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Quizz 3A Game Theory

This document contains a 10 question quiz on game theory concepts like Nash equilibria, dominance, and payoff matrices. The questions cover identifying properties of preference relations, analyzing games for Nash equilibria using techniques like iterated elimination of dominated strategies, and classifying different game scenarios like prisoners' dilemmas.

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Camilla
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61 views

Quizz 3A Game Theory

This document contains a 10 question quiz on game theory concepts like Nash equilibria, dominance, and payoff matrices. The questions cover identifying properties of preference relations, analyzing games for Nash equilibria using techniques like iterated elimination of dominated strategies, and classifying different game scenarios like prisoners' dilemmas.

Uploaded by

Camilla
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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G&S_W3A Score:

1.    Which one of the following properties are not required for a preference relation:
A Symmetry

B Reflexiveness

C Transitivity

D Completeness

2.    Composing utility functions by any strictly increasing function does not change
the outcome of a game.
A True

B False

3.    Consider the following game:

LR
T (1,0) (0,2)
M (0,2) (2,0)
B (1,1) (2,1)

Which of the following is/are pure strategy Nash equilibria?


A LB

B RB

C Both

D There is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium.

4.    Consider the following two-player game. Each player is seperately and


simultaneously offered the following choice: either give 3 euros to the other player
or keep 1 euro for himself. The Nash equilibrium payoffs are:
A (3,3)

B (4,0)

C (0,4)

D (1,1)

5.    Consider the following two-player game: each player has to chose between right
and left. If both chose the same, player 1 wins 1 euro. If they chose differently,
player 2 wins 1€. This game does not have a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
A True

B False

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6.    Consider the following game:

LCR
T (1,1) (4,2) (0,-1)

M (1,3) (2,4) (0,3)

B (0,1) (2,5) (-2,2)

By iterated elimination of dominated strategies, choose the Nash equilibrium.


A TC

B BC

C MR

D ML

7.    Consider the following game: two players must choose a number between 0 and
10. Then the winner is whoever is closer to the mean of their answers. Which of the
propositions is a Nash Equilibrium??
A (5,5)

B (2,3)

C (3,9)

D (0,0)

E Any combination.

F (8,4)

8.    Consider the following game:

LCR
T (10,1) (4,2) (2,1)

M (1,3) (5,5) (6,1)

B (3,1) (1,4) (-2,2)

By iterated elimination of dominated strategies, find a Nash equilibrium.


A TL

B TC

C MR

D BR

E MC

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9.    French and British fishermen are at war. Resources are getting scarce and both
countries know they should strongly diminish the fished quantities. Still, no one
wants to make the first step in reducing its quotas. This can be modelled as an
instance of...
A a Prisoners' dilemma.

B A Crossing game.

C Dove and Hawks.

D Battle of the sexes.

10.    Consider the following payoff matrix:

LR
T (a,b) (1,2)
B (0,5) (1,4)

For which pair (a,b) are T and L simultaneously strictly dominant?


A (1,2)

B (3,2)

C (2,3)

D They can't be strictly dominant.

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