minimum vertical clearance of 17 ft (5.2 m) should be maintained throughout the
inspection facility. Higher clearance may be desirable for inspection equipment.

B. Provide a minimum clear height of 17 ft 6 in (5.4 m).

XV. Inspection Office

A. The inspection office serves as the central control center for the truck inspection
station and provides shelter for security personnel. Every truck inspection station
should have an inspection office. As the control center, the inspection office controls
the vehicle barricades, traffic control devices, access controls, and lighting. The
office should include space for the following equipment and functions:

1. Support 3-5 security personnel;

2. House communications equipment;

3. Contain electronic control panels for all current or anticipated future automated
gates or barriers;

4. Monitor stations for CCTV or computer monitors associated with automation

controls, UVSS, and imaging systems;

5. Include an electrical room for the main electric panel boards and electronic
controls;

6. Include locker storage for traffic control devices, weapons, and personnel
equipment including vehicle inspection kits and the pre-positioning of personal
protective equipment for CBR exposure;

7. Develop space for storing and charging batteries for communication and/or
inspection equipment;

8. House computer servers for future automated identification systems;

9. Provide counter or work space; and

10. Include waiting/processing area for vehicle occupants.

XVI. Cargo Handling Equipment and Storage

A. Although advanced inspection equipment is designed to inspect the contents of a
suspect vehicle without opening or removing the cargo, it is anticipated that removal
of cargo will be necessary at times for a complete inspection. In addition, current
inspection procedures frequently require the removal of all or portions of the cargo
in the suspect vehicle. Therefore, the truck inspection station should have cargo
handling equipment and storage areas to provide temporary storage of material
removed from suspect vehicles. The size of this area should be based on the
anticipated demand.

XVII. Electrical Power Requirements

A. Electrical design shall consider current power demands as well as the power
requirements for future traffic control devices, identification equipment, and other
devices associated with potential automation of the inspection station. This includes
an allowance for the power demands of future vehicle inspection equipment, such as
fixed large vehicle X-ray devices. See the section on Space Requirements for Fixed/
Portable System for additional information concerning vehicle inspection equipment.

XVIII. Exterior Lighting

A. IESNA HB-9 and TM 5-811-1 discuss exterior lighting for general security
purposes. The parking and roadway areas of the truck inspection station should
have a minimum illumination of 3 footcandle (30 lux). The areas where the actual
inspections take place should be illuminated to a minimum of 10 footcandle (100
lux).

1. It may also be necessary to provide additional task lighting in the ID and

inspection areas to support adequate identification of vehicle occupants and
contents. Lighting may also be mounted at or below pavement level to facilitate
under vehicle inspection or associated with under vehicle inspection systems
(see the section on Space Requirements for Fixed/Portable System).

XIX. Perimeter Fence and Gate

1. Ensure that where the inspection facility is part of a Commercial/Large Vehicle
Entrance Control Facility (ECF), each ECF has a gate enabling the ECF to be
closed at the installation perimeter when not in use;

2. Reinforce gate with cables as indicated in UFC 4-022-02 to increase resistance

to a moving vehicle threat;

3. Secure a Type III Barricade to the gate horizontally in accordance with Manual
Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD) (3 per lane). This configuration enables
a reduced potential penetration and maximizes stand-off when the ECF is not in
use;

4. Secure a centralized truck inspection facility located off installation with a security
fence in accordance with service regulations; and

5. Include a gate enabling the inspection facility to be closed at the perimeter of the
site when not in use.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Return to Table of Contents

BACK

Appendix 14: Building-Specific Security Alert Plan

I. General

INSERT BUILDING NUMBER

INSERT BUILDING ADDRESS

A. Purpose and Scope

1. The purpose of this plan is to provide appropriate security countermeasures for

____BUILDING ADDRESS__________ during heightened security conditions
due to emergency situations such as terrorist attack, natural disaster, and civil
unrest.

2. During periods of heightened alert, it may be prudent to increase security at this

facility over and above day-to-day security countermeasures. In order to ensure
rapid escalation of security in the face of an increased threat, it is critical that a
measured response be planned in advance. This plan provides five tiered sets of
security measures to be taken in case of a change in the Security Alert level.

B. Definitions

1. Designated official. The highest ranking official of the primary customer agency or
the alternate highest ranking official or designee selected by mutual agreement
by other customer agency officials is responsible for developing, implementing
and maintaining a current Occupant Emergency Plan (OEP) for each facility. See
Chapter 15, Occupant Emergency Plan, for more information on the OEP.

2. Contingency plans. Detailed plans designed to incorporate all the elements

needed in order to direct the implementation of a response to an emergency
situation that will ensure the protection of GSA-controlled facilities. Regions
are responsible for developing regional specific plans that contain operational
guidelines and procedures to address all possible contingencies for emergency
situations. These plans should support and not conflict with established OEPs.

3. Continuity of Operations Plans (COOP). Detailed advance plans for the

relocation of business services to designed alternate sites based on nature and
severity of impact of threat or catastrophic event.

4. Emergency Situation. For the purpose of these guidelines, this will include:
bombings, bomb threats, explosions and other hostile or destructive acts, civil
disturbances, natural disasters, etc.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
588 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Return to Table of Contents
BACK

5. Security alert. A condition, designated by a color, that is declared when an

analysis of information gathered or the presence of an existing situation dictates
the advisability of increasing the level of security.

6. Background. The purpose of the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) is

to advise government, industry, and the public of the Nation’s current threat alert
level. It combines threat information with vulnerability assessments and provides
communications to public safety officials and the public to enact appropriate
security countermeasures.

(a) Homeland Security Threat Advisories contain actionable information

about an incident involving, or a threat targeting, critical national networks
or infrastructures or key assets. They could, for example, relay newly
developed procedures or protective measures that, when implemented,
would significantly improve the current security baseline. They could also
suggest a change in readiness posture, protective actions, or response.
This category includes products formerly named alerts, advisories, and
sector notifications. Advisories are targeted to Federal, State, and local
governments, private sector organizations, and international partners.

(b) Homeland Security Information Bulletins communicate information

of interest to the Nation’s critical infrastructures that do not meet
the timeliness, specificity or significance thresholds of warning
messages. Such information may include statistical reports, periodic
summaries, incident response or reporting guidelines, common
vulnerabilities and patches, and configuration standards or tools. It also
may include preliminary requests for information. Bulletins are targeted to
Federal, State, and local governments, private sector organizations, and
international partners.

(c) Color-coded Threat Level System is used to communicate with public

safety officials and the public at-large through a threat-based, color-
coded system so that protective measures can be implemented to
reduce the likelihood or impact of an attack. Raising the threat condition
has economic, physical, and psychological effects on the nation; so,
the Homeland Security Advisory System can place specific geographic
regions or industry sectors on a higher alert status than other regions or
industries, based on specific threat information.

C. Implementation

1. This security plan was developed by FPS in conjunction with and approved
by the Building Security Committee (BSC). No countermeasures will be
implemented as part of these plans without the concurrence of the BSC.

2. Implementation of the plan will be upon:

(a) A change in the HSAS Alert Level nationally, locally or with other respect
to the facility (i.e., transportation sector);

(b) By the GSA Administrator nationally;

(c) By a GSA Regional Administrator for the respective region;

(d) By the Director of the FPS nationally; or

(e) At a specific facility upon recommendation of FPS and with concurrence

of the BSC chairperson or Designated Official upon receipt of specific
threat information regarding the building meriting its implementation (i.e., a
planned demonstration).

3. The security plan is to be controlled as For Official Use Only, in accordance with
DHS policy on Sensitive but Unclassified Information. It is also marked “Law
Enforcement Sensitive,” which although not a control mechanism indicates the
sensitivity and type of information contained herein.

4. This security plan will be reviewed with the BSC and revised as necessary as
part of each recurring BSA or upon request of the BSC Chairperson.

D. Responsibilities

1. Federal Protection Services (FPS)

(a) FPS will ensure Plans are developed in conjunction with BSCs and are
reviewed and updated at least as often as the periodic BSA is conducted.

(b) FPS will notify the BSC of changes to the Homeland Security Alert Level
and other conditions that merit a corresponding change in security
measures.

(c) FPS will coordinate with the BSC and GSA with regard to implementing
increased alert levels absent a declaration by the DHS.

(d) FPS will notify suppliers of services and equipment to be delivered upon
implementation (i.e., notifying guard companies of an increased staffing
requirement).

(e) FPS will establish appropriate contracting mechanisms to facilitate rapid

delivery of services in support of the Plan.

(f) FPS will provide other support as agreed to in the plan to implement
countermeasures (i.e., increased K-9 patrols, etc.).

(g) FPS will verify that countermeasures have been implemented.

(h) FPS will take appropriate steps for de-escalation once the Alert Level is
reduced.

2. Building Security Committee (BSC)

(a) The BSC will work with the Inspector to develop the security plan for the
building.

●● In signing the plan, the BSC indicates concurrence with the actions to
be taken.

●● If the plan requires funding to implement such as increased guard

presence, the Tenant Agencies will provide funding.

This Plan agreed to by:

____________________________________ _________________
FPS Regional Director date

____________________________________ _________________
Building Security Committee Chairperson date

Green Protective Measures

General Guidance Building Specific Actions
At regular intervals, remind customer agency
representatives to be suspicious and inquisitive about
strangers, particularly those carrying suitcases or other
containers. Watch for suspicious vehicles on or adjacent
to GSA property. Watch for abandoned parcels or
suitcases and any unusual activity.
Ensure the building manager or representative with
access to building plans and occupant emergency plans
is available at all times.
Recommend buildings, rooms, and storage areas not in
regular use be secured.
Review all plans and requirements related to introduction
of higher security level.
Require US Government picture identification for Federal
employees and a current valid government picture
identification (such as a drivers license, state identification
card, passport, or immigration card) system for visitors.
Inspect and search all packages, handbags, and
other containers, except those persons displaying US
Government credentials. Deny entrance to all persons
who refuse this inspection.
Check basement, engineering spaces, heating and air
conditioning ducts, shrubbery, and potential entry points
such as roof openings, steam and other utility tunnels,
doors and windows.
Refine and exercise preplanned proactive measures.
Ensure personnel receive training on Homeland Security
Alert System (HSAS) and department or agency-specific
protective measures. Regularly assess facilities for
vulnerabilities and take measures to reduce them.
Consult local authorities on the threat and mutual
antiterrorism measures.
Limit access points for vehicles and personnel
commensurate with a reasonable flow of traffic.
After normal duty hours ensure exterior and parking areas
floodlights are operating properly to discourage intruders.

Funding Impact Associated with these measures:

Blue Protective Measures

General Guidance Building Specific Actions
Continue, or introduce, all measures listed in Alert
Level Green.
Review all plans and requirements related to
introduction of higher security level.
Check communications with designated emergency
response or command locations. Review and update
emergency response procedures and provide the
public with necessary information.
Review and coordinate security measures for high-
risk personnel as appropriate.
Increase security spot checks of vehicles and
persons entering GSA property.

Funding Impact Associated with these measures:

Yellow Protective Measures

General Guidance Building Specific Actions
Continue, or introduce, all measures listed in Alert Level
Blue and warn customers of any other potential form of
terrorist attack.
Keep all personnel involved in implementing antiterrorist
contingency plans on call.
Check plans for implementation of the next alert level.
At the beginning and end of each workday, as well as at
other regular and frequent intervals inspect the interior
and exterior of buildings in regular use for suspicious
packages.
In the early stage inform the Building Security Committees
of actions to be taken. Explain reasons for actions.
Increase contacts with individuals responsible for activities
such as child care centers, and agencies with a high
amount of personal threat reporting, to build confidence
among staff.
Make customers aware of the general situation in order to
stop rumors and prevent unnecessary alarm.
Move unchecked cars and objects (i.e. crates, trash
containers) at least 100 feet from buildings. Use other
measures where distance cannot be achieved.
Request personnel who handle mail and deliveries
to scrutinize incoming material (above the regular
examination process) for letter or parcel bombs.
Implement additional security measures for high-risk
personnel as appropriate.
Consult local authorities on threat and mutual antiterrorism
measures.
Increase surveillance of critical facilities.
Implement appropriate contingency and emergency plans.
After normal duty hours require all employees and visitors
sign the building register upon entering and leaving the
building.

Funding Impact Associated with these measures:

Orange Protective Measures

General Guidance Building Specific Actions
Continue, or introduce, all measures listed in Alert
Level Yellow.
All FPS personnel are subject to emergency recall.
Limit facility access points to the absolute minimum.
Protect all designated vulnerable points.
Strictly enforce control of entry. Randomly search
vehicles.
Increase patrol tempo of security guards, police
officers, and Inspectors.
Erect barriers and obstacles to control traffic flow.
Consult local authorities about closing public streets
that might make facilities more vulnerable to attacks.
Restrict outside vehicular parking to 300 feet of the
facility. Use other measures where distance cannot
be achieved.
Coordinate necessary security efforts with armed
forces and other law enforcement agencies.

Funding Impact Associated with these measures:

Red Protective Measures

General Guidance Building Specific Actions
Continue, or introduce actions listed in Alert Level Orange.
Augment security guards as necessary.
Search all vehicles and their contents before allowing
entrance to the building.
Control access and implement positive identification of all
individuals with no exceptions.
Thoroughly search all suitcases, briefcases, and packages
brought into the building.
Make frequent checks of the exterior of buildings and parking
areas under GSA jurisdiction.
Coordinate the possible closing of public streets and facilities
with local authorities.
Activate the facility OEP.
FPS should assign emergency response personnel and pre-
position specialty trained teams. Monitor, redirect, and/or
constrain transportation systems.
Increase and/or redirect personnel to address critical
emergency needs.
Consider closing of facility.

Funding Impact Associated with these measures:

Occupant Emergency Plans: Guide

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BACK Return to Table of Contents

Occupant Emergency Plan (OEP) Guide: Introduction

In the post-911 world, emergency preparedness at work, at home, and in the community is
everyone’s responsibility. Planning for workplace emergencies is critical to reducing risk to
personnel and property. Individuals need to understand what emergencies could occur and
what actions to take if something happens. Life safety, communication, efficiency, and roles
and responsibilities are critical components to accomplishing facility safety and preparedness.
Emergencies can be handled routinely if building occupants are familiar with established
procedures and know pertinent emergency contact information.

●● Emergency plans are required for virtually all buildings. The Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) requires that an emergency action plan1 be developed and
implemented if fire extinguishers are required or provided in the workplace and if anyone
will be evacuating during a fire or other emergency. The Federal Management Regulations
41 FMR 102-74 requires that all Federal departments and agencies comply with the
occupational safety and health standards established in the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970 and develop and implement occupant emergency plans.

To be most effective at protecting life and property, all emergency plans should:
●● Provide clear instruction on roles and responsibilities for all aspects of the preparedness
spectrum from prevention and protection to response and recovery.
●● Use an all-hazards approach that includes procedures to handle a wide range of hazards
and threats that could affect a building such as medical emergencies, bomb threats,
suspicious packages, and natural disasters.
●● Meet the specific characteristics, needs, and criteria for each facility2. For example,
location-specific procedures are added to address unique threats or hazards such as
hazardous materials spills or releases of radioactive materials.
●● Involve coordination with local emergency responders and law enforcement to address
multi-jurisdictional issues regarding mass care, sheltering, and evacuation.
This Occupant Emergency Plan Guide is a tool that should be used in the construction and
update of OEPs. It provides assistance in the planning, development, and implementation
of facility-specific OEPs. Pairing this OEP Plan Guide with the OEP Template, emergency
planners should establish a foundation from which an OEP directly addresses protection goals
and objectives.

1 Refer to OSHA’s website for detailed information and instructions for preparation of emergency action plans.
http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/e-tools/evacuation/index.
html
2 For small, one-level facilities with fewer than 500 employees, emergency information may be entered on GSA Form 3415, Occupant Emergency Plan (abbreviated).

Table of Contents

Part 1: Prepare to Write the OEP

1.0 Get Organized

2.0 Gather Information on Threats and Capabilities

3.0 Coordinate with Internal and External Groups

4.0 Address Special Considerations

5.0 Enhanced Protection for Increased Threat

6.0 Post-Incident Recovery

7.0 Completing the OEP

Part 2 Write the OEP

Part 3 Implement and Maintain the OEP

1.0 Integrate Plan into Facility Operations

2.0 Training, Drills, and Exercises

3.0 Evaluate and Modify OEP

Attachments

1. General Responsibilities of the OEO Teams

2. Sample Emergency Procedures

3. Reviewing OEP Procedures and Identifying Best Practices

4. Additional Resources

Acronyms

I. Part 1: Prepare to Write the OEP

Before writing an OEP, it is important to get organized by establishing a planning team to
encourage participation and personal investment in the process, enhance the visibility and
stature of the planning process, and provide for a broad perspective on related issues. The
size of the planning team will depend on the facility’s operations, requirements and resources.
1.0 Get Organized
The responsibility for managing in emergencies in a Federally owned or leased facility is with
the Designated Official, who is the highest ranking official of the primary occupant agency, or a
designee selected by mutual agreement of occupant agency officials. The Designated Official
must supervise the development of the OEP and the staffing and training of the Occupant
Emergency Organization (OEO). The OEO coordinates all emergency response procedures in
each facility. The OEO should:
●● Be limited in size. Carefully determine how many positions are needed and define their
duties clearly. It is important to have enough help in an emergency, but too many people
could get in the way and prevent fast, efficient action.
●● Consist of, and use, the existing hierarchy of the occupant agencies. Officials heading
agencies on a day-to-day basis should assume leadership positions during an emergency
since they reflect an agency’s greatest leadership, experience, and skill and have ultimate
responsibility for the safety and well being of their employees. Members should be
accountable, active individuals that will carry out procedures, training, and associated
duties for emergency preparedness.
●● Consist of members selected by position, not by name. This automatically allows for
continuity since positions are typically filled when the incumbent is absent. The acting
official assumes the incumbent’s role in the emergency organization as well. Selection by
position also eliminates the need for assigning alternates.
●● Be made up of three primary teams that, together, comprise the building’s Emergency
Response Team (ERT)3. Each team is discussed in the following sections and general
responsibilities for all members of these teams are included in Attachment 1.
OEO personnel should be provided with visual identifiers such as colored safety hats and/or
armbands. Occupants should be familiar with these identifiers and their significance.
1.1 Command Center Team
The Command Center Team (CCT) directs all emergency operations from the building’s
Command Center. CCT members in a large facility, would include:
●● Designated Official (DO) – the highest-ranking official of the primary occupant agency;
or alternatively, a designee selected by mutual agreement of occupant agency officials.
Responsible for activating the plan in all emergencies during normal duty hours.
●● Occupant Emergency Coordinator (OEC) – the official appointed by the Designated Official
and serves as the primary assistant to the Designated Official to ensure the continued
viability of the OEP and its organization. During emergencies the OEC operates the
3The Building Security Council (BSC) is a separate body comprising representatives from each Agency/tenant in a facility. The BSC coordinates with FPS personnel to disseminate security updates
and notifications, and to ensure tenant compliance with safety requirements. The BSC is not directly involved with ERT activities, but supports its mission through compliance, as all tenants are
required to follow OEP procedures. The DO serves as the linkage, serving on both bodies. Individual BSC members can also serve on both bodies.

Command Center.
●● Floor Team Coordinator – supervises and expedites the planned and controlled movement
of all building occupants in an emergency.
●● Damage Control Team Coordinator – controls dangerous conditions until further help
arrives to assess potential and real damage.
●● Medical Coordinator – the head of the Health and First Aid Unit and is responsible for
training and equipping all employees assigned to perform first aid in an emergency.
●● Administrative Officer – records emergency procedures and activities.
●● Technical Advisors – occupants familiar with the building’s utilities and mechanical systems
or other areas of expertise who advise the DO and OEC.
In a small facility, some positions, such as Administrative Officer, Medical Coordinator, and
Floor Team Coordinator, may not be needed or one person could perform several functions.
1.2 Floor Teams
Floor Teams are assigned to each floor of a facility. In a large facility, a typical Floor Team
would include:
●● Floor Monitors – supervisory personnel selected by the individual Tenant Agency. During a
supervisor’s absence, there should be an acting supervisor who should assume the Floor
Monitor responsibility. In agencies where the supervisory employee is frequently assigned
outside the office, a responsible, conscientious, non‑supervisory staff employee may be
selected. Floor monitors act in several different capacities, depending on the emergency.
●● Floor Area or Wing Monitors – assigned for each major area of the floor.
●● Stairwell Monitors – support the Area/Wing Monitors by controlling movement of persons on
stairways.
●● Elevator Monitors – support the Area/Wing Monitors; one is assigned for each floor where
elevators may be captured.
●● Exit Monitors – support floor monitors for street and ground level.
●● Monitors for Disabled – employees appointed by the floor wardens to assist people with
special needs during emergencies. Where possible, two monitors should be assigned to
each person. In an emergency, monitors are responsible for remaining with the person
throughout the emergency and assisting in their evacuation, following the instructions of the
command center and/or the floor warden.
1.3 Damage Control Team
The Damage Control Team consists of the Property Manager and other individuals familiar with
the facility’s construction, equipment, and overall operating system. Team members report to
the Damage Control Coordinator.
●● The Property Manager provides information, guidance, and advice on establishing and
maintaining the OEO; assists the Designated Official in recruiting qualified personnel
for technical services; and is responsible for designating and supervising the building
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
602 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

maintenance supervisor.
●● Building maintenance supervisor controls building utilities during an emergency. Under the
direction of the Property Manager, the building maintenance supervisor:
○○ Establishes a plan to attend mechanical devices; ventilation, water, gas, and steam
valves; power switches, elevators, etc., during an emergency.
○○ Provides training for emergency situations and coordinates training for bomb searches
for building mechanical personnel.
●● Ensures that building mechanical personnel know procedures for all emergency situations.

II. Part 2.0: Gather Information on Threats and Capabilities

The next step is to become familiar with the security posture of the facility and landscape
of its surroundings. Gather and review existing reports and other sources of information
on the facility’s current security posture, local response capabilities, and possible areas for
improvement. Table 1 provides a detailed list of sources of information. Since conditions
change within and surrounding a facility, consider the following at a minimum to further validate
information:

What are nearby facilities or structures that could add to the threat level of a facility?
Examples include:
●● Federal/State/local government offices; post offices, law enforcement stations, fire/rescue,
town/city hall, and local mayor/governor’s residences; judicial offices and courts.
●● Recreation facilities including sports arenas, theaters, malls, and special interest group
facilities.
●● Military installations.
●● Chemical plants, industrial complexes, utilities, nuclear plants, or rail yards that
manufacture, use, transport, store, or dispose of large amounts of hazardous materials.
●● Road, rail, or water transportation arteries on which hazardous materials are transported
within a mile from the facility. For example:
○○ Traffic - Roads/tunnels/bridges carry large volumes of traffic; points of congestion that
could impede response or place citizens in a vulnerable area and time of day and day of
week this activity occurs.
○○ Trucking and Transport Activity - Location of hazardous materials cargo loading/
unloading facilities; vulnerable areas such as weigh stations and rest areas this cargo
may transit.
○○ Waterways - Pipelines and process/treatment facilities; berths and ports for cruise ships,
roll-on/roll-off cargo vessels, and container ships; international (foreign) flagged vessels
(and cargo they carry) that conduct business in the area.
○○ Airports - Carriers, flight paths, and airport layout; location of air traffic control tower,
runways, passenger terminal, and parking areas.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
603 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

○○ Trains/Subways - Location of rails and lines, interchanges, terminals, tunnels, and

cargo/passenger terminals; any hazardous material that may be transported by rail.

Does the geographical location (city, state) increase the threat to the facility from
natural hazards?
Examples include: Fault lines - earthquakes; coastal locations - hurricanes/tsunamis; tornado
alley, etc.

What police, rescue, and hazardous materials response is available to the facility?
Examples include:
●● Location and response time of the nearest fire department and hazardous materials team.
●● Local rescue, detection, identification, and decontamination capabilities.
●● Potential of a chemical, biological, or radiological incident that could affect the facility from
internal sources. Examples include: Laboratory areas and storage areas.

Are there services provided within the building that could contribute to overall risk or
require specialized considerations? Examples include: CHildcare centers and retail space.

What are facility critical products, services, and operations? Examples include:
●● Products and services provided by suppliers.
●● Services such as electrical power, water, sewer, gas, telecommunications, transportation;
●● Operations equipment, and personnel vital to continued functioning of facility.

●● Once all the information is gathered and analyzed, assess available resources and ability to
respond to each potential emergency:
○○ Do we have the needed resources and capabilities to respond?
○○ Will external resources be able to respond to use for this emergency as quickly as we
may need them, or will they have other priority areas to serve?
●● If the answer is no, identify what can be done to correct the problem. Examples include:
○○ Develop additional emergency procedures
○○ Conduct additional training
○○ Acquire additional equipment
○○ Establish mutual aid agreements
○○ Establish agreements with specialized contractors

Table 1: Sources of Information

●● Evacuation Plan ●● Employee Manuals

●● Fire Protection Plan ●● Hazardous Materials/WMD

Plan
●● Code Adam Activation Procedures
●● Process Safety
●● Safety and Health Program Assessment
Internal Plans and
Policies ●● Environmental Policies ●● Risk Management Plan
●● Security Procedures ●● Capital Improvement
●● Insurance Programs Program
●● Finance and Purchasing ●● Mutual Aid Agreements
Procedures ●● Facility Closure Policy
●● Occupational Safety and Health ●● Transportation Regulations
Codes and Regulations ●● Zoning Regulations
Regulations ●● Environmental Regulations ●● Tenant Policies
●● Fire Codes ●● Seismic Safety Codes
Emergency Call Lists – wallet sized if possible, of all persons on and
off site who would be involved in responding to an emergency, their
responsibilities, and their 24-hour contact numbers.
Building and site maps that include:
●● Location of each building (include ●● Alarm and enunciators
name of building, street name,
and number) ●● Fire extinguishers and
Information to suppression systems
Maintain in the ●● Utility shutoffs
Command Center ●● Exits, stairways,
●● Water hydrants, main valves, designated escape routes,
lines and restricted areas
●● Gas main valves and lines ●● Hazardous materials
●● Electrical cutoffs and substations (including cleaning supplies
and chemicals)
●● Storm drains and sewer lines
●● High-value items
●● Floor plans

III. 3.0 Coordinate with Internal and External Groups

●● Government agencies, community organizations, and utilities are all involved with, and
affected by, a facility’s OEP program and operations. Communication with these groups is
important in orchestrating an effective emergency response strategy.
●● There are many external resources that could be needed in an emergency. In some cases,
formal agreements may be necessary to define the facility’s relationship. In other cases, it
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
605 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

is important to have open lines of communication to share information on possible threats

and vulnerabilities.

●● Sample External Groups:

○○ Community Emergency Management Office
○○ Mayor or Community Administrator’s Office
○○ Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC)
○○ Fire Department
○○ Police Department
○○ Emergency Medical Services/Hospitals
○○ American Red Cross/Community Services
○○ HAZMAT Response
○○ National Weather Service
○○ Public Works Department/Utilities
○○ Insurance Carriers

Discuss coordination and development of the facility OEP with appropriate external groups.
While their official approval may not be required, they will likely have valuable insights and
information to offer. Some considerations for external coordination include:
●● What are their plans and available resources for preparedness and response to potential
emergencies?
●● What are State and local requirements for reporting emergencies?
●● Determine protocols for turning control of a response over to outside agencies. For
example:
○○ Establish lines of communication with outside responders
○○ Decide gate or entrance for responding units use; where they will go and to whom they
will report
○○ Determine what kind of identification authorities will require from key personnel to allow
entrance during an emergency
○○ Under the Incident Command System (ICS) and National Incident Management System
(NIMS), who becomes the official in charge and when
○○ In an Incident of National Significance, what external agency is responsible for
emergency support under the National Response Plan (NRP)
Coordination with internal contacts is equally as important. Examples of internal resources and
capabilities include:
●● Personnel – fire brigade, HAZMAT response team, emergency medical services, security,

emergency management group, evacuation team, public information officer

●● Equipment – fire protection and suppression equipment, communications equipment,
first aid supplies, emergency supplies, warning systems, emergency power equipment,
decontamination equipment, equipment to evacuate occupants with disabilities
●● Facilities – command center, media briefing area, shelter areas, first stations, sanitation
facilities
●● Organizational Capabilities – training, evacuation plan, employee support system
●● Backup Systems – arrangements with other facilities to provide for:
○○ Payroll
○○ Communications
○○ Emergency Power
○○ Shipping and Receiving
○○ Information Systems Support
○○ Recovery Support
○○ Method or equipment to account for location of occupants
○○ Employee Skills (medical, engineering, communications, foreign language) that might
be needed in an emergency
Maintain contact with internal department/agency offices, and communicate with them to
establish OEP activation procedures and the primary and alternate means of communication
that will be used. The decision to activate is based upon the best available information,
including an understanding of local tensions, the sensitivity of target agency(ies), and previous
experience with similar situations. Advice shall be solicited, when possible, from the GSA
building manager, appropriate Federal Protective Service official, and Federal, State, and local
law enforcement agencies.

IV. 4.0 Address Special Considerations

To ensure full preparedness and successful OEP activation and administration, a number of
logistical considerations should be coordinated and accounted for. Each is discussed in the
following sections.
4.1 Primary and Alternate Command Centers
Emergency operations are directed from a Command Center. It should be centrally located
and easily accessible for effective communication and control with good communications
capability (e.g., two telephones, portable radios and pagers, messengers). An alternate
Command Center location is used if the primary location is incapacitated, or if evacuation is
necessary. Special consideration must be made for rapid transportation of team members from
their workstations to the Command Center and for quick notification of team members of an
emergency.

4.2 Evacuation and Shelter Facilities

When evacuation of the facility is necessary, rally points are established where occupants
convene, and are accounted for, to ensure that the facility has been completely evacuated.
In some cases, it may be necessary to arrange for alternate facilities to provide shelter for
evacuees. If evacuees are to remain in the shelter location for an extended period of time,
other considerations may involve arranging for medical support, food and transportation.
4.3 Primary and Alternate Means of Communications

A primary and alternate means of communications must be available to activate the occupant
emergency organization, inform building occupants of the nature of an emergency and what
actions to take, to coordinate activities during an emergency.

●● All building occupants must understand how to operate and respond to the alarm system to
avoid confusion and delay in reporting fire or other emergencies. The fire alarm system is
used to initiate immediate evacuation of the building. Drills are scheduled to test the OEP
functions and familiarize plan members with emergency procedures of the Plan. These
systems are tested on a regular schedule to ensure that the equipment is working properly.
An oral announcement may be used to warn of other emergency or non-emergency
situations. These could be, but not limited to: earthquakes, floods, and windstorms,
explosions, civil disturbances, bomb threats, demonstrations and hostage situations.
●● In most cases, the building’s fire alarm system may not be used as a means of notifying
the organization and the occupants without approval of the Building Manager and or the
Fire Department. As such, appropriate use of telephones, public address systems, and/
or messengers may prove more feasible. If telephones are used, a Communications
Coordinator should be appointed by the Administrative Officer to set up a system of
contacting all members of the emergency organization. The Administrative Officer/person
should also be responsible for updating lists of telephone numbers. Multilevel buildings may
have emergency telephone systems for coordinating emergency activities. However, most
buildings must rely on the normal telephone system, the public address system, the fire
alarm, and messengers.
4.4 Child Care Centers
The Designated Official and FPS Inspectors should work with the director of a childcare center
in a Federal facility to develop and post emergency response procedures. Center staff should
know whom to contact in the event of a medical emergency, how the center will be notified
of a fire or other danger that may require evacuation, the location of fire alarm boxes and fire
extinguishers, the primary and secondary evacuation routes, and the locations of safe areas.
4.5 Disabled Occupants
Occupants with disabilities who need assistance during an emergency should be involved
in planning to inform appropriate personnel of their needs, including exactly what kind of
assistance is required. Consider the following when evaluating the facility’s capacity to address
occupants with disabilities during an emergency:
●● More time may be needed to evacuate disabled individuals.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
608 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

●● Audible warnings and emergency instructions are not effective for deaf or hard of hearing
occupants and, as such, other notification means are needed.
●● Blind or partially sighted occupants need to depend on others to lead them during an
evacuation.
●● Occupants in wheelchairs may require assistance to evacuate the building.
●● Persons with mental disabilities may be unable to understand the emergency and could
become disoriented or confused about the proper way to react.
●● Respiratory illnesses may become aggravated by stress.
●● Emergency, oxygen and respiratory equipment may not be readily available.
●● Medication regimen of occupants with serious conditions may be interrupted.
Other examples of people who do not fit the legal definition of a person with a disability, but
who may need assistance or special planning for emergencies include the elderly, pregnant
women, and people who are obese. There may also be people with temporary or intermittent
needs. Contact local emergency services to determine what evacuation equipment (such as
evacuation chairs) they can offer. It is important to provide instruction on the use of evacuation
chairs to affected occupants in an actual emergency.
4.6 Protocols for Nights/Weekends/Holidays

●● In the event of an emergency at night, over the weekend, or on a holiday, the senior
Federal official present should act as the DO and initiate appropriate action. This person
will need to coordinate with the senior FPS Officer, contract guard on the premises and/or
with appropriate maintenance personnel.
●● Procedures must also be spelled out and responsibilities assigned for handling
emergencies that occur during nights, weekends, and holidays. The OEO’s members and
their titles and telephone numbers should be noted on forms.
4.7 Emergency Telework
Telework4 is simply a way of getting work done from a different location. It can serve multiple
purposes – and have multiple benefits – when it is implemented effectively in an organization
and, as such, should be part of agency emergency planning. The National Strategy for
Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan references the benefits of using telework to slow the
spread of disease by keeping face-to-face contact to a minimum (often referred to as “social
distancing”) while maintaining operations as close to normal as possible. Telework can also
help agencies retain functionality as infrastructure issues and other challenges make the main
work site difficult to access.

4 The Office of Personnel Management defines telework as “work arrangements in which an employee regularly performs officially assigned duties at home or other work sites geographically
convenient to the residence of the employee.”
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
609 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

V. 5.0 Enhanced Protection for Increased Threat

Facility-specific steps should be established for increasing protection based on changes to
threats that could potentially affect individual facilities. For increases in protection associated
with terrorist threats, the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) is a color-coded
terrorism threat level system designed to target protective measures when information specific
to an individual sector or geographic region is received. It combines threat information with
vulnerability assessments and provides communications to public safety officials and the
public. The scale consists of five color-coded threat levels to reflect the probability of a terrorist
attack and its potential gravity. Each level triggers specific actions by Federal agencies and
State and local governments and affects the level of security at government facilities.

VI. 6.0 Post-Emergency Recovery

Facility recovery operations are intended to restore essential services and resume normal
operations as quickly and safely as possible. To facilitate post-emergency recovery, consider
the following during planning:
●● Identify long-term implication of interruption to normal services
●● Make contractual arrangements with vendors for such post-emergency services as records
preservation, equipment repair, earthmoving or engineering
●● Meet with insurance carriers to discuss property and business resumptions policies
●● Determine critical operations and make plans for bringing those systems back on-line. The
process may entail:
○○ Repairing or replacing equipment
○○ Relocating operations to an alternate location
○○ Contracting operations on a temporary basis
●● Establish procedures for:
○○ Ensuring the chain of command
○○ Maintaining lines of succession for key personnel
○○ Moving to alternate headquarters (include these considerations in all exercise
scenarios.)
●● Determine the audiences that may be affected by an emergency and identify their
information needs. When emergencies expand beyond the facility, the community will want
to know the nature of the incident, whether the public’s safety or health is in danger, what
is being done to resolve the problem and what was done to prevent the situation from
happening.
●● Maintain complete and accurate records at all times to ensure a more efficient emergency
response and recovery. Certain records may also be required by regulation or by your
insurance carriers or prove invaluable in the case of legal action after an incident.

●● Administrative actions include many that are covered by a well written, coordinated, and
implemented OEP. For example:
○○ Maintain training records
○○ Maintain all written communications
○○ Document drills and exercises and their critiques
○○ Acquire equipment
○○ Stockpile supplies
○○ Designate emergency facilities
○○ Establish training facilities
○○ Establish mutual aid agreements
○○ Prepare a resource inventory

VII. 7.0 Completing the OEP Template

This section provides step-by-step guidance for completing the OEP Template.
OEP Cover Page – Each OEP is unique to a facility. Enter building name, address, and date
information to replace generic text.

Emergency Notification Numbers - All building occupants should know whom to contact in
case of emergency. Enter building-specific emergency notification numbers. Note that for GSA
owned or leased facilities, the Federal Protective Service must be notified of any emergency
situation. Other department/agency facilities may replace this with another provider as
appropriate.

Responsible Officials’ Sign-Off Sheet - OEO officials (e.g., the designated official and the
occupant emergency coordinator) must certify their participation in the OEP development and
verify their understanding of emergency procedures affecting the facility and employees within
for which they are responsible.

Additional officials may be added as appropriate.

Part 1: Organization and Responsibilities

Introduction - The introduction gives management a brief overview of the purpose of the OEP,
the facility’s emergency management policy, authorities and responsibilities of key personnel,
the types of emergencies that could occur, and where response operations will be managed.

Replace highlighted text with facility specifics as follows:

Scope
●● [insert building name]
●● [insert brief description of number of stories and type of complex]
●● [insert address]
●● Effective Date
●● [insert effective date]
●● [name of building/facility]
Facility-Specific Information – consists of three forms that provide information on the command
center, facility characteristics, and occupants.
●● Command Center - information with primary and alternate locations and addresses.
●● Facility Characteristics - potentially impacting emergency response procedures.
●● Occupants Form - outlines the primary occupant agency, number of occupants, and lists
occupants by floor, and subsequent contact information and special considerations such as
hazardous materials use and storage.

Occupant Emergency Organization (OEO) – provides an overview of the structure and purpose
of the OEO and an overview of responsibilities of the various components of the OEO.
●● Replace highlighted text with facility specifics as follows:
○○ [Insert what is used…colored safety hats and/or armbands].
Throughout this section, modify or delete text to reflect facility-specific structure.

Part 2: Activation and Contact Information

Provides the protocol for activating the OEP. Throughout this section, modify or delete text to
reflect facility-specific structure pertaining to:
●● Who makes the decision to activate the OEP?
●● How is the decision made?
●● Actions if there is immediate danger to persons or property

Facility Emergency Contact Information - Replace highlighted text with name, title, desk and
mobile telephone numbers for facility contacts as follows:
●● General Services Administration
●● Federal Protective Service
●● Command Center Team (CCT)
●● Floor Team (FT)
●● Damage Control Team (DCT)
Throughout this section, modify or delete text to reflect facility-specific structure.

Part 3: Emergency Procedures

The OEP Template outlines proposed actions to be taken in a number of building-related
emergencies. Table 2-1 provides a list of types of emergencies to consider in facility-specific
planning. Modify text to reflect facility-specific emergency procedures and contingency plans.
Replace yellow highlighted text with facility-specific information.

Attachment 2 provides a series of sample emergency procedures that can be used as a

starting point. Following are some additional points to consider for select procedures:

Medical (Attachment 2-1)

●● OEO members and other identified occupants may be the fastest source of first aid/
cardiopulmonary resuscitation. All FPS officers are qualified in first aid/CPR.
●● The facility’s health unit, if there is one, can usually provide immediate medical attention.
Local physicians and emergency medical unites are normally closer than a hospital; the
area should be surveyed to determine their availability, and their telephone numbers
should be on the Emergency Call List. Local police, fire, and rescue squads can provide
ambulance services and paramedics; police and fire department personnel can also
maintain order during an emergency requiring large-scale medical services.

Evacuation (Attachment 2-2)

●● All occupants should know the locations of fire alarm boxes and extinguishers, as well
as how/when to use them, and the procedures to follow when the alarm is sounded.
Occupants should know whom to notify after an alarm as been sounded so the Command
Center Team can be activated.
●● FPS officers and typically members of the Disaster Control Team are trained in fighting
small fires. Once the fire department arrives, the fire official in charge will assume
command.
●● Orderly evacuation is the simplest and most reliable action, and is used as a response
to relatively common incidents such as fire drills and alarms, and also to more serious
emergencies such as bomb threats. In most situations where an airborne release originates
from a source inside a building, evacuation follows. Evacuation considerations include:
Evacuation may lead to other risks, by taking the occupants from the physically secure
environment of the building into the streets. Evacuation routes may also be hazardous in that
they may expose individuals to contaminated areas as they exit the facility.
Properly trained Floor Team Coordinators, Area/Wing Monitors, Stairway Monitors, and
Elevator Monitors can lead the safest and fastest evacuation of a building.
FPS officers and/or local police can control traffic and crowds during an evacuation. If
evacuation is ordered because of a fire, the local fire department official in charge will assume
command.
●● For childcare center evacuation:
○○ Become familiar with the location of all stairways and exits, and the nearest building fire
alarm manual pull stations, duress alarms and their operation.
○○ All personnel members must be trained on the proper fire protection and evacuation
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
617 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

practices.
○○ Personnel should not attempt to secure or recover items of clothing or personal property
after an alarm has sounded. The facility should not be reentered until the incident
commander gives the all clear.
○○ In case of emergency or drill, all personnel should leave the building in an orderly
manner - Walk, Don’t Run. The personnel should search their rooms in the Center,
closing all doors before leaving. Additionally, the Director or other assigned personnel
will search all areas within the Center and ensure that all occupants have been safely
evacuated.
○○ Take attendance and immediately proceed to the Safe Haven (enter appropriate,
detailed address/location) as directed by the Center Director or designee
○○ Determine if parents should be notified and/or asked to pickup children. The decision
to have parents pick up their children will be made based on expected time out of the
Center or the nature of the emergency.
○○ Physically challenged children will be provided with assistance to help them exit the
building. Infants will be evacuated in designated evacuation cribs.

Table 2-1: Types of Emergencies to Consider

Historical types of • Fires • Hurricanes
emergencies that have • Severe Weather • Tornadoes
occurred • Hazardous Material Spills • Missing child
• Transportation Accidents • Utility Outages
• Earthquakes • Prohibited access to the facility
Geographic Proximity to:
• Flood plains, seismic faults, and dams
• Companies that produce, store, and use/transport hazardous materials
• Major transportation routes and airports
• Nuclear power plants
Technological • Safety system failure • Power failure
• Telecommunications failure • Healing/cooling system failure
• Computer system failure • Emergency notification system failure
Human Error • Poor training • Misconduct
• Poor maintenance • Substance abuse
• Carelessness • Fatigue
Physical • Ruptured gas mains • Explosion
• Water damage • Building collapse
• Smoke damage • Trapped persons
• Structural damage • Chemical release
• Pandemic Outbreak • Air or water contamination

Hazardous Substance (Attachment 2-3)

●● Supervisors are required to label all hazardous chemicals in their workplaces and list them
on Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDSs), and to develop, publish, and implement a hazard
communication program, inclusive of employee training.5
●● The Designated Official must maintain an inventory of hazardous materials used in
chemical laboratories and hazardous material storage areas in the building. This inventory
should include the following information for each chemical that poses a potential health or
physical hazard:
○○ Substance name and trade name
○○ National Stock Number/Chemical Abstracts Service Number, if applicable
○○ Name and location of user
○○ Container size
○○ Quantity of chemical normally in use and stored
●● The Chemical Transportation Center provides 24-hour information on handling accidents in
the transportation of chemicals, as the official “Hotline” for this type of emergency at 1-800-
424-9300.

Bomb Threat (Attachment 2-4)

●● Most bomb threats are received by phone. Bomb threats are serious until proven otherwise.
Provide occupants with instruction and a checklist positioned by the telephone so that they
may act quickly, but remain calm and obtain appropriate information.
●● FPS officers and local police can help in training for bomb searches and provide leadership
during a search. The bomb disposal unit of the local police would, in most instances,
provide the quickest response for defusing or otherwise disposing of a bomb. A sample
bomb threat checklist is also included in Attachment 2-4.
●● The evacuation of occupants may be necessary.

5 The Hazard Communication Standard (29 CFR 1910.1200) establishes uniform requirements for evaluation of all hazardous chemicals used in U.S. workplaces and communication of this
information to the appropriate personnel. This Standard was designed to ensure that (1) employers receive the information they need to inform and train employees properly and to design and put in
place employee protection programs, and (2) that employees receive necessary hazard information so they can participate in the development of protective measures in their workplaces and support
them once they are in place.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
619 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

Suspicious Object (Attachment 2-5)

●● Because of their familiarity with the space where they work, occupants can most easily
spot something that does not belong there. They should be warned, however, not to touch
suspicious objects, and to report them immediately upon discovery to the FPS.
●● The evacuation of occupants may be necessary.
●● Prepare announcements to be used if necessary as follows:

○○ May I have your attention please? May I have your attention please? May I have your
attention please?
○○ We have identified a suspicious package on the ___ floor.
○○ Occupants of the ___, ___, and ___ floor(s) (1 above and 1 below) are required to
evacuate until the emergency is over. (REPEAT)
○○ Please walk to the nearest exit and report to your floor’s designated evacuation area.
○○ Only the affected floors need to evacuate.
○○ Do not use the elevators, please proceed to stairways. (REPEAT)
●● When the “All Clear” is given:
○○ May I have your attention please? May I have your attention please? May I have your
attention please?
○○ The emergency on the ____ floor is now over.
○○ Occupants of the ___, ___, and ___ floors may return to their work areas.

Shelter in-Place (SIP) (Attachment 2-6)

●● When dangerous airborne contaminant releases originate from outside a building,

evacuation is typically not appropriate. During such events, it may be necessary to Shelter-
in-Place for a short period of time until local authorities can arrive to assess circumstances.
Partnering with local authorities is crucial because OEPs should not conflict with the plans
of local community first responder protocol. In many locations, particularly outside major
population centers, local officials may not recommend SIP planning because the risks in
these areas do not justify this course of action.
●● There may be times when building occupants are required to remain inside a building if
local community recognized experts determine that:
○○ It is safer than outside
○○ Releasing a large number of employees onto the roads and public transportation will
only add to the confusion and panic, or
○○ There is likely exposure to some hazard or harm, and releasing employees will spread
the hazard to others, including family members.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
620 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

●● It is important to develop the building’s proactive SIP plan with employees and other
authorities to maximize the cooperation of employees with the SIP plan. It is recommended
that a group consisting of key representatives be formed to develop building-specific SIP
plans based on the following considerations/steps.
Step 1 Review Building’s Vulnerability Assessment Reports - Review the executive summary of the building’s Vulnerability
Assessment reports, related security Threat Assessment reports, and the building’s OEP.
Step 2 Identify Building Features - The purpose of identifying the existing features is to gather information about the ventilation
system and the characteristics that determine the building’s protective capability. This information is required for the
development of each building’s SIP plan by Property Management (PM) and building operating personnel. This assists in the
development of HVAC control protocols for airborne contaminant releases. This plan should describe the operation of the
building’s heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems during a SIP event.
Step 3 Identify Features Increasing Building Vulnerability - Identify features that make the building vulnerable to airborne
contaminant releases originating from outside the building.
Step 4 Identify SIP Safe Zones - Based on the above SIP information, building authorities should identify a list of possible SIP
safe zones. A SIP safe zone might be (a) designated room(s), the entire building, or a safe area. This document uses the
term SIP in its general term, which indicates a safe zone inside the building where people can stay safely in the event of an
outdoor release.
Step 5 Develop a Communications Plan - An effective communications plan for SIP should be developed based on building-
specific OEP procedures.
Step 6 Conduct SIP Training and Drills - Practice drills using the SIP procedures among building occupants should be
performed as part of routine OEP drills. Train and familiarize those who are occupants in the building on awareness and the
procedures to be taken in an airborne toxic release initiated outdoors. Training plans should be developed by the DO with
input from the BSC, Property Management (PM), FPS, and other law enforcement entities.
Step 7 Reactive Guidelines for SIP -Once notification has been received from the local authorities, the following reactive
measures are recommended based on the information gathered in the proactive review and building system evaluations.

Part 3: Implement and Maintain the OEP

●● Implementation is more than simply exercising the OEP during an emergency. It means
acting on recommendations made during the vulnerability analysis, integrating the plan into
company operations, training employees, and evaluating the plan.
●● During an event, the decision to activate the OEP shall be based upon the best available
information, including an understanding of local tensions, the sensitivity of target
agency(ies), and previous experience with similar situations. Advice shall be solicited, when
possible, from the GSA building manager, appropriate FPS officials, and Federal, State,
and local law enforcement agencies.
●● When there is immediate danger to persons or property, such as fire, explosion, or the
discovery of an explosive device (not including a threat), occupants shall be evacuated
or relocated in automatic accordance with the plan. This shall be accomplished by
sounding the fire alarm system or by other appropriate means. A warning message
should be prepared beforehand for each of the protective actions that are practical for the
building. This will ensure that the actions can be taken as rapidly as possible and that the
instructions will be clearly understood. The messages should be worded to be effective
without causing panic.
●● Integrate the Plan into Facility Operations
Emergency planning must become apart of the building’s corporate culture:
●● Look for opportunities to build awareness
●● Educate and train personnel
●● Test procedures
●● Involve all levels of management, all departments, and the community in the planning
process
●● Make emergency management part of what personnel do on a day-to-day basis
1.0 Test the OEP to ensure:

●● Senior management supports the responsibilities outlined in the plan

●● Emergency planning concepts are fully incorporated into the facility’s accounting,
personnel, and financial procedures
●● Emergency preparedness information is distributed
●● There are constant safety reminders to occupants
●● Personnel are aware of their responsibilities during an emergency
●● All levels of the organization are involved in evaluating and updating the plan
2.0 Training, Drills, and Exercises

●● Everyone who works at or visits the facility requires some form of training. Consider how to
involve community responders in training activities, and conduct reviews after each training
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
622 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

activity to identify areas for improvement and record best practices. Involve both personnel
and community responders in the evaluation process.
2.1 Planning Considerations

●● Assign responsibilities for developing a training plan. Consider the training and information
needs for employees, contractors, visitors, managers, and those with an emergency
response role identified in the OEP and OEO. General training for all employees should
address:
○○ Individual roles and responsibilities
○○ Information on the subject of threats, hazards, and protective actions
○○ Notification, warning, and communications procedures
○○ Means for locating family members in an emergency
○○ Emergency response procedures
○○ Evacuation, shelter, and accountability procedures
○○ Location and use of common emergency equipment
○○ Emergency shutdown procedures
2.2 Training Activities
The following training activities should be incorporated into the training plan:
●● Orientation and Education sessions – are regularly scheduled discussion sessions to
provide information, answer questions, an identify needs and concerns.
●● Tabletop Exercises – members of the emergency management group meet in a conference
room setting to discuss their responsibilities and how they would react to emergency
scenarios. Using floor plans and building schematics, each key position ensures that they
know where to go, what to do, and have the opportunity to discuss “what ifs”. This is a cost-
effective and efficient way to identify areas of overlap and confusion before conducting
more demanding training activities.
●● Walk-Through Drills – The emergency management group and response teams actually
perform their emergency response functions. This activity generally involves more people
and is more thorough than a tabletop exercise.
●● Functional Drills – These drills test specific functions such as medical response, emergency
notifications, warning, and communications procedures and equipment. These tests may
be performed singularly or collectively. Personnel are asked to evaluate the systems and
identify problem areas.
●● Evacuation Drills – Personnel walk the evacuation route to a designated area where
procedures for accounting for all personnel are tested. Conditions of drills should be varied
so that occupants are prepared to know how to respond to varying conditions. For example,
use of alternate exits because primary exits are blocked. Participants are asked to make
notes as they investigate potential hazards during emergencies (e.g. stairways cluttered
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
623 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

with debris, smoke in hallways). Plans are modified accordingly.

●● Full-Scale Exercises – A real-life emergency situation is simulated as closely as possible.
This exercise involves company emergency response personnel, employees, management
and community response organizations.
●● After Action Reports – After an exercise, drill, or actual emergency, an analysis should be
conducted to identify issues that could require a modification to the OEP.
2.3 Facility Training Schedule

●● Distribute the first draft to group members for review. Revise as needed. For a second
review, conduct a tabletop exercise with management and personnel who have a key
emergency management responsibility. In a conference room setting, describe an
emergency scenario and have participants discuss their responsibilities and how they
would react to the situation. Based on this discussion, identify areas of confusion and
overlap, and modify the plan accordingly.
●● Capabilities and hazards must be analyzed after a vulnerability analysis is conducted.
The single most important determination for a facility and security managers to make
in determining the needs for an occupant emergency plan is a comprehensive risk
assessment for the facility.
3.0 Evaluate and Modify the OEP

●● Conduct an evaluation of the entire plan at least once a year. Attachment 3-1 provides
checklists that can be used to evaluate OEP procedures. Evaluation and modification of
OEPs should take place after each training drill, exercise, and emergency. OEP review is
also relevant when personnel or responsibilities change, alongside facility layout, design,
policy and procedure changes. Each modification requires that personnel and OEO
individuals be briefed. Some issues to consider are:
○○ Methods to involve all levels of management in evaluating and updating the plan
○○ Ways to sufficiently address problem areas and resource shortfalls identified in the
vulnerability analysis
○○ Inclusion of lessons learned from drills and actual events
○○ Review emergency management group and ERT to understand respective
responsibilities as well as to provide training for new members
○○ Reflection of changes in the physical layout of the facility
○○ Specification of any new facility processes
○○ Updated photographs and other records of facility assets
○○ Assessment of the facility training objectives
○○ Changes of hazards to the facility
○○ Citing names, titles, and telephone numbers in OEP, and ensuring they are kept current

Attachment 1: General Responsibilities of the OEO Teams

Designated Official - the highest-ranking official of the primary occupant agency; or

alternatively, a designee selected by mutual agreement of occupant agency officials as
prescribed by 41 CFR § 101‑20.003(g). Responsible for activating the plan in all emergencies
during normal duty hours along with the following:
●● Developing and maintaining the OEP to protect life and property, and to minimize the
damage in the event of a disaster.
●● Coordinating the plan with the OEP Coordinator and tenant agency officials.
●● Organizing, and providing training for, an adequate staff to conduct the emergency
operations required by the facility’s OEP.
●● Disseminating the basic provisions of the OEP to all persons employed in the building and
arranging for publication and distribution of a roster of organization personnel responsible
for emergency operations.
●● Maintaining liaison, and cooperating, with the heads of the tenant agencies, or their
designees, as well as Federal, State, and local agencies that might respond to an
emergency in the facility.
●● Taking all necessary actions to ensure that the facility’s organization operates safely and
efficiently in emergencies.
●● Exercising command responsibility where appropriate for the orderly evacuation of all
personnel in the building (including non‑tenants) in accordance with the OEP.
●● Coordinating and directing fire and evacuation drills.
●● Participates in the facility’s Emergency Response Team and Building Security Committee.
Occupant Emergency Coordinator - The official appointed by the Designated Official and
serves as the primary assistant to the Designated Official to ensure the continued viability
of the OEP and its organization. During emergencies the Occupant Emergency Coordinator
operates the Command Center. Under the general direction of the Designated Official, the
Occupant Emergency Coordinator performs the following duties:
●● Coordinating training for the occupant emergency organization members as required.
●● Monitoring fire drills and evacuations to ensure procedures are workable, and initiating
further training when necessary.
Floor Team Coordinator - Supervises and expedites the planned and controlled movement
of all building occupants in an emergency. Under the general direction of the Designated
Official, the Floor Team Coordinator serves as head of occupant evacuations and performs the
following duties:
●● Plans personnel movement routes and establishes movement procedures.
●● Assigns and trains floor wardens and related personnel within, into, or out of the building,
during drills and actual emergencies, as required by the plan.

