NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., G.R. No.

155550

Petitioner,

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,

Chairperson,

- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CORONA,*

NACHURA, and

REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:

STEVEN P. CHIONG,

Respondent. January 31, 2008

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:
 Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking
the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 503082 which
affirmed in toto the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision3 holding petitioner Northwest Airlines,
Inc. (Northwest) liable for breach of contract of carriage.

On March 14, 1989, Philimare Shipping and Seagull Maritime Corporation (Philimare),
as the authorized Philippine agent of TransOcean Lines (TransOcean), hired respondent Steven
Chiong as Third Engineer of TransOceans vessel M/V Elbia at the San Diego, California Port.
Under the service crew agreement, Chiong was guaranteed compensation at a monthly salary of
US$440.00 and a monthly overtime pay of US$220.00, or a total of US$7,920.00 for one year.

Subsequently, on March 27, 1989, Philimare dispatched a Letter of Guarantee to CL

Hutchins & Co., Inc., TransOceans agent at the San Diego Port, confirming Chiongs arrival
thereat in time to board the M/V Elbia which was set to sail on April 1, 1989 (California, United
States time). For this purpose, Philimare purchased for Chiong a Northwest plane ticket for San
Diego, California with a departure date of April 1, 1989 from Manila. Ten (10) days before his
scheduled departure, Chiong fetched his entire family from Samar and brought them to Manila to
see him off at the airport.
 On April 1, 1989, Chiong arrived at the Manila International Airport4 (MIA), at about
6:30 a.m., three (3) hours before the scheduled time of departure. Marilyn Calvo, Philimares
Liaison Officer, met Chiong at the departure gate, and the two proceeded to the Philippine Coast
Guard (PCG) Counter to present Chiongs seaman service record book for clearance. Thereafter,
Chiongs passport was duly stamped, after complying with government requirements for
departing seafarers.

Calvo remained at the PCG Counter while Chiong proceeded to queue at the Northwest
check-in counter. When it was Chiongs turn, the Northwest personnel5 informed him that his
name did not appear in the computers list of confirmed departing passengers. Chiong was then
directed to speak to a man in barong standing outside Northwests counters from whom Chiong
could allegedly obtain a boarding pass. Posthaste, Chiong approached the man in barong who
demanded US$100.00 in exchange therefor. Without the said amount, and anxious to board the
plane, Chiong queued a number of times at Northwests Check-in Counter and presented his
ticket. However, the Northwest personnel at the counter told him to simply wait and that he was
being a pest.

Frustrated, Chiong went to Calvo at the PCG counter and inquired if she had money so he
could obtain a boarding pass from the man in barong. Calvo, who already saw that something
was amiss, insisted that Chiongs plane ticket was confirmed and as such, he could check-in
smoothly and board the plane without shelling out US$100.00 for a boarding pass. Ultimately,
Chiong was not allowed to board Northwest Flight No. 24 bound for San Diego that day and,
consequently, was unable to work at the M/V Elbia by April 1, 1989 (California, U.S.A. time).
 It appears that Chiongs name was crossed out and substituted with W. Costine in Northwests
Air Passenger Manifest.6

In a letter dated April 3, 1989, Chiongs counsel demanded as recompense: (1) the amount
equivalent to Chiongs salary under the latters Crew Agreement7 with TransOcean; (2)
P15,000.00 for Chiongs expenses in fetching and bringing his family from Samar to Manila; (3)
P500,000.00 as moral damages; and (4) P500,000.00 as legal fees.8

Northwest demurred. Thus, on May 24, 1989, Chiong filed a Complaint for breach of
contract of carriage before the RTC. Northwest filed a Motion to Dismiss9 the complaint citing
the trial courts lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, but the trial court denied
the same.10

In its Answer,11 Northwest contradicted the claim that it breached its contract of carriage
with Chiong, reiterating that Chiong had no cause of action against it because per its records,
Chiong was a no-show passenger for Northwest Flight No. 24 on April 1, 1989.

In the RTCs Pre-trial Order12 based on the parties respective Pre-trial Briefs,13 the triable
issues were limited to the following:
 (a) Whether [Chiong] was bumped-off by [Northwest] from Flight NW 24 or
whether [Chiong] no-showed for said flight.

(b) If defendant is found guilty of having breached its contract of carriage with
plaintiff, what damages are awardable to plaintiff and how much.

In the course of proceedings, Northwest, on September 14, 1990, filed a separate criminal
complaint for False Testimony14 against Chiong based on the latters testimony that he did not
leave the Philippines after April 1, 1989 contrary to the notations in his seaman service record
book that he had left the country on April 17, 1989, and returned on October 5 of the same year.
Chiong did not participate in the preliminary investigation; thus, on December 14, 1990, the City
Prosecutor of Manila filed an Information against Chiong with the RTC Manila, Branch 54,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 90-89722.

In the meantime, after a flurry of motions filed by Northwest in the civil case were denied
by the RTC, Northwest filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA imputing grave abuse of
discretion to the RTC.15 Correlatively, Northwest moved for a suspension of the proceedings
before the trial court. However, both the Petition for Certiorari and Motion for Suspension of the
proceedings were denied by the CA and RTC, respectively.16

After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision finding preponderance of evidence in favor of
Chiong, and holding Northwest liable for breach of contract of carriage. The RTC ruled that the
evidence adduced by the parties supported the conclusion that Chiong was deliberately prevented
from checking-in and his boarding pass unjustifiably withheld to accommodate an American
passenger by the name of W. Costine.
 The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, in consideration of all the foregoing,

judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the defendant liable to plaintiff in damages
by reason of the latters inability to take defendants NW Flight No. 24 on April 1,
1989, for the following amounts:

1) U.S.$8,447.0017 or its peso equivalent at the time of finality of

this judgment with legal interests until fully paid, representing
compensatory damages due to plaintiffs loss of income for one (1)
year as a direct result of defendants breach of contract of carriage;

2) P15,000.00, Philippine Currency, representing plaintiffs actual

incurred damages as a consequence of his failure to avail of
defendants Flight No. 24 on April 1, 1989;

3) P200,000.00, Philippine Currency, representing moral damages

suffered and sustained by the plaintiff as a result of defendants
breach of contract of carriage;

4) P200,000.00, Philippine Currency, representing exemplary or

punitive damages due to plaintiff from defendant, owing to the
latters breach of contract of carriage with malice and fraud; and

5) P200,000.00, Philippine Currency, for and as attorneys fees, plus

costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC. Identical to the RTCs findings,
those of the CA were as follows: on April 1, 1989, Chiong was at the MIA three hours before the
10:15 a.m. departure time for Northwest Flight No. 24. Contrary to Northwests claim that
Chiong was a no-show passenger, the CA likewise concluded, as the RTC did, that Chiong was
not allowed to check-in and was not issued a boarding pass at the Northwest check-in counter to
accommodate a certain W. Costine. As for Northwests defense that Chiong had left the country
after April 1, 1989 and worked for M/V Elbia, the CA ruled that Northwests failure to raise this
defense in its Answer or Motion to Dismiss is equivalent to a waiver thereof. The CA declared
that, in any event, Northwest failed to present any evidence to prove that Chiong had worked
under the original crew agreement.

Hence, this recourse.

Northwest ascribes grievous errors to the CA when the appellate court ruled that: (1)
Northwest breached the contract of carriage with Chiong who was present at the MIA on April 1,
1989 to board Northwests Flight No. 24; (2) As a result of the breach, Northwest is liable to
Chiong for compensatory, actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and costs of suit;
and (3) Northwests Exhibits 2 and 3, the Flight Manifest and the Passenger Name Record,
respectively, were hearsay evidence and ought to be excluded from the records.

The petition must fail.

We are in complete accord with the common ruling of the lower courts that Northwest
breached the contract of carriage with Chiong, and as such, he is entitled to compensatory, actual,
moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit.

Northwest contends that Chiong, as a no-show passenger on April 1, 1989, already defaulted
in his obligation to abide by the terms and conditions of the contract of carriage;18 and thus,
Northwest could not have been in breach of its reciprocal obligation to transport Chiong. In sum,
Northwest insists that Chiongs testimony is a complete fabrication, supposedly demonstrated by
the following: (1) Chiongs seaman service record book reflects that he left the Philippines after
April 1, 1989, specifically on April 17, 1989, to board the M/V Elbia, and was discharged
therefrom upon his personal request; (2) the Information filed against Chiong for False
Testimony; and (3) the Flight Manifest and the Passenger Name Record both indicate that he was
a no-show passenger.

We are not convinced.

The records reveal that Chiong, as plaintiff in the trial court, satisfied the burden of proof
required in civil cases, i.e., preponderance of evidence. Section 1 of Rule 133 provides:

SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. In civil cases, the

party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence
on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstance
of the case, the witnesses manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and
opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the
facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony,
their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the
same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the
number of witnesses, though preponderance is not necessarily with the greater
number.

In this regard, the Court notes that, in addition to his testimony, Chiongs evidence consisted of a
Northwest ticket for the April 1, 1989 Flight No. 24, Chiongs passport and seaman service record
book duly stamped at the PCG counter, and the testimonies of Calvo, Florencio Gomez,19 and
Philippine Overseas Employment and Administration (POEA) personnel who all identified the
signature and stamp of the PCG on Chiongs passport.
 We have scoured the records, and found no reason to depart from the well-settled rule that
factual findings of the lower courts deserve the utmost respect and are not to be disturbed on
appeal.20 Indeed, Chiongs Northwest ticket for Flight No. 24 on April 1, 1989, coupled with the
PCG stamps on his passport showing the same date, is direct evidence that he was present at
MIA on said date as he intended to fly to the United States on board that flight. As testified to by
POEA personnel and officers, the PCG stamp indicates that a departing seaman has passed
through the PCG counter at the airport, surrendered the exit pass, and complied with government
requirements for departing seafarers. Calvo, Philimares liaison officer tasked to assist Chiong at
the airport, corroborated Chiongs testimony on the latters presence at the MIA and his check-in
at the PCG counter without a hitch. Calvo further testified that she purposely stayed at the PCG
counter to confirm that Chiong was able to board the plane, as it was part of her duties as
Philimares liaison officer, to confirm with their principal, TransOcean in this case, that the
seafarer had left the country and commenced travel to the designated port where the vessel is
docked.21 Thus, she had observed that Chiong was unable to check-in and board Northwest
Flight No. 24, and was actually being given the run-around by Northwest personnel.

It is of no moment that Chiongs witnesses who all corroborated his testimony on his
presence at the airport on, and flight details for, April 1, 1989, and that he was subsequently
bumped-off are, likewise, employees of Philimare which may have an interest in the outcome of
this case. We intoned in Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,22 thus:

(T)his Court has repeatedly held that a witness relationship to the victim
does not automatically affect the veracity of his or her testimony. While this
principle is often applied in criminal cases, we deem that the same principle may
apply in this case, albeit civil in nature. If a witness relationship with a party
does not ipso facto render him a biased witness in criminal cases where the
 quantum of evidence required is proof beyond reasonable doubt, there is no
reason why the same principle should not apply in civil cases where the
quantum of evidence is only preponderance of evidence.

The foregoing documentary and testimonial evidence, taken together, amply establish the
fact that Chiong was present at MIA on April 1, 1989, passed through the PCG counter without
delay, proceeded to the Northwest check-in counter, but when he presented his confirmed ticket
thereat, he was not issued a boarding pass, and ultimately barred from boarding Northwest Flight
No. 24 on that day.

In stark contrast is Northwests bare-faced claim that Chiong was a no-show passenger, and
was scheduled to leave the country only on April 17, 1989. As previously discussed, the records
belie this assertion. It is also noteworthy that Northwest did not present any evidence to support
its belated defense that Chiong departed from the Philippines on April 17, 1989 to work as Third
Engineer on board M/V Elbia under the original crew agreement.

It is true that Chiongs passport and seaman service record book indicate that he had left the
country on April 17, 1989 and come back on October 5 of the same year. However, this evidence
fails to debunk the facts established to have transpired on April 1, 1989, more particularly,
Chiongs presence at the airport and his subsequent bumping-off by Northwest despite a
confirmed ticket. Although initially, the burden of proof was with Chiong to prove that there was
a breach of contract of carriage, the burden of evidence shifted to Northwest when Chiong
adduced sufficient evidence to prove the facts he had alleged. At that point, Northwest had the
burden of going forward23 to controvert Chiongs prima facie case. As the party asserting that
Chiong was a no-show passenger, Northwest then had the burden of evidence to establish its
claim. Regrettably, Northwest failed to do so.
 Furthermore, it has not escaped our attention that Northwest, despite the declaration in its
Pre-Trial Brief, did not present as a witness their check-in agent on that contentious date.24 This
omission was detrimental to Northwests case considering its claim that Chiong did not check-in
at their counters on said date. It simply insisted that Chiong was a no-show passenger and totally
relied on the Flight Manifest, which, curiously, showed a horizontal line drawn across Chiongs
name, and the name W. Costine written above it. The reason for the insertion, or for Chiongs
allegedly being a no-show passenger, is not even recorded on the remarks column of the Flight
Manifest beside the Passenger Name column. Clearly, the categorical declaration of Chiong and
his other witnesses, coupled with the PCG stamp on his passport and seaman service record book,
prevails over Northwests evidence, particularly the Flight Manifest. Thus, we are perplexed why,
despite the evidence presented by Chiong, and the RTCs specific order to Northwests counsel to
present the person(s) who prepared the Flight Manifest and Passenger Name Record for a proper
identification of, and to testify on, those documents, Northwest still insisted on presenting
Gonofredo Mendoza and Amelia Meris who were, admittedly, not competent to testify
thereon.25

In its desperate attempt to evade liability for the breach, Northwest claims that Chiong
worked at M/V Elbia when he left the Philippines on April 17, 1989. The argument was not only
belatedly raised, as we have repeatedly stated, but is off-tangent.

On this point, we uphold the RTCs and CAs ruling that the failure of Northwest to raise the
foregoing defense in its Motion to Dismiss or Answer constituted a waiver thereof. Section 1,
Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. Defenses and objections

not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived.
 However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the
court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action
pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred
by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
(Emphasis supplied)

Similarly, Section 8, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court reads:

SECTION 8. Omnibus Motion. Subject to the provisions of section 1 of Rule 9,

a motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment, or proceeding shall include all
objections then available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed
waived.

Moreover, Northwest paints a scenario that ostensibly transpired on a different date. Even if
Chiong left the Philippines on April 17, 1989, it would not necessarily prove that Chiong was a
no-show on April 1, 1989. Neither does it negate the already established fact that Chiong had a
confirmed ticket for April 1, 1989, and first passed through the PCG counter without delay, then
reached and was at the Northwest check-in counters on time for the scheduled flight.

Essentially, Northwest argues that Chiong was a no-show passenger on two (2) separate
occasions, March 28 and April 1, 1989 because he was actually scheduled to depart for the US
on April 17, 1989 as ostensibly evidenced by his passport and seaman record book. Had this new
matter alleged been proven by Northwest, it would prevent or bar recovery by Chiong.
Unfortunately, Northwest was unsuccessful in proving not only the no-show claim, but that
Chiong, likewise, worked under the original crew agreement.

Northwest likewise insists now that there is a pending criminal case for False Testimony
against Chiong that a falsified part of Chiongs testimony would indicate the falsity of his entire
testimony, consistent with the falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus26 doctrine. Following Northwests
flawed logic, this would invariably lead to the conclusion that the corroborating testimonies of
Chiongs witnesses are also false.

The legal maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, cited by Northwest, is not a positive rule
of law and is not strictly applied in this jurisdiction. Before this maxim can be applied, the
witness must be shown to have willfully falsified the truth on one or more material points. The
principle presupposes the existence of a positive testimony on a material point contrary to
subsequent declarations in the testimony. However, the records show that Chiongs testimony did
not contain inconsistencies on what occurred on April 1, 1989. Yet, Northwest never even
attempted to explain or impugn the evidence that Chiong passed through the PCG counter on
April 1, 1989, and that his passport was accordingly stamped, obviously for purposes of his
departure on that day.

As to the criminal case, it is well to note that there is no final determination, as yet, of
Chiongs guilt by the courts. But even if Chiong is adjudged guilty, it will have little effect on the
outcome of this case. As we held in Leyson v. Lawa:27

The testimony of a witness must be considered in its entirety instead of in

truncated parts. The technique in deciphering a testimony is not to consider only
its isolated parts and anchor a conclusion on the basis of said parts. In ascertaining
the facts established by a witness, everything stated by him on direct, cross and
redirect examinations must be calibrated and considered.

It must be stressed that facts imperfectly or erroneously stated in answer to one

question may be supplied or explained as qualified by his answer to other question.
The principle falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not strictly applied in this
jurisdiction. The doctrine deals only with the weight of evidence and is not a
positive rule of law, and the same is not an inflexible one of universal application.
 The testimony of a witness can be believed as to some facts and disbelieved as to
others:

xxxx

Professor Wigmore gives the following enlightening commentary:

It may be said, once for all, that the maxim is in itself worthless
first, in point of validity, because in one form it merely contains in
loose fashion a kernel of truth which no one needs to be told, and
in the others, it is absolutely false as a maxim of life; and secondly,
in point of utility, because it merely tells the jury what they may do
in any event, not what they must do or must not do, and therefore it
is a superfluous form of words. It is also in practice pernicious,
first, because there is frequently a misunderstanding of its proper
force, and secondly, because it has become in the hands of many
counsel a mere instrument for obtaining new trials upon points
wholly unimportant in themselves.

From the foregoing disquisition, the ineluctable conclusion is that Northwest breached its
contract of carriage with Chiong.

Time and again, we have declared that a contract of carriage, in this case, air transport, is
primarily intended to serve the traveling public and thus, imbued with public interest. The law
governing common carriers consequently imposes an exacting standard of conduct. As the
aggrieved party, Chiong only had to prove the existence of the contract and the fact of its
non-performance by Northwest, as carrier, in order to be awarded compensatory and actual
damages.

We reiterate that Northwest failed to prove its claim that Chiong worked on M/V Elbia from
April 17 to October 5, 1989 under the original crew agreement. Accordingly, we affirm the lower
courts finding on Chiongs entitlement to actual and compensatory damages.
 We, likewise, uphold the findings of both courts on Northwests liability for moral and
exemplary damages, and attorneys fees.

Under Article 2220 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an award of moral damages, in
breaches of contract, is in order upon a showing that the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad
faith. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence.28 It imports a dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong.29 It means breach of a known
duty through some motive, interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud.30 Bad faith is
in essence a question of intention.31

In the case at bench, the courts carefully examined the evidence as to the conduct and
outward acts of Northwest indicative of its inward motive. It is borne out by the records that
Chiong was given the run-around at the Northwest check-in counter, instructed to deal with a
man in barong to obtain a boarding pass, and eventually barred from boarding Northwest Flight
No. 24 to accommodate an American, W. Costine, whose name was merely inserted in the Flight
Manifest, and did not even personally check-in at the counter.32

Under the foregoing circumstances, the award of exemplary damages is also correct given
the evidence that Northwest acted in an oppressive manner towards Chiong.33
 As for the award of attorneys fees, while we recognize that it is sound policy not to set a
premium on the right to litigate,34 we sustain the lower courts award thereof.

Attorneys fees may be awarded when a party is compelled to litigate or incur expenses to
protect his interest,35 or where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to
satisfy the plaintiffs plainly valid, just and demandable claim.36 In the case at bench, Northwest
deliberately breached its contract of carriage with Chiong and then repeatedly refused to satisfy
Chiongs valid, just and demandable claim. This unjustified refusal constrained Chiong to not
only lose income under the crew agreement, but to further incur expenses and exert effort for
almost two (2) decades in order to protect his interests and vindicate his right. Therefore, this
Court deems it just and equitable to grant Chiong P200,000.00 as attorneys fees. The award is
reasonable in view of the time it has taken for this case to be resolved.37

Finally, the issue of the exclusion of Northwests Exhibits 2 and 3 need not detain us long.
Suffice it to state that the RTC and CA correctly excluded these documents as hearsay evidence.
We quote with favor the CAs holding thereon, thus:

As a rule, entries made at, or near the time of the transactions to which they refer,
by a person deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the facts
therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such person made the
entries in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty and in the
ordinary or regular course of business or duty. [Rule 130, Section 43, Revised
Rules of Court]

Otherwise stated, in order to be admissible as entries in the course of business, it

is necessary that: (a) the person who made the entry must be dead or unable to
testify; (b) the entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which
 they refer; (c) the entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries;
(d) the entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a
duty; and (e) the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business
or duty.

Tested by these requirements, we find the manifest and passenger name record to
be mere hearsay evidence. While there is no necessity to bring into court all the
employees who individually made the entries, it is sufficient that the person who
supervised them while they were making the entries testify that the account was
prepared under his supervision and that the entries were regularly entered in the
ordinary course of business. In the case at bench, while MENDOZA was the
supervisor on-duty on April 1, 1989, he has no personal knowledge of the
entries in the manifest since he did not supervise the preparation thereof.
More importantly, no evidence was presented to prove that the employee
who made the entries was dead nor did the defendant-appellant set forth the
circumstances that would show the employees inability to testify.38

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The ruling of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 50308 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
MAXIMO ALVAREZ, Petitioner,

- versus -

SUSAN RAMIREZ, Respondent.

G.R. No. 143439

Promulgated:

October 14, 2005

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] of the Court of
Appeals dated May 31, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 56154, entitled Susan Ramirez, petitioner,
versus, Hon. Benjamin M. Aquino, Jr., as Judge RTC, Malabon, MM, Br. 72, and Maximo
Alvarez, respondents.

Susan Ramirez, herein respondent, is the complaining witness in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN
for arson[3] pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, Malabon City. The accused is
Maximo Alvarez, herein petitioner. He is the husband of Esperanza G. Alvarez, sister of
respondent.

On June 21, 1999, the private prosecutor called Esperanza Alvarez to the witness stand as the
first witness against petitioner, her husband. Petitioner and his counsel raised no objection.

Esperanza testified as follows:

ATTY. ALCANTARA:
We are calling Mrs. Esperanza Alvarez, the wife of the accused, Your Honor.

COURT:

Swear in the witness.

xxx

ATTY. MESIAH: (sic)

Your Honor, we are offering the testimony of this witness for the purpose of proving that the
accused Maximo Alvarez committed all the elements of the crime being charged particularly that
accused Maximo Alvarez pour on May 29, 1998 gasoline in the house located at Blk. 5, Lot 9,
Phase 1-C, Dagat-dagatan, Navotas, Metro Manila, the house owned by his sister-in-law Susan
Ramirez; that accused Maximo Alvarez after pouring the gasoline on the door of the house of
Susan Ramirez ignited and set it on fire; that the accused at the time he successfully set the house
on fire (sic) of Susan Ramirez knew that it was occupied by Susan Ramirez, the members of the
family as well as Esperanza Alvarez, the estranged wife of the accused; that as a consequence of
the accused in successfully setting the fire to the house of Susan Ramirez, the door of said house
was burned and together with several articles of the house, including shoes, chairs and others.

COURT:

You may proceed.

xxx

DIRECT EXAMINATION
ATTY. ALCANTARA:

xxx

Q: When you were able to find the source, incidentally what was the source of that scent?

A: When I stand by the window, sir, I saw a man pouring the gasoline in the house of my sister
(and witness pointing to the person of the accused inside the court room).

Q: For the record, Mrs. Witness, can you state the name of that person, if you know?

A: He is my husband, sir, Maximo Alvarez.

Q: If that Maximo Alvarez you were able to see, can you identify him?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: If you can see him inside the Court room, can you please point him?

A: Witness pointing to a person and when asked to stand and asked his name, he gave his name
as Maximo Alvarez.[4]

In the course of Esperanzas direct testimony against petitioner, the latter showed uncontrolled
emotions, prompting the trial judge to suspend the proceedings.

On June 30, 1999, petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion[5] to disqualify Esperanza from
testifying against him pursuant to Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court on marital
disqualification.
 Respondent filed an opposition[6] to the motion. Pending resolution of the motion, the trial
court directed the prosecution to proceed with the presentation of the other witnesses.

On September 2, 1999, the trial court issued the questioned Order disqualifying Esperanza
Alvarez from further testifying and deleting her testimony from the records.[7] The prosecution
filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in the other assailed Order dated October 19,
1999.[8]

This prompted respondent Susan Ramirez, the complaining witness in Criminal Case No.
19933-MN, to file with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari[9] with application for
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order.[10]

On May 31, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision nullifying and setting aside the
assailed Orders issued by the trial court.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

The issue for our resolution is whether Esperanza Alvarez can testify against her husband in
Criminal Case No. 19933-MN.

Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. During their marriage, neither the husband nor
the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in
a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against
the other or the latters direct descendants or ascendants.

The reasons given for the rule are:

1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;

2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury;

3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life, even at the
risk of an occasional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness; and

4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse
through the hostile testimony of the other.[11]

But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions, both in
civil actions between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the
other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are backed by sound reasons which, in the excepted
cases, outweigh those in support of the general rule. For instance, where the marital and domestic
relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility
which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case,
identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is
non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of private life, which the
law aims at protecting, will be nothing but ideals, which through their absence, merely leave a
void in the unhappy home.[12]

In Ordoo vs. Daquigan,[13] this Court held:

We think that the correct rule, which may be adopted in this jurisdiction, is that laid down in
Cargil vs. State, 35 ALR 133, 220 Pac. 64, 25 Okl. 314, wherein the court said:

The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the person is too narrow; and the
rule that any offense remotely or indirectly affecting domestic harmony comes within the
exception is too broad. The better rule is that, when an offense directly attacks, or directly and
vitally impairs, the conjugal relation, it comes within the exception to the statute that one shall
not be a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committee (by)
one against the other.

Obviously, the offense of arson attributed to petitioner, directly impairs the conjugal relation
between him and his wife Esperanza. His act, as embodied in the Information for arson filed
against him, eradicates all the major aspects of marital life such as trust, confidence, respect and
love by which virtues the conjugal relationship survives and flourishes.

As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals:

The act of private respondent in setting fire to the house of his sister-in-law Susan Ramirez,
knowing fully well that his wife was there, and in fact with the alleged intent of injuring the latter,
is an act totally alien to the harmony and confidences of marital relation which the
disqualification primarily seeks to protect. The criminal act complained of had the effect of
directly and vitally impairing the conjugal relation. It underscored the fact that the marital and
domestic relations between her and the accused-husband have become so strained that there is no
more harmony, peace or tranquility to be preserved. The Supreme Court has held that in such a
case, identity is non-existent. In such a situation, the security and confidences of private life
which the law aims to protect are nothing but ideals which through their absence, merely leave a
void in the unhappy home. (People v. Castaeda, 271 SCRA 504). Thus, there is no longer any
reason to apply the Marital Disqualification Rule.

It should be stressed that as shown by the records, prior to the commission of the offense, the
relationship between petitioner and his wife was already strained. In fact, they were separated de
facto almost six months before the incident. Indeed, the evidence and facts presented reveal that
the preservation of the marriage between petitioner and Esperanza is no longer an interest the
State aims to protect.

At this point, it bears emphasis that the State, being interested in laying the truth before the
courts so that the guilty may be punished and the innocent exonerated, must have the right to
offer the direct testimony of Esperanza, even against the objection of the accused, because (as
stated by this Court in Francisco[14]), it was the latter himself who gave rise to its necessity.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. The trial court, RTC,
Branch 72, Malabon City, is ordered to allow Esperanza Alvarez to testify against petitioner, her
husband, in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 107383. February 20, 1996.]

CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN,

respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and
papers taken by her from private respondents clinic without the latters knowledge and consent.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982,
petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her
mother, a driver and private respondents secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in
her husbands clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr.
Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martins
passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case
for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had
filed against her husband.

Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages
against petitioner. The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X, which,
after trial, rendered judgment for private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him the
capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of plaintiffs Complaint or
those further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and
any person acting in her behalf to immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him
P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorneys fees; and to pay the
costs of the suit. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner
Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from using or
submitting/admitting as evidence the documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.

There is no question that the documents and papers in question belong to private respondent, Dr.
Alfredo Martin, and that they were taken by his wife, the herein petitioner, without his
knowledge and consent. For that reason, the trial court declared the documents and papers to be
properties of private respondent, ordered petitioner to return them to private respondent and
enjoined her from using them in evidence. In appealing from the decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming the trial courts decision, petitioners only ground is that in Alfredo Martin v.
Alfonso Felix, Jr.,1 this Court ruled that the documents and papers (marked as Annexes A-i to
J-7 of respondents comment in that case) were admissible in evidence and, therefore, their use by
petitioners attorney, Alfonso Felix, Jr., did not constitute malpractice or gross misconduct. For
this reason it is contended that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial
court instead of dismissing private respondents complaint.

Petitioners contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for disbarment. Among
other things, private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as complainant in that case, charged that in
using the documents in evidence, Atty. Felix, Jr. committed malpractice or gross misconduct
because of the injunctive order of the trial court. In dismissing the complaint against Atty. Felix,
Jr., this Court took note of the following defense of Atty. Felix, Jr. which it found to be
impressed with merit:2

On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of respondent [Alfonso Felix, Jr.], he maintains
that:

xxx xxx xxx

4. When respondent refiled Cecilias case for legal separation before the Pasig Regional Trial
Court, there was admittedly an order of the Manila Regional Trial Court prohibiting Cecilia from
using the documents Annex A-I to J-7. On September 6, 1983, however having appealed the said
order to this Court on a petition for certiorari, this Court issued a restraining order on aforesaid
date which order temporarily set aside the order of the trial court. Hence, during the
enforceability of this Courts order, respondents request for petitioner to admit the genuineness
and authenticity of the subject annexes cannot be looked upon as malpractice. Notably, petitioner
Dr. Martin finally admitted the truth and authenticity of the questioned annexes. At that point in
time, would it have been malpractice for respondent to use petitioners admission as evidence
against him in the legal separation case pending in the Regional Trial Court of Makati?
Respondent submits it is- not malpractice.

Significantly, petitioners admission was done not thru his counsel but by Dr. Martin himself
under oath. Such verified admission constitutes an affidavit, and, therefore, receivable in
evidence against him. Petitioner became bound by his admission. For Cecilia to avail herself of
her husbands admission and use the same in her action for legal separation cannot be treated as
malpractice.

Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to no more than a
declaration that his use of the documents and papers for the purpose of securing Dr. Martins
admission as to their genuiness and authenticity did not constitute a violation of the injunctive
order of the trial court. By no means does the decision in that case establish the admissibility of
the documents and papers in question.

It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the charge of violating the
writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court, it was only because, at the time he used
the documents and papers, enforcement of the order of the trial court was temporarily restrained
by this Court. The TRO issued by this Court was eventually lifted as the petition for certiorari
filed by petitioner against the trial courts order was dismissed and, therefore, the prohibition
against the further use of the documents and papers became effective again.

Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable3 is no
less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands
infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only
exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a] court or when
public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.4 Any violation of this provision
renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.5

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers
and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A
person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of
the affected spouse while the marriage subsists.6 Neither may be examined without the consent
of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, save for specified exceptions.7 But one thing is freedom of communication; quite
another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has
nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado (Chairman), Romero, and Puno, JJ., concur.

 [A.C. No. 5108. May 26, 2005]

ROSA F. MERCADO, complainant, vs. ATTY. JULITO D. VITRIOLO, respondent.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

Rosa F. Mercado filed the instant administrative complaint against Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo,
seeking his disbarment from the practice of law. The complainant alleged that respondent
maliciously instituted a criminal case for falsification of public document against her, a former
client, based on confidential information gained from their attorney-client relationship.
Let us first hearken to the facts.
Complainant is a Senior Education Program Specialist of the Standards Development
Division, Office of Programs and Standards while respondent is a Deputy Executive Director IV
of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED).[1]
Complainants husband filed Civil Case No. 40537 entitled Ruben G. Mercado v. Rosa C.
Francisco, for annulment of their marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City.
This annulment case had been dismissed by the trial court, and the dismissal became final and
executory on July 15, 1992.[2]
In August 1992, Atty. Anastacio P. de Leon, counsel of complainant, died. On February 7,
1994, respondent entered his appearance before the trial court as collaborating counsel for
complainant.[3]
On March 16, 1994, respondent filed his Notice of Substitution of Counsel,[4] informing the
RTC of Pasig City that he has been appointed as counsel for the complainant, in substitution of
Atty. de Leon.
It also appears that on April 13, 1999, respondent filed a criminal action against complainant
before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Pasig City, entitled Atty. Julito Vitriolo, et al. v. Rose
Dela Cruz F. Mercado, and docketed as I.S. No. PSG 99-9823, for violation of Articles 171 and
172 (falsification of public document) of the Revised Penal Code.[5] Respondent alleged that
complainant made false entries in the Certificates of Live Birth of her children, Angelica and
Katelyn Anne. More specifically, complainant allegedly indicated in said Certificates of Live
Birth that she is married to a certain Ferdinand Fernandez, and that their marriage was
solemnized on April 11, 1979, when in truth, she is legally married to Ruben G. Mercado and
their marriage took place on April 11, 1978.
Complainant denied the accusations of respondent against her. She denied using any other
name than Rosa F. Mercado. She also insisted that she has gotten married only once, on April 11,
1978, to Ruben G. Mercado.
 In addition, complainant Mercado cited other charges against respondent that are pending
before or decided upon by other tribunals (1) libel suit before the Office of the City Prosecutor,
Pasig City;[6] (2) administrative case for dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service, pursuit of private business, vocation or profession without the
permission required by Civil Service rules and regulations, and violations of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, before the then Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption;[7]
(3) complaint for dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service before the Office of the Ombudsman, where he was found guilty of misconduct and
meted out the penalty of one month suspension without pay;[8] and, (4) the Information for
violation of Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, as amended, otherwise known as the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees before the
Sandiganbayan.[9]
Complainant Mercado alleged that said criminal complaint for falsification of public
document (I.S. No. PSG 99-9823) disclosed confidential facts and information relating to the
civil case for annulment, then handled by respondent Vitriolo as her counsel. This prompted
complainant Mercado to bring this action against respondent. She claims that, in filing the
criminal case for falsification, respondent is guilty of breaching their privileged and confidential
lawyer-client relationship, and should be disbarred.
Respondent filed his Comment/Motion to Dismiss on November 3, 1999 where he alleged
that the complaint for disbarment was all hearsay, misleading and irrelevant because all the
allegations leveled against him are subject of separate fact-finding bodies. Respondent claimed
that the pending cases against him are not grounds for disbarment, and that he is presumed to be
innocent until proven otherwise.[10] He also states that the decision of the Ombudsman finding
him guilty of misconduct and imposing upon him the penalty of suspension for one month
without pay is on appeal with the Court of Appeals. He adds that he was found guilty, only of
simple misconduct, which he committed in good faith.[11]
In addition, respondent maintains that his filing of the criminal complaint for falsification of
public documents against complainant does not violate the rule on privileged communication
between attorney and client because the bases of the falsification case are two certificates of live
birth which are public documents and in no way connected with the confidence taken during the
engagement of respondent as counsel. According to respondent, the complainant confided to him
as then counsel only matters of facts relating to the annulment case. Nothing was said about the
alleged falsification of the entries in the birth certificates of her two daughters. The birth
certificates are filed in the Records Division of CHED and are accessible to anyone.[12]
In a Resolution dated February 9, 2000, this Court referred the administrative case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.[13]
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline set two dates for hearing but complainant failed to
appear in both. Investigating Commissioner Rosalina R. Datiles thus granted respondents motion
to file his memorandum, and the case was submitted for resolution based on the pleadings
submitted by the parties.[14]
On June 21, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors approved the report of investigating
commissioner Datiles, finding the respondent guilty of violating the rule on privileged
communication between attorney and client, and recommending his suspension from the practice
of law for one (1) year.
On August 6, 2003, complainant, upon receiving a copy of the IBP report and
recommendation, wrote Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., a letter of desistance. She stated that
after the passage of so many years, she has now found forgiveness for those who have wronged
her.
At the outset, we stress that we shall not inquire into the merits of the various criminal and
administrative cases filed against respondent. It is the duty of the tribunals where these cases are
pending to determine the guilt or innocence of the respondent.
We also emphasize that the Court is not bound by any withdrawal of the complaint or
desistance by the complainant. The letter of complainant to the Chief Justice imparting
forgiveness upon respondent is inconsequential in disbarment proceedings.
We now resolve whether respondent violated the rule on privileged communication between
attorney and client when he filed a criminal case for falsification of public document against his
former client.
A brief discussion of the nature of the relationship between attorney and client and the rule
on attorney-client privilege that is designed to protect such relation is in order.
In engaging the services of an attorney, the client reposes on him special powers of trust and
confidence. Their relationship is strictly personal and highly confidential and fiduciary. The
relation is of such delicate, exacting and confidential nature that is required by necessity and
public interest.[15] Only by such confidentiality and protection will a person be encouraged to
repose his confidence in an attorney. The hypothesis is that abstinence from seeking legal advice
in a good cause is an evil which is fatal to the administration of justice.[16] Thus, the
preservation and protection of that relation will encourage a client to entrust his legal problems to
an attorney, which is of paramount importance to the administration of justice.[17] One rule
adopted to serve this purpose is the attorney-client privilege: an attorney is to keep inviolate his
clients secrets or confidence and not to abuse them.[18] Thus, the duty of a lawyer to preserve
his clients secrets and confidence outlasts the termination of the attorney-client relationship,[19]
and continues even after the clients death.[20] It is the glory of the legal profession that its
fidelity to its client can be depended on, and that a man may safely go to a lawyer and converse
with him upon his rights or supposed rights in any litigation with absolute assurance that the
lawyers tongue is tied from ever disclosing it.[21] With full disclosure of the facts of the case by
the client to his attorney, adequate legal representation will result in the ascertainment and
enforcement of rights or the prosecution or defense of the clients cause.
Now, we go to the rule on attorney-client privilege. Dean Wigmore cites the factors essential
to establish the existence of the privilege, viz:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in
his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in
confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from
disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be waived.[22]
In fine, the factors are as follows:
 (1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client relationship,
and it is by reason of this relationship that the client made the communication.
Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are protected by the rule on privileged
communication even if the prospective client does not thereafter retain the lawyer or the latter
declines the employment.[23] The reason for this is to make the prospective client free to discuss
whatever he wishes with the lawyer without fear that what he tells the lawyer will be divulged or
used against him, and for the lawyer to be equally free to obtain information from the prospective
client.[24]
On the other hand, a communication from a (prospective) client to a lawyer for some
purpose other than on account of the (prospective) attorney-client relation is not privileged.
Instructive is the case of Pfleider v. Palanca,[25] where the client and his wife leased to their
attorney a 1,328-hectare agricultural land for a period of ten years. In their contract, the parties
agreed, among others, that a specified portion of the lease rentals would be paid to the
client-lessors, and the remainder would be delivered by counsel-lessee to client's listed creditors.
The client alleged that the list of creditors which he had confidentially supplied counsel for the
purpose of carrying out the terms of payment contained in the lease contract was disclosed by
counsel, in violation of their lawyer-client relation, to parties whose interests are adverse to those
of the client. As the client himself, however, states, in the execution of the terms of the aforesaid
lease contract between the parties, he furnished counsel with the confidential list of his creditors.
We ruled that this indicates that client delivered the list of his creditors to counsel not because of
the professional relation then existing between them, but on account of the lease agreement. We
then held that a violation of the confidence that accompanied the delivery of that list would
partake more of a private and civil wrong than of a breach of the fidelity owing from a lawyer to
his client.
(2) The client made the communication in confidence.
The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality.[26]
The client must intend the communication to be confidential.[27]
A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by voluntary act of
disclosure between attorney and client in confidence and by means which, so far as the client is
aware, discloses the information to no third person other than one reasonably necessary for the
transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which it was given.[28]
Our jurisprudence on the matter rests on quiescent ground. Thus, a compromise agreement
prepared by a lawyer pursuant to the instruction of his client and delivered to the opposing
party,[29] an offer and counter-offer for settlement,[30] or a document given by a client to his
counsel not in his professional capacity,[31] are not privileged communications, the element of
confidentiality not being present.[32]
(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity.[33]
The communication made by a client to his attorney must not be intended for mere
information, but for the purpose of seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his rights or
obligations. The communication must have been transmitted by a client to his attorney for the
purpose of seeking legal advice.[34]
 If the client seeks an accounting service,[35] or business or personal assistance,[36] and not
legal advice, the privilege does not attach to a communication disclosed for such purpose.
Applying all these rules to the case at bar, we hold that the evidence on record fails to
substantiate complainants allegations. We note that complainant did not even specify the alleged
communication in confidence disclosed by respondent. All her claims were couched in general
terms and lacked specificity. She contends that respondent violated the rule on privileged
communication when he instituted a criminal action against her for falsification of public
documents because the criminal complaint disclosed facts relating to the civil case for annulment
then handled by respondent. She did not, however, spell out these facts which will determine the
merit of her complaint. The Court cannot be involved in a guessing game as to the existence of
facts which the complainant must prove.
Indeed, complainant failed to attend the hearings at the IBP. Without any testimony from the
complainant as to the specific confidential information allegedly divulged by respondent without
her consent, it is difficult, if not impossible to determine if there was any violation of the rule on
privileged communication. Such confidential information is a crucial link in establishing a
breach of the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client. It is not enough to
merely assert the attorney-client privilege.[37] The burden of proving that the privilege applies is
placed upon the party asserting the privilege.[38]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the complaint against respondent Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 95367 May 23, 1995

COMMISSIONER JOSE T. ALMONTE, VILLAMOR C. PEREZ, NERIO ROGADO, and

ELISA RIVERA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE CONRADO M. VASQUEZ and CONCERNED CITIZENS, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to annul the subpoena duces tecum
and orders issued by respondent Ombudsman, requiring petitioners Nerio Rogado and Elisa
Rivera, as chief accountant and record custodian, respectively, of the Economic Intelligence and
Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce "all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for
the year 1988 and all evidence, such as vouchers (salary) for the whole plantilla of EIIB for
1988" and to enjoin him from enforcing his orders.

Petitioner Jose T. Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the EIIB, while Villamor C. Perez is
Chief of the EIIB's Budget and Fiscal Management Division. The subpoena duces tecum was
issued by the Ombudsman in connection with his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging
that funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed.
The letter, purporting to have been written by an employee of the EIIB and a concerned citizen,
was addressed to the Secretary of Finance, with copies furnished several government offices,
including the Office of the Ombudsman.

The letter reads in pertinent parts:

1 These are the things that I have been observing. During the implementation of E.O. 127 on
May 1, 1988, one hundred ninety (190) personnel were dismissed. Before that implementation,
we had a monthly savings of P500,000.00 from unfilled plantilla position plus the
implementation of RA 6683 wherein seventy (70) regular employees availed a total amount of
P1,400,000.00 was saved from the government monthly. The question is, how do they used or
disbursed this savings? The EIIB has a syndicate headed by the Chief of Budget Division who is
manipulating funds and also the brain of the so called "ghost agents" or the "Emergency
Intelligence Agents" (EIA). The Commissioner of EIIB has a biggest share on this. Among his
activities are:

a) Supporting RAM wherein he is involved. He gives big amount especially during the Dec.
Failed coup.

b) Payment for thirty five (30) mini UZI's.

c) Payment for the purchased of Maxima '87 for personal used of the Commissioner.
d) Another observation was the agents under the Director of NCR EIIB is the sole operating unit
within Metro Manila which was approved by no less than the Commissioner due to anomalous
activities of almost all agents assigned at the central office directly under the Commissioner.
Retired Brig. Gen. Almonte as one of the Anti-Graft board member of the Department of Finance
should not tolerate this. However, the Commissioner did not investigate his own men instead, he
placed them under the 15-30 payroll.

e) Many more which are personal.

2. Sir, my question is this. Can your good office investigate EII intelligence funds particularly
Personal Services (01) Funds? I wonder why the Dep't of Budget & Mgmt. cannot compel EIIB
to submit an actual filled up position because almost half of it are vacant and still they are
releasing it. Are EIIB plantilla position classified? It is included in the Personal Services
Itemization (PSI) and I believe it is not classified and a ruling from Civil Service Commission
that EIIB is not exempted from Civil Service. Another info, when we had salary differential last
Oct '88 all money for the whole plantilla were released and from that alone, Millions were saved
and converted to ghost agents of EIA.

3. Another thing that I have observed was the Chief Budget Division possesses high caliber
firearms such as a mini UZI, Armalite rifle and two (2) 45 cal. pistol issued to him by the
Assistant Commissioner wherein he is not an agent of EIIB and authorized as such according to
memorandum order number 283 signed by the President of the Republic of the Philippines
effective 9 Jan. 1990.

Another observation was when EIIB agents apprehended a certain civilian who possesses
numerous assorted high powered firearms. Agents plus one personnel from the legal proclaimed
only five (5) firearms and the remaining was pilfered by them.

Another observation is almost all EIIB agents collects payroll from the big time smuggler
syndicate monthly and brokers every week for them not to be apprehended.

Another observation is the commissioner allocates funds coming from the intelligence funds to
the media to sustain their good image of the bureau.

In his comment 1 on the letter-complaint, petitioner Almonte denied that as a result of the
separation of personnel, the EIIB had made some savings. He averred that the only funds
released to his agency by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) were those
corresponding to 947 plantilla positions which were filled. He also denied that there were "ghost
agents" in the EIIB and claimed that disbursements for "open" (i.e., "overt" personnel) and
"closed" (i.e., "covert" personnel) plantillas of the agency had been cleared by the Commission
on Audit (COA); that the case of the 30 Uzis had already been investigated by Congress, where it
was shown that it was not the EIIB but an agent who had spent for the firearms and they were
only loaned to the EIIB pending appropriation by Congress; that, contrary to the charge that a
Maxima car had been purchased for his use, he was using a government issued car from the
NICA; that it was his prerogative as Commissioner to "ground" agents in the EIIB main office so
that they could be given reorientation and retraining; that the allegation that the EIIB operatives
pilfered smuggled firearms was without factual basis because the firearms were the subject of
seizure proceedings before the Collector of Customs, Port of Manila; that the EIIB had been
uncompromising toward employees found involved in anomalous activities; and that intelligence
funds had not been used for media propaganda and if media people went to the EIIB it was
because of newsworthy stories. Petitioner asked that the complaint be dismissed and the case
considered closed.

Similarly petitioner Perez, budget chief of the EIIB, denied in his comment 2 dated April 3,
1990 that savings had been realized from the implementation of E.O. No. 127, since the DBM
provided allocations for only the remaining 947 personnel. He said that the disbursement of
funds for the plantilla positions for "overt" and "covert" personnel had been cleared by the COA
and that the high-powered firearms had been issued for the protection of EIIB personnel
attending court hearings and the Finance Officer in withdrawing funds from the banks.

The Graft Investigation Officer of the Ombudsman's office, Jose F. Saño, found the comments
unsatisfactory, being "unverified and plying only on generalizations without meeting specifically
the points raised by complainant as constitutive of the alleged anomalies." 3 He, therefore,
asked for authority to conduct a preliminary investigation. Anticipating the grant of his request,
he issued a subpoena 4 to petitioners Almonte and Perez, requiring them to submit their
counter-affidavits and the affidavits of their witnesses, as well as a subpoena duces tecum 5 to
the Chief of the EIIB's Accounting Division ordering him to bring "all documents relating to
Personal Services Funds for the year 1988 and all evidence, such as vouchers (salary) for the
whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988."

Petitioners Almonte and Perez moved to quash the subpoena and the subpoena duces tecum. In
his Order dated June 15, 1990, 6 respondent Ombudsman granted the motion to quash the
subpoena in view of the fact that there were no affidavits filed against petitioners. But he denied
their motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum. He ruled that petitioners were not being forced
to produce evidence against themselves, since the subpoena duces tecum was directed to the
Chief Accountant, petitioner Nerio Rogado. In addition the Ombudsman ordered the Chief of the
Records a Section of the EIIB, petitioner Elisa Rivera, to produce before the investigator "all
documents relating to Personnel Service Funds, for the year 1988, and all documents, salary
vouchers for the whole plantilla of the EIIB for 1988, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof."

Petitioners Almonte and Perez moved for a reconsideration, arguing that Rogado and Rivera
were EIIB employees under their supervision and that the Ombudsman was doing indirectly what
he could not do directly, i.e., compelling them (petitioners Almonte and Perez) to produce
evidence against themselves.

Petitioners' motion was denied in respondent Ombudsman's order dated August 6, 1990. Hence,
this petition which questions the orders of June 15, 1990 and August 6, 1990 of respondent
Ombudsman.

To put this case in perspective it should be stated at the outset that it does not concern a demand
by a citizen for information under the freedom of information guarantee of the Constitution. 7
Rather it concerns the power of the Office of the Ombudsman to obtain evidence in connection
with an investigation conducted by it vis-a-vis the claim of privilege of an agency of the
Government. Thus petitioners raise the following issues: 8

I. WHETHER OR NOT A CASE BROUGHT ABOUT BY AN UNSIGNED AND

UNVERIFIED LETTER COMPLAINT IS AN "APPROPRIATE CASE" WITHIN THE
CONCEPT OF THE CONSTITUTION IN WHICH PUBLIC RESPONDENT CAN OBLIGE
PETITIONERS BY VIRTUE OF HIS SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM TO PRODUCE TO HIM
"ALL DOCUMENTS RELATING TO PERSONAL SERVICES FUNDS FOR THE YEAR 1988
AND ALL EVIDENCES, SUCH AS VOUCHERS (SALARY) FOR THE WHOLE
PLANTILLA OF EIIB FOR 1988."

II. WHETHER OR NOT "ALL DOCUMENTS RELATING TO PERSONAL SERVICES

FUNDS FOR THE YEAR 1988 AND ALL EVIDENCES, SUCH AS VOUCHERS (SALARY)
FOR THE WHOLE PLANTILLA OF EIIB FOR 1988" ARE CLASSIFIED AND, THEREFORE,
BEYOND THE REACH OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT'S SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM.

I.

There are several subsidiary issues raised by petitioners, but the principal ones revolve on the
question whether petitioners can be ordered to produce documents relating to personal services
and salary vouchers of EIIB employees on the plea that such documents are classified.
Disclosure of the documents in question is resisted on the ground that "knowledge of EIIB's
documents relative to its Personal Services Funds and its plantilla . . . will necessarily [lead to]
knowledge of its operations, movements, targets, strategies, and tactics and the whole of its
being" and this could "destroy the EIIB." 9

Petitioners do not question the power of the Ombudsman to issue a subpoena duces tecum nor
the relevancy or materiality of the documents required to be produced, to the pending
investigation in the Ombudsman's office. Accordingly, the focus of discussion should be on the
Government's claim of privilege.

A.

At common law a governmental privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to state
secrets bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters. This privilege is based upon public
interest of such paramount importance as in and of itself transcending the individual interests of a
private citizen, even though, as a consequence thereof, the plaintiff cannot enforce his legal
rights. 10

In addition, in the litigation over the Watergate tape subpoena in 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court
recognized the right of the President to the confidentiality of his conversations and
correspondence, which it likened to "the claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations." Said
the Court in United States v. Nixon: 11

The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondence,

like the claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, has all the values to which
we accord deference for the privacy of all citizens and, added to those values, is the necessity for
protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in
Presidential decision-making. A President and those who assist him must be free to explore
alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many
would be unwilling to express except privately. These are the considerations justifying a
presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. The privilege is fundamental to the
operation of the government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the
Constitution. . . .

Thus, the Court for the first time gave executive privilege a constitutional status and a new name,
although not necessarily a new birth. 12

"The confidentiality of judicial deliberations" mentioned in the opinion of the Court referred to
the fact that Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court and judges of lower federal courts have
traditionally treated their working papers and judicial notes as private property. A 1977 proposal
in the U.S. Congress that Justices and judges of lower federal courts "should be encouraged to
make such arrangements as will assure the preservation and eventual availability of their
personal papers, especially the deposit of their papers in the same depository they select for [their]
Public Papers" 13 was rebuffed by the Justices who, in a letter to the Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Regulation and Government Information of the U.S. Senate, referred to
"difficult concerns respecting the appropriate separation that must be maintained between the
legislative branch and this Court." 14

There are, in addition to such privileges, statutorily-created ones such as the Government's
privilege to withhold the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of laws. 15

With respect to the privilege based on state secret, the rule was stated by the U.S. Supreme Court
as follows:

Judicial control over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive
officers. Yet we will not go so far as to say that the court may automatically require a complete
disclosure to the judge before the claim of privilege will be accepted in any case. It may be
possible to satisfy the court, from all the circumstances of the case, that there is a reasonable
danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters which, in the interest of
national security, should not be divulged. When this is the case, the occasion for the privilege is
appropriate, and the court should not jeopardize the security which the privilege is meant to
protect by insisting upon an examination of the evidence, even by the judge alone, in
chambers. . . . In each case, the showing of necessity which is made will determine how far the
court should probe in satisfying itself that the occasion for invoking the privilege is appropriate.
Where there is a strong showing of necessity, the claim of privilege should not be lightly
accepted, but even the most compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the
court is ultimately satisfied that military secrets are at stake. A fortiori, where necessity is
dubious, a formal claim of privilege, made under the circumstances of this case, will have to
prevail. 16

On the other hand, where the claim of confidentiality does not rest on the need to protect military,
diplomatic or other national security secrets but on a general public interest in the confidentiality
of his conversations, courts have declined to find in the Constitution an absolute privilege of the
President against a subpoena considered essential to the enforcement of criminal laws. 17

B.

In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the
production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. Indeed, EIIB's function is the
gathering and evaluation of intelligence reports and information regarding "illegal activities
affecting the national economy, such as, but not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax
evasion, dollar salting." 18 Consequently, while in cases which involve state secrets it may be
sufficient to determine from the circumstances of the case that there is reasonable danger that
compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters without compelling production, 19 no
similar excuse can be made for a privilege resting on other considerations.

Nor has our attention been called to any law or regulation which considers personnel records of
the EIIB as classified information. To the contrary, COA Circular No. 88-293, which petitioners
invoke to support their contention that there is adequate safeguard against misuse of public funds,
provides that the "only item of expenditure which should be treated strictly confidential" is that
which refers to the "purchase of information and payment of rewards." Thus, part V, No. 7 of the
Circular reads:

The only item of expenditure which should be treated as strictly confidential because it falls
under the category of classified information is that relating to purchase of information and
payment of rewards. However, reasonable records should be maintained and kept for inspection
of the Chairman, Commission on Audit or his duly authorized representative. All other
expenditures are to be considered unclassified supported by invoices, receipts and other
documents, and, therefore, subject to reasonable inquiry by the Chairman or his duly authorized
representative. 20

It should be noted that the regulation requires that "reasonable records" be kept justifying the
confidential or privileged character of the information relating to informers. There are no such
reasonable records in this case to substitute for the records claimed to be confidential.

The other statutes and regulations 21 invoked by petitioners in support of their contention that
the documents sought in the subpoena duces tecum of the Ombudsman are classified merely
indicate the confidential nature of the EIIB's functions, but they do not exempt the EIIB from the
duty to account for its funds to the proper authorities. Indeed by denying that there were savings
made from certain items in the agency and alleging that the DBM had released to the EIIB only
the allocations needed for the 947 personnel retained after its reorganization, petitioners in effect
invited inquiry into the veracity of their claim. If, as petitioners claim, the subpoenaed records
have been examined by the COA and found by it to be regular in all respects, there is no reason
why they cannot be shown to another agency of the government which by constitutional mandate
is required to look into any complaint concerning public office.

On the other hand, the Ombudsman is investigating a complaint that several items in the EIIB
were filled by fictitious persons and that the allotments for these items in 1988 were used for
illegal purposes. The plantilla and other personnel records are relevant to his investigation. He
and his Deputies are designated by the Constitution "protectors of the people" and as such they
are required by it "to act promptly on complaints in any form or manner against public officials
or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporation." 22

His need for the documents thus outweighs the claim of confidentiality of petitioners. What is
more, while there might have been compelling reasons for the claim of privilege in 1988 when it
was asserted by petitioners, now, seven years later, these reasons may have been attenuated, if
they have not in fact ceased. The agents whose identities could not then be revealed may have
ceased from the service of the EIIB, while the covert missions to which they might have been
deployed might either have been accomplished or abandoned. On the other hand, the
Ombudsman's duty to investigate the complaint that there were in 1988 unfilled positions in the
EIIB for which continued funding was received by its officials and put to illegal use, remains.

Above all, even if the subpoenaed documents are treated as presumptively privileged, this
decision would only justify ordering their inspection in camera but not their nonproduction.
However, as concession to the nature of the functions of the EIIB and just to be sure no
information of a confidential character is disclosed, the examination of records in this case
should be made in strict confidence by the Ombudsman himself. Reference may be made to the
documents in any decision or order which the Ombudsman may render or issue but only to the
extent that it will not reveal covert activities of the agency. Above all, there must be a scrupulous
protection of the documents delivered.

With these safeguards outlined, it is believed that a satisfactory resolution of the conflicting
claims of the parties is achieved. It is not amiss to state that even matters of national security
have been inquired into in appropriate in camera proceedings by the courts. In Lansang v. Garcia
23 this Court held closed door sessions, with only the immediate parties and their counsel present,
to determine claims that because of subversion there was imminent danger to public safety
warranting the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in 1971. Again in Marcos v. Manglapus
24 the Court met behind closed doors to receive military briefings on the threat posed to national
security by the return to the country of the former President and his family. In the United States,
a similar inquiry into the danger to national security as a result of the publication of classified
documents on the Vietnam war was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court. 25 We see no reason
why similar safeguards cannot be made to enable an agency of the Government, like the Office
of the Ombudsman, to carry out its constitutional duty to protect public interests 26 while
insuring the confidentiality of classified documents.

C.

Petitioners contend that under Art. XI, § 13(4) the Ombudsman can act only "in any appropriate
case, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law" and that because the complaint
in this case is unsigned and unverified, the case is not an appropriate one. This contention lacks
merit. As already stated, the Constitution expressly enjoins the Ombudsman to act on any
complaint filed "in any form or manner" concerning official acts or omissions. Thus, Art. XI, §
12 provides:

The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints
filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and shall in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the
result thereof. (Emphasis added)

Similarly, the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (Rep. Act No. 6770) provides in § 26(2):

The Office of the Ombudsman shall receive complaints from any source in whatever form
concerning an official act or omission. It shall act on the complaint immediately and if it finds
the same entirely baseless, it shall dismiss the same and inform the complainant of such
dismissal citing the reasons therefor. If it finds a reasonable ground to investigate further, it shall
first furnish the respondent public officer or employee with a summary of the complaint and
require him to submit a written answer within seventy-two hours from receipt thereof. If the
answer is found satisfactory, it shall dismiss the case. (Emphasis added)

Accordingly, in Diaz v. Sandiganbayan 27 the Court held that testimony given at a fact-finding
investigation and charges made in a pleading in a case in court constituted a sufficient basis for
the Ombudsman to commence investigation, because a formal complaint was really not
necessary.

Rather than referring to the form of complaints, therefore, the phrase "in an appropriate case" in
Art. XI, § 12 means any case concerning official act or omission which is alleged to be "illegal,
unjust, improper, or inefficient." 28 The phrase "subject to such limitations as may be provided
by law" refers to such limitations as may be provided by Congress or, in the absence thereof, to
such limitations as may be imposed by the courts. Such limitations may well include a
requirement that the investigation be concluded in camera, with the public excluded, as exception
to the general nature of the proceedings in the Office of the Ombudsman. 29 A reconciliation is
thereby made between the demands of national security and the requirement of accountability
enshrined in the Constitution. 30

What has been said above disposes of petitioners' contention that the anonymous letter-complaint
against them is nothing but a vexatious prosecution. It only remains to say that the general
investigation in the Ombudsman' s office is precisely for the purpose of protecting those against
whom a complaint is filed against hasty, malicious, and oppressive prosecution as much as
securing the State from useless and expensive trials. There may also be benefit resulting from
such limited in camera inspection in terms of increased public confidence that the privilege is not
being abused and increased likelihood that no abuse is in fact occurring.

II.

Nor is there violation of petitioner's right to the equal protection of the laws. Petitioners complain
that "in all forum and tribunals . . . the aggrieved parties . . . can only hale respondents via their
verified complaints or sworn statements with their identities fully disclosed," while in
proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman anonymous letters suffice to start an
investigation. In the first place, there can be no objection to this procedure because it is provided
in the Constitution itself. In the second place, it is apparent that in permitting the filing of
complaints "in any form and in a manner," the framers of the Constitution took into account the
well-known reticence of the people which keep them from complaining against official
wrongdoings. As this Court had occasion to point out, the Office of the Ombudsman is different
from the other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the government because those subject to
its jurisdiction are public officials who, through official pressure and influence, can quash, delay
or dismiss investigations held against them. 31 On the other hand complainants are more often
than not poor and simple folk who cannot afford to hire lawyers. 32

III.

Finally, it is contended that the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum would violate petitioners'
right against self-incrimination. It is enough to state that the documents required to be produced
in this case are public records and those to whom the subpoena duces tecum is directed are
government officials in whose possession or custody the documents are. Moreover, if, as
petitioners claim the disbursement by the EIIB of funds for personal service has already been
cleared by the COA, there is no reason why they should object to the examination of the
documents by respondent Ombudsman.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, but it is directed that the inspection of subpoenaed
documents be made personally in camera by the Ombudsman, and with all the safeguards
outlined in this decision.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 130716. December 9, 1998]

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD

GOVERNMENT (PCGG) and MAGTANGGOL GUNIGUNDO, (in his capacity as
chairman of the PCGG), respondents. GLORIA A. JOPSON, CELNAN A. JOPSON,
SCARLET A. JOPSON, and TERESA A. JOPSON, petitioners-in-intervention.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J:

Petitioner asks this Court to define the nature and the extent of the people’s constitutional
right to information on matters of public concern. Does this right include access to the terms of
government negotiations prior to their consummation or conclusion? May the government,
through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), be required to reveal the
proposed terms of a compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs as regards their alleged
ill-gotten wealth? More specifically, are the “General Agreement” and “Supplemental
Agreement,” both dated December 28, 1993 and executed between the PCGG and the Marcos
heirs, valid and binding?

The Case

These are the main questions raised in this original action seeking (1) to prohibit and
“[e]njoin respondents [PCGG and its chairman] from privately entering into, perfecting and/or
executing any agreement with the heirs of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos x x x
relating to and concerning the properties and assets of Ferdinand Marcos located in the
Philippines and/or abroad -- including the so-called Marcos gold hoard”; and (2) to “[c]ompel
respondent[s] to make public all negotiations and agreement, be they ongoing or perfected, and
all documents related to or relating to such negotiations and agreement between the PCGG and
the Marcos heirs.”i

The Facts

Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, as “taxpayer, citizen and former government official who
initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies who committed unmitigated plunder
of the public treasury and the systematic subjugation of the country’s economy,” alleges that
what impelled him to bring this action were several news reportsii bannered in a number of
broadsheets sometime in September 1997. These news items referred to (1) the alleged
discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss
banks; and (2) the reported execution of a compromise, between the government (through PCGG)
and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets.
Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to informationiii and the correlative duty of the
state to disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national interest,iv demands that
respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG’s task of
recovering the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth. He claims that any compromise on the alleged
billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of “paramount public interest,” since it has a
“debilitating effect on the country’s economy” that would be greatly prejudicial to the national
interest of the Filipino people. Hence, the people in general have a right to know the
transactions or deals being contrived and effected by the government.
Respondents, on the other hand, do not deny forging a compromise agreement with the
Marcos heirs. They claim, though, that petitioner’s action is premature, because there is no
showing that he has asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the Agreements. And
even if he has, PCGG may not yet be compelled to make any disclosure, since the proposed
terms and conditions of the Agreements have not become effective and binding.
Respondents further aver that the Marcos heirs have submitted the subject Agreements to the
Sandiganbayan for its approval in Civil Case No. 141, entitled Republic v. Heirs of Ferdinand E.
Marcos, and that the Republic opposed such move on the principal grounds that (1) said
Agreements have not been ratified by or even submitted to the President for approval, pursuant
to Item No. 8 of the General Agreement; and (2) the Marcos heirs have failed to comply with
their undertakings therein, particularly the collation and submission of an inventory of their
assets. The Republic also cited an April 11, 1995 Resolution in Civil Case No. 0165, in which
the Sandiganbayan dismissed a similar petition filed by the Marcoses’ attorney-in-fact.
Furthermore, then President Fidel V. Ramos, in his May 4, 1998 Memorandumv to then
PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo, categorically stated:
“This is to reiterate my previous position embodied in the Palace Press Release of 6
April 1995 that I have not authorized you to approve the Compromise Agreements of
December 28, 1993 or any agreement at all with the Marcoses, and would have
disapproved them had they been submitted to me.
“The Full Powers of Attorney of March 1994 and July 4, 1994, did not authorize
you to approve said Agreements, which I reserve for myself as President of the
Republic of the Philippines.”
The assailed principal Agreementvi reads:
“GENERAL AGREEMENT
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
This Agreement entered into this 28th day of December, 1993, by and between -
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), a governmental agency vested with authority defined under
Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14, with offices at the Philcomcen Building, Pasig,
Metro Manila, represented by its Chairman referred to as the FIRST PARTY,
 -- and --
Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos, represented by Imelda Romualdez Marcos and
Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., all of legal age, and with address at c/o No. 154 Lopez Rizal
St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, and Imelda Romualdez Marcos, Imee Marcos
Manotoc, Ferdinand E. Marcos, Jr., and Irene Marcos Araneta, hereinafter collectively
referred to as the PRIVATE PARTY.
W I T N E S S E T H:
WHEREAS, the PRIVATE PARTY has been impelled by their sense of
nationalism and love of country and of the entire Filipino people, and their desire to set
up a foundation and finance impact projects like installation of power plants in selected
rural areas and initiation of other community projects for the empowerment of the
people;
WHEREAS, the FIRST PARTY has obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal
Tribunal of December 21, 1990, that the $356 million belongs in principle to the
Republic of the Philippines provided certain conditionalities are met, but even after 7
years, the FIRST PARTY has not been able to procure a final judgment of conviction
against the PRIVATE PARTY;
WHEREAS, the FIRST PARTY is desirous of avoiding a long-drawn out litigation
which, as proven by the past 7 years, is consuming money, time and effort, and is
counter-productive and ties up assets which the FIRST PARTY could otherwise utilize
for its Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, and other urgent needs;
WHEREAS, His Excellency, President Fidel V. Ramos, has adopted a policy of
unity and reconciliation in order to bind the nation’s wounds and start the process of
rebuilding this nation as it goes on to the twenty-first century;
WHEREAS, this Agreement settles all claims and counterclaims which the parties
may have against one another, whether past, present, or future, matured or inchoate.
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the mutual covenants set forth
herein, the parties agree as follows:
1. The parties will collate all assets presumed to be owned by, or held by other parties
for the benefit of, the PRIVATE PARTY for purposes of determining the totality of
the assets covered by the settlement. The subject assets shall be classified by the
nature thereof, namely: (a) real estate; (b) jewelry; (c) paintings and other works of
art; (d) securities; (e) funds on deposit; (f) precious metals, if any, and (g)
miscellaneous assets or assets which could not appropriately fall under any of the
preceding classification. The list shall be based on the full disclosure of the
PRIVATE PARTY to insure its accuracy.
2. Based on the inventory, the FIRST PARTY shall determine which shall be ceded to
the FIRST PARTY, and which shall be assigned to/retained by the PRIVATE
PARTY. The assets of the PRIVATE PARTY shall be net of, and exempt from,
any form of taxes due the Republic of the Philippines. However, considering the
unavailability of all pertinent and relevant documents and information as to balances
 and ownership, the actual specification of assets to be retained by the PRIVATE
PARTY shall be covered by supplemental agreements which shall form part of this
Agreement.
3. Foreign assets which the PRIVATE PARTY shall fully disclose but which are held
by trustees, nominees, agents or foundations are hereby waived over by the
PRIVATE PARTY in favor of the FIRST PARTY. For this purpose, the parties
shall cooperate in taking the appropriate action, judicial and/or extrajudicial, to
recover the same for the FIRST PARTY.
4. All disclosures of assets made by the PRIVATE PARTY shall not be used as
evidence by the FIRST PARTY in any criminal, civil, tax or administrative case, but
shall be valid and binding against said PARTY for use by the FIRST PARTY in
withdrawing any account and/or recovering any asset. The PRIVATE PARTY
withdraws any objection to the withdrawal by and/or release to the FIRST PARTY
by the Swiss banks and/or Swiss authorities of the $356 million, its accrued interests,
and/or any other account; over which the PRIVATE PARTY waives any right,
interest or participation in favor of the FIRST PARTY. However, any withdrawal
or release of any account aforementioned by the FIRST PARTY shall be made in the
presence of any authorized representative of the PRIVATE PARTY.
5. The trustees, custodians, safekeepers, depositaries, agents, nominees, administrators,
lawyers, or any other party acting in similar capacity in behalf of the PRIVATE
PARTY are hereby informed through this General Agreement to insure that it is fully
implemented and this shall serve as absolute authority from both parties for full
disclosure to the FIRST PARTY of said assets and for the FIRST PARTY to
withdraw said account and/or assets and any other assets which the FIRST PARTY
on its own or through the help of the PRIVATE PARTY/their trustees, etc., may
discover.
6. Any asset which may be discovered in the future as belonging to the PRIVATE
PARTY or is being held by another for the benefit of the PRIVATE PARTY and
which is not included in the list per No. 1 for whatever reason shall automatically
belong to the FIRST PARTY, and the PRIVATE PARTY in accordance with No. 4
above, waives any right thereto.
7. This Agreement shall be binding on, and inure to the benefit of, the parties and their
respective legal representatives, successors and assigns and shall supersede any other
prior agreement.
8. The PARTIES shall submit this and any other implementing Agreements to the
President of the Philippines for approval. In the same manner, the PRIVATE
PARTY shall provide the FIRST PARTY assistance by way of testimony or
deposition on any information it may have that could shed light on the cases being
pursued by the FIRST PARTY against other parties. The FIRST PARTY shall
desist from instituting new suits already subject of this Agreement against the
PRIVATE PARTY and cause the dismissal of all other cases pending in the
Sandiganbayan and in other courts.
9. In case of violation by the PRIVATE PARTY of any of the conditions herein
contained, the PARTIES shall be restored automatically to the status quo ante the
signing of this Agreement.
For purposes of this Agreement, the PRIVATE PARTY shall be represented by
Atty. Simeon M. Mesina, Jr., as their only Attorney-in-Fact.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have signed this instrument this 28th day of
December, 1993, in Makati, Metro Manila.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON
GOOD GOVERNMENT
By:
[Sgd.] MAGTANGGOL C. GUNIGUNDO
Chairman
ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R.
MARCOS, MA. IMELDA MARCOS-MANOTOC,
FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., & IRENE
MARCOS-ARANETA
By:
[Sgd.]IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS
[Sgd.] MA. IMELDA MARCOS-MANOTOC
FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR.vii
[Sgd.] IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA
Assisted by:
[Sgd.] ATTY. SIMEON M. MESINA, JR.
Counsel& Attorney-in-Fact”
viii
Petitioner also denounces this supplement to the above Agreement:
“SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT
This Agreement entered into this 28th day of December, 1993, by and between --
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), a governmental agency vested with authority defined under
Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14, with offices at the Philcomcen Building, Pasig,
Metro Manila, represented by its Chairman Magtanggol C. Gunigundo, hereinafter
referred to as the FIRST PARTY,
-- and --
Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos, represented by Imelda Romualdez Marcos and
Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., all of legal age, and with address at c/o No. 154 Lopez Rizal
St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, and Imelda Romualdez Marcos, Imee Marcos
 Manotoc, Ferdinand E. Marcos, Jr., and Irene Marcos Araneta, hereinafter collectively
referred to as the PRIVATE PARTY.
W I T N E S S E T H:
The parties in this case entered into a General Agreement dated Dec. 28, 1993;
The PRIVATE PARTY expressly reserve their right to pursue their interest and/or
sue over local assets located in the Philippines against parties other than the FIRST
PARTY.
The parties hereby agree that all expenses related to the recovery and/or
withdrawal of all assets including lawyers’ fees, agents’ fees, nominees’ service fees,
bank charges, traveling expenses and all other expenses related thereto shall be for the
account of the PRIVATE PARTY.
In consideration of the foregoing, the parties hereby agree that the PRIVATE
PARTY shall be entitled to the equivalent of 25% of the amount that may be eventually
withdrawn from said $356 million Swiss deposits.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have signed this instrument this 28th day of
December, 1993, in Makati, Metro Manila.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON
GOOD GOVERNMENT
By:
[Sgd.] MAGTANGGOL C. GUNIGUNDO
Chairman
ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R.
MARCOS, MA. IMELDA MARCOS-MANOTOC,
FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR.,& IRENE
MARCOS-ARANETA
By:
[Sgd.] IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS
[Sgd.] MA. IMELDA MARCOS-MANOTOC
FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR.ix
[Sgd.] IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA
Assisted by:
[Sgd.] ATTY. SIMEON M. MESINA, JR.
Counsel & Attorney-in-Fact”
Acting on a motion of petitioner, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Orderx dated
March 23, 1998, enjoining respondents, their agents and/or representatives from “entering into,
or perfecting and/or executing any agreement with the heirs of the late President Ferdinand E.
Marcos relating to and concerning their ill-gotten wealth.”

Issues

The Oral Argument, held on March 16, 1998, focused on the following issues:
“(a) Procedural:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner has the personality or legal standing to file the
instant petition; and
(2) Whether or not this Court is the proper court before which this action may be
filed.
(b) Substantive:
(1) Whether or not this Court could require the PCGG to disclose to the public the
details of any agreement, perfected or not, with the Marcoses; and
(2) Whether or not there exist any legal restraints against a compromise
agreement between the Marcoses and the PCGG relative to the Marcoses’ ill-gotten
wealth.”xi
After their oral presentations, the parties filed their respective memoranda.
On August 19, 1998, Gloria, Celnan, Scarlet and Teresa, all surnamed Jopson, filed before
the Court a Motion for Intervention, attaching thereto their Petition in Intervention. They aver
that they are “among the 10,000 claimants whose right to claim from the Marcos Family and/or
the Marcos Estate is recognized by the decision in In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human
Rights Litigation, Maximo Hilao, et al., Class Plaintiffs No. 92-15526, U.S. Court of Appeals
for the 9th Circuit US App. Lexis 14796, June 16, 1994 and the Decision of the Swiss Supreme
Court of December 10, 1997.” As such, they claim to have personal and direct interest in the
subject matter of the instant case, since a distribution or disposition of the Marcos properties may
adversely affect their legitimate claims. In a minute Resolution issued on August 24, 1998, the
Court granted their motion to intervene and required the respondents to comment thereon. The
September 25, 1998 Commentxii of the solicitor general on said motion merely reiterated his
aforecited arguments against the main petition.xiii

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is imbued with merit.

First Procedural Issue: Petitioner’s Standing

 Petitioner, on the one hand, explains that as a taxpayer and citizen, he has the legal
personality to file the instant petition. He submits that since ill-gotten wealth “belongs to the
Filipino people and [is], in truth and in fact, part of the public treasury,” any compromise in
relation to it would constitute a diminution of the public funds, which can be enjoined by a
taxpayer whose interest is for a full, if not substantial, recovery of such assets.
Besides, petitioner emphasizes, the matter of recovering the ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses is an issue “of transcendental importance to the public.” He asserts that ordinary
taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning the validity of acts or orders
of government agencies or instrumentalities, if the issues raised are “of paramount public
interest;” and if they “immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the
people.”
Moreover, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest,
when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right,xiv such as in this case. He invokes
several decisionsxv of this Court which have set aside the procedural matter of locus standi,
when the subject of the case involved public interest.
On the other hand, the solicitor general, on behalf of respondents, contends that petitioner
has no standing to institute the present action, because no expenditure of public funds is involved
and said petitioner has no actual interest in the alleged agreement. Respondents further insist
that the instant petition is premature, since there is no showing that petitioner has requested
PCGG to disclose any such negotiations and agreements; or that, if he has, the Commission has
refused to do so.
Indeed, the arguments cited by petitioner constitute the controlling decisional rule as regards
his legal standing to institute the instant petition. Access to public documents and records is a
public right, and the real parties in interest are the people themselves.xvi
In Tañada v. Tuvera,xvii the Court asserted that when the issue concerns a public right and
the object of mandamus is to obtain the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as
the real parties in interest; and because it is sufficient that petitioner is a citizen and as such is
interested in the execution of the laws, he need not show that he has any legal or special interest
in the result of the action.xviii In the aforesaid case, the petitioners sought to enforce their right to
be informed on matters of public concern, a right then recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the
1973 Constitution,xix in connection with the rule that laws in order to be valid and enforceable
must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated. In ruling for
the petitioners’ legal standing, the Court declared that the right they sought to be enforced “is a
public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land.”
Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission,xx while reiterating Tañada, further declared that
“when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of
personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that petitioner is a citizen and, therefore, part of the
general ‘public’ which possesses the right.”xxi
Further, in Albano v. Reyes,xxii we said that while expenditure of public funds may not have
been involved under the questioned contract for the development, the management and the
operation of the Manila International Container Terminal, “public interest [was] definitely
involved considering the important role [of the subject contract] x x x in the economic
development of the country and the magnitude of the financial consideration involved.” We
concluded that, as a consequence, the disclosure provision in the Constitution would constitute
sufficient authority for upholding the petitioner’s standing.
Similarly, the instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to information and
access to official records, documents and papers -- a right guaranteed under Section 7, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner, a former solicitor general, is a Filipino citizen. Because
of the satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down by decisional law to sustain petitioner’s
legal standing, i.e. (1) the enforcement of a public right (2) espoused by a Filipino citizen, we
rule that the petition at bar should be allowed.
In any event, the question on the standing of Petitioner Chavez is rendered moot by the
intervention of the Jopsons, who are among the legitimate claimants to the Marcos wealth. The
standing of the Jopsons is not seriously contested by the solicitor general. Indeed, said
petitioners-intervenors have a legal interest in the subject matter of the instant case, since a
distribution or disposition of the Marcoses’ ill-gotten properties may adversely affect the
satisfaction of their claims.

Second Procedural Issue:The Court’s Jurisdiction

Petitioner asserts that because this petition is an original action for mandamus and one that is
not intended to delay any proceeding in the Sandiganbayan, its having been filed before this
Court was proper. He invokes Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, which confers upon
the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over petitions for prohibition and mandamus.
The solicitor general, on the other hand, argues that the petition has been erroneously
brought before this Court, since there is neither a justiciable controversy nor a violation of
petitioner’s rights by the PCGG. He alleges that the assailed agreements are already the very lis
mota in Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0141, which has yet to dispose of the issue; thus, this
petition is premature. Furthermore, respondents themselves have opposed the Marcos heirs’
motion, filed in the graft court, for the approval of the subject Agreements. Such opposition
belies petitioner’s claim that the government, through respondents, has concluded a settlement
with the Marcoses as regards their alleged ill-gotten assets.
In Tañada and Legaspi, we upheld therein petitioners’ resort to a mandamus proceeding,
seeking to enforce a public right as well as to compel performance of a public duty mandated by
no less than the fundamental law.xxiii Further, Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution,
expressly confers upon the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus.
Respondents argue that petitioner should have properly sought relief before the
Sandiganbayan, particularly in Civil Case No. 0141, in which the enforcement of the
compromise Agreements is pending resolution. There may seem to be some merit in such
argument, if petitioner is merely seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the compromise and/or to
compel the PCGG to disclose to the public the terms contained in said Agreements. However,
petitioner is here seeking the public disclosure of “all negotiations and agreement, be they
ongoing or perfected, and documents related to or relating to such negotiations and agreement
between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs.”
 In other words, this petition is not confined to the Agreements that have already been drawn,
but likewise to any other ongoing or future undertaking towards any settlement on the alleged
Marcos loot. Ineluctably, the core issue boils down to the precise interpretation, in terms of
scope, of the twin constitutional provisions on “public transactions.” This broad and
prospective relief sought by the instant petition brings it out of the realm of Civil Case No. 0141.

First Substantive Issue:

Public Disclosure of Terms of Any Agreement, Perfected or Not

In seeking the public disclosure of negotiations and agreements pertaining to a compromise

settlement with the Marcoses as regards their alleged ill-gotten wealth, petitioner invokes the
following provisions of the Constitution:
“Sec. 7 [Article III]. The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research
data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.”
“Sec. 28 [Article II]. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State
adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest.”
Respondents’ opposite view is that the above constitutional provisions refer to completed
and operative official acts, not to those still being considered. As regards the assailed
Agreements entered into by the PCGG with the Marcoses, there is yet no right of action that has
accrued, because said Agreements have not been approved by the President, and the Marcos
heirs have failed to fulfill their express undertaking therein. Thus, the Agreements have not
become effective. Respondents add that they are not aware of any ongoing negotiation for
another compromise with the Marcoses regarding their alleged ill-gotten assets.
The “information” and the “transactions” referred to in the subject provisions of the
Constitution have as yet no defined scope and extent. There are no specific laws prescribing the
exact limitations within which the right may be exercised or the correlative state duty may be
obliged. However, the following are some of the recognized restrictions: (1) national security
matters and intelligence information, (2) trade secrets and banking transactions, (3) criminal
matters, and (4) other confidential information.

Limitations to the Right: (1) National Security Matters

At the very least, this jurisdiction recognizes the common law holding that there is a
governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military,
diplomatic and other national security matters.xxiv But where there is no need to protect such
state secrets, the privilege may not be invoked to withhold documents and other information,xxv
provided that they are examined “in strict confidence” and given “scrupulous protection.”
 Likewise, information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and
executive agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of national interest.xxvi

(2) Trade Secrets and Banking Transactions

The drafters of the Constitution also unequivocally affirmed that, aside from national
security matters and intelligence information, trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the
Intellectual Property Codexxvii and other related laws) as well as banking transactions (pursuant
to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Actxxviii) are also exempted from compulsory disclosure.xxix

(3) Criminal Matters

Also excluded are classified law enforcement matters, such as those relating to the
apprehension, the prosecution and the detention of criminals,xxx which courts may not inquire
into prior to such arrest, detention and prosecution. Efforts at effective law enforcement would
be seriously jeopardized by free public access to, for example, police information regarding
rescue operations, the whereabouts of fugitives, or leads on covert criminal activities.

(4) Other Confidential Information

The Ethical Standards Actxxxi further prohibits public officials and employees from using or
divulging “confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their
office and not made available to the public.”xxxii
Other acknowledged limitations to information access include diplomatic correspondence,
closed door Cabinet meetings and executive sessions of either house of Congress, as well as the
internal deliberations of the Supreme Court.xxxiii

Scope: Matters of Public Concern and Transactions Involving Public Interest

In Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr.,xxxiv the Court emphasized that the information sought must be
“matters of public concern,” access to which may be limited by law. Similarly, the state policy
of full public disclosure extends only to “transactions involving public interest” and may
also be “subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law.” As to the meanings of the terms
“public interest” and “public concern,” the Court, in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission,xxxv
elucidated:
“In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is
no rigid test which can be applied. ‘Public concern’ like ‘public interest’ is a term that
eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the
public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply
 because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final
analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at
issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.”
Considered a public concern in the above-mentioned case was the “legitimate concern of
citizens to ensure that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only
by persons who are eligibles.” So was the need to give the general public adequate notification
of various laws that regulate and affect the actions and conduct of citizens, as held in Tañada.
Likewise did the “public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by
the alleged borrowers (members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa)” qualify the information
sought in Valmonte as matters of public interest and concern. In Aquino-Sarmiento v.
xxxvi
Morato, the Court also held that official acts of public officers done in pursuit of their
official functions are public in character; hence, the records pertaining to such official acts and
decisions are within the ambit of the constitutional right of access to public records.
Under Republic Act No. 6713, public officials and employees are mandated to “provide
information on their policies and procedures in clear and understandable language, [and] ensure
openness of information, public consultations and hearings whenever appropriate x x x,”
except when “otherwise provided by law or when required by the public interest.” In
particular, the law mandates free public access, at reasonable hours, to the annual performance
reports of offices and agencies of government and government-owned or controlled corporations;
and the statements of assets, liabilities and financial disclosures of all public officials and
employees.xxxvii
In general, writings coming into the hands of public officers in connection with their official
functions must be accessible to the public, consistent with the policy of transparency of
governmental affairs. This principle is aimed at affording the people an opportunity to
determine whether those to whom they have entrusted the affairs of the government are honestly,
faithfully and competently performing their functions as public servants.xxxviii Undeniably, the
essence of democracy lies in the free flow of thought;xxxix but thoughts and ideas must be
well-informed so that the public would gain a better perspective of vital issues confronting them
and, thus, be able to criticize as well as participate in the affairs of the government in a
responsible, reasonable and effective manner. Certainly, it is by ensuring an unfettered and
uninhibited exchange of ideas among a well-informed public that a government remains
responsive to the changes desired by the people.xl

The Nature of the Marcoses’ Alleged Ill-Gotten Wealth

We now come to the immediate matter under consideration.

Upon the departure from the country of the Marcos family and their cronies in February
1986, the new government headed by President Corazon C. Aquino was specifically mandated to
“[r]ecover ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime and
[to] protect the interest of the people through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets or
accounts.”xli Thus, President Aquino’s very first executive orders (which partook of the nature of
legislative enactments) dealt with the recovery of these alleged ill-gotten properties.
 Executive Order No. 1, promulgated on February 28, 1986, only two (2) days after the
Marcoses fled the country, created the PCGG which was primarily tasked to assist the President
in the recovery of vast government resources allegedly amassed by former President Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives and close associates both here and abroad.
Under Executive Order No. 2, issued twelve (12) days later, all persons and entities who had
knowledge or possession of ill-gotten assets and properties were warned and, under pain of
penalties prescribed by law, prohibited from concealing, transferring or dissipating them or from
otherwise frustrating or obstructing the recovery efforts of the government.
On May 7, 1986, another directive (EO No. 14) was issued giving additional powers to the
PCGG which, taking into account the overriding considerations of national interest and national
survival, required it to achieve expeditiously and effectively its vital task of recovering ill-gotten
wealth.
With such pronouncements of our government, whose authority emanates from the people,
there is no doubt that the recovery of the Marcoses’ alleged ill-gotten wealth is a matter of public
concern and imbued with public interest.xlii We may also add that “ill-gotten wealth,” by its very
nature, assumes a public character. Based on the aforementioned Executive Orders, “ill-gotten
wealth” refers to assets and properties purportedly acquired, directly or indirectly, by former
President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives and close associates through or as a result of
their improper or illegal use of government funds or properties; or their having taken undue
advantage of their public office; or their use of powers, influences or relationships, “resulting in
their unjust enrichment and causing grave damage and prejudice to the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines.” Clearly, the assets and properties referred to supposedly
originated from the government itself. To all intents and purposes, therefore, they belong to the
people. As such, upon reconveyance they will be returned to the public treasury, subject only to
the satisfaction of positive claims of certain persons as may be adjudged by competent courts.
Another declared overriding consideration for the expeditious recovery of ill-gotten wealth is
that it may be used for national economic recovery.
We believe the foregoing disquisition settles the question of whether petitioner has a right to
respondents’ disclosure of any agreement that may be arrived at concerning the Marcoses’
purported ill-gotten wealth.

Access to Information on Negotiating Terms

But does the constitutional provision likewise guarantee access to information regarding
ongoing negotiations or proposals prior to the final agreement? This same clarification was
sought and clearly addressed by the constitutional commissioners during their deliberations,
which we quote hereunder:xliii
“MR. SUAREZ. And when we say ‘transactions’ which should be distinguished
from contracts, agreements, or treaties or whatever, does the Gentleman refer to the
steps leading to the consummation of the contract, or does he refer to the contract itself?
 “MR. OPLE. The ‘transactions’ used here, I suppose, is generic and, therefore, it
can cover both steps leading to a contract, and already a consummated contract, Mr.
Presiding Officer.
“MR. SUAREZ. This contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the
consummation of the transaction?
“MR. OPLE. Yes, subject to reasonable safeguards on the national interest.”
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, we believe that it is
incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to
disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take
up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though,
must pertain to definite propositions of the government, not necessarily to intra-agency or
inter-agency recommendations or communicationsxliv during the stage when common assertions
are still in the process of being formulated or are in the “exploratory” stage. There is a need, of
course, to observe the same restrictions on disclosure of information in general, as discussed
earlier -- such as on matters involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations,
intelligence and other classified information.

Second Substantive Issue: Legal Restraints on a Marcos-PCGG Compromise

Petitioner lastly contends that any compromise agreement between the government and the
Marcoses will be a virtual condonation of all the alleged wrongs done by them, as well as an
unwarranted permission to commit graft and corruption.
Respondents, for their part, assert that there is no legal restraint on entering into a
compromise with the Marcos heirs, provided the agreement does not violate any law.

Prohibited Compromises

In general, the law encourages compromises in civil cases, except with regard to the
following matters: (1) the civil status of persons, (2) the validity of a marriage or a legal
separation, (3) any ground for legal separation, (4) future support, (5) the jurisdiction of courts,
and (6) future legitime.xlv And like any other contract, the terms and conditions of a compromise
must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy or public order.xlvi A
compromise is binding and has the force of law between the parties,xlvii unless the consent of a
party is vitiated -- such as by mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence -- or when
there is forgery, or if the terms of the settlement are so palpably unconscionable. In the latter
instances, the agreement may be invalidated by the courts.xlviii

Effect of Compromise on Civil Actions

 One of the consequences of a compromise, and usually its primary object, is to avoid or to
end a litigation.xlix In fact, the law urges courts to persuade the parties in a civil case to agree to a
fair settlement.l As an incentive, a court may mitigate damages to be paid by a losing party who
shows a sincere desire to compromise.li
In Republic & Campos Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,lii which affirmed the grant by the PCGG of
civil and criminal immunity to Jose Y. Campos and family, the Court held that in the absence of
an express prohibition, the rule on compromises in civil actions under the Civil Code is
applicable to PCGG cases. Such principle is pursuant to the objectives of EO No. 14,
particularly the just and expeditious recovery of ill-gotten wealth, so that it may be used to hasten
economic recovery. The same principle was upheld in Benedicto v. Board of Administrators of
Television Stations RPN, BBC and IBCliii and Republic v. Benedicto,liv which ruled in favor of
the validity of the PCGG compromise agreement with Roberto S. Benedicto.

Immunity from Criminal Prosecution

However, any compromise relating to the civil liability arising from an offense does
not automatically terminate the criminal proceeding against or extinguish the criminal
liability of the malefactor.lv While a compromise in civil suits is expressly authorized by law,
there is no similar general sanction as regards criminal liability. The authority must be
specifically conferred. In the present case, the power to grant criminal immunity was conferred
on PCGG by Section 5 of EO No. 14, as amended by EO No. 14-A, which provides:
“SECTION 5. The Presidential Commission on Good Government is authorized
to grant immunity from criminal prosecution to any person who provides information or
testifies in any investigation conducted by such Commission to establish the unlawful
manner in which any respondent, defendant or accused has acquired or accumulated the
property or properties in question in any case where such information or testimony is
necessary to ascertain or prove the latter’s guilt or his civil liability. The immunity
thereby granted shall be continued to protect the witness who repeats such testimony
before the Sandiganbayan when required to do so by the latter or by the Commission.”
The above provision specifies that the PCGG may exercise such authority under these
conditions: (1) the person to whom criminal immunity is granted provides information
or testifies in an investigation conducted by the Commission; (2) the information or testimony
pertains to the unlawful manner in which the respondent, defendant or accused acquired or
accumulated ill-gotten property; and (3) such information or testimony is necessary to ascertain
or prove guilt or civil liability of such individual. From the wording of the law, it can be easily
deduced that the person referred to is a witness in the proceeding, not the principal respondent,
defendant or accused.
Thus, in the case of Jose Y. Campos, the grant of both civil and criminal immunity to him
and his family was “[i]n consideration of the full cooperation of Mr. Jose Y. Campos [with] this
Commission, his voluntary surrender of the properties and assets [--] disclosed and declared by
him to belong to deposed President Ferdinand E. Marcos [--] to the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines[;] his full, complete and truthful disclosures[;] and his commitment to pay a
sum of money as determined by the Philippine Government.”lvi Moreover, the grant of criminal
immunity to the Camposes and the Benedictos was limited to acts and omissions prior to
February 25, 1996. At the time such immunity was granted, no criminal cases have yet been
filed against them before the competent courts.

Validity of the PCGG-Marcos Compromise Agreements

Going now to the subject General and Supplemental Agreements between the PCGG and the
Marcos heirs, a cursory perusal thereof reveals serious legal flaws. First, the Agreements do
not conform to the above requirements of EO Nos. 14 and 14-A. We believe that criminal
immunity under Section 5 cannot be granted to the Marcoses, who are the principal
defendants in the spate of ill-gotten wealth cases now pending before the Sandiganbayan.
As stated earlier, the provision is applicable mainly to witnesses who provide information or
testify against a respondent, defendant or accused in an ill-gotten wealth case.
While the General Agreement states that the Marcoses “shall provide the [government]
assistance by way of testimony or deposition on any information [they] may have that could shed
light on the cases being pursued by the [government] against other parties,”lvii the clause does
not fully comply with the law. Its inclusion in the Agreement may have been only an
afterthought, conceived in pro forma compliance with Section 5 of EO No. 14, as
amended. There is no indication whatsoever that any of the Marcos heirs has indeed provided
vital information against any respondent or defendant as to the manner in which the latter may
have unlawfully acquired public property.
Second, under Item No. 2 of the General Agreement, the PCGG commits to exempt from all
forms of taxes the properties to be retained by the Marcos heirs. This is a clear violation of the
Constitution. The power to tax and to grant tax exemptions is vested in the Congress and, to a
certain extent, in the local legislative bodies.lviii Section 28 (4), Article VI of the Constitution,
specifically provides: “No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the
concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.” The PCGG has absolutely no
power to grant tax exemptions, even under the cover of its authority to compromise
ill-gotten wealth cases.
Even granting that Congress enacts a law exempting the Marcoses from paying taxes on
their properties, such law will definitely not pass the test of the equal protection clause under the
Bill of Rights. Any special grant of tax exemption in favor only of the Marcos heirs will
constitute class legislation. It will also violate the constitutional rule that “taxation shall be
uniform and equitable.”lix
Neither can the stipulation be construed to fall within the power of the commissioner of
internal revenue to compromise taxes. Such authority may be exercised only when (1) there is
reasonable doubt as to the validity of the claim against the taxpayer, and (2) the
taxpayer’s financial position demonstrates a clear inability to pay.lx Definitely, neither requisite
is present in the case of the Marcoses, because under the Agreement they are effectively
conceding the validity of the claims against their properties, part of which they will be allowed to
retain. Nor can the PCGG grant of tax exemption fall within the power of the commissioner to
abate or cancel a tax liability. This power can be exercised only when (1) the tax appears to be
unjustly or excessively assessed, or (2) the administration and collection costs involved do not
justify the collection of the tax due.lxi In this instance, the cancellation of tax liability is done
even before the determination of the amount due. In any event, criminal violations of the Tax
Code, for which legal actions have been filed in court or in which fraud is involved, cannot be
compromised.lxii
Third, the government binds itself to cause the dismissal of all cases against the Marcos
heirs, pending before the Sandiganbayan and other courts.lxiii This is a direct encroachment on
judicial powers, particularly in regard to criminal jurisdiction. Well-settled is the doctrine that
once a case has been filed before a court of competent jurisdiction, the matter of its dismissal or
pursuance lies within the full discretion and control of the judge. In a criminal case, the manner
in which the prosecution is handled, including the matter of whom to present as witnesses, may
lie within the sound discretion of the government prosecutor;lxiv but the court decides, based on
the evidence proffered, in what manner it will dispose of the case. Jurisdiction, once acquired
by the trial court, is not lost despite a resolution, even by the justice secretary, to withdraw the
information or to dismiss the complaint.lxv The prosecution’s motion to withdraw or to dismiss is
not the least binding upon the court. On the contrary, decisional rules require the trial court to
make its own evaluation of the merits of the case, because granting such motion is equivalent to
effecting a disposition of the case itself.lxvi
Thus, the PCGG, as the government prosecutor of ill-gotten wealth cases, cannot
guarantee the dismissal of all such criminal cases against the Marcoses pending in the
courts, for said dismissal is not within its sole power and discretion.
Fourth, the government also waives all claims and counterclaims, “whether past, present, or
future, matured or inchoate,” against the Marcoses.lxvii Again, this all-encompassing stipulation
is contrary to law. Under the Civil Code, an action for future fraud may not be waived.lxviii The
stipulation in the Agreement does not specify the exact scope of future claims against the
Marcoses that the government thereby relinquishes. Such vague and broad statement may
well be interpreted to include all future illegal acts of any of the Marcos heirs, practically giving
them a license to perpetrate fraud against the government without any liability at all. This is a
palpable violation of the due process and equal protection guarantees of the Constitution. It
effectively ensconces the Marcoses beyond the reach of the law. It also sets a dangerous
precedent for public accountability. It is a virtual warrant for public officials to amass
public funds illegally, since there is an open option to compromise their liability in
exchange for only a portion of their ill-gotten wealth.
Fifth, the Agreements do not provide for a definite or determinable period within which the
parties shall fulfill their respective prestations. It may take a lifetime before the Marcoses
submit an inventory of their total assets.
Sixth, the Agreements do not state with specificity the standards for determining which
assets shall be forfeited by the government and which shall be retained by the Marcoses. While
the Supplemental Agreement provides that the Marcoses shall be entitled to 25 per cent of the
$356 million Swiss deposits (less government recovery expenses), such sharing arrangement
pertains only to the said deposits. No similar splitting scheme is defined with respect to the
other properties. Neither is there, anywhere in the Agreements, a statement of the basis for the
25-75 percent sharing ratio. Public officers entering into an arrangement appearing to be
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government, in violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act,lxix invite their indictment for corruption under the said law.
 Finally, the absence of then President Ramos’ approval of the principal Agreement, an
express condition therein, renders the compromise incomplete and unenforceable. Nevertheless,
as detailed above, even if such approval were obtained, the Agreements would still not be valid.
From the foregoing disquisition, it is crystal clear to the Court that the General and
Supplemental Agreements, both dated December 28, 1993, which the PCGG entered into
with the Marcos heirs, are violative of the Constitution and the laws aforementioned.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The General and Supplemental Agreements
dated December 28, 1993, which PCGG and the Marcos heirs entered into are hereby declared
NULL AND VOID for being contrary to law and the Constitution. Respondent PCGG, its
officers and all government functionaries and officials who are or may be directly or
indirectly involved in the recovery of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses
and their associates are DIRECTED to disclose to the public the terms of any proposed
compromise settlement, as well as the final agreement, relating to such alleged ill-gotten wealth,
in accordance with the discussions embodied in this Decision. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 133250. July 9, 2002]

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI

COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

This is an original Petition for Mandamus with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
and a temporary restraining order. The petition seeks to compel the Public Estates Authority
(PEA for brevity) to disclose all facts on PEAs then on-going renegotiations with Amari Coastal
Bay and Development Corporation (AMARI for brevity) to reclaim portions of Manila Bay. The
petition further seeks to enjoin PEA from signing a new agreement with AMARI involving such
reclamation.

The Facts

On November 20, 1973, the government, through the Commissioner of Public Highways,
signed a contract with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP
for brevity) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also
included the construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated
itself to carry out all the works in consideration of fifty percent of the total reclaimed land.
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No.
1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA to reclaim land, including foreshore and
submerged areas, and to develop, improve, acquire, x x x lease and sell any and all kinds of
lands.lxx On the same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085
transferring to PEA the lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Baylxxi under
the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
On December 29, 1981, then President Marcos issued a memorandum directing PEA to
amend its contract with CDCP, so that [A]ll future works in MCCRRP x x x shall be funded and
owned by PEA. Accordingly, PEA and CDCP executed a Memorandum of Agreement dated
December 29, 1981, which stated:
(i) CDCP shall undertake all reclamation, construction, and such other works in the
MCCRRP as may be agreed upon by the parties, to be paid according to progress of
works on a unit price/lump sum basis for items of work to be agreed upon, subject to
price escalation, retention and other terms and conditions provided for in Presidential
Decree No. 1594. All the financing required for such works shall be provided by PEA.
xxx
 (iii) x x x CDCP shall give up all its development rights and hereby agrees to cede and
transfer in favor of PEA, all of the rights, title, interest and participation of CDCP in and
to all the areas of land reclaimed by CDCP in the MCCRRP as of December 30, 1981
which have not yet been sold, transferred or otherwise disposed of by CDCP as of said
date, which areas consist of approximately Ninety-Nine Thousand Four Hundred
Seventy Three (99,473) square meters in the Financial Center Area covered by land
pledge No. 5 and approximately Three Million Three Hundred Eighty Two Thousand
Eight Hundred Eighty Eight (3,382,888) square meters of reclaimed areas at varying
elevations above Mean Low Water Level located outside the Financial Center Area and
the First Neighborhood Unit.lxxii
On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517,
granting and transferring to PEA the parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite
Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) containing a total area of one million nine
hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square meters. Subsequently, on
April 9, 1988, the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Paraaque issued Transfer Certificates
of Title Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands
known as the Freedom Islands located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road,
Paraaque City. The Freedom Islands have a total land area of One Million Five Hundred Seventy
Eight Thousand Four Hundred and Forty One (1,578,441) square meters or 157.841 hectares.
On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA for brevity) with
AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands. The JVA also required the
reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of submerged areas surrounding these islands to
complete the configuration in the Master Development Plan of the Southern Reclamation
Project-MCCRRP. PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public
bidding.lxxiii On April 28, 1995, the Board of Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245,
confirmed the JVA. lxxiv On June 8, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos, through then
Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA.lxxv
On November 29, 1996, then Senate President Ernesto Maceda delivered a privilege speech
in the Senate and denounced the JVA as the grandmother of all scams. As a result, the Senate
Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, conducted a joint investigation. The Senate
Committees reported the results of their investigation in Senate Committee Report No. 560 dated
September 16, 1997.lxxvi Among the conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA
seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the government
has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the
certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal.
On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential Administrative
Order No. 365 creating a Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view
of Senate Committee Report No. 560. The members of the Legal Task Force were the Secretary
of Justice,lxxvii the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel,lxxviii and the Government Corporate
Counsel.lxxix The Legal Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions
reached by the Senate Committees.lxxx
On April 4 and 5, 1998, the Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today published reports that there
were on-going renegotiations between PEA and AMARI under an order issued by then President
Fidel V. Ramos. According to these reports, PEA Director Nestor Kalaw, PEA Chairman
Arsenio Yulo and retired Navy Officer Sergio Cruz composed the negotiating panel of PEA.
On April 13, 1998, Antonio M. Zulueta filed before the Court a Petition for Prohibition with
Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction
docketed as G.R. No. 132994 seeking to nullify the JVA. The Court dismissed the petition for
unwarranted disregard of judicial hierarchy, without prejudice to the refiling of the case before
the proper court.lxxxi
On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez (Petitioner for brevity) as a taxpayer, filed the
instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
and Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner contends the government stands to lose billions of
pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly
disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and Section 7,
Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern. Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a blatant violation
of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the
public domain to private corporations. Finally, petitioner asserts that he seeks to enjoin the loss
of billions of pesos in properties of the State that are of public dominion.
After several motions for extension of time,lxxxii PEA and AMARI filed their Comments on
October 19, 1998 and June 25, 1998, respectively. Meanwhile, on December 28, 1998, petitioner
filed an Omnibus Motion: (a) to require PEA to submit the terms of the renegotiated
PEA-AMARI contract; (b) for issuance of a temporary restraining order; and (c) to set the case
for hearing on oral argument. Petitioner filed a Reiterative Motion for Issuance of a TRO dated
May 26, 1999, which the Court denied in a Resolution dated June 22, 1999.
In a Resolution dated March 23, 1999, the Court gave due course to the petition and required
the parties to file their respective memoranda.
On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture Agreement
(Amended JVA, for brevity). On May 28, 1999, the Office of the President under the
administration of then President Joseph E. Estrada approved the Amended JVA.
Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President, petitioner now
prays that on constitutional and statutory grounds the renegotiated contract be declared null and
void.lxxxiii

The Issues

The issues raised by petitioner, PEAlxxxiv and AMARIlxxxv are as follows:

I. WHETHER THE PRINCIPAL RELIEFS PRAYED FOR IN THE PETITION ARE
MOOT AND ACADEMIC BECAUSE OF SUBSEQUENT EVENTS;
II. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL FOR FAILING TO OBSERVE
THE PRINCIPLE GOVERNING THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS;
III. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL FOR NON-EXHAUSTION
 OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES;
IV. WHETHER PETITIONER HAS LOCUS STANDI TO BRING THIS SUIT;
V. WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO INFORMATION INCLUDES
OFFICIAL INFORMATION ON ON-GOING NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE A
FINAL AGREEMENT;
VI. WHETHER THE STIPULATIONS IN THE AMENDED JOINT VENTURE
AGREEMENT FOR THE TRANSFER TO AMARI OF CERTAIN LANDS,
RECLAIMED AND STILL TO BE RECLAIMED, VIOLATE THE 1987
CONSTITUTION; AND
VII. WHETHER THE COURT IS THE PROPER FORUM FOR RAISING THE
ISSUE OF WHETHER THE AMENDED JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT IS
GROSSLY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT.

The Courts Ruling

First issue: whether the principal reliefs prayed for in the petition are moot and academic
because of subsequent events.

The petition prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms and conditions of the on-going
negotiations for a new agreement. The petition also prays that the Court enjoin PEA from
privately entering into, perfecting and/or executing any new agreement with AMARI.
PEA and AMARI claim the petition is now moot and academic because AMARI furnished
petitioner on June 21, 1999 a copy of the signed Amended JVA containing the terms and
conditions agreed upon in the renegotiations. Thus, PEA has satisfied petitioners prayer for a
public disclosure of the renegotiations. Likewise, petitioners prayer to enjoin the signing of the
Amended JVA is now moot because PEA and AMARI have already signed the Amended JVA
on March 30, 1999. Moreover, the Office of the President has approved the Amended JVA on
May 28, 1999.
Petitioner counters that PEA and AMARI cannot avoid the constitutional issue by simply
fast-tracking the signing and approval of the Amended JVA before the Court could act on the
issue. Presidential approval does not resolve the constitutional issue or remove it from the ambit
of judicial review.
We rule that the signing of the Amended JVA by PEA and AMARI and its approval by the
President cannot operate to moot the petition and divest the Court of its jurisdiction. PEA and
AMARI have still to implement the Amended JVA. The prayer to enjoin the signing of the
Amended JVA on constitutional grounds necessarily includes preventing its implementation if in
the meantime PEA and AMARI have signed one in violation of the Constitution. Petitioners
principal basis in assailing the renegotiation of the JVA is its violation of Section 3, Article XII
of the Constitution, which prohibits the government from alienating lands of the public domain
to private corporations. If the Amended JVA indeed violates the Constitution, it is the duty of the
Court to enjoin its implementation, and if already implemented, to annul the effects of such
unconstitutional contract.
The Amended JVA is not an ordinary commercial contract but one which seeks to transfer
title and ownership to 367.5 hectares of reclaimed lands and submerged areas of Manila Bay
to a single private corporation. It now becomes more compelling for the Court to resolve the
issue to insure the government itself does not violate a provision of the Constitution intended to
safeguard the national patrimony. Supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot
prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution. In
the instant case, if the Amended JVA runs counter to the Constitution, the Court can still prevent
the transfer of title and ownership of alienable lands of the public domain in the name of AMARI.
Even in cases where supervening events had made the cases moot, the Court did not hesitate to
resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the
bench, bar, and the public.lxxxvi
Also, the instant petition is a case of first impression. All previous decisions of the Court
involving Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, or its counterpart provision in the 1973
Constitution,lxxxvii covered agricultural lands sold to private corporations which acquired the
lands from private parties. The transferors of the private corporations claimed or could claim the
right to judicial confirmation of their imperfect titleslxxxviii under Title II of Commonwealth Act.
141 (CA No. 141 for brevity). In the instant case, AMARI seeks to acquire from PEA, a public
corporation, reclaimed lands and submerged areas for non-agricultural purposes by purchase
under PD No. 1084 (charter of PEA) and Title III of CA No. 141. Certain undertakings by
AMARI under the Amended JVA constitute the consideration for the purchase. Neither AMARI
nor PEA can claim judicial confirmation of their titles because the lands covered by the
Amended JVA are newly reclaimed or still to be reclaimed. Judicial confirmation of imperfect
title requires open, continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain for at least thirty years since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Besides, the deadline for
filing applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect title expired on December 31, 1987.lxxxix
Lastly, there is a need to resolve immediately the constitutional issue raised in this petition
because of the possible transfer at any time by PEA to AMARI of title and ownership to portions
of the reclaimed lands. Under the Amended JVA, PEA is obligated to transfer to AMARI the
latters seventy percent proportionate share in the reclaimed areas as the reclamation progresses.
The Amended JVA even allows AMARI to mortgage at any time the entire reclaimed area to
raise financing for the reclamation project.xc

Second issue: whether the petition merits dismissal for failing to observe the principle
governing the hierarchy of courts.

PEA and AMARI claim petitioner ignored the judicial hierarchy by seeking relief directly
from the Court. The principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally to cases involving factual
questions. As it is not a trier of facts, the Court cannot entertain cases involving factual issues.
The instant case, however, raises constitutional issues of transcendental importance to the
public.xci The Court can resolve this case without determining any factual issue related to the
case. Also, the instant case is a petition for mandamus which falls under the original jurisdiction
of the Court under Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution. We resolve to exercise primary
jurisdiction over the instant case.

Third issue: whether the petition merits dismissal for non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies.

PEA faults petitioner for seeking judicial intervention in compelling PEA to disclose
publicly certain information without first asking PEA the needed information. PEA claims
petitioners direct resort to the Court violates the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. It also violates the rule that mandamus may issue only if there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
PEA distinguishes the instant case from Taada v. Tuveraxcii where the Court granted the
petition for mandamus even if the petitioners there did not initially demand from the Office of
the President the publication of the presidential decrees. PEA points out that in Taada, the
Executive Department had an affirmative statutory duty under Article 2 of the Civil Codexciii
and Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 638xciv to publish the presidential decrees. There was,
therefore, no need for the petitioners in Taada to make an initial demand from the Office of the
President. In the instant case, PEA claims it has no affirmative statutory duty to disclose publicly
information about its renegotiation of the JVA. Thus, PEA asserts that the Court must apply the
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies to the instant case in view of the failure of
petitioner here to demand initially from PEA the needed information.
The original JVA sought to dispose to AMARI public lands held by PEA, a government
corporation. Under Section 79 of the Government Auditing Code,xcv2 the disposition of
government lands to private parties requires public bidding. PEA was under a positive legal duty
to disclose to the public the terms and conditions for the sale of its lands. The law obligated
PEA to make this public disclosure even without demand from petitioner or from anyone. PEA
failed to make this public disclosure because the original JVA, like the Amended JVA, was the
result of a negotiated contract, not of a public bidding. Considering that PEA had an affirmative
statutory duty to make the public disclosure, and was even in breach of this legal duty, petitioner
had the right to seek direct judicial intervention.
Moreover, and this alone is determinative of this issue, the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not apply when the issue involved is a purely legal or constitutional
question.xcvi The principal issue in the instant case is the capacity of AMARI to acquire lands
held by PEA in view of the constitutional ban prohibiting the alienation of lands of the public
domain to private corporations. We rule that the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies does not apply in the instant case.

Fourth issue: whether petitioner has locus standi to bring this suit

PEA argues that petitioner has no standing to institute mandamus proceedings to enforce his
constitutional right to information without a showing that PEA refused to perform an affirmative
duty imposed on PEA by the Constitution. PEA also claims that petitioner has not shown that he
will suffer any concrete injury because of the signing or implementation of the Amended JVA.
Thus, there is no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial review.
The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayers suit because the petition seeks to compel
PEA to comply with its constitutional duties. There are two constitutional issues involved here.
First is the right of citizens to information on matters of public concern. Second is the application
of a constitutional provision intended to insure the equitable distribution of alienable lands of the
public domain among Filipino citizens. The thrust of the first issue is to compel PEA to disclose
publicly information on the sale of government lands worth billions of pesos, information which
the Constitution and statutory law mandate PEA to disclose. The thrust of the second issue is to
prevent PEA from alienating hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the public domain in
violation of the Constitution, compelling PEA to comply with a constitutional duty to the nation.
Moreover, the petition raises matters of transcendental importance to the public. In Chavez v.
PCGG,xcvii the Court upheld the right of a citizen to bring a taxpayers suit on matters of
transcendental importance to the public, thus -
Besides, petitioner emphasizes, the matter of recovering the ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses is an issue of transcendental importance to the public. He asserts that ordinary
taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning the validity of acts or
orders of government agencies or instrumentalities, if the issues raised are of paramount
public interest, and if they immediately affect the social, economic and moral well being
of the people.
Moreover, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal
interest, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, such as in this
case. He invokes several decisions of this Court which have set aside the procedural
matter of locus standi, when the subject of the case involved public interest.
xxx
In Taada v. Tuvera, the Court asserted that when the issue concerns a public right
and the object of mandamus is to obtain the enforcement of a public duty, the people are
regarded as the real parties in interest; and because it is sufficient that petitioner is a
citizen and as such is interested in the execution of the laws, he need not show that he
has any legal or special interest in the result of the action. In the aforesaid case, the
petitioners sought to enforce their right to be informed on matters of public concern, a
right then recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, in connection
with the rule that laws in order to be valid and enforceable must be published in the
Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated. In ruling for the petitioners' legal
standing, the Court declared that the right they sought to be enforced is a public right
recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land.
Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, while reiterating Taada, further declared that
when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement
of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that petitioner is a citizen and, therefore,
part of the general 'public' which possesses the right.
Further, in Albano v. Reyes, we said that while expenditure of public funds may not
have been involved under the questioned contract for the development, management
and operation of the Manila International Container Terminal, public interest [was]
 definitely involved considering the important role [of the subject contract] . . . in the
economic development of the country and the magnitude of the financial consideration
involved. We concluded that, as a consequence, the disclosure provision in the
Constitution would constitute sufficient authority for upholding the petitioner's
standing.
Similarly, the instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to information
and access to official records, documents and papers a right guaranteed under Section 7,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner, a former solicitor general, is a Filipino
citizen. Because of the satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down by decisional
law to sustain petitioner's legal standing, i.e. (1) the enforcement of a public right (2)
espoused by a Filipino citizen, we rule that the petition at bar should be allowed.
We rule that since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves the enforcement of
constitutional rights - to information and to the equitable diffusion of natural resources - matters
of transcendental public importance, the petitioner has the requisite locus standi.

Fifth issue: whether the constitutional right to information includes official information on
on-going negotiations before a final agreement.

Section 7, Article III of the Constitution explains the peoples right to information on matters
of public concern in this manner:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as
basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)
The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest reinforces the
peoples right to information on matters of public concern. This State policy is expressed in
Section 28, Article II of the Constitution, thus:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest. (Emphasis supplied)
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making
and in the operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to
exercise effectively other constitutional rights. These twin provisions are essential to the exercise
of freedom of expression. If the government does not disclose its official acts, transactions and
decisions to citizens, whatever citizens say, even if expressed without any restraint, will be
speculative and amount to nothing. These twin provisions are also essential to hold public
officials at all times x x x accountable to the people,xcviii for unless citizens have the proper
information, they cannot hold public officials accountable for anything. Armed with the right
information, citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the formulation of
government policies and their effective implementation. An informed citizenry is essential to the
existence and proper functioning of any democracy. As explained by the Court in Valmonte v.
Belmonte, Jr.xcix
An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process
of communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the
State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the
government may perceive and be responsive to the peoples will. Yet, this open dialogue
can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to
formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of
the issues and have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit.
PEA asserts, citing Chavez v. PCGG,c that in cases of on-going negotiations the right to
information is limited to definite propositions of the government. PEA maintains the right does
not include access to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during
the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the
exploratory stage.
Also, AMARI contends that petitioner cannot invoke the right at the pre-decisional stage or
before the closing of the transaction. To support its contention, AMARI cites the following
discussion in the 1986 Constitutional Commission:
Mr. Suarez. And when we say transactions which should be distinguished from
contracts, agreements, or treaties or whatever, does the Gentleman refer to the steps
leading to the consummation of the contract, or does he refer to the contract itself?
Mr. Ople: The transactions used here, I suppose is generic and therefore, it can
cover both steps leading to a contract and already a consummated contract, Mr.
Presiding Officer.
Mr. Suarez: This contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the
consummation of the transaction.
Mr. Ople: Yes, subject only to reasonable safeguards on the national interest.
Mr. Suarez: Thank you.ci (Emphasis supplied)
AMARI argues there must first be a consummated contract before petitioner can invoke the right.
Requiring government officials to reveal their deliberations at the pre-decisional stage will
degrade the quality of decision-making in government agencies. Government officials will
hesitate to express their real sentiments during deliberations if there is immediate public
dissemination of their discussions, putting them under all kinds of pressure before they decide.
We must first distinguish between information the law on public bidding requires PEA to
disclose publicly, and information the constitutional right to information requires PEA to release
to the public. Before the consummation of the contract, PEA must, on its own and without
demand from anyone, disclose to the public matters relating to the disposition of its property.
These include the size, location, technical description and nature of the property being disposed
of, the terms and conditions of the disposition, the parties qualified to bid, the minimum price
and similar information. PEA must prepare all these data and disclose them to the public at the
start of the disposition process, long before the consummation of the contract, because the
Government Auditing Code requires public bidding. If PEA fails to make this disclosure, any
citizen can demand from PEA this information at any time during the bidding process.
 Information, however, on on-going evaluation or review of bids or proposals being
undertaken by the bidding or review committee is not immediately accessible under the right to
information. While the evaluation or review is still on-going, there are no official acts,
transactions, or decisions on the bids or proposals. However, once the committee makes its
official recommendation, there arises a definite proposition on the part of the government. From
this moment, the publics right to information attaches, and any citizen can access all the
non-proprietary information leading to such definite proposition. In Chavez v. PCGG,cii the
Court ruled as follows:
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, we believe that it is incumbent
upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose
sufficient public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up
with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though,
must pertain to definite propositions of the government, not necessarily to intra-agency
or inter-agency recommendations or communications during the stage when common
assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the exploratory stage.
There is need, of course, to observe the same restrictions on disclosure of information in
general, as discussed earlier such as on matters involving national security, diplomatic
or foreign relations, intelligence and other classified information. (Emphasis supplied)
Contrary to AMARIs contention, the commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
understood that the right to information contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the
consummation of the transaction. Certainly, a consummated contract is not a requirement for
the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no
contract is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose
its defects.
Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract, which
may be grossly disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, becomes a fait accompli. This
negates the State policy of full transparency on matters of public concern, a situation which the
framers of the Constitution could not have intended. Such a requirement will prevent the
citizenry from participating in the public discussion of any proposed contract, effectively
truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill of Rights. We can allow neither an emasculation of
a constitutional right, nor a retreat by the State of its avowed policy of full disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest.
The right covers three categories of information which are matters of public concern, namely:
(1) official records; (2) documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions and
decisions; and (3) government research data used in formulating policies. The first category
refers to any document that is part of the public records in the custody of government agencies or
officials. The second category refers to documents and papers recording, evidencing, establishing,
confirming, supporting, justifying or explaining official acts, transactions or decisions of
government agencies or officials. The third category refers to research data, whether raw,
collated or processed, owned by the government and used in formulating government policies.
The information that petitioner may access on the renegotiation of the JVA includes
evaluation reports, recommendations, legal and expert opinions, minutes of meetings, terms of
reference and other documents attached to such reports or minutes, all relating to the JVA.
However, the right to information does not compel PEA to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries
and the like relating to the renegotiation of the JVA.ciii The right only affords access to records,
documents and papers, which means the opportunity to inspect and copy them. One who
exercises the right must copy the records, documents and papers at his expense. The exercise of
the right is also subject to reasonable regulations to protect the integrity of the public records and
to minimize disruption to government operations, like rules specifying when and how to conduct
the inspection and copying.civ
The right to information, however, does not extend to matters recognized as privileged
information under the separation of powers.cv The right does not also apply to information on
military and diplomatic secrets, information affecting national security, and information on
investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused,
which courts have long recognized as confidential.cvi The right may also be subject to other
limitations that Congress may impose by law.
There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is privileged
information rooted in the separation of powers. The information does not cover Presidential
conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings which, like
internal deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of
either house of Congress,cvii are recognized as confidential. This kind of information cannot be
pried open by a co-equal branch of government. A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and
assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to
protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative
and Judicial power.cviii This is not the situation in the instant case.
We rule, therefore, that the constitutional right to information includes official information
on on-going negotiations before a final contract. The information, however, must constitute
definite propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like
privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national
security and public order.cix Congress has also prescribed other limitations on the right to
information in several legislations.cx

Sixth issue: whether stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands,
reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution.

The Regalian Doctrine

The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in the
Regalian doctrine which holds that the State owns all lands and waters of the public domain.
Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and possessions
in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.cxi The King, as the sovereign ruler and
representative of the people, acquired and owned all lands and territories in the Philippines
except those he disposed of by grant or sale to private individuals.
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted the Regalian doctrine substituting, however,
the State, in lieu of the King, as the owner of all lands and waters of the public domain. The
Regalian doctrine is the foundation of the time-honored principle of land ownership that all lands
that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public
domain.cxii Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889, which is now Article 420 of the Civil Code of
1950, incorporated the Regalian doctrine.
Ownership and Disposition of Reclaimed Lands
The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 was the first statutory law governing the ownership and
disposition of reclaimed lands in the Philippines. On May 18, 1907, the Philippine Commission
enacted Act No. 1654 which provided for the lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the
government to corporations and individuals. Later, on November 29, 1919, the Philippine
Legislature approved Act No. 2874, the Public Land Act, which authorized the lease, but not the
sale, of reclaimed lands of the government to corporations and individuals. On November 7,
1936, the National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public
Land Act, which authorized the lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the government to
corporations and individuals. CA No. 141 continues to this day as the general law governing the
classification and disposition of lands of the public domain.
The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 and the Civil Code of 1889
Under the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, the shores, bays, coves, inlets and all waters
within the maritime zone of the Spanish territory belonged to the public domain for public
use.cxiii The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 allowed the reclamation of the sea under Article 5,
which provided as follows:
Article 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed by the
State, or by the provinces, pueblos or private persons, with proper permission, shall
become the property of the party constructing such works, unless otherwise provided by
the terms of the grant of authority.
Under the Spanish Law of Waters, land reclaimed from the sea belonged to the party undertaking
the reclamation, provided the government issued the necessary permit and did not reserve
ownership of the reclaimed land to the State.
Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889 defined property of public dominion as follows:
Art. 339. Property of public dominion is
1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar
character;
2. That belonging exclusively to the State which, without being of general public use, is
employed in some public service, or in the development of the national wealth, such
as walls, fortresses, and other works for the defense of the territory, and mines, until
granted to private individuals.
Property devoted to public use referred to property open for use by the public. In contrast,
property devoted to public service referred to property used for some specific public service and
open only to those authorized to use the property.
Property of public dominion referred not only to property devoted to public use, but also to
property not so used but employed to develop the national wealth. This class of property
constituted property of public dominion although employed for some economic or commercial
activity to increase the national wealth.
Article 341 of the Civil Code of 1889 governed the re-classification of property of public
dominion into private property, to wit:
Art. 341. Property of public dominion, when no longer devoted to public use or to
the defense of the territory, shall become a part of the private property of the State.
This provision, however, was not self-executing. The legislature, or the executive department
pursuant to law, must declare the property no longer needed for public use or territorial defense
before the government could lease or alienate the property to private parties.cxiv
Act No. 1654 of the Philippine Commission
On May 8, 1907, the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1654 which regulated the
lease of reclaimed and foreshore lands. The salient provisions of this law were as follows:
Section 1. The control and disposition of the foreshore as defined in existing law,
and the title to all Government or public lands made or reclaimed by the Government
by dredging or filling or otherwise throughout the Philippine Islands, shall be retained
by the Government without prejudice to vested rights and without prejudice to rights
conceded to the City of Manila in the Luneta Extension.
Section 2. (a) The Secretary of the Interior shall cause all Government or public
lands made or reclaimed by the Government by dredging or filling or otherwise to be
divided into lots or blocks, with the necessary streets and alleyways located thereon, and
shall cause plats and plans of such surveys to be prepared and filed with the Bureau of
Lands.
(b) Upon completion of such plats and plans the Governor-General shall give
notice to the public that such parts of the lands so made or reclaimed as are not
needed for public purposes will be leased for commercial and business purposes, x x
x.
xxx
(e) The leases above provided for shall be disposed of to the highest and best
bidder therefore, subject to such regulations and safeguards as the Governor-General
may by executive order prescribe. (Emphasis supplied)
Act No. 1654 mandated that the government should retain title to all lands reclaimed by
the government. The Act also vested in the government control and disposition of foreshore
lands. Private parties could lease lands reclaimed by the government only if these lands were no
longer needed for public purpose. Act No. 1654 mandated public bidding in the lease of
government reclaimed lands. Act No. 1654 made government reclaimed lands sui generis in that
unlike other public lands which the government could sell to private parties, these reclaimed
lands were available only for lease to private parties.
Act No. 1654, however, did not repeal Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. Act
No. 1654 did not prohibit private parties from reclaiming parts of the sea under Section 5 of the
Spanish Law of Waters. Lands reclaimed from the sea by private parties with government
permission remained private lands.
Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature
On November 29, 1919, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 2874, the Public Land
Act.cxv The salient provisions of Act No. 2874, on reclaimed lands, were as follows:
Sec. 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the
public domain into
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands, x x x.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the government and disposition of alienable or
disposable public lands, the Governor-General, upon recommendation by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time declare what
lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act.
Sec. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession
which have been officially delimited or classified x x x.
xxx
Sec. 55. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber nor
mineral land, shall be classified as suitable for residential purposes or for commercial,
industrial, or other productive purposes other than agricultural purposes, and shall be
open to disposition or concession, shall be disposed of under the provisions of this
chapter, and not otherwise.
Sec. 56. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filling, or other means;
(b) Foreshore;
(c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon the shores or banks
of navigable lakes or rivers;
(d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes.
x x x.
Sec. 58. The lands comprised in classes (a), (b), and (c) of section fifty-six shall
be disposed of to private parties by lease only and not otherwise, as soon as the
Governor-General, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, shall declare that the same are not necessary for the public
service and are open to disposition under this chapter. The lands included in class (d)
may be disposed of by sale or lease under the provisions of this Act. (Emphasis
supplied)
Section 6 of Act No. 2874 authorized the Governor-General to classify lands of the public
domain into x x x alienable or disposablecxvi lands. Section 7 of the Act empowered the
Governor-General to declare what lands are open to disposition or concession. Section 8 of the
Act limited alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been officially delimited
and classified.
Section 56 of Act No. 2874 stated that lands disposable under this titlecxvii shall be classified
as government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands, as well as other lands. All these lands,
however, must be suitable for residential, commercial, industrial or other productive
non-agricultural purposes. These provisions vested upon the Governor-General the power to
classify inalienable lands of the public domain into disposable lands of the public domain. These
provisions also empowered the Governor-General to classify further such disposable lands of the
public domain into government reclaimed, foreshore or marshy lands of the public domain, as
well as other non-agricultural lands.
Section 58 of Act No. 2874 categorically mandated that disposable lands of the public
domain classified as government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands shall be disposed of to
private parties by lease only and not otherwise. The Governor-General, before allowing the
lease of these lands to private parties, must formally declare that the lands were not necessary for
the public service. Act No. 2874 reiterated the State policy to lease and not to sell government
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands of the public domain, a policy first enunciated in 1907 in
Act No. 1654. Government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands remained sui generis, as the
only alienable or disposable lands of the public domain that the government could not sell to
private parties.
The rationale behind this State policy is obvious. Government reclaimed, foreshore and
marshy public lands for non-agricultural purposes retain their inherent potential as areas for
public service. This is the reason the government prohibited the sale, and only allowed the lease,
of these lands to private parties. The State always reserved these lands for some future public
service.
Act No. 2874 did not authorize the reclassification of government reclaimed, foreshore and
marshy lands into other non-agricultural lands under Section 56 (d). Lands falling under Section
56 (d) were the only lands for non-agricultural purposes the government could sell to private
parties. Thus, under Act No. 2874, the government could not sell government reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy lands to private parties, unless the legislature passed a law allowing their
sale.cxviii
Act No. 2874 did not prohibit private parties from reclaiming parts of the sea pursuant to
Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. Lands reclaimed from the sea by private parties
with government permission remained private lands.
Dispositions under the 1935 Constitution
On May 14, 1935, the 1935 Constitution took effect upon its ratification by the Filipino
people. The 1935 Constitution, in adopting the Regalian doctrine, declared in Section 1, Article
XIII, that
Section 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy and other
natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition,
exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines or
to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned
by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of
the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural
resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and
no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any
of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years,
 renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water
supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which
cases beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant. (Emphasis supplied)
The 1935 Constitution barred the alienation of all natural resources except public
agricultural lands, which were the only natural resources the State could alienate. Thus, foreshore
lands, considered part of the States natural resources, became inalienable by constitutional fiat,
available only for lease for 25 years, renewable for another 25 years. The government could
alienate foreshore lands only after these lands were reclaimed and classified as alienable
agricultural lands of the public domain. Government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public
domain, being neither timber nor mineral lands, fell under the classification of public agricultural
lands.cxix However, government reclaimed and marshy lands, although subject to classification
as disposable public agricultural lands, could only be leased and not sold to private parties
because of Act No. 2874.
The prohibition on private parties from acquiring ownership of government reclaimed and
marshy lands of the public domain was only a statutory prohibition and the legislature could
therefore remove such prohibition. The 1935 Constitution did not prohibit individuals and
corporations from acquiring government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain that
were classified as agricultural lands under existing public land laws. Section 2, Article XIII of
the 1935 Constitution provided as follows:
Section 2. No private corporation or association may acquire, lease, or hold
public agricultural lands in excess of one thousand and twenty four hectares, nor
may any individual acquire such lands by purchase in excess of one hundred and
forty hectares, or by lease in excess of one thousand and twenty-four hectares, or by
homestead in excess of twenty-four hectares. Lands adapted to grazing, not exceeding
two thousand hectares, may be leased to an individual, private corporation, or
association. (Emphasis supplied)
Still, after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the legislature did not repeal Section 58 of Act
No. 2874 to open for sale to private parties government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public
domain. On the contrary, the legislature continued the long established State policy of retaining
for the government title and ownership of government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public
domain.
Commonwealth Act No. 141 of the Philippine National Assembly
On November 7, 1936, the National Assembly approved Commonwealth Act No. 141, also
known as the Public Land Act, which compiled the then existing laws on lands of the public
domain. CA No. 141, as amended, remains to this day the existing general law governing the
classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral
lands.cxx
Section 6 of CA No. 141 empowers the President to classify lands of the public domain into
alienable or disposablecxxi lands of the public domain, which prior to such classification are
inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Section 7 of CA No. 141 authorizes the President
to declare what lands are open to disposition or concession. Section 8 of CA No. 141 states that
the government can declare open for disposition or concession only lands that are officially
delimited and classified. Sections 6, 7 and 8 of CA No. 141 read as follows:
 Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Commerce, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in like manner transfer such lands from one class to
another,cxxii for the purpose of their administration and disposition.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or
disposable public lands, the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time declare what lands are open to
disposition or concession under this Act.
Sec. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession
which have been officially delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed,
and which have not been reserved for public or quasi-public uses, nor appropriated by
the Government, nor in any manner become private property, nor those on which a
private right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law may be
claimed, or which, having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so. x x x.
Thus, before the government could alienate or dispose of lands of the public domain, the
President must first officially classify these lands as alienable or disposable, and then declare
them open to disposition or concession. There must be no law reserving these lands for public or
quasi-public uses.
The salient provisions of CA No. 141, on government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy
lands of the public domain, are as follows:
Sec. 58. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber nor
mineral land, is intended to be used for residential purposes or for commercial,
industrial, or other productive purposes other than agricultural, and is open to
disposition or concession, shall be disposed of under the provisions of this chapter
and not otherwise.
Sec. 59. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filling, or other means;
(b) Foreshore;
(c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon the shores or banks
of navigable lakes or rivers;
(d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes.
Sec. 60. Any tract of land comprised under this title may be leased or sold, as the
case may be, to any person, corporation, or association authorized to purchase or lease
public lands for agricultural purposes. x x x.
Sec. 61. The lands comprised in classes (a), (b), and (c) of section fifty-nine shall
be disposed of to private parties by lease only and not otherwise, as soon as the
President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture, shall declare that the
same are not necessary for the public service and are open to disposition under this
chapter. The lands included in class (d) may be disposed of by sale or lease under the
 provisions of this Act. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 61 of CA No. 141 readopted, after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, Section
58 of Act No. 2874 prohibiting the sale of government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy
disposable lands of the public domain. All these lands are intended for residential, commercial,
industrial or other non-agricultural purposes. As before, Section 61 allowed only the lease of
such lands to private parties. The government could sell to private parties only lands falling
under Section 59 (d) of CA No. 141, or those lands for non-agricultural purposes not classified as
government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy disposable lands of the public domain. Foreshore
lands, however, became inalienable under the 1935 Constitution which only allowed the lease of
these lands to qualified private parties.
Section 58 of CA No. 141 expressly states that disposable lands of the public domain
intended for residential, commercial, industrial or other productive purposes other than
agricultural shall be disposed of under the provisions of this chapter and not otherwise. Under
Section 10 of CA No. 141, the term disposition includes lease of the land. Any disposition of
government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy disposable lands for non-agricultural purposes
must comply with Chapter IX, Title III of CA No. 141,cxxiii unless a subsequent law amended or
repealed these provisions.
In his concurring opinion in the landmark case of Republic Real Estate Corporation v.
Court of Appeals,cxxiv Justice Reynato S. Puno summarized succinctly the law on this matter, as
follows:
Foreshore lands are lands of public dominion intended for public use. So too are lands
reclaimed by the government by dredging, filling, or other means. Act 1654 mandated
that the control and disposition of the foreshore and lands under water remained in the
national government. Said law allowed only the leasing of reclaimed land. The Public
Land Acts of 1919 and 1936 also declared that the foreshore and lands reclaimed by the
government were to be disposed of to private parties by lease only and not otherwise.
Before leasing, however, the Governor-General, upon recommendation of the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources, had first to determine that the land reclaimed was
not necessary for the public service. This requisite must have been met before the land
could be disposed of. But even then, the foreshore and lands under water were not to
be alienated and sold to private parties. The disposition of the reclaimed land was
only by lease. The land remained property of the State. (Emphasis supplied)
As observed by Justice Puno in his concurring opinion, Commonwealth Act No. 141 has
remained in effect at present.
The State policy prohibiting the sale to private parties of government reclaimed, foreshore
and marshy alienable lands of the public domain, first implemented in 1907 was thus reaffirmed
in CA No. 141 after the 1935 Constitution took effect. The prohibition on the sale of foreshore
lands, however, became a constitutional edict under the 1935 Constitution. Foreshore lands
became inalienable as natural resources of the State, unless reclaimed by the government and
classified as agricultural lands of the public domain, in which case they would fall under the
classification of government reclaimed lands.
After the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, government reclaimed and marshy disposable
lands of the public domain continued to be only leased and not sold to private parties.cxxv These
lands remained sui generis, as the only alienable or disposable lands of the public domain the
government could not sell to private parties.
Since then and until now, the only way the government can sell to private parties
government reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of the public domain is for the legislature to
pass a law authorizing such sale. CA No. 141 does not authorize the President to reclassify
government reclaimed and marshy lands into other non-agricultural lands under Section 59 (d).
Lands classified under Section 59 (d) are the only alienable or disposable lands for
non-agricultural purposes that the government could sell to private parties.
Moreover, Section 60 of CA No. 141 expressly requires congressional authority before lands
under Section 59 that the government previously transferred to government units or entities could
be sold to private parties. Section 60 of CA No. 141 declares that
Sec. 60. x x x The area so leased or sold shall be such as shall, in the judgment of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, be reasonably necessary for the
purposes for which such sale or lease is requested, and shall not exceed one hundred
and forty-four hectares: Provided, however, That this limitation shall not apply to grants,
donations, or transfers made to a province, municipality or branch or subdivision of the
Government for the purposes deemed by said entities conducive to the public interest;
but the land so granted, donated, or transferred to a province, municipality or branch
or subdivision of the Government shall not be alienated, encumbered, or otherwise
disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except when authorized by Congress: x x x.
(Emphasis supplied)
The congressional authority required in Section 60 of CA No. 141 mirrors the legislative
authority required in Section 56 of Act No. 2874.
One reason for the congressional authority is that Section 60 of CA No. 141 exempted
government units and entities from the maximum area of public lands that could be acquired
from the State. These government units and entities should not just turn around and sell these
lands to private parties in violation of constitutional or statutory limitations. Otherwise, the
transfer of lands for non-agricultural purposes to government units and entities could be used to
circumvent constitutional limitations on ownership of alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain. In the same manner, such transfers could also be used to evade the statutory prohibition
in CA No. 141 on the sale of government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain to
private parties. Section 60 of CA No. 141 constitutes by operation of law a lien on these
lands.cxxvi
In case of sale or lease of disposable lands of the public domain falling under Section 59 of
CA No. 141, Sections 63 and 67 require a public bidding. Sections 63 and 67 of CA No. 141
provide as follows:
Sec. 63. Whenever it is decided that lands covered by this chapter are not needed
for public purposes, the Director of Lands shall ask the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce (now the Secretary of Natural Resources) for authority to dispose of the
same. Upon receipt of such authority, the Director of Lands shall give notice by public
advertisement in the same manner as in the case of leases or sales of agricultural public
land, x x x.
 Sec. 67. The lease or sale shall be made by oral bidding; and adjudication shall
be made to the highest bidder. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, CA No. 141 mandates the Government to put to public auction all leases or sales of
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.cxxvii
Like Act No. 1654 and Act No. 2874 before it, CA No. 141 did not repeal Section 5 of the
Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. Private parties could still reclaim portions of the sea with
government permission. However, the reclaimed land could become private land only if
classified as alienable agricultural land of the public domain open to disposition under CA No.
141. The 1935 Constitution prohibited the alienation of all natural resources except public
agricultural lands.
The Civil Code of 1950
The Civil Code of 1950 readopted substantially the definition of property of public
dominion found in the Civil Code of 1889. Articles 420 and 422 of the Civil Code of 1950 state
that
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1)Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and
bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar
character;
(2)Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for
some public service or for the development of the national wealth.
x x x.
Art. 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or
for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State.
Again, the government must formally declare that the property of public dominion is no
longer needed for public use or public service, before the same could be classified as patrimonial
property of the State.cxxviii In the case of government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public
domain, the declaration of their being disposable, as well as the manner of their disposition, is
governed by the applicable provisions of CA No. 141.
Like the Civil Code of 1889, the Civil Code of 1950 included as property of public
dominion those properties of the State which, without being for public use, are intended for
public service or the development of the national wealth. Thus, government reclaimed and
marshy lands of the State, even if not employed for public use or public service, if developed to
enhance the national wealth, are classified as property of public dominion.

Dispositions under the 1973 Constitution

The 1973 Constitution, which took effect on January 17, 1973, likewise adopted the
Regalian doctrine. Section 8, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution stated that
Sec. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other
 mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural
resources of the Philippines belong to the State. With the exception of agricultural,
industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the public domain,
natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the
exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources
shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than
twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or
industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases, beneficial
use may be the measure and the limit of the grant. (Emphasis supplied)
The 1973 Constitution prohibited the alienation of all natural resources with the exception of
agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the public domain. In
contrast, the 1935 Constitution barred the alienation of all natural resources except public
agricultural lands. However, the term public agricultural lands in the 1935 Constitution
encompassed industrial, commercial, residential and resettlement lands of the public domain.cxxix
If the land of public domain were neither timber nor mineral land, it would fall under the
classification of agricultural land of the public domain. Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions,
therefore, prohibited the alienation of all natural resources except agricultural lands of the
public domain.
The 1973 Constitution, however, limited the alienation of lands of the public domain to
individuals who were citizens of the Philippines. Private corporations, even if wholly owned by
Philippine citizens, were no longer allowed to acquire alienable lands of the public domain
unlike in the 1935 Constitution. Section 11, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution declared that
Sec. 11. The Batasang Pambansa, taking into account conservation, ecological, and
development requirements of the natural resources, shall determine by law the size of
land of the public domain which may be developed, held or acquired by, or leased to,
any qualified individual, corporation, or association, and the conditions therefor. No
private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain
except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area nor may any citizen hold
such lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares or acquire by purchase,
homestead or grant, in excess of twenty-four hectares. No private corporation or
association may hold by lease, concession, license or permit, timber or forest lands and
other timber or forest resources in excess of one hundred thousand hectares. However,
such area may be increased by the Batasang Pambansa upon recommendation of the
National Economic and Development Authority. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, under the 1973 Constitution, private corporations could hold alienable lands of the
public domain only through lease. Only individuals could now acquire alienable lands of the
public domain, and private corporations became absolutely barred from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain. The constitutional ban extended to all kinds of alienable
lands of the public domain, while the statutory ban under CA No. 141 applied only to
government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public domain.

PD No. 1084 Creating the Public Estates Authority

 On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084
creating PEA, a wholly government owned and controlled corporation with a special charter.
Sections 4 and 8 of PD No. 1084, vests PEA with the following purposes and powers:
Sec. 4. Purpose. The Authority is hereby created for the following purposes:
(a) To reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas, by dredging,
filling or other means, or to acquire reclaimed land;
(b) To develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and
sell any and all kinds of lands, buildings, estates and other forms of real property,
owned, managed, controlled and/or operated by the government;
(c) To provide for, operate or administer such service as may be necessary for the
efficient, economical and beneficial utilization of the above properties.
Sec. 5. Powers and functions of the Authority. The Authority shall, in carrying out
the purposes for which it is created, have the following powers and functions:
(a)To prescribe its by-laws.
xxx
(i) To hold lands of the public domain in excess of the area permitted to private
corporations by statute.
(j) To reclaim lands and to construct work across, or otherwise, any stream,
watercourse, canal, ditch, flume x x x.
xxx
(o) To perform such acts and exercise such functions as may be necessary for the
attainment of the purposes and objectives herein specified. (Emphasis supplied)
PD No. 1084 authorizes PEA to reclaim both foreshore and submerged areas of the public
domain. Foreshore areas are those covered and uncovered by the ebb and flow of the tide.cxxx
Submerged areas are those permanently under water regardless of the ebb and flow of the
tide.cxxxi Foreshore and submerged areas indisputably belong to the public domaincxxxii and are
inalienable unless reclaimed, classified as alienable lands open to disposition, and further
declared no longer needed for public service.
The ban in the 1973 Constitution on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of
the public domain did not apply to PEA since it was then, and until today, a fully owned
government corporation. The constitutional ban applied then, as it still applies now, only to
private corporations and associations. PD No. 1084 expressly empowers PEA to hold lands of
the public domain even in excess of the area permitted to private corporations by statute. Thus,
PEA can hold title to private lands, as well as title to lands of the public domain.
In order for PEA to sell its reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public
domain, there must be legislative authority empowering PEA to sell these lands. This legislative
authority is necessary in view of Section 60 of CA No.141, which states
Sec. 60. x x x; but the land so granted, donated or transferred to a province,
municipality, or branch or subdivision of the Government shall not be alienated,
encumbered or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except when
authorized by Congress; x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Without such legislative authority, PEA could not sell but only lease its reclaimed foreshore and
submerged alienable lands of the public domain. Nevertheless, any legislative authority granted
to PEA to sell its reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain would be subject to the
constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain.
Hence, such legislative authority could only benefit private individuals.

Dispositions under the 1987 Constitution

The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions before it, has adopted the
Regalian doctrine. The 1987 Constitution declares that all natural resources are owned by the
State, and except for alienable agricultural lands of the public domain, natural resources cannot
be alienated. Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution state that
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception
of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The
exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full
control and supervision of the State. x x x.
Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may
be further classified by law according to the uses which they may be devoted. Alienable
lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations
or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by
lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than
twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the
Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than
twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead, or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development,
and subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law,
the size of lands of the public domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or
leased and the conditions therefor. (Emphasis supplied)
The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution banning private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Like the 1973
Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows private corporations to hold alienable lands of the
public domain only through lease. As in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the general law
governing the lease to private corporations of reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of
the public domain is still CA No. 141.

The Rationale behind the Constitutional Ban

The rationale behind the constitutional ban on corporations from acquiring, except through
lease, alienable lands of the public domain is not well understood. During the deliberations of the
1986 Constitutional Commission, the commissioners probed the rationale behind this ban, thus:
 FR. BERNAS: Mr. Vice-President, my questions have reference to page 3, line 5 which
says:
`No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease, not to exceed one thousand hectares in area.
If we recall, this provision did not exist under the 1935 Constitution, but this was
introduced in the 1973 Constitution. In effect, it prohibits private corporations from
acquiring alienable public lands. But it has not been very clear in jurisprudence what
the reason for this is. In some of the cases decided in 1982 and 1983, it was indicated
that the purpose of this is to prevent large landholdings. Is that the intent of this
provision?
MR. VILLEGAS: I think that is the spirit of the provision.
FR. BERNAS: In existing decisions involving the Iglesia ni Cristo, there were instances
where the Iglesia ni Cristo was not allowed to acquire a mere 313-square meter land
where a chapel stood because the Supreme Court said it would be in violation of this.
(Emphasis supplied)
In Ayog v. Cusi,cxxxiii the Court explained the rationale behind this constitutional ban in this
way:
Indeed, one purpose of the constitutional prohibition against purchases of public
agricultural lands by private corporations is to equitably diffuse land ownership or to
encourage owner-cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm and to prevent a
recurrence of cases like the instant case. Huge landholdings by corporations or private
persons had spawned social unrest.
However, if the constitutional intent is to prevent huge landholdings, the Constitution could have
simply limited the size of alienable lands of the public domain that corporations could acquire.
The Constitution could have followed the limitations on individuals, who could acquire not more
than 24 hectares of alienable lands of the public domain under the 1973 Constitution, and not
more than 12 hectares under the 1987 Constitution.
If the constitutional intent is to encourage economic family-size farms, placing the land in
the name of a corporation would be more effective in preventing the break-up of farmlands. If
the farmland is registered in the name of a corporation, upon the death of the owner, his heirs
would inherit shares in the corporation instead of subdivided parcels of the farmland. This would
prevent the continuing break-up of farmlands into smaller and smaller plots from one generation
to the next.
In actual practice, the constitutional ban strengthens the constitutional limitation on
individuals from acquiring more than the allowed area of alienable lands of the public domain.
Without the constitutional ban, individuals who already acquired the maximum area of alienable
lands of the public domain could easily set up corporations to acquire more alienable public
lands. An individual could own as many corporations as his means would allow him. An
individual could even hide his ownership of a corporation by putting his nominees as
stockholders of the corporation. The corporation is a convenient vehicle to circumvent the
constitutional limitation on acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of the public domain.
 The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is to transfer ownership of
only a limited area of alienable land of the public domain to a qualified individual. This
constitutional intent is safeguarded by the provision prohibiting corporations from acquiring
alienable lands of the public domain, since the vehicle to circumvent the constitutional intent is
removed. The available alienable public lands are gradually decreasing in the face of an
ever-growing population. The most effective way to insure faithful adherence to this
constitutional intent is to grant or sell alienable lands of the public domain only to individuals.
This, it would seem, is the practical benefit arising from the constitutional ban.

The Amended Joint Venture Agreement

The subject matter of the Amended JVA, as stated in its second Whereas clause, consists of
three properties, namely:
1. [T]hree partially reclaimed and substantially eroded islands along Emilio Aguinaldo
Boulevard in Paranaque and Las Pinas, Metro Manila, with a combined titled area of
1,578,441 square meters;
2. [A]nother area of 2,421,559 square meters contiguous to the three islands; and
3. [A]t AMARIs option as approved by PEA, an additional 350 hectares more or less to
regularize the configuration of the reclaimed area.cxxxiv
PEA confirms that the Amended JVA involves the development of the Freedom Islands and
further reclamation of about 250 hectares x x x, plus an option granted to AMARI to
subsequently reclaim another 350 hectares x x x.cxxxv
In short, the Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares. Only 157.84 hectares
of the 750-hectare reclamation project have been reclaimed, and the rest of the 592.15
hectares are still submerged areas forming part of Manila Bay.
Under the Amended JVA, AMARI will reimburse PEA the sum of P1,894,129,200.00 for
PEAs actual cost in partially reclaiming the Freedom Islands. AMARI will also complete, at its
own expense, the reclamation of the Freedom Islands. AMARI will further shoulder all the
reclamation costs of all the other areas, totaling 592.15 hectares, still to be reclaimed. AMARI
and PEA will share, in the proportion of 70 percent and 30 percent, respectively, the total net
usable area which is defined in the Amended JVA as the total reclaimed area less 30 percent
earmarked for common areas. Title to AMARIs share in the net usable area, totaling 367.5
hectares, will be issued in the name of AMARI. Section 5.2 (c) of the Amended JVA provides
that
x x x, PEA shall have the duty to execute without delay the necessary deed of transfer
or conveyance of the title pertaining to AMARIs Land share based on the Land
Allocation Plan. PEA, when requested in writing by AMARI, shall then cause the
issuance and delivery of the proper certificates of title covering AMARIs Land Share
in the name of AMARI, x x x; provided, that if more than seventy percent (70%) of the
titled area at any given time pertains to AMARI, PEA shall deliver to AMARI only
seventy percent (70%) of the titles pertaining to AMARI, until such time when a
corresponding proportionate area of additional land pertaining to PEA has been titled.
 (Emphasis supplied)
Indisputably, under the Amended JVA AMARI will acquire and own a maximum of 367.5
hectares of reclaimed land which will be titled in its name.
To implement the Amended JVA, PEA delegated to the unincorporated PEA-AMARI joint
venture PEAs statutory authority, rights and privileges to reclaim foreshore and submerged areas
in Manila Bay. Section 3.2.a of the Amended JVA states that
PEA hereby contributes to the joint venture its rights and privileges to perform Rawland
Reclamation and Horizontal Development as well as own the Reclamation Area,
thereby granting the Joint Venture the full and exclusive right, authority and privilege to
undertake the Project in accordance with the Master Development Plan.
The Amended JVA is the product of a renegotiation of the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 and
its supplemental agreement dated August 9, 1995.

The Threshold Issue

The threshold issue is whether AMARI, a private corporation, can acquire and own under
the Amended JVA 367.5 hectares of reclaimed foreshore and submerged areas in Manila Bay in
view of Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which state that:
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception
of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. x x x.
xxx
Section 3. x x x Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural
lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the
public domain except by lease, x x x.(Emphasis supplied)

Classification of Reclaimed Foreshore and Submerged Areas

PEA readily concedes that lands reclaimed from foreshore or submerged areas of Manila
Bay are alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. In its Memorandum,cxxxvi PEA
admits that
Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed lands are classified as
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain:
Sec. 59. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the government by dredging, filling, or other means;
x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, the Legal Task Forcecxxxvii constituted under Presidential Administrative Order
No. 365 admitted in its Report and Recommendation to then President Fidel V. Ramos,
[R]eclaimed lands are classified as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.cxxxviii
The Legal Task Force concluded that
D. Conclusion
Reclaimed lands are lands of the public domain. However, by statutory authority,
the rights of ownership and disposition over reclaimed lands have been transferred to
PEA, by virtue of which PEA, as owner, may validly convey the same to any qualified
person without violating the Constitution or any statute.
The constitutional provision prohibiting private corporations from holding public
land, except by lease (Sec. 3, Art. XVII,cxxxix 1987 Constitution), does not apply to
reclaimed lands whose ownership has passed on to PEA by statutory grant.
Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the foreshore and submerged areas of
Manila Bay are part of the lands of the public domain, waters x x x and other natural resources
and consequently owned by the State. As such, foreshore and submerged areas shall not be
alienated, unless they are classified as agricultural lands of the public domain. The mere
reclamation of these areas by PEA does not convert these inalienable natural resources of the
State into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. There must be a law or presidential
proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to
disposition or concession. Moreover, these reclaimed lands cannot be classified as alienable or
disposable if the law has reserved them for some public or quasi-public use.cxl
Section 8 of CA No. 141 provides that only those lands shall be declared open to disposition
or concession which have been officially delimited and classified.cxli The President has the
authority to classify inalienable lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable lands of
the public domain, pursuant to Section 6 of CA No. 141. In Laurel vs. Garcia,cxlii the Executive
Department attempted to sell the Roppongi property in Tokyo, Japan, which was acquired by the
Philippine Government for use as the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy. Although the
Chancery had transferred to another location thirteen years earlier, the Court still ruled that,
under Article 422cxliii of the Civil Code, a property of public dominion retains such character
until formally declared otherwise. The Court ruled that
The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy
service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion
happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use (Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene
Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 [1975]. A property continues to be part of the public
domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership until there is a formal
declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being such (Ignacio v.
Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960]. (Emphasis supplied)
PD No. 1085, issued on February 4, 1977, authorized the issuance of special land patents for
lands reclaimed by PEA from the foreshore or submerged areas of Manila Bay. On January 19,
1988 then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 in the name of PEA for
the 157.84 hectares comprising the partially reclaimed Freedom Islands. Subsequently, on April
9, 1999 the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Paranaque issued TCT Nos. 7309, 7311 and
7312 in the name of PEA pursuant to Section 103 of PD No. 1529 authorizing the issuance of
certificates of title corresponding to land patents. To this day, these certificates of title are still in
the name of PEA.
PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquinos actual issuance of a special patent covering
the Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the Freedom Islands as
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. PD No. 1085 and President Aquinos issuance
of a land patent also constitute a declaration that the Freedom Islands are no longer needed for
public service. The Freedom Islands are thus alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain, open to disposition or concession to qualified parties.
At the time then President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, PEA had already
reclaimed the Freedom Islands although subsequently there were partial erosions on some areas.
The government had also completed the necessary surveys on these islands. Thus, the Freedom
Islands were no longer part of Manila Bay but part of the land mass. Section 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution classifies lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral
lands, and national parks. Being neither timber, mineral, nor national park lands, the reclaimed
Freedom Islands necessarily fall under the classification of agricultural lands of the public
domain. Under the 1987 Constitution, agricultural lands of the public domain are the only natural
resources that the State may alienate to qualified private parties. All other natural resources, such
as the seas or bays, are waters x x x owned by the State forming part of the public domain, and
are inalienable pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
AMARI claims that the Freedom Islands are private lands because CDCP, then a private
corporation, reclaimed the islands under a contract dated November 20, 1973 with the
Commissioner of Public Highways. AMARI, citing Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of
1866, argues that if the ownership of reclaimed lands may be given to the party constructing the
works, then it cannot be said that reclaimed lands are lands of the public domain which the State
may not alienate.cxliv Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters reads as follows:
Article 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed by the
State, or by the provinces, pueblos or private persons, with proper permission, shall
become the property of the party constructing such works, unless otherwise provided by
the terms of the grant of authority. (Emphasis supplied)
Under Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, private parties could reclaim from
the sea only with proper permission from the State. Private parties could own the reclaimed land
only if not otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of authority. This clearly meant that no
one could reclaim from the sea without permission from the State because the sea is property of
public dominion. It also meant that the State could grant or withhold ownership of the reclaimed
land because any reclaimed land, like the sea from which it emerged, belonged to the State. Thus,
a private person reclaiming from the sea without permission from the State could not acquire
ownership of the reclaimed land which would remain property of public dominion like the sea it
replaced.cxlv Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 adopted the time-honored principle
of land ownership that all lands that were not acquired from the government, either by purchase
or by grant, belong to the public domain.cxlvi
Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters must be read together with laws subsequently
enacted on the disposition of public lands. In particular, CA No. 141 requires that lands of the
public domain must first be classified as alienable or disposable before the government can
alienate them. These lands must not be reserved for public or quasi-public purposes.cxlvii
Moreover, the contract between CDCP and the government was executed after the effectivity of
the 1973 Constitution which barred private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable
land of the public domain. This contract could not have converted the Freedom Islands into
private lands of a private corporation.
Presidential Decree No. 3-A, issued on January 11, 1973, revoked all laws authorizing the
reclamation of areas under water and revested solely in the National Government the power to
reclaim lands. Section 1 of PD No. 3-A declared that
The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the reclamation of
areas under water, whether foreshore or inland, shall be limited to the National
Government or any person authorized by it under a proper contract. (Emphasis
supplied)
x x x.
PD No. 3-A repealed Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 because reclamation of
areas under water could now be undertaken only by the National Government or by a person
contracted by the National Government. Private parties may reclaim from the sea only under a
contract with the National Government, and no longer by grant or permission as provided in
Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.
Executive Order No. 525, issued on February 14, 1979, designated PEA as the National
Governments implementing arm to undertake all reclamation projects of the government, which
shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a proper contract executed by it with any person or
entity. Under such contract, a private party receives compensation for reclamation services
rendered to PEA. Payment to the contractor may be in cash, or in kind consisting of portions of
the reclaimed land, subject to the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring
alienable lands of the public domain. The reclaimed land can be used as payment in kind only if
the reclaimed land is first classified as alienable or disposable land open to disposition, and then
declared no longer needed for public service.
The Amended JVA covers not only the Freedom Islands, but also an additional 592.15
hectares which are still submerged and forming part of Manila Bay. There is no legislative or
Presidential act classifying these submerged areas as alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain open to disposition. These submerged areas are not covered by any patent or
certificate of title. There can be no dispute that these submerged areas form part of the public
domain, and in their present state are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Until
reclaimed from the sea, these submerged areas are, under the Constitution, waters x x x owned
by the State, forming part of the public domain and consequently inalienable. Only when actually
reclaimed from the sea can these submerged areas be classified as public agricultural lands,
which under the Constitution are the only natural resources that the State may alienate. Once
reclaimed and transformed into public agricultural lands, the government may then officially
classify these lands as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition. Thereafter, the
government may declare these lands no longer needed for public service. Only then can these
reclaimed lands be considered alienable or disposable lands of the public domain and within the
commerce of man.
The classification of PEAs reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands into alienable or
disposable lands open to disposition is necessary because PEA is tasked under its charter to
undertake public services that require the use of lands of the public domain. Under Section 5 of
PD No. 1084, the functions of PEA include the following: [T]o own or operate railroads,
tramways and other kinds of land transportation, x x x; [T]o construct, maintain and operate such
systems of sanitary sewers as may be necessary; [T]o construct, maintain and operate such storm
drains as may be necessary. PEA is empowered to issue rules and regulations as may be
necessary for the proper use by private parties of any or all of the highways, roads, utilities,
buildings and/or any of its properties and to impose or collect fees or tolls for their use. Thus,
part of the reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands held by the PEA would actually be needed
for public use or service since many of the functions imposed on PEA by its charter constitute
essential public services.
Moreover, Section 1 of Executive Order No. 525 provides that PEA shall be primarily
responsible for integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf
of the National Government. The same section also states that [A]ll reclamation projects shall be
approved by the President upon recommendation of the PEA, and shall be undertaken by the
PEA or through a proper contract executed by it with any person or entity; x x x. Thus, under EO
No. 525, in relation to PD No. 3-A and PD No.1084, PEA became the primary implementing
agency of the National Government to reclaim foreshore and submerged lands of the public
domain. EO No. 525 recognized PEA as the government entity to undertake the reclamation of
lands and ensure their maximum utilization in promoting public welfare and interests.cxlviii
Since large portions of these reclaimed lands would obviously be needed for public service, there
must be a formal declaration segregating reclaimed lands no longer needed for public service
from those still needed for public service.
Section 3 of EO No. 525, by declaring that all lands reclaimed by PEA shall belong to or be
owned by the PEA, could not automatically operate to classify inalienable lands into alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain. Otherwise, reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands of
the public domain would automatically become alienable once reclaimed by PEA, whether or not
classified as alienable or disposable.
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987, a later law than either PD No. 1084 or EO No.
525, vests in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR for brevity) the
following powers and functions:
Sec. 4. Powers and Functions. The Department shall:
(1) x x x
xxx
(4) Exercise supervision and control over forest lands, alienable and disposable public
lands, mineral resources and, in the process of exercising such control, impose
appropriate taxes, fees, charges, rentals and any such form of levy and collect such
revenues for the exploration, development, utilization or gathering of such resources;
xxx
(14) Promulgate rules, regulations and guidelines on the issuance of licenses, permits,
concessions, lease agreements and such other privileges concerning the development,
exploration and utilization of the countrys marine, freshwater, and brackish water
and over all aquatic resources of the country and shall continue to oversee, supervise
and police our natural resources; cancel or cause to cancel such privileges upon failure,
 non-compliance or violations of any regulation, order, and for all other causes which are
in furtherance of the conservation of natural resources and supportive of the national
interest;
(15) Exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all lands of
the public domain and serve as the sole agency responsible for classification,
sub-classification, surveying and titling of lands in consultation with appropriate
agencies.cxlix (Emphasis supplied)
As manager, conservator and overseer of the natural resources of the State, DENR exercises
supervision and control over alienable and disposable public lands. DENR also exercises
exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all lands of the public domain. Thus,
DENR decides whether areas under water, like foreshore or submerged areas of Manila Bay,
should be reclaimed or not. This means that PEA needs authorization from DENR before PEA
can undertake reclamation projects in Manila Bay, or in any part of the country.
DENR also exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the disposition of all lands of the public
domain. Hence, DENR decides whether reclaimed lands of PEA should be classified as alienable
under Sections 6cl and 7cli of CA No. 141. Once DENR decides that the reclaimed lands should
be so classified, it then recommends to the President the issuance of a proclamation classifying
the lands as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain open to disposition. We note that
then DENR Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. countersigned Special Patent No. 3517 in
compliance with the Revised Administrative Code and Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141.
In short, DENR is vested with the power to authorize the reclamation of areas under water,
while PEA is vested with the power to undertake the physical reclamation of areas under water,
whether directly or through private contractors. DENR is also empowered to classify lands of the
public domain into alienable or disposable lands subject to the approval of the President. On the
other hand, PEA is tasked to develop, sell or lease the reclaimed alienable lands of the public
domain.
Clearly, the mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged areas does
not make the reclaimed lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less
patrimonial lands of PEA. Likewise, the mere transfer by the National Government of lands of
the public domain to PEA does not make the lands alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA.
Absent two official acts a classification that these lands are alienable or disposable and open
to disposition and a declaration that these lands are not needed for public service, lands
reclaimed by PEA remain inalienable lands of the public domain. Only such an official
classification and formal declaration can convert reclaimed lands into alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain, open to disposition under the Constitution, Title I and Title IIIclii of
CA No. 141 and other applicable laws.cliii

PEAs Authority to Sell Reclaimed Lands

PEA, like the Legal Task Force, argues that as alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain, the reclaimed lands shall be disposed of in accordance with CA No. 141, the Public
Land Act. PEA, citing Section 60 of CA No. 141, admits that reclaimed lands transferred to a
branch or subdivision of the government shall not be alienated, encumbered, or otherwise
disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except when authorized by Congress: x x x.cliv
(Emphasis by PEA)
In Laurel vs. Garcia,clv the Court cited Section 48 of the Revised Administrative Code of
1987, which states that
Sec. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. Whenever real property of
the Government is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of conveyance shall be
executed in behalf of the government by the following: x x x.
Thus, the Court concluded that a law is needed to convey any real property belonging to the
Government. The Court declared that -
It is not for the President to convey real property of the government on his or her own
sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by
the Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence. (Emphasis supplied)
PEA contends that PD No. 1085 and EO No. 525 constitute the legislative authority
allowing PEA to sell its reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085, issued on February 4, 1977, provides that
The land reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore area of Manila Bay pursuant to
the contract for the reclamation and construction of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road
Project between the Republic of the Philippines and the Construction and Development
Corporation of the Philippines dated November 20, 1973 and/or any other contract or
reclamation covering the same area is hereby transferred, conveyed and assigned to the
ownership and administration of the Public Estates Authority established pursuant to
PD No. 1084; Provided, however, That the rights and interests of the Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines pursuant to the aforesaid contract shall be
recognized and respected.
Henceforth, the Public Estates Authority shall exercise the rights and assume the
obligations of the Republic of the Philippines (Department of Public Highways) arising
from, or incident to, the aforesaid contract between the Republic of the Philippines and
the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines.
In consideration of the foregoing transfer and assignment, the Public Estates
Authority shall issue in favor of the Republic of the Philippines the corresponding
shares of stock in said entity with an issued value of said shares of stock (which) shall
be deemed fully paid and non-assessable.
The Secretary of Public Highways and the General Manager of the Public Estates
Authority shall execute such contracts or agreements, including appropriate agreements
with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines, as may be
necessary to implement the above.
Special land patent/patents shall be issued by the Secretary of Natural Resources
in favor of the Public Estates Authority without prejudice to the subsequent transfer
to the contractor or his assignees of such portion or portions of the land reclaimed or
to be reclaimed as provided for in the above-mentioned contract. On the basis of such
 patents, the Land Registration Commission shall issue the corresponding certificate
of title. (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Section 3 of EO No. 525, issued on February 14, 1979, provides that -
Sec. 3. All lands reclaimed by PEA shall belong to or be owned by the PEA which
shall be responsible for its administration, development, utilization or disposition in
accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084. Any and all income
that the PEA may derive from the sale, lease or use of reclaimed lands shall be used in
accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084.
There is no express authority under either PD No. 1085 or EO No. 525 for PEA to sell its
reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085 merely transferred ownership and administration of lands
reclaimed from Manila Bay to PEA, while EO No. 525 declared that lands reclaimed by PEA
shall belong to or be owned by PEA. EO No. 525 expressly states that PEA should dispose of its
reclaimed lands in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084, the charter of
PEA.
PEAs charter, however, expressly tasks PEA to develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal
in, subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands x x x owned, managed,
controlled and/or operated by the government.clvi (Emphasis supplied) There is, therefore,
legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its lands, whether patrimonial or alienable lands of
the public domain. PEA may sell to private parties its patrimonial properties in accordance with
the PEA charter free from constitutional limitations. The constitutional ban on private
corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain does not apply to the sale of
PEAs patrimonial lands.
PEA may also sell its alienable or disposable lands of the public domain to private
individuals since, with the legislative authority, there is no longer any statutory prohibition
against such sales and the constitutional ban does not apply to individuals. PEA, however, cannot
sell any of its alienable or disposable lands of the public domain to private corporations since
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution expressly prohibits such sales. The legislative
authority benefits only individuals. Private corporations remain barred from acquiring any kind
of alienable land of the public domain, including government reclaimed lands.
The provision in PD No. 1085 stating that portions of the reclaimed lands could be
transferred by PEA to the contractor or his assignees (Emphasis supplied) would not apply to
private corporations but only to individuals because of the constitutional ban. Otherwise, the
provisions of PD No. 1085 would violate both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.

The requirement of public auction in the sale of reclaimed lands

Assuming the reclaimed lands of PEA are classified as alienable or disposable lands open to
disposition, and further declared no longer needed for public service, PEA would have to
conduct a public bidding in selling or leasing these lands. PEA must observe the provisions of
Sections 63 and 67 of CA No. 141 requiring public auction, in the absence of a law exempting
PEA from holding a public auction.clvii Special Patent No. 3517 expressly states that the patent is
issued by authority of the Constitution and PD No. 1084, supplemented by Commonwealth Act
No. 141, as amended. This is an acknowledgment that the provisions of CA No. 141 apply to the
disposition of reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain unless otherwise provided by law.
Executive Order No. 654,clviii which authorizes PEA to determine the kind and manner of
payment for the transfer of its assets and properties, does not exempt PEA from the requirement
of public auction. EO No. 654 merely authorizes PEA to decide the mode of payment, whether in
kind and in installment, but does not authorize PEA to dispense with public auction.
Moreover, under Section 79 of PD No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing
Code, the government is required to sell valuable government property through public bidding.
Section 79 of PD No. 1445 mandates that
Section 79. When government property has become unserviceable for any cause,
or is no longer needed, it shall, upon application of the officer accountable therefor, be
inspected by the head of the agency or his duly authorized representative in the presence
of the auditor concerned and, if found to be valueless or unsaleable, it may be destroyed
in their presence. If found to be valuable, it may be sold at public auction to the
highest bidder under the supervision of the proper committee on award or similar body
in the presence of the auditor concerned or other authorized representative of the
Commission, after advertising by printed notice in the Official Gazette, or for not less
than three consecutive days in any newspaper of general circulation, or where the
value of the property does not warrant the expense of publication, by notices posted for
a like period in at least three public places in the locality where the property is to be
sold. In the event that the public auction fails, the property may be sold at a private
sale at such price as may be fixed by the same committee or body concerned and
approved by the Commission.
It is only when the public auction fails that a negotiated sale is allowed, in which case the
Commission on Audit must approve the selling price.clix The Commission on Audit implements
Section 79 of the Government Auditing Code through Circular No. 89-296clx dated January 27,
1989. This circular emphasizes that government assets must be disposed of only through public
auction, and a negotiated sale can be resorted to only in case of failure of public auction.
At the public auction sale, only Philippine citizens are qualified to bid for PEAs reclaimed
foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public domain. Private corporations are barred
from bidding at the auction sale of any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
PEA originally scheduled a public bidding for the Freedom Islands on December 10, 1991.
PEA imposed a condition that the winning bidder should reclaim another 250 hectares of
submerged areas to regularize the shape of the Freedom Islands, under a 60-40 sharing of the
additional reclaimed areas in favor of the winning bidder.clxi No one, however, submitted a bid.
On December 23, 1994, the Government Corporate Counsel advised PEA it could sell the
Freedom Islands through negotiation, without need of another public bidding, because of the
failure of the public bidding on December 10, 1991.clxii
However, the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 covered not only the Freedom Islands and
the additional 250 hectares still to be reclaimed, it also granted an option to AMARI to reclaim
another 350 hectares. The original JVA, a negotiated contract, enlarged the reclamation area to
750 hectares.clxiii The failure of public bidding on December 10, 1991, involving only 407.84
hectares,clxiv is not a valid justification for a negotiated sale of 750 hectares, almost double the
area publicly auctioned. Besides, the failure of public bidding happened on December 10, 1991,
more than three years before the signing of the original JVA on April 25, 1995. The economic
situation in the country had greatly improved during the intervening period.

Reclamation under the BOT Law and the Local Government Code

The constitutional prohibition in Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is absolute
and clear: Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease, x x x. Even Republic Act No. 6957 (BOT Law, for brevity), cited by
PEA and AMARI as legislative authority to sell reclaimed lands to private parties, recognizes the
constitutional ban. Section 6 of RA No. 6957 states
Sec. 6. Repayment Scheme. - For the financing, construction, operation and
maintenance of any infrastructure projects undertaken through the
build-operate-and-transfer arrangement or any of its variations pursuant to the
provisions of this Act, the project proponent x x x may likewise be repaid in the form of
a share in the revenue of the project or other non-monetary payments, such as, but not
limited to, the grant of a portion or percentage of the reclaimed land, subject to the
constitutional requirements with respect to the ownership of the land: x x x.
(Emphasis supplied)
A private corporation, even one that undertakes the physical reclamation of a government BOT
project, cannot acquire reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain in view of the
constitutional ban.
Section 302 of the Local Government Code, also mentioned by PEA and AMARI,
authorizes local governments in land reclamation projects to pay the contractor or developer in
kind consisting of a percentage of the reclaimed land, to wit:
Section 302. Financing, Construction, Maintenance, Operation, and Management of
Infrastructure Projects by the Private Sector. x x x
xxx
In case of land reclamation or construction of industrial estates, the repayment plan
may consist of the grant of a portion or percentage of the reclaimed land or the
industrial estate constructed.
Although Section 302 of the Local Government Code does not contain a proviso similar to that
of the BOT Law, the constitutional restrictions on land ownership automatically apply even
though not expressly mentioned in the Local Government Code.
Thus, under either the BOT Law or the Local Government Code, the contractor or developer,
if a corporate entity, can only be paid with leaseholds on portions of the reclaimed land. If the
contractor or developer is an individual, portions of the reclaimed land, not exceeding 12
hectaresclxv of non-agricultural lands, may be conveyed to him in ownership in view of the
legislative authority allowing such conveyance. This is the only way these provisions of the BOT
Law and the Local Government Code can avoid a direct collision with Section 3, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution.
Registration of lands of the public domain

Finally, PEA theorizes that the act of conveying the ownership of the reclaimed lands to
public respondent PEA transformed such lands of the public domain to private lands. This theory
is echoed by AMARI which maintains that the issuance of the special patent leading to the
eventual issuance of title takes the subject land away from the land of public domain and
converts the property into patrimonial or private property. In short, PEA and AMARI contend
that with the issuance of Special Patent No. 3517 and the corresponding certificates of titles, the
157.84 hectares comprising the Freedom Islands have become private lands of PEA. In support
of their theory, PEA and AMARI cite the following rulings of the Court:
1. Sumail v. Judge of CFI of Cotabato,clxvi where the Court held
Once the patent was granted and the corresponding certificate of title was issued, the
land ceased to be part of the public domain and became private property over which
the Director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction.
2. Lee Hong Hok v. David,clxvii where the Court declared -
After the registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title
based on a public land patent, the land covered thereby automatically comes under
the operation of Republic Act 496 subject to all the safeguards provided therein.
3. Heirs of Gregorio Tengco v. Heirs of Jose Aliwalas,clxviii where the Court ruled -
While the Director of Lands has the power to review homestead patents, he may do
so only so long as the land remains part of the public domain and continues to be
under his exclusive control; but once the patent is registered and a certificate of title
is issued, the land ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private
property over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction.
4. Manalo v. Intermediate Appellate Court,clxix where the Court held
When the lots in dispute were certified as disposable on May 19, 1971, and free
patents were issued covering the same in favor of the private respondents, the said
lots ceased to be part of the public domain and, therefore, the Director of Lands lost
jurisdiction over the same.
5.Republic v. Court of Appeals,clxx where the Court stated
Proclamation No. 350, dated October 9, 1956, of President Magsaysay legally
effected a land grant to the Mindanao Medical Center, Bureau of Medical Services,
Department of Health, of the whole lot, validly sufficient for initial registration under
the Land Registration Act. Such land grant is constitutive of a fee simple title or
absolute title in favor of petitioner Mindanao Medical Center. Thus, Section 122 of
the Act, which governs the registration of grants or patents involving public lands,
provides that Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the
Government of the United States or to the Government of the Philippines are
alienated, granted or conveyed to persons or to public or private corporations, the
same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Act (Land Registration
Act, Act 496) and shall become registered lands.
 The first four cases cited involve petitions to cancel the land patents and the corresponding
certificates of titles issued to private parties. These four cases uniformly hold that the Director of
Lands has no jurisdiction over private lands or that upon issuance of the certificate of title the
land automatically comes under the Torrens System. The fifth case cited involves the registration
under the Torrens System of a 12.8-hectare public land granted by the National Government to
Mindanao Medical Center, a government unit under the Department of Health. The National
Government transferred the 12.8-hectare public land to serve as the site for the hospital buildings
and other facilities of Mindanao Medical Center, which performed a public service. The Court
affirmed the registration of the 12.8-hectare public land in the name of Mindanao Medical Center
under Section 122 of Act No. 496. This fifth case is an example of a public land being registered
under Act No. 496 without the land losing its character as a property of public dominion.
In the instant case, the only patent and certificates of title issued are those in the name of
PEA, a wholly government owned corporation performing public as well as proprietary functions.
No patent or certificate of title has been issued to any private party. No one is asking the Director
of Lands to cancel PEAs patent or certificates of title. In fact, the thrust of the instant petition is
that PEAs certificates of title should remain with PEA, and the land covered by these certificates,
being alienable lands of the public domain, should not be sold to a private corporation.
Registration of land under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 does not vest in the registrant
private or public ownership of the land. Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership but is
merely evidence of ownership previously conferred by any of the recognized modes of acquiring
ownership. Registration does not give the registrant a better right than what the registrant had
prior to the registration.clxxi The registration of lands of the public domain under the Torrens
system, by itself, cannot convert public lands into private lands.clxxii
Jurisprudence holding that upon the grant of the patent or issuance of the certificate of title
the alienable land of the public domain automatically becomes private land cannot apply to
government units and entities like PEA. The transfer of the Freedom Islands to PEA was made
subject to the provisions of CA No. 141 as expressly stated in Special Patent No. 3517 issued by
then President Aquino, to wit:
NOW, THEREFORE, KNOW YE, that by authority of the Constitution of the
Philippines and in conformity with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084,
supplemented by Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, there are hereby granted
and conveyed unto the Public Estates Authority the aforesaid tracts of land containing a
total area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four
(1,915,894) square meters; the technical description of which are hereto attached and
made an integral part hereof. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the provisions of CA No. 141 apply to the Freedom Islands on matters not covered by
PD No. 1084. Section 60 of CA No. 141 prohibits, except when authorized by Congress, the sale
of alienable lands of the public domain that are transferred to government units or entities.
Section 60 of CA No. 141 constitutes, under Section 44 of PD No. 1529, a statutory lien
affecting title of the registered land even if not annotated on the certificate of title.clxxiii Alienable
lands of the public domain held by government entities under Section 60 of CA No. 141 remain
public lands because they cannot be alienated or encumbered unless Congress passes a law
authorizing their disposition. Congress, however, cannot authorize the sale to private
corporations of reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain because of the constitutional ban.
Only individuals can benefit from such law.
The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands in accordance with Section 60 of CA
No. 141 does not automatically convert alienable lands of the public domain into private or
patrimonial lands. The alienable lands of the public domain must be transferred to qualified
private parties, or to government entities not tasked to dispose of public lands, before these lands
can become private or patrimonial lands. Otherwise, the constitutional ban will become illusory
if Congress can declare lands of the public domain as private or patrimonial lands in the hands of
a government agency tasked to dispose of public lands. This will allow private corporations to
acquire directly from government agencies limitless areas of lands which, prior to such law, are
concededly public lands.
Under EO No. 525, PEA became the central implementing agency of the National
Government to reclaim foreshore and submerged areas of the public domain. Thus, EO No. 525
declares that
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 525
Designating the Public Estates Authority as the Agency Primarily Responsible for
all Reclamation Projects
Whereas, there are several reclamation projects which are ongoing or being proposed to
be undertaken in various parts of the country which need to be evaluated for consistency
with national programs;
Whereas, there is a need to give further institutional support to the Governments
declared policy to provide for a coordinated, economical and efficient reclamation of
lands;
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 3-A requires that all reclamation of areas shall be
limited to the National Government or any person authorized by it under proper
contract;
Whereas, a central authority is needed to act on behalf of the National Government
which shall ensure a coordinated and integrated approach in the reclamation of
lands;
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 1084 creates the Public Estates Authority as a
government corporation to undertake reclamation of lands and ensure their
maximum utilization in promoting public welfare and interests; and
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 1416 provides the President with continuing authority
to reorganize the national government including the transfer, abolition, or merger of
functions and offices.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution and pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 1416, do hereby order and direct the following:
Section 1. The Public Estates Authority (PEA) shall be primarily responsible for
integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf of
the National Government. All reclamation projects shall be approved by the President
 upon recommendation of the PEA, and shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a
proper contract executed by it with any person or entity; Provided, that, reclamation
projects of any national government agency or entity authorized under its charter shall
be undertaken in consultation with the PEA upon approval of the President.
xxx.
As the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide,
with authority to sell reclaimed lands, PEA took the place of DENR as the government agency
charged with leasing or selling reclaimed lands of the public domain. The reclaimed lands being
leased or sold by PEA are not private lands, in the same manner that DENR, when it disposes of
other alienable lands, does not dispose of private lands but alienable lands of the public domain.
Only when qualified private parties acquire these lands will the lands become private lands. In
the hands of the government agency tasked and authorized to dispose of alienable of
disposable lands of the public domain, these lands are still public, not private lands.
Furthermore, PEAs charter expressly states that PEA shall hold lands of the public domain
as well as any and all kinds of lands. PEA can hold both lands of the public domain and private
lands. Thus, the mere fact that alienable lands of the public domain like the Freedom Islands are
transferred to PEA and issued land patents or certificates of title in PEAs name does not
automatically make such lands private.
To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as
private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations
from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. PEA will simply turn around, as
PEA has now done under the Amended JVA, and transfer several hundreds of hectares of these
reclaimed and still to be reclaimed lands to a single private corporation in only one transaction.
This scheme will effectively nullify the constitutional ban in Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which was intended to diffuse equitably the ownership of alienable lands of the
public domain among Filipinos, now numbering over 80 million strong.
This scheme, if allowed, can even be applied to alienable agricultural lands of the public
domain since PEA can acquire x x x any and all kinds of lands. This will open the floodgates to
corporations and even individuals acquiring hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the public
domain under the guise that in the hands of PEA these lands are private lands. This will result in
corporations amassing huge landholdings never before seen in this country - creating the very
evil that the constitutional ban was designed to prevent. This will completely reverse the clear
direction of constitutional development in this country. The 1935 Constitution allowed private
corporations to acquire not more than 1,024 hectares of public lands.clxxiv The 1973 Constitution
prohibited private corporations from acquiring any kind of public land, and the 1987 Constitution
has unequivocally reiterated this prohibition.
The contention of PEA and AMARI that public lands, once registered under Act No. 496 or
PD No. 1529, automatically become private lands is contrary to existing laws. Several laws
authorize lands of the public domain to be registered under the Torrens System or Act No. 496,
now PD No. 1529, without losing their character as public lands. Section 122 of Act No. 496,
and Section 103 of PD No. 1529, respectively, provide as follows:
Act No. 496
 Sec. 122. Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the x x x
Government of the Philippine Islands are alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or
the public or private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under the
operation of this Act and shall become registered lands.
PD No. 1529
Sec. 103. Certificate of Title to Patents. Whenever public land is by the
Government alienated, granted or conveyed to any person, the same shall be brought
forthwith under the operation of this Decree. (Emphasis supplied)
Based on its legislative history, the phrase conveyed to any person in Section 103 of PD No.
1529 includes conveyances of public lands to public corporations.
Alienable lands of the public domain granted, donated, or transferred to a province,
municipality, or branch or subdivision of the Government, as provided in Section 60 of CA No.
141, may be registered under the Torrens System pursuant to Section 103 of PD No. 1529. Such
registration, however, is expressly subject to the condition in Section 60 of CA No. 141 that the
land shall not be alienated, encumbered or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its title,
except when authorized by Congress. This provision refers to government reclaimed, foreshore
and marshy lands of the public domain that have been titled but still cannot be alienated or
encumbered unless expressly authorized by Congress. The need for legislative authority prevents
the registered land of the public domain from becoming private land that can be disposed of to
qualified private parties.
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 also recognizes that lands of the public domain
may be registered under the Torrens System. Section 48, Chapter 12, Book I of the Code states
Sec. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. Whenever real property of
the Government is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of conveyance shall be
executed in behalf of the government by the following:
(1) x x x
(2) For property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, but titled in the name
of any political subdivision or of any corporate agency or instrumentality, by the
executive head of the agency or instrumentality. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, private property purchased by the National Government for expansion of a public wharf
may be titled in the name of a government corporation regulating port operations in the country.
Private property purchased by the National Government for expansion of an airport may also be
titled in the name of the government agency tasked to administer the airport. Private property
donated to a municipality for use as a town plaza or public school site may likewise be titled in
the name of the municipality.clxxv All these properties become properties of the public domain,
and if already registered under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529, remain registered land. There is no
requirement or provision in any existing law for the de-registration of land from the Torrens
System.
Private lands taken by the Government for public use under its power of eminent domain
become unquestionably part of the public domain. Nevertheless, Section 85 of PD No. 1529
authorizes the Register of Deeds to issue in the name of the National Government new
certificates of title covering such expropriated lands. Section 85 of PD No. 1529 states
 Sec. 85. Land taken by eminent domain. Whenever any registered land, or interest
therein, is expropriated or taken by eminent domain, the National Government, province,
city or municipality, or any other agency or instrumentality exercising such right shall
file for registration in the proper Registry a certified copy of the judgment which shall
state definitely by an adequate description, the particular property or interest
expropriated, the number of the certificate of title, and the nature of the public use. A
memorandum of the right or interest taken shall be made on each certificate of title by
the Register of Deeds, and where the fee simple is taken, a new certificate shall be
issued in favor of the National Government, province, city, municipality, or any other
agency or instrumentality exercising such right for the land so taken. The legal expenses
incident to the memorandum of registration or issuance of a new certificate of title shall
be for the account of the authority taking the land or interest therein. (Emphasis
supplied)
Consequently, lands registered under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 are not exclusively private or
patrimonial lands. Lands of the public domain may also be registered pursuant to existing laws.
AMARI makes a parting shot that the Amended JVA is not a sale to AMARI of the Freedom
Islands or of the lands to be reclaimed from submerged areas of Manila Bay. In the words of
AMARI, the Amended JVA is not a sale but a joint venture with a stipulation for reimbursement
of the original cost incurred by PEA for the earlier reclamation and construction works
performed by the CDCP under its 1973 contract with the Republic. Whether the Amended JVA
is a sale or a joint venture, the fact remains that the Amended JVA requires PEA to cause the
issuance and delivery of the certificates of title conveying AMARIs Land Share in the name of
AMARI.clxxvi
This stipulation still contravenes Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that private corporations shall not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except
by lease. The transfer of title and ownership to AMARI clearly means that AMARI will hold the
reclaimed lands other than by lease. The transfer of title and ownership is a disposition of the
reclaimed lands, a transaction considered a sale or alienation under CA No. 141,clxxvii the
Government Auditing Code,clxxviii and Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
The Regalian doctrine is deeply implanted in our legal system. Foreshore and submerged
areas form part of the public domain and are inalienable. Lands reclaimed from foreshore and
submerged areas also form part of the public domain and are also inalienable, unless converted
pursuant to law into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. Historically, lands
reclaimed by the government are sui generis, not available for sale to private parties unlike other
alienable public lands. Reclaimed lands retain their inherent potential as areas for public use or
public service. Alienable lands of the public domain, increasingly becoming scarce natural
resources, are to be distributed equitably among our ever-growing population. To insure such
equitable distribution, the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions have barred private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Those who attempt to dispose of
inalienable natural resources of the State, or seek to circumvent the constitutional ban on
alienation of lands of the public domain to private corporations, do so at their own risk.
We can now summarize our conclusions as follows:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now
 covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public
domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or
transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these
lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987
Constitution and existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural
resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open
to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government can
make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these
submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public
domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In their
present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the
commerce of man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation,
ownership of 77.34 hectaresclxxix of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for
being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156
hectaresclxxx of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the
alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.
PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the
reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer
needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the
public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain.
Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. Under Article 1409clxxxi of the Civil Code, contracts whose object or purpose is
contrary to law, or whose object is outside the commerce of men, are inexistent and void from
the beginning. The Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution, and
therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio.

