Radio Frequency Interference Best Practices Guidebook: February 2020
Radio Frequency Interference Best Practices Guidebook: February 2020
INTERFERENCE BEST
PRACTICES GUIDEBOOK
FEBRUARY 2020
Executive Summary
Public safety voice and data communications are continuously at risk of radio frequency (RF)
interference, which is defined as “the effect of unwanted energy due to one or a combination of
emissions, radiations, or inductions upon reception in a radio communication system, manifested by any
performance degradation, misinterpretation, or loss of information which could be extracted in the
absence of such unwanted energy.” 1 RF interference can impact a variety of commonly-used wireless
technologies such as land mobile radio (LMR), Long-Term Evolution (LTE), Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, and
Global Positioning Systems (GPS). Both manmade and natural sources can generate undesired signals
that may cause RF interference capable of disrupting wireless communications, including 911 calls,
essential LMR or LTE communications between first responders, and navigational systems using GPS or
other satellite-based location services. 2
To mitigate possible risks to public safety communications, SAFECOM and the National Council of
Statewide Interoperability Coordinators (NCSWIC) developed the Radio Frequency Interference Best
Practices Guidebook with the support of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) to educate
public safety organizations on RF interference threats. Specifically, this Guidebook:
• Provides an overview of the different types of RF interference, illegal jamming operations, and
the implications they pose to public safety communications;
• Summarizes ongoing efforts related to awareness, preparation, mitigation, and current laws
pertaining to RF interference; and
• Offers information on how public safety organizations can best recognize, respond to, report, and
resolve RF interference incidents.
Following a review of the current threats posed by RF interference, SAFECOM, NCSWIC, CISA, and
S&T recommend that public safety organizations:
• Train personnel to recognize and respond to RF interference that is either: (1) unintentionally
caused by naturally occurring or manmade signal sources; or (2) the result of an intentional
attempt to disrupt communications;
• Create and routinely test a Primary, Alternate, Contingency, and Emergency (PACE) Plan to
ensure communications operability and resiliency;
• Familiarize themselves with how to report incidents of RF interference to the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) and other appropriate authorities; and
• Help legislators and regulators understand the value of RF interference enforcement legislation.
This document does not contain information on specific system requirements, comprehensive operating
procedures, or specific governance considerations, but instead provides general recommendations and
resources for state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) public safety practitioners.
1
International Telecommunication Union (ITU), “Radio Regulations Chapter I – Terminology and Technical Characteristics” last accessed January 3,
2020.
2
Examples of known RF interference include: nearby wireless communications transmitters, vehicle ignition systems, jamming devices, lightning, solar
flares, and auroras.
Table of Contents
Executive Summary ..................................................................................................................... i
Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1
RF Interference Categories and Symptoms ............................................................................. 2
Internal/Self Interference ........................................................................................................... 2
External Interference ................................................................................................................. 3
Intentional Interference .............................................................................................................. 3
RF Jammers .......................................................................................................................... 3
Meaconing ............................................................................................................................. 4
Legal and Public Safety Responses to RF Interference .......................................................... 5
Federal Law ............................................................................................................................... 5
State Law .................................................................................................................................. 6
RF Interference Mitigation .......................................................................................................... 6
Education .................................................................................................................................. 6
Everyday Preparedness ............................................................................................................ 7
Special Events ........................................................................................................................... 7
RF Interference Mitigation Lifecycle .......................................................................................... 8
Recognize .............................................................................................................................. 8
Respond ................................................................................................................................ 9
Report .................................................................................................................................... 9
Resolve ................................................................................................................................ 11
Resilience ............................................................................................................................ 12
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 12
Appendix A: DHS RF Interference Activities ........................................................................ A-1
Appendix B: Acronym List ..................................................................................................... B-1
Appendix C: DHS-FCC Jammer Infographic ........................................................................ C-1
Appendix D: Disclaimer of Liability ....................................................................................... D-1
Figures
Figure 1. RF Jammer Examples ................................................................................................. 4
Tables
Table 1. Internal RF Interference Examples ................................................................................ 2
Introduction
In day-to-day operations, and even
more critically in emergency and “A responder’s most important tool is his or her
communication device. It’s what provides the awareness
disaster situations, resilient
we need to accomplish our mission when responding to
communications and situational
an emergency. It is ultimately what serves as our lifeline
awareness play a vital part in
and determines whether we make it home or not.”
supporting the missions of public
safety and protecting the lives of first Rodney Reed
responders. Interruption to mission- Assistant Chief, Operational Support
critical communications may lead Fire Marshal’s Office, Harris County, TX
public safety personnel into dangerous (The Siren, 2017)
situations or delay delivery of life-
saving services. To minimize disruption, the public safety community must work together to address and
mitigate the growing problem of radio frequency (RF) interference.