●● Assures that all building occupants, including members of the organization, comply with
procedures indicated by the alarm signal as specified by the plan.
●● Coordinates bomb search of office space.
●● Is a member of the Emergency Command Center during emergencies.
●● Advises Designated Official of the progress of evacuation and/or bomb searches.
Damage Control Team Coordinator - Under the direction of the designated official, the damage
control coordinator serves as head of the utilities controls group as follows:
●● Establish a plan to control mechanical devices such as: ventilation equipment, water, gas,
and electrical distribution systems at the direction of the Fire Chief or Designated Official.
●● During emergency situations the Utility Officer immediately proceeds to the Emergency
Command Center to await instructions from the Fire Chief or Designated Official.
●● Dispatches individuals or mechanical teams to operate building utilities or assist emergency
personnel in the control of building utility systems.
Medical Coordinator - The medical coordinator is head of the Health and First Aid Unit and
is responsible for training and equipping all employees assigned to perform first aid in an
emergency.
●● Arranging with the American Red Cross or other sources for first aid and medical self-help
training for all organizational personnel as requested by members of the organization.
●● Supervising the selection of first aid or medical treatment areas as required.
●● Directing first aid or medical self‑help operations and controlling access to medical
supplies, as required, to ensure their proper use, conservation and availability for
emergency use.
●● Establish policy and rules governing emergency treatment of the ill and injured. The
maintenance of adequate sanitation and hygienic standards, and other matters relating to
emergency health, hygiene and medical activities during emergencies.
Administrative Officer – The administrative officer must administer actions during and after an
emergency which include:
●● Maintain telephone logs
●● Keep a detailed record of events
●● Maintain a record of injuries and follow-up actions
●● Account for personnel
●● Coordinating notification of family members
●● Issue press releases
●● Maintain sampling records
●● Manage finances
●● Coordinate personnel services

2-1 MEDICAL
Position ACTIONS
Limited Widespread with Multiple Injuries
ALL Building Occupants
All Building • CALL 911 [or other emergency number]
Occupants • If First Aid/CPR trained, provide assistance until medical personnel arrive.
Command Center Team
DO/OEC • Notify Floor Monitor • Go to Primary Command Center
• Notify Medical Coordinator • Activate Command Center Team
Medical • Go to scene • Go to scene
Coordinator • Ensure that appropriate • Advise regarding medical assistance and ensure that appropriate
assistance has been called assistance has been summoned
• Recommend follow-up action • Report to DO
• Report to DO
All other CCT NA • Go to Primary Command Center
members • Notify or activate teams as appropriate.
Floor Team
Floor Team NA • Provide first aid/CPR
Members • Obtain medical assistance (see emergency call list)
• Notify OEC
• Notify Federal Protective Service
• Reserve elevators for emergency use
• Meet responding emergency unit at ground floor
• Verify medical assistance response
• Report to Floor Team Monitor
Damage Control Team
Damage Control NA • Provide first aid/CPR and rescue services.
Team Members • Report to Damage Control Coordinator.

2-2 Evacuation
Evacuation policies and procedures should:
●● Determine conditions under which an evacuation would be necessary.
●● Establish a clear chain of command.
●● Identify personnel with the authority to order an evacuation.
●● Designate “evacuation wardens” who will assist others in an evacuation and account for
personnel.
●● Establish a system for accounting personnel.
●● Consider employees’ transportation needs for community-wide evacuations.
●● Establish procedures for assisting persons with disabilities and those who do not speak
English.
●● Consider evacuation procedures for Child Care Centers.
●● Include post evacuation procedures:
○○ Designate personnel to continue or shut down critical operations while an evacuation
is underway. They must be capable of recognizing when to abandon the operation and
evaluate themselves.
○○ Coordinate plans with the local emergency management office.
○○ Final decision for personnel (e.g. resume work, go home, etc.) will be made by the DO
and communicated to everyone along appropriate communication channels.
Designate primary and secondary evacuation routes and exits. Have routes and exits within
the facility clearly marked, well lit, and announced with appropriate signage. Evacuation
routes, exits, location destinations, etc., must be discreet outside the facility to ensure proper
protection of building occupants.
Be reviewed and approved through:
○○ Distribute the first draft to group members for review – Revise as necessary
○○ During second review, conduct tabletop exercise with management and personnel
with key emergency management responsibility. In conference room setting, describe
an emergency scenario and have participants discuss their responsibilities and how
they would react to the situation. Based on discussion, identify areas of confusion and
overlap, and modify plan accordingly.
○○ Arrange a briefing for the DO, chief executive officer, and senior management – obtain
written approval.
○○ Install emergency lighting in case a power outage occurs during an evacuation.
○○ Ensure that evacuation routes and emergency exits are:
Wide enough to accommodate the number of evacuating personnel
○○ Clear and unobstructed at all times

○○ Unlikely to expose evacuating personnel to additional hazards

○○ Capable of avoiding (or having alternate routes that avoid) the main lobby
●● Be evaluated by someone not in your organization

2-2 EVACUATION
Position ACTIONS
ALL Building Occupants
• Activate the nearest fire alarm pull box then dial [insert number] to notify [insert title] and provide specifics.
All Building Occupants
• Follow instructions provided by the Command Center Team.
Command Center Team
• Go to Primary Command Center and activate the Command Center Team
DO/OEC • Verify fire department notification and response and brief responding personnel
• Coordinate activities
Medical Coordinator • Go to Primary Command Center and advise regarding medical assistance
• Go to Primary Command Center and activate Floor Teams and coordinate Floor Team activities and verify
Floor Team Coordinator
occupant status
Damage Control • Go to Primary Command Center and activate the Damage Control Team
Coordinator • Determine building conditions (e.g., environmental, structural, etc.)
Administrative Officer • Go to Primary Command Center and record activities
Other
Floor Team Fire Floor First Floor
Floors
• Activate fire alarm (if not already done).
Floor Monitors • Supervise and verify evacuation. • Lead fire department to control
• Report to Floor Team Coordinator. center.
• Evacuate area occupants • Restrict building access.
Area Monitors • Inspect area to ensure total evacuation • Assist with occupant evacuation
• Report status to Floor Monitor. • If floor is to be
• Direct occupants to the nearest safe • Report to First Floor Monitor evacuated,
stairwell. • Capture assigned elevators. follow Fire
Elevator Moni-
• Assist in elevator evacuation of the disabled • Use of elevators can be authorized Floor Team
tors if elevator use of this purpose has been only by the fire department, DO, instructions.
authorized. or OEC. • If not, stand by
• Inspect stairway for smoke or other for instructions
Stairway Moni- obstruction and report status to Area Monitor. • Lead fire department to control
tors • Keep occupants moving in a single file down center.
the stairway. • Restrict building access.
Monitors for Dis- • Evacuate disabled to safe area. • Assist with occupant evacuation
abled Report status to Area Monitor

Damage Control Team

Damage Control
• Report to Damage Control Coordinator and activate emergency systems
Team Members

2-2 EVACUATION
Position ACTIONS
• Activate fire alarm (if not already done).
• Supervise evacuation.
Floor Monitors
• Verify evacuation. • Lead fire department to control
• Report to FTC. center.
• Evacuate area occupants • Restrict building access.
• Inspect area to ensure total evacuation • Assist with occupant evacuation
Area Monitors
• Report status to Floor Monitor (including
relocation of disabled).
• Report to First Floor Monitor
• If floor is to be
• Capture assigned elevators
• Direct occupants attempting to use evacuated,
(either automatically or using
elevators to the nearest safe stairwell. follow Fire
required special key or the regular
Elevator Monitors • Assist in elevator evacuation of the Floor Team
call button).
disabled if elevator use of this purpose instructions.
• After capture, use of elevators
has been authorized. • If not, stand by
can be authorized only by the fire
for instructions
department, DO, or OEC.
• Inspect stairway for smoke or other
obstruction, if obstructed direct occupants
to another stairway. • Lead fire department to control
Stairway Monitors
• Keep occupants moving in a single file center.
down the stairway. • Restrict building access.
• Report status to Area Monitor. • Assist with occupant evacuation
Monitors for • Evacuate disabled to safe area.
Disabled • Report status to Area Monitor
Damage Control Team
• Report to Damage Control Coordinator
Damage Control
• Activate emergency systems: Alarm systems, Smoke control, Fire extinguishment, and Emergency
Team Members
power

2-3 HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE

Position ACTIONS
ALL Building Occupants
All Building • Dial [insert number] to notify [insert title] and provide specifics.
Occupants • Follow instructions provided by the Command Center Team.
Command Center Team
• Activate Command Center Team.
• Determine if an evacuation is appropriate:
o If yes, follow evacuation procedures.
o If no, follow shelter-in-place procedures.
• Notify fire department.
DO/OEC • Notify Federal Protective Service.
• Notify appropriate utility company or hazard materials expert.
• Go to Alternate Command Center.
• Hold occupants at relocation site.
• Do not permit reentry until determined safe by proper authorities.
• In case of explosion, follow instructions under Bomb Explosion.
All Other CCT • Go to Primary Command Center.
Members • Notify or activate appropriate teams as appropriate.
Floor Team
• Activate Floor Teams.
Floor Monitors • Supervise evacuation.
• Report to Floor Team Coordinator at relocation site Alternate Command Center.
• Coordinate area evacuation.
• Report conditions to Floor Monitors.
Area Monitors
• Accompany area occupants to relocation site.
• Hold occupants and await instructions.
• Control evacuation via stairways.
Stairwell Monitors
• Report to Area Monitors.
• Assist individuals requiring assistance to relocation site.
Monitors for the
• Remain with disabled.
Disabled
• Report to Area Monitors when possible.
• Go to relocation site.
Elevator Monitors
• Report to Floor Monitor.
Damage Control Team
Damage Control
• Report to Damage Control Coordinator at relocation site Command Center
Team Members

2-4 BOMB THREAT

Position Actions
ALL Building Occupants
All Building • Dial [insert number] to notify [insert title] and provide specifics.
Occupants • Follow instructions provided by the Command Center Team.
Command Center Team
• Go to Primary Command Center
DO/OEC
• Verify FPS notification and response
All Other CCT • Go to Primary Command Center.
Members • Notify or activate appropriate teams as appropriate.
First & Ground Unaffected
Floor Team Affected Floors
Floors Floors
• Control building access.
• Initiate evacuation/relocation. • Keep people away from building perimeter
Floor Monitors • Supervise and verify evacuation. • Control occupant movement, according to
• Report to Floor Team Coordinator. instructions received from Primary Command
Center
• Instruct occupants to search their work areas.
• Evacuate/relocate occupants.
Area Monitors • Inspect area to ensure total evacuation. NA
• Search assigned public areas and exit routes.
• Report to Floor Monitors.
Elevator Monitors NA NA
• Inspect stairwells and exit routes.
Stairwell Monitors • Lead occupants to safe area. NA
• Report to Area Monitors.
Disabled Occupant • Verify status of disabled occupants.
NA
Monitors • Report to Area Monitors.
Damage Control Team
Damage Control
Search assigned areas including maintenance, storage, outside, and rooftop areas
Team Members

Bomb Threat Received

If a bomb threat is received by phone:

●● Remain calm. Keep the caller on the he line for as long as possible. DO NOT HANG UP,
even if the caller does.
●● List carefully. Be polite and show interest.
●● Try to keep the caller talking to learn more information.
●● If possible, write a note to a colleague to call the authorities or, as soon as the caller hangs
up, immediately notify them yourself.
●● If your phone has a display, copy the number and/or letters on the window display.
●● Complete the Bomb Threat Checklist immediately. Write down as much detail as you can
remember. Try to get exact words.
●● Immediately upon termination of the call, DO NOT HANG UP. From a different phone,
contact FPS immediately with information and await instructions.
If a bomb threat is received by handwritten note or through the mail:
●● Call [Insert Correct Contact Information]
●● Handle note as minimally as possible.

If a bomb threat is received by e-mail:

●● Call [Insert Correct Contact Information]

●● Do not delete the message.
●● DO NOT:
○○ Use two-way radios or cellular phone; radio signals have the potential to detonate a
bomb.
○○ Evacuate the building until police arrive and evaluate the threat.
○○ Activate the fire alarm.
○○ Touch or move a suspicious package.

Following is information to be recorded by a bomb threat message recipient during or

immediately after the threat is communicated.
Date:

Time:

Time Caller Hung Up:
Phone Number Where Call Was Received:

Questions to ask Caller:

Where is the bomb located? (Building, Floor, Room, etc.):
When will it go off?
What does it look like?
What kind of bomb is it?
What will make it explode?
Did you place the bomb? (Yes, No)
Why?

What is your name?
Where are you?

Record Exact Words of Threat:

Record Information About Caller:

Where is the caller located? (Background and level of noise)
Estimated age
Is the voice familiar? If so, who does it sound like?

Circle Any That Apply

Caller’s Voice Background Sounds: Threat Language:
Accent Animal Noises Message Read Incoherently
Angry House Noises Taped
Calm Kitchen Noises Irrational
Clearing throat Street Noises Profane
Coughing Booth Well-spoken
Cracking voice PA System
Crying Conversation
Deep Music
Deep breathing Motor
Disguised Clear
Distinct Static
Excited Office machinery
Female Factory machinery
Laughter Local
Lisp Long distance
Loud
Male
Nasal
Normal
Ragged
Rapid
Raspy
Slow
Slurred
Soft
Stutter

2-5 SUSPICIOUS OBJECT

Position Actions
ALL Building Occupants
All Building • Do not touch suspicious objects Signs of a Suspicious
Occupants • Report them immediately upon discovery. Package
• Dial [insert number] to notify [insert title] • No Return Address
• Provide specifics. • Excessive Postage
• Follow instructions provided by the Command Center Team. • Stains
Command Center Team • Strange Odor
DO/OEC • Go to Primary Command Center • Strange Sounds
• Activate Command Center Team • Unexpected Delivery
• Verify fire department notification and response • Poorly Handwritten
• Brief responding personnel • Misspelled Words
• Evacuate or relocate occupants • Incorrect Titles
• Building Manager to put elevators in Phase I Service. • Foreign Postage
• Restrictive Notes
All Other CCT • Go to Primary Command Center.
Members • Notify or activate appropriate teams as appropriate.
Floor Team Affected Floors First and Ground Unaffected
Floors Floors
Floor Monitors • Carry out evacuation or relocation plan. • Control building access. • After evacuation,
• Supervise and verify evacuation. • Keep people away from restrict use of
• Report to Floor Team Coordinator. building perimeter elevators, escalators
Area Monitors • Coordinate area evacuation. and stairwells
• Determine location of suspicious object;
avoid using stairwells, elevators or
escalators in immediate area.
• Inspect area to ensure total evacuation.
• Report status to Floor Monitor.
Elevator Monitors NA • Report to First Floor Monitor.
• Hold elevators and assist
emergency units.
Stairwell Monitors • Inspect stairwells and exit routes. NA NA
• Lead occupants to safe area.
• Report status to Area Monitors.
Disabled Occupant • Coordinate evacuation if disabled NA NA
Monitors occupants.
• Report status to Area Monitor.
Damage Control Team
Damage Control NA NA NA
Team Members

2-6 SHELTERING-IN-PLACE
This information on sheltering-in-place (SIP) provides a general guideline for developing a plan
for SIP with tenant agency and other building occupant cooperation.
Step 1 - Review Building Vulnerability Assessment Reports and OEP

Step 2 - Identify Building Features

●● Determine the building’s age6.

●● Determine the building’s type of ventilation system – natural ventilation, unit ventilators
(through-the-wall units in each room), or duct system with air handling units, HVAC,
elevators, and building envelope.
●● If a duct system, record the number of different zones and air handling units, and the
locations of switches for each.
○○ Are there protections on the intake and re-circulation ducts of the HVAC system?
○○ How long does it take to stop the intake of air into your facility?
○○ Is the HVAC system shut off in one central location, or are multiple shutoffs required?
●● Determine if the building has smoke purge fans, and whether the intakes of the smoke
purge fans are elevated or at ground level.
○○ Record the locations and identification of switches for the smoke purge fans.
○○ Determine if the building has automatic dampers in working condition on outside air fans
and air handlers.
○○ List all exhaust fans and the location and identification of the control for each.
○○ Determine if stairwells are protected from smoke (external and isolated).
●● Determine whether the building has a public address system. If yes, record the locations of
the broadcast microphone and controls.
●● Record the information on communication with the building security personnel.
●● Obtain a copy of the evacuation routes posted for a fire emergency.
●● Evaluate the elevator system for its impact on building airflow to determine availability of
use during a SIP event.
●● Evaluate the potential for air infiltration through the building envelope.
●● Determine if there are safe zones for possible SIP.
Step 3 – Identify Features Increasing Building Vulnerability

●● If the building has mechanical ventilation with a duct system, record the location of all
fresh-air intakes that are at ground level and accessible to the public or next to a street or
roadway.
6 Buildings constructed after 1970 tend to be more airtight than older buildings, due to increased energy conservation
standards.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
638 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

●● List the locations of mechanical rooms having air handlers, whether each mechanical room
is kept locked, and which have outside entrances.
●● Determine where the lobby and any public access areas of the building share an air-
handling unit with office areas.
●● Determine if security-screening procedures are in place to prevent hazardous materials
from being brought into the building.
Step 4 – Identify SIP Safe Zones
In general, a SIP safe zone should:
●● Be identified based on the features that make a building vulnerable to the outside airborne
contaminant releases.
●● Have the least air infiltration when the HVAC and other ventilation systems are shut off.
●● Have sufficient space for all building occupants. In some situations, the SIP zone may
consist of the entire building or significant portions of the building. If the safe zone is a
number of designated room(s), then it is preferred to be located in the inner part of the
building (no windows to the outside). The rooms should have doors that are fairly effective
at preventing airflow from the hallways: at least there should be no gap around the edges
of the door, and preferably there should be a gasket to completely seal the room. Opening
and closing a conventional door can pump significant amounts of air into the safe zone.
Safe rooms are best located on mid floors and in interior rooms away from outside walls.
●● Have a shelter kit. The identified safe zone should have enough space for all building
occupants. Before an incident occurs, your SIP safe zone should have a shelter kit.
●● Not be bathrooms, kitchens, and other unsafe spaces with exhausted ducts to outside.
Bathrooms are typically a bad choice for a SIP location because they often have an
exhaust duct that leads directly outside. If the exhaust fan is turned off, then the duct can
allow contaminants to enter the facility from outside. Additionally, the stack effect can draw
air into the bathroom from within the building, eventually contaminating the building during
an indoor release. If the exhaust fan is left on, then air will be drawn into the bathroom from
other parts of the building, which will eventually contaminate the bathroom.
●● Have a Knox Box key repository with all necessary keys and cards needed for the fire and
hazardous materials team responders to gain access to your safe areas.
Step 5 – Develop a Communication Plan
The plan should suggest how to:
●● Receive timely information on the threat of airborne contaminant releases outside of the
building and effectively communicate the information to building authorities.
●● Activate the organization in response to a threat.
●● Inform building occupants of the nature of an emergency and what action to take.
●● Coordinate activities during the SIP.
●● Use all available resources to get word out (e-mail, voice-mail system, telephone, OEP
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
639 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

monitor, office-to-office personal notification) when informing building authorities and

occupants.
●● Prepare a warning message before an incident for each protective action practical for
the building. This will ensure the actions can be taken as rapidly as possible and that
instructions will be clearly understood. Messages should be worded to be effective without
causing panic.
●● Provide instructions on turning off fans or closing windows during SIP. In buildings with
unit ventilators, sheltering messages may require instructions for turning off ventilators.
In buildings with natural ventilation, instructions for closing windows and doors may be
required.
●● Consider procedures and communication avenues for the following activities:
○○ Determining if/when the outside release occurs in conjunction with local emergency
responders
○○ Determining the characteristics of the release in conjunction with local emergency
responders
○○ Deciding upon the best action to take in conjunction with local emergency responders
based on conditions and events
○○ Deciding if a SIP condition exists
○○ Issuing the order authorizing a SIP
○○ Communicating emergency instructions to all in the building
○○ Sheltering-in-place
○○ Monitoring the event in conjunction with local emergency responders
○○ Issuing “All Clear” notifications as appropriate
Step 6 – SIP Training Drills
Training and drills should satisfy the following objectives:
●● Develop an employee awareness of potential airborne hazards. When trained, the building
occupants can serve to detect hazards and reduce response time by being aware of odors,
signs, symptoms, and suspicious activities. Training should include familiarization with the
warning properties of hazardous chemicals stored or used outside and within the building,
information on what actions are to be taken, and awareness of suspicious activities relating
to fresh air intakes, mechanical rooms, and abandoned parcels. This training should be part
of a program that trains building occupants to the Awareness level in WMD.
●● Develop an understanding of the responses and what steps to take for each of the possible
protective programs.
●● Inform building occupants about the BSC, their job, and how they can be contacted.
●● Inform those employees taking prescriptions or other medications that they should keep an
on-hand supply on their person.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
640 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

●● Discuss and take necessary actions with authorities related to special needs that may be
required by some building occupants.
●● Train building occupants on water conservation for the duration of the SIP.
●● Train property managers for SIP conditions.
●● Train contractors and contract employees.
●● Identify and mark safe SIP zones (locations and accountability for them)
●● Ensure guards are familiar with SIP procedures in alignment with post orders.
●● Assign duties to specific employees with backups.
●● Coordinate actions with local emergency responders including ensuring familiarization with
where safe rooms are, number of people within, and other safety measures in place.
Stages of OEP integration.

●● Conduct orientation drills and meetings where ERT becomes acquainted with local
responders in preparation for an emergency.
●● Facility “Walk Through” exercises, with Fire Department officials and EMS responders to
preplan facility OEPs.
●● Participate in, or observe tabletop exercises for emergency managers to allow decision
makers to learn what will happen when an emergency occurs and how to integrate the
internal response within the operational framework.
●● Offer to host and participate in Functional and Full-Scale exercises.
●● Allow local emergency responders to conduct Walkthroughs to determine multiple routes to
and from safe areas.
●● Determine various possible upgrade and up wind decontamination sites that would be used
by local responders in an emergency.
Step 7 – Reactive Guidelines for SIP
Once notification has been received from local authorities, the following guidelines are
recommended if SIP is required:
●● Inform building occupants of SIP conditions, direct them to SIP safe zone(s), and account
for people;
●● Notify the Building Security Committee (BSC) members, Federal Security Authorities,
property management personnel, and all other occupants of the building about the incident
and SIP requirements;
●● Minimize the rate of air exchange with the outside as to keep indoor concentration as low
as possible for as long as possible by closing all windows and doors to the outside, and
closing all necessary doors;
●● Shut-off all HVAC fans and close all HVAC dampers, including exhaust dampers. Shut off
other fans such as kitchen and bathroom exhausts. If shutting off these systems takes more
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
641 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

time due to the building condition, then shutting off the whole electrical system should be
evaluated during SIP proactive planning;
●● Do not use elevators – they create a piston effect and can pump air into or out of the
building;
●● Seal the doors, windows, and vents if necessary;
●● Establish communication with outside through a TV, radio, cell phone, or others and ensure
that emergency responders know your location(s);
●● Once the threat has passed and the authority having jurisdiction gives an “all clear,”
evacuate the building and flush it with outdoor air. When leaving, be aware and cognizant of
signs and symptoms of contamination in the event evacuee pass through a contamination
pocket in the structure or outside. SIP requires two distinct actions be taken without delay
to maximize the passive protection;
●● Reduce indoor/outdoor air exchange rate before hazardous plume arrives. Close all
windows and doors and turn off all fans, air conditioners, HVAC, elevators and combustion
heathers.
●● Increase indoor/outdoor air exchange rate as soon as hazardous plume has passed. Open
all windows and doors and turn on all fans to ventilate the building. Though tightly sealed, a
building does not prevent contaminated air from entering; it minimizes the rate of infiltration.
Outside air enters more slowly, and once the external hazard has passed, the building
releases the contaminated air slowly as long as it remains closed. If there is a release close
to the ground near a tall building, and if the building’s air intakes are on the roof or upper
floors of the building far from the release areas, operating the HVAC so as to pressurize the
building with air taken-in through the HVAC system will usually be better than shutting off
the HVAC entirely. Actions such as this can only be taken if there is a very good knowledge
of the release location and the dispersion of the contamination and if the designated
official authorizes it. This decision should be made in consultation with local emergency
responders if available as the weather; contaminant chemical and physical properties can
cause variable reactions with the contaminant’s behavior.
The amount of protection varies with the following:

●● Duration of exposure. Protection varies with time, diminishing as the time of exposure
increases. SIP is therefore suitable only for exposures of short duration, generally three
hours or less, depending upon building conditions and the nature of the incident.
●● Natural filtering. Some filtering occurs when an airborne agent is deposited in the building
shell or upon interior surfaces as air respires through the building. This filtering effect is
greatest in tight-fitted buildings.
Distribution of the SIP

●● Place the final plan in three-ring binders and number all copies and pages.
●● Each individual receiving a copy should be required to sign for it and be responsible for
posting subsequent changes.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
642 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

●● Determine which sections of the plan would be appropriate to share with other government
agencies (some section may refer to classified information or include private listings of
names, telephone numbers, or radio frequencies) and emergency response agencies
(appropriate sections).

2-7 EXPLOSION
Position Actions
ALL Building Occupants
All Building • Dial [insert number] to notify [insert title] and provide specifics.
Occupants • Follow instructions provided by the Command Center Team.
Command Center Team
• Go to Primary Command Center.
DO/OEC
• Activate Command Center Team.
All Other CCT • Go to Primary Command Center.
Members • Notify or activate appropriate teams as appropriate.
First & Ground
Floor Team Affected Floors Unaffected Floors
Floors
• Notify Floor Team.
• Supervise evacuation, first aid, and
Floor Monitors rescue.
• Report conditions to Floor Team • Inform occupants.
Coordinator. Control access to the building • Maintain control of
• Coordinate area evacuation, first aid, occupants.
and rescue. • Control egress.
Area Monitors
• Inspect area to determine conditions. • Maintain
• Report to Floor Monitor. communication
• Capture elevators. with Floor Team
• Hold until determined safe Coordinator.
Elevator Monitors NA
for use. • Evacuate to a safe
• Assist emergency teams. area if instructed to
• Inspect assigned stairwell. do so by Floor Team
• Report conditions to Area Monitors. Coordinator.
Stairwell Monitors
• Lead occupants to safe area if NA
required.
Monitors for Disabled • Move disabled occupants to safe area.
Damage Control Team
• Assist in rescue.
Damage Control • Control access.
Team Members • Inspect elevators, fire protection systems, and utilities.
• Report conditions to Damage Control Team Coordinator. Make required repairs.

2-8 NATURAL DISASTER

ACTIONS
Position
Advance Notice No Advance Notice
ALL Building Occupants
8. All Building
Follow instructions provided by the Command Center Team.
Occupants
Command Center Team
• Activate the Command Center Team.
DO/OEC • Review plans and decide course of action
• Notify occupants.
• Go to scene
• Ensure that appropriate assistance has
• Go to scene
Medical Coordinator been called
• Advise regarding medical assistance
• Recommend follow-up action
• Report to DO
Floor Team • Go to Primary Command Center
• Review plans with floor monitors
Coordinator • Coordinate and assist Floor Teams
Damage Control • Activate DCT for damage prevention • Go to Primary Command Center
Coordinator work. • Activate Damage Control Team
• Go to Primary Command Center
Administrative Officer NA
• Record activities
Floor Team
• Capture assigned elevators.
Elevator Monitors NA • Restrict use until determined safe (mechanical safety
inspection may be required).
Damage Control Team
• Assess damage.
• Determine needs for controlling dangerous conditions.
Damage Control • Protect windows and doors.
• Provide repair, rescue, and first aid services as directed.
Team Members • Secure outdoor objects.
• Isolate unsafe areas.
• Report to Damage Control Coordinator.

Building Manager to place Elevators in Phase I Service upon complete evacuation.

2-9 DEMONSTRATIONS
Position ACTIONS
Advance Notice No Advance Notice
ALL Building Occupants
All Building Occupants Follow instructions provided by the Command Center Team.
Command Center Team
DO/OEC • Go to Primary Command Center
• Notify Federal Protective Service – if FPS not in area, notify local police department.
• Notify Floor Team Coordinator.
Medical Coordinator • Go to scene
• Ensure that appropriate assistance has been called
• Report to DO
• Advise regarding medical assistance
Floor Team Coordinator • Go to Primary Command Center
• Activate Ground Level Floor Team

Damage Control • Activate DCT for damage • Go to Primary Command Center

Coordinator prevention work. • Activate Damage Control Team
Administrative Officer NA • Go to Primary Command Center
• Record activities
Floor Team
Ground Level • Secure perimeter doors.
• Avoid any interaction with demonstrators.
• Prevent any occupant interaction with demonstrators.
• Follow instructions in responding to FPS officers and/or local police.
Damage Control Team
Damage Control Team • Protect windows and doors. • Assess damage.
Members • Secure outdoor objects. • Determine needs for controlling dangerous conditions.
• Provide repair, rescue, and first aid services as directed.
• Isolate unsafe areas.
• Report to Damage Control Coordinator.

2-10 MISSING CHILD - CODE ADAM

Position ACTIONS
ALL Building Occupants
All Building • Immediately report lost or missing child notifications to security personnel
Occupants • Assist in search for missing child according to communicated description
Command Center Team
DO/OEC • Obtain a detailed description of the missing child. At a minimum, the description should include: name, race,
gender, age, eye color, hair color, approximate height, weight, any identifying marks, description of clothing (to
include shoe color and style1), time the child was last seen, last known location.
• Direct or take parent/guardian/responsible party to a pre-determined contact location/main staging area for
easy access in case more information is needed.
• Report information to entrance control posts immediately by issuing a Code Adam Alert for building/location.
• Pass description information to entrance control posts. If available, use a public address (PA) system to
broadcast an announcement that a Code Adam Alert is in effect so that all tenants are alerted to look for the
missing child.
• Establish a central command location to which all Command Center Team members can report and coordinate
their efforts with all responding personnel. Notifying a Regional Dispatch Center (i.e. FPS MegaCenter) that a
Code Adam Alert has been initiated.
• Instruct all access control posts to continue to control/monitor building access in addition to being aware of all
people leaving the building.
• Advise non-security personnel to participate through observation and reporting only.
• Terminate Code Adam Alert when parent/guardian positively identifies child, and safety has been established.
If found unharmed and no criminal activity has occurred, reunited child with parent/guardian.
• Contact local law enforcement authorities if Alert renders negative results.
Floor Team • Coordinate and assist Floor Teams
Coordinator
Administrative • Assist with search efforts; track and document areas that have been searched and cleared.
Officer • Record activities/document the incident
• Prepare initial report of incident and supplement with other pertinent information in update or follow-up report
with original report’s case control number
All other CCT • Assist with search efforts
Members
Floor Team
Floor Team • Conduct a thorough search of the building to positively identify all children located in the building
Members • Search all potential hiding places, offices, common areas, and exterior areas of the property
• If a CCTV system is in place, monitor it closely for the missing child
• If CCTV system has capabilities of viewing without interrupting ongoing recording, review video to identify the
last time child was seen
Floor Team • Conduct a thorough search of the building
Members • Search all potential hiding places, offices, common areas, and exterior areas of the property
• Positively identify all children located in the building
• If a CCTV system is in place, monitor it closely for the missing child
• If CCTV system has capabilities of viewing without interrupting ongoing recording, review video to identify the
last time child was seen
• Announce Code Adam Alert cancellation upon DO determination via available means of dissemination

2.11 Enhanced Protection Due to Increased Threat

Low Condition (Green): Low risk of terrorist attack. Security partners should consider the
following general measures in addition to the facility-specific protective measures they
develop and implement:
Refine and exercise as appropriate preplanned protective measures
Ensure that personnel receive proper training on the Homeland Security Advisory System
and specific preplanned department or agency protective measures
Institutionalize a process to ensure that all facilities and regulated sectors are regularly
assessed for vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks and that all reasonable measures are taken to
mitigate these vulnerabilities
Guarded Condition (Blue): General risk of terrorist attack. In addition to the protective
measures taken in the previous threat condition, security partners should consider the
following general measures in addition to the facility-specific protective measures they
develop and implement:
Check communications with designated emergency response or command locations
Review and update emergency response procedures
Provide the public with any information that would strengthen its ability to act appropriately
Elevated Condition (Yellow): Significant risk of terrorist attack. In addition to the protective
measures taken in the previous threat condition, security partners should consider the
following general measures in addition to the facility-specific protective measures they
develop and implement:
Increase surveillance of critical locations
Coordinate emergency plans as appropriate with nearby jurisdictions
Assess whether the precise characteristics of the threat require the further refinement of
preplanned protective measures
Implement, as appropriate, contingency and emergency response plans
High Condition (Orange): High risk of terrorist attack. In addition to the protective measures
taken in the previous threat condition, security partners should consider the following general
measures in addition to the facility-specific protective measures they develop and implement:
Coordinate necessary security efforts with Federal, State, and local law enforcement
agencies or any National Guard or other appropriate armed forces organizations
Take additional precautions at public events and possibly consider alternative venues or even
cancellation
Prepare to execute contingency procedures, such as moving to an alternate site or dispersing
the facility’s workforce
Restrict threatened facility access to essential personnel only
Severe Condition (Red): Severe risk of terrorist attack. Under most circumstances, the
protective measures for a Severe Condition are not intended to be sustained for substantial
periods of time. In addition to the protective measures taken in the previous threat condition,
security partners should consider the following general measures in addition to the facility-
specific protective measures they develop and implement:
Increase or redirect personnel to address critical emergency needs
Assign emergency response personnel and pre-positioning and mobilizing specially trained
teams or resources
Monitor, redirect, or constrain transportation systems
Close public and government facilities

2-12 Post-Emergency Recovery

Immediately after an emergency, take steps to resume operations.
●● As soon as possible, report to the OEP Team following notification of an incident/
emergency;
●● Maintain contact with all members of the OEP Team and facilitate the flow of information
between members of the OEP Team;
●● Identify the required support personnel who may be needed;
●● Dispatch, as required, members of the OEP Team, to assist in the incident/emergency;
●● Assist in the coordination and movement of personnel away from impacted area;
●● Advise, in consultation with members of the OEP Team and local authorities, when the
building is safe for reoccupation when the incident has concluded sound the All Clear; and
●● Upon arrival of FPS and/or local authorities, the OEC shall brief emergency responders of
the existing emergency.

Within 48 hours of the emergency:

●● Call a follow-up meeting of the OEP Team to discuss the events of the emergency.
●● Reinforce actions/responses, which worked well.
●● Lessons learned change actions/responses that did not work well.
●● Recommend changes to the OEP. Local emergency personnel shall be invited, if
appropriate.
●● Responsible for scheduling evacuation drills for their building.
●● Determine if any critical operations cannot be disrupted.
●● Brief all building occupants on the drill and given assignments.
●● Recruit non-occupants of the building to observe the drill and make critical evaluations.
●● Notify Safety and Security that a simulated emergency is in progress.
●● Decide if occupants are to be evacuated to off-site facilities.
●● Notify the relocation center if an off-site evacuation is to be performed.
●● Identify the locations to be evacuated.
●● Ensure all occupants are aware of these different locations and when to use them.
●● Post these locations in each area and exercise these evacuations.
●● Identify person (s) responsible for ensuring all people have been evacuated.
●● Identify when occupant may return.

2-12 Post-Emergency Recovery

●● Communicate with floor wardens, and conduct visual inspections of the building for
evacuation hazards.
●● Establish a recovery team, if necessary.
●● Establish priorities for resuming operations.
●● Continue to ensure the safety of personnel on the property. Assess remaining hazards.
●● Maintain security at the incident scene.
●● Conduct an employee briefing.
●● Keep detailed records. Consider audio recording all decisions. Take photographs of or
videotape the damage.
●● Account for all damage-related costs. Establish special job order numbers and charge
codes for purchases and repair work.
●● Follow notification procedures. Notify employees’ families about the status of personnel
on the property. Notify off-duty personnel about work status. Notify insurance carriers and
appropriate government agencies.
●● Protect undamaged property. Close up building openings. Remove smoke, water and
debris.
●● Protect equipment against moisture. Restore sprinkler systems. Physically secure the
property. Restore power.
●● Conduct an investigation. Coordinate actions with appropriate government agencies.
●● Conduct salvage operations. Segregate damaged from undamaged property. Keep
damaged goods on hand until an insurance adjuster has visited the premises, but you
can move material outside if it’s seriously in the way and exposure to the elements won’t
make matters worse.
●● Take an inventory of damaged goods.
●● Restore equipment and property. For major repair work, review restoration plans with the
insurance adjuster and appropriate government agencies.
●● Assess the value of damaged property. Assess the impact of business interruption.
●● Maintain contact with customers and suppliers.

Attachment 3: Reviewing OEP Procedures and Identifying Best Practices

This section provides code requirements and industry practices for emergency action plans to
distinguish areas of conformance and shortfalls. The three columns on the right of the tables
are provided for agency analysis.

Employee Emergency Plans and Fire Prevention Plans Compliance with Requirement or
[OSHA 29 CFR § 1910.38] Standard
Yes No Comments
Emergency escape procedures
Escape routes
Procedures to be followed by employees who remain to operate
critical plant operations before they evacuate
Procedures to account for all employees after evacuation has
been completed
Duties for employees designated to perform rescue and medical
functions
The preferred means of reporting fires and other emergencies
The names or regular job titles of people or departments that can
be contacted for further information or explanation of duties under
the plan.

Emergency Drills and Review of Emergency Plans Compliance with Requirement or

[OSHA 29 CFR § 1910.38] Standard
Yes No Comments
Objectives of the drill
Frequency of drills
Nature of drills—announced versus surprise
Drill safety and assessment of means of egress
Roles and responsibilities of emergency evacuation
staff
Accountability of building occupants
Staff roles and responsibilities
Coordination with fire department
Coordination within the facility

National Fire Protection Association Standards (NFPA)

The NFPA establishes national standards for fire drills in codes such as NFPA 1, Fire
Prevention Code, and NFPA 101®, Life Safety Code®, which are commonly adopted by many
local jurisdictions.

Under NFPA 1, emergency action drills are required for those buildings containing more than
500 occupants. A building may also be required to conduct drill exercises if it contains less than
500 occupants but it houses 100 or more individuals above or below street level. In addition to
requiring drills NFPA 1 also requires the following:
●● Drills will be conducted periodically
●● Drills will be conducted as needed to familiarize occupants with procedures
●● Drills will be conducted at both planned and unexpected times
●● Drills will vary conditions to address unusual conditions
●● All building personnel will participate in drills
●● NFPA 1 also requires the establishment of emergency plans covering all building
occupants. These plans are to be updated and reviewed on an annual basis.

ASIS International’s Disaster Preparation Guide

American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS) International’s “Disaster Preparation Guide”
Compliance with Requirement or
Evacuations - ASIS Recommendations Standard
Yes No Comments
Describing the conditions under which evacuation
would be ordered.
Develop evacuation procedures, with appropriate
options for the various hazards that avoid potential
secondary hazards (i.e., live high voltage wires
that could fall; fuel lines that could be ruptured by
earthquake explosion; fire damage; etc.).
Identifying the individual responsible for ordering an
evacuation and establishing lines of succession for
carrying out evacuation functions.
Indicating under what conditions it would be safe to
complete facility shutdown before ordering general
evacuation.
Describing the alerting and communication systems for
signaling impending or immediate evacuation for each
type of evacuation your facility may require.
Procedures for search and rescue teams, if evacuation
alarms are inoperative.
Maps indicating evacuation routes from buildings and
the facility site.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
651 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

Compliance with Requirement or

Evacuations - ASIS Recommendations Standard
Yes No Comments
Clearly marked evacuation routes throughout company
facilities, with two exit options (and fire escapes where
needed) for every employee.
Assuring that all personnel know the evacuation routes,
routines, and check-in procedures for both area and
site evacuations.
Helping any handicapped employees to evacuate.
Special attention to ensure any non-English-speaking
employees understand warning signals and know
where and how to evacuate the work place.
Identifying public or company provided safe reassembly
areas that will not leave evacuees exposed to adverse
weather conditions—below freezing temperatures,
driving rains, etc.—or to radiological hazards following
a nuclear incident or attack.
Assigning responsibility in an evacuation to a rear
guard to ensure that all personnel get clear.
An organized head-count to ensure that all facility
occupants have exited.
A system for identifying missing persons.
Ensuring that vital records are evacuated.
Identifying critical equipment to be evacuated and
explaining how and by whom it will be moved.
A facility status report to specified company and civil
authorities from the responsible onsite person following
a site evacuation.
Periodic evacuation drills for all facilities.
Designating responsible staff members (by name and
title) to maintain and update the evacuation plan on a
standby basis.

Compliance with Requirement or

Sheltering in Place - ASIS Recommendations Standard
Yes No Comments
Identifying existing shelter space in company facilities.
Orderly movement to onsite shelter, with a general
traffic pattern and ready-made directional signs.
Assigning corridor, floor, and building wardens to assist
employee movement.
Crisis stocking of food, water, medical supplies, and
other necessities for fallout shelter stay (for on-site
company shelters only).
Designating shelter managers and support staff.

Compliance with Requirement or

Sheltering in Place - ASIS Recommendations Standard
Yes No Comments
Obtaining radiation-measuring devices from local
emergency management officials.
Arranging training for shelter managers and radiological
monitors from local and state emergency management
officials.
Receiving and registering additional people from
nearby areas, in close coordination with government
officials, if company facilities have been included in the
local in-place fallout shelter inventory.
Coordinating with local authorities to identify shelter
locations assigned to company employees outside the
facility in accordance with the local in-place shelter
allocation.
Printed instructions advising employees of shelter
locations and routes to get there, either within the
facility or nearby.
Identifying the individual responsible for maintaining
on-site shelters.
Assuring that key workers required to continue
essential operations are provided blast shelter in or
near the work place.
Coordinating all key worker shelter needs with the local
government.
Determining when occupants can be released from
shelter.

Compliance with Guidelines

Business & Industry Emergency Management Guide
Yes No Comments
Determine the conditions under which an evacuation
would be necessary.
Establish a clear chain of OEP.
Identify personnel with the authority to order an
evacuation.
Designate “evacuation wardens” to assist others in an
evacuation and to account for personnel.
Establish specific evacuation procedures.
Establish a system for accounting for personnel.
Consider employees’ transportation needs for
community-wide evacuations.
Establish procedures for assisting persons with
disabilities and those who do not speak English.
Post evacuation procedures.
Designate personnel to continue or shut down critical
operations while an evacuation is underway.

Coordinate plans with the local emergency

management office.
Attachment 4: Additional Resources

Telephone Hotlines

●● Domestic Preparedness Chemical/Biological Help Line (phone: 800-368-6498, fax: 410-

612-0715, e-mail: [email protected]) This service provides technical
assistance during business hours to eligible State and local emergency responders and
their organizations.
●● National Response Center Hotline (800-424-8802) A service that receives reports of oil,
chemical, biological, and radiological releases and actual or potential domestic terrorism;
provides technical assistance to emergency responders; and connects callers with
appropriate Federal resources. The hotline operates 24 hours a day, 365 days a year.
●● Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center (301-816-5100, collect calls accepted)
accepts reports of accidents involving radiological materials.
Authorities / References

●● Under 41 CFR § 102-74.250, the decision to activate the OEP must be made by the
Designated Official, or by the designated alternate official. After normal duty hours, the
senior officer in the Operations Center on duty will represent the Designated Official or his/
her alternates and must initiate action to cope with emergencies in accordance with the
OEP.
●● Code requirements for fire drills, which address emergency evacuation planning, are found
in several national standards:
○○ Code of Federal Regulations, Title 41, Chapter 102 Federal Management Regulations,
Part 102-71, Subpart 102-74.230, Occupant Emergency Program (41 CFR § 102-
74.230).
○○ Code of Federal Regulations, Title 29, Part 1904 Recording and Reporting Occupational
Injuries and Illnesses, Section 39 Reporting Fatality and Multiple Hospitalization
Incidents to OSHA (29 CFR § 904.39).
○○ Code of Federal Regulations, Title 29, Chapter 1910 Occupational Safety and Health
Standards, Section 38 Employee Emergency Plans and Fire Prevention Rules (29 CFR
§ 1910.38)
○○ Code of Federal Regulations, Title 29, Part 1910 Occupational Safety and Health
Standards, Section 120 Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response (29
CFR § 1910.120).
○○ Code of Federal Regulations, Title 29, Part 1910 Occupational Safety and Health
Standards, Section 165 Employee Alarm Systems (29 CFR § 1910.165).
○○ Code of Federal Regulations, 29 CFR § 1960 Basic Program Elements for Federal
Employee Occupational Safety and Health Matters, Section 16 Compliance with
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
654 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

Occupational Safety and Health Administration Standards (29 CFR §1960.70), and 29
CFR § 1960, Reporting of Serious Accidents.
○○ The General Services Administration Accident and Fire Prevention Handbook PBS P
5900.2C.
○○ U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Fact Sheet on Obtaining and Using
Employee Medical Information as Part of Emergency Evacuation Procedures, dated
October 31, 2001.
○○ Emergency Preparedness Guide, National Organization on Disability: http://www.nod.
org/emergency
○○ The Property Professional’s Guide to Emergency Preparedness, BOMA International:
http://www.boma.org/pubs/property_gep.htm
○○ Protecting Buildings And Their Occupants From Airborne Hazards, U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers Technical Instruction, October 2001: http://www.fema.gov/fima/antiterrorism/
resources.shtm
○○ Emergency Preparedness in the Built Environment, International Facility Management
Association (IFMA), November 2001: http://www.ifma.org/profdev/seminar/catalog/
ep.cfm/actionbig=7
○○ GSA Occupant Emergency Program (OEP) Guide, U.S. General Services
Administration, March 2002: http://www.usda.gov/oo/beprepared/OEPplans.htm
○○ Shelter-In-Place at Your Office: A general guide for preparing a shelter-in-place plan in
the workplace, National Institute for Chemical Studies: http://www.nicsinfo.org/OEP%20
plan%20for%20offices%20NICS%20feb2003.pdf
○○ Planning Protective Action Decision-Making: Evacuate or Shelter-in-Place, Oak Ridge
National Laboratory, June 2002.http://www.ornl.gov/
○○ Protecting Buildings From a Biological or Chemical Attack: actions to take before
or during a release, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, January 2003: http://
securebuildings.lbl.gov/images/BldgAdvice.pdf
○○ Guidance for Protecting Building Environments from Airborne Chemical, Biological,
or Radiological Attacks; CDC and NIOSH, May 2002 (http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/
bldvent/2002-139.html)
○○ Risk Management Guidance for Health, Safety and Environmental Security under
Extraordinary Incidents, ASHRAE, January 2003 (http://xp20.ashrae.org/ABOUT/Task_
Force_Rpt_12Jan02.pdf)
○○ Emergency Management Guide for Business and Industry, FEMA (http://www.fema.gov/
business/guide/toc.shtm)
○○ Critical Incident Protocol, Michigan State University: http://www.cj.msu.edu/~outreach/
CIP/CIP PDF
○○ Evacuation Plans and Procedures e-Tool, OSHA: http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/e-tools/

evacuation/index.html
○○ Small Business Disaster Planning Guide, Small Business Association, Institute for
Business & Home Safety: http://www.ibhs.org/docs/openforbusiness.pdf
○○ Developing a Preparedness Plan and Conducting Emergency Evacuation Drills,
National Fire Protection Association: http://www.nfpa.org/Research/nfpafactsheets/
emergency/emergency.asp
○○ Model Shelter-in-Place Plan for Businesses, National Institute for Chemical Studies:
http://www.nicsinfo.org/OEP%20plan%20for%20offices%20NICS%20feb2003.pdf
○○ Shelter-in-Place in an Emergency, American Red Cross: http://www.redcross.org/
services/disaster/beprepared/shelterinplace.html
○○ Business and Industry Preparedness Guide, American Red Cross: http://www.redcross.
org/services/disaster/beprepared/busi_industry.html#fema
○○ Army Training Support Center (http://www.atsc.army.mil) provides a digital library
with approved training and doctrine information. Files include Field Manuals, Mission
Training Plans, Soldier Training Pubs, and more.
○○ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) (http://www.bt.cdc.gov) information
regarding infectious diseases
○○ CBIAC: Chemical and Biological Defense Information and Analysis Center (http://www.
cbiac.apgea.army.mil) Collects, reviews, analyzes, and summarizes chemical warfare/
contraband detection (CW/CBD) information.
○○ Chemical and Biological Warfare – Health and Safety (http://www.ntis.gov/hs/prep-
response.aspx) Department of Commerce National Technical Information Service
(NTIS) site has information on chemical and biological agents, Government research,
detoxification and decontamination studies, developing immunizations, and drug
theories.
○○ Chemical Accident Prevention Provisions Overview (CAPPO) (http://www.epa.gov/
emergencies/content/lawsregs/rmpover.htm) information on the CEPPO office,
upcoming events, publications, legislation and regulations, and links to outside
resources Also contains information on accident prevention and risk management
planning
○○ Chemical Transportation Emergency Center (CHEMTREC) (http://www.chemtrec.com/
Chemtrec/) source of technical assistance from chemical product safety specialists,
emergency response coordinators, toxicologists and other hazardous materials
(HazMat) specialists
○○ FEMA – Guide for Terrorism Emergency Management (http://www.city.waltham.ma.us/
lepcweb/cterr/FEMA_Guide_for_Terrorism.htm) Currently 35 links to various emergency
management-related bibliographies. At least 10 of these relate to WMD.
○○ Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/AEOD/
FRERP/downld.html)

○○ U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (CHPPM) (http://
chppm-www.apgea.army.mil) Home Page providing links especially requests for
CHPPM services. Links connect to Directorates of Environmental Health Engineering,
Health Promotion and Wellness, Laboratory Sciences, Occupational Health, and
Toxicology.
○○ U.S. Army Medical Research and Development (R&D) Command (http://MRMC-www.
army.mil) Links include military infectious disease, chemical and biological links,
scientific and technical reports, and Web site links.
○○ U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense (http://chemdef.apgea.
army.mil) provides data links to open literature for medical management of chemical
casualties and assay techniques for chemical agents.
○○ U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (http://www.usamriid.army.
mil) provides links to Medical Command (MEDCOM), Ebola site, outbreak reporting site,
CDC, Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), U.S. Army, and more.
Cross-Reference Websites

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

●● EPA’s Chemical Emergency and Prevention Office (CEPPO). CEPPO provides leadership,
advocacy, and assistance to prevent and prepare for chemical emergencies, respond to
environmental crises, and inform the public about chemical hazards in their community.
●● EPA’s Environmental Response Team (ERT) The ERT is a group of skilled experts in
environmental emergencies who provide on-scene assistance on a “round-the-clock” basis
to deal with environmental disasters.
●● EPA’s Role in Counterterrorism. This Web site describes EPA’s counterterrorism efforts and
shares relevant counterterrorism information and resources.
Department of Defense (DoD)

●● DoD’s Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center. This Web site is
DoD’s focal point for chemical and biological warfare information.
●● DoD’s Counter proliferation: Chem Bio Defense. This is a DoD “web network” on nuclear,
biological, and chemical (NBC) defense.
●● DoD’s Hazardous Technical Information Services (HTIS) HTIS is a service of the Defense
Logistics Agency, located in Richmond, Virginia.
●● DoD’s Medical (Army Surgeon General). This Web site contains extensive medical
documents, training materials, audiovisual clips, a search engine, and links to other sites.
Department of Justice (DOJ)

●● Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

●● Awareness of National Security Issues and Response Program (ANSIR). The ANSIR is the

“public voice” of the FBI for espionage, cyber and physical infrastructure protection.
●● National Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO). The NDPO Web site provides a location
for information regarding the available Federal training and programs intended to enhance
the capabilities of the public safety community in dealing with weapons of mass destruction
(WMD). The NDPO mission, members, services, newsletter, and recommended links are
contained on this site.
●● Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support (OSLDPS). OSLDPS provides
technical assistance to States and local jurisdictions to enhance their ability to develop,
plan, and implement a program for WMD preparedness.
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

●● Background: Terrorism. This FEMA Web site provides basic background information on
terrorism-related issues.
●● Terrorism Annex to the Federal Response Plan. The site includes the full text of the Annex
in PDF format that can be downloaded and reproduced.
●● National Fire Academy. The National Fire Academy homepage provides links to the course
catalog and to specific courses and job aids relating to terrorism preparedness.
●● FEMA’s Emergency Response to Terrorism Self-Study Course - This Web site provides
a link to a self-study course designed to provide basic awareness training to prepare first
responders to respond safely and effectively to incidents of terrorism.
Department of Health and Human Services

●● Office of Emergency Preparedness / National Disaster Medical System – The website

provides information on current and previous disaster responses, counter terrorism
programs and links to other Federal sites.
●● Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response
Program – The website provides information on bioterrorism preparedness issues,
response planning and recent publications related to bioterrorism.
●● Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) also provide helpful (though not
comprehensive) lists of chemical and biological agents that might be used by terrorists.
These lists are included in “Biological and Chemical Terrorism: Strategic Plan for
Preparedness and Response,” in CDC’s Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, April 21,
2000 (Vol. 49, No. RR‑4).
Federal Law Enforcement Links:

●● Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF)

●● Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)
●● Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI)
●● Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)

●● United States Customs Service

●● United States Secret Service
Useful Links:

●● The Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO)

●● Federal Law Enforcement Center (FLETC)
●● United States Dept of Justice
●● NOAA Computer Security Program
●● NOAA Office for Law Enforcement (OLE)
●● National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX)
●● (DAVIS/DITIS) --DOD Poster collection

Acronyms

●● ASIS American Society for Industrial Security

●● BSC Building Security Committee
●● CCT Command Center Team
●● CHEMTREC Chemical Transportation Emergency Center
●● CPR Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation
●● DCT Disaster Control Team
●● DO Designated Official
●● ERT Emergency Response Team
●● FMR Federal Management Regulations
●● FPS Federal Protective Service
●● FT Floor Team
●● FTC Floor Team Coordinator
●● GSA General Services Administration
●● HAZMAT Hazardous Materials
●● HSAS Homeland Security Advisory System
●● HVAC Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning
●● ICS Incident Command System
●● LEPC Local Emergency Planning Commission
●● MSDS Material Safety Data Sheet

●● NFPA National Fire Protection Association

●● NIMS National Incident Management System
●● NRP National Response Plan
●● OEC Occupant Emergency Coordinator
●● OEO Occupant Emergency Organization
●● OEP Occupant Emergency Plan
●● OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration
●● SIP Shelter in place

Occupant Emergency Plan Template

Emergency Notification Numbers

Fire
Medical Emergency
Building Security
Federal Protective Service 1 – 877 – 437 – 7411

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BACK Return to Table of Contents

Responsible Officials’ Sign-off Sheet

A. By their signatures below, the following officials certify that they have participated in
the development of this Occupant Emergency Plan (OEP) and fully understand the
procedures to be followed in an emergency affecting the facility and the employees
for which they are responsible.
Position Primary Alternate

Name Name

Designated
Title Title
Official

Signature Signature

Name Name

Occupant
Emergency Title Title
Coordinator

Signature Signature

Name Name

Title Title

Signature Signature

I. Part 1: Organization and Responsibilities

A. Introduction

1. The best way to protect against the potentially harmful effects of both man-made
incidents and natural disasters is to ensure that all building occupants know how
to respond in an emergency. This involves pre-planning, training, and rehearsal.

