48. Eugenio, Sr., vs. Velez, 185 SCRA 425 G.R. No.

85140 May 17, 1990

G.R. No. 85140 May 17, 1990

TOMAS EUGENIO, SR., petitioner,

vs.

HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City, DEPUTY
SHERIFF JOHNSON TAN, JR., Deputy Sheriff of Branch 20, Regional Trial Court, Cagayan de Oro City, and the
Private Respondents, the petitioners in Sp. Proc. No. 88-55, for "Habeas Corpus", namely: CRISANTA VARGAS-
SANCHEZ, SANTOS and NARCISA VARGAS-BENTULAN, respondents.

G.R. No. 86470 May 17, 1990.

TOMAS EUGENIO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.

HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City, CRISANTA
VARGAS-SANCHEZ, FELIX VARGAS, ERNESTO VARGAS, NATIVIDAD VARGAS-CAGAPE, NENITA VARGAS-CADENAS,
LUDIVINA VARGAS-DE LOS SANTOS and NARCISA VARGAS-BENTULAN, respondents-appellees.

Maximo G. Rodriguez for petitioner.

PADILLA, J.:

On 5 October 1988, petitioner came to this Court with a petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for
restraining order and/or injunction (docketed as G.R. No. 85140) seeking to enjoin respondent Judge from proceeding
with the Habeas Corpus case (Sp. Proc. No. 88- 55, RTC, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City), * the respondent Sheriff from
enforcing and implementing the writ and orders of the respondent Judge dated 28, 29, and 30 September 1988, and to
declare said writ and orders as null and void. In a resolution issued on 11 October 1988, this Court required comment
from the respondents on the petition but denied the application for a temporary restraining order.

The records disclose the following:

Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of (Vitaliana Vargas Vitaliana for brevity), her full blood brothers and sisters,
herein private respondents (Vargases', for brevity) filed on 27 September 1988, a petition for habeas corpus before the
RTC of Misamis Oriental (Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City) alleging that Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her residence
sometime in 1987 and confined by herein petitioner in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. Despite her
desire to escape, Vitaliana was allegedly deprived of her liberty without any legal authority. At the time the petition was
filed, it was alleged that Vitaliana was 25 years of age, single, and living with petitioner Tomas Eugenio.

The respondent court in an order dated 28 September 1988 issued the writ of habeas corpus, but the writ was returned
unsatisfied. Petitioner refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana (who had died on 28 August 1988) to the respondent
sheriff, reasoning that a corpse cannot be the subject of habeas corpus proceedings; besides, according to petitioner, he
had already obtained a burial permit from the Undersecretary of the Department of Health, authorizing the burial at the
palace quadrangle of the Philippine Benevolent Christian Missionary, Inc. (PBCM), a registered religious sect, of which he
(petitioner) is the Supreme President and Founder.

Petitioner also alleged that Vitaliana died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in his residence on 28 August
1988. As her common law husband, petitioner claimed legal custody of her body. These reasons were incorporated in an
explanation filed before the respondent court. Two (2) orders dated 29 and 30 September 1988 were then issued by
respondent court, directing delivery of the deceased's body to a funeral parlor in Cagayan de Oro City and its autopsy.

Petitioner (as respondent in the habeas corpus proceedings) filed an urgent motion to dismiss the petition therein,
claiming lack of jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the action under sec. 1(b) of Rule 16 in relation to sec. 2, Rule
72 of the Rules of Court.1 A special proceeding for habeas corpus, petitioner argued, is not applicable to a dead person
but extends only to all cases of illegal confinement or detention of a live person.

Before resolving the motion to dismiss, private respondents (as petitioners below) were granted leave to amend their
petition. 2 Claiming to have knowledge of the death of Vitaliana only on 28 September 1988 (or after the filing of the
habeas corpus petition), private respondents (Vargases') alleged that petitioner Tomas Eugenia who is not in any way
related to Vitaliana was wrongfully interfering with their (Vargases') duty to bury her. Invoking Arts. 305 and 308 of the
Civil Code, 3 the Vargases contended that, as the next of kin in the Philippines, they are the legal custodians of the dead
body of their sister Vitaliana. An exchange of pleadings followed. The motion to dismiss was finally submitted for
resolution on 21 October 1988.

