I. Jurisdiction of COA To Adjudicate Money Claims
I. Jurisdiction of COA To Adjudicate Money Claims
The COA has primary jurisdiction to pass upon a private entity’s money claims
against a provincial gov’t. The authority and powers of the Commission [on Audit] shall
extend to and comprehend all matters relating to … the examination, audit, and
settlement of all debts and claims of any sort due from or owing to the Government or
any of its subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities…
The scope of the COA's authority to take cognizance of claims is circumscribed,
however, by an unbroken line of cases holding statutes of similar import to mean
only liquidated claims, or those determined or readily determinable from vouchers,
invoices, and such other papers within reach of accounting officers. (Euro-Med
Laboratories, Phil., Inc. v. Province of Batangas, G.R. No. 148106, July 17, 2006)
However, the jurisdiction of the COA over money claims against the government
does not include the power to rule on the constitutionality or validity of laws. The 1987
Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare unconstitutional
a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation in this Court and in all Regional Trial
Courts. (Parreño v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 162224, June 7, 2007)
- Can the COA still adjudicate a claim despite the issuance of a writ of execution?
YES. The COA still retains its primary jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim even after
the issuance of a writ of execution. We said that as a matter of fact, the claimant has to
first seek the COA's approval of the monetary claim, despite the rendition of a final and
executory judgment validating said money claim against an agency or instrumentality of
the Government. Its filing with the COA is a condition sine qua non before payment can
be effected. Concomitantly, the duty to examine, audit, and settle claims means
deciding whether to allow or disallow the same. This duty involves more than the
simple expedient of affirming or granting the claim on the basis that it has already been
validated by the courts. To limit it would render the power and duty of the COA
meaningless. This rationale also rings true with the Compromise Agreement at hand,
which again, as we have demonstrated, needs not only the recommendation of the COA
and the President, but also the approval of Congress pursuant to EO No. 292.
At this juncture, we emphasize anew, the import of the word "settled" in Section
20 (1), Chapter IV, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of EO No. 292. Citing an earlier
case, Benedicto v. The Board of Administrators of Television Stations RPN, BBC and
IBC, we held in Strategic that the mandatory congressional approval of the compromise
is only for claims that are already settled. This is in harmony with the scope of the
COA's authority to only take cognizance of money claims that are liquidated and
uncontested. This means that claims must be determined or readily determinable from
vouchers, invoices, and such other papers within reach of accounting officers. It may
also mean that the claim no longer presents a justiciable question ripe for judicial
determination. The liability or non-liability of the government shall no longer be in issue
and shall no longer require the examination of evidence and the use of judicial
discretion. (Binga Hydroelectric Plant, Inc. v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 218721,
July 10, 2018)
Hence, the conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that this Court
may compel the COA to perform. This discretion on its part is in line with the
constitutional pronouncement that the COA has the exclusive authority to define
the scope of its audit and examination. When the language of the law is clear and
explicit, there is no room for interpretation, only application. Neither can the
scope of the provision be unduly enlarged by this Court. (Dela Llana v.
Chairperson, Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 180989, February 7, 2012)