UNIT-2

PSYCHOANALYTICAL APPROACH TO PEACE

Freud (1922) wrote that all human behaviour stems from the interaction between Eros – the
life instinct – and Thanatos – the death instinct. Through the concept of displacement, the
energy of Thanatos is directed away from the self, towards others. This concept of self-
directed destruction is one of the most controversial in psychoanalytic theory. While rejected
by many psychodynamic psychologists, the idea that aggression stems primarily from
instinctive drives has generally been supported within psychoanalytic research.

In 1932 Albert Einstein wrote a letter to the father of psychoanalysis, Sigmund Freud, asking
if this new science could offer insights that might deliver humankind from the menace of war.
In his response to Einstein, Freud1 expressed little hope for an end to war and violence, or the
role of psychoanalysis in changing human behaviour beyond the individual level. Even
though some analysts such as Jacob Arlow have found indications of cautious optimism in
some of Freud’s writings, Freud’s general pessimism was mirrored by many of his followers.
This has played a key role in limiting the contributions psychoanalysis has made to
international relations in general and in finding more peaceful solutions for conflicts between
enemy groups in particular.

Freud gave up the idea that the sexual seduction of children came from the external world,
and instead focused on the stimuli that comes from the child’s own wishes and fantasies for
formation psychopathology. Since early psychoanalysts followed this tradition, classical
psychoanalysis accepted this de-emphasis on actual seduction coming from the external
world when considering the developing child’s psyche and generalized it to include de-
emphasis on the role of traumatic external events. This de-emphasis included traumatic
international events as they impact the mental health of individuals affected by them. The
Holocaust is a prime example. For a long time, psychological studies of the Holocaust were
too painful to be carried out, and the whole topic of its psychological impact on those who
were affected directly and on the human psyche in general was avoided. (Despite of some
studies on this topic, in general, a “denial” of the psychological plight of Holocaust survivors
strangely persisted for decades after the World War II – a defense that, astonishingly,
extended even to Israel. In a November 2, 1995 story, an Israeli television station reported
that even the Jewish state had long neglected the trauma undergone by Holocaust survivors.
After their arrival in 1940s, survivors had been immediately treated for depression and other
mental disorders in psychiatric hospitals. Incredibly, however, many of these patients’ official
files did not even mention that they were Holocaust victims.)

Freud
The Disillusionment of the War:
Freud has taken it upon himself to help the general civilian population understand and come
to terms with their mental distress. He believes that the two major factors contributing to this
distress are the disillusionment and altered attitude towards death which the war has brought
about.

According to Freud, within the warring nations, high social standards induced much self-
restraint on the individual. These social standards were the basis of the civilized state’s
existence. Freud asserts, however, that there is a disagreement between the warring state’s
moral standards and its actions. The state acts in the way that it openly condemns in the
individual, including deliberately lying and using deception (112). It keeps secrets from its
citizens while expecting utmost loyalty. However, the state cannot prevent itself from wrong-
doing, because that would put the nation at a disadvantage. This relaxation of moral demands
has the same effect on individuals. When society cannot rebuke citizens for the sake of
hypocrisy, suppression of base passions is relieved, and men commit acts of treachery,
cruelty, fraud, and barbarity. Samuel Weber, however, criticizes Freud’s use of
[4]
psychoanalysis to explain the violence of the war as insufficient. According to Weber, the
attempt to account for the phenomenon of war in terms of a theory of “drives,” developed
through the interpretation of the behavior of individuals, runs the risk of being dismissed as
completely psychologistic. Louis Breger’s disagreement with Freud on this point is aimed
more at psychoanalysis in general. According to Breger, psychoanalysis was not able to
predict the multitude of citizens who suffered from lasting mental illness as a result of the
 [5]
war.

The disillusionment results not only from the discrepancy in moral relations exhibited by the
state and its expectations, according to Freud, but also from the cruelty shown by individuals.
The inmost essence of human nature consists of elemental forces, which include those that
society considers evil. Civilization is the fruit of renunciation of instinctual satisfaction and
causes instincts to be transformed into altruistic and social ends. Society strains the moral
standard to the highest possible point, which forces citizens to diverge even further from their
instincts.
Our mortification and disillusionment about the barbaric behavior of our fellow humans in
this war is unjustified. In reality, Freud argues, they have not sunk as low as previously
thought, because they have never risen so high as society believed them capable of doing.
They are merely taking a break from the oppressive moral constraints of society (Freud 121).

It is not until all these vicissitudes to which instinctual impulses are subject have been
surmounted that what we call a person's character is formed, and this, as we know, can only
very inadequately be classified as 'good' or 'bad'. A human being is seldom altogether good or
bad; he is usually 'good' in one relation and 'bad' in another, or 'good' in certain external
circumstances and in others decidedly 'bad'. It is interesting to find that the pre-existence of
strong 'bad' impulses in infancy is often the actual condition for an unmistakable inclination
towards 'good' in the adult. Those who as children have been the most pronounced egoists
may well become the most helpful and self-sacrificing members of the community; most of
our sentimentalists, friends of humanity and protectors of animals have been evolved from
little sadists and animal-tormentors.

