See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.

net/publication/315132317

Introduction: An Overview of Emerging Technology and Employment in the

Early Twenty-First Century

Chapter · March 2017

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-51165-8_1

CITATIONS READS
2 3,515

2 authors:

Kevin Lagrandeur James Hughes

New York Institute of Technology University of Massachusetts Boston
22 PUBLICATIONS   79 CITATIONS    51 PUBLICATIONS   1,102 CITATIONS   

SEE PROFILE SEE PROFILE

Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:

Cyborg Buddha View project

Developing an Augmented Reality Application for the Humanities View project

All content following this page was uploaded by Kevin Lagrandeur on 03 October 2017.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

 1

Introduction: An Overview of Emerging Technology

and Employment in the Early Twenty-First Century

By
Kevin LaGrandeur and James J. Hughes

(NOTE: This is an early draft of the introductory chapter of our book Surviving the
Machine Age: Intelligent Technology and the Transformation of Human Work (Palgrave
Macmillan, 2017). For the final version, see the book. It can be found at books.google.com,
or at Palgrave’s website.)

For two hundred years there have been predictions that technological innovation would

lead to widespread unemployment. Instead, jobs in factories opened as farm work declined, and

then jobs in offices and services grew as factory work declined (this process, called “creative

destruction,” is the topic of James Clark’s chapter later in this book). Today we are seeing the

rapid transformation of work by robotics, artificial intelligence, the Internet, 3D manufacturing,

synthetic biology and nanotechnology. Automation and other technologies appear to be

changing the relative profitability of investments in capital versus labor. In a 2014 survey by

Boston Consulting Group (BCG), three quarters of manufacturers expected manufacturing to

dramatically improve productivity using robots, materials engineering, digital manufacturing and

3-D printing in the next ten years (Sirkin et al. 2015). The key question today is whether

emerging technologies, especially the exponentially declining cost of information technology,

robotics and automation, will make next couple of decades fundamentally different than the

previous two centuries.

 2

Technological Unemployment: The Scope of the Problem

Many economists and policy makers believe that these new technologies will again create

as many new jobs as they make obsolete. At most, they believe there will be a need for

educational innovation and work re-training to make the transition less painful. They have

pointed out a) that historically innovation has created new employment, b) that the growth of

productivity actually slowed in the last fifteen years, and c) that the implementation of IT and

robotics has created some forms of employment.

Some recent studies appear to back these claims. A working paper published in May,

2016, by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) claims that if

jobs are examined in terms of the collection of tasks within each that are automatable rather than

looking at a more general likelihood of automating whole occupations, the likelihood that

humans will lose these jobs to robots or computers is not dire: only about 9% in the United

States, and the same percentage of jobs across 21 OECD (i.e., developed) countries (Arntz et al.,

26). The authors’ rationale here is that we must consider that automation of some tasks in a job

does not necessarily lead to the automation of the whole job. Likewise, the VDMA, a German

industry trade group for engineering companies, has recently stated that—at least in Germany—

there is “no proven correlation between increasing robot density and unemployment, pointing out

that the number of employees in the German automotive industry rose by 13 percent between

2010 and 2015, while industrial robot stock in the industry rose 17 percent in the same period”

(Prodhan 2016).

Other economists and experts, however, have begun to argue that these innovations may

finally create the long predicted decline of work. They point to the dwindling set of skills that
 3

humans can still do more cheaply and efficiently than machines, and they are urging policy

makers to take seriously the possibility of widespread technological unemployment in the

coming decades. These worries are not new, but they are increasing in volume and frequency.

One of the first experts to express concern over this issue was the economist James Meade, who

argued back in 1964 that technological advances would pose a threat to wages (Economist.com

2015). More recently, preoccupation with the effects of technology on workers has really gained

steam because of the increasing danger, and incidence, of labor displacement by intelligent

machines. In 2011, for example, two MIT economists, Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee,

outlined the case for imminent, widespread technological unemployment in their book Race

Against the Machine, inspiring growing research on the topic. And in a widely cited 2013 study

two Oxford economists, Carl Frey and Michael Osborne, looked at the skill composition of more

than 400 jobs in the US economy and weighted the likelihood that each of those jobs would be

subject to automation in the next twenty years. Unlike the authors of the OECD paper noted

above, they consider that these jobs all entail enough repetitive or numerical tasks that it is

workable to assume their complete automation. Accordingly, they estimated that almost half of

all American jobs could be automated in the coming decades. These studies have been replicated

with similar results for British (Frey and Osborn 2014) and European occupations (Bowles

2014), as reviewed in Frey and Osborne’s 2015 summary of the topic Technology at Work.

More recently, Martin Ford’s book Rise of the Robots: Technology and the Threat of a Jobless

Future (2015) makes the most contemporary and compelling case. Ford surveys the latest

robotics and artificial intelligence innovations in dozens of fields, as they work their way into our

factories, roadways and homes. Without hype, Ford makes clear that a wave of disruption is

poised to crash on the global economy.