2. Pre-planning includes establishing the Occupant Emergency Organization

(OEO) comprised of employees designated to undertake certain responsibilities
to ensure that personnel are moved quickly to safety, that damage to property
is minimized, and that proper authorities are notified in the event of a localized
emergency, as outlined in this Occupant Emergency Plan (OEP)1. Training is
conducted to ensure that all tenants understand the contents of the OEP and
their individual responsibilities. Rehearsals, or drills, provide an opportunity to
practice emergency procedures to ensure efficient response in the event of a real
emergency.

3. Participation in OEP activities includes all tenants regardless of employment

status (e.g., managers, supervisors, OEP team members, volunteers, contracting
officers, and hosts of visitors). Each individual must assume the responsibility
for own planning and safety in an emergency, as well as working effectively with
emergency planning officials.

B. Scope

1. This OEP applies to all employees, support

contractors, and visitors and assumes a localized emergency in which the
building is impacted in part or in whole.

2. The facility is a
located at .

C. Effective Date

1. The effective date of this OEP is . This document supersedes

all previously recognized OEPs for . This OEP will be
reviewed and updated on an annual basis.

D. Facility-Specific Information

1. Information on the facility, its occupants, and command center is included in the
following tables.

Federal Management Regulations (FMR), Subpart 102-74.230A requires Federal agencies that occupy Federal property to develop Occupant Emergency Plans with technical
RETURN assistanceTO
provided
TOP by
GSA for establishing and maintaining them.
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
665 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

E. Command Center Information

Street
Primary Location
City, State

Telephone
Street
Alternate Location
City, State

Telephone
F. Facility Characteristics

Facility Name

Address
Normal Operating Hours
Required Authorization for Access
Year Completed
Number of Floors
Government Occupied Floors
Basement(s)
Gross Floor Area
Net Assignable Floor Area
Type of Building Construction
Emergency Systems Control
Fire Alarm System and Signals
Automatic Sprinkler
In-House Emergency Telephone
Voice Communications
Elevator Capture and Recall
Smoke Detection
Smoke Control
Health Unit
Emergency Lighting

G. Occupants

1. Begin with the lowest floor and work upward. Upon moving, agencies must
update sheet accordingly.

Primary Occupant Agency Number of Occupants

Federal Other Total

Floor Occupant Type of Phone Uses or Stores
Occupancy Hazardous
Materials/Special
Considerations

H. Occupant Emergency Organization (OEO)

1. The Occupant Emergency Organization (OEO) is made up of the following teams

that together comprise the building’s OEP Emergency Response Team (ERT)1:

(a) The Command Center Team (CCT) directs all emergency operations from
the building’s Command Center. CCT members in a large facility, would
include:
o Designated Official (DO) – The highest-ranking official of the primary
occupant agency; or alternatively, a designee selected by mutual agreement
of occupant agency officials. Responsible for activating the plan in all
emergencies during normal duty hours.
o Occupant Emergency Coordinator (OEC) – An official appointed by the
Designated Official and serves as the primary assistant to the Designated
Official to ensure the continued viability of the OEP and its organization.
During emergencies the OEC operates the Command Center.
o Floor Team Coordinator – Supervises and expedites the planned and
controlled movement of all building occupants in an emergency.
o Damage Control Team Coordinator – Controls dangerous conditions until
further help arrives to assess potential and real damage.
o Medical Coordinator – The head of the Health and First Aid Unit and is
responsible for training and equipping all employees assigned to perform first
aid in an emergency.
o Administrative Officer – Records emergency procedures and activities.
o Technical Advisors – Occupants familiar with the building’s utilities and
mechanical systems or other areas of expertise who advise the DO and OEC.
2. In a small facility, some positions, such as Administrative Officer, Medical
Coordinator, and Floor Team Coordinator, may not be needed; or one person
could perform several functions.

(a) Floor Teams are assigned to each floor of a facility. In a large facility, a
typical Floor Team would include:

●● Floor Monitors – supervisory personnel selected by the individual

Tenant Agency. During a supervisor’s absence, there should be an
acting supervisor who should assume the Floor Monitor responsibility.
In agencies where the supervisory employee is frequently assigned
outside the office, a responsible, conscientious, non-supervisory staff
employee may be selected. Floor monitors act in several different
capacities, depending on the emergency.

●● Floor Area or Wing Monitors – one is assigned for each major area of
the floor.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
668 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

●● Stairwell Monitors – support the Area/Wing Monitors by controlling

movement of persons on stairways.

●● Elevator Monitors – support the Area/Wing Monitors; one is assigned

for each floor where elevators may be captured.

●● Exit Monitors – support floor monitors for street and ground level.

●● Monitors for Disabled – employees appointed by the floor wardens to

assist people with special needs during emergencies. Where possible,
two monitors should be assigned to each person. In an emergency,
monitors are responsible for remaining with the person throughout the
emergency and assisting in their evacuation, following the instructions
of the command center and/or the floor warden.

(b) The Damage Control Team consists of the Property Manager and
other individuals familiar with the facility’s construction, equipment, and
overall operating system. Team members report to the Damage Control
Coordinator.

3. OEO personnel are provided with the following visual identifiers to be used during
activation of the OEP:

Visual Identifier

Part 4 provides an overview of general responsibilities for these personnel.

NOTE: DELETE CONTENT IN PART 4 THAT IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE FACILITY

II. Part 2: Activation and Contact Information

A. The activation and implementation of this OEP is conducted by the Designated

Official (DO) and coordinated from the building’s Command Center (CC).
[MODIFY TEXT TO REFLECT FACILITY-SPECIFIC PROTOCOL]
1. Who makes the decision to activate?

(a) Normal Duty Hours - Designated Official, or by the Designated Alternate

Official.

(b) After Normal Duty Hours - The senior official on duty will represent the
Designated Official or his/her alternates and must initiate action to cope
with emergencies in accordance with the OEP.

(c) How is the decision made?

o The decision to activate is based upon the best available information,
including an understanding of local tensions, the sensitivity of target
agency(ies), and previous experience with similar situations. Advice shall be
solicited, when possible, from the GSA building manager, appropriate Federal
Protective Service official, and Federal, State, and local law enforcement
agencies.
o If there is immediate danger to persons or property (e.g., fire, explosion, or
the discovery of an explosive device (not including a threat)), evacuate or
relocate occupants in accordance with this OEP without outside consultation.
Sound the fire alarm system or use other appropriate means to signal
evacuation.
B. Facility Emergency Contact Information

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION Facility Contacts

Position Primary Alternate
Name Name
Property Manager Phone Phone
Mobile Mobile
Name Name
Building Engineer Phone Phone
Mobile Mobile
Name Name
[ADD OTHER
CONTACTS AS Phone Phone
NEEDED]
Mobile Mobile

FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE Facility Contacts

Position Primary Alternate
Name Name
Building Security Phone Phone
Mobile Mobile
Name Name
FPS Inspector Phone Phone
Mobile Mobile
FPS MegaCenter Phone Phone
Name Name
[ADD OTHER
CONTACTS AS Phone Phone
NEEDED]
Mobile Mobile

COMMAND CENTER TEAM (CCT)

Position Primary Alternate
Name Name
Designated Official Phone Phone
Mobile Mobile
Name Name
Occupant
Emergency
Coordinator
Phone Phone
Name Name
Floor Team
Title Title
Coordinator
Phone Phone
Name Name
Damage Control
Title Title
Coordinator
Phone Phone
Name Name
Medical Team
Title Title
Coordinator
Phone Phone

COMMAND CENTER TEAM (CCT)

Position Primary Alternate
Name Name
Technical Advisor:
Title Title
Safety and Health
Phone Phone
Name Name
Technical Advisor:
Physical Security Title Title
Specialist
Phone Phone
Name Name
Administrative
Title Title
Officer
Phone Phone

Floor Number
FLOOR TEAM:
Position Primary Alternate
Name Name
Floor Monitor Phone Phone
Mobile Mobile
Name Name

Area or Wing Phone Phone

Monitor Mobile Mobile
Name Name
Stairwell Monitor Phone Phone
Mobile Mobile
Name Name
Elevator Monitor Phone Phone
Mobile Mobile
Name Name
Exit Monitor Phone Phone
Mobile Mobile
Name Name
Monitor for
Disabled Phone Phone
Occupants
Mobile Mobile

NOTE: DUPLICATE THE FLOOR TEAM TABLE SO THAT THERE IS ONE FOR EACH FLOOR IN THE
BUILDING

DAMAGE CONTROL TEAM

Position Primary Alternate
Name Name
Building Manager Phone Phone
Mobile Mobile
Name Name
[ADD OTHER
POSITIONS AS Phone Phone
APPROPRIATE]
Mobile Mobile

III. Part 3: Emergency Procedures

A. Emergency procedures are provided for the following:

1. Medical– Localized and Widespread

2. Evacuation

3. Hazardous Substance

4. Bomb Threat

5. Suspicious Object

6. Explosion

7. Natural Disaster – with advance notice and without

8. Demonstrations

9. Missing Child – Code Adam

10. Enhanced Protection Due to Increased Threat

11. Shelter-in-Place

12. Post-Incident Recovery

NOTE: MODIFY TEXT TO REFLECT FACILITY-SPECIFIC EMERGENCY PROCEDURES AND CONTINGENCY

PLANS
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
673 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

Medical
Position ACTIONS
Limited Widespread with Multiple Injuries
ALL Building Occupants
All Building • CALL 911 [or ]
Occupants • If First Aid/CPR trained, provide assistance until medical personnel arrive.

Command Center Team

DO/OEC • Notify Floor Monitor • Go to Primary Command Center
• Notify Medical Coordinator • Activate Command Center Team
Medical • Go to scene • Go to scene
Coordinator • Ensure that appropriate assistance • Advise regarding medical assistance and ensure that appropriate
has been called assistance has been summoned
• Recommend follow-up action • Report to DO
• Report to DO

All other CCT NA • Go to Primary Command Center

members • Notify or activate teams as appropriate.

Floor Team
Floor Team NA • Provide first aid/CPR
Members • Obtain medical assistance (see emergency call list)
• Notify OEC
• Notify Federal Protective Service
• Reserve elevators for emergency use
• Meet responding emergency unit at ground floor
• Verify medical assistance response
• Report to Floor Team Monitor

Damage Control Team

Damage Control NA • Provide first aid/CPR and rescue services.
Team Members • Report to Damage Control Coordinator.

Evacuation
Position ACTIONS
ALL Building Occupants
All Building • Activate the nearest fire alarm pull box then dial to notify and provide specifics.
Occupants • Follow instructions provided by the Command Center Team.

Command Center Team

DO/OEC • Go to Primary Command Center and activate the Command Center Team
• Verify fire department notification and response and brief responding personnel
• Coordinate activities
Medical • Go to Primary Command Center and advise regarding medical assistance
Coordinator
Floor Team • Go to Primary Command Center and activate Floor Teams and coordinate Floor Team activities and verify
Coordinator occupant status
Damage Control • Go to Primary Command Center and activate the Damage Control Team
Coordinator • Determine building conditions (e.g., environmental, structural, etc.)
Administrative • Go to Primary Command Center and record activities
Officer

Floor Team Fire Floor First Floor Other Floors

Floor Monitors • Activate fire alarm (if not already done). • Lead fire department to control • If floor is to be
• Supervise and verify evacuation. center. evacuated, follow
• Report to Floor Team Coordinator. • Restrict building access. Fire Floor Team
• Assist with occupant evacuation instructions.
Area Monitors • Evacuate area occupants • If not, stand by for
• Inspect area to ensure total evacuation instructions
• Report status to Floor Monitor.
Elevator Monitors • Direct occupants to the nearest safe • Report to First Floor Monitor
stairwell. • Capture assigned elevators.
• Assist in elevator evacuation of the • Use of elevators can be
disabled if elevator use of this purpose authorized only by the fire
has been authorized. department, DO, or OEC.
Stairway Monitors • Inspect stairway for smoke or other • Lead fire department to control
obstruction and report status to Area center.
Monitor. • Restrict building access.
• Keep occupants moving in a single file • Assist with occupant evacuation
down the stairway.
Monitors for • Evacuate disabled to safe area.
Disabled • Report status to Area Monitor

Damage Control Team

Damage Control Team • Report to Damage Control Coordinator and activate emergency systems
Members

Hazardous Substance
Position ACTIONS
ALL Building Occupants
All Building • Dial to notify and provide specifics.
Occupants • Follow instructions provided by the Command Center Team.

Command Center Team

DO/OEC • Activate Command Center Team.
• Determine if an evacuation is appropriate:
o If yes, follow evacuation procedures.
o If no, follow shelter-in-place procedures.
• Notify fire department.
• Notify Federal Protective Service.
• Notify appropriate utility company or hazard materials expert.
• Go to Alternate Command Center.
• Hold occupants at relocation site.
• Do not permit reentry until determined safe by proper authorities.
• In case of explosion, follow instructions under Bomb Explosion.
All Other CCT • Go to Primary Command Center.
Members • Notify or activate appropriate teams as appropriate.

Floor Team
Floor Monitors • Activate Floor Teams.
• Supervise evacuation.
• Report to Floor Team Coordinator at relocation site Alternate Command Center.
Area Monitors • Coordinate area evacuation.
• Report conditions to Floor Monitors.
• Accompany area occupants to relocation site.
• Hold occupants and await instructions.
Stairwell Monitors • Control evacuation via stairways.
• Report to Area Monitors.
Monitors for the • Assist individuals requiring assistance to relocation site.
Disabled • Remain with disabled.
• Report to Area Monitors when possible.
Elevator Monitors • Go to relocation site.
• Report to Floor Monitor.

Damage Control Team

Damage Control • Report to Damage Control Coordinator at relocation site Command Center
Team Members

Bomb Threat
Position ACTIONS
ALL Building Occupants
All Building • Dial to notify and provide specifics.
Occupants • Follow instructions provided by the Command Center Team.

Command Center Team

DO/OEC • Go to Primary Command Center
• Verify FPS notification and response
All Other CCT • Go to Primary Command Center.
Members • Notify or activate appropriate teams as appropriate.

Floor Team Affected Floors First & Ground Floors Unaffected

Floors
Floor Monitors • Initiate evacuation/relocation. • Control building access.
• Supervise and verify evacuation. • Keep people away from building perimeter
• Report to Floor Team Coordinator. • Control occupant movement, according to instructions
received from Primary Command Center
Area Monitors • Instruct occupants to search their work areas. NA
• Evacuate/relocate occupants.
• Inspect area to ensure total evacuation.
• Search assigned public areas and exit routes.
• Report to Floor Monitors.
Elevator NA NA
Monitors
Stairwell • Inspect stairwells and exit routes. NA
Monitors • Lead occupants to safe area.
• Report to Area Monitors.
Disabled • Verify status of disabled occupants. NA
Occupant • Report to Area Monitors.
Monitors

Damage Control Team

Damage Control • Search assigned areas including maintenance, storage, outside, and rooftop areas
Team Members

Sample Bomb Threat Checklist

Following is information to be recorded by a bomb threat message recipient during or
immediately after the threat is communicated.

Date

Time

Time Caller Hung Up

Phone Number Where Call Was Received

Questions to ask Caller:

Where is the bomb located? (Building, Floor, Room, etc.)

When will it go off?

What does it look like?

What kind of bomb is it?

What will make it explode?

Did you place the bomb? (Yes, No)

Why?

What is your name?

Where are you?

Record Exact Words of Threat:

Record Information About Caller:

Where is the caller located? (Background and level of noise)

Estimated age
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
678 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

Is the voice familiar? If so, who does it sound like?

Other Points:

Caller’s Voice

CIRCLE ANY THAT APPLY Background Sounds: Threat Language:

Animal Noises Message Read Incoherently
Caller’s Voice: House Noises Taped
Accent Kitchen Noises Irrational
Angry Street Noises Profane
Calm Booth Well-spoken
Clearing throat PA System
Coughing Conversation
Cracking voice Music
Crying Motor
Deep Clear
Deep breathing Static
Disguised Office machinery
Distinct Factory machinery
Excited Local
Female Long distance
Laughter
Lisp
Loud
Male
Nasal
Normal
Ragged
Rapid
Raspy
Slow
Slurred
Soft
Stutter

Suspicious Object
Signs of a Suspicious
Position ACTIONS Package
ALL Building Occupants No Return Address
All Building • Do not touch suspicious objects Excessive Postage
Occupants • Report them immediately upon discovery.
• Dial to notify Stains
• Provide specifics. Strange Odor
• Follow instructions provided by the Command Center Team.
Strange Sounds
Command Center Team Unexpected Delivery
DO/OEC • Go to Primary Command Center Poorly Handwritten
• Activate Command Center Team
• Verify fire department notification and response Misspelled Words
• Brief responding personnel Incorrect Titles
• Evacuate or relocate occupants
• Building Manager to put elevators in Phase I Service. Foreign Postage

All Other CCT • Go to Primary Command Center. Restrictive Notes

Members • Notify or activate appropriate teams as appropriate.

Floor Team Affected Floors First and Ground Unaffected

Floors Floors
Floor Monitors • Carry out evacuation or relocation plan. • Control building access. After
• Supervise and verify evacuation. • Keep people away from building evacuation,
• Report to Floor Team Coordinator. perimeter restrict use
of elevators,
Area Monitors • Coordinate area evacuation. escalators and
• Determine location of suspicious object; avoid stairwells
using stairwells, elevators or escalators in
immediate area.
• Inspect area to ensure total evacuation.
• Report status to Floor Monitor.
Elevator NA • Report to First Floor Monitor.
Monitors • Hold elevators and assist
emergency units.
Stairwell • Inspect stairwells and exit routes. NA NA
Monitors • Lead occupants to safe area.
• Report status to Area Monitors.

Disabled • Coordinate evacuation if disabled occupants. NA NA

Occupant • Report status to Area Monitor.
Monitors

Damage Control Team

Damage Control NA NA NA
Team Members

Explosion
Position ACTIONS
ALL Building Occupants
All Building • Dial to notify and provide specifics.
Occupants • Follow instructions provided by the Command Center Team.

Command Center Team

DO/OEC • Go to Primary Command Center.
• Activate Command Center Team.
All Other CCT • Go to Primary Command Center.
Members • Notify or activate appropriate teams as appropriate.

Floor Team Affected Floors First and Ground Unaffected Floors

Floors
Floor Monitors • Notify Floor Team. • Control access to the • Inform occupants.
• Supervise evacuation, first aid, and building • Maintain control of
rescue. occupants.
• Report conditions to Floor Team • Control egress.
Coordinator. • Maintain communication
with Floor Team
Area Monitors • Coordinate area evacuation, first aid, and Coordinator.
rescue. • Evacuate to a safe area if
• Inspect area to determine conditions. instructed to do so by Floor
• Report to Floor Monitor. Team Coordinator.
Elevator Monitors NA • Capture elevators.
• Hold until determined safe
for use.
• Assist emergency teams.
Stairwell Monitors • Inspect assigned stairwell. NA
• Report conditions to Area Monitors.
• Lead occupants to safe area if required.
Monitors for • Move disabled occupants to safe area.
Disabled

Damage Control Team

Damage Control • Assist in rescue.
Team Members • Control access.
• Inspect elevators, fire protection systems, and utilities.
• Report conditions to Damage Control Team Coordinator. Make required repairs.

Natural Disaster
Position ACTIONS
Advance Notice No Advance Notice
ALL Building Occupants
All Building • Follow instructions provided by the Command Center Team.
Occupants

Command Center Team

DO/OEC • Activate the Command Center Team.
• Review plans and decide course of action
• Notify occupants.
Medical Coordinator • Go to scene • Go to scene
• Ensure that appropriate assistance has • Advise regarding medical assistance
been called
• Recommend follow-up action
• Report to DO
Floor Team • Review plans with floor monitors • Go to Primary Command Center
Coordinator • Coordinate and assist Floor Teams
Damage Control • Activate DCT for damage prevention • Go to Primary Command Center
Coordinator work. • Activate Damage Control Team
Administrative Officer • NA • Go to Primary Command Center
• Record activities

Floor Team
Elevator Monitors NA • Capture assigned elevators.
• Restrict use until determined safe (mechanical safety
inspection may be required).

Damage Control Team

Damage Control • Protect windows and doors. • Assess damage.
Team Members • Secure outdoor objects. • Determine needs for controlling dangerous conditions.
• Provide repair, rescue, and first aid services as directed.
• Isolate unsafe areas.
• Report to Damage Control Coordinator.

Building Manager to place Elevators in Phase I Service upon complete evacuation.

Demonstrations
Position ACTIONS
Advance Notice No Advance Notice
ALL Building Occupants
All Building Occupants • Follow instructions provided by the Command Center Team.

Command Center Team

DO/OEC • Go to Primary Command Center
• Notify Federal Protective Service – if FPS not in area, notify local police department.
• Notify Floor Team Coordinator.
Medical Coordinator • Go to scene
• Ensure that appropriate assistance has been called
• Report to DO
• Advise regarding medical assistance
Floor Team Coordinator • Go to Primary Command Center
• Activate Ground Level Floor Team

Damage Control • Activate DCT for damage • Go to Primary Command Center

Coordinator prevention work. • Activate Damage Control Team
Administrative Officer NA • Go to Primary Command Center
• Record activities

Floor Team
Ground Level • Secure perimeter doors.
• Avoid any interaction with demonstrators.
• Prevent any occupant interaction with demonstrators.
• Follow instructions in responding to FPS officers and/or local police.

Damage Control Team

Damage Control Team • Protect windows and doors. • Assess damage.
Members • Secure outdoor objects. • Determine needs for controlling dangerous conditions.
• Provide repair, rescue, and first aid services as directed.
• Isolate unsafe areas.
• Report to Damage Control Coordinator.

Missing Child - Code Adam

Command Center Team

DO/OEC • Obtain a detailed description of the missing child. At a minimum, the description should include: name,
race, gender, age, eye color, hair color, approximate height, weight, any identifying marks, description of
clothing (to include shoe color and style1), time the child was last seen, last known location.
• Direct or take parent/guardian/responsible party to a pre-determined contact location/main staging area for
easy access in case more information is needed.
• Report information to entrance control posts immediately by issuing a Code Adam Alert for building/
location.
• Pass description information to entrance control posts. If available, use a public address (PA) system to
broadcast an announcement that a Code Adam Alert is in effect so that all tenants are alerted to look for
the missing child.
• Establish a central command location to which all Command Center Team members can report and
coordinate their efforts with all responding personnel. Notifying a Regional Dispatch Center (i.e. FPS
MegaCenter) that a Code Adam Alert has been initiated.
• Instruct all access control posts to continue to control/monitor building access in addition to being aware of
all people leaving the building.
• Advise non-security personnel to participate through observation and reporting only.
• Terminate Code Adam Alert when parent/guardian positively identifies child, and safety has been
established. If found unharmed and no criminal activity has occurred, reunited child with parent/guardian.
• Contact local law enforcement authorities if Alert renders negative results.
Floor Team • Coordinate and assist Floor Teams
Coordinator
Administrative • Assist with search efforts; track and document areas that have been searched and cleared.
Officer • Record activities/document the incident
• Prepare initial report of incident and supplement with other pertinent information in update or follow-up
report with original report’s case control number
All other CCT • Assist with search efforts
Members

Floor Team
Floor Team • Conduct a thorough search of the building to positively identify all children located in the building
Members • Search all potential hiding places, offices, common areas, and exterior areas of the property
• If a CCTV system is in place, monitor it closely for the missing child
• If CCTV system has capabilities of viewing without interrupting ongoing recording, review video to identify
the last time child was seen

1 A child’s clothes may be changed, but an abductor does not usually remove or change shoes

Enhanced Protection Due to Increased Threat

Severe Condition (Red): Severe risk of terrorist attack. Under most circumstances, the
protective measures for a Severe Condition are not intended to be sustained for substantial
periods of time. In addition to the protective measures taken in the previous threat condition,
security partners should consider the following general measures in addition to the facility-
specific protective measures they develop and implement:
Increase or redirect personnel to address critical emergency needs
Assign emergency response personnel and pre-positioning and mobilizing specially trained
teams or resources
Monitor, redirect, or constrain transportation systems
Close public and government facilities

Shelter-In-Place (SIP)
Position ACTIONS
ALL Building Occupants
All Building Occupants

Command Center Team

DO/OEC
Medical Coordinator
Floor Team Coordinator
Damage Control Coordinator
Administrative Officer

Floor Team
Floor Team Members •

Damage Control Team

Damage Control Team •
Members

A complete procedure should be established for Shelter In Place (SIP) at each facility. The
following are sample actions to consider in development of a procedure:
• Notification is received from various sources that there is an outdoor hazard and that
SIP is in effect
• Inform building occupants of SIP conditions, direct them to SIP safe zone(s), and
account for people
• Notify the Building Security Committee (BSC) members, Federal Security Authorities,
property management personnel, and all other occupants of the building about the
incident and SIP requirements
• Minimize the rate of air exchange with the outside as to keep indoor concentration as
low as possible for as long as possible by closing all windows and doors to the outside,
and closing all necessary doors
• Shut-off all HVAC fans and close all HVAC dampers, including exhaust dampers. Shut
off other fans such as kitchen and bathroom exhausts. If shutting off these systems
takes more time due to the building condition, then shutting off the whole electrical
system should be evaluated during SIP proactive planning.
• Do not use elevators – they create a piston effect and can pump air into or out of the
building.
• Seal the doors, windows, and vents if necessary.
• Establish communication with outside through a TV, radio, cell phone, or others and
ensure that emergency responders know your location(s).

Post-Incident Recovery
Immediately after an emergency, take steps to resume operations:
• As soon as possible, report to the OEP Team following notification of an incident/
emergency.
• Maintain contact with all members of the OEP Team and facilitate the flow of
information between members of the OEP Team.
• Identify the required support personnel who may be needed.
• Dispatch, as required, members of the OEP Team, to assist in the incident/emergency.
• Assist in the coordination and movement of personnel away from impacted area.
• Advise, in consultation with members of the OEP Team and local authorities, when the
building is safe for reoccupation when the incident has concluded sound the All Clear.
• Upon arrival of FPS and/or local authorities, the OEC shall brief emergency
responders of the existing emergency.

Within 48 hours of the emergency/incident:

• Call a follow-up meeting of the OEP Team to discuss the events of the emergency
• Reinforce actions/responses, which worked well
• Lessons learned change actions/responses that did not work well
• Recommend changes to the OEP. Local emergency personnel shall be invited, if
appropriate
• Responsible for scheduling evacuation drills for their building.
• Determine if any critical operations cannot be disrupted.
• Brief all building occupants on the drill and given assignments.
• Recruit non-occupants of the building to observe the drill and make critical
evaluations.
• Notify Safety and Security that a simulated emergency is in progress.
• Decide if occupants are to be evacuated to off-site facilities.
• Notify the relocation center if an off-site evacuation is to be performed
• Identify the locations to be evacuated.
• Ensure all occupants are aware of these different locations and when to use them.
• Post these locations in each area and exercise these evacuations.
• Identify person(s) responsible for ensuring all people have been evacuated.
• Identify when occupant may return.
• Communicate with floor wardens, and conduct visual inspections of the building for
evacuation hazards.
• Establish a recovery team, if necessary.
• Establish priorities for resuming operations.
• Continue to ensure the safety of personnel on the property. Assess remaining hazards.
• Maintain security at the incident scene.
• Conduct an employee briefing.
• Keep detailed records. Consider audio recording all decisions. Take photographs of or
videotape the damage.

Post-Incident Recovery
• Account for all damage-related costs. Establish special job order numbers and charge
codes for purchases and repair work.
• Follow notification procedures. Notify employees’ families about the status of
personnel on the property. Notify off-duty personnel about work status. Notify
insurance carriers and appropriate government agencies.
• Protect undamaged property. Close up building openings. Remove smoke, water and
debris.
• Protect equipment against moisture. Restore sprinkler systems. Physically secure the
property. Restore power.
• Conduct an investigation. Coordinate actions with appropriate government agencies.
• Conduct salvage operations. Segregate damaged from undamaged property. Keep
damaged goods on hand until an insurance adjuster has visited the premises, but you
can move material outside if it’s seriously in the way and exposure to the elements
won’t make matters worse.
• Take an inventory of damaged goods.
• Restore equipment and property. For major repair work, review restoration plans with
the insurance adjuster and appropriate government agencies.
• Assess the value of damaged property. Assess the impact of business interruption.
• Maintain contact with customers and suppliers.

IV. Part 4: OEO Responsibilities

A. Command Center Team (CCT)

Position Responsibilities
Designated Official • Selects and trains CCT members
• Coordinates with all tenants and develops, applies, and maintains an OEP.
• Initiates activities to prepare occupants for emergencies and inform them of response procedures.
• Ensures that appropriate procedures are followed during emergencies.
• Identifies and establishes working relationships with Federal, State, and local agencies that might respond
to an emergency in the facility.
• Activates the plan if experience warrants doing so, if people or property is in immediate danger, or if the
official gets advance notice of an emergency.
• Sits on the facility’s Emergency Response Team and Building Security Committee.
Occupant • Assists the DO and performs delegated duties as appropriate.
Emergency • Serves as liaison between DO and other members of the CCT.
Coordinator
Floor Team • Assists in the development of the OEP.
Coordinator • Coordinates planning of occupant movement between floors during an emergency.
• Coordinates floor, wing, stairwell, elevator, and other monitor activities.

Position Responsibilities
Technical Advisors • Building Manager (GSA or Lessor) - Works with the OEC and provides information about the building and
the operation of its mechanical systems.
• Physical Security Specialist and/or FPS Inspector - Works with the OEC; provides advice on security and
law enforcement matters; and serves as liaison with Federal and local law enforcement agencies.
• Other occupants familiar with the building’s utilities and mechanical systems.
Damage Control • Assists the OEC.
Coordinator • Identifies utilities, alarm systems, communications equipment, and other pertinent systems and equipment
in the building.
• Makes recommendations on the use of facilities and equipment.
• Maintains emergency call list for utilities and hazardous substances.
• Directs Damage Control Team activities.
Medical • Assists the OEC.
Coordinator • Identifies available medical emergency services.
• Maintains first aid equipment.
• Arranges CPR, first aid, and other paramedical training.
• Maintains list of personnel with CPR and paramedical training.
• Maintains the list of disabled occupants as provided by Floor Monitors.
Administrative • Assists the OEC.
Officer • Records enacted emergency procedures.
• Maintains organization records and updates them monthly.
• Provides required administrative services (phones, faxes, radios, etc.) and prepares reports.

B. Floor Teams

Position Responsibilities
Floor Monitor • Assist FTC
(FM) • Maintain communication with CC during an emergency; provide progress reports on evacuation; notify CC when
floor is completely cleared
• Designate exact boundaries of floor areas and assign responsibilities for these areas
• Make necessary changes in floor organization with approval of the FTC and OECs
• Ensure that evacuation routes are clearly identified and posted on bulletin boards, corridor intersections, and
office exits and are known to occupants
• Maintain a list of disabled occupants and communicate the list to the CC.
Area or Wing • Work with FM; notify FM when area has been completely cleared
Monitors • Ensure that evacuation routes are clearly identified and made known to occupants
• Direct orderly flow of occupants during drills and emergencies, along the prescribed evacuation routes
• Ensure that area or wing is completely vacated, when required
• Ensure that windows and doors are closed lights on, and electrical appliances off during fire evacuations
• Leave windows and doors open and lights on during bomb threat evacuations
• Assign Monitors for the disabled, one per disabled person
• Supervise Stairwell Monitors and Monitors for the disabled
• Maintain list of disabled occupants including name, telephone extension, room number, and type of disability
within area of responsibility; provide revisions to the FM.

Position Responsibilities
Stairwell • Support the Area/Wing Monitor
Monitors • If evacuating because of a bomb threat, search stairwell
• Control movement of occupants on stairways, keeping them in single file and moving steadily at a walking pace;
instruct occupants to grasp handrails
• Keep door open to stairway until the area/wing is clear
• Restrict and monitor use of stairwells and escalators as necessary
Elevator • Assist and Support Area/Floor Monitors
Monitors • Be familiar with the provisions of GSA Bulletins covering emergency plans for using elevators to evacuate
disabled occupants
• Be familiar with manual operation of elevators
• Capture assigned elevator and permit use only as directed by FM
• During fire evacuation, direct occupants attempting to use elevator to appropriate stairway; relinquish control of
elevator to firefighting personnel when they arrive
• If emergency personnel are arriving by elevator, meet them and direct them to the scene of the emergency
• Assist the evacuation of disabled occupants by elevator if elevator has been approved for use
Exit Monitors • Work with FMs
• Ensure the exits are open and free of hindrances
• Deny unauthorized access to the building
• Direct orderly movement of occupants to safety areas
• Assist in evacuation of disabled occupants

Monitors for • Know locations and telephone numbers of the disabled occupants to be assisted, types of disabilities, and the
Disabled location of crutches, wheelchairs, and other support devices
• Know which elevators may be used for evacuation of disabled occupants
• Assist disabled occupants from their workplaces to the elevator, down, and out of the building. If elevator cannot
be used, assist person to an area adjacent to the nearest safe stairway and get or await help.
• Coordinate with the Area and Floor Monitors to ensure that this information is up-to-date

C. Damage Control Team

●● Generally, the damage control team’s job is to control dangerous conditions until
further help arrives and to assess potential and real danger. This may include the
following duties:
●● Ensure that appropriate response organization (e.g., Fire Department, Police
Department, medical, hazardous materials, etc.) has been notified.
●● Initiate reasonable fire suppression or confinement using facility portable fire
extinguishers.
●● Assist emergency response personnel.
●● Disconnect utilities or equipment.
●● Conduct bomb search.
●● Protect or remove equipment, records, hazardous substances, etc.
●● Perform rescue and first aid.
●● Make emergency repairs.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BACK Return to Table of Contents

Appendix 20.5: Workplace Violent Behavior

Prevention Plan (Sample)

Note: This document should be revised and edited to assure that it describes the Workplace Violent
Behavior Prevention Plan at your facility. The portions of the document that are underlined must be
revised such that the appropriate information is provided. This appendix is provided as a reference only.

I. Purpose
A. Workplace Violent Behavior Prevention Plans:

1. Assure that a safe and healthful workplace is maintained;

2. Minimize or eliminate violent behavior (e.g., verbal or physical aggression);

3. Minimize the severity of injuries resulting from violent behavior; and

4. Assure that employees exposed to violent behavior are provided appropriate

medical care and counseling.

II. Background
A. Violent behavior of visitors and/or employees in insert name of facility and other
locations where facility employees are required to perform their duties is an
occupational health hazard. Workplace violence is preventable and most acts of
violence in the workplace have warning signs (verbal and non-verbal). Prevention
of violence in the workplace greatly enhances services provided by allowing staff to
safely interact with visitors and other employees. Additionally, preventive measures
reduce costs associated with work-related injuries.

B. Insert name of facility is required by Federal law (Public Law 91-596 and Executive
Order 12196) to provide a place of employment free from recognized hazards that
are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm. The Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has cited Federal facilities for failing to
protect its workers from violent behavior in accordance with Executive Order 12196,
“Occupational Safety and Health Programs for Federal Employees,” paragraph
1-201a.

III. Policy
A. Violent behavior will not be tolerated at this facility. Persons committing acts of
violence will be reported to the appropriate authorities and prosecuted to the fullest
extent of the law. Appropriate disciplinary action will be instituted against employees,
customers and visitors who are verbally or physically aggressive.

IV. Responsibilities
A. The Facility Director is responsible for:

1. Assuring that employees are provided a safe and healthful work environment;

2. Notifying appropriate law enforcement agencies when a CBP visitor or employee

is assaulted as a result of direct or indirect employment-related involvement
within the workplace.
Note: Each facility should designate an appropriate official to coordinate development and
implementation of the facility’s Plan. Facility organizations (such as Health Services, Police and
Security Service, and the Safety Office) must work together to assure that this Plan is effective. Other
organizations that should be involved include emergency medical care personnel, social welfare workers,
and nursing service. It is recommended that a representative of one of these offices be designated as
the coordinator, and that representatives of these organizations serve as a subcommittee of the Facility
Safety Committee. If a representative from one of these organizations is designated as coordinator, the
appropriate section (C, D, or E) can be combined with this paragraph.

B. Insert appropriate title will serve as the facility Workplace Violent Behavior
Prevention Plan Coordinator and is responsible for:

1. Coordinating the facility Workplace Violent Behavior Prevention Plan;

2. Assuring that all employees are provided violent behavior prevention training;

3. Reviewing the facility’s Plan annually to assure that it is current, relevant, and
addresses the facility’s needs;

4. Reviewing incident investigation reports prepared by supervisors, conducting

incident investigations, if deemed appropriate, and identifying corrective actions
to preclude incidents of violence at the facility; and

5. Providing the Facility Safety Committee periodic reports concerning plan

effectiveness.
Note: The following responsibilities should be assigned to Health Services or other appropriate clinical
organization.

C. Insert appropriate title is responsible for:

1. Assisting in the presentation of violent behavior prevention training related to

assaults, etc.;

2. Assisting and supporting the coordinator and the Facility Safety Committee
when implementing an effective Workplace Violent Behavior Prevention Plan
throughout the facility; and

3. Assisting with counseling of staff that have been exposed to violent behavior in
the workplace, as appropriate.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
695 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

Note: The following responsibilities should be assigned to the Police and Security Service or other
appropriate organization.

D. Insert appropriate title is responsible for:

1. Assuring that incidents involving violence at the facility, in the surrounding

neighborhood, or at off-site work areas, are reported and addressed as part of the
facility’s Workplace Violent Behavior Prevention Plan;

2. Developing recommendations and implementing corrective action(s) intended

to preclude recurrence of violence at the facility (in coordination with the
requirements of this Plan); and

3. Assisting in the presentation of violent behavior prevention training related to

violent behavior throughout the facility.

4. Assisting and supporting the coordinator and the Facility Safety Committee in
implementing an effective Workplace Violent Behavior Prevention Plan throughout
the facility.
Note: The following responsibilities should be assigned to the Facility Safety Office or other appropriate
organization.

E. Insert appropriate title is responsible for:

1. Assuring that incidents of violence involving employees (either as victims or

perpetrators) are reported and addressed as part of the facility’s Workplace
Violent Behavior Prevention Plan;

2. Developing recommendations and implementing corrective action(s) intended

to preclude recurrence of violent behavior incidents involving employees (in
coordination with the requirements of this Plan);

3. Assisting in the presentation of violent behavior prevention training for employees.

4. Assisting and supporting the coordinator and the Facility Safety Committee in
implementing an effective Workplace Violent Behavior Prevention Plan throughout
the facility; and

5. Additional Responsibilities: Any additional responsibilities resulting from facility

level requirements should be included in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, or 4, as appropriate.

F. Supervisor responsibilities include:

1. Enforcing CBP safety rules, regulations, and standards, including those

concerning violent behavior;

2. Identifying unsafe conditions and practices in areas of the supervisor’s

responsibility and taking prompt corrective action, as appropriate;
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
696 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

3. Notifying appropriate personnel of work-related injuries that occur to employees

under their supervision;

4. Investigating injuries or illnesses that occur to employees under their supervision,

documenting the investigation, and instituting or recommending corrective
actions intended to preclude recurrence of similar injuries;

5. Assuring that employees under their supervision receive prompt and appropriate
medical attention in the event of injury;

6. Completing compensation forms, when appropriate;

7. Instructing employees under their supervision in safe work practices and

correcting employees that do not follow safe work practices;

8. Assuring that employees who are verbally or physically assaulted, who witness
violent behavior in the workplace, or who have demonstrated warning signs
associated with potential violent behavior, are provided counseling, professional
support, and critical incident stress debriefings;

9. Asking for support from the Employee Assistance Program (EAP). The EAP
is available to offer professional counseling to those who seek it, and to
provide debriefings to individuals and groups affected by trauma. Encouraging
employees to take advantage of the EAP as a way of preserving health, not as a
sign of sickness;

10. Initiating disciplinary action, as appropriate, against employees who assault

visitors or other employees; and

11. Assuring that all employees complete appropriate violent behavior prevention
training (see paragraph 7).

G. Employees are responsible for:

1. Following safe work practices (those that minimize the potential for violent
behavior);

2. Recognizing unsafe conditions and immediately taking corrective action to

eliminate those unsafe conditions under the control of the employee;

3. Reporting unsafe conditions to supervisory personnel;

4. Reporting work-related injuries to supervisory personnel;

5. Attending OSHA training related to violent behavior prevention; and

6. Attending counseling and support meetings, as appropriate.

H. Facility Safety Committee is responsible for:

1. Providing assistance and support for the facility Workplace Violent Behavior
Prevention Plan and serving as the focal point for facility-wide violent behavior
prevention initiatives;

2. Assisting in the development and revision of policies, programs, and procedures

related to violent behavior prevention; recommending approval; and evaluating
the effectiveness of these policies, programs, and procedures;

3. Recommending and monitoring resource allocations for the facility Workplace

Violent Behavior Prevention Plan;

4. Reviewing and commenting on assessments and annual assessment updates

(including corrective actions and interim corrective actions) conducted to identify
potential sources of violent behavior at the facility or at other work sites where
CBP employees are assigned;

5. Identifying trends and developing strategies to reduce or eliminate risks

associated with violent behavior at the facility; and

6. Promoting violent behavior-prevention throughout the facility.

I. The Violent Behavior Prevention Subcommittee is a subcommittee of the Facility

Safety Committee, consisting of representatives of insert appropriate titles and is
responsible for:

1. Assisting the Workplace Violent Behavior Prevention Plan Coordinator in

developing and implementing an effective Workplace Violent Behavior Prevention
Plan; and

2. Providing technical support and assistance for the facility’s Plan.

NOTE: If facility management does not feel that a subcommittee is needed (for whatever reason), this
Section could be deleted.

J. Other Appropriate Officials: This Section should be revised to include insert other
facility officials that have responsibilities assigned to them as part of the facility’s
Workplace Violent Behavior Prevention Plan, as appropriate.

V. Identification of Potential Sources of Violent Behavior

A. Assessments of potential sources of violent behavior are conducted by insert
appropriate title. A copy of the final report dated insert appropriate date can be
obtained in insert appropriate title and location. Following is a list of potential sources
of violent behavior:

1. Assessment: While it is good management practice to conduct an assessment of

any hazard located within a workplace, such an assessment for violent behavior
prevention is not required by Federal regulations. Using assessments to identify
potential sources of violent behavior is one method to assure that the facility is
in compliance with OSHA regulations. If there have been no potential sources of
violent behavior identified, the chances of non-compliance with OSHA regulations
or a deficient program greatly increase. Summarize all potential sources of
violent behavior identified by the assessment. Any special considerations that
may increase the likelihood of violence (e.g., money kept on site, programs that
provide services to employees, applicants, etc.) should be noted;

2. Training: The persons performing the assessment must have completed

appropriate training concerning the identification of sources of violent behavior or
have appropriate experience;

3. Maintenance of Records: It is recommended that assessment reports completed

as part of the facility’s Workplace Violent Behavior Prevention Plan be maintained
on file for three years; and

4. Priorities: Each CBP facility should identify where potential sources of violent
behavior are located at the facility. Priority should be given to locations where
money is handled; entrances (e.g., facility access by visitors and relatives);
isolated areas; poorly lit areas; and security posts.

B. Employees - Insert appropriate summary of potential violent behavior that could be

expected from this group.

1. Employees: Persons committing violence in this category have a direct

employment-related involvement with the workplace. This section should
recognize frustrations sometimes associated with interaction with customers, or
beneficiaries and any specific requirements associated with the services provided
at the facility.

(a) As Victims - Employees working in the cashier’s office, the cafeteria, and
the main reception area interact with customers continually. Employees
must notify their respective Security Office or police immediately if they
suspect that anyone may have a weapon;

(b) As Perpetrators - Employees in stressful situations; worried about

downsizing or having performance problems; that have deteriorating
relationships with other employees, spouses, or associates; or that
have been assaulted previously, have the potential for violent behavior.
Employees must be informed that all weapons are prohibited at this
facility, and possession of a weapon could result in disciplinary action or
dismissal.

C. Visitors - Insert appropriate summary of potential violent behavior that could be

expected from this group.

1. Visitors: Persons committing violence in this category have an indirect

employment-related involvement with the workplace. This category includes
current/former spouse or lover, a relative or friend, or some other person who has
a dispute involving an employee.

D. Perpetrators of Criminal Activities - Insert appropriate summary of potential violent

behavior that could be expected from these groups.

1. Perpetrators of Criminal Activities: This category includes persons who have no

legitimate relationship to the facility but may commit criminal acts of violence
in and around the workspace. If a facility handles money, the potential for
robbery should be addressed. Additionally, the crime rate of the neighborhood
surrounding the facility and any necessary precautions (traveling in groups after
dark, parking in well lighted areas, etc.) should be discussed.
Note: While the Workplace Violent Behavior Prevention Plan must be communicated effectively to
employees, portions of the Plan could contain information that would assist criminals (e.g., locations of
locked doors). Such portions of the Plan may need to be considered “confidential” to avoid its misuse by
any person intending on committing criminal activity.

E. Annual Assessment Update: Insert appropriate title will perform an update

assessment of the potential sources of violent behavior identified at the facility insert
appropriate time period, after any significant incident involving violent behavior, and
prior to any changes to the use or function of an area that could impact the potential
for violent behavior. A report of this update assessment will be provided to the
Facility Safety Committee and corrective actions will be developed, as appropriate.

1. Annual Updates: While it is good management practice to conduct an annual

assessment of any hazard located within a workplace, such an update is not
required by Federal regulations. Annual assessment updates for sources of
violent behavior are recommended as one method to assure that the facility is
in compliance with OSHA regulations concerning violent behavior prevention. If
the current use or function of a location has changed significantly from that at
the time of the initial assessment, the chances of non-compliance with OSHA
regulations greatly increase.

F. Assessment Training:

1. Training: The personnel assigned responsibility to perform this annual

assessment must have completed appropriate training concerning the
identification of potential sources of violent behavior or have appropriate
experience.

VI. Controls
A. Building Access: Insert appropriate summary of initiatives implemented to prevent
violent behavior related to building access.

1. Building Access: This section should summarize all controls related to building
access that have been implemented to prevent violent behavior or to limit the
impact of such behavior. A summary of facility regulations concerning building
access should be included in this section. All employees should be aware of
these procedures, which must be discussed during training.

B. Office Access - Insert appropriate summary of initiatives implemented to prevent

violent behavior related to office or ward access.

1. Office Access: A description of the office procedures concerning access to

restricted areas of the offices or wards should be included in this section. All
employees should be aware of these restrictions, and training should address
these procedures.

C. Office Configuration - Insert appropriate summary of initiatives implemented to

prevent violent behavior related to office or ward configuration.

1. Office Configuration: A description of the office procedures concerning access to

restricted areas of individual offices or wards should be included in this section.
All employees should be aware of these procedures, and training should address
these procedures. Depending upon the configuration of the facility, Sections VI.B
and VI.C may be combined.

D. Neighborhood Safeguards - Insert appropriate summary of initiatives implemented to

prevent violent behavior related to the neighborhood and surrounding area.

1. Neighborhood Safeguards: A description of the safeguards implemented because

of the neighborhood surrounding the building should be addressed in this section.
All employees should be aware of these safeguards, and training should discuss
these procedures.

VII. Training
A. Employees:

1. Awareness Training: All employees must complete general violent behavior

prevention awareness training, which addresses security issues at work, in and
around the building, and while on travel;
Note: Awareness training can be either a separate training initiative or can be part of new employee
orientation. Females should receive rape prevention training. Males should be invited, and allowed to
attend and/or participate in this training. To obtain training materials on Workplace Violence refer to this
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
701 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

OSHA website.
2. Customer Service Training: All employees and supervisors of employees
that provide services to customers must complete customer service training
that addresses methods to recognize potential violent behavior, appropriate
responses, methods to obtain assistance, procedures to summon CBP Security
or appropriate law enforcement, etc. This training must emphasize prevention,
early intervention, and methods to minimize exposure of visitors and employees
to violent behavior. Warning signs, response procedures, prevention techniques,
and defensive techniques must be addressed by this training.
Note: This training can be included as part of other customer service enhancement training or can be
presented separately. Employees should complete this training before being placed in positions where
they may be exposed to potentially violent behavior.

B. Supervisors: All supervisors must complete a training program that enables them
to identify warning signs of potential violent behavior and learn what to do once
violent behavior is detected. The supervisor also needs to be knowledgeable on the
counseling services available to an employee.

1. Supervisor Training: Violent behavior prevention training for supervisors can be

included as part of other supervisor training or can be presented separately.

VIII. Medical Care and Counseling

A. Emergency Medical Care: Any employee that is injured on the job will be provided
medical care by the insert appropriate title and location. If the employee cannot
go to the insert appropriate medical personnel will come to the work area. Medical
assistance can be obtained by calling the insert appropriate telephone number.
If more involved medical care is required, the employee will be transported to
insert name and address of appropriate hospital unless otherwise directed by the
employee.

B. Counseling: Supervisors must consult facility Human Resources Management

personnel prior to recommending counseling for employees that have been identified
as having the potential to act violently. Supervisors of employees that are verbally or
physically assaulted or that witness violent behavior in the workplace should contact
insert name, address, and telephone number of the Employee Assistance Program
to determine the most appropriate method to address the needs of the employee.
A traumatic incident can overwhelm an employee’s defense mechanisms. The EAP
provides counseling to minimize the impact of an operational traumatic incident on
employees. Operational traumatic incidents are job-related (not necessarily on-duty)
incidents that would cause mental or emotional trauma, such as, but not limited to,
direct or indirect involvement in shootings, hostage incidents, suicides, vehicular
or plane crashes, threats on life or major injuries. Post-trauma debriefings must be
performed as soon as possible but no more than 48 hours after the incident unless
the employee is incapacitated or otherwise unable to attend the debriefing within that
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
702 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

time frame. Counseling and debriefings are provided at no charge by the Employee
Assistance Program (EAP). The EAP will provide initial counseling/assessment and
refer the employee to community based resources for further treatment, if additional
counseling is required. After critical incidents, stress debriefing sessions that include
interpersonal support techniques will be provided by insert appropriate title and
location.

IX. Disciplinary Actions

A. Supervisors must consult facility human resources management personnel prior to
initiating any disciplinary action associated with violent behavior.

X. Investigation and Follow-up

A. All incidents of violence in the workplace will be investigated by the employee’s
supervisor and documented. The insert title and location of the Violent Behavior
Prevention Plan Coordinator and the Facility Occupational Safety and Health staff
will review the investigation report and will complete an investigation, if deemed
appropriate.
Note: Corrective actions identified by the investigations should be implemented within 30 days from
the date of the report of the investigation. Those corrective actions that require more than 30 days to
implement should be included in the facility’s abatement program and interim corrective actions must be
implemented.

B. Training: The persons performing incident investigations must have appropriate

training or have appropriate experience.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BACK Return to Table of Contents

Appendix: SMD/Field Security Operations Branch (Future)

I. General
A. The Security Management Division (SMD) plans to expand operations to support
Field Elements at Regional and District Office locations with the establishment of the
Field Security Operations Branch.

II. Security Management Division, Field Security Operations Branch

A. SMD will create and staff a Field Security Operations Branch (FSOB) located
at Headquarters CBP/IA/SMD. The FSOB primary function is to act as the
administrative and operational control activity providing oversight, policies and
standard procedures for the field security offices.

1. The FSOB will be required to provide ongoing support and guidance to all the
field security staff;

2. The FSOB Staffing Plan will enhance SMD’s capability to meet internal and
external customer requirements;

3. Establish the FSOB as an oversight office at headquarters;

4. Establish Regional and District Security Offices; identifying areas of responsibility

and chain-of-command reporting requirements;

5. The FSOB, Regional Security Offices (RSOs) and District Security Offices
(DSOs) will support the overarching SMD area of responsibility; and

6. The FSOB will provide security program oversight to all RSOs and DSOs which
have been designated by the CBP Chief Security Officer for each of the field
locations.

III. Establishment of Regional and District Security Offices

A. Three Regional Security Offices (RSOs) and thirty District Security Offices (DSOs)
will be established and staffed according to the requirements as identified for each
location. The FSOB will dedicate three staff members to the RSOs and DSOs within
each Region. The RSOs and DSOs will be established to implement the security
programs for CBP at each of their respective locations.

B. Regional Security Offices:

1. Three (3) Regional Security Offices (RSOs) will be established near, or co-
located with, each of the CBP National Logistics Centers (NLCs). The Regional
Security Office is focused on servicing CBP field locations’ needs in all disciplines
of security, ensuring that CBP maintains a strong security posture that is
consistent with departmental and agency security regulations and in compliance
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
706 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

with national security policies;

2. The SMD will provide the initial staffing of the Regional Security Offices through
temporary duty assignments. The Regional Security Officer is to maintain a
multidisciplinary security team that is proactive, flexible, embodies the highest
level of professionalism, supported by information technology, and viewed as a
model for excellence by other Federal agencies.

C. District Security Offices

1. District Security Offices (DSOs) will be co-located with Office of Internal Affairs
field offices. The FSOB will work with the Office of Field Operations, Office of
Border Patrol, Air and Marine and Port Security Office to ensure the locations
of the DSOs are established in cities which are in close proximity to high-profile
ports of entry.