He transformation of 'bad' instincts is brought about by two co-operating factors, an internal

and an external one. The internal factor consists in the influence exercised on the bad - let us
say, the egoistic - instincts exercised by erotism, that is, by the human need for love, taken in
its widest sense. By the admixture of erotic components the egoistic instincts are transformed
into social ones. We learn to value being loved as an advantage for which we are willing to
sacrifice other advantages. The external factor is the force exercised by upbringing, which
represents the claims of our cultural environment, and this is continued later by the direct
pressure of that environment. Civilization has been attained through the renunciation of
instinctual satisfaction, and it demands the same renunciation from each newcomer in turn.

Throughout an individual's life there is a constant replacement of external by internal

compulsion. The influences of civilization cause an ever-increasing transformation of egoistic
trends into altruistic and social ones by an admixture of erotic elements. In the last resort it
may be assumed that every internal compulsion which makes itself felt in the development of
human beings was originally - that is, in the history of mankind - only an external one. Those
who are born to-day bring with them as an inherited organization some degree of tendency
(disposition) towards the transformation of egoistic into social instincts, and this disposition
is easily stimulated into bringing about that result. A further portion of this instinctual
transformation has to be accomplished during the life of the individual himself. So the human
being is subject not only to the pressure of his immediate cultural environment, but also to the
influence of the cultural history of his ancestors.

The instinctual impulses of other people are of course hidden from our observation. We infer
them from their actions and behaviour, which we trace back to motives arising from their
instinctual life. Such an inference is bound to be erroneous in many cases. This or that action
which is 'good' from the cultural point of view may in one instance originate from a 'noble'
motive, in another not. Ethical theorists class as 'good' actions only those which are the
outcome of good impulses; to the others they refuse recognition. But society, which is
practical in its aims, is not on the whole troubled by this distinction; it is content if a man
regulates his behaviour and actions by the precepts of civilization, and is little concerned with
his motives.

External compulsion exercised on a human being by his upbringing and environment

produces a further transformation towards good in his instinctual life - a further turning from
egoism towards altruism. But this is not the regular or necessary effect of the external
compulsion. Upbringing and environment not only offer benefits in the way of love, but also
employ other kinds of incentive, namely, rewards and punishments. In this way their effect
may turn out to be that a person who is subjected to their influence will choose to behave
well in the cultural sense of the phrase, although no ennoblement of instinct, no
transformation of egoistic into altruistic inclinations, has taken place in him. The result will,
roughly speaking, be the same; only a particular concatenation of circumstances will reveal
that one man always acts in a good way because his instinctual inclinations compel him to,
and the other is good only in so far and for so long as such cultural behaviour is advantageous
for his own selfish purposes. But superficial acquaintance with an individual will not enable
us distinguish between the two cases, and we are certainly misled by our optimism into
grossly exaggerating the number of human beings who have been transformed in a cultural
sense.

Attitude Towards Death:

According to Freud, the second major factor that contributes to the mental anguish of the
time is an alteration in the people’s attitude towards death (121). While humans are aware
that death is the eventual outcome of their lives, in reality their own death is unimaginable to
them. However, even though they cannot fathom their own deaths, humans are still deeply
affected when it occurs to other people. The war has taken away their ability to ignore death.
It can no longer be denied, as people are dying by the thousands.

Primitive man was violent, as evidenced by the murderous history of man which children
learn in school. However, the sense of guilt that humans feel can be traced back to primitive
man’s unease about killing humans. Contemplation of a loved one’s corpse prompted early
man to feel guilt and sorrow. The corpse not only influenced the development of the soul, but
also the first inkling of a moral sense—Thou shalt not kill. According to Freud, this final
development is no longer experienced by civilized man (128).

When the unconscious is probed, Freud finds that it has the same view of death as the
primitive man. There are two antithetical attitudes: that which acknowledges it as the
destruction of life, and the other which denies its success in that endeavor. Towards the
stranger, our minds are murderously-minded. Our own death is inaccessible to us, and loved
ones evoke an ambivalent or divided mind-set. The war strips us of civilization’s effects on
our minds and causes us to regress to the primitive man within us.

Freud ends with an adaptation of an old saying: If you would endure life, be prepared for
death (133). Weber finds this conclusion to be ironic. According to Weber, everything that
Freud said earlier in the article only proves how difficult it is to follow his parting words of
[7]
advice. Freud’s ending, however, shows how far modern culture and society are from even
acknowledging that the task of preparing for death might be necessary.

Volkan
His theory of collective violence begins with the chosen trauma. A chosen trauma is the
shared mental representation of an event in a large group’s history in which the group
suffered a catastrophic loss, humiliation, and helplessness at the hands of enemies. When
members of a victim group are “unable” to mourn such losses and reverse their humiliation
and helplessness, they pass on to their offspring the images of their injured selves and the
psychological tasks that need to be completed. This process is known as the
transgenerational transmission of trauma. All such images and tasks contain references to
the same historical event. As decades pass, the mental representation of such an event links
all the individuals in the large group. Thus, such a mental representation of a historical event
emerges as a significant large-group identity marker.

