XXIV. CITIZENSHIP Reyes, the father of Allan F. Poe.

Reyes, the father of Allan F. Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had not been presented
in evidence, his death certificate, however, identified him to be a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos,
A. General Considerations Pangasinan, and 84 years old at the time of his death on 11 September 1954. The certificate of
1. Tecson v. COMELEC birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed that he was born on 17 May 1915 to an Español
father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestizaEspañol mother, Marta Reyes. Introduced by petitioner was
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its mother, it an “uncertified” copy of a supposed certificate of the alleged marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita
did so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child of an Gomez on 05 July 1936. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the
alien father in line with the assumption that the mother had custody, would exercise parental date of their marriage to be on 16 September 1940. In the same certificate, Allan F. Poe was
authority and had the duty to support her illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to stated to be twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-
prejudice or discriminate against him. two years old, unmarried, and an American citizen. The birth certificate of FPJ, would disclose that
he was born on 20 August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years old, married to Bessie
The fact of the matter—perhaps the most significant consideration—is that the 1935 Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-one years old and married.
Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of birth of respondent
FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries
Constitution states that among the citizens of the Philippines are “those whose fathers are on the birth certificate of respondent and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only
citizens of the Philippines.” There utterly is no cogent justification to prescribe conditions or conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would be
distinctions where there clearly are none provided. that—
1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;
Facts: 2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
This is a consolidated case upon the issue of citizenship of FPJ. 3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940;
Ronald Allan Kelly Poe aka Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ) filed his COC for Presidency. The 4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and
issue of citizenship is brought up to challenge his qualifications as a presidential candidate to hold
the highest office of the land. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a 5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be “Fernando Jr.,” or “Ronald Allan” Poe, Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate
his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of
Petitioners filed an action to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his their contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides:
certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his “Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a
certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by
Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.”
father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.
Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries made therein
transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. could be grounded on 1) the sense of official duty in the preparation of the statement made, 2) the
Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions—first, Allan penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of that duty, 3) the routine and disinterested origin of
F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley most such statements, and 4) the publicity of record which makes more likely the prior exposure
and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only of such errors as might have occurred.31
a year after the birth of respondent.
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11 September 1954,
The first case was dismissed by COMELEC and denied the motion for reconsideration. at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed that Lorenzo Pou
The other petitions are later consolidated. was born sometime in the year 1870 when the Philippines was still a colony of Spain. Petitioner
would argue that Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippines during the crucial period of from 1898 to
Issue: Whether or not there was misrepresentation on the part of FPJ for stating in his COC that 1902 considering that there was no existing record about such fact in the Records Management
he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines and Archives Office. Petitioner, however, likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any
Ruling: other place during the same period. In his death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou was
stated to be San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be
The Supreme Court held that NO, there was no misrepresentation and thus qualified for sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a person at the time of
presidency. his death was also his residence before death. It would be extremely doubtful if the Records
Management and Archives Office would have had complete records of all residents of the
FPJ’s birthdate appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Philippines from 1898 to 1902.
Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship—naturalization, jus soli, res
judicata and jus saguinis. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship status
a “natural-born” citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 should be deemed independent from and not inextricably tied up with that prescribed for civil law
Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor, jus sanguinis or blood purposes. The Civil Code or Family Code provisions on proof of filiation or paternity, although
relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth. good law, do not have preclusive effects on matters alien to personal and family relations. The
ordinary rules on evidence could well and should govern. For instance, the matter about pedigree
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the earliest is not necessarily precluded from being applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code provisions.
established direct ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to Marta
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides— certificate of respondent and a marriage certificate of his parents showed that FPJ was born on
20 August 1939 to a Filipino father and an American mother who were married to each other a
“Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to year later, or on 16 September 1940. Birth to unmarried parents would make FPJ an illegitimate
testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be child. Petitioner contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ so followed the citizenship of his
received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the mother, Bessie Kelley, an American citizen.
two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word ‘pedigree’ includes
relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, is
facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately most convincing; he states:
connected with pedigree.”
“The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was established long ago by
For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already dead People vs. Cayat. I would grant that the distinction between legitimate children and illegitimate
or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the declarant must be a children rests on real differences. xxx But real differences alone do not justify invidious distinction.
relative of the person whose pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be made before the Real differences may justify distinction for one purpose but not for another purpose.
controversy has occurred, and (e) the relationship between the declarant and the person whose
pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. “xxx What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public service? What possible
state interest can there be for disqualifying an illegitimate child from becoming a public officer. It
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie was not the fault of the child that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive the child of the fullness
Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC, might be accepted to prove the acts of of political rights for no fault of his own? To disqualify an illegitimate child from holding an important
Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e, living together with Bessie public office is to punish him for the indiscretion of his parents. There is neither justice nor
Kelley and his children (including respondent FPJ) in one house, and as one family— rationality in that. And if there is neither justice nor rationality in the distinction, then the distinction
transgresses the equal protection clause and must be reprobated.”
“I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing in Stockton,
California, U.S.A., after being sworn in accordance with law do hereby declare that: Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its
mother, it did so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for the illegitimate
“1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe. child of an alien father in line with the assumption that the mother had custody, would exercise
“2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr. parental authority and had the duty to support her illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to
prejudice or discriminate against him.
“3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan Poe, more
popularly known in the Philippines as `Fernando Poe, Jr.,’ or `FPJ’. The fact of the matter—perhaps the most significant consideration—is that the 1935
Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of birth of respondent
“4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ’ was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke’s Hospital, FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the
Magdalena Street, Manila. Constitution states that among the citizens of the Philippines are “those whose fathers are citizens
of the Philippines.” There utterly is no cogent justification to prescribe conditions or distinctions
“xxx x xx x xx where there clearly are none provided.
“7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became engaged while they were
students at the University of the Philippines in 1936. I was also introduced to Fernando
Poe, Sr., by my sister that same year. 2. Re: Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar, Vicente D. Ching
“8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in 1938. FACTS:
“9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children, Elizabeth, Ronald, Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A.
Allan and Fernando II, and myself lived together with our mother at our family’s house Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth,
on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate until the liberation of Manila in 1945, Ching has resided in the Philippines.
except for some months between 1943-1944.
On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis
“10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4) more children University in Baguio City, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution
after Ronald Allan Poe. of this Court, dated 1 September 1998, he was allowed to take the Bar Examinations, subject to
the condition that he must submit to the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship.
“xxx x xx x xx
In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18 November 1998, the following
“18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew, Ronald Allan documents:
Poe is a natural born Filipino, and that he is the legitimate child of Fernando Poe, Sr.
1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board of Accountancy of the Professional
“Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January 2004. Regulations Commission showing that Ching is a certified public accountant;
Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he could not 2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, Election Officer of the
have transmitted his citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child. According Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in Tubao La Union showing that Ching is a registered voter
to petitioner, prior to his marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936, contracted of the said place; and
marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez, making his subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley
bigamous and respondent FPJ an illegitimate child. The veracity of the supposed certificate of 3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, showing that Ching
marriage between Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be most doubtful at best. But the was elected as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union during the 12 May 1992
documentary evidence introduced by no less than respondent himself, consisting of a birth synchronized elections.
On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were released and Ching was one of Constitution which states that "(t)hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect
the successful Bar examinees. The oath-taking of the successful Bar examinees was scheduled Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority" are Philippine citizens. 6 It should be
on 5 May 1999. However, because of the questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine
allowed to take his oath. Pursuant to the resolution of this Court, dated 20 April 1999, he was citizenship should not be understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the
required to submit further proof of his citizenship. In the same resolution, the Office of the Solicitor acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. 7 If the citizenship of a person
General (OSG) was required to file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to the bar and on was subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new
the documents evidencing his Philippine citizenship. charter even if the judicial challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new
Constitution. 8
The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching, being the "legitimate child of a
Chinese father and a Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen and C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution,
continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship" 1 in prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine
strict compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An Act Providing for citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect
the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by
Whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen." The OSG adds that "(w)hat he acquired at best was only an the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the
inchoate Philippine citizenship which he could perfect by election upon reaching the age of nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of
majority." 2 In this regard, the OSG clarifies that "two (2) conditions must concur in order that the allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."
election of Philippine citizenship may be effective, namely: (a) the mother of the person making
the election must be a citizen of the Philippines; and (b) said election must be made upon reaching However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the
the age of majority." 3 The OSG then explains the meaning of the phrase "upon reaching the age election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election
of majority:" should be made "upon reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then commenced upon
reaching twenty-one (21) years. 9 In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases involving
The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has been construed to mean a reasonable time the validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time
after reaching the age of majority which had been interpreted by the Secretary of Justice to be period on the decisions of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these
three (3) years (VELAYO, supra at p. 51 citing Op., Sec. of Justice No. 70, s. 1940, Feb. 27, 1940). decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the
Said period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when a (sic) person concerned has pronouncements of the Department of State of the United States Government to the effect that
always considered himself a Filipino (ibid., citing Op. Nos. 355 and 422, s. 1955; 3, 12, 46, 86 and the election should be made within a "reasonable time" after attaining the age of majority. 10 The
97, s. 1953). But in Cuenco, it was held that an election done after over seven (7) years was phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made within
not made within a reasonable time. three (3) years from reaching the age of majority. 11 However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of
Justice, 12 that the three (3) year period is not an inflexible rule. We said:
In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship and,
if ever he does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by present It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable period after reaching the age
jurisprudence. However, due to the peculiar circumstances surrounding Ching's case, the OSG of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that three (3) years is the reasonable time
recommends the relaxation of the standing rule on the construction of the phrase "reasonable to elect Philippine citizenship under the constitutional provision adverted to above, which period
period" and the allowance of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with C.A. No. 625 may be extended under certain circumstances, as when the person concerned has always
prior to taking his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar. considered himself a Filipino. 13
On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his Affidavit of Election of However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect Philippine citizenship
Philippine Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance, both dated 15 July 1999. In his Manifestation, is not indefinite:
Ching states:
Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He became of age on
“I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999 in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 625; February 16, 1944. His election of citizenship was made on May 15, 1951, when he was over
My election was expressed in a statement signed and sworn to by me before a notary public; I twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over seven (7) years after he had reached the age of majority.
accompanied my election of Philippine citizenship with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution It is clear that said election has not been made "upon reaching the age of majority." 14
and the Government of the Philippines; I filed my election of Philippine citizenship and my oath of
allegiance to (sic) the Civil Registrar of Tubao La Union, and I paid the amount of TEN PESOS In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirty-five (35) years
(Ps. 10.00) as filing fees.” old when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen
(14) years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on the interpretation of the phrase
ISSUE: "upon reaching the age of majority," Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable
yardstick, the allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in this
Whether or not Ching has elected Philippine citizenship within a "reasonable time." connection, that the special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and
RULING: uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a registered voter
and a former elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically
NO. We hold that Ching failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.
When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution. Under Article IV, Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute what Ching erroneously labels
Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother as informal election of citizenship.
and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority,
the child elected Philippine citizenship. 4 This right to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of Ching. However, even if we consider the
in the 1973 Constitution when it provided that "(t)hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to special circumstances in the life of Ching like his having lived in the Philippines all his life and his
the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are citizens of the consistent belief that he is a Filipino, controlling statutes and jurisprudence constrain us to
Philippines. 5 Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987 disagree with the recommendation of the OSG. Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to
validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span of fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time 4. Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC
he reached the age of majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship
is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon reaching the age of As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution's
majority." Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely
citizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious exclude foundlings either.
and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Facts:
Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching's
unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over. Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned as a
newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar (Edgardo) on 3
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed September 1968. Parental care and custody over petitioner was passed on by Edgardo to his
and suppressed when convenient. 20 One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only relatives, Emiliano Militar (Emiliano) and his wife. Three days after, 6 September 1968, Emiliano
an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm reported and registered petitioner as a foundling with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City
and promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship (OCR-Iloilo). In her Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, the petitioner was given the
and, as a result. this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp. name "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar."
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's application When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a.
for admission to the Philippine Bar. Fenando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a petition for her adoption
with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan City. On 13 May 1974, the trial court granted
their petition and ordered that petitioner's name be changed from "Mary Grace Natividad
B. Natural Born Citizens Contreras Militar" to "Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe." Although necessary notations were
made by OCR-Iloilo on petitioner's foundling certificate reflecting the court decreed adoption,[2]
3. Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita the petitioner's adoptive mother discovered only sometime in the second half of 2005 that the
lawyer who handled petitioner's adoption failed to secure from the OCR-Iloilo a new Certificate of
 Only natural-born Filipino citizens may be appointed as justice of the Supreme Court Live Birth indicating petitioner's new name and the name of her adoptive parents.[3] Without delay,
petitioner's mother executed an affidavit attesting to the lawyer's omission which she submitted to
 Decision of administrative body (Bureau of Immigration) declaring one a natural-born
the OCR-Iloilo. On 4 May 2006, OCR-Iloilo issued a new Certificate of Live Birth in the name of
citizen is not binding upon the courts when there are circumstances that entail factual
Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe. Having reached the age of eighteen (18) years in 1986,
assertions that need to be threshed out in proper judicial proceedings
petitioner registered as a voter with the local COMELEC Office in San Juan City. On 13 December
FACTS: 1986, she received her COMELEC Voter's Identification Card for Precinct No. 196 in Greenhills,
San Juan, Metro Manila.
This case arose when respondent Gregory S. Ong was appointed by Executive Secretary, in
On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a naturalized American citizen.
representation of the Office of the President, as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.
Petitioners contended that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen, born on May 25, 1953 to Chinese On 8 April 2004, the petitioner came back to the Philippines together with Hanna to
parents. They further added that even if it were granted that eleven years after respondent Ong’s support her father's candidacy for President in the May 2004 elections.
birth, his father was finally granted Filipino citizenship by naturalization, that, by itself, would not
make respondent Ong a natural-born citizen. For his part, respondent Ong contended that he is a After a few months, specifically on 13 December 2004, petitioner rushed back to the
natural-born citizen and presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ Philippines upon learning of her father's deteriorating medical condition. Her father slipped into a
declaring him to be such. coma and eventually expired. The petitioner stayed in the country until 3 February 2005 to take
care of her father's funeral arrangements as well as to assist in the settlement of his estate.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Ong is a natural-born Filipino citizen
According to the petitioner, the untimely demise of her father was a severe blow to her
RULING: entire family. In her earnest desire to be with her grieving mother, the petitioner and her husband
decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines sometime in the first quarter of 2005.
xxx respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent recognition of his
As early as 2004, the petitioner already quit her job in the U.S.
natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of
the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his father. Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines on 24 May 2005[24] and without delay,
secured a Tax Identification Number from the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Her three children
The series of events and long string of alleged changes in the nationalities of respondent Ong's immediately followed while her husband was forced to stay in the U.S. to complete pending
ancestors, by various births, marriages and deaths, all entail factual assertions that need to be projects as well as to arrange the sale of their family home there.
threshed out in proper judicial proceedings so as to correct the existing records on his birth and
citizenship. The chain of evidence would have to show that Dy Guiok Santos, respondent Ong's On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
mother, was a Filipino citizen, contrary to what still appears in the records of this Court. pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
Respondent Ong has the burden of proving in court his alleged ancestral tree as well as his 2003. Under the same Act, she filed with the Bureau of Immigration (BI) a sworn petition to
citizenship under the time-line of three Constitutions. Until this is done, respondent Ong cannot reacquire Philippine citizenship together with petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of her
accept an appointment to this Court as that would be a violation of the Constitution. For this three minor children on 10 July 2006. As can be gathered from its 18 July 2006 Order, the BI acted
reason, he can be prevented by injunction from doing so. favorably on petitioner's petitions and declared that she is deemed to have reacquired her
Philippine citizenship while her children are considered as citizens of the Philippines.
 On 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before the Vice Consul of the U.S. Embassy jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose, she being a citizen of the Philippines, but not over the
in Manila an "Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States."[49] On that status of the petitioners, who are foreigners. Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043
day, she accomplished a sworn questionnaire before the U.S. Vice Consul wherein she stated entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules to Govern the Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children
that she had taken her oath as MTRCB Chairperson on 21 October 2010 with the intent, among and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the "Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995"), R.A. No.
others, of relinquishing her American citizenship. In the same questionnaire, the petitioner stated 8552, entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Adoption of Filipino Children and
that she had resided outside of the U.S., specifically in the Philippines, from 3 September 1968 to For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and this Court's
29 July 1991 and from May 2005 to present. A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC or the "Rule on Adoption," all expressly refer to "Filipino children" and include
foundlings as among Filipino children who may be adopted.
On 9 December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a "Certificate of Loss of
Nationality of the United States" effective 21 October 2010. On 2 October 2012, the petitioner filed It has been argued that the process to determine that the child is a foundling leading to
with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein the issuance of a foundling certificate under these laws and the issuance of said certificate are
she answered "6 years and 6 months" to the question "Period of residence in the Philippines acts to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship which make the foundling a naturalized Filipino at
before May 13, 2013." Petitioner obtained the highest number of votes and was proclaimed best. This is erroneous. Under Article IV, Section 2 "Natural-born citizens are those who are
Senator on 16 May 2013. citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship." In the first place, "having to perform an act" means that the act must be
On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016 personally done by the citizen. In this instance, the determination of foundling status is done not
Elections.[56] In her COC, the petitioner declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that her by the child but by the authorities. Secondly, the object of the process is the determination of the
residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship of the child. Lastly, the process is certainly not
(11) months counted from 24 May 2005.[57] The petitioner attached to her COC an "Affidavit analogous to naturalization proceedings to acquire Philippine citizenship, or the election of such
Affirming Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship" subscribed and sworn to before a notary public in citizenship by one born of an alien father and a Filipino mother under the 1935 Constitution, which
Quezon City on 14 October 2015.[58]Petitioner's filing of her COC for President in the upcoming is an act to perfect it. In this instance, such issue is moot because there is no dispute that petitioner
elections triggered the filing of several COMELEC cases against her which were the subject of is a foundling, as evidenced by a Foundling Certificate issued in her favor. The Decree of Adoption
these consolidated cases. issued on 13 May 1974, which approved petitioner's adoption by Jesusa Sonora Poe and Ronald
A day after petitioner filed her COC for President, Estrella Elamparo (Elamparo) filed a Allan Kelley Poe, expressly refers to Emiliano and his wife, Rosario Militar, as her "foundling
petition to deny due course or cancel said COC which was docketed as SPA No. 15-001 (DC) and parents," hence effectively affirming petitioner's status as a foundling. Foundlings are likewise
raffled to the COMELEC Second Division.[59] She is convinced that the COMELEC has citizens under international law. Under the 1987 Constitution, an international law can become
jurisdiction over her petition.[60] Essentially, Elamparo's contention is that petitioner committed part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation
material misrepresentation when she stated in her COC that she is a naturalborn Filipino citizen method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a
and that she is a resident of the Philippines for at least ten (10) years and eleven (11) months up constitutional mechanism such as local legislation.
to the day before the 9 May 2016 Elections. On the other hand, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the
On the issue of citizenship, Elamparo argued that petitioner cannot be considered as a incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive
natural-born Filipino on account of the fact that she was a foundling. Elamparo claimed that from treaty obligations. Generally accepted principles of international law include international
international law does not confer natural born status and Filipino citizenship on foundlings. custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as law, and general principles of law
Following this line of reasoning, petitioner is not qualified to apply for reacquisition of Filipino recognized by civilized nations. International customary rules are accepted as binding as a result
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 for she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen to begin with. Even from the combination of two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on
assuming arguendo that petitioner was a natural-born Filipino, she is deemed to have lost that the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates
status when she became a naturalized American citizen. According to Elamparo, natural-born (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question
citizenship must be continuous from birth. is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. "General principles of law
recognized by civilized nations" are principles "established by a process of reasoning" or judicial
Issue: Whether or not Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen. logic, based on principles which are "basic to legal systems generally," such as "general principles
of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice," and the "general principle against
Held: discrimination" which is embodied in the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International
Yes, she is a natural-born citizen. Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention Against Discrimination in
Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and
These laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee Occupation. "These are the same core principles which underlie the Philippine Constitution itself,
must be a Filipino in the first place to be adopted. The most basic of such laws is Article 15 of the as embodied in the due process and equal protection clauses of the Bill of Rights.
Civil Code which provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights, duties, status, conditions, legal
capacity of persons are binding on citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad." Adoption
deals with status, and a Philippine adoption court will have jurisdiction only if the adoptee is a 5. David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal
Filipino. In Ellis and Ellis v. Republic, a child left by an unidentified mother was sought to be
adopted by aliens. This Court said: Facts:
“In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceeding in rem, which no court Senator Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares (Senator Poe) is a foundling whose biological parents are
may entertain unless it has jurisdiction, not only over the subject matter of the case and over the unknown. As an infant, she was abandoned at the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo. Edgardo Militar
parties, but also over the res, which is the personal status of Baby Rose as well as that of found her outside the church on September 3, 1968 at about 9:30 a.m. He later turned her over
petitioners herein. Our Civil Code (Art. 15) adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the status to Mr. and Mrs. Emiliano Militar. Emiliano Militar reported to the Office of the Local Civil Registrar
of a natural person is determined by the latter's nationality. Pursuant to this theory, we have
that the infant was found on September 6, 1968. She was given the name Mary Grace Natividad On November 17, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal promulgated its assailed Decision finding
Contreras Militar. Senator Poe to be a natural-born citizen and, therefore, qualified to hold office as Senator.
On May 13, 1974, the Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal promulgated the Decision granting the
Petition for Adoption of Senator Poe by Spouses Ronald Allan Poe (more popularly known as
Fernando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (more popularly known as Susan Roces). The Issue: WON the respondent is considered as a natural-born citizen
Decision also ordered the change in Senator Poe's name from Mary Grace Natividad Contreras
Militar to Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe. October 27, 2005, Clerk of Court III Eleanor A. Sorio
certified that the Decision had become final in a Certificate of Finality. Ruling:
On April 11, 1980, the Office of Civil Registrar-Iloilo received the Decision of the San Juan Court Private respondent Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen qualified to hold
Municipal Court and noted on Senator Poe's foundling certificate that she was adopted by office as Senator of the Republic.
Spouses Ronald Allan and Jesusa Poe.
Though her parents are unknown, private respondent is a Philippine citizen without the need for
On April 4, 1988, the Department of Foreign Affairs issued her a Philippine passport. Her passport an express statement in the Constitution making her so. Her status as such is but the logical
was renewed on April 5, 1993, May 19, 1998, October 13, 2009, December 19, 2013, and March consequence of a reasonable reading of the Constitution within its plain text.
18, 2014. Having become Senator, she was also issued a Philippine diplomatic passport on
December 19, 2013. The assumption should be that foundlings are natural-born unless there is substantial evidence to
the contrary. This is necessarily engendered by a complete consideration of the whole
Senator Poe took Development Studies at the University of the Philippines, Manila, but eventually Constitution, not just its provisions on citizenship. This includes its mandate of defending the well-
went to the United States in 1988 to obtain her college degree. being of children, guaranteeing equal protection of the law, equal access to opportunities for public
service, and respecting human rights, as well as its reasons for requiring natural-born status for
On July 27, 1991, Senator Poe married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares, both an American select public offices. Moreover, this is a reading validated by contemporaneous construction that
and Filipino national since birth. On July 29, 1991, Senator Poe returned to the United States with considers related legislative enactments, executive and administrative actions, and international
her husband. For some time, she lived with her husband and children in the United States. instruments.
Senator Poe was naturalized and granted American citizenship on October 18, 2001. She was Petitioner's claim that the burden of evidence shifted to private respondent upon a mere showing
subsequently given a United States passport. that she is a foundling is a serious error.
Senator Poe decided to return home in 2005.Following her return, Senator Poe was issued by the Petitioner invites this Court to establish a jurisprudential presumption that all newborns who have
Bureau of Internal Revenue a Tax Identification Number (TIN) on July 22, 2005.bleslaw been abandoned in rural areas in the Philippines are not Filipinos. His emphasis on private
On July 7, 2006, Senator Poe took the Oath of Allegiance to Republic of the Philippines. On July respondent's supposed burden to prove the circumstances of her birth places upon her an
10, 2006, Senator Poe filed a Petition for Retention and or Re-acquisition of Philippine Citizenship impossible condition. To require proof from private respondent borders on the absurd when there
through Republic Act No. 9225. She also "filed applications for derivative citizenship on behalf of is no dispute that the crux of the controversy—the identity of her biological parents—is simply not
her three children who were all below eighteen (18) years of age at that time." known.

The Petition was granted by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation on July 18, 2006 . On July "Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to
31, 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued Identification Certificates in the name of Senator Poe establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law." Burden of proof lies on
and her children. It stated that Senator Poe is a "citizen of the Philippines pursuant to the the party making the allegations; that is, the party who "alleges the affirmative of the issue" Burden
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 . . . in relation to Administrative Order No. of proof never shifts from one party to another. What shifts is the burden of evidence. This shift
91, Series of 2004 and Memorandum Circular No. AFF-2-005 per Office Order No. AFF-06-9133 happens when a party makes a prima facie case in his or her favor. The other party then bears
signed Associate Commissioner Roy M. Almoro dated July 18, 2006." the "burden of going forward” with the evidence considering that which has ostensibly been
established against him or her.
Senator Poe made several trips to the United States of America between 2006 and 2009 using
her United States Passport No. 170377935. She used her passport "after having taken her Oath In an action for quo warranto, the burden of proof necessarily falls on the party who brings the
of Allegiance to the Republic on 07 July 2006, but not after she has formally renounced her action and who alleges that the respondent is ineligible for the office involved in the controversy.
American citizenship on 20 October 2010." In proceedings before quasi-judicial bodies such as the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the requisite
quantum of proof is substantial evidence. This burden was petitioner's to discharge. Once the
On October 6, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III appointed Senator Poe as Chairperson petitioner makes a prima facie case, the burden of evidence shifts to the respondent.
of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB). On October 20, 2010,
Senator Poe executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America Private respondent's admitted status as a foundling does not establish a prima facie case in favor
and Renunciation of American Citizenship. of petitioner. While it does establish that the identities of private respondent's biological parents
are not known, it does not automatically mean that neither her father nor her mother is a Filipino.
Senator Poe decided to run as Senator in the 2013 Elections. On September 27, 2012, she
executed a Certificate of Candidacy, which was submitted to the Commission on Elections on The most that petitioner had in his favor was doubt. A taint of doubt, however, is by no means
October 2, 2012. She won and was declared as Senator-elect on May 16, 2013. substantial evidence establishing a prima facie case and shifting the burden of evidence to private
respondent.
David, a losing candidate in the 2013 Senatorial Elections, filed before the Senate Electoral
Tribunal a Petition for Quo Warranto on August 6, 2015. He contested the election of Senator Poe Isolating the fact of private respondent's being a foundling, petitioner trivializes other
for failing to "comply with the citizenship and residency requirements mandated by the 1987 uncontroverted circumstances that we have previously established as substantive evidence of
Constitution." private respondent's parentage:
(1) Petitioner was found in front of a church in Jaro, Iloilo; (1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under Section
1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "the Overseas
(2) She was only an infant when she was found, practically a newborn; Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;

(3) She was-found sometime in September 1968; (2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time
(4) Immediately after she was found, private respondent was registered as a foundling; of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an
(5) There was no international airport in Jaro, Iloilo; and oath;

(6) Private respondent's physical features are consistent with those of typical Filipinos. (3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their
Petitioner's refusal to account for these facts demonstrates an imperceptive bias. As against assumption of office; Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country
petitioner's suggested conclusions, the more reasonable inference from these facts is that at least where they took that oath;
one of private respondent's parents is a Filipino.
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper
Apart from how private respondent is a natural-born Filipino citizen consistent with a reading that authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice; and
harmonizes Article IV, Section 2's definition of natural-born citizens and Section 1(2)'s reference
to parentage, the Constitution sustains a presumption that all foundlings found in the Philippines (5) That the right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot
are born to at least either a Filipino father or a Filipino mother and are thus natural-born, unless be exercised by, or extended to, those who:
there is substantial proof otherwise. Consistent with Article IV, Section 1(2), any such
countervailing proof must show that both—not just one—of a foundling's biological parents are not a. are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are
Filipino citizens. naturalized citizens; and/or
The presumption that all foundlings found in the Philippines are born to at least either a Filipino b. are in active service as commissioned or noncommissioned officers in the armed forces of
father or a Filipino mother (and are thus natural-born, unless there is substantial proof otherwise) the country which they are naturalized citizens. (Emphasis supplied)
arises when one reads the Constitution as a whole, so as to "effectuate [its] whole purpose.
As much as we have previously harmonized Article IV, Section 2 with Article IV, Section 1(2), Thus, natural-born Filipinos who have been naturalized elsewhere and wish to run for elective
constitutional provisions on citizenship must not be taken in isolation. They must be read in light public office must comply with all of the following requirements:
of the constitutional mandate to defend the well-being of children, to guarantee equal protection First, taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. This effects the retention or reacquisition of
of the law and equal access to opportunities for public service, and to respect human rights. They one's status as a natural-born Filipino. This also enables the enjoyment of full civil and political
must also be read in conjunction with the Constitution's reasons for requiring natural-born status rights, subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws, provided the
for select public offices. Further, this presumption is validated by contemporaneous construction solemnities recited in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9225 are satisfied.
that considers related legislative enactments, executive and administrative actions, and
international instruments. Second, compliance with Article V, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189,
otherwise known as the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, and other existing laws. This is
Article II, Section 13 and Article XV, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution require the state to enhance to facilitate the exercise of the right of suffrage; that is, to allow for voting in elections.
children's well-being and to project them from conditions prejudicial to or that may undermine their
development. Fulfilling this mandate includes preventing discriminatory conditions. Third, "mak[ing] a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath." This, along with satisfying the other qualification
Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born Filipino citizens is tantamount to permanently requirements under relevant laws, makes one eligible for elective public office.
discriminating against our foundling citizens. They can then never be of service to the country in
the highest possible capacities. It is also tantamount to excluding them from certain means such Private respondent has complied with all of these requirements. First, on July 7, 2006, she took
as professions and state scholarships, which will enable the actualization of their aspirations. the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Second, on August 31, 2006, she
These consequences cannot be tolerated by the Constitution, not least of all through the present became a registered voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan. This evidences her compliance
politically charged proceedings, the direct objective of which is merely to exclude a singular with Article V, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution. Since she was to vote within the country, this
politician from office. Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born citizens creates an inferior dispensed with the need to comply with the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003. Lastly, on
class of citizens who are made to suffer that inferiority through no fault of their own. October 20, 2010, she executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of
America and Renunciation of American Citizenship. This was complemented by her execution of
(sa reacquisition of citizenship naman to) an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States before Vice-Consul Somer
Taking the Oath of Allegiance effects the retention or reacquisition of natural-born citizenship. It E. Bessire-Briers on July 12, 2011, which was, in turn, followed by Vice Consul Jason Galian's
also facilitates the enjoyment of civil and political rights, "subject to all attendant liabilities and issuance of a Certificate of Loss of Nationality on December 9, 2011 and the approval of this
responsibilities." However, other conditions must be met for the exercise of other faculties: certificate by the Overseas Citizen Service, Department of State, on February 3, 2012.

Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine Private respondent has, therefore, not only fully reacquired natural-born citizenship; she has also
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant complied with all of the other requirements for eligibility to elective public office, as stipulated in
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions: Republic Act No. 9225.
C. Loss of Citizenship as Portuguese in commercial documents he signed, specifically, the Companies registry of Tai
Shun Estate Ltd. filed in Hongkong sometime in April 1980.
6. Yu v. Defensor-Santiago
ISSUE:
FACTS:
Whether or not the acts of the petitioner constitute express renunciation of citizenship
The present controversy originated with a petition for habeas corpus filed with the Court on 4 July
1988 seeking the release from detention of herein petitioner. After manifestation and motion of RULING:
the Solicitor General of his decision to refrain from filing a return of the writ on behalf of the CID,
respondent Commissioner thru counsel filed the return. Counsel for the parties were heard in oral To the mind of the Court, the foregoing acts considered together constitute an express
argument on 20 July 1988. The parties were allowed to submit marked exhibits, and to file renunciation of petitioner's Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization. In Board of
memoranda. An internal resolution of 7 November 1988 referred the case to the Court en banc. Immigration Commissioners us, Go Gallano, express renunciation was held to mean a
In its 10 November 1988 resolution, denying the petition for habeas corpus, the Court disposed of renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication.
the pending issues of (1) jurisdiction of the CID over a naturalized Filipino citizen and (2) validity Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after having renounced Portuguese citizenship
of warrantless arrest and detention of the same person. upon naturalization as a Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired his prior status as a Portuguese
citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport and represented himself as such in
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with prayer for restraining order dated 24 November official documents even after he had become a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or
1988. On 29 November 1988, the Court resolved to deny with finality the aforesaid motion for reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine
reconsideration, and further resolved to deny the urgent motion for issuance of a restraining order citizenship.
dated 28 November 1988.
This Court issued the aforementioned TRO pending hearings with the Board of Special Inquiry,
Undaunted, petitioner filed a motion for clarification with prayer for restraining order on 5 CID. However, pleadings submitted before this Court after the issuance of said TRO have
December 1988. unequivocally shown that petitioner has expressly renounced his Philippine citizenship. The
material facts are not only established by the pleadings — they are not disputed by petitioner. A
Acting on said motion, a temporary restraining order was issued by the Court on 7 December rehearing on this point with the CID would be unnecessary and superfluous. Denial, if any, of due
1988. Respondent Commissioner filed a motion to lift TRO on 13 December 1988, the basis of process was obviated when petitioner was given by the Court the opportunity to show proof of
which is a summary judgment of deportation against Yu issued by the CID Board of continued Philippine citizenship, but he has failed.
Commissioners on 2 December 1988. Petitioner also filed a motion to set case for oral argument
on 8 December 1988. While normally the question of whether or not a person has renounced his Philippine citizenship
should be heard before a trial court of law in adversary proceedings, this has become unnecessary
In the meantime, an urgent motion for release from arbitrary detention was filed by petitioner on as this Court, no less, upon the insistence of petitioner, had to look into the facts and satisfy itself
13 December 1988. A memorandum in furtherance of said motion for release dated 14 December on whether or not petitioner's claim to continued Philippine citizenship is meritorious.
1988 was filed on 15 December 1988 together with a vigorous opposition to the lifting of the TRO.
Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or were to be displayed when
The lifting of the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on 7 December 1988 is urgently required and suppressed when convenient. This then resolves adverse to the petitioner his motion
sought by respondent Commissioner who was ordered to cease and desist from immediately for clarification and other motions mentioned in the second paragraph, page 3 of this Decision.
deporting petitioner Yu pending the conclusion of hearings before the Board of Special Inquiry,
CID. To finally dispose of the case, the Court will likewise rule on petitioner's motion for clarification WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner's motion for release from detention is DENIED.
with prayer for restraining order dated 5 December 1988, urgent motion for release from arbitrary Respondent's motion to lift the temporary restraining order is GRANTED. This Decision is
detention dated 13 December 1988, the memorandum in furtherance of said motion for release immediately executory.
dated 14 December 1988, motion to set case for oral argument dated 8 December 1988.
Acting on the motion to lift the temporary restraining order (issued on 7 December 1988) dated 9
December 1988, and the vigorous opposition to lift restraining order dated 15 December 7. Aznar v. COMELEC
1988, the Court resolved to give petitioner Yu a non-extendible period of three (3) days from Facts: Private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmeña filed his certificate of candidacy with the
notice within which to explain and prove why he should still be considered a citizen of the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province. Thereafter, the Cebu PDP-
Philippines despite his acquisition and use of a Portuguese passport. Laban Provincial Council (Cebu-PDP Laban), as represented by petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his
Petitioner filed his compliance with the resolution of 15 December 1988 on 20 December capacity as its incumbent Provincial Chairman, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the
1988 followed by an earnest request for temporary release on 22 December 1988. Respondent disqualification of private respondent on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being
filed on 2 January 1989 her comment reiterating her previous motion to lift temporary restraining a citizen of the United States of America.
order. Petitioner filed a reply thereto on 6 January 1989. Petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a certificate issued by the then Immigration and
Petitioner's own compliance reveals that he was originally issued a Portuguese passport in Deportation Commission that Osmeña is an American citizen.
1971, 17 valid for five (5) years and renewed for the same period upon presentment before the Osmeña, on the other hand, maintained that he is a Filipino Citizen, that he is a legitimate son of
proper Portuguese consular officer. Despite his naturalization as a Philippine citizen on 10 Dr. Emilio Osmeña, a Filipino and son of the Late President Sergio Osmeña Sr., that he is a holder
February 1978, on 21 July 1981, petitioner applied for and was issued Portuguese Passport No. of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and been continuously residing in the Philippines
35/81 serial N. 1517410 by the Consular Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. Said since birth and that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines.
Consular Office certifies that his Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986. While still a citizen
of the Philippines who had renounced, upon his naturalization, "absolutely and forever all COMELEC (First Division) directed the Board of Canvassers to proclaim the winning candidates.
allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty" and pledged to Having obtained the highest number of votes, Osmeña was proclaimed the Provincial Governor
"maintain true faith and allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines," he declared his nationality
of Cebu. COMELEC, thereafter, dismissed the petition for Disqualification for not having been of dual citizenship or allegiance, the fact is it actually existed. Be it noted further that under the
timely filed and for lack of enough proof that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen. aforecited proviso, the effect of such dual citizenship or allegiance shall be dealt with by a future
law. Said law has not yet been enacted.
Issue: Whether or not Osmeña is, in fact, a Filipino citizen.
Held:
8. People v. Manayao
The Supreme Court deemed it is a matter of public interest to ascertain the respondent's
citizenship and qualification to hold the public office to which he has been proclaimed elected. It would shock the conscience of any enlightened citizenry to say that this appellant, by the very
There is enough basis for us to rule directly on the merits of the case, as the COMELEC did below. fact of committing the treasonous acts charged against him, the doing of which under the
Petitioner's contention that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen and, therefore, disqualified circumstances of record he does not deny, divested himself of his Philippine citizenship and
from running for and being elected to the office of Provincial Governor of Cebu, is not supported thereby placed himself beyond the arm of our treason law. For if this were so, his very crime would
by substantial and convincing evidence. be the shield that would protect him from punishment.
In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present direct proof that private
respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63.
Among others, these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express Facts:
renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Appellant Pedro Manayao and Filomeno Flores and Raymundo Flores were charged with the high
Constitution or laws of a foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent crime of treason with multiple murder in the People's Court. The Floreses not having been
Osmeña did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by apprehended, only Manayao was tried.
any other mode of losing Philippine citizenship.
On or about the 27th of January, 1945, the guerrillas raided the Japanese in Sitio Pulong
In concluding that private respondent had been naturalized as a citizen of the United States of Tindahan, Municipality of Angat, Province of Bulacan. In reprisal, Japanese soldiers and a number
America, the petitioner merely relied on the fact that private respondent was issued alien certificate of Filipinos affiliated with the Makapili, among them the instant appellant, conceived the diabolical
of registration and was given clearance and permit to re-enter the Philippines by the Commission idea of killing the residents of Barrio Banaban of the same municipality (Exhibits A, C, and C-1).
on Immigration and Deportation. Petitioner assumed that because of the foregoing, the respondent Pursuant to this plan, said Japanese soldiers and their Filipino companions, armed with rifles and
is an American and "being an American", private respondent "must have taken and sworn to the bayonets, gathered the residents of Banaban behind the barrio chapel on January 29, 1945.
Oath of Allegiance required by the U.S. Naturalization Laws.” Numbering about sixty or seventy, the residents thus assembled included men, women and
Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino citizens and who are not. children — mostly women (Exhibits A, C, amd C-1; pp. 3-16, 29, 30, 65, 102, t.s.n.).
Whether or not a person is considered an American under the laws of the United States Appellant alone killed about six women, two of whom were Patricia and Dodi whom he bayoneted
does not concern the Supreme Court here. to death in the presence of their daughters, Maria Paulino and Clarita Perez, respectively. Patricia
By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that private respondent and Dodi pleaded with appellant for mercy, he being their relative, but he gave the callous answer
is a Filipino remains. It was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that private respondent that no mercy would be given them because they were wives of guerrillas.
had lost his Philippine citizenship. As earlier stated, however, the petitioner failed to The foregoing facts have been clearly established by the testimony of eye-witnesses — Clarita
positively establish this fact. Paulino, Maria Perez, and Policarpio Tigas — to the ruthless massacre of Banaban. There is a
In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies having taken the oath of allegiance of complete absence of evidence tending to show motive on the part of these witnesses for falsely
the United States. He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has continuously testifying against appellant — such a motive is not even insinuated by the defendant. Indeed,
participated in the electoral process in this country since 1963 up to the present, both as a voter appellant's counsel frankly states (p. 3, brief) that he "does not dispute the findings of fact of the
and as a candidate. Thus, private respondent remains a Filipino and the loss of his Philippine People's Court."
citizenship cannot be presumed. Not only this, but the testimony of Clarita Perez and Maria Paulino is so clear, positive and
xx convincing that it would be sufficient for conviction without any further corroboration. Yet, there is
ample corroborative proof. Thus, Tomas M. Pablo declared that he had seen the corpses of the
In the learned dissent of Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla, he stresses the fact that because Osmeña massacred residents of Banaban shortly after the happening of the heinous crime (p. 136, t.s.n.).
obtained Certificates of Alien Registration as an American citizen, the first in 1958 when he was And appellant himself admitted his participation in the massacre in two sworn statements — one
24 years old and the second in 1979, he, Osmeña should be regarded as having expressly made on August 28, 1945, before Lt. Jesus Cacahit, Detachment Commander of the Angat 23d
renounced Philippine citizenship. To Our mind, this is a case of non sequitur (It does not follow). MP Command (Exhibit A; pp. 75-77, t.s.n.) and another made on September 5, 1945 before
Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact Feliciano F. Torres, Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan (Exhibits C, C-1; pp. 150-159, t.s.n.).
that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not s till a Filipino. In
the case of Osmeña, the Certification that he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Counsel for appellant presents two assignment of errors:
Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express First, appellant's counsel contends that appellant was a member of the Armed Forces of
renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of Japan, was subject to military law, and not subject to the jurisdiction of the People's Court
said citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship
must be "express", it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine citizenship Second, he advances the theory that appellant had lost his Philippine citizenship and was
when there is no renunciation, either “express” or “implied.” therefore not amenable to the Philippine law of treason.
The statement in the 1987 Constitution that "dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national
interest and shall be dealt with by law" (Art. IV , Sec. 5) has no retroactive effect. And while it is
true that even before the 1987 Constitution, Our country had already frowned upon the concept Issue:
WON Appellant is not subject to the jurisdiction of the People’s Court and had lost his Philippine D. Reacquisition of Citizenship (Repatriation)
citizenship and was therefore not amenable to the Philippine law of treason.
9. People v. Avengoza
FACTS:
Ruling:
Go Gam alias Luistro Sancho a Chinese, his wife Anselina Avengoza and the latter's mother
We cannot uphold either contention. Gavina Avengoza, were charged in Criminal Case No. 6201 of the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur with violation of Commonwealth Act No. 108, as amended, in the information which
We are of the considered opinion that the Makapili, although organized to render military aid to reads:
the Japanese Army in the Philippines during the late war, was not a part of said army. It was an
organization of Filipino traitors, pure and simple. As to loss of Philippine citizenship by appellant, That during the period comprised between July 19, 1954 and April 1957, in the Municipalities of
counsel's theory is absolutely untenable. Libmanan and Sipocot province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused Anselina Avengoza and Go Gam ahas Luistro Sancho being
There is no evidence that appellant has subscribed to an oath of allegiance to support the Chinese citizens, who as such are barred from acquiring private agricultural lands in the
constitution or laws of Japan. His counsel cites the fact that "he subscribed an oath before he was Philippines and with deliberate intent to defraud, mislead, and for the evident purpose of evading
admitted into the Makapili association, "the aim of which was to help Japan in its fight against the Section 5 of Article XIII of the Philippine Constitution did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
Americans and her allies.'" And the counsel contends from this that the oath was in fact one of feloniously and for their own benefits and for profits, utilize as a dummy their co-accused Gavina
allegiance to support the constitution and laws of Japan. We cannot uphold such a far-fetched Avengoza, a Filipino citizen, who in turn deliberately allowed and permitted herself to be used as
deduction. such dummy in the acquisition and sale of private agricultural land.
Neither is there any showing of the acceptance by appellant of a commission "in the military, naval, Acts contrary to law.
or air service" of Japan.
In Criminal Case No. 6643 of the same court, Anselina Avengoza was charged together with
Further, appellant's contention is repugnant to the most fundamental and elementary principles Rafaela Alfante of violation of Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 108 in an information which
governing the duties of a citizen toward his country under our Constitution. Article II, section 2, of reads:
said constitution ordains:
That on or about the 12th day of February 1950 in the municipality of Sipocot province of
"SEC. 2. The defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Rafaela
all citizens may be required by law to render personal, military or civil service." (Emphasis Alfante, who is a Filipina citizen and being then the owner of a private agricultural land registered
supplied.). under original certificate of Title No. 289 situated in said municipality and the ownership of which
This constitutional provision covers both time of peace and time of war, but it is brought more is expressly reserved by the Constitution or the laws to the citizens of the Philippines, did, then
immediately and peremptorily into play when the country is involved in war. During such a period and there knowingly, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously cede transfer and convey by way of deed
of stress, under a constitution enshrining such tenets, the citizen cannot be considered free to cast of sale said property to accused Anselina Avengoza, a Chinese citizen and who, knowingly aids,
off his loyalty and obligations toward the Fatherland. And it cannot be supposed, without reflecting assists or abets in the consummation or perpetration of the aforementioned sale, then an alien by
on the patriotism and intelligence of the Legislature, that in promulgating Commonwealth Act No. reason of lawful marriage with Go Gam alias Luistro Sancho a Chinese citizen, who as such is
63, under the aegis of our Constitution, it intended (but did not declare) that the duties of the citizen barred from acquiring private agricultural lands in the Philippines.
solemnly proclaimed in the above-quoted constitutional precept could be effectively cast off by Acts contrary to law.
him even when his country is at war, by the simple expedient of subscribing to an oath of allegiance
to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country, and an enemy country at that, or by All the accused pleaded not guilty and the two cases were tried jointly .
accepting a commission in the military, naval or air service of such country, or by deserting from
the Philippine Army, Navy, or Air Corps. While the cases were pending in the lower court, the accused Gavina Avengoza and Go Gam
alias Luistro Sancho died; thus trial continued only as regard Anselina Avengoza and Rafaela
It would shock the conscience of any enlightened citizenry to say that this appellant, by the very Alfante.
fact of committing the treasonous acts charged against him, the doing of which under the
circumstances of record he does not deny, divested himself of his Philippine citizenship and Counsel for the said accused subsequently filed a motion for leave to withdraw their plea of not
thereby placed himself beyond the arm of our treason law. For if this were so, his very crime would guilty and to be permitted to file a motion to quash alleging that accused Anselina Avengoza had
be the shield that would protect him from punishment. reacquired her Philippine citizenship by repatriation, by reason whereof the criminal liability of said
accused and that of the remaining defendant Rafaela Alfante, if any, was thereby extinguished;
But the laws do no admit that the bare commission of a crime amounts of itself to a divestment of and that the issue in the criminal cases had thus been rendered moot and academic.
the character of citizen, and withdraws the criminal from their coercion. They would never
prescribe an illegal act among the legal modes by which a citizen might disfranchise himself; nor The trial court allowed defendants to withdraw their plea, admitted and found defendants' motion
render treason, for instance, innocent, by giving it the force of a dissolution of the obligation of the to quash meritorious, and ordered the dismissal of the two cases, with costs de oficio. Reason for
criminal to his country. (Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. III, p. 731.) the dismissal is principally predicated on the trial court's opinion that defendant Anselina Avengoza
has validly reacquired her Philippine citizenship.
696. No person, even when he has renounced or incurred the loss of his nationality, shall take up
arms against his native country; he shall be held guilty of a felony and treason, if he does not
strictly observe this duty. (Fiore's International Law Codified, translation from Fifth Italian Edition ISSUE:
by Borchard.)
(1) Whether or not the lower court erred in holding that the accused, Anselma Avengoza, by
executing an oath of allegiance to the Philippines and registering it with the local civil registry of
Sipocot Camarines Sur had legally repatriated herself and thereby reacquired her Philippine
citizenship.
2. YES. Defendant Avengoza's sole evidence on record to support her repatriation
(2) Whether or not the lower court erred in holding that, having reacquired her Philippine is her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. No evidence has been presented to
citizenship by repatriation, Anselma Avengoza's title over the agricultural lands purchased by show conclusively that she has the right to be repatriated under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act
Gavina Avengoza for her and her husband, became lawful and valid as of the date of their No. 63. As aptly stated by the Solicitor General in his brief, "to sustain the findings of the trial court
conveyance or transfer to her and her alien husband, and in concluding that as a result of said on this point would establish a very dangerous precedent as any alien woman married to a
repatriation the criminal acts committed by her and her husband, and those who aided them to Chinese citizen can easily "acquire" Philippine citizenship upon the death of her Chinese husband
possess those lands, had been extinguished. by merely executing an oath of allegiance to the Republic and filing the same with the local civil
registry even if she does not possess the required citizenship." Defendant Anselina Avengoza
RULING: became an alien by reason of her lawful marriage to a Chinese citizen; however, this does not
necessarily mean that she was a Filipino citizen previous to such marriage. Thus, she should first
1. YES. The Supreme Court finds merit in this appeal. Records show that prove her citizenship previous to her marriage and as there is no conclusive proof of this matter
defendant Anselina Avengoza merely executed an that of allegiance to the Philippine on record, this question must be judicially determined before she can be legally repatriated.
Republic, filed it with the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Sipocot Camarines Sur on Further, even Filipino citizens can be criminally liable under the anti-dummy law; and, aliens
October 18, 1966, and the trial court considered it sufficient for her to reacquire violating said law are not exempted from criminal liability upon becoming a Filipino citizen.
Philippine citizenship by repatriation. Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 63 provides that
would be repatriate should show by conclusive evidence that he or she has the Finally, the sales in favor of alien Anselina Avengoza, through a dummy, of various parcels
qualifications to be so repatriated. Without such conclusive proof, he or she has to file of land are void for being contrary to public policy. And, like an alien who became a naturalized
with the proper Court of First Instance a petition for repatriation. Filipino citizen, her repatriation did not exempt her from criminal liability for violation of the Anti-
Dummy Law.
Pertinent sections of Commonwealth Act No. 63 provides:
Section 2. How Citizenship may be reacquired:
10. Frivaldo v. COMELEC
2. By repatriation of deserters of the Army, Navy or Air Corps: Provided That a woman who lost
her citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien may be repatriated in accordance with this Facts:
Act after the termination of the marital status:
Sec. 4. Repatriation shall be effected by merely taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the
Commonwealth (now Republic) of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry. Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of
Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988, the league
And, the Rules and Regulations issued by The Department of Justice on July 1, 1937, pursuant of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter (hereafter, League), represented by its President, Salvador
to Section 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 63 governing the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the Commission on Elections a
provide: petition for the annulment of Frivaldo's election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a
Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on January 20,1983. In his answer
Rule 3. Any person who has lost his or her Philippine citizenship in any of the following ways dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but
and/or events: pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to
1. By having been declared, by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine Army, Navy, or protect himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was "merely forced upon
Air corps in time of war, unless subsequently a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted; and himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's
agents abroad." He added that he had returned to the Philippines after the EDSA revolution to
2. In the case of a woman, upon her marriage to a foreigner if, by virtue of the law in force in her help in the restoration of democracy.
husband's country, she acquires his nationality.
The private respondents reiterated their assertion that Frivaldo was a naturalized
Anyone wishing to reacquire his or her Philippine citizenship by repatriation under the American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the
provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 63, shall file an application with any Court of First election on January 18, 1988. He was therefore not qualified to run for and be elected governor.
Instance setting forth his name and surname; his present and former places of residences;
his occupation; the place and date of his birth; whether single or married, in the case of Speaking for the public respondent, the Solicitor General supported the contention
deserter of the Army, Navy, or Air Corps, and if married, the name, age; and birth place, that Frivaldo was not a citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his
and residence of his wife and each of the children. naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified from public office in the
Philippines. His election did not cure this defect because the electorate of Sorsogon could not
In the case of a woman who lost her Philippine citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien, amend the Constitution, the Local Government Code, and the Omnibus Election Code.
the applicant shall state the date and place of her marriage, the nationality of her former husband,
and the cause of the dissolution of the marriage. The petition must be supported by the affidavit In his Reply, Frivaldo insisted that he was a citizen of the Philippines because his
of at least two persons stating that they are citizens of the Philippine Islands, and that said naturalization as an American citizen was not "impressed with voluntariness." He said he could
petitioner, in their opinion, has all the qualifications necessary to be repatriated. lf after the hearing not have repatriated himself before the 1988 elections because the Special
the court believes in view of the evidence taken that the petitioner has all the qualifications required Committee on Naturalization created for the purpose by LOI No. 270 had not yet been organized
by Commonwealth Act No. 63, it shall require the petitioner to take in open court the following oath then. His oath in his certificate of candidacy that he was a natural-born citizen should be a sufficient
of allegiance: ... "and shall order the registration of such oath in the proper civil registry through act of repatriation. Additionally, his active participation in the 1987 congressional elections had
the clerk of court. " divested him of American citizenship under the laws of the United States, thus restoring his
Philippine citizenship.
Issue: by the National Press Club with private respondent’s picture; (5) Certificate of Appreciation issued
by the Rotary Club of Davao (6) Photocopy of a Plaque of Appreciation issued by the Republican
Whether or not Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his College, Quezon City; (7) Photocopy of a Plaque of Appreciation issued by the Davao-Bicol
election on January 18,1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon. (No.) Association; (8) Certification issued by the Records Management and Archives Office that the
Ruling: record of birth of private respondent was not on file; and (8) Certificate of Naturalization issued by
the United States District Court.
If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine
citizenship, the petitioner should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. The court granted the petition and held JUAN G. FRIVALDO, is re-admitted as a citizen
Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be of the Republic of the Philippines by naturalization, thereby vesting upon him, all the rights and
reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. privileges of a natural born Filipino citizen. On the same day, private respondent was allowed to
take his oath of allegiance before respondent Judge.
While Frivaldo does not invoke either of the first two methods, he nevertheless claims
he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of a valid repatriation. He claims that by actively SC Ruling:
participating in the elections in this country, he automatically forfeited American citizenship under In his comment to the State’s appeal of the decision granting him Philippine citizenship
the laws of the United States. Such laws do not concern us here. The alleged forfeiture is between in G.R. No. 104654, private respondent alleges that the precarious political atmosphere in the
him and the United States as his adopted country. It should be obvious that even if he did lose his country during Martial Law compelled him to seek political asylum in the United States, and
naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could not have the effect of eventually to renounce his Philippine citizenship.
automatically restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier renounced. At best,
what might have happened as a result of the loss of his naturalized citizenship was that he became He claims that his petition for naturalization was his only available remedy for his
a stateless individual. reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. He tried to reacquire his Philippine citizenship through
repatriation and direct act of Congress. However, he was later informed that repatriation
Frivaldo's contention that he could not have repatriated himself under LOI 270 because proceedings were limited to army deserters or Filipino women who had lost their citizenship by
the Special Committee provided for therein had not yet been constituted seems to suggest that reason of their marriage to foreigners. His request to Congress for sponsorship of a bill allowing
the lack of that body rendered his repatriation unnecessary. That is far-fetched if not specious. him to reacquire his Philippine citizenship failed to materialize, notwithstanding the endorsement
Such a conclusion would open the floodgates, as it were. It would allow all Filipinos who have of several members of the House of Representatives in his favor. He attributed this to the
renounced this country to claim back their abandoned citizenship without formally rejecting their maneuvers of his political rivals.
adopted state and reaffirming their allegiance to the Philippines.
He also claims that the re-scheduling of the hearing of the petition to an earlier date,
It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts. He contends that by without publication, was made without objection from the Office of the Solicitor General. He makes
simply filing his certificate of candidacy he had, without more, already effectively recovered mention that on the date of the hearing, the court was jam-packed.
Philippine citizenship. But that is hardly the formal declaration the law envisions — surely,
Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply recovered. If the Special Committee It is private respondent’s posture that there was substantial compliance with the law and
had not yet been convened, what that meant simply was that the petitioner had to wait until this that the public was well-informed of his petition for naturalization due to the publicity given by the
was done, or seek naturalization by legislative or judicial proceedings. media.
Anent the issue of the mandatory two-year waiting period prior to the taking of the oath
of allegiance, private respondent theorizes that the rationale of the law imposing the waiting period
11. Republic v. De La Rosa is to grant the public an opportunity to investigate the background of the applicant and to oppose
i. G.R. No. 104654 – this is the case appealed to SC wherein the issue of Frivaldo’s citizenship is the grant of Philippine citizenship if there is basis to do so. In his case, private respondent alleges
resolved. that such requirement may be dispensed with, claiming that his life, both private and public, was
well-known. Private respondent cites his achievement as a freedom fighter and a former Governor
Petitioner filed a petition for naturalization. Court directed the publication of the said of the Province of Sorsogon for six terms.
order and petition in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation, for three
consecutive weeks, the last publication of which should be at least six months before the said date The appeal of the Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines is
of hearing. The order further required the posting of a copy thereof and the petition in a meritorious. The naturalization proceedings in SP Proc. No. 91-58645 was full of procedural flaws,
conspicuous place in the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Manila. rendering the decision an anomaly.

On January 14, 1992, private respondent filed a "Motion to Set Hearing Ahead of Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine citizenship thru naturalization
Schedule," where he manifested his intention to run for public office in the May 1992 elections. under the Revised Naturalization Law, is duty bound to follow the procedure prescribed by the
He alleged that the deadline for filing the certificate of candidacy was March 15, one day before said law. It is not for an applicant to decide for himself and to select the requirements which he
the scheduled hearing. He asked that the hearing set on March 16 be cancelled and be moved believes, even sincerely, are applicable to his case and discard those which be believes are
to January 24. The motion was granted in an Order dated January 24, 1992, wherein the hearing inconvenient or merely of nuisance value. The law does not distinguish between an applicant who
of the petition was moved to February 21, 1992. The said order was not published nor a copy was formerly a Filipino citizen and one who was never such a citizen. It does not provide a special
thereof posted. procedure for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by former Filipino citizens akin to the
repatriation of a woman who had lost her Philippine citizenship by reason of her marriage to an
On February 21, the hearing proceeded with private respondent as the sole witness. He alien.
submitted the following documentary evidence: (1) Affidavit of Publication of the Order dated
October 7, 1991 issued by the publisher of The Philippine Star; (2) Certificate of Publication of the The trial court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition for naturalization of private
order issued respondent. The proceedings conducted, the decision rendered and the oath of allegiance taken
by the National Printing Office; (3) Notice of Hearing of Petition; (4) Photocopy of a Citation issued therein, are null and void for failure to comply with the publication and posting requirements under
the Revised Naturalization Law.
 Under Section 9 of the said law, both the petition for naturalization and the order setting voter. Petitioner further prayed that the votes case in favor of private respondent be considered
it for hearing must be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette as stray votes, and that he, on the basis of the remaining valid votes cast, be proclaimed winner.
and a newspaper of general circulation respondent cites his achievements as a freedom fighter
and a former Governor of the Province of Sorsogon for six terms. COMELEC dismissed for having been filed out of time, citing Section 19 of R.A. No.
7166. Said section provides that the period to appeal a ruling of the board of canvassers on
The petition for naturalization lacks several allegations required by Sections 2 and 6 of questions affecting its composition or proceedings was three days.
the Revised Naturalization Law, particularly: (1) that the petitioner is of good moral character; (2)
that he resided continuously in the Philippines for at least ten years; (3) that he is able to speak Petitioner argues that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
and write English and any one of the principal dialects; (4) that he will reside continuously in the ignored the fundamental issue of private respondent’s disqualification in the guise of technicality.
Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition until his admission to Philippine citizenship; He claims that the inclusion of private respondent’s name in the list of registered voters in Sta.
and (5) that he has filed a declaration of intention or if he is excused from said filing, the justification Magdalena, Sorsogon was invalid because at the time he registered as a voter in 1987, he was
therefor. The absence of such allegations is fatal to the petition. as American citizen. Petitioner further claims that the grant of Filipino citizenship to private
respondent is not yet conclusive because the case is still on appeal before SC.
Likewise, the petition is not supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons
who vouched for the good moral character of private respondent as required by Section 7 of the SC Ruling:
Revised Naturalization Law. Private respondent also failed to attach a copy of his certificate of The COMELEC failed to resolve the more serious issue — the disqualification of private
arrival to the petition as required by Section 7 of the said law. respondent to be proclaimed Governor on grounds of lack of Filipino citizenship. In this aspect,
The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following irregularities: (1) the the petition is one for quo warranto. In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245
hearing of the petition was set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing, without a publication of the (1989), we held that a petition for quo warranto, questioning the respondent’s title and seeking to
order advancing the date of hearing, and the petition itself; (2) the petition was heard within six prevent him from holding office as Governor for alienage, is not covered by the ten-day period for
months from the last publication of the petition; (3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of appeal prescribed in Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. Furthermore, we explained that
allegiance before the finality of the judgment; and (4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without "qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the
observing the two-year waiting period. time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer’s entire tenure; once
any of the required qualification is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged."
Section 1 of R.A. No. 530 provides that no decision granting citizenship in naturalization
proceedings shall be executory until after two years from its promulgation in order to be able to Petitioner’s argument, that to unseat him will frustrate the will of the electorate, is
observe if: (1) the applicant has left the country; (2) the applicant has dedicated himself untenable. Both the Local Government Code and the Constitution require that only Filipino citizens
continuously to a lawful calling or profession; (3) the applicant has not been convicted of any can run and be elected to public office. We can only surmise that the electorate, at the time they
offense or violation of government promulgated rules; and (4) the applicant has committed any act voted for private respondent, was of the mistaken belief that he had legally reacquired Filipino
prejudicial to the interest of the country or contrary to government announced policies. Even citizenship.
discounting the provisions of R.A. No. 530, the courts cannot implement any decision granting the
petition for naturalization before its finality.
iii. G.R. No. 105735 – rendered moot and academic
FRIVALDO IS NOT A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES.
This is a petition for mandamus under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court in
relation to Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution, with prayer for temporary restraining
ii. G.R. No. 105715 – In view of the finding in G.R. No. 104654 that private respondent is not yet order. The parties herein are identical with the parties in G.R. No. 105715.
a Filipino citizen, we have to grant the petition in G.R. No. 105715 after treating it as a petition In substance, petitioner prays for the COMELEC’s immediate resolution of SPA Case
for certiorari instead of a petition for mandamus. Said petition assails the en banc resolution of the No. 92-016, which is a petition for the cancellation of private respondent’s certificate of candidacy
COMELEC, dismissing SPC Case No. 92-273, which in turn is a petition to annul private filed on March 23, 1992 by Quiterio H. Hermo, the intervenor in G.R. No. 104654
respondent’s proclamation.
In substance, petitioner prays for the COMELEC’s immediate resolution of SPA Case
This is a petition for certiorari, mandamus with injunction under Rule 65 of the No. 92-016, which is a petition for the cancellation of private respondent’s certificate of candidacy
Revised Rules of Court in relation to Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution with prayer for filed on March 23, 1992 by Quiterio H. Hermo, the intervenor in G.R. No. 104654 (Rollo, p. 18).
temporary restraining order filed by Raul R. Lee against the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) and private respondent, to annul the en banc Resolution of the COMELEC, which The petition for cancellation alleged: (1) that private respondent is an American citizen,
dismissed his petition docketed as SPC Case No. 92-273. The said petition sought to annul the and therefore ineligible to run as candidate for the position of governor of the Province of
proclamation of private respondent as Governor-elect of the Province of Sorsogon. Sorsogon; (2) that the trial court’s decision re-admitting private respondent as a Filipino citizen
was fraught with legal infirmities rendering it null and void; (3) that assuming the decision to be
Petitioner was the official candidate of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) for valid, private respondent’s oath of allegiance, which was taken on the same day the questioned
the position of governor of the Province of Sorsogon in the May 1992 elections. Private respondent decision was promulgated, violated Republic Act No. 530, which provides for a two-year waiting
was the official candidate of the Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats (Lakas-NUCD) for period before the oath of allegiance can be taken by the applicant; and (4) that the hearing of the
the same position. Private respondent was proclaimed winner on May 22, 1992. petition on February 27, 1992, was held less than four months from the date of the last publication
Petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to annul the proclamation of private of the order and petition. The petition prayed for the cancellation of private respondent’s certificate
respondent as Governor-elect of the Province of Sorsogon on the grounds: (1) that the of candidacy and the deletion of his name from the list of registered voters in Sta. Magdalena,
proceedings and composition of the Provincial Board of Canvassers were not in accordance with Sorsogon.
law; (2) that private respondent is an alien, whose grant of Philippine citizenship is being In his answer to the petition for cancellation, private respondent denied the allegations
questioned by the State in G.R. No. 104654; and (3) that private respondent is not a duly registered therein and averred: (1) that Quiterio H. Hermo, not being a candidate for the same office for which
private respondent was aspiring, had no standing to file the petition; (2) that the decision re- Association; (8) Certification issued by the Records Management and Archives Office that the
admitting him to Philippine citizenship was presumed to be valid; and (3) that no case had been record of birth of private respondent was not on file; and (8) Certificate of Naturalization issued by
filed to exclude his name as a registered voter. Raul R. Lee intervened in the petition for the United States District Court.
cancellation of private respondent’s certificate of candidacy.
The court granted the petition and held JUAN G. FRIVALDO, is re-admitted as a citizen
On May 13, 1992, said intervenor urged the COMELEC to decide the petition for of the Republic of the Philippines by naturalization, thereby vesting upon him, all the rights and
cancellation, citing Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, which provides that all petitions on privileges of a natural born Filipino citizen. On the same day, private respondent was allowed to
matters involving the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy must be decided "not later than take his oath of allegiance before respondent Judge.
fifteen days before election," and the case of Alonto v. Commission on Election, 22 SCRA 878
(1968), which ruled that all pre-proclamation controversies should be summarily decided. SC Ruling:

The COMELEC concedes that private respondent has not yet reacquired his Filipino In his comment to the State’s appeal of the decision granting him Philippine citizenship
citizenship because the decision granting him the same is not yet final and executory (Rollo, p. in G.R. No. 104654, private respondent alleges that the precarious political atmosphere in the
63). However, it submits that the issue of disqualification of a candidate is not among the grounds country during Martial Law compelled him to seek political asylum in the United States, and
allowed in a eventually to renounce his Philippine citizenship.
pre-proclamation controversy, like SPC Case No. 92-273. Moreover, the said petition was filed He claims that his petition for naturalization was his only available remedy for his
out of time. reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. He tried to reacquire his Philippine citizenship through
The COMELEC contends that the preparation for the elections occupied much of its repatriation and direct act of Congress. However, he was later informed that repatriation
time, thus its failure to immediately resolve SPA Case No. 92-016. It argues that under Section 5 proceedings were limited to army deserters or Filipino women who had lost their citizenship by
of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, it is excused from deciding a disqualification reason of their marriage to foreigners. His request to Congress for sponsorship of a bill allowing
case within the period provided by law for reasons beyond its control. It also assumed that the him to reacquire his Philippine citizenship failed to materialize, notwithstanding the endorsement
same action was subsequently abandoned by petitioner when he filed before it a petition of several members of the House of Representatives in his favor. He attributed this to the
for quo warranto docketed as EPC No. 92-35. The quo warranto proceedings sought private maneuvers of his political rivals.
respondent’s disqualification because of his American citizenship. He also claims that the re-scheduling of the hearing of the petition to an earlier date,
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. No. 104654 and G.R. No. 105715 are both without publication, was made without objection from the Office of the Solicitor General. He makes
GRANTED while the petition in G.R. No. 105735 is DISMISSED. Private respondent is declared mention that on the date of the hearing, the court was jam-packed.
NOT a citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as It is private respondent’s posture that there was substantial compliance with the law and
GOVERNOR of the Province of Sorsogon. He is ordered to VACATE his office and to that the public was well-informed of his petition for naturalization due to the publicity given by the
SURRENDER the same to the Vice-Governor of the Province of Sorsogon once this decision media.
becomes final and executory. No pronouncement as to costs.
Anent the issue of the mandatory two-year waiting period prior to the taking of the oath
of allegiance, private respondent theorizes that the rationale of the law imposing the waiting period
12. Frivaldo v. COMELEC is to grant the public an opportunity to investigate the background of the applicant and to oppose
the grant of Philippine citizenship if there is basis to do so. In his case, private respondent alleges
i. G.R. No. 104654 – this is the case appealed to SC wherein the issue of Frivaldo’s citizenship is that such requirement may be dispensed with, claiming that his life, both private and public, was
resolved. well-known. Private respondent cites his achievement as a freedom fighter and a former Governor
of the Province of Sorsogon for six terms.
Petitioner filed a petition for naturalization. Court directed the publication of the said
order and petition in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation, for three The appeal of the Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines is
consecutive weeks, the last publication of which should be at least six months before the said date meritorious. The naturalization proceedings in SP Proc. No. 91-58645 was full of procedural flaws,
of hearing. The order further required the posting of a copy thereof and the petition in a rendering the decision an anomaly.
conspicuous place in the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Manila.
Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine citizenship thru naturalization
On January 14, 1992, private respondent filed a "Motion to Set Hearing Ahead of under the Revised Naturalization Law, is duty bound to follow the procedure prescribed by the
Schedule," where he manifested his intention to run for public office in the May 1992 elections. said law. It is not for an applicant to decide for himself and to select the requirements which he
He alleged that the deadline for filing the certificate of candidacy was March 15, one day before believes, even sincerely, are applicable to his case and discard those which be believes are
the scheduled hearing. He asked that the hearing set on March 16 be cancelled and be moved inconvenient or merely of nuisance value. The law does not distinguish between an applicant who
to January 24. The motion was granted in an Order dated January 24, 1992, wherein the hearing was formerly a Filipino citizen and one who was never such a citizen. It does not provide a special
of the petition was moved to February 21, 1992. The said order was not published nor a copy procedure for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by former Filipino citizens akin to the
thereof posted. repatriation of a woman who had lost her Philippine citizenship by reason of her marriage to an
alien.
On February 21, the hearing proceeded with private respondent as the sole witness. He
submitted the following documentary evidence: (1) Affidavit of Publication of the Order dated The trial court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition for naturalization of private
October 7, 1991 issued by the publisher of The Philippine Star; (2) Certificate of Publication of the respondent. The proceedings conducted, the decision rendered and the oath of allegiance taken
order issued therein, are null and void for failure to comply with the publication and posting requirements under
by the National Printing Office; (3) Notice of Hearing of Petition; (4) Photocopy of a Citation issued the Revised Naturalization Law.
by the National Press Club with private respondent’s picture; (5) Certificate of Appreciation issued
by the Rotary Club of Davao (6) Photocopy of a Plaque of Appreciation issued by the Republican Under Section 9 of the said law, both the petition for naturalization and the order setting
College, Quezon City; (7) Photocopy of a Plaque of Appreciation issued by the Davao-Bicol it for hearing must be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette
and a newspaper of general circulation respondent cites his achievements as a freedom fighter COMELEC dismissed for having been filed out of time, citing Section 19 of R.A. No.
and a former Governor of the Province of Sorsogon for six terms. 7166. Said section provides that the period to appeal a ruling of the board of canvassers on
questions affecting its composition or proceedings was three days.
The petition for naturalization lacks several allegations required by Sections 2 and 6 of
the Revised Naturalization Law, particularly: (1) that the petitioner is of good moral character; (2) Petitioner argues that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
that he resided continuously in the Philippines for at least ten years; (3) that he is able to speak ignored the fundamental issue of private respondent’s disqualification in the guise of technicality.
and write English and any one of the principal dialects; (4) that he will reside continuously in the He claims that the inclusion of private respondent’s name in the list of registered voters in Sta.
Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition until his admission to Philippine citizenship; Magdalena, Sorsogon was invalid because at the time he registered as a voter in 1987, he was
and (5) that he has filed a declaration of intention or if he is excused from said filing, the justification as American citizen. Petitioner further claims that the grant of Filipino citizenship to private
therefor. The absence of such allegations is fatal to the petition. respondent is not yet conclusive because the case is still on appeal before SC.
Likewise, the petition is not supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons SC Ruling:
who vouched for the good moral character of private respondent as required by Section 7 of the
Revised Naturalization Law. Private respondent also failed to attach a copy of his certificate of The COMELEC failed to resolve the more serious issue — the disqualification of private
arrival to the petition as required by Section 7 of the said law. respondent to be proclaimed Governor on grounds of lack of Filipino citizenship. In this aspect,
the petition is one for quo warranto. In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245
The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following irregularities: (1) the (1989), we held that a petition for quo warranto, questioning the respondent’s title and seeking to
hearing of the petition was set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing, without a publication of the prevent him from holding office as Governor for alienage, is not covered by the ten-day period for
order advancing the date of hearing, and the petition itself; (2) the petition was heard within six appeal prescribed in Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. Furthermore, we explained that
months from the last publication of the petition; (3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of "qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the
allegiance before the finality of the judgment; and (4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer’s entire tenure; once
observing the two-year waiting period. any of the required qualification is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged."
Section 1 of R.A. No. 530 provides that no decision granting citizenship in naturalization Petitioner’s argument, that to unseat him will frustrate the will of the electorate, is
proceedings shall be executory until after two years from its promulgation in order to be able to untenable. Both the Local Government Code and the Constitution require that only Filipino citizens
observe if: (1) the applicant has left the country; (2) the applicant has dedicated himself can run and be elected to public office. We can only surmise that the electorate, at the time they
continuously to a lawful calling or profession; (3) the applicant has not been convicted of any voted for private respondent, was of the mistaken belief that he had legally reacquired Filipino
offense or violation of government promulgated rules; and (4) the applicant has committed any act citizenship.
prejudicial to the interest of the country or contrary to government announced policies. Even
discounting the provisions of R.A. No. 530, the courts cannot implement any decision granting the
petition for naturalization before its finality. iii. G.R. No. 105735 – rendered moot and academic
FRIVALDO IS NOT A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES. This is a petition for mandamus under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court in
relation to Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution, with prayer for temporary restraining
order. The parties herein are identical with the parties in G.R. No. 105715.
ii. G.R. No. 105715 – In view of the finding in G.R. No. 104654 that private respondent is not yet
a Filipino citizen, we have to grant the petition in G.R. No. 105715 after treating it as a petition In substance, petitioner prays for the COMELEC’s immediate resolution of SPA Case
for certiorari instead of a petition for mandamus. Said petition assails the en banc resolution of the No. 92-016, which is a petition for the cancellation of private respondent’s certificate of candidacy
COMELEC, dismissing SPC Case No. 92-273, which in turn is a petition to annul private filed on March 23, 1992 by Quiterio H. Hermo, the intervenor in G.R. No. 104654
respondent’s proclamation. In substance, petitioner prays for the COMELEC’s immediate resolution of SPA Case
This is a petition for certiorari, mandamus with injunction under Rule 65 of the No. 92-016, which is a petition for the cancellation of private respondent’s certificate of candidacy
Revised Rules of Court in relation to Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution with prayer for filed on March 23, 1992 by Quiterio H. Hermo, the intervenor in G.R. No. 104654 (Rollo, p. 18).
temporary restraining order filed by Raul R. Lee against the Commission on Elections The petition for cancellation alleged: (1) that private respondent is an American citizen,
(COMELEC) and private respondent, to annul the en banc Resolution of the COMELEC, which and therefore ineligible to run as candidate for the position of governor of the Province of
dismissed his petition docketed as SPC Case No. 92-273. The said petition sought to annul the Sorsogon; (2) that the trial court’s decision re-admitting private respondent as a Filipino citizen
proclamation of private respondent as Governor-elect of the Province of Sorsogon. was fraught with legal infirmities rendering it null and void; (3) that assuming the decision to be
Petitioner was the official candidate of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) for valid, private respondent’s oath of allegiance, which was taken on the same day the questioned
the position of governor of the Province of Sorsogon in the May 1992 elections. Private respondent decision was promulgated, violated Republic Act No. 530, which provides for a two-year waiting
was the official candidate of the Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats (Lakas-NUCD) for period before the oath of allegiance can be taken by the applicant; and (4) that the hearing of the
the same position. Private respondent was proclaimed winner on May 22, 1992. petition on February 27, 1992, was held less than four months from the date of the last publication
of the order and petition. The petition prayed for the cancellation of private respondent’s certificate
Petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to annul the proclamation of private of candidacy and the deletion of his name from the list of registered voters in Sta. Magdalena,
respondent as Governor-elect of the Province of Sorsogon on the grounds: (1) that the Sorsogon.
proceedings and composition of the Provincial Board of Canvassers were not in accordance with
law; (2) that private respondent is an alien, whose grant of Philippine citizenship is being In his answer to the petition for cancellation, private respondent denied the allegations
questioned by the State in G.R. No. 104654; and (3) that private respondent is not a duly registered therein and averred: (1) that Quiterio H. Hermo, not being a candidate for the same office for which
voter. Petitioner further prayed that the votes case in favor of private respondent be considered private respondent was aspiring, had no standing to file the petition; (2) that the decision re-
as stray votes, and that he, on the basis of the remaining valid votes cast, be proclaimed winner. admitting him to Philippine citizenship was presumed to be valid; and (3) that no case had been
filed to exclude his name as a registered voter. Raul R. Lee intervened in the petition for that when he lost his Australian citizenship, he became solely a Filipino. To restore his Filipino
cancellation of private respondent’s certificate of candidacy. citizenship, he must be naturalized or repatriated or be declared as a Filipino through an act of
Congress – none of this happened.
On May 13, 1992, said intervenor urged the COMELEC to decide the petition for
cancellation, citing Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, which provides that all petitions on Labo, being a foreigner, cannot serve public office. His claim that his lack of citizenship should not
matters involving the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy must be decided "not later than overcome the will of the electorate is not tenable. The people of Baguio could not have, even
fifteen days before election," and the case of Alonto v. Commission on Election, 22 SCRA 878 unanimously, changed the requirements of the Local Government Code and the Constitution
(1968), which ruled that all pre-proclamation controversies should be summarily decided. simply by electing a foreigner (curiously, would Baguio have voted for Labo had they known he is
Australian). The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the
The COMELEC concedes that private respondent has not yet reacquired his Filipino Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of the
citizenship because the decision granting him the same is not yet final and executory (Rollo, p. Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that
63). However, it submits that the issue of disqualification of a candidate is not among the grounds privilege over their countrymen.
allowed in a
pre-proclamation controversy, like SPC Case No. 92-273. Moreover, the said petition was filed 2. Lardizabal on the other hand cannot assert, through the quo warranto proceeding, that he
out of time. should be declared the mayor by reason of Labo’s disqualification because Lardizabal obtained
the second highest number of vote. It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the
The COMELEC contends that the preparation for the elections occupied much of its constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or
time, thus its failure to immediately resolve SPA Case No. 92-016. It argues that under Section 5 plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the
of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, it is excused from deciding a disqualification majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him. Sound
case within the period provided by law for reasons beyond its control. It also assumed that the policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number
same action was subsequently abandoned by petitioner when he filed before it a petition of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of
for quo warranto docketed as EPC No. 92-35. The quo warranto proceedings sought private government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless
respondent’s disqualification because of his American citizenship. he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. No. 104654 and G.R. No. 105715 are both
GRANTED while the petition in G.R. No. 105735 is DISMISSED. Private respondent is declared
NOT a citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as 14. Bengson III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
GOVERNOR of the Province of Sorsogon. He is ordered to VACATE his office and to
SURRENDER the same to the Vice-Governor of the Province of Sorsogon once this decision Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized
becomes final and executory. No pronouncement as to costs. Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen.

13. Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC Facts:

FACTS:
In 1988, Ramon Labo, Jr. was elected as mayor of Baguio City. His rival, Luis Lardizabal filed a Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac,
petition for quo warranto against Labo as Lardizabal asserts that Labo is an Australian citizen on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935
hence disqualified; that he was naturalized as an Australian after he married an Australian. Labo Constitution.
avers that his marriage with an Australian did not make him an Australian; that at best he has dual
citizenship, Australian and Filipino; that even if he indeed became an Australian when he married
an Australian citizen, such citizenship was lost when his marriage with the Australian was later On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and,
declared void for being bigamous. Labo further asserts that even if he’s considered as an without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United
Australian, his lack of citizenship is just a mere technicality which should not frustrate the will of States. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63,
the electorate of Baguio who voted for him by a vast majority. Section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among others, "rendering service to or
accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country." Said provision of law reads:
ISSUES:
Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways
1. Whether or not Labo can retain his public office. and/or events:
2. Whether or not Lardizabal, who obtained the second highest vote in the mayoralty race, can xxx xxx xxx
replace Labo in the event Labo is disqualified.
(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country: Provided,
HELD: That the rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such commission in, the armed forces of a
1. No. Labo did not question the authenticity of evidence presented against him. He was foreign country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with the consent of the
naturalized as an Australian in 1976. It was not his marriage to an Australian that made him an Republic of the Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either of the
Australian. It was his act of subsequently swearing by taking an oath of allegiance to the following circumstances is present:
government of Australia. He did not dispute that he needed an Australian passport to return to the(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with said foreign country;
Philippines in 1980; and that he was listed as an immigrant here. It cannot be said also that he is or
a dual citizen. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with
by law. He lost his Filipino citizenship when he swore allegiance to Australia. He cannot also claim
(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with the consent of the the naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is
Republic of the Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of rendering a natural-born citizen thereof.
said service, or acceptance of said commission, and taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto,
states that he does so only in connection with his service to said foreign country; And provided, As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the
finally, That any Filipino citizen who is rendering service to, or is commissioned in, the armed Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine
forces of a foreign country under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), shall citizenship." On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens
not be permitted to participate nor vote in any election of the Republic of the Philippines during through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the
the period of his service to, or commission in, the armed forces of said country. Upon his discharge Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by
from the service of the said foreign country, he shall be automatically entitled to the full enjoyment Republic Act No. 530.
of his civil and political rights as a Filipino citizen x x x. To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting
Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from its promulgation when the
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines;
by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any
Marine Corps. offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the
interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies.
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. 63 (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes
repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by
the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.
of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.
Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63. Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who
qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications and none of the
citizen as required under Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution. disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.

On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost
warranto and declaring respondent Cruz the duly elected Representative of the Second District of their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; (2) service in the armed forces of the
Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections. The HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion for allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other
reconsideration of the decision in its resolution dated April 27, 2000. time; (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political and economic necessity.

Cruz then filed this petition assailing HRET’s decision. As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists
of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath
in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a
Issue: naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in
the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine
Held: citizenship under R.A. No. 2630, which provides:
Yes, he is still considered a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting
commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces
The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follows: of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution; taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local
Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines; allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered
reaching the age of majority, and the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited
provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born
4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his
ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and Philippine citizenship.
 15. Calilung v. Datumanong 16. Nicolas-Lewis v. COMELEC
Facts: FACTS:
Petitioner prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from implementing Republic In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, petitioners, referring to themselves as "duals" or dual
Act No. 9225, entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign citizens, pray that they and others who retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship under
Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended, and Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, be
for Other Purposes." Petitioner avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates allowed to avail themselves of the mechanism provided under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act
Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution that states, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to of 2003 1 (R.A. 9189) and that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) accordingly be ordered
the national interest and shall be dealt with by law." to allow them to vote and register as absentee voters under the aegis of R.A. 9189.
Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 922 reads: Petitioners are successful applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225
which accords to such applicants the right of suffrage, among others. Long before the May 2004
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.-It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all national and local elections, petitioners sought registration and certification as "overseas absentee
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have voter" only to be advised by the Philippine Embassy in the United States that, per a COMELEC
lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act. letter to the Department of Foreign Affairs dated September 23, 2003, they have yet no right to
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.-Any provision of law to the contrary vote in such elections owing to their lack of the one-year residence requirement prescribed by the
notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine Constitution. The same letter, however, urged the different Philippine posts abroad not to
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby discontinue their campaign for voter’s registration, as the residence restriction adverted to would
deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of contextually affect merely certain individuals who would likely be eligible to vote in future elections.
allegiance to the Republic: Prodded for clarification by petitioner Loida Nicolas-Lewis in the light of the ruling in Macalintal vs.
"I ___________________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and COMELEC on the residency requirement, the COMELEC wrote in response:
defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal Although R.A. 9225 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality …, it is the Commission's position
orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby that those who have availed of the law cannot exercise the right of suffrage given under the OAVL
declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will for the reason that the OAVL was not enacted for them. Hence, as Filipinos who have merely re-
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself acquired their citizenship on 18 September 2003 at the earliest, and as law and jurisprudence now
voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion." stand, they are considered regular voters who have to meet the requirements of residency, among
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become others under Section 1, Article 5 of the Constitution.
citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the Faced with the prospect of not being able to vote in the May 2004 elections owing to the
aforesaid oath. COMELEC's refusal to include them in the National Registry of Absentee Voters, petitioner
Nicolas-Lewis et al., 5 filed on April 1, 2004 this petition for certiorari and mandamus.

Issue: Whether sections 2 and 3 of RA 9225, together allow dual allegiance and not dual A little over a week before the May 10, 2004 elections, or on April 30, 2004, the COMELEC filed
citizenship. a Comment, 6 therein praying for the denial of the petition. As may be expected, petitioners were
not able to register let alone vote in said elections.
Ruling: Petition is denied.
On May 20, 2004, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation (in Lieu of
During the deliberation of the Congress, it was clarified that the purpose of these contended Comment), therein stating that "all qualified overseas Filipinos, including dual citizens who care to
sections is to recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and his loyalty to the exercise the right of suffrage, may do so" , observing, however, that the conclusion of the 2004
Republic.It is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with elections had rendered the petition moot and academic. 7
the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-
born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does The holding of the 2004 elections had, as the OSG pointed out, indeed rendered the petition moot
is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by and academic, but insofar only as petitioners’ participation in such political exercise is concerned.
reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not recognize The broader and transcendental issue tendered or subsumed in the petition, i.e., the propriety of
dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly allowing "duals" to participate and vote as absentee voter in future elections, however, remains
renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of unresolved.
the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or not Observing the petitioners’ and the COMELEC’s respective formulations of the issues, the same
there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship may be reduced into the question of whether or not petitioners and others who might have
was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225. meanwhile retained and/or reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 may vote as
Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing absentee voter under R.A. 9189.
provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. ISSUE:
Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of
naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their Whether or not dual citizens may exercise their right to suffrage as absentee voters even short of
naturalization. Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of 1-year residency requirement.
what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial
department, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance. RULING:
Yes. There is no provision in the RA 9225 requiring duals to actually establish residence and Thereafter, Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before the COMELEC En Banc on the
physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. Congress enacted ground that "the evidence is insufficient to justify the Resolution and that the said Resolution is
RA 9189 pursuant to Sections 1 and 2 of Article V of the Constitution, identifying in its Section 4 contrary to law.” However, Petitioner Maquiling, another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and
of the said Act who can vote under it, among others, are Filipino immigrants and permanent who garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the case
residents in another country opens an exception and qualifies the disqualification rule under the and led before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration together with an Opposition
Section 5(d) of the same Act. to Arnado's Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the First Division
correctly disqualied Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government
By applying the doctrine of necessary implication, Constitutional Commission provided for an Code is not applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation of Arnado's
exception to actual residency requirement of Section 1, Article 5 of 1987 Constitution, with respect candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who
to qualified Filipinos abroad. Filipino immigrants and permanent residents in another country may obtained the highest number of lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the winner.
be allowed to vote even though they do not fulfill the residency requirement of said Sec 1 Art V
of the Constitution. Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run for
public office despite his continued use of a US passport, and praying that Maquiling be proclaimed
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court rules and so holds that as the winner in the 2010 mayoralty race in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, the Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, may exercise the right to vote under the system of Issue: Whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship affects
absentee voting in Republic Act No. 9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003. one's qualifications to run for public office.
Held:
17. Maquiling v. COMELEC The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and
voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest
Facts: Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of his Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but recants the Oath of Renunciation required
subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino to qualify one to run for an elective position.
citizenship.
Section 5 (2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003:
Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General
of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil
Philippines on 10 July 2008. On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing
and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor. laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
On 3 April 2009, Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an (2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for
Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship. On November of the same year, Arnado filed holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time
his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, certifying that he is a of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and
natural born/naturalized Filipino citizen and that he is not a permanent resident of or immigrant to all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath…
a foreign country
Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He took the Oath
Thereafter, respondent Balua, another mayoralty candidate, led a petition to disqualify Arnado of Allegiance and renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no question that after performing
and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte these twin requirements required under Section 5 (2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention
in connection with the elections. He contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he became eligible to run for public office.
del Norte and that he is a foreigner.
Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but twice: first, on 10 July 2008
Balua’s motions were not acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections where Arnado when he applied for repatriation before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco,
garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate USA, and again on 03 April 2009 simultaneous with the execution of his Affidavit of Renunciation.
for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte By taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic, Arnado re-acquired his Philippine citizenship. At
the time, however, he likewise possessed American citizenship. Arnado had therefore become a
Ruling of the COMELEC First Division dual citizen.
The COMELEC First Division considered it as one for disqualification. Balua's contention that After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American citizenship by
Arnado is a resident of the United States was dismissed upon the finding that "Balua failed to executing an Affidavit of Renunciation, thus completing the requirements for eligibility to run for
present any evidence to support his contention," whereas the First Division still could "not public office. By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen,
conclude that Arnado failed to meet the one-year residency requirement under the Local regardless of the effect of such renunciation under the laws of the foreign country.
Government Code."
However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when,
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for disqualification and/or to cancel the after renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his
certificate of candidacy of Rommel C. Arnado is hereby GRANTED. Rommel C. Arnado's continued possession of a foreign citizenship.
proclamation as the winning candidate for Municipal Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte is
hereby ANNULLED. Let the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his foreign
of 1991 take effect. citizenship, he continued to use his US passport to travel in and out of the country before ling his
certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009. The pivotal question to determine is whether he
xx was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at the time he led his certificate of candidacy, thereby
rendering him eligible to run for public office.
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009,
the date he led his COC, he used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the
affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively Resolution: It must be stressed that what is at stake here is the principle that only those who are
and voluntarily represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before immigration exclusively Filipinos are qualified to run for public office. If we allow dual citizens who wish to run
authorities of both countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges for public office to renounce their foreign citizenship and afterwards continue using their foreign
granted by the United States of America. passports, we are creating a special privilege for these dual citizens, thereby effectively junking
the prohibition in Section 40 (d) of the Local Government Code.
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed
at any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual
renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights 18. David v. Agbay
granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship.
One lost Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. R.A. 9225 itself treats those
While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in of his category as having already lost Philippine citizenship, in contradistinction to those natural-
Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, it born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 came into force. In other words, Section
is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former 2 declaring the policy that considers Filipinos who became foreign citizens as not to have lost their
Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local Philippine citizenship, should be read together with Section 3 which clarifies that such policy
elective position. governs all cases after the new law’s effectivity.
The COMELEC En Banc is correct that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado Facts:
of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as
an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual In 1974, Renato David migrated to Canada became a Canadian citizen by
citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented himself naturalization. Upon their retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines. Sometime
as an American citizen by using his US passport. in 2000, they purchased a lot along the beach in Tambong, Gloria, Oriental Mindoro. However, in
the year 2004, they came to know that the portion where they built their house is public land and
This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one's foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado's part of the salvage zone.
bid for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local
position. On April 12, 2007, David filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) over the subject
land with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) at the Community
Arnado's category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired through a Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) in Socorro. In the said application, petitioner
positive act of applying for naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual citizens by indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.
virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take the oath of renunciation as the mere ling of the
certificate of candidacy already carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship. Dual Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application on the ground that
citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for
to the Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to falsification of public documents under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code against the
qualify as a candidate for public office. petitioner.
By the time he led his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen Meanwhile, on October 11, 2007, while petitioner’s MLA was pending, petitioner re-
enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He was qualified to vote, acquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of R.A. 9225 as evidenced by Identification
but by the express disqualification under Section 40 (d) of the Local Government Code, 40 40 he Certificate No. 266-10-07 issued by the Consulate General of the Philippines (Toronto).
was not qualified to run for a local elective position. In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a
Filipino citizen only for a period of eleven days, or from 3 April 2009 until 14 April 2009, on which In his defense, petitioner averred that at the time he filed his application, he had
date he first used his American passport after renouncing his American citizenship. intended to re-acquire Philippine citizenship and that he had been assured by a CENRO officer
that he could declare himself as a Filipino. He further alleged that he bought the property from the
The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be Agbays who misrepresented to him that the subject property was titled land and they have the
possessed not just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but right and authority to convey the same. The dispute had in fact led to the institution of civil and
continuously. Any act which violates the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship issue criminal suits between him and private respondent’s family.
to attack.
On June 3, 2008, the CENRO issued an order rejecting petitioner’s MLA. It ruled that
Arnado's act of consistently using his US passport effectively negated his "Affidavit of petitioner’s subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA
Renunciation." This does not mean, that he failed to comply with the twin requirements under R.A. which was void ab initio.
No. 9225, for he in fact did. It was after complying with the requirements that he performed positive
acts which effectively disqualified him from running for an elective public office pursuant to Section Meanwhile, the Office of the Prosecutor, affirmed by the DOJ, found probable cause in
40 (d) of the Local Government Code of 1991. The purpose of the Local Government Code in the complaint. Consequently, an information was filed before the MTC. David filed an Urgent
disqualifying dual citizens from running for any elective public office would be thwarted if we were Motion for the Re-Determination of Probable Cause in the MTC. MTC denied said motion holding
to allow a person who has earlier renounced his foreign citizenship, but who subsequently that R.A. 9225 makes a distinction between those who became foreign citizens during its
represents himself as a foreign citizen, to hold any public office. effectivity, and those who lost their Philippine citizenship before its enactment when the governing
law was CA No. 63. A petition for certiorari was filed before the RTC contending that once a
The Supreme Court held that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American natural-born Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in another country re-acquires his
citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local citizenship under R.A. 9225, his Filipino citizenship is thus deemed not to have been lost on
Government Code applies to his situation. He is disqualified not only from holding the public office account of said naturalization. RTC denied said petition.
but even from becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections.
Issue: THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Prior to the effectivity.
Whether by re-acquiring the Philippine citizenship status under R.A. 9225, David was REP. JAVIER. Well, you have two kinds of natural-born citizens here. Natural-born
by legal fiction, “deemed not to have lost it (natural-born status)” at the time of his naturalization. citizens who acquired foreign citizenship after the effectivity of this act are considered to have
retained their citizenship. But natural-born citizens who lost their Filipino citizenship before the
effectivity of this act are considered to
Ruling: have reacquired. May I know the distinction? Do you mean to say that natural born citizens who
The Supreme Court ruled NO. became, let's say, American citizens after the effectivity of this act are considered natural-born?

R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003," was Now in the second paragraph are the natural-born citizens who lost their citizenship
signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on August 29, 2003. Sections 2 and 3 of before the effectivity of this act are no longer natural born citizens because they have just
said law read: reacquired their citizenship. I just want to know this distinction, Mr. Chairman.

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy . — It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). The title of the Senate version is precisely retention
citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their and reacquisition. The reacquisition will apply to those who lost their Philippine citizenship
Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act. by virtue of Commonwealth Act 63. Upon the effectivity — assuming that we can agree on this,
upon the effectivity of this new measure amending Commonwealth Act 63, the Filipinos who lost
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. — Any provision of law to the contrary their citizenship is deemed to have reacquired their Philippine citizenship upon the effectivity of
notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship the act.
by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have
reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the The second aspect is the retention of Philippine citizenship applying to future
Republic: instances. So that's the distinction.

"I ____________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the REP. JAVIER. Well, I'm just asking this question because we are here making
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by distinctions between natural-born citizens. Because this is very important for certain government
the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept positions, 'no, because natural-born citizens are only qualified for a specific. . .
the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Yes. We can get to that later on. It's one of the
that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of provisions, yes. But just for purposes of the explanation, Congressman Javier, that is our
evasion." conceptualization. Reacquired for those who previously lost [Filipino citizenship] by virtue
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of of Commonwealth Act 63, and retention for those in the future.
a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.

Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the effectivity of R.A.
While Section 2 of R.A. 9225 declares the general policy that Filipinos who have become citizens 9225, he belongs to the first category of natural-born Filipinos under the first paragraph of Section
of another country shall be deemed “not to have lost their Philippine citizenship,” such is qualified 3 who lost Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. As the new law allows dual
by the phrase “under the conditions of this Act.” Section 3 lays down such conditions for two citizenship, he was able to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship by taking the required oath of
categories of natural-born Filipinos referred to in the first and second paragraphs. Under the first allegiance.
paragraph are those natural-born Filipinos who have lost their citizenship by naturalization in a For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner at the time of filing his MLA, it is not
foreign country who shall re-acquire their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance necessary to discuss the rulings in Frivaldo and Altarejos on the retroactivity of such reacquisition
to the Republic of the Philippines. The second paragraph covers those natural-born Filipinos who because R.A. 9225 itself treats those of his category as having already lost Philippine citizenship,
became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, who shall retain their Philippine citizenship in contradistinction to those natural- born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225
upon taking the same oath. The taking of oath of allegiance is required for both categories of came into force. In other words, Section 2 declaring the policy that considers Filipinos who became
natural-born Filipino citizens who became citizens of a foreign country, but the terminology used foreign citizens as not to have lost their Philippine citizenship, should be read together with Section
is different, “re-acquired” for the first group, and “retain” for the second group. R.A. 9225 thus 3, the second paragraph of which clarifies that such policy governs all cases after the new law’s
makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens before and effectivity. Falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 in relation to Article 171 of
after the effectivity the said law. the RPC refers to falsification by a private individual, or a public officer or employee who did not
That the law distinguishes between re-acquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship take advantage of his official position, of public, private, or commercial documents. The elements
was made clear in the discussion of the Bicameral Conference Committee on the Disagreeing of falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 of the RPC are: (1) that the offender
Provisions of House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130 held on August 18, 2003, where is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official
Senator Franklin Drilon was responding to the query of Representative Exequiel Javier: position; (2) that he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the
RPC; and (3) that the falsification was committed in a public, official or commercial document.
REP. JAVIER. I have some questions in Section 3. Here, under Section 3 of the Senate
version, "Any provision of law on the contrary notwithstanding, natural born citizens of the David made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a Filipino citizen at
Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, shall. . . and so forth, ano, shall retain their the time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen. Under
Philippine citizenship. CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian citizen, naturalization in a
foreign country was among those ways by which a natural-born citizen loses his Philippine
Now in the second paragraph, natural-born citizens who have lost their citizenship by citizenship. While he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later, the
reason of their naturalization after the effectivity of this Act are deemed to have reacquired. . . falsification was already a consummated act, the said law having no retroactive effect insofar as
his dual citizenship status is concerned. The MTC therefore did not err in finding probable cause The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is so delicately affected with public
for falsification of public document. interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate
it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.
Article XII, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution
Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality,
“No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall faithful observance of the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing
be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the
the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens; Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and for
nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes
than fifty years. Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except under the condition him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the
that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the common continued exercise of his professional privilege.
good so requires. The State shall encourage equity participation in public utilities by the general
public. The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
shall be limited to their proportionate share in its capital, and all the executive and managing
officers of such corporation or association must be citizens of the Philippines. SECTION 1. Who may practice law. – Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the
bar, or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, and who is in
good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
19. Petition for Leave to Resume Practice of Law, Benjamin M. Dacanay Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in accordance with the
statutory requirements and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law.
FACTS:
Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates that an applicant
This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to resume the for admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good
practice of law. moral character and a resident of the Philippines. 5 He must also produce before this Court
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral
Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.
Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid program. His application was approved Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing satisfactory proof of
and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004. educational, moral and other qualifications; passing the bar examinations;8 taking the lawyer’s
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate
Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that day, he took his oath of of the license to practice.
allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in good standing ― is a continuing
Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice. There is a requirement. This means continued membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual
question, however, whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine membership dues in the IBP; payment of the annual professional tax; compliance with the
bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition. mandatory continuing legal education requirement; faithful observance of the rules and ethics of
In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule 138 the legal profession and being continually subject to judicial disciplinary control.
(Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court: Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law in the
SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. – Every applicant for Philippines? No.
admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to
years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce before Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law. Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for
the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently,
him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines. the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino
Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his reacquisition of citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice
Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of the of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.
disqualifications for membership in the bar. The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another
ISSUE: country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all Philippine citizens
who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
Whether or not Dacanay may be allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines, citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]." Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen
conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s oath to remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in
member of the Philippine bar. accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership
in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he
RULING: reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper
YES. The Supreme Court resolved to approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice." 18 Stated otherwise, before a lawyer
Confidant with certain modifications. who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must first
secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP; (1) Whether or not R.A. No. 9139 applies to petitions for naturalization by judicial act.
(No.)
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(2) Whether or not the witnesses presented by petitioner are "credible" in accordance
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is with the jurisprudence and the definition and guidelines set forth in C.A. No. 473. (No.)
especially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and update
him of legal developments and Ruling:
(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties and (1)
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a foreigner into the political body of
a nation by clothing him or her with the privileges of a citizen. Under current and existing laws,
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine there are three ways by which an alien may become a citizen by naturalization: (a) administrative
bar. naturalization pursuant to R.A. No. 9139; (b) judicial naturalization pursuant to C.A. No. 473, as
amended; and (c) legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted by Congress bestowing
Philippine citizenship to an alien.
E. Naturalization Petitioner's contention that the qualifications an applicant for naturalization should
20. So v. Republic possess are those provided for in R.A. No. 9139 and not those set forth in C.A. No. 473 is barren
of merit. The qualifications and disqualifications of an applicant for naturalization by judicial act are
Facts: set forth in Sections 2 and 4 of C.A. No. 473. On the other hand, Sections 3 and 4 of R.A. No.
9139 provide for the qualifications and disqualifications of an applicant for naturalization
Edison So filed before the RTC a Petition for Naturalization under Commonwealth Act by administrative act.
(C.A.) No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. He alleged the
following in his petition: First. C.A. No. 473 and R.A. No. 9139 are separate and distinct laws — the former
covers all aliens regardless of class while the latter covers native-born aliens who lived here in the
He was born on February 17, 1982, in Manila; he is a Chinese citizen who has lived in Philippines all their lives, who never saw any other country and all along thought that they were
No. 528 Lavezares St., Binondo, Manila, since birth; as an employee, he derives an average Filipinos; who have demonstrated love and loyalty to the Philippines and affinity to the customs
annual income of around P100,000.00 with free board and lodging and other benefits; he is single, and traditions. To reiterate, the intention of the legislature in enacting R.A. No. 9139 was to make
able to speak and write English, Chinese and Tagalog; he is exempt from the filing of Declaration the process of acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical and more encouraging
of Intention to become a citizen of the Philippines pursuant to Section 6 of Commonwealth Act which is administrative rather than judicial in nature. Thus, although the legislature believes that
(C.A.) No. 473, as amended, because he was born in the Philippines, and studied in a school there is a need to liberalize the naturalization law of the Philippines, there is nothing from which it
recognized by the Government where Philippine history, government and culture are taught; and can be inferred that C.A. No. 473 was intended to be amended or repealed by R.A. No. 9139.
he is of good moral character. What the legislature had in mind was merely to prescribe another mode of acquiring Philippine
Attached to the petition were the Joint Affidavit of Atty. Artemio Adasa, Jr. and Mark B. citizenship which may be availed of by native born aliens. The only implication is that, a native
Salcedo. born alien has the choice to apply for judicial or administrative naturalization, subject to the
prescribed qualifications and disqualifications.
The RTC issued an Order setting the petition for hearing during which all persons
concerned were enjoined to show cause, if any, why the petition should not be granted. The entire In the instant case, petitioner applied for naturalization by judicial act, though at the time
petition and its annexes, including the order, were ordered published once a week for three of the filing of his petition, administrative naturalization under R.A. No. 9139 was already available.
consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and also in a newspaper of general circulation in the Consequently, his application should be governed by C.A. No. 473.
City of Manila. The RTC likewise ordered that copies of the petition and notice be posted in public Second. If the qualifications prescribed in R.A. No. 9139 would be made applicable
and conspicuous places in the Manila City Hall Building. No one opposed the petition. even to judicial naturalization, the coverage of the law would be broadened since it would then
The RTC granted the petition. However, Republic of the Philippines, through the Office apply even to aliens who are not native born. It must be stressed that R.A. No. 9139 applies only
of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the decision to the CA. to aliens who were born in the Philippines and have been residing here.