RF interference is defined as “the effect of unwanted energy due to one or a combination of emissions,
radiations, or inductions upon reception in a radio communication system, manifested by any
performance degradation, misinterpretation, or loss of information which could be extracted in the
absence of such unwanted energy.” 3
Effects of interference can range from mild disruption or delays in data throughput to a complete loss of
service. All devices that use RF are potentially vulnerable to interference, including radio, cellular, radar,
satellite, Wi-Fi, Global Positioning System (GPS), unmanned aircraft system (UAS) communications and
control systems, and other technologies. While public safety personnel primarily use land mobile radios
(LMR) for emergency communications, the rollout of the Nationwide Public Safety Broadband Network
(NPSBN) by the First Responder Network Authority (FirstNet Authority) 4 and a wider array of available
mobile communications technologies have required that agencies recognize their current vulnerabilities to
RF interference and prepare to mitigate them appropriately.
According to the International Telecommunication Union’s (ITU) Radio Regulations (RR), there are three
types of RF interference:
• Permissible interference (RR, No. 1.167): “Observed or predicted interference which complies
with quantitative interference and sharing criteria contained in these [ITU RR]…or in ITU
Radiocommunication Sector (ITU-R) Recommendations or in special agreements as provided for
in these Regulations” 5;
• Accepted interference (RR, No. 1.168): “Interference at a higher level than defined as
permissible interference and which has been agreed upon between two or more administrations
without prejudice to other administrations” 6; and
• Harmful interference (RR, No. 1.169): “Interference which endangers the functioning of a
radio[-]navigation service or of other safety services or seriously degrades, obstructs, or
repeatedly interrupts a radio…communication service operating in accordance with RR” 7.
3
Ibid, ITU.
4
The FirstNet Authority is “the first nationwide public safety broadband network dedicated to public safety…ready to help law enforcement, the fire
services, and EMS do their jobs safely and effectively.”
5
Ibid, ITU.
6
Ibid, ITU.
7
Ibid, ITU.
Internal/Self Interference
Internal or self-interference is a type of unintentional RF interference which occurs when an
organization’s own devices may be operating in a manner that interferes with their internal
communications. Most RF interference can be attributed to internal interference, which may be caused by
the improper or incorrect setup of communications equipment. Internal interference can occur directly
after upgrading equipment, adding new equipment to networks, or changing existing configurations.
Table 1. Internal RF Interference Examples
Internal RF Interference Examples
Interruptions may be caused by new installations of or updates to
communications technologies. For example, updates to physical infrastructure
Equipment problem (e.g., new additions to a tower or relocation of a receiver), as well as upgrades
of radio consoles or hubs may cause this kind of internal interference.
Interruptions may be caused by “non-linear mixing” of external signals inside
Receiver the receiver. 9 Users will usually hear multiple wireless signal emissions at the
intermodulation same time.
Interruptions may be caused by inadequate filtering of radio equipment, or
Front-end overload equipment that needs adjustment.
8
DHS S&T, “GOT COMMS? Recognizing and Mitigating Intentional and Unintentional Interference,” last accessed January 3, 2020.
9
Jay M. Jacobsmeyer, “800 MHz Interference: What Is It, How Do We Mitigate It and What Does the Future Hold?” November 6, 2017.
External Interference
Table 2. External RF Interference Examples
External RF Interference Examples
Caused by more than one transmitter communicating on the same channel
Co-channel due to improper frequency coordination, deteriorating or malfunctioning
equipment, or anomalous propagation. 10
Caused by a transmitter operating on an adjacent frequency and its energy
spilling over into the desired receive channel. 11 For example, adjacent channel
Adjacent channel interference occurs along the U.S. Southwest Border where there are reported
difficulties coordinating with local Mexican entities. 12
Caused when a transmitter emits on frequencies on which it is not meant to
Spurious emissions operate. This can be observable by poor audio quality or connectivity. 13
Caused by natural events such as solar flares, northern lights, and other
Natural occurrences electromagnetic activities. 14 Natural disasters, including hurricanes and floods,
can also disrupt and damage RF communications infrastructure.
External interference is a type of unintentional RF interference that can result from sources similar to
those associated with internal RF interference but exist outside of an organization’s jurisdiction or
control. External RF interference may result from a neighboring organization’s communication system
affecting another’s frequency, or naturally occurring space weather events, such as solar flares.
Intentional Interference
Intentional interference – or jamming – is performed by an actor with a willful intent to disrupt,
disconnect, or degrade communications. Malicious jamming and nuisance jamming are the two types of
intentional interference. Malicious jamming is conducted by individuals with willful and criminal intent.
The criminal intent may be to prevent public safety personnel from completing their mission, or conceal
an ongoing criminal activity, among other possible motivations.
In contrast, nuisance jammers are willful, but not malicious as they cause interference without criminal
intent. 15 Common examples include drivers using mobile GPS jammers to avoid GPS tracking and speed
monitoring, and cellular or Wi-Fi jammers used to create “quiet zones” in workplaces, places of worship,
and other locations. Despite the lack of malicious intent, nuisance jamming is dangerous as it could
impact public safety operations (e.g., blocking 911 calls, impacting radio dispatch), and the first
responders should recognize that anyone they interact with daily could be a nuisance jammer, not just
individuals or organizations with criminal intent.
RF Jammers
Jamming is a term used to describe one type of intentional interference, a Denial-of-Service (DoS)
attack, 16 which can either use a “brute force” method to overwhelm a signal or use relatively low-powered
signals to overwhelm public safety communications systems. Illegal jamming devices are designed to
emit RF signals—or noise—over specific bands to overpower the intended, legitimate signals. Under
Title 47, United States Code (U.S.C.) Sections 302a(a) and 302a(b), the manufacture, importation,
10
Kenneth Wyatt, “Identifying and Locating Radio Frequency Interference (RFI),” September 7, 2018.
11
Ibid.
12
For more on adjacent channel regulation and procedures at U.S. borders, see Manual of Regulations and Procedures for Federal Radio Frequency
Management.
13
Telecom ABC, “Spurious Emission,” last accessed January 3, 2020.
14
Jacoba Poppleton, “Solar Storms: A Communication Problem,” Research Matters 2010, last accessed January 3, 2020.
15
John Merrill, “Ensuring Resilient Communications – Briefing for Position, Navigation & Timing Advisory Board,” May 17, 2018.
16
United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), “Understanding Denial-of-Service Attacks,” last modified November 20, 2019.
marketing, sale, shipment, or operation of devices capable of interfering with radio communications (e.g.,
jammers) is illegal in the United States. 17
Outside the U.S., RF jamming devices are commercially available, however the cost and supported range
varyies significantly by device. It is difficult to detect the presence of low powered jammers as they are
often cheaply made overseas and emit inconsistent signals. Moreover, these devices, examples of which
are outlined in Figure 1 below, are easily concealed, mobile, and can be effective in concentrated areas.
Bad actors can obtain illegal jamming devices or utilize their knowledge of RF systems to sufficiently
disrupt public safety communications, as illustrated below in Table 3:
Table 3. Intentional Interference Examples
Intentional Interference Examples
Intentional An internal actor may be causing RF interference through one of the
interference within previously discussed methods or through a jamming device.
the organization
An external actor uses equipment, such as a jamming device, to overpower or
Intentional external
send continuous transmissions on communications channels critical for law
interference
enforcement or public safety operations, such as smuggling interdiction.
Meaconing
Meaconing describes a system which receives radio beacon signals and rebroadcasts them on the same
frequency to intentionally confuse navigation. Meaconing stations cause inaccurate bearings to be
obtained by aircraft or ground stations. Meaconing introduces position and altitude errors onto a
navigation system such as a GPS. Meaconing may be extremely difficult to detect as the GPS receiver
may appear to be functioning properly however its position or altitude information is inaccurate.
The threat of intentional interference frequently impacts the public safety community and puts the public
at risk. This delay or disruption of public safety communications can result in the loss of life or property,
as outlined in the following examples:
Examples of Intentional RF Interference to Public Safety Communications
In 2013, police in Suffolk County, New York, arrested a man who, over a nine-month period, repeatedly
interfered with Melville Fire Department’s radio transmissions. 18 The Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) investigated this complaint and worked closely with local police to resolve this
intentional interference to GPS signals.
Examples of Intentional RF Interference
In 2012, the FCC investigated a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) complaint regarding interference
to their Ground-Based Augmentation System (GBAS) at Newark Liberty International Airport. FCC
17
47 U.S.C. § 302a (2013)
18
Frank Eltman, “2 NY Congressman Propose Law on Fire Radio Jammers,” The Washington Times, March 10, 2014.
agents found the source of interference was coming from an individual using a GPS jammer in his
company vehicle while traveling along the New Jersey Turnpike. Although the individual intentionally
interfered with GPS to avoid detection and tracking of his vehicle, his intent was not to disrupt the GBAS.
The FCC levied a fine of $31,875 against the individual. 19
Similarly, in 2013, the FCC received an interference complaint from a local wireless service provider.
FCC agents investigated and found an individual using a cell phone jamming device in his car during his
daily work commute to and from Tampa, Florida, which caused interference to cellular service along
Interstate 4, and disrupted police communications. The FCC levied a fine of $48,000 against the
individual. 20
Examples of Federal Government Activity to Counter RF Interference
Agencies along the U.S. Southwest Border face ongoing challenges mitigating unintentional adjacent
channel interference originating from Mexico. Cooperation and coordination on the federal, state, and
local levels are critical to resolving these incidents. 21
The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has jurisdiction to inspect imported goods as they enter
the country via mail facilities and airports, seizing jammers when identified. While these jamming devices
are subject to confiscation if properly identified, it is difficult to estimate how many shipments of illegal
jammers may have entered the country without impediment.
19
Inside Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS), “FCC Fines Operator of GPS Jammer That Affected Newark Airport GBAS,” August 31, 2013.
20
FCC, “FCC Fines Florida Driver $48k For Jamming Communications,” May 25, 2016.
21
CISA, “Southwest Border Communications Working Group Fact Sheet,” last accessed January 3, 2020.
22
FCC, “GPS, Wi-Fi, and Cell Phone Jammers Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs),” last accessed December 20, 2018.
23
Ibid.
24
47 C.F.R. § 2.803
25
47 C.F.R. § 2.805
26
47 C.F.R. § 2.807
Violators of the Act and associated FCC rules may be subject to the penalties set forth in Title 47, U.S.C.
Sections 501 through 510. 27
• Section 503 allows the FCC to impose forfeitures for willful or repeated violations of the Act, the
Commission’s rules, regulations, or related orders, as well as for violations of the terms and
conditions of any license, certificate, or other FCC authorization, among other things; and
• Section 510 allows for seizure of equipment used, possessed, advertised, or sold with knowing
intent to violate Title 47, U.S.C. Sections 301 or 302.
State Law
In addition to the prohibitions set forth by the Act, several states have enacted laws that prohibit jamming
and intentional interference.
Table 4. State Legislation Overview
State Legislation Penalties
Statute Chapter 877, A person who violates this Section commits a felony of the
Florida Section 27 third degree. 28
Statute Chapter 38, Violations under this Section are considered a Class A
Texas Section 152 misdemeanor. 29
A person who violates Subsection A is guilty of a Class 6
Arizona Chapter 13, Section 2922 felony and a person who violates Subsection B is guilty of a
Class 1 misdemeanor. 30
Anyone in Alabama who interferes with public safety
Alabama Statute Section 13a-10-16
communications is charged with a Class C felony. 31
In addition, Colorado, 32 Connecticut, 33 Illinois, 34 and Tennessee 35 have established laws prohibiting the
use of in-vehicle jamming devices.
RF Interference Mitigation
Education
An organization’s technical team, radio support personnel, and Communications Unit Leaders (COML)
are the most qualified staff to recognize if there is a persistent RF interference problem. However, the key
to early detection and data collection is to educate field personnel on the threat and potential mitigation
methods. Additionally, having teams formally trained and accredited in RF interference mitigation
ensures that staff supporting public safety answering points (PSAP) or other public safety agencies are
equipped and trained in mitigation methods. Officials should be made aware that public, state, and local
government agencies, including state and local law enforcement agencies, are also prohibited from using
jammers or any other type of device that blocks, jams, or interferes with authorized communications.