Chosen Trauma
A chosen trauma reflects the “infection” of a large-group’s mourning process. A reactivation
of a chosen trauma serves to link the members of a large group. Such reactivation can be used
by the political leadership to promote new massive societal movements, some of them deadly
and malignant. The defeat of Serbs by Turks at the battle of Kosovo in 1396 was the battle
cry in the 1990’s for ethnic cleansing of the Moslems. Although the defeat occurred six
hundred years ago, it lives on in the minds and hearts of Serbians. A chosen trauma is the
shared mental represtation of an event in a large group’s history in which the group suffered a
catastrophic loss, humiliation and helplessness at the hands of enemies. When members of a
victim group are unable to mourn such losses and reverse their humiliation and helplessness,
they pass on to their off spring the images of their injured selves and the psychological tasks
that need to be completed. This process is known as the transgenerational transmission of
trauma. Political leaders may initiate the reactivation of chosen traumas in order to fuel
entitlement ideologies.

According to Volkan traumatized groups may evolve two kinds of leadership; the
“reparative” type uses the traumatic event to unite the group and solidify its identity without
harming another group. The “destructive type” uses the “chosen trauma” to increase a sense
of victimization, vilify a real or imagined enemy and to resurrect dormant ideologies. These
ideologies typically claim exaggerated privilege and endorse revenge. This construct provides
an excellent psychological framework to analyze the phenomenon of violent entities such as
ISIS. Here, ISIS propaganda videos targeting Iraqi audiences repeatedly evoke the “Shia
regime” of Nouri Al-Maliki. The solitary speech of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi uploaded on
social media contained repeated references to excesses by Maliki and spoke of the
“ideological war” that must be fought with Shias. The videos aimed at Syrians speak of the
atrocities perpetrated by theAlawite Bashar-ul-Assad on Sunni civilians.

The “chosen trauma” paradigm is thus utilized by violent extremist leadership throughout the
Muslim world and provides them with some powerful modus for imposing draconian statutes
as well as evoking fear and hatred. It allows them to justify persecution both within the
ingroup as well as towards outgroups designated as enemies. The crucial role that the
vicarious trauma of graphic videos plays in fostering hate on all sides cannot be stressed
enough. These videos are viscerally disturbing and evoke fear and loathing which they are
designed to do. While their transmission on popular websites is protected by free speech laws
some self-censorship is certainly called for. The tendency of some sources to seek out the
most gruesome carnage and put it on display for all may enhance popularity but benefits
ultimately only those who feed on hatred and schism.

The next step is the failure to mourn for the losses sustained in the chosen trauma. That is
why the trauma lives on. Then comes the feeling of entitlement to revenge. Rather than
facing the anguish of mourning and self-examination, a group can find distraction in self-
righteous hostility and aggression against a purported enemy.

Then there is collective regression. Under the pressure of fear/anxiety, a majority regress to
early childhood mentality: mixtures of good and bad are unknown. One’s parents and leaders
are good, and enemies are bad. This mentality views violence as the only alternative, since
we are completely good, the enemy is not only bad, but evil. Collective regression of the kind
described by Volkan has less direct effect on the conduct of one’s daily life than it does on
large scale matters at a distance.

Mourning is an obligatory human psychobiological response to a meaningful loss. When a

loved one dies, the mourner has to go through predictable and definable phases until his or
her mourning process comes to a practical end (Volkan, 1981, Pollock, 1989). If everything
goes in a routine fashion, the mourner also identifies with aspects and functions the dead
person or thing possessed when still living or when it was still around and keeps the dead
person or thing “alive” within his or her psyche. This process may take many years. The
individual mourning processes can be “infected” due to various reasons, and we can predict
what may happen after such “infections” (Volkan, 1981, Volkan and Zintl, 1993).

Large groups also mourn. Since a large group is not one living organism with one brain, its
mourning over the loss of loved ones, lands, and prestige after a war or war-like situation will
appear in large-group processes on a societal level. For example, after a major shared trauma
and loss at the hand of enemies, a political ideology of irredentism —a shared sense of
entitlement to recover what had been lost—may emerge that reflects a complication in large
group mourning and an attempt both to deny losses and to recover them.

But we need to integrate all four emotions (grief, anxiety/dear, shame, anger) into a wider
consideration of emotional/relational worlds. These worlds, although next to invisible in
modern societies, probably play an important part in generating either public support or
opposition to collective violence.

Despite its theoretical basis as psychoanalysis, the book is not laden with heavy terminology,
but rather written in a simple style and a personal tone which is another merit in terms of ease
of reading. The author defines precisely and lucidly such key terms as the ‘echo’ and
‘accordion’ phenomena, and ‘mini conflicts’, and makes some valuable suggestions about the
process of Track II diplomacy, namely informal and unofficial diplomacy. He uses the
metaphor of the accordion to describe the ‘rhythmic alternation of togetherness and
distancing’ (p. 46) of opposing groups, and argues that ‘agreements between enemies are
most stable if they are made when the accordion is at neither extreme’

In addition, he points out the negative impacts of an external event over the unofficial
diplomatic dialogue which is defined as the ‘echo phenomenon’ and suggests that facilitators
should not ