E-ISSN: 2469-4339

Management and Economics Research Journal, Vol. 4, S1, 60–66, 2018

Special Issue: Is there a

need for Reforms in IMF?
A Critical Evaluation of IMF History
and Policies

Ahmed and Sukar

HATASO, USA
60 Special Issue: Is there a need for Reforms in IMF?

A Critical Evaluation of IMF History and Policies

Syed Ahmed*, Abdulhamid Sukar
School of Business, Cameron University, 2800 W. Gore Boulevard, Lawton, OK 73505, USA.

*Correspondence: [email protected]

Received: Oct 5, 2017; Accepted: Dec 19, 2017

Abstract
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was originally mandated to maintain exchange rate stability and adjustment of
external imbalances in member countries and to act as a lender for countries facing short-term balance-of-payment cri-
ses. With the breakdown of the fixed exchange rate system, the IMF had to adjust its role in exchange rate management.
The international banking crisis in the 1980s required a recalibration of IMF policies. Most of the policies in the 1980s and
1990s were driven by “Washington Consensus,” a doctrinaire view of economic development that called for structural
adjustment through market liberalization and privatizations. However, critics indicate that the IMF, by failing to consider
the unique conditions in developing economies and lumping them under a “one size fits all,” category may have caused
more damage than good. In addition, it was alleged that IMF loans imposed unrealistic conditions on borrowers. All
these policies are under review now in a quest for appropriate policies that will address some of these concerns and aid
economic development. This paper provides a brief review of IMF policies from a historical perspective and a critique of
IMF policies over the last few decades.

Keywords: Capital control; conditionality; financial crisis; financial reform; global institution, reserve asset, structural
adjustment.

1.  INTRODUCTION

The establishment of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) at the conclusion of the Bretton Woods agree-
ment heralded a new era in the international economic landscape after the stalemate of interwar years.
The Bretton Woods agreement was the brainchild of two protagonists. Representing the British side was
the world renowned economist, John Maynard Keynes, who revolutionized macroeconomics with his Gen-
eral Theory. Representing the US side was a Harvard economist, John Dexter White, then treasury secre-
tary. These two prodigies had two different, sometimes, opposing visions about the emerging international
monetary order. Keynes, being the reputed economist, wanted to maintain UK interests in the postwar era,
whereas White wanted to ensure that the emergence of the United States as the mightiest economic power
was recognized. Another complicating issue was that British and other European powers needed immediate
financial aid to recover from their prewar losses.
Keynes envisioned a truly multilateral system, based on a single international central bank that would
serve as an international clearing union (ICU). The ICU would be structured in a way so that no single cur-
rency and, therefore, no single country could dominate the system and also to prevent a crisis in the for-
eign exchange market similar to the one in 1928-1932 (D’Arista and Erturk, 2013). In Keynes’ vision, the ICU
would create an international reserve currency, Bancour, which would supplement gold and dollar. Similar
to Keynes, White also believed that a multilateral institution would be far more effective than a bilateral
institution in helping countries ravaged by the war. He suggested the formation of an international credit
cooperative, which would provide loans to banks, the size of the loan to be determined by the amounts paid
by other member countries. At the end, neither of the two proposals saw the light of the day in their original
forms, but the final deal incorporated parts of both proposals.
This paper provides a brief review of IMF policies from a historical perspective and a critique of IMF
policies. Section 2 delineates the evolution of IMF from a historical perspective. Section 3 provides a critique
of IMF governance and policies. Section 4 demonstrates some evidence between IMF loans and economic
growth. Section 5 provides some concluding thoughts.

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2.  EVOLUTION OF IMF POLICIES—A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

We can divide the evolving history of the IMF into three phases.