 4

Statistics from some industry groups support these dire assessments given by authors and

experts like Ford. BCG, for instance, in the same report mentioned above that predicts large

productivity gains from automation, also projects that within just ten years rising productivity

will lower labor costs and demand for human labor by an average of 16% in the OECD overall,

with the largest impacts in South Korea, China, the U.S., Japan, and Germany. This forecast is

backed by a major technology research firm, Gartner, which recently predicted that software,

robots, and smart machines would replace one-third of U.S. jobs by 2025 (Barajas 2014). Given

this preponderance of pessimism, there is a need to look more closely at the questions concerning

not only whether technological employment will happen, but also at some specific scenarios for

it, whether we might avoid it, and some options we may have to do so. Thus the collection of

essays in the present book aims to move the discussion about technological unemployment

forward by engaging experts involved in the study of technological unemployment, and by

outlining the risks and benefits of the various responses that can be offered if technological

unemployment begins to accelerate.

What Types of Workers are Being Displaced, and How?

Industrial robots began displacing workers in the automobile industry in the 1960’s, but

now this process is affecting jobs in a much broader way—not just in the working classes, but

even in the middle and upper-middle classes. And this process of technological displacement is

accelerating. For example, it may be no surprise, given what’s happened in the automobile

industry, that the world’s first farm that is completely run by robots is about to open in Japan

(“World's First 'Robot Run' Farm” 2016); or that a new Australian robot called “Hadrian” is

available for the construction industry, and it can lay bricks 20 times faster than a human.

According to an article about it in the online magazine Techly, the first model, which is due to be
 5

released in 2016 will have “a 28-metre telescopic boom…be mounted on a truck in its final form,

[and will use] information from a 3D computer-aided design of the home, with mortar pushed

under pressure towards the head of the boom,” to lay 1000 bricks per hour (Speight 2015). Of

course, the farming robots are likely to displace farm workers, and the bricklaying robots will

probably displace masons, which is not unusual. This kind of displacement of manual labor

happened in the previous three industrial revolutions as well (the four revolutions are:

mechanization/steam, assembly lines/electricity, automation/computers, and cyberphysical

systems/interconnected AI).

More surprising in today’s environment is the breadth of jobs that can be replaced by

cyberphysical systems and interconnected AI—the backbone of our current industrial revolution.

These interconnected systems that constitute the paradigm shift in today’s production do not just

replace manual laborers, they also replace members of the middle-class, and even highly

educated and compensated upper-middle-class workers, and that is a huge difference from past

paradigm shifts. In our current revolution, for instance, teleworkers in the service industries are

being gradually displaced by automated phone trees; also, more recently, those who interact with

customers in digital platforms, such as Twitter and Facebook, are beginning to be replaced by

chatbots—AI-based programs that can communicate with customers via text and chat

applications. Moreover, increasing numbers of university-educated workers in the financial

industries are being replaced by software that can do their jobs faster. Algorithmic trading done

by computers in the stock markets is now common, for example, and human commodities and

equities traders are losing their jobs as a result. Even journalists are being replaced by computer

software. In January 2016, “the Associated Press (AP) revealed that [a software program called]

Wordsmith has been rolling out content since July 2014 without any human intervention.” This
 6

Wordsmith software has been generating 1000 stories per month, mostly about financial matters,

which is “14 times more than the previous manual output of AP's reporters and editors” (Gleyo

2015). In terms of sheer productivity, humans cannot keep up with ever-faster computers and

robots. And even when they can, all things being equal, machines and digital systems are often

more convenient and cheaper. A good example of this is the virtual reality real estate tours that

are already available at high-end real estate offices in New York City. In those offices, clients

can use the newest 3D virtual reality goggles to view a property in realistic 3D without even

leaving their chairs. For the real estate company, this is cheaper, more convenient and, at least

for now, sexier than employing an old-fashioned human real estate agent to show the property to

the client. One real estate office in New York is even showing a property in Brooklyn that has

not been completely built yet: the virtual reality program and goggles they use can render a

three-dimensional experience of how the property will look in the future, when it is finished

(Miller 2016).

The Consequences To Society of Job Displacement

We need to do something as a society to compensate for our replacement by machines.

And we need to start with the workers at the bottom of the labor structure because they will be—

in fact, already are being—most immediately affected by technological displacement. As noted

above, although workers across the employment spectrum stand to lose their jobs to intelligent

machines, the problem is still mainly tied to workers who do manual labor and number-based or

repetitive tasks. Jobs that depend on creative solutions to problems or on interacting with and

managing people are not as much at risk—though some of the examples mentioned above show

that this risk is increasing too. Ultimately, technological unemployment exacerbates the

working-class job losses caused by other recent economic changes, such as the offshoring of jobs
 7

and the shift from manufacturing to service work. This means that those who do low wage jobs

are the most at risk of being left without any job at all, which will worsen the already increasing

gap between the rich and the working poor. This gap is already extreme and getting worse: the

most recent State of the Nation’s Housing report released on June 22, 2016, by the Harvard

University Joint Center for Housing Studies notes the glum statistic that over the past ten years

45% of the net growth in U.S. households has been in those earning only $25,000 or less (Un

2016). This means almost half of all new households in the United States are below the poverty

line.