IV. RSO and DSO Security Operational Activities

A. Security compliance and regulatory requirements are established in Presidential
and Executive Orders during the establishment of the various programs: Continuity
of Operations Oversight Program, Industrial Security Program, Internal Security
Program, Operations Security Program and Physical Security Program.

B. Security specialist will need to be appointed to fill the roles identified below and
designated in writing for each of the RSOs and DSOs as appropriate areas of
responsibility.

1. Physical Security Program:

(a) Access Control System;

●● Key Control System;

●● Intrusion Detection System; and

●● Badge System/Operation.

(b) HSPD-7, Critical Infrastructure and Key Resource Protection;

(c) National Infrastructure Protection Program;

(d) Classified Facility Construction Requirements;

(e) Visitor Control for Government Facilities;

(f) Foreign National Vetting;

(g) Incoming Visitor Authorization;

(h) Alternate Technical Representative for Guard Services;

(i) HSPD-12, Policy for a Common Identification Standard for Federal

Employees and Contractors; and

(j) Homeland Security Data Network (HSDN).

2. Information Security Program Requirements:

(a) Sensitive Security Information Coordinator;

(b) Sensitive But Unclassified Information Coordinator;

(c) National Security Classified Information; and

(d) Self-Inspections.

3. Industrial Security Program Requirements:

(a) Contract Reviews incorporating Security Requirements;

(b) Contractor Owned and Operated Facility Inspections.

4. Internal Security Program:

(a) Training and Awareness;

(b) Foreign Travel and Foreign Contact Reporting and Briefing/Debriefing;

(c) Foreign Visitor Vetting; and

(d) Security Issue Review Plan.

5. Operations Security Program (OPSEC):

(a) OPSEC Plan;

(b) Occupant Emergency Plan.

6. Continuity of Operations Oversight Program (COOP) Liaison:

(a) CBP Field Office Exercise Plan and Participant;

(b) Occupant Emergency Plan.

7. Personnel Security Program Liaison:

(a) Suitability & Clearance Forms (Federal and Contract Employees);

(b) Credential Forms;

(c) Access Forms;

(d) Courier Card Forms; and

(e) Visit Certification Forms.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BACK Return to Table of Contents

Appendix: Glossary

APPENDIX: GLOSSARY

A.C. or AC. See Alternating Current

Access. (1) A condition or equipment mode that allows authorized entry into a protected area
without alarm by electronically or mechanically deactivating a sensor or sensors. (2) The
ability and means to approach, store or retrieve data, or to communicate with or make use
of Information Technology resources. (3) The ability and opportunity to obtain knowledge of
classified information. An individual, in fact, may have access to classified information by being
in a place where such information is kept if the security measures which are in force are not
sufficient to prevent gaining knowledge of the classified information.

Access Code. A group of numbers and/or letters that when properly entered into a specific
device allow authorized into a specific area without causing alarm or activating sensors.

Access Control. (1) An aspect of security that utilizes hardware systems and specialized
procedures to control and monitor the movement of individuals, vehicles, or materials into, out
of, or within secured areas. Access to various points may be a function of authorization level
or time, or a combination of the two. (2) The use of physical security as a means of controlling
movement into or out of secured areas.

Access Control Card. A card containing coded information that is read by an access control
system; access is granted if the card is valid for that specific parameter; ie – date, time, place.

Access-Control System. An electronic, electro-mechanical or mechanical system designed

to identify and/or admit authorized personnel to the secure area. Identification may be based
on any number of factors such as a sequencing of combinations, special keys, badges,
fingerprints, signature, voice, etc. These systems are for personnel access control only and are
not to be used for the protection of stored information or materials.

Access Parameters. Specifications programmed or entered into an access control system to

define authorization levels, entry times, identification codes and other system information.

Alarm. (1) an alarm device or an alarm signal. (2) One or more detection devices connected
to a control device that indicate unauthorized intrusion. (3) An audible or visual warning device
triggered by the presence of abnormal conditions in a machine or system.

Alarm Station. (1) A manually actuated device installed at a fixed location to transmit an alarm
signal in response to an alarm condition, such as a concealed holdup button in a bank teller’s
cage. (2) A well-marked emergency control unit, installed a fixed location usually accessible to
the public, used to summon help in response to an alarm condition. The control unit contains
either a manually actuated switch or telephone connection to fire or police headquarters, or a
telephone answering service.

Alarm Zone. Smaller subdivisions into which larger areas are divided to permit selective
access to some areas while maintaining other areas secure and to permit pinpointing the
specific location from which an alarm signal is transmitted.

Alternating Current. Abbreviated AC or A.C. a flow of electricity which reaches maximum

voltage in one direction, decreases to zero volts, reverses itself and reaches maximum voltage
in the other direction. The cycle is repeated continuously. In the U.S., utility companies provide
60 hertz power to customers.

Ambient Light. The normal, non-manipulated light level for an area.

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Federal act requiring individuals with disabilities be
reasonably accommodated.

Annealed. To subject glass or metal to a process of heating and slow cooling in order to
toughen, strengthen or harden and reduce brittleness.

Annunciator. (1) A device that signals a change of protection zone status in a security system.
An annunciator may log alarms or display a continuous status for each alarm sensor in a
system. Annunciators include Cathode Ray Tube displays; sometimes called an alarm receiver,
alarm monitor or alarm device. (2) The component of an alarm system that announces a
change of status of the systems, usually in the form of audible and/or visual signals.

Area Detection. Coverage of an internal space or volume of a secured area by means of a

space or volumetric detector. See Volumetric Alarm.

Armory. An armory is a space within CBP law enforcement and detention facilities for the
storage, issuance, and upkeep of weaponry, ammunition, and chemical agents. Armory spaces
can include the issuing area, weapons maintenance area, leather storage area, ammunition
storage area, and high-powered weapons and ammunition storage area.

Audit Trail. A sequential record of system activities that is sufficient to enable the
reconstruction, review, and examination of the sequence of states and activities surrounding or
leading to each event in the path of a transaction from its inception to output of final results.

Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ). An organization (local, state, federal), government

office, appointee, or other person having authority to enforce and/or interpret laws, rules,
specifications, and approve equipment or procedures.

Authorized Persons. Those persons who have a need-to-know for the classified information
involved, and have been cleared for the receipt of such information. Responsibility for
determining whether a person’s duties require that he/she possess, or have access to, any
classified information, and whether he/she is authorized to receive it, rests upon the individual
who has possession, knowledge, or control of the information involved, and not upon the
prospective recipient. Also includes persons approved to enter a controlled or restricted area.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
713 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

Badge. An emblem (a small piece of plastic, cloth or metal) that signifies the bearer’s status,
rank or membership or affiliation. A device, patch, or accoutrement which is presented or
displayed to indicate some feat of service, a special accomplishment, a symbol of authority
(e.g., police), a simple means of identification. Also referred to in FLETC policy as a badge.

Balanced Magnetic Switch. A two-part sensor that generates an alarm condition when a
change in the magnetic field between the parts is detected. Usually mounted on a door and
doorframe to detect opening of the door. A balanced magnetic switch provides better protection
against a defeat attempt than a standard magnetic contact.

Bar Lock. (1) A type of rim lock in which metal bars slide out from a central point on the door
and into receivers on both sides of the door frame. Turning a key or bolt on the center element
retracts the bars enough to let the door open. A door with a bar lock cannot be pulled out of its
frame even if the hinge pins are removed. (2) a metal rod or tube which slides through fittings
affixed to the front of a file cabinet, bent at the top and secured with a combination lock, which
holds the drawers closed.

Battery Backup. A standby battery that is kept fully charged for use during a primary
power failure. An essential element in all electrically operated security systems. Also called
Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS).

Biometric Access Control. A method of access verification in which the person seeking entry
is identified by finger print, retinal eye pattern, palm pattern, hand geometry, voice analysis and
similar features.

BNC Connector (Bayonet Neil-Concelman). A standard CCTV coaxial cable connector with
a bayonet locking mechanism.

Bollard. A post used as a barrier against or to control pedestrian or vehicular traffic.

Bolt. The part of a lock which, when actuated, is projected (or “thrown”) from the lock into a
retaining member, such as a strike plate, to prevent a door or window from moving or opening.
See also dead bolt, flush bolt, and latch.

Building Security Committee. A committee consisting of representatives of all Federal

tenants in the facility, generally responsible for identifying building-specific security issues
and approving the implementation of security measures and practices. In the case of new
construction or pending lease actions, the Building Security Committee may consist of the
design team and planned tenants.

Bypassed. Circumvention of an alarm system, rendering it or a portion of it inoperative.

Camera Dome. Spherical high-impact plastic dome that covers a camera to protect it from the
environment or conceals it from view.

Camera Housing. An enclosure designed to protect the CCTV camera from undue
environmental exposure, tampering, or theft.

Candela. The unit of luminous intensity in a given direction. One candela is commonly called
one candle power.

Capacitance. The property of two or more objects, which enables them to store electrical
energy in an electric field between them. The basic measurement unit is the Farad.
Capacitance varies inversely with the distance between the objects, so the change in
capacitance with relative motion is greater when one object is nearer to the other.

Capacitance Alarm System. An alarm system in which a protected object is electrically

connected as a capacitance sensor. The approach of an intruder causes sufficient change
in capacitance to upset the balance of the system and initiate an alarm signal. Also called a
proximity alarm system.

Capacitance Sensor. An electric condenser that radiates energy and detects changes in the
capacitive coupling between an antenna and a ground. When an intruder enters the energy
field the balance between the antenna and ground is disrupted, causing an alarm.

Card Access. A type of access control system that uses a card with a coded area or strip,
on or inside the card, to actuate a lock or other access control device. To activate the device,
the card is inserted into or through a slot where the data in the coded area is read. If the code
is accepted, a signal will be transmitted to unlock the device or perform some other access
control function. See definition of Card Reader for more information on types.

Card Key. A card, usually plastic, that contains encoded information to open a locking device.

Card Reader. A device that reads the information on a card key. Card readers may obtain
data from access cards by reading punched holes, magnetic spots, stripes or wires, or any of
several other methods that use punched, embossed, or embedded information. The reader
may be an integral part of the lock, or it can be located in the immediate vicinity. Card readers
fall in one of two categories, on-line or intelligent. On-line readers must communicate with
a central processor that makes the entry/exit decision and transmits a signal back to the
locking device. The intelligent card reader compares the data on the card with preprogrammed
parameters and entry or exit is granted or denied by the card reader itself at the reader
location. Intelligent readers are also called stand-alone or off-line readers.

Central Station. (1) An organization or business established for the purpose of monitoring
subscribers’ alarm systems from a centralized monitoring location rather than at the individual
sites. Communication with subscriber alarm systems is generally by telephone line, but may be
by wireless or direct wire. The central station notifies police or fire services immediately upon
receipt of alarm. All alarms are recorded and investigated. Central stations may utilize WATS
lines to extend services on a regional or national basis. (2) The control point of a monitoring
system that is normally supervised by security personnel.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
715 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

Central Station Alarm System. An alarm system that uses a central station, as distinguished
from a proprietary alarm system where the alarm monitoring is done on-site.

Change Key. A key that will operate only one lock or group of keyed-alike locks, as
distinguished from a master key.

Cipher Lock. A digital push-button combination type lock.

Classified Information. Official information that has been identified and marked as Top
Secret, Secret, or Confidential in the interests of National Security.

Closed-Circuit Television. Abbreviated CCTV. A television system, usually hard-wired,

used for proprietary purposes and not for public or general broadcast. Often used in security
applications in conjunction with access control, general surveillance, motion detection, or alarm
assessment.

Cognizant Security Authority. The Central Intelligence Agency has been designated by
the National Foreign Intelligence Board to maintain cognizance over the Department of the
Interior’s security program relating to approvals for access to, and the receipt, handling,
storage, and destruction of Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI).

Combination. The group of numbers that represent the bitting of a key and/or the tumblers of
a lock or cylinder.

Combination Lock. A keyless lock which requires the turning of a numbered dial to a preset
sequence of numbers for the lock to open. It is usually a three position, manipulation resistant,
dial type lock, although cipher locks with push buttons are also referred to as combination
locks.

Concrete Masonry Unit (CMU). Cinder block.

Controlled Area. A room, office, building, or facility to which access is monitored, limited or
controlled. Admittance to a controlled area is limited to persons who have official business
within the area.

Control Unit. The nerve center of the alarm system located on the premises.

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED). A multi-disciplinary approach

to deterring criminal behavior through environmental design. CPTED strategies rely upon
the ability to influence offender decisions that precede criminal acts. As of 2004, most
implementations of CPTED occur solely within the built environment.

CS-Mount. A CCTV industry standard for lens mounting, consisting of a 1-inch diameter
threaded barrel with 32 threads per inch. The distance from the lens mounting surface to the
sensor surface is 0.492 inches (12.497 mm).
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
716 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

Custodian. An individual who is designated the responsibility for maintaining the Classified
Document Register (DI Form 1834) and the centralized storage for a given functional area, and
is charged with the responsibility for safeguarding and accounting for classified information.

Cylinder. A housing that contains a tumbler mechanism and a keyway plug that can only be
turned by the correct key. It includes a cam or spindle to transmit rotary action to a lock or latch
mechanism.

Credentials. Documentation usually consists of an identity card, badge or a shield, etc.,

issued by a trusted third party after some form of identity verification. Credentials are utilized
as identification showing that an individual is entitled to represent, or exercise official power as,
part of a Unites States Government Agency.

Dead Bolt. A type of bolt that is moved in and out of the strike mechanically without spring
action, as by a thumb latch knob. Dead bolt locks are available in single and double
configuration; single throw/cylinder dead bolts have an actuating thumb switch on the interior
side of the door; double dead bolts utilize a key on both sides of the lock to actuate the lock.

Dead Latch. A spring-actuated latch bolt having a beveled end and incorporating a feature that
automatically locks the projected latch bolt against return by end pressure.

Dedicated Line. (1) A power or transmission line with a single function, such as data
transmission, or to a single source such as an outlet for a computer. (2) A non-shared
telephone line to an individual subscriber from a central station.

Dedicated Mode. Operation of an Automated Information System (AIS) when each user with
direct or indirect access to the AIS, its peripherals, remote terminals, or remote hosts, has all of
the following: a) a valid personnel clearance for all information on the system, b) formal access
approval for and has signed nondisclosure agreements for all the information stored and/or
processed (including all compartments, sub compartments and/or special access programs),
and c) a valid need-to-know for all information contained in the system.

Delay. A time interval, measured by an electronic circuit, used to provide a desired alarm
feature such as entry/exit delay.

Designated Official. The highest ranking official of the primary tenant agency of a Federal
facility or, alternatively, a designee selected by mutual agreement of tenant agency officials.
For facilities owned and leased by the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA), the
definition appears in Title 41, Section 102-71.20, of the Code of Federal Regulations (41 CFR
102-71.20).

Detector. Any device that senses the presence of an intruder, an intrusion attempt, fire, etc.

Deterrent. Any physical or psychological device or method that discourages action. In the
physical security arena, locks or window grills are physical deterrents and the presence of a
guard or surveillance camera are psychological deterrents.

Door Closer. A device used to control the closing of a door by means of a spring and either
hydraulic or air pressure or by electronic means. Multi-stage closers provide for adjustments of
swing, latch, and back swing.

Doppler Effect. The change in the frequency of a wave, as a light wave or sound wave,
resulting from relative motion of the source and the receiver.

Dual Technology Sensor. A sensor using two types of sensing technology (e.g. PIR and
acoustic sensors) to reduce false alarms.

DUNS. The Data Universal Numbering System (DUNS) is a unique nine-digit numbering
system that is used to identify a business.

Duress Alarm. (1) An alarm condition that signals a dangerous situation, such as an intruder.
Often unobtrusive sensors so as to not place the victim in greater danger trigger these alarms.
Duress alarms are usually designed to silently initiate an alarm, which is annunciated at a
remote station or guard post. (2) A sensor used in a duress-sensing capacity.

Egress Button. A switch used near an access controlled door that, when pushed, sends a
signal to the controller to release the door locking device. (See also REX)

Electric Door Strike. An electrically activated door locking mechanism consisting of a

solenoid and mechanical latching device. Application of electrical power causes the solenoid
to withdraw the latching pin so that the door is free to open or to extend the pin to prevent the
door from opening.

Electromagnetic Lock. A door lock that uses an electrically actuated magnetic attraction to
secure the door. Magnetic locks use no moving parts.

End Device. Any device at the end of an operating network, such as an alarm sensor, access
control reader, electrical lock, or hydraulic device.

Entry Function Lockset. A mortise or cylindrical lockset with the outside or both knobs locked
or unlocked by an inside thumb turn and unlocked or unlatched by an outside key.

Expanded Metal. An open mesh formed by slitting and drawing sheet metal. It is made in
various patterns and metal thickness, with either a flat or irregular surface.

Fail Safe. A condition whereby an electromechanical door lock reverts to the unlocked position
in the event of a power failure. This feature may be necessary for compliance with life safety
requirements in certain hardware applications.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
718 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

Fail Secure. A condition whereby an electromechanical door lock reverts to a locked position
when there is a power failure.

False Alarm. An alarm signal that does not represent a dangerous or unwanted condition,
usually caused by some fault or problem in the system.

FIPS 201. Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 201, entitled Personal Identity
Verification of Federal Employees and Contractors, was developed to satisfy the requirements
of HSPD 12, which is comprised of two (2) specific components PIV-I and PIV-II. FIPS 201
requires that the PIV card be a smart card and the card body is similar to a bank credit card
conforming to the ISO/IEC 7810 specification.

• The card must contain both contact and contactless interfaces, which may be provided
by two separate integrated circuit chips (ICC) or by one dual-interface ICC. The contact
interface must conform to the ISO/IEC 7816-4:2005 specification.
• The contactless interface must conform to the ISO/IEC 14443 specification.
• In most cases, physical access applications will use the contactless interface, although
there are special cases in which the contact interface will be used for physical access.
This is according to the NIST FIPS 201 PDF, the Standard Publication for Personal
Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and Contractors.

Floor Master Key. A master key which operates all or most lock cylinders on a particular floor
of a building.

Foil. An electrically conductive ribbon used for a sensing circuit. Foil is normally between
0.001 and 0.0003 inch in thickness, and from 0.125 to 1.0 inch in width. It is commonly used
on windows and other glass applications. The metal strip completes an electrical circuit that if
broken, causes an alarm condition. Also called tape.

Foot Candle. A unit of illumination, one foot-candle is the amount of light emitted by one
candle in one square foot. Abbreviated as fc. In the International Systems of Units, the unit
is lux (lumens per square meter). One foot-candle is equal to 10.76 lux; typically this is
approximated as 1 foot-candle being equal to 10 lux.

For Official Use Only (FOUO). The term used within DHS to identify unclassified information
of a sensitive nature, not otherwise categorized by statute or regulation, the unauthorized
disclosure of which could adversely impact a person’s privacy or welfare, the conduct
of Federal programs, or other programs or operations essential to the national interest.
Information impacting the National Security of the United States and classified Confidential,
Secret, or Top Secret under Executive Order 12958, “Classified National Security Information,”
as amended, or its predecessor or successor orders, is not to be considered FOUO. FOUO is
not to be considered classified information.

General Alarm. The notification, often by annunciation, of an evacuation or readiness alert

throughout a facility.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
719 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

Glassbreak Vibration Detector. A vibration detection system which employs a contact

microphone to detect the particular frequency of the cutting or breaking of glass.

Grand Master Key. The key that operates two or more separate groups of locks, which are
each operated by different master keys.

GSA. General Services Administration

Hinge. A type of bearing that connects two solid objects such as a door and a door frame.
There are many types of door hinges. Four main types include:
• Pivot Hinges, which pivot in openings in the floor and the top of the door frame. Also
referred to as a double-acting floor hinge. This type is found already in ancient dry stone
buildings;
• Butt/Mortise Hinges, usually in threes or fours, which are inset (mortised) into the door
and frame. Most residential hinges found in the U.S. are made of steel, although mortise
hinges for out swing doors are often made of brass or stainless steel base to prevent
corrosion;
• Continuous Hinges, which run the entire length of the door (also known as “Piano
Hinges”); and
• Concealed Hinges, used for furniture doors (with or without self-closing feature, and
with or without dampening systems). They are made of 2 parts: One part is the hinge
cup and the arm; the other part is the mounting plate.

Hinge Dowel. A dowel or pin which projects from a door jamb into an opening in the edge of a
door at its hinge which prevents removal of the locked door even if the hinges or hinge pins are
removed.

Holdup Alarm. An alarm that originates from a point where holdup protection is required, such
as a bank teller window or store cash register. It is usually a silent alarm to protect the cashier.

HSPD-7. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 instructs Federal departments and

agencies to prepare plans for protecting physical and cyber critical infrastructure and key
resources (CI/KR), owned or operated, including leased facilities by July 31, 2004.

HSPD-12. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 establishes a policy for a common

identification standard for Federal employees and contractors and mandates the establishment
of a “mandatory Government-wide standard for secure and reliable forms of identification
issued by the federal government to its employees and contractors.”

IDMS. Personal Identity Verification Identity Management System. A system comprised of

one or more systems or applications used to manage the identity verification, validation,
and issuance processes. A DHS/HQ central data base used to house personal identifiable
information for all DHS employees and contractors.

Internal Affairs Background Investigation Database (IABI). A CBP database utilized by

CBP/PSD to input CBP personnel’s employment, suitability and clearance status for verification
purposes by CBP Security personnel.

Industrial Security. That portion of internal security that is concerned with the protection of
classified information in the hands of U.S. industry.

Information. Any information or material regardless of its physical form or characteristics,

which is owned by, produced by or for, or is under the control of the United States Government.

Infrared Motion Detector. A passive, low power, area protection device that detects a change
in ambient temperature within the coverage pattern caused by the movement of a body.
Sensor circuitry generates an alarm when a moving object causes a change in radiated energy
levels within the coverage area. These units are more sensitive to objects moving across the
beam pattern than to objects moving toward the sensor. Also called Passive Infrared.

Infrared Sensor. (1) Passive: detects an intruder by body heat (Infrared Energy), (2) Active: a
photoelectric beam that emits infrared to detect an intruder.
Initial Briefing. The initial indoctrination on the national security information provided to
personnel prior to being authorized access to classified information and the execution of the
Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement form.

Intrusion Detection System. An alarm system comprised of intrusion sensors and alarm
annunciation devices for the purpose of detecting intruders. Typical intrusion detectors include
balanced magnetic contact switches and ultrasonic, infrared, or microwave motion or intrusion
sensors.

Latch Guard. A plate, such as an astragal, applied to an out swinging door that covers a
portion of the door leaf and the door frame at the area where a spring latch or dead bolt enters
a strike plate.

Light Meter. A device used to measure the amount of light in a given area.

Line Supervision. A means where a known current is present on the line to the central station.
Cutting or shorting the line changes this current, which results in an alarm.

Local Alarm. An alarm that annunciates at the location of a locking device, to discourage
or announce intrusion attempts. The alarm usually uses a bell, siren, lighting system or
combination of such devices. It usually turns off automatically after a pre-set time, although
some require a manual shutoff. A local alarm may also be linked to a central station or other
remote location.

Lux. Abbreviation for unit of illuminance set by the International System of Units (SI); lumens
per square meter. A measurement of 10 Lux is equal to 1 foot-candle.

Magnetic Contact. A magnetically operated switch, typically used on doors and windows to
detect opening.

Magnetic Lock. A type of door lock consisting of an electromagnet and opposing strike plate.
When current is applied the strength of the electromagnet secures the door to the strike plate.

Magnetometer. An electronic device used specifically to search personnel for hidden metallic
weapons (knives and guns) at entrances to airports, public schools, courthouses, and other
guarded spaces. When used with access control equipment, they can perform two functions:

(1) Detect the presence of concealed metal objects

(2) Determine the size of those objects
• Metal is detected by measuring the change in an established magnetic field when dense
metal or ferrous materials are moved through the field. The antenna of a detector sets
up a magnetic field around itself. As the antenna of the detector is brought near metal
or metal is moved past the antenna, the pitch from a tone generator increases, thereby
alerting the operator to the presence of metal. Measurement capabilities are adjustable
allowing for varying the amount of metal desired to be detected.

Microwave Sensor. An active intrusion sensor that detects the movement of a person or
object through a pattern of microwave energy. Microwave sensors are classified as monostatic,
bistatic, or terrain following. Generally, they use the Doppler Effect to recognize movement
within a protected area. Bistatic sensors operate on a beam break principle. Terrain-following
microwave sensors are essentially bistatic sensors with antenna configurations that are not
overall line-of-sight. Monostatic sensors are typically designated for indoor use; bistatic and
terrain-following sensors are normally used for outdoor applications.

Mogul Lock. A high-security lock that incorporates a number of features designed to defeat
attempts to pick or destroy it. The lock cylinder assembly employs multiple arrays of pass key
pins, making picking of the lock much more difficult. The arrangement of the pass key pins
in separate arrays requires that multiple cuts would have to be made into the lock housing
or cylinder in order to defeat the lock cylinder assembly. The lock cylinder assembly may
incorporate multiple sets of hardened dowel pins to prevent drilling through the lock housing in
the area of the driver pins.

Mortis Lock. A lock with its case is mortised or recessed into the edge of the door. The most
common variety of mortise lock has a door knob on each side of the door; however, entrance
doors often have an exterior thumb-latch, rather than a door knob, to open the door. The
mortise lock can be locked from the inside by a thumb turn, or by a button on the edge of the
lock case. A key is required to lock or unlock it from the outside.

Multiplexer. A device that allows the simultaneous communication of two or more signals for
transmission to a remote annunciator or central station. In video, a device that allows a camera
to be electronically switched to a variety of image projection and recording devices.

National Security Information. Designated information, which requires protection in the

interest of national defense or foreign relations of the United States, that is, information
classified in accordance with Executive Order 12356 and not falling within the definition of
Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data.

Nuisance Alarm. An alarm activation caused by environmental or other unexplained action.

PIV-II. Provides detailed technical specifications of components and processes required

for interoperability of PIV cards with personal authentication, access control, and PIV card
management systems across the Federal government and the issuance of smartcards.

Power Supply. A source of operating power such as a generator, transformer, or battery

including its circuits, terminations, and connections to the dependant system components.

Propellant-Activated Device. Any tool or special mechanized device or gas generator system
that is activated by a propellant or releases or directs work through a propellant charge.

Protected Area. That portion of a premises that is covered by an alarm system.

Proximity Alarm System. See Capacitance Alarm System.

Proximity Card. An identification card containing a microcircuit. When place in close proximity
to a card reader, the card will activate the reader’s circuitry and register its assigned unique
code.

Radiation Detector. A small electronic device about the size of a pager (Personal Radiation
Detector) or a hand held electronic device (Radiation Isotope Identification Device) or a large
portal (Radiation Portal Monitor) that is capable of detecting gamma and neutron emissions
from radioactive isotopes.

The Personal Radiation Detector (PRD) is worn on the Border Protection Officer’s utility belt
while he/she is on duty. The Radiation Isotope Identification Device (RIID) is used by Border
Protection Officers to determine the exact source of a radiation alarm. The Radiation Portal
Monitor (RPM) provides a passive, non-intrusive means to screen cars, trucks and other
conveyances for the presence of radioactive and nuclear materials.

Refresher Briefing. The periodic reindoctrination on the national security information program
provided to personnel with continuing authorized access to classified information.

Restricted Area. A room, office, building, or facility to which access is strictly and tightly
controlled. Admittance to a restricted area is limited to personnel assigned to the area or
persons who have been specifically authorized access to the area. Visitors to a restricted area
and uncleared personnel must be escorted by personnel assigned to the area and all classified
and sensitive information must be protected from observation, disclosure or removal.

REX. A request to exit device. See Egress Button

Risk. The possibility of suffering harm or loss.

Risk Analysis. An analytical tool used to minimize risk by applying security measures
commensurate with the threats, vulnerabilities, and values of the asset(s) to be protected.

Risk Assessment. A detailed study of the vulnerabilities, threats, likelihood, loss or impact of
loss and theoretical effectiveness of security measures.

Risk Management. The process of factoring the criticality of assets with the vulnerability to a
threat, and determining the threshold of acceptable risk.

Screens. An array of wires or electrified screening that protects areas or openings, such as
skylights and crawl spaces. It may use broken circuit or capacitance techniques to sense
intrusion.

Security. Refers to the safeguarding of information classified Top Secret, Secret, or

Confidential to prevent unlawful unauthorized dissemination, duplication or observation.

Security Liaison (SL). The individual responsible for coordinating compliance with the
implementation of CBP security programs through the District Security Officer/Regional
Security Officer and serve as the primary point of contact for all security issues in the their
facilities.

Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) Building Information. SBU includes but is not limited to
paper and/or electronic documentation of the physical facility information.
SBU is the formal designation for information that, by law or regulation, requires some form
of protection but is outside the formal system of classification, in accordance with Executive
Order 12958, Classified National Security Information as amended, and DHS MD 11042.1
Safeguarding Sensitive But Unclassified (For Official Use Only) Information.

Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). SCI is classified information concerning or

derived from intelligence sources, methods, or analytical processes, which is required to
be handled exclusively within formal control systems established by the Director of Central
Intelligence.

Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF). An accredited area, room, group

of rooms, or installation where SCI may be stored, used, discussed, and/or electronically
processed.

Small Arms Ammunition. Any shotgun, rifle or pistol cartridge and any cartridge for
propellant-activated devices. This definition does not include military ammunition containing
bursting charges or incendiary, tracer, spotting or pyrotechnic projectiles.

Special Access Program. Any program imposing access controls beyond those normally
provided for access to Confidential, Secret, or Top Secret. Such programs include special
clearances, investigative requirements, or special access lists of persons determined to require
special access. Special access programs pertaining to intelligence activities, or intelligence
sources or materials exercised by the Director of Central Intelligence.

Special Security Officer (SSO). An individual who is designated the responsibility for the
secure operation of a SCIF and insuring the secure handling, storage, destruction and
transmittal of foreign intelligence material.

Spring Latch. A beveled, spring loaded bolt of a rim, mortise, or cylindrical lockset that is
retracted by a knob, lever,or key, and is depressed by a strike plate lip. The bolt is extended by
the spring pressure.

Strongroom. A reinforced interior space enclosed by or separated from other similar spaces
by four walls, a ceiling and a floor, constructed of solid building materials, and used for storage
of classified materials.

Supervised Lines. Interconnecting lines in alarm systems that are electrically supervised
against tampering. See also Line Supervision.

Surreptitious Entry. The unauthorized entry into a facility or security container in a manner in
which evidence of such entry is not discernable under normal circumstances.

Tamper Switch. A switch, usually mechanically operated, used to detect opening of alarm
equipment.

Termination Briefing. The briefing provided to personnel upon termination of authorization for
access to classified information and their acknowledgement of their continuing responsibilities
by executing a Debriefing Acknowledgement.

Threat. Acts or conditions which may result in the compromise of information, loss of life,
damage, loss or destruction of property or the disruption of the mission of an organization.

Threat Assessment. The analysis of an asset’s vulnerability to its threats.

Top Guard. Anti-personnel device, usually of barbed or concertina wire, installed at the tops of
fences and along roof edges.

Ultrasonic Detector. A device that senses motion in a protected area by a Doppler shift in the
transmitted ultrasonic energy. The device operates by filling a space with a pattern of ultrasonic
waives; the modulation of these waves by a moving object is detected and initiates an alarm
signal.

Unauthorized Person. Any person who is not authorized to have access to specific classified
information. Regardless of the degree of clearance, an individual is not authorized access to
classified information of any degree without a demonstrated need-to-know.

Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS). UPS systems provide backup power. They monitor
the incoming power lines and provide continuous electrical current in the event of a change in
voltage. The UPS provides a certain amount of battery backup.

Vault. A windowless enclosure of heavy, reinforced construction with walls, floor, roof and
door(s) designed and constructed to delay penetration sufficiently to enable the timely arrival of
response forces.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
726 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

Vibration Detection. An alarm system that employs one or more contact microphones and
vibration sensors, which are fastened to the surfaces of the area or object being protected to
detect excessive levels of vibration. The contact microphone system consists of microphones,
a control unit containing an amplifier and an accumulator, and a power supply. The unit’s
sensitivity is adjustable so that ambient noises or normal vibrations will not initiate an alarm
signal.

Visitor. Any person who is not a DHS or CBP Federal employee or DHS or CBP contractor
with current DHS or CBP suitability and issued a DHS or CBP Photo Access Card (PAC).

Volumetric Alarm. A system that detects movement through the interior of an alarmed area,
as opposed to the detection of perimeter penetrations.

Vulnerability. The probability that a threat will result in the compromise of information, loss of
life, damage, loss or destruction of property or the disruption of the mission of an organization.

Walk Test. A procedure of actually walking through the area protected by a motion detector to
determine the limits of its coverage.

X-ray System. A device or system that inspects the contents of a package or container for
concealed explosives or contraband. Some systems can only detect objects made of materials
possessing high atomic numbers, such as steel, tin, aluminum, and iron. Other systems can
detect materials with both high and low atomic numbers. Some systems have two monitors,
one for objects with high atomic numbers and one for objects with low atomic numbers. Color
systems presently available use only one monitor to view both types of materials. Specific
colors are assigned to high and low atomic number materials. Such systems can detect and
discriminate among plastics, metals, and explosives in firearms and bombs.

Zone. Large protected premises are divided into areas or zones, each having its own
identification and/or annunciation.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BACK Return to Table of Contents
RETURN TO TOP

Additional CBP Security Links

Information Security/For Official Use Only (INFOSEC/FOUO) - 12/03/2007

CBP Courier Card

Awareness Training for Safeguarding Sensitive But Unclassified/For Official Use Only
Information - 11/29/2007

Sensitive Security Information (SSI)

Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI)

Industrial Security - 11/29/2007

CBP Badge and Credential - 12/14/2005

This information is available for requesting badges, credentials, and badge lucite preservation.
Also contains the guidelines for reporting lost or stolen badges and credentials.

RRB Crime Incidents - 12/18/2007

II. CBP Communications Security (COMSEC)

CBP’s Communication Security (COMSEC) program falls under the responsibility of the
Security and Technology Policy Branch within the Office of Information and Technology. CBP’s
COMSEC Central Office of Record (COR) has day-to-day management responsibility for
CBP’s COMSEC program.

III. CBP COMSEC COR POINTS OF CONTACT

Keith Booker
CBP COMSEC COR Program Manager
Supervisory COMSEC
Desk: 540-542-2430
Blackberry: 571-271-9653
Fax: 540-542-2994
[email protected]

The Office of Information Technology (OIT) Network and Security Operations (NSO) and
the Security and Technology Policy (STP) Branch spearheaded a newly formed COMSEC
Working Group to unify all Communications Security (COMSEC) under an OIT sponsored
centralized program. The COMSEC Working Group includes representation from all CBP
COMSEC stakeholders to include Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination (OIOC),
Office of Internal Affairs (OIA), Office of Field Operations (OFO), Office of Border Patrol (OBP)
and Office of Air & Marine (OAM). COMSEC services include identification of equipment to
be procured, start-up of new secure communications equipment, inventory services, and
coordination of service and maintenance. It is critical that CBP maintains its current system
for transmitting time-sensitive classified communications from CBP Headquarters to the
field offices. This working group was established to charter the CBP COMSEC program
governance, structure and operational capabilities.

Communications Security (COMSEC) is the measures and controls taken to deny

unauthorized individuals information derived from secure communications and to ensure the
authenticity of such secure communications. COMSEC includes cryptosecurity, transmission
security, emission security, and physical security of COMSEC.

National Policy for the Destruction of COMSEC Paper Material

DHS Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) Page

IV. The Office of Information Technology (OIT)

Shall be responsible for managing CBP’s Communications Security (COMSEC) program,
accreditation of classified systems, providing Information Technology security training and
responsible for CBP systems access requirements as defined in the CBP Information Systems
Security Policies and Procedures Handbook 1400-05C.

Though the COMSEC Account will not be authorized for open storage, the DHS Management
Directive (MD) No. 11046 Open Storage Area Standards for Collateral Classified Information
(issued 2/22/2005) be used in the certification process. This is in addition to verifying that the
minimum physical security standards set forth in NSTISSI No. 4005 has been met for the room
where the COMSEC Account will be established.

Physical security certification of the room where a COMSEC Account is located can only be
approved by the Office of Internal Affairs. If Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) will be

Request for physical security certification of COMSEC Account room is to be submitted to cbp.
[email protected].

For securing a crypto card and or a secure telephone device in a government office, the
COMSEC User must comply with the DHS Secure Telephone User Guide, Attachment Q3 to
the DHS MD 4300B.

Physical security certification of a private residence for securing a crypto card and or a
secure telephone device can only be approved by the Office of Internal Affairs. If Top Secret
is involved, then the request must be coordinated through the Office of Internal Affairs, to the
DHS Office of Security for physical security certification of the residence.

Request for physical security certification of a private residence for securing a crypto card and
or a secure telephone device is to be submitted to [email protected]. Upon receipt of the
request, the Office of Internal Affairs will provide the required documents.

V. CBP National Security Systems Security

CBP Office of Information and Technology

VI. CBP Operations Security (OPSEC)

CBP OPSEC

VII. CBP Personnel Security (PSD)

CBP Security Clearances - Background Investigations
CBP Personnel Security Handbook 1400-07 2006

Questions pertaining to Security can be directed to the IA Security Management mailbox

[email protected] or by calling 202-325-0110.

Information Security: Safeguarding Classified

and Sensitive But Unclassified Information Handbook

Foreword........................................................................ 745

1. Chapter 1: Introduction..........................................747
1.1. Policy............................................................................................ 747

1.2. Authorities. ................................................................................... 747

2. Chapter 2: Responsibilities .....................................749
2.1. THE COMMISSIONER, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION (CBP).................................................................... 749

2.2. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF INTERNAL

AFFAIRS AS THE DESIGNATED CSO........................................ 749

2.3. THE DIRECTOR, SECURITY MANAGEMENT DIVISION............ 749

2.4. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONERS, DIRECTORS, AND OTHERS

WITH EQUIVALENT AUTHORITY............................................... 749

2.5. DESIGNATED SECURITY OFFICERS......................................... 749

2.6. THE OFFICE OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS, PERSONNEL SECURITY

DIVISION....................................................................................... 749

2.7. THE OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONS

COORDINATION........................................................................... 750

2.8. THE OFFICE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (OIT).............. 750

2.9. CBP SUPERVISORS AND MANAGERS...................................... 750

2.10. CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT CUSTODIAN..................................... 750

2.11. ALL PERSONNEL........................................................................ 750

3. Chapter 3: CBP Safeguarding
Classified Policy and Program Management............751
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
735 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK
3.1. POLICY......................................................................................... 751

3.2. INTERPRETATION ...................................................................... 751

4. Chapter 4: Security Classification .........................757
4.1. POLICY......................................................................................... 757

4.2. CBP SECURITY CLASSIFICATION MANAGEMENT.................. 757

4.3. ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY (OCA)..................... 757

4.4. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION

OCA POSITIONS ......................................................................... 757

4.5. ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION PROCESS.................................... 758

4.6. CLASSIFICATION LEVELS.......................................................... 759

4.7. CLASSIFICATION CATEGORIES................................................ 759

4.8. DURATIONS OF CLASSIFICATION UNDER EO 12958.............. 760

4.9. COMMUNICATING ORIGINAL

CLASSIFICATION DECISIONS ...................................................760

4.10. CBP CLASSIFICATION GUIDES.................................................760

4.11. CLASSIFICATION PROHIBITIONS.............................................. 761

4.12. CLASSIFICATION BY COMPILATION ........................................ 761

4.13. EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES............................................. 762

4.14. RECLASSIFYING PREVIOUSLY

DECLASSIFIED INFORMATION.................................................. 762

4.15. RECORDS FOR ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION ACTIONS.......... 762

4.16. CLASSIFICATION CHALLENGES. ............................................. 763

4.17. INFORMAL CLASSIFICATION CHALLENGES. ......................... 763

4.18. FORMAL CLASSIFICATION CHALLENGES............................... 763

4.20. DERIVATIVE CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY.............................764

4.21. DERIVATIVE CLASSIFICATION APPLICATIONS.......................764

4.22. RECORDS OF DERIVATIVE CLASSIFICATION ACTIONS.........764

4.23. DERIVATIVE CLASSIFICATION

SPECIALIZED TRAINING............................................................ 765
5. Chapter 5: Declassification ....................................767
5.1. POLICY......................................................................................... 767

5.2. DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY . ........................................... 767

5.3. EXTENSION OF CLASSIFICATION . ..........................................768

5.4. EXEMPTION FROM DECLASSIFICATION (INFORMATION NOT

CONTAINED IN A FILE SERIES) ................................................768

5.5. EXEMPTION FROM DECLASSIFICATION (INFORMATION

CONTAINED IN A SPECIFIC FILE SE-RIES).............................. 769

5.6. ONSET OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION ......................... 770

5.7. MANDATORY DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW ........................... 771

6. Chapter 6: Marking Classified Information ............775
6.1. POLICY......................................................................................... 775
7. Chapter 7: Access and Dissemination of Classified
Information .............................................................779
7.1. POLICY.........................................................................................779

7.2. ACCESS AND DISSEMINATION RESTRICTIONS......................780

7.3. CBP EMPLOYEE VISIT CERTIFICATION OF SECURITY

CLEARANCE . .............................................................................780

7.4. DISSEMINATION OF CBP CLASSIFIED INFORMATION........... 781

7.6. DISSEMINATION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.................... 781

8. Chapter 8: Custody and Accountability. .................785
8.1. POLICY......................................................................................... 785

8.2. CUSTODY DURING EMERGENCIES...........................................785

8.3. ACCOUNTABILITY OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION................. 786

8.4. ACCOUNTABILITY OF TOP SECRET INFORMATION............... 786

8.5. ACCOUNTABILITY OF SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL

INFORMATION............................................................................. 787

8.6. RECEIPTS FOR CLASSIFIED TRANSMISSION......................... 787

8.7. CLASSIFIED MEETINGS AND CONFERENCES .......................788

8.8. REPRODUCTION OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL . .......................789

8.9. ANNUAL INVENTORY OF CLASSIFIED HOLDINGS................. 791

8.10. DESTRUCTION OF CLASSIFIED MATERIALS . ........................ 791

8.11. END-OF-DAY SECURITY CHECKS.............................................792

9. Chapter 9: Storage of Classified Information ........793
9.1. POLICY.........................................................................................793

9.2. STANDARDS FOR STORAGE EQUIPMENT...............................793

9.3. NEW PURCHASES . ....................................................................793

9.4. MAINTENANCE ........................................................................... 793

9.5. TOP SECRET INFORMATION STORAGE ..................................794

9.6. SECRET INFORMATION STORAGE...........................................794

9.7. CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION STORAGE ..............................795

9.9. IDENTIFICATION OF SECURITY CONTAINERS.........................795

9.10. PROTECTING CLASSIFIED COMBINATIONS

USING STANDARD FORM (SF) 700 ...........................................796

9.11. ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED COMBINATIONS...............................796

9.12. CHANGING COMBINATIONS...................................................... 797

9.13. SECURITY CONTAINER CHECK SHEET.................................... 797

9.14. OPEN-CLOSED SIGNS ............................................................... 797

9.15. SECURITY CONTAINERS TAKEN OUT OF SERVICE. ............. 797

10. Chapter 10: Transmission and Transportation.........799
10.1. POLICY.........................................................................................799

10.2. METHODS OF TRANSMISSION OR TRANSPORTATION.........799

10.3. SHIPMENT OF FREIGHT.............................................................801

10.4. PREPARATION OF MATERIAL FOR TRANSMISSION.............. 801

10.5. ESCORT OR HAND-CARRYING OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL..802

10.6. COURIER TRAVEL BY COMMERCIAL AIR................................802

10.7. TRANSPORT OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL

WITHIN AN ACTIVITY OR OFFICE..............................................803

10.8. RECEIPTS.....................................................................................803
11. Chapter 11: Security Violations and Infractions.....805
11.1. POLICY.........................................................................................805

11.2. DEFINITIONS................................................................................805

11.3. REPORTING SECURITY INCIDENTS..........................................805

11.4. CLASSIFIED SPILLAGE..............................................................806

11.5. INCIDENTS INVOLVING SENSITIVE COMPARTMENT

INFORMATION (SCI) ...................................................................807

11.6. PRELIMINARY INQUIRY .............................................................807

11.7. FORMAL INVESTIGATION .........................................................809

11.8. OVERSEAS SECURITY VIOLATIONS

AND INFRACTIONS .................................................................... 810

11.9. OTHER AGENCY SECURITY VIOLATIONS

AND INFRACTIONS .................................................................... 810

11.10. SANCTIONS ............................................................................ 810

11.11. ANNUAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS . ............................ 811

12. Chapter 12: Industrial Security Program...............813
12.1. CBP’S INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM.............................. 813

12.2. PROCESSING REQUIREMENTS................................................. 818

13. Chapter 13: Safeguarding Sensitive But Unclassified
(For Official Use Only) Information........................821
13.1. POLICY......................................................................................... 821
14. Chapter 14: Sensitive Security
Information (SSI).....................................................823
14.1. POLICY......................................................................................... 823

14.2. RESPONSIBILITIES .................................................................... 823

14.3. CATEGORIES OF SSI..................................................................826

14.4. ORIGINAL DESIGNATION OF INFORMATION AS SSI ............. 826

14.5. MARKING SSI .............................................................................827

14.7. CHALLENGING SSI ....................................................................829

14.8. AUDITS AND INSPECTIONS ......................................................830

14.9. SHARING, DISSEMINATION AND ACCESS ..............................830

14.10. STORAGE AND HANDLING . .................................................832

14.11. CBP SSI FOIA REVIEW PROCESS.........................................832

14.12. TRANSMISSION .....................................................................833

14.13. DESTRUCTION .......................................................................834

14.14. INCIDENT REPORTING . ........................................................834

14.15. PROGRAM STATUS REPORTING .........................................835

15. Chapter 15: Security Education
and Awareness.........................................................837

15.1. POLICY......................................................................................... 837

15.2. RESPONSIBILITIES..................................................................... 837

15.3. SECURITY TRAINING..................................................................837

16. Chapter 16: Compliance Reviews
and Self-Inspections................................................839

16.1. POLICY.........................................................................................839

16.2. RESPONSIBILITIES.....................................................................839

16.3. COMPLIANCE REVIEW PROCEDURES.....................................839

16.4. SELF-INSPECTIONS....................................................................840

16.5. UNANNOUNCED REVIEWS........................................................840

16.6. EXTERNAL REVIEWS AND INSPECTIONS...............................840

Foreword

U.S. Customs and Border Protection Safeguarding Classified and Sensitive But
Unclassified Handbook.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) are charged with securing America’s
borders to protect American people and our economy. CBP ensures border security
against terrorist, other criminals and weapons of mass destruction, while facilitating
legitimate trade and travel.

CBP achieves critical missions while working with critical information such as Classified
National Security Information, For Official Use Only/Law Enforcement Sensitive
Information and Sensitive Security Information.

This handbook supersedes Customs Issuance System (CIS) HB 1400-03, dated

February 1991 and Immigration Naturalization Services, Security Officer Handbook.

Safeguarding classified and sensitive but unclassified information is vital to our mission
and operations. I fully support the Office of Internal Affairs in their program oversight
activities of CBP’s Information Security Program.

Deputy Commissioner
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

1. Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1. Policy
1.1.1. This security handbook implements the Executive Order 12958, as amended,
Classified National Security Information and Department of Homeland
Security Management Directives, 11000 series. It is applicable to all persons
who are permanently or temporarily assigned, detailed to, employed or
under contract with Customs and Border Protection (CBP). It establishes
safeguarding, classifying, declassifying, and downgrading of official
information requiring protection in the interest of national security.
1.1.2. This handbook also establishes safeguards for sensitive but unclassified
information within CBP. DHS departmental policy states, that all sensitive but
unclassified information generated within DHS and it’s components, that is not
regulated by statute, shall be referred to as “For Official Use Only,” (FOUO).
DHS MD 11042.1, provides specific guidance for the safeguarding of such
information.
1.1.3. The provisions of this handbook set forth the minimum security standards and
safeguards to ensure the protection of classified and sensitive but unclassified
information within CBP.
1.2. Authorities
1.2.1. Executive Order 12333, as amended 46 F.R. 59941 (Dec 8, 1981); 68
F.R. 4075 (Jan. 23, 2003); 73 F.R. 45325 (July 30, 2008), United States
Intelligence Activities
1.2.2. Executive Order 12829, as amended 58 F.R. 3470 (Jan 6, 1993); 58 F.R.
65863 (Dec 14, 1993), National Industrial Security Information.
1.2.3. Executive Order 12958, as amended, 68 F.R. 15315 (Mar 28, 2003),
Classified National Security Information
1.2.4. Executive Order 13284, Amendment of Executive Orders, and Other Actions,
in Connection with the Establishment of the Department of Homeland Security
1.2.5. 6 CFR §7, Department of Homeland Security, Classified National Security
Information
1.2.6. 32 CFR §2001, Part Implementing Directive for E.O. 12958, as amended
1.2.7. 44 USC Chapters 21, 31, 33, Federal Records Act
1.2.8. 49 USC §114(s), Nondisclosure of Security Activities
1.2.9. 49 CFR §1.520, Protection of Sensitive Security Information, May 18, 2004
1.2.10. Homeland Security Act, Pub L. 107-296, 116 Stat 2135 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 6 USC §101 et seq).

2. Chapter 2: Responsibilities
2.1. THE COMMISSIONER, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION (CBP)
2.1.1. Shall designate the Assistant Commissioner, Office of Internal Affairs, as the
Component Chief Security Officer (CSO).
2.2. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF INTERNAL
AFFAIRS AS THE DESIGNATED CSO
2.2.1. Shall serve as the principal advisor to the CBP Deputy Commissioner
regarding CBP’s Information Security Program;
2.2.2. Shall ensure sufficient resources are in place to implement and manage
CBP’s Information Security Program and the requirements of this handbook;
and
2.2.3. Shall designate the Director, Security Management Division to implement and
manage the CBP Information Security Program.
2.3. THE DIRECTOR, SECURITY MANAGEMENT DIVISION
2.3.1. Shall direct and administer CBP’s Information Security Program under which
information is classified, safeguarded, and declassified;
2.3.2. Shall issue any necessary written procedures required for the effective
implementation of this handbook.
2.4. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONERS, DIRECTORS, AND OTHERS
WITH EQUIVALENT AUTHORITY
2.4.1. CBP may choose to exceed the standards as cited within this handbook,
but may not lessen them, per DHS MD 11044. If the choice is to exceed
the minimum requirements, sufficient justification must exist to warrant any
increased expenditures
2.4.2. Shall appoint in writing a Designated Security Officer (DSO) for their
respective areas of responsibility to ensure procedures set forth in this
handbook are followed.
2.5. DESIGNATED SECURITY OFFICERS
2.5.1. Shall provide assistance and support to regional CBP personnel and serve as
a liaison to the Office of Internal Affairs for applicable matters relating to the
implementation and compliance with the provisions of this handbook.
2.6. THE OFFICE OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS, PERSONNEL SECURITY
DIVISION
2.6.1. Shall develop policy and procedures which implement and administer the

personnel security and suitability program for CBP; render employment

suitability; and grant security clearances for access to Classified National
Security Information, as defined in the CBP Personnel Security Handbook,
HB 1400-07
2.7. THE OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONS
COORDINATION
2.7.1. Shall be responsible for managing CBP’s Sensitive Compartmented
Information (SCI) program and granting SCI access to CBP personnel.
2.8. THE OFFICE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (OIT)
2.8.1. Shall be responsible for managing CBP’s Communications Security
(COMSEC) program, accreditation of classified systems, provide Information
Technology security training and responsible for CBP systems access
requirements, as defined in the CBP Information Systems Security Policies
and Procedures Handbook 1400-05C.
2.9. CBP SUPERVISORS AND MANAGERS
2.9.1. Shall ensure that they and those they supervise are aware of and comply
with the applicable provisions of this handbook and promote and ensure
compliance by staff members.
2.9.2. Shall appoint, in writing, a primary and alternate Classified Document
Custodian (CDC) for those situations where classified information is stored
and processed.
2.9.3. Shall ensure security education and awareness training is provided upon
initial assignment of an employee, detailee, and contractor and reinforced
periodically thereafter through routine office interaction, e-mail reminders,
staff meetings and other office gatherings, which will contribute to an informed
workforce.
2.10. CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT CUSTODIAN
2.10.1. Shall ensure the procedures set forth in Chapter 3 are followed.
2.11. ALL PERSONNEL
2.11.1. Shall be responsible for protecting classified and sensitive but unclassified
information from unauthorized disclosure.
2.11.2. Shall be aware of, and comply with, the applicable provisions of this
handbook and report to the appropriate officials any infractions or violations
that affect the safeguarding of classified and sensitive but unclassified
information.