2.1.  Phase I: IMF Policies during the Fixed Exchange Period, 1944-1971
The mandate of the IMF at its creation was to govern and support the new international economic order in
the postwar world (Kenen, 2007). The IMF was created to maintain exchange rate stability and adjustment
of external imbalances in member countries and act as a lender for countries facing short-term balance-
of-payment crises (Minton-Beddoes, 1995). In the initial years, the overriding objective of the IMF was to
support and maintain the multi-currency parity rate based on the fixed price of dollar in terms of gold. Dur-
ing the fixed exchange rate system, the US dollar was pegged to gold at $35 per ounce of gold and other
major currencies were linked to the US dollar at a fixed rate. The IMF would advise a country to devalue its
currency if it considered the currency to be overvalued, hurting its balance-of-payment position. Exchange
rate misalignment and balance-of-payment difficulties were the main preoccupation of the IMF during the
period from 1944 to 1971.
During the 1950s and 1960s, IMF lending mostly comprised short-term loans to advanced economies
to facilitate moderate exchange rate adjustments (Reinhart and Trebesch, 2015). Western developed nations
such as the United Kingdom, France, Iceland, Italy, Spain Portugal, and the United States borrowed from the
IMF in the initial years after the formation of IMF. Later, the IMF assistance was provided mainly to develop-
ing economies of Asia, Africa, and Latin America and emerging market economies in Eastern Europe. Mem-
bership expanded from 28 in 1945 to 188 in 1990s. Membership experienced two growth spurts, one in the
1960s because of independence of former colonies of Africa and the other in the 1990s after the breakdown
of the soviet empire and the independence of eastern European countries (Broughton, 2009).
Since its inception, the Bretton Woods system suffered from problems of liquidity, confidence, and
adjustment. In the post-World War II world economy, the dollar emerged as the key currency and a major
reserve asset. Dollars held by the official institutions (mainly non-US central banks) were freely convertible
into gold. However, the problem was, as Triffin (1960, 1968) indicated, the inherent unsustainability of the
system. This is because a growing supply of world liquidity of reserve assets (US dollar) depended crucially
on a growing US trade deficit. However, a large balance-of-payments deficit, relative to the supply of gold,
undermines confidence in the reserve currency and could trigger a crisis. The pressure on the US dollar
mounted, as the US trade balance worsened in the 1960s owing to Vietnam, a huge international aid pro-
gram, and other commitments.
When some European central banks began to convert US dollars into gold, US gold reserves at Fort
Knox began to fall at an alarming rate. President Nixon declared a moratorium on the convertibility of dollar
into gold on August 15, 1971, ending the era of fixed exchange rate.

2.2.  Phase II: Oil Price Shock and International Banking Crisis, 1972-2007
After a turmoil in the foreign exchange market upon the collapse of the Bretton Woods agreement in 1971,
dust started to settle around 1973 when the Jamaica agreement was reached. The era of floating exchange
rates began with the exchange rates of developed countries determined by free forces of demand and sup-
ply and exchange rates of most developing economies linked to major convertible currencies of the west.
The oil price shocks of 1973-1974 unleashed a new set of dynamics both on the demand and the supply
side in the foreign exchange market, which also provided new challenges for the fund. On the demand side,
oil-importing countries were in need of dire financial help for high costs of oil imports. On the supply side,
oil-exporting countries ended up with a sudden bonanza of reserves from the oil price hike. Much of the oil
revenues found their way into European financial markers as petrodollars. To meet the challenges of the oil
price shock, the IMF created an oil facility (Broughton, 2009).
On the heel of the international banking crisis in the early 1980s, the IMF had to reinvent itself to meet
new challenges and recalibrate its policies to deal with the crisis that unfolded with default on sovereign debt
by some Latin American countries. The focus shifted from exchange rate management issues and balance-
of-payment problems to sovereign default and international banking issues. The scope of IMF expanded to
structural reform and financial stabilization management of member countries. The international institution

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62 Special Issue: Is there a need for Reforms in IMF?

was expected to provide a new public good in the form of financial market stability (Bordo and James,
2000). In view of recurring banking crises, the IMF adopted a two-pronged policy of financial sector stabil-
ity and prevention of liquidity crisis (Papi et al., 2015). These issues reemerged during the global financial
crisis of 2008. Since the early 1980s, term loans were replaced with long-term loans on projects that would
span over decades with precautionary credit lines provided to prequalified countries. Loans became more of
developmental assistance. Following the lead of World Bank and based on the Washington consensus, IMF
loans were also tied to structural reforms. Loans were made conditional upon implementation of structural
adjustment policies and successful reforms in the economy. Close surveillance, constant monitoring, and
policy recommendations became part of the new policy. Since 1990s, IMF loans have been tied to financial
reform measures and capital account liberalization measures (Joyce and Noy, 2008). An important lesson
learned from the financial crises of the 1990s in Mexico, Southeast Asian counties, Russia, and Turkey is
that financial sector liberalization, without tight banking supervision in place, may lead to banking sector
fragility.

2.3.  Phase III: Global Financial Crisis and New Challenges, 2000
During the Asian financial crisis in 1997, many Southeast Asian countries could not get IMF loans because of
highly stringent conditions attached to the loans. Consequently, the IMF reserves continued to grow. Coun-
tries such as Thailand, Hong Kong, Korea, and Singapore learned a valuable lesson from their experiences of
financial crises. Not taking any more chances, some of these countries gathered over $100 billion war-chest
funds to ride over any possible financial storm (Eraseder, 2015). Consequently, around 2003, income from
the IMF loan portfolio shrunk alarmingly as countries started taking fewer loans from the IMF.
The global financial crisis of 2007-2008 changed the international financial landscape for the IMF again,
as it regained its status as international lender of last resort (Ban and Gallagher, 2014). The IMF started provid-
ing more loans to countries that suffered financial crises, opening the spigot of money to distressed countries.
During the global financial crisis, the IMF provided loan arrangements of $225 billion as of October 31, 2009,
whereas it had provided only $36 billion in loans to distressed countries in Southeast Asia in 1997-1998. Thus,
according to Rose (2010), the IMF emerged as the lead international financial institution in charge of dealing
with financial crises. The IMF received additional resources in the form of Special Drawing Right (SDRs) worth
$250 billion. Its lending capacity increased to $750 billion through an expansion of “New Arrangements to
Borrow” (Rose, 2010). Within 18 months of the unfolding of the crisis, 18 countries received loans as part of
the crisis management. After the global financial crisis, the IMF loan exceeded any previous record in terms of
sheer volume of loan provided to Greece and other PIIGS (Portugal, Italy, Iceland, Greece, and Spain) countries
(Eraseder, 2015). According to Rose (2010), the IMF rose to the occasion in the aftermath of the global financial
crisis, as leaders of developed countries stood by their IMF commitments. As a result, the IMF was not criti-
cized as badly about handling the global crisis as it was in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis.
Since the financial crisis of 2008, the IMF started emphasizing the importance of fiscal balance and
consolidation to borrower countries with reduced emphasis on structural reforms that characterized the IMF
policies in the 1980s and 1990s (Broome, 2014).

3.  REVIEW OF IMF POLICIES

The original framework of the Bretton Woods system had international development content and was for-
mulated in consultation with developing countries. The Bretton Woods discussion generated many innova-
tive proposals to create a development-friendly international financial order, some of which found their way
into the agreement (Helliner, 2014). The content was dramatically watered down when many of the original
architects of the system lost influence and those who assumed power were skeptical about the development
goals and urged free trade and the acceptance of foreign investment in the region (Helliner, 2017).
Countries of Latin America and India expressed strong frustration with the lack of international devel-
opment content in the existing system and together with Africa and other developing countries demanded
a “New International Economic Order” (NIEO) that would support their development goals. They demanded
greater access to financial resources in the North to meet development needs and an increase in the overall
participation in the decision-making process of the fund.