In past industrial revolutions, this very same situation caused severe social disruptions,

from the Luddites rioting in England and smashing steam-powered weaving looms in the early

19th Century, to America’s Haymarket Square riot in 1886, the Colorado Labor Wars in 1903,

and the Everett Massacre in 1916. The only thing that eventually quelled violent social

disruption was the advent of workers’ unions, because this was the only way in which workers

could gain power relative to the very wealthy and powerful owners of increasingly automated

industries: unionized collective action allowed workers to demand improvement in their

conditions. However, in America, at least, unions have waned. Now workers are back to the

position of relative powerlessness they suffered about 120 years ago. This combination:

increasing downward pressure on wages and job availability caused by automation, the

disappearance of avenues for demanding and obtaining improvements in conditions, the

concentration of wealth and power in the hands of fewer and fewer people, and the decline in the

welfare of all but the top earners in industrialized society, is a repeat of what happened during

the so-called “Gilded Age.” And so we stand in great danger of seeing a repeat of the violence

of that era too. We are already seeing some similarities in the teetering of certain social
 8

structures: as we write this, Europe is reeling from economic stress, waves of refugees,

widespread unemployment, and an increasing income gap—all of which is beginning to mirror

the conditions of a century ago. One symptom of this increasing unrest of laborers is the exit of

Great Britain from the European Union, which is motivated in great part by the stresses on social

structures and everyday workers just mentioned.

Possible Solutions to Technological Unemployment

How do we mitigate the peril of massive unemployment and the poverty, dislocation, and

even violence that might follow, as it has in past industrial revolutions? We have four near-term

solutions to propose in this chapter as a way to introduce the larger discussion contained in this

book and, hopefully, to start a wider discussion of the issues outlined here. These short-term

proposals are: cutting back work hours to six hours per day; instituting a Basic Income

Guarantee; instituting micro-fees on certain types of Internet commerce; and using the proceeds

of those fees to provide both micro-incomes for the rest of society, as well as incentives to open-

source developers to provide “bootstrapping” technologies to aid the economically displaced in

developed countries and the poor in Third World regions. The following sections elaborate on

these ideas.

Reducing Working Hours for Everyone to Provide More Work

The first idea of reducing work hours is already being tried in Sweden. The experiment,

based in the city of Gothenburg, and instituted by its City Council is mainly aimed at reducing

worker burnout and illness and at improving working conditions, but businesses have discovered

it also has the unexpected benefits of raising productivity and worker efficiency. Reducing all

work hours to a maximum of 30 hours per week also makes it necessary to hire more workers,
 9

and yet this has been done with surprisingly little increase in cost. This is because workers are

more productive and efficient, feeling fresher during their 6-hour days and 30-hour weeks, and

so requiring less time to accomplish nearly the same amount of work they did before. Even

though the businesses involved do need to hire more workers, the costs of that are offset by

productivity gains, so that their bottom line stays healthy. And so do the workers. One example

of this successful experiment is Gothenburg’s Sahlgrenska University Hospital. According to a

recent article in The New York Times,

Last year, the orthopedics unit switched 89 nurses and doctors to a six-hour day. It hired
15 new staff members to make up for the lost time and extend operating room hours. At 1
million kroner (about $123,000) a month, the experiment was expensive, said Anders
Hyltander, the executive director. But since then, almost no one calls in sick, and nurses
and doctors have been more efficient….The unit is performing 20 percent more
operations, generating additional business from treatments like hip replacements that
would have gone to other hospitals. Surgery waiting times were cut to weeks from
months. (Alderman 2016).
The overall benefits are clear here, but there is a catch. This experiment of reducing work hours

has so far been tried mainly in smaller businesses. There have also been some failures; but these

failures all have one thing in common: they don’t apply the reduced work hours consistently or

they don’t apply them to the whole workforce. As a result, the gains in productivity and

efficiency don’t happen, in the first case, and in the second case the workers who are not

included in the experiment get resentful and workplace friction occurs, reducing productivity. In

both of these instances, businesses and workers ended up unhappy. But when applied

consistently, the reduction in work hours—and the subsequent hiring of more workers—offers

net gains for workers and businesses alike. For our purposes here, the multiplication of job

openings for humans by using this strategy would also, importantly, help to offset technological

unemployment.
 10

Instituting a Basic Income Guarantee

The second idea, the idea of a Basic Income Guarantee (B.I.G.)—which also goes by

other names, such as Universal Basic Income (U.B.I.)—is discussed at length by Scott Santens in

a later chapter of this book. His discussion of it focuses on the moral and philosophical reasons

it is needed, so here we focus on what it is and how it would work. Let’s start with what the idea

of B.I.G. offers and where it comes from. The idea of a B.I.G. is not a new one. Thomas Paine

first proposed it in his 1797 pamphlet, “Agrarian Justice,” as a way to encourage the democratic

allotment of common resources and erase the English social hierarchies the new United States

had inherited from Great Britain. In his formulation of B.I.G., every person would at the age of

adulthood receive from the commonwealth the equivalent of fifteen pounds, about one half the

average yearly income of the average laborer. The intent was that they could then use these

grants to start them on their way in whatever business they chose. Whereas Paine’s intention

was to guarantee universal access to opportunity in a society that sought to modify the

aristocratic property traditions of its former English overlords, today’s version of B.I.G. is

slightly different and aimed at ending systemic unemployment.

Here is the way the current notion works: all current social welfare programs—which in

the United States would include such programs as unemployment insurance, welfare payments,

and food stamps—would be discontinued and replaced by a guaranteed basic income. This

would insure that even as human workers were displaced by technology, they would still be able

to meet their basic economic needs and they also would not have to worry about the time it

would take to re-train themselves for more technological and probably more complex jobs that

have a steep learning curve. Finland is just this year, in 2016, implementing this system. Some

smaller regions in other parts of Europe are too, such as the Dutch cities of Utrecht and Tilburg
 11

(Boffey 2015). Eighteen more Dutch cities are set to follow their example, and the experiment is

also being tried on a very small scale in Germany (only 26 people). In the Dutch experiment, the

government will pay the equivalent of $870/month to everyone; anything you earn on top of that

you get to keep, whether it is from fulltime or part time work (Boffey 2015; Sanchez Diez 2015).

The obvious worry here, and one that makes the politics of implementing this idea difficult, is

that people getting guaranteed income will just sit home watching TV. But there are several

things that make this unlikely. First, the amount guaranteed to all is enough to provide

necessities, but not so much as to make people feel wealthy; it is similar to social security in the

United States, which doesn’t kill ambition: many retirees there work, if they are physically able

to do so, to fight off boredom, provide extra money, stay socially active, and so forth.

Another consideration is that the present system of forcing people to work short term

menial jobs that they mostly hate discourages them from working, as does the fact that the jobs

they find may pay less than their welfare checks, also discouraging them from working. With

B.I.G., the intention is that, with no strings attached to the base amount of money one receives,

and any extra earned income treated as a bonus, people will be encouraged to find work, and

they will also have the time to find—and to train for—work that they like. This would improve

things in a number of ways: first, it would reduce the size of the bureaucracy because recipients

would no longer be monitored; right now, they are tracked to prove they are doing something in

exchange for that money. Second, it would also reduce bureaucracy because just sending people

money is far less complex than the current system and can easily be automated (a good use of

automation). So this system would also be cheaper because of the reduction in the size and

complexity of government systems.

 12

Some critics, however, have argued that even these savings would not cover the

expenditures necessary for instituting B.I.G. For example, according to the staff of the British

business magazine The Economist, the recent Swiss referendum to institute a B.I.G. would have

been “absurdly expensive: a rough calculation suggests it would cost about SFr197 billion ($210

billion), or 30% of GDP” (Economist.com 2015). Even if their math is correct, there are other

ways of boosting the funding for it, or enhancing it, such as generating micro-incomes and/or

micro-taxes from previously untapped sources. This brings us to another idea.

Using Micro-Fees and Micro-Incomes to Offset Forced Unemployment

A third idea to combat the declining need for human workers is that of providing a

variety of micro-incomes to the general population by levying micro-fees on internet businesses

in exchange for the personal data that they now collect on all of us for free, and also for digital

work that such corporations now use for free—such as open source coding done by unpaid

software coders, or other types of work that is resident online. Here is an example: the Google

language translation algorithms work by sampling millions of translations created by human

translators, but those humans are never paid for that sampling.11 Similarly, data miners make a

lot of money by using data they glean from our Internet use. Why should they get all that from

us for free? It would not be difficult to create an algorithm that would credit each of us for use

of our property; all those little bits add up. The precedent for this already exists in America

where all Alaskans are sent a check at the end of every year for the oil that companies get from

their soil.
 13

The fourth and last idea is twofold: to subsidize technology for the economically

disadvantaged and to focus on ways to make technology cheaper and more usable for poor

regions of the earth. This would help those displaced by increasing automation to better keep up

with the rapid changes in technology and to make themselves more readily employable in an

increasingly digital economy. The second of these two things—making technology more

available and cheaper to the third world—has been in process for a while, as, for instance, in the

adaptation of various technologies to energy-poor environments. Examples we already have:

windup radios and flashlights; basic laptops like the OLPC XO, a low-cost and low-power laptop

computer; and low-cost tech components such as the Raspberry Pi, a small, inexpensive

computer processor the size of a credit card that costs only $25-35. The first idea, subsidizing

technology like this for the third world and for the working poor who need technology to retrain

themselves for the changing economy, is built into the idea of micro-fees. At least a portion of

those fees could be used to subsidize this kind of research into technology for energy-poor,

Internet-poor environments; we would suggest that the micro-fees collected from corporations’

use of previously free, open-source codes go to this purpose. Right now, all kinds of developers’

codes are made available for free by all kinds of hobbyists, and corporations profit handsomely

by this.

This amounts not only to corporate freeloading, but worse: it is exploitation of the open-

source programming community, many of whom live very humble lives. Recently, some of

these “citizen developers” have been bucking against this system. Azer Koçulu, for instance, a

young man from Oakland, California with a high school education, deleted the open source code

he had made and posted on the Web for other developers to use as part of a programming

template. As detailed in an article in the online magazine Quartz, the reason was that a
 14

corporation who used his code gave him trouble about the name of his code package: he called

the bit of JavaScript he contributed to the template “kik,” and an attorney for the messaging

application, Kik, emailed him to ask him to change his code package’s name, because they

needed to protect their trademark (Collins 2016). Because all programmers, including those

working for Kik, stood to benefit from his code, because he made and posted it for free, and

because he was planning to make an open source project with the same name, he refused. When

Kik became insistent, Koçulu responded by deleting his code, and suddenly lots of programmers

around the world —including those being paid good money by digital corporations—could not

do their jobs. The issue was ultimately resolved, but this story shows how dependent for-profit

entities are on free code contributed to open source repositories. Why can’t corporations pay a

small fee, a “donation” to the collective good, every time they use this free material? Why not

pay back the altruism of the open source community by giving back to the wider community?

Long-Term Solutions are Harder to See, but the Past Shows a Way

We emphasize that solutions like this one and those previously mentioned are only near-

term solutions. In the long run (and we want to emphasize this, because those who defend

automation generally do not distinguish the short run from the long run consequences of it)

history shows that industrial revolutions spawn a lot of new jobs that evolve from the basis of the

revolution itself, from the technology that caused it. We hope that this historical trend continues.

One way this is likely to happen is via smart implants in human beings that can leverage the new

interconnectivity between and with smart machines. As Thomas Philbeck discusses at more

length in his chapter in this volume, humans who agreed to get digital implants to allow

enhanced thinking and physical performance could work symbiotically with smart technology in

new ways to create whole new employment categories that we have a hard time even imagining
 15

now. It is difficult to project very far into the future in any specific way, but the groundwork is

already laid for this possibility via a number of emerging innovations.

One such innovation that is already in the prototype phase is a very thin, flexible plastic-

metal mesh that is so fine it can be injected into the brain via a large blood vessel, such as the

carotid artery. Once in the brain, it unfolds into a sort of microscopic, electronic net that is so

thin it becomes assimilated by the neurons of the cortex. Invented by a team of scientists at

Harvard, this “syringe-injectable” electronic mesh can be used to record, transmit or monitor

activity in very tiny biological spaces, like those between brain cells. These scientists have

already successfully used this very fine, light mesh as a digital device-to-brain interface in mice

for transmitting various kinds of information back and forth, and its possibilities for doing the

same with humans is clear enough that various groups, including “the U.S. Air Force’s

Cyborgcell program, which focuses on small-scale electronics for the ‘performance

enhancement’ of cells,” have expressed interest (Powell 2015).

What is revolutionary about this innovation is that it can be put into someone’s body with

an easy, non-invasive injection, as compared to neural electronics already in use to treat such

things as Parkinson’s Disease—which have to be surgically implanted. Jacob Robinson, a Rice

University scientist who develops technology that interfaces with the brain, asserted that this

new, neural mesh invention holds huge potential: “This could make some inroads to a brain

interface for consumers,” he said (Powell 2015). Elon Musk evidently agrees, having said

recently that he sees this device—which he calls “neural lace”—as just the kind of thing that will

allow humans to interface directly with their digital devices at lightening speed, and so to ramp

up their mental power, speed and capacity in comparison to machines (Furness 2016).
 16

In our view, this neural mesh could be even stronger coupled with something like an the

memory booster being developed by Theodore Berger’s team at the University of Southern

California (Berger et al. 2012). His team has developed a way to encode long term memories

from the hippocampus—the brain’s seat of that type of memory—and then feed it back in if

those memories are lost. Essentially, they are developing a prosthetic memory. Their chief aim

is to help those with diseases like Alzheimer’s, but if coupled with something like neural

mesh/lace, we could amplify the speed and memory of the human brain, as well as its ability to

interface with machines. This kind of pairing could therefore create a whole new category of

human jobs, for those willing to get dual implants of these two devices, when fully developed.

The problem with this kind of long-term solution is one which most of the authors in the

present book delve into in their respective chapters: that is, even new solutions to under-

employment that the current industrial revolution might provide—such as neural lace or

prosthetic memory—may not be sufficient to resolve the problem of an ever-increasing

population in need of work; for one thing, people may resist the idea of implants like these.