3. Chapter 3: CBP Safeguarding Classified Policy and

Program Management
3.1. POLICY
3.1.1. All CBP personnel are personally and individually responsible for providing
proper protection of classified information under their custody and control. All
officials within CBP who hold management or supervisory positions have a
non-delegable responsibility for the quality, implementation, and management
of the Information Security Program within their area of responsibility.
3.1.2. CBP personnel who create or handle classified information will be rated
accordingly. Management of classified information shall be included as a
critical element for CBP personnel serving as a Designated Security Officer
(DSO) or Classified Document Custodian (CDC) whose duties primarily or
collaterally involve the safeguarding of classified information.
3.2. INTERPRETATION
3.2.1. Questions concerning policies pertaining to classified national security
information should be referred to the Office of Internal Affairs (IA), Security
Management Division (SMD). The Director, SMD shall provide CBP
interpretation of policies and procedures concerning the protection of
classified national security information, and provide written guidance to CBP
offices, as necessary.
1.3. PROGRAM POLICIES
3.3.1. The unauthorized disclosure of information classified in the national interest
can cause irreparable damage to the national security and loss of human
life. Our national interest requires that certain information be maintained in
confidence in order to protect our citizens, our democratic institutions, and
our participation within the community of nations. Accordingly, classifying
authorities, program managers, supervisors, and employees shall follow
all applicable laws, including the provisions of EO 12958, as amended,
subsequent orders and the provisions of this handbook to protect national
security information.
3.3.2. DHS has delegated Original Classification Authority (OCA) up to the Top
Secret level to the Commissioner, CBP and the Assistant Commissioner,
Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination (OIOC). No other CBP
official is authorized to classify information at the Top Secret level.
3.3.3. CBP OCAs cannot re-delegate this authority, but it may be exercised by
persons designated in writing to act in the absence of the OCA, provided they
have the appropriate level of security clearance and training.
3.3.4. Derivative classification includes the classification of information based on

classification guidance or classified source material. With the appropriate

security clearance, and as required by job, CBP personnel involved in the
generation, extraction or summarization of information based on previously
classified information are authorized to derivatively classified information.
3.3.5. E.O. 12958, as amended, states that authorized holders of information who,
in good faith, believe that its classification status is improper, are encouraged
and expected to challenge the classification status of the information in
accordance with the procedures identified in this handbook. Authorized
holders wishing to challenge the classification status of information shall
follow those procedures outlined in 4.16-4.18 of this handbook.
3.3.6. Information that continues to meet the classification requirements of E.O.
12958, as amended, or any other applicable law or subsequent orders,
requires continued protection. However, CBP generated classified information
shall be declassified as soon as it no longer meets the standards for
classification under any applicable law.
3.3.7. When classified information is transferred from another agency or DHS
component in conjunction with a transfer of functions, and not merely
for storage purpose, the receiving CBP office shall be deemed to be the
originating office for purposes of downgrading and declassification.
3.3.8. Classified information generated by CBP must be reviewed for
declassification upon receipt of a request by a United States citizen or
permanent resident alien, a Federal agency, or a state or local government.
A request for mandatory review of classified information shall be submitted in
writing and describe the information with sufficient specificity to locate it with a
reasonable amount of effort.
3.3.9. Assistant Commissioners, Directors, and alike shall appoint in writing, an
individual with a Top Secret security clearance to serve as the Top Secret
Control Officer (TSCO) within his or her office if the office processes
information classified at the Top Secret level. The TSCO is responsible for
protection, accountability, receiving, dispatching and overall control of all Top
Secret information within his or her office.
3.3.10. Assistant Commissioners, Directors, Office Directors, Managers, and
Supervisors must designate in writing an appropriately cleared employee
to serve as the Classified Document Custodian (CDC) whenever classified
information is handled and stored within his or her office.
3.3.11. Assistant Commissioners, Directors, Office Directors, Managers, and
Supervisors must establish procedures for the control and accountability
of classified (Top Secret, Secret and Confidential) information received.
Procedures shall ensure movement of classified information can be traced,
its dissemination limited, its retrieval is obtained promptly, its loss can be
detected, and excessive holdings and reproduction are limited. Offices

maintaining classified information must conduct an annual inventory,

reviewing their classified holdings. The CDC must visually inspect each
classified document upon initial receipt during the annual inventory to ensure
that the document is completely intact, and accounted for by written evidence
of proper disposition. Results of this inventory shall be kept locally on file.
3.3.12. No employee has a right to access classified information by virtue of title,
position, or level of security clearance. An employee is only eligible for access
to classified information provided that the employee has been determined
to be trustworthy by the appropriate background investigation, adjudicated
favorably, and access is essential to accomplish lawful and authorized
Government purpose.
3.3.13. Classified information (in any form), to include extra copies, is not personal
property and may not be removed from the Government’s control by any
departing employee. The CDC shall account for and transfer all classified
information from the possession of the departing employee.
3.3.14. All Directors, Supervisors and Managers must ensure that only authorized
persons obtain access to classified information; however, the final
responsibility for determining whether an individual gains access to classified
information rests with the individual who has possession, knowledge or
control of the information and not with the prospective recipient. Classified
information must be protected at all times by the holder of the information.
Before classified information is disclosed, the holder must verify the
recipient’s identification and security clearance through their operating unit’s
servicing officer or security contact, determine the recipient’s need to know,
and advise the recipient of the classification level of the information.
3.3.15. Classified information may be transmitted by approved means both inside
and outside of CBP’s facilities; however, classified information may only be
hand-carried aboard commercial aircraft when there is neither time nor other
means available to properly transmit the information. Requests for permission
to hand-carry classified information aboard a commercial aircraft shall be
submitted, in writing, to the Office of Internal Affairs, Security Management
Division as identified in Chapter 10 of this handbook.
3.3.16. CBP personnel may receive authorization from the Office of Internal Affairs
to hand-carry classified information up to the Top Secret level within the
United States and its territories, except by commercial aircraft. Authorization
shall be requested for CBP personnel who are required and routinely carry
classified material to facilities in the same geographical areas. To be an
authorized courier, the employee must have valid justification to transport,
hold an appropriate security clearance and possess a valid DHS Courier
Authorization Card, as described in Chapter 10.8 of this handbook.
3.3.17. Classified information must be stored under conditions that will provide
adequate protection against access by unauthorized persons. Whenever

classified information is not under the personal control and observation of a

cleared person, it must be guarded by personnel with the appropriate security
clearance or stored in a GSA-approved security container.
3.3.18. Certain security measures and controls must be in place for the storage of
Top Secret material. The same applies to open storage. Storage for these
purposes must be approved and accredited by the Office of Internal Affairs.
3.3.19. Classified documents must be destroyed in a manner sufficient to preclude
recognition or reconstruction of the classified information. Assistant
Commissioners, Office Directors and Division Directors shall ensure the
proper destruction of classified information for classified information is
stored and handled in their offices. Such procedures must be by approved
destruction methods, adequate destruction records are maintained, and
the destruction is properly witnessed as described in section 8.10 of this
handbook.
3.3.20. Classified information shall not be discussed, or otherwise transmitted
or processed, on any telecommunications equipment not approved and
accredited by the Office of Information Technology (OIT) and Office of Internal
Affairs (IA) accordingly. For further details, see the Information Systems
Security Policies and Procedures Handbook HB 1400-05C.
3.3.21. All information security incidents, violations, or compromises must be
reported. Any person who is aware of or suspects the unauthorized
disclosure, mishandling, loss or compromise (in any form) of classified
information must notify the Office of Internal Affairs, Joint Intake Center
3.3.22. CBP Office heads will be notified through official memorandum of security
violations or infractions involving personnel within their office. Security
violations or infractions committed shall be noted in the employee’s
evaluation. All reports and any information contained during an inquiry or
investigation will be retained in the employees personnel security file. CBP
personnel involved in security violations may be subject to U.S. Customs and
Border Protection, Table of Offenses and Penalties. Personnel involved in
security incidents may be subject to a re-examination of a granted security
clearance.
3.3.23. The Designated Security Officer (DSO) will assist in the implementation
and program management of the policies and procedures set forth in DHS
MD 11041, Protection of Classified National Security Information Program
Management.
3.3.24. Classified Contracts. CBP Offices entering into contractual agreements
involving classified information shall adhere to the CBP National Industrial
Security Program policy and procedures set forth in Chapter 12, CBP
Industrial Security Program.
3.3.25. Reporting Requirements. CBP offices are required to participate in the

following recurring reports to ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of the

CBP Information Security Program:
●● Standard Form (SF) 311, Agency Security Classification Management
Program Data Report, which reflects the status of an agency’s
classification management program. Each CBP office will submit a single
report reflecting the classification and declassification actions taken during
the preceding fiscal year. The Office of Internal Affairs will compile the
information into one single report for submission to the DHS Chief Security
Officer. The DHS Chief Security Officer will compile input from each DHS
component for submission to the Information Security Oversight Office
(ISSO). CBP Offices will submit report upon request by the Office of
Internal Affairs.
●● Lock Replacement Report. 32 CFR §§2001/2004, Section 2001.43,
Classified National Security Information (Directive No. 1); Final Rule,
requires the use of GSA approved equipment for the storage of classified
information. Further, locks used on equipment for the storage of classified
information must meet Federal Specification FF-L-2740-A. The referenced
directive allows agencies until October 1, 2012, to meet the referenced
standards.
3.3.26. CBP offices must develop a plan to replace equipment used for the storage
of classified information that does not meet the standards referenced above
and submit to the Office of Internal Affairs for review. CBP offices will submit a
status of their replacement plan to the Office of Internal Affairs by April 4 each
calendar year. The Office of Internal Affairs will compile into one single report
for submission to the DHS Chief Security Officer:
●● Cost Accounting Report. This report reflects the estimated cost expended
for the protection of classified information for the current fiscal year. CBP
offices will report any cost associated to the Office of Internal Affairs.
Reports will be submitted upon request and with specific instructions. The
Office of Internal Affairs will compile into one single report for submission
to the DHS Chief Security Officer. The DHS Chief Security Officer will
submit one agency report to the Information Security Oversight Office.
●● Security Violations and Infractions. The Office of Internal Affairs must
submit the total number of confirmed violations and infractions committed,
by category, occurring within CBP in the preceding calendar year, by
January 15 of each calendar year. The exceptions are incidents involving
Communication Security (COMSEC) and Special Compartmented
Information (SCI) which are reported through separate channels.
The purpose of the report is to provide DHS-wide trend analysis for
determining enhanced and focused educational and awareness needs.
3.3.27. Oversight and Compliance. The Office of Internal Affairs has overall
responsibility for the oversight and compliance with the standards set forth

in this handbook. As such, the Office of Internal Affairs will conduct periodic
program reviews of CBP offices that store and handle classified information to
assess compliance and provide guidance and assistance as necessary.
3.3.28. Self-Inspections. Each CBP office that creates stores or handles classified
information must participate in the Self Inspection Program (SIP). The Office
of Internal Affairs will evaluate results and ensure that deficiencies cited are
resolved appropriately.

4. Chapter 4: Security Classification

4.1. POLICY
4.1.1. The national interest requires that certain information be maintained in
confidence through a system of classification in order to protect our citizens,
our democratic institutions, and our participation within the community of
nations. The unauthorized disclosure of information classified in the national
interest can cause irreparable damage to the national security and potential
loss of human life. Security classification shall be applied only to protect the
national security and information may not be classified unless its disclosure
reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security.
Original classification decisions will be made in accordance with the guidance
provided in E.O. 12958, as amended, any applicable DHS directives including
MD 11044, and the provisions set forth in this chapter.
4.2. CBP SECURITY CLASSIFICATION MANAGEMENT
4.2.1. The integrity of Customs and Border Protection’s classification system is
dependent upon knowledge and judgment of CBP personnel involved in the
oversight and implementation of programs that may involve the production of
classified national security information.
4.2.2. The Office of Internal Affairs has program oversight of CBP’s Classification
Management process, polices and procedures set forth in this handbook,
however further program coordination with the Office of Intelligence and
Operations Coordination will occur accordingly.
4.2.3. CBP officials involved in the classification process shall comply with the
standards cited in this handbook and ensure integrity of the system is
maintained.
4.3. ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY (OCA)
4.3.1. An original classification authority (OCA) is written authorization to an official,
either by the President, by agency heads, or other officials delegated by the
President, to make an initial determination to classify information.
4.3.2. The Secretary of Homeland Security has been designated by the President
as an OCA with authority to classify eligible information up to and including
the Top Secret level. The Secretary can further delegate Top Secret original
classification authority to additional DHS officials pursuant to EO 12958, as
amended.
4.3.3. The DHS Chief Security Officer when designated by the Secretary as the
“Senior Agency Official” may delegate Secret and Confidential original
classification authority to additional DHS officials.
4.4. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION OCA POSITIONS
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
755 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

4.4.1. Customs and Border Protection officials who are delegated OCA by DHS will
be officially announced in the form of a DHS management directive. CBP
officials who have been delegated original classification authority cannot
further delegate this authority. However, if an appropriately cleared individual
is designated to act on behalf of a delegated OCA, that individual has the
authority to classify eligible information.
4.4.2. Persons delegated OCA at a specified level are also authorized to classify
information at a lower level.
4.4.3. CBP office heads may request OCA delegation where an operational need
exists. Request for OCA delegations shall be submitted to DHS Office of
Security through the Assistant Commissioner, Office of Internal Affairs using
the DHS Form 1401-1 “Request for Original Classification Authority.” OCA
delegation requests shall be based on justification of a demonstrated and
continuing need for such authority.
4.4.4. CBP Officials serving in OCA delegated positions:
●● Shall be trained on OCA responsibilities, methods, and procedures, within
sixty (60) days of occupying a delegated position. The Office of Internal
Affairs is responsible for providing this training.
●● Are encouraged to consult with the Office of Internal Affairs for assistance
when classifying information.
●● Shall communicate original decisions either through use of a classification
guide and/or through markings placed directly on the materials.
●● Shall ensure record systems are designed and maintained to optimize the
safeguarding of classified information, and to facilitate the declassification
of records under the provisions of Chapter 5, Declassification, and as
defined in EO 12958, as amended, when such information no longer
meets the standards for continued classification.
4.5. ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION PROCESS
4.5.1. Original classification is the initial determination that an item of information
requires protection against unauthorized disclosure in the interest of nation
security. Information may be originally classified under the terms of EO
12958, as amended if all of the following conditions are met.
●● An Original Classification Authority (OCA) classifies the information;
●● The information is owned by, produced by or for, or is under the control of
the U.S. Government; (for purposes of this handbook, “control” means the
authority of CBP to regulate access to the information.)
●● The information falls within one or more of the categories of information
listed in section 4.7 below as defined in EO 12958, as amended;
●● The OCA determines that the unauthorized disclosure of the information
reasonably could be expected to cause in damage to the national security
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
756 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

which includes defense against transnational terrorism and the OCA is

able to identify or describe the damage; and
●● The OCA assigns a classification level as defined in Section 4.6.
4.6. CLASSIFICATION LEVELS
4.6.1. National security information that requires protection against unauthorized
disclosure shall be classified by an original classification authority (OCA) at
one of the following three levels.
●● Top Secret shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of
which reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage
to the national security that the original classification authority is able to
identify or describe.
●● Secret shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of
which reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the
national security that the original classification authority is able to identify
or describe.
●● Confidential shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure
of which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national
security that the original classification authority is able to identify or
describe.
4.6.2. At the time of the decision, there is no requirement for the classifying authority
to prepare a written description of such damage; however, the classifying
authority must be able to support the decision in writing, including identifying
or describing the damage, should the classification decision become the
subject of a challenge or access demand.
4.6.3. Except as otherwise provided by statute, no other terms shall be used to
identify U.S. classified information e.g., “For Official Use Only,” “Sensitive But
Unclassified.”
4.6.4. “For Official Use Only” or “Sensitive But Unclassified” information shall not
be labeled with classified national security classification levels “Top Secret,”
“Secret,” or “Confidential.”
4.7. CLASSIFICATION CATEGORIES
4.7.1. Information considered for classification must fall into one or more of the
following categories (the numerical indicator preceding each category is the
category identifier cited in Section 1.4 of EO 12958, as amended.):
o 1.4 (a) military plans, weapons systems, or operations;
o 1.4 (b) foreign government information;
o 1.4 (c) intelligence activities, (including special activities), intelligence
sources or methods, or cryptology;
o 1.4 (d) foreign relations or foreign activities of the U.S., including

confidential sources;
o 1.4 (e) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national
security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism;
o 1.4 (f) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials
or facilities;
o 1.4 (g) vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations,
infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to
the national security, which includes defense against transnational
terrorism; or
o 1.4 (h) weapons of mass destruction.
4.8. DURATIONS OF CLASSIFICATION UNDER EO 12958
4.8.1. At the time of original classification under EO 12958, as amended, the OCA
will assign a date or event at which time the information will be downgraded
and/or declassified. At the time of classification, original classifiers shall:
●● Attempt to determine a specific date or event within ten years of the
date of origination, upon which the information can be automatically
declassified. If that is not possible, OCAs shall attempt to:
●● Assign a date ten years (10) from the date of origination at which the
information can be automatically declassified. Should the sensitivity of the
information warrant classification beyond a 10-year period, they shall:
4.8.2. Assign a date no longer than 25 years from the date of origination at which
the information will be automatically declassified, unless it is reclassified.
4.8.3. OCA cannot classify information beyond the 25 years unless such information
has been specifically approved for exemption from declassification pursuant
to EO 12958, as amended and Chapter 5, Declassification of this handbook.
The only exception to this rule is when disclosure of the information could
be expected to reveal the identity of a confidential human source or human
intelligence source. In this instance, the “Declassify On” line may be marked
25X-Human. This marking is not authorized for use when the information
pertains to non-human intelligence sources or intelligence methods.
4.9. COMMUNICATING ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION DECISIONS
4.9.1. Classification decisions will be communicated either through publication of
a security classification guide (see 4.10) or markings placed directly on the
materials by the authorized OCA.
4.10. CBP CLASSIFICATION GUIDES
4.10.1. Classification guides are a documentary form of classification issued by
an Original Classification Authority. The guide identifies the elements
of information regarding a specific subject that must be classified and
establishes the level and duration of classificaction for each element.

4.10.2. CBP offices and/or programs that develop classification guides will coordinate
the development of such guides with the CBP, Office of Internal Affairs, Office
of Intelligence and Operations Coordination, and DHS Office of Security.
●● CBP classification guides will be prepared consistent with the standard
DHS format. See EO 12958, Classified National Security Information, as
amended, and DHS MD 11041 Protection of Classified National Security
Information Program Management.
●● CBP classification guides must be coordinated through the DHS Office
of Security prior to the appropriate CBP delegated OCA signing the CBP
classification guides.
●● Final copies of CBP classification guides shall be submitted to the DHS
Office of Security for file in the central DHS-wide classification guide
repository.
4.10.3. Original classification authority is not required for individuals using
classification guides. CBP personnel who generate information that requires
classification based on the guide are authorized to “classify” the information
by citing the applicable item in the guide and applying the classification level.
This action is derivative classification from a classification guide.
4.11. CLASSIFICATION PROHIBITIONS
4.11.1. Information shall not be classified to:
●● Conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error;
●● Prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency;
●● Restrain competition; or
●● Prevent or delay the release of information that does not require protection
4.11.2. Classify basic scientific research information not clearly related to the national
security.
4.12. CLASSIFICATION BY COMPILATION
4.12.1. Compilations of items of information that are individually unclassified
may be classified in certain circumstances if the compilation reveals an
additional association or relationship that meets the standards and criteria
for classification under EO 12958, as amended; the additional association
or relationship is not otherwise evident or revealed in the individual items of
information; and the information is classified by an OCA. In this instance, the
additional association or relationship is what is considered for classification,
not the individual items of unclassified information. Careful consideration must
be taken when determining the need for classification by compilation. When
the determination is made that classification by compilation is necessary, the
OCA must provide explicit instructions as to what elements of the compilation
when combined, constitute classification and the addition association or

relationship that warrants the classification. CBP delegated OCAs, Office

of Intelligence and Operations Coordination and/or the Office of Internal
Affairs may provide assistance in making the determination of whether or not
information should be classified by compilation.
4.13. EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
4.13.1. When a CBP employee and/or contractor, develops information believed to
require classification, the individual shall safeguard and mark the information
in the manner prescribed according to its intended classification. Additionally,
the notation, “TENTATIVELY CLASSIFIED PENDING AN ORIGINAL
CLASSIFICATION DECISION” shall be prominently and conspicuously
marked on the bottom of each page.
●● A request for a classification decision will be submitted by a means
approved for the level of classification, to the appropriate delegated CBP
OCA. The OCA shall notify the sender of a classification determination
within 30 days of receiving the request.
●● When guidance is needed to determine the appropriate OCA with subject
matter interest, contact the Office of Internal Affairs.
4.14. RECLASSIFYING PREVIOUSLY DECLASSIFIED INFORMATION
4.14.1. Information may be reclassified after it has been declassified and released to
the public under proper authority. The following conditions will be met for CBP
information that falls within this chapter.
●● The Secretary of Homeland Security or Deputy Secretary personally
endorses, in writing, that the reclassification action is in the best interest of
national security and meets the standards and criteria for classification.
●● The released information may be reasonably recovered and brought back
under DHS control.
●● The reclassification action is reported within 30 days to the Director,
Information Security Oversight Office.
4.15. RECORDS FOR ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION ACTIONS
4.15.1. Persons performing original classification actions shall maintain a record of
each action taken. The records shall include the total number of documents
originally classified by classification level and by declassification date.
●● Records will be counted and reported by document not by page. For
example, a newly created original classified document consisting of
multiple pages and containing both SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL
information is counted and reported as one original classified document at
the SECRET level.
●● Records will be submitted annually to the Office of Internal Affairs. The
Office of Internal Affairs will submit one component report to the DHS

Office of Security as part of the annual reporting requirements defined

in EO 12958, as amended, Chapter 3.3.24 of this handbook, and DHS
reporting requirements policy, including MD 11044.
4.16. CLASSIFICATION CHALLENGES.
4.16.1. Authorized holders of classified information, who, in good faith, believe its
classification status is improper, are encouraged and expected to challenge
the classification status. Classification challenges shall be presented to the
classifier of the information. Where necessary, assistance and/or anonymity
in processing a classification challenge can be obtained by processing the
challenge through the DHS Office of Security.
4.17. INFORMAL CLASSIFICATION CHALLENGES.
4.17.1. Classification challenges do not prohibit an authorized holder from informally
questioning the classification of information through direct and informal
contact with the classifier. When appropriate or when uncertainties exist over
the classification status, holders of classified information are encouraged to
make direct contact with the classifier to obtain clarification. When a change
in classification results from an informal challenge, the challenger will ensure
the official from whom the change was received is authorized to make such
a change and a record of the change, to include the official’s name, position,
agency and date is maintained with a file copy of the document.
4.18. FORMAL CLASSIFICATION CHALLENGES
4.18.1. Formal challenges to classification shall be in writing and presented to an
OCA having jurisdiction over the challenged information. Every effort should
be made to keep the written correspondence unclassified. However, if the
challenge includes classified information it shall be marked and safeguarded
accordingly. The written correspondence shall sufficiently describe the
information being challenged and can consist of only questions as to why the
information is classified and why it is classified at a particular level.
●● Individuals submitting a classification challenge shall not be subject
to retribution of any kind for bringing such actions. Anonymity can be
requested by processing the challenge through the Office of Internal
Affairs or DHS Office of Security.
●● The OCA receiving the challenge shall provide a written response with a
classification/declassification decision to the challenger within sixty (60)
days of receipt.
●● The individual submitting the challenge has a right to appeal the decision
to the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel established by
EO 12958 §5.3, as amended. The Office of Internal Affairs will assist in
appeals as needed.
●● Challenged information remains classified and shall be protected at its

highest level of classification until a final classification determination is

made by an appropriate OCA.
4.19. DERIVATIVE CLASSIFICATION
4.19.1. Unlike original classification, derivative classification is incorporating,
paraphrasing, restating, reproducing or generating in new form, information
that is already classified, and marking the newly developed material
consistent with the classification markings that apply to the source
information. Derivative classification includes the classification of information
based on guidance provided in a security classification guide.
4.20. DERIVATIVE CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY
4.20.1. Delegated authority is not required to perform a derivative classification
action. Unless restricted by Assistant Commissioners, Directors and alike
of a CBP Office, any CBP employee with the appropriate level of security
clearance and the need to perform derivative classification as part of their
official government duties is authorized to do so.
4.21. DERIVATIVE CLASSIFICATION APPLICATIONS
4.21.1. Personnel performing derivative classification shall follow the guidance noted
below:
●● Respect and forward original classification markings cited on the source or
in a security classification guide into the newly created document.
●● Apply all applicable classification markings, declassification instructions,
and handling on the newly created material.
●● Attach a listing of classified source(s) to the official file or record copy.
4.21.2. Questions on the classification markings as they appear on the source or
in a security classification guide will be referred to the originator. Questions
can also be addressed to the Office of Internal Affairs or the Office of Internal
Affairs, Security Liaison and Representative, which will coordinate with the
originator.
4.22. RECORDS OF DERIVATIVE CLASSIFICATION ACTIONS
4.22.1. Personnel performing derivative classification actions shall maintain records
of each action taken. Records shall include the total number of documents
derivatively classified by classification level.
4.22.2. Records for classification actions will be counted and reported by
document-not by page. For example, a newly created derivatively classified
document consisting of multiple pages and containing both SECRET and
CONFIDENTIAL information is counted and reported as one derivatively
classified document at the SECRET level.
4.22.3. Records will be maintained by fiscal year and submitted annually to the Office

of Internal Affairs. The Office of Internal Affairs will submit one component
report to the DHS Office of Security as part of the annual reporting
requirements defined in EO 12958, as amended.
4.23. DERIVATIVE CLASSIFICATION SPECIALIZED TRAINING
4.23.1. Persons performing, or who plan to perform, derivative classification actions
should attend specialized training for the proper procedures and marking
of materials. The Office of Internal Affairs is responsible for providing such
training.

5. Chapter 5: Declassification
5.1. POLICY
5.1.1. Information that continues to meet the classification requirements of
Executive Order 12958, Classified National Security Information, requires
continued protection; all Customs and Border Protection information to
include legacy Customs and Immigration and Naturalization information shall
be declassified as soon as it no longer meets the standards for classification
under this executive order.
5.1.2. CBP personnel shall coordinate with the CBP Records Manager before
reviewing records in their holdings to ensure that appropriate procedures are
established for maintaining the integrity of the records and that the National
Archives and Records Administration (NARA) receives accurate information
about CBP declassification actions when records are transferred to NARA.
5.1.3. CBP senior officials who have reason to believe that the public interest in
disclosure of information outweighs the need for continued classification shall
refer the matter to the Office of Internal Affairs, who will further coordinate with
the appropriate original classification authority or DHS Senior Official.
5.1.4. None of the provisions cited in this directive apply to information classified in
accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Restricted Data
and Formerly Restricted Data).
5.2. DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY
5.2.1. Information may be declassified or downgraded by:
●● The Secretary of Homeland Security;
●● The DHS Cheif Security Officeer as defined in DHS MD 8100.3;
●● Officials who have been delegated Original Classification Authority, their
current successor in function, or a supervisory official of either;
●● Officials who have been delegated declassification authority, in writing by
the Secretary or DHS Senior Agency Official; and
●● CBP Declassification Authorities identified by appropriate delegation order.
5.2.2. CBP officials with declassification authority shall develop and issue
declassification guides to facilitate effective review and declassification of
CBP information (which includes legacy the U.S. Customs Service and the
Immigration and Naturalization Service information) not previously covered
by a classification or declassification guide, and for information exempt from
automatic declassification.
5.2.3. Declassification Authority is not required for simply canceling or changing
classification markings in accordance with declassification or downgrading
instructions cited on a document, directions found in a security classification

guide or declassification guide, or instructions received from an original

classification or declassification authority as defined below.
5.3. EXTENSION OF CLASSIFICATION
5.3.1. If an original classification authority with jurisdiction over the information does
not extend the classification of information that has been assigned a specific
date or event for declassification, the information is automatically declassified
upon the occurrence of the date or event.
5.3.2. If an original classification authority has assigned a date or event for
declassification that is less than 25 years from the date of classification,
an original classification authority with jurisdiction over the information may
extend the classification duration of such information for a period not to
exceed 25 years from the date of origination.
5.3.3. Decisions to extend classification must take into account the potential
difficulty of notifying holders of the extension; including the possible inability
to ensure continued, uniform protection of the information. Officials who make
a determination to extend a declassification date are responsible for notifying
holders of the information of the decision and providing a new date and
instructions for declassification.
5.3.4. For information in records determined to have permanent historical value,
successive extensions of classification may not exceed 25 years from the
date of the information’s origin.
5.4. EXEMPTION FROM DECLASSIFICATION (INFORMATION NOT
CONTAINED IN A FILE SERIES)
5.4.1. Circumstances may arise where the safeguarding of classified information
may be extended beyond the 25-year period and exempt from automatic
declassification. The following information may be exempt from automatic
declassification as defined below, if approved pursuant to 5.4.2.
●● Reveal the identity of a confidential human source, or a human intelligence
source, or reveal information about the application of an intelligence
source or method;
●● Reveal information that would assist in the development or use of
weapons of mass destruction;
●● Reveal information that would impair U.S. cryptologic systems or activities;
●● Reveal information that would impair the application of state of the art
technology within a U.S. weapon system;
●● Reveal actual U.S. military war plans that remain in effect;
●● Reveal information, including foreign government information, that would
seriously and demonstrably impair relations between the United States
and a foreign government, or seriously and demonstrably undermine

ongoing diplomatic activities of the United States;

●● Reveal information that would clearly demonstrably impair the current
ability of United States Government officials to protect the President, Vice
President, and other protectees from whom protection services, in the
interest of the national security, are authorized;
●● Reveal information that would seriously and demonstrably impair current
national security emergency preparedness plans or reveal current
vulnerabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, or projects relating
to the national security; or
●● Violate a statute, treaty, or international agreement.
5.4.2. For CBP information that falls within one or more of the categories in Chapter
5.4.1, exemption requests shall be endorsed by the CBP Commissioner and
submitted through the DHS Chief Security Officer to the DHS Secretary.
Exemptions endorsed by the Secretary will be submitted to the Information
Security Oversight Office for approval. Submissions shall be made no earlier
than five (5) years, and no later than 180 days, before the information is
scheduled for automatic declassification. Requests should have the following
information:
5.4.3. Description of the specific information to be exempted;
●● Explanation why the information must remain classified beyond the 25-
year period; and
●● Except for the identity of a confidential human source or human
intelligence source, a specific date or event upon which the information
will be declassified.
5.5. EXEMPTION FROM DECLASSIFICATION (INFORMATION
CONTAINED IN A SPECIFIC FILE SE-RIES)
●● Specific file series may be exempt from the 25-year automatic
declassification provisions of the EO 12958, as amended. Such exemption
requests shall be endorsed by the CBP Commissioner and submitted
through the DHS Chief Security Officer, to the DHS Secretary. The DHS
Secretary shall notify the President, through the Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs and the Information Security Oversight Office,
of any specific file series proposed for exemption from 25-year automatic
declassification. Submissions shall be made no earlier than 5 years, and
no later than 180 days, before the information is scheduled for automatic
declassification. In addition to the specific exemption cited above,
submissions shall include:
o Description of the file series;
o Explanation of why the information within the file series must remain
classified beyond a 25-year period; and

o Except for the identity of a confidential human source or human

intelligence source, a specific date or event upon which the information
will be declassified.
5.5.1. Information that falls within the file series in Section 5.4.4 shall not be subject
to automatic declassification unless the DHS Secretary specifically decides
to remove the series from the exempted category. Information exempted from
automatic declassification at 25 years remains subject to the mandatory and
systematic declassification review provisions of this handbook.
5.6. ONSET OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION
5.6.1. The following provisions shall apply to the onset of automatic declassification:
●● Classified records within an integral file block that are otherwise subject
to automatic declassification under this chapter, shall not be automatically
declassified until December 31 of the year that is 25 years from the date of
the most recent record within the file block.
●● If a CBP office purposes to exempt a specific file series of records
from automatic declassification, based on Section 5.4.2, the head of
the office shall submit the request for change to CBP Office of Internal
Affairs for an assessment. The Office of Internal Affairs will forward the
request to the DHS Office of Security and the Director of the Information
Security Oversight Office, before the records are subject to automatic
declassification. The Secretary or the DHS Chief Security Officer may
delay automatic declassification for up to five (5) additional years
for classified information contained in microforms, motion pictures,
audiotapes, videotapes, or comparable media that make a review.
●● If a CBP office purposes to exempt a specific file series of records
from automatic declassification, based on Section 5.4.2, the head of
the office shall submit the request for change to CBP Office of Internal
Affairs for an assessment. The Office of Internal Affairs will forward the
request to the DHS Office of Security and the Director of the Information
Security Oversight Office, before the records are subject to automatic
declassification. The Secretary or the DHS Chief Security Officer may
delay automatic declassification for up to three (3) years for classified
records that have been referred or transferred to DHS by another agency
less than three (3) years before automatic declassification would other
otherwise be required.
●● If a CBP office purposes to exempt a specific file series of records from
automatic declassification, based on Section 5.4.2, the head of the office
shall submit the request for change to CBP Office of Internal Affairs for
an assessment. The Office of Internal Affairs will forward the request to
the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office, the Secretary
or DHS Chief Security Officer may delay automatic declassification for
up to three (3) yeas from the date of discovery of classified records that
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
768 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

were inadvertently not reviewed prior to the effective date of automatic

declassification.
o Information contained in records not determined to be permanently
valuable, and not scheduled for disposal or retention by the National
Archives, is not subject to automatic declassification. CBP retention
and destruction requirements apply.
5.7. MANDATORY DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW
5.7.1. Any individual may request a review for declassification of information
classified under EO 12958, as amended, or it predecessor orders. Such
requests shall be sent to the Department of Homeland Security, Director,
Departmental Disclosure, Privacy Office, Washington D.C. 20528.
5.7.2. Information originated by the incumbent President; the incumbent President’s
White House Staff; committees, commissions, or boards appointed by the
incumbent President, or other entities within the Executive Office of the
President that solely advise and assist the incumbent President are exempt
from the provisions of this chapter.
5.7.3. Responsibilities
●● The Disclosure Office shall serve as the central processing point for all
mandatory review requests concerning DHS information. The Disclosure
Officer will promptly, but no later than thirty days from receipt, forward
mandatory review requests to the applicable DHS organizational
elements(s) having primary jurisdiction over the requested information.
The Disclosure Officer will provide the requester with an acknowledgment
of receipt of the request.
●● Customs and Border Protection shall promptly process any request
received. The CBP FOIA Office shall receive such requests and properly
coordinate with the Office of Internal Affairs. Information reviewed shall
be declassified if it no longer meets the standards for classification
established by Executive Order 12958, as amended, and this handbook.
Information that is declassified shall be released to the requester unless
withholding is appropriate under applicable law (for example, the Freedom
of Information Act or the Privacy Act of 1974).
5.7.4. Processing Mandatory Review Requests
●● The request must sufficiently describe the document or material with
enough specificity to allow it to be located by CBP personnel with a
reasonable amount of effort. When the description of the information in
the request is deficient, the FOIA Office shall solicit as much additional
identifying information as possible from the requester. If the information or
material requested cannot be obtained with a reasonable amount of effort,
the FOIA Office shall provide the requester, through the DHS Disclosure
Office, with written notification, of the reasons why no action will be taken

and of the requester’s right to appeal.

●● Requests for review of information that has been subjected to a
declassification review request within the preceding two years shall not be
processed. The DHS Disclosure Officer will notify the requester of such
denial.
●● Requests for information exempted from search or review under Sections
105C, 105D, or 701 or the National Security Act of 1947 (50 USC 403-5c,
403-5e, and 431), shall not be processed. The DHS Disclosure Officer will
notify the requester of such denial.
●● If documents or material being reviewed for declassification under this
chapter contain information that has been originally classified by another
government agency, the reviewing activity shall notify the Disclosure
Officer. Unless the association of that organization with the requested
information is itself classified, the DHS Disclosure Officer will then notify
the requester of the referral.
●● CBP may refuse to confirm or deny the existence, or non-existence, of
requested information when the fact of its existence, or non-existence,
iswarrants protection.
●● CBP shall make a final determination on requests received as soon as
practicable but within one year from receipt. When information cannot
be declassified in its entirety, CBP will make reasonable efforts to redact
those portions that still meet the standards for classification and release
those declassified portions of the requested information that constitute a
coherent segment.
●● The Office of Internal Affairs shall notify the DHS Disclosure Officer of
the determination made in the processing of a mandatory review request.
Such notification shall include the number of pages declassified in full;
the number of pages declassified in part; and the number of pages where
declassified was denied.
●● The DHS Disclosure Officer shall maintain a record of all mandatory
review actions for reporting in accordance with applicable federal
requirements.
5.7.5. Processing Appeals
●● The mandatory declassification review system shall provide for
administrative appeal in cases where the review results in the information
remaining classified. The requester shall be notified of the results of
the review and of the right to appeal the denial of declassification. To
address such appeals, the DHS Disclosure Office will convene a DHS
Classification Appeals Panel (DHS/CAP). The DHS/CAP will, at a
minimum, consist of representatives from the DHS Disclosure Office,
the DHS Office of Security, the DHS Office of General Counsel, and a
representative from CBP, if CBP information is involved.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
770 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

●● If the requester files an appeal through the DHS/CAP, and the appeal is
denied, the requester shall be notified of the right to appeal the denial to
the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP).
5.7.6. Foreign Government Information
●● The declassification agency is the agency that initially received or
classified the information. When foreign government information is being
considered for declassification or appears to be subject to automatic
declassification, the declassifying agency shall determine whether the
information is subject to a treaty or international agreement that would
prevent its declassification at that time. The declassifying agency or the
Department of State, as appropriate, should consult with the foreign
government prior to declassification.
5.7.7. Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act Requests
●● If a requester submits a request under both the mandatory declassification
review provisions cited in this handbook and the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA), 5 USC §552, the requester shall be advised to elect one
process or the other. If the requester fails to elect one or the other, the
request will be treated as a FOIA request.
5.7.8. Systematic Declassification Review
●● CBP shall conduct systematic declassification review for classified
information that is exempted from automatic declassification which:
o Contain information that has been identified to have significant value
for historical or scientific research or for promoting the public welfare;
and
o Have reasonable likelihood of being declassified upon review.
●● CBP personnel shall contact the Office of Internal Affairs for further
systematic declassification review guidance.

6. Chapter 6: Marking Classified Information

6.1. POLICY
6.1.1. A uniform security classification system requires that standard markings
be applied to classified information. At the time of original classification, all
national security information shall be marked in a manner appropriate to the
medium involved. This chapter sets forth the requirements described by the
Information Security Oversight Office Directive No. 1 and 32 CFR §2001, et
seq.
6.1.2. The DHS standard security classification guide template also prescribes the
markings that shall be uniformly and conspicuously applied to ensure the
classified status of the information, the level of protection required, and the
duration of the classification. See DHS MD 11041, Appendix 1 for further
information.
6.1.3. Overall Markings. Documents shall be marked with the highest classification
level (Top Secret, Secret or Confidential) of information contained in the
document. The marking shall be printed or stamped in bold letters at the top
and bottom of the outside front cover (if there is one), on the title page (if
there is one), on the first page, and on the outside back cover (if there is one).
6.1.4. Page Marking. Each interior page is typed or stamped at the top and bottom
according to the highest classification of the contents of the page, when
appropriate, or according to the overall classification of the document.
The three authorized classification designations (Top Secret, Secret
or Confidential) may be used in conjunction with approved Intelligence
Community compartmented information code words.
6.1.5. Portion Marking
●● Each subject line, title, paragraph, subparagraph, section (i.e.
classified diagram, map, drawing, etc.) or similar portion of a classified
document shall be marked to show the level of classification of that
portion or to indicate that it is unclassified. Classification of portions of
a document must be shown by placing the appropriate classification
symbol immediately before or after the portion. In marking portions, the
parenthetical symbols, “(TS)” for Top Secret, “(S)” for Secret, “(C)” for
Confidential, and “(U)” for Unclassified will be used.
●● The Director of the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) may
grant and revoke waivers of the foregoing portion marking requirement.
A request for such a waiver must be made through the Office of Internal
Affairs to DHS Office of Security. The written request must identify the
information or class of documents for which the waiver is sought and
a declaration that the circulation of the document and its potential as
a source for derivative classification determinations will be kept to a

minimum. The increased administrative burden of portion marking may not

be used as a sole justification for the waiver.
6.1.6. At the time of original classification the information shown in the example
below shall appear on the face of each classified document, or shall be
applied to other classified media in an appropriate manner.
6.1.7. One of the three classifications, Top Secret, Secret or Confidential as defined
in Chapter 4.6 of this handbook.
6.1.8. The identity, by name or personal identifier and position, of the original
classification authority and the agency and office of origin, if not otherwise
evident:
●● Example:
Classified By: Assistant Commissioner, Office of
Intelligence
U. S. Customs and Border Protection
Reason: 1.5 (g) Vulnerabilities or capabilities of
systems, installations, instructions

6.1.9. A concise reason for classification which, at a minimum, cites the applicable
classification category as defined in Chapter 4.6.
●● Example
Classified By: Commissioner,
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

●● When the reason for classification is not apparent from the content of the
information (e.g., classification by compilation) the classifier shall provide
a more detailed explanation of the reason for classification.
6.1.10. Declassification Instruction. Note: the X1 through X8 exemption categories
formerly used to exempt information from 10-year declassification can no
longer be used. The duration of the original classification decision shall
be placed on the “Declassify On” line. All classified materials shall have a
declassification date and/or instruction. One of the following instructions shall
apply:
●● A date or event for declassification less than 10 years, or if unable to
identify such a date or event;
–– A date 10 years from the date of the document for declassification;
–– A date greater than 10 and less than 25 years from the date of the

document; or
–– A date 25 years from the date of the document.
6.1.11. The following information may be exempt from automatic declassification as
defined below, if approved pursuant to 5.4.2.
●● Reveal the identity of a confidential human source, or a human intelligence
source, or reveal information about the application of an intelligence
source or method;
●● Reveal information that would assist in the development or use of
weapons of mass destruction;
●● Reveal information that would impair U.S. cryptologic systems or activities;
●● Reveal information that would impair the application of state of the art
technology within a U.S. weapon system;;
●● Reveal actual U.S. military war plans that remain in effect;
●● Reveal information, including foreign government information, that would
seriously and demonstrably impair relations between the United States
and a foreign government, or seriously and demonstrably undermine
ongoing diplomatic activities of the United States;
●● Reveal information that would clearly demonstrably impair the current
ability of United States Government officials to protect the President, Vice
President, and other protectees from whom protection services, in the
interest of the national security, are authorized;
●● Reveal information that would seriously and demonstrably impair current
national security emergency preparedness plans or reveal current
vulnerabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, or projects relating
to the national security; or
●● Violate a statute, treaty, or international agreement.
6.1.12. Derivative Classification Markings
6.1.13. The Information Security Oversight Office Directive No.1 “Marking Classified
Information Pamphlet” sets forth the uniform security classification system
for standard markings that are applied to classified information, original or
derivative.
6.1.14. The DHS Standard Security Classification Guide, also describes the markings
that shall be uniformly and conspicuously applied to classified information.

7. Chapter 7: Access and Dissemination of Classified

Information
7.1. POLICY
7.1.1. Federal employees are not automatically granted access to classified
information. An employee is eligible for access to classified information only
when the employee has been determined to be trustworthy by an appropriate
background investigation and access is essential to the accomplishment of
lawful and authorized government purposes.
7.1.2. As defined in the Personnel Security Handbook, HB 1400-07, CBP Form
6100 is used to request security clearances for CBP personnel.
7.1.3. Each head of CBP offices, supervisors, or program mangers, must ensure
that only authorized persons obtain access to classified information. No
employee has the right to gain access to classified information solely by virtue
of title, position, or level of security clearance. Before classified information
is disclosed, the holder must verify the recipients’ identification and security
clearance through the Office of Internal Affairs, Personnel Security Division
and/or CBP personnel, e.g., designated security liaisons and/or other liaisons
that have been authorized by the Office of Internal Affairs, Personnel Security
Division to verify personnel security clearances through CBP’s official security
clearance database.
7.1.4. CBP personnel who are granted security clearances shall receive such
notification from the Office of Internal Affairs, Personnel Security Division,
receive a briefing on the safeguarding and handling of classified information,
must sign the SF-312 Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement, and
the Foreign Contact Non-disclosure agreement. All forms must be submitted
to the Office of Internal Affairs, Personnel Security Division, prior to the formal
granting of a security clearance.
7.1.5. The Office of Internal Affairs, Director, Personnel Security Division, shall
suspend, cancel or revoke a security clearance when the security clearance
or access is no longer consistent with the interests of national security.
7.1.6. Upon termination of a security clearance, the holder shall receive a formal
security debriefing describing the continuing responsibility to protect the
national security information to which the individual had access. The
debriefing section of the SF-312 Nondisclosure Agreement shall be completed
upon the debriefing. The Office of Internal Affairs and/or the servicing
regional Security Officer may conduct the security debriefing. The debriefing
acknowledgment form shall be sent to the headquarters Office of Internal
Affairs, Personnel Security Division for file.
7.1.7. As defined in the National Industrial Security Manual, contractors and

consultants working in the federal government may not be given access

to classified material without the proper processing of a classified contract
and the execution of a DD-254. To obtain classified contract and DD-254
processing refer to the CBP National Industrial Security Chapter 12.2,
Processing Requirements. Section 7.3 provides the security clearance
verification process for CBP contractors/consultants.
7.1.8. Contractors and consultants may be granted access to classified material in
the custody of CBP after Section 7.1.7 is executed accordingly and the Office
of Internal Affairs, Personnel Security Division has verified the applicable
contractors hold the appropriate security clearance through Defense Security
Service (DSS).
7.1.9. As defined in the Personnel Security Handbook, HB 1400-07, all CBP
contractors and consultants are required to undergo a Background
Investigation (BI) to determine suitability for contractor employment. This
is not the same as receiving a security clearance for access to classified
information. CBP program offices that require contractors and/or consultants
to access classified information are required to be in compliance with Section
7.1.8 .
7.1.10. Classified information (in any form), to include extra copies, is not personal
property and may not be removed from the Government’s control by any
departing employee or contractor. Designated Security Officer, and other
designated security liaison appointments and/or positions shall ensure all
debriefed personnel have accounted for all classified information in their
possession and transferred it to an authorized custodian.
7.2. ACCESS AND DISSEMINATION RESTRICTIONS
7.2.1. Classified information may be discussed and disclosed under the following
conditions:
●● The recipient of the classified information has a current security clearance
at the appropriate level and the security clearance has been verified per
the Personnel Security Handbook, HB 1400-07.
●● The holder of the classified information has validated the recipient’s need-
to-know; and
●● discussion must be held in an appropriately cleared Federal Government
or contractor facilities to preclude unauthorized disclosure of classified
information.
●● The recipient has the means to protect the information in accordance to
EO 12958 and other applicable DHS, CBP policies, through retention,
storage or destruction.
7.3. CBP EMPLOYEE VISIT CERTIFICATION OF SECURITY
CLEARANCE

7.3.1. CBP employees who have a need to certify their security clearance
information to another government agency or contracting facility must initiate
the CBP Form 6101, Classified Visit Request Security Clearance Certification
as defined in the Personnel Security Handbook, HB 1400-07. Some agencies
or government facilities require the use of their own form for visits to their
facilities. The individual coordinating the security clearance certification
should verify the method acceptable to other agencies prior to the visit. For
policy regarding outside CBP employee visit certification of security clearance
refer to Section 7.6.10.
7.4. DISSEMINATION OF CBP CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.
7.4.1. Each CBP Office head, Director, or Program Manager is responsible for
providing specific procedures for dissemination of classified information
originated by his or her office. Procedures must include but not be limited
to the guidance cited in Section 7.2.1 and Sections 7.5-7.7.6.11 and must
otherwise be consistent with this Directive.
7.5. DISSEMINATION OF OTHER AGENCY INFORMATION
7.5.1. Also commonly known as the “Third Agency Rule.” Classified information
originated by another agency and furnished to DHS and DHS components
shall not be further distributed outside of DHS without the prior consent of the
originating agency. Unless limitations have been imposed by the originator,
this restriction does not apply to further distribution to authorized personnel
within DHS and components of DHS, or distribution to cleared contractors
who require the information in performance of a DHS contract.
7.6. DISSEMINATION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
7.6.1. Outside the Executive Branch
●● Classified information can be made available to persons outside the
Executive Branch provided that such information is necessary for
performance of a function for which the U.S. Government will derive
a benefit or advantage, and that such release is not prohibited by the
originating department or agency.
7.6.2. Judicial
●● The CBP Chief Counsel will be consulted whenever a litigation request
or demand is made upon CBP personnel for official CBP information
for testimony concerning such information. The personnel upon whom
the request or demand was made shall immediately notify the Office of
Chief Counsel or servicing regional Associate or Assistant Chief Counsel.
The CBP Office of Chief Counsel will consult with the DHS Office of the
General Counsel accordingly with all requests. Classified information
entered into the Judicial System shall be handled in accordance with the
Classified Information Procedures Act (PL 96-456). Justices of the U.S.

Supreme Court and Judges of the U.S. Courts of Appeals and District
Courts do not require an investigation and determination of eligibility for
access to classified information. All other members must be appropriately
investigated and granted a security clearance.
7.6.3. Congress
●● Access to classified information or material by Congress, its committee,
members, and staff representatives shall be coordinated with the CBP
Office of Congressional Affairs. The CBP Office of Congressional Affairs
will further coordinate with the DHS Office of Legislative Affairs. Any
CBP employee testifying before a Congressional committee in executive
session, in relation to a classified matter, shall obtain the assurance of
the committee that the individuals present have a security clearance
commensurate with the highest classification of information that may be
discussed. Members of Congress, by virtue of their elected positions, do
not require an investigation and determination of eligibility for access to
classified information. All other congressional staff members and other
associated officials must be appropriately investigated and granted a
security clearance.
7.6.4. State, Local, Tribal, and Private Sector Officials
●● State Governors, by virtue of their elected positions, do not require an
investigation and determination for eligibility for access to collateral
classified information. Other State, Local, Tribal and Private Sector
Officials must be appropriately investigated and granted a security
clearance by DHS or other Federal government agencies.
7.6.5. Foreign Nationals
●● U.S. Intelligence information and classified information may be shared
with foreign nationals only when consistent with U.S. national security and
foreign policy objectives and when an identifiable benefit can be expected
for the United States. For requirements of sharing of such information
with foreign nationals and security clearance verification, refer to the CBP
Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination who further coordinates
with the DHS Foreign Disclosure Office.
7.6.6. Representatives of the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
●● Representatives of the GAO may be granted access to classified
information when such information is relevant to the performance of
the statutory responsibilities of that office. Certifications of security
clearances, and the basis thereof, shall be accomplished pursuant to
arrangements between GAO and CBP Office of Internal Affairs.
7.6.7. Government Printing Office (GPO)
●● Documents and material of all classification may be processed by the
GPO, which protects the information in accordance with the guidelines

prescribed in the Executive Order, 12958, as amended, Classified National

Security Information.
7.6.8. Historical Researchers
●● Persons outside the Executive Branch who are engaged in historical
research projects may be authorized access to classified information
provided that a CBP Original Classification Authority (OCA), with
classification jurisdiction over the information, accomplishes the following:
o Makes a written determination that such access is clearly consistent
with the interests of National Security in view of the intended use of
the material to which access is granted, and certifies that the requester
has been found to be trustworthy based on such investigation as
determined by the DHS CSO.
o Limits such access to specific categories of information over which
CBP has classification jurisdiction, and to any other category of
information for which the researcher obtains the written consent of
a CBP or other DHS component OCA, or non-DHS Department or
Agency that has classification jurisdiction over information contained
in or revealed by the document, within the scope of the proposed
historical research.
o Maintains custody of the classified material at a DHS installation
or activity, or authorizes access to documents in the custody of the
National Archives and Records Administration.
o Obtains the researcher’s agreement to safeguard the information
and to submit any notes and manuscripts for review by CBP or non-
DHS departments or agencies with classification jurisdiction, for a
determination that no classified information is contained therein. This
information shall be included in a non-disclosure agreement, which
shall be executed by the researcher as a condition of access.
o Issues an authorization for access valid for not more than two years
from the date of issuance.
7.6.9. Former Presidential Appointees
●● Persons who previously occupied policy-making positions, to which the
President appointed them, may not remove classified information upon
departure from office. Such material must remain under the secure
control of the U.S. Government. Such persons may be authorized access
to classified information they originated, received, reviewed, signed, or
that was addressed to them while serving as such an appointee, upon
approval of the Secretary, Deputy Secretary or Chief Security Officer in
consultation with the Office of the General Counsel. The approving official
shall:
o Make a written determination that such access is clearly consistent

with the interest of national security in view of the intended use of the
material to which access is granted, and by certifying that the requester
has been determined to be trustworthy based on such investigation as
determined by the CSO.
o Limit access to specific categories of information over which DHS
has classification jurisdiction and to any other category of information
for which the former appointee obtains the written consent of a non-
DHS Department or Agency that has classification jurisdiction over
information contained in or revealed by documents within the scope of
the proposed access.
o Retain custody of the classified material at a DHS installation or
activity, or authorizes access to documents in the custody of the
National Archives and Records Administration.
o Obtain the former Presidential appointee’s agreement, through the
execution of a non-disclosure agreement, to safeguard the information
and to submit any notes and manuscripts for review by DHS or non-
DHS departments or agencies with classification jurisdiction for a
determination that no classified information is contained therein.
7.6.10. Security Clearance Certification CBP Visit Notification
●● For personnel visiting CBP facilities for meetings/projects where classified
information is shared, security clearance verification shall be submitted
from the Security Office of the parent organization to the Office of Internal
Affairs (IA), Personnel Security Division (PSD). CBP personnel shall not
disclose any classified information to visitors until notification from Internal
Affairs/ Personnel Security Division (IA/PSD) that security clearance has
been verified.
7.6.11. Emergency Release of Classified Information
●● In an emergency situation, in which there is an imminent threat to life
or defense of the homeland, the Secretary of Homeland Security has
delegated the authority to release such information in the custody of CBP
to the Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Under these
conditions the Commissioner shall follow the provisions of the Department
of Homeland Security Delegation of Emergency Authority to Disseminate
Classified Information, DHS Delegation No. 12001.

8. Chapter 8: Custody and Accountability

8.1. POLICY
8.1.1. Any person who has possession of, or is charged with responsibility for
classified information must protect and account for that information. The
following measures shall be applied to properly protect classified information:
●● While in use, classified information shall not be left unattended, unless
stored properly in accordance with this handbook.
●● Before granting access to classified material, all CBP personnel must
verify security clearance information per Chapter 7 of this handbook.
●● An office that receives classified information (in any form) and has no
authorized storage equipment available must either return the classified
information to the sender, arrange with another office to properly store the
information, or destroy it by an approved method as defined in Section
8.10.
●● Custodian of classified information must ensure that persons who do
not possess an appropriate security clearance and need-to-know do not
access classified information.
●● Classified information must be appropriately stored in a GSA-approved
security container at all times when not in use.
8.1.2. Classified information must be covered with the appropriate GSA Standard
Form (SF) cover sheet (SF-703, Top Secret; SF-704, Secret; or SF-705,
Confidential).
8.2. CUSTODY DURING EMERGENCIES
8.2.1. In the event of fire, natural disaster, civil disturbance, terrorist activities,
hostile action, or an evacuation of office space, classified information shall be
protected by placing it in a GSA-approved security container and/or safe or by
proper destruction.
8.2.2. Each program office shall prepare a general plan for the protection and
destruction of classified information in the event of an emergency, as detailed
in 8.2.1. Such plans should be forwarded to the Office of Internal Affairs
and/or the Designated Security Officer (DSO) for review and approval, as
appropriate.
●● The plan should include the priority of safeguarding and destruction,
persons responsible for the destruction, and the recommended place and
method of destruction.
●● The classified destruction plan shall be distributed to all cleared personnel
working with classified information. The DSO, and/or other designated
security liaison positions shall ensure that personnel are briefed on the

responsibilities of the plan.