There are many commercially available training opportunities to expand knowledge of RF Interference
Mitigation (RFIM) best practices, as well as courses on RF interference identification and how to use a
spectrum analyzer. One example is the International Certification Accreditation Council (ICAC) which
offers several accredited training courses and certificate programs related to RFIM. 36 Gaining
competency and certification on RFIM enables public safety technicians to quickly identify, mitigate, and
27
FCC, “Public Notice DA # 05-1776s,” June 27, 2005.
28
FL Stat § 877.27 (2016)
29
Texas Penal Code § 38.152
30
AZ Rev Stat § 13-2922 (2017)
31
AL Code § 13A-10-16 (2014)
32
CO Rev Stat § 42-4-1415 (2017)
33
CT Gen Stat § 53a-127c (2016)
34
IL Vehicle Code 625 ILCS 5/12-613
35
TN Code § 39-16-610 (2017)
36
Electronics Technicians Association, “RF Interference Mitigation – RFIM Competency Requirements,” last accessed January 3, 2020.
Everyday Preparedness
Combining education with everyday preparedness practices further assists RF interference mitigation
from the onset. Public safety organizations should engage legal counsel to better understand state, local,
territorial, and tribal (SLTT) jamming laws that exist in addition to FCC rules and regulations. On some
occasions, the interference is frequency specific. To further minimize impacts, organizations are
recommended to procure communications systems in bands different from their primary system, with a
preference for high frequency (HF), ultra-high frequency (UHF), or very high frequency (VHF) bands
where possible, and change the frequencies in LMRs to mitigate interference. If changing frequency does
not work, changing the band of frequencies may mitigate the interference.
It is crucial that organizations only operate devices that have received FCC grants of equipment
authorization, and maintain transmission systems that are compliant with FCC-issued licenses. Certain
FCC-certified frequency coordinators can receive, investigate, and recommend engineering solutions to
resolve complaints of interference to private LMR licensees. If interference arises, licensees should be
prepared to provide frequency coordinators with the necessary information as expeditiously as possible.
It is also important to ensure that the FCC equipment authorization remains up-to-date by notifying the
FCC of any organizational administrative changes (e.g., entity name, points of contact, address) when
applicable. Organizations should maintain active awareness of construction deadlines and expiration
dates, as operating pursuant to an expired license or one that terminated due to failure to construct would
violate FCC rules and result in the loss of license. Licensees can also face forfeiture for unauthorized
operation, though renewals filed no later than 30 days following expiration are typically granted.
Special Events
Special events are situations where RF interference is more likely to occur, as they bring diverse actors
with diverse intentions into the operational environment, resulting in an increased likelihood for
equipment to be installed or operated improperly. Localities may need to reconfigure their equipment or
make rapid adjustments to equipment to counter the challenges that special events create. 37 Below are
steps to mitigate RF interference during special events:
• Train security teams, including internal and external stakeholders, on RF interference
identification, mitigation tactics, and reporting procedures;
• Monitor events with spectrum analyzers and direction-finding equipment to locate interfering
signals; and
• Where possible, ensure that each participating stakeholder has communications systems in
multiple bands, and a communications plan to direct back-up procedures (e.g., a Primary,
Alternate, Contingency, and Emergency [PACE] plan).
37
Some physical modifications could invalidate the equipment authorization and using different equipment may require a Special Temporary Authority
(STA) request, https://www.fcc.gov/applying-special-temporary-authority. Refer to FCC guidance when modifying equipment.
In addition to these actions, public safety organizations should include knowledgeable staff experienced
with RF interference in their special event operations. 38 Stakeholders are encouraged to leverage expertise
from federal government entities, such as CISA, FCC, the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (NTIA), and the Wireless Spectrum Research and Development (WSRD) Interagency
Working Group (IWG) 39 to support interference identification and resolution.
Recognize
RESILIENCE Respond
Resolve Report
Recognize
Although public safety agencies may attribute equipment failure to normal wear or general
malfunctioning, disruptions in communications may result from internal or external RF interference. Per
the above figure from S&T, 40 identifying the source of the RF interference is a crucial step to mitigating
issues and regaining communications capabilities.