In the absence of a restraining order from this Court, proceedings continued before the respondent court; the body was
placed in a coffin, transferred to the Greenhills Memorial Homes in Cagayan de Oro City, viewed by the presiding Judge
of respondent court, and examined by a duly authorized government pathologist. 4

Denying the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner, the court a quo held in an order, 5 dated 17 November 1988, that:

It should be noted from the original petition, to the first amended petition, up to the second amended petition that the
ultimate facts show that if the person of Vitaliana Vargas turns out to be dead then this Court is being prayed to declare
the petitioners as the persons entitled to the custody, interment and/or burial of the body of said deceased. The Court,
considering the circumstance that Vitaliana Vargas was already dead on August 28, 1988 but only revealed to the Court
on September 29, 1988 by respondent's counsel, did not lose jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of this case
because it may entertain this case thru the allegations in the body of the petition on the determination as to who is
entitled to the custody of the dead body of the late Vitaliana Vargas as well as the burial or interment thereof, for the
reason that under the provisions of Sec. 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, which reads as follows:

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;

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(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;

(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions:

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it so provides that the Regional Trial Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to try this case. The authority to try the
issue of custody and burial of a dead person is within the lawful jurisdiction of this Court because of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129 and because of the allegations of the pleadings in this case, which are enumerated in Sec. 19, pars. 1, 5 and 6 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129.

Thereafter, the court a quo proceeded as in or civil cases and, in due course, rendered a decision on 17 January 1989, 6
resolving the main issue of whether or not said court acquired jurisdiction over the case by treating it as an action for
custody of a dead body, without the petitioners having to file a separate civil action for such relief, and without the Court
first dismissing the original petition for habeas corpus.

Citing Sections 19 and 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981), 7 Sections 5 and 6 of
Rule 135 of the Rules of Court8 Articles 305 and 308 in relation to Article 294 of the Civil Code and Section 1104 of the
Revised Administrative Code, 9 the decision stated:

. . . . By a mere reading of the petition the court observed that the allegations in the original petition as well as in the two
amended petitions show that Vitaliana Vargas has been restrained of her liberty and if she were dead then relief was
prayed for the custody and burial of said dead person. The amendments to the petition were but elaborations but the
ultimate facts remained the same, hence, this court strongly finds that this court has ample jurisdiction to entertain and
sit on this case as an action for custody and burial of the dead body because the body of the petition controls and is
binding and since this case was raffled to this court to the exclusion of all other courts, it is the primary duty of this court
to decide and dispose of this case. . . . . 10

Satisfied with its jurisdiction, the respondent court then proceeded to the matter of rightful custody over the dead body,
(for purposes of burial thereof). The order of preference to give support under Art. 294 was used as the basis of the
award. Since there was no surviving spouse, ascendants or descendants, the brothers and sisters were preferred over
petitioner who was merely a common law spouse, the latter being himself legally married to another woman. 11
On 23 January 1989, a new petition for review with application for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary
injunction was filed with this Court (G.R. No. 86470). Raised therein were pure questions of law, basically Identical to
those raised in the earlier petition (G.R. No. 85140); hence, the consolidation of both cases. 12 On 7 February 1989,
petitioner filed an urgent motion for the issuance of an injunction to maintain status quo pending appeal, which this
Court denied in a resolution dated 23 February 1989 stating that "Tomas Eugenio has so far failed to sufficiently
establish a clear legal right to the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana Vargas, which now needs a decent burial." The
petitions were then submitted for decision without further pleadings.

Between the two (2) consolidated petitions, the following issues are raised:

1. propriety of a habeas corpus proceeding under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court to recover custody of the dead body of a
25 year old female, single, whose nearest surviving claimants are full blood brothers and sisters and a common law
husband.

2. jurisdiction of the RTC over such proceedings and/or its authority to treat the action as one for
custody/possession/authority to bury the deceased/recovery of the dead.