8.3. ACCOUNTABILITY OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
8.3.1. In order to control and account for classified information, each CBP Office
where classified information is generated and received must designate either
a DSO and/or a CDC. CBP personnel who are designated in these positions
shall ensure that the movement of classified information can be traced,
dissemination is limited, prompt retrieval of information can be obtained, the
loss of information can be detected, and excessive holding and reproduction
are limited. However CBP personnel who serve in a security liaison position
are not personally accountable for other CBP personnel who handle classified
information.
8.4. ACCOUNTABILITY OF TOP SECRET INFORMATION
8.4.1. Each CBP office and/or program office that has requested and received
approval from the Office of Internal Affairs to store Top Secret information is
required to appoint an appropriately cleared CBP employee to serve as the
Top Secret Control Officer (TSCO).
●● Top Secret information within the National Capital Region will continue to
be stored within the Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF).
8.4.2. The TSCO appointment shall be made in writing, with a copy forwarded to the
Office of Internal Affairs.
8.4.3. The TSCO is responsible for receiving, disseminating, and maintaining control
and accountability of Top Secret information within their program office.
8.4.4. The TSCO is required to account for all Top Secret information using DHS
Form 11000-03, Document Control Register Top Secret National Security
Information.
●● Each Top Secret document will be assigned a Document Control Number
(DCN) and entered under the applicable Top Secret Control Account
(TSCA).
o The DCN will consist of the office identifier, or other coding information,
indicating the specific office possessing the document, the calendar
year, and a sequential number indicating the number of documents
generated/received within the calendar year.
o Information annotated on the DHS Form 11000-03 shall be
unclassified. If the title of the document is classified, then it is
recommended the DHS Form 11000-03 identify the document through
the Top Secret DCN.
●● When a Top Secret document is transmitted internal or external to CBP,
the TSCO will coordinate the transmission. A Classified Document Record
of Transmittal, DHS Form 11000-11.1, is required for the transmission.

o Each Top Secret document in the TSCA will have attached to it a Top
Secret Signature Record, DHS Form 11000-04. Each person having
access to the Top Secret information will sign and date the form
indicating they had access.
o The TSCO shall maintain a copy of the DHS Form 11000-11.1 and
DHS Form 11000-04.
o If a signed receipt is not received within 30 days, the TSCO shall follow
up with a second receipt or contact the recipient to determine the
status.
8.4.5. Reproduction of Top Secret information. Reproduction of Top Secret
Information will be coordinated with the TSCO.
●● The DHS Form 11000-03 shall reflect any additional copies of reproduced
Top Secret information.
8.4.6. Top Secret Information Annual Inventory. No later than December 31 of each
year, a hands-on inventory of Top Secret material maintained in a Top Secret
Control Account will be conducted. Inventory records will be maintained on file
and submitted to the Office of Internal Affairs no later than January 31 of each
year.
8.5. ACCOUNTABILITY OF SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMATION
8.5.1. Except as required by the originator or as specified for certain categories
of SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL information, there is no requirement to
maintain accountability records or inventories for SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL
information. However, Assistant Commissioners, Directors, and alike may
mandate the use of accountability records within their respective offices at
their discretion.
8.6. RECEIPTS FOR CLASSIFIED TRANSMISSION
8.6.1. When transport or transmission of classified information occurs external to a
program office, the custodian of the information is responsible for the proper
transmission in accordance with Chapter 10 of this handbook and obtaining
signed receipts as set forth below.
8.6.2. Transmission of Top Secret information requires a receipt, DHS Form 11000-
11.1 and coordination with the assigned Top Secret Control Officer as defined
in Section 8.4.4.
8.6.3. A receipt is required for the transmission of SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL
information internal or external to CBP.
8.6.4. Pending Receipts for Classified Transmission
●● Receipts of classified information shall be received in a timely manner.
The holder or Classified Document Custodian shall maintain a suspense

copy of all document receipts for classified material transferred external

to CBP. If a signed receipt is not received within 30 days, then a follow-
up receipt shall be mailed to the organization that received the mailed
document. If a signed receipt is still not received within two weeks, the
sender or Classified Document Custodian must contact the organization to
determine the status of the classified material.
8.7. CLASSIFIED MEETINGS AND CONFERENCES
8.7.1. Meetings and conferences that involve classified information present special
vulnerabilities to unauthorized disclosure. CBP Senior Managers shall limit:
●● In-house gatherings and other impromptu meetings. For in-house
gatherings and other impromptu meetings where classified information will
be discussed, it is incumbent upon the host or sponsor of the meeting to
ensure appropriate security measures are in place as defined below:
o The meeting is held in an area under the secure control of a U.S.
Government agency, or at an appropriately cleared U.S. contractor
facility.
o Ensure that all electronic equipment maintained in the room capable of
transmitting signals outside the room, is powered off and disconnected
from electrical outlets.
o Conduct a sound attenuation test to ensure normal conversational tone
from inside the room cannot be heard intelligibly from outside the room,
pay particular attention to vents, ducts, and other openings. If public
address or other amplification systems are used, conduct the test with
these systems on and off.
o Assign and post cleared host office personnel at exterior doors and
hallways to keep the room’s perimeter under surveillance and prevent
passers-by from stopping and listening.
o Limit the number of room entrances and access controls prior to or
during the meeting to prevent access by unauthorized persons.
o Control access to the room to prohibit those without proper
authorization and security clearance from attending. Use an attendee
roster if applicable, and have sufficient backup host office personnel
available, as needed.
o Ensure the security clearances of attendees are at least equal to
the level of classified information to be disclosed and verify security
clearance of participants in accordance with Chapter 7.3 of this
handbook and the CBP Personnel Security Handbook, HB 1400-07.
o Verify the identity of each participant via U.S. Government photo
identification or similar documentation.
o When notifying personnel or presenters of a classified meeting, inform
them of the highest level of classified information to be presented/
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
786 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

discussed and when multiple presentations are given, the specific

classification (or unclassified status) of each presentation.
o Announcements of classified meetings shall be unclassified and shall
not describe the specific classified subjects that are to be presented.
o Ensure security protection for the room is maintained during breaks.
o Comply with all security safeguards for classified information.
o At the conclusion of the meeting, conduct an inspection of the room to
ensure no classified materials have been left behind.
8.7.2. The dissemination of classified information to large audiences increases
security risks and may involve substantial costs to provide adequate security.
The number of meetings involving the dissemination of classified information
must be limited; and those that are conducted shall only be authorized when
the head of each office, determines in writing the:
(a) Conduct of the classified conference serves a specific U.S. Government
purpose.

(b) The use of other prescribed channels for dissemination of classified

information does not accomplish the purpose.

(c) The location selected for the meeting is under the secure control of a
U.S. Gov-ernment Agency or a U.S. contractor having an appropriate facility
clearance.

(d) Adequate security procedures have been developed and can be

implemented as defined in Section 8.7.1.

(e) Classified sessions shall be held only at a U.S. Government facility or

a U.S. con-tractor facility where adequate physical security and procedural
controls have been approved in accordance with the Physical Security
Handbook.

(f) A physical security assessment of the selected facility and/or a Technical

Surveil-lance Countermeasure (TSCM) survey may be conducted if deemed
necessary by the Office of Internal Affairs.

8.8. REPRODUCTION OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL

8.8.1. Documents and other materials containing classified information shall
be reproduced only when necessary to accomplish the mission of the
organization or for compliance with applicable statutes or directives and
shall be kept to a minimum. This section outlines the security precautions
necessary to protect classified information from possible compromise as a
result of copier use. New technology available for copiers increases security
vulnerabilities. Security measures must be in place to prevent: unauthorized

individuals from gaining access to copies of classified information, the misuse

of copiers by authorized personnel, and information retention through latent
or residual images on the machines or electronic memory is prevented. At a
minimum, the copier security requirements below must be in place before any
reproduction of classified information.
8.8.2. Copiers within Customs and Border Protection must first be designated and
“approved” before being used for the reproduction of classified information.
The Office of Internal Affairs, coordinating with the Office of Information
Technology or the servicing Information Systems Security Officer, is
designated as the approval authority. Determination of approved copiers must
be based upon the following:
●● Machines with unacceptable risks, such as machines that are connected
to an unclassified LAN, equipped with remote diagnostics, equipped
with an internal memory, or in some other way retain images, will not be
approved for classified reproduction.
●● Physical location of the copier. Approved machines must be located in
locked or secured areas to deny access to unauthorized users. If no
locked or secure area is available, the copier shall be located away from
high traffic areas where unauthorized persons are situated. The location
must allow continuous monitoring of the copier by office personnel during
work hours.
8.8.3. After designation of a copier as “approved” it will be affixed with a GSA
Standard Form (SF) label (SF-707, Top Secret; SF-708, Secret; or SF-709,
Confidential) indicating the classification level it is approved to copy. Copiers
not approved for classified information will have SF-710, Unclassified label
applied to serve as a reminder to users not to copy classified information on
this machine. Additionally, the Office of Internal Affairs, or DSO will issue a
classified copier equipment approval letter which will be posted next to the
copier. The letter at a minimum will identify: the machine(s) that is approved,
the classification level that it is approved to copy, the location of the copier
and the point of contact in the office. The point of contact will be required to
coordinate with the Office of Internal Affairs or DSO when potential problems
arise, or when there are incidents of possible compromise.
●● Copies of the letters must be sent to the Office of Internal Affairs,
headquarters for filing.
8.8.4. Accountability of Classified Information. Records must be maintained to show
the accountability of certain classified information.
●● The reproduction of Top Secret must be coordinated with the TSCO and
accounted for in accordance with the procedures defined above in 8.4.4.
●● Unless otherwise restricted by special dissemination or reproduction
limitations, Secret and Confidential document reproduction accountability
logs are not required but recommended.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
788 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

8.8.5. Copier Security Procedures. The following are procedures for reproducing
classified information.
●● Reproduction of classified information is done on an approved copier
machine. Refer to Section 8.8.2.
●● Cleared individuals (security clearance) will remain at the copier until
classified reproduction is complete.
●● Before leaving the copier, cleared individuals must check the copier for
any copies or originals that may be left in or around the copier.
8.8.6. Additional copies not needed or rejected copies must be destroyed in
accordance with the procedures in Section 8.10.
●● If the copier malfunctions and the copy or original cannot be retrieved, the
Office of Internal Affairs and/or the DSO shall be notified to ensure that
the copier is removed from approved service until the certification of the
malfunction has been properly cleared.
●● Scheduled Maintenance. The Office of Internal Affairs and/or DSO shall
be notified prior to a scheduled service visit and arrange for a cleared
individual to be present. Any documents, image retaining drum sheets,
or memory chips removed from the machine must be collected by a
cleared individual and submitted to the Office of Internal Affairs or DSO.
No maintenance person shall be allowed to service any reproduction
equipment used for the reproduction of classified materials without a
cleared escort.
8.9. ANNUAL INVENTORY OF CLASSIFIED HOLDINGS
8.9.1. CBP offices maintaining classified information must conduct an annual
inventory and review their classified holdings to reduce the amount necessary
for operational and program purposes. All classified documents shall be
reviewed upon initial receipt and during the annual inventory. The inventory
shall include a review to determine possible downgrade, declassification or
destruction of classified holdings. For documents that meet the requirements
for downgrading or declassifying, refer to Chapter 5, Declassification, of this
handbook. Documents which are no longer required for operational purposes
must be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Records
Act and CBP records retention policy. For classified information that meets
the requirements for destruction, refer to Section 8.10.
8.10. DESTRUCTION OF CLASSIFIED MATERIALS
8.10.1. When no longer needed as identified in Section 8.9.1, classified information
shall be destroyed completely to preclude recognition or reconstruction of
the classified information. Methods and equipment approved for destroying
classified information include burning, cross-cut shredding, wet-pulping,
mutilation, chemical decomposition or pulverizing. The most common

method for Customs and Border Protection offices is destroying through

use of a cross-cut shredder, see Sections 8.10.2 and 8.10.3. The use of
strip-cut shredders, or other types of shredders not approved by NSA, as
well as tearing into small pieces, or cutting up, are not acceptable means for
destroying classified information.
8.10.2. Only National Security Administration (NSA) approved cross-cut shredders
that produces a residue particle size that does not exceed 1/32-inch in width
by ½-inch in length will be used for the destruction of all classified information.
8.10.3. Where maintenance is performed on such machines that involves rebuilding
the shredder blade assembly, or where new shredders are purchased for
the destruction of classified information, the replacement or new purchase
must comply with CNSS Policy No. 16, National Policy for the Destruction
of COMSEC Paper Material, and be equipment listed on the NSA Evaluated
Products List (EPL) of High Security Cross-Cut Shredders. A copy of the EPL
can be obtained from the Office of Internal Affairs and/or the DSO.
8.10.4. Technical guidance concerning appropriate methods, equipment, and
standards for the destruction of classified electronic media may be obtained
from the Office of Internal Affairs.
8.11. END-OF-DAY SECURITY CHECKS
8.11.1. Each CBP office that receives, stores and/or processes classified information
shall establish a system of security checks at the close of each working day
to ensure that all classified information has been returned to the appropriate
GSA-approved security container and is properly secured. Each office is
also required to visibly display the Standard Form (SF) 701 Security Activity
Checklist to ensure:
●● All desk and counter tops are free of classified information and secured
properly;
●● All COMSEC material is secured; and
●● All SF-702 Security Container Check Sheet information has been noted
accordingly.

9. Chapter 9: Storage of Classified Information

9.1. POLICY
9.1.1. Classified national security information will be afforded a level of protection
against unauthorized access and disclosure that is commensurate with its
level of classification. When classified information is not under the personal
control and observation of a cleared person, it must be guarded by personnel
with the appropriate security clearance or stored in a locked General Services
Administration (GSA) approved security container. Any person(s) having
access to and possession of classified information is responsible for meeting
the accountability and storage requirements prescribed in this handbook.
9.1.2. Classified information shall be secured under conditions adequate to
prevent access by unauthorized persons. The requirements specified in this
handbook represent the minimal acceptable security standards. Weapons,
sensitive or valuable items such as funds, jewels, precious metals, or
seized items, such as drugs, shall not be stored in the same container used
to safeguard classified information. Security requirements for Sensitive
Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs) are established by the Director
of Central Intelligence through the Director of Central Intelligence Directives
(DCIDs) or Intelligence Community Directives (ICDs). Current holdings of
classified material shall be reduced to the minimum required for mission
accomplishment. For more information regarding SCIFs at U.S. Customs
and Border Protection (CBP), refer to the CBP Office of Intelligence and
Operations Coordination (OIOC).
9.2. STANDARDS FOR STORAGE EQUIPMENT
9.2.1. GSA establishes and publishes minimum standards, specifications, and
supply schedules for security containers, vault doors, modular vaults, alarm
systems, and associated security devices suitable for the storage and
protection of classified information.
9.3. NEW PURCHASES
9.3.1. New purchases of GSA approved security containers or combination locks
for GSA approved security containers, vaults, doors, and secure rooms shall
conform to Federal Specification FF-L-2740A. Existing non-FF-L-2740A
mechanical combination locks will not be repaired. If they should fail, they will
be replaced with locks meeting FF-L-2740A standards.
9.4. MAINTENANCE
9.4.1. Maintenance performed on GSA-approved security containers must be in
accordance with Federal Standard 809A, Neutralization and Repair of GSA-
Approved Containers. When repairs to a GSA-approved security container
affect its original integrity, the GSA-approved label shall be removed and the

container will no longer be authorized for the storage of classified information.

For maintenance or repair issues for security containers, contact the Office of
Internal Affairs and/or the designated security office.
9.5. TOP SECRET INFORMATION STORAGE
9.5.1. Before CBP Offices are allowed the storage of Top Secret information or
materials within their facilities, a written request must be forwarded to the
Office of Internal Affairs, Security Management Division for review and
approval. Approvals and denials will be made based on the review of physical
security measures and proposed supplemental controls.
9.5.2. Top Secret Information shall be stored in a GSA-approved security container.
One or more of the following supplemental controls must also be in place:
●● The location that houses the security container is subject to continuous
protection by cleared guard or duty personnel;
●● Cleared guard or duty personnel shall inspect the security container once
every two hours;
●● An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is in place with cleared personnel
arriving within 15 minutes of the alarm annunciation;
●● A Security-In-Depth system, as determined by the CBP Physical Security
Handbook Appendix 8.9, Intrusion Detection Systems, when the GSA-
approved container is equipped with a lock meeting Federal Specification
FF-L-2740A; or
●● A modular vault or a secure room constructed in accordance with the
CBP Physical Security Handbook and equipped with an IDS, with cleared
personnel responding within 15 minutes of the alarm annunciation if the
area is covered by Security-In-Depth, or a 5-minute alarm response time if
it is not.
9.5.3. Storage of Top Secret information in the National Capital Region will continue
to be stored in the SCIF.
9.6. SECRET INFORMATION STORAGE
9.6.1. Secret Information shall be stored by one of the following methods:
●● In the same manner as prescribed for Top Secret Information;
●● In a GSA-approved security container or vault without supplemental
controls; or
●● In a non-GSA-approved container having a built-in combination lock or in
a non-GSA-approved container secured with a rigid metal lock bar and a
GSA-approved padlock (policy valid until October 1, 2012). When stored in
a non-GSA approved container, one or more of the following supplemental
controls must be in place:
o The location that houses the security container must be subject to

continuous protection by cleared guard or duty personnel;

o Cleared guard or personnel shall inspect the security container once
every four hours; or
o An Intrusion Detection System (IDS), approved by the Office of Internal
Affairs, with a thirty-minute response time to the alarm location.
9.7. CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION STORAGE
9.7.1. Confidential information shall be stored in the same manner as prescribed for
Top Secret or Secret, without the supplemental controls.
9.8. OPEN STORAGE
9.8.1. Approval of open storage will be considered when the volume of material
or operational necessity of the mission dictates. Only the Office of Internal
Affairs, Security Management Division cant authorize approvals; refer to DHS
MD 11046 Open Storage Area Standards for Collateral Classified Information,
and the Physical Security chapter of this handbook.
9.8.2. Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) shall only be stored in
accordance with specifications and requirements of the Director, Central
Intelligence Agency. The Department Homeland Security (DHS), Special
Security Programs has oversight in accrediting DHS facilities for the storage
of SCI.
9.8.3. The Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination (OIOC) is the only
CBP office authorized to receive and store SCI within CBP. Any requests for
additional facilities for the storage of SCI must be approved by the Assistant
Commissioner of OIOC. OIOC further coordinates with DHS for SCI facility
accreditations.
9.8.4. For the storage requirements for sensitive but unclassified information e.g.,
“For Official Use Only”/“Law Enforcement Sensitive,” refer to Chapter 13,
Safeguarding Sensitive But Unclassified Information..
9.9. IDENTIFICATION OF SECURITY CONTAINERS
9.9.1. There shall be no external mark revealing the level of classified information
stored in a security container.
9.9.2. Each security container must be marked accountability and ready
identification. This can be accomplished in a variety of ways, including use of
the existing property control number.
9.9.3. An internal or local system shall be established by which each security
container in use (other than vaults/secure areas) can be easily identified by a
consecutive number, without regard to physical location of the container.
9.9.4. Identification numbers will be fixed to the container where it will be
conspicuously visible.

9.10. PROTECTING CLASSIFIED COMBINATIONS USING

STANDARD FORM (SF) 700
9.10.1. Combinations to security containers, vaults or other areas approved for
storage must be recorded on the SF-700, Security Container Information. The
SF 700 must be completed accurately and reflect all pertinent information
such as container’s location, description/type, personnel with access to the
combination, etc..
9.10.2. Knowledge of combinations shall be limited to the minimum number of
persons necessary for operating purposes.
●● Combinations shall not be recorded on calendars, rolodex, in desk
drawers, in key-locked cabinets, in wallets, stored at home, etc.
Combinations to security container storing classified information that are
recorded on anything other than the required SF 700, Part 2A, will be
considered a security violation.
9.10.3. When completed, the SF 700 shall be separated into its three parts;
●● Part 1 shall be affixed to the inside of the security container, closest to the
lock and visible when the container is open.
●● Part 2A, containing the written combination, will be sealed inside part 2.
●● Part 2, shall be stored in a separate security container as listed below;
o CBP Headquarters and facilities located within the National Capital
Region shall forward the SF-700, Part 2 to the CBP Office of Internal
Affairs, Security Management Division headquarters,
o CBP field offices shall forward the SF-700, Part 2 to the Director of
the appropriate Office, Sector Headquarters, and/or sector or regional
offices.
9.10.4. An SF 700 containing the combination of a container, vault, or secure room
used for storage of classified information or material shall be afforded
protection equal to that given to the highest level of classified information
stored in the container. Therefore, the standards cited in this handbook and
the requirements identified in DHS MD 11047 shall be strictly enforced for the
transmission of those SF 700s.
9.10.5. An SF 700 must be completed for each lock, especially containers that have
multiple locks and marked with the highest classification level that the security
container is approved to store.
9.11. ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED COMBINATIONS
9.11.1. Only appropriately cleared and authorized employees shall have access to
classified combinations. The number of employees with access shall be kept

to a minimum. Contact information shall be annotated on the SF 700 in case

the container is ever found open and unattended.
9.12. CHANGING COMBINATIONS
9.12.1. Combinations to security containers shall be changed by the Office of Internal
Affairs or by appropriately cleared government personnel.
9.12.2. Combinations shall be changed:
●● When first placed in to use;
●● Whenever an individual knowing the combination no longer requires
access to it, unless other sufficient controls exist to prevent access to the
lock;
●● When the combination has been subject to actual or possible compromise;
●● Every two years, if none of the above has occurred.
●● When taken out of service, built-in combination locks shall be reset to the
standard combination 50-25-50 and combination padlocks shall be reset
to the standard combination 10-20-30.
9.13. SECURITY CONTAINER CHECK SHEET
9.13.1. A SF 702, Security Container Check Sheet, shall be placed on the exterior of
each security container to record every time the container is opened, closed,
and double-checked. Each opening and closing shall be recorded using the
initials of the individual conducting the action and the time of the opening
or closing. The “Checked By” column will be used every day that the office
is occupied to conduct work. This is done to ensure that an individual who
failed to complete the “Opened By” and “Closed By” blocks did not leave the
security container open accidentally. The “Guard Check” column is optional.
The individual who conducts the end-of-day double-check of the container
must ensure that the container is properly locked and secured by pulling on
the handles of the drawers and then spinning the combination dial at least
four rotations in the same direction. Although it is not always possible, the
person conducting the end-of-day double-check of the security containers
should not be the same person who opened and closed the security container
during the duty day. This procedure provides an additional security measure
to ensure that classified information in the office is protected. Supervisors are
responsible for establishing procedures to ensure that the requirements in this
chapter are met.
9.14. OPEN-CLOSED SIGNS
9.14.1. Reversible OPEN-CLOSED (or OPEN-SECURED) signs should be used on
all classified security containers each time they are locked or unlocked as a
visual reminder.
9.15. SECURITY CONTAINERS TAKEN OUT OF SERVICE.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
795 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

9.15.1. Security containers no longer used for the storage of classified information
may be transferred to other areas where they are needed or stored as
surplus. Prior to removing any container, the container shall be thoroughly
searched to ensure all classified information has been removed. Areas to be
searched include: between, behind and beneath the container and behind,
under, and on the sides of all drawers. The person who conducts the search
must declare the container empty by placing a written statement on the
outside front of the container indicating the date of the inspection, the person
who conducted the inspection, and the office that last used the container. In
addition, prior to removing any security container with a built-in combination
dial, the combination shall be reset to the standard combination of 50-25-50.
The written statement on the outside of the container shall identify that the
combination has been reset. The security contact must remove and destroy
Part 1 of the SF-700 located inside the control drawer. No security container
shall be relocated or taken out of service without first notifying the Office of
Internal Affairs (IA) and/or the DSO.

10. Chapter 10: Transmission and Transportation

10.1. POLICY
10.1.1. Classified information shall be transmitted and received pursuant to the
standards cited in this handbook and in a manner that ensures tampering
can be detected, inadvertent access is precluded, and timely delivery to the
intended recipient is assured. Persons transmitting classified information are
responsible for ensuring that intended recipients are authorized to receive the
information, aware of the transmission, and have the capability to properly
safeguard it. Under no circumstances will classified information be transmitted
by any means other than the approved methods described in this handbook.
10.1.2. Requests to waive requirements cited in this handbook will be submitted in
writing through the Office of Internal Affairs to the DHS Chief Security Officer.
Waiver requests must include sufficient justification to support the request
and identify compensatory measures that will be implemented to mitigate
deficiencies.
10.2. METHODS OF TRANSMISSION OR TRANSPORTATION.
10.2.1. Top Secret information shall be transmitted by:
●● Direct contact between appropriately cleared persons.
●● Secure telephone equipment (STE) or Secure Fax keyed to the Top Secret
level.
●● Defense Courier Service (DCS) or other authorized government agency
courier service.
●● Department of State Courier System (also known as a diplomatic pouch).
●● Electronic means over NSA-approved cryptographic communications
system(s).
10.2.2. Secret and Confidential information shall be transmitted by any of the
following means:
●● Any of the methods approved for transmitting Top Secret.
●● U.S. Postal Service Registered Mail.
●● U.S. Postal Service Express Mail. When using U.S. Postal Service
Express Mail, the Waiver of Signature and Indemnity block (Item 11-B),
on the U.S. Postal Service Express Mail Label shall not be executed.
Additionally, street-side collection boxes shall not be used.
●● Commercial carriers or cleared commercial messenger services cleared
for such purpose under the National Industrial Security Program
(NISPOM).
●● On an exceptional basis and when an urgent requirement exists for
overnight delivery within the U.S. and its territories, the current holders of
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
797 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

the General Services Administration (GSA) contract for overnight delivery

of information for the Executive Branch may be used. The list of current
holders of the GSA contract will be updated and published periodically
by DHS Office of Security. Use of these services is under exceptional
circumstances only and shall not be used for routine transmission of
classified information. When using these services, the following conditions
apply:
o Classified Communications Security (COMSEC) Information/
Equipment, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and Foreign
Government Information shall not be transmitted in this manner.
o The use of street-side collection boxes is prohibited.
o Carrier personnel shall not be notified that the package contains
classified information.
o Material shall be packaged for transmission as cited in this handbook.
o The outer address label may contain the personal name of the
intended recipient.
o The release signature block on the receipt label shall not be executed.
o The sender is responsible for verifying the proper mailing address and
ensuring that an authorized person will be available to accept delivery.
o Packages should be shipped only on Monday through Thursday and
not on the eve of a federal holiday unless prior arrangements have
been made to ensure a cleared person will be available to accept
delivery.
10.2.3. Under no circumstances will Top Secret information be transmitted via the
U.S. Postal Service or any other uncleared commercial delivery service.
When it is necessary to transmit Top Secret material, the Top Secret
Control Officer (TSCO) shall ensure that the methods and procedures used
comply with the requirements of this handbook. Questions concerning
the transmission of Top Secret information, which are not covered in this
handbook, shall be referred to the Special Security Officer (SSO) for the
National Capital Region. For CBP offices located outside the NCR, contact
the Office of Internal Affairs or designated security liaisons.
10.2.4. Transmitting classified information to a U.S. Government facility located
outside of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
Islands, Guam, and any other territory or possession of the United States,
shall be by methods commensurate with the level of classified information
being transmitted. U.S. Registered Mail through Military Postal Service
facilities may be used to transmit Secret and Confidential information provided
that the information does not at any time pass out of the control of a U.S.
citizen and does not pass through a foreign postal system.

10.2.5. Transmission of classified information to foreign governments will be

approved in accordance with CBP and DHS foreign disclosure policies and
procedures.
10.3. SHIPMENT OF FREIGHT
10.3.1. Transmitting bulk classified material will be performed by qualified, cleared
carriers that are authorized to transport material via a Protective Security
Service (PSS) under the Department of Defense Industrial Security Program.
This may be done only within the United States when the size, bulk weight,
and nature of the shipment make other methods impractical.
10.3.2. Observation is not required while the shipment is stored in an aircraft or
ship in connection with air or sea transport provided the shipment is in a
compartment that is not accessible to unauthorized persons or is loaded
in specialized shipping containers, including closed cargo containers.
The container or compartment must be sealed to prevent access without
detection.
10.3.3. Cleared operators, officers of ships or pilots of aircraft who are U.S. citizens
may be designated as escorts if control and surveillance of the cargo is
maintained 24 hours a day. The escort shall protect the shipment at all times
through personal observation, placing the shipment in protected storage
or other measures designed to prevent inspection, tampering, pilferage or
unauthorized access.
10.3.4. All additional control notices imposed by an Original Classification Authority
must be honored when transmitting & transporting classified national security
information.
10.4. PREPARATION OF MATERIAL FOR TRANSMISSION.
10.4.1. Envelopes or Containers. All classified information physically transmitted
outside CBP facilities shall be enclosed in two layers, both of which conceal
the contents, prevent inadvertent opening, and would provide reasonable
evidence of tampering. When envelopes are used, they shall be sealed with
reinforced tape.
●● The inner enclosure shall clearly identify the name of the intended
recipient, the address of both the sender and the recipient, the highest
classification level of the contents, and any appropriate warning notices.
●● The outer enclosure shall clearly identify the office of the recipient
(personal names shall not be used), and the address of both the sender
and the recipient. There will be no markings on the outside envelope
to indicate that the contents are classified. Intended recipients shall be
identified by name only on the inner envelope. The following exceptions
apply:
o If the classified information is an internal component of a packable item

of equipment, the outside shell or body may be considered as the inner

enclosure provided it does not reveal classified information;
o If the classified information is an item of equipment that is not
reasonably packable and the shell or body is classified, it shall be
concealed with an opaque enclosure that will hide all classified
features;
o Specialized shipping containers, including closed cargo transporters or
diplomatic pouch, may be considered the outer enclosure when used;
and
o When classified information is hand-carried outside a facility, a locked
briefcase or similar locking container may serve as the outer enclosure.
10.4.2. The Office of Internal Affairs may approve the use of specialized shipping
containers that are secured with high security padlocks and equipped with
an electronic seal that would provide evidence of surreptitious entry is of
sufficient construction to provide evidence of forced entry, and are handled
by the carrier to ensure that the container is protected until its delivery is
completed.
10.5. ESCORT OR HAND-CARRYING OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL.
10.5.1. Courier authorizations shall be issued to individuals who must hand-carry
classified information outside of, and beyond the perimeter of a building or
compound, and will be processed through and approved by the Office of
Internal Affairs. Requests for courier authorization will be submitted to the
Office of Internal Affairs, Security Management Division on DHS Form 11000-
2, Courier Authorization Request. The individual’s security clearance level
must be equal to or exceed the level of material being carried. Designated
couriers are required to review the DHS Guidance for Classified Couriers
briefing pamphlet and must sign and return an acknowledgement receipt.
●● A one-time courier letter shall be issued when the designated courier is
required to hand-carry classified information on an infrequent basis within
the local commuting area. Such letters shall have an expiration date not to
exceed 30 days from the date of issue.
●● A permanent courier card shall be issued when the designated courier is
required to frequently and routinely handcarry classified information within
the local commuting area. Such cards shall have an expiration date not
to exceed two (2) years from the date of issue. The DHS Form 11000-01,
Classified National Security Information Courier Card, may be used for this
purpose.
10.6. COURIER TRAVEL BY COMMERCIAL AIR
10.6.1. Transporting classified material aboard commercial aircraft is discouraged,
but will only be approved by the Office of Internal Affairs, in instances of great
urgency, and only when the material cannot be transmitted by other means.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
800 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

10.6.2. The request, with justification, will be submitted to the Office of Internal Affairs
using the DHS Form 11000-2. The justification section will clearly state that
the courier will be transporting classified information via commercial air.
10.6.3. If information technology equipment, e.g., a laptop computer, computer
media, etc., containing classified information is to be transported, it must
be encrypted prior to transport. Refer to DHS National Security Systems
Handbook for additional information.
10.6.4. The CBP Office of Internal Affairs will approve or disapprove the request
based on the justification provided.
10.6.5. If approved, a courier authorization letter (see sample at Attachment D) shall
be prepared and issued by the CBP Office of Internal Affairs.
10.7. TRANSPORT OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL WITHIN AN
ACTIVITY OR OFFICE
10.7.1. If required to transport classified material from one building to another via a
public street or road, courier authorization is required, and the material shall
be packaged in accordance with the requirements of this directive.
10.7.2. If required to transport classified material within the same building or
compound, an appropriate cover sheet (SF 703, Top Secret; SF 704, Secret;
and SF 705, Confidential) shall be affixed to the document and the document
shall be placed in an unmarked envelope or folder to avoid undue attention.
Courier authorization is not required.
10.8. RECEIPTS.
10.8.1. Receipts for Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential materials transmitted or
transferred outside of CBP are required. DHS Form 11000-11, Document
Record of Transmittal or a similar transmittal form may be used for this
purpose.

11. Chapter 11: Security Violations and Infractions

11.1. POLICY
11.1.1. Programs and safeguards established for the identification and protection
of classified information are necessary to assure U.S. National Security.
Incidents involving the mishandling of classified information must be promptly
and thoroughly investigated to determine the cause, assess and mitigate
potential damage, and implement measures to prevent recurrence.
11.2. DEFINITIONS
11.2.1. Security Infraction: Any knowing, willful, or negligent action contrary to the
requirements of Executive Order 12958, as amended, and its implementing
directives, that does not rise to the level of a Security Violation. A
Security Infraction is usually a minor incident or administrative error in the
safeguarding of classified information that does not result in the compromise
of such information or in which the likelihood of such compromise is remote.
11.2.2. Security Violation: Any knowing, willful or negligent action: (1) that could
reasonably be expected to result in an unauthorized disclosure of classified
information; (2) to classify or continue the classification of information
contrary to the requirements of Executive Order 12958, as amended, and
its implementing directives; and/or (3) to create or continue a special access
program contrary to the requirements of Executive Order 12958, as amended.
11.3. REPORTING SECURITY INCIDENTS
11.3.1. Security incidents shall be reported promptly, but no later than the next
business day from the time of discovery. All security incidents involving the
mishandling of collateral classified must be recorded on the DHS Form
11000-10 “Record of Security Violation” and reported to the Office of Internal
Affairs, Joint Intake Center. Depending on the incident, a preliminary inquiry
or formal investigation will be conducted by the Office of Internal Affairs. This
includes incidents where CBP employees knowingly, willfully or by negligent
action could reasonably expect that an unauthorized disclosure of classified
information may have occurred. Examples of reportable security incidents
include:
●● Any knowing, willful or negligent action that could reasonably be expected
to result in an unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
●● Any knowing, willful or negligent action to classify or continue the
classification of information contrary to the requirements of E.O. 12958, as
amended, and it’s implementing directives.
●● Any knowing, willful, or negligent action to create or continue a special
access program contrary to the requirements of E. O. 12958, as amended.
●● Any incident involving computer, telecommunications equipment or media
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
803 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

that may result in disclosure of classified information to unauthorized

individuals. Or an incident that will result in unauthorized modification,
destruction of classified system data, the loss of classified computer
system processing capability or loss/theft of classified computer system
media.
●● Any incident involving the processing of classified information on computer
equipment that has not been specifically approved and accredited for that
purpose by an authorized official.
●● Any incident involving the transmission/transportation of classified
information by an unapproved method. Or any evidence of tampering
with a shipment, delivery or mailing of packages containing classified
information.
●● Any incident in which classified information is not stored by an approved
means.
●● Any incident in which classified information is inadvertently revealed to or
released to a person that is not authorized access.
●● Any incident in which classified information has been destroyed by
unauthorized means.
●● Any incident in which classified information has been reproduced without
authorization or contrary to specific restrictions imposed by the originator
or on equipment that has not been specifically approved and accredited
for that purpose.
●● Any other incident in which classified information is not safeguarded or
handled in accordance with prescribed procedures.
11.3.2. Refer to Section 11.4 for security incidents involving classified spillages. Refer
to Section 11.5 for incidents involving Sensitive Compartmented Information
(SCI) and incidents within a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility
(SCIF).
11.4. CLASSIFIED SPILLAGE
11.4.1. Classified spillage is the accidental, inadvertent or intentional introduction of
classified information into unclassified information technology (IT) systems
not specifically certified and accredited for classified use, or certified and
accredited at a level lower than that of the classified information introduced
into it. Any IT incident could pose a significant, negative impact to the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of CBP IT systems.
11.4.2. Reporting a Classified Spillage. Classified spillages must be reported
immediately to a supervisor and the CBP Computer Security Incident
Response Center (CSIRC) in accordance with OIT HB 1400-05C.
11.4.3. Users must take no action to delete, disturb or further disclose spilled
information, such as deleting an email that contains classified information or a

classified attachment or printing hard copies off of a printer.

11.4.4. Specific information regarding a spill shall itself be classified at the same level
of the classification of the information spilled until confirmation is received
that the spilled information has been effectively eradicated from the IT system
or the potential for compromise has been otherwise neutralized. Specific
information means information sufficient to allow a dedicated intruder or
curiosity seeker to search for and access the spilled material.
11.4.5. The CSIRC is responsible for forwarding incident reports to the Office of
Internal Affairs, Joint Intake Center for preliminary inquiry or investigation.
11.5. INCIDENTS INVOLVING SENSITIVE COMPARTMENT
INFORMATION (SCI)
11.5.1. Incidents involving SCI, Special Access Program (SAP) information and all
other incidents within a SCIF shall be reported to the Office of Intelligence and
Operations Coordination (OIOC), Special Security Officer (SSO).
11.6. PRELIMINARY INQUIRY
11.6.1. Upon notification of an alleged security incident, the CBP Office of Internal
Affairs and/or DSO shall initiate a preliminary inquiry. The person conducting
the preliminary inquiry shall serve as the Inquiry Official. The Inquiry Official
shall have the authority to conduct interviews and obtain statements from
personnel knowledgeable about the incident. Personnel involved in the inquiry
process are required to cooperate with Inquiry Officials. Failure to cooperate
can result in sanctions as defined in the U.S. Customs and Border Protection,
Table of Offenses and Penalties.
11.6.2. A preliminary inquiry and corresponding Report of Inquiry (ROI) shall be
completed within 30 work days from date of initiation. Where an inquiry
cannot be completed within 30 work days, the Inquiry Official shall include a
statement in the Report of Inquiry justifying the delay.
11.6.3. A preliminary inquiry shall be conducted to determine:
●● Whether a security violation or infraction did or did not occur;
●● Time, date, and location of the alleged incident;
●● Whether there was an actual compromise or suspected compromise of
classified information;
●● Identification of the classified information involved;
●● The person(s) responsible for and involved in the security violation or
infraction;
●● The cause of the security violation or infraction.;
●● The actions taken to minimize damage or neutralize the potential for
compromise;

●● Recommendations to prevent recurrence of similar security incidents, to

include additional training, procedural changes and/or administrative or
disciplinary action;
11.6.4. If the security incident involves the improper transmission of classified
information to CBP from an outside agency, the Inquiry Official shall notify the
security official of the sending office or agency who shall pursue the matter
further in accordance with the sending agency’s regulations. For classified
spillage incidents, the CBP CSIRC will conduct damage control of the affected
CBP automated systems to remove any trace of the classified information.
11.6.5. If the security incident involves the improper transmission of classified
information to CBP from another DHS component, CBP shall notify the
appropriate security official of the sending Component or office who shall
pursue the matter further.
11.6.6. If the preliminary inquiry reveals an actual compromise or a suspected
compromise of classified information, the Inquiry Official shall request that the
OCA with jurisdiction over the information conduct a damage assessment.
11.6.7. If CRP originated classification information was originated by a CBP, OCA
is compromised, the preliminary inquiry report and request for damage
assessment will be forwarded to the Office of Internal Affairs Assistant
Commissioner for processing (see MD 11049 for DHS components).
11.6.8. If another government agency’s information is compromised a copy of
the preliminary inquiry report and request for damage assessment will be
forwarded to the applicable government agency. A copy of the preliminary
inquiry report and request for damage assessment will be forwarded to the
Office of Internal Affairs.
11.6.9. If the originator of the information cannot be determined, the preliminary
inquiry report will be forwarded to the DHS Office of Security/Administrative
Security Division (OS/ASD). OS/ASD will attempt to determine the originator
of the information and process the damage assessment request. If OS/
ASD cannot determine the originator, OS/ASD shall seek guidance from the
Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO).
11.6.10. If the incident involves the inadvertent disclosure of classified information to a
person not authorized access, then the person who received the information
will be asked to sign an Inadvertent Disclosure Statement. If the person
refuses to sign the Inadvertent Disclosure Statement, the information on
the form will be read orally to the person, in the presence of a witness, and
the form will be annotated to reflect the individual’s refusal to sign; both the
Inquiry Official and the witness will sign the form. This information will be
included in the preliminary inquiry report.
11.6.11. The completed preliminary inquiry report shall be sent from the Office of
Internal Affairs, Assistant Commissioner to the Assistant Commissioner’s,

Office Directors and alike with jurisdiction where the security incident
occurred and responsibility over the person(s) involved, for further action as
appropriate.
11.6.12. If the preliminary inquiry report contains classified information, it will be
handled and marked accordingly. At a minimum, the preliminary inquiry report
will be marked and handled as “For Official Use Only (FOUO).”
11.6.13. Persons who are suspected or found to have committed a security incident
shall be afforded the opportunity to provide a written statement disputing the
facts or identifying mitigating circumstances. Such written statements shall be
included as an attachment to the preliminary inquiry report.
11.6.14. A copy of the preliminary inquiry report shall be retained by the Office of
Internal Affairs. Where a person(s) is suspected or found to have committed
a security violation or infraction, a copy of the preliminary inquiry report and
all other supporting documentation shall also be included in the individual’s
personnel security file.
11.6.15. Reports pertaining to contract employees shall be provided to the applicable
Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative or equivalent Federal
employee having oversight of the contract. In addition, further reporting
relative to contractors shall be made in accordance with the National
Industrial Security Program (NISP) directives.
11.6.16. Preliminary inquiry and/or subsequent inquiry report will be sufficient to close
the incident if it determines that:
●● The loss or compromise of classified information has not occurred or its
likelihood is remote;
●● The compromise of classified information has occurred but there is no
indication of knowing, willful, or negligent behavior or significant security
weaknesses;
●● There is no evidence of employee misconduct, criminal behavior, or
espionage;
●● No additional information will be gained by conducting a formal
investigation.
11.7. FORMAL INVESTIGATION
11.7.1. The decision to conduct a formal investigation in lieu of or subsequent to a
preliminary inquiry shall be made by the Assistant Commissioner, Office of
Internal Affairs.
11.7.2. Upon determination that a formal investigation is appropriate, the Office of
Internal Affairs, Investigative Operations Division will conduct the investigation
accordingly. Should the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG), the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) or another agency assume investigative
responsibility, CBP will coordinate all further actions with that investigative
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
807 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

agency.
11.7.3. Reports of Investigations may be forwarded to the DHS, Office of Security.
11.8. OVERSEAS SECURITY VIOLATIONS AND INFRACTIONS
11.8.1. Security incidents occurring at overseas locations are under the purview of
the Department of State (DOS). If a security incident is observed by CBP
personnel at an overseas location, the DOS Regional Security Officer(s),
United States Marine Corps (USMC) Security Guard(s) or other designated
person(s) shall be notified.
11.8.2. Security incidents occurring at overseas locations involving CBP personnel
are reported by DOS using an Optional Form (OF) 117, “Notice of Security
Violation” through the DHS Office of Security.
11.8.3. Upon receipt of OF 117, IA/SMD shall forward the notice, with a cover letter,
to the INFOSEC Branch for conducting a preliminary inquiry.
11.9. OTHER AGENCY SECURITY VIOLATIONS AND INFRACTIONS
11.9.1. CBP personnel who observe or learn of a security incident committed by a
visiting or detailed employee or contractor of another agency shall follow the
guidelines provided in Section 11.6 for reporting and conducting a preliminary
inquiry or formal investigation.
11.9.2. The Office of Internal Affairs, Assistant Commissioner shall send a
memorandum to the security office of the visiting or detailed individual’s
agency with a description of the incident.
11.10. SANCTIONS
11.10.1. When an individual is found to be responsible for the commission of a security
violation or infraction, he/she may be subject to administrative, disciplinary
or criminal sanctions as defined in the U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Table of Offenses and Penalties. The type of sanctions imposed shall be
under the purview and authority of appropriate supervisory/management
officials and based on several considerations, including the following:
●● Severity of the incident;
●● Intent of the person committing the security violation or infraction;
●● Extent of training the person(s) has received; and
●● Frequency of which the individual has been found responsible in the•
commission of other such security violations or infractions.
11.10.2. Sanctions may include, but are not limited to, verbal or written counseling,
reprimand, suspension without pay, removal, suspension or revocation
of security clearance, loss or denial of access to classified information or
termination of classification authority or criminal penalties.
11.10.3. These sanctions will be assessed in accordance with established policies and
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
808 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

procedures established in the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Table of

Offenses and Penalties.
11.10.4. Where a proposed sanction associated with the unauthorized disclosure of
classified information is in excess of a reprimand, the official imposing the
sanction shall first coordinate with the Office of the Chief Counsel (OCC), for
legal review, prior to imposing the sanction. Further, where a criminal violation
has occurred that will result in a criminal prosecution, the investigating agency
shall coordinate with OCC, which shall coordinate with the Department of
Justice, as appropriate.
11.11. ANNUAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
11.11.1. No later than January 15, CBP shall submit to DHS Office of Security a
consolidated report reflecting the security violations and infractions that
occurred during the preceding calendar year. This report shall consist of the
total number of confirmed CBP security violations and infractions; a brief
synopsis of the circumstances for each (i.e., improper storage, improper
destruction or improper transmission etc); and remedial actions. Incidents
involving COMSEC and SCI, which are reported through other channels, and
shall not be included in this report. This report will be used to assess trends
and determine the need for enhanced and focused education and awareness
programs. The Office of Internal Affairs is responsible for providing this report.

12. Chapter 12: Industrial Security Program

12.1. CBP’S INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM
12.1.1. This chapter sets forth the policies and procedures for the Department of
Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) participation
in the National Industrial Security Program (NISP). Established by E. O.
12829 on January 6, 1993, the National Industrial Security Program provides
for the protection of classified information as defined by E. O. 12958, as
amended and the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
12.1.2. The NISP serves as a single, integrated, cohesive program for the protection
of classified information when not in U.S. Government possession. Under the
NISP, contractors are mandated to protect all classified information to which
they have been given access or custody by the U.S. Government.
12.1.3. DHS formalized its use of the industrial security services of the Department of
Defense (DoD), as a user agency of the NISP, by Memorandum of Agreement
dated August 22, 2003. As a result of the agreement, DoD is authorized to act
for and on behalf of DHS in rendering security services for the protection of
classified information released to or within industry by DHS. DHS participates
in the NISP to ensure that any classified information released to or accessed
by industry, in connection with DHS contracts, grants, or related activities, is
properly safeguarded in accordance with Executive Order 12958.
12.1.4. Participation in the NISP allows DHS to use the Defense Security Service
(DSS) to conduct investigations for contractor facilities and personnel security
clearances, and to monitor the contractor’s compliance with safeguarding
requirements. All facility and personnel security clearances granted by
DoD will be accepted by DHS to establish eligibility for access to classified
information. Contractors granted an interim facility and personnel security
clearance, such as an interim TOP SECRET, will only be eligible for access
to DHS classified information at the SECRET level. Upon completion by DSS
of all investigative requirements, that facility shall be considered eligible for
access to classified information, or contract award, at the appropriate level
granted by DSS.
12.1.5. DSS issues and maintains facility security clearances and personnel security
clearances, as required, for DHS contractors. DSS inspects and monitors
contractors who require or will require access to classified information. The
Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office (DISCO), a field element of
DSS, issues personnel security clearances under the authority of the NISP.
●● The Chief Security Officer (CSO) as the Senior Agency Official (SAO) will
direct and administer DHS’ Industrial Security Program.
●● The Chief, Administrative Security Division, under the direction and
authority of the CSO/SAO, delegated the authority to administer

implementation and management of the Industrial Security Program within

CBP to the Assistant Commissioner, Office of Internal Affairs.
●● The Assistant Commissioner of the Office of Internal Affairs shall delegate
the authority to administer implementation and management of the
Industrial Security Program within CBP to the Security Management
Division (SMD).
●● The Director, Internal Affairs, Security Management Division shall delegate
management of the Industrial Security Program within the Information
Security Branch and ensure cooperation among relevant CBP offices.
●● CBP IA/SMD/Information Security Branch Chief shall:
o Serve as the CBP official responsible for management,
implementation, and oversight of the Industrial Security Program within
CBP.
o Provide assistance and guidance to contracting and program
personnel relating to the security requirements of any procurement
action involving classified or sensitive information and provide
assistance and guidance to committee control officers relating to
processing requests for security clearances for members of Federal
Advisory Committees and facility security clearances under the NISP.
o Process requests for verification of facility security clearances for
prospective contractors or employers of advisory committee members
and process paperwork for facility clearance sponsorship.
o Assist the program office, Office of Finance, and contracting officer’s
technical representative (COTR) in the development of security
classification guidance.
o Represent CBP in all NISP matters within DHS, boards, committees,
etc.
o Review and approve the DD Form 254, Contract Security Classification
Specification, and provide a completed copy to the Office of Finance,
DSS, and DHS Office of Security. The approved form will be returned
to the Office of Finance for inclusion in the contract or solicitation.
For contracts involving Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI),
IA/SMD will review the DD 254 to ensure the correct information is
provided, but the DHS Administrative Security Division will provide
oversight and final approval for the DD 254 and contracts.
o Review amendments, modifications, etc., with security implications
where changes affect the security posture of the contract.
o Provide training to contract officers/specialists, COTRs, and program
area representatives, as needed.
o In regards to visit authorization requests, verify contractors are working
on classified contracts.

●● Office of Finance shall:

o Ensure that all solicitations and contracts under their oversight comply
with the policies and procedures identified in this directive, in addition
to the requirements of the Federal Acquisition Regulation regarding
safeguarding classified information.
o Review all proposed solicitations to determine whether access to
classified information may be required by offerors, or by a contractor
prior to and/or during the contract performance.
o Ensure that the classified acquisition is conducted as required by the
NISP or CBP procedures, as appropriate.
o Inform contractors and subcontractors of the security classifications
and requirements assigned to the various documents, materials, tasks,
subcontracts, and components of the classified contract.
o Ensure the statement work or other pertinent documentation contains
the appropriate clauses to include, the Security Requirements Clause,
52.204.2, (for classified contracts), the HSAR Clause, 3052.204-71,
Contractor Employee Access (for all contracts), and the Suitability
Statement.
o Verify that all performance specifications are identified in the statement
of work.
●● COTR shall:
o Monitor the Contractor’s compliance with contractual security
requirements.
●● CBP Program Manager shall:
o Consider security requirements at the earliest possible stage in the
procurement process, to include the conduct of security risk analyses
on classified acquisitions.
o Work with Internal Affairs on generating the DD 254 and properly
identifying all security requirements as stated in the Statement of Work.
o Ensure classification guide is provided to Office of Finance when the
requirement is to generate classified information.
o Issue a DD Form 254 whenever the security requirements change or
additional classification guidance is found necessary.
o Issue a final DD Form 254 if additional disposition instructions are
needed for any classified information the contractor may possess
which pertains to the departmental contract.
●● Office of Internal Affairs, Personnel Security Division (PSD) shall:
o Verify that all contractors who are required to have security clearances
do so.
o Verify that all contractor visit requests are tied to a classified contract
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
813 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

prior to certifying security clearances.

o Ensure that Internal Affairs/Security Management Division and COTR
are notified of negative responses (i.e. contractor does not have a
required security clearance) regarding contractor security clearances.
●● Office of Information Technology (OIT)
o Notify CBP/IA of contractors who are no longer working on a classified
contract.
12.1.6. Security Clearances.
●● To ensure that classified information entrusted to private industry is
properly safeguarded, CBP requires that contractors who will require
access to classified information in the completion of their contractual
responsibilities, be processed for security clearances in accordance with
the requirements stipulated in the NISPOM.
●● Individuals employed by a contractor will be cleared through DSS/DISCO.
The cleared contractor is required to have a designated facility security
officer (FSO) through whom requests for personnel security clearances
are submitted to DISCO. The FSO will provide the Office of Internal
Affairs, Security Management Division and Office of Finance with an
updated status report of security clearance actions required, pending, and
approved as required. The FSO is also responsible for submitting visitor
authorization requests on all cleared employees. Contractor personnel
must have security clearances commensurate with the level of access
required for performance under the contract. CBP has no role in the
processing or granting of security clearances to industry personnel.
●● For consultants who are working on an interagency agreement, the
consultant’s agency shall provide the consultants’ security clearance.
The consultant and the component office head will execute a Security
Agreement which will include the consultant’s responsibilities and any
accesses required. A DD 254 is not needed. If the individual will require
access to SCI and does not currently have access, a justification from
the individual will need to be sent to the Facility Security Officer in the
form of a nomination letter. The Facility Security Officer will put together a
package and submit it to the CBP Special Security Officer for processing,
as well as provide a copy of the Security Agreement to DHS, Office of
Security. DHS Office of Security will be provided a copy of the Security
Agreement.
●● For independent consultants, HR notifies Internal Affairs that they are
bringing a consultant on board and sends a copy of the Consultant
Agreement to Internal Affairs. Internal Affairs completes the Security
Agreement and sends it and the Non-Disclosure agreement to the hiring
office for signatures. The signed Security agreement and Non-Disclosure
Agreement are kept on file.

12.1.7. Facility Security Clearance.

●● Any firm or business under contract with CBP, which requires access
to classified information, will require a facility security clearance
commensurate with access required. Additionally, any firm or business
entity that requires access to classified information to prepare a response
to a Request for Proposal, Request for Bid, etc., and/or in performance of
a classified Department contract, will require a facility security clearance.
●● Firms that do not possess a facility security clearance, or the requisite
level of facility security clearance, will be sponsored for a DoD facility
security clearance when a determination has been made by the
government contracting officer that the contract effort will require access
to classified information. Facility security clearance sponsorship requests
will be made by the CBP Program office and shall be submitted to Internal
Affairs, for processing to DSS. Facility security clearances for sub-
contracts shall be sponsored and processed by the prime contractor in
accordance with the NISPOM.
●● Facility security clearances for sub-contracts shall be sponsored and
processed by the prime contract in accordance with the NISPOM.
●● DSS will conduct a risk assessment for all contracts that require
contractors to store, process, or access CBP information, systems, or
property at their facility to:
o Identify countermeasures.
o Ensure identified countermeasures are implemented prior to the
contractor gaining control of CBP material.
●● Physical Security oversight for cleared contractor facilities, those with
access to NSI, will be provided by the cognizant DSS office.
●● DHS Office of Security will provide oversight in regards to Sensitive
Compartmented Information (SCI) and Special Access Programs (SAP).
12.1.8. Contract Security Classification Specification (DD Form 254)
●● In order to activate DSS services and obligate the contractor to the
provisions of the NISPOM, CBP offices will include in all classified
contracts and classified contract solicitations, a DD Form 254. The DD
Form 254 is the primary vehicle for relaying contract specific security
classification guidance to the contractor and shall, therefore, in Section 13
of the form, identify a published Security Classification Guide applicable to
the contract effort, or the classification will be based on existing classified
information from which the contractor shall derive and apply classification
guidance. Where the source(s) is identified as a security classification
guide(s), the contractor shall be provided access to, or a copy of, the
applicable guide(s).
●● A DD Form 254 is required and will be completed only for contracts that

require access to classified information.