Seventh issue: whether the Court is the proper forum to raise the issue of whether the
Amended JVA is grossly disadvantageous to the government.

Considering that the Amended JVA is null and void ab initio, there is no necessity to rule on
this last issue. Besides, the Court is not a trier of facts, and this last issue involves a
determination of factual matters.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates Authority and Amari
Coastal Bay Development Corporation are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from implementing
the Amended Joint Venture Agreement which is hereby declared NULL and VOID ab initio.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 169777*
represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON,
in his capacity as Senate President, JUAN
M. FLAVIER, in his capacity as Senate
President Pro Tempore, FRANCIS N. Present:
PANGILINAN, in his capacity as Majority
Leader, AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.,
in his capacity as Minority Leader,
SENATORS RODOLFO G. BIAZON, PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
COMPANERA PIA S. CAYETANO,
JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, LUISA PUNO,**
LOI EJERCITO ESTRADA, JUAN
PONCE ENRILE, RICHARD J. QUISUMBING,
GORDON, PANFILO M. LACSON, YNARES-SANTIAGO,
ALFREDO S. LIM, M. A. MADRIGAL, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
SERGIO OSMENA III, RALPH G.
RECTO, and MAR ROXAS, CARPIO,

Petitioners, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CORONA,

- versus - CARPIO MORALES,

CALLEJO, SR.,

EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as AZCUNA,

Executive Secretary and alter-ego of
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and TINGA,
anyone acting in his stead and in behalf of
the President of the Philippines, CHICO-NAZARIO,

Respondents. GARCIA, and

x------------------------------------------x VELASCO, JR., JJ.

BAYAN MUNA represented by DR.

REYNALDO LESACA, JR., Rep. SATUR
OCAMPO, Rep. CRISPIN BELTRAN,
Rep. RAFAEL MARIANO, Rep. LIZA
MAZA, Rep. TEODORO CASINO, Rep.
JOEL VIRADOR, COURAGE represented
by FERDINAND GAITE, and
COUNSELS FOR THE DEFENSE OF
LIBERTIES (CODAL) represented by
ATTY. REMEDIOS BALBIN,
Promulgated:
Petitioners,

- versus -
April 20, 2006

EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as

Executive Secretary and alter-ego of
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,

Respondent.

x------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 169659

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ,

Petitioner,

- versus -

EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as

Executive Secretary, AVELINO J. CRUZ,
JR., in his capacity as Secretary of Defense,
and GENEROSO S. SENGA, in his
capacity as AFP Chief of Staff,

Respondents.

x------------------------------------------x
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC.
(ALG),

Petitioner,

- versus -

HON. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his

capacity as Executive Secretary,

Respondent.

x-----------------------------------------x

PDP- LABAN,

Petitioner,

G.R. No. 169660

- versus -

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO

R. ERMITA,

Respondent.

x------------------------------------------x

JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, FELICIANO

M. BAUTISTA, ROMULO R. RIVERA,
JOSE AMOR AMORANDO, ALICIA A.
RISOS-VIDAL, FILEMON C. ABELITA
III, MANUEL P. LEGASPI, J. B. JOVY C.
BERNABE, BERNARD L. DAGCUTA,
ROGELIO V. GARCIA, and the
INTEGRATED BAR FOR THE
PHILIPPINES,

Petitioners,
G.R. No. 169667

- versus -

HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EDUARDO R. ERMITA,

Respondent.

G.R. No. 169834

 G.R. No. 171246

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

A transparent government is one of the hallmarks of a truly republican state. Even in the
early history of republican thought, however, it has been recognized that the head of government
may keep certain information confidential in pursuit of the public interest. Explaining the reason
for vesting executive power in only one magistrate, a distinguished delegate to the U.S.
Constitutional Convention said: Decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally
characterize the proceedings of one man, in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of
any greater number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be
diminished.39

History has been witness, however, to the fact that the power to withhold information
lends itself to abuse, hence, the necessity to guard it zealously.
 The present consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President
has abused such power by issuing Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464) last September 28, 2005.
They thus pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.

In resolving the controversy, this Court shall proceed with the recognition that the
issuance under review has come from a co-equal branch of government, which thus entitles it to
a strong presumption of constitutionality. Once the challenged order is found to be indeed
violative of the Constitution, it is duty-bound to declare it so. For the Constitution, being the
highest expression of the sovereign will of the Filipino people, must prevail over any issuance of
the government that contravenes its mandates.

In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various
Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter
alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices
including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).

On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations
to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as
resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways
Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail
Project). The public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile
urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the
contract covering the North Rail Project.
 The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewise issued invitations40
dated September 22, 2005 to the following officials of the AFP: the Commanding General of the
Philippine Army, Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon; Inspector General of the AFP Vice Admiral
Mateo M. Mayuga; Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the AFP Rear Admiral Tirso R.
Danga; Chief of the Intelligence Service of the AFP Brig. Gen. Marlu Q. Quevedo; Assistant
Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Brig. Gen. Francisco V. Gudani; and
Assistant Commandant, Corps of Cadets of the PMA, Col. Alexander F. Balutan, for them to
attend as resource persons in a public hearing scheduled on September 28, 2005 on the following:
(1) Privilege Speech of Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel Jr., delivered on June 6, 2005 entitled
Bunye has Provided Smoking Gun or has Opened a Can of Worms that Show Massive Electoral
Fraud in the Presidential Election of May 2005; (2) Privilege Speech of Senator Jinggoy E.
Estrada delivered on July 26, 2005 entitled The Philippines as the Wire-Tapping Capital of the
World; (3) Privilege Speech of Senator Rodolfo Biazon delivered on August 1, 2005 entitled
Clear and Present Danger; (4) Senate Resolution No. 285 filed by Senator Maria Ana Consuelo
Madrigal Resolution Directing the Committee on National Defense and Security to Conduct an
Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, and in the National Interest, on the Role of the Military in the
So-called Gloriagate Scandal; and (5) Senate Resolution No. 295 filed by Senator Biazon
Resolution Directing the Committee on National Defense and Security to Conduct an Inquiry, in
Aid of Legislation, on the Wire-Tapping of the President of the Philippines.

Also invited to the above-said hearing scheduled on September 28 2005 was the AFP
Chief of Staff, General Generoso S. Senga who, by letter41 dated September 27, 2005,
requested for its postponement due to a pressing operational situation that demands [his] utmost
personal attention while some of the invited AFP officers are currently attending to other urgent
operational matters.
 On September 28, 2005, Senate President Franklin M. Drilon received from Executive
Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita a letter42 dated September 27, 2005 respectfully request[ing] for
the postponement of the hearing [regarding the NorthRail project] to which various officials of
the Executive Department have been invited in order to afford said officials ample time and
opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that they may better enlighten the
Senate Committee on its investigation.

Senate President Drilon, however, wrote43 Executive Secretary Ermita that the Senators are
unable to accede to [his request] as it was sent belatedly and [a]ll preparations and arrangements
as well as notices to all resource persons were completed [the previous] week.

Senate President Drilon likewise received on September 28, 2005 a letter44 from the
President of the North Luzon Railways Corporation Jose L. Cortes, Jr. requesting that the hearing
on the NorthRail project be postponed or cancelled until a copy of the report of the UP Law
Center on the contract agreements relative to the project had been secured.

On September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. 464, ENSURING OBSERVANCE OF
THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS, ADHERENCE TO THE RULE ON
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE AND RESPECT FOR THE RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS
APPEARING IN LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,45 which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof,
took effect immediately. The salient provisions of the Order are as follows:
SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. In
accordance with Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement the
Constitutional provisions on the separation of powers between co-equal branches
of the government, all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the
government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing
before either House of Congress.
When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President
so states in writing, the appearance shall only be conducted in executive session.

SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege.

(a) Nature and Scope. - The rule of confidentiality based on executive privilege is
fundamental to the operation of government and rooted in the separation of
powers under the Constitution (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May
1995). Further, Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides that Public Officials and
Employees shall not use or divulge confidential or classified information
officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the
public to prejudice the public interest.
Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified information between the
President and the public officers covered by this executive order, including:

Conversations and correspondence between the President and

the public official covered by this executive order (Almonte
vs. Vasquez G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v.
Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002);

Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which

in the interest of national security should not be divulged
(Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995;
Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government,
G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998).

Information between inter-government agencies prior to the

conclusion of treaties and executive agreements (Chavez v.
Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No.
130716, 9 December 1998);

Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings (Chavez v.

Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No.
130716, 9 December 1998);

Matters affecting national security and public order (Chavez v.

Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002).

(b) Who are covered. The following are covered by this executive order:
 Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the
department heads are covered by the executive privilege;

Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are
covered by the executive privilege;

Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief

superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the
judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive
privilege;

Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National

Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and

Such other officers as may be determined by the President.

SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials Before Congress. All public

officials enumerated in Section 2 (b) hereof shall secure prior consent of the
President prior to appearing before either House of Congress to ensure the
observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on
executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials appearing in
inquiries in aid of legislation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Also on September 28, 2005, Senate President Drilon received from Executive Secretary
Ermita a copy of E.O. 464, and another letter46 informing him that officials of the Executive
Department invited to appear at the meeting [regarding the NorthRail project] will not be able to
attend the same without the consent of the President, pursuant to [E.O. 464] and that said
officials have not secured the required consent from the President. On even date which was also
the scheduled date of the hearing on the alleged wiretapping, Gen. Senga sent a letter47 to
Senator Biazon, Chairperson of the Committee on National Defense and Security, informing him
that per instruction of [President Arroyo], thru the Secretary of National Defense, no officer of
the [AFP] is authorized to appear before any Senate or Congressional hearings without seeking a
written approval from the President and that no approval has been granted by the President to
any AFP officer to appear before the public hearing of the Senate Committee on National
Defense and Security scheduled [on] 28 September 2005.
 Despite the communications received from Executive Secretary Ermita and Gen. Senga, the
investigation scheduled by the Committee on National Defense and Security pushed through,
with only Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani among all the AFP officials invited attending.

For defying President Arroyos order barring military personnel from testifying before
legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved
from their military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings.

As to the NorthRail project hearing scheduled on September 29, 2005, Executive Secretary
Ermita, citing E.O. 464, sent letter of regrets, in response to the invitations sent to the following
government officials: Light Railway Transit Authority Administrator Melquiades Robles, Metro
Rail Transit Authority Administrator Roberto Lastimoso, Department of Justice (DOJ) Chief
State Counsel Ricardo V. Perez, then Presidential Legal Counsel Merceditas Gutierrez,
Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) Undersecretary Guiling Mamonding,
DOTC Secretary Leandro Mendoza, Philippine National Railways General Manager Jose Serase
II, Monetary Board Member Juanita Amatong, Bases Conversion Development Authority
Chairperson Gen. Narciso Abaya and Secretary Romulo L. Neri.48 NorthRail President Cortes
sent personal regrets likewise citing E.O. 464.49

On October 3, 2005, three petitions, docketed as G.R. Nos. 169659, 169660, and 169667, for
certiorari and prohibition, were filed before this Court challenging the constitutionality of E.O.
464.
 In G.R. No. 169659, petitioners party-list Bayan Muna, House of Representatives
Members Satur Ocampo, Crispin Beltran, Rafael Mariano, Liza Maza, Joel Virador and Teodoro
Casino, COURAGE, an organization of government employees, and Counsels for the Defense of
Liberties (CODAL), a group of lawyers dedicated to the promotion of justice, democracy and
peace, all claiming to have standing to file the suit because of the transcendental importance of
the issues they posed, pray, in their petition that E.O. 464 be declared null and void for being
unconstitutional; that respondent Executive Secretary Ermita, in his capacity as Executive
Secretary and alter-ego of President Arroyo, be prohibited from imposing, and threatening to
impose sanctions on officials who appear before Congress due to congressional summons.
Additionally, petitioners claim that E.O. 464 infringes on their rights and impedes them from
fulfilling their respective obligations. Thus, Bayan Muna alleges that E.O. 464 infringes on its
right as a political party entitled to participate in governance; Satur Ocampo, et al. allege that
E.O. 464 infringes on their rights and duties as members of Congress to conduct investigation in
aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws; COURAGE
alleges that the tenure of its members in public office is predicated on, and threatened by, their
submission to the requirements of E.O. 464 should they be summoned by Congress; and CODAL
alleges that its members have a sworn duty to uphold the rule of law, and their rights to
information and to transparent governance are threatened by the imposition of E.O. 464.

In G.R. No. 169660, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, claiming that his constitutional rights
as a citizen, taxpayer and law practitioner, are affected by the enforcement of E.O. 464, prays in
his petition that E.O. 464 be declared null and void for being unconstitutional.

In G.R. No. 169667, petitioner Alternative Law Groups, Inc.50 (ALG), alleging that as a
coalition of 17 legal resource non-governmental organizations engaged in developmental
lawyering and work with the poor and marginalized sectors in different parts of the country, and
as an organization of citizens of the Philippines and a part of the general public, it has legal
standing to institute the petition to enforce its constitutional right to information on matters of
public concern, a right which was denied to the public by E.O. 464,51 prays, that said order be
declared null and void for being unconstitutional and that respondent Executive Secretary Ermita
be ordered to cease from implementing it.

On October 11, 2005, Petitioner Senate of the Philippines, alleging that it has a vital
interest in the resolution of the issue of the validity of E.O. 464 for it stands to suffer imminent
and material injury, as it has already sustained the same with its continued enforcement since it
directly interferes with and impedes the valid exercise of the Senates powers and functions and
conceals information of great public interest and concern, filed its petition for certiorari and
prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 169777 and prays that E.O. 464 be declared unconstitutional.

On October 14, 2005, PDP-Laban, a registered political party with members duly elected
into the Philippine Senate and House of Representatives, filed a similar petition for certiorari and
prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 169834, alleging that it is affected by the challenged E.O. 464
because it hampers its legislative agenda to be implemented through its members in Congress,
particularly in the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation and transcendental issues need to be
resolved to avert a constitutional crisis between the executive and legislative branches of the
government.

Meanwhile, by letter52 dated February 6, 2006, Senator Biazon reiterated his invitation
to Gen. Senga for him and other military officers to attend the hearing on the alleged wiretapping
scheduled on February 10, 2005. Gen. Senga replied, however, by letter53 dated February 8,
2006, that [p]ursuant to Executive Order No. 464, th[e] Headquarters requested for a clearance
from the President to allow [them] to appear before the public hearing and that they will attend
once [their] request is approved by the President. As none of those invited appeared, the hearing
on February 10, 2006 was cancelled.54

In another investigation conducted jointly by the Senate Committee on Agriculture and

Food and the Blue Ribbon Committee on the alleged mismanagement and use of the fertilizer
fund under the Ginintuang Masaganang Ani program of the Department of Agriculture (DA),
several Cabinet officials were invited to the hearings scheduled on October 5 and 26, November
24 and December 12, 2005 but most of them failed to attend, DA Undersecretary Belinda
Gonzales, DA Assistant Secretary Felix Jose Montes, Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority
Executive Director Norlito R. Gicana,55 and those from the Department of Budget and
Management56 having invoked E.O. 464.

In the budget hearings set by the Senate on February 8 and 13, 2006, Press Secretary and
Presidential Spokesperson Ignacio R. Bunye,57 DOJ Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez58 and
Department of Interior and Local Government Undersecretary Marius P. Corpus59
communicated their inability to attend due to lack of appropriate clearance from the President
pursuant to E.O. 464. During the February 13, 2005 budget hearing, however, Secretary Bunye
was allowed to attend by Executive Secretary Ermita.

On February 13, 2006, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz and the incumbent members of the Board
of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as taxpayers, and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines as the official organization of all Philippine lawyers, all invoking their constitutional
right to be informed on matters of public interest, filed their petition for certiorari and prohibition,
docketed as G.R. No. 171246, and pray that E.O. 464 be declared null and void.

All the petitions pray for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining
respondents from implementing, enforcing, and observing E.O. 464.

In the oral arguments on the petitions conducted on February 21, 2006, the following
substantive issues were ventilated: (1) whether respondents committed grave abuse of discretion
in implementing E.O. 464 prior to its publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation; and (2) whether E.O. 464 violates the following provisions of the
Constitution: Art. II, Sec. 28, Art. III, Sec. 4, Art. III, Sec. 7, Art. IV. Sec. 1, Art. VI, Sec. 21, Art.
VI, Sec. 22, Art. XI, Sec. 1, and Art. XIII, Sec. 16. The procedural issue of whether there is an
actual case or controversy that calls for judicial review was not taken up; instead, the parties
were instructed to discuss it in their respective memoranda.

After the conclusion of the oral arguments, the parties were directed to submit their
respective memoranda, paying particular attention to the following propositions: (1) that E.O.
464 is, on its face, unconstitutional; and (2) assuming that it is not, it is unconstitutional as
applied in four instances, namely: (a) the so called Fertilizer scam; (b) the NorthRail
investigation (c) the Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP; and (d) the investigation on the Venable
contract.60
 Petitioners in G.R. No. 16966061 and G.R. No. 16977762 filed their memoranda on
March 7, 2006, while those in G.R. No. 16966763 and G.R. No. 16983464 filed theirs the next
day or on March 8, 2006. Petitioners in G.R. No. 171246 did not file any memorandum.

Petitioners Bayan Muna et al. in G.R. No. 169659, after their motion for extension to file
memorandum65 was granted, subsequently filed a manifestation66 dated March 14, 2006 that it
would no longer file its memorandum in the interest of having the issues resolved soonest,
prompting this Court to issue a Resolution reprimanding them.67

Petitioners submit that E.O. 464 violates the following constitutional provisions:

Art. VI, Sec. 2168

Art. VI, Sec. 2269

Art. VI, Sec. 170

Art. XI, Sec. 171

Art. III, Sec. 772

 Art. III, Sec. 473

Art. XIII, Sec. 16 74

Art. II, Sec. 2875

Respondents Executive Secretary Ermita et al., on the other hand, pray in their
consolidated memorandum76 on March 13, 2006 for the dismissal of the petitions for lack of
merit.

The Court synthesizes the issues to be resolved as follows:

1. Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress;

2. Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern; and

3. Whether respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they implemented
E.O. 464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
Essential requisites for judicial review

Before proceeding to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of E.O. 464, ascertainment of
whether the requisites for a valid exercise of the Courts power of judicial review are present is in
order.

Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject
to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge the validity of
the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3)
the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.77

Except with respect to the requisites of standing and existence of an actual case or
controversy where the disagreement between the parties lies, discussion of the rest of the
requisites shall be omitted.

Standing

Respondents, through the Solicitor General, assert that the allegations in G.R. Nos. 169659,
169660 and 169667 make it clear that they, adverting to the non-appearance of several officials
of the executive department in the investigations called by the different committees of the Senate,
were brought to vindicate the constitutional duty of the Senate or its different committees to
conduct inquiry in aid of legislation or in the exercise of its oversight functions. They maintain
that Representatives Ocampo et al. have not shown any specific prerogative, power, and
privilege of the House of Representatives which had been effectively impaired by E.O. 464, there
being no mention of any investigation called by the House of Representatives or any of its
committees which was aborted due to the implementation of E.O. 464.

As for Bayan Munas alleged interest as a party-list representing the marginalized and
underrepresented, and that of the other petitioner groups and individuals who profess to have
standing as advocates and defenders of the Constitution, respondents contend that such interest
falls short of that required to confer standing on them as parties injured-in-fact.78

Respecting petitioner Chavez, respondents contend that Chavez may not claim an interest
as a taxpayer for the implementation of E.O. 464 does not involve the exercise of taxing or
spending power.79

With regard to the petition filed by the Senate, respondents argue that in the absence of a
personal or direct injury by reason of the issuance of E.O. 464, the Senate and its individual
members are not the proper parties to assail the constitutionality of E.O. 464.
 Invoking this Courts ruling in National Economic Protectionism Association v. Ongpin80
and Valmonte v. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office,81 respondents assert that to be
considered a proper party, one must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that
he has sustained or will sustain direct injury due to the enforcement of E.O. 464.82

That the Senate of the Philippines has a fundamental right essential not only for
intelligent public decision-making in a democratic system, but more especially for sound
legislation83 is not disputed. E.O. 464, however, allegedly stifles the ability of the members of
Congress to access information that is crucial to law-making.84 Verily, the Senate, including its
individual members, has a substantial and direct interest over the outcome of the controversy and
is the proper party to assail the constitutionality of E.O. 464. Indeed, legislators have standing to
maintain inviolate the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their
office and are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which they claim
infringes their prerogatives as legislators.85

In the same vein, party-list representatives Satur Ocampo (Bayan Muna), Teodoro Casino
(Bayan Muna), Joel Virador (Bayan Muna), Crispin Beltran (Anakpawis), Rafael Mariano
(Anakpawis), and Liza Maza (Gabriela) are allowed to sue to question the constitutionality of
E.O. 464, the absence of any claim that an investigation called by the House of Representatives
or any of its committees was aborted due to the implementation of E.O. 464 notwithstanding, it
being sufficient that a claim is made that E.O. 464 infringes on their constitutional rights and
duties as members of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct
oversight functions in the implementation of laws.
 The national political party, Bayan Muna, likewise meets the standing requirement as it
obtained three seats in the House of Representatives in the 2004 elections and is, therefore,
entitled to participate in the legislative process consonant with the declared policy underlying the
party list system of affording citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties who lack well-defined political constituencies to contribute to the
formulation and enactment of legislation that will benefit the nation.86

As Bayan Muna and Representatives Ocampo et al. have the standing to file their
petitions, passing on the standing of their co-petitioners COURAGE and CODAL is rendered
unnecessary.87

In filing their respective petitions, Chavez, the ALG which claims to be an organization of
citizens, and the incumbent members of the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP in behalf of its
lawyer members,88 invoke their constitutional right to information on matters of public concern,
asserting that the right to information, curtailed and violated by E.O. 464, is essential to the
effective exercise of other constitutional rights89 and to the maintenance of the balance of
power among the three branches of the government through the principle of checks and
balances.90

It is well-settled that when suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner in assailing the
constitutionality of laws, presidential decrees, orders, and other regulations, must be direct and
personal. In Franciso v. House of Representatives,91 this Court held that when the proceeding
involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement
of personal interest.

As for petitioner PDP-Laban, it asseverates that it is clothed with legal standing in view of
the transcendental issues raised in its petition which this Court needs to resolve in order to avert a
constitutional crisis. For it to be accorded standing on the ground of transcendental importance,
however, it must establish (1) the character of the funds (that it is public) or other assets involved
in the case, (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory
prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government, and (3) the
lack of any party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised.92
The first and last determinants not being present as no public funds or assets are involved and
petitioners in G.R. Nos. 169777 and 169659 have direct and specific interests in the resolution of
the controversy, petitioner PDP-Laban is bereft of standing to file its petition. Its allegation that
E.O. 464 hampers its legislative agenda is vague and uncertain, and at best is only a generalized
interest which it shares with the rest of the political parties. Concrete injury, whether actual or
threatened, is that indispensable element of a dispute which serves in part to cast it in a form
traditionally capable of judicial resolution.93 In fine, PDP-Labans alleged interest as a political
party does not suffice to clothe it with legal standing.

Actual Case or Controversy

Petitioners assert that an actual case exists, they citing the absence of the executive officials
invited by the Senate to its hearings after the issuance of E.O. 464, particularly those on the
NorthRail project and the wiretapping controversy.
 Respondents counter that there is no case or controversy, there being no showing that
President Arroyo has actually withheld her consent or prohibited the appearance of the invited
officials.94 These officials, they claim, merely communicated to the Senate that they have not
yet secured the consent of the President, not that the President prohibited their attendance.95
Specifically with regard to the AFP officers who did not attend the hearing on September 28,
2005, respondents claim that the instruction not to attend without the Presidents consent was
based on its role as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, not on E.O. 464.

Respondents thus conclude that the petitions merely rest on an unfounded apprehension that
the President will abuse its power of preventing the appearance of officials before Congress, and
that such apprehension is not sufficient for challenging the validity of E.O. 464.

The Court finds respondents assertion that the President has not withheld her consent or
prohibited the appearance of the officials concerned immaterial in determining the existence of
an actual case or controversy insofar as E.O. 464 is concerned. For E.O. 464 does not require
either a deliberate withholding of consent or an express prohibition issuing from the
President in order to bar officials from appearing before Congress.

As the implementation of the challenged order has already resulted in the absence of
officials invited to the hearings of petitioner Senate of the Philippines, it would make no sense to
wait for any further event before considering the present case ripe for adjudication. Indeed, it
would be sheer abandonment of duty if this Court would now refrain from passing on the
constitutionality of E.O. 464.
Constitutionality of E.O. 464

E.O. 464, to the extent that it bars the appearance of executive officials before Congress,
deprives Congress of the information in the possession of these officials. To resolve the question
of whether such withholding of information violates the Constitution, consideration of the
general power of Congress to obtain information, otherwise known as the power of inquiry, is in
order.

The power of inquiry

The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the

Constitution which reads:

SECTION 21.The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective

committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by
such inquiries shall be respected. (Underscoring supplied)
This provision is worded exactly as Section 8 of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution except that,
in the latter, it vests the power of inquiry in the unicameral legislature established therein the
Batasang Pambansa and its committees.

The 1935 Constitution did not contain a similar provision. Nonetheless, in Arnault v.
Nazareno,96 a case decided in 1950 under that Constitution, the Court already recognized that
the power of inquiry is inherent in the power to legislate.

Arnault involved a Senate investigation of the reportedly anomalous purchase of the

Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by the Rural Progress Administration. Arnault, who was
considered a leading witness in the controversy, was called to testify thereon by the Senate. On
account of his refusal to answer the questions of the senators on an important point, he was, by
resolution of the Senate, detained for contempt. Upholding the Senates power to punish Arnault
for contempt, this Court held:

Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either

House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the
end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such
power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other
words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the
conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the
legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not
infrequently true recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has
shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that
information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some
means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.97 . . . (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
 That this power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch may be
deduced from the same case. The power of inquiry, the Court therein ruled, is co-extensive with
the power to legislate.98 The matters which may be a proper subject of legislation and those
which may be a proper subject of investigation are one. It follows that the operation of
government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation.

Thus, the Court found that the Senate investigation of the government transaction involved
in Arnault was a proper exercise of the power of inquiry. Besides being related to the expenditure
of public funds of which Congress is the guardian, the transaction, the Court held, also involved
government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions it is within the power of
Congress to regulate or even abolish.

Since Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive branch, it would
be incongruous to hold that the power of inquiry does not extend to executive officials who are
the most familiar with and informed on executive operations.

As discussed in Arnault, the power of inquiry, with process to enforce it, is grounded on the
necessity of information in the legislative process. If the information possessed by executive
officials on the operation of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by
parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to that information and the power to compel the
disclosure thereof.
 As evidenced by the American experience during the so-called McCarthy era, however,
the right of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is, in theory, no less susceptible to
abuse than executive or judicial power. It may thus be subjected to judicial review pursuant to
the Courts certiorari powers under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.

For one, as noted in Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,99 the inquiry itself
might not properly be in aid of legislation, and thus beyond the constitutional power of Congress.
Such inquiry could not usurp judicial functions. Parenthetically, one possible way for Congress
to avoid such a result as occurred in Bengzon is to indicate in its invitations to the public officials
concerned, or to any person for that matter, the possible needed statute which prompted the need
for the inquiry. Given such statement in its invitations, along with the usual indication of the
subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof, there would be less
room for speculation on the part of the person invited on whether the inquiry is in aid of
legislation.

Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes crucial safeguards that proscribe the
legislative power of inquiry. The provision requires that the inquiry be done in accordance with
the Senate or Houses duly published rules of procedure, necessarily implying the constitutional
infirmity of an inquiry conducted without duly published rules of procedure. Section 21 also
mandates that the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected, an
imposition that obligates Congress to adhere to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights.

These abuses are, of course, remediable before the courts, upon the proper suit filed by
the persons affected, even if they belong to the executive branch. Nonetheless, there may be
exceptional circumstances, none appearing to obtain at present, wherein a clear pattern of abuse
of the legislative power of inquiry might be established, resulting in palpable violations of the
rights guaranteed to members of the executive department under the Bill of Rights. In such
instances, depending on the particulars of each case, attempts by the Executive Branch to
forestall these abuses may be accorded judicial sanction.

Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the
power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of executive privilege. Since this term
figures prominently in the challenged order, it being mentioned in its provisions, its preambular
clauses,100 and in its very title, a discussion of executive privilege is crucial for determining the
constitutionality of E.O. 464.

Executive privilege

The phrase executive privilege is not new in this jurisdiction. It has been used even prior to
the promulgation of the 1986 Constitution.101 Being of American origin, it is best understood in
light of how it has been defined and used in the legal literature of the United States.

Schwartz defines executive privilege as the power of the Government to withhold

information from the public, the courts, and the Congress.102 Similarly, Rozell defines it as
the right of the President and high-level executive branch officers to withhold information from
Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public.103
 Executive privilege is, nonetheless, not a clear or unitary concept. 104 It has encompassed
claims of varying kinds.105 Tribe, in fact, comments that while it is customary to employ the
phrase executive privilege, it may be more accurate to speak of executive privileges since
presidential refusals to furnish information may be actuated by any of at least three distinct kinds
of considerations, and may be asserted, with differing degrees of success, in the context of either
judicial or legislative investigations.

One variety of the privilege, Tribe explains, is the state secrets privilege invoked by U.S.
Presidents, beginning with Washington, on the ground that the information is of such nature that
its disclosure would subvert crucial military or diplomatic objectives. Another variety is the
informers privilege, or the privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity of persons
who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement of that
law. Finally, a generic privilege for internal deliberations has been said to attach to
intragovernmental documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations
comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated. 106

Tribes comment is supported by the ruling in In re Sealed Case, thus:

Since the beginnings of our nation, executive officials have claimed a variety of
privileges to resist disclosure of information the confidentiality of which they felt
was crucial to fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of the
executive branch of our government. Courts ruled early that the executive had a
right to withhold documents that might reveal military or state secrets. The courts
have also granted the executive a right to withhold the identity of government
informers in some circumstances and a qualified right to withhold information
related to pending investigations. x x x107 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
 The entry in Blacks Law Dictionary on executive privilege is similarly instructive regarding
the scope of the doctrine.

This privilege, based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers,

exempts the executive from disclosure requirements applicable to the ordinary
citizen or organization where such exemption is necessary to the discharge of
highly important executive responsibilities involved in maintaining
governmental operations, and extends not only to military and diplomatic secrets
but also to documents integral to an appropriate exercise of the executive
domestic decisional and policy making functions, that is, those documents
reflecting the frank expression necessary in intra-governmental advisory and
deliberative communications.108 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

That a type of information is recognized as privileged does not, however, necessarily mean
that it would be considered privileged in all instances. For in determining the validity of a claim
of privilege, the question that must be asked is not only whether the requested information falls
within one of the traditional privileges, but also whether that privilege should be honored in a
given procedural setting.109

The leading case on executive privilege in the United States is U.S. v. Nixon, 110 decided
in 1974. In issue in that case was the validity of President Nixons claim of executive privilege
against a subpoena issued by a district court requiring the production of certain tapes and
documents relating to the Watergate investigations. The claim of privilege was based on the
Presidents general interest in the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondence. The
U.S. Court held that while there is no explicit reference to a privilege of confidentiality in the
U.S. Constitution, it is constitutionally based to the extent that it relates to the effective discharge
of a Presidents powers. The Court, nonetheless, rejected the Presidents claim of privilege, ruling
that the privilege must be balanced against the public interest in the fair administration of
criminal justice. Notably, the Court was careful to clarify that it was not there addressing the
issue of claims of privilege in a civil litigation or against congressional demands for information.

Cases in the U.S. which involve claims of executive privilege against Congress are rare.111
Despite frequent assertion of the privilege to deny information to Congress, beginning with
President Washingtons refusal to turn over treaty negotiation records to the House of
Representatives, the U.S. Supreme Court has never adjudicated the issue.112 However, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in a case decided earlier in the same year
as Nixon, recognized the Presidents privilege over his conversations against a congressional
subpoena.113 Anticipating the balancing approach adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Nixon,
the Court of Appeals weighed the public interest protected by the claim of privilege against the
interest that would be served by disclosure to the Committee. Ruling that the balance favored the
President, the Court declined to enforce the subpoena. 114

In this jurisdiction, the doctrine of executive privilege was recognized by this Court in
Almonte v. Vasquez.115 Almonte used the term in reference to the same privilege subject of
Nixon. It quoted the following portion of the Nixon decision which explains the basis for the
privilege:

The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and

correspondences, like the claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for
example, has all the values to which we accord deference for the privacy of all
citizens and, added to those values, is the necessity for protection of the public
 interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential
decision-making. A President and those who assist him must be free to explore
alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so
in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are the
considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications.
The privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably
rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution x x x (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Almonte involved a subpoena duces tecum issued by the Ombudsman against the therein
petitioners. It did not involve, as expressly stated in the decision, the right of the people to
information.116 Nonetheless, the Court recognized that there are certain types of information
which the government may withhold from the public, thus acknowledging, in substance if not in
name, that executive privilege may be claimed against citizens demands for information.

In Chavez v. PCGG,117 the Court held that this jurisdiction recognizes the common law
holding that there is a governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state
secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters.118 The same case
held that closed-door Cabinet meetings are also a recognized limitation on the right to
information.

Similarly, in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,119 the Court ruled that the right to
information does not extend to matters recognized as privileged information under the separation
of powers,120 by which the Court meant Presidential conversations, correspondences, and
discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings. It also held that information on military and
diplomatic secrets and those affecting national security, and information on investigations of
crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused were exempted from
the right to information.

From the above discussion on the meaning and scope of executive privilege, both in the
United States and in this jurisdiction, a clear principle emerges. Executive privilege, whether
asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types
of information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a
claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context
in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from
the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the
extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily
against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.

Validity of Section 1

Section 1 is similar to Section 3 in that both require the officials covered by them to
secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before Congress. There are significant
differences between the two provisions, however, which constrain this Court to discuss the
validity of these provisions separately.

Section 1 specifically applies to department heads. It does not, unlike Section 3, require a
prior determination by any official whether they are covered by E.O. 464. The President herself
has, through the challenged order, made the determination that they are. Further, unlike also
Section 3, the coverage of department heads under Section 1 is not made to depend on the
department heads possession of any information which might be covered by executive privilege.
In fact, in marked contrast to Section 3 vis--vis Section 2, there is no reference to executive
privilege at all. Rather, the required prior consent under Section 1 is grounded on Article VI,
Section 22 of the Constitution on what has been referred to as the question hour.

SECTION 22.The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the
consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each
House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter
pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the
President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least
three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited
to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of
the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing,
the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.

Determining the validity of Section 1 thus requires an examination of the meaning of Section
22 of Article VI. Section 22 which provides for the question hour must be interpreted vis--vis
Section 21 which provides for the power of either House of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation. As the following excerpt of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
shows, the framers were aware that these two provisions involved distinct functions of Congress.

MR. MAAMBONG. x x x When we amended Section 20 [now Section 22 on the

Question Hour] yesterday, I noticed that members of the Cabinet cannot be
compelled anymore to appear before the House of Representatives or before the
Senate. I have a particular problem in this regard, Madam President, because in
our experience in the Regular Batasang Pambansa as the Gentleman himself has
experienced in the interim Batasang Pambansa one of the most competent inputs
that we can put in our committee deliberations, either in aid of legislation or in
congressional investigations, is the testimonies of Cabinet ministers. We usually
invite them, but if they do not come and it is a congressional investigation, we
usually issue subpoenas.

I want to be clarified on a statement made by Commissioner Suarez when

he said that the fact that the Cabinet ministers may refuse to come to the
 House of Representatives or the Senate [when requested under Section 22]
does not mean that they need not come when they are invited or subpoenaed
by the committee of either House when it comes to inquiries in aid of
legislation or congressional investigation. According to Commissioner Suarez,
that is allowed and their presence can be had under Section 21. Does the
gentleman confirm this, Madam President?

MR. DAVIDE. We confirm that, Madam President, because Section 20 refers

only to what was originally the Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would
refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that
matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the
House.121 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour.
While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in
inquiries in aid of legislation. The reference to Commissioner Suarez bears noting, he being one
of the proponents of the amendment to make the appearance of department heads discretionary in
the question hour.

So clearly was this distinction conveyed to the members of the Commission that the
Committee on Style, precisely in recognition of this distinction, later moved the provision on
question hour from its original position as Section 20 in the original draft down to Section 31, far
from the provision on inquiries in aid of legislation. This gave rise to the following exchange
during the deliberations:

MR. GUINGONA. [speaking in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee on

Style] We now go, Mr. Presiding Officer, to the Article on Legislative and may I
request the chairperson of the Legislative Department, Commissioner Davide, to
give his reaction.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Davide is recognized.

 MR. DAVIDE. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer. I have only one reaction to the
Question Hour. I propose that instead of putting it as Section 31, it should follow
Legislative Inquiries.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. What does the committee say?

MR. GUINGONA. I ask Commissioner Maambong to reply, Mr. Presiding

Officer.

MR. MAAMBONG. Actually, we considered that previously when we

sequenced this but we reasoned that in Section 21, which is Legislative
Inquiry, it is actually a power of Congress in terms of its own lawmaking;
whereas, a Question Hour is not actually a power in terms of its own
lawmaking power because in Legislative Inquiry, it is in aid of legislation. And
so we put Question Hour as Section 31. I hope Commissioner Davide will
consider this.

MR. DAVIDE. The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power,
and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative
Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential
not only in the application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of
legislation.

MR. MAAMBONG. After conferring with the committee, we find merit in the
suggestion of Commissioner Davide. In other words, we are accepting that and
so this Section 31 would now become Section 22. Would it be, Commissioner
Davide?

MR. DAVIDE. Yes.122 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Consistent with their statements earlier in the deliberations, Commissioners Davide and
Maambong proceeded from the same assumption that these provisions pertained to two different
functions of the legislature. Both Commissioners understood that the power to conduct inquiries
in aid of legislation is different from the power to conduct inquiries during the question hour.
Commissioner Davides only concern was that the two provisions on these distinct powers be
placed closely together, they being complementary to each other. Neither Commissioner
considered them as identical functions of Congress.

The foregoing opinion was not the two Commissioners alone. From the above-quoted
exchange, Commissioner Maambongs committee the Committee on Style shared the view that
the two provisions reflected distinct functions of Congress. Commissioner Davide, on the other
hand, was speaking in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee on the Legislative Department.
His views may thus be presumed as representing that of his Committee.

In the context of a parliamentary system of government, the question hour has a definite
meaning. It is a period of confrontation initiated by Parliament to hold the Prime Minister and the
other ministers accountable for their acts and the operation of the government,123
corresponding to what is known in Britain as the question period. There was a specific provision
for a question hour in the 1973 Constitution124 which made the appearance of ministers
mandatory. The same perfectly conformed to the parliamentary system established by that
Constitution, where the ministers are also members of the legislature and are directly accountable
to it.

An essential feature of the parliamentary system of government is the immediate

accountability of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet to the National Assembly.
They shall be responsible to the National Assembly for the program of
government and shall determine the guidelines of national policy. Unlike in the
presidential system where the tenure of office of all elected officials cannot be
terminated before their term expired, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet remain
in office only as long as they enjoy the confidence of the National Assembly. The
moment this confidence is lost the Prime Minister and the Cabinet may be
changed.125
 The framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the mandatory nature of such appearance
during the question hour in the present Constitution so as to conform more fully to a system of
separation of powers.126 To that extent, the question hour, as it is presently understood in this
jurisdiction, departs from the question period of the parliamentary system. That department
heads may not be required to appear in a question hour does not, however, mean that the
legislature is rendered powerless to elicit information from them in all circumstances. In fact, in
light of the absence of a mandatory question period, the need to enforce Congress right to
executive information in the performance of its legislative function becomes more imperative. As
Schwartz observes:

Indeed, if the separation of powers has anything to tell us on the subject

under discussion, it is that the Congress has the right to obtain information
from any source even from officials of departments and agencies in the
executive branch. In the United States there is, unlike the situation which
prevails in a parliamentary system such as that in Britain, a clear separation
between the legislative and executive branches. It is this very separation that
makes the congressional right to obtain information from the executive so
essential, if the functions of the Congress as the elected representatives of the
people are adequately to be carried out. The absence of close rapport between
the legislative and executive branches in this country, comparable to those which
exist under a parliamentary system, and the nonexistence in the Congress of an
institution such as the British question period have perforce made reliance by the
Congress upon its right to obtain information from the executive essential, if it is
intelligently to perform its legislative tasks. Unless the Congress possesses the
right to obtain executive information, its power of oversight of administration in a
system such as ours becomes a power devoid of most of its practical content,
since it depends for its effectiveness solely upon information parceled out ex
gratia by the executive.127 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
 Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should
not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the
power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may
be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the
objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function.

When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the
statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the
President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their
performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of
powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in
which Congress requires their appearance is in aid of legislation under Section 21, the
appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.128

In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only
to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with the intent
discerned from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.

Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under
Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of
powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the
power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information.

When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to
exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the
mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from
this power the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of
Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official
of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which
is sanctioned by a long-standing custom.

By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from this power of
inquiry. Unlike the Presidency, judicial power is vested in a collegial body; hence, each member
thereof is exempt on the basis not only of separation of powers but also on the fiscal autonomy
and the constitutional independence of the judiciary. This point is not in dispute, as even counsel
for the Senate, Sen. Joker Arroyo, admitted it during the oral argument upon interpellation of the
Chief Justice.

Having established the proper interpretation of Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the
Court now proceeds to pass on the constitutionality of Section 1 of E.O. 464.

Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of Article VI of the

Constitution and the absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be
construed as limited in its application to appearances of department heads in the question
hour contemplated in the provision of said Section 22 of Article VI. The reading is dictated by
the basic rule of construction that issuances must be interpreted, as much as possible, in a way
that will render it constitutional.

The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is

only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI
of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on
their part.
 Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in
aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department
head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by
the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.

Validity of Sections 2 and 3

Section 3 of E.O. 464 requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure
the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration
is broad. It covers all senior officials of executive departments, all officers of the AFP and the
PNP, and all senior national security officials who, in the judgment of the heads of offices
designated in the same section (i.e. department heads, Chief of Staff of the AFP, Chief of the
PNP, and the National Security Adviser), are covered by the executive privilege.

The enumeration also includes such other officers as may be determined by the President.
Given the title of Section 2 Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege , it is evident that
under the rule of ejusdem generis, the determination by the President under this provision is
intended to be based on a similar finding of coverage under executive privilege.

En passant, the Court notes that Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 virtually states that executive
privilege actually covers persons. Such is a misuse of the doctrine. Executive privilege, as
discussed above, is properly invoked in relation to specific categories of information and not to
categories of persons.
 In light, however, of Sec 2(a) of E.O. 464 which deals with the nature, scope and coverage
of executive privilege, the reference to persons being covered by the executive privilege may be
read as an abbreviated way of saying that the person is in possession of information which is, in
the judgment of the head of office concerned, privileged as defined in Section 2(a). The Court
shall thus proceed on the assumption that this is the intention of the challenged order.

Upon a determination by the designated head of office or by the President that an official is
covered by the executive privilege, such official is subjected to the requirement that he first
secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before Congress. This requirement
effectively bars the appearance of the official concerned unless the same is permitted by the
President. The proviso allowing the President to give its consent means nothing more than that
the President may reverse a prohibition which already exists by virtue of E.O. 464.

Thus, underlying this requirement of prior consent is the determination by a head of office,
authorized by the President under E.O. 464, or by the President herself, that such official is in
possession of information that is covered by executive privilege. This determination then
becomes the basis for the officials not showing up in the legislative investigation.

In view thereof, whenever an official invokes E.O. 464 to justify his failure to be present,
such invocation must be construed as a declaration to Congress that the President, or a head of
office authorized by the President, has determined that the requested information is privileged,
and that the President has not reversed such determination. Such declaration, however, even
without mentioning the term executive privilege, amounts to an implied claim that the
information is being withheld by the executive branch, by authority of the President, on the basis
of executive privilege. Verily, there is an implied claim of privilege.
 The letter dated September 28, 2005 of respondent Executive Secretary Ermita to Senate
President Drilon illustrates the implied nature of the claim of privilege authorized by E.O. 464. It
reads:

In connection with the inquiry to be conducted by the Committee of the Whole

regarding the Northrail Project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation on 29
September 2005 at 10:00 a.m., please be informed that officials of the Executive
Department invited to appear at the meeting will not be able to attend the same
without the consent of the President, pursuant to Executive Order No. 464 (s.
2005), entitled Ensuring Observance Of The Principle Of Separation Of Powers,
Adherence To The Rule On Executive Privilege And Respect For The Rights Of
Public Officials Appearing In Legislative Inquiries In Aid Of Legislation Under
The Constitution, And For Other Purposes. Said officials have not secured the
required consent from the President. (Underscoring supplied)

The letter does not explicitly invoke executive privilege or that the matter on which these
officials are being requested to be resource persons falls under the recognized grounds of the
privilege to justify their absence. Nor does it expressly state that in view of the lack of consent
from the President under E.O. 464, they cannot attend the hearing.

Significant premises in this letter, however, are left unstated, deliberately or not. The letter
assumes that the invited officials are covered by E.O. 464. As explained earlier, however, to be
covered by the order means that a determination has been made, by the designated head of office
or the President, that the invited official possesses information that is covered by executive
privilege. Thus, although it is not stated in the letter that such determination has been made, the
same must be deemed implied. Respecting the statement that the invited officials have not
secured the consent of the President, it only means that the President has not reversed the
standing prohibition against their appearance before Congress.
 Inevitably, Executive Secretary Ermitas letter leads to the conclusion that the executive
branch, either through the President or the heads of offices authorized under E.O. 464, has made
a determination that the information required by the Senate is privileged, and that, at the time of
writing, there has been no contrary pronouncement from the President. In fine, an implied claim
of privilege has been made by the executive.

While there is no Philippine case that directly addresses the issue of whether executive
privilege may be invoked against Congress, it is gathered from Chavez v. PEA that certain
information in the possession of the executive may validly be claimed as privileged even against
Congress. Thus, the case holds:

There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is

privileged information rooted in the separation of powers. The information
does not cover Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions
during closed-door Cabinet meetings which, like internal-deliberations of the
Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either
house of Congress, are recognized as confidential. This kind of information
cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of government. A frank exchange
of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure
by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-making
of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power. This is
not the situation in the instant case.129 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Section 3 of E.O. 464, therefore, cannot be dismissed outright as invalid by the mere fact
that it sanctions claims of executive privilege. This Court must look further and assess the claim
of privilege authorized by the Order to determine whether it is valid.
 While the validity of claims of privilege must be assessed on a case to case basis, examining
the ground invoked therefor and the particular circumstances surrounding it, there is, in an
implied claim of privilege, a defect that renders it invalid per se. By its very nature, and as
demonstrated by the letter of respondent Executive Secretary quoted above, the implied claim
authorized by Section 3 of E.O. 464 is not accompanied by any specific allegation of the
basis thereof (e.g., whether the information demanded involves military or diplomatic secrets,
closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc.). While Section 2(a) enumerates the types of information that
are covered by the privilege under the challenged order, Congress is left to speculate as to which
among them is being referred to by the executive. The enumeration is not even intended to be
comprehensive, but a mere statement of what is included in the phrase confidential or classified
information between the President and the public officers covered by this executive order.

Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested
information privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized
head of office, has determined that it is so, and that the President has not overturned that
determination. Such declaration leaves Congress in the dark on how the requested information
could be classified as privileged. That the message is couched in terms that, on first impression,
do not seem like a claim of privilege only makes it more pernicious. It threatens to make
Congress doubly blind to the question of why the executive branch is not providing it with the
information that it has requested.

A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemption from an obligation to disclose information,

must, therefore, be clearly asserted. As U.S. v. Reynolds teaches:

The privilege belongs to the government and must be asserted by it; it can
neither be claimed nor waived by a private party. It is not to be lightly invoked.
There must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the
department which has control over the matter, after actual personal consideration
by that officer. The court itself must determine whether the circumstances are
 appropriate for the claim of privilege, and yet do so without forcing a disclosure
of the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.130 (Underscoring supplied)

Absent then a statement of the specific basis of a claim of executive privilege, there is no
way of determining whether it falls under one of the traditional privileges, or whether, given the
circumstances in which it is made, it should be respected.131 These, in substance, were the same
criteria in assessing the claim of privilege asserted against the Ombudsman in Almonte v.
Vasquez132 and, more in point, against a committee of the Senate in Senate Select Committee
on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon.133

A.O. Smith v. Federal Trade Commission is enlightening:

[T]he lack of specificity renders an assessment of the potential harm resulting

from disclosure impossible, thereby preventing the Court from balancing such
harm against plaintiffs needs to determine whether to override any claims of
privilege.134 (Underscoring supplied)

And so is U.S. v. Article of Drug:135

On the present state of the record, this Court is not called upon to perform this
balancing operation. In stating its objection to claimants interrogatories,
government asserts, and nothing more, that the disclosures sought by
claimant would inhibit the free expression of opinion that non-disclosure is
 designed to protect. The government has not shown nor even alleged that those
who evaluated claimants product were involved in internal policymaking,
generally, or in this particular instance. Privilege cannot be set up by an
unsupported claim. The facts upon which the privilege is based must be
established. To find these interrogatories objectionable, this Court would have to
assume that the evaluation and classification of claimants products was a matter
of internal policy formulation, an assumption in which this Court is unwilling to
indulge sua sponte.136 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Mobil Oil Corp. v. Department of Energy137 similarly emphasizes that an agency must
provide precise and certain reasons for preserving the confidentiality of requested information.

Black v. Sheraton Corp. of America138 amplifies, thus:

A formal and proper claim of executive privilege requires a specific designation

and description of the documents within its scope as well as precise and certain
reasons for preserving their confidentiality. Without this specificity, it is
impossible for a court to analyze the claim short of disclosure of the very thing
sought to be protected. As the affidavit now stands, the Court has little more than
its sua sponte speculation with which to weigh the applicability of the claim. An
improperly asserted claim of privilege is no claim of privilege. Therefore,
despite the fact that a claim was made by the proper executive as Reynolds
requires, the Court can not recognize the claim in the instant case because it is
legally insufficient to allow the Court to make a just and reasonable determination
as to its applicability. To recognize such a broad claim in which the Defendant
has given no precise or compelling reasons to shield these documents from
outside scrutiny, would make a farce of the whole procedure.139 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
 Due respect for a co-equal branch of government, moreover, demands no less than a claim of
privilege clearly stating the grounds therefor. Apropos is the following ruling in McPhaul v.
U.S:140

We think the Courts decision in United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 70 S. Ct.
724, is highly relevant to these questions. For it is as true here as it was there, that
if (petitioner) had legitimate reasons for failing to produce the records of the
association, a decent respect for the House of Representatives, by whose
authority the subpoenas issued, would have required that (he) state (his)
reasons for noncompliance upon the return of the writ. Such a statement
would have given the Subcommittee an opportunity to avoid the blocking of its
inquiry by taking other appropriate steps to obtain the records. To deny the
Committee the opportunity to consider the objection or remedy is in itself a
contempt of its authority and an obstruction of its processes. His failure to
make any such statement was a patent evasion of the duty of one summoned to
produce papers before a congressional committee[, and] cannot be condoned.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

Upon the other hand, Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the
claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is
meant to protect.141 A useful analogy in determining the requisite degree of particularity would
be the privilege against self-incrimination. Thus, Hoffman v. U.S.142 declares:

The witness is not exonerated from answering merely because he declares

that in so doing he would incriminate himself his say-so does not of itself
establish the hazard of incrimination. It is for the court to say whether his
silence is justified, and to require him to answer if it clearly appears to the
court that he is mistaken. However, if the witness, upon interposing his claim,
were required to prove the hazard in the sense in which a claim is usually required
to be established in court, he would be compelled to surrender the very protection
which the privilege is designed to guarantee. To sustain the privilege, it need
only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which
 it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why
it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could
result. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus
invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain
reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the
President has not given her consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether
the withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of each case. It severely
frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress.

In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated.

No infirmity, however, can be imputed to Section 2(a) as it merely provides guidelines,

binding only on the heads of office mentioned in Section 2(b), on what is covered by executive
privilege. It does not purport to be conclusive on the other branches of government. It may thus
be construed as a mere expression of opinion by the President regarding the nature and scope of
executive privilege.

Petitioners, however, assert as another ground for invalidating the challenged order the
alleged unlawful delegation of authority to the heads of offices in Section 2(b). Petitioner Senate
of the Philippines, in particular, cites the case of the United States where, so it claims, only the
President can assert executive privilege to withhold information from Congress.

Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 virtually provides that, once the head of office
determines that a certain information is privileged, such determination is presumed to bear the
Presidents authority and has the effect of prohibiting the official from appearing before Congress,
subject only to the express pronouncement of the President that it is allowing the appearance of
such official. These provisions thus allow the President to authorize claims of privilege by mere
silence.

Such presumptive authorization, however, is contrary to the exceptional nature of the

privilege. Executive privilege, as already discussed, is recognized with respect to information the
confidential nature of which is crucial to the fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of
the executive branch,143 or in those instances where exemption from disclosure is necessary to
the discharge of highly important executive responsibilities.144 The doctrine of executive
privilege is thus premised on the fact that certain informations must, as a matter of necessity, be
kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an
exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity
must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a
particular case.

In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to
limit to the President the power to invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize the
Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary
must state that the authority is By order of the President, which means that he personally
consulted with her. The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the
highest official in the executive hierarchy. In other words, the President may not authorize her
subordinates to exercise such power. There is even less reason to uphold such authorization in
the instant case where the authorization is not explicit but by mere silence. Section 3, in relation
to Section 2(b), is further invalid on this score.
 It follows, therefore, that when an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter
which, in his own judgment, might be covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded
reasonable time to inform the President or the Executive Secretary of the possible need for
invoking the privilege. This is necessary in order to provide the President or the Executive
Secretary with fair opportunity to consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of
executive privilege. If, after the lapse of that reasonable time, neither the President nor the
Executive Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer bound to respect the failure of
the official to appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of the necessary legal means to
compel his appearance.

The Court notes that one of the expressed purposes for requiring officials to secure the consent of
the President under Section 3 of E.O. 464 is to ensure respect for the rights of public officials
appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation. That such rights must indeed be respected by
Congress is an echo from Article VI Section 21 of the Constitution mandating that [t]he rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

In light of the above discussion of Section 3, it is clear that it is essentially an authorization for
implied claims of executive privilege, for which reason it must be invalidated. That such
authorization is partly motivated by the need to ensure respect for such officials does not change
the infirm nature of the authorization itself.

Right to Information

E.O 464 is concerned only with the demands of Congress for the appearance of executive
officials in the hearings conducted by it, and not with the demands of citizens for information
pursuant to their right to information on matters of public concern. Petitioners are not amiss in
claiming, however, that what is involved in the present controversy is not merely the legislative
power of inquiry, but the right of the people to information.

There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information
which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his
right to information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued
by Congress. Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony
from government officials. These powers belong only to Congress and not to an individual
citizen.

Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does not
follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry, the
people are exercising their right to information.

To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public, however,
any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations
necessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation,
is presumed to be a matter of public concern. The citizens are thereby denied access to
information which they can use in formulating their own opinions on the matter before Congress
opinions which they can then communicate to their representatives and other government
officials through the various legal means allowed by their freedom of expression. Thus holds
Valmonte v. Belmonte:

It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political
discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and
be responsive to the peoples will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only
 to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will
intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues
and have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit.145 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of E.O. 464 is,
therefore, in the sense explained above, just as direct as its violation of the legislatures power of
inquiry.

Implementation of E.O. 464 prior to its publication

While E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it does not follow that the
same is exempt from the need for publication. On the need for publishing even those statutes that
do not directly apply to people in general, Taada v. Tuvera states:

The term laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general
application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit
there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting
citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was
decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not
affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the
people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any
member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a
proper party, even in courts of justice.146 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
 Although the above statement was made in reference to statutes, logic dictates that the
challenged order must be covered by the publication requirement. As explained above, E.O. 464
has a direct effect on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. It is,
therefore, a matter of public interest which members of the body politic may question before this
Court. Due process thus requires that the people should have been apprised of this issuance
before it was implemented.

Conclusion

Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is
sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground
that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.

The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade
congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or
proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. That is impermissible. For

[w]hat republican theory did accomplishwas to reverse the old presumption in

favor of secrecy, based on the divine right of kings and nobles, and replace it with
a presumption in favor of publicity, based on the doctrine of popular sovereignty.
(Underscoring supplied)147
Resort to any means then by which officials of the executive branch could refuse to divulge
information cannot be presumed valid. Otherwise, we shall not have merely nullified the power
of our legislature to inquire into the operations of government, but we shall have given up
something of much greater value our right as a people to take part in government.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive
Order No. 464 (series of 2005), ENSURING OBSERVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF
SEPARATION OF POWERS, ADHERENCE TO THE RULE ON EXECUTIVE
PRIVILEGE AND RESPECT FOR THE RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS APPEARING IN
LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, are declared VOID. Sections 1 and 2(a) are, however, VALID.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 201011 January 27, 2014

THERESITA, JUAN, ASUNCION, PATROCINIA, RICARDO, and GLORIA, all surnamed

DIMAGUILA, Petitioners,
vs.
JOSE and SONIA A. MONTEIRO, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
August 15, 2011Decision1 and the March 5, 2012 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in
CA-G.R. CV No. 92707, which affirmed the August 23, 2007 Decision3 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 27, Santa Cruz, Laguna (RTC), in Civil Case No. SC-3108.