Even more important, agree all the authors in our book, it would not solve the problem of the

increasing chasm between the “haves and have-nots.” This is a more fundamental problem that

has to do with how we define work, property, ownership, and, especially, the reasons why we

work. These issues are the ones that underpin the deeper philosophy of the coming chapters.

Overview of Upcoming Chapters

The second chapter of this book, by Melanie Swan, goes more deeply than this first

chapter of ours does regarding the evidence that technological unemployment is already upon us.
 17

She examines how, in our increasingly automated economy, technology has replaced much of

the need for non-elective human labor. Thus automation is a double-edged sword. On one hand,

technological unemployment worsens income inequality and wealth disparity. On the other hand,

there are purported gains in productivity and economic growth. She then posits Abundance

Economics as a new theory of economics that addresses this problematic disparity in two phases.

First, in the automation economy phase, there would be an alleviation of material-goods scarcity

for human survival, and second, in the actualization economy phase, there would be a focus on

social goods for greater human thriving.

In chapter three James Clark, the Director of the World Technology Network, discusses

how “creative destruction”—the notion that new technology destroys older jobs only to create

even more new ones—has worked in the past and how it has changed with the present advent of

emerging technology in the workplace. He points out in his chapter that in past industrial

revolutions this process of creative destruction worked well; however, this time things look

different, mainly because the pace of destruction and change is so much faster and ubiquitous

than in past revolutions, and that pace seems to be accelerating. He asserts that there are three

big questions we must address now as a society in order to prepare for the loss of jobs to smart

machines: “1) What are the primary CHALLENGES we likely face regarding these issues in a

world heading toward massive technological disruption of human labor? 2) What NEW

STRATEGIES regarding these issues would need to be developed/created in order to address

these challenges? 3) What ACTIONS should we take now regarding these issues to speed up the

move to a stable and equitable society with little required human labor?” He notes that these big

questions were tackled for the first time at the recent World Summit on Technological
 18

Unemployment held by the World Technology Network and attended by many leaders of

industry and economics, and he gives links to their deliberations.

Chapter four describes a radically alien future. In it, economist and computer expert

Robin Hanson elaborates his theory of what life will be like once we achieve the ability to create

human brain emulations—that is, exact, virtual copies of human brains, an event he argues is

likely. In the context of the chapter he has written for this book, he discusses how the advent of

what he terms “ems” will change the nature of work. He first lays out the reasons he sees ems as

a likely near-term phenomenon (that is, likely to arrive within the next century or so), as opposed

to the less likely advent of human-level Artificial Intelligence. Then he describes how whole

societies of ems—some in robotic bodies, but most living in idyllic virtual environments—would

operate, especially in terms of labor. He goes on to explain how the ems’ existence and superior

work rates would affect the human employment outlook, leaving humans with two roads to

economic happiness: either convert themselves to ems to stretch the wealth that they already

have (because living as an em retiree in a virtual existence would be much cheaper than doing so

in the physical world), or invest early in ems and in their work.

The fifth chapter examines how technological unemployment will interact with rising old

age dependency and extended longevity. John Danaher opens the fifth chapter of this book by

examining how Populations in developed societies are rapidly aging: fertility rates are at all-time

lows while life expectancy creeps ever higher. This is triggering a social crisis in which

shrinking youth populations are required to pay for the care and retirements of an aging majority.

Some people argue that by extending the healthy and productive phases of life we can avoid this

crisis (thereby securing a ‘longevity dividend’); however, this chapter argues, this longevity

dividend is unlikely to be paid if lifespan extension coincides with rampant technological

 19

unemployment. This in turn leads to the argument that our vision of the extended life, post-work

utopia may need to be reconceived by prioritizing the role of play and how we conceive of it in

the well-lived life.

Chapter six asks whether we can build resilience against technological unemployment

into future modes of employment. Thomas Philbeck, a philosopher and business specialist who

works with the World Economic Forum, presents a number of ways by which experts think we

might make future employment more robust. He points to new modes of education, jobs that

focus on uniquely human skills, non-standard work (the “gig” economy), new policies and

regulations, and even, in the longer term, a merging of humans and machines into a post-human,

hybridized form that might compete with increasingly intelligent machines for jobs. Ultimately,

though, he finds something lacking in all of these ideas. Even if humans can digitally enhance

themselves, he notes, “If biotechnology becomes the only hope of attaining the high-level skills for

high-paying jobs of the future, the division caused by skills-biased technological change will only

increase, and then both technology and society will have been thoroughly appropriated by a merely

economic orientation.” Instead, he concludes that we must “seriously consider that the growth model

may not be a desirable end in a technologically mediated society,” and that we eventually need to re-

define how the economy, society, and individual relate to one another.