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In early 1970s when interest rates were low, developing countries borrowed heavily to invest in infra-
structure and other large-scale development projects. When interest rates increased sharply in 1980s, heavy
debt loads seriously affected their ability to repay and forced them to borrow more to finance their debt. As
a result of this, the push for the NIEO order collapsed, developing countries lost their voice in the decision
making, state-level development policies were dismantled, and multilateral governance became mainly
centered around G7 (Helliner, 2017).
As mentioned above, the World Bank and IMF introduced structural adjustment programs (SAP)—long-
term loans to countries experiencing recurrent balance-of-payment problems. These loans emerged with
a variety of conditions based on what is termed as “Washington Consensus.” The Washington consensus
maintained that market liberalization, privatization, and fiscal responsibility would spur economic growth
in less-developed economies as it did in developed economies. Restructuring comprised reducing public
expenditure, liberalizing trade, investment, and capital controls; deregulation; and privatization of state-
owned enterprises. Frequently, the terms of conditionality were attached with IMF loans without due con-
sideration for borrower countries’ individual circumstances and their perspectives.
According to critics, the IMF imposed the Washington consensus upon developing economies with
considerably many restrictions. Stiglitz (2002) contends that requirements of conditionality imposed by
international institutions such as the IMF or World Bank have been used as policy tools frequently without
considering the best interests of the economics concerned. In some cases, the IMF may have provided
wrong recommendations to developing economies in terms of monetary and fiscal policies. For example,
Stiglitz provided an example of Korea where during the Asian financial crisis, the IMF urged the central
bank of Korea to focus on inflation although monetary policy did not cause any problem there. Stiglitz also
suggested that the “one size fits all” approach did not recognize the distinct characteristics and dynamics of
different countries and the policies might have caused more harm than good.
Critics argue that the IMF policies were applied all at once than sequentially—for example, careful
regard was not taken to determine whether appropriate Institutional framework was present for imple-
mentation of such policies. For example, privatization of utility companies was recommended without con-
sideration for the impact on unemployment. Large-scale privatization was conducted without creating an
appropriate institutional framework to deal with unemployment problems that would result from the mas-
sive layoffs by the newly created private firms who took over public companies, leading to immense eco-
nomic and social problems.
Critics of IMF were also apprehensive about the role of the Bretton Woods institutions in shaping the
development discourse through their research, publishing activities. Many of the top positions of the IMF
were held by University of Chicago graduates who were strong supporters of free market economy and
advocated privatization, deregulation, and cuts on social spending (Klein, 2007). As the World Bank and the
IMF staff were regarded as experts in the field of financial regulations and economic development, their
view and prescriptions undermined or eliminated alternative perspectives on development. Even within
the Chicago boys, those who tried to introduce these ideas with democratic debate were overwhelmingly
rejected (Klein, 2007).
There is a slew of critical literature on the conditionality with a general focus on the distributional
aspect of the reform. Criticisms of IMF policies include the failure of reforms to take social and environmen-
tal issues into account and the failure to ensure sustained growth. Another point of criticism of the IMF was
that the conditionality impinged upon the sovereignty of borrowers. Thus, there were not only economic
repercussions of conditionality but the inflexibility in negotiations alienated governments from the mea-
sures they were supposed to implement. The overlap of IMF and the World Bank policies also swamped
governments of borrowing countries with policy conditions (Kellick, 1993).In response to the critique, the
IMF became more flexible in ways it engaged with countries in issues related to structural reform. In 1999, it
replaced SAP with poverty reduction and growth facility (PRGF). The PRGF was intended to be based more
on participation and country ownership, be more selective in the use of terms of conditionality, and include
stronger analysis of social issues (Bull et al., 2006).
The guidelines on the conditionality were revised in 2000. The new guidelines state the key principles
of conditionality are to ensure that fund resources are used to assist members in solving their balance of
payments, which is consistent with the original intent of the fund (IMF, 2002). The new guidelines emphasize
five interrelated principles that the fund believes are relevant for the success of fund-supported programs: 1)

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64 Special Issue: Is there a need for Reforms in IMF?

National ownership of reform program, 2) Parsimony in the application of program-related conditions, 3)

­Tailoring programs to members circumstances, 4) Effective coordination of policies with other multilateral
institutions, and 5) Clarity in specific conditions (IMF, 2002).
Cooperation among governments of member countries is of paramount importance to address a
global economic crisis. The IMF is criticized for not being adequately equipped to ensure such cooperation
(Woods, 2006). It is a global institution, but it is dominated by a few major industrialized countries who pay
little heed to the views of developing countries. Advanced economies provide the bulk of IMF resources
but do not use the facilities while developing countries provide a small share but draw upon the fund’s
resources for financial assistance, which makes them subject to conditionality. This situation created tension
around governance issues. Developing countries make up 85% of the total membership and believe they
have an inappropriately small voice within the organization (Bloomberg and Broz, 2006). Jha and Saggar
(2000) mentioned that the Bretton Woods agreement did not provide a clear raison d’être for the quota sys-
tem. Moreover, the quota system is inherently biased against developing economies. According to them,
despite impressive growth, some non-oil-exporting countries experienced a decline in their quota shares.
Under the existing quota structure, members should vote to approve or disapprove policy proposals before
they are implemented. In most cases, a majority of 70% votes are required to make a decision. In certain
cases, such as admitting a new member, it would require 85% of the votes (Woods, 2006). Because of the
way the governance of the IMF is structured, few industrialized countries dominate their votes. For many
years, there has been an effort to reform the IMF through changing vote. In December 2010, the board of
governors of the IMF approved a package of the fund’s quotas and governance, and the reform became
effective only in January 26, 2016 (IMF, 2017). The reform reflects the increasing importance of emerging
market countries. The voting shares of China, Russia, Brazil, and India were increased. The United States
is the largest member of the IMF currently accounting for 17.46% of the quota and 16.52% of voting shares
(IMF, 2017). With such a big chunk of the quota, the United States along with other G7 countries domi-
nates decisions in the IMF. The fifteenth review of quotas, scheduled for 2019, is expected to show further
increased share of dynamic economies of emerging markets. Reforms also envisage an increase in perma-
nent capital resources. In fact, the IMF resources doubled to SDR $477 billon (approximately US$659 billion)
in recent years.
The IMF was created with limited lending ability, because it was overtly reliant on the US dollar. It did
not develop an effective method for dealing with trade imbalances. Consequently, imbalances among coun-
tries continued to grow. “Lack of an effective mechanism to deal with trade imbalances ultimately under-
mined the system’s ability to provide flexible monetary reserves and simultaneously safeguard its integrity”
(D’ Arista and Erturk, 2013, 235). Currently, Germany, Japan, and China are sitting atop a huge amount of
international reserves, whereas, the United States is running with a huge trade deficit with no automatic
adjustment in place.
Another concern is the role of unrestricted movement of capital across national boundaries in financial
crises including the ones in Mexico in 1994, East Asian financial crisis in 1997, and the global financial crisis
in 2007-2008. The IMF stance on capital control has changed drastically over the years. In the initial years
after its inception, the IMF supported capital control, consistent with the views of the academic circles then,
namely, Keynes and White. Capital control allows a country to pursue an independent macroeconomic
policy and maintain financial and currency stability. However, this view changed with the onset of the liberal
era in the 1980s. The IMF started supporting capital account liberalization and, for example, did not, in par-
ticular, support Malaysia imposing capital control in the wake of the financial crisis in 1994. However, in the
aftermath of the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, the IMF started supporting a limited capital control.
However, there was considerable ambivalence about capital control. The pendulum swung to capital control
as all doubts about it evaporated after the global financial crisis of 2008.
The IMF has made a significant progress over the years including adaptation of lending facilities,
streamlining reforms, and helping countries to have control over their own reform (Helliner, 2017). The
changes, however, have been very slow and considerably little to have any significant impact on IMF deci-
sion making. Dissatisfied with the decision-making process and policies of the IMF, the developing countries
started to look for alternative sources of funding. In particular, China’s influence in developing countries
has been increasing. Moreover, it has become an important source of both development funds and foreign
exchange. New institutions such as New Development Bank and Asian Infrastructure Investment Fund pose

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further challenges to the IMF. Unless, the fund reforms its quota system to reflect the changing economic
dynamics of the world, its credibility and influence will be further eroded.

4.  EVIDENCE ON ASSOCIATION BETWEEN IMF LOAN AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

The evidence on the impact of IMF loans on the economic growth of developing economies is mixed. The
IMF reviews typically report a positive relationship between IMF loans and economic growth. For example,
in a study of 36 countries that received support under structural adjustment facility (SAF) and enhanced
structural adjustment facility (ESAF), the IMF study finds that most of them became more market oriented
and economically stronger after receiving IMF loans IMF (1997). The living standards of the people in these
countries improved, and substantial progress was made toward external viability. The IMF study also recog-
nized that the progress was uneven, thereby reflecting policy weakness, and a number of ESAF countries are
still poor. Easterly (2003) finds no systematic effect of adjustment lending on growth. Papi et al. (2015) cov-
ered 113 low- and medium-income countries from 1970 to 2010 and found that countries who participated
in the IMF-supported programs were less likely to have banking crises. Eichengreen et al. (2008) also found
that countries with strong fundamentals who take IMF loans are less likely to have financial crises.
Dreher and Walter (2010), in a study of IMF programs in 68 developing countries that spanned five
years, found that the IMF aid reduced probability of a currency crisis. They also indicated that it was the
terms of the lending agreement that made a difference. Since 1990s, IMF loans have been tied to financial
reform measures and capital account liberalization measures (Joyce and Noy, 2008). An important lesson
learned from those days is financial sector liberalization without tight banking supervision may lead to
banking sector fragility. Przeworsky and Vreeland (2000) and Barro and Lee (2003) found that the IMF loan
participation had a negative effect on economic growth.

5.  CONCLUSION

Since the inception of the IMF in 1944, it has come a long way in meeting new challenges of international
finance and international monetary order. During the first few decades of the IMF’s formation, major clients
of the IMF were advanced economies of the west. Since the 1980, banking crises and sovereign default prob-
lems in Latin American and African economies dominated the IMF agenda and focus shifted from balance-
of-payment problems of advanced economies to debt sustainability problems of developing economies.
In recent years, the IMF has conducted major reforms in terms of quota and governance of loans. The
IMF’s fourteenth general quota review, which was conducted in 2010, reflected a major shift in quota gov-
ernance policy. The reforms entailed a major shift in quota share toward dynamic emerging market econo-
mies. Another remarkable development is the elevation of four emerging market economies, Brazil, India,
China, and Russia, to the group of 10 largest members of IMF. According to some quarters, the changes,
however, have been very slow and considerably little to have any significant impact on IMF decision mak-
ing. Dissatisfied with the decision-making process and policies of IMF, developing countries started look-
ing for escaping the IMF orbit by seeking alternative source of Funds (Ocampo, 2013). In particular, China’s
influence in developing countries has been increasing. Moreover, it has become an important source of
both development funds and foreign exchange. New institutions such as New Development Bank and Asian
Infrastructure Investment Fund pose further challenges to the IMF. Unless, the fund reforms its quota system
to reflect the changing economic dynamics of the world, its credibility and influence will be further eroded.

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Citation: Ahmed S, Sukar A. 2018. A critical evaluation of IMF history and policies. Management and Economics Research Journal 4:
60-66.

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