3. interpretation of par. 1, Art. 294 of the Civil Code (Art. 199 of the new Family Code) which states:

Art. 294. The claim for support, when proper and two or more persons are obliged to give it, shall be made in the
following order:

(1) From the spouse;

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Section 19, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides for the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts over
civil cases. Under Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus may be granted by a Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court). It is an elementary rule of procedure that what controls is not the caption of the
complaint or petition; but the allegations therein determine the nature of the action, and even without the prayer for a
specific remedy, proper relief may nevertheless be granted by the court if the facts alleged in the complaint and the
evidence introduced so warrant. 13

When the petition for habeas corpus was filed before the court a quo, it was not certain whether Vitaliana was dead or
alive. While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere perfimetory operation on
the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is exercised in its issuance, and such facts must be made to appear to the
judge to whom the petition is presented as, in his judgment, prima facie entitle the petitioner to the writ. 14 While the
court may refuse to grant the writ if the petition is insufficient in form and substance, the writ should issue if the petition
complies with the legal requirements and its averments make a prima facie case for relief. However, a judge who is
asked to issue a writ of habeas corpus need not be very critical in looking into the petition for very clear grounds for the
exercise of this jurisdiction. The latter's power to make full inquiry into the cause of commitment or detention will
enable him to correct any errors or defects in the petition. 15

In Macazo and Nunez vs. Nunez, 16 the Court frowned upon the dismissal of a habeas corpus petition filed by a brother
to obtain custody of a minor sister, stating:

All these circumstances notwithstanding, we believe that the case should not have been dismissed. The court below
should not have overlooked that by dismissing the petition, it was virtually sanctioning the continuance of an adulterous
and scandalous relation between the minor and her married employer, respondent Benildo Nunez against all principles
of law and morality. It is no excuse that the minor has expressed preference for remaining with said respondent, because
the minor may not chose to continue an illicit relation that morals and law repudiate.

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The minor's welfare being the paramount consideration, the court below should not allow the technicality, that Teofilo
Macazo was not originally made a party, to stand in the way of its giving the child full protection. Even in a habeas
corpus proceeding the court had power to award temporary custody to the petitioner herein, or some other suitable
person, after summoning and hearing all parties concerned. What matters is that the immoral situation disclosed by the
records be not allowed to continue. 17
After the fact of Vitaliana's death was made known to the petitioners in the habeas corpus proceedings, amendment of
the petition for habeas corpus, not dismissal, was proper to avoid multiplicity of suits. Amendments to pleadings are
generally favored and should be liberally allowed in furtherance of justice in order that every case may so far as possible
be determined on its real facts and in order to expedite the trial of cases or prevent circuity of action and unnecessary
expense, unless there are circumstances such as inexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse party by surprise or the
like, which justify a refusal of permission to amend. 18 As correctly alleged by respondents, the writ of habeas corpus as
a remedy became moot and academic due to the death of the person allegedly restrained of liberty, but the issue of
custody remained, which the court a quo had to resolve.

Petitioner claims he is the spouse contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, the term spouse used therein not being
preceded by any qualification; hence, in the absence of such qualification, he is the rightful custodian of Vitaliana's body.
Vitaliana's brothers and sisters contend otherwise. Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A
man and woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the
public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be
considered legally mauled in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines. 19

While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are present in our society, and that
they produce a community of properties and interests which is governed by law, 20 authority exists in case law to the
effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the man and woman living together must not in any way be
incapacitated to contract marriage. 21 In any case, herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a
legal impediment which disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI of Cavite, 22 ,the Court,
thru Mr. Justice Paras, interpreting Art. 188 of the Civil Code (Support of Surviving Spouse and Children During
Liquidation of Inventoried Property) stated: "Be it noted however that with respect to 'spouse', the same must be the
legitimate 'spouse' (not common-law spouses)."

There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse" embraces common law relation for
purposes of exemption from criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief committed or caused
mutually by spouses. The Penal Code article, it is said, makes no distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is
sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband and wife de facto.23 But this view cannot even
apply to the facts of the case at bar. We hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the
contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis
Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.

Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving brothers and sisters (the Vargases).
Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:

Sec. 1103. Persons charged with duty of burial. — The immediate duty of burying the body of a deceased person,
regardless of the ultimate liability for the expense thereof, shall devolve upon the persons hereinbelow specified:

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(b) If the deceased was an unmarried man or woman, or a child, and left any kin, the duty of burial shall devolve upon
the nearest of kin of the deceased, if they be adults and within the Philippines and in possession of sufficient means to
defray the necessary expenses.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Both petitions are hereby DISMISSED. No Costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Medialdea and
Regalado, JJ., concur.

Gancayco and Grino-Aquino, JJ., are on leave.