Universal Basic Income is the topic of chapter seven. In this chapter, Scott Santens

makes an impassioned plea for the idea of instituting a Universal Basic Income (also known by

other names, such as Basic Income Guarantee) as a solution to the increasing number of people

being put out of jobs because of automation. Key to his argument is his explication of the idea of

the “commonwealth” and its obligations: his idea that since all goods and services are produced

not in isolation, but by all who make up the economy in general, and that since the wealthy
 20

among us therefore benefit greatly from the commons, and that, in addition, because automation

stands to provide virtually infinite productivity, everyone deserves a minimal amount of livable

income.

Chapter eight is about policy responses to technological unemployment. Beginning with

a survey of various proposed public policies to respond to growing technological unemployment,

Yvonne Stevens and Gary Marchant, legal specialists on the governance of emerging technology,

find them lacking. Instead, they propose that because we likely face an increasingly jobless

future in which machines increasingly take over production from human laborers, we need a new

system of rewards to replace our standard idea of work. This system would be one comprised of

rewards based on a digital “badge” system, where people who may be underemployed would be

rewarded, on top of any income they might earn, with badges that could be traded for

supplemental goods and services they might need. These badges could also be used in case

automation leads to a situation of abundance, in which money ceases to be meaningful. In either

case, badges would be rewarded for activity that society deems meaningful: child-care, volunteer

work, or creative production of open-source software, for instance. In this way, people would

receive compensation for activities that they like to do and that help society. Marchant and

Stevens point to the precedent of China, which is already working on such a system, and where

by 2020, “everyone…will be registered in a national ‘social credit’ database.” And they close

by giving answers to some possible problems that such a system might raise.

James Hughes assesses the job creation potential of new technologies in chapter nine.

Although most human mental and physical labor will eventually be replaced by automation,

complex cognitive skills, such as creativity and social-emotional intelligence, will take longer to

replace. As a consequence there may be, for a time, expanding employment opportunities for
 21

occupations that use more of those skills, such as architects, artists and designers, information

specialists and public relations professionals. It is impossible to predict exactly what new

creative or social jobs might be invented, but it is likely that the future job market will see more

part-time "gig" jobs, public sector jobs, and elder care, and that many new jobs will be types that

will integrate technology, such as the neural lace mentioned above in this introductory chapter,

and humans in a symbiotic way.

In the final chapter, philosopher David Gunkel deliberates about how we can rethink

education in the face of growing displacement of workers by technology. The possibility of a

future in which automation causes joblessness challenges the existing standard operating

presumptions of higher education and the task of preparing and credentialing individuals for

employment. This chapter argues for a significant recalibration of higher education to meet the

demands of the 21st century by diagnosing the opportunities and challenges that emerging

technology presents to existing instructional structures and methodologies, and by then

describing concrete steps that can be instituted by both educational institutions and individual

students in order to better anticipate and respond to the coming wave of technological

unemployment.

Notes

1. Jaron Lanier discussed this idea at a recent debate: “Don't Trust The Promise Of Artificial

Intelligence, a debate co-presented with Intelligence Squared U.S.” (Wed, Mar 9, 2016, 7 p.m.:

Kaufmann Concert Hall, New York, NY). It clearly stems from his earlier ideas regarding
 22

automatic, small person-to-person payments for music and other creative content posted on the

Internet, which he discusses in his book You Are Not a Gadget (New York: Knopf Doubleday,

2010) 100-101.

References

Alderman, Liz. “In Sweden, an Experiment Turns Shorter Workweek into Bigger Gains.” New
York Times, May 20, International Business sec.
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/21/business/international/in-sweden-an-experiment-
turns-shorter-workdays-into-bigger-
gains.html?action=click&pgtype=Homepage&version=Moth-
Visible&moduleDetail=inside-nyt-region-5&module=inside-nyt-region&region=inside-
nyt-region&WT.nav=inside-nyt-region

Arntz, Melanie, Terry Gregory, and Ulrich Zeirahn. 2016. “The Risk of Automation for Jobs in
OECD Countries: A Comparative Analysis.” OECD Social, Employment and Migration
Working
Papers, No. 189, Paris: OECD Publishing. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jlz9h56dvq7-
en

Berger, Theodore W. et al. 2017. “A Hippocampal Cognitive Prosthesis: Multi-Input, Multi-

Output Nonlinear Modeling and VLSI Implementation.” Ieee Transactions on Neural
Systems and Rehabilitation Engineering 20.2 (2012): 198–211. PMC, April 27.
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3395724/

Boffey, Daniel. 2015. “Dutch City Plans to Pay Citizens a ‘Basic Income’, and Greens Say It
Could Work in the UK.” The Guardian, December 26.
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/26/dutch-city-utrecht-basic-income-uk-
greens

Barajas, Joshua. 2014. “Smart Robots Will Take Over a Third of Jobs by 2025, Gartner Says.”
PBS Newshour: The Rundown, October 7.
 23

http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/smart-robots-will-take-third-jobs-2025-gartner-
says/

Boston Consulting Group. 2015. Takeoff in Robotics Will Power the Next Productivity Surge in
Manufacturing. February 10.
http://www.bcg.com/d/press/10feb2015-robotics-power-productivity-surge-manufacturing-
838

Bowles, Jeremy. 2014. “The Computerisation of European Jobs.” Bruegel think tank (blog).
July 24,
http://www.bruegel.org/nc/blog/detail/article/1394-the-computerisation-of-european-jobs

Brynjolfsson, Erik and Andrew McAfee. 2011. Race Against the Machine. Digital Frontier
Press. Kindle edition.