S&T offers the following recommendations for public safety network technicians, COMLs, or others
responsible for recognizing and mitigating RF interference:
• Track reports of equipment malfunctions/disruptions in communications:
o If multiple operational assets experience issues simultaneously, or if there are repeated or
escalating issues at or near the same location, investigate. 41
• Characterize the interference using a spectrum analyzer:
o Is there a high noise floor?
38
Where applicable, agencies should review existing Tactical Interoperable Communications Plans (TICP) and Regional Interoperable
Communications Plans (RICP) at the local, county, regional, state, or territorial levels for the existence of additional information or identified best
practices for interference mitigation.
39
The WSRD IWG helps coordinate research and development activities in the federal government and with academia and the private sector. For
additional information, visit https://www.nitrd.gov/nitrdgroups/index.php?title=Wireless_Spectrum_Research_and_Development.
40
DHS S&T, “First Responder Electronic Jamming Exercise,” last accessed January 3, 2020.
41
Technicians troubleshooting RF interference should be aware that narrow band equipment (e.g., 6.25 MHz) requires annual or more frequent
retuning. When out of tune, this equipment is less tolerant of receiving signals and may cause RF interference.
o Is there blocking or lack of a control channel? Is the Bit Error Rate (BER) within
reasonable bounds? Is audio disabled or degraded? Is the pattern discernable on a
particular day of the week or at a particular time of day? Use these clues to help diagnose
whether the communications are experiencing RF interference.
Respond
42
NTIA, “Manual of Regulations and Procedures for Federal Radio Frequency Management (Redbook),” last accessed January 3, 2020.
43
NTIA, “NTIA Interference Report Form,” last accessed January 3, 2020.
44
The GPS Operations Center (GPSOC) at Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado, is the focal point in the DOD for operational issues and questions
concerning military use of GPS. The GPSOC, part of Air Force Space Command, provides DOD and allied GPS users worldwide with anomaly reports
and other information 24 hours a day, seven days a week.
PIRT Reporting
The Purposeful Interference Response Team (PIRT) is an interagency organization chartered by the
National Security Council (NSC) to facilitate U.S. Government collaboration with commercial owners,
operators, and allies to attribute and resolve satellite interference. The PIRT includes seven core member
agencies: DOD, Department of State (DOS), Department of Commerce (DOC), DHS, Department of
Transportation (DOT), Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and the FCC, with several
other conditional member agencies. The FCC is one of the founding members of the PIRT and actively
supports the resolution of domestic and international instances of satellite interference. 45
Resolve
Once public safety agencies have recognized, responded to, and reported an RF interference incident, they
must resolve it by identifying lessons learned at an agency level so they can apply them to improve future
incident response. To better prepare, an agency should focus on the following:
Educate
As indicated in the previous section, public safety agencies need to educate their operational personnel on
how to best recognize and respond to incidents of RF interference. It is important that personnel can
distinguish the different types of interferences and know which reporting process they should follow.
Prepare
Public safety agencies should update personnel and agency policies, understand interference reporting
requirements, and conduct operational exercises. Agencies should also routinely conduct maintenance,
upgrades, and exchange of transmission system components as they occur, and inspect transmission
system components on a regular basis and after severe weather events.
It is also critical to develop a PACE Plan for communications and train all agency operators on it. The
PACE Plan includes a “waterfall” of communications methods, and regular training will help all operators
know what to do if their primary means of communication is disabled by RF interference or equipment
failure. A PACE Plan allows agencies to pre-set their continuity plans for communications—usually
switching between multiple channels, bands, or devices—ensuring that operators understand what other
avenues and tools are available in case of an interruption and that all operators go to the same back-up
methods in the same order. The PACE Plan should also be routinely tested and exercised to ensure its
effectiveness in maintaining communications operability and resiliency.
Evaluate
Public safety agencies need to evaluate their baseline of communications resiliency by assessing how well
personnel are prepared to identify, locate, and mitigate RF interference. If communications vulnerabilities
are exposed, organizations should address gaps as needed, develop after action reports to review how RF
interference incidents were handled, and identify lessons learned to incorporate throughout the agency.
45
FCC, “Satellite Interference Monitoring and Resolution,” last modified December 4, 2015.