The Facts

On July 5, 1993, the respondent spouses, Jose and Sonia Monteiro (Spouses Monteiro), along
with Jose, Gerasmo, Elisa, and Clarita Nobleza, filed their Complaint for Partition and Damages
before the RTC, against the pet1t10ners, Theresita, Juan, Asuncion, Patrocinia, Ricardo, and
Gloria Dimaguila (The Dimaguilas), together with Rosalina, Jonathan, Eve, Sol, Venus, Enrique,
Nina, Princess Arieta, and Evangelina Borlaza. The complaint alleged that all the pmiies were
co-owners and prayed for the pmiition of a residential house and lot located at Gat. Tayaw St.,
Liliw, Laguna, with an area of 489 square meters, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 1453.
Spouses Monteiro anchored their claim on a deed of sale executed in their favor by the heirs of
Pedro Dimaguila (Pedro).

In their Answer, the Dimaguilas and the other defendants countered that there was no
co-ownership to speak of in the first place. They alleged that the subject property, then owned by
Maria Ignacio Buenaseda, had long been partitioned equally between her two sons, Perfecto and
Vitaliano Dimaguila, through a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, with its southern-half portion
assigned to Perfecto and the northern-half portion to Vitaliano. They claimed that they were the
heirs of Vitaliano and that Spouses Monteiro had nothing to do with the property as they were
not heirs of either Perfecto or Vitaliano.

During the course of the proceedings, several incidents were initiated, namely: (a) Motion to
Dismiss for lack of legal capacity to sue of Spouses Monteiro and for lack of cause of action; (b)
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of denial thereof, which was denied; (c) Motion for
Production and Inspection of Documents; (d) Motion for Reconsideration of the Order granting
the same, which was denied; (e) Motion to Defer Pre-trial; (f) Notice of Consignation by the
petitioners in the exercise of their alleged right of redemption of the share being claimed by the
Spouses Monteiro in light of the deed of sale they produced and claimed to have been executed
by the heirs of Pedro in their favor; (g) Motion to Remove Sonia Monteiro (Sonia) as plaintiff,
which was denied; (h) Motion for Reconsideration thereof, which was also denied; (i) Motion for
Clarification and/or Extended Resolution; and (j) Motion to Suspend Proceedings due to a
pending Petition for Certiorari before the CA assailing several of the RTC orders. The
proceedings resumed after the promulgation by the CA of its April 5, 2000 Resolution in CA-G.R.
No. SP 52833, which upheld the assailed RTC orders.

On January 2, 2001, upon resumption of the proceedings, Spouses Monteiro filed their Motion
for Leave to Amend and/or Admit Amended Complaint.4 The RTC granted their motion. The
amended complaint abandoned the original claim for partition and instead sought the recovery of
possession of a portion of the subject property occupied by the Dimagui as and other defendants,
specifically, the potiion sold to the couple by the heirs of Pedro. Furthermore, only Spouses
Monteiro were retained as plaintiffs and the Dimaguilas as defendants.

In amending their complaint, Spouses Montiero adopted the Dimaguilas' admission in their
original answer that the subject propetiy had already been partitioned between Perfecto and
Vitaliano, through a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, dated October 5, 1945, and that during their
lifetime, the brothers agreed that Perfecto would become the owner of the southern-hal f portion
and Vitaliano of the northern-half portion, which division was observed and respected by them as
well as their heirs and successors-in-interest.

Spouses Monteiro further averred that Perfecto was survived by Esperanza, Leandro and Pedro,
who had divided the southern-half portion equally amongst themselves, with their respective 1 /3
shares measuring 81.13 square meters each; that Pedro's share pertains to the 1 /3 of the
southern-half immediately adjacent to the northern-half adjudicated to the

Dimaguilas as heirs of Vitaliano; that on September 29, 1992, Pedro's share was sold by his heirs
to them through a Bilihan ng Lahat Naming Karapatan (Bilihan) with the acquiescence of the
heirs of Esperanza and Leandro appearing in an Affidavit of Conformity and Waiver; and that
when they attempted to take possession of the share of Pedro, they discovered that the subject
portion was being occupied by the Dimaguilas.

In their Answer5 to the amended complaint, the Dimaguilas admitted that the subject property
was inherited by, and divided equally between Perfecto and Vitaliano, but denied the admission
in their original answer that it had been actually divided into southern and nmihern portions.
Instead, they argued that the Extrajudicial Partition mentioned only the division of the subject
property "into two and share and share alike." In effect, they argued the existence of a
co-owenrship, contrary to their original position. The Dimaguilas further argued that the Bilihan
did not specify the metes and bounds of the property sold, in violation of Article 1458 of the
Civil Code. Even assuming that such had been specified, they averred that the sale of a definite
portion of a property owned in common was void since a co-owner could only sell his undivided
share in the property.

During the trial, Spouses Monteiro presented Pedrito Adrieta, brother of Sonia Monteiro (Sonia),
who testified that Perfecto was his grandfather and that at the time of Perfecto's death, he had
two properties, one of which was the subject property in Liliw, Laguna, which went to his
children, Esperanza, Leonardo and Pedro. Pedro was survived by his children Pedrito, Theresita,
Francisco, and Luis, who, in turn, sold their rights over the subject property to Sonia.
Sonia testified that she was approached by Pedro's son, Francisco, and was asked if she was
interested in purchasing Pedro's 1/3 share of the southern portion of the Bahay na Sato, and that
he showed her a deed of extrajudicial partition executed by and between Perfecto and Vitaliano,
as well as the tax declaration of the property to prove that the property had already been
partitioned between the two brothers.

Engineer Baltazar F. Mesina testified that he was the geodetic engineer hired by Spouses
Monteiro to survey the property in Liliw, and recounted that he checked the boundary of the
subject property, subdivided the lot into two and came up with a survey plan.

Crisostomo Arves, an employee from the Office of the Municipal Assessor, presented a certified
true copy of the cadastral map of Liliw and a list of claimants/owners.

Dominga Tolentino, a record officer of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), testified that as part of her duties, she certifies and safekeeps the records of surveyed
land, including cadastral maps from the region.

One of the Dimaguilas, Asuncion, was the sole witness for the defendants. She testified that their
first counsel made a mistake when he alleged in their original answer that the property had
already been partitioned into n01ihern and southern portions between the two brothers, as the
original answer had been rushed and they were never given a copy of it. She claimed that the
mistake was only pointed out to her by their new counsel after their former counsel withdrew due
to cancer. She further testified that there was no intention to partition the "bahay na bato" which
stood on the subject property, in order to preserve its historical and sentimental value.

Ruling of the RTC

In its August 23, 2007 Decision, the RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Monteiro and ordered the
Dimaguilas to turn over the possession of the subject 1 /3 portion of the southern-half of the
property, to wit:

WHEREOF, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants:

a. Ordering the defendants and all persons claiming rights under them to peacefully vacate and
turn-over possession of 1/ 3 of the southern portion of the property covered by Tax Declaration
No. 1453, specifically described as "A" of Lot 877 in the sketch plan marked as Exhibit "I",
within 60 days from the finality of this Decision, failing which let a writ of possession issue;

b. Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs, jointly and solidarily, the amount of ?500 per
month in the form of rent for the use of the property from July 1993 until the property is vacated;

c. Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs, jointly and solidarily, attorney's fees of P30,000
and litigation expense of P20,000.

SO ORDERED.6
The RTC found that although the extrajudicial partition merely divided the property into two
share and share alike, evidence aliunde was appreciated to show that there was an actual division
of the property into south and north between Perfecto and Vitaliano, and that such partition was
observed and honored by their heirs. These pieces of evidence were the cadastral map of Liliw7
and a corresponding list of claimants, which showed that the subject property had long been
registered as Lot 876 (northern-half), claimed by Buenaventura Dimaguila (Buenaventura), an
heir of Vitaliano, and Lot 877 (southern-half), claimed by Perfecto.

The RTC held that the manner of partition was admitted by the Dimaguilas themselves in their
original answer. It gave no credence to the claim of Asuncion that such admission was an error of
their fonner counsel and that she was unaware of the contents of their original answer. It noted
that the Dimaguilas had strongly maintained their theory of partition from 1992 when the
complaint was first filed, and only changed their defense in 2001 when Spouses Monteiro filed
their amended complaint. It keenly observed that it was precisely their admission which
propelled Spouses Monteiro to amend their complaint from one of partition to recovery of
possession. Thus, the RTC concluded that there was indeed a partition of the subject property
into southern-half and northern-half portions between Perfecto and Vitaliano and that the
Dimaguilas were estopped from denying the same.

As to the authenticity of the Bilihan, where the 1 /3 share of Pedro was sold to Spouses Monteiro,
the RTC found the document to be regular and authentic absent any piece of evidence to the
contrary. It stated that the proper persons to contest the sale were not the Dimaguilas, who were
the heirs of Vitaliano, but the heirs of Perfecto. It noted that the records showed that the heirs of
Esperanza and Leandro (Pedro's siblings), had signified their conformity to the pa1iition and to
the sale of Pedro's 1 /3 portion.

Ruling of the CA

In its assailed August 15, 2011 Decision, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC.

The CA found that Spouses Monteiro had established their case by a preponderance of evidence
thru their presentation of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition,8 the cadastral map and the
municipal assessor's records.9 It noted, more importantly, that the Dimaguilas themselves
corroborated the claim of partition in their original answer. It likewise ruled that the petitioners
were estopped from denying their admission of partition after the respondent spouses had relied
on their judicial admission.

The Dimaguilas also insisted on their argument, which was raised before the RTC, but not
addressed, that the Bilihan should not have been admitted as evidence for lack of a documentary
stamp tax, in accordance with Section 201 of the National Internal Revenue Code (N!RC). Citing
Gabucan v. Manta10 and Del Rosario v. Hamoy,11 the CA, however, ruled that if a document
which did not bear the required documentary stamp was presented in evidence, the court should
require the proponent to affix the requisite stamp. The CA noted that the RTC had failed to direct
Spouses Monteiro to affix the stamp and merely reminded the presiding judge to be more vigilant
on similar situations in the future. Nonetheless, it held that the petitioners did not possess the
necessary personality to assail the sale between Spouses Monteiro and the heirs of Pedro because
it pe1iained to the southern-half of the property to which they had no claim.

The CA likewise found sufficient basis for the award of rentals as compensatory damages since
Spouses Monteiro were wrongfully deprived of possession of the 1/3 portion of the southern-half
of the subject property. It also upheld the award of attorney's fees and litigation expenses by the
RTC, considering that Spouses Monteiro were compelled to litigate and incur expenses to protect
their rights and interest.

In its assailed March 5, 2012 Resolution, the CA denied the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.

Hence, this petition.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS AN

ACTUAL PARTITION OF THE PROPERTY COVERED BY TAX DECLARATION NO. 1453.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 1/3 PORTION OF
THE SOUTHERN HALF OF THE PROPERTY WAS SOLD TO THE RESPONDENTS.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE EXHIBIT C,

THE BIL/HAN NG LAHA T NAMING KARAPATAN.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE RESPONDENTS

ARE ENTITLED TO RECOVER POSSESSION OF THE 1/3 PORTION OF THE SOUTHERN
HALF OF THE PROPERTY.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE PETITIONERS LIABLE

FOR RENTALS FOR THE USE OF THE PROPERTY FROM JULY 1993 UNTIL VACATED.

VI

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THE PETITIONERS LIABLE

FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND LITIGATION EXPENSES.
VII

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE

PETITIONERS' SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT AND TO
GRANT THE COUNTERCLAIMS INTERPOSED THEREIN.12

The Dimaguilas argue that their original allegation regarding the partition of the subject property
into northern and southern portions was a mistake of their former counsel, and it was not their
intention to partition the property because to do so would damage the house thereon. Even
assuming an admission was made, the petitioners aver that such was made only by some, but not
all, of the co-owners; and that partition can only be made by all co-owners, and allowing the
admission is tantamount to effecting partition by only some co-owners. Spouses Monteiro
themselves, in their original complaint, made an admission that they were co-owners of the
property and asserted that there was no partition. The evidence aliunde considered by the RTC,
consisting of the cadastral map and the list of claimants, were timely objected to during the trial
as hearsay and a violation of the best evidence rule.

The petitioners reiterate that the Bilihan should not have been admitted into evidence because it
lacked the documentary stamp tax required by Section 201 of the NIRC, providing that no
document shall be admitted in evidence until the requisite stamps have been affixed thereto.
They argue that the ruling of petitioners' lack of personality to assail the deed of sale is different
from the issue of the deed of sale's admissibility as evidence. They conclude that considering that
no documentary stamp was ever affixed on the deed of sale, such should never have been
admitted into evidence and consequently, should not have been relied upon by the lower courts to
prove the sale of 1/3 of the southern portion; and that considering that the Bilihan is inadmissible
as evidence, the respondent spouses have no basis for their claim to the subject 1/3 portion of the
southern-half of the property. Thus, they insist that the lower courts erred in awarding to Spouses
Monteiro the possession of the subject prope1iy, the rentals, attorney's fees and litigation
expenses, and in failing to rule on their counterclaim for demolition of improvements and
payment of damages.

The assignment of errors boils down to two main issues:

I. Whether there was a pa1iition of the subject property; and

2. Whether the 1/3 portion of the southern-half of the subject property was sold to the respondent
spouses.

Ruling of the Court

At the outset, it must be pointed out that the petitioners' assignment of errors calls for the Court
to again evaluate the evidence to determine whether there was a partition of the property and
whether the 1/3 portion of the southern half was sold to the respondent spouses. These clearly
entail questions of fact which are beyond the Court's ambit of review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, especially considering that the findings of fact of the RTC were affirmed by the CA.13
On this ground alone, the present petition must be denied. Nonetheless, the Court shall delve into
these factual issues to finally put this case to rest.

Partition of the Subject Property

Spouses Monteiro, as plaintiffs in the original case, had the burden of proof to establish their case
by a preponderance of evidence, which is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence
on either side, synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence." Preponderance of
evidence is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is
offered in opposition thereto.14

To prove their claim of partition, the respondent spouses presented the following: (1) the Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition, dated October 5, 1945, executed by and between the brothers Perfecto
and Vitaliano; (2) the cadastral map of Liliw Cadm-484,15 dated August 6, 1976, showing that
the subject property had been divided into southern and northern portions, registered as Lot Nos.
876 and 877; and (3) the Municipal Assessor's records16 showing that the said lots were
respectively claimed by Buenaventura and Perfecto.

It is undisputed that the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition stated that Perfecto and Vitaliano agreed
"to divide between them into two and share and share alike" the subject property, including the
house situated thereon. It appears, however, that the property was actually partitioned into
definite portions, namely, southern and northern halves, as reflected in the cadastral map of Liliw,
which were respectively claimed by an heir of Vitaliano and Perfecto himself. It, thus, appears
that the subject property had already been partitioned into definite portions more than 20 years
prior to the original complaint for partition filed in 1993, and that such division had been
observed by the brothers' heirs. As earlier pointed out, the petitioners themselves admitted to this
very fact in their original answer, to wit:

(b) On September 5, 1945 the brothers PERFECTO and VITALIANO DIMAGUILA executed a
deed of EXTRA JUDICIAL PARTITION of the aforedescribed property dividing the same into
two (2) equal parts as indicated in the aforesaid deed as follows, to wit:

xxx

(c) As a result of the foregoing partition and as known by all the parties in this case from the
beginning or as soon as they reached the age of discernment PERFECTO DIMAGUILA became
the sole and exclusive owner of the southern half of the aforedescribed property and
VITALIANO DIMAGUILA became the sole owner of the northern half of the same property; the
house that was built thereon and still existing up to this time was likewise equally divided
between the two (2) DIMAGUILA brothers in accordance with the extrajudicial partition of half
equal shares;

xxx

2. In other words, the share of VITALIANO DIMAGUILA in the above described property has
already been long segregated and had passed on to his heirs as is very well known by all the
parties in this case;17

xxx

(Emphases in the Original)

Section 418 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that an admission made by a pa1iy in the
course of the proceedings in the same case does not require proof, and may be contradicted only
by showing that it was made through palpable mistake. The petitioners argue that such admission
was the palpable mistake of their former counsel in his rush to file the answer, a copy of which
was not provided to them. Petitioner Asuncion testified:

Q So, why was that allegations (sic) made in the Answer?

A May be, (sic) in his rush to file the Answer, Atty. Paredes filed the same without giving us a
copy ...19

This contention is unacceptable. It is a purely self-serving claim unsupported by any iota of

evidence. Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof.20
Furthermore, the Court notes that this position was adopted by the petitioners only almost eight
(8) years after their original answer was filed, in response to the amended complaint of the
respondent spouses. In their original answer to the complaint for partition, their claim that there
was already a partition into northern-half and southern-half portions, was the very essence of
their defense. It was precisely this admission which moved the respondent spouses to amend
their complaint. The petitioners cannot now insist that the very foundation of their original
defense was a palpable mistake.

Article 143121 of the Civil Code provides that through estoppel, an admission is rendered
conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person
relying thereon. The respondent spouses had clearly relied on the petitioners' admission and so
amended their original complaint for partition to one for recovery of possession of a portion of
the subject property. Thus, the petitioners are now estopped from denying or attempting to prove
that there was no partition of the property.

Considering that an admission does not require proof, the admission of the petitioners would
actually be sufficient to prove the partition even without the documents presented by the
respondent spouses. If anything, the additional evidence they presented only served to
corroborate the petitioners' admission.

The petitioners argue that they timely objected to the cadastral map and the list of claimants
presented by the respondent spouses, on the ground that they violated the rule on hearsay and the
best evidence rule.

Anent the best evidence rule, Section 3( d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that when
the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than
the original document itself, except when the original is a public record in the custody of a public
officer or is recorded in a public office.22 Section 7 of the same Rule provides that when the
original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its
contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof.23
Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that the record of public documents may be evidenced by a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody or the record.24

Certified true copies of the cadastral map of Liliw and the corresponding list of claimants of the
area covered by the map were presented by two public officers. The first was Crisostomo Arves,
Clerk III of the Municipal Assessor's Office, a repository of such documents. The second was
Dominga Tolentino, a DENR employee, who, as a record officer, certifies and safekeeps records
of surveyed land involving cadastral maps. The cadastral maps and the list of claimants, as
ce1iified true copies of original public records, fall under the exception to the best evidence rule.

As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court similarly provides that
entries in official records are an exception to the rule.25 The rule provides that entries in official
records made in the performance of the duty of a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person
in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated. The necessity of this rule consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of requiring
the official's attendance as a witness to testify to the innumerable transactions in the course of his
duty. The document's trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of performance of
official duty.26

Cadastral maps are the output of cadastral surveys. The DENR is the department tasked to
execute, supervise and manage the conduct of cadastral surveys.27 It is, therefore, clear that the
cadastral map and the corresponding list of claimants qualify as entries in official records as they
were prepared by the DENR, as mandated by law. As such, they are exceptions to the hearsay
rule and are primafacie evidence of the facts stated therein.

Even granting that the petitioners had not admitted the partition, they presented no evidence to
contradict the evidence of the respondent spouses. Thus, even without the admission of the
petitioners, the respondent spouses proved by a preponderance of evidence that there had indeed
been a partition of the subject property.

Sale of 1/3 Portion of the Southern-half

To prove that 1/3 of the southern-half portion of the subject property was sold to them, Spouses
Monteiro presented a deed of sale entitled Bilihan ng Lahat Naming Karapatan,28 dated
September 29, 1992, wherein Pedro's share was sold by his heirs to them, with the acquiescence
of the heirs of Esperanza and Leandro in an Affidavit of Conformity and Waiver.29 The
petitioners argue that the Bilihan should not have been admitted into evidence because it lacked
the documentary stamp tax required by Section 201 of the NIRC.

On August 29, 1994, the petitioners filed a motion for the production and/or inspection of
documents,30 praying that Spouses Monteiro be ordered to produce the deed of sale, which they
cited as the source of their rights as co-owners. On November 20, 1995, Spouses Monteiro
submitted their compliance,31 furnishing the RTC and the petitioners with a copy32 of the
Bilihan. On January 3, 1996, the petitioners filed a notice of consignation,33 manifesting that
they had attempted to exercise their right of redemption as co-owners of the 1/3 portion of the
southern half of the property under Article 162334 of the Civil Code by sending and tendering
payment of redemption to Spouses Monteiro, which was, however, returned.

By filing the notice of consignation and tendering their payment for the redemption of the 1/3
portion of the southern-half of the property, the petitioners, in effect, admitted the existence, due
execution and validity of the Bilihan. Consequently, they are now estopped from questioning its
admissiblity in evidence for relying on such for their right of redemption. Additionally, the Court
notes that the copy35 of the Bilihan which was originally submitted by Spouses Monteiro with
its compliance filed on November 20, 1995, does in fact bear a documentary stamp tax. It could
only mean that the documentary stamp tax on the sale was properly paid. The Bilihan was,
therefore, properly admitted into evidence and considered by the RTC.

In any case, as correctly held by the lower cou1is, the petitioners, as heirs of Vitaliano, who
inherited the northern-half po1iion of the subject property, do not possess the necessary
personality to assail the sale of the southern-half portion between Spouses Monteiro and the heirs
of Pedro.1âwphi1 They are not real parties-in-interest who stand to be benefited or injured by the
sale of the 1/3 portion of the southern-half over which they have absolutely no right. As correctly
ruled by the courts below, only fellow co-owners have the personality to assail the sale, namely,
the heirs of Pedro's siblings, Esperanza and Leandro. They have, however, expressly aquiesced to
the sale and waived their right to the property in the affidavit presented by Spouses Monteiro.36
As such, the petitioners have no right to their counterclaims of demolition of improvements and
payment of damages.

With Spouses Monteiro having sufficiently proved their claim over the subject I /3 portion of the
southern-half of the prope1iy through the Bilihan, the lower courts did not err in awarding
possession, rentals, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses to them.

The Court, however, finds that the award of rentals should be reckoned from January 2, 2001, the
date the Spouses Monteiro filed their Amended Complaint seeking recovery of the subject
portion. Interest at the rate of 6% per annum shall also be imposed on the total amount of rent
due from finality of this Decision until fully paid.37

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The August 15, 2011 Decision and the March 15, 2012
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G .R. CV No. 92707 are AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION, in that:

a. The award of rent at the rate of P500.00 per month shall be reckoned from January 2, 2001
until the property is vacated; and

b. Interest at the rate of 6% per annum shall be imposed on the total amount of rent due from
finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 190341 March 16, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
ROMY FALLONES y LABANA, Appellant.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case involves the admissibility of the deceased rape victim’s spontaneous utterances during
the time she was being sexually abused and immediately afterwards.

The Facts and the Case

The public prosecutor charged the accused Romy Fallones y Labana with rape1 in an amended
information dated September 14, 2004 before a Regional Trial Court (RTC).2

The complainant in this case, Alice,3 was a retardate. She died while trial was ongoing, hence,
was unable to testify.4 To prove its case, the prosecution presented Allan (Alice’s father),
Amalia5 (her sister), PO3 Lilibeth S. Aguilar (a police investigator), BSDO Eduardo P. Marcelo
and BSDO Arturo M. Reyes (the apprehending officers), Dr. Paul Ed D. Ortiz (a medico-legal
officer), and Eden H. Terol (a psychologist). The accused testified in his defense.6

Amalia testified that at about 9:45 a.m. on June 29, 2004, her mother told her older sister, Alice,
to look for their brother Andoy.7 Since Andoy arrived without Alice, her mother asked Amalia to
look for her. Amalia looked in places where Andoy often played and this led her near accused
Fallones’ house. As she approached the house, Amalia heard someone crying out from within,
"Tama na, tama na!" Recognizing Alice’s voice, Amalia repeatedly knocked on the door until
Fallones opened it. Amalia saw her sister standing behind him. As Amalia went in to take her
sister out, Alice held out a sanitary napkin and, crying, said that Fallones had given her the
napkin. Alice’s shorts were wet and blood-stained. Frightened and troubled, the two girls went
home.8

On their way home, Alice recounted to her sister that Fallones brought her to his bathroom,
pulled down her shorts, and ravished her. She said that Fallones wet her shorts to make it appear
that she tripped and had her monthly period.9 Along the way, they met an uncle and told him
what happened. On their arrival, their father brought Alice to the barangay while Amalia returned
to Fallones’ house where she saw her uncle, some relatives, and neighbors accosting and beating
Fallones. Shortly after, some barangay officials arrived and intervened.10

Accused Fallones testified that, at about the time and date of the alleged rape, he was at home
with his wife, cleaning their house. After his wife left and while he was having his lunch, two
men arrived, arrested him at gunpoint, and brought him to the barangay hall. They accused him
of raping Alice but he denied the charge. The barangay officials brought him to the police station
where he was detained and further interrogated.11 Again, he denied the accusations.
On July 10, 2007 the RTC rendered a Decision, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of simple rape. The RTC sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and
ordered him to pay P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as damages. The accused
appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) but the latter court rendered judgment on June 30, 2009,
affirming the RTC Decision. Accused Fallones moved for reconsideration but the CA denied his
motion, hence, the present appeal to this Court.

The Issue Presented

The core issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s finding that
accused Fallones raped Alice, a mental retardate.

The Court’s Ruling

Although Alice died before she could testify, the evidence shows that she positively identified
Fallones as her abuser before the barangay officials and the police. Amalia, her sister, testified of
her own personal knowledge that she had been out looking for Alice that midmorning; that she
heard the latter’s voice from within Fallones’ house imploring her attacker to stop what he was
doing to her; that upon repeatedly knocking at Fallones’ door, he opened it, revealing the
presence of her sister, her shorts bloodied.

The prosecution presented the psychologist who gave Alice a series of psychological tests. She
confirmed that Alice had been sexually abused and suffered post-traumatic stress disorder. She
found Alice to have moderate mental retardation with a mental age of a five-year-old person,
although she was 18 at the time of the incident. On cross-examination, the psychologist testified
that while Alice may be vulnerable to suggestions, she had no ability to recall or act out things
that may have been taught to her. Neither can anyone manipulate her emotions if indeed she was
influenced by others.12

Accused Fallones tried to discredit Amalia’s testimony as hearsay, doubtful, and

unreliable.1@wphi1 But, although what Alice told Amalia may have been hearsay, the rest of the
latter’s testimony, which established both concomitant (Alice’s voice from within Fallones’
house, pleading that she was hurting) and subsequent circumstance (Alice coming from behind
Fallones as the latter opened the door, her shorts bloodied), are admissible in evidence having
been given from personal knowledge.

Further, the Court considers a res gestae Amalia’s recital of what she heard Alice utter when she
came and rescued her. Res gestae refers to statements made by the participants or the victims of,
or the spectators to, a crime immediately before, during, or after its
commission.http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/apr2006/gr_163217_2006.html -
fnt49#fnt49 These statements are a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement
of the occasion, without any opportunity for the declarant to fabricate a false statement. An
important consideration is whether there intervened, between the occurrence and the statement,
any circumstance calculated to divert the mind and thus restore the mental balance of the
declarant; and afford an opportunity for deliberation.13 For spontaneous statements to be
admitted in evidence, the following must concur: 1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling
occurrence; 2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and
3) the statements concerned the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances.14

Here, Fallones’ act of forcing himself into Alice is a startling event. And Amalia happened to be
just outside his house when she heard Alice cry out "tama na, tama na!" When Fallones opened
the door upon Amalia’s incessant knocking, Alice came out from behind him, uttering "Amalia,
may napkin na binigay si Romy o." The admissibility of Alice’s spontaneous statements rests on
the valid assumption that they were spoken under circumstances where there had been no chance
to contrive.15 It is difficult to lie in an excited state and the impulsiveness of the expression is a
guaranty of trustworthiness.16

For his defense, Fallones claimed that the members of Alice’s family pressured her into pointing
to him as her abuser. But he has been unable to establish any possible ill-motive that could
prompt Alice’s family into charging him falsely. Indeed, Fallones admitted at the trial that there
had been no animosity between Alice’s family and him.17

Fallones argues that Alice’s actuations after the incident negate rape, invoking the Court’s ruling
in People v. Dela Cruz.18 But the circumstances of the latter case are far too different from those
existing in the present case. In Dela Cruz, although the victim was seven years old when the
supposed rape took place, she was not mentally retarded. Further, she was already 19 years old
when she reported the incident 12 years after it happened. Besides, the medical findings revealed
that her hymen remained intact. Thus, the Court did not believe that she had been raped when she
was seven.

In sum, the testimony of the witnesses, the physical evidence, the medico-legal finding, and the
psychologist’s report all establish that Fallones raped Alice. The defense offered no witness or
evidence of Fallones’ innocence other than his bare denial. Again, the Court will not disturb the
RTC’s findings and conclusion being the first-hand observer of the witnesses’ attitude and
behavior during trial. The defense counsel was unsuccessful in impeaching Amalia during
cross-examination. In fine, the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Alice is dead but, as Shakespeare wrote in his Sonnets—The Winter’s Tale, "the silence often of
pure innocence persuades when speaking fails."19

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the appeal and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC 03182 dated June 30, 2009.

SO ORDERED.
EVANGELINE D. IMANI, G.R. No. 187023

Petitioner,

Present:

CARPIO, J.,

Chairperson,

- versus - NACHURA,

PERALTA,

ABAD, and

MENDOZA, JJ.

METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST Promulgated:

COMPANY,

Respondent. November 17, 2010

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:
 On appeal is the July 3, 2008 Decision148 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 93061, setting aside the November 22, 2005 Order149 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati City, Branch 64, as well as its subsequent Resolution dated March 3, 2009,150 denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration.

On August 28, 1981, Evangeline D. Imani (petitioner) signed a Continuing Suretyship

Agreement in favor of respondent Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company (Metrobank), with Cesar
P. Dazo, Nieves Dazo, Benedicto C. Dazo, Cynthia C. Dazo, Doroteo Fundales, Jr., and Nicolas
Ponce as her co-sureties. As sureties, they bound themselves to pay Metrobank whatever
indebtedness C.P. Dazo Tannery, Inc. (CPDTI) incurs, but not exceeding Six Million Pesos
(P6,000,000.00).

Later, CPDTI obtained loans of P100,000.00 and P63,825.45, respectively. The loans
were evidenced by promissory notes signed by Cesar and Nieves Dazo. CPDTI defaulted in the
payment of its loans. Metrobank made several demands for payment upon CPDTI, but to no avail.
This prompted Metrobank to file a collection suit against CPDTI and its sureties, including
herein petitioner. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 15717.

After due proceedings, the RTC rendered a decision151 in favor of Metrobank. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court renders a judgment in
favor of [Metrobank] ordering defendants, C.P. Dazo Tannery, Inc., Cesar P.
Dazo, Nieves Dazo, Benedicto C. Dazo, Evangelina D. Imani, Cynthia C. Dazo,
Doroteo Fundales, Jr., and Nicolas Ponce to pay [respondent] Metropolitan Bank
and Trust Company:

1. Under the First Cause of Action, the sum of P175,451.48 plus the
stipulated interest, penalty charges and bank charges from March 1, 1984 and
until the whole amount is fully paid;

2. Under the Second Cause of Action, the sum of P92,158.85 plus the
stipulated interest, penalty charges and bank charges from February 24, 1985, and
until the whole amount is fully paid;

3. The sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total amount due under
the First and Second Cause of Action; and

4. Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of suit and expenses of

litigation.

SO ORDERED.152

Therein defendants appealed to the CA. On September 29, 1997, the CA issued a
Resolution dismissing the appeal.153 Consequently, on October 22, 1997, the CA issued an
Entry of Judgment.154

Metrobank then filed with the RTC a motion for execution,155 which was granted on
December 7, 1999.156 A writ of execution157 was issued against CPDTI and its co-defendants.
The sheriff levied on a property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-27957 P(M)
and registered in the name of petitioner. A public auction was conducted and the property was
awarded to Metrobank, as the highest bidder.

Metrobank undertook to consolidate the title covering the subject property in its name,
and filed a Manifestation and Motion,158 praying that spouses Sina and Evangline Imani be
directed to surrender the owners copy of TCT No. T-27957 P(M) for cancellation. Petitioner
opposed the motion and filed her Comment with Urgent Motion to Cancel and Nullify the Levy
on Execution, the Auction Sale and Certificate of Sale Over TCT No. T-27957 P(M).159 She
argued that the subject property belongs to the conjugal partnership; as such, it cannot be held
answerable for the liabilities incurred by CPDTI to Metrobank. Neither can it be subject of levy
on execution or public auction. Hence, petitioner prayed for the nullification of the levy on
execution and the auction sale, as well as the certificate of sale in favor of Metrobank.

On June 20, 2005, the RTC issued an Order160 denying Metrobanks motion, explaining
that:

[Petitioner] Evangelina D. Imani incurred the obligation to [Metrobank]

by the mere fact that she executed the Continuing Suretyship Agreement in favor
of [Metrobank]. The loan proceeds were not intended for [petitioner] Evangelina
D. Imani. It cannot therefore be presumed that the loan proceeds had redounded to
the benefit of her family. It is also worth stressing that the records of this case is
bereft of any showing that at the time of the signing of the Suretyship Agreement
and even at the time of execution and sale at public auction of the subject property,
[petitioner] Evangelina D. Imani has the authority to dispose of or encumber their
conjugal partnership properties. Neither was she conferred the power of
administration over the said properties. Hence, when she executed the Suretyship
Agreement, she had placed the Conjugal Partnership in danger of being dissipated.
The law could have not allowed this in keeping with the mandate of protecting
and safeguarding the conjugal partnership. This is also the reason why the
 husband or the wife cannot dispose of the conjugal partnership properties even
onerously, if without the consent of the other, or gratuitously, as by way of
donation.161

The RTC decreed that:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, [Metrobanks] motion for issuance of

an Order directing Spouses Sina Imani and Evangeline Dazo-Imani to surrender
the owners copy of TCT No. T-27957 P(M) to the Register of Deeds of
Meycauayan, Bulacan for cancellation, is DENIED.

On the other hand, [petitioners] Motion to Cancel and Nullify the Levy on
Execution, the Auction Sale and Certificate of Sale with respect to the real
property covered by TCT No. T-27957 P(M) is GRANTED.

The Levy on Execution and the Sale by Public Auction of the property covered
by TCT No. T-27957 P(M) are nullified and the Certificate of Sale over the same
property is hereby Cancelled.

SO ORDERED.162

Metrobank filed a motion for reconsideration. Petitioner opposed the motion, asserting
that the property belongs to the conjugal partnership.163 Attached to her opposition were an
Affidavit164executed by Crisanto Origen, the former owner of the property, attesting that
spouses Sina and Evangeline Imani were the vendees of the subject property; and the
photocopies of the checks165 allegedly issued by Sina Imani as payment for the subject
property.
 However, despite petitioners opposition, the RTC issued an Order dated August 15, 2005,
setting aside its June 20, 2005 Order. Thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is

GRANTED. The Order dated June 20, 2005 is set aside. Evangelina Dazo-Imani
is hereby ordered to surrender TCT No. T-27957 P(M) to the Register of Deeds of
Meycauayan, Bulacan for cancellation.

The effectivity of the Levy on Execution, the Auction Sale and the Certificate of
Sale with respect to the real property covered by TCT No. T-27957 P(M) is
reinstated.

SO ORDERED.166

But on petitioners motion for reconsideration, the RTC issued an Order dated November 22,
2005,167 reinstating its June 20, 2005 Order. In so ruling, the RTC relied on the affidavit of
Crisanto Origen, and declared the property levied upon as conjugal, which cannot be held
answerable for petitioners personal liability.

Metrobank assailed the November 22, 2005 Order via a petition for certiorari in the CA,
ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC for annulling the levy on execution
and the auction sale, and for canceling the certificate of sale.

On July 3, 2008, the CA rendered the now challenged Decision reversing the RTC, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
 WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. ACCORDINGLY,
the Order dated November 22, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 64, is hereby REVERSED and new one is entered declaring the Levy on
Execution, Sale by Public Auction of the property covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title T-27957 [P](M) and the Certificate of Sale over said property as valid and
legal.

SO ORDERED.168

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied it on March 3, 2009.169

Hence, this recourse by petitioner, arguing that:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRS (sic) IN

REVERSING THE FINDING OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE
PROPERTY IS CONJUGAL IN NATURE BASED ON MERE
SPECULATIONS AND CONJECTURES.170

II

THE UNSUPPORTED TEMPORARY RULING THAT THE

PROPERTY IS NOT CONJUGAL AND THE SUGGESTION TO VINDICATE
THE RIGHTS OF SINA IMANI AND THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IN A
SEPARATE ACTION UNDER SEC. 16, RULE 39 ENCOURAGE
MULTIPLICITY OF SUITS AND VIOLATE THE POLICY OF THE RULES
FOR EXPEDIENT AND INEXPENSIVE DISPOSITION OF ACTIONS.
 III

THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION, B[EI]NG A ROAD RIGHT OF WAY,

IS NOT SUBJECT TO EXECUTION UNDER SEC. 50, 2ND PARAGRAPH, OF
PD [NO.] 1529.171

First, the procedural issue on the propriety of the course of action taken by petitioner in the
RTC in vindication of her claim over the subject property.

Petitioner takes exception to the CA ruling that she committed a procedural gaffe in
seeking the annulment of the writ of execution, the auction sale, and the certificate of sale. The
issue on the conjugal nature of the property, she insists, can be adjudicated by the executing
court; thus, the RTC correctly gave due course to her motion. She asserts that it was error for the
CA to propose the filing of a separate case to vindicate her claim.

We agree with petitioner.

The CA explained the faux pas committed by petitioner in this wise:

Under [Section 16, Rule 39], a third-party claimant or a stranger to the

foreclosure suit, can opt to file a remedy known as terceria against the sheriff or
officer effecting the writ by serving on him an affidavit of his title and a copy
thereof upon the judgment creditor. By the terceria, the officer shall not be bound
to keep the property and could be answerable for damages. A third-party claimant
may also resort to an independent separate action, the object of which is the
recovery of ownership or possession of the property seized by the sheriff, as well
as damages arising from wrongful seizure and detention of the property despite
 the third-party claim. If a separate action is the recourse, the third-party claimant
must institute in a forum of competent jurisdiction an action, distinct and separate
from the action in which the judgment is being enforced, even before or without
need of filing a claim in the court that issued the writ. Both remedies are
cumulative and may be availed of independently of or separately from the other.
Availment of the terceria is not a condition sine qua non to the institution of a
separate action.

It is worthy of note that Sina Imani should have availed of the remedy of
terceria authorized under Section 16 of Rule 39 which is the proper remedy
considering that he is not a party to the case against [petitioner]. Instead, the trial
court allowed [petitioner] to file an urgent motion to cancel and nullify the levy of
execution the auction sale and certificate of sale over TCT No. T27957 [P](M).
[Petitioner] then argue[s] that it is the ministerial duty of the levying officer to
release the property the moment a third-party claim is filed.

It is true that once a third-party files an affidavit of his title or right to the
possession of the property levied upon, the sheriff is bound to release the property
of the third-party claimant unless the judgment creditor files a bond approved by
the court. Admittedly, [petitioners] motion was already pending in court at the
time that they filed the Affidavit of Crisanto Origen, the former owner, dated July
27, 2005.

In the instant case, the one who availed of the remedy of terceria is the
[petitioner], the party to the main case and not the third party contemplated by
Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

Moreover, the one who made the affidavit is not the third-party referred to
in said Rule but Crisanto Origen who was the former owner of the land in
question.172

Apparently, the CA lost sight of our ruling in Ong v. Tating,173 elucidating on the applicability
of Section 16 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, thus:

When the sheriff thus seizes property of a third person in which the
judgment debtor holds no right or interest, and so incurs in error, the supervisory
power of the Court which has authorized execution may be invoked by the third
person. Upon due application by the third person, and after summary hearing, the
 Court may command that the property be released from the mistaken levy and
restored to the rightful owner or possessor. What the Court can do in these
instances however is limited to a determination of whether the sheriff has acted
rightly or wrongly in the performance of his duties in the execution of the
judgment, more specifically, if he has indeed taken hold of property not belonging
to the judgment debtor. The Court does not and cannot pass upon the question of
title to the property, with any character of finality. It can treat the matter only in
so far as may be necessary to decide if the Sheriff has acted correctly or not. x x x.

xxxx

Upon the other hand, if the claim of impropriety on the part of the
sheriff in the execution proceedings is made by a party to the action, not a
stranger thereto, any relief therefrom may only be applied with, and
obtained from, only the executing court; and this is true even if a new party has
been impleaded in the suit.174

The filing of the motion by petitioner to annul the execution, the auction sale, and the certificate
of sale was, therefore, a proper remedy. As further held by this Court:

Certain it is that the Trial Court has plenary jurisdiction over the proceedings for
the enforcement of its judgments. It has undeniable competence to act on motions
for execution (whether execution be a matter of right or discretionary upon the
Court), issue and quash writs, determine if property is exempt from execution,
or fix the value of property claimed by third persons so that a bond equal to such
value may be posted by a judgment creditor to indemnify the sheriff against
liability for damages, resolve questions involving redemption, examine the
judgment debtor and his debtors, and otherwise perform such other acts as may be
necessary or incidental to the carrying out of its decisions. It may and should
exercise control and supervision over the sheriff and other court officers and
employees taking part in the execution proceedings, and correct them in the event
that they should err in the discharge of their functions.175
 Contrary to the CAs advice, the remedy of terceria or a separate action under Section 16,
Rule 39 is no longer available to Sina Imani because he is not deemed a stranger to the case filed
against petitioner:

[T]he husband of the judgment debtor cannot be deemed a stranger to the case
prosecuted and adjudged against his wife.176

Thus, it would have been inappropriate for him to institute a separate case for annulment
of writ of execution.
In Spouses Ching v. Court of Appeals,177 we explained:

Is a spouse, who was not a party to the suit but whose conjugal property is
being executed on account of the other spouse being the judgment obligor,
considered a "stranger?" In Mariano v. Court of Appeals, we answered this
question in the negative. In that case, the CFI of Caloocan City declared the wife
to be the judgment obligor and, consequently, a writ of execution was issued
against her. Thereupon, the sheriff proceeded to levy upon the conjugal properties
of the wife and her husband. The wife initially filed a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals praying for the annulment of the writ of execution. However,
the petition was adjudged to be without merit and was accordingly dismissed. The
husband then filed a complaint with the CFI of Quezon City for the annulment of
the writ of execution, alleging therein that the conjugal properties cannot be made
to answer for obligations exclusively contracted by the wife. The executing party
moved to dismiss the annulment case, but the motion was denied. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals, in Mariano, ruled that the CFI of Quezon City, in continuing to
hear the annulment case, had not interfered with the executing court. We reversed
the Court of Appeals' ruling and held that there was interference by the CFI of
Quezon City with the execution of the CFI of Caloocan City. We ruled that the
husband of the judgment debtor cannot be deemed a "stranger" to the case
prosecuted and adjudged against his wife, which would allow the filing of a
separate and independent action.

The facts of the Mariano case are similar to this case. Clearly, it was
inappropriate for petitioners to institute a separate case for annulment when they
could have easily questioned the execution of their conjugal property in the
collection case. We note in fact that the trial court in the Rizal annulment case
specifically informed petitioners that Encarnacion Ching's rights could be
ventilated in the Manila collection case by the mere expedient of intervening
therein. Apparently, petitioners ignored the trial court's advice, as Encarnacion
Ching did not intervene therein and petitioners instituted another annulment case
after their conjugal property was levied upon and sold on execution.

There have been instances where we ruled that a spouse may file a
separate case against a wrongful execution. However, in those cases, we allowed
the institution of a separate and independent action because what were executed
upon were the paraphernal or exclusive property of a spouse who was not a party
to the case. In those instances, said spouse can truly be deemed a "stranger." In the
present case, the levy and sale on execution was made upon the conjugal property.
Ineluctably, the RTC cannot be considered whimsical for ruling on petitioners motion. The CA,
therefore, erred for declaring otherwise.

Now, on the merits of the case.

Petitioner asserts that the subject property belongs to the conjugal partnership. As such, it
cannot be made to answer for her obligation with Metrobank. She faults the CA for sustaining
the writ of execution, the public auction, and the certificate of sale.

We sustain the CA ruling on this point.

Indeed, all property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal. However, for this
presumption to apply, the party who invokes it must first prove that the property was acquired
during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non to the
operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.178 Thus, the time when the
property was acquired is material.179

Francisco v. CA180 is instructive, viz.:

Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved
 that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. However, the party who
invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was
acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a
condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the
conjugal partnership. The party who asserts this presumption must first prove said
time element. Needless to say, the presumption refers only to the property
acquired during the marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to
when property alleged to be conjugal was acquired.181

To support her assertion that the property belongs to the conjugal partnership, petitioner
submitted the Affidavit182 of Crisanto Origen, attesting that petitioner and her husband were the
vendees of the subject property, and the photocopies of the checks183 allegedly issued by Sina
Imani as payment for the subject property.

Unfortunately for petitioner, the said Affidavit can hardly be considered sufficient
evidence to prove her claim that the property is conjugal. As correctly pointed out by Metrobank,
the said Affidavit has no evidentiary weight because Crisanto Origen was not presented in the
RTC to affirm the veracity of his Affidavit:

The basic rule of evidence is that unless the affiants themselves are placed on the
witness stand to testify on their affidavits, such affidavits must be rejected for
being hearsay. Stated differently, the declarants of written statements pertaining
to disputed facts must be presented at the trial for cross-examination. 184

In the same vein, the photocopies of the checks cannot be given any probative value. In
Concepcion v. Atty. Fandio, Jr.185 and Intestate Estate of the Late Don Mariano San Pedro y
Esteban v. Court of Appeals,186 we held that a photocopy of a document has no probative value
and is inadmissible in evidence. Thus, the CA was correct in disregarding the said pieces of
evidence.

Similarly, the certificate of title could not support petitioners assertion. As aptly ruled by
the CA, the fact that the land was registered in the name of Evangelina Dazo-Imani married to
Sina Imani is no proof that the property was acquired during the spouses coverture. Acquisition
of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that registration does not
confer title but merely confirms one already existing.187

Indubitably, petitioner utterly failed to substantiate her claim that the property belongs to
the conjugal partnership. Thus, it cannot be rightfully said that the CA reversed the RTC ruling
without valid basis.

As a last ditch effort, petitioner asserts that the property is a road right of way; thus, it cannot
be subject of a writ of execution.

The argument must be rejected because it was raised for the first time in this petition. In
the trial court and the CA, petitioners arguments zeroed in on the alleged conjugal nature of the
property. It is well settled that issues raised for the first time on appeal and not raised in the
proceedings in the lower court are barred by estoppel. Points of law, theories, issues, and
arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court ought not to be considered by a
reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. To consider the alleged
facts and arguments raised belatedly would amount to trampling on the basic principles of fair
play, justice, and due process.188

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and the Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 93061 sustaining the validity of the writ of execution, the auction
sale, and the certificate of sale are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
RULE ON EXAMINATION OF CHILD WITNESS

[G.R. No. 119308. April 18, 1997]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CHRISTOPHER

ESPANOLA y PAQUINGAN alias "Langga" or "Cocoy", JIMMY
PAQUINGAN y BATILO alias Jimmy" and JEOFFREY ABELLO y
SALADO alias "Beroy, accused-appellants.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

This is an appeal from the decisionclxxxii dated November 21, 1994, of the Regional
Trial Court of Lanao Del Norte, 12th Judicial Region, Branch 5, City of Iligan, finding the
accused-appellants Christopher Espanola y Paquingan, Jimmy Paquingan y Batilo and
Jeoffrey Abello y Salado guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals for the murder of
Jessette Tarroza in Criminal Case No. 3773. The three accused were meted a prison
term of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided by law. They were
ordered to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the victim Jessette Tarroza the
amount of P50,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as compensatory damages,
P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The Amended Information charging the accused-appellants with the crime of Murder
and indicting another accused in the person of Joel Gonzales reads:
"AMENDED INFORMATION
The undersigned City Prosecutor of Iligan accuses CHRISTOPHER ESPANOLA y
Paquingan alias "Langga", JIMMY PAQUINGAN y Batilo, JEOFFREY ABELLO y
Salado alias "Beroy" and JOEL GONZALES alias "Awing" alias "Wingwing" of the crime
of MURDER, committed as follows:
'That on or about November 16, 1991, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, who were all
under the influence of drugs (Marijuana), conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping each other with intent to kill and by means of
treachery and with abuse of superior strength, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stab and hit one Jessette Tarroza,
thereby inflicting upon the said Jessette Tarroza the following physical injuries,
to wit:
- Incised wound 2.5 cms in length, lateral border of (R) ala nasi
- Triangular stab wound, neck (R) side, 4 cms x 3 cms x 5.5 cms
- Incised wound, anterior neck, 6 cms x 4 cms x 3.5 cms which traversed
 thru the trachea, external jugular vein and 3/4 of the esophagus
- Stab wound, anterior neck, (R) supraclavicular area, 2.5 cms x 1 cm x 4
cms
- Stab wound, (L) anterior chest, midclavicular line 1.5 cms x 1 cm x 2.5
cms
- Stab wound, (R) anterior chest, 4 cms x 2 cms with fracture of the 4th
and 5th rib with lung tissue out
- Stab wound, (R) anterior chest, level of axilla, 2 cms x 1 cm x 5 cms
- Stab wound, (R) anterior chest, 3rd ICS, midclavicular line 2.5 x 1.4 cms
- C-shaped stab wound, (R) anterior chest, midclavicular line, 3.5 cms x 2
cms x 3 cms, 2nd ICS
- Stab wound, (R) anterior chest, 2nd ICS, (R) parasteal line, 2.5 cms x 1.5
cms x 4 cms
- Confluent abrasion (R) elbow joint, anteromedial aspect 3 cms in
diameter
- Multiple punctured wounds (5), back, (R) side
- Confluent abrasion 10 cms by 3 cms, back, lumbar area
and as a result thereof the said Jessette Tarroza died; that immediately after
inflicting fatal injuries on the said Jessette Tarroza, the herein accused took
turns in having sexual intercourse with the victim.'
Contrary to and in violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code with the
aggravating circumstances of: (1) treachery and abuse of superior strength; (2) cruelty
in all (sic) ignominy; (3) that the accused were under the influence of drugs at the time of
the commission of the offense and (4) outraging or scoffing of (sic) the corpse of the
victim.
City of Iligan, November 29, 1991."
The facts of the case show that Jessette Tarroza went to work at the Mercy
Community Clinic, Camague, Iligan City, as a medical technologist at about 3 o'clock in
the afternoon of November 16, 1991. Her tour of duty was from 3 o'clock in the afternoon
to eleven o'clock in the evening.clxxxiii After working for eight hours, she left the clinic at
about 11:15 p.m. with Claro Liquigan, a co-employee. When they reached the junction
road leading to her house at about 11:30 p.m., Claro offered to escort Jessette to her
house but she refused saying that she knew the people in the area. She then walked
towards her house while Claro rode his bicycle and went home. When they parted ways,
Claro noticed four (4) persons in the pathway leading to Jessette's house. They were
about 60 to 70 meters away from him and he did not recognize whether they were male
or female.clxxxiv
Jessette Tarroza failed to come home that fateful evening. She was found dead. Her
father, Romeo Tarroza, rushed to the place where her body was discovered.clxxxv He was
shocked to see Jessette lying in a grassy area more or less fifty (50) meters from their
home and only fifteen (15) meters from the pathway. Her body bore stab wounds. Her
red blouse was wide open and her pants removed. Her panty was likewise removed
while her braclxxxvi was cut. The red blouseclxxxvii was torn with three (3) holes at the back,
ten (10) holes on the front and six (6) holes on the left sleeve. Her blouse, bra and shoes
were stained with blood. Her panty, found about two (2) feet away from her cadaver, had
blood on the front portion. A light green T-shirt with the print "Midwifery" at the back and
"ICC" on the frontclxxxviii was also found near the shoes of the victim. The T-shirt was not
hers.clxxxix
The law enforcement officers of Iligan City immediately conducted an investigation.
They found blood stains along the pathway which was approximately fifteen (15) meters
away from the place where the victim was found. There was a sign of struggle as the
plants and bushes at the scene of the crime were destroyed and flattened. They
extended their investigation to the neighboring sitios and purok of Kilumco but found no
lead as to the perpetrators of the crime.cxc
In the morning of November 19, 1991, SPO 4 Ruperto Neri received an anonymous
telephone call suggesting that a certain "Wing-wing"cxci be investigated as he has
knowledge of the crime. Antonio Lubang, Chief of the Homicide Section, Intelligence and
Investigation Division of the Iligan City Police Station, and his men looked for
"Wing-wing". Lubang knew "Wing-wing" as the latter frequently roamed around the public
plaza. They learned that the real name of "Wing-wing" is Joel Gonzales. They then saw
Gonzales at his house and invited him to the police station. At the police station,
Gonzales confessed that he was present when the crime was committed and that he
knew its perpetrators. He identified them as "Beroy", "Langga" and "Jimmy". He informed
that the three stabbed and raped Jessette Tarroza. Gonzales, however, did not give the
surnames of the three suspects. The policemen asked Romeo Tarroza whether he knew
the suspects. Romeo Tarroza declared that they were his neighbors. He identified
"Jimmy" as Jimmy Paquingan, "Langga" as Christopher Espanola and "Beroy" as
Jeoffrey Abello.cxcii On the same day, Gonzales was detained at the police station.
In the early morning of November 21, 1991, Chief Lubang invited Jimmy Paquingan,
Christopher Espanola and Jeoffrey Abello to the police station where they were
investigated. All denied the story of Gonzales. A police line-up of twelve (12) persons
which included the three accused-appellants was then made in the police station.
Gonzales was called and he pointed to Paquingan, Espanola and Abello as his
companions in the killing and rape of Jessette Tarroza. After the line-up, the three
suspects were brought to the City Health Office for check-up because the policemen saw
that they had bruises and scratches on their faces, foreheads and breasts.cxciii They were
examined by Dr. Livey J. Villarin. With respect to Paquingan, the medical certificate
(Exhibit "I") showed that he had scratch abrasions on the right mandibular area (jaw), on
the left side of the neck and on the right mid-axillary (chest). Dr. Villarin testified that the
abrasions could have been caused by any sharp object or possibly fingernails. The
medical certificate issued to Espanola (Exhibit "J") showed that he had contusions on the
right shoulder and hematoma. Dr. Villarin testified that the injuries could have been
effected by a jab or sharp blow. The medical certificate issued to Abello (Exhibit "K")
showed that he sustained abrasion and contusion at the right deltoid area which
according to Dr. Villarin, could have been caused by a sharp or hard object or a fist blow
that hit that particular area of the body.cxciv
On the same day, an information for rape with homicidecxcv was filed against
Paquingan, Espanola and Abello. They were committed to the city jail after their warrant
of arrest was issued by Executive Judge Federico V. Noel.cxcvi
In the afternoon of November 25, 1991, Chief Lubang brought Jimmy Paquingan to
the City Prosecutor's Office for the taking of his confession after he manifested to the jail
warden his intention to confess. City Prosecutor Ulysses V. Lagcao asked Paquingan if
he would avail the services of counsel and he answered in the affirmative. When asked if
he had a counsel of his own choice, he answered in the negative. He was provided with
the services of Atty. Leo Cahanap, the legal counsel of the City Mayor's Office, and Atty.
Susan Echavez, a representative of the IBP Legal Aid, Iligan City Chapter. They were
given time to confer with him.cxcvii Paquingan then confessed. However, when asked to
sign the stenographic notes, Paquingan refused saying he would wait for his mother
first.cxcviii The sworn statement of Paquingan (Exhibit "L") was transcribed on November
29, 1991, but signed only by the two lawyers. According to the statement, Abello slashed
the neck of Jessette. Jessette fell down and was brought to a bushy area where she was
sexually abused. The first to have sexual intercourse with the victim was Abello.
Paquingan then followed him. Espanola had his turn next; and Gonzales was the last.cxcix
Upon review of the records of the case, Fiscal Lagcao discovered that the victim was
sexually abused after she was murdered. Thus, he filed an Amended Information on
November 29, 1991, charging the three accused with the crime of murder and indicting
Joel Gonzales as the fourth accused.cc A warrant for the arrest of Gonzales was issued
on the same date by Executive Judge Federico V. Noel.cci
All the accused pleaded "not guilty" when arraigned. After presenting several
witnesses, the prosecution filed on June 17, 1992, a motion to discharge accused Joel
Gonzales as a state witnessccii in accordance with Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court, alleging:
"1. That accused Joel Gonzales has intimated to the undersigned City Prosecutor
that he is willing to testify for the prosecution as state witness;
"2. That there is absolute necessity for the testimony of accused Joel Gonzales
considering that the evidence for the prosecution in this case is mainly circumstantial;
"3. That the testimony of accused Joel Gonzales can be substantially corroborated
in its material points;
"4. That the said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
"5. That he has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude."
In traversing the motion, the defense asserted:
"1.That there is no showing in the face of said motion that Joel Gonzales agrees to
be utilized as state witness;
"2.That Joel Gonzales appears to be the most guilty as he alone among the
accused has executed a confession regarding the killing of Jessette Tarroza."
In an Ordercciii dated June 26, 1992, the trial court discharged Gonzales as a state
witness.
In the course of the trial, Dr. Chito Rey Gomez, Medico-Legal Officer of the Iligan
City Health Office, testified that he conducted a post mortem examination on the cadaver
of Jessette Tarroza. He issued a Death Certificate (Exhibit "E") which indicated that the
cause of death was cardio respiratory arrest due to pneumohemathorax of the right chest.
He also prepared a Necropsy Report (Exhibit "F") after the examination. He found five (5)
stab wounds at the back of the victim and ten (10) stab wounds at the front, consisting of
an incised wound at the lateral border of the ala nasi, right; triangular stab wounds on the
right side of the neck and lower neck; an incised wound which traversed through the
trachea external jugular vein and three-fourths (3/4) of the esophagus; a C-shaped stab
wound that penetrated the thorax cavity and a stab wound above the breast near the
axilla. He testified further that the wounds inflicted must have reached some vital organs
of the body, possibly the lungs and blood vessels, and that the wounds were probably
caused by three (3) different instruments. He likewise conducted a vaginal examination
on the victim and noted that there was a fresh complete hymenal laceration at 3 o'clock
and fresh complete lacerations at 7 o'clock and 8 o'clock, which could have been caused
by a finger or a sex organ inserted into the vagina. When asked if the victim was sexually
molested, he answered in the affirmative.cciv
Another witness for the prosecution was Dr. Tomas P. Refe, Medico-Legal Officer III
of the National Bureau of Investigation, Central Visayas Regional Office. He testified that
he conducted an autopsy examination on the cadaver of Jessette Tarroza and prepared
Autopsy Report No. 91-27 (Exhibit "H"). He found abrasions and thirteen (13) stab
wounds on the front part of the chest, right side, and at the back of the victim's chest. He
also found an incised wound at the region of the nose involving the upper portion of the
right side of the mouth, an incised wound on the front part of the neck cutting the trachea
and partially the esophagus and an incised wound at the anterior aspect right side of the
neck.ccv He declared that death was caused by the incised wounds and multiple stab
wounds. The fatal wounds were wound nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9 and 10 (Exhibits "H", "H-1").
He likewise examined the vagina of the victim and found the hymen moderately thick and
narrow with lacerations complete at 3 o'clock and 6 o'clock, deep at 7 o'clock, 9 o'clock,
10 o'clock and 11 o'clock, and the edges of the lacerations were sharp and coaptable.
He opined that there could have been a sexual intercourse committed after the death of
the victim considering that the lacerations did not show any evidence of vital reaction
which is commonly found in lacerations during lifetime.ccvi
The prosecution also presented Joel Gonzales who turned state witness. On the
basis of the demeanor of Gonzales and the manner he answered the questions, the trial
court gathered the impression that he was mentally retarded.ccvii Gonzales did not know
how to read and write.ccviii In any event, he was able to testify that on the night of
November 16, 1991, he went to Baybay, Camague, Iligan City, to witness a dance. His
companions were "Beroy", "Jimmy" and "Cocoy". He identified Jeoffrey Abello as
"Beroy", Christopher Espanola as "Cocoy" or "Langga" and Jimmy Paquingan as
"Jimmy".
At the dance, they drank one (1) bottle of Tanduay and smoked one (1) stick of
marijuana each. After the dance, he and his three (3) companions proceeded to Bacayo.
While on their way, they met a woman whom Beroy, Cocoy and Jimmy followed. They
brought the woman to a nipa hut and slept ("gidulgan") right beside the woman.
When asked who killed the victim on the night of November 16, 1991, at Kilumco,
Camague, Iligan City, he answered "sila", referring to herein appellants. He further
testified that Beroy slashed the neck of Jessette Tarroza, Langga slashed her breast,
and Paquingan stabbed her at the back. The victim resisted by scratching her
attackers.ccix After she died, they carried her to a bushy area and all of them sexually
molested her. Beroy was first; Gonzales was second; Cocoy was third and Jeoffrey was
the last. Gonzales likewise identified the T-shirt worn by Jeoffrey Abello that night as
"That one Mercy." He declared that the brownish discoloration on the T-shirt was caused
by the blood of Jessette Tarroza.ccx
On cross-examination, Gonzales said that Jessette Tarroza was not the one brought
to the nipa hut, but a woman from Tambacan who went home later on. He then reiterated
that after their encounter with the unnamed woman, they went to the school, met and
followed Jessette Tarroza to a dark place. They encountered her on the road. He
affirmed that it was Beroy who slashed the neck of the victim while Cocoy, also known as
Langga, was the one who slashed her breasts.ccxi
For their defense, all the appellants took the witness stand. Jimmy Paquingan
narrated that at about 6 o'clock to 9 o'clock in the evening of November 16, 1991, he
watched "beta" (movie) in the house of Sima Ybanez at Kilumco, Camague. Thereafter,
he went to the house of his grandmother located at the same barangay and slept there.
He did not go out again and woke up at 6 o'clock in the morning of November 17, 1991.
His testimony was corroborated by Emma Mingo who testified that at about 6 o'clock in
the evening of November 16, 1991, she viewed "beta" in her residence at Kilumcol
Camague, with her daughter and accused Christopher Espanola. At about 9:30 in the
evening, the film ended and Christopher left. At about the same time, Jimmy Paquingan,
her nephew, came and proceeded to his room downstairs. As she waited for her
husband to come home, she continuously stayed at the porch until 1:30 in the early
morning of November 17, 1991. In her long wait, she did not see Jimmy leave his
room.ccxii
Christopher Espanola alleged that he was at home in the evening of November 16,
1991. He went out to view a "beta" in the house of Sima Ybanez. From there, he
proceeded to a disco. On his way, he passed by the house of Carmencita Gatase who
was then with Jeoffrey Abello. They went to the disco together. At the disco, he joined
the group of Lito Moraira and Titing Mingo and drank with them. There was no occasion
that he left the disco place until after 1 o'clock in the early morning of November 17, 1991,
when they went home. He woke up at 7 o'clock the following morning and proceeded to
the house of his grandmother to fetch water.ccxiii
Jeoffrey Abello narrated that in the early evening of November 16, 1991, he was at
their house in Kilumco, Camague. He left their house to watch a "beta" in the house of
Sima Ybanez. However, he was invited by Carmencita Gatase to go to a disco in Baybay,
Camague. He acceded and went to Gatase's house. Christopher Espanola joined them
on their way to the disco. They arrived at the disco at about 10 o'clock in the evening. He
saw there a group of persons including Joel Gonzales and Titing Mingo. While he saw
Christopher at about 11 o'clock that evening, he did not see Jimmy Paquingan. At about
1 o'clock in the early morning of November 17, 1991, he and Carmencita left ahead of
Christopher. They then proceeded to the house of Carmencita where they slept.ccxiv
In her testimony, Carmencita Gatase identified the three (3) accused as her
neighbors and long-time acquaintances. At about 8 o'clock in the evening of November
16, 1991, Jeoffrey Abello went to her house. At 9:30 in the evening, she asked Jeoffrey
and Christopher Espanola, who was then downstairs, to go with her to the disco. They
reached the place at about 10 o'clock. Christopher then asked permission to join the
group of his Uncle Mingo. She and Jeoffrey remained conversing and standing at the
side of the disco. They left the dancing area at 1:30 in the early morning of November 17,
1991, not noticing the whereabouts of Christopher. On their way home, the two of them
passed by the basketball court which was only eighty (80) meters from their house. They
did not notice anything unusual. Jeoffrey then slept in her house.ccxv
After considering the opposing versions of the parties, the trial court gave credence
to the evidence presented by the prosecution, particularly the testimony of state witness
Joel Gonzales. It found that Jessette Tarroza was killed by the accused Christopher
Espanola, Jimmy Paquingan and Jeoffrey Abello. It rejected the defense of the accused
as unnatural, incredible and riddled with inconsistencies. The three accused were
convicted of the crime of Murder as the killing was attended by the aggravating
circumstance of treachery. They were sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a total amount of One Hundred Seventy Five Thousand pesos
(P175,000.00) as damages to the heirs of the victim.
Hence, this appeal where accused-appellants contend:
"1. THAT THE LOWER COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONVICTING
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ON THE BASIS OF THE TESTIMONY OF JOEL
GONZALES WHO WAS AN ADDITIONAL ACCUSED IN THE AMENDED
INFORMATION OF (sic) MURDER AND WHOSE DISCHARGE WAS SOUGHT BY
THE PROSECUTION AND GRANTED BY SAID COURT, INSPITE AND DESPITE
OPPOSITION BY THE DEFENSE.
"2. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO THE
TESTIMONY OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT PAQUINGAN THAT THE TAKING OF HIS
AFFIDAVIT OF CONFESSION BY CITY PROSECUTOR LAGCAO WAS NOT
VOLUNTARY, AND IN FACT, HE REFUSED TO SIGN THE SAME, CONTRARY TO
THE STATEMENT OF SAID PROSECUTOR THAT IT WAS VOLUNTARILY GIVEN BY
THE SAID ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
"3. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT PAQUINGAN TO COUNSEL
OF HIS OWN CHOICE, PREMISED FROM (sic) THE TAKING OF THE AFFIDAVIT OF
CONFESSION BY PROSECUTOR LAGCAO, AGAINST HIS PENAL INTEREST. IN
FACT HE TESTIFIED THAT SAID LAWYERS, ATTYS. LEO CAHANAP, THE CITY
LEGAL OFFICER OF ILIGAN, AND SUSAN ECHAVEZ, WERE NOT THE COUNSELS
OF HIS OWN CHOICE AND WERE MERELY SUPPLIED BY THE PROSECUTOR.
"4. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN UTILIZING THE GROUND OF ALIBI
WHEN IT SAID THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ADVANCED IT AS A MATTER
OF DEFENSE. THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DID NOT CLING TO IT AS A MATTER
OF DEFENSE. THEY MERELY STATED WHAT WAS TRUE AND FACTUAL IN SO
FAR AS THEY WERE CONCERNED, AND IT WAS AN ERROR ON THE PART OF
THE LOWER COURT TO RULE ON THE ISSUE AS ALIBI, WHICH PRECISELY, IN
MANY DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT,(sic) THAT ALIBI
NEED NOT BE INQUIRED INTO WHERE THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE IS
 WEAK, AS IN THE CASE AT BAR.
"5. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT TO THE
TESTIMONY OF JOEL GONZALES NOTWITHSTANDING THE IMPROPRIETIES OF
HIS DISCHARGE AS AN ACCUSED ON THE AMENDED INFORMATION OF (sic)
MURDER, MORE SO, ON THE MATERIAL INCONSISTENCIES OF HIS
TESTIMONIES, AS BORNE OUT BY THE TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC
NOTES, AND MOST ESPECIALLY ON HIS MENTAL INCAPACITY, WHERE HIS
TESTIMONIES WERE RUMBLING. (sic)
"6. THAT THE LOWER COURT, AT THE INSTANCE OF HON. MOSLEMEN
MACARAMBON ERRED IN METING A PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA AS
AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANTS, THE LATTER, (sic) BEING A DETAILED JUDGE
IN RTC, BRANCH V, ILIGAN CITY, WAS THE ONE WHO PREPARED AND
RENDERED THE DECISION, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT HE WAS NOT ABLE TO
HEAR A SINGLE HEARING AND HAD NOT OBSERVED THE DEMEANOR AND
CHARACTER TRAITS OF WITNESSES AND ACCUSED IN SAID CASE, AND
INSPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE JUDGE WHO TOTALLY HEARD THE CASE OF
RTC, BRANCH V, ILIGAN CITY,(sic) STILL CONNECTED WITH THE JUDICIARY,
BUT MERELY DETAILED IN ONE OF THE SALAS OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, DAVAO CITY, AND HENCE, NOT RETIRED OR FOR (sic) OTHERWISE,
AND APPROPRIATELY, THE RECORDS OF THE CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SENT
TO HIM, FOR HIM TO PREPARE THE DECISION AND TO (sic) SEND THE SAME TO
THE CLERK OF COURT OF RTC, BRANCH V, ILIGAN CITY, FOR PROMULGATION,
AND THUS WAS (sic) THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION BY JUDGE
MACARAMBON WAS NULL AND VOID."
We find the appeal unmeritorious.
We shall first discuss assigned errors numbers 1 and 5, in view of their
inter-relationship.
The appellants contend that the trial court violated the rule in discharging Gonzales
as a state witness. They claim that Gonzales was the only one who executed an affidavit
of confession, hence, he was the most guilty of the accused and cannot be used as a
state witness. To be discharged as state witness, Section 9, Rule 119 of the Revised
Rules of Court requires that:
1. the discharge must be with the consent of the accused concerned;
2. his testimony must be absolutely necessary;
3. there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed;
4. his testimony can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
5. he does not appear to be the most guilty; and
6. he has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
We do not agree that Gonzales is the most guilty of the accused. From the evidence,
it appears that Gonzales is mentally retarded. He could not have been a leader of the
group for he was intellectually wanting. He did not inflict any of the fatal wounds that led
to the death of the victim. The trial court's assessment that he is not the most guilty is
well-grounded.
It is also established that there was no eyewitness to the crime or other direct
evidence. The testimony of Gonzales was absolutely necessary for the proper
prosecution of the case against appellants. This was the decision of the prosecution itself
when it moved for the discharge of Gonzales as a state witness. Part of prosecutorial
discretion is the determination of who should be used as a state witness to bolster the
successful prosecution of criminal offenses. Unless done in violation of the Rules, this
determination should be given great weight by our courts.
The records will also show that while Gonzales rambled in some parts of his
testimony in view of his low intellect, nonetheless, his testimony was substantially
corroborated in its material points. His declaration that the victim resisted and used her
bare hands in scratching her attackers is confirmed by the findings of Dr. Villarin in
Exhibits "I", "J" and "K". His statement that Beroy slashed the neck of the victim, Langga
slashed her breast and Jimmy stabbed her at the back finds support in the result of the
autopsy of the victim's cadaver by Dr. Refe and Dr. Gomez showing incised wounds and
numerous stab wounds on the front and back of the victim and incised wounds on her
trachea and esophagus. His assertion that he and the appellants sexually abused the
victim after her death is corroborated by the lacerations found in the private part of the
victim as determined by Dr. Gomez and Dr. Refe.
Lastly, there is no showing that Gonzales has been convicted of an offense involving
moral turpitude. Gonzales also gave his consent to be utilized as state witness.ccxvi In sum,
all the requirements of Section 9, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court were satisfied
by the prosecution and the trial court did not err in discharging Gonzales as state
witness.
Appellants also assail the testimony of Gonzales on the ground of his alleged mental
incapacity. Section 20 of Rule 130 provides that "except as provided in the next
succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their
perception to others, may be witnesses." Section 21, inter alia, disqualifies as witnesses,
"those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such
that they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others." A mental
retardate is not therefore, per se, disqualified from being a witness. As long as his
senses can perceive facts and if he can convey his perceptions in court, he can be a
witness.ccxvii In the case at bar, we find that Gonzales had a tendency to be repetitious
and at times had to be asked leading questions, but he was not unintelligible to be
beyond understanding. He was clear and unyielding in identifying the appellants as the
perpetrators of the crime. On the whole, his account of the crime was coherent enough to
shed light on the guilt or innocence of the accused. To be sure, modern rules on
evidence have downgraded mental incapacity as a ground to disqualify a witness.ccxviii As
observed by McCormick, the remedy of excluding such a witness who may be the only
person available who knows the facts, seems inept and primitive.ccxix Our rules follow the
modern trend of evidence.
Nor can the alleged inconsistencies between the sworn statement of Gonzales and
his testimony in court affect his credibility. Gonzales' testimony jibes on material points.
His inconsistencies on minor details of the crime are not earmarks of falsehoods. On the
contrary, they show that his testimony is honest and unrehearsed.ccxx Moreover, it is a
well-settled rule that affidavits should not be considered as the final and full repository of
truth. Affidavits are usually taken ex-parte. They are oftentimes incomplete and
inaccurate. Ordinarily in a question-and-answer form, they are usually and routinely
prepared in police precincts by police investigators. Not in frequently, the investigator
propounds questions merely to elicit a general picture of the subject matter under
investigation.ccxxi Thus, the fact that the sworn statement of Gonzales (Exhibit "M") did not
mention a woman from Tambacan whom they met and brought to a nipa hut and slept
with on the night of November 16, 1991, is attributable to the fact that he was not asked
about women other than Jessette Tarroza. His line of questioning was as follows:
"x x x
FISCAL LAGCAO:
Q: After 11:00 o'clock that night, where did you and your companions go?
A: We went to a grassy place in Camague, Iligan City to wait for a certain Jessette Tarroza.
Q: Whose idea was it that you will wait for Jessette Tarroza in that secluded place at
Camague, Iligan City?
A: Beroy, sir.
Q: And eventually, did you see this Jessette?
A: Yes, sir.
x x x"
The presence of another woman came out only in response to questions propounded to
him during his cross-examination, viz:
"x x x
ATTY. FLORES:
Q: Who was that woman killed?
A: Jessette Tarroza.
Q: The same woman brought to the nipa hut?
FISCAL LAGCAO:
I object, your Honor. . .
COURT:
Witness may answer, let him answer.
A: No.
COURT:
Proceed.
ATTY. FLORES:
 Q: You want to tell the Honorable Court, Mr. Witness that there was another woman in the
nipa hut?
A: Yes.
Q: Who was the woman in the nipa hut?
FISCAL LAGCAO:
Immaterial . . .
COURT:
Witness may answer.
A: She is from Tambacan.
Q: Do you know her name.
A: No.
COURT:
In other words, for the Court's clarification, there were two (2) women during that night
that you found in the nipa hut that you mentioned?
A: Yes.
COURT:
The other woman was killed - Jessette Tarroza?
A: Yes.
COURT:
The other woman was not killed?
A: No.
Q: And this was not known to the authorities, the one that was not killed?
A: No.
Q: What was only mentioned to the authorities was the one that was killed?
A: Yes.
x x x. "ccxxii
Indeed, there is no rule of evidence that would stop an affiant from elaborating his prior
sworn statement at the trial itself.ccxxiii Testimonies given during trials are more exact and
elaborate for their accuracy is tested by the process of cross-examination where the truth
is distilled from half truths and the total lies.
The appellants also contend that Gonzales mixed-up his identification of appellants.
In his sworn statement, he mentioned "Beroy, Jimmy and Langga" as his companions on
the night of November 16, 1991, and as the ones who killed Jessette Tarroza, while in
his direct testimony, he named and pointed at Beroy, Cocoy and Jimmy. A reading of his
testimony, however, will reveal the fact that he consistently referred to appellant Jeoffrey
Abello as "Beroy", Jimmy Paquingan as "Jimmy" and Christopher Espanola as "Cocoy"
or "Langga", viz:
"x x x
FISCAL LAGCAO:
Q: Mr. Witness, do you know a certain Beroy?
A: Yes.
Q: If this Beroy is in court, will you please identify him by pointing at him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Please point to him if he is around.
A: (Witness pointing to a person who when asked identified himself as Jeoffrey Abello.)
Q: Do you know a certain Langga?
A: Yes.
Q: If he is around, will you please identify him by pointing at him?
A: Yes.
Q: Please point at him.
A: (Witness pointing to a person who identified himself as Christopher Espanola.)
Q: Do you know a certain Jimmy?
A: Yes.
Q: If he is around, will you please point to him?
A: (Witness pointing to a person who identified himself as Jimmy Paquingan).
"x x x
FISCAL LAGCAO:
Q: Now, this Cocoy which you are referring to, is he in the courtroom at present?
A: Yes, he is around.
Q: Please identify him if he is around.
A: (Witness pointing to a person who when asked to identify himself answered that he is
Christopher Espanola.)
x x x "ccxxiv
The foregoing testimony of Gonzales clearly shows that appellant Christopher Espanola
is "Cocoy" or "Langga".
We are not also prepared to disbelieve Gonzales simply because of his inconsistent
statement as to the correct sequence the victim was sexually abused by the appellants. It
matters little that Gonzales was tentative on who molested the victim first, second, third
and last. What matters is that all the appellants molested the dead Tarroza.
 The appellants also capitalize on the discrepancy in the identification of the print on
the T-shirt worn by appellant Jeoffrey Abello. When asked to recall the clothes worn by
Abello that fateful night, Gonzales stated "That one Mercy." In contrast, prosecution
witness Romeo Tarroza testified that the light green T-shirt found near the shoes of the
victim was printed with "Midwifery" and "ICC". This was corroborated by the testimony of
Georgie Tarroza that he recalled having seen Abello wearing that night a green T-shirt
printed with "Midwifery" at the back and "ICC" on the front. We uphold the explanation of
the trial court that the discrepancy could be attributed to the fact that Gonzales does not
know how to read and write.
We now discuss assigned errors numbers 2 and 3. Appellants contend that the trial
court erred when it ruled that the sworn statement of Jimmy Paquingan was voluntarily
given by him though he refused to sign the same. Under the Constitution and existing
law and jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must satisfy the following
requirements: 1) the confession must be voluntary; 2) the confession must be made with
the assistance of competent and independent counsel; 3) the confession must be
express; and 4) the confession must be in writing.ccxxv In People v. Bandula,ccxxvi we ruled
that an extra-judicial confession must be rejected where there is doubt as to its
voluntariness. The fact that appellant Paquingan did not sign his sworn statement casts
serious doubt as to the voluntariness of its execution. It is inadmissible evidence.
Additionally, the claim of appellant Paquingan that he was not assisted by a counsel
of his own choice when his affidavit of confession was taken is worth noting. Paquingan's
sworn statement was taken on November 25, 1991, at 3 o'clock in the afternoon. At that
time, an information for rape with homicide had already been filed against him and his
co-appellants. Hence, when Paquingan gave his confession, Paquingan was no longer
under custodial investigationccxxvii since he was already charged in court. Nonetheless,
the right to counsel applies in certain pretrial proceedings that can be considered
"critical stages" in the criminal process.ccxxviii Custodial interrogation before or after
charges have been filed and non-custodial interrogations after the accused has
been formally charged are considered to be critical pretrial stages.ccxxix The
investigation by Fiscal Lagcao of Paquingan after the latter has been formally charged
with the crime of rape with homicide, is a critical pretrial stage during which the right to
counsel applies. The right to counsel means right to competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice.ccxxx It is doubtful whether the counsels given to Paquingan
were of his own choice. In her rebuttal testimony, Rosita L. Abapo, declared to wit:
"x x x
ATTY. FLORES:
xxx
Q: In other words, you want to tell this Honorable Court as you stated earlier that it was
Fiscal Lagcao who called up for these lawyers? Do you want to tell the Honorable Court
that these lawyers were not the counsel of choice of Jimmy Paquingan at that time?
They were not the counsel of choice of Mr. Paquingan at that time?
COURT:
 Mr. Counsel, this witness does not know what is a counsel of choice. Make it clearer. It was
not Mr. Paquingan who asked that Atty. Dalisay, Atty. Echavez and Atty. Cahanap be
called to represent him?
WITNESS:
A: Yes, sir.
x x x"ccxxxi
Moreover, we hold that Atty. Cahanap cannot qualify as an independent counsel, he
being a Legal Officer of Iligan City. An independent counsel cannot be burdened by any
task antithetical to the interest of an accused. As a legal officer of the city, Atty. Cahanap
provides legal assistance and support to the mayor and the city in carrying out the
delivery of basic services to the people, including the maintenance of peace and order.
His office is akin to a prosecutor who undoubtedly cannot represent the accused during
custodial investigation due to conflict of interest.ccxxxii Assigned errors numbered 2 and 3
are therefore ruled in favor of the appellants.
As to the fourth assignment of error, we subscribe to the finding of the trial court that
the evidence of the accused-appellants proffers the defense of alibi. Time and again, we
have ruled that both denial and alibi are weak defenses which cannot prevail where there
is positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses.ccxxxiii For alibi to
prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused is somewhere else when the crime
was committed but he must likewise demonstrate that he could not have been physically
present at the place of the crime or in its immediate vicinity at the time of its
commission.ccxxxiv In the case at bar, it was not physically impossible for the appellants to
be at the crime scene considering the proximity of the place where they claimed they
were and the spot where Jessette Tarroza was brutally murdered.
We also reject appellants' claim that the decision of the trial court is void on the
ground that the judge who penned the decision, Judge Moslemen T. Macarambon, was
not the one who heard and tried the case. We have ruled in People v. Rayray, 241 SCRA
1 [1995], that the fact that the judge who heard the evidence is not himself the one who
prepared, signed and promulgated the decision constitutes no compelling reason to
jettison his findings and conclusions, and does not per se render his decision void. While
it is true that the trial judge who conducted the hearing would be in a better position to
ascertain the truth or falsity of the testimonies of the witnesses, it does not necessarily
follow that a judge who was not present during the trial cannot render a valid and just
decision.ccxxxv For a judge who was not present during the trial can rely on the transcript of
stenographic notes taken during the trial as basis of his decision.ccxxxvi Such reliance does
not violate substantive and procedural due process of law.
We now review the award of damages to the heirs of Jessette Tarroza. When death
occurs as a result of a crime, the heirs of the deceased are entitled to the amount of
P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the victim without need of any evidence or
proof of damages.ccxxxvii Accordingly, we award P50,000.00 to the heirs of Jessette
Tarroza for her death. As for actual damages, we find the award of P50,000.00 proper
considering that Romeo Tarroza spent more or less the same amount for the interment
and burial of his deceased daughter.ccxxxviii
 We have also awarded indemnity for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased --
an amount to be fixed by the court considering the victim's actual income at the time of
death and his probable life expectancy.ccxxxix The trial court awarded P50,000.00 as
compensatory damages. We find the same inadequate considering that Jessette, who
was twenty-four (24) years old at the time of her death, was employed as a medical
technologist earning P99.00 per day.ccxl To compute the award for Jessette's loss of
earning capacity, her annual income should be fixed at P39,146.25.ccxli.
We also find the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages proper considering the
mental anguish suffered by the parents of the victim on account of her brutal murder. We
likewise uphold the award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages considering that the
killing of Jessette Tarroza was attended by treachery. She was also raped while already
lifeless. All these are shocking to conscience. The imposition of exemplary damages
against the appellants will hopefully deter others from perpetrating the same evil deed.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we AFFIRM WITH MODIFICATION the assailed Decision
dated November 21, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 5) of Lanao del Norte,
Iligan City, in Criminal Case No. 3773. Accordingly, the monetary awards granted in
favor of the heirs of Jessette Tarroza are modified as follows:
a) Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as indemnity for her death;
b) Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as actual damages;
c) Six Hundred Fifty Nine Thousand Two Hundred Ninety Four pesos and Fifty
centavos (P659,294.50) for loss of earning capacity of said deceased;
d) Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as moral damages; and
e) Twenty Five Thousand pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary damages.
Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-38635 November 17, 1980

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. DANIEL HAYAG,

Accused-Appellant.

AQUINO, J.:

Daniel Hayag appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao del Norte,
Tagum Branch VIII, convicting him of rape, sentencing him to "imprisonment for the rest
of his natural life" and ordering him to pay to Esperanza Ranga ten thousand pesos as
moral damages (Criminal Case No. 1210).

Issue is the trustworthiness of the interpreter's verbalization of deaf-mute's sign language. -

In this alleged rape of Esperanza, 32, a farm girl and a deaf-mute, the case has been
simplified by the admission of the accused, Hayag, 50, a married man with eight children,
who finished grade six, that he had sexual intercourse with Esperanza nine times between
1970 and December 4, 1972 in the town of Carmen, Davao del
Norte.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The ultimate issue is whether Virginia Ranga 26, a public school teacher, a college graduate
and the victim's sister, correctly and credibly interpreted and verbalized the sign language
of Esperanza as meaning that Hayag raped Esperanza on October 26, 1972 or whether
credence should be given to Hayag's story that the sexual intercourse on that occasion, as
on other occasions, was voluntary.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

Attached to the complaint for rape was a certificate from the Davao General Hospital that
on December 7, 1972 Esperanza was examined and found to be "positive for pregnancy"
(Exh. C or 10). However, the record does not show whether she gave birth. There was no
medical examination of Esperanza immediately after the rape allegedly perpetrated on
October 26, 1972.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The prosecution labored under the handicap that it could prove the alleged rape only
through the sign language of the victim, Esperanza. The victim's sister, Virginia, who has
communicated with her since childhood by means of sign language, was the sole available
witness who could make known to her the questions on direct and cross-examination and
could articulate her alleged answers for the record.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

Because there was no means of checking the correctness and veracity of Virginia's
interpretation and because she herself believed that Esperanza was raped by Hayag, it is
not surprising that the defense counsel vehemently objected to Virginia's role as interpreter.
The defense regarded her as biased and as lacking the cold neutrality of a third person
acting as interpreter.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

As Esperanza did not study in the school for deaf-mutes and as there was no instructor in
that school available as an interpreter the trial court had no choice but to use Virginia as
the medium for communicating with Esperanza. Was she a reliable interpreter? That is the
intriguing question in this case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

This Court in two cases convicted an accused of having raped a deaf-mute but in those
cases an instructor in the school for deaf-mutes acted as an interpreter and the conviction
was not based solely on the evidence given by the victim. In the instant case, the judgment
of conviction was based exclusively on the story of Esperanza that she was raped, a story
made known through her sister, Virginia, who signed the complaint for
rape.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In People vs. De Leon, 50 Phil. 539, the accused was charged with having raped his
fifteen-year-old step-daughter, a deaf-mute The trial was held in the house, called "Country
Home;" where the accused brought the girl. She testified in sign language which was
interpreted by a teacher in the school for deaf-mutes. The accused was convicted on the
basis of such testimony.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In People vs. Sasota, 52 Phil. 281, the accussed was also charged with having raped a
fourteen-year-old deaf-mute. She testified with the assistance of an instructor in the school
for deaf-mutes. Her testimony was corroborated by her seven-year-old sister who was
present when the outrage was committed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library

Seven days after the alleged rape, the victim, Rufina Barbuco, submitted to a medical
examination. The doctor introjudo su especulum en la parte genital de ella y dicha Rufina
sintio' dolor por la introduccion de dicho instrumento". The accused was convicted of
rape.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

But in People vs. Bustos, 51 Phil. 385, a homicide case, the testimony of a deaf-mute, an
alleged eyewitness, as interpreted by a teacher from the school for deaf-mutes, who did not
teach the witness (the latter never having studied in such school) was not given credence.
(See People vs. Nava, CA 40 O.G. 4327 and People vs. Tejano, CA-G.R. No. 21954-R, May
25, 1959, 7 Velayo's Digest 724. As to a deaf-mute convicted of robbery, see People vs.
Nazario, 97 Phil. 990.)

Rules regarding communication with a deaf-mute. - At the outset, it is relevant to state the
jurisprudential rules for verbalizing the perceptions of a
deaf-mute.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

'Although in ancient times the rule was otherwise, deaf-mutes are now generally accepted
as competent witnesses. In any given case a showing must be made that the witness has a
system of communication, and if he has and he is otherwise competent, his testimony will be
received" (81 Am. Jur. 2nd 116).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The modern rule is to the effect that deaf and dumb persons are not incompetent as
witnesses merely because they are deaf and dumb if they are able to communicate the facts
by a method which their infirmity leaves available to them, and are of sufficient mental
capacity to observe the matters as to which they will testify and to appreciate the obligation
of an oath; but where the person is not so educated as it is possible to make him understand
the questions which are put to him he is not competent (97 C.J.S.
454).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The method to be employed in eliciting the testimony of a deaf-mute should be that which is
best suited to attain the desired end, the particular method of examination resting largely in
the discretion of the trial court. Thus, a deaf and dumb witness may be examined by means
of written questions to which he gives written answers, or he may be examined through the
medium of an interpreter who communicates with the witness by means of signs. The
qualifications of a particular person to act as an interpreter for a deaf-mute rests largely in
the discretion of the trial court (98 C.J.S. 25).

The other statements of the procedure for taking the sign-language of a deaf-mute are
quoted below:chanrobles virtual law library

The modern and generally accepted rule is to the effect that deaf-mutes are competent
witnesses where they have sufficient knowledge to understand and appreciate the sanctity
of an oath and comprehend the facts as to which they wish to speak, and are capable of
communicating their Ideas with respect thereto (Annotation, 9 ALR
482).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

If deaf-mutes have sufficient understanding to comprehend facts about which they

undertake to speak, and appreciate the sanctity of an oath, they may give evidence by signs,
or through an interpreter or in writing, and such testimony, through an interpreter, is not
hearsay (Bugg vs. Town of Houlka, 84 So. 387, 9 ALR
480).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

It has been said that a court has the inherent power to elicit testimony from a competent
deaf-mute by whatsoever means necessary to the end to be obtained, and that the manner
in which the examination of a deaf-mute should be conducted is a matter to be regulated
and controlled by the trial court in its discretion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

However, it has also been said that the best method should be adopted. And there is
authority to the effect that the method adopted will not be reviewed by an appellate court
in the absence of a showing that the complaining party was in some way injured by reason
of the particular method adopted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In fact it has been said that, in the absence of a showing as to what constituted the best
method of taking a deaf-mute's testimony, it will be presumed on appeal that the trial court
adopted the best method.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

As is stated in the authorities approved in Bugg vs. Town of Houlka, 84 So. 387, 9 ALR 480,
the general rule is that deaf-mutes who are competent to testify may give evidence by signs,
or through an interpreter, or in writing.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

More specifically it has been held that a deaf-mute who can read and write may testify
through that medium. Thus, in Ritchey vs. People (1896), 23 Colo 314, 47 Pac. 272, a
deaf-mute was examined by submitting to him written questions, to which he replied in
writing, which questions and answers were then read to the
jury.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

And the general rule is that the evidence of a deaf-mute who can be communicated with by
signs may be taken through an interpreter who understands such signs and can interpret
them to the court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

And it has been held that it is permissible to take the testimony of a deaf-mute through an
interpreter by signs notwithstanding the evidence could have been written. At least where
there is no showing that the interpretation by signs is not the better
method.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

And especially where it appears that the witness is capable of relating the facts "correctly"
by signs, but, while able to read and write, can only communicate Ideas imperfectly' by
writing. And it is not necessary that the witness be able to read and write. However, it has
been said that it would seem to be better in the case of a deaf and dumb witness who can
read and write to conduct his examination in writing.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

With respect to the conducting of the examination of a deaf-mute itself, it has been held
that the allowing of leading questions is in the discretion of the court. This discretion was
said to arise out of the fact that 'there is always more or less difficulty in eliciting testimony'
where the witness is a deaf-mute (Annotation, 9 ALR 482-484).

Procedure followed by the lower court in qualifying Virginia Ranga as an interpreter of her
sister's sign language. - How to communicate with the victim, Esperanza, was the problem
of the municipal judge during the preliminary examination. Esperanza knows how to sign
her name and to read and write figures. That was all.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

The complaint for rape, filed in the municipal court on December 26, 1972, was signed by
Esperanza. Her sister Virginia certified under oath that she translated, interpreted and
explained the contents of the complaint "faithfully and truthfully through sign language"
to Esperanza (p. 1, Record).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

At the preliminary examination, the municipal judge tested the capacity of Virginia to
communicate with Esperanza. Virginia admitted that there were deficiencies in her mode of
communication with Esperanza. Virginia testified:
17. Q: (by municipal judge). How adequate is the communication between Esperanza
Ranga and you? - A: Not too much but I think only a few things which she wish to convey
which I do not understand.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

18. Q: Would you ten me one or two of these few things which you don't understand? - A:
Those things which are very deep like for example those invisible words.

19. Q: What do you mean by invisible words? - A: For example, the meaning of the word
'truth' whereby I could not expect to her in one sign only the meaning of the word 'truth'
but I could only explain that through other signs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

20. Q: These signs that you employ in communicating between you and Esperanza Ranga,
are these conventional signs or the 'Deaf and Dumb signs? - A: No,
sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

21. Q: What then are the signs? - A: Just like the actions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

22. Q: In other words, you just contrived or improvised the signs? - A: Yes,
sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

23. Q: For how long a time have both of you been at this means of communications? - A:
Since my birth.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

24. Q: You mean that when you were born you ready communicate with each other? - A:
Not exactly but when I already teamed to talk and she could not
understand.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

25. Q: Do you still employ the same improvised signs in communicating with your older
sister? - A: Yes, sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

26. Q: Have you ever revised or modify these so-called improvised signs? - A: No,
sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

27. Q: You have improvised along the way, have you? - A: Yes,
sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

28. Q: Suppose you wanted to convey to your older sister the meaning of: 'She better dress
up because you are going to bring her to the Court'. How would you communicate with
your sister?chanrobles virtual law library

A: (The witness demonstrated by raising her two hands from the head then downward
which would imply putting on the dress; her right hand placed over the nose which means
'good or beautiful' and touch her older sister (Esperanza) on her shoulder and pointing
towards her and touching both of them with the same hand gesturing towards the road and
a sign indicating a roof which implies the Municipal Hall.)

The Court is of the opinion that witness may adequately communicate with her older sister
Esperanza Ranga through their improvised sign language. In view thereof, this Court
hereby commissions Virginia Ranga to act as an interpreter for her sister, Esperanza Ranga,
in this preliminary examination (pp. 15-16, Record).

The municipal judge then asked Virginia to take an oath as an interpreter. After taking the
oath, the judge instructed Virginia to ask Esperanza whether the latter understood the
meaning of an oath. Esperanza replied by signs that she would tell the
truth.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

According to the sign language of Esperanza, as interpreted by Virginia, the alleged rape
was committed in this manner:chanrobles virtual law library

While she (Esperanza) was she was pulled away from the road and then she resisted and
(was) dragged until she was kicked on her leg whereby she stumbled down. The one (Hayag)
who pulled her boxed her on her breast and on the legs and then she lost consciousness and
then when she lost consciousness, she did not know what
happened.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

When she regained consciousness, she found out that she was raped by the man who pulled
her (pp. 16-17, Record).

Esperanza Identified the man who raped her as a person with a mole between his eyes just
below his forehead. She pointed to Hayag as the rapist. Hayag and his counsel were present
at the preliminary examination.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The rape was not reported because Hayag told Esperanza that she would be killed if she
divulged the rape to anybody (p. 18, Record).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

Hayag waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. The case was elevated to
the Court of First Instance where the provincial fiscal filed an information for rape dated
February 12, 1973.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The trial court tested Virginia's capacity to communicate with Esperanza in sign language
improvised by the two sisters, a procedure opposed by defense counsel, as may be seen from
the following transcript:chanrobles virtual law library

Private prosecutor: ... since the complainant, your Honor, is a deaf-mute, we wig present
her sister as an interpreter, and we will qualify the sister to act as an
interpreter. ...chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Defense counsel: ... we object to the competency (of Virginia) on the ground that this
witness is not an expert witness to interpret the language of a deaf-mute. She would not be
competent as to the sign to be conveyed to her, and finally it would be prejudicial and
biased, your Honor. ...chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

I believe, your Honor, that this case is so serious as it involves the liberty of the accused,
and if we will be hasty in proceeding ... even granting that the witness can be able to
perceive and communicate, there is no definite provision in the Rules of Court that a sister
could be qualified as an interpreter to a
deaf-mute. ...chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Court: ... the Court win allow her (the sister) to be an interpreter in the case as long as she
can be qualified to interpret the signs of her sister.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

Defense counsel ... And granting that the sister will be allowed to translate and interpret in
behalf of the offended party, how will we be so sure that the sister will convey the same
translation as the offended party wanted to convey to
her? ...chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Private prosecutor: Good faith is presumed, your Honor please. Bad faith is not
presumed. ...chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Court: Well, anyway, those are recorded already and in case of an appeal, those can be
taken up because those will appear in the transcript of the stenographic notes, all the
objections that you have raised insofar as allowing the sister of the offended party to
interpret her sign language.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Defense counsel: ... we will submit a memorandum to that effect that the sister is the
interpreter in this case, she being not competent and expert
witness.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Court: Well, she is not presented here as an expert witness. She is just being used now as an
interpreter, and you are objecting to that? chanrobles virtual law library

Defense counsel: ... We are really seriously objecting.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

chanrobles virtual law library

Court: ... the appellate court will be guided by the stenographic transcript whether you
made your observation and your objection in time before a person is allowed to be an
interpreter in a case like this.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We cannot also ask say a teacher in (the) school for deaf-mutes to be an interpreter here
because, probably, if that deaf-mute did not go to the school for deaf-mutes, she would not
know the sign language of the teacher.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

So, probably, this is my personal observation, that they should adapt themselves to the
circumstances of the situation. Now, since their sister is dumb and cannot hear, and because
they were living together, they have to devise a way by which they could communicate (with)
each other, and, probably, not the same sign language in the school for deaf and dumb
persons.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

So, in the interest of justice, the Court will allow the sister to interpret the testimony of the
offended party. (4-11 tsn June 11, 1973).

After Virginia had taken her oath and testified that she and Esperanza had been
communicating by means of sign language since childhood, she was directed to ask
Esperanza's name.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Virginia made a sign to Esperanza to sign her name. Esperanza wrote on a piece of paper
"Esperanza Ranga May 3, 1972 " (17-18 tsn June 11, 1973).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

When the trial judge directed Virginia to ask Esperanza why she was in court, Esperanza
moved her head sidewise and placed a finger on her lips. She was not able to answer that
question in sign language because, as the private prosecutor himself admitted, it is difficult
to formulate a "why" question in sign language (17-19, 23 tsn).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

The fiscal noted that Esperanza could answer "what where and when" questions but it
would be difficult to make her understand a "why" question because "there were certain
questions that she cannot easily understand" (26-27 tsn). The following portion of the
transcript is a sample of how Virginia communicated with Esperanza on direct
examination:

Q. Alright. Tell her (Esperanza) to demonstrate to kick her right leg? - A. Yes,sir.
(Witness-interpreter's sister doing the same.) chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Tell her to repulse or fight back an opponent when she is attacked? - A. Yes, sir. (The
sister doing the same.) chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Let us be specific. Does your sister know how to look (up) a date in the calendar? - A.
Yes, sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. You taught her. - A. She has an Idea.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law

library

Q. Alright. Do you have ... a calendar? - A. Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library

Q Will you tell your sister to point to figure 7? - A. Yes, sir. (Witness-interpreter translating
the same to her sister in sign language and the sister likewise pointed to figure 7.)
chanrobles virtual law library

Q Tell her to point to No. 23. - A. Yes, sir. (Witness-interpreter translating the same to the
sister and the sister pointing also to No. 23.) chanrobles virtual law library

Q What about the month appearing in that calendar, can she read? What is that month
there appearing there in that calendar for 1973, in her sign language? ... - A. She cannot
read.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q But she can read the days or the number? - A. Yes, sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

Q Can she point to No. 18? (Witness-interpreter translating the same to the sister, and the
sister pointing also to No. 18.) chanrobles virtual law library

Q Alright. Now, how would she communicate the month of a year. What month is she
referring when she refers to a date, for example. How will she communicate that with you?
- A. She will use the calendar, sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q But she cannot read the month in the calendar, she said already. Is it not? - A. She can
understand, and at least she can point.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

Q Alright.Will you tell your sister to see in that calendar the month of July? - A. We still
need to write the month, sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q You give her a piece of paper and write there July. Then let her locate it there in the
calendar. - A. Yes, sir. (Witness-interpreter doing the same and the sister located the month
of July.) chanrobles virtual law library

Q Now, tell her to locate the month of November. - A. Yes, sir. (The sister locating the
same )chanrobles virtual law library

Q Will you tell her whether she knows the days in the week, like Monday, Tuesday,
Wednesday like that? - A. Yes, sir. I think she knows.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

Q And what are the days in the week? Ask her. - A. She does not know,
sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Q Do you know what day is today? Ask her. - A. Yes, sir. (Witness-interpreter translating
the question to the sister, and she pointed to June 11 in the 1973 Calendar.) chanrobles
virtual law library

Q Now, can you point therein the calendar any day? - A. (The sister pointed to Tuesday
after the question was properly translated to her by the witness-interpreter.) "Court: Make
it of record that she pointed to Tuesday.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

Q by Court: Do you know what day is today? (Witness pointing to June 11 in the 1973
calendar.) - A: (by Witness-interpreter): She does not know, your
Honor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q by Court: Do you know what is today? - (Witness pointing to June 11 in the 1973
calendar.) chanrobles virtual law library

Court: I think she can adequately communicate, perhaps not to our satisfaction. Alright, ...
(To the Witness-Interpreter Virginia): Do you swear to interpret faithfully and to the best
of your knowledge the questions to your sister and the answers that she gives to the
questions? - Witness-Interpreter: Yes, your Honor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

Court: Alright. (To private prosecutor )Your first witnesschanrobles virtual law library

Private prosecutor: Our first witness is the complainant herself, your

Honor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Court: Put her on the stand. (30-37 tsn.)

The oath was then administered to Esperanza. How it was administered is not shown in the
record. It should be recalled that Virginia testified that "invisible words" like truth cannot
be made known in sign language to Esperanza.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

When Esperanza was asked as to her age, she write on a piece of paper "May 3, 1983 32"
(39 tsn June 11, 1973).

Testimony of Esperanza as verbalized by her sister Virginia. - Esperanza resided in

Carmen and worked in the ricefield of her brother Dencio She used to walk from her house
to the ricefield which was quite far. Upon being asked, Esperanza pointed to the figure
"26" in the calendar. She worked in the ricefield on October 26, 1972 up to the time in the
afternoon when the sun was in a certain position which, as calculated by the court, meant
that it was approximately three o'clock.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

She was on her way home alone. She sketched the road leading to the highway which was
taken by her and the scene of the alleged rape (Exh. A or 2). When she reached a grassy
spot along the road, her left hand was pulled by a man with a mole between his eyebrows
whom Esperanza Identified as Hayag who was in court. Hayag pulled her to the grassy
bush. (At this point, defense counsel manifested that Esperanza did not make any sign that
she was pulled to the grassy bush and that it was Virginia, the interpreter, who supplied
that allegation, 47 tsn).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Esperanza resisted but Hayag kicked her in the right leg and she stumbled. Hayag choked
her while she was prostrate on the ground. Asked if she was boxed, Esperanza replied that
Hayag boxed her on the chest while he was standing. At this point, Esperanza went down
the witness stand and demonstrated how she resisted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

Hayag removed her short pants and kissed her and then, as stated by the interpreter, she
was raped. Asked the leading question of whether she was unconscious when she was raped,
she replied in the affirmative and added that she regained consciousness after she was
raped. Her pants were on her side on the ground. There was blood in her private part. She
pushed aside Hayag.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Hayag stood up and told Esperanza not to tell anybody what happened or else he would kill
her. Hayag picked up her pants and threw them over her body and left. She put on her
pants and went home crying. She was still crying when she arrived home but she did not
disclose to her mother the alleged rape because of the threat made by
Hayag.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Esperanza indicated in the sketch the spot where she was raped on October 26, 1972,
Identified as Exhibit A-2 or 2-A (63 tsn).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

According to Esperanza. on December 4, 1972 she encountered Hayag in the same place
but she avoided him by passing near the central school and going to the house of her
sister-in-law, as indicated in the sketch, Exhibit A. She arrived home at eight o'clock in the
evening and reported the rape incident to her mother.

Hayag's story. - To support his defense that his sexual intercourse with Esperanza was
voluntarily consummated and was not accomplished through force or against her will, he
testified that he and Esperanza, whom he had known for more than fifteen years, loved
each other. They were neighbors in the town of Carmen. Hayag's daughter Ester is married
to Antonio, a brother of Esperanza.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

Their liaison allegedly started one morning in December, 1970 when Esperanza appeared at
the foot of the stairs of his house and made a sign that she wanted to drink water. Hayag
signalled her to go upstairs. He was absent from work on that
day.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

He went to the kitchen where Esperanza followed him. After she had drunk water, she
made a sign by pointing to herself and to Hayag and placing her two fingers side by side or
juxtaposing them. Hayag said that by means of that sign Esperanza wanted to convey that
she and Hayag were sweethearts. Hayag nodded to show his assent to Esperanza's offer of
love.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Hayag said that thereafter Esperanza embraced him and they kissed each other. After the
embrace, Esperanza disengaged herself and formed a circle with her left thumb and index
finger and inserted into the circle the fingers of her right hand, repeatedly making a
push-and-pull movement. That signal meant that she wanted sexual intercourse. In answer
to that signal, Hayag nodded.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Esperanza took off her panties and because the kitchen floor 'was dirty Hayag indicated to
her that they would have sexual congress on the table which was clean. 'They performed
the sexual intercourse on the table and reached the climax in about five
minutes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

After they went down from the table, they embraced and kissed and Esperanza allegedly
made a sign that they should repeat the sexual act. At that juncture, Florita Hayag's
daughter, barged in and saw them. They separated.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

Four days later, Esperanza met Hayag at about six-thirty in the morning at the crossing or
intersection of the highway going to Tagum and the road going to Tibal-og in the vicinity of
the bridge and the chapel. There was a grassy spot in that place (Exh. 9 and A). There, they
had sexual intercourse for about five minutes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

In the meantime, Florita reported to her mother, Adoracion, that she had seen Hayag and
Esperanza in a compromising situation. Hayag and his wife quarrelled. Mrs. Hayag and
her three daughters left the conjugal abode and took refuge in her mother's house in Maco.
Hayag was able to persuade his wife to return to their house after he had promised not to
have anything more to do with Esperanza.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library

For more than a year, Hayag lived up to his promise. Then, in the morning of May 12, 1972,
Hayag met Esperanza on the highway while he was waiting for transportation to take him
to his work as a foreman (capataz) of the Bureau of Public Highways in Mawab
Nabunturan.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On that occasion, Esperanza allegedly made a sign to him that they should have sexual
intercourse, pointing to him the grassy spot where they had done it before. Hayag made a
counter-sign to convey to Esperanza the message that they should have sexual intercourse
after he had cleared a spot amidst the dense talahib grass.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

It took Hayag three days to prepare the place of assignation (See photographs, Exh. 5 to 8).
On May 15, 1973 he and Esperanza allegedly had sexual intercourse in the spot which he
had cleared. Thereafter, they had six other acts of sexual intercourse in that place. A white
plastic raincoat allegedly belonging to Esperanza was used to cover the ground (Exh.
4).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Hayag specified that he had carnal intercourse with Esperanza on September 2 and 23,
October 20 and 26, November 4 and December 4, 1972. Esperanza allegedly advised Hayag
to remember the dates because she might become pregnant. The last three acts of sexual
intercourse took place in the afternoon after Hayag had come from work and while
Esperanza was on her way home from the farm (13-14 tsn October 26,
1972).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

After each sexual intercourse, Esperanza would take Hayag's ball pen and write the date
on the palm of his hand. Hayag himself did not make any record of the dates of the sexual
intercourse. He committed them to memorychanrobles virtual law library

In the afternoon of December 4, 1972, after Hayag and Esperanza had sexual intercourse in
their usual trysting place (Exh. 5 to 8), they were seen in that vicinity by Jose Santillan, a
close friend of Hayag, and by Esteban Ranga, the uncle of Esperanza, who appeared to be
angry and who held her and brought her home.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

Two days later, or on December 6, Hayag was arrested by Patrolmen Rolando Yambao and
Samuel Casuga because Esperanza's mother and uncle had charged him with
rape.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Hayag's daughter Florita and his wife Adoracion corroborated his testimony as to the
quarrel between him and his wife when she learned that he had an affair with
Esperanza.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Florita testified that Esperanza cried when she learned that Hayag was in prison and in
sign language she allegedly made it known that she had voluntary sexual intercourse with
Hayag and that, to prove that she loved Hayag, she (Esperanza) gave to Florita the plastic
raincoat already mentioned (Exh. 4).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

Jose Santillan, a farmer, a friend of Hayag and a neighbor of the Ranga family, testified
that as a Peeping Tom or voyeur, he witnessed the sexual intercourse between Hayag and
Esperanza in the afternoon of December 4, 1972 in the grassy spot mentioned by Hayag in
his testimony.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The trial court reacted in disbelief of Hayag's story. It branded Hayag's version as unusual
and bizarre. It concluded that Hayag took advantage of the physical defect of Esperanza
and that he was under the illusion that because she is a deaf-mute she would not be able to
communicate the outrage perpetrated against her.

Ruling. - Hayag's counsel de oficio contends in this appeal that the trial court erred in
basing the judgment of conviction on the testimony of Esperanza in sign language as
verbalized by her sister, an alleged biased interpreter.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
We have conscientiously examined the record. Our conclusion is that the prosecution failed
to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The culpability of Hayag
cannot be made to rest on the uncorroborated story of Esperanza, as conjectured by her
sister and mother. That story in itself is not clear, convincing, positive and free from
suspicion. It is not impeccable and does not ring true throughout (People vs. Ariarte 60,
Phil. 326).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Lack of tenacious resistance on the part of Esperanza Ranga, her delay in reporting the
alleged rape to her mother and the absence of an immediate medical examination of her
private organ are circumstances creating reasonable doubt as to the commission of the
rape.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

From Esperanza's version, as articulated by her sister, it is at once evident that Esperanza
did not offer much resistance to the alleged sexual assault made by Hayag. She did not
suffer any physical injuries. Her dress was not torn. She did not attempt to free herself
from the clutches of Hayag.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

This is not a case of a teenage girl being raped by a strong and robust adult. This is a case
of a thirty-two-year-old farm girl who was allegedly forced to have carnal intercourse by a
fifty-year-old man. Her story does not contain details as to how she repelled Hayag's
attempts to ravish her. And that story was not recounted by her directly in her own words
but was made known by means of sign language which was interpreted by her sister. The
trustworthiness of that interpretation is doubtful.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

The defense objected to such interpretation. The probability of error or fabrication in such
a case is very manifest. As observed by Justice Villa-Real, that is a dangerous procedure for
ascertaining the truth especially in a case where the liberty of an accused is at stake (People
vs. Bustos, 51 Phil. 385, 390). The court and the accused have no means of checking the
accuracy of the verbalization made by the interpreter who is herself interested in sending
the accused to prison.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It is difficult to rape a healthy adult woman without the help of confederates or without
terrifying her with a deadly weapon. If she makes a vigorous resistance, the likelihood is
that the lascivious desire of her assailant would be foiled.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

The resistance would, as in this case, be more effective in an open field where there are
more chances of eluding the assailant or frustrating his advances. The rape committed by a
man without the assistance of other persons is possible but is a rare case. (2 Cuello Calon,
Derecho Penal, 1975 Ed., 588; People vs. Barbo, L-30988, March 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 459,
467.) chanrobles virtual law library

Then, there is the fact that although the alleged rape took place on October 26, 1972, it was
only forty days later, or on December 4, that Esperanza confided to her mother (by means
of signs, of course) that she was supposedly raped. Her story was not
corroborated.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The uncorroborated testimony of the offended woman may be sufficient under certain
circumstances to warrant a conviction for rape. Yet, "from the very nature of the charge
and the ease with which it may be made and the difficulty which surrounds the accused in
disproving it where the point at issue is as to whether the cohabitation was had with or
without the use of force or threats, it is imperative that such testimony should be
scrutinized with the greatest caution." (Carson, J., in U.S. vs. Flores, 26 Phil. 262, 268.)
chanrobles virtual law library

In all such cases the conduct of the woman immediately following the alleged assault is of
the utmost importance as tending to establish the truth or falsity of the charge. Indeed it
may well be doubted whether a conviction of the offense of rape should ever be sustained
upon the uncorroborated testimony of the woman unless the court is satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt that her conduct at the time when the alleged rape was committed and
immediately thereafter was such as might be reasonably expected from her under all the
circumstances of the case. (U.S. vs. Flores, pp. 268-269.)

Moreover, the case for the prosecution was irreparably impaired by the inconsistencies
committed by the complainant's mother, Mrs. Ranga. She first swore that according to her
interpretation of Esperanza's sign language five rapes were admitted on different
dates.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Then, she rectified her first affidavit and swore in a second affidavit and during the
preliminary examination that only one rape was committed. (Exh. 1 and 3.) chanrobles
virtual law library

On the witness stand, she declared that the rape was committed on December 4, 1972 but
on cross-examination she declared that her daughter was abused on October 26, 1972.
Contrary to the prosecution's theory, Mrs. Ranga testified that Hayag did not do anything
to Esperanza on December 4, 1972 (56 and 65 tsn August 6,
1972).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment of conviction is reversed and set aside. On the
ground of reasonable doubt or the insufficiency of the prosecution's evidence, defendant
Daniel Hayag is acquitted of the charge of rape. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 113791. February 22, 1996]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROLANDO

MENDOZA, accused-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; TESTIMONIES; QUALIFICATION OF WITNESSES.
- Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides: Except as provided in the next
succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known
their perception to others, may be witnesses x x x. With respect to the
disqualification of children to be witnesses, Section 2 1(b) of the abovementioned
rule reads: The following persons cannot be witnesses: x x x (b) Children whose
mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts
respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully. It is thus clear
that any child, regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he can perceive, and
perceiving, can make known his perception to others and of relating truthfully facts
respecting which he is examined.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DETERMINATION THEREOF; BEST RESOLVED BY THE TRIAL
COURT. - The requirements then of a childs competency as a witness are the: (a)
capacity of observation, (b) capacity of recollection, and (c) capacity of
communication. And in ascertaining whether a child is of sufficient intelligence
according to the foregoing requirements, it is settled that the trial court is called upon
to make such determination. As held in United States vs. Buncad, (25 Phil. 530, 536
[1913]) quoting from Wheeler vs. United States (159 U.S. 523 [1895]), and reiterated
in People vs. Raptus (198 SCRA 425, 433 [1991]) and People vs. Libungan (220
SCRA 315, 323 [1993]): The decision of this question rests primarily with the trial
judge, who sees the proposed witness, notices his manner, his apparent possession
or lack of intelligence, and may resort to any examination which will tend to disclose
his capacity and intelligence as well as his understanding of the obligations of an
oath. As many of these matters cannot be photographed into the record, the decision
of the trial judge will not be disturbed on review unless from that which is preserved it
is clear that it was erroneous. The trial court has adjudged Paul Michael competent
to testify. We agree. A close and careful examination of the testimony of Paul
Michael shows that at the time he testified, he could be deemed a child of above
average intelligence, i.e., capable of giving responsive ansWers to the questions
asked of him by the trial judge, as well as recalling events and relating them to such
recollections. The initial hesitancy of Paul Michael to name his father as the author of
the crime was sufficiently explained by the trial court as follows: The first time Paul
Michael was presented as [a] witness, the only thing substantial he testified on was
 that his father boxed his mother in the mouth and tied her. On further questions, he
refused to answer anymore. The Court noticed the reason for such adamant attitude
of the witness. His father, the accused, was directly in his sight and whenever their
eyes met, the child could speak no more. The second time the witness was
presented, the private prosecutor covered the child from the accused. The Court
likewise directed the accused to sit farther away thereby placing the accused out of
the direct sight of the witness. As a result, the child was able to testify freely and
extensively without hesitation. We defer to such observation and explanation. Indeed,
there are certain matters that aid the trial court in assessing the credibility of a
witness which are not available to the appellate court, such as emphasis, gesture,
and the inflection of the voice of the witness. The trial court had the distinct
opportunity to make such observations and to avail of such aids while Paul Michael
was on the witness stand, thusly, we find no reason to disregard the assessment
made by the trial court.
3. CRIMINAL LAW; ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCES; INTOXICATION;
MITIGATING, ABSENT SUFFICIENT PROOF THAT IT WAS HABITUAL NOR
SUBSEQUENT TO THE PLAN TO COMMIT THE FELONY; CASE AT BAR. - The
trial court correctly appreciated in favor of the accused-appellant the mitigating
circumstance of intoxication. The accused-appellant committed the felony in
question in a state of intoxication and there was no sufficient proof that it was
habitual nor subsequent to the plan to commit the felony.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Miguel P. Pineda for accused-appellant.

DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Maria Gina Avila Mendoza, a mother of three young children, was put to fire in her
home in Balasing, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, on 22 November 1989. She suffered extensive
second to fourth degree burns and died of hypostatic pneumonia and infected fourth
degree burns on 30 November 1989. Her husband, accused-appellant Rolando
Mendoza, was charged with the crime of parricide in an information filed on 29 June
1990 with Branch 8 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan. The
accusatory portion thereof read:
That on or about the 22nd day of November, 1989, in the municipality of Sta. Maria,
province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused Rolando Mendoza, armed with a kerosene gas [sic] and with intent to kill
his wife Maria Gina Mendoza, with whom he was united in lawful wedlock, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and burn with the kerosene gas
he was then provided, the said Maria Gina Mendoza which directly caused her death.
Contrary to law.1
 Trial on the merits was had after accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty at his
arraignment.2
The prosecution presented as its witnesses Paul Michael Mendoza, a five-year old
child of the victim and the accused-appellant; Jhun Avila, Teofisto Avila, and Rodora
Avila, the victims brother, father, and sister, respectively; and Dr. Nieto M. Salvador, the
Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). On its part, the
defense presented the accused-appellant himself and Erlinda Porciuncula, a childhood
friend.
The testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution established the following facts:
The accused-appellant and the victim were married on 30 January 1985 at the Sto.
Cristo Parish Church in Bocaue, Bulacan and lived in Balasing, Sta. Maria, Bulacan.3
Their union bore three children: Paul Michael, the eldest, who was born on 7 June 1985,4
John-John, and Paula, the youngest.5
In the evening of 22 November 1989, the accused-appellant and his wife were in
their residence with their children. At around 4:00 a.m. the next morning, relatives of the
accused-appellant went to the house of Jhun Avila (the victims brother) in Wawa,
Balagtas, Bulacan, and informed him that his sister Gina got burned. Two hours later,
Jhun and his father Teofisto Avila went to the house of Gina and her husband, only to
discover that the latter were not there. They found the things inside the house in disarray;
saw a Coke bottle which smelled of kerosene, hair strands and burned human flesh in
the comfort room; and the burned clothes of Gina outside the house. They also noticed
that the branches and leaves of the atienza tree in front of the house were likewise
somewhat burned. They proceeded to a neighbors house where Paul Michael,
John-John, and Paula were temporarily sheltered. Paul Michael was sitting in a corner
and somewhat tulala, while Paula was sleeping. Jhun then brought the children to his
house.6
As Erlinda Porciuncula informed the Avila family that Gina had been brought to the
Manila Sanitarium Hospital in Pasay City, Teofisto, Jhun, and Rodora proceeded there.7
According to Jhun, however, they were not able to talk to Gina that day as she was
inside the operating room. It was only after two days that Jhun was able to see Gina, who
lay naked with all the hospital gadget[s] in the mouth and at the head and she was
completely bald and her body was burned.8 Jhun likewise testified that Gina was unable
to talk to her sister Rodora nor her father Teofisto.9
Gina died on 30 November 1989. Dr. Noel Minay, Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI,,
conducted the autopsy and determined the cause of death to be hypostatic pneumonia;
infected 4th degree burns;10 and in his Autopsy Report,11 he entered the following
post-mortem findings:
Burns, extensive, second to fourth degree, with skin grafts, excepting the back of
the neck and head, pelvic area, buttocks, whole of the back, posterior aspect of the right
leg, and lower anterior third of the leg and foot, left side.
Lungs, with foci of consoliditions at the bases; transections shows (sic) yellowish
mucoid material in the lower part of the tracheo-bronchial tree.
 Brain and other visceral organs, marked congestion.
Stomach contains small amount of yellowish fluid material.
This report also indicated that the cause of death was HYPOSTATIC PNEUMONIA;
INFECTED FOURTH DEGREE BURNS.
Dr. Nieto M. Salvador testified on the certification and autopsy report, in view of Dr.
Minays resignation from the NBI sometime after he examined the cadaver of the victim.12
In the evening of 30 November 1989, Jhun told Paul Michael that his mother Gina
had died. Paul Michael then narrated to him what actually happened to his mother that
fateful evening. Because of these revelations and the findings of the doctor, Jhun
reported the matter to the police authorities in Sta. Maria, Bulacan.13
Jhun Avila had gone five times to the residence of Gina and the accused-appellant
from 23 November 1989 to 30 November 1989, yet he did not see the accused-appellant;
in fact, the latter never showed up during the wake nor burial of Gina. It was only when
the accused-appellant was arrested in the house of a woman in Longos, Balagtas,
Bulacan,14 that Jhun saw him for the first time after the incident.
The medical expenses incurred for the hospitalization of Gina amounted to
P88,750.00, of which, her parents were able to pay only P18,000.00. For the balance,
Teofisto had to sign a promissory note to be paid on installments.15
As to how Gina was burned, only five-year old Paul Michael could testify thereon.
In his testimony during the presentation of the evidence in chief on 18 February 1991,
Paul Michael declared that one evening inside their house, his father boxed his mother
on her mouth and then tied her up. However, the witness did not answer succeeding
questions which sought to elicit what happened thereafter, although he kept on looking at
his father throughout this period. He later revealed that he saw matches and kerosene in
their house. He likewise declared that his mother was now in heaven because she was
dead.16 During his rebuttal testimony on 12 October 1992, Paul Michael categorically
declared that it was his father who burned his mother. The accused-appellant, who was
drunk at that time, first tied the victims hands behind her back, then poured kerosene on
the front of her body and set her aflame. Paul Michael further declared that his father
tied-up his mother because they quarreled when his mother wanted him (Paul Michael)
to go with the accused-appellant to the street corner, but his father refused. Finally, many
times before, his parents quarreled because his father was always drunk.17 Pertinent
portions of Paul Michaels testimony on rebuttal are as follows:
Q When your father Rolando Mendoza testified on direct examination, he stated that
when he returned to your house in Balasing, Sta. Maria, Bulacan on November 22,
1989, he saw your mother was jumping up and down while her dress was already
burning. What can you say about that?
A It is not true, Sir.
Q Why do you say that it is not true?
A Because it was he who burned my mother, Sir.
COURT:
How did he burn your mother?
A At first he tied up my mother, then he poured kerosine [sic] upon my mother, Sir.
Q What was tied, the hands or the feet of your mother? -
A The hands, Your Honor.
Q How was it tied?
A At the back, Your Honor.
Q Do you know the reason why she was tied up?
A Yes Your Honor. They were quarreling because my mother wanted me to go with
my father to [sic] street corner.
Q Then what happened next?
A Because of that they quarreled already.
Q What you mean is that your mother was objecting you to go [sic] with your father?
A My mother wanted me to go with my father but my father refused me [sic] to go with
him, Your Hon or.
Q What would you do at the street corner with your father?
A She just wanted me to accompany my father.
Q And because of that quarrel, your father tied the hands of your mother?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Then he put kerosine [sic] at the front body [sic] of your mother?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q And after putting kerosine [sic], what did he do next?
A He lighted it, Your Honor.
Q Was that the first time that you[r] mother and your father quarreled?
A Many times, Your Honor.
Q What was the cause of their quarrel?
A Because my father was always drunk, Your Honor.
Q At the time when your mother was tied and then kerosine [sic] was poured upon her
dress, was your father drunk?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Your father always went out and when he returned he was always drunk?
A Yes, Your Honor.18
The defense, of course, had a different story to tell.
 Erlinda Porciuncula, who grew up with the accused-appellant and was like a sister to
him, testified that at around 8:30 p.m. of 22 November 1989, Rolando Mendoza came to
her house asking for help because his wife burned herself. Together with the
accused-appellant, she borrowed the owner-type jeep of her neighbor so they could
bring his wife to the hospital. They proceeded to St. Marys Hospital, but the attending
physician advised them to bring the victim to the Philippine General Hospital (PGH). At
the hospital, the staff could not admit the victim due to the unavailability of rooms. On the
way to the PGH, the victim, who was lying in the front seat of the jeep, told Porciuncula
that she was fed up with her life and was entrusting her children to her. They then went to
the Manila Sanitarium Hospital where the victim was immediately given first aid and
transferred to the isolated Room No. 328. The accused-appellant requested the witness
to buy medicine and inform the relatives of the victim of what had happened, which she
acceded to. She was able to visit the victim three more times before the victim died on 30
November 1989, and on two of these occasions, she saw the accused-appellant at the
hospital.19
Accused-appellant Rolando Mendoza testified that on 22 November 1989, between
5:00 to 6:00 p.m., three persons who wanted to befriend him visited him in his house.
These three persons, of whom the accused-appellant could only name one, brought a
bottle of liquor and had a drinking session with him, which lasted about an hour or two.
As these three persons were leaving, the accused-appellant offered to accompany them
to the road. After doing so, he returned home, whereupon he saw his wife jumping up
and down and removing her burning clothes. He saw a pail of water which he then used
to douse out the flames. At this time, his wife cursed him and said: Putang-ina mo,
sawang-sawa na ako sa buhay na ito, and Huwag mo akong pakialaman.20 The
accused-appellant did not mind her, merely proceeded to remove her dress and cried for
help. The neighbors came over and he entrusted the children to them. Several others
arrived and he asked one of them who owned a vehicle to help him bring his wife to the
hospital. They were able to bring her to St. Marys Hospital, but since the hospital did not
have a burns specialist, they were advised to bring the victim to a hospital in Manila. The
driver of the jeep, however, refused to bring them to Manila as he had neither a drivers
license nor gas. The accused-appellant was instead brought to Bocaue, Bulacan, and
there he was able to procure another vehicle and borrow some money. Eventually, his
wife was brought to the Manila Sanitarium Hospital after the PGH refused to admit the
victim. He stayed with his wife from the time she was admitted up to the time she died,
and even bought the needed medicines. He did not attend her wake nor burial because
of the threats his brother-in-law made. When asked if he knew why his wife burned
herself, he surmised that she was aburido21 from all their financial difficulties.22
In giving full credence to the testimony of eyewitness Paul Michael,23 the trial court
observed that:
As provided by Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, a person who can perceive,
and perceiving, can make known his perception to others, may be a witness. A four-year
old boy can already speak clearly, can understand things happening around him, and
ready to study, to read and to write. For families who can afford, a four-year old child is
already sent to the nursery to begin his/her studies. An intelligent boy is undoubtedly the
best observer to be found. He is little influenced by the suggestion of others and
describes objects and occurrences as he has really seen them (Pp. vs. Bustos, 45 Phil.
9). Paul Michael was five months over four years when the incident happened. He could
perceive things happening around him. This was the reason why when his grandfather
and an uncle found him in the house of a neighbor, he was in a state of shock, or at
least dumbfounded (tulala). Because he knew the implication of what had happened to
his mother. He knew that the burning of his mother might cause her death. If, indeed, he
could not yet perceive things, such happening would pass unnoticed and without impact
on him. Unless a childs testimony is punctured with serious inconsistencies as to lead
one to believe that he was coached, if he can perceive and make known his perception,
he is considered a competent witness (Pp. vs. Cidro, et al., 56 O.G. 3547).
The first time Paul Michael was presented as [a] witness, the only thing substantial
he testified on was that his father boxed his mother in the mouth and tied her. On further
questions, he refused to answer anymore. The Court noticed the reason for such
adamant attitude of the witness. His father, the accused, was directly in his sight and
whenever their eyes met, the child could speak no more. The second time the witness
was presented, the private prosecutor covered the child from the accused. The Court
likewise directed the accused to sit farther away thereby placing the accused out of the
direct sight of the witness. As a result, the child was able to testify freely and extensively
without hesitation.24
The trial court rejected the version of the accused-appellant, stating that:
Accused Rolando Mendoza made the defense that his wife Maria Gina
Avila-Mendoza burned herself. He, however, lost courage when Gina died. After Ginas
death, he left the hospital and never returned. He failed to visit her during the wake and
even during the burial. He was forced to come out only when arrested in a house of a
woman in Longos, Balagtas, Bulacan. Against such behaviour of his may be applied an
interpretation of flight in criminal law - that flight of the accused is an evidence of guilt
and a guilty conscience (U.S. vs. Alegado, 25 Phil. 310). Accused gave as a reason for
his failure to attend the wake and burial of his wife the threat of his brother-in-law to kill
him if anything would happen to Gina. It is said that the wicked flee even when no man
pursueth, whereas the righteous are as brave as a lion (U.S. vs. Sarikala, 37 Phil. 486).
If, indeed, accused was not guilty and nothing bothered his conscience, he would be
brave as a lion to meet his brother-in-law and face any and all consequences. In the
same way that if his conscience is clear, no threat, real or imaginary, in the whole world
would prevent him from staying by the side of his wife during her last moments on earth.
The fact that he Went into hiding, ashamed or fearful of the death of his wife is an
indication of his guilt. Further, the burning in the dress and body of Gina gives support to
the claim of the prosecution that she was burned. Paul Michael testified that the hands
of his mother were tied at the back. Jhun Avila testified that the branches and leaves of
the atienza tree were burned. They tend to show that Gina was tied at the back, placed
near the trunk of a tree and burned. Being tied, only the front portion of her body would
naturally be burned. The tendency of one who burns himself is to burn his whole body
and not stay stationary in one position so that both his front and back portions of his
body would be burned. In this case, however, only the front portion of Ginas dress and
body were burned as well as the branches and leaves of the atienza tree. That indicates
that while the victim was burning, she remained stationary in the place where she was
tied.25
 Accordingly, the trial court convicted the accused-appellant as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Rolando Mendoza guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide, defined and penalized under Article 246 of
the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to a penalty of reclusion perpetua,
and to indemnify the parents of the victim Maria Gina Avila-Mendoza the sum of
P88,000.00 representing the amount of hospital bills of the victim. No cost.
SO ORDERED.26
In this appeal, the accused-appellant prays for a reversal of the lower courts decision,
maintaining that if his evidence is considered in its entirety, it would show his innocence.
The accused-appellant underscores the fact that:
[A]fter November 22, 1989, the date of the incident, the child Paul Michael Mendoza
had been and remains under the custody and care of the parents and brothers and
sisters of the late Maria Gina Mendoza, who in full and unwavering anger, hatred,
hostility, resentment, revenge and spite against the accused, pursued the charge
against the accused and the ones who brought the child to the court to testify.27
He thus asks this Court to disregard the testimony of Paul Michael for being open to
serious question and consideration as it was often attended [by] unintelligible answers
and punctuated by contrary answers to previously given answers; [b]esides the childs
tender age, he suffer[s] from [a] lack or inadequacy of sense of duty to tell the truth. He
further claims that per the findings of the Medico-Legal Officer, the victim did not die of
burns but of hypostatic pneumonia.28
After a thorough examination of the records and scrutiny of the evidence, we find no
merit in this appeal. The accused-appellants seven-page Brief miserably fails to present
convincing grounds why the challenged decision should be overturned.
The lower court convicted the accused-appellant primarily on the basis of the
testimony of eyewitness Paul Michael Mendoza, and it is obvious that the pith of the
present appeal is the childs competency to testify and the credibility of his testimony.
Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:
Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive,
and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. xxx
With respect to the disqualification of children to be witnesses, Section 21(b) of the
abovementioned rule reads:
The following persons cannot be witnesses:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of
perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully.
It is thus clear that any child, regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he can
perceive, and perceiving, can make known his perception to others and of relating
truthfully facts respecting which he is examined. In the 1913 decision in United States vs.
Buncad,29 this Court stated:
 Professor Wigmore, after referring to the common-law precedents upon this point,
says: But this much may be taken as settled, that no rule defines any particular age as
conclusive of incapacity; in each instance the capacity of the particular child is to be
investigated. (Wigmore on Evidence, vol. I, p. 638)30
While on the same subject, Underhill declares:
257. Children on the witness stand. - Under the common law, competency of a child
under the age of fourteen years to testify must be shown to the satisfaction of the court.
He is presumptively incompetent, but if he is shown to be competent it is immaterial how
young he may be when he testifies. He is competent if he possesses mental capacity
and memory sufficient to enable him to give a reasonable and intelligible account of the
transaction he has seen, if he understands and has a just appreciation of the difference
between right and wrong, and comprehends the character, meaning and obligation of
an oath. If the witness fulfills these requirements, it is immaterial as bearing upon his
competency that he is unable to define the oath or to define testimony. In the wise
discretion of the court, a child four, five, six and for such ages as seven, eight, nine, ten,
eleven, twelve, thirteen or fifteen years of age may be shown competent to testify. It
may not be said that there is any particular age at which as a matter of law all children
are competent or incompetent. x x x31
The requirements then of a childs competency as a witness are the: (a) capacity of
observation, (b) capacity of recollection, and (c) capacity of communication.32 And in
ascertaining whether a child is of sufficient intelligence according to the foregoing
requirements, it is settled that the trial court is called upon to make such determination.33
As held in United States vs. Buncad,34 quoting from Wheeler vs. United States,35 and
reiterated in People vs. Raptus36 and People vs. Libungan:37
The decision of this question rests primarily with the trial judge, who sees the proposed
witness, notices his manner, his apparent possession or lack of intelligence, and may
resort to any examination which will tend to disclose his capacity and intelligence as well
as his understanding of the obligations of an oath. As many of these matters cannot be
photographed into the record, the decision of the trial judge will not be disturbed on
review unless from that which is preserved it is clear that it was erroneous.38
The trial court has adjudged Paul Michael competent to testify. We agree. A close
and careful examination of the testimony of Paul Michael shows that at the time he
testified, he could be deemed a child of above average intelligence, i.e., capable of
giving responsive answers to the questions asked of him by the trial judge, as well as
recalling events and relating them to such recollections. The initial hesitancy of Paul
Michael to name his father as the author of the crime was sufficiently explained by the
trial court as follows:
The first time Paul Michael was presented as [a] witness, the only thing substantial
he testified on was that his father boxed his mother in the mouth and tied her. On further
questions, he refused to answer anymore. The Court noticed the reason for such
adamant attitude of the witness. His father, the accused, was directly in his sight and
whenever their eyes met, the child could speak no more. The second time the witness
was presented, the private prosecutor covered the child from the accused. The Court
likewise directed the accused to sit farther away thereby placing the accused out of the
 direct sight of the witness. As a result, the child was able to testify freely and extensively
without hesitation.39
We defer to such observation and explanation. Indeed, there are certain matters that
aid the trial court in assessing the credibility of a witness which are not available to the
appellate court, such as emphasis, gesture, and the inflection of the voice of the witness.
The trial court had the distinct opportunity to make such observations and to avail of such
aids while Paul Michael was on the witness stand,40 thusly, we find no reason to
disregard the assessment made by the trial court.
The accused-appellants contention that Paul Michaels testimony could have been
influenced by the relatives of Gina, who were full of unwavering anger, hatred, hostility,
resentment, revenge, more so since the child had been in their custody since after 22
November 1989, is unacceptable. The charge is nothing but unmitigated speculation as
not a shred of evidence was offered in support thereof. Not even the rigorous
cross-examination Paul Michael underwent dented the probative force of his testimony;
on the contrary, it merely added strength thereto as it elicited nothing less than the boys
adherence to truth.
We realize how extremely painful it was for Paul Michael to reveal that it was his
father who burned his mother. He knew that such a revelation could send his father to jail
and thus brand him a son of a killer or a convict. If he did, nevertheless, it was to expose
the truth and give justice to his mother who met an excruciatingly painful death. Verily,
from the mouths of children we get the truth.41
Neither are we persuaded by the accused-appellants claim that the cause of death of
his wife was hypostatic pneumonia and not due to the burns she sustained. Such a claim
borders on misrepresentation, for as earlier shown, both the Autopsy Report (Exhibit H-1)
and the Certificate of Post-Mortem Examination (Exhibit H) indicated the cause of death
to be hypostatic pneumonia; infected fourth degree burns. Moreover, as testified to by Dr.
Nieto Salvador, the proximate cause of the hypostatic pneumonia was Ginas recumbent
position due to the fourth degree burns she suffered. Thus:
COURT:
What could have caused hypostatic pneumonia?
A The victim was recumbent because of her intensive infections in front of her body
and therefore she was always lying down which could have caused the hypostatic
pneumonia.
Q What you mean [is] it [was] because of the fourth degree burns the victim sustained
in front thats why she was always lying down and unable to change her position?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Do you mean that hypostatic pneumonia can be acquire[d] by merely always lying
down?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Is that the only cause?
 A Thats why it is called hypostatic because hypostatic means that the assumed
position of the patient is recumbent and the recumbent position of the patient would
greatly affect the fluids in the lungs as it cant flow down.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Would you say that hypostatic pneumonia may also be caused by fourth degree
burns?
A Yes, Sir.42
It goes without saying that an accused is liable for all the consequences of his
felonious act.43
Finally, the accused-appellant was never seen after the death of his wife - neither
during her wake nor at her burial. His whereabouts were unknown. He did not even
bother to visit his children or inform them where to find him in case they needed him,
knowing all too well that he was the only parent left to them. In short, he was even afraid
to see his children; he could not trust them. In a manner of speaking, he was afraid of his
own shadow. All his protestations of innocence are thus belied by his flight as indicative
of guilt on his part, or of his guilty mind. It has been said that the wicked man flees
though no man pursueth, but the righteous are as bold as a lion.44 The explanation
proffered for his flight is lame and feeble, moreover, he offered no credible proof that
indeed the family of his wife had threatened him bodily harm.
The trial court correctly appreciated in favor of the accused-appellant the mitigating
circumstance of intoxication. The accused-appellant committed the felony in question in
a state of intoxication and there was no sufficient proof that it was habitual nor
subsequent to the plan to commit the felony.45 It failed, however, to award civil indemnity
to the children of the victim. Conformably with current case law, they should be awarded
the sum of P50.000.00.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. Being in accordance with
the facts and the law, the challenged decision of Branch 8 of the Regional Trial Court of
Bulacan in Criminal Case No. 1414-M-90 is AFFIRMED, subject to the above
modification on the additional award of P5 0,000.00, as civil indemnity, to the heirs of the
victim, Gina Avila Mendoza.
Costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J (Chairman), Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
MARITAL DISQUALIFICATION

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-25643 June 27, 1968

JOSE MANUEL LEZAMA and PAQUITA LEZAMA, petitioners,

vs.
HON. JESUS RODRIGUEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo,
JOSE DINEROS, in his capacity as Receiver of the LA PAZ ICE PLANT and COLD STORAGE CO., INC.,
and THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Efrain B. Trenas and Sergio D. Mabunay for petitioners.

Ricardo J. Gerochi for respondents.

CASTRO, J.:

The issue tendered for resolution in this case is whether a wife, who is a co-defendant of her husband in an
action, may be examined as a hostile witness by the adverse party under section 6 of Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, without infringing on her marital privilege not to testify against her husband under section 20 (b) of
Rule 130. The trial court, presided by the respondent Judge Jesus Rodriguez, ruled in the affirmative and
required the wife to appear and testify. The petitioners sued for certiorari but the Court of Appeals dismissed
their petition1 and denied their motion for reconsideration.2 Hence this appeal.3

On July 18, 1960 Jose S. Dineros, acting as receiver of the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co. in Iloilo,
together with C.N. Hodges and Ricardo Gurrea, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the
annulment of a judgment rendered against the La Paz Ice Plant by the Court of First Instance of Manila in civil
case 39827. Named as defendants were Marciano C. Roque, in whose favor judgment was rendered, and the
spouses Jose Manuel and Paquita Lezama. The complaint alleged that, because of mismanagement by the
Lezamas, the La Paz Ice Plant was placed under the receivership of Dineros; that during the pendency of the
receivership, Marciano C. Roque brought an action against the La Paz Ice Plant in the Court of First Instance
of Manila for the collection of P150,000, which sum he had supposedly lent to it; that summons was served not
on the receiver but on the spouses Jose Manuel and Paquita Lezama; and that, through the collusion of the
Lezamas, Roque was able to obtain judgment by default against the company. It was claimed that, because the
summons was served on Jose Manuel Lezama instead of on the receiver, the Court of First Instance of Manila
acquired no jurisdiction over the La Paz Ice Plant and that, therefore, the decision of that court was
void.1ªvvphi1.nêt

In their answer, the defendant spouses (the herein petitioners), while admitting that the company was placed
under receivership, maintained that Jose Manuel Lezama nevertheless remained president of the La Paz Ice
Plant and that as such he had authority to receive in behalf of the company the court summons in civil case
39827. They denied entering into collusion with Roque and averred that they did not contest Roque's claim
because they knew it to be a legitimate obligation which the La Paz Ice Plant had incurred pursuant to a
resolution of its board of directors.

Issues having been joined, the case was thereupon heard. At the hearing Dineros asked the court to issue a
subpoena to Paquita Lezama to testify as "a witness summoned by the plaintiffs in accordance with the Rules
of Court." The request was granted over the objection of the petitioners who invoked the following provision
of the Rules of Court:
A husband cannot be examined for or against his wife without her consent; nor a wife for or against her
husband without his consent, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime
committed by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other.4

This provision deals with two different matters which rest on different grounds of policy: the disqualification
of husband and wife to testify in each other's behalf, as well as their privilege not to testify against each other.5
The fundamental theory of the common law is said to be that relationship of the spouses, not their pecuniary
interest, is the basis of the disqualification.6 Indeed section 20 of Rule 130 is entitled "Disqualification by
reason of ... relationship."

On the other hand, while a shelter of emotional reasons has been offered7 for the privilege, the "true
explanation [which] is after all the simplest"8 and which constitutes "the real and sole strength of the
opposition to abolishing the privilege," is the natural repugnance in every fair-minded person to compelling a
wife or husband to be the means of the other's condemnation and to subjecting the culprit to the humiliation of
being condemned by the words of his intimate life partner.9

Here the request for subpoena indicated that Paquita Lezama was to do no more than testify as an adverse party
in the case and, indeed, in the light of the allegations both in the complaint and in the answer, the request was
apparently one that could reasonably be expected to be made. Thus, the complaint charged

13. — That in obtaining the judgment by default in Civil Case No. 39827 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila against the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co., Inc. defendants, in gross and evident bad faith, and in
fraudulent conspiracy, made it appear that the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co., Inc. had obtained a loan of
P150,000.00 from defendant Marciano C. Roque thru defendant Jose Manuel Lezama allegedly upon an
authority vested upon defendant Jose Manuel Lezama by the alleged Board of Directors of the La Paz Ice Plant
& Cold Storage Co., Inc. allegedly evidenced by the minutes of the meetings of the Board of Directors of the
said corporation signed by defendant Jose Manuel Lezama and attested to by Benjamin Luis Borja and Paquita
B. Lezama and that defendants spouses Jose Manuel Lezama and Paquita B. Lezama had manipulated the
books of the corporation by making it appear that such fictitious loan was then in existence.

On the other hand, the answer claimed

13. That the herein defendants specifically deny all the allegations contained in paragraph 13 of the complaint;
the truth is, that the herein defendants have not conspired and acted in bad faith with the plaintiff [Marciano C.
Roque] in Civil Case No. 39827 of the Court of First Instance of Manila for the rendition of the said judgment
referred to therein; for the truth is, that the herein defendants, in their capacities as President-Manager and
Secretary of the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co., Inc., believing as they believe that the obligation sought
to be enforced by said civil action being legitimate and the allegations of the complaint in said Civil Case No.
39827 of the Court of First Instance of Manila are true, they did not deem it wise to contest the same; that the
obligation of P150,000.00 of the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co., Inc., which the defendant Marciano C.
Roque sought to be enforced in Civil Case No. 39827 of the Court of First Instance of Manila was legitimately
contracted in accordance with law; that said obligation was duly entered in the books of the corporation and
that the said loan is not fictitious; that the amount realized therefrom was spent for the benefit of the said
corporation.

Thus, while the petitioners denied the charge that the loan was fictitious, they did not deny the allegation that it
was Paquita Lezama who, as secretary of the company, signed the minutes of the meeting at which Jose
Manuel Lezama was allegedly authorized to negotiate the loan and that it was she who, likewise as secretary,
made the entry in the books of the corporation.

It was obviously to test the truth of the assertion that the loan transaction was above board that Dineros, the
company receiver, wanted Paquita Lezama on the witness stand, not as a spouse witness "for or against her
husband," but rather as an adverse party in the case.

It is postulated that a party can make, as it were, such forays into his opponent's position on the strength of
section 6 of Rule 132 which provides:

Direct examination of unwilling or hostile witnesses. — A party may interrogate any unwilling or hostile
witness by leading questions. A party may call an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a
public or private corporation or of a partnership or association which is an adverse party, and interrogate him
by leading questions and contradict and impeach him in all respects as if he had been called by the adverse
party and the witness thus called may be contradicted and impeached by or on behalf of the adverse party also,
and may be cross-examined by the adverse party only upon the subject-matter of his examination in chief.

The basic issue may therefore be restated thus: In this case where the wife is a co-defendant in a suit charging
fraud against the spouses, can the wife be compelled to testify as an adverse party witness concerning her
participation in the alleged fraud without violating section 20 (b) of Rule 130?

It is argued that the wife may be so compelled but her testimony would be receivable only against her.10 It is
even suggested that "each may testify in his or her own behalf, although the testimony may inure to the benefit
of the other spouse, or against his or her own interest, although the testimony may also militate against the
other spouse."11 Upon the other hand, it is insisted that compelling Paquita Lezama to testify will transgress
section 20(b) of Rule 130, especially if her testimony will support the plaintiff's charge.

The complaint charges "fraudulent conspiracy" on the part of the spouses and one Marciano C. Roque to make
it appear that the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co., Inc. was indebted to Roque. The wife, Paquita Lezama,
is called upon to testify as an adverse party witness on the basis of her following participation in the alleged
fraudulent scheme: "that it was Paquita Lezama who as Secretary of the company signed the minutes of the
meeting during which Manuel Lezama was allegedly authorized to negotiate the loan and that it was she who,
likewise as Secretary, made the entry in the books of the corporation."

Evidently, Paquita Lezama will be asked to testify on what actually transpired during the meeting and will be
asked questions on the matter of the veracity or falsity of the entry in the books of the corporation. Whether her
testimony will turn out to be adverse or beneficial to her own interest, the inevitable result would be to pit her
against her husband. The interests of husband and wife in this case are necessarily interrelated. Testimony
adverse to the wife's own interests would tend to show the existence of collusive fraud between the spouses
and would then work havoc upon their common defense that the loan was not fictitious. There is the possibility,
too, that the wife, in order to soften her own guilt, if guilty she is, may unwittingly testify in a manner entirely
disparaging to the interests of the husband.

Because of the unexpensive wording of the rule which provides merely that the wife cannot be examined "for
or against her husband without his consent," it is further argued that "when husband and wife are parties to an
action, there is no reason why either may not be examined as a witness for or against himself or herself alone,"
and his or her testimony could operate only against himself or herself.12

Even if such view were generally acceptable as an exception to the rule, or even as a separate doctrine, it
would be inapplicable in this case where the main charge is collusive fraud between the spouses and a third
person, and the evident purpose of examination of the wife is to prove that charge.

Indeed, in those jurisdictions which allow one spouse to be subjected to examination by the adverse party as a
hostile witness when both spouses are parties to the action, either the interests of the spouses are separate or
separable, or the spouse offered as a witness is merely a formal or nominal party.13

The final point urged upon us is that to prevent one spouse from testifying would encourage alliance of
husband and wife as an instrument of fraud; for then what better way would there be to prevent discovery than
to make a co-conspirator in fraud immune to the most convenient mode of discovery available to the opposite
party? This argument overlooks the fact that section 6 of Rule 132 is a mere concession, for the sake of
discovery, from the rule which precludes the husband or the wife from becoming the means of the other's
condemnation. The said rule of discovery should therefore not be expanded in meaning or scope as to allow
examination of one's spouse in a situation where this natural repugnance obtains.

It may not be amiss to state in passing that the respondent Dineros has not demonstrated that there is no
evidence available to him other than the Lezamas' testimony to prove the charge recited in the
complaint.1äwphï1.ñët

ACCORDINGLY, the resolutions appealed from are versed, and this case is ordered remanded to the court of
origin for further proceedings in accordance with law. No costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Sanchez, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Makalintal and Zaldivar, JJ., took no part.
G.R. No. L-46306 February 27, 1979

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. MARIANO C. CASTAÑEDA, JR., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch III, and
BENJAMIN F. MANALOTO, respondents.

Fiscal Regidor Y Aglipay and Special Counsel Vicente Macalino for petitioner.

Moises Sevilla Ocampo for private petitioner.

Cicero J. Punzalan for respondent.

SANTOS, J.:

On the basis of the complaint 1 of his wife, Victoria M. Manaloto, herein private respondent Benjamin
Manaloto was charged before the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, presided by respondent Judge, Hon.
Mariano C. Castaneda Jr., with the crime of Falsification of Public Document committed, according to the
Information, as follows:

That on or about the 19th day of May, 1975, in the Municipality of San Fernando, province of Pampanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named a BENJAMIN F.
MANALOTO, with deliberate intent to commit falsification, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously counterfeit, imitate and forge the signature of his spouse Victoria M. Manaloto in a deed of sale
executed by said accused wherein he sold a house and lot belonging to the conjugal partnership of said spouse
in favor of Ponciano Lacsamana under Doc. No. 1957, Page No. 72, Book No. LVII, Series of 1975, notarized
by Notary Public Abraham Pa. Gorospe, thereby making it appear that his spouse Victoria M. Manaloto gave
her marital consent to said sale when in fact and in truth she did not. 2

At the trial, the prosecution called the complaint-wife to the witness stand but the defense moved to disqualify
her as a witness, invoking Sec. 20, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules Of Court which provides:

SEC. 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship — The following persons cannot testify as to
matters in which they are interested, directly or indirectly as herein enumerated.

xxx xxx xxx

(b) A husband can not be examined for or at his wife without her consent; nor a wife for or against her husband
without his consent, except in a civil case by one against the other or in a criminal case for a crime committed
by one against the other.

The prosecution opposed said motion to disquality on the ground that the case falls under the exception to the
rule, contending that it is a "criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other." Notwithstanding
such opposition, respondent Judge granted the motion, disqualifying Victoria Manaloto from testifying for or
against her husband, in an order dated March 31, 1977. A motion for reconsideration petition was filed but was
denied by respondent Judge in an order dated May 19, 1977.

Hence, this petition for certiorari file by the office of the Provincial Fiscal, on behalf of the People of the
Philippines, seeking set aside the aforesaid order of the respondent Judge and praying that a preliminary
injunction or a ternporary restraining order be issued by this Court enjoining said judge from further
proceeding with the trial of aforesaid Criminal Case No. 1011.

On June 20, 1977, this Court resolved — (a) to issue a temporary restraining order, and (b) to require the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the petitioner. 3 The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Notice
of Appearance on June 27, 1977, 4 and its Memorandum in support of the Petition on August 30, 1977. 5
The respondents filed their Memorandum on September 5, 1977. 6 Whereupon, the case was considered
submitted for decision. 7

From the foregoing factual and procedural antecedents emerges the sole issues determinative of the instant
petition, to wit: Whether or not the criminal case for Falsification of Public Document filed against herein
private respondent Benjamin F. Manaloto — who allegedly forged the signature of his wife, Victoria M.
Manaloto, in a deed of sale, thereby making it appear that the latter gave her marital consent to the sale of a
house and lot belonging to their conjugal partnership when in fact and in truth she did not — may be
considered as a criminal case for a crime committed by a husband against his wife and, therefore, an exception
to the rule on marital disqualification.

We sustain petitioner's stand that the case is an exception to the marital disqualification rule, as a criminal case
for a crime committed by the accused-husband against the witness-wife.

1. The act complained of as constituting the crime of Falsification of Public Document is the forgery by the
accused of his wife's signature in a deed of sale, thereby making it appear therein that said wife consented to
the sale of a house and lot belonging to their conjugal partnership when in fact and in truth she did not. It must
be noted that had the sale of the said house and lot, and the signing of the wife's name by her husband in the
deed of sale, been made with the consent of the wife, no crime could have been charged against said husband
Clearly, therefore, it is the husband's breach of his wife's confidence which gave rise to the offense charged.
And it is this same breach of trust which prompted the wife to make the necessary complaint with the Office of
the Provincial Fiscal which, accordingly, filed the aforesaid criminal case with the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga. To rule, therefore, that such criminal case is not one for a crime committed by one spouse against
the other is to advance a conclusion which completely disregards the factual antecedents of the instant case.

2. This is not the first time that the issue of whether a specific offense may be classified as a crime committed
by one spouse against the other is presented to this Court for resolution. Thus, in the case of Ordoño v.
Daquigan, 8 this Court, through Mr. Justice Ramon C. Aquino, set up the criterion to be followed in
resolving the issue, stating that:

We think that the correct rule, which may be adopted in this jurisdiction, is that laid down in Cargill v. State, 35
ALR, 133, 220, Pac 64,26 OkL 314, wherein the court said:

The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the is too narrow; and the rule that any offense
remotely or indirectly affecting domestic within the exception is too broad. The better rule is that, WHEN AN
OFFENSE DIRECTLY ATTACKS, OR DIRECTLY AND VITALLY IMPAIRS, THE CONJUGAL
RELATION, IT COMES WITHIN THE EXCEPTION to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the
other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed (by) one against the other.

Applying the foregoing criterion in said case of Ordoño v. Daquigan this Court held that the rape committed by
the husband of the witness-wife against their daughter was a crime committed by the husband against his wife.
Although the victim of the crime committed by the accused in that can was not his wife but their daughter, this
Court, nevertheless, applied the exception for the reason that said criminal act "Positively undermine(d) the
connubial relationship. 9
With more reason must the exception apply to the instant case where the victim of the crime and the person
who stands to be directly prejudiced by the falsification is not a third person but the wife herself. And it is
undeniable that the act comp of had the effect of directly and vitally impairing the conjugal relation. This is
apparent not only in the act Of the wife in personally lodging her complaint with the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal, but also in her insistent efforts 10 in connection with the instant petition, which seeks to set aside the
order disqualified her from testifying against her husband. Taken collectively, the actuations of the
witness-wife underacore the fact that the martial and domestic relations between her and the accused-husband
have become so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved said nor peace and tranquility which
may be disturbed. In such a case, as We have occasion to point out in previous decisions, "identity of interests
disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that Identity is nonexistent. Likewise, in such a
situation, the security and confidence of private life which the law aims at protecting will be nothing but Ideals
which, through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home. 11 Thus, there is no reason to apply
the martial disqualification rule.

3. Finally, overriding considerations of public policy demand that the wife should not be disqualified from
testifying against her husband in the instant case. For, as aptly observed by the Solicitor General," (t)o espouse
the contrary view would spawn the dangerous precedent of a husband committing as many falsifications
against his wife as he could conjure, seeking shelter in the anti-marital privilege as a license to injure and
prejudice her in secret — all with unabashed and complete impunity.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the order of the lower court dated March 31, 1977, disqualifying
Victoria Manaloto from testifying for or against her husband, Benjamin Manaloto, in Criminal Case No. 1011,
as well as the order dated May 19, 1977, denying the motion for reconsideration are hereby SET ASIDE. The
temporary restraining order issued by this Court is hereby lifted and the respondent Judge is hereby ordered to
proceed with the trial of the case, allowing Victoria Manaloto to testify against her husband.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.
RULE 130, SECTION 23

G.R. No. L-27434 September 23, 1986

GENARO GOÑI, RUFINA P. vda. DE VILLANUEVA, VIOLA P. VILLANUEVA, OSCAR P.

VILLANUEVA, MARINA P. VILLANUEVA, VERNA P. VILLANUEVA, PRAXEDES P. VILLANUEVA,
JR., JOSE P. VILLANUEVA, SAMUEL P. VILLANUEVA, LOURDES P. VILLANUEVA, MILAGROS P.
VILLANUEVA DE ARRIETA, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and GASPAR VICENTE, respondents-appellees.

Ambrosio Padilla Law Office for petitioners-appellants.

San Juan, Africa, Gonzales & San Agustin Law Office for respondents-appellees.

FERNAN, J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the then Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 27800-R entitled,
"Gaspar Vicente, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. Genaro Goni, et. al., Defendants-Appellants" as well as from the
resolution denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

The factual backdrop is as follows:

The three (3) haciendas known as San Sebastian, Sarria and Dulce Nombre de Maria situated in the
Municipality of Bais, Negros Oriental, were originally owned by the Compania General de Tabacos de
Filipinas [TABACALERA]. Sometime in 1949, the late Praxedes T. Villanueva, predecessor-in-interest of
petitioners, negotiated with TABACALERA for the purchase of said haciendas. However, as he did not have
sufficient funds to pay the price, Villanueva with the consent of TABACALERA, offered to sell Hacienda
Sarria to one Santiago Villegas, who was later substituted by Joaquin Villegas. Allegedly because
TABACALERA did not agree to the transaction between Villanueva and Villegas, without a guaranty private
respondent Gaspar Vicente stood as guarantor, for Villegas in favor of TABACALERA. The guarantee was
embodied in a document denominated as "Escritura de Traspaso de Cuenta." 1

Either because the amount realized from the transaction between Villanueva and Villegas still fell short of the
purchase price of the three haciendas, or in consideration of the guaranty undertaken by private respondent
Vicente, Villanueva contracted or promised to sell to the latter fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 of Hacienda Dulce
Nombre de Maria for the sum of P13,807.00. This agreement was reduced to writing and signed by petitioner
Genaro Goni as attorney-in-fact of Villanueva, thus:

En consideracion a la garantia que Don Gaspar Vicente assume con la Cia. Gral. de Tabacos de Filipinas por el
saldo de Don Santiago Villegas de P43,539.75 asumido por Don Joaquin Villegas el que Subscribe Praxedes T.
Villanueva se compromete ceder es venta a Don Gaspar Vicente los campos nos. 3, 4 y 13 del plano de
porcelario de la Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria, en compra projectada de la Cia. Gral. de Tabacos de
Filipinas. Estas campos representan 6-90-35 hectares por valor de P13,807.00 que Don Gasper Vicente pagara
directamente a Praxedes T. Villanueva

Bais Central, Octubre 24, 1949.

Fdo. Praxedes T. Villanueva

Por: Fdo Genaro Goñi Apoderado 2

Private respondent Vicente thereafter advised TABACALERA to debit from his account the amount of
P13,807.00 as payment for the balance of the purchase price. However, as only the amount of P12,460.24 was
actually needed to complete the purchase price, only the latter amount was debited from private respondent's
account. The difference was supposedly paid by private respondent to Villanueva, but as no receipt evidencing
such payment was presented in court, this fact was disputed by petitioners.

It is alleged by petitioners that subsequent to the execution of the contract/promise to sell, Villanueva was able
to raise funds by selling a property in Ayungon, Negros Oriental. He thus went to private respondent Vicente
for the purpose of rescinding the contract/promise to sell However, as the amount of P12,460.24 had already
been debited from private respondent's account, it was agreed that lots 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre
de Maria would merely be leased to private respondent Vicente for a period of five (5) years starting with
crop-year 1950-51 at an annual rental of 15% of the gross income, said rent to be deducted from the money
advanced by private respondent and any balance owing to Villanueva would be delivered by Vicente together
with the lots at the end of the stipulated period of lease.

On December 10, 1949, TABACALERA executed a formal deed of sale covering the three haciendas in favor
of Villanueva. Fields Nos. 3, 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria were thereafter registered in
the name of Villanueva under TCT No. T-4780 of the Register of Deeds of Negros Oriental. The fields were
likewise mortgaged by Villanueva to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC), later transferred to the
Philippine National Bank on December 16, 1955, for a total indebtedness of
P334,400.00. 3

Meanwhile, Fields nos. 4 and 13 were delivered to private respondent Vicente after the 1949-1950 milling
season in January and February, 1950.

On June 17, 1950, Villanueva executed a "Documento de la Venta Definitive" in favor of Joaquin Villegas,
covering Lot No. 314 of the Cadastral Survey of Bais with an area of 468,627 square meters, more or less.
(Hacienda Sarria). A supplemental instrument was later executed by Villanueva in favor of Villegas to include
in the sale of June 17, 1950 the sugar quota of the land.

On November 12, 1951, Villanueva died. Intestate proceedings were instituted on November 24, 1951 before
the then Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, docketed as Special Case No. 777. Among the properties
included in the inventory submitted to the court were fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 of Hacienda Dulce Nombre de
Maria. Field no. 13 with an area of 1 hectare, 44 ares and 95 centares was listed as Lot no. 723 of the inventory
while fields nos. 3 and 4, with areas of 3 hectares, 75 ares and 60 centares, and 1 hectare, 69 ares and 80
centares, respectively, were included in Lot no. 257 of the inventory.

On October 7, 1954, the day before the intestate proceedings were ordered closed and the estate of the late
Praxedes Villanueva delivered to his heirs, private respondent Vicente instituted an action for recovery of
property and damages before the then Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental against petitioner Goñi in his
capacity as administrator of the intestate estate of Praxedes Villanueva. In his complaint docketed as Civil Case
No. 2990, private respondent Vicente sought to recover field no. 3 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria,
basing his entitlement thereto on the contract/promise to sell executed by the late Praxedes Villanueva in his
favor on October 24, 1949. He likewise prayed by way of attorney's fees and other costs the sum of P2,000.00
and for such other further relief which the court may deem just and equitable in the premises. 4

On October 25, 1954, petitioner Goni as defendant in Civil Case No. 2990, filed an answer with counterclaim
for accounting of the produce of fields nos. 4 and 13, as well as the surrerder thereof on June 20, 1955, the end
of the fifth crop-year, plus moral damages in the sum of P30,000.00 and P3,000.00 as attorney's fees. After an
answer to the counter-claim had been filed, private respondent Vicente amended his complaint on September 1,
1955, to include a prayer for damages representing the produce of field no. 3 from 1949-50 until delivery
thereof to him. An answer with counterclaim to the amended complaint was duly filed, and on April 25, 1956,
private respondent Vicente amended his complaint anew to include as parties-defendants the heirs of the late
Praxedes Villanueva.

On July 13, 1957, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts, agreeing, among others, on the costs of
production and produce of the three fields in question. The case thereafter proceeded to trial. Plaintiff
presented two (2) witnesses: then party-plaintiff Gaspar Vicente, himself, who over the objection of therein
defendants testified on facts occurring before the death of Praxedes Villanueva, and Epifanio Equio a clerk of
TABACALERA Agency in the Bais Sugar Central. Defendants presented Genaro Goni, who testified on the
alleged verbal lease agreement.

On December 18, 1959, the trial court rendered a decision ordering therein defendants-heirs to deliver to
Gaspar Vicente field no 3, to execute a formal deed of sale covering fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 in favor of Vicente,
to pay the latter actual or compensatory damages in the amount of P 81,204.48, representing 15% of the total
gross income of field no. 3 for crop-years 1950-51 to 1958-59, and such other amounts as may be due from
said field for the crop years subsequent to crop-year 1958-59, until the field is delivered to Vicente, and to pay
the sum of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees plus costs. Therein defendant Goñi was relieved of any civil liability
for damages, either personally or as administrator of the estate. 5

Both parties appealed the decision to the then Court of Appeals; the plaintiff from the portion awarding
damages on a claim that he was entitled to more, and defendants, from the entire decision.

On December 15, 1966, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, affirming that of the lower court, with
the modification that the amount of damages to be paid by defendant-heirs to the plaintiff should be the total
net income from field no. 3 from the crop year 1950-51 until said field is finally delivered to the plaintiff plus
interest thereon at the legal rate per annum. 6

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but were denied the relief sought in a resolution dated February 9,
1967. Hence, the present appeal by certiorari whereby petitioners raise the following questions of law:

MAY RESPONDENT GASPAR VICENTE TESTIFY ON MATTERS OF FACT OCCURRING BEFORE

THE DEATH OF PRAXEDES T. VILLANUEVA, WHICH CONSTITUTES A CLAIM OR DEMAND UPON
HIS ESTATE. IN VIOLATION OF RULE 123, SEC, 26, PAR. (C), NOW RULE 130, SEC. 20 PAR. (A)?

MAY NOT A WRITTEN PROMISE TO SELL DATED OCTOBER 24,1949 BE NOVATED INTO A
VERBAL AGREEMENT OF LEASE DURING THE LIFETIME OF THE PROMISSOR, WHOSE DEATH
OCCURRED ON NOVEMBER 12, 1951, BY FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SUBSTANTIATED BY
COMPETENT ORAL EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE?

SHOULD THE PROMISEE IN A PROMISE TO SELL, WHO PAID P12,460.24 WHICH WAS TO BE
ACCOUNTED AND TO BE CREDITED AS RENTALS AFTER FIVE (5) YEARS OF LEASE, WHO IN
HIS ORIGINAL COMPLAINT DID NOT ALLEGE NOR PROVE DAMAGES, EXCEPT THE SUM OF
P2,000.00 AS ATTORNEY'S FEES, RECEIVE A JUDGMENT FOR DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF
P74,056.35 WHICH CONSISTS OF P37,121.26 PLUS LEGAL INTEREST FOR THE CROP YEARS
1950-51 TO 1958-59 AND FOR P3,624.18 TO P4,374.78 FOR EVERY CROP YEAR SUBSEQUENT TO
1958-59 PLUS
INTEREST? 7

We find that neither the trial nor appellate court erred in ruling for the admissibility in evidence of private
respondent Vicente's testimony. Under ordinary circumstances, private respondent Vicente 8 would be
disqualified by reason of interest from testifying as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of Praxedes
T. Villanueva, such disqualification being anchored on Section 20(a) of Rule 130, commonly known as the
Survivorship Disqualification Rule or Dead Man Statute, which provides as follows:

Section 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship.-The following persons cannot testify as to
matters in which they are interested, directly or indirectly, as herein enumerated:

(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor
or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a
claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot
testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such person
became of unsound mind.

The object and purpose of the rule is to guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to the
transaction in question on the part of the surviving party and further to put the two parties to a suit upon terms
of equality in regard to the opportunity of giving testimony. 9 It is designed to close the lips of the party
plaintiff when death has closed the lips of the party defendant, in order to remove from the surviving party the
temptation to falsehood and the possibility of fictitious claims against the deceased. 10

The case at bar, although instituted against the heirs of Praxedes Villanueva after the estate of the latter had
been distributed to them, remains within the ambit of the protection. The reason is that the defendants-heirs are
properly the "representatives" of the deceased, not only because they succeeded to the decedent's right by
descent or operation of law, but more importantly because they are so placed in litigation that they are called
on to defend which they have obtained from the deceased and make the defense which the deceased might
have made if living, or to establish a claim which deceased might have been interested to establish, if living.
11

Such protection, however, was effectively waived when counsel for petitioners cross-examined private
respondent Vicente. "A waiver occurs when plaintiff's deposition is taken by the representative of the estate or
when counsel for the representative cross-examined the plaintiff as to matters occurring during deceased's
lifetime. 12 It must further be observed that petitioners presented a counterclaim against private respondent
Vicente. When Vicente thus took the witness stand, it was in a dual capacity as plaintiff in the action for
recovery of property and as defendant in the counterclaim for accounting and surrender of fields nos. 4 and 13.
Evidently, as defendant in the counterclaim, he was not disqualified from testifying as to matters of fact
occurring before the death of Praxedes Villanueva, said action not having been brought against, but by the
estate or representatives of the estate/deceased person.

Likewise, under a great majority of statutes, the adverse party is competent to testify to transactions or
communications with the deceased or incompetent person which were made with an agent of such person in
cases in which the agent is still alive and competent to testify. But the testimony of the adverse party must be
confined to those transactions or communications which were had with the agent. 13 The contract/promise to
sell under consideration was signed by petitioner Goñi as attorney-in-fact (apoderado) of Praxedes Villanueva.
He was privy to the circumstances surrounding the execution of such contract and therefore could either
confirm or deny any allegations made by private respondent Vicente with respect to said contract. The
inequality or injustice sought to be avoided by Section 20(a) of Rule 130, where one of the parties no longer
has the opportunity to either confirm or rebut the testimony of the other because death has permanently sealed
the former's lips, does not actually exist in the case at bar, for the reason that petitioner Goñi could and did not
negate the binding effect of the contract/promise to sell. Thus, while admitting the existence of the said
contract/promise to sell, petitioner Goñi testified that the same was subsequently novated into a verbal contract
of lease over fields nos. 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria.

Novation takes place when the object or principal condition of an obligation is changed or altered. 14 In
order, however, that an obligation may be extinguished by another which substitutes the same, it is imperative
that it be so declared in unequivocal terms, or that the old and the new obligations be on every point
incompatible with each other. 15 "Novation is never presumed. It must be established that the old and the
new contracts are incompatible in all points, or that the will to novate appear by express agreement of the
parties or in acts of equivalent import. 16

The novation of the written contract/promise to sell into a verbal agreement of lease was clearly and
convincingly proven not only by the testimony of petitioner Goñi, but likewise by the acts and conduct of the
parties subsequent to the execution of the contract/promise to sell. Thus, after the milling season of crop year
1949-50, only fields nos. 4 and 13 were delivered to private respondent Vicente. Fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 were
subsequently registered in Villanueva's name and mortgaged with the RFC. Villanueva likewise executed a
deed of sale covering Hacienda Sarria in favor of Joaquin Villegas. All these were known to private respondent
Vicente, yet he did not take any steps toward asserting and/or protecting his claim over fields nos. 3, 4 and 13
either by demanding during the lifetime of Villanueva that the latter execute a similar document in his favor, or
causing notice of his adverse claim to be annotated on the certificate of title of said lots. If it were true that he
made demands on Villanueva for the surrender of field no. 3 as well as the execution of the corresponding deed
of sale, he should have, upon refusal of the latter to do so, immediately or within a reasonable time thereafter,
instituted an action for recovery, or as previously observed, caused his adverse claim to be annotated on the
certificate of title. Considering that field no. 3, containing an area of three (3) hectares, 75 ares and 60 centares,
is the biggest among the three lots, an ordinary prudent man would have taken these steps if he honestly
believed he had any right thereto. Yet, private respondent Vicente did neither. In fact such inaction persisted
even during the pendency of the intestate proceedings wherein he could have readily intervened to seek
exclusion of fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 from the inventory of properties of the late Praxedes Villanueva.

The reason given by private respondent Vicente that field no. 3 was not delivered to him together with fields
nos. 4 and 13 because there were small sugar cane growing on said field at that time belonging to
TABACALERA, might be taken as a plausible explanation why he could not take immediate possession of lot
no. 3, but it certainly could not explain why it took him four years before instituting an action in court, and
very conveniently, as petitioners noted, after Villanueva had died and at the time when the verbal contract of
lease was about to expire.

Both the trial and appellate courts chose to believe in the contract/promise to sell rather than the lease
agreement, simply because the former had been reduced to writing, while the latter was merely verbal. It must
be observed, though, that the contract/promise to sell was signed by petitioner Goñi as attorney-in-fact of the
late Praxedes Villanueva, an indication, to our mind, that final arrangements were made by petitioner Goñi in
the absence of Villanueva. It was therefore natural for private respondent Vicente to have demanded that the
agreement be in writing to erase any doubt of its binding effect upon Villanueva. On the other hand, the verbal
lease agreement was negotiated by and between Villanueva and private respondent Vicente themselves. Being
close friends and relatives 17 it can be safely assumed that they did not find it necessary to reduce the same
into writing.

In rejecting petitioners' contention respecting the verbal lease agreement, the appellate court put much weight
on the failure of petitioners to demand an accounting of the produce of fields nos. 4 and 13 from 1950 to 1954,
when the action for recovery of property was filed. Such failure was satisfactorily explained by petitioners in
their motion for reconsideration filed before the then Court of Appeals, in this manner:

... Mr. Genaro Goni is also a farmer by profession and that there was no need for him to demand a yearly
accounting of the total production because the verbal lease agreement was for a term of 5 years. The defendant
Mr. Genaro Goni as a sugar planter has already full knowledge as to the annual income of said lots nos. 4 and
13, and since there was the amount of P12,460.25 to be liquidated, said defendant never deemed it wise to
demand such a yearly accounting. It was only after or before the expiration of the 5 year lease that said
defendant demanded the accounting from the herein plaintiff regarding the production of the 2 lots that were
then leased to him.

It is the custom among the sugar planters in this locality that the Lessee usually demands an advance amount to
cover the rental for the period of the lease, and the demand of an accounting will be only made after the
expiration of the lease period. It was adduced during the trial that the amount of P12,460.75 was considered as
an advance rental of the 2 lots which was leased to the Plaintiff, lots nos. 4 and 13; so we humbly believe that
there was no necessity on the part of defendant Mr. Genaro Goñi to make a yearly demand for an accounting
for the total production of 2 parcels leased to the plaintiff. 18

Petitioners, having clearly and sufficiently shown that the contract/promise to sell was subsequently novated
into a verbal lease agreement, it follows that they are entitled to a favorable decision on their counterclaim.
Discussion of the third issue raised therefore becomes unnecessary.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed. The judicial administrator of the estate of
private respondent Gaspar Vicente and/or his successors-in-interest are hereby ordered to: a) surrender
possession of fields nos. 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria to petitioners; b) render an
accounting of the produce of said fields for the period beginning crop-year 1950-51 until complete possession
thereof shall have been delivered to petitioners; and c) to pay the corresponding annual rent for the said fields
in an amount equivalent to 15% of the gross produce of said fields, for the periods beginning crop-year
1950-51 until said fields shall have been surrendered to petitioners, deducting from the amount due petitioners
the sum of P12,460.24 advanced by private respondent Gaspar Vicente.

SO ORDERED.

Feria (Chairman), Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., and Paras, JJ., concur,

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992
ENRIQUE RAZON, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and VICENTE B. CHUIDIAN, in his capacity as Administrator of
the Estate of the Deceased JUAN T. CHUIDIAN, respondents.

G.R. No. 74315 March 16, 1992

VICENTE B. CHUIDIAN, petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ENRIQUE RAZ0N, and E. RAZON, INC., respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The main issue in these consolidated petitions centers on the ownership of 1,500 shares of stock in E. Razon,
Inc. covered by Stock Certificate No. 003 issued on April 23, 1966 and registered under the name of Juan T.
Chuidian in the books of the corporation. The then Court of First Instance of Manila, now Regional Trial Court
of Manila, declared that Enrique Razon, the petitioner in G.R. No. 74306 is the owner of the said shares of
stock. The then Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, however, reversed the trial court's
decision and ruled that Juan T. Chuidian, the deceased father of petitioner Vicente B. Chuidian in G.R. No.
74315 is the owner of the shares of stock. Both parties filed separate motions for reconsideration. Enrique
Razon wanted the appellate court's decision reversed and the trial court's decision affirmed while Vicente
Chuidian asked that all cash and stock dividends and all the pre-emptive rights accruing to the 1,500 shares of
stock be ordered delivered to him. The appellate court denied both motions. Hence, these petitions.

The relevant Antecedent facts are as follows:

In his complaint filed on June 29, 1971, and amended on November 16, 1971, Vicente B. Chuidian prayed that
defendants Enrique B. Razon, E. Razon, Inc., Geronimo Velasco, Francisco de Borja, Jose Francisco, Alfredo
B. de Leon, Jr., Gabriel Llamas and Luis M. de Razon be ordered to deliver certificates of stocks representing
the shareholdings of the deceased Juan T. Chuidian in the E. Razon, Inc. with a prayer for an order to restrain
the defendants from disposing of the said shares of stock, for a writ of preliminary attachment v. properties of
defendants having possession of shares of stock and for receivership of the properties of defendant
corporation . . .

xxx xxx xxx

In their answer filed on June 18, 1973, defendants alleged that all the shares of stock in the name of
stockholders of record of the corporation were fully paid for by defendant, Razon; that said shares are subject
to the agreement between defendants and incorporators; that the shares of stock were actually owned and
remained in the possession of Razon. Appellees also alleged . . . that neither the late Juan T. Chuidian nor the
appellant had paid any amount whatsoever for the 1,500 shares of stock in question . . .

xxx xxx xxx

The evidence of the plaintiff shown that he is the administrator of the intestate estate of Juan Telesforo
Chuidian in Special Proceedings No. 71054, Court of First Instance of Manila.

Sometime in 1962, Enrique Razon organized the E. Razon, Inc. for the purpose of bidding for the arrastre
services in South Harbor, Manila. The incorporators consisted of Enrique Razon, Enrique Valles, Luisa M. de
Razon, Jose Tuason, Jr., Victor Lim, Jose F. Castro and Salvador Perez de Tagle.

On April 23, 1966, stock certificate No. 003 for 1,500 shares of stock of defendant corporation was issued in
the name of Juan T. Chuidian.

On the basis of the 1,500 shares of stock, the late Juan T. Chuidian and after him, the plaintiff-appellant, were
elected as directors of E. Razon, Inc. Both of them actually served and were paid compensation as directors of
E. Razon, Inc.

From the time the certificate of stock was issued on April 1966 up to April 1971, Enrique Razon had not
questioned the ownership by Juan T. Chuidian of the shares of stock in question and had not brought any action
to have the certificate of stock over the said shares cancelled.

The certificate of stock was in the possession of defendant Razon who refused to deliver said shares to the
plaintiff, until the same was surrendered by defendant Razon and deposited in a safety box in Philippine Bank
of Commerce.

Defendants allege that after organizing the E. Razon, Inc., Enrique Razon distributed shares of stock
previously placed in the names of the withdrawing nominal incorporators to some friends including Juan T.
Chuidian

Stock Certificate No. 003 covering 1,500 shares of stock upon instruction of the late Chuidian on April 23,
1986 was personally delivered by Chuidian on July 1, 1966 to the Corporate Secretary of Attorney Silverio B.
de Leon who was himself an associate of the Chuidian Law Office (Exhs. C & 11). Since then, Enrique Razon
was in possession of said stock certificate even during the lifetime of the late Chuidian, from the time the late
Chuidian delivered the said stock certificate to defendant Razon until the time (sic) of defendant Razon. By
agreement of the parties (sic) delivered it for deposit with the bank under the joint custody of the parties as
confirmed by the trial court in its order of August 7, 1971.

Thus, the 1,500 shares of stook under Stock Certificate No. 003 were delivered by the late Chuidian to Enrique
because it was the latter who paid for all the subscription on the shares of stock in the defendant corporation
and the understanding was that he (defendant Razon) was the owner of the said shares of stock and was to have
possession thereof until such time as he was paid therefor by the other nominal incorporators/stockholders
(TSN., pp. 4, 8, 10, 24-25, 25-26, 28-31, 31-32, 60, 66-68, July 22, 1980, Exhs. "C", "11", "13" "14"). (Ro11o
— 74306, pp. 66-68)

In G.R. No. 74306, petitioner Enrique Razon assails the appellate court's decision on its alleged misapplication
of the dead man's statute rule under Section 20(a) Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. According to him, the "dead
man's statute" rule is not applicable to the instant case. Moreover, the private respondent, as plaintiff in the case
did not object to his oral testimony regarding the oral agreement between him and the deceased Juan T.
Chuidian that the ownership of the shares of stock was actually vested in the petitioner unless the deceased
opted to pay the same; and that the petitioner was subjected to a rigid cross examination regarding such
testimony.

Section 20(a) Rule 130 of the Rules of Court (Section 23 of the Revised Rules on Evidence) States:

Sec. 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship — The following persons cannot testify as to
matters in which they are interested directly or indirectly, as herein enumerated.

(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor
or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a
claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot
testify as to any matter of fact accruing before the death of such deceased person or before such person became
of unsound mind." (Emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

The purpose of the rule has been explained by this Court in this wise:

The reason for the rule is that if persons having a claim against the estate of the deceased or his properties were
allowed to testify as to the supposed statements made by him (deceased person), many would be tempted to
falsely impute statements to deceased persons as the latter can no longer deny or refute them, thus unjustly
subjecting their properties or rights to false or unscrupulous claims or demands. The purpose of the law is to
"guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the
surviving party." (Tongco v. Vianzon, 50 Phil. 698; Go Chi Gun, et al. v. Co Cho, et al., 622 [1955])

The rule, however, delimits the prohibition it contemplates in that it is applicable to a case against the
administrator or its representative of an estate upon a claim against the estate of the deceased person. (See
Tongco v. Vianzon, 50 Phil. 698 [1927])

In the instant case, the testimony excluded by the appellate court is that of the defendant (petitioner herein) to
the affect that the late Juan Chuidian, (the father of private respondent Vicente Chuidian, the administrator of
the estate of Juan Chuidian) and the defendant agreed in the lifetime of Juan Chuidian that the 1,500 shares of
stock in E. Razon, Inc. are actually owned by the defendant unless the deceased Juan Chuidian opted to pay the
same which never happened. The case was filed by the administrator of the estate of the late Juan Chuidian to
recover shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. allegedly owned by the late Juan T. Chuidian.

It is clear, therefore, that the testimony of the petitioner is not within the prohibition of the rule. The case was
not filed against the administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon claims against the estate.

Furthermore, the records show that the private respondent never objected to the testimony of the petitioner as
regards the true nature of his transaction with the late elder Chuidian. The petitioner's testimony was subject to
cross-examination by the private respondent's counsel. Hence, granting that the petitioner's testimony is within
the prohibition of Section 20(a), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the private respondent is deemed to have
waived the rule. We ruled in the case of Cruz v. Court of Appeals (192 SCRA 209 [1990]):

It is also settled that the court cannot disregard evidence which would ordinarily be incompetent under the
rules but has been rendered admissible by the failure of a party to object thereto. Thus:

. . . The acceptance of an incompetent witness to testify in a civil suit, as well as the allowance of improper
questions that may be put to him while on the stand is a matter resting in the discretion of the litigant. He may
assert his right by timely objection or he may waive it, expressly or by silence. In any case the option rests with
him. Once admitted, the testimony is in the case for what it is worth and the judge has no power to disregard it
for the sole reason that it could have been excluded, if it had been objected to, nor to strike it out on its own
motion (Emphasis supplied). (Marella v. Reyes, 12 Phil. 1.)

The issue as to whether or not the petitioner's testimony is admissible having been settled, we now proceed to
discuss the fundamental issue on the ownership of the 1,500 shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc.

E. Razon, Inc. was organized in 1962 by petitioner Enrique Razon for the purpose of participating in the
bidding for the arrastre services in South Harbor, Manila. The incorporators were Enrique Razon, Enrique
Valles, Luisa M. de Razon, Jose Tuazon, Jr., Victor L. Lim, Jose F. Castro and Salvador Perez de Tagle. The
business, however, did not start operations until 1966. According to the petitioner, some of the incorporators
withdrew from the said corporation. The petitioner then distributed the stocks previously placed in the names
of the withdrawing nominal incorporators to some friends, among them the late Juan T. Chuidian to whom he
gave 1,500 shares of stock. The shares of stock were registered in the name of Chuidian only as nominal
stockholder and with the agreement that the said shares of stock were owned and held by the petitioner but
Chuidian was given the option to buy the same. In view of this arrangement, Chuidian in 1966 delivered to the
petitioner the stock certificate covering the 1,500 shares of stock of E. Razon, Inc. Since then, the Petitioner
had in his possession the certificate of stock until the time, he delivered it for deposit with the Philippine Bank
of Commerce under the parties' joint custody pursuant to their agreement as embodied in the trial court's order.