CA set aside the ruling of the RTC and dismissed the petition for naturalization. Third. Applying the provisions of R.A. No. 9139 to judicial naturalization is contrary to
According to the CA, petitioner's two (2) witnesses were not credible because they failed to the intention of the legislature to liberalize the naturalization procedure in the country. One of the
mention specific details of petitioner's life or character to show how well they knew him. The qualifications set forth in R.A. No. 9139 is that the applicant was born in the Philippines and should
appellate court likewise ruled that petitioner failed to comply with the requirement of the law that have been residing herein since birth. Thus, one who was born here but left the country, though
the applicant must not be less than 21 years of age on the day of the hearing of the petition; during resided for more than ten (10) years from the filing of the application is also disqualified. On the
the first hearing, petitioner was only twenty (20) years, nine (9) months, and twenty-five (25) days other hand, if we maintain the distinct qualifications under each of the two laws, an alien who is
old, falling short of the requirement. (R.A. No. 9139 which lowered the applicant's age requirement not qualified under R.A. No. 9139 may still be naturalized under C.A. No. 473.
to eighteen (18) years old refers only to administrative naturalization filed with the Special Thus, absent a specific provision expressly amending C.A. No. 473, the law stands and
Committee on Naturalization; it does not apply to judicial naturalization, C.A. No. 473, before the the qualifications and disqualifications set forth therein are maintained.
court, as in the present case.
(2)
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied.
In any event, petitioner failed to prove that the witnesses he presented were competent
Issues: to vouch for his good moral character, and are themselves possessed of good moral character. It
must be stressed that character witnesses in naturalization proceedings stand as insurers of the a degree in Bachelor of Science in Management from the Ateneo De Manila University on March
applicant's conduct and character. Thus, they ought to testify on specific facts and events justifying 18, 1978. On February 1, 1981, he married Griselda S. Yap, also a Chinese citizen. They have
the inference that the applicant possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications four children, who were all born and raised in the Philippines.
provided by law.
Ong alleged in his petition that he has been a "businessman/business manager" since
Petitioner's witnesses, Atty. Adasa and Salcedo, did not testify on his specific acts; they 1989, earning an average annual income of ₱150,000.00. When he testified, however, he said
did not elaborate on his traits. Their testimonies do not convince the Court that they personally that he has been a businessman since he graduated from college in 1978. Moreover, Ong did not
know petitioner well and are therefore in a position to vouch for his qualifications. As correctly specify or describe the nature of his business. Respondent further testified that he socializes with
found by the CA, the witnesses' testimonies consisted mainly of general statements in answer to Filipinos; celebrates the Sinulog, fiestas, birthdays, and Christmas. He is a member of the Alert/
the leading questions propounded by his counsel. What they conveniently did was to enumerate React VII Communications Group and the Masonic organization.
the qualifications as set forth in the law without giving specific details.
Respondent Ong presented a health certificate to prove that he is of sound physical and
Atty. Adasa is close to petitioner's family, but not specifically to petitioner. Atty. Adasa's mental health. As shown by the clearances from the National Bureau of Investigation, the
statements refer to his observations on the family's practices and not to petitioner in particular. Philippine National Police, the trial courts, and the barangay, he has no criminal record or pending
Nothing in his testimony suggests that he was close to petitioner and knew him well enough to criminal charges. He also presented Rudy Carvajal (Carvajal) and Bernard Sepulveda
vouch for his qualifications. (Sepulveda) as his character witnesses. At that time, Sepulveda was the vice-mayor of Borbon,
Cebu. He has known Ong since 1970 because Ong is the close friend of Sepulveda’s brother. He
On the other hand, Salcedo also did not give specific details on petitioner's testified that Ong is very helpful in the community and adopts the Filipino culture. Meanwhile,
qualifications. In sum, petitioner's witnesses clearly did not personally know him well enough; their Carvajal testified that he has known Ong since the 1970s because they were high school
testimonies do not satisfactorily establish that petitioner has all the qualifications and none of the classmates. He testified that Ong is morally irreproachable and possesses all the qualifications to
disqualifications prescribed by law. be a good citizen of the Philippines. Carvajal is a businessman engaged in leasing office spaces.
In naturalization proceedings, it is the burden of the applicant to prove not only his own Trial court granted Ong’s petition and held that Ong possesses all the qualifications and
good moral character but also the good moral character of his/her witnesses, who must be credible none of the disqualifications provided for by law to become a citizen of the Philippines. Republic
persons.The records likewise do not show that the character witnesses of petitioner are persons appealed to the CA.
of good standing in the community; that they are honest and upright, or reputed to be trustworthy
and reliable. The most that was established was the educational attainment of the witnesses; The Republic faulted the trial court for granting Ong’s petition despite his failure to prove
however, this cannot be equated with their credibility. In fine, petitioner focused on presenting that he possesses a known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation as required under
evidence tending to build his own good moral character and neglected to establish the credibility Section 2, fourth paragraph of the Revised Naturalization Law.
and good moral character of his witnesses.
The Republic posited that, contrary to the trial court’s finding, respondent Ong did not
Thus, petitioner failed to show full and complete compliance with the requirements prove his allegation that he is a businessman/business manager earning an average income of
of naturalization law. It must be stressed that admission to citizenship is one of the highest ₱150,000.00 since 1989. His income tax returns belie the value of his income. Moreover, he failed
privileges that the Republic of the Philippines can confer upon an alien. It is a privilege that should to present evidence on the nature of his profession or trade, which is the source of his income.
not be conferred except upon persons fully qualified for it, and upon strict compliance with the law. Considering that he has four minor children (all attending exclusive private schools), he has
declared no other property and/or bank deposits, and he has not declared owning a family home,
his alleged income cannot be considered lucrative. Under the circumstances, the Republic
21. Republic v. Ong maintained that respondent Ong is not qualified as he does not possess a definite and existing
business or trade.
The courts must always be mindful that naturalization proceedings are imbued with the highest
public interest. Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the The appellate court dismissed the Republic’s appeal. It explained:
government and against the applicant. The burden of proof rests upon the applicant to show full In the case at bar, the [respondent] chose to present [pieces of evidence] which relates
and complete compliance with the requirements of law. [sic] to his lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation. Judging from the present standard of
Facts: living and the personal circumstances of the [respondent] using the present time as the index for
the income stated by the [respondent], it may appear that the [respondent] has no lucrative
On November 26, 1996, respondent Ong, then 38 years old, filed a Petition for employment. However, We must be mindful that the petition for naturalization was filed in 1996,
Naturalization. As decreed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended by Republic Act No. 530, which is already ten years ago. It is of judicial notice that the value of the peso has taken a
known as the Revised Naturalization Law, the petition was published in the Official Gazette and a considerable plunge in value since that time up to the present. Nonetheless, if We consider the
newspaper of general circulation, and posted in a public place for three consecutive weeks, six income earned at that time, the ages of the children of the [respondent], the employment of his
months before the initial hearing. The Office of the Solicitor General entered its appearance and wife, We can say that there is an appreciable margin of his income over his expenses as to be
authorized the city prosecutor to appear on its behalf. Accordingly, Fiscals Ester Veloso and Perla able to provide for an adequate support.
Centino participated in the proceedings below.
Issue: Whether respondent Ong has proved that he has some known lucrative trade, profession
Respondent Ong was born at the Cebu General Hospital in Cebu City to Chinese or lawful occupation in accordance with Section 2, fourth paragraph of the Revised Naturalization
citizens Siao Hwa Uy Ong and Flora Ong on March 4, 1958. He is registered as a resident alien Law.
and possesses an alien certificate of registration and a native-born certificate of residence from
the Bureau of Immigration. He has been continuously and permanently residing in the Philippines Ruling:
from birth up to the present. Ong can speak and write in Tagalog, English, Cebuano, and Amoy. The Supreme Court held that NO, there was no evidence to the same. The trial court
He took his elementary and high school studies at the Sacred Heart School for Boys in Cebu City, held that respondent Ong "is a businessman engaged in lawful trade and business since 1989"
where social studies, Pilipino, religion, and the Philippine Constitution are taught. He then obtained but did not cite the evidence, which supports such finding. After poring over the records, the Court
finds that the reason for the lack of citation is the absence of evidence to support such conclusion. is a known exception to the general rule that only questions of law may be entertained in a Rule
The trial court’s conclusion that Ong has been a businessman since 1989 is only an assertion 45 petition.
found in Ong’s petition for naturalization. But, on the witness stand, Ong did not affirm this
assertion. Instead, he testified that he had been a businessman since he graduated from college, Moreover, a review of the decisions involving petitions for naturalization shows that the
which was in 1978. Court is not precluded from reviewing the factual existence of the applicant’s qualifications. In fact,
jurisprudence holds that the entire records of the naturalization case are open for consideration in
First to consider is that the courts must always be mindful that naturalization an appeal to this Court. Indeed, "[a] naturalization proceeding is so infused with public interest
proceedings are imbued with the highest public interest. Naturalization laws should be rigidly that it has been differently categorized and given special treatment. x x x [U]nlike in ordinary
enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant. The burden judicial contest, the granting of a petition for naturalization does not preclude the reopening of that
of proof rests upon the applicant to show full and complete compliance with the requirements of case and giving the government another opportunity to present new evidence. A decision or order
law. granting citizenship will not even constitute res judicata to any matter or reason supporting a
subsequent judgment cancelling the certification of naturalization already granted, on the ground
In the case at bar, the controversy revolves around respondent Ong’s compliance with that it had been illegally or fraudulently procured. For the same reason, issues even if not raised
the qualification found in Section 2, fourth paragraph of the Revised Naturalization Law, which in the lower court may be entertained on appeal. As the matters brought to the attention of this
provides: Court x x x involve facts contained in the disputed decision of the lower court and admitted by the
SECTION 2. Qualifications. – Subject to section four of this Act, any person having the following parties in their pleadings, the present proceeding may be considered adequate for the purpose of
qualifications may become a citizen of the Philippines by naturalization: determining the correctness or incorrectness of said decision, in the light of the law and extant
jurisprudence." In the case at bar, there is even no need to present new evidence. A careful review
xxxx of the extant records suffices to hold that respondent Ong has not proven his possession of a
"known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation" to qualify for naturalization.
Fourth. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos,
Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation;
xxxx 22. Burca v. Republic
Based on jurisprudence, the qualification of "some known lucrative trade, profession, or FACTS:
lawful occupation" means "not only that the person having the employment gets enough for his
ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown that the employment gives one an income such that On April 24, 1964, petitioner filed with the Court of First Instance of Leyte a petition alleging that
there is an appreciable margin of his income over his expenses as to be able to provide for an she is married to Filipino citizen and possesses all the qualifications and none the disqualifications
adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid for naturalization under Commonwealth Act 473 and praying that a declaration to such effect be
one’s becoming the object of charity or a public charge." His income should permit "him and the made by the Court for the purpose of laying the basis for the cancellation by the Bureau of
members of his family to live with reasonable comfort, in accordance with the prevailing standard Immigration of her alien certificate of registration. On April 17, 1964, the court set the petition for
of living, and consistently with the demands of human dignity, at this stage of our civilization." hearing on November 20, 1964 and ordered notified thereof to be given to the Solicitor General.
In the same order it was required that said notice of hearing be published in the Official Gazette
Moreover, it has been held that in determining the existence of a lucrative income, the once a month for three consecutive months a once a week for three consecutive weeks in the
courts should consider only the applicant’s income; his or her spouse’s income should not be Morning Times, a newspaper edited in the City of Ormoc, where petition resides, and posted in a
included in the assessment. The spouse’s additional income is immaterial "for under the law the public and conspicuous place in the Office of the Clerk of Court. On November 13, 1964, the
petitioner should be the one to possess ‘some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful Solicitor General filed an "Opposition and Motion to Dismiss" on the following grounds:
occupation’ to qualify him to become a Filipino citizen." Lastly, the Court has consistently held that
the applicant’s qualifications must be determined as of the time of the filing of his petition. (1) As an application for Philippine Citizenship, the petition is fatally defective for failure to contain
or mention the essential allegations required under Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law,
Going over the decisions of the courts below, the Court finds that the foregoing as amended, such as petitioner's former places of residence, and that she has all the qualifications
guidelines have not been observed. To recall, respondent Ong and his witnesses testified that required under Section 2 and none of the disqualifications specified under Section 4 of the Revised
Ong is a businessman but none of them identified Ong’s business or described its nature. The Naturalization Law. Specifically, as can be gathered in the Notice of Hearing, there is no allegation
Court finds it suspect that Ong did not even testify as to the nature of his business, whereas his that she is of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the Philippine
witness Carvajal did with respect to his own. Constitution, and has conducted herself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire
period of her residence in the Philippines; or that she has some known lucrative trade, profession,
The dearth of documentary evidence compounds the inadequacy of the testimonial or lawful occupation. Likewise, there is no showing that the petition is supported by the affidavits
evidence. The applicant provided no documentary evidence, like business permits, registration, of at least two credible persons stating that they are citizens of the Philippines and personally
official receipts, or other business records to demonstrate his proprietorship or participation in a know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time required by this Act,
business. Instead, Ong relied on his general assertions to prove his possession of "some known and a person of good repute and morally irreproachable, and that said petitioner has, in their
lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation." Bare, general assertions cannot discharge the opinion, all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines, and is not in any
burden of proof that is required of an applicant for naturalization. way disqualified under the provision of the Act. Similarly, there is no showing that she has filed a
Clearly, therefore, respondent Ong failed to prove that he possesses the qualification of declaration of intention or is exempt from such requirement. Even in the Notice of Hearing, there
a known lucrative trade provided in Section 2, fourth paragraph, of the Revised Naturalization Law. is failure to mention the names of witnesses whom she proposes to introduce in support of the
petition, as required under Section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended.
The Court finds no merit in respondent’s submission that a Rule 45 petition precludes a
review of the factual findings of the courts below. In the first place, the trial court and appellate (2) As a separate proceedings to declare the petitioner a citizen being allegedly the wife of a
court’s decisions contain conclusions that are bereft of evidentiary support or factual basis, which Filipino citizen, and to direct the cancellation of her alien Registry, it is well settled in this jurisdiction
that there is no proceeding established by law, or the rules for the judicial declaration of the
citizenship of an individual (Palaran vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-15047, January 30, 1962; Channie
Tan vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-14159, April 18, 1960; Tan Yu Chin vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-15775, We cannot grant petitioner-appellee's prayer for the affirmance of the trial court's judgment
April 29, 1961; Delumen vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-552. January 28, 1954; in re Hospicion Obiles declaring her a Filipino citizen. It must be noted that the sole and only purpose of the petition is
49 Off. Gaz. 923), and that citizenship is not the proper subject for declaratory judgment (Feliseta to have petitioner declared a Filipino citizen. Under our laws there can be no judicial action or
Tan vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-16108, October 31, 1960: Santiago vs. Commissioner of proceeding for the declaration of the citizenship of an individual. It is as an incident only of the
Immigration, G.R. No. L-14653, January 31, 1963; Board of Commissioners, et al. vs. Hon. Felix adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy, that the courts may pass upon, and make
R. Domingo, etc., et al., G.R. No. L-21274, July 31, 1963). a pronouncement relative to, their status. In Moy Ya Lim Yao, We adverted to administrative
procedure heretofore followed in the Bureau Immigration regarding the steps to be taken by an
Thereafter, the court proceeded to hear the case and rendered its decision- declaring that ZITA alien woman married to a Filipino for the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration, and
NGO BURCA petitioner, has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a thus secure recognition of her status Filipino citizen. Such a procedure could be availed of
Filipino Citizen and that she being married to a Filipino Citizen, is hereby declared a citizen of the Petitioner. Judicial recourse would be avoidable to Petitioner in case of an adverse action by the
Philippines, after taking the necessary oath of allegiance, as soon as this decision becomes final Immigration Commissioner.
and executory.
At the same time, it may not be amiss to clarify a matter related to the point involved in this case,
which has given to a certain degree of confusion and unnecessary difficulties on the part of all
The Solicitor General appealed in due time and made several assignment of errors. concerned. We deem it wise to deal with it here in order to preclude unnecessary litigations, not
to speak of legal complications that may ensue as a consequence of the lack of finality of judicial
ISSUE: or administrative determinations on person's citizenship in certain cases.
Whether or not the trial court erred in declaring that petitioner has all the qualifications and none It has been the constant doctrine of this Court, that a final and executory decision the question of
of the disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen. citizenship, by a court other than in naturalization proceedings, or by an administrative body,
generally not considered binding in other cases and for other purpose than that specifically
RULING: involved in the case where such decision is rendered. Thus for instance, in a case involving the
YES. We cannot grant petitioner-appellee's prayer for the affirmance of the trial court's determination of the citizenship of a party as a prerequisite to the exercise of a license, franchise
judgment declaring her a Filipino citizen. or privilege, such as operation of a public utility, and where the administration agency concerned
shall have found as an established fact to the applicant is a Filipino citizen, even if such finding,
In the decision of this Court in this case rendered on January 30, 1967, the position of the Solicitor may have been affirmed by this Court on appeal, the same will be considered as conclusive on
General was upheld the above judgment of the trial court was reversed, the Court holding (1) that the question of such citizenship. Hence if such party should apply for a license to engage in retail
the only means by which the alien wife Filipino citizen may have herself declared as having trade or for the lease or purchase of any disposable lands of the public domain, the question of
become a Filipino citizen by reason of her marriage is through compliance with the procedure for his citizenship may litigated again.
naturalization contained in the Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473, and (2) in said
proceeding aside from the showing that she is laboring under any of the disqualifications Understandably such a result is unfair to the party concerned. Instead of according finality and
enumerate Section 4, thereof, she must prove that she possesses all qualifications under Section stability judicial or administrative decisions, it engenders confusion and multiplicity of suits.
2 of the same statute. More specifically the alien wife of a Filipino citizen, in order to acquire the Certainly if the decision of the administrative agency on the matter of citizenship, as an important
citizenship of her husband is required to file corresponding petition for naturalization in court, issue involved in the case, is affirmed by this Court, We find no cogent reason why such decision
allege prove all the requisite requirements such as continuous residence for a period of at least on the matter can not be given preclusive effect. We have conceded the authority of certain
ten years, lucrative income and the like. In other words, she was required to follow procedure for administrative agencies to ascertain the citizenship of the parties involved in the cases therein, as
the judicial naturalization of aliens, thus rendering for naught the first paragraph of Section 15 of a matter inherent in or essential to the efficient exercise of their powers. Recognizing the basic
Revised Naturalization Law. Under such doctrine the alien wife of a Filipino was placed in some premise, that there must be an end to litigations, some authorities recognize that administrative
cases in a disadvantageous position than an ordinary alien. rulings or decisions should have res judicata or preclusive effect. Obviously, if the decision of an
To accord substance to the obvious legislative purpose this Court in the Moy Ya Lim Yao case, administrative agency on the question of citizenship, is affirmed by this Court on the ground that
held thru Mr. Justice Barredo: the same is supported by substantial evidence on the whole record, there appears to be no valid
reason why such finding should have no conclusive effect in other cases, where the same issue
With all these considerations in mind, We are persuaded that it is in the best interest of all is involved. The same observation holds true with respect to a decision of a court on the matter of
concerned that Section 15 of the Naturalization Law be given effect in the same way as it was citizenship as a material matter in issue in the case before it, which is affirmed by this Court.
understood and construed when the phrase 'who may be lawfully naturalized', found in the
American statute from which it was borrowed and copied verbatim, was applied by the American In resume, therefore, since Our opinion in the decision January 30, 1967, requiring an alien woman
courts and administrative authorities. Accordingly, We now hold, all previous decisions of this married to Filipino who desires to be a citizen of this Country, to submit a judicial proceeding in all
Court indicating otherwise notwithstanding, that under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act respects similar to a naturalization case, wherein in addition, she has to prove not only that she
473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native-born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a not laboring under any of the disqualifications under section but also possesses all the
Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of Philippines under Section 4 of the qualifications set forth in section 2 of the Revised Naturalization Law, conflicts with Our ruling Moy
same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized Ya Lim Yao, the decision has to that extent be consider modified. 1We cannot, however, affirm
here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment takes his oath as petitioner's claim Filipino citizenship in these proceedings. That is a matter that the appropriate
Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under governmental agency, such as the Commissioner on Immigration, shall have to pass upon.
said Section 4. IN VIEW WHEREOF, and consistently with the foregoing opinion, the decision herein of January
Withal, the Court also held that it is not necessary for alien wife of a Filipino citizen to resort to the 30, 1967 is hereby modified; the reversal of the decision of the court a quo and the dismissal of
procedure naturalization cases before she can be declared a citizen reason of her marriage. the petition, are however affirmed, without prejudice to petitioner's availing of the procedure
indicated above. No costs.
 23. Po v. Republic the province where the petitioner resides, and to have copies of said petition and a general notice
of hearing posted in a public and conspicuous place in his office or in the building where said office
Facts: is located, setting forth in such notice the name, birthplace and residence of the petitioner, the
Po Yo bi a Certified Chinese citizen who was born in the Philippines filed a petition for date and place of his arrival in the Philippines, the names of the witnesses whom the petitioner
naturalization in the CFI of Ilo-ilo, when approved and was scheduled for hearing, he moved to proposes to introduce in support of his petition, and the date of the hearing of the petition, which
amend his petition twice which resulted in the moving of the said hearing also twice. In his second hearing shall not be held until after six months from the date of the last publication of the notice. .
amended petition it contained inserted allegations, however there was no stating that he is a ..
person of good moral character. Upon the moving of his hearing to a final date of Feb. 26, 1962 A notice of petition which was published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks and that the
with orders of publication in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation in Iloilo, same made references to some date in the petition and stated the date and place of hearing, did
however the second Amended Petition itself was not published in the Official Gazette or in a not save the day for both the petitioner and the trial court. The publication of the notice did not
newspaper of general circulation, but instead only the amended notice of petition was published. constitute substantial compliance with the cited section.
It was also not posted in a public and conspicuous place in the Office of the Clerk of Court or in
the building where such office is located. After trial, the RTC granted the petition and declared Po Petitioner was not exempt from filing a declaration of intention. His claim for exemption is anchored
Bi as a Filipino citizen, but in his amended application, it failed to file a statement of intent to be on his having been born in the Philippines; his having completed his primary and secondary
naturalized as a Filipino citizen by birth in this country which is the Philippines. On 30 October education in schools recognized by the Philippine government wherein enrollment is not limited to
1963 the Solicitor General filed a motion to reconsider the above decision contending that any race or nationality and where Philippine Civics, Philippine History and Philippine Government
petitioner is not exempt from filing his declaration of intention, and has not complied with Section are prescribed and taught as part of the school curriculum; and that his children, except the
4 of the Revised Naturalization Law, and that his witnesses are not competent and credible youngest who is not of school age, are all enrolled in the schools contemplated by law. The
persons within the contemplation of law. On December 1, 1965 petitioner filed a motion alleging evidences presented by petitioner were lacking to prove he indeed finish school here. He failed to
therein that more than two (2) years had elapsed since the decision and that he has complied with submit certifications that he was enrolled in these schools.
all the conditions and requisites, he then prays that after hearing, the decision be executed and Section 12 of the Revised Naturalization Law requires that before a certificate of naturalization is
he be allowed to take his oath as a Filipino citizen. issued, the petitioner shall renounce "absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any
foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty." It is settled that a Chinese national cannot be
Issues: naturalized as a citizen of the Philippines unless he has complied with the laws of Nationalist China
1. WoN Po complied with the requirement of good moral character requiring previous permission of its Minister of Interior for the renunciation of his nationality. In the
instant case, petitioner did not offer any evidence to prove that he obtained such permission.
2. WoN publication of notice of petition is enough compliance of publication
3. WoN Po should be given Filipino citizenship
24. Republic v. Karbasi
Held:
Judicially, the Naturalization Law provides that after hearing the petition for citizenship and the
1. No. Despite two (2) amendments to the original petition, petitioner did not allege in any of his receipt of evidence showing that the petitioner has all the qualifications and none of the
petitions that he is of good moral character. The third of the six (6) qualifications to become a disqualifications required by law, the competent court may order the issuance of the proper
citizen of the Philippines, as provided for in Section 2 of the Revised Naturalization Law, is: naturalization certificate and its registration in the proper civil registry.
Third. He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the Philippine Facts:
Constitution, and must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the
entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as On June 25, 2002, Kamran F. Karbasi (Karbasi) filed a petition for naturalization with
well as with the community in which he is living; . . . the RTC, where he alleged the following:

In the Twelfth paragraph of the second amended petition, petitioner practically copied all the words 1. His full name is Kamran F. Karbasi;
in the section except for the opening clause on good moral character; thus, he alleges: 2. He is recognized as a Person of Concern by the United Nations High Commissioner for
Twelfth. I believe in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution. I have conducted myself Refugees (UNHCR) as shown in a certification duly issued by the UNHCR;
in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of my residence in the Philippines 3. He is presently residing with his family at 341 Burgos Street, Dipolog City, since early
in my relations with the constituted Government as well as with the community in which I am living. part of June 2000 and more so has resided continuously in the Philippines for not less
2. As correctly pointed out by the Republic, the second amended petition was not published. than 11 years immediately preceding the date of this petition; to wit, since 11 July 1990
Neither were the original and the amended petitions. What the Office of the Clerk of Court did was and in Dipolog City for more than one (1) year;
to prepare and issue notices of the petition. It was said notices alone which were ordered to be 4. His last place of foreign residence was Pakistan and his other places of residence, prior
published and posted. In respect to the second amended petition, the notice was published in the to his present residence, were as follows (i) Panay Ave., Quezon City; (ii) Sta. Filomena,
10, 17 and 24 July 1961 issues of the Official Gazette and the 1, 8 and 15 July 1961 issues of the Dipolog City; (iii) Capitol Area, Dumaguete City; (iv) Dohinob, Roxas, Zamboanga del
GUARDIAN. Norte;
Section 9 of the Revised Naturalization Law22 requires that the petition itself must be published. It 5. He was born on 4 September 1966 in Tehran, Iran, as shown in his identity card which
reads in part as follows: also serves as his birth certificate;
Sec. 9. Notification and appearance. — Immediately upon the filing of a petition, it shall be the 6. He is married and is the father of one (1) child;
duty of the clerk of court to publish the same at petitioner's expense, once a week for three
consecutive weeks, in the Official Gazette, and in one of the newspapers of general circulation in
 7. His wife Cliji G. Lim Karbasi is a Filipino citizen, 22 years old and born on 10 August overthrowing an existing government by force and violence, were among those who left. Since the
1979 in Cebu City, whom he married on 12 October 2000 in Dipolog City, as shown in government confiscated his passport, they traveled by camel and passed by the desert during
their certificate of marriage; night time to reach Pakistan. He stayed there for almost three (3) years,
8. His child, Keenyji L. Karbasi, 1-year old , was born on 9 June 2001 in Dipolog City and Being foreigners in Pakistan, they submitted themselves to the United Nations High
presently residing with him and his wife at 341 Burgos Street, Dipolog City; Commissioner for Refugees. However, they were not granted the status of refugee right away
since Pakistan is adjacent to Iran. They had to transfer to a third country not at war with Iran. Since
9. He arrived in Manila, Philippines, under an assumed name (Syed Gul Agha) from his brother Ali Reza was already studying in the Philippines, they decided to come here.
Pakistan on 11 July 1990 specifically at the Manila International Airport on board
Philippine Airlines Flight No. 731, per UNHCR certification containing reference to his As it was difficult for him to get travel documents, petitioner procured a Pakistani
Pakistani passport issued under said assumed name; passport under the assumed name of Syed Gul Agha.
10. Due to his marriage, he is entitled to the benefit of Section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. Upon his arrival in the Philippines on July 11, 1990, he submitted himself to the United
473, which reduced to five years the ten year requirement of continuous residence; Nations in Manila. After several interviews, he was admitted as a refugee and, later on, as a person
of concern. As a refugee, he was granted by the United Nations allowances, medical benefits and
11. He speaks and writes English and Visayan; protection to some extent.
12. His trade or occupation is as a repair technician in which he has been engaged since After having been interviewed by the Solicitor General regarding his intention to become a Filipino
1998 and, as such, he derives an average annual income of Php 80,000.00 more or citizen, he filed the corresponding Declaration of Intention, dated March 28, 2001, on May 25,
less; 2001.
13. He has all the qualifications required under Section 2 and none of the disqualifications
under Section 4, of the Commonwealth Act No. 473; Sometime in 2002, petitioner, having signified his intention to become a Filipino citizen,
was issued a certification captioned "UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Liaison Office for the
14. He has complied with the requirements of the Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act Philippines," dated 25 June 2002, certifying that he has been recognized as a person of concern
No. 473) regarding the filing with the Office of the Solicitor General of his bona fide who arrived in the Philippines on 11 July 1990 on board Philippine Airlines flight 731 under an
intention to become a citizen of the Philippines, as shown in his Declaration of Intention assumed name (Syed Gul Agha).
duly filed on 25 May 2001;
At the time of the filing of the petition, he was already married and residing at 341 Burgos Street,
15. It is his intention in good faith to become a citizen of the Philippines and to renounce Dipolog City. However, upon arrival in the Philippines, he first resided at Panay Avenue, Quezon
absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state City, where he stayed for almost six months. During those times, the United Nations provided him
or sovereignty, and particularly to Iran of which, at this time, he is a citizen or subject; a monthly allowance of P2,800.00, being a refugee. He then transferred to Burgos Street, Miputak,
that he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of filing of this petition Dipolog City, where he stayed at the house of the father-in-law of his brother Ali Reza for a month.
up to the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship;
He then moved to Sta. Filomena, Dipolog City, at the house of his sister-in-law. It was
16. Dominador Natividad Tagulo, of legal age, Filipino, married and residing at ABC during this time that he enrolled at Andres Bonifacio College where he studied from 1990 to 1992.
Compound, Quezon Ave., Miputak, Dipolog City and Alton C. Ratificar, of legal age, He finished a two-year vocational course in said school as evidenced by a Diploma issued by the
Filipino, married and residing at 047 Burgos Street, Dipolog City, who are Filipino Andres Bonifacio College, Dipolog City. In Iran, he finished Bachelor of Science in Economics.
citizens, whose affidavits are attached to his petition, will appear and testify as
witnesses at the hearing thereof. He then pursued a four-year course (Bachelor of Science in Industrial Technology Major
in Electronics) at the Central Visayas Polytechnic College in Dumaguete City. He resided in the
On several hearing dates thereafter, Karbasi himself took the witness stand. As Capitol Area of said city. He was already receiving a monthly allowance of P4,800.00 from the
summarized by the RTC, the gist of his testimony is as follows: United Nations at that time. He graduated from said institution as evidenced by a Diploma issued
by said school. He also attended technical trainings conducted by Asian Durables Manufacturing,
He is an Iranian national. He was born in Tehran, Iran, and resided there since birth up Inc. as evidenced by a Certificate of Attendance issued by said company.
to 1986. His father is Abdolhossein Karbasi, a doctor in Iran, and his mother is Narjes Froghnia
Karbasi, a retired teacher. In 1996, he returned to Dipolog City and resided at Burgos Street where he opened his
He has five brothers and two sisters. The eldest of the brood, Hamid Reza Karbasi, is electronics repair shop (KX3 Electronics Repair Shop).
in the United States of America and is now an American Citizen. The second, Dr. Ali Reza Karbasi,
admitted as Filipino citizen in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Dipolog City, is in the Philippines. On October 12, 2000, he got married. The couple transferred to the house of his
The third is Qite Karbasi, his sister. The fourth, his brother, Dr. Abduoul Reza Karbasi, graduated parents-in-law after the marriage. When the grandfather of his wife got ill, they were requested to
in India. The fifth, his sister, Kia Karbasi, is a nurse. The sixth, his brother Qolam Reza Karbasi, take care of him. Thus, the couple transferred their residence to Dohinob, Roxas. However, they
is an engineer who graduated in France. His last four siblings are all in Iran. moved back to their house in Burgos Street, Dipolog City, as it is nearer to a hospital. When his
grandfather-in-law died, he participated in all the rites and ceremonies relative to his wake and
He was a Shiite Muslim before he was converted as Roman Catholic. His former religion burial.
believes in the existence of a Supreme Being called God. It believes in the existence of
government and repudiates violence. His said religion is not within an organization of Al Qaeda, At present, his repair shop's gross monthly income hovers between P20,000.00 to
Jemayah Islamiya, or any terrorist group. It also adheres to the principle of one man-one woman P25,000.00
marital relation. Additionally, Karbasi claimed that he had never been involved in any demonstration or
He and his brother, Ali Reza Karbasi, left Iran in 1986 because of the war between Iran mass action protesting any issuances, policies or acts of the Philippine Government and its
and Iraq at that time. When the Shah of Iran, Pahlavi, was overthrown by Ayatolah Khomini in officials; that he had never made any rebellious or seditious utterances; that he believed in the
1979, some Iranian nationals left Iran. He and Ali Reza, who also condemns the act of principles underlying the Philippine Constitution and he had even memorized the preamble; and
that he can also sing the Philippine National Anthem and recite the Filipino Patriotic Pledge, both Citizenship involves political status; hence, every person must be proud of his citizenship and
of which he did in open court. should cherish it. Naturalization is not a right, but one of privilege of the most discriminating, as
well as delicate and exacting nature, affecting, as it does, public interest of the highest order, and
On January 17, 2007, the RTC found Karbasi's evidence sufficient to support his which may be enjoyed only under the precise conditions prescribed by law therefor.
petition. Finding Karbasi as possessing all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to
become a Filipino citizen, the RTC rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: Jurisprudence dictates that in judicial naturalization, the application must show
substantial and formal compliance with the law. In other words, an applicant must comply with the
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for naturalization filed by KAMRAN F. jurisdictional requirements; establish his or her possession of the qualifications and none of the
KARBASI to be admitted as citizen of the Philippines is hereby GRANTED. disqualifications enumerated under the law; and present at least two (2) character witnesses to
SO ORDERED. support his allegations. Section 2 of the Naturalization Law clearly sets forth the qualifications that
must be possessed by any applicant, viz:
Not in conformity, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), interposed an appeal to the CA, based mainly on the ground that the RTC erred Section 2. Qualifications. - Subject to section four of this Act, any person having the following
in granting Karbasi's petition as he failed to comply with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. qualifications may become a citizen of the Philippines by naturalization:
473 (Naturalization Law) on character, income and reciprocity. Specifically, the OSG pointed out First. He must be not less than twenty-one years of age on the day of the hearing of the petition;
that Karbasi failed to establish that: 1] Iran grants reciprocal rights of naturalization to Filipino
citizens; 2] he has a lucrative income as required under the law; and 3] he is of good moral Second. He must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than ten years;
character as shown by his disregard of Philippine tax laws when he had underdeclared his income
in his income tax returns (ITRs) and overstated the same in his petition for naturalization. On Third. He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the Philippine
January 29, 2013, the CA rendered the assailed decision affirming the grant of Filipino citizenship Constitution, and must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during
to Karbasi. the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government
as well as with the community in which he is living.
The CA ruled that the alleged under declaration in Karbasi's ITRs was prepared in good
faith because he was of the belief that he no longer needed to include the income he received as Fourth. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos,
payment of his services to Daewoo Electronics Electronics Services, Inc. (Daewoo) and Kolins Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful
Philippines International, Inc. (Kolins), because the same were already withheld at source. The occupation;
CA likewise affirmed the RTC finding that Karbasi, as a refugee, need not prove reciprocity Fifth. He must be able to speak and write English or Spanish and any one of the principal Philippine
between Philippine and Iranian laws. Hence, this petition. languages;
Issue: Sixth. He must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the public schools or
Whether or not the CA had correctly affirmed the RTC decision granting Karbasi's private schools recognized by the Office of Private Education1 of the Philippines, where the
application for naturalization despite the opposition posed by the OSG. Philippine history, government and civics are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum,
during the entire period of the residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of
Held: his petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen.
Yes, the CA correctly affirmed the RTC’s decision. Considering the above disquisitions, the Court does not need to belabor the last issue
on reciprocity between Iranian and Philippine laws on naturalization. True, the Naturalization Law
Citizenship is personal and, more or less a permanent membership in a political disqualifies citizens or subjects of a foreign country whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right to
community. It denotes possession within that particular political community of full civil and political become naturalized citizens or subjects. A perusal of Karbasi's petition, both with the RTC and
rights subject to special disqualifications. Reciprocally, it imposes the duty of allegiance to the the CA, together with his supplemental pleadings filed with the Court, however, reveals that he
political community. The core of citizenship is the capacity to enjoy political rights, that is, the right has successfully established his refugee status upon arrival in the Philippines. In effect, the
to participate in government principally through the right to vote, the right to hold public office and country's obligations under its various international commitments come into operation. Articles 6
the right to petition the government for redress of grievance. and 34 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, to which the Philippines is a
No less than the 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens. Among those signatory, must be considered in this case, to wit:
listed are citizens by naturalization. Naturalization refers to the legal act of adopting an alien and Article 6 of the 1951 Convention:
clothing him with the privilege of a native-born citizen. Under the present laws, the process of
naturalization can be judicial or administrative. Judicially, the Naturalization Law provides that after For the purposes of this Convention, the term "in the same circumstances" implies that any
hearing the petition for citizenship and the receipt of evidence showing that the petitioner has all requirements (including requirements as to length and conditions of sojourn or residence) which
the qualifications and none of the disqualifications required by law, the competent court may order the particular individual would have to fulfill for the enjoyment of the right in question, if he were
the issuance of the proper naturalization certificate and its registration in the proper civil registry. not a refugee, must be fulfilled by him, with the exception of requirements which by their nature a
On the other hand, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9139 provides that aliens born and residing in the refugee is incapable of fulfilling.
Philippines may be granted Philippine citizenship by administrative proceeding by filing a petition
for citizenship with the Special Committee, which, in view of the facts before it, may approve the Article 34 of the 1951 Convention:
petition and issue a certificate of naturalization. In both cases, the petitioner shall take an oath of
allegiance to the Philippines as a sovereign nation. The Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization
of refugees. They shall in particular make every effort to expedite naturalization
It is a well-entrenched rule that Philippine citizenship should not easily be given proceedings and to reduce as far as possible the charges and costs of such proceedings.
away. All those seeking to acquire it must prove, to the satisfaction of the Court, that they have
complied with all the requirements of the law. The reason for this requirement is simple. In the same vein, Article 7 of the said Convention expressly provides exemptions from
reciprocity, while Article 34 states the earnest obligation of contracting parties to "as far as possible
facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees." As applied to this case, Karbasi's status 26. Republic v. Cokeng
as a refugee has to end with the attainment of Filipino citizenship, in consonance with Philippine
statutory requirements and international obligations. Indeed, the Naturalization Law must be read FACTS:
in light of the developments in international human rights law specifically the granting of nationality Respondent-appellee Francisco Cokeng seeks reconsideration of this Court's decision in the
to refugees and stateless persons. above entitled case, ordering the revocation of his certificate of naturalization. Bases of the
decision were that in the original application for naturalization, said respondent failed to state all
his former places of residence; and lack of good moral character and irreproachable conduct,
F. Denaturalization rendering the naturalization one that was illegally obtained.
25. Schneider v. Rusk With regard to the first ground, this Court's main decision found that appellee, in addition to his
given address at 428 Sto. Cristo, Manila, had also resided at 28, 12th Street, corner Broadway,
Facts: Quezon City, but had not revealed it in the amended application for his naturalization that was the
Angelika Schneider, a native of Germany, had come to the United States as a child. She and her one published as required by law.
parents were naturalized, and Schneider lived in America through her college years. Afterward, That the appellee Cokeng had resided in the house in Quezon City is indubitable, as it appears
she went abroad to continue her studies and married a German citizen. Schneider then settled in manifested by him in several public documents executed between 1951 and 1954, as detailed in
Germany and began a family. Twice she returned to America for brief visits. In 1959, when our decision. Some of these were even sworn to by him (Exh. A and Exh. SSS, for example). His
Schneider tried to renew her U.S. passport, the State Department refused her request, saying she explanations, that in some of said documents the residence in Quezon City was set down by
was no longer an American citizen. mistake, or that it was an address and not a residence, or that he had purchased it for his parents,
The government based its decision on a section of the 1952 Immigration and Naturalization Act. were examined and found unconvincing and not acceptable.1ªvvphi1.nêt
The law said naturalized citizens who lived in their native lands for three years lost their American In his motions for reconsideration, the appellee stresses that in law a person can only have one
citizenship. The government believed returning to one's homeland weakened a naturalized legal domicile, and that appellee, in good faith, only made it appear in his application for
citizen's allegiance to the United States, and sometimes put the American government in conflict naturalization that his residence was 428 Sto. Cristo, Manila, because it was there that he stayed
with foreign nations. In 1962, almost 1,000 people had been expatriated under this law. most of the time.
Schneider sued the State Department to regain her citizenship. A district court found for the ISSUE:
government, and Schneider appealed to the Supreme Court.
Whether or not the appellee was correct in his contention that in law a person can only have one
legal domicile
Issue: WON the 1952 Immigration and Naturalization Act is constitutional. RULING:
These arguments are unmeritorious. It is noteworthy that section 7 of the Naturalization Law
Held: expressly requires the applicant to state his "present and past place of residence", and the words
used in the statute clearly show that the term used ("residence") was not employed in the sense
The Court ruled that the pertinent provision of the Immigration and Naturalization Act was of "legal domicile", precisely because a person can only have one domicile. Considering the
unconstitutional. purpose of the requirement, which is to enable the public and the investigating agencies of the
government to gather all information available as to the conduct of an applicant, and thus
The Immigration and Nationality' Act of 1952, Section 352(a)(1) provides: determine whether his behaviour at all times has been irreproachable as required by law, and
(a) A person who has become a national by naturalization shall lose his nationality by -- hence, whether the prospective admission to citizenship should be objected to or not, it becomes
obvious that by places of residence, section 7 of the Naturalization Law refers to the places of
(1) having a continuous residence for three years in the territory of a foreign state of which he was actual physical residence,1 whether temporary or permanent.
formerly a national or in which the place of his birth is situated, except as provided in section 353
of this title, whether such residence commenced before or after the effective date of this Act. . . . In Qua vs. Republic, L-19834, October 27, 1964, this court said —