●● The Statement of Work or other documentation used to describe the
services or supplies that will be provided by the contract will be provided
to the Office of Internal Affairs to assist in verifying the DD Form 254.
●● The contract, Statement of Work, or other documentation shall contain
the FAR Security Clause 52.204.2 which states that a Government
contracting officer made a determination that the contract issued will
require access to classified information by the contractor or his or her
employees in the performance of the contract. In addition, the DHS HSAR
Clause 3052.204-70 mandates that contractors requiring unescorted
access to government facilities, access to sensitive information, or access
to government information technology resources are required to have
a favorably adjudicated background investigation prior to commencing
work on this contract. This requirement shall be prescribed for all CBP
classified contracts, and will be applicable to all phases of pre-contract
activity, including solicitations (bids, quotations, and proposals), pre-
contract negotiations, post-contract activity, or other government
Contracting Activity Programs that require access to classified information
by a contractor. In addition, such documentation shall also identify the
classification level, Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential.
●● The Office of Internal Affairs will return the approved DD Form 254 to
the CBP Office of Finance for inclusion in the contract or solicitation. The
Office of Internal Affairs will distribute a copy of the DD Form 254 to DSS
and DHS Office of Security. DSS will conduct investigations and issue
the personnel security clearance(s) for the contract employees. DSS will
provide security oversight functions in coordination with the Contractor’s
Facility Security Officer, with the exception of “carve out” contracts
requiring access to SAPs. DHS, Office of Security, Special Security
Programs Division will provide oversight for contracts involving access to
SCI and SAP information.
o In some instances, it may be necessary to include classified
information in a DD Form 254. In those cases, the documentation
must be protected in a manner approved for classified information, as
identified in Chapter 9.5 of this handbook.
12.2. PROCESSING REQUIREMENTS
12.2.1. For each classified contract, the contract solicitation must include a statement
that the contractor will require access to classified information and/or will
generate classified information in the performance of the contract.
●● All classified contracts require verification of facility security clearances by
Office of Internal Affairs.
●● The contract, statement of work, or other documents will contain a security
clause stating that a Government contracting officer made a determination
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
816 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

that the contract will require access to classified information by the

contractor in the performance of the contract.
●● The DD Form 254 is reviewed to ensure that all of the security
requirements captured in the Statement of Work are also identified in the
DD Form 254.
12.2.2. Classified Visits
●● CBP is to accept visit authorization letters only when they are submitted in
accordance with, and contain the information as required by, Chapter 6 of
the NISPOM.
●● All classified visits by contractors require advance notification to the
office hosting the visit. Requests must be in writing and can be submitted
by mail, facsimile, or teletype, no hand-carried visit requests shall be
accepted. CBP has final approval authority for the proposed visit. CBP
need not notify a requester that a visit has been approved if sufficient
advance notice of the visit was provided. If CBP disapproves a visit, the
requester must be promptly notified.
●● The number of classified visits shall be held to a minimum. CBP must
determine that the visit is necessary and requires access to classified
information in order to approve a classified visit.
●● Visitors are not to take notes; make records of classified discussions;
discuss classified information on non-secure phones; or take photographs
in areas where classified information might be recorded, unless given
permission by the hosting organization.
●● CBP offices are to ensure that access to classified information higher than
the level of the visitor’s security clearance certified in the visit authorization
letter is not granted.
●● Classified visit requests will require certification from the Office of Internal
Affairs, Personnel Security Division.
12.2.3. International Security Agreement
●● International Security Agreements with foreign governments address
security controls, protection, and assurance for safeguarding classified
information. These agreements establish the “government-to-government”
principle, signifying that signatory governments each have legal
responsibility over the others’ classified information at all times. All
agreements will be in accordance with Chapter 10 of the NISPOM.
●● DHS Office of Security shall be responsible for the administration and
oversight of classified material to be exported (any disclosure or transfer of
technical data to a foreign national), the permanent and temporary import
of classified information, and compliance by cleared U.S. contractors
involved with NATO, foreign governments, or foreign contractors. DHS
maintains a record of cleared U.S. contractors involved with foreign

entities and related activities. Any offices and contractors desiring to enter
into international agreements will report their intentions to DHS Office of
Security. The report shall contain:
o Name of Country
o Name and address of government entity issuing contract
o Contract/RFP number
o Name of U.S. contractor/name of any subcontractors involved
o Contract/RFP issue and response date
●● Contractors are still required to report their activities to DSS per the
NISPOM.
12.2.4. DHS Office of Security shall use this report to issue proper guidance to CBP
and contractors to ensure compliance with governing export control laws: the
Export Administration Regulation and the Arms Export Control Act, before
executing any agreement with a foreign interest that involves access to DHS
classified information by a foreign national. Contractors are still required to
comply with foreign ownership, control, or influence (FOCI) requirements
per the NISPOM. Prior to the execution of such agreements, review and
approval are required by the State Department and release of the classified
information must be approved by DHS. Failure to comply with Federal
licensing requirements may render a contractor ineligible for a facility security
clearance.

13. Chapter 13: Safeguarding Sensitive But Unclassified

(For Official Use Only) Information
13.1. POLICY
13.1.1. FOUO is the designator used within DHS to identify Sensitive but Unclassified
information with the DHS community that is not otherwise specifically
described and governed by statute or regulation and the unauthorized
disclosure of which could adversely impact a person’s privacy or welfare, the
conduct of Federal programs, or other programs or operations essential to the
national interest. For example, information designated as Protected Critical
Infrastructure Information (PCII) and Sensitive Security Information (SSI) are
governed by separate guidance issued by the responsible program office.
Any DHS employee, detailee, or contractor can designate information as
FOUO provided it meets the sensitivity threshold defined in DHS MD 11042.1
(Safeguarding Sensitive But Unclassified (For Official Use Only) Information)
and falls within one of the types of information listed in the MD as FOUO.
Officials occupying supervisory or managerial position are authorized to
designate other information, not listed in the MD and originating under their
jurisdiction as FOUO. Access to FOUO information is based on a “need–to-
know” as determined by the holder of the information.
13.1.2. Other government agencies and international organization may use different
terminology to identify sensitive information, such as Limited Official Use
(LOU) and Official Use Only (OUO). In most instances, this information is
equivalent to FOUO information and should be protected as such.
13.1.3. Information designated as FOUO will be sufficiently marked so that persons
having access to it are aware of its sensitivity and protection requirements. At
a minimum, prominently mark on the bottom of each page “FOR OFFICIAL
USE ONLY”.
13.1.4. FOUO information will be sent by U.S. Postal Service first class mail or an
accountable commercial deliver service and may be entered into an inter-
office mail system, provided it is afforded sufficient protection to prevent
unauthorized access (e.g., sealed in an envelope).
13.1.5. FOUO information in electronic form shall:
●● not be entered or posted on any public website,
●● not to be sent to personal e-mail accounts,
●● be stored or processed on encrypted thumb or jump drives, and
●● be transmitted over secure communications systems or encrypted if
transmitted over unclassified or “open” communications
13.1.6. When unattended, FOUO materials will, at a minimum, be stored in a locked
file cabinet, locked desk drawer, a locked overhead storage compartment,
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
819 of 890
or similar locked compartment. An FOUO coversheet will be used when
removed from storage.
13.1.7. When no longer needed, FOUO information will be destroyed in any manner
to prevent recognition and reconstruction.
13.1.8. The loss, actual or suspected compromise/disclosure of FOUO information
must be reported to the Office of Internal Affairs. FOUO information in
electronic format will be reported to the Computer Security Incident Response
Center (CSIRC)
13.1.9. Questions pertaining to Security can be directed to the IA Security
Management mailbox [email protected] or by calling (202) 325-0110.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

14. Chapter 14: Sensitive Security Information (SSI)

14.1. POLICY
14.1.1. As defined in 49 C.F.R. §1520.5, Sensitive Security Information (SSI) is
information obtained or developed in the conduct of security activities,
including research and development, the disclosure of which DHS, the
Transportation Security Agency (TSA), or CBP has determined would (1)
constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy (including, but not limited to,
information contained in any personnel, medical, or similar file); (2) reveal
trade secrets or privileged or confidential information obtained from any
person; or (3) be detrimental to the security of transportation. In addition,
CBP Directive, 1450.021, May 13, 2008 establishes the Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) policy regarding the recognition, identification, and
safeguarding of Sensitive Security Information (SSI).
14.2. RESPONSIBILITIES
14.2.1. The following entities and CBP Offices have a significant role in the oversight
and management of CBP’s SSI Program:
●● DHS and TSA:
o DHS has program oversight responsibility for promulgation of
Department-wide policy governing the recognition, identification, and
safeguarding of SSI. The DHS Chief Security Officer coordinates
with the Director of TSA/SSI Office the development of any security
classification guide that may identify information that requires
protection of SSI. The Assistant Secretary for TSA serves as
the authority for implementation, management, and oversight of
SSI, pursuant to 49 USC §114(s). The TSA SSI Office assists in
the promulgation of regulations and procedural guidance for the
implementation and management of SSI, and serves as the approval
authority for publication of CBP SSI guidance and procedures,
CBP Directive 1450.021. The TSA SSI Office Director also works in
coordination with the DHS Office of Security to establish, provide
guidance for, and approve processes and programs for the audit,
oversight, and inspection of the management and practical application
of SSI to include reviews of SSI records for consistent and appropriate
application and use of SSI.
●● Commissioner for U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) shall:
o Administer implementation and management of SSI within CBP
through written appointment of a Government official to serve as the
SSI Program Manager for CBP. The appointed SSI Program Manager,
Office of Internal Affairs (IA), Security Management Division (SMD),
shall represent CBP on the DHS SSI Oversight Committee. Copies of

the appointment record shall be forwarded to the Director of the TSA

SSI Office and the DHS Chief Security Officer.
o Ensure appointment of at least one employee in each office that
generates or accesses SSI to serve as SSI Coordinator, and grant
each Coordinator authority to make determinations that records
generated by CBP are appropriately marked SSI.
o Ensure that periodic and random reviews are conducted for effective
management and practical application, consistent and appropriate
application and use of SSI, and notify the DHS Office of Security about
these reviews. Such reviews shall assess compliance with regulations,
policies, procedures, and guidance governing SSI recognition,
identification, and safeguarding. The DHS Office of Security may also
conduct SSI reviews within CBP, as it deems appropriate.
o Where necessary, develop and implement supplemental internal
SSI procedures and guidance specific to the management and
administration of SSI within CBP. Supplemental procedures and
guidance shall be approved by the Director of the TSA SSI Office, in
coordination with the DHS Office of Security prior to implementation.
o Ensure that when a lawful request to publicly release a record
containing information determined to be SSI is received, the record
is reviewed in a timely manner to determine whether any information
contained in the record meets the criteria for continued SSI protection
under applicable law and regulation. Portions that no longer require
SSI protection shall be released subject to applicable laws and
regulations, including §§§§552 and 552a of Title 5, United States
Code. Any records containing SSI originating from another DHS
Component shall be referred to the appropriate Component for review
and response. Any information originally designated as SSI pursuant
to 49 C.F.R. §§1520.5(b)(9)(iii) or 1520.5(b)(16) shall be referred to the
Assistant Secretary for the Transportation Security Administration.
●● The Office of Policy and Planning (OPP) shall:
o Serve as the liaison with external audit groups such as the Office of the
Inspector General (OIG) and the Government Accounting Office (GAO)
to coordinate CBP responses to external audit reports and reviews that
contain potential CBP SSI.
●● CBP SSI Program Manager shall:
o Serve as the CBP official responsible for management,
implementation, and oversight of SSI within CBP.
o Represent CBP on the DHS SSI Oversight Committee.
o Conduct self-inspections of CBP for effective management and
practical application of SSI, and consistent and appropriate application
and use of SSI. Self-inspections shall be conducted in accordance with
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
822 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

MD 11056.1 or the DHS Security Operating Manual.

o Ensure appointment of an appropriate number of office-level SSI
Coordinators in order to effectively implement and manage SSI within
the respective offices.
o Maintain an up-to-date record of all CBP SSI Coordinators and provide
a copy to the Director of the TSA SSI Office on a semi-annual basis.
o Develop CBP-specific SSI identification and procedural guidance as
necessary to implement and manage SSI.
●● CBP SSI Coordinator shall:
o Facilitate the administration and oversight of SSI within their applicable
office.
o Assist office personnel in the appropriate use and application of SSI
and make determinations that records generated by that office are
appropriately marked SSI.
o Conduct self-inspections of their respective office for effective
management and practical application of SSI and consistent and
appropriate application and use of SSI.
o Ensure training of office personnel who access and/or generate SSI.
o Keep abreast of SSI policies and procedures and maintain liaison with
the CBP SSI Program Manager.
●● DHS Oversight Committee is:
o Chaired by the Director of the TSA SSI Office, with membership
consisting of the DHS Chief Security Officer and Component SSI
Program Managers.
o Used as a forum for the discussion of policies and procedures related
to the implementation, management, and oversight of SSI within DHS
and an exchange of information related to lessons learned and best
practices.
●● CBP employees, contractors, consultants, and other CBP Covered
Persons (i.e. airport operator, aircraft operator, anyone with a
transportation-related responsibility) to whom access to SSI is granted
shall:
o Be aware of and comply with the recognition, identification, disclosure
restrictions, and safeguarding requirements for SSI as outlined in DHS
MD 11046.1, 49 CFR §1520 and any other approved implementing
regulations, directives, procedures, and guidance.
o Be aware that divulging SSI without proper authority could result in
enforcement or corrective action.
o Participate in training sessions presented to communicate the
requirements for recognizing, identifying, and safeguarding SSI.

14.3. CATEGORIES OF SSI

14.3.1. Security Programs including amendments, comments, guidance and
Contingency Plans
●● Security Directives (SDs) or orders
●● Information Circulars under, and any comments, instructions, or
implementing guidance pertaining thereto.
●● Performance specifications, test objects and test procedures
●● Vulnerability assessments directed, created, held, funded, approved by, or
provided to DOT or DHS
●● Security inspection or investigation information
●● Threat information against transportation held by Government
●● Security measures: specific details of aviation or maritime security
measures
●● Security screening information (aviation or maritime)
●● Security training materials created for aviation or maritime security training
purposes
●● Identifying information of certain transportation security personnel
●● Critical aviation or maritime infrastructure asset information
●● Systems security information of IT systems: security procedures,
inspections, vulnerability information
●● Confidential business information related to aviation or maritime security
●● Research and development information
●● Other (as determined by TSA)
14.4. ORIGINAL DESIGNATION OF INFORMATION AS SSI
14.4.1. The DHS Secretary, the Assistant Secretary for the TSA, and the Director
of the TSA SSI Office are authorized, under 49 C.F.R. §1520.5(b)(16), to
designate information as SSI, which is not otherwise categorized as SSI
under 49 CFR §§1520.5(b)(1) through (15).
●● This designation authority also includes a determination to protect
detailed information about screening locations in accordance with 49
C.F.R. §1520.5(b)(9)(iii). No other officials shall have the authority to
designate information as SSI that is not otherwise covered under 49 CFR
§§1520.5(b)(1) through (15).
14.4.2. If information is identified or developed that would constitute an unwarranted
invasion of privacy, reveal trade secrets or privileged or confidential
information obtained from any person, or be detrimental to the security of
transportation if publicly disclosed, but is not otherwise categorized as SSI
under 49 C.F.R. §§1520.5(b)(1) through (15), it shall be transmitted through

the CBP SSI Program Manager, IA/SMD to the Director of the TSA SSI Office,
for review and determination as to whether or not the information warrants
protection as SSI. Such information shall be marked and protected as SSI
on an interim basis in accordance with policies and procedures issued or
approved by the TSA SSI Office, pending a final assessment by the Director
of the TSA SSI Office.
14.4.3. A record shall be maintained of each original SSI designation made. The
record shall include the date, title or subject of the document, and a detailed
synopsis of the information. A copy of the record and the information to be
protected shall be transmitted to the TSA SSI Office within 30 days following
designation. Whenever possible, to maintain consistency, such designations
should be done in consultation with the TSA SSI Office prior to designation.
14.4.4. Information designated as SSI shall be marked in accordance with 49 C.F.R.
§1520.13. To the extent practicable, the front page, title page, and/or the
first page shall include the notation “Designated SSI Pursuant to 49 C.F.R.
§1520.5(b)(16),” or, “Designated SSI Pursuant to 49 C.F.R. §1520.5(b)(9)
(iii),” as applicable. Where the official marking is not otherwise evident, the
additional notation “Designated by (name and position of authorized official)”
shall be added.
14.4.5. Once information is properly designated as SSI under 49 C.F.R. §§1520.5(b)
(9)(iii) or 1520.5(b)(16), the designation must be communicated to appropriate
parties with a need-to-know.
14.5. MARKING SSI
14.5.1. A CBP covered person shall mark information as SSI if it meets the criteria
for SSI as cited in 49 C.F.R. §1520.5(b) and MD 11056.1. Mark the record by
placing the protective marking conspicuously on the top, and the distribution
limitation statement on the bottom, of (1) The outside of any front and back
cover, including a binder cover or folder, if the document has a front and back
cover; (2) Any title page; and (3) Each page of the document. In addition, the
protective marking “SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION and the following
limitation statement will be identified:

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled

under 49 CFR §15 and §1520. No part of this record may be disclosed to persons
without a “need to know”, as defined in 49 CFR §15 and §1520, except with the writ-
ten permission of the Ad-ministrator of the Transportation Security Administration or
the Secretary of Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or
other action. For U.S. government agen-cies, public disclosure is governed by 5 USC
552 and 49 CFR §15 and §1520.
14.5.2. Where there is doubt as to the applicability of an SSI category, the information
shall be marked as SSI on an interim basis and submitted to the applicable

office SSI Coordinator or CBP SSI Program Manager for final assessment. If
the information is believed to warrant protection as SSI but is not governed
by a category of information under 49 C.F.R. §§1520.5(b)(1) through (15),
the SSI Program Manager shall refer the information as cited in MD 11056.1,
VI.C.3 or the DHS Administrative Security Operating Manual.
14.5.3. Information meeting the SSI criteria shall be marked in accordance with 49
C.F.R. §1520.13. Additionally, the following markings shall be applied:
●● Subjects, titles, paragraphs, subparagraphs, charts, graphs, and similar
portions (portion markings) need not be portion marked unless (1) the
record contains other types of information that requires portion marking,
e.g., classified information; or (2) the information is to be transmitted
outside of DHS to Congress, or Congressional Committees. All SSI
records submitted by DHS to Congress or Congressional Committees
must be portion-marked. When used, such portion markings shall be
reviewed by the CBP SSI Program Manager prior to dissemination. The
parenthetical abbreviation (SSI) shall be used.
●● Portion markings will be applied to unclassified portions of a record within
a classified record that contain SSI. The parenthetical abbreviation (SSI)
shall be used.
14.6. DURATION OF SSI AND SSI REVIEWS
14.6.1. Information designated or appropriately marked as SSI will remain SSI unless
determined releasable by the Assistant Secretary for the Transportation
Security Administration, the Commandant of the United States Coast Guard
(USCG), the Director of the TSA SSI Office, or other authorized officials, in
accordance with policies and procedures issued or approved by the TSA SSI
Office.
14.6.2. SSI information that is over three years old or older will be subject to release
upon request, unless the DHS Office of Security, TSA SSI Office, or CBP SSI
Program Manager determines that one of the following conditions applies:
●● The information is incorporated in a current transportation security
directive, security plan, contingency plan, or information circular.
●● The information contains current information in one of the following
SSI categories: equipment or personnel performance specifications;
vulnerability assessments; security inspection or investigative information;
threat information; security measures; security screening information;
security training materials; identifying information or designated
transportation security personnel; critical aviation or maritime infrastructure
asset information; systems security information; confidential business
information; or research and development information
●● The information is otherwise exempt from disclosure under applicable law,
i.e. the Privacy Act

●● If the SSI does not fall under a category cited in MD 11056.1 or the DHS
Administrative Security Operating Manual, then the request for release
may only be denied in whole or in part, if the Secretary or the Assistant
Secretary for the Transportation Security Administration, makes a written
determination that identifies a rational reason why the information must
remain SSI. Such written determination shall be provided to the party that
made the request within twenty (20) business days after the determination
has been made. Additionally, each written determination shall be provided
to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of
Representatives as part of the annual reporting requirement.
14.6.3. Pursuant to 49 C.F.R. §1520.5(c), the Director of the TSA SSI office shall
coordinate with the USCG and the DHS SSI Oversight Committee to
develop and implement policy and procedures relating to the loss of an SSI
designation from information that no longer meets the criteria set forth in 49
C.F.R. §1520.5(a).
14.6.4. In accordance with 49 C.F.R. §1520.15(a) and (b), the CBP SSI Program
Manager or other authorized CBP offices may review and redact SSI records
upon requests for public release under the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) in accordance with policies and procedures issued or approved by
the Director of the TSA SSI office and Chapter 14.10, CBP SSI FOIA Review
Process in this handbook.
14.6.5. CBP offices may also redact SSI records in response to other requests, in
accordance with MD 11056.1 or the DHS Administrative Security Operating
Manual, and policies and procedures issued or approved by the Director of
the TSA SSI office.
14.7. CHALLENGING SSI
14.7.1. Any authorized holder of SSI who believes the information has been
improperly or erroneously marked as SSI is encouraged to challenge the
marking. Such challenges may be done either formally or informally.
14.7.2. Informal challenges may be made directly by the holder of the information
to the person that applied the SSI marking who shall reevaluate the marking
against the criteria cited in 49 C.F.R. §1520.5(b)(1) through (15) and
implementing guidance published or approved by the Director of the TSA SSI
Office.
14.7.3. A formal challenge may be submitted in writing to the person that applied
the SSI marking through the applicable office SSI Coordinator and the CBP
SSI Program Manager, IA/SMD to the TSA SSI Office, or the DHS Office of
Security. An appeal of the decision made by the recipient of the challenge
may be filed with the Director of the TSA SSI Office. A further appeal of the
decision made by the Director of the TSA SSI Office may be made to the
Assistant Secretary for TSA. The decision of the Assistant Secretary for the

TSA shall be final.

14.7.4. Individuals submitting a challenge shall not be subject to retribution for
bringing such actions. Anonymity may be requested from any of the reviewers
listed above, and the reviewers shall honor a challenger’s request for
anonymity and fully consider and appropriately process the challenge.
14.8. AUDITS AND INSPECTIONS
14.8.1. Nothing in this policy shall diminish the authority of the Office of Inspector
General to conduct audits, inspections, or investigations, in accordance with
the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, 5 USC App. 3, and DHS
Management Directive 0810.1 or DHS Administrative Security Operating
Manual.
14.8.2. The DHS Office of Security may conduct periodic oversight and compliance
reviews of SSI within DHS, as it deems appropriate.
14.8.3. The Director of the TSA SSI office shall develop, issue, and approve policies,
procedures, and guidance for the implementation and management of self-
inspection CBP programs that access or generate SSI. The TSA SSI Office
shall create, publish and approve appropriate guidance and checklists to
facilitate the conduct of self-inspections by SSI Program Managers and SSI
Coordinators. The DHS Office of Security shall also provide a means to
monitor and track self-inspection program implementation.
14.8.4. The CBP SSI Program Manager, IA/SMD, shall conduct a self-inspection of
the program at least once every eighteen (18) months. The results of self-
inspections conducted pursuant to MD 11056.1 or the DHS Administrative
Security Operating Manual shall be reported to the TSA SSI Office within thirty
(30) days after completion. Discrepancies cited during the self-inspection shall
be reconciled in a timely manner, and the SSI Program Manager, IA/SMD or
the TSA SSI Office will take remedial action as needed.
14.8.5. SSI Coordinators shall conduct a self-inspection of their applicable office
SSI program at least once every 12 months. The results of self-inspections
conducted shall be reported to the CBP SSI Program Manager, IA/SMD within
30 days after completion. Discrepancies cited during the self-inspection shall
be reconciled in a timely manner, and the SSI Coordinator or the SSI Program
Manager will take remedial action as needed.
14.8.6. Self-inspections shall assess compliance with regulations, policies,
procedures, and guidance governing SSI recognition, identification, and
safeguarding.
14.9. SHARING, DISSEMINATION AND ACCESS
14.9.1. SSI shall not be disseminated in any manner (orally, electronically, visually,
or in any other manner) to unauthorized personnel. The Assistant Secretary
for TSA may determine in writing that information which might otherwise be
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
828 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

considered SSI may be released publicly in the interest of public safety or in

furtherance of transportation security under 49 C.F.R. §1520.5(b). Under 49
C.F.R. §1520.15(e), the Assistant Secretary for TSA, and under 49 C.F.R.
§1520.9(a)(2), the Assistant Secretary for TSA and the Commandant of the
USCG, may also determine in writing that specific SSI may be released to
non-covered persons (e.g., individuals not within the definition provided at
49 C.F.R. §1520.7), in accordance with policies and procedures issued or
approved by the TSA SSI Office.
14.9.2. In addition to other requirements cited previously and in 49 C.F.R. §1520,
access to SSI is based on a need-to-know as determined by the holder of
the information. Where there is uncertainty as to a person’s need-to-know,
the holder of the information will request dissemination instructions from his
or her next-level supervisor or the originator of the information. Need-to-
know is determined in accordance with 49 C.F.R. §1520.11 and procedures
issued or approved by the TSA SSI Office. Under 49 C.F.R. §1520.11(a),
a DHS covered person has a need-to-know specific SSI in the following
circumstances:
●● When the person requires access to specific SSI to carry out
transportation security activities approved, accepted, funded,
recommended, or directed by DHS or DOT;
●● When the person is in training to carry out transportation security activities
approved, accepted, funded, recommended, or directed by DHS or DOT;
●● When the information is necessary for the person to supervise or
otherwise manage individuals carrying out transportation security activities
approved, accepted, funded, recommended, or directed by the DHS or
DOT;
●● When the person needs the information to provide technical or legal
advise to a covered person regarding transportation security requirements
of Federal law; or
●● When the person needs the information to represent a covered person in
connection with any judicial or administrative proceeding regarding those
requirements.
●● Pursuant to 49 C.F.R. §1520.11(b), a Federal employee has a need-to-
know SSI if access to the information is necessary for performance of
the employee’s official duties, on behalf or in defense of the interests of
the Federal, State, local or tribal government, or a person acting in the
performance of a contract or grant from DHS or DOT has a need-to-
know SSI if access to the information is necessary to performance of the
contract or grant.
●● Pursuant to 49 C.F.R. §1520.11(d), for some specific SSI, DHS may make
a finding that only specific persons or classes of persons, whose official
duties, on behalf or in defense of the interests of the Federal, State, local

or tribal government, have a need-to-know, in accordance with procedures

issued or approved by the Director of the TSA SSI Office.
14.9.3. A security clearance is not required for access to SSI. However, in
accordance with 49 C.F.R. §1520.11(c), TSA or USCG may make an
individual’s access to SSI contingent upon satisfactory completion of a
security background check or other procedures and requirements for
safeguarding SSI. The TSA SSI Office must approve any SSI background
check or processing requirements or procedures developed by the USCG or
CBP.
14.9.4. SSI shall be shared with other agencies, state, tribal, or local governments
and law enforcement officials, provided a need-to-know has been established
in accordance with 49 C.F.R. §1520.11, and the information is shared in
support of transportation security or in the furtherance of a coordinated and
official governmental activity.
14.9.5. In accordance with 49 C.F.R. §§1520.11(b)(1) and 1520.15(c), SSI shall be
shared with Congress, Congressional Committees, the Comptroller General
(Government Accountability Office), the Office of Inspector General, and other
similar entities acting within their official governmental capacities.
14.10. STORAGE AND HANDLING
14.10.1. When unattended, SSI will, at a minimum, be stored in a locked container
or in a room or area that has sufficient physical access control measures to
afford adequate protection and prevent unauthorized access by members of
the public, visitors, or other persons without a need-to-know, such as a locked
room, or an authorized area where access is controlled by a guard, cipher
lock, or card reader. Additional guidance can be obtained through the CBP
Program Manager, IA/SMD or the TSA SSI Office.
14.10.2. Information Technology (IT) systems that store SSI will be certified and
accredited for operation in accordance with Federal and DHS standards.
Consult the DHS Information Technology Security Program Handbook for
Sensitive Systems, Publication 4300A, or additional guidance published by
the TSA SSI Office for more detailed information.
14.10.3. When removed from an authorized storage location and persons without a
need-to-know are present, or where casual observation would reveal SSI
to unauthorized persons, measures such as an unmarked folder, envelope,
or SSI cover sheet shall be used to prevent unauthorized or inadvertent
disclosure.
14.11. CBP SSI FOIA REVIEW PROCESS
14.11.1. All Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests submitted to the CBP
FOIA Office must be reviewed for the presence of SSI. If the FOIA Office
determines that a record responsive to a FOIA request may contain SSI, it will

be forwarded to the SSI Program Manager, IA/SMD for a full review.

14.11.2. Procedures
●● Any person who receives a FOIA request must submit it to the CBP FOIA
Office for processing.
●● The FOIA Office will process the request by gathering records and
preparing an appropriate response while maintaining an awareness of
what constitutes SSI.
●● The FOIA Office will identify SSI in all records it receives and the response
it prepares.
●● If the FOIA Office determines that any records it reviews contain SSI,
those records will be forwarded to the SSI Program Manager, IA/SMD for
review and determination.
●● The SSI Program Manager will identify all SSI material in records it
receives from the FOIA Office and prepare a visibly redacted version of
the record, removing SSI material.
●● The visibly redacted version of the record will be returned to the FOIA
Office for further processing.
14.11.3. Information designated as SSI qualifies for exemption from disclosure under
the FOIA.
14.11.4. If a record contains both SSI and non-SSI material, only the non-SSI material
may be disclosed in response to a FOIA request.
14.11.5. f there is disagreement about the existence of SSI material, the issue will be
presented to a review committee consisting of a representative from the FOIA
Office, the SSI Program Office, and the Office of Chief Counsel. The SSI
Program Office will make the final decision.
14.12. TRANSMISSION
14.12.1. When transmitting SSI, the SSI marking must be applied to the transmittal
document (letter, memorandum, or fax). The transmittal document must
contain, if applicable, a disclaimer noting that it is no longer SSI when it
is detached from the SSI material it is transmitting (transmittal e-mails do
not need to contain this disclaimer), and a warning that if received by an
unintended or different recipient, the sender must be notified immediately.
14.12.2. When discussing or transmitting SSI to another individual(s), CBP Covered
Persons must ensure that the individual with whom the discussion is to be
held or the information is to be transferred has a valid need-to-know. In
addition, CBP Covered Persons must ensure that precautions are taken
to prevent unauthorized individuals from overhearing the conversation,
observing the materials, or otherwise accessing the information.
14.12.3. SSI shall be mailed in a manner that offers reasonable protection of the sent

materials and sealed in such a manner as to prevent inadvertent opening and

show evidence of tampering.
14.12.4. SSI may be mailed by U.S. Postal Service First Class Mail or an authorized
commercial delivery service such as DHL or Federal Express.
14.12.5. SSI may be placed into an inter-office mail system provided it is afforded
sufficient protection to prevent unauthorized access, e.g., sealed envelope.
14.12.6. Electronic Transmission
●● Transmittal r-controlled or -sponsored encrypted or otherwise protected
portals (applications or data networks), such as the Homeland Security
Information Network (HSIN), USCG HomePort, or TSA’s WebBoards.
Such posting shall be in accordance with guidance published or approved
by the TSA SSI Office, CBP Program Manager, IA/SMD and appropriate IT
security offices.
14.13. DESTRUCTION
14.13.1. In accordance with 49 CFR. §1520.19, SSI will be destroyed when no longer
needed and its continued retention is not otherwise required under the
National Archives Records Administration (NARA) records retention laws and
regulations. Destruction may be accomplished as follows:
●● “Hard Copy” materials will be destroyed by shredding, burning, pulping,
or pulverizing, such as to assure destruction beyond recognition and
reconstruction. After destruction, materials may be disposed of with normal
waste.
●● Electronic records may be deleted in accordance with policies or
procedures issued or approved by the TSA SSI Office and CBP Program
Manager, IA/SMD and in accordance with NARA records retention
policies. Electronic storage media (compact discs, personal computers,
etc.) shall be sanitized appropriately by overwriting or degaussing. Contact
the CBP Program Manager, IA/SMD or IT security personnel for additional
guidance.
●● Paper products containing SSI will not be disposed of in regular trash or
recycling receptacles unless the materials have first been destroyed as
specified above.
14.14. INCIDENT REPORTING
14.14.1. The loss, compromise, suspected compromise, or unauthorized disclosure of
SSI must be reported to the CBP SSI Program Manager, IA/SMD to the DHS
Office of Security or the TSA SSI Office. Incidents involving SSI in DHS IT
systems will be reported to the CBP Computer Security Incident Response
Center in accordance with IT incident reporting requirements. The TSA SSI
Office shall, in coordination with the DHS SSI Oversight Committee, develop,
publish or approve procedures for reporting, mitigating, and investigating

incidents involving the improper handling, suspicious or inappropriate

requests for, or unauthorized disclosure of SSI.
14.14.2. CBP shall have its own delegated authority, pursuant with DHS Delegation
8100.3, to pursue enforcement action of violations of the SSI regulation in
accordance with 49 CFR §1520.17, other applicable statutes and regulations,
and procedures issued or approved by the TSA SSI Office.
14.15. PROGRAM STATUS REPORTING
14.15.1. No later than January of each year the CBP SSI Program Manager shall
report, through the TSA SSI Office to the DHS Office of Security, the total
number of SSI records that were generated as SSI in their entirety for the
preceding calendar year. SSI in their entirety means any record, the entire
content of which the creator of the record believes to be SSI. Any record
that the creator of the record believes contains a combination of SSI and
information that is not SSI is not considered SSI in its entirety and therefore
not reportable. DHS Office of Security shall compile this information into
a single report for submission to the House and Senate Committees on
Homeland Security no later than January 31 of each calendar year.

15. Chapter 15: Security Education and Awareness

15.1. POLICY
15.1.1. A security program is most effective when employees practice security daily.
The Office of Internal Affairs, Security Management Division is responsible
for the Security Education and Awareness as it pertains to Administrative
Security i.e. safeguarding of classified and sensitive but unclassified
information, Physical Security, Counterintelligence and OPSEC. Refer to
Chapter 17 for specified security training descriptions and method of delivery.
15.2. RESPONSIBILITIES
15.2.1. The Director, Security Management Division has overall responsibility for
CBP’s Administrative Security Education and Awareness training as defined
in Chapter 17 and ensures CBP personnel who have not fulfilled the required
training requirements are restricted from unescorted access to CBP areas
and/or from access to classified information until the requirements are met.
15.3. SECURITY TRAINING
15.3.1. Security training will encompass the fundamentals of how to properly
safeguard classified and sensitive but unclassified information. The overall
intent of training is to provide CBP personnel with the basic knowledge
required to work effectively with critical information to:
●● Ensure that each employee who creates, processes, or handles
classified information has a satisfactory knowledge and understanding of
classification, safeguarding, and declassification policies, procedures, and
practices;
●● Increase uniformity among personnel when handling classified and
sensitive but unclassified information;
●● Reduce improper classification, safeguarding, transmission, and disclosing
incidents; and
●● Foster motivation to attend security education and awareness training
activities.
15.3.2. Training methods may include on-site briefings provided by the Office of
Internal Affairs (IA), security liaison and/or web base delivery.
15.3.3. Security Orientation Training:
●● All CBP employees, detailed personnel, and contractors are required to
attend Security Orientation Training within the first 30 days of assignment.
This training covers the basics on protection, reporting emergencies, theft,
misconduct and protection of information.
15.3.4. Initial Security Training “Safeguarding Classified National Security

Information:”
●● As defined in Executive Order 12958, as amended, all CBP personnel
who have undergone a complete favorable background investigation
for access to classified and require a security clearance as defined in
Chapter 7.1 are required to have Initial Security Training on the proper
safeguarding of classified information prior to being granted a final security
clearance. Individuals shall receive a comprehensive briefing to inform
them of their safeguard and security responsibilities for the protection of
Classified National Security Information and penalties associated with
the mishandling of this information. At this time personnel will also be
required to execute the Standard Form (SF) 312, Classified Information
Nondisclosure Agreement, and the Department of Homeland Security,
Customs and Border Protection Reporting Foreign Contacts Form. The
Office of Internal Affairs, Personnel Security Division is responsible for
providing this training.
15.3.5. Refresher Security Training “Safeguarding Classified National Security
Information:”
●● All CBP personnel who have been granted a security clearance are
required to undergo annual refresher training on the safeguarding and
handling of classified information as defined in Executive Order 12958,
as amended. This training is required to ensure the individual’s continued
access to classified information.

16. Chapter 16: Compliance Reviews and Self-Inspections

16.1. POLICY
16.1.1. This handbook is designed to ensure proper and adequate security services
to CBP personnel while safeguarding and protecting critical information from
unauthorized disclosure such as theft, sabotage or mishandling. Unauthorized
disclosure of classified and sensitive but unclassified information threatens
our national security. Security compliance, which may consist of self-
inspections, security surveys, assessments, assistance visits, compliance
reviews and unannounced spot checks are conducted to ensure compliance
with laws, Executive Orders, Federal regulations, and CBP policies.
16.1.2. This chapter provides an overview of compliance reviews conducted by
the Office of Internal Affairs and ongoing standards for the Self-Inspection
Program (SIP) as it relates to the safeguarding of classified and sensitive but
unclassified information.
16.2. RESPONSIBILITIES
16.2.1. The Director, Security Management Division is responsible for ensuring
that all CBP offices comply with established security laws, regulations, and
policies. Compliance review teams, which conduct compliance surveys,
inspections, assessments, and spot checks, carry out this function.
16.3. COMPLIANCE REVIEW PROCEDURES
16.3.1. Compliance reviews and frequency of the reviews are based on CBP office
program needs and the magnitude of security activity to include the (SIP)
results. Compliance review teams will conduct reviews of CBP offices that
handle and store classified information biannually.
16.3.2. The compliance review team will provide an in-brief prior to the commencing
of the review and provide an exit briefing at the conclusion of the review.
16.3.3. Compliance reviews are not limited to the protection of critical information and
may include physical, personnel and operational security practices. Reviews
may include information listed below and information contained in Section
19.4, Self-Inspections:
●● A review of internal procedures and processes for the safeguarding of
classified and sensitive but unclassified information;
●● Interviews with office personnel;
●● A review of access and control records;
●● A review of safes/security containers; and
●● A review of a sampling of classified and sensitive but unclassified
documents processed and/or stored.

16.3.4. The compliance review team will prepare a draft report that documents
preliminary findings and recommendations. A final report will be provided to
the relevant CBP program activity through the appropriate CBP Office head.
16.4. SELF-INSPECTIONS
16.4.1. CBP offices are required to conduct self-inspections for the safeguarding
of classified and sensitive but unclassified information on an annual basis.
The Office of Internal Affairs, Security Management Division receives and
analyzes SIP results in this area.
16.5. UNANNOUNCED REVIEWS
16.5.1. The Office of Internal Affairs may conduct an unannounced review of a CBP
program office without the benefit of advance notification. An unannounced
review is conducted when issues or circumstances arise, which raise
concerns relative to the effective and efficient management of classified or
sensitive but unclassified information within a CBP program office.
16.6. EXTERNAL REVIEWS AND INSPECTIONS
16.6.1. CBP offices may be subject to reviews and inspections from outside entities
such as the DHS Chief Security Office, DHS Office of Inspector General or
the National Archives Records Administration, Information Security Oversight
Office.

17. Appendix A - Security Forms

SECURITY FORMS
• DHS 11000-1(08-03): Classified National Security Information Courier Card
• DHS 11000-02: Courier Authorization Request
• DHS 11000-3(08-03): Document Control Register
• DHS 11000-4(08-03): Top Secret Signature Record
• DHS 11000-5: DHS Personnel Security Data Verification Request
• DNS 11000-6: Non-Disclosure Agreement
• DHS 11000-8: Disclosure Record
• DHS 11000-9: Disclosure and Authorization Pertaining to Consumer Reports
Pursuant to the Fair Credit Reporting Act
• DHS 11000-10: Record of Security Violation
• DHS 11000-11,1: Document Record of Transmittal
• DHS 11000-13: Visitor Processing Information
• DHS 11000-14: Identification Access Control Card Request
• DHS 11000-15: Courier Service Request
• DHS 11000-16: DHS Employee Credential Request Form
• DHS 11000-17: Request for Security Clearance for Access to Classified Information
• DHS 11000-18: Classified Document Certification of Destruction
• DHS 11041-1: Request for Delegation of Original Classification Authority
• DHS 11042-1: For Official Use Only (FOUO) Labels
• DHS 11043-1: Notification of Foreign Travel
• DHS 11053-5: Foreign Contact Form
• SF-312: Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement (01/00)
• SF-700: Security Container Information (08/85)
• SF-701: Activity Security Check Sheet
• SF-702: Security Container Check Sheet
• SF-703: Top Secret Cover Sheet
• SF-704: Secret Cover Sheet
• SF-705: Confidential Cover Sheet
• SF-706: Top Secret Label

• SF-707: Secret Label

• SF-708: Confidential Label
• SF-710: Unclassified Label
• SF-711: Data Descriptor Label
• CBP Form 241: Separation Clearance
• CBP Form 242: Contractor Employee Separations Clearance
• CBP Form 2002: Computer Incident Report
• CBP Form 6100: Security Clearance Request
• CBP Form 6101: Classified Visit Request Security Clearance Certification
• No Number: Inadvertent Disclosure Statement (IAW DHS MD 11049-Attachment 2)
• No Number: DHS For Official Use Only (FOUO) Cover Sheet
• No Number: DHS CBP Reporting Foreign Contacts

Badges, Credentials and Official Identification

CONTENTS

1. Chapter 1: Definitions�� 851

1.1. Definitions�� 851

2. Chapter 2: Purpose, Scope, and Superseded/Cancelled

Policy/Summary of Changes�� 853

2.1. Purpose�� 853

2.2. Scope�� 853

2.3. Superseded/Cancelled Policy/Summary of Changes�� 853

3. Chapter 3: Policy�� 855

3.1. Policy�� 855

3.2. New Badges, Credentials, and/or Methods of Use or Display�� 855

3.3. Use of Badges and Credentials�� 855

3.4. Misconduct and Penalties�� 856

3.5. Qualified Retired Law Enforcement Officers�� 856

4. Chapter 4: Authorities and References�� 859

5. Chapter 5: Roles and Responsibilities�� 861

5.1. Commissioner�� 861

5.2. Director of Security Management Division (SMD)�� 861

5.3. Badge and Credentialing Office Manager (BCOM)�� 861

5.4. Assistant Commissioners, Chief of the Border Patrol, and Chief Counsel.
�� 861

5.5. Assistant Commissioner of Human Resources Management �� 862

5.6. Deputy Assistant Commissioners, Directors, Executive Directors,

Associate Chief Counsels, Office Directors, Division Directors, and
Sector Chiefs �� 862

5.7. Local Field Badge Coordinator �� 862

5.8. CBP Employees �� 862

6. Chapter 6: Titles, Authorities, and Positions�� 865

6.1. Titles, Authorities, and Positions�� 865

7. Chapter 7: Accountability, Retention, Inventory, and

Storage/Physical Security�� 867

7.1. Accountability and Retention�� 867

7.2. Inventory�� 869

7.3. Storage and Physical Security of Badges and Credentials�� 869

8. Chapter 8: Requesting, Issuing, Shipping,

and Purchasing�� 871

8.1. Badge and Credentials Requests�� 871

8.2. Issuance of Badges and Credentials�� 871

8.3. Credential Photograph, Signature, and Authentication Criteria�� 873

8.4. Shipment of Badges and Credentials�� 874

8.5. Purchase of Badges, Credential Laminates,

and Credential Stock Paper�� 874

8.6. Additional Issues and Optional Equipment�� 874

9. Chapter 9: Lost/Stolen, Damaged, or Destroyed�� 875

9.1. Lost/Stolen Badges and Credentials�� 875

9.2. Destruction of Badges and Credentials�� 876

10. Chapter 10: Incentive Awards, Retirement, Badge

Preservation, and Commemorative Badges�� 879

10.1. Incentive Awards�� 879

10.2. Retirement and Preservation of Badges and Credentials�� 879

10.3. Commemorative Badges�� 880

11. Chapter 11: Requesting and Issuing Retired Law

Enforcement Identification Cards�� 883

11.1. Policy�� 883

12. Chapter 12: Inspections�� 885

12.1. Inspections�� 885

13. APPENDIX 8.1: Authorized Badge Titles�� 887

14. APPENDIX 8.2: CBP Credential Types and Authorities889

15. APPENDIX 10.1: Request for Retirement/Preservation of

CBP Badge and Credential�� 891

1. Chapter 1: Definitions
1.1. Definitions
1.1.1. Electronic Badge Inventory and Control System (BICS). BICS is the data base
system that maintains the CBP badge and credentials life cycle data.
1.1.2. Credentials. Forms of identification that describe the authority of the bearer and
identify that individual’s right to exercise specific responsibilities for official and legal
purposes. .
1.1.3. Credential Holder. Two-section plain black leather or vinyl wallet sized item used to
display and protect a two-part credential independent of a badge.
1.1.4. Badge. A metallic emblem that is presented or displayed by the authorized bearer
to indicate and serve as a sign and representative symbol of specific authority. CBP
Badges are a uniform size and made of heavy gauged metal; and have a primarily
gold electroplated finish appearance with dark navy blue enameled background, and
the Department of Homeland Security Seal.
1.1.5. Commissioning Book. Three-section plain black leather or vinyl wallet size item
used to display and protect a two-part credential and badge.
1.1.6. Law Enforcement Officer. As defined in 5 USC §§ 8331(20);8331(17), and includes
DHS employees whose primary duties are the investigation, apprehension, and
detention of individuals suspected or convicted of offenses against the criminal laws
of the United States, or the protection of officials of the United States against threats
to personal safety; an employee who transfers from performing the aforementioned
duties for at least three years to a supervisory or administrative position; and certain
employees who have frequent and direct contact with convicted criminals.
1.1.7. Good Standing. A CBP employee or an employee from an agency whose functions
were merged into CBP, shall be deemed to have retired in good standing, unless at
the time of their retirement:
●● A determination made or action initiated to remove or proposing to remove the
employee from federal employment;
●● Employee’s security clearance was suspended or revoked or a proposal to
suspend or revoke the clearance had been issued;
●● Employee was the subject of a pending psychological fitness for duty evaluation
or had been found to be not fit for duty; or
●● An unadjudicated charge of misconduct against the employee or the employee
was subject to an adverse disciplinary action resulting from a substantiated claim
of misconduct.
1.1.8. Qualified Retired Law Enforcement Officer. A qualified retired law enforcement
officer is an individual who:
●● Retired in good standing from service with a public agency as a law enforcement
officer, other than for reasons of mental instability;
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
847 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

●● Before such retirement, was authorized by law to engage in or supervise the

prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of or the incarceration of any
person for any violation of law, and had statutory powers of arrest;
●● Before such retirement, was regularly employed as a law enforcement officer for
an aggregate of 15 years or more; or Retired from service with such agency, after
completing any applicable probationary period of such service, due to a service-
connected disability, as determined by such agency:
●● Has a nonforfeitable right to benefits under the retirement plan of the agency;
●● During the most recent 12-month period has met at the expense of the individual,
the State’s standards for training and qualification for active law enforcement
officers to carry firearms;
●● Is not under the influence of alcohol or another intoxicating or hallucinatory drug
or substance; and
●● Is not prohibited by Federal law from receiving a firearm.
1.1.9. Retiree Identification Card. A photographic identification card issued by CBP that
certifies the holder as a qualified retired law enforcement officer as defined under 18
USC §§926B; 926C. The card can be used to satisfy the identification requirements
under 18 USC §926B, §926C, but provides the holder with no law enforcement
powers or authorities nor any authority to carry a firearm.

2. Chapter 2: Purpose, Scope, and Superseded/Cancelled

Policy/Summary of Changes
2.1. Purpose
2.1.1. This volume of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Security Policy
Handbook establishes the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) CBP policies,
roles, and responsibilities regarding CBP official identification. Its purpose is to
establish uniform protocols and provide guidance to all CBP employees regarding
the issuance, use, display, control, accountability, return, and destruction of all CBP
identification. Exceptions to policies and procedures must be requested in writing
through the Assistant Commissioner of Internal Affairs and approved in writing by the
Commissioner of CBP.
2.2. Scope
2.2.1. This publication establishes CBP badge and credentialing procedures and
authorizes the implementation of the CBP Badge and Credentialing Program to
conduct and manage all activities related to employee identification. These policies
apply to all CBP Federal employees and contractors who have been issued or have
access to any CBP identification.
2.2.2. This publication also establishes CBP policy with respect to retired qualified law
enforcement officers and the application of the provisions of the Law Enforcement
Officers Safety Act of 2004.
2.3. Superseded/Cancelled Policy/Summary of Changes
2.3.1. This volume supersedes previous issuances and previously recognized processes
relating to the Badge and Credentialing Program. Effective with the issuance of
this publication, all current or previous policies and/or directives relating to the CBP
Badge and Credentialing Program are hereby rescinded.

3. Chapter 3: Policy
3.1. Policy
3.1.1. The Office of Internal Affairs (IA) is responsible for the oversight, functional, and
operational control of CBP identification(s).
3.1.2. This publication mandates that badges and credentials will be issued only to
authorized employees as evidence of their authority when having contact with the
public and in dealings with Federal, State, local or foreign officials under purposes
authorized by law, statute or CBP policy. Changes to this policy shall be authorized
by the Commissioner and will be added as an addendum as required.
3.1.3. Badges and credentials are controlled and accountable CBP property. Every
employee issued badges and/or credentials is required to sign a receipt for issuance,
and is responsible for the proper use, safeguarding, accountability, and return of
their issued badges and/or credentials in accordance with this publication.
3.1.4. Employees must not display any badge or credential associating them with CBP that
has not been officially issued to them. All CBP offices, officials, and employees will
comply with the policy and procedures.
3.1.5. Badges and credentials signify that the bearer is authorized to perform specific
official functions under the law, statute or position of assignment.
3.1.6. No employee, office, organization or unit may privately purchase, obtain or produce
CBP badges or credentials. Employees may not alter, deface, change or mark a
badge or credential in any manner.
3.2. New Badges, Credentials, and/or Methods of Use or Display
3.2.1. Development, use or display of new badges or credentials will be coordinated
in advance with the Assistant Commissioner of Internal Affairs, concurred by the
Assistant Commissioner of the functional area concerned, and approved in writing
by the Commissioner of CBP.
3.3. Use of Badges and Credentials
3.3.1. Badges and/or credentials will be issued on a selective and/or restricted basis.
Badges and/or credentials authorize the bearer to perform specific official functions
as mandated by law, statute or position of assignment.
3.3.2. Credentials shall identify whether an employee is authorized to:
●● Carry a firearm;
●● Conduct investigations; and
●● Make arrests.
3.3.3. Issued badges and credentials are used only for official purposes related to CBP
duties and must be displayed with discretion. The use of a badge and/or credential
to coerce, intimidate, deceive, or obtain directly or indirectly, any privilege, favor,

preferential treatment, reward or personal gain for themselves or others, is

considered misconduct.
3.3.4. Possession of credentials does not relieve the bearer from complying with
established access control requirements. Any circumstance that presents a
reasonable doubt on the authenticity or validity of the credential or the verification of
identity or authority of the bearer shall be reported to appropriate security officials.
3.4. Misconduct and Penalties
3.4.1. Misconduct. Employees and contractors are responsible for the proper use and
safeguarding of all CBP identification. The careless handling, abuse, misuse or
intentional misrepresentation of badges and credentials shall be cause for possible
administrative or disciplinary action, which may include, but not limited to temporary
suspension, reassignment, revocation of official duties and responsibilities, removal
from employment with CBP or other penalties.
3.4.2. Penalties. Badges and credentials should never be issued or used for transacting
non-official business. Penalties may be imposed pursuant to law for the improper
use of official identification to include:
●● 18 USC §499. Military, naval, or official passes--”Whoever falsely makes, forges,
counterfeits, alters, or tampers with any naval, military, or official pass or permit,
issued by or under the authority of the United States, or with intent to defraud
uses or possesses any such pass or permit, or personates or falsely represents
himself to be or not to be a person to whom such pass or permit has been duly
issued, or willfully allows any other person to have or use any such pass or
permit, issued for his use alone, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both.”
●● 18 USC §1028 details what are fraudulent activities, as well applicable penalties,
in connection with identification documents and information.
●● USC 18 §701. Official badges, identification cards, other insignia--”Whoever
manufactures, sells, or possesses any badge, identification card, or other
insignia, of the design prescribed by the head of any department or agency of
the United States for use by any officer or employee thereof, or any colorable
imitation thereof, or photographs, prints, or in any other manner makes or
executes any engraving, photograph, print, or impression in the likeness of
any such badge, identification card, or other insignia, or any colorable imitation
thereof, except as authorized under regulations made pursuant to law, shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than six months, or both.”
3.5. Qualified Retired Law Enforcement Officers
3.5.1. Pursuant to 18 USC §926C, a qualified retired law enforcement officer may carry a
concealed firearm, subject to certain limitations, including:
●● CBP Credentials (containing their photograph, name, signature, and position
title) marked in a visible manner as to designate the retired status on the top and
bottom portion of the credentials.; or
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
852 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

●● A photographic identification issued by CBP; and

●● During the most recent 12-month period, has met, at the expense of the
individual, the standards for the state in which the individual resides for training
and qualification for active law enforcement officers to carry a firearm.
3.5.2. CBP shall prepare and issue a retiree identification card for qualified retired law
enforcement officers who have retired from CBP or a predecessor agency that
was merged into CBP to replace any lost or stolen “Retired” CBP Credentials. If
the retired law enforcement officer did not receive “Retired” CBP credentials or
retired credentials for a predecessor agency, a sworn affidavit to that effect must
accompany the request for the retired identification card. This identification card shall
be separate and distinct from an employee’s retired credentials.
3.5.3. CBP shall prepare and issue a retiree identification card only for qualified retired
law enforcement officers who have retired from CBP or a predecessor agency that
was merged into CBP since 1995. Retirees who retired before 1995 cannot request
retired identification cards.
3.5.4. If the retiree identification card is being requested as a replacement for lost or stolen
CBP “Retired” credentials, the retiree will be required to file a lost or stolen report
with their local law enforcement office and ensure that a National Crime Information
Center (NCIC) report was filed before the retired identification card can be issued.
3.5.5. Each retiree identification card shall, at a minimum, include the name of the
applicant, the individual’s photograph, an identification number traceable to the
bearer, the date the employee retired in good standing from service with CBP or
an agency whose functions were merged into CBP, and the phrase “Retired Law
Enforcement Officer.”
3.5.6. Retiree identification cards issued to qualified retired law enforcement officers in
accordance with this section carry no law enforcement powers or authorities, and
do not provide the holder with any authority to carry a firearm. This disclaimer shall
be clearly marked on each retiree identification card issued by CBP, and prior to
issuance. All qualified retired law enforcement officers will be required to sign a
written disclaimer acknowledging that the retiree identification card carries no such
powers or authorities.
3.5.7. CBP shall not issue a retiree identification card under this section to a qualified
retired law enforcement officer until the individual signs a waiver indemnifying CBP
for, and holding CBP harmless from, any resulting liability for use of or possession of
a firearm carried under 18 USC §§926B; 926C.
3.5.8. CBP will not reimburse retired law enforcement officers for any cost associated with
the certification requirement referenced in 3.5.1 of this section or provide firearm
qualification testing.
3.5.9. CBP shall not train or qualify retired employees to carry a firearm. A retired, qualified
law enforcement officer must qualify pursuant to 18 USC §926C(d)(2)(B), and in
accordance with State standards for active law enforcement officers.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
853 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

3.5.10. It shall be within the discretion of CBP to issue a qualified retired law enforcement
officer a retiree identification card as described in this chapter. Should CBP
determine that the subject is not qualified, or enter into an agreement in which the
subject agrees that he or she is not qualified, the subject shall not be issued the
retiree identification card described above.
3.5.11. With respect to the requirement that a qualified retired law enforcement officer
“is not under the influence of alcohol or another intoxicating or hallucinatory drug
or substance,” in addition to any applicable Federal regulations or requirements,
each former CBP employee seeking such State certification annually must meet
State standards, if any, regarding alcohol or drug use by law enforcement officers
authorized to carry a firearm.
3.5.12. Individuals who meet the definition of a qualified law enforcement officer under 18
USC §926B, §926C may or may not meet the definition of a law enforcement officer
under the Civil Service Retirement System or the Federal Employee Retirement
System. No provision of credentials or identification should be constituted as having
bearing on qualifications for any other Federal program.

