Geoforum xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Geoforum
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/geoforum

Securing the market: Water security and the internal contradictions of

Chile’s Water Code
Jessica Budds
School of International Development, University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, UK

ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT

Keywords: Chile has operated a system of private tradable water rights since 1981. In theory, this framework contributes to
Water markets water security by instituting private property rights to water to enable permanent access, and by using market
Drought transactions to facilitate the reallocation of scarce water to ensure optimal distribution. Yet, since 2010, the
Export agriculture country has faced critical water scarcity in several regions, arising from a combination of overexploitation and dry
Capital accumulation
weather. The aim of this paper is to analyse the relationship between water markets and water security in Chile. It
Hydrosocial cycle
Political ecology
has two objectives: to examine how the water policy framework has shaped responses to acute water scarcity,
based on a case study of the La Ligua river basin during the 2014–15 drought, and to explore how water-society
relations have influenced the nature and implications of these responses. The analysis employs a relational ap-
proach to water security that attends to the configuration of hydrosocial relations, as opposed to the supply of
water. I make three related arguments. First, the framework fostered supply-led responses to drought that were
counterproductive to water security. Second, these responses can be attributed to the privatised and individualised
hydrosocial relations under the market system, which now present an internal contradiction by threatening to
undermine it. Third, supply-led responses were not merely pragmatic solutions to water shortages, but a means to
neutralise this internal contradiction so as to stave off the potential destabilisation of the water policy framework.

1. Introduction water users often look to new sources (e.g. aquifers, reservoirs) rather
than the market, because users are generally reluctant to purchase
Chile has adopted the principles of water privatisation and markets water rights, and because the supply of water rights does not always
to the greatest extent internationally. The 1981 Water Code introduced meet demand (Budds, 2004, 2008, 2009a). However, what has been far
a system of tradable private water rights with minimal government less explored is how the framework functions in situations of unusual
regulation, that sought to use the principles of private property and and/or unexpected acute scarcity, which have become more prevalent
market transactions to enable the efficient (re)allocation of water. This in Chile since 2010, even in temperate regions of the country (although
framework was moderately reformed in 2005 (Budds, 2013), and fur- see Guiloff (2013)). Water scarcity is associated with the effects of re-
ther reforms were proposed in 2015.1 Several authors have analysed the gional (El Niño Southern Oscillation), and potentially global, climatic
empirical outcomes of the Water Code across regions, sectors and users variations, but is also connected with high demand among natural re-
in Chile (e.g. Bauer, 1997, 1998b; Budds, 2004, 2008, 2009b, 2010; source based export industries (mining, agriculture, forestry) (DGOP,
Prieto, 2015, 2016; Romano and Leporati, 2002). Their work has shed 2017). Therefore, it is both necessary and timely to extend existing
light on the practical functioning of the framework, evidencing its ef- assessments of how the provisions of the Water Code relate to pre-
fects on water allocation, livelihoods, cultural identity, ecosystems, and vailing water scarcity, and to examine how they respond to situations of
water governance, and challenging previous claims of positive out- unexpected acute scarcity, as well as to contemplate the broader dy-
comes (Bauer, 2015).2 namics of these responses.
This prior work has examined the functioning of the market-led Water security is an increasingly influential concept in policy and
water policy framework in the context of prevailing water scarcity in scholarship, to promote the long-term provision of water for human,
Chile. Findings have suggested that provision for trading water rights economic and environmental needs, and the policy and governance
does not manage demand, even in arid and semi-arid regions, because measures needed to achieve this (e.g. Grey and Sadoff, 2007). As Jepson

E-mail address: [email protected].

1
These were passed by the Chamber of Deputies in November 2016. At the time of writing (June 2018), they were under debate in the Senate.
2
Such claims continue to be repeated, yet without supporting evidence (e.g. Donoso et al., 2012).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2018.09.027
Received 3 January 2018; Received in revised form 19 September 2018; Accepted 20 September 2018
0016-7185/ © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Please cite this article as: Budds, J., Geoforum, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2018.09.027

J. Budds Geoforum xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx

et al. (2017) note, most literature conceptualises water security in terms these conditions were related to the privatised and marketised water
of securing the supply of water, thereby neglecting the water-society re- policy framework, as well as the extent to which its key features have
lations that may underpin water insecurity and that thus may merit been mobilised, and effective, in addressing them. Section 6 concludes
transformation to promote water security (see also Budds and Loftus, with my contention that the Water Code not only exacerbated water
2014; Loftus, 2015). These authors, therefore, argue that water security scarcity, but also constrained responses to it, by fostering individualistic
should not be regarded as a state characterised by the presence of behaviour and encouraging supply-led solutions. I argue that these
adequate water, but rather as “a relationship that describes how in- dynamics present an internal contradiction to the framework by
dividuals, households, and communities navigate and transform hydro- threatening to undermine it, and I suggest that supply-led responses
social relations to access the water that they need and in ways that serve not only to alleviate shortages, but also to neutralise this internal
support the sustained development of human capabilities and wellbeing in contradiction in the face of growing challenges to the Water Code.
their full breadth and scope” (Jepson et al., 2017: 50, emphasis added).
In Chile, the term ‘water security’ (seguridad hídrica) is increasingly 2. Water markets and water security: Securing what?
deployed to denote the imperative to protect the availability of water
resources for human and economic needs, especially vis-à-vis climate In theory, Chile’s system of private tradable water rights is related to
change.3 While some reports place emphasis on the management of water ‘security’ in two key ways: first, by instituting private property
water itself, through water storage infrastructure, integrated water and rights to water to guarantee permanent access and foster user investment
catchment management, and water supply and demand (Donoso et al., in infrastructure, and, second, by employing market principles to enable
2012; MOP, 2017a), others stress the stress the human and develop- the reallocation of scarce water for optimal distribution (Bauer, 1998a;
ment dimensions of water security, including prioritisation of water for Muchnik et al., 1997). These propositions reflect the logic of free market
basic needs and domestic livelihoods, conservation of water resources economics that private ownership and market transactions will increase
and aquatic ecosystems, sustainable and coordinated water use among the effectiveness and efficiency of water management, thereby con-
economic sectors, and protection against water-related hazards (DGOP, tributing to water security, broadly defined (Loftus and Budds, 2016).
2017; Peña, 2016). While not necessarily denoted by the term ‘water Indeed, Grey and Sadoff (2007) incorporate this rationale into their ap-
security’ as such, security is also associated with the permanent and proach to water security, framed as the need to protect the availability of
exclusive tenure afforded by private water rights.4 The security of pri- water for human and economic needs in the context of human and
vate water rights is contested by previous work, on the basis that water natural processes of change. Similarly, other authors advocate using
rights are regulated by private law, which not all users are able to ac- economic principles and involving the private sector in water security
cess in case of infractions (Budds, 2004), private water rights are easier initiatives (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2013; World Economic Forum, 2011).
to alienate than state-granted concessions, as other users can simply use However, critical work on water privatisation and marketisation has
purchasing power to acquire them (Budds, 2009b), and, increasingly, contested these propositions. Several authors have critiqued the effec-
the water represented by a right may be temporarily or permanently tiveness of the private sector, arguing that private property rights and
exhausted in practice (Budds, 2009a). commercial principles do not necessarily lead to investment or effi-
My analysis will add to existing scholarship in two principal ways. ciency (Bakker, 2002, 2003, 2010; Budds and McGranahan, 2003;
First, it will assess the functioning of the water market framework Spronk, 2007), and that they serve the interests of capital accumulation
under conditions of unusual and/or unexpected acute scarcity, thereby over human needs (Schulpen and Gibbon, 2002; Swyngedouw, 2005).
adding to existing analyses that have examined prevailing semi-arid Others have questioned the efficacy of private and market led initiatives
and arid environments in Chile. Second, it will contribute to critical in addressing water scarcity - relating to either water services or water
geographical literature that interrogates the concept of water security resources, - identifying scarcity as socially constructed and/or socially
and its mobilisation in practice. By looking beyond how water is sup- produced, rather than pre-existing and/or natural (Bakker, 2000; Kaika,
plied through responses to drought, and instead to how hydrosocial 2003; Swyngedouw, 1995). As Bakker (2002) insightfully notes, scar-
relations configure, and are configured by, such responses, the study city is required in order for markets to work, and if it does not exist, it
aims to shed light on the rationale, motives and prospects of common must be manufactured to produce this outcome (e.g. via exclusivity
water security interventions. The analysis draws on qualitative field- rights). What these critiques highlight above all is the need to under-
work conducted in Santiago, Quillota, and La Ligua, Chile, in May and stand water supply as partly produced through social processes as op-
June 2015, comprising semi-structured interviews with key informants posed to the outcome of material conditions alone.
from the public sector (including political representatives and regional Subsequent work thus moved beyond examining the effects of pri-
and local officials from relevant agencies) and rural communities (pri- vatisation and marketisation, and repositioned these as part of a broader
marily farmers, community leaders, and rural water supply managers), process of the ‘neoliberalisation’ of water, whereby resource reregulation
a review of relevant documentation on drought measures, and field (e.g. commodification, enclosure, valuation) reconfigured water-society
observations throughout the La Ligua river basin during this period. relations in distinct ways (Bakker, 2003, 2010; Loftus and Budds, 2016).
Following this introduction, in Section 2 I set out a conceptual Such analyses also served to highlight that water’s material properties
framework of water security grounded in hydrosocial relations to ap- and cultural meanings rendered it physically and symbolically resistant
proach the relationship between private tradable water rights and to market-led approaches (Bakker, 2003; Perreault, 2006), and that
water scarcity. Section 3 then briefly describes the key features of water technologies were not inert but played an agential role in water-
Chile’s Water Code, highlighting recent criticisms that are increasingly society relations (Birkenholtz, 2013; Loftus, 2006).
challenging the framework. In Section 4, I turn to the case of La Ligua, Swyngedouw’s (1999) reconceptualisation of water as the mani-
to describe the causes and effects of increased water scarcity since festation of a process, rather than a pre-existing material substance,
2009, and examine responses by government agencies and water users extended analyses beyond patterns of allocation and access to inspire a
to the 2014–15 drought. Section 5 analyses how far and in what ways more explicit focus on how social relations can be recast through water.
This showed how control over water has served wider political agendas.
For instance, Swyngedouw (1999) argued that the connection of Spain’s
3
Climate change is prominent in both policy arenas and the public imagi- river basins was designed to foster a new national unity that facilitated
nation in Chile, related to glacier melt, reduced precipitation, and increased the country’s subjugation to authoritarian rule in the 1930s, while
droughts. Vandewalle and Jepson (2015) demonstrated that state interventions to
4
This enables water rights to be used as collateral to guarantee credit, and in promote household drinking water treatment in low-income commu-
theory incentivises user investment in water infrastructure. nities in Texas reinforced private and individual responsibility over

2
J. Budds Geoforum xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx

water as a means of diminishing state responsibility for service provi- 3. The evolution and contestation of Chile’s Water Code
sion. Other authors examined how reregulation does not merely re-
shape the social relations of control over, and access to, water, but The 1981 Water Code formed part of the free-market economic re-
deeper-rooted social subjectivities and identities. For example, Linton forms that characterised all areas of public policy during Chile’s mili-
(2010) described how the provision of drinking water through public tary dictatorship (1973–90), in the absence of political opposition
water fountains and bottled water vending in Canadian university (Bauer, 1998a). The Water Code enabled existing water rights to be
campuses fostered the identities of citizen versus consumer, respec- converted into private property, which were decoupled from land to
tively, while O’Reilly (2006) demonstrated how the installation of facilitate a market in water trading. Water rights could be transferred -
household water connections in poor rural households in India trans- inherited, gifted, leased, traded5 - when properly filed at property re-
formed women’s identity from ‘traditional’ to ‘modern’. gistries, and were protected under the military government’s 1980
In line with this thinking, Loftus (2015) and Jepson et al. (2017) Constitution.6 Private water rights could only be expropriated by the
move away from material water as the focus of water security, and state at full market value (Budds, 2013), which has precluded this
instead towards water-society relations. Jepson et al. (2017) re- measure on a large scale.7
conceptualise water security from a state that describes the supply of Water rights applied to all uses, such as agriculture, industry and
water under specific conditions (quality, quantity, continuity, afford- mining. Water rights were needed for urban drinking water networks,
ability) to a relationship between people and water, the nature of which but not for rural drinking water supply, as this was considered an au-
configures access and autonomy. This approach opens up questions that tomatically legitimate use. Separate water rights were needed for sur-
go beyond conventional analyses of how ‘water’ – typically regarded as face water and groundwater resources, despite these often being in-
material, universal and inert - can be secured; and instead contemplate terconnected (Budds, 2004, 2009a). Water rights were obtained in three
what water is being secured – to acknowledge different types, states or ways: (i) existing water rights could be converted into private water
identities of water, - and, moreover, what is being secured through rights (through regularisation); (ii) water rights to available sources
water security – water itself, or other objectives? (see Budds et al., were obligatorily allocated by the state to applicants (free of charge);
2014; Linton and Budds, 2014). and (iii) water rights could be purchased from other owners. Once
Approaching water security in a more critical way can thus open up available water rights for a particular source were fully allocated, re-
new directions and insights in the relationship between water markets, distribution was expected to happen through the market according to
water scarcity, and water security in Chile. Previous scholarship has supply and demand, and no prioritisation between uses was thus set. As
considered the creation and operation of water markets, covering both such, the role of the National Water Directorate (Dirección General de
private ownership and tradability, across regions and sectors, including Aguas, DGA) was to administer the system, and regulation was dele-
among peasant and indigenous communities (Bauer, 1997, 1998b; gated to water user organisations, mainly irrigation canal user asso-
Budds, 2004, 2009b, 2010; Hadjigeorgalis, 2008; Prieto, 2015, 2016; ciations, and basin-wide Vigilance Committees (Junta de Vigilancia).8 As
Romano and Leporati, 2002). Within this body of work, the relationship private property, water rights were governed by civil (private) law, and
between the Water Code and water scarcity has been explicitly ad- conflicts were to be resolved between users or the civil courts rather
dressed by Budds (2008, 2009a) in relation to the social dynamics of than by the DGA.
uneven water allocation in central Chile, by Guiloff (2013) in regard to In sum, therefore, the Chilean framework is based on three key
the human rights dimensions of rural drinking water shortages in the private and market principles. First, the use of the market to manage
same region, and by Prieto (2015, 2016) in the context of indigenous demand, whereby users are incentivised to buy or sell water rights
communities in northern Chile. The first objective of this paper is to go according to the value of the intended use. Second, the designation of
beyond these existing assessments of how the Water Code relates to water rights as private property protected by the state, which provides
scarcity – in theory by addressing it, but in practice by producing it - to users with a security of tenure that was expected to encourage user
how far and in what ways the policy framework is mobilised, and is investment in water infrastructure. Third, the delegation of regulation
effective, in addressing acute water scarcity. to water user organisations, deemed to avoid potentially politicised and
The second objective is to extend previous analyses of how water- bureaucratic government decision-making.
society relations have become configured in Chile under the Water These provisions transformed water-society relations in Chile in
Code, to consider how they affect interventions towards water security both material and symbolic ways. First, despite water being defined as a
in the face of growing scarcity, and their wider dynamics, agendas, and “national good for public use” (bien nacional de uso público) in the Water
implications. Budds (2013) related the actors and discourses involved Code and the Constitution,9 the conversion of water rights to private
in the development of the Water Code with the dual motives of capital property enclosed and privatised water to rights-holders, and curtailed
accumulation and elite political power from the 1970s, arguing that the state’s role in governing Chile’s water (and its watersheds, aquatic
these relations were evident in the debate over the 2005 modification of environments, and water-related ecosystem services). Second, the
the legislation, in which three related groups (conservative politicians, transferability of private water rights changed water’s identity from a
neoliberal analysts, industrial sectors) that substantially benefited from public resource to a private commodity, which incentivised strategies of
the framework lobbied for minimal reforms. While this analysis showed accumulation (Budds, 2004). Third, the Water Code defined individual
how the Water Code reshaped water-society relations, the relational
approach to water security outlined above offers the opportunity to
consider two further aspects. First, how water is produced under the 5
Trading refers to the sale of the permanent water right, while leasing refers
Water Code: how it is supplied, regulated, defined, and perceived, and to the sale of volumes of water (corresponding to all or part of the entitlement)
how those characteristics shape users’ responses to water scarcity. deriving from the permanent right.
6
Second, what is being secured through water security interventions in See Bauer (1998a) for a full description of the Water Code and its history,
response to water scarcity, and for whom. and Budds (2013) for an analysis of its politics.
7
The state has repurchased water rights in very few cases, some of which
Linking the production of water and the recasting of hydrosocial
were undertaken to redress historic dispossession of water among indigenous
relations with responses to scarcity will help to elucidate the specific
groups in Northern Chile (Budds, 2009b).
mechanisms through which water insecurity is created, as well as shed 8
As groundwater was not widely used in 1981, groundwater user committees
light on the nature, agendas and prospects of particular water security were introduced under the 2005 reform of the Water Code.
initiatives. I will proceed to explore these questions through the experi- 9
The meaning of this crucial phrase is ambiguous, and is at the heart of
ences of, and responses to, the 2014–15 drought in the La Ligua river ongoing moral and legal debate in Chile as to whether water is, and/or should
basin, following a brief account of the development of the Water Code. be, “public” or “private”.

3
J. Budds Geoforum xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx

ownership of water rights (person, organisation, or company), thereby

precluding collective tenure, which was reinstated for groups self-
identifying as indigenous under the 1993 Indigenous Law. Fourth, it
converted water rights from the relative measure of a share of a water
flow (in an irrigation canal or from a communal well), measured as a
fraction of the flow, to the absolute volume of water from a source, a
fixed amount measured metrically in litres per second. This measure
was intended to facilitate water rights trading by making clear exactly
how much water a right represented (Bauer, 1998a).10 Fifth, moving to
private regulation by water users could potentially enable those parties
to dominate water management beyond the wider public interest, and
privilege water users with better access to the means (financial re-
sources, knowledge, social status) to enforce regulation (Budds, 2004).
The outcomes of the Water Code were much debated during the
controversial process of amending it over 13 years between 1992 and
2005 (Budds, 2013). The key concern was the potential to encourage
the accumulation of water rights for speculative purposes. Although
data were not collected, most observers agreed that markets were in-
Fig. 1. Poster advertising a preparatory event for the National Water March,
active throughout Chile (Bauer, 1997; Budds, 2004; Prieto, 2015), even Santiago, 2013, organised by a coalition of civil society organisations. The
if interpretations differed over whether it mattered (Muchnik et al., captions read “Preparatory day for the carnival march for the defence and re-
1997). Unequal access to groundwater rights among small farmers was cuperation of water” (top) and “let’s take back our water!” (bottom).
also noted, as the low level of historic groundwater use meant that Source: Latin American Observatory of Environmental Conflicts [Observatorio
many wells needed new water rights (Budds, 2004, 2008). Environ- Latinoamericano de Conflictos Ambientales], Chile, http://olca.cl/articulo/
mental concerns were raised, including the lack of provision of nota.php?id=102950, accessed 1 September 2017
minimum flows for rivers (unrecognised in 1981), or the ability to as-
sess aquifer capacity before allocating groundwater rights. Never- demonstrations in 2011, old and new, and national and local, civil
theless, Budds (2013) argues that this debate was less about over- society organisations started campaigning for ‘private’ water to be
coming the limitations of the Water Code, and more about maintaining made ‘public’, as illustrated by Fig. 1.
the privatised and marketised system that was an emblematic legacy of Soon after taking office, the second government under Michelle
the military regime. The process resulted in modest changes to the Bachelet (2014–18) responded by setting up a National Water
Water Code in 2005, the most significant being a system of fees for non- Resources Task Force in March 2014. It was headed by a presidential
use of water rights (increasing with length of time and northward lo- delegate, who was tasked with assessing the functioning of the market-
cation) to deter speculation. led water policy framework throughout Chile, assisted by regional de-
Following these hard-fought yet moderate amendments, it was dif- legates, and compiling a report that would form the basis of a new
ficult to envisage future major reforms to the Water Code (Larraín and legislative reform bill, which was submitted to Congress in 2015.
Segura, 2017). However, attention became refocused on the Water What emerged from 2012, therefore, is a situation in which the
Code and its effects from 2008, when water crises in several regions of effectiveness and the legitimacy of the Water Code were being in-
Chile highlighted the over-abstraction of water, as well as illegal ex- creasingly and publicly questioned. What is of interest for this paper is
traction of groundwater (i.e. without the corresponding water rights), how this related to Chile’s most pressing water issue: drought. How far
which were attributed to the lack of external regulation of water users. and in what ways were the principles of the Water Code mobilised to
Two cases became particularly emblematic. The La Ligua river basin in address regional water crises? How were responses to drought config-
the centre north became the focus of water theft. Some national poli- ured, and what were their motivations and implications? To explore
ticians (government ministers, congressional deputies) with farms in- these questions, I now turn to the nature of, and responses to, acute
vesting in export agriculture were accused of drawing groundwater water scarcity in the La Ligua river basin during the 2014–15 drought.
either beyond the entitlement of their water rights, or without water
rights, with some cases prosecuted by the DGA. Widespread illegal
4. Securing water for accumulation: Responses to drought in the
extraction affected the livelihoods of small farmers, who relied on ir-
La Ligua river basin
rigation canals and small wells that had become diminished or dry
(Budds, 2004). The Copiapó basin in northern Chile became the ex-
La Ligua is a small river basin with a semi-arid climate, located in
ample of over-allocation of water rights. This grape-producing region
Petorca Province11 in Chile’s Valparaíso Region (Fifth Administrative
had become increasingly dominated by mining, whose representatives
Region). La Ligua River rises in the Andean foothills (Fig. 2), meaning
had lobbied the DGA to allocate additional water rights to meet its
that it benefits from snowmelt in spring but not in summer, when de-
needs.
mand for irrigation is highest. The main economic activity is agri-
These cases provoked renewed and reinvigorated public critiques of
culture, with farms ranging from large commercial properties (ap-
the Water Code. They attracted attention from civil society organisa-
proximately 100–500 ha) to smallholdings owned by beneficiaries of
tions, which had previously campaigned about water-related injustices
agrarian reform or subsequent buyers (approximately 2–12 ha)
(especially around hydroelectric dams), but not the policy framework
(ODEPA-CIREN, 2014, 2017).
itself. Possibly inspired by the major and enduring university student
Until the 1990s, agriculture comprised a mix of commercial fruit
production from larger farms, and annual crops from smaller farms,
mainly irrigated by canals drawing surface water from La Ligua River.
10
This change was complicated on two counts: converting existing shares of Thereafter, fruit production for export – mainly avocados – increased
flows to litres per second for the purposes of regularisation, and for practical
water sharing when flows are reduced, as there is no obligation for earlier users
11
to reduce their extraction in order to ensure that subsequent entitlements are Petorca Province comprises Petorca, Cabildo, La Ligua, Papudo, and
fulfilled; unless a drought is officially declared, which enables the DGA to order Zapallar Municipalities. La Ligua river basin covers Cabildo, the southern half
all users to reduce their extractions proportionally. of La Ligua, and Papudo.

4
J. Budds Geoforum xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx

Fig. 2. Location of the La Ligua river basin, Chile.

Source: Budds, 2004, adapted from IGM, 1984

due to a combination of several factors: an optimal climate, a growing Table 1

export market, accessibility of drip irrigation systems, access to untilled Estimate of area of land under avocado produc-
land on the valley sides, and, importantly, the availability of ground- tion in the La Ligua river basin, 2002–2017
water rights from the hitherto underexploited aquifer (Budds, 2004). (ODEPA-CIREN, 2002, 2008, 2014, 2017).a
Table 1shows estimated avocado production in the La Ligua river basin
Year Area (hectares)
between 2002 and 2017, indicating a steep increase between 2002 and
2008 as plantations expanded, followed by a similarly sharp decline 2002 3396
from 2014, as a result of drought. 2008 5191
2014 3712
With the increase in fruit plantations, applications for available
2017 3453
groundwater rights rose steeply. By 1996, the amount requested was so
large that the DGA suspended the approval of applications while it a
This is a rough estimate because data are
commissioned a hydrogeological study to determine allocation.12 produced by political-administrative unit rather
Meanwhile, many farmers continued to drill wells, and extract than watershed. The figures for La Ligua river
groundwater illegally, taking advantage of the lack of external basin comprise all production in Cabildo and
Papudo Municipalities, and half of that for La
Ligua Municipality. This is likely to slightly un-
derestimate the total, given the greater pro-
12
Demand for groundwater rose from an estimated 5267 litres per second (l/ ductivity of land in La Ligua (southern half of La
s) in 1995, to 10,134 l/s in 2004, with a further estimated illegal groundwater Ligua Municipality) than Petorca river basin
extraction of 13,859 l/s by the same year (Budds, 2009a). (northern half).

5
J. Budds Geoforum xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx

monitoring and enforcement (Budds, 2009a).13 In 2004, the DGA fi-

nalised groundwater allocation, and closed the aquifer to further ap-
plications.14 As around 90 per cent of avocado plantations were irri-
gated with efficient micro spray or drip irrigation systems (ODEPA-
CIREN, 2017), this enabled the expansion of land for fruit production.
Until 2009, the basin had been able to sustain the expanded agri-
cultural production in years with normal precipitation, with acute
scarcity emerging only in dry summers (related to El Niño).15 This was
likely due to the water reserves in the aquifer, which supported much of
the new agricultural land. However, from the onset of a prolonged
drought in 2010 onwards, most summers became characterised by se-
vere water scarcity, caused by a combination of successive dry winters,
increased groundwater extraction, and exacerbated by higher water
demand from matured fruit plantations.16
These trends are documented by Chilean government agencies (e.g.
DGA, National Meteorological Directorate). By 2015, water scarcity
was evident throughout Chile, as manifested in river flows and reservoir
levels of between 50 and 80 per cent below normal (DGA, 2015). In Fig. 3. Landscape in the upper La Ligua valley with new avocado plantations in
March 2016, the Valparaíso Region had the greatest hydrological deficit autumn 2003.
in the country, with surface water (rivers and reservoirs) between 30 Source: author
and 100 per cent below normal levels (DGA, 2016). By 2015, a state of
agricultural emergency was in place in 194 municipalities throughout
Chile - including in Petorca Province from 2008 until at least 2017 - and
a National Drought Management Plan (2015) was announced (de Chile,
2015). While these reports focus on meteorological conditions and field
observations, the contribution of high water demand for Chile’s natural
resource based economic activities is also acknowledged (Comisión de
Recursos Hídricos y Desertifiación, 2016).
By 2010, the effects of severe water scarcity were visible on the
valley’s landscape (see Figs. 3 and 4). In 2009, La Ligua River ceased
flowing, and since only returned during flash floods. By 2013, flows in
irrigation canals had successively reduced, and large areas of fruit trees
had been cropped due to the lack of water (Fig. 5).17 Water table levels
had fallen significantly, from levels of approximately 5–20 m in the
1990s and 2000s (Budds, 2004), to 80–120 m from around 2013,18
leaving many shallower wells dry, including most of those belonging to
small farmers.
These conditions became acute in the drought of the 2014–15
summer. Irrigation canals were dry throughout most of the middle and
lower sections of the basin, and flowed at about 25 per cent of capacity Fig. 4. Landscape from Fig. 3 photographed from a slightly different angle in
in the upper section.19 Only the deepest wells of approximately 80 m winter 2015.
plus yielded water.20 Many fruit plantations had been cropped, re- Source: author
flected in the area dedicated to avocado production (Table 1), as well as
testimonies of local government officials.21 Some farms used their
available water to concentrate irrigation to a smaller area, while others
became unproductive, leading to temporary abandonment and switch to paid labour, or bankruptcy and repossession, or conversion to other
uses, including annual crops or low density livestock.22 This is sub-
stantiated by data on the size of fruit plantations in Petorca Province,
13
which show that both the number of farms and the total area decreased
The DGA had an administrative, but not regulatory, role. Following the
between 2014 and 2017, with the largest decline - approximately 15
legislative reforms in 2005, the DGA was able to monitor illegal groundwater
extraction when denounced by affected users, although this was hampered by a
per cent - in the smallest landholdings of under five hectares, suggesting
lack of resources and refusals of access by landowners. that land either ceased fruit production, or that smaller plantations
14
25 per cent of the total allocated groundwater flow was allocated as became consolidated into larger properties (ODEPA-CIREN, 2014,
provisional rights, which were annulled in March 2014 due to impacts on the 2017). The entire landscape became dry, dusty, barren, and lifeless – in
aquifer. short, desertified.
15
All seasons refer to those of the southern hemisphere. Immediate responses to the drought comprised largely individual
16
Personal communication, local government official 1, La Ligua, June 2015. solutions. These included deepening existing wells, funds permitting,23
17
Cropping avocado trees is a strategy of last resort to keep them alive with which is allowed under the Water Code as it defines water yield but not
the least water possible. Trunks are typically painted white to deflect the sun depth of extraction.24 Another common response comprised drilling a
and prevent scorching (see Fig. 5). If irrigation is resumed, the tree will take 2–3
years to grow back.
18
Multiple accounts in the field, La Ligua, May-June 2015.
19 22
Personal communications, small farmers’ leaders 1, 2 and 3, upper La Personal communications, small farmers’ leaders 4 and 5, central and
Ligua valley, June 2015. lower La Ligua valley, June 2015.
20 23
Personal communications, commercial farmers 1 and 2, La Ligua, June Approximately USD 300 per metre depth, La Ligua, 2015.
24
2015. Personal communication, commercial farmer 3, central La Ligua valley,
21
Personal communication, local government official 1, La Ligua, June 2015. June 2015.

6
J. Budds Geoforum xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx

Fig. 5. A part abandoned and part cropped fruit plantation in La Ligua, June Fig. 6. A new surface storage pond in the upper section of La Ligua, June 2015.
2015. The land had been repossessed by the lending bank, which paid a care- Source: author
taker to maintain an area of lemon trees using water volumes purchased from
another landowner.
Source: author

new well in a different place on the same landholding to find water, and
applying to transfer the groundwater rights from the dry well;25 a legal
fix that helps to ensure that groundwater rights can be fulfilled in the
context of depletion.26 Many farmers also constructed surface storage
ponds to be filled by groundwater, again funds permitting (Fig. 6).
Landowners who had abandoned their plantations, but whose wells still
yielded water, sold volumes of water to other farmers (as in Fig. 5). It is
important to note that this trading represents a temporary transaction
of water that is derived from a permanent groundwater right, and that
the groundwater right itself is not sold, meaning that this does not
entail a permanent reallocation of water from one user to another.
Interviews with stakeholders in La Ligua suggested that sales of
permanent water rights had not increased in response to drought,
mainly because water was not present to fulfil many surface water or
groundwater rights. Any sales were thought most likely to have oc-
curred together with sales of land upon the disposal of farms, as in the Fig. 7. Unmaintained irrigation canal, lower La Ligua valley, June 2015.
past (see Budds, 2004).27 Source: author
The irrigation canals that had previously been the mainstay of
agriculture on the traditional valley floor ran either low or dry, and rural population of the valley from 2011 to 2016.30 The operators were
most became effectively obsolete. While canal associations claimed that entrepreneurs who owned land and water rights in La Ligua basin, and
they continued to hold meetings and collect dues,28 some irrigation drew water from deep wells in the valley for the tankers (Fig. 8).31 In
canals, especially in the badly affected lower section of the basin, were other words, the state was obliged to buy water that it used to control
no longer being maintained (Fig. 7). from private owners in order to fulfil its citizens’ basic needs.
Furthermore, the drought did not only affect agriculture, but also In response to increasing water scarcity in La Ligua, various gov-
rural drinking water supply systems organised by village-based auton- ernment agencies announced emergency measures from 2010, mainly
omous committees or cooperatives. Most systems relied on wells, which funded by the Central Government, and all of which were coordinated
are exempt from formal water rights as they are for rural drinking by the Petorca Provincial Government.
water, and most of which ran dry. This water had to be replaced by In November 2010, the Ministry of Public Works declared a six-
emergency water tankers, which are private licensed operators con- month “Drought Zone” (Zona de Escasez Hídrica) for Petorca Province,
tracted by the La Ligua municipal government (under its obligation to which was subsequently extended nine times until September 2016
provide potable water),29 and which supplied around one third of the (with gaps from June-October 2013 and October 2015 - March 2016).32
This measure allowed the DGA to reduce or suspend water rights, al-
though designated no additional financial resources to undertake these
25 activities.
Groundwater rights are registered with the geo-coordinates of the point
(well) from which they are drawn, and their relocation requires authorisation.
26
Personal communication, regional government official, Quillota, June
30
2015. Personal communication, local government official 3, La Ligua, June 2015.
27 31
Formal records are challenging to review, because sales of water rights are Personal communication, local government official 4, La Ligua, June 2015.
32
recorded in hand-written registers at Property Rights Registries, which take Ministry of Public Works Decree 403, 24 November 2010; Decree 223, 6
time to update. June 2011; Decree 416, 7 December 2011; Decree 225, 12 June 2012; Decree
28
Personal communications, small farmers’ leaders 1, 2 and 3, upper La 362, 13 December 2012; Decree 289, 11 October 2013; Decree 235, 10 April
Ligua valley, June 2015. 2014; Decree 422, 13 October 2014; Decree 129, 14 April 2015; Decree 154, 24
29
Personal communication, local government official 2, La Ligua, June 2015. March 2016.

7
J. Budds Geoforum xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx

“Agricultural Emergency” (Emergencia Agrícola) for Petorca Province,

lasting for two years and targeted at small farmers and the rural po-
pulation. It included measures to support agriculture, such as im-
proving irrigation canals, and promoting drip irrigation. The National
Institute for Agricultural Development (Instituto Nacional de Desarrollo
Agropecuario, INDAP) - the government agency that supports those
classified as peasant farmers - however, promoted collective solutions
among this farming sector, including shared surface water storage
ponds and communal irrigation wells, which it considered more effi-
cient and cost-effective than individual solutions. This provision also
waived agricultural taxes, and for peasant farmers also cancelled credit
repayments and disbursed grants of USD 430-715. Further Agricultural
Emergencies were declared in February 2011, April 2014, and March
2015.
In parallel, the team of the regional presidential delegate for water
in the Valparaíso Region was working to raise awareness of water issues
and stimulate organisation among water users, through activities in-
cluding three-monthly ‘round table’ meetings. INDAP also sought to
Fig. 8. Private tanker drawing water in La Ligua valley, June 2015.
Source: author foster organisation among its users, in order to implement the collective
solutions that it was pursuing.
Responses in La Ligua can thus be categorised as follows: individual
The DGA had already started to control illegal groundwater ex- measures, short-term drought relief, longer-term infrastructure solu-
traction, in response to the aforementioned water theft in 2011. It tions, and state-led user organisation. These responses converge on the
mandated the formation of a Vigilance Committee in La Ligua, as one goal of increasing water supply to sustain the level of agriculture that
never existed, although the water users had not enacted it. It also has developed since the 1990s, either directly, through technology and
mandated seven Groundwater Committees, to be responsible for in- infrastructure to rationalise existing and develop additional sources, or
stalling meters on legal wells, although these had also not become ac- indirectly, by bolstering mechanisms to support these interventions,
tive. It started to legalise historic groundwater rights for the rural such as tax waivers and user organisation. What is also remarkable,
drinking water systems; while not technically needed to extract water, however, is that these measures are neither supported by a compre-
they enable legal action against other users who are infringing their hensive hydrological study that would inform responses, nor a process
rights. of land use planning that would assess the limits of agricultural ex-
In February 2012, the Ministry of the Interior declared a 12-month pansion. While state agencies and water users broadly agreed that in-
“Disaster Zone” (Zona de Catástrofe) due to drought for Petorca, La creasing the supply of water in both the short and long terms was an
Ligua and Cabildo Municipalities,33 which was extended for two appropriate response to drought, less attention and scrutiny were di-
years.34 This measure carried the greatest institutional weight. It rected towards the potential for these new sources of water to fuel fresh
prioritised drinking water, and funded the water tankers. It also fa- demand and thus further expansion, rather than secure existing needs.
cilitated the construction of emergency irrigation infrastructure, which In the next section, I analyse the dynamics, motives and implica-
including deepening wells, lining irrigation canals with concrete, and tions of these responses, in order to assess what exactly they served to
building water storage ponds. secure.
A subsequent six-month measure passed in October 201435 enabled
the Directorate of Hydraulic Works to undertake measures comprising
the improvement of rural drinking water sources, new wells for irri- 5. Managing Drought: The internal contradictions of the Water
gation and drinking water, improvements to irrigation canals and sto- Code
rage ponds, and river restoration. It also provided resources for feasi-
bility studies for artificial aquifer recharge and a desalination plant for By comprising predominantly supply-led and state-led actions, re-
rural drinking water (see below). In August 2014, agricultural taxes for sponses to drought in La Ligua addressed the symptoms of water scar-
small and medium-sized farmers were also waived.36 city as opposed to its causes. The increase in water provision served to
Alongside these emergency relief measures, two longer-term mea- sustain a paradigm of agricultural development that was inequitable
sures were also defined. First, a major irrigation reservoir for La Ligua, and unsustainable, and avoided challenging the power relations that
which had been pending for several decades, and had been widely underpinned it. As one local government official observed,38 the crisis
partly blamed for water shortages in La Ligua (see Budds, 2004, 2008). presented a choice between further perpetuating the current mode of
Second, a coastal desalination plant, which would supply rural drinking agricultural development and supply-led water solutions that privileges
water systems, thereby replacing the dry wells and tankers, which were commercial farmers, or taking the opportunity to restructure agri-
costing La Ligua Municipality approximately USD 400,000 per culture to promote a viable mix of small and large farmers producing
month.37 The desalination plant would produce additional irrigation for domestic, niche and export markets within the limits of the valley’s
water, and would require a large financial contribution from bene- resources. The responses described above fit squarely with the former.
ficiary farmers (MOP, 2017b). Moreover, what is also evident from these responses is the absence
In January 2008, the Ministry of Agriculture declared the first of the core principles of the Water Code: the use of the market in water
rights to manage demand, the security of private property to promote
user investment in infrastructure, and the delegation of regulation to
33
Supreme Decree 234, 28 February 2012. users and their organisations. I will now take each of these aspects in
34
Supreme Decree 133, 1 February 2013; Supreme Decree 1422, 29 July turn to assess how they relate to responses to the drought.
2014. The Disaster Zone was later extended to Papudo Municipality (Supreme Despite low supply and high demand under drought, an active water
Decree 1776, 24 November 2014). market in water rights had not emerged. Most users were using their
35
Supreme Decree 1776, 28 October 2014.
36
Supreme Decree 1523, 23 August 2014.
37 38
Personal communication, local government official 5, La Ligua, June 2015. Personal communication, local government official 1, La Ligua, June 2015.

8
J. Budds Geoforum xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx

available water, many irrigation canals and wells did not yield any/ collective solutions. In 2010, a new local civil society organisation,
enough water to fulfil rights, and illegal groundwater use persisted Modatima,45 formed around a campaign to publicise water theft and its
despite some DGA enforcement.39 Water trading appeared to be limited effects on local people.46 Yet, agricultural community leaders stated
to some sales of temporary water volumes, deriving from permanent that protesting about water scarcity and its causes would be futile.47
water rights, which does not entail reallocation in response to demand One explanation for this stance is that traditional farming organisations
on a permanent basis, as envisaged under the Water Code (see Romano have become less active with both the shift from surface water to
and Leporati, 2002).40 groundwater use and growing water scarcity, which have rendered
Furthermore, the possibility under the Water Code for the govern- canals less significant as irrigation sources. Since small farming has
ment to either repurchase or expropriate water rights was not con- declined, irrigation canal associations have become less important and
sidered. No interviewee mentioned the possibility of these measures, active, and neither the Vigilance Committee nor the Groundwater
and when prompted, described them as irrelevant or unworkable. Committees were as yet operational.
Besides the moral question of whether the state should pay private This suggests that what is at stake is not simply how water is
parties to reclaim resources that it had previously relinquished at no managed under the Water Code, but rather how the framework has
cost, expropriation is considered a very extreme and sensitive measure transformed the relationship between water and society in Chile. In
in Chile, as it was employed for agrarian reform and renationalisation Section 3, I identified five key changes: privatisation, commodification,
under the governments of Eduardo Frei (1964–70) and, especially, individualisation, metrication (shares to litres per second), and private
Salvador Allende (1970–73), and remains politically untenable for its regulation. My contention is that these changes have shaped stake-
perceived violation of private liberty.41 holders’ interactions with, and attitudes towards, water in ways that
Responses to drought privileged infrastructure solutions, which have constrained responses to drought. I thus suggest that these hy-
were to be largely state directed and financed, with minimal input from drosocial relations, fostered by the Water Code, now present a set of
water users. While new major infrastructure, including the reservoir internal contradictions that are serving to undermine it.
and desalination plant, could likely not be developed without govern- In particular, this transformed relationship between water and so-
ment support and finance, smaller works implemented under the ciety has been counterproductive to responses to drought, having fos-
emergency programmes, such as improvements to irrigation canals, tered supply-led solutions, the state’s reliance on private water sources
were simply imposed, thereby precluding any wider discussion of the for emergency drinking water provision, and individualised behaviour
problematic or exploration of solutions with farmers.42 In addition, among water users. I associate individualised behaviour with three
while the water users interviewed agreed that state-led infrastructure specific factors. First, the conversion of water rights into private
projects and improvements were necessary, there was little considera- property, which has both encouraged strategies of accumulation, and
tion of how these would be organised and financed, or how end users has disregarded the wider public interest. Second, the definition of
would be involved in decision-making. As a large hydraulic project that water rights as individual entitlements, and the metrication from water
would benefit farmers, the irrigation reservoir would require a 70 per shares to litres per second, which have fostered competitive rather than
cent financial contribution from users, although my interviews sug- cooperative behaviour in some instances as users strive to extract their
gested that farmers had little sense of how the water would be owned, entitlements amid reduced flows. Third, the dynamics of groundwater
priced, and distributed.43 While the proposed desalination plant would and wells, which by their nature foster individual rather than collective
require a 90 per cent contribution - presumably to subsidise its con- management and governance.
struction so as to render it economically viable for the supply of rural It is these transformed hydrosocial relations, I contend, that are
drinking water (MOP, 2017b) – interviews with water users indicated producing internal contradictions to challenge the water policy fra-
that they had given little consideration to the eventual level of water mework in new and more profound ways. Until now, the negative ef-
tariffs and their affordability for rural consumers, or the governance fects associated with the Water Code – hoarding and speculation, lack
implications of the replacement of customary wells with desalinated of access to groundwater, and illegal extractions - had not seriously
water.44 affected the principal groups that supported and benefited from it.
The prevalent response to water scarcity thus comprised state-led However, the production of scarcity under the framework, as well as its
and top-down infrastructure solutions, with a sense that these were inability to manage that scarcity - by not effectively managing demand,
simultaneously implemented by the state and expected by water users. curbing illegal use, or controlling sources of water supply – is now
There was little parallel social mobilisation or organisation of water undermining the interests of those groups, including commercial
users around either the causes of scarcity, or potential solutions. farmers who cannot draw their water and sustain their livelihoods.
Indeed, the principal efforts towards local social organisation that I These contradictions are not easily addressed by proposals for better
observed in 2015 were led by two state actors: the regional presidential enforcement or minor reforms to the law, as in the past, or by the sorts
delegate’s team in holding round table meetings, and INDAP’s pursuit of of technical fixes that had been deployed up until then, such as surface
storage ponds and transferring the geo-coordinates of dry wells.
The solutions mobilised, therefore, address the situation by in-
39
Due to its widespread nature, easiness to undertake, reliance on in- creasing water supply and introducing supporting measures such as tax
formants, and limited resources. Personal communication, local government waivers. These serve to sustain existing important forms of accumula-
official 6, La Ligua, June 2015. tion and to stabilise these into the future, thus avoiding structural re-
40
It is also possible that any land being repossessed or sold would include the forms to address the water insecurity to which they respond. This, in
water rights that were being used on it (see Budds, 2004). turn, requires protecting the Water Code, and the benefits of
41
In past and current proposals to amend the Water Code, the term ‘ex-
propriation’ has provoked strong political resistance (Budds, 2013).
42
Personal communications, small farmers’ leaders 4 and 5, central and
45
lower La Ligua valley, June 2015. Movement for the Defence of Access to Water, Land and Environmental
43
Personal communications, local government official 1, La Ligua, June Protection (Movimiento de Defensa por el Acceso al Agua, la Tierra y la Protección
2015; commercial farmer 4, central La Ligua valley, May 2015; and small del Medio Ambiente) emerged in Petorca Province in 2010, comprising profes-
farmers’ leaders 4 and 5, central and lower La Ligua valley, June 2015. sionals and local people who highlight and challenge illegal water extraction,
44
Rural water supply systems receive government funding for infrastructure, and advocate the abolition of private water rights.
46
and thereafter water charges fund operation and maintenance. MOP (2017b) Personal communication, civil society representative, La Ligua, June 2015.
47
states that the production cost of desalinated water will be USD 0.34 per cubic Personal communications, small farmers’ leaders 1, 2 and 3, upper La
metre, excluding land purchase for infrastructure and returns for the operator. Ligua valley, June 2015.

9
J. Budds Geoforum xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx

permanent, untaxed, unrestricted and deregulated flows of water that it Carmen Cancino and Flavio Montenegro, Viviana Fernández, Andrew
represents for the stakeholders driving, and benefiting from, capital Hodgkin and Sara Elgueta, Ariel Zuleta and Luis Nuñez at INDAP La
accumulation: large-scale commercial water users, conservative politi- Ligua, Robinson Sanhueza, Gregorio Correa, and Maria Fragkou and
cians (who support and/or have interests in these industries), and colleagues in the Geography Department at the University of Chile. I
neoliberal analysts (who are ideologically aligned and/or have links thank Trevor Birkenholtz, Anne-Marie Debbané, Vanessa Empinotti,
with industries and politicians) (Budds, 2013). Thus, supplying water Andrew Hodgkin, Wendy Jepson, and Alex Loftus for comments on a
does not just alleviate the effects of drought, but sustains export agri- first draft, and three Geoforum reviewers for feedback that helped to
culture and, moreover, obscures the limitations of the Water Code so as improve the paper. The usual disclaimers apply.
to reduce pressure for its reform.
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