The rights of citizenship of the native born and of the naturalized person are of the same dignity, Petitioner argues, however, that his residence in Manila was only temporary so that his legal
and are coextensive. The only difference drawn by the Constitution is that only the "natural born" residence or domicile remained to be Legazpi City. Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law
citizen is eligible to be President. Art. II, section 1. speaks of "present and former places of residence" without specifying actual or legal residence.
Its purpose, as stated, is to give the public and the investigating agencies of the government an
This statute proceeds on the impermissible assumption that naturalized citizens as a class are opportunity to gather information and to express objection relative to the petition. Precisely, for
less reliable, and bear less allegiance to this country than do the native born. This is an assumption this reason, it is important that petitioner's actual, physical residence be likewise set forth and
that is impossible for us to make. Moreover, while the Fifth Amendment contains no equal published, since information regarding petitioner and objection to his application are apt to be
protection clause, it does forbid discrimination that is "so unjustifiable as to be violative of due provided by people in his actual, physical surrounding.
process." A native-born citizen is free to reside abroad indefinitely without suffering loss of
citizenship. The discrimination aimed at naturalized citizens drastically limits their rights to live and We reiterated these views in O Ku Phuan vs. Republic, 1967C, PHILD 570, 573, 2 where it was
work abroad in a way that other citizens may. It creates indeed a second-class citizenship. Living ruled that:
abroad, whether the citizen be naturalized or native born, is no badge of lack of allegiance, and in The only former place of residence mention in the petition for naturalization was 1040 O'Donnell,
no way evidences a voluntary renunciation of nationality and allegiance. It may indeed be Sta. Cruz, Manila. The record shows, however, that petitioner had resided in Davao from 1936 to
compelled by family, business, or other legitimate reasons. 1946, at No. 788 Juan Luna, Tondo, Manila, from 1946 to 1948 and in the 2nd Avenue, Grace
Park, Caloocan City, from 1948 to 1949. It is well settled that this failure to mention petitioner's estopped by anything shown in the record in this case. (U.S. vs. Nopoulos, 225 Fed. 656, cit.
former residences affects the jurisdiction of the court to hear the case. author.)
Indeed, such omission tends to defeat the purpose of the publication, required by law, of notice of It can be readily seen that the lack of fraudulent intent or trickery in obtaining naturalization is no
the filing of the petition for naturalization. It deprives the Government of the opportunity to make a obstacle to the cancellation of a naturalization certificate originally issued in violation of law. It may
thorough and effective investigation of petitioner's background, prior to the hearing of his petition. be added that appellee's contention that his true residence was No. 428 Sto. Cristo, Manila, is not
Moreover, people residing in the neighborhood of the former places of residence not mentioned free from doubt, considering the evidence that these premises were under lease to Go Tian Hoo
in the petition may thus be led to believe that petitioner is another person. They may, accordingly, (doing business under the name of Francis Trading) from April 1951 to December 1958 (tsn. p.
refrain from conveying to the Government pieces of information relevant, if not vital, to the petition 31, Sept. 28, 1961; Exhs. V-I and V-II), while the petition for naturalization was filed in 1955.
for naturalization. For this reason, the fact that petitioner mentioned, in his testimony, said former
places of residence, does not and can not — contrary to the import of the order appealed from — The conclusion is, therefore, inevitable that the respondent has not established adequate grounds
cure the effect of the failure to specify them in his aforementioned petition. for altering the conclusions made in the main decision (17 Supreme Court Reports Annotated, p.
857) to the effect that his failure to disclose all his places of residence justified the revocation of
Upon the other hand, the decisions in Zuellig vs. Republic, 83 Phil. 768, and Chausintek vs. his naturalization.
Republic, 88 Phil. 717, discuss residence for purposes of venue for the filing of the petition for
naturalization and are, therefore, inapplicable to the present issue. With regard to the second ground for revocation, to wit, that respondent Cokeng had committed
under declarations of his income, thereby evincing lack of that irreproachable conduct which the
Likewise obvious it is that the good faith of the applicant in omitting one or more of his "present law requires of applicants for citizenship, respondent stresses that the first group of Bureau of
and past places of residence" in his application, becomes and is irrelevant for the purposes of the Internal Revenue examiners had found that Cokeng overpaid his income taxes for 1952, 1953 and
law. Whether the omission be in good or bad faith, the fact is that full inquiry as to the 1954; the second group of examiners that had gone over Cokeng's case found overpayments only
irreproachability of applicant's behaviour is thereby prevented, and the law's intent frustrated. for 1952 and 1954, but certified to this taxpayer's being deficient in his income declarations for the
Hence, this Court in a long line of decisions has inveriably held that such omission is fatal to the years 1953, 1955, 1956 and 1957; and still a third group of examiners in turn confirmed Cokeng's
application for naturalization (Lim Tan vs. Republic, April 30, 1966; Ong Ping Seng vs. Republic, overpayments for 1952 and 1954, but reported that for the years 1953, 1955, 1956 and 1957,
L-19575, February 26, 1965 and numerous decisions cited therein; Tan vs. Republic, L-22077, there was neither deficiency nor overpayment. To cap this confusing situation, respondent has
February 18, 1967; O Ku Phuan vs. Republic, L-23406, August 31, 1967, 1967C PHILD, 570 and submitted (See Annexes to his Motion of November 14, 1966) a report of Supervising Revenue
cases cited). Examiner Restituto D. Atienza, (who had originally investigated Cokeng's tax case, and assessed
him for additional taxes) wherein said examiner declared, as of October 1963, that respondent
It is apparent from the preceding considerations that the act of appellee Cokeng in not disclosing had overpaid his income taxes for the years 1951, 1952 and 1954; and recommended that he be
his residence in Quezon City, having deprived the State of opportunity to fully inquire into the assessed for deficiency income taxes for 1958 and 1959, but without penalty, because "there is
applicant's conduct, rendered the decree of naturalization improvident and improper, being no direct evidence of fraud."
contrary to the requirements and policy of the law. While the decree had become final, the State
is not thereby deprived of corrective action through denaturalization proceedings for the The records further disclose a memorandum dated May 8, 1967 of Commissioner of Internal
cancellation of the naturalization certificate. For under section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, Revenue Misael P. Vera, reporting to the Solicitor General 3 that other revenue examiners had
"a competent judge may cancel the naturalization certificate issued and its registration in the civil verified anew respondent's tax cases, and that —
registry whenever it is shown that — said naturalization certificate was obtained fraudulently or
illegally". These terms were reproduced from the American law that allowed cancellation of The examiners found no evidence in the records to show that the deficiency tax arose from
naturalizations "fraudulently or illegally procured", and it has been the consistent interpretation of undeclared income that would indicate bad faith on the part of the taxpayers, thus, substantiating
the Federal and Supreme Courts of the United States that the term "illegally procured" is not limited the conclusion and recommendation of the late Examiner Atienza as adverted to above. On the
to irregularity, but also denoted a determination by the Court contrary to law of the matter other hand, the examiners found instances showing good faith on the part of the taxpayer. He
submitted to it. (U.S. vs. Nopoulos, 225 Fed. 656; U.S. vs. Plaistrow, 189 Fed. 1010; Grahl vs. voluntarily filed his amended returns for 1952 up to 1955, inclusive, declaring an additional income
U.S., 261 Fed. 487; U.S. vs. Koopmans, 290 Fed. 545; U.S. vs. Khaw, 1 Fed. 2d 1006; U.S. vs. consisting of dividends from San Miguel Brewery Corporation. This additional income has not
Ness, 62 L. Ed., 321; U.S. vs. Ginsberg, 61 L. Ed. 853). been discovered by the team of Examiners Timoteo C. Andrada and Felix S. Lopez whose
examination covered the years 1948 up to 1954, inclusive. Moreover, the amended returns were
No alien has the slightest right to naturalization unless all statutory requirements are complied filed even before the start of the second re-investigation, which was then not expected. The
with; and every certificate of citizenship must be treated as granted upon condition that the taxpayer also voluntarily filed a Supplementary Inventory, on February 14, 1956, as Administrator
government may challenge it, as provided in section 15, and demand its cancellation, unless of the estate of his deceased father thereby increasing the estate and inheritance taxes. These
issued in accordance with such requirements. If procured when prescribed qualifications have no acts of taxpayer, the examiners pointed out, demonstrate not only good faith but civic-mindedness
existence in fact, it is illegally procured; a manifest mistake by the judge can not supply these nor long before the denaturalization case was stated sometime in 1960.
render their existence non-essential. (U.S. vs. Ginsberg, 61 Law Ed. 853, 856).
These conclusions the Commissioner confirmed and adopted, saying —
Naturalization granted without the filing of a certificate of arrival as required by the statute, the
same being a matter of substance, is illegally procured. (U.S. vs. Ness, 62 L. Ed. 321). It appearing that the examiners' findings are based on a thorough appraisal and evaluation of the
records of Mr. Cokeng's tax cases, this Office finds it unnecessary to add to or detract from the
No alien has the right to naturalization unless he has complied with the statutory requirements. If said comments, which are therefore, hereby confirmed and adopted as our official answer to the
a certificate of naturalization has been procured when the statutory qualification did not exist in questions posed in your query.
fact, it may be cancelled.Proof of fraud in obtaining a certificate is unnecessary to justify
cancellation, illegality alone will subject a certificate to successful attack. (U.S. vs. Beda, 118 Fed. In view of these developments, we are left with no alternative but to conclude that, despite the
2d 458, 459, cit, U.S. Sup. Court decisions). (Emphasis supplied) suspicious variations in the results of the different examinations of respondent's tax cases, the
second charge of under declarations of his income has not been clearly established, and therefore,
The statute requires certain conditions to exist to entitle a person to naturalization, and no person his denaturalization can not be predicated upon said charge.
and no bureau, and no court, can waive these conditions; therefore the government can not be
It appearing, however, that Cokeng's naturalization was illegally obtained, because the Court Nora Fe Sagun is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national, and Marta
granting it improperly disregarded the applicant's failure to disclose one of his places of residence, Borromeo, a Filipino citizen. She was born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio City and did not elect
contrary to the requirement of section 7 of the Naturalization Law, the denaturalization decreed in Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. In 1992, at the age of 33 and after getting
the original decision of this Court must be maintained. married to Alex Sagun, she executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Said document was notarized by Atty. Cristeta Leungon but was not recorded and registered with
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby denied. the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City.
Sometime in September 2005, respondent applied for a Philippine passport. Her
27. Chan Teck Lao v. Republic application was denied due to the citizenship of her father and there being no annotation on her
birth certificate that she has elected Philippine citizenship. Consequently, she sought a judicial
Facts: The application for naturalization of Chan Teck Lao was denied on October 31, 1949. Upon declaration of her election of Philippine citizenship averring that she was raised as a Filipino and
appeal, the Supreme Court on June 15, 1950, reversed this Court's decision. More than 10 years she is a registered voter of Precinct No. 0419A of Barangay Manuel A. Roxas in Baguio City and
later, the Office of the Solicitor General filed the petition for the cancellation of the certificate of had voted in local and national elections as shown in the Voter Certification. She asserted that by
naturalization, raising the alleged jurisdictional question based on the subsequent Tan Ten Koc virtue of her positive acts, she has effectively elected Philippine citizenship and such fact should
ruling where an applicant must present positive evidence the newspaper where his petition was be annotated on her record of birth so as to entitle her to the issuance of a Philippine passport.
published was indeed of general circulation in the province where the proceeding was had. The
Office of the Solicitor General argued that there was no showing or proof that the Nueva Era was After conducting a hearing, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision on April 3,
a newspaper of general circulation in the province of Tarlac, where the petitioner then resided. 2009 granting the petition and declaring respondent a Filipino citizen.

Issue: Whether or not the Office of Solicitor General is correct in canceling the naturalization of Upon payment of the required fees, the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City is hereby
Chan Teck Lao on the ground that he failed to follow the publication requirement. directed to annotate [on] her birth certificate, this judicial declaration of Filipino citizenship of said
petitioner.
Held:
Petitioner, through the OSG, directly filed the instant recourse via a petition for review
No. The 1967 leading case of Gan Tsitung v. Republic with former Chief Justice Concepcion as on certiorari before us. Petitioner points out that while respondent executed an oath of allegiance
spokesman for the Court, indicates clearly the merit of this appeal by petitioner Chan Teck Lao before a notary public, there was no affidavit of her election of Philippine citizenship. Additionally,
from a lower court decision promulgated in 1965 ordering the cancellation of his certificate of her oath of allegiance which was not registered with the nearest local civil registry was executed
naturalization that dates back to 1952 as a result of 1950 decision of this Tribunal sustaining his when she was already 33 years old or 12 years after she reached the age of majority.
plea to become a Filipino.
Issues:
Gan Tsitung, in language plain and unequivocal makes manifest that no retroactive effect is to be
given a judicial pronouncement that would impose on a party proceeded against in a 1. Whether respondent’s petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship is
denaturalization proceeding a requirement not in existence at a time that his application was heard authorized by the Rules of Court and jurisprudence.
and favorably acted on. There would be manifest unfairness in setting aside a decision that had 2. Whether the respondent has effectively elected Philippine citizenship in accordance
subsequently become final and did lead to the grant of the coveted boon citizenship. with the procedure prescribed by law.
Unfortunately, the lower court decision came out in 1965, a full two years earlier. The Republic Ruling:
thus emerged victorious in its suit to declare null and void the original judgment in favor of
petitioner in view of Tan Ten Koc v. Republic, which the year before held for the first time that an 1. YES. However, it should be stressed that there is no specific statutory or procedural
applicant must present positive evidence the newspaper where his petition was published was rule which authorizes the direct filing of a petition for declaration of election of Philippine
indeed of general circulation in the province where the proceeding was had. With the principle of citizenship before the courts. Respondent cannot now be allowed to seek the
nonretroactivity now firmly adhered to, there is no more justification for what the low court did. The intervention of the court to confer upon her Philippine citizenship when clearly she has
status of petitioner as a national of this country for well-nigh thirteen years ought to have remained failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship.
undisturbed. What is more, a 1970 resolution of this Court penned by the present Chief Justice in
Republic v. Co Keng, warning against undue receptivity to claims by the State in denaturalization Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of the
proceedings, further strengthens the position of petitioner-appellant in seeking a reversal. citizenship of an individual. Courts of justice exist for settlement of justiciable controversies, which
imply a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right,
Therefore, the decision of the lower court of January 20, 1965 ordering the cancellation of the and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. As an incident only of the
certificate of naturalization of Chan Teck Lao as a Filipino citizen is SET ASIDE and REVERSED. adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy, the court may pass upon, and make a
pronouncement relative to their status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond judicial
power.
G. Judicial Declaration of Citizenship Clearly, it was erroneous for the trial court to make a specific declaration of respondents
28. Republic v. Sagun Filipino citizenship as such pronouncement was not within the court's competence.

The law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of citizenship by election. All that As to the propriety of respondent's petition seeking a judicial declaration of election of
is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, Philippine citizenship, it is imperative that we determine whether respondent is required under the
thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. law to make an election and if so, whether she has complied with the procedural requirements in
the election of Philippine citizenship.
When respondent was born on August 8, 1959, the governing charter was the 1935
Facts: Constitution, which declares as citizens of the Philippines those whose mothers are citizens of the
Philippines and elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Sec. 1, Art. IV of 108 of the Rules of Court. Substantial issues like citizenship were not covered. In effect, it was
the 1935 Constitution reads: held the petition was for a judicial declaration of citizenship, which was not allowed under existing
rules.
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
Article 412 of the Civil Code simply provides: "No entry in the civil registry shall be
x x x x (4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the changed or corrected without a judicial order."In fairness to the respondent judge, there was
age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship. abundant jurisprudence to lend support to his Orders at the time they were issued. Since then,
Under Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate however, the strict doctrine announced in those cases has been relaxed, most recently in the case
child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, of Republic v. Valencia, 5 supported by twelve members of this Court with only one other member
upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. The right to elect not taking part.
Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided that [t]hose who
elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and In that case (arising, incidentally, also in Cebu City), there was a petition for the
thirty-five are citizens of the Philippines. Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was correction in the birth entries of two persons in the local civil registry, specifically to change their
carried over to the 1987 Constitution which states that [t]hose born before January 17, 1973 of citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino," their status as children from "legitimate" to "illegitimate,"
Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority are Philippine and their mother’s status from "married" to "single." The motion to dismiss filed by the local civil
citizens. It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the registrar having been denied, a full-blown trial was held and the changes sought were thereafter
election of Philippine citizenship should not be understood as having a curative effect on any ordered by the trial court.
irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. If the
citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to The Republic of the Philippines then came to this Court to question the decision,
challenge under the new charter even if the judicial challenge had not been commenced before invoking substantially the same grounds on which the Orders now being challenged were based.
the effectivity of the new Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the two Orders of the respondent judge dismissing a petition for the
correction of an allegedly wrong entry in the birth records of Kim Joseph describing him as a
2. NO. Based on the foregoing circumstances, respondent clearly failed to comply with Chinese national instead of a Filipino citizen is correct.
the procedural requirements for a valid and effective election of Philippine citizenship. Respondent
cannot assert that the exercise of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitutes RULING:
a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship since the law specifically lays down the
requirements for acquisition of citizenship by election. All that is required of the elector is to NO. In Wong v. Republic, Justice Vicente Abad Santos, in a separate concurrence,
execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the expressed the view that Article 412, which Rule 108 was supposed to implement, does not say
nearest civil registry. Having failed to comply with the foregoing requirements, respondent’s that it applies only to non-controversial issues and that the procedure to be used is summary in
petition before the trial court must be denied. The mere exercise of suffrage, continuous and nature," adding that "Article 412 contemplates all kinds of issues and all kinds of procedures."
uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar acts showing exercise of Philippine Justice Pacifico de Castro, in a dissenting opinion, agreed with him and said (speaking also of
citizenship cannot take the place of election of Philippine citizenship. Hence, respondent cannot Article 412) that "no prohibition may be seen from its express provision, nor by mere implication,
now be allowed to seek the intervention of the court to confer upon her Philippine citizenship when against correction of a substantial error as one affecting the status of a person."
clearly she has failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. As we held in Ching, the prescribed The ruling in Republic v. Valencia (141 SCRA 462) has in effect adopted the fore-going
procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All views insofar as it now allows changes in the birth entry regarding a person’s citizenship as long
that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, as adversary proceeding are held. Where a change in the birth registry regarding citizenship is
thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Having failed to comply with the foregoing ordered, the Court will not be establishing a substantive right but only correcting or rectifying an
requirements, respondents petition before the trial court must be denied. (Re: Application For erroneous entry in the civil registry as authorized by law. In short, Rule 108 of the Rule of Court
Admission to the Philippine Bar. Vicente D. Ching, Bar Matter No. 914, October 1, 1999, 316 provides only the procedure or mechanism for the proper enforcement of the substantive law
SCRA 1, 7-8.) embodied in Article 412 of the Civil Code and so does not violate the Constitution.
H. Correction of Entries The Court notes that in the case at bar the petition was dismissed outright without a trial
29. Chiao Ben Lim v. Zosa being held, on the justification that it was not permitted. In the light of the Valencia ruling, the
Orders of the respondent judge must now be reversed, to give way to the appropriate
FACTS: proceedings necessary to the resolution of the substantial issue raised by the petitioner. The
records show that the publication requirement has already been complied with. The next step,
This is an appeal by certiorari from two Orders of the respondent judge dismissing a therefore, is for the petitioner and all adverse and interested parties to be given their day in court
petition for the correction of an allegedly wrong entry in the birth records of Kim Joseph describing in a regular trial on the merits.
him as a Chinese national instead of a Filipino citizen.
The petitioner had offered to prove the error through several pieces of evidence, among WHEREFORE, the challenged Orders are hereby set aside, and Special Proceeding No. 3596-R
them an earlier birth certificate of Kim Joseph describing him as a Filipino citizen, the birth of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch V, is reinstated for trial on the merits without delay.
certificates of his seven brothers and sisters all describing them as Filipinos, and a decision of the
Court of Appeals recognizing their grandfather as a Filipino citizen.
On opposition by the local civil registrar of Cebu, however, the respondent judge I. Deportation of Citizens
dismissed the petition and sustained the contention that only clerical errors were allowed to be
corrected in the summary proceedings authorized under Article 412 of the Civil Code and Rule 30. Republic v. Harp
Facts: deportation proceedings. A citizen is entitled to live in peace, without molestation from any
official or authority, and if he is disturbed by a deportation proceeding, he has the unquestionable
Davonn Maurice Harp was born and raised in the United States of America to Toiya Harp and right to resort to the courts for his protection, either by a writ of habeas corpus or of prohibition, on
Manuel Arce Gonzalez (Manuel). While on a visit to the Philippines, he was discovered by the legal ground that the Board lacks jurisdiction. If he is a citizen and evidence thereof is
basketball talent scouts. He was invited to play in the Philippine Basketball League and was satisfactory, there is no sense nor justice in allowing the deportation proceedings to
eventually drafted to play in the Philippine Basketball Association (PBA). continue, granting him the remedy only after the Board has finished its investigation of his
Harp was among those invited to participate in a Senate investigation. The inquiry sought to review undesirability.
the processes and requirements involved in the acquisition and determination of Philippine . . . And if the right (to peace) is precious and valuable at all, it must also be protected on time, to
citizenship in connection with the "influx of bogus Filipino-American (Fil-Am) or Filipino-foreign prevent undue harassment at the hands of ill-meaning or misinformed administrative officials. Of
(Fil-foreign) basketball players into the PBA and other basketball associations in the Philippines." what use is this much boasted right to peace and liberty if it can be availed of only after the
In the course of the inquiry, it was established that respondent had previously obtained recognition Deportation Board has unjustly trampled upon it, besmirching the citizen's name before the bar of
as a citizen of the Philippines from the BI and the DOJ. public opinion?

The Senate committees, however, found reason to doubt the Philippine citizenship of respondent. Since respondent has already been declared and recognized as a Philippine citizen by the BI and
After a scrutiny of the documents he had submitted and its own field investigation of his purported the DOJ, he must be protected from summary deportation proceedings. We affirm the ruling of the
background, they concluded that he had used spurious documents in support of his Petition for CA on this matter:
Recognition. True, "[t]he power to deport an alien is an act of the State. It is an act by or under the authority of
In the report, the Senate committees also directed the BI and the DOJ to examine thoroughly the the sovereign power. It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose presence in the
authenticity of the documents submitted by certain PBA players, including respondent, and to country is found to be injurious to the public good and domestic tranquility of the people." However,
determine if they were indeed citizens of the Philippines. in this controversy, petitioner is not an alien. He is a Filipino citizen duly recognized by the BI, the
DOJ and the DFA . . . .
Pursuant to this directive, the DOJ issued Department Order creating a special committee to
investigate the citizenship of the PBA players identified in the report. With regard to Harp, the
committee concluded that there was "substantial evidence to conduct summary deportation
proceeding . . . for 'misrepresentation as a Filipino citizen' in applying for recognition before the
Bureau of Immigration and the Department of Justice." The Committee relied, in particular, on the
findings of the Senate committees and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on the apparent
alterations made in the Certificate of Live Birth of respondent's father.
Acting on the basis of the special committee's findings, DOJ Secretary Gonzalez issued a
Resolution directing the BI to undertake summary deportation proceedings against Harp and other
five PBA players.
Harp filed a petition which sought to enjoin the BI proceedings for the summary of his deportation.
However, BI ordered the summary deportation of Harp.
Upon receipt of the Summary Deportation Order, Harp filed a Petition for Review with an
application for injunction before the CA to seek the reversal of BI Summary Deportation Order.
The CA granted the Petition and set aside the deportation order. It held that respondent, who was
a recognized citizen of the Philippines, could not be summarily deported.
Issue:
Whether the Summary Deportation Order is valid. (No.)
Ruling:
It is settled that summary deportation proceedings cannot be instituted by the BI against citizens
of the Philippines. In Board of Commissioners v. Dela Rosa, the Court reiterated the doctrine that
citizens may resort to courts for protection if their right to live in peace, without molestation from
any official or authority, is disturbed in a deportation proceeding. In that case, we stated:
However, the rule enunciated in the above-cases admits of an exception, at least insofar as
deportation proceedings are concerned. Thus, what if the claim to citizenship of the alleged
deportee is satisfactory? Should the deportation proceedings be allowed to continue or should the
question of citizenship be ventilated in a judicial proceeding? In Chua Hiong vs. Deportation
Board (96 Phil. 665 [1955]), this Court answered the question in the affirmative, and We quote:
When the evidence submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to
immediate review should also be recognized and the courts should promptly enjoin the