Collins, Keith. 2016. “How one programmer broke the internet by deleting a tiny piece of
code.” Quartz, March 27. http://qz.com/646467/how-one-programmer-broke-the-internet-
by-deleting-a-tiny-piece-of-
code/?utm_source=pocket&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=pockethits

Economist.com. 2015. “Basically Unaffordable.” The Economist, May 23.

http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21651897-replacing-welfare-
payments-basic-income-all-alluring

Ford, Martin. 2015. Rise of the Robots: Technology and the Threat of a Jobless Future. New
York: Basic Books.

Frey, Carl Benedikt, and Michael A. Osborne. 2013. “The Future of Employment: How
Susceptible are Jobs to Computerisation?” Oxford: Oxford Martin School Working Paper.

---. 2014. “Agiletown: The Relentless March of

Technology and London’s Response.” London Futures. Deloitte, November.
http://www2.deloitte.com/uk/en/pages/growth/articles/agiletown-the-relentless-march-of-
technology-and-londons-response.html#
 24

---. 2015. “Technology at Work: The Future of Innovation and Employment.” Oxford Martin
School.

Furness, Dyllan. 2016. “Elon Musk Thinks We Should Insert ‘Neural Laces’ into Our Brains So
We Can Become Cyborgs.” Digital Trends, June 3.
http://www.digitaltrends.com/cool-tech/elon-musk-cyborg/

Gleyo, Fritz. 2015. “AP Has a Robot Journalist that Writes a Thousand Articles per Month.”
Tech Times, October 10. http://www.techtimes.com/articles/93473/20151010/ap-has-a-
robot-journalist-that-writes-a-thousand-articles-per-month.htm

Lanier, Jaron. 2010. You Are Not a Gadget. New York: Knopf Doubleday.

Miller, Jennifer. 2016. “A New Dimension in Home Buying: Virtual Reality.” New York
Times, February 12, Real Estate Sec.
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/realestate/virtual-reality-to-sell-homes.html
Paine, Thomas. 1797; reprint 1824. “Agrarian Justice.” In The Political Writings of Thomas
Paine. 2 vols. Charlestown, MA: George Davidson. 2: 404-405.
Powell, Devin. 2015. “A Flexible Circuit Has Been Injected into Living Brains.”
Smithsonian.com, June 8. http://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/flexible-circuit-
has-been-injected-living-brains-180955525/#eKhTIO9rPqHc6Urv.99

Prodhan, Georgina. 2016. “Europe’s Robots to Become ‘Electronic Persons’ Under Draft Plan.”
Reuters, June 21. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-robotics-
lawmaking-idUSKCN0Z72AY

Sanchez Diez, Maria. 2015. “The Dutch ‘Basic Income’ Experiment is Expanding Across
Multiple
Cities.” Quartz, August 13. http://qz.com/473779/several-dutch-cities-want-to-give-
residents-a-no-strings-attached-basic-income/

Sirkin, Harold L., Michael Zinser, and Justin Rose. 2015. “Why Advanced Manufacturing Will
Boost Productivity.” Boston Consulting Group, January 30.
 25

https://www.bcgperspectives.com/content/articles/lean_and_manufacturing_production_
why_advanced_manufacturing_boost_productivity/

Speight, Janek. 2015. “Aussie Brick-Laying Robot Works 20 Times Faster than Humans.”
Techly, July 23. http://www.techly.com.au/2015/07/23/aussie-bricklaying-
robot-works-20-times-faster-humans/

Un, Sushma. 2016. “Fewer Americans Can Afford Housing Despite Improvement in the
Overall
Market.” Marketwatch, June 24. http://www.marketwatch.com/story/fewer-americans-
can-afford-housing-despite-improvement-in-the-overall-market-2016-06-24

2016. “World's First 'Robot Run' Farm to Open in Japan.” Phys.org, February 1.
http://phys.org/news/2016-02-world-robot-farm-japan.html

1
Jaron Lanier discussed this idea at a recent debate: “Don't Trust The Promise Of Artificial

Intelligence, a debate co-presented with Intelligence Squared U.S.” (Wed, Mar 9, 2016, 7 p.m.:

Kaufmann Concert Hall, New York, NY). It clearly stems from his earlier ideas regarding

automatic, small person-to-person payments for music and other creative content posted on the

Internet, which he discusses in his book You Are Not a Gadget (New York: Knopf Doubleday,

2010) 100-101.

View publication stats