4. Chapter 4: Authorities and References

United States Code
• 5 USC §301, Departmental Regulations
• 18 USC §499, Military, Naval or Official Passes
• 18 USC §701, Official Shields, Identification Cards, and Other Insignia
• 18 USC §926B, §926C, Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act (LEOSA) of 2004
• 18 USC §1028, Fraud and Related Activity in Connection with Identification
Documents and Information
• 6 USC §112, Secretary; Functions
• 31 USC §321, General Authority of the Secretary; [Treasury Directive 71-10, Chapter
III, Section 6, Department of the Treasury Credentials and Badges/Shields, June 30,
1998] to the extent this is included for retirees with IDs.
Public Law
• Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act of 2004, Pub. L.108-277, 118 Stat. 865
(certified at 18 USC §926B, §926C.
• Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 6 USC §101 et. seq.)
Department of Homeland Security Management Directives
• DHS MD 11010.1, Issuance and Control of Credentials
• DHS MD 121-01-002, Issuance and Control of DHS Badges
U.S. Customs and Border Protection Handbooks
• HB 5200-13B, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Personal Property Management
Handbook, dated November 2005
U.S. Customs and Border Protection Training Directive
• Mandatory Successful Completion of Basic Training Directive 51250-001A,
September 3, 1999
Legacy
• Customs Directive Number 4510-017A, U.S. Customs Firearms and Use of Force,
dated December 17, 2001
• CIS HB 4500-01A, 03/03, Firearms and Use of Force Handbook

5. Chapter 5: Roles and Responsibilities

5.1. Commissioner
5.1.1. Oversight responsibility for the development, coordination, and administration of the
CBP Badge and Credentialing Program.
5.2. Director of Security Management Division (SMD)
5.2.1. Responsible for the management of the CBP Badge and Credentialing Program and
ensures policies and procedures are established and implemented by CBP.
5.3. Badge and Credentialing Office Manager (BCOM)
5.3.1. Appointed by the Director of SMD and is responsible for the overall management
of the operational and administrative functions of the CBP Badge and Credentialing
Program. The BCOM will ensure program compliance and controls are in place to
account for all badges and credentials.
●● Operates and manages the Badge and Credentialing Office;
●● Issues all badges and credentials for CBP;
●● Provides CBP field locations with administrative, functional guidance, and
procedures regarding the Badge and Credentialing Program;
●● Maintains records and accounting of all CBP badges and credentials;
●● Conducts annual inventories of all badges and credentials;
●● Maintains an inventory of badges, laminate, and credential stock paper;
●● Assists in the development of a CBP identification checklist for use during
periodic management inspections;
●● Ensures compliance, standardization, and continuity for all aspects of the Badge
and Credentialing Program; and
●● Serves as the Contracting Officer Technical Representative (COTR) for all
badges, commissioning books, credential laminate, credential cardstock, and
peripheral equipment/software to manage and supply materials for the Badge
and Credentialing Program.
5.3.2. Responsible for reviewing all applications for retiree identification cards, coordinating
with the appropriate program officers to ensure that all necessary checks are
conducted and determinations made as to an applicant’s eligibility, verifying the
applicant’s identity, and issuing the card.
5.4. Assistant Commissioners, Chief of the Border Patrol, and Chief Counsel.
5.4.1. Will ensure the CBP Badge and Credentialing Program is implemented according to
established Federal laws, Executive Orders, and statutes.
●● Ensures all CBP employees comply with CBP Badge and Credentialing policies
and procedures; and
●● Ensures all CBP employees are issued a badge and/or credential only after
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
857 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

successfully meeting mandatory training requirements and/or meeting other

established CBP criteria governing the issuance of badges and/or credentials to
CBP employees.
5.5. Assistant Commissioner of Human Resources Management
5.5.1. Responsible for ensuring that information about the application of LEOSA and
the process for obtaining the required retiree identification card is provided to all
CBP law enforcement officers who are about to retire as part of their retirement
processing, and, upon request, to all retired law enforcement officers who retired
from CBP or an agency whose functions were merged into CBP.
5.6. Deputy Assistant Commissioners, Directors, Executive Directors, Asso-
ciate Chief Counsels, Office Directors, Division Directors, and Sector
Chiefs
5.6.1. Responsible for directing the operational and administrative functions of the Badge
and Credentialing Program within their components. Responsible for appointing in
writing to the CBP Badge and Credentialing Office, a local Field Badge Coordinator
and an alternate to operate a Badge and Credentialing Program within their offices,
areas or sectors.
5.7. Local Field Badge Coordinator
5.7.1. An individual appointed by the Field Office Principal to locally manage the needs of
the field office employees regarding badges and credentials.
●● Serves as the primary point of contact for correspondence, requests, and actions
with the Badge and Credentialing Office;
●● Maintains accurate records of all badges and credentials within that components
area of responsibility;
●● Ensures CBP badges and credentials are issued only to CBP employees;
●● Immediately reports the loss or theft of CBP badges and/or credentials; and
●● Maintains accountability and coordinates all inventories and reports any
discrepancies.
5.8. CBP Employees
5.8.1. CBP employee are responsible for:
●● Ensuring issued badges and/or credentials are properly used and safeguarded at
all times;
●● Becoming familiar and complying with the provisions of this publication;
●● Carrying issued badges and/or credentials physically on their person at all times
while on duty or while carrying a CBP issued or authorized firearm or weapon;
●● Immediately reporting the loss or theft of the badges and/or credentials detailed
in Chapter 9;
●● Ensuring badges and/or credentials are properly maintained in serviceable and
presentable condition;
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
858 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

●● Requesting authorization to retain their badges and/or credentials upon

retirement as detailed in Chapter 10;
●● Surrendering all badges and/or credentials upon:
o Request of a supervisor or other duly authorized CBP official;
o Retirement;
o Termination, suspension or otherwise deemed unfit for duty
o Resigning from CBP; or
o Assignment to a position that no longer requires the issuance of a badge and/
or credential as detailed in Chapter 8.
●● Requesting updates to badges and/or credentials due to:
o A change in occupational series;
o A change of name; or
o A defect found on the badge and/or credential as detailed in Chapter 9.

6. Chapter 6: Titles, Authorities, and Positions

6.1. Titles, Authorities, and Positions
6.1.1. CBP badges and credentials are issued based on the employee’s responsibilities
and duties. CBP employees meeting one of the following criteria may be issued CBP
badges upon satisfactory completion of required training for:
●● Designated law enforcement officers;
●● Employees required to carry a firearm pursuant to his or her official duties;
●● Employees who perform investigations and inspections relating to enforcement of
laws or regulations; and
●● Employees that the Commissioner may designate in writing.
6.1.2. CBP employees with the duties and responsibilities in 6.1.1 will receive the badge(s)
as required by their position of assignment, a standard commissioning book, and an
appropriate two-part credential listing the applicable and approved authority of the
individual’s CBP job series and the current title of the employee.
6.1.3. All other employees within CBP will receive an appropriate two-part credential that
lists the applicable and approved authority of the individual’s CBP job series and a
credential holder.
6.1.4. Employees who are assigned on detail to a position that requires different badges
and/or credentials will:
●● Turn in their assigned badges and/or credentials to be held in the Badge and
Credentialing Office until the detail is completed.
●● Be issued another badge and/or credentials to reflect the position of assignment
of their detail.
●● Turn in their temporary badges and/or credentials when their detail is completed.
●● Receive their original badge(s) and credential(s) upon completion of their detail.
6.1.5. CBP credentials will be permanently laminated before issuance.
6.1.6. Only the Commissioner of CBP has the authority to remove, change or add badge
titles and/or credential authorities.

7. Chapter 7: Accountability, Retention, Inventory, and

Storage/Physical Security
7.1. Accountability and Retention
7.1.1. Employees, their supervisors, Deputy Assistant Commissioners, Directors of Field
Operations, Executive Directors, Associate Chief Counsels, Office Directors, Division
Directors, and Sector Deputy Chiefs, and the Badge and Credentialing Officer are
responsible for CBP identification accountability within their geographic areas of
responsibility.
7.1.2. Badges and credentials will be accounted for on the CBP Form 259, Personal
Equipment and Clothing Record. This document will be generated at the Badge
and Credentialing Office when badge and/or credentials are initially issued to an
employee.
7.1.3. The CBP Form 259, Personal Equipment and Clothing Record, will be shipped with
the badge and credential; the Field Badge Coordinator will have the employee sign
the CBP Form 259 indicating receipt/turn-in of the badge and/or credential. One
copy will be given to the employee, a copy will be maintained in the employee’s local
personnel file, and a copy will be transmitted to the Badge and Credentialing Office
within 10 days of receipt.
7.1.4. When a badge and/or credential is returned to the Badge and Credentialing Office
the same procedure will apply indicating the return of badge and/or credential. In
addition to returning the badge and/or credential with CBP Form 259, the head of
the office will provide supporting documentation detailing the employee’s status and
reason(s) as to why the badge and/or credential is being returned.
7.1.5. When an employee is reassigned, transferred or moved to a different location within
CBP the employee will:
●● Retain the assigned badge and/or credential if the new position the employee will
occupy warrants the same type of badge and/or credential;
●● Relinquish the badge and/or credential at the gaining duty station if the employee
must travel while carrying an authorized CBP firearm and the new position does
not require the same type of badge and credential issued to the employee;
●● Turn in the badge at the losing duty station if the new position does not require
the same type of badge and the employee is not carrying an authorized CBP
firearm during travel. Employee will travel with the credentials;
●● Turn in the credentials at the gaining duty station if the new position does not
require the same type of credentials;
●● Upon arriving at the new duty station the employee will contact their Field Badge
Coordinator and indicate that they have arrived with their assigned badge and/or
credentials or that they require a new badge and/or credential be issued because
of the employee’s position and/or assigned duties;

7.1.6. An employee must turn in the assigned badge and/or credential when:
●● Employment with CBP has been terminated;
●● Resigned from CBP;
●● Retired from CBP;
●● Transferred to a position that no longer requires badge and/or credentials;
●● Badge or credential is damaged and no longer presentable or serviceable;
●● No longer meeting CBP requirements to retain the badge and/or credential;
●● Law Enforcement Officers on authorized sick leave or leave without pay status
for an entire qualification period;
●● Suspended from their positions (badge and/or credentials must be turned in prior
to suspension);
●● Placed on administrative leave during the course of an internal investigation/
inquiry;
●● Recalled/mobilized for active military duty for 30 days or more; or
●● Determined by the Commissioner that it is in the best interest of CBP.
7.1.7. All employees who no longer meet CBP requirements in 7.1.6 will:
●● Return their badge and/or credentials to the Badge and Credentialing Office until
final disposition on the employee is determined.
●● When final disposition is made on these employees, the Badge and Credentialing
Officer will be notified and the badge and/or credentials will be processed as
required.
7.1.8. Employees who have terminated, retired, resigned or transferred from CBP will
return their badge and/or credentials to their immediate supervisor prior to being
granted final clearance. A completed CBP Form 241, Separation Clearance Form,
will be sent with the badge and credentials so final disposition of the badges and/
or credentials can be implemented according to this publication. The Field Badge
Coordinator will take the appropriate action to ensure that badge and/or credentials
are returned to the Badge and Credentialing Office pursuant to this publication within
10 days after completion of the personnel action.
7.1.9. Employees who have resigned or are terminated from CBP may not retain their
badge and/or credential as a memento. Exceptions to this policy will be granted
on a case-by-case basis with a waiver approved through the respective Assistant
Commissioner of the functional area and approved in writing by the Commissioner.
7.1.10. CBP badges and/or credentials that have been confiscated and are being held by
the U.S. Attorneys Office, Federal, State or local law enforcement agencies will be
reported to the Badge and Credentialing Office. The Field Badge Coordinator will
prepare memorandum with the contact information of the individual who will be the
primary point of contact for the confiscated badge and/or credentials. A copy of
this memorandum will be maintained with the local records and a copy sent to the

Badge and Credentialing Office. The badge and/or credentials will be placed into
a pending status at the Badge and Credentialing Office. Confiscated badge and/or
credentials are required to be inventoried on an annual basis. Once the badge and/
or credentials are no longer required for legal proceedings they will be returned to
the Badge and Credentialing Office for final disposition.
7.2. Inventory
7.2.1. Badge and Credential Inventory. The Badge and Credentialing Office will conduct an
annual, CBP-wide, inventory of issued and un-issued badges and issued credentials.
7.2.2. All Field Badge Coordinators will ensure that every badge and credential within
their geographic area of responsibility is physically inventoried. A signed and
dated copy of the inventory will be returned to the Badge and Credentialing Office.
Documentation for any discrepancies will be forwarded to the CBP Badge and
Credentialing Office.
7.2.3. The Badge and Credentialing Office is responsible for reviewing all inventoried
records received from all CBP offices and initiating any necessary actions to address
discrepancies annotated or not identified during the annual inventory.
7.2.4. The Badge and Credentialing Office will conduct an annual inventory of all badges
and credentials stored in the Badge and Credentialing Office(s). Representatives of
the Badge and Credentialing Office will conduct the annual inventory.
7.3. Storage and Physical Security of Badges and Credentials
7.3.1. Badges and credentials that are not assigned to an employee will be retained at the
CBP Badge and Credentialing Office or other physically secure areas authorized as
satellite CBP Badge and Credentialing Offices. Unassigned badges and credentials
are not authorized to be stored at field offices for any purpose.
7.3.2. Badges, credentials, laminate, and credential stock paper will be stored in a
physically secured area with controlled access to the CBP Badge and Credentialing
Office employees.

8. Chapter 8: Requesting, Issuing, Shipping, and Purchasing

8.1. Badge and Credentials Requests
8.1.1. Requests for new, updated (change in name or position) or replacement of lost/
stolen/damaged badges and/or credentials must be requested using CBP Form 56.
All items on the form must be completed. For employees in the field, the Field Badge
Coordinator will forward the request to the Badge and Credentialing Office.
8.1.2. Requests for badges and/or credentials will include:
●● Documentation indicating the employee has been hired or promoted to a new
position by CBP;
●● Using Appendix 8.1, Authorized Badge Titles, determine the appropriate Job Title
to be placed on credentials; employees not issued a CBP badge will not have a
title on their credential;
●● Remarks section will include the CBP Credential Type, three letter designation,
to be issued; and a copy of course diploma or other official documentation with
the name, class number, and date of graduation of the employee will be included
with the request if specific training is required prior to issuance of a badge and/or
credential.
8.1.3. Requests to replace lost or stolen badges and/or credentials are addressed in
Chapter 9.1, Lost/Stolen Badges and Credentials.
8.2. Issuance of Badges and Credentials
8.2.1. Only the Office of Internal Affairs Badge and Credentialing Office is authorized to
issue badges and credentials.
8.2.2. CBP employees may not retain more than one badge set and/or one credential at a
time. Issuance of updated badges or credentials will only occur when the badge and/
or credential to be replaced are turned in on a one for one basis, except in the case
of lost or stolen badges and credentials.
8.2.3. The Commissioner of CBP has the authority to permit additional badges. This
additional badge will be an authorized CBP badge, required by the employee’s
position or assignment. Badges issued as a set will always be the same type of
badge. CBP employees are not authorized to purchase a replica badge from a
private vendor for any official or non-official purpose.
8.2.4. Employees will be issued their badges and/or credentials upon successful
completion of mandatory basic training programs or when they meet the CBP
criteria for the authorized issuance of a badge and/or credential. The Badge and
Credentialing Office will verify that the employee has met the mandatory training
requirements and/or criteria for the issuance of the requested badge and/or
credential type.
8.2.5. The CBP Commissioner is authorized to waive CBP training requirements. A copy
of the signed waiver must be provided at the time of the request for badge and/or
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
867 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

credentials.
8.2.6. Contractors and other temporary CBP employees will not be issued CBP badges or
credentials.
8.2.7. The Badge and Credentialing Office will review the CBP Form 56 for accuracy, the
required photo, and signature prior to issuing a badge and/or credential.
8.2.8. Only the employee’s legal name is authorized to appear on a credential. Any
discrepancies will be resolved by verifying the employee’s identification with a
driver’s license, social security card, birth certificate or passport.
8.2.9. All CBP employees authorized to carry a badge and/or credential will be issued:
●● One commissioning book or credential case;
●● Badge(s) (if required);
●● One two-part credential that reflects the employee’s authority and title (if
applicable); or
●● Replacement commissioning books or credential cases will not be issued by the
Badge and Credentialing Office.
8.2.10. Credentials Authorizing Firearms
●● A request for a credential authorizing the carrying of firearms for an employee
who has not carried a firearm previously must:
o Be signed by an Assistant Commissioner of the functional area or Chief of the
Border Patrol prior to forwarding the request to the Badge and Credentialing
Office;
o If the employee is in a job series that does not authorize or usually does not
have a firearm associated with it, a written memorandum authorizing the
employee to carry a firearm from the Assistant Commissioner of the function
area must accompany the request.
●● Subsequent requests for replacement credentials can be requested by the Field
Badge Coordinator;
●● Prior to the issuance of a credential authorizing an employee to carry a firearm:
o Certification(s) will be made by the appropriate Assistant Commissioner that
the employee has qualified with a primary duty weapon;
o Has a need to carry a firearm; and
o Date of the most current qualification of the employee will be placed on the
CBP Form 56.
●● The Field Badge Coordinator will ensure:
o Prior to issuing a firearms credential to an employee whose job title/series is
not authorized to carry a firearm that a copy of the Assistant Commissioner’s
waiver for approval for the individual/position to carry a firearm is attached to
CBP Form 56;

o Mandatory training requirements must be met in accordance with the

CBP Basic Training Directive for a new issue or a waiver approved in
writing through the Assistant Commissioner of the functional area and the
Commissioner of CBP; and
o Employees who fail to qualify with the weapon they are authorized to carry
must immediately surrender their credential authorizing them to carry firearms
to their Field Badge Coordinator who will forward them to the Badge Office to
be held in a pending status.
●● A credential, as identified above, can be requested for employees who fail to
qualify to identify them as a CBP employee, but with no authorities.
8.2.11. Credentials remain valid for the duration of employment. Credentials may be
updated and reissued to the bearer when a change takes place under the following
conditions:
●● Upon legal name change (Documentation must be provided with request);
●● Official change in the bearer’s authority (Documentation required);
●● Significant change in the bearer’s appearance over a period of time; or
●● Mutilation or excessive wear of the credential.
8.3. Credential Photograph, Signature, and Authentication Criteria
8.3.1. Credential photographs should be sent in a digital JPEG format via e-mail and the
signature can be transmitted via fax or in a digital form via e-mail to the Badge and
Credentialing Office. All digital media will be identified with the employee’s last name
and the last four of the social security number.
8.3.2. The following criteria must be met for a credential photo to be accepted:
●● A full-face, frontal view, color digital image, in JPEG Format, showing a true
likeness of the bearer. If prescription glasses are worn full-time, then glasses will
be worn when the credential photograph is taken, except when the glasses are
tinted;
●● Tinted glasses or sunglasses must be removed prior to taking photograph;
●● No headgear to include uniform hats will be worn for the photo, except for
religious wear. Small hairclips, bows, etc., are acceptable. However, the hair
should be pushed to the side or back if it interferes with a clear picture of a large
portion of the face or the eye area. Hair will not cover any facial features;
●● Employees will be photographed in authorized uniforms, if not in uniform,
business attire is authorized;
●● Facial hair is acceptable unless it conflicts with approved uniform standards;
●● Both eyes must be open;
●● The photo must be clearly focused; and
●● A gray backdrop is the only acceptable backdrop.
8.3.3. The following criteria must be met for a credential signature to be acceptable:
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
869 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

●● A neat and legible signature of the employee will be provided; and

●● The employee will sign his or her name exactly as printed on the credential.
Initials or abbreviations are not authorized.
8.3.4. The CBP Commissioner authenticates every CBP credential by electronically signing
all CBP credentials.
8.4. Shipment of Badges and Credentials
8.4.1. Badges and credentials will be:
●● Packaged and shipped in double envelopes;
●● Sent via:
o The current carrier authorized by DHS for U. S. Government express
mailings;
o Certified mail with return receipt required; or
o Overnight mail.
8.4.2. All badges and/or credentials shipped will be transferred with the CBP Form 259,
documenting the status of the badge and/or credentials. (NOTE: Badges and
credentials returned without any or all documentation will be destroyed or returned to
inventory).
8.5. Purchase of Badges, Credential Laminates, and Credential Stock Paper
8.5.1. The Badge and Credentialing Office is responsible for ordering badges, credential
laminate, and credential stock paper from authorized vendors.
8.5.2. The Badge and Credentialing Office is required to maintain sufficient stock of
badges, credential laminate, and credential stock paper, commissioning books, and
credential holders to meet the annual needs of CBP.
8.6. Additional Issues and Optional Equipment
8.6.1. CBP organizations are authorized to purchase belt clips, lanyard badge holders, and
personalized commissioning books for their employees from outside vendors.
8.6.2. Employees are authorized to purchase and use privately purchased belt clip badge
holders, or lanyard badge holders, and commissioning books from outside vendors.

9. Chapter 9: Lost/Stolen, Damaged, or Destroyed

9.1. Lost/Stolen Badges and Credentials
9.1.1. CBP Employees must report the loss or theft of their issued badge and/or credential
within 24 hours by filing the following reports:
●● Verbal and written notification to the employee’s immediate supervisor;
●● Notification to their servicing Internal Affairs Field Office or the Joint Intake Center
via 1-877-2-INTAKE;
●● An incident report filed with the National Communication Center and request to
be entered into the National Crime Information Center (NCIC); and
●● A formal report will be filed with the local law enforcement agency for stolen
badges and/or credentials.
9.1.2. Each report filed regarding a lost or stolen badge and/or credential must include:
●● Employee’s name;
●● Proof that they are employed by CBP;
●● Social security number;
●● Credential serial number;
●● Title on the credential;
●● Badge number (including the three alphabetical letters);
●● Type of badge;
●● Date and place where the incident occurred;
●● Explanation of the incident; and
●● Any other relevant facts.
9.1.3. Reports and documentation of the lost/stolen badge and/or credentials will be
forwarded through the Field Badge Coordinator to the Badge and Credentialing
Office and all required documentation will be updated.
9.1.4. A request for replacement of lost or stolen badges and/or credentials will be
forwarded through the employee’s Field Badge Coordinator to the Badge and
Credentialing Office. The request for replacement will be made using the CBP Form
56. No replacement badge and/or credential will be issued until copies of below
reports are filed with the Badge and Credentialing Office:
●● Law enforcement report;
●● Employee report; and
●● NCIC case number included with the supporting documentation
9.1.5. Recovered badge and/or credentials will be reported in the same manner.
9.1.6. Reports, documentation, and the recovered badge and/or credentials will be
forwarded through the Field Badge Coordinator to the Badge and Credentialing
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
871 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

Office and records shall be adjusted to reflect the recovery as appropriate.

9.1.7. Recovered badge(s) will be returned to the Badge and Credentialing Office for
processing and removed from inventory.
9.1.8. Recovered credentials will be returned to the Badge and Credentialing Office for
processing and destruction.
9.1.9. Lost or Stolen badges and/or credentials will be processed through existing
Board of Survey procedures outlined in the Personal Property Handbook by the
employees duty station. If it is determined that negligence or poor judgment was
used in safeguarding the badge and/or credentials, the employee may be subject to
discipline and/or required to pay for the badges and/or credentials.
9.1.10. Damaged Badges and Credentials
9.1.11. Damaged badges are authorized to be replaced. If a badge is damaged to the extent
that it projects an unprofessional appearance or is not serviceable, replacement will
be requested using the CBP Form 56.
9.1.12. If a credential becomes unserviceable (i.e. separating laminate or damaged through
excessive wear or use) it will be replaced using CBP Form 56.
9.1.13. Damaged badges will be approved for repair or destruction based on their condition
as determined by the Badge and Credentialing Office.
9.1.14. Damaged credentials will be returned to the Badge and Credentialing Office,
removed from the inventory and destroyed.
9.2. Destruction of Badges and Credentials
9.2.1. Unserviceable badges will be destroyed at least once every fiscal year and
credentials will be destroyed at least once a month.
9.2.2. Destruction of Badges
●● The Badge and Credentialing Office will identify unserviceable CBP badges that
are damaged, obsolete or for any reason removed from the badge inventory to
be destroyed. The Badge and Credentialing Office representative will complete
CBP Form 4613, Order to Destroy and Record of Destruction of Forfeited,
Abandoned, or Unclaimed Merchandise, with the required information;
●● A memorandum requesting destruction of the CBP badges will be prepared, a
Report of Excess Personal Property, SF 120, completed with type and serial
number of each badge to be destroyed, and the CBP Form 4613 Order to
Destroy and Record of Destruction of Forfeited, Abandoned, or Unclaimed
Merchandise, prepared and sent to the Director, Security Management Division
for approval;
●● Once approval for destruction is received each badge will be listed by type
of badge and serial number on the SF 120. The badges will be inventoried
and verified by two other CBP employees and annotated with the date of the
inventory and employee’s name and signature on the SF 120. Badges will be
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
872 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

sealed with tape and marked in such a manner that will prevent unauthorized
access and secured in the Badge and Credentialing Office until shipped or
transported to an authorized destruction facility; and
●● All records of the badge destruction will be maintained in the Badge and
Credentialing Office. Records will be updated with the proper destruction code
and date of destruction.
9.2.3. Destruction of Credentials
●● Credentials that have been returned by employees, damaged, obsolete or for
any reason removed from the credential inventory will be destroyed and certified
on the Order to Destroy and Record of Destruction of Forfeited, Abandoned, or
Unclaimed Merchandise, CBP Form 4613;
●● Each credential will be listed by credential form number and serial number
on the Report of Excess Personal Property, SF 120. The credentials will be
inventoried and verified by another CBP employee and annotated with the
date of the inventory and employees name and signature on the SF 120. Once
the credentials are inventoried they will be locally shredded in the presence of
the BCOM or their designee and one witness. CBP employees witnessing the
credential destruction will sign the CBP Form 4613; and
●● All records of the credential destruction will be maintained in the Badge and
Credentialing Office. Records will be updated with the proper destruction code
and date of destruction.

10. Chapter 10: Incentive Awards, Retirement, Badge

Preservation, and Commemorative Badges
10.1. Incentive Awards
10.1.1. In accordance with the CBP Incentive Awards Program, presentations of badges as
honorary awards are authorized in recognition of the recipient’s specific significant
accomplishments in furtherance of the CBP mission.
10.1.2. When the intention is to honor an employee by awarding a badge in Lucite, the
recommendation must be in compliance with CBP Incentive Awards Program
guidelines and submitted to the CBP Badge and Credentialing Office.
10.1.3. The Badge and Credentialing Office will forward the request to the Headquarters
Honorary Awards Administrator for processing.
10.2. Retirement and Preservation of Badges and Credentials
10.2.1. CBP employees who retire in good standing and are authorized to have their badges
and/or credentials preserved as a memento of their service.
10.2.2. CBP employees who have been promoted or changed positions within CBP and
their new position does not require the same type of badges are authorized to have
one of their assigned badges embedded in Lucite.
10.2.3. CBP employees who have been promoted or changed positions within CBP and
their new position does not require the same type of credentials are not authorized
to retain their credentials as a memento.
10.2.4. Employees who have resigned or transferred from CBP are not authorized to have
their badges embedded in Lucite or their credentials canceled and returned to them
as a memento.
10.2.5. Badge Preservation
●● Retiring employees occupying law enforcement officer positions for an aggregate
of 15 years or more prior to retirement, or retired due to a service-connected
disability (after completing any applicable probationary period) are authorized
to have badges preserved with an embossed “RETIRED” emblem or encased
in Lucite. One of these methods is mandatory to limit such use to exhibition
purposes and to ensure distinction from active badge. New or replacement
badges are not authorized to be issued to retirees or persons separated from
CBP;
●● Retiring employees who occupied law enforcement officer positions for less
than an aggregate of 15 years prior to retirement are authorized to have badges
preserved by being encased in Lucite and returned to the employee. This is
mandatory to limit such use to exhibition purposes and to ensure distinction from
active badges. New or replacement badges are not authorized to be issued to
retirees or persons separated from CBP;

●● Employees who were promoted or changed positions within CBP and are
authorized may have one of their assigned badges preserved by being encased
in Lucite and returned to the employee. This is mandatory to limit such use to
exhibition purposes and to ensure distinction from active badges; and
●● The CBP Badge and Credentialing Office will provide approved vendor
information, costs, and options for badge preservation.
10.2.6. Credential Preservation
●● Retirees are authorized to have their credentials retired. Credentials will
be marked in a visible manner as to designate the Retired Status. New or
replacement credentials are not authorized to be issued to retirees or persons
previously separated from CBP; and
●● Retired credentials issued by CBP meet the requirements of LEOSA.
●● Additional information on the LEOSA retiree identification card can be found in
Chapter 3.5.1.
10.2.7. Deceased CBP Employees
●● Families and/or co-workers are authorized to request to have the badges and/or
credentials of a CBP employee who has died while employed by CBP preserved
as a memento. The CBP Badge and Credentialing Office will provide approved
vendor information, costs, and options. The badge and credentials will be
embossed with an “FOR HONORABLE SERVICE” emblem. This is mandatory
to limit such use to exhibition purposes and to ensure distinction from active
badges and/or credentials. Funds through the CBP National Awards Program are
authorized for payment of badges and/or credentials of a CBP employee who is
deceased.
10.2.8. Requesting Retirement and/or Preservation of CBP Badges and Credentials
●● All authorized requests for the retirement and/or preservation of CBP badges and
credentials must use the Request for Retirement/Preservation of CBP Badges
and Credentials (Appendix 10.1). Requests for the retirement and/or preservation
of badges and/or credentials will include documentation indicating the employee
has retired from CBP or been promoted or transferred within CBP. All items
must be filled out and the request, supporting documentation and badge and/
or credentials forwarded to the Badge and Credentialing Office through their
respective Field Badge Coordinator; and
●● CBP employees who are requesting retirement and/or preservation of their
badges and credentials and who were employed as a law enforcement officer for
an aggregate of 15 years or more before retirement or retired due to a service-
connected disability (after completing any applicable probationary period) will be
required to provide documentation of their law enforcement officer service with
the Request for Retirement/Preservation of CBP Badges and Credentials.
10.3. Commemorative Badges
10.3.1. Commemorative badges are unofficial and are not administered by the Badge and
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
876 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

Credentialing Office. Because of the potential for misuse when badges imitations are
distributed, the manufacture and purchase of commemorative badges is prohibited
without the direct written approval of the Commissioner of CBP. These unofficial
badges appear similar to official CBP badges and therefore, must be embedded in
Lucite.

11. Chapter 11: Requesting and Issuing Retired Law

Enforcement Identification Cards
11.1. Policy
11.1.1. Retired law enforcement officers must prepare and submit a complete application
package to the CBP Badge and Credential Program. The application must contain
original signatures. Electronic signatures will not be accepted. The complete
application package can be accessed on the Internet at http://www.cbp.gov.
11.1.2. Once an application is received, the CBP Badge and Credential Office will review
the package, paperwork, and determine the applicant’s eligibility to receive a retiree
identification card.
11.1.3. A determination as to an applicant’s eligibility to receive the retiree identification card
shall be made within 60 business days of the receipt of the initial application.
11.1.4. If after all the necessary and/or required checks are conducted, the retiree is
determined to be eligible to receive a retiree identification card, the CBP Badge and
Credential Office will mail the card to the requested address.
11.1.5. If the retiree is determined to be ineligible to receive the retiree identification card,
the CBP Badge and Credential Office will mail a letter to the retiree indicating such
determination and the basis for this decision. The individual will then be given an
opportunity to respond as provided for in the letter.

12. Chapter 12: Inspections

12.1. Inspections
12.1.1. The CBP Badge and Credentialing Office is authorized to conduct inspections.
Inspections will be conducted to verify conformance with this policy and provide
advice and assistance to employees. A formal report will be provided to the office
listing any deficiencies within 10 working days after the inspection. The office
inspected will have 60 days to correct any deficiencies from the date of the report
and provide written documentation to the Badge and Credentialing Office that
deficiencies have been corrected.

13. APPENDIX 8.1: Authorized Badge Titles

Badge Organization of Primary
Approved Badge Title
Designation Assignment

AIA Air and Marine Air Interdiction Agent

AIR Air and Marine Aviation Enforcement Officer
AMA Air and Marine Chief of Staff
AMB Air and Marine Executive Director
AMC Air and Marine Assistant Commissioner
AMD Air and Marine Deputy Assistant Commissioner
AME Air and Marine Director
AMF Air and Marine Deputy Director
AMG Air and Marine Detection Enforcement Officer
AMH Air and Marine Supervisory Detection Enforcement Officer
AMJ Air and Marine Specialist
ASA Air and Marine Supervisory Air Interdiction Agent
AUD Customs and Border Protection Regulatory Auditor
BPA Border Patrol Border Patrol Chief
BPB Border Patrol Deputy Chief
BPC Border Patrol Associate Chief
BPD Border Patrol Chief Patrol Agent
BPE Border Patrol Deputy Chief Patrol Agent
BPF Border Patrol Assistant Chief Patrol Agent
BPG Border Patrol Patrol Agent In Charge
BPH Border Patrol Assistant Patrol Agent In Charge
BPJ Border Patrol Supervisory Patrol Agent
BPL Border Patrol Senior Patrol Agent
BPM Border Patrol Patrol Agent
CAA Customs and Border Protection Deputy Commissioner
CAB Customs and Border Protection Assistant Commissioner
CAC Customs and Border Protection Deputy Assistant Commissioner
CAD Customs and Border Protection Chief of Staff
CAE Customs and Border Protection Senior Policy Advisor
CAF Customs and Border Protection Chief Counsel
CAG Customs and Border Protection Deputy Chief Counsel
CAH Customs and Border Protection Deputy Chief Of Staff
CAJ Customs and Border Protection Director Field Operations
CAK Customs and Border Protection Director
CAL Customs and Border Protection Deputy Director
CAM Customs and Border Protection Assistant Director
CAN Customs and Border Protection Port Director
CAP Customs and Border Protection Chief
CAQ Customs and Border Protection Supervisor
CAR Customs and Border Protection Officer
CAS Customs and Border Protection Agriculture Specialist
CAT Customs and Border Protection Seized Property Specialist
CAU Customs and Border Protection Import Specialist
CAV Customs and Border Protection Regulatory Auditor
CAW Customs and Border Protection Forensic Scientist
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
883 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

CAX Customs and Border Protection Congressional Liaison

CAY Customs and Border Protection Public Affairs Specialist
CAZ Customs and Border Protection Associate Chief Counsel
CBD Customs and Border Protection Honorary Officer
CBI Customs and Border Protection Internal Affairs
CBP Customs and Border Protection Commissioner
CCA Customs and Border Protection Supervisory Attorney
CCB Customs and Border Protection Attorney
CCD Customs and Border Protection Security Specialist
CCE Customs and Border Protection Communications Officer
CCF Customs and Border Protection Intelligence Research Specialist
CIA Customs and Border Protection Technology Officer
DSP Customs and Border Protection Specialist
MIA Air and Marine Operations Marine Interdiction Agent
SMA Air and Marine Operations Supervisory Marine Interdiction Agent

14. APPENDIX 8.2: CBP Credential Types and Authorities

Credential Credential
Credential Authority
Type Letter
3700 CBP issues a two-part credential. The top portion of all credentials
is referred to as a 3700. This portion of the credential states the
employee name, credential number and title if applicable.
3700/3701 AAA A two-part credential issued to employees who are authorized
to make arrests and carry firearms. The credential is issued to
Officers and other employees who do not have investigation duties.
This portion of the credential reflects the employees authority,
photo, signature, issue date and credential number. This credential
accompanies a badge and should be considered void if badge is
not present. The CBP-3701 may be displayed inside the two-part
credential/badge case. Represented in BICS by the AAA code.
3700/3702 BBB A two-part credential issued to employees authorized to carry a
firearm and who do not have arrest or investigative authority. This
portion of the credential gives the employees authority, photo,
signature, issue date and credential number. This credential
accompanies a badge and should be considered void if badge is
not present. The CBP-3702 may be displayed inside the two-part
credential/badge case. Represented in BICS by the BBB code.
3700/3703 CCC A two-part credential issued to employees who are issued a
badge, but have no firearms authority, no arrest authority, and no
investigative authority. This credential accompanies a badge and
should be considered void if badge is not present. The CBP-3703
may be displayed inside the two-part credential/badge case. This
portion of the credential gives the employees authority, photo,
signature, issue date and credential number. Represented in BICS
by the CCC code.
3700/3704 DDD A two-part credential issued to employees who have no badge, no
firearms authority, no arrest authority, and no investigative authority.
The CBP-3704 may be displayed inside the two-part credential
case. This portion of the credential gives the employees authority,
photo, signature, issue date and credential number. Represented in
BICS by the DDD code.

3700/3705 EEE A two-part credential issued to Border Patrol Agents and

Enforcement Officers who are authorized full authority to include
firearms authority, arrest authority, and investigative authority. This
credential accompanies a badge and should be considered void if
badge is not present. The CBP-3705 may be displayed inside the
two-part credential/badge case. This portion of the credential gives
the employees authority, photo, signature, issue date and credential
number. Represented in BICS by the EEE code.

15. APPENDIX 10.1: Request for Retirement/Preservation of

CBP Badge and Credential
DATE:
TO: CBP BADGE AND CREDENTIALING OFFICE
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
TH-390 A
Glynco, GA 31524
ATTN: Badge & Credentials
(912) 554-4289/[email protected]

FROM:

E-Mail:
Phone #:

Employee: NAME:
SSN:
BADGE#’s:
BADGE TYPE:
CREDENTIAL #:
CREDENTIAL TITLE:

The above referenced CBP Employee requests retirement/preservation of his/herbadge and/

or credentials as indicated below and has the approval of a supervisor, or higher official as
indicated by signature below. I certify that the individual is (please check below reason):

Retiring from Federal Service employed as a LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER WITH
15 YEARS OR MORE years of service.
Attach copy of SF52 or clearing papers and copies of SF50’s documenting 15 years of service
as a Law Enforcement Officer.

Retiring from Federal Service employed as a Law Enforcement Officer due to a service-
connected disability.
Attach copy of SF52 or clearing papers and copies of SF50’s documenting Law Enforcement
Officer service and service-connected disability.

Retiring from Federal Service with less than 15 year of service as a Law Enforcement
Officer.
Attach copies of SF52 or clearing papers and copy of SF50 documenting Law Enforcement
Officer service at time of retirement.

Retiring from Federal Service.

__________________________________________ Attach copies of SF52 or clearing papers.

Being promoted and/or new position and does not require same type of badge and/or
credential.
RETURN TO TOP
WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall
not be distributed beyond the original addressees without prior authorization of the originator.
887 of 890
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BACK Return to Table of Contents

Attach copy of SF52 or clearing papers and waiver if required.

A survivor of a CBP employee who died while in service.

NOTE: WITHOUT PROPER DOCUMENTATION ATTACHED BAGDE AND/OR CREDENTIAL

RETIREMENT/PRESERVATION WILL NOT BE PROCESSED.

OPTIONS: (Refer to CBP Law Enforcement Badge and Credential Policy for further details of
options.) PLACE AN X IN FRONT OF CHOICE.

Retiring from Federal Service employed as a LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER

WITH 15 YEARS OR MORE years of service.

R
etiring from Federal Service employed as a Law Enforcement Officer due to a
service-connected disability.

BADGE: RETIRED ROCKER: EMBED IN LUCITE:

DO NOT WISH TO RETAIN BADGE

CREDENTIALS: MARKED RETIRED AND RETURNED

DO NOT WISH TO RETAIN CREDENTIALS

Retiring from Federal Service with less than 15 year of service as a Law
Enforcement Officer.
BADGE : EMBED IN LUCITE DO NOT WISH TO RETAIN BADGE

CREDENTIALS: MARKED RETIRED AND RETURNED

DO NOT WISH TO RETAIN CREDENTIALS

Retiring from Federal Service or promoted/new position or resigned from CBP with
waiver.
BADGE: EMBED IN LUCITE
DO NOT WISH TO RETAIN BADGE

CREDENTIALS: MARKED RETIRED AND RETURNED

DO NOT WISH TO RETAIN CREDENTIALS

APPROVING OFFICIAL:________________________________________________________

SIGNATURE: ________________________________________________________________

EMPLOYEE SIGNATURE: ______________________________________________________

The Security Risk Handbook Assess, Survey, Audit (Charles Swanson)
No ratings yet
The Security Risk Handbook Assess, Survey, Audit (Charles Swanson)
539 pages
Security & Safety Hand Book
100% (23)
Security & Safety Hand Book
110 pages
Security Management Standard - Physical Asset Protection ANSI - ASIS PAP AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARD - 1 - 部分3
100% (1)
Security Management Standard - Physical Asset Protection ANSI - ASIS PAP AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARD - 1 - 部分3
20 pages
2018 DHS Memo
75% (4)
2018 DHS Memo
6 pages
ASIS Security Model
100% (3)
ASIS Security Model
34 pages
Physical Security Assessment Form PDF
100% (5)
Physical Security Assessment Form PDF
17 pages
A School Security Officer: What Makes a Good One?
From Everand
A School Security Officer: What Makes a Good One?
James Puckett
No ratings yet
Risk Potential Assessment Tool: Resource Management Guide No. 107
No ratings yet
Risk Potential Assessment Tool: Resource Management Guide No. 107
20 pages
8 A 70B03C19Q00000074
100% (1)
8 A 70B03C19Q00000074
75 pages
Ocso-Bomb Threat Samepage-Brochure PDF
No ratings yet
Ocso-Bomb Threat Samepage-Brochure PDF
1 page
D-8 FPS Sgim
No ratings yet
D-8 FPS Sgim
96 pages
Operational Readiness Order HQ-OrO-002-2018 Photography & Videotaping
No ratings yet
Operational Readiness Order HQ-OrO-002-2018 Photography & Videotaping
6 pages
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) : Building Security
No ratings yet
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) : Building Security
3 pages
CCC Physical Security Policy Handbook PDF
100% (1)
CCC Physical Security Policy Handbook PDF
92 pages
What Is Security Management
100% (1)
What Is Security Management
5 pages
Security Service Guide To Producing Operational Requirements For Security Measures
100% (2)
Security Service Guide To Producing Operational Requirements For Security Measures
33 pages
Security Best Practices Sbpr6
100% (3)
Security Best Practices Sbpr6
67 pages
Physical Security
60% (5)
Physical Security
16 pages
GF1SECURITYSTUDYGUIDEINPDFFULLFINAL
100% (1)
GF1SECURITYSTUDYGUIDEINPDFFULLFINAL
157 pages
Security Checklist
No ratings yet
Security Checklist
19 pages
Security Audit: Lighting
No ratings yet
Security Audit: Lighting
3 pages
What Are Assignment Instruction and SOP?
No ratings yet
What Are Assignment Instruction and SOP?
3 pages
Physical Security Management Policy TEMPLATE V1
No ratings yet
Physical Security Management Policy TEMPLATE V1
4 pages
STH Security Awareness Report 2015
No ratings yet
STH Security Awareness Report 2015
23 pages
Security Management
No ratings yet
Security Management
2 pages
POA CH - 19 Physical Security
No ratings yet
POA CH - 19 Physical Security
196 pages
2 STD SG-ORM1-2017 - STD
No ratings yet
2 STD SG-ORM1-2017 - STD
131 pages
Travel Risk Assessment Checklist - Security & Safety
No ratings yet
Travel Risk Assessment Checklist - Security & Safety
13 pages
POA Security Planning Guide
No ratings yet
POA Security Planning Guide
4 pages
Private Security Guidelines
0% (1)
Private Security Guidelines
11 pages
Chief Security Officer Guidlines
100% (2)
Chief Security Officer Guidlines
13 pages
2021-2022physical Security
No ratings yet
2021-2022physical Security
30 pages
IFPO SO Risks Competencies 1st
No ratings yet
IFPO SO Risks Competencies 1st
89 pages
Securityguard Manual
100% (2)
Securityguard Manual
396 pages
Guide To Security Risk Assessment
No ratings yet
Guide To Security Risk Assessment
3 pages
Crime Prevention by Design
No ratings yet
Crime Prevention by Design
7 pages
Physical Security Process
No ratings yet
Physical Security Process
40 pages
Protection of Assets Manual: The Body of Knowledge in Security
No ratings yet
Protection of Assets Manual: The Body of Knowledge in Security
6 pages
Asisglpo
No ratings yet
Asisglpo
28 pages
(eBook PDF) Implementing Physical Protection Systems: A Practical Guide, 2nd Edition 2024 scribd download
67% (3)
(eBook PDF) Implementing Physical Protection Systems: A Practical Guide, 2nd Edition 2024 scribd download
35 pages
Integrated Enterprise Security
100% (1)
Integrated Enterprise Security
16 pages
Security SOP GUIDE - July 2016
100% (1)
Security SOP GUIDE - July 2016
23 pages
Crowded Places Guidance - v1 170607 - NaCTSO
100% (1)
Crowded Places Guidance - v1 170607 - NaCTSO
174 pages
Security Assessment Template
100% (1)
Security Assessment Template
19 pages
ASIS International ESRM Slideshow PDF
0% (1)
ASIS International ESRM Slideshow PDF
18 pages
Advance Security and Safety Management Done
0% (1)
Advance Security and Safety Management Done
120 pages
Security Guard Report
No ratings yet
Security Guard Report
11 pages
Aasis Handbook
No ratings yet
Aasis Handbook
24 pages
ASIS Chief Security Officer (CSO) Guideline
100% (1)
ASIS Chief Security Officer (CSO) Guideline
18 pages
PDF
80% (5)
PDF
623 pages
Audit of Physical Security Management
No ratings yet
Audit of Physical Security Management
9 pages
Guide For Defining or For Security Measures (CPNI)
100% (1)
Guide For Defining or For Security Measures (CPNI)
42 pages
Physical Security: Sample Questions
No ratings yet
Physical Security: Sample Questions
218 pages
Security and The Lodging Industry-: Ishie Mae Marie A. Kirong HM1-103 Fundamentals in Lodging Operations
100% (1)
Security and The Lodging Industry-: Ishie Mae Marie A. Kirong HM1-103 Fundamentals in Lodging Operations
6 pages
15 Physical Security Final Redacted
100% (1)
15 Physical Security Final Redacted
24 pages
Asis Guidelines For Pso
No ratings yet
Asis Guidelines For Pso
28 pages
Threats Catalogue
No ratings yet
Threats Catalogue
48 pages
JBS Guide To SRMBoK - Physical Security Specifications and Postures
No ratings yet
JBS Guide To SRMBoK - Physical Security Specifications and Postures
75 pages
Security Handbook
0% (1)
Security Handbook
35 pages
Top 7 Reasons Why Should You Hire A Security Service
No ratings yet
Top 7 Reasons Why Should You Hire A Security Service
3 pages
Corporate Security Director
100% (1)
Corporate Security Director
2 pages
IN-SITE: Keys to an Effective Site Safety and Security Program
From Everand
IN-SITE: Keys to an Effective Site Safety and Security Program
Gerald G. Doane
No ratings yet
General Orders for Security Personnel: A Guide to Maintaining Discipline and Professionalism
From Everand
General Orders for Security Personnel: A Guide to Maintaining Discipline and Professionalism
MELVYN C.C. VALENZUELA
No ratings yet
Airtight: Security Solutions for the New Millennium
From Everand
Airtight: Security Solutions for the New Millennium
Clint Kirkwood
No ratings yet
Facility Security Principles for Non-Security Practitioners
From Everand
Facility Security Principles for Non-Security Practitioners
Jr. Art B. Crow
No ratings yet
Security Engineering; Risk Assessment and Security Measures
From Everand
Security Engineering; Risk Assessment and Security Measures
Renato Golob
No ratings yet
PROTECTED Sensitive: Cabinet (When Complete)
No ratings yet
PROTECTED Sensitive: Cabinet (When Complete)
10 pages
Security Management: Manual
No ratings yet
Security Management: Manual
49 pages
Active Shooter Consequence Management
No ratings yet
Active Shooter Consequence Management
64 pages
Global Risks Report Executive Summary 2018
No ratings yet
Global Risks Report Executive Summary 2018
6 pages
ISO 31000 - 2018 Risk Management Checklist - SafetyCulture PDF
No ratings yet
ISO 31000 - 2018 Risk Management Checklist - SafetyCulture PDF
13 pages
Checklist For The Security Industry: Public Places
No ratings yet
Checklist For The Security Industry: Public Places
5 pages
Hotel Security Checklist - SafetyCulture PDF
No ratings yet
Hotel Security Checklist - SafetyCulture PDF
19 pages
Letter To Da 11 21
No ratings yet
Letter To Da 11 21
1 page
Dhs Bib - Web Version - Final 508
No ratings yet
Dhs Bib - Web Version - Final 508
112 pages
The Soter Group - U.S. Capitol Police and Other Federal Law Enforcement Funding and Staffing
No ratings yet
The Soter Group - U.S. Capitol Police and Other Federal Law Enforcement Funding and Staffing
2 pages
CMR Secret Service Response To The Guardian Reporting
No ratings yet
CMR Secret Service Response To The Guardian Reporting
1 page
Fy 2021 Dhs Bib Web Version
No ratings yet
Fy 2021 Dhs Bib Web Version
106 pages
GAO Report On Firearms Released To Public
No ratings yet
GAO Report On Firearms Released To Public
86 pages
Portland, Oregon: Confidential Settlement Communication Under Fre 408 Via Usps Mail
No ratings yet
Portland, Oregon: Confidential Settlement Communication Under Fre 408 Via Usps Mail
40 pages
Highlands Ranch Law Enforcement Training Facility
No ratings yet
Highlands Ranch Law Enforcement Training Facility
25 pages
BBO Complaint Against Meg Stanley
No ratings yet
BBO Complaint Against Meg Stanley
2 pages
Wall of Moms, Et Al. v. DHS, Et Al.
No ratings yet
Wall of Moms, Et Al. v. DHS, Et Al.
48 pages
RRB_ITC_FINAL_RFP_10312016
No ratings yet
RRB_ITC_FINAL_RFP_10312016
21 pages
JULY 31, 2014 Trial Transcript Trentadue PDF
No ratings yet
JULY 31, 2014 Trial Transcript Trentadue PDF
170 pages
LVMPD Report On Jorge Gomez Shooting
No ratings yet
LVMPD Report On Jorge Gomez Shooting
75 pages
DHS Had Authority To Deploy Federal Law Enforcement Officers To Protect Federal Facilities in Portland, Oregon, But Should Ensure Better Planning and Execution in Future Cross-Component Activities
No ratings yet
DHS Had Authority To Deploy Federal Law Enforcement Officers To Protect Federal Facilities in Portland, Oregon, But Should Ensure Better Planning and Execution in Future Cross-Component Activities
32 pages
Delta Green INVESTIGATOR TEMPLATES ICE
100% (1)
Delta Green INVESTIGATOR TEMPLATES ICE
4 pages
CBP SecurityHandbook
100% (2)
CBP SecurityHandbook
1,280 pages
PSOTP Student Guide
No ratings yet
PSOTP Student Guide
213 pages
(U - FOUO) JIB - Tactics Techniques and Procedures Used in The 13 Novembe
No ratings yet
(U - FOUO) JIB - Tactics Techniques and Procedures Used in The 13 Novembe
10 pages
Progress Made and Work Remaining in Implementing Homeland Security Missions 10 Years After 9/11
No ratings yet
Progress Made and Work Remaining in Implementing Homeland Security Missions 10 Years After 9/11
226 pages
CBP SecurityHandbook PDF
100% (1)
CBP SecurityHandbook PDF
912 pages
Postal Police Officers AssociationSenator Booker LE Equity Support
No ratings yet
Postal Police Officers AssociationSenator Booker LE Equity Support
1 page
Jason Leopold: FOIA FBI Threats Following Mar-a-Lago Raid
100% (2)
Jason Leopold: FOIA FBI Threats Following Mar-a-Lago Raid
25 pages