Resilience
Applying best practices from this document will help public safety organizations become more resilient to
RF interference. Everyday preparedness through training, developing and implementing standard
operating procedures (SOP) for special events, and educating staff on the threats of RF interference
incidents will enable entire organizations to be vigilant. When more staff learn to recognize, respond to,
report, and resolve RF interference incidents, the organization becomes more resilient and can return to
efficiently operating without disruption.
Conclusion
RF interference is not a temporary communications issue. RF interference, including internal, external,
and malicious sources, will continue to be a threat to key communications systems and mission-critical
communications in public safety.
Public safety organizations may be dealing with daily RF interference, and the effects of unresolved RF
interference may be detrimental to mission-critical communications. Educating and informing members
of the public safety community on best practices and procedures surrounding RF interference will allow
for effective response and mitigation.
The public safety community must continue to share best practices and methods to combat and protect
against RF interference. Public safety organizations must work with legal authorities when responding to
RF interference incidents. Except for a few states that have adopted legislation, local law enforcement
agencies do not have the authority to confiscate RF jamming devices. It is important that key members of
public safety organizations understand their legal and procedural capabilities and limitations associated
with cases of RF interference and to whom they should report these incidents.
The guidance surrounding RF interference in the public safety space is continuing to evolve and improve.
As a result, the community must continue to speak about, educate themselves, and share best practices in
order to strive for communications resilience.
S&T
2016 and 2017 First Responder Electronic Jamming Exercises
S&T is working to combat RF interference by evaluating jamming’s impact, testing mitigation
technologies and tactics, working with public safety agencies to update training procedures, and raising
awareness of jamming threats and interference reporting channels. First, S&T hosted the 2016 JamX
event, a multi-agency operational exercise at White Sands Missile Range. 48 The exercise assessed the
impact of illegal jamming on public safety communications systems and mission response, and identified
gaps in training, techniques, and procedures. DHS used illegal commercial-grade jamming devices that
were representative of the types of jammers that public safety agencies may routinely encounter in their
communities. The results proved that jamming threats could significantly impact the communications of
law enforcement and public safety organizations across the country.
JamX 17 was held at the Department of Energy (DOE)’s Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and focused on
strengthening resilience against jamming threats on a community and national level. 49 During JamX 17,
DHS and public safety, law enforcement, private sector, and academic partners simulated the impact of
jamming on a variety of communications systems and evaluated tactics and technologies to help
responders better identify, locate, and mitigate the impact of jamming. 50 As a result, S&T and CISA are
working together to provide robust recommendations to law enforcement and public safety agencies on
how to improve their resiliency to jamming and all other forms of RF interference.
In 2020, S&T plans to host JamX 20 to further evaluate how public safety agencies have implemented
DHS communications resiliency recommendations, assess advancements in counter-jamming
technologies, profile non-jamming interference sources, and provide an interference testbed for industry.
46
DHS S&T, “First Responder Electronic Jamming Exercise,” last accessed January 3, 2020.
47
DHS CISA, “Interoperable Communications Technical Assistance Program Resources”, last accessed January 3, 2020..
48
DHS S&T, “2016 First Responder Electronic Jamming Exercise,” July 18, 2016.
49
DHS S&T, “2017 First Responder Electronic Jamming Exercise,” January 25, 2017.
50
DHS S&T, “First Responder Electronic Jamming Exercise,” last accessed January 20, 2020.
51
DHS S&T, “News Release: DHS Awards Nearly $3 Million to Small Businesses for Innovative Research,” May 24, 2018.
52
DHS S&T, “News Release: Nine Small Businesses Awarded $10M to Advance Homeland Security Research Projects,” May 2, 2019.
53
FEMA, “06CP-07-RFDF - Equipment, RF Direction Finding,” last accessed January 3, 2020.
54
GovTribe,“Market Survey Report Radio Frequency (RF) Detection, Spectrum Analysis, and Direction Finding Equipment,” last modified June 11,
2018.
Acronym Definition
TDoS Telephony Denial-of-Service
UAS Unmanned aircraft systems
UHF Ultra-high frequency
USAF United States Air Force
U.S.C. United States Code
USB Universal Serial Bus
US-CERT United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team
USCG United States Coast Guard
WSRD Wireless Spectrum Research and Development
VHF Very high frequency