The petitioner maintains that his aforesaid oral testimony as regards the true nature of his agreement with the
late Juan Chuidian on the 1,500 shares of stock of E. Razon, Inc. is sufficient to prove his ownership over the
said 1,500 shares of stock.

The petitioner's contention is not correct.

In the case of Embassy Farms, Inc. v. Court of Appeals (188 SCRA 492 [1990]) we ruled:

. . . For an effective, transfer of shares of stock the mode and manner of transfer as prescribed by law must be
followed (Navea v. Peers Marketing Corp., 74 SCRA 65). As provided under Section 3 of Batas Pambansa
Bilang, 68 otherwise known as the Corporation Code of the Philippines, shares of stock may be transferred by
delivery to the transferee of the certificate properly indorsed. Title may be vested in the transferee by the
delivery of the duly indorsed certificate of stock (18 C.J.S. 928, cited in Rivera v. Florendo, 144 SCRA 643).
However, no transfer shall be valid, except as between the parties until the transfer is properly recorded in the
books of the corporation (Sec. 63, Corporation Code of the Philippines; Section 35 of the Corporation Law)

In the instant case, there is no dispute that the questioned 1,500 shares of stock of E. Razon, Inc. are in the
name of the late Juan Chuidian in the books of the corporation. Moreover, the records show that during his
lifetime Chuidian was ellected member of the Board of Directors of the corporation which clearly shows that
he was a stockholder of the corporation. (See Section 30, Corporation Code) From the point of view of the
corporation, therefore, Chuidian was the owner of the 1,500 shares of stock. In such a case, the petitioner who
claims ownership over the questioned shares of stock must show that the same were transferred to him by
proving that all the requirements for the effective transfer of shares of stock in accordance with the
corporation's by laws, if any, were followed (See Nava v. Peers Marketing Corporation, 74 SCRA 65 [1976])
or in accordance with the provisions of law.

The petitioner failed in both instances. The petitioner did not present any by-laws which could show that the
1,500 shares of stock were effectively transferred to him. In the absence of the corporation's by-laws or rules
governing effective transfer of shares of stock, the provisions of the Corporation Law are made applicable to
the instant case.

The law is clear that in order for a transfer of stock certificate to be effective, the certificate must be properly
indorsed and that title to such certificate of stock is vested in the transferee by the delivery of the duly indorsed
certificate of stock. (Section 35, Corporation Code) Since the certificate of stock covering the questioned 1,500
shares of stock registered in the name of the late Juan Chuidian was never indorsed to the petitioner, the
inevitable conclusion is that the questioned shares of stock belong to Chuidian. The petitioner's asseveration
that he did not require an indorsement of the certificate of stock in view of his intimate friendship with the late
Juan Chuidian can not overcome the failure to follow the procedure required by law or the proper conduct of
business even among friends. To reiterate, indorsement of the certificate of stock is a mandatory requirement of
law for an effective transfer of a certificate of stock.

Moreover, the preponderance of evidence supports the appellate court's factual findings that the shares of stock
were given to Juan T. Chuidian for value. Juan T. Chuidian was the legal counsel who handled the legal affairs
of the corporation. We give credence to the testimony of the private respondent that the shares of stock were
given to Juan T. Chuidian in payment of his legal services to the corporation. Petitioner Razon failed to
overcome this testimony.

In G.R. No. 74315, petitioner Vicente B. Chuidian insists that the appellate court's decision declaring his
deceased father Juan T. Chuidian as owner of the 1,500 shares of stock of E. Razon, Inc. should have included
all cash and stock dividends and all the pre-emptive rights accruing to the said 1,500 shares of stock.

The petition is impressed with merit.

The cash and stock dividends and all the pre-emptive rights are all incidents of stock ownership.

The rights of stockholders are generally enumerated as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

. . . [F]irst, to have a certificate or other evidence of his status as stockholder issued to him; second, to vote at
meetings of the corporation; third, to receive his proportionate share of the profits of the corporation; and lastly,
to participate proportionately in the distribution of the corporate assets upon the dissolution or winding up.
(Purdy's Beach on Private Corporations, sec. 554) (Pascual v. Del Saz Orozco, 19 Phil. 82, 87)

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

a) In G.R. No. 74306, the petition is DISMISSED. The questioned decision and resolution of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court, now the Court of Appeals, are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

b) In G.R. No. 74315, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned Resolution insofar as it denied the
petitioner's motion to clarify the dispositive portion of the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court,
now Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the appellate court is MODIFIED in
that all cash and stock dividends as, well as all pre-emptive rights that have accrued and attached to the 1,500
shares in E. Razon, Inc., since 1966 are declared to belong to the estate of Juan T. Chuidian.

SO ORDERED.

Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

PRIVELEGE COMMUNICATIONS (RULE 130, SECTION 124)

G.R. No. 108854 June 14, 1994

MA. PAZ FERNANDEZ KROHN, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and EDGAR KROHN, JR., respondents.

Cruz, Durian, Agabin, Atienza, Alday and Tuason for petitioner.

Oscar F. Martinez for private respondent.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

A confidential psychiatric evaluation report is being presented in evidence before the trial court in a petition for
annulment of marriage grounded on psychological incapacity. The witness testifying on the report is the
husband who initiated the annulment proceedings, not the physician who prepared the report.

The subject of the evaluation report, Ma. Paz Fernandez Krohn, invoking the rule on privileged communication
between physician and patient, seeks to enjoin her husband from disclosing the contents of the report. After
failing to convince the trial court and the appellate court, she is now before us on a petition for review on
certiorari.

On 14 June 1964, Edgar Krohn, Jr., and Ma. Paz Fernandez were married at the Saint Vincent de Paul Church
in San Marcelino, Manila. The union produced three children, Edgar Johannes, Karl Wilhelm and Alexandra.
Their blessings notwithstanding, the relationship between the couple developed into a stormy one. In 1971, Ma.
Paz underwent psychological testing purportedly in an effort to ease the marital strain. The effort however
proved futile. In 1973, they finally separated in fact.

In 1975, Edgar was able to secure a copy of the confidential psychiatric report on Ma. Paz prepared and signed
by Drs. Cornelio Banaag, Jr., and Baltazar Reyes. On 2 November 1978, presenting the report among others,
he obtained a decree ("Conclusion") from the Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimoniale in Manila nullifying his
church marriage with Ma. Paz on the ground of "incapacitas assumendi onera conjugalia due to lack of due
discretion existent at the time of the wedding and thereafter." 1 On 10 July 1979, the decree was confirmed
and pronounced "Final and Definite." 2

Meanwhile, on 30 July 1982, the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Pasig, Br. II,
issued an order granting the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership.

On 23 October 1990, Edgar filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage with Ma. Paz before the trial
court. 3 In his petition, he cited the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report which Ma. Paz merely denied
in her Answer as "either unfounded or irrelevant." 4

At the hearing on 8 May 1991, Edgar took the witness stand and tried to testify on the contents of the
Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report. This was objected to on the ground that it violated the rule on
privileged communication between physician and patient. Subsequently, Ma. Paz filed a Manifestation
expressing her "continuing objection" to any evidence, oral or documentary, "that would thwart the
physician-patient privileged communication rule," 5 and thereafter submitted a Statement for the Record
asserting among others that "there is no factual or legal basis whatsoever for petitioner (Edgar) to claim
'psychological incapacity' to annul their marriage, such ground being completely false, fabricated and merely
an afterthought." 6 Before leaving for Spain where she has since resided after their separation, Ma. Paz also
authorized and instructed her counsel to oppose the suit and pursue her counterclaim even during her absence.

On 29 May 1991, Edgar opposed Ma. Paz' motion to disallow the introduction of the confidential psychiatric
report as evidence, 7 and afterwards moved to strike out Ma. Paz' Statement for the Record. 8

On 4 June 1991, the trial court issued an Order admitting the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report in
evidence and ruling that —

. . . the Court resolves to overrule the objection and to sustain the Opposition to the respondent's Motion; first,
because the very issue in this case is whether or not the respondent had been suffering from psychological
incapacity; and secondly, when the said psychiatric report was referred to in the complaint, the respondent did
not object thereto on the ground of the supposed privileged communication between patient and physician.
What was raised by the respondent was that the said psychiatric report was irrelevant. So, the Court feels that
in the interest of justice and for the purpose of determining whether the respondent as alleged in the petition
was suffering from psychological incapacity, the said psychiatric report is very material and may be testified to
by petitioner (Edgar Krohn, Jr.) without prejudice on the part of the respondent to dispute the said report or to
cross-examination first the petitioner and later the psychiatrist who prepared the same if the latter will be
presented. 9

On 27 November 1991, the trial court denied the Motion to Reconsider Order dated June 4, 1991, and directed
that the Statement for the Record filed by Ma. Paz be stricken off the record. A subsequent motion for
reconsideration filed by her counsel was likewise denied.

Counsel of Ma. Paz then elevated the issue to respondent Court of Appeals. In a Decision promulgated 30
October 1992, the appellate court dismissed the petition for certiorari. 10 On 5 February 1993, the motion to
reconsider the dismissal was likewise denied. Hence, the instant petition for review.

Petitioner now seeks to enjoin the presentation and disclosure of the contents of the psychiatric report and
prays for the admission of her Statement for the Record to form part of the records of the case. She argues that
since
Sec. 24, par. (c), Rule 130, of the Rules of Court 11 prohibits a physician from testifying on matters which
he may have acquired in attending to a patient in a professional capacity, "WITH MORE REASON should be
third person (like respondent-husband in this particular instance) be PROHIBITED from testifying on
privileged matters between a physician and patient or from submitting any medical report, findings or
evaluation prepared by a physician which the latter has acquired as a result of his confidential and privileged
relation with a patient." 12 She says that the reason behind the prohibition is —

. . . to facilitate and make safe, full and confidential disclosure by a patient to his physician of all facts,
circumstances and symptoms, untrammeled by apprehension of their subsequent and enforced disclosure and
publication on the witness stand, to the end that the physician may form a correct opinion, and be enabled
safely and efficaciously to treat his patient. 13

She further argues that to allow her husband to testify on the contents of the psychiatric evaluation report "will
set a very bad and dangerous precedent because it abets circumvention of the rule's intent in preserving the
sanctity, security and confidence to the relation of physician and his patient." 14 Her thesis is that what
cannot be done directly should not be allowed to be done indirectly.

Petitioner submits that her Statement for the Record simply reiterates under oath what she asserted in her
Answer, which she failed to verify as she had already left for Spain when her Answer was filed. She maintains
that her "Statement for the Record is a plain and simple pleading and is not as it has never been intended to
take the place of her testimony;" 15 hence, there is no factual and legal basis whatsoever to expunge it from
the records.

Private respondent Edgar Krohn, Jr., however contends that "the rules are very explicit: the prohibition applies
only to a physician. Thus . . . the legal prohibition to testify is not applicable to the case at bar where the person
sought to be barred from testifying on the privileged communication is the husband and not the physician of
the petitioner." 16 In fact, according to him, the Rules sanction his testimony considering that a husband may
testify against his wife in a civil case filed by one against the other.

Besides, private respondent submits that privileged communication may be waived by the person entitled
thereto, and this petitioner expressly did when she gave her unconditional consent to the use of the psychiatric
evaluation report when it was presented to the Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimoniale which took it into
account among others in deciding the case and declaring their marriage null and void. Private respondent
further argues that petitioner also gave her implied consent when she failed to specifically object to the
admissibility of the report in her Answer where she merely described the evaluation report as "either
unfounded or irrelevant." At any rate, failure to interpose a timely objection at the earliest opportunity to the
evidence presented on privileged matters may be construed as an implied waiver.

With regard to the Statement for the Record filed by petitioner, private respondent posits that this in reality is
an amendment of her Answer and thus should comply with pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court, hence,
its exclusion from the records for failure to comply with the Rules is proper.

The treatise presented by petitioner on the privileged nature of the communication between physician and
patient, as well as the reasons therefor, is not doubted. Indeed, statutes making communications between
physician and patient privileged are intended to inspire confidence in the patient and encourage him to make a
full disclosure to his physician of his symptoms and condition. 17 Consequently, this prevents the physician
from making public information that will result in humiliation, embarrassment, or disgrace to the patient. 18
For, the patient should rest assured with the knowledge that the law recognizes the communication as
confidential, and guards against the possibility of his feelings being shocked or his reputation tarnished by their
subsequent disclosure. 19 The physician-patient privilege creates a zone of privacy, intended to preclude the
humiliation of the patient that may follow the disclosure of his ailments. Indeed, certain types of information
communicated in the context of the physician-patient relationship fall within the constitutionally protected
zone of privacy, 20 including a patient's interest in keeping his mental health records confidential. 21 Thus,
it has been observed that the psychotherapist-patient privilege is founded upon the notion that certain forms of
antisocial behavior may be prevented by encouraging those in need of treatment for emotional problems to
secure the services of a psychotherapist.

Petitioner's discourse while exhaustive is however misplaced. Lim v. Court of Appeals 22 clearly lays down
the requisites in order that the privilege may be successfully invoked: (a) the privilege is claimed in a civil case;
(b) the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or
obstetrics; (c) such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his professional
capacity; (d) the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and, (e) the information was
confidential and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation (formerly character) of the patient.

In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is claimed is not one duly authorized to practice
medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He is simply the patient's husband who wishes to testify on a document
executed by medical practitioners. Plainly and clearly, this does not fall within the claimed prohibition. Neither
can his testimony be considered a circumvention of the prohibition because his testimony cannot have the force
and effect of the testimony of the physician who examined the patient and executed the report.

Counsel for petitioner indulged heavily in objecting to the testimony of private respondent on the ground that it
was privileged. In his Manifestation before the trial court dated 10 May 1991, he invoked the rule on privileged
communications but never questioned the testimony as hearsay. It was a fatal mistake. For, in failing to object
to the testimony on the ground that it was hearsay, counsel waived his right to make such objection and,
consequently, the evidence offered may be admitted.

The other issue raised by petitioner is too trivial to merit the full attention of this Court. The allegations
contained in the Statement for the Records are but refutations of private respondent's declarations which may
be denied or disproved during the trial.

The instant appeal has taken its toll on the petition for annulment. Three years have already lapsed and private
respondent herein, as petitioner before the trial court, has yet to conclude his testimony thereat. We thus enjoin
the trial judge and the parties' respective counsel to act with deliberate speed in resolving the main action, and
avoid any and all stratagems that may further delay this case. If all lawyers are allowed to appeal every
perceived indiscretion of a judge in the course of trial and include in their appeals depthless issues, there will
be no end to litigations, and the docket of appellate courts will forever be clogged with inconsequential cases.
Hence, counsel should exercise prudence in appealing lower court rulings and raise only legitimate issues so as
not to retard the resolution of cases. Indeed, there is no point in unreasonably delaying the resolution of the
petition and prolonging the agony of the wedded couple who after coming out from a storm still have the right
to a renewed blissful life either alone or in the company of each other. 23

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of
respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on 30 October 1992 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Davide, Jr., Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

 [G.R. Nos. 115439-41. July 16, 1997]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE

SANDIGANBAYAN, MANSUETO V. HONRADA, CEFERINO S.
PAREDES, JR. and GENEROSO S. SANSAET, respondents.

DECISION
REGALADO, J.:

Through the special civil action for certiorari at bar, petitioner seeks the annulment of
the resolution of respondent Sandiganbayan, promulgated on December 22, 1993, which
denied petitioners motion for the discharge of respondent Generoso S. Sansaet to be
utilized as a state witness, and its resolution of March 7, 1994 denying the motion for
reconsideration of its preceding disposition.
The records show that during the dates material to this case, respondent Honrada
was the Clerk of Court and Acting Stenographer of the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
San Francisco-Bunawan-Rosario in Agusan del Sur. Respondent Paredes was
successively the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, then Governor of the same
province, and is at present a Congressman. Respondent Sansaet was a practicing
attorney who served as counsel for Paredes in several instances pertinent to the criminal
charges involved in the present recourse.
The same records also represent that sometime in 1976, respondent Paredes
applied for a free patent over Lot No. 3097-A, Pls-67 of the Rosario Public Land
Subdivision Survey. His application was approved and, pursuant to a free patent granted
to him, an original certificate of title was issued in his favor for that lot which is situated in
the poblacion of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur.
However, in 1985, the Director of Lands filed an action for the cancellation of
respondent Paredes patent and certificate of title since the land had been designated
and reserved as a school site in the aforementioned subdivision survey. The trial court
rendered judgment nullifying said patent and title after finding that respondent Paredes
had obtained the same through fraudulent misrepresentations in his application.
Pertinently, respondent Sansaet served as counsel of Paredes in that civil case.
Consequent to the foregoing judgment of the trial court, upon the subsequent
complaint of the Sangguniang Bayan and the preliminary investigation conducted
thereon, an information for perjury was filed against respondent Paredes in the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court. On November 27, 1985, the Provincial Fiscal was, however, directed
by the Deputy Minister of Justice to move for the dismissal of the case on the ground
inter alia of prescription, hence the proceedings were terminated. In this criminal case,
respondent Paredes was likewise represented by respondent Sansaet as counsel.
Nonetheless, respondent* Paredes was thereafter haled before the Tanodbayan for
preliminary investigation on the charge that, by using his former position as Provincial
Attorney to influence and induce the Bureau of Lands officials to favorably act on his
application for free patent, he had violated Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended. For the third time, respondent Sansaet was Paredes counsel of record
therein.
On August 29, 1988, the Tanodbayan, issued a resolution recommending the
criminal prosecution of respondent Paredes. Atty. Sansaet, as counsel for his
aforenamed co-respondent, moved for reconsideration and, because of its legal
significance in this case, we quote some of his allegations in that motion:
x x x respondent had been charged already by the complainants before the
Municipal Circuit Court of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, went to jail on detention in
1984 under the same set of facts and the same evidence x x x but said case after
arraignment, was ordered dismissed by the court upon recommendation of the
Department of Justice. Copy of the dismissal order, certificate of arraignment and the
recommendation of the Department of Justice are hereto attached for ready reference;
thus the filing of this case will be a case of double jeopardy for respondent herein x x x.
(Italics supplied.)
A criminal case was subsequently filed with the Sandiganbayan charging respondent
Paredes with a violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. However,
a motion to quash filed by the defense was later granted in respondent courts resolution
of August 1, 1991 and the case was dismissed on the ground of prescription.
On January 23, 1990, one Teofilo Gelacio, a taxpayer who had initiated the perjury
and graft charges against respondent Paredes, sent a letter to the Ombudsman seeking
the investigation of the three respondents herein for falsification of public documents. He
claimed that respondent Honrada, in conspiracy with his herein co-respondents,
simulated and certified as true copies certain documents purporting to be a notice of
arraignment, dated July 1, 1985, and transcripts of stenographic notes supposedly taken
during the arraignment of Paredes on the perjury charge. These falsified documents
were annexed to respondent Paredes motion for reconsideration of the Tanodbayan
resolution for the filing of a graft charge against him, in order to support his contention
that the same would constitute double jeopardy.
In support of his claim, Gelacio attached to his letter a certification that no notice of
arraignment was ever received by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan del Sur in
connection with that perjury case; and a certification of Presiding Judge Ciriaco Ario that
said perjury case in his court did not reach the arraignment stage since action thereon
was suspended pending the review of the case by the Department of Justice.
Respondents filed their respective counter-affidavits, but Sansaet subsequently
discarded and repudiated the submissions he had made in his counter-affidavit. In a
so-called Affidavit of Explanations and Rectifications, respondent Sansaet revealed that
Paredes contrived to have the graft case under preliminary investigation dismissed on
the ground of double jeopardy by making it that the perjury case had been dismissed by
the trial court after he had been arraigned therein.
For that purpose, the documents which were later filed by respondent Sansaet in the
preliminary investigation were prepared and falsified by his co-respondents in this case
in the house of respondent Paredes. To evade responsibility for his own participation in
the scheme, he claimed that he did so upon the instigation and inducement of
respondent Paredes. This was intended to pave the way for his discharge as a
government witness in the consolidated cases, as in fact a motion therefor was filed by
the prosecution pursuant to their agreement.
Withal, in a resolution dated February 24, 1992, the Ombudsman approved the filing
of falsification charges against all the herein private respondents. The proposal for the
discharge of respondent Sansaet as a state witness was rejected by the Ombudsman on
this evaluative legal position:
x x x Taking his explanation, it is difficult to believe that a lawyer of his stature, in
the absence of deliberate intent to conspire, would be unwittingly induced by another to
commit a crime. As counsel for the accused in those criminal cases, Atty. Sansaet had
control over the case theory and the evidence which the defense was going to present.
Moreover, the testimony or confession of Atty. Sansaet falls under the mantle of
privileged communication between the lawyer and his client which may be objected to, if
presented in the trial.
The Ombudsman refused to reconsider that resolution and, ostensibly to forestall
any further controversy, he decided to file separate informations for falsification of public
documents against each of the herein respondents. Thus, three criminal cases, each of
which named one of the three private respondents here as the accused therein, were
filed in the graft court. However, the same were consolidated for joint trial in the Second
Division of the Sandiganbayan.
As stated at the outset, a motion was filed by the People on July 27, 1993 for the
discharge of respondent Sansaet as a state witness. It was submitted that all the
requisites therefor, as provided in Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, were
satisfied insofar as respondent Sansaet was concerned. The basic postulate was that,
except for the eyewitness testimony of respondent Sansaet, there was no other direct
evidence to prove the confabulated falsification of documents by respondents Honrada
and Paredes.
Unfortunately for the prosecution, respondent Sandiganbayan, hewing to the theory
of the attorney-client privilege adverted to by the Ombudsman and invoked by the two
other private respondents in their opposition to the prosecutions motion, resolved to deny
the desired discharge on this ratiocination:
From the evidence adduced, the opposition was able to establish that client and
lawyer relationship existed between Atty. Sansaet and Ceferino Paredes, Jr., before,
during and after the period alleged in the information. In view of such relationship, the
facts surrounding the case, and other confidential matter must have been disclosed by
accused Paredes, as client, to accused Sansaet, as his lawyer in his professional
capacity. Therefore, the testimony of Atty. Sansaet on the facts surrounding the offense
charged in the information is privileged.
 Reconsideration of said resolution having been likewise denied, the controversy was
elevated to this Court by the prosecution in an original action for the issuance of the
extraordinary writ of certiorari against respondent Sandiganbayan.
The principal issues on which the resolution of the petition at bar actually turns are
therefore (1) whether or not the projected testimony of respondent Sansaet, as proposed
state witness, is barred by the attorney-client privilege; and (2) whether or not, as a
consequence thereof, he is eligible for discharge to testify as a particeps criminis.
I
As already stated, respondent Sandiganbayan ruled that due to the lawyer-client
relationship which existed between herein respondents Paredes and Sansaet during the
relevant periods, the facts surrounding the case and other confidential matters must
have been disclosed by respondent Paredes, as client, to respondent Sansaet, as his
lawyer. Accordingly, it found no reason to discuss it further since Atty. Sansaet cannot be
presented as a witness against accused Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. without the latters
consent.
The Court is of a contrary persuasion. The attorney-client privilege cannot apply in
these cases, as the facts thereof and the actuations of both respondents therein
constitute an exception to the rule. For a clearer understanding of that evidential rule, we
will first sweep aside some distracting mental cobwebs in these cases.
1. It may correctly be assumed that there was a confidential communication made by
Paredes to Sansaet in connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 17791-93 for falsification
before respondent court, and this may reasonably be expected since Paredes was the
accused and Sansaet his counsel therein. Indeed, the fact that Sansaet was called to
witness the preparation of the falsified documents by Paredes and Honrada was as
eloquent a communication, if not more, than verbal statements being made to him by
Paredes as to the fact and purpose of such falsification. It is significant that the
evidentiary rule on this point has always referred to any communication, without
distinction or qualification.
In the American jurisdiction from which our present evidential rule was taken, there is
no particular mode by which a confidential communication shall be made by a client to
his attorney. The privilege is not confined to verbal or written communications made by
the client to his attorney but extends as well to information communicated by the client to
the attorney by other means.
Nor can it be pretended that during the entire process, considering their past and
existing relations as counsel and client and, further, in view of the purpose for which such
falsified documents were prepared, no word at all passed between Paredes and Sansaet
on the subject matter of that criminal act. The clincher for this conclusion is the
undisputed fact that said documents were thereafter filed by Sansaet in behalf of
Paredes as annexes to the motion for reconsideration in the preliminary investigation of
the graft case before the Tanodbayan. Also, the acts and words of the parties during the
period when the documents were being falsified were necessarily confidential since
Paredes would not have invited Sansaet to his house and allowed him to witness the
same except under conditions of secrecy and confidence.
2. It is postulated that despite such complicity of Sansaet at the instance of Paredes
in the criminal act for which the latter stands charged, a distinction must be made
between confidential communications relating to past crimes already committed, and
future crimes intended to be committed, by the client. Corollarily, it is admitted that the
announced intention of a client to commit a crime is not included within the confidences
which his attorney is bound to respect. Respondent court appears, however, to believe
that in the instant case it is dealing with a past crime, and that respondent Sansaet is set
to testify on alleged criminal acts of respondents Paredes and Honrada that have already
been committed and consummated.
The Court reprobates the last assumption which is flawed by a somewhat inaccurate
basis. It is true that by now, insofar as the falsifications to be testified to in respondent
court are concerned, those crimes were necessarily committed in the past. But for the
application of the attorney-client privilege, however, the period to be considered is the
date when the privileged communication was made by the client to the attorney in
relation to either a crime committed in the past or with respect to a crime intended to be
committed in the future. In other words, if the client seeks his lawyers advice with respect
to a crime that the former has theretofore committed, he is given the protection of a
virtual confessional seal which the attorney-client privilege declares cannot be broken by
the attorney without the clients consent. The same privileged confidentiality, however,
does not attach with regard to a crime which a client intends to commit thereafter or in
the future and for purposes of which he seeks the lawyers advice.
Statements and communications regarding the commission of a crime already
committed, made by a party who committed it, to an attorney, consulted as such, are
privileged communications. Contrarily, the unbroken stream of judicial dicta is to the
effect that communications between attorney and client having to do with the clients
contemplated criminal acts, or in aid or furtherance thereof, are not covered by the cloak
of privileges ordinarily existing in reference to communications between attorney and
client. (Emphases supplied.)
3. In the present cases, the testimony sought to be elicited from Sansaet as state
witness are the communications made to him by physical acts and/or accompanying
words of Paredes at the time he and Honrada, either with the active or passive
participation of Sansaet, were about to falsify, or in the process of falsifying, the
documents which were later filed in the Tanodbayan by Sansaet and culminated in the
criminal charges now pending in respondent Sandiganbayan. Clearly, therefore, the
confidential communications thus made by Paredes to Sansaet were for purposes of and
in reference to the crime of falsification which had not yet been committed in the past by
Paredes but which he, in confederacy with his present co-respondents, later committed.
Having been made for purposes of a future offense, those communications are outside
the pale of the attorney-client privilege.
4. Furthermore, Sansaet was himself a conspirator in the commission of that crime of
falsification which he, Paredes and Honrada concocted and foisted upon the authorities.
It is well settled that in order that a communication between a lawyer and his client may
be privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end. The
existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from attaching. In fact, it has also
been pointed out to the Court that the prosecution of the honorable relation of attorney
and client will not be permitted under the guise of privilege, and every communication
made to an attorney by a client for a criminal purpose is a conspiracy or attempt at a
conspiracy which is not only lawful to divulge, but which the attorney under certain
circumstances may be bound to disclose at once in the interest of justice.
It is evident, therefore, that it was error for respondent Sandiganbayan to insist that
such unlawful communications intended for an illegal purpose contrived by conspirators
are nonetheless covered by the so-called mantle of privilege. To prevent a conniving
counsel from revealing the genesis of a crime which was later committed pursuant to a
conspiracy, because of the objection thereto of his conspiring client, would be one of the
worst travesties in the rules of evidence and practice in the noble profession of law.
II
On the foregoing premises, we now proceed to the consequential inquiry as to
whether respondent Sansaet qualifies, as a particeps criminis, for discharge from the
criminal prosecution in order to testify for the State. Parenthetically, respondent court,
having arrived at a contrary conclusion on the preceding issue, did not pass upon this
second aspect and the relief sought by the prosecution which are now submitted for our
resolution in the petition at bar. We shall, however, first dispose likewise of some
ancillary questions requiring preludial clarification.
1. The fact that respondent Sandiganbayan did not fully pass upon the query as to
whether or not respondent Sansaet was qualified to be a state witness need not prevent
this Court from resolving that issue as prayed for by petitioner. Where the determinative
facts and evidence have been submitted to this Court such that it is in a position to finally
resolve the dispute, it will be in the pursuance of the ends of justice and the expeditious
administration thereof to resolve the case on the merits, instead of remanding it to the
trial court.
2. A reservation is raised over the fact that the three private respondents here stand
charged in three separate informations. It will be recalled that in its resolution of February
24, 1992, the Ombudsman recommended the filing of criminal charges for falsification of
public documents against all the respondents herein. That resolution was affirmed but,
reportedly in order to obviate further controversy, one information was filed against each
of the three respondents here, resulting in three informations for the same acts of
falsification.
This technicality was, however, sufficiently explained away during the deliberations
in this case by the following discussion thereof by Mr. Justice Davide, to wit:
Assuming no substantive impediment exists to block Sansaets discharge as state
witness, he can, nevertheless, be discharged even if indicted under a separate
information. I suppose the three cases were consolidated for joint trial since they were
all raffled to the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan. Section 2, Rule XV of the
Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan allows consolidation in only one Division of cases
 arising from the same incident or series of incidents, or involving common questions of
law and fact. Accordingly, for all legal intents and purposes, Sansaet stood as
co-accused and he could be discharged as state witness. It is of no moment that he was
charged separately from his co-accused. While Section 9 of Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules
of Criminal Procedure uses the word jointly, which was absent in the old provision, the
consolidated and joint trial has the effect of making the three accused co-accused or
joint defendants, especially considering that they are charged for the same offense. In
criminal law, persons indicted for the same offense and tried together are called joint
defendants.
As likewise submitted therefor by Mr. Justice Francisco along the same vein, there
having been a consolidation of the three cases, the several actions lost their separate
identities and became a single action in which a single judgment is rendered, the same
as if the different causes of action involved had originally been joined in a single action.
Indeed, the former provision of the Rules referring to the situation (w)hen two or
more persons are charged with the commission of a certain offense was too broad and
indefinite; hence the word joint was added to indicate the identity of the charge and the
fact that the accused are all together charged therewith substantially in the same manner
in point of commission and time. The word joint means common to two or more, as
involving the united activity of two or more, or done or produced by two or more working
together, or shared by or affecting two or more. Had it been intended that all the accused
should always be indicted in one and the same information, the Rules could have said so
with facility, but it did not so require in consideration of the circumstances obtaining in the
present case and the problems that may arise from amending the information. After all,
the purpose of the Rule can be achieved by consolidation of the cases as an alternative
mode.
2. We have earlier held that Sansaet was a conspirator in the crime of falsification,
and the rule is that since in a conspiracy the act of one is the act of all, the same penalty
shall be imposed on all members of the conspiracy. Now, one of the requirements for a
state witness is that he does not appear to be the most guilty. not that he must be the
least guilty as is so often erroneously framed or submitted. The query would then be
whether an accused who was held guilty by reason of membership in a conspiracy is
eligible to be a state witness.
To be sure, in People vs. Ramirez, et al. we find this obiter:
It appears that Apolonio Bagispas was the real mastermind. It is believable that he
persuaded the others to rob Paterno, not to kill him for a promised fee. Although he did
not actually commit any of the stabbings, it was a mistake to discharge Bagispas as a
state witness. All the perpetrators of the offense, including him, were bound in a
conspiracy that made them equally guilty.
However, prior thereto, in People vs. Roxas, et al., two conspirators charged with
five others in three separate informations for multiple murder were discharged and used
as state witnesses against their confederates. Subsequent thereto, in Lugtu, et al. vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., one of the co-conspirators was discharged from the information
charging him and two others with the crime of estafa. The trial court found that he was
not the most guilty as, being a poor and ignorant man, he was easily convinced by his
two co-accused to open the account with the bank and which led to the commission of
the crime.
On appeal, this Court held that the finding of respondent appellate court that Lugtu
was just as guilty as his co-accused, and should not be discharged as he did not appear
to be not the most guilty, is untenable. In other words, the Court took into account the
gravity or nature of the acts committed by the accused to be discharged compared to
those of his co-accused, and not merely the fact that in law the same or equal penalty is
imposable on all of them.
Eventually, what was just somehow assumed but not explicitly articulated found
expression in People vs. Ocimar, et al., which we quote in extenso:
Ocimar contends that in the case at bar Bermudez does not satisfy the conditions
for the discharge of a co-accused to become a state witness. He argues that no
accused in a conspiracy can lawfully be discharged and utilized as a state witness, for
not one of them could satisfy the requisite of appearing not to be the most guilty.
Appellant asserts that since accused Bermudez was part of the conspiracy, he is
equally guilty as the others.
We do not agree. First, there is absolute necessity for the testimony of Bermudez.
For, despite the presentation of four (4) other witnesses, none of them could positively
identify the accused except Bermudez who was one of those who pulled the highway
heist which resulted not only in the loss of cash, jewelry and other valuables, but even
the life of Capt. Caeba, Jr. It was in fact the testimony of Bermudez that clinched the
case for the prosecution. Second, without his testimony, no other direct evidence was
available for the prosecution to prove the elements of the crime. Third, his testimony
could be, as indeed it was, substantially corroborated in its material points as indicated
by the trial court in its well-reasoned decision. Fourth, he does not appear to be the
most guilty. As the evidence reveals, he was only invited to a drinking party without
having any prior knowledge of the plot to stage a highway robbery. But even assuming
that he later became part of the conspiracy, he does not appear to be the most guilty.
What the law prohibits is that the most guilty will be set free while his co-accused who
are less guilty will be sent to jail. And by most guilty we mean the highest degree of
culpability in terms of participation in the commission of the offense and not necessarily
the severity of the penalty imposed. While all the accused may be given the same
penalty by reason of conspiracy, yet one may be considered least guilty if We take into
account his degree of participation in the perpetration of the offense. Fifth, there is no
evidence that he has at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude.
x x x
Thus, We agree with the observations of the Solicitor General that the rule on the
discharge of an accused to be utilized as state witness clearly looks at his actual and
individual participation in the commission of the crime, which may or may not have been
perpetrated in conspiracy with the other accused. Since Bermudez was not individually
responsible for the killing committed on the occasion of the robbery except by reason of
conspiracy, it cannot be said then that Bermudez appears to be the most guilty. Hence,
his discharge to be a witness for the government is clearly warranted. (Italics ours.)
The rule of equality in the penalty to be imposed upon conspirators found guilty of a
criminal offense is based on the concurrence of criminal intent in their minds and
translated into concerted physical action although of varying acts or degrees of depravity.
Since the Revised Penal Code is based on the classical school of thought, it is the
identity of the mens rea which is considered the predominant consideration and,
therefore, warrants the imposition of the same penalty on the consequential theory that
the act of one is thereby the act of all.
Also, this is an affair of substantive law which should not be equated with the
procedural rule on the discharge of particeps criminis. This adjective device is based on
other considerations, such as the need for giving immunity to one of them in order that
not all shall escape, and the judicial experience that the candid admission of an accused
regarding his participation is a guaranty that he will testify truthfully. For those reasons,
the Rules provide for certain qualifying criteria which, again, are based on judicial
experience distilled into a judgmental policy.
III
The Court is reasonably convinced, and so holds, that the other requisites for the
discharge of respondent Sansaet as a state witness are present and should have been
favorably appreciated by the Sandiganbayan.
Respondent Sansaet is the only cooperative eyewitness to the actual commission of
the falsification charged in the criminal cases pending before respondent court, and the
prosecution is faced with the formidable task of establishing the guilt of the two other
co-respondents who steadfastly deny the charge and stoutly protest their innocence.
There is thus no other direct evidence available for the prosecution of the case, hence
there is absolute necessity for the testimony of Sansaet whose discharge is sought
precisely for that purpose. Said respondent has indicated his conformity thereto and has,
for the purposes required by the Rules, detailed the substance of his projected testimony
in his Affidavit of Explanations and Rectifications.
His testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points by reputable
witnesses, identified in the basic petition with a digest of their prospective testimonies, as
follows: Judge Ciriaco C. Ario, Municipal Circuit Trial Court in San Francisco, Agusan del
Sur; Provincial Prosecutor and Deputized Ombudsman Prosecutor Claudio A. Nistal;
Teofilo Gelacio, private complainant who initiated the criminal cases through his
letter-complaint; Alberto Juvilan of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Fernando, Agusan del
Sur, who participated in the resolution asking their Provincial Governor to file the
appropriate case against respondent Paredes, and Francisco Macalit, who obtained the
certification of non-arraignment from Judge Ario.
On the final requirement of the Rules, it does not appear that respondent Sansaet
has at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. Thus, with the
confluence of all the requirements for the discharge of this respondent, both the Special
Prosecutor and the Solicitor General strongly urge and propose that he be allowed to
testify as a state witness.
This Court is not unaware of the doctrinal rule that, on this procedural aspect, the
prosecution may propose but it is for the trial court, in the exercise of its sound discretion,
to determine the merits of the proposal and make the corresponding disposition. It must
be emphasized, however, that such discretion should have been exercised, and the
disposition taken on a holistic view of all the facts and issues herein discussed, and not
merely on the sole issue of the applicability of the attorney-client privilege.
This change of heart and direction respondent Sandiganbayan eventually assumed,
after the retirement of two members of its Second Division and the reconstitution thereof.
In an inversely anticlimactic Manifestation and Comment dated June 14, 1995, as
required by this Court in its resolution on December 5, 1994, the chairman and new
members thereof declared:
4) That the questioned Resolutions of December 22, 1993 and March 7, 1994 upon
which the Petition for Certiorari filed by the prosecution are based, was penned by
Associate Justice Narciso T. Atienza and concurred in by the undersigned and
Associate Justice Augusto M. Amores;
5) That while the legal issues involved had been already discussed and passed
upon by the Second Division in the aforesaid Resolution, however, after going over the
arguments submitted by the Solicitor-General and re-assessing Our position on the
matter, We respectfully beg leave of the Honorable Supreme Court to manifest that We
are amenable to setting aside the questioned Resolutions and to grant the prosecutions
motion to discharge accused Generoso Sansaet as state witness, upon authority of the
Honorable Supreme Court for the issuance of the proper Resolution to that effect within
fifteen (15) days from notice thereof.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is hereby granted SETTING ASIDE
the impugned resolutions and ORDERING that the present reliefs sought in these cases
by petitioner be allowed and given due course by respondent Sandiganbayan.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres, Jr., JJ., on leave.

G.R. No. 70054 July 8, 1986

BANCO FILIPINO vs. MONETARY BOARD
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 70054 July 8, 1986

BANCO FILIPINO, petitioner,

vs.
MONETARY BOARD, ET AL., respondents.

RESOLUTION

Subject of this "Petition to Set Aside Order to Produce Documents dated 17 February 1986" is the Order of
Branch 136, Regional Trial Court, Makati, granting the motion of the petitioner herein, based on Section 1,
Rule 27, of the Rules of Court, for the production, inspection, and copying of certain papers and records which
are claimed as needed by the Petitioner Bank for the preparation of its comments, objections, and exceptions to
the Conservator's report dated January 8, 1985, and Receiver's Report dated March 19, 1985. The documents
now asked to be produced, inspected, and copied are the following:

(1) Copies of tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board (MB) deliberations on the closure of Banco Filipino
(BF) and its meeting on July 27, 1984, and March 22, 1985;

(2) Copies of the letter and reports of first conservator, Mr. Basilio Estanislao, to the MB and to Central Bank
Governor Jose Fernandez;

(3) Papers showing computations of all the interests and penalties charged by the CB against BF;

(4) Schedule of recommended valuation of reserves per Mr. Tiaoqui's report dated March 19, 1985;

(5) Adjustment per Annex "C" of Mr. Tiaoqui's report;

(6) Annexes"A","B",and"C"of the joint report of Mr. Tiaoqui, Mr. Aurellano, and Mrs. Valenzuela;

(7) Schedule of devaluation of CB premises of Paseo de Roxas of same report;

(8) Schedule of BF's realizable assets from P5,159.44 B to P3,909.23 B as of January 25, 1985;

(9) Documents listed in BF's letter to Mrs. Carlota Valenzuela dated October 25, 1985.

In issuing the challenged order, the court below took the view that the Supreme Court's resolution referring to
it the matters relative to the bank's closure does not preclude the petitioner from availing of this mode of
discovery as an additional means of preparing for the hearing. It considered the documents sought to be
produced as not privileged because these constitute or contain evidence material to the issues into by the Court.
These materials are said to comprise of records of the administrative proceedings conducted by respondent's
officials and representatives from the inception of and preparation of the challenged reports and the resolution
placing petitioner under receivership and thereafter under liquidation as it is the regularity and impartiality of
these administrative proceedings which are being assailed by the petitioner, the trial court saw no reason why
said documents should be thus concealed from it.
Respondents Monetary Board and Central Bank take exception to the said order and pray in their petition
before this Court for the reversal and setting aside of the same. The grounds recited in support of their petition
are the following:

(1) The ratiocination of the trial court is wholly in error because the proceedings before it do not at all deal
with either the administrative proceedings conducted by the respondents or the regularity and impartiality of
the CB actions on BF; it does so simply upon the charge that no "hearing" was given BF prior to those actions
of closure and liquidation. However, no such prior hearing had been called as none is required by the law and
by the Supreme Court decisions in force to this date (Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc. vs. Arca, 15 SCRA 66, and
Rural Bank of Bato vs. IAC, G.R. 65642, Oct. 15, 1984).

(2) The tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board deliberations are confidential pursuant to Sections 13 and
15 of the Central Bank Act.

Sec. 13. Withdrawal of persons having a personal interest. Whenever any member attending a meeting of the
Monetary Board has a material personal interest, directly or indirectly, in the discussion or resolution of any
given matter, said member shall not participate in the discussion or resolution of the matter and must retire
from the meeting during the deliberation thereon. The subject matter, when resolved, and the fact that a
member had a personal interest in it, shall be made available to the public. The minutes of the meeting shall
note the withdrawal of the member concerned. (As amended by PD No. 1827).

Sec. 15. Responsibility. — Any member of the Monetary Board or officer or employee of the Central Bank
who wilfully violates this Act or who is guilty of gross negligence in the performance of his duties shall be
held liable for any loss or injury suffered by the Bank as a result of such violation or negligence. Similar
responsibility shall apply to the disclosure of any information of a confidential nature about the discussion or
resolutions of the Monetary Board, except as required in Section 13 of this Act, or about the operations of the
Bank, and to the use of such information for personal gain or to the detriment of the Government, the Bank or
third parties. (As amended by Presidential Decree No. 72). (Italics supplied).

(3) The Monetary Board deliberations were necessarily held subsequent t the submission of the CB reports.
They did not enter into the making of those reports and can have no materiality to any question of fact that may
be raised in relation to their contents.

On April 16, 1986, Petitioner Banco Filipino filed its Comment on Respondent's petition to set aside the order
for the production of the documents. In said pleading, the petitioner bank assails the respondent's petition on
the following grounds:

(1) There is no reason why Banco Filipino should not be furnished the documents, particularly Nos. 3 to 9 of
its motion, when these are merely attachments to the Supervision and Examination Sector, Dept. It (SES)
Reports, copies of which were given to it pursuant to a Supreme Court order.

(2) The Supreme Court in its referral of October 8, 1985 to the RTC Makati intended full evidence taking of
the proceeding for judicial review of administrative action filed with the Supreme Court, the trial court being
better equipped for evidence taking.

(3) The respondents cannot claim privilege in refusing to produce the Central Bank records because it is based
only on the generalized interest in confidentiality. Petitioner cites as a precedent the doctrine established in the
case of U.S. vs. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713, which states that "when the ground for asserting privilege as to
subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal case is based only on the generalized interest in
confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law."
(4) The requested documents and records of the Central Bank are material and relevant because BF is entitled
to prove from the CB records (a) that Governor Fernandez closed BF without a MB resolution and without
examiner's reports on the financial position of BF; (b) that a MB resolution was later made to legalize the BF
closure but it had no supporting examiner's report; (c) that the earlier reports did not satisfy respondent
Governor Fernandez and he ordered the examiners and the conservator, Gilberto Teodoro, to "improve" them;
and (d) that the reports were then fabricated.

Petitioner adds that what respondents fear is disclosure of their proceedings because petitioner has accused the
CB governor of (a) covering 51% of its stockholding, (b) encashing BF securities in trickles as fuel a run, (c)
appointing a conservator when the President ordered the MB to grant petitioner a P 3 Billion credit line, (d)
replacing Estanislao with Gilberto Teodoro when the former wanted to resume normal operations of BF, and (e)
changing the conservatorship to receivership when it appointed Carlota Valenzuela as receiver again without
hearing.

On May 13, 1986, Respondent Monetary Board filed their Reply to Petitioner Bank's Comment dated April 15,
1986. Respondents argue that:

(1) The case of U.S. vs. Nixon and the other decisions cited by petitioner are inapplicable because-

a) The authorities cited refer only to a claim of privilege based only on the generalized interest of
confidentiality or on an executive privilege that is merely presumptive. On the other hand, the so-called MB
deliberations are privileged communications pursuant to Section 21, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court because
statements and opinions expressed in the deliberation of the members of the MB are specifically vested with
confidentiality under Secs. 13 and 15 of the Central Bank Act. The "public interest" requirement for
non-disclosure is evident from the fact that the statute punishes any disclosure of such deliberations.

b) Petitioner has not in the least shown any relevance or need to produce the alleged MB deliberations. What
petitioner intends to prove are not "issues" raised in the pleadings of the main petition.

(2) Petitioner is interested, not in discovering evidence, but in practicing oppression by the forced publication
of the MB members' confidential statements at board meetings.

(3) The so-called deliberations of the Monetary Board are in truth merely the individual statements and
expressions of opinion of its members. They are not statements or opinions that can be imputed to the board
itself or to the Central Bank. The transcripts of stenographic notes on the deliberations of the MB are not
official records of the CB; they are taken merely to assist the Secretary of the MB in the preparation of the
minutes of the meetings. And as advertedly also, the tape recordings are not available as these are used over
and over again.

The motion for the production of the subject documents was filed by petitioner pursuant to Section 1, Rule 27,
of the Rules of Court. It has been held that "a party is ordinarily entitled to the production of books, documents
and papers which are material and relevant to the establishment of his cause of action or defense" (General
Electric Co. vs. Superior Court in and for Alameda County, 45 C. 2d 879, cited in Martin, Rules of Court, 3rd
edition, Vol. 2, p. 104). "The test to be applied by the trial judge in determining the relevancy of documents
and the sufficiency of their description is one of reasonableness and practicability" (Line Corp. of the
Philippines vs. Moran, 59 Phil. 176, 180). "On the ground of public policy, the rules providing for production
and inspection of books and papers do not authorize the production or inspection of privileged matter, that is,
books, papers which because of their confidential and privileged character could not be received in evidence"
(27) CJS 224). "In passing on a motion for discovery of documents, the courts should be liberal in determining
whether or not documents are relevant to the subject matter of action" (Hercules Powder Co. vs. Haas Co., U.S.
Dist. Ct. Oct. 26, 1944, 9 Fed. Rules Service, 659, cited in Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1979 Ed.
Vol. 2, p. 102). Likewise, "any statute declaring in general terms that official records are confidential should be
liberally construed, to have an implied exception for disclosure when needed in a court of justice" (Wigmore
on Evidence, Vol. VIII, p. 801, citing the case of Marbury vs. Madison, 1 Cr. 137,143).

In the light of the jurisprudence above-cited, this Court holds that no grave abuse of discretion was committed
by the court below in granting petitioner's motion for the production of the documents enumerated herein. We
accept the view taken by the court below that the documents are not privileged and that these constitute or
contain evidence material to the issues being inquired into by the Court.

With respect to Items Nos. 3 to 9, these are the annexes to the Supervision and Examination Sector, Dept. II
(SES) Reports submitted to the Central Bank and Monetary Board which were taken into consideration by said
respondents in closing petitioner bank. A copy of the SES Reports was furnished to the petitioner. We,
therefore, fail to see any proper reason why the annexes thereto should be withheld. Petitioner cannot
adequately study and properly analyze the report without the corresponding annexes. Pertinent and relevant,
these could be useful and even necessary to the preparation by petitioner of its comment, objections and
exceptions to the Conservator's reports and receiver's reports.

Regarding copies of the letter and reports of first Conservator, Mr. Basilio Estanislao, to the Monetary Board
and to Central Bank Governor Fernandez (Item No. 2) these appear relevant as petitioner has asserted that the
above-named Conservator had in fact wanted to resume normal operations of Banco Filipino but then he was
thereafter replaced by Mr. Gilberto Teodoro. The letter and reports could be favorable or adverse to the case of
petitioner but whatever the result may be, petitioner should be allowed to photocopy the same.

As to the tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board deliberations on the closure of Banco Filipino and its
meetings on July 27, 1984, and March 22, 1985, (Item No. 1), respondents contend that "it is obvious from the
requirement (Sections 13 and 15 of the Central Bank Act) that the subject matter (of the deliberations), when
resolved. . . shall be made available to the public but the deliberations themselves are not open to disclosure
but are to be kept in confidence." This Court, however, sees it in a different light. The deliberations may be
confidential but not necessarily absolute and privileged. There is no specific provision in the Central Bank Act,
even in Sections 13 and 15 thereof, which prohibits absolutely the courts from conducting an inquiry on said
deliberations when these are relevant or material to a matter subject of a suit pending before it. The disclosure
is here not intended to obtain information for personal gain. There is no indication that such disclosure would
cause detriment to the government, to the bank or to third parties. Significantly, it is the bank itself here that is
interested in obtaining what it considers as information useful and indispensably needed by it to support its
position in the matter being inquired to by the court below.

On the other hand, respondents cite Section 21, Rule 130, Rules of Court which states:

Section 21. Privileged Communications. The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in
confidence in the following cases:

xxx xxx xxx

(e) A public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or afterwards, as to communications made to
him in official confidence, when the court finds that the public interest would suffer by disclosure.

But this privilege, as this Court notes, is intended not for the protection of public officers but for the protection
of public interest (Vogel vs. Gruaz 110 U.S. 311 cited in Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1980 Ed.
Vol. 5, p. 211). Where there is no public interest that would be prejudiced, this invoked rule will not be
applicable.

The rule that a public officer cannot be examined as to communications made to him in official confidence
does not apply when there is nothing to show that the public interest would suffer by the disclosure
question. ... ,( Agnew vs. Agnew,'52 SD 472, cited in Martin Rules of Court of the Philippines, Third Edition,
Vol. 5, p. 199).

In the case at bar, the respondents have not established that public interest would suffer by the disclosure of the
papers and documents sought by petitioner. Considering that petitioner bank was already closed as of January
25, 1985, any disclosure of the aforementioned letters, reports, and transcripts at this time pose no danger or
peril to our economy. Neither will it trigger any bank run nor compromise state secrets. Respondent's reason
for their resistance to the order of production are tenuous and specious. If the respondents public officials acted
rightfully and prudently in the performance of their duties, there should be nothing at all that would provoke
fear of disclosure

On the contrary, public interests will be best served by the disclosure of the documents. Not only the banks and
its employees but also its numerous depositors and creditors are entitled to be informed as to whether or not
there was a valid and legal justification for the petitioner's bank closure. It will be well to consider that—

Public interest means more than a mere curiosity; it means something in which the public, the community at
large, has some pecuniary interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected (State vs. Crocket, 206,
p. 816 cited in Words and Phrases, Vol. 35, p. 229).

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the order to produce documents dated February 17, 1986 issued by the
court below in S.C.- G.R. No. 70054, is hereby affirmed, except as to the copies of the tapes relative to the
Monetary Board deliberations on the closure of Banco Filipino on January 25, 1985 and its meetings on July
27, 1984, and March 22, 1985 and only if such tapes are actually no longer available taking into account
respondent Monetary Board's manifestations that the tape recording of the deliberations of that Board are, for
purposes of economy, used over and over again inasmuch as these tapes are not required to be kept or stored.
(See Respondent's Reply, dated May 12, 1986; Rollo, Vol. IV, pp. 1288-1289).

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., took no part.

G.R. No. L-65674 April 15, 1988

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DANILO B. CAPULONG, defendant-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Bayani Ma. Rino for defendant-appellant.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is an appeal interposed by accused Danilo B. Capulong from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, 4th
Judicial Region, Santa Cruz, Laguna, Branch XXVI finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425, the Dangerous Drugs Act of the 1972 as amended and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P 20,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, with all the accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay the costs.

The information filed against Capulong alleged:

That on or about October 14, 1982 in the afternoon at Brgy. Santissima, Municipality of Santa Cruz, Republic
of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named accused, without
lawful authority and not being authorized by law, did then and there, wilfully and feloniously, sell six (6) small
transparent plastic bags of dried marijuana, leaves in the amount of FIFTY (P 50.00) PESOS, to a poseur buyer
without any authority or license to sell Id marijuana, which is a prohibited drug in Violation of Sec. 4, Art. II,
of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. (p. 8, Rollo)

When arraigned, the appellant pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued.

The prosecution's evidence which formed the basis for the appellant's conviction can be summarized as
follows:

On October 14, 1982, a special mission of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit composed of Sgt. Lino Jarilla
as head, Sgt. Adjare Jasani and Patrolman Reynaldo Resurreccion as members proceeded to Santissima Cruz,
Santa Cruz, Laguna to conduct a "buy bust" operation for the purpose of apprehending pushers who are
engaged in the selling of marijuana. Their specific assignment was to locate Danilo Capulong, the
accused-appellant who was the alleged number one pusher in the sale of marijuana in Santa Cruz, Laguna. The
team arrived at Santissima Cruz at about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day. With them was an
informant, Larry Estacio. The informant was given instructions to contact the accused after which the team
positioned themselves at strategic places.

Estacio then approached Capulong pretending to buy marijuana leaves for himself. Capulong agreed to sell six
(6) plastic bags of dried marijuana for the price of P 50.00 winch was paid by Estacio. The transaction was
witnessed by the team so that immediately after Capulong received the marked money (P 50.00) from Estacio,
the former arrested Capulong. With Capulong at the time was Bernardo Paynaganan who was also charged for
violation of section 8, Art. II of the Dangerous Drugs Act (Criminal Case No. SC-2816 of the Regional Trial
Court, Santa Cruz, Laguna).

Found in the possession of Capulong was the marked money, a fifty peso bill with serial No. JF 247521, while
one stick of marijuana was found in the possession of Paynaganan.

Capulong was brought to the headquarters at Calamba, Laguna where he was investigated. Thereafter, he
executed an extra-judicial confession admitting his guilt. After a laboratory examination at the PC Laboratory,
the bags containing dried leaves were found positive for marijuana.

On his part, Capulong's defense is summarized as follows:

On October 14, 1982 at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, he was with Bernardo Paynaganan in Aling Nelia's
store watching a basketball game in a vacant lot when Larry Estacio, who was drunk, arrived. Estacio was
holding a fifty peso (P 50.00) bill, and asked Capulong and Paynaganan if they had marijuana to which they
replied in the negative. Estacio then left but returned a few minutes later carrying with him six (6) plastic bags
of marijuana and one (1) stick of marijuana. After giving the stick of marijuana to Paynaganan, Estacio left.

A little later, Estacio returned with CANU officials riding in a jeep and Paynaganan and Capulong were
immediately handcuffed.

The defense also tried to prove that Capulong was maltreated several times by the investigators forcing him to
sign an extra-judicial confession admitting his guilt. In addition, he asserted that his pieces of jewelry
amounting to P 3,000.00, his new Adidas pair of shoes worth P 500.00 and his Zeppo lighter worth P 80.00
were taken by investigator, Lino Jarilla.

The trial court gave credence to the prosecution's evidence and rejected that of the appellant. Accordingly,
Capulong was found guilty as charged.

The issues raised in this appeal can be categorized into the following: (1) whether or not the extrajudicial
confession of Capulong is admissible in the light of the force, duress and intimidation which allegedly attended
the execution thereof and 2) credibility of the witnesses.

The records are clear to the effect that the extrajudicial confession of Capulong was made without the
assistance of counsel. Therefore, applying our pronouncements in the case of People v. Benigno Pineda y
Dimatulac, (G.R. No. 72400, January 15, 1988), this issue has become academic. We said:

A discussion of the alleged coercion and intimidation in the first assigned error has become academic with the
change in the Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution regarding the rights of the accused. Article 3, Section 12
of the 1987 Constitution specifically provides that the rights of the accused, among them the right to counsel,
cannot be waived except in writ and in the presence of counsel. Thus, even if the confession of the accused is
gospel truth, since it was made without assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible in evidence regardless of
the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given.
After a careful examination of the records, however, we find no reason to depart from the trial court's
appreciation of the evidence of the prosecution and that of the defense.

On the credibility of the witnesses, the well-settled rule is that the trial court's findings are accorded the highest
degree of respect, it being in the position to observe the demeanor and manner of testifying of the witnesses
(People v. de Jesus, 145 SCRA 521).

In the instant case, the guilt of the accused was proven beyond reasonable doubt. He was caught in flagrante
delicto by the CANU officers who were then on a mission to conduct a "buy bust" operation for the purpose of
apprehending marijuana pushers in Santissima, Santa Cruz, Laguna. What the team did was to employ ways
and means of entrapping and catching him in flagrante. The three CANU officers were eyewitnesses to the
crime committed by the appellant. We give credence to the narration of the incident by the three officers of the
team because they are law enforcers and are, therefore, presumed to have regularly performed their duty in the
absence of proof to the contrary (People v. Gamayon, 121 SCRA 642; People v. Patog, 144 SCRA 429; People
v. Natipravat, 145 SCRA 483; People v. de Jesus, 145 SCRA 521). The testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses were accepted by the trial court as credible. Going over the details of said testimonies, we see no
reason not to follow the conclusions of the trial court.

Moreover, the record does not show that the CANU officers who were responsible for the appellant's
entrapment were motivated by any improper motives other than to accomplish their mission (See People vs. De
Jesus, supra.)

The appellant alleges that he was a victim of a pre-planned extortion. To prove his allegation. The appellant
cites the following circumstances: The complaint against him was filed only on October 20, 1982, six days
after his arrest; that the complaint was filed without any supporting documents; affidavits of the accused were
attached only on October 21, 1982; the alleged marijuana leaves were submitted for laboratory examination
only on October 27, 1982 or after a period of 13 days from the arrest of the accused and 7 days or the
complaint was filed. These delays according to the appellant were for the purpose of extorting money from him
and his relatives especially his half-sister who was the common-law wife of a rich Chinese businessman. Thus,
the appellant alleges that the filing of the complaint was completed only on October 27, 1982, after his sister
failed to see Patrolman Resurreccion for the delivery of the money being demanded from the appellant in
exchange for his freedom.

We are not inclined to believe his extortion angle of the case. As the lower court said:

In his attempt to weaken the evidence of the prosecution, the accused tried to prove that, in the course of the
investigation, investigating officials, particularly a certain Pat. Reynaldo Resurreccion of the INP was extorting
P 30,000.00 from him in order to fix the case and that for their failure to raise the necessary amount, this case
was fabricated against him. Be that as it may, that the investigator was extorting from the accused does not
disprove the commission of the crime. In fact, it is even an admission of a crime. Why would anybody extort
from another unless there is a case to be fixed? Bernardo Paynaganan, one of the witnesses for the accused,
testified and was corroborated by Violets Osano that the CANU officials were asking the sum of P 30,000.00,
but according to Violeta, she was not able to raise said amount and the case had already been filed. If it were
true that the accused was not actually engaged in any illegal activity selling prohibited drugs, the demand could
have been rejected outright and they could have reported the matter to the higher authorities. While Violeta
Osano alleged to have gone to Colonel Antonio to denounce the actuation of Resurreccion, she testified that
she did not want to be responsible for the suspension of said officer from his work, because she had observed
Resurreccion's poor economic condition. Between Resurreccion and her own brother, the accused in this case,
it is against human nature that she would think of the effect of Resurreccion's suspension on his future life and
disregard the would be effect on that of her brother. Contrary to her allegation that the case was filed because
they had failed to produce the required amount, she testified on cross that on October 20, she already knew
about the case filed before the municipal court. Despite that fact, she mentioned having gone to Resurreccion's
place on the 24th of said month but Resurreccion was not in his place at that time (tsn May 16, 1983, pp.
19-20). Another witness for the defense Bernardo Paynaganan, the companion of the accused at the time of the
apprehension by the CANU officers, claimed that he was not able to produce the amount because he is only a
fisherman. (p. 25-27, Rollo)

Finally, the appellant questions the non-presentation of Larry Estaclo, the informant used by the CANU
officers in entrapping him in flagrante. The number of witnesses to be presented and the nature of the facts to
be established during the examination of those witnesses is a discretionary function of the prosecution.

The non-presentation of Estacio as witness is not fatal to the prosecution's case. His testimony would be
merely corroborative and cumulative (See People v. Cerelegia 147 SCRA 538).

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the Regional Trial Court, 4th
Judicial District, Santa Cruz, Laguna, Branch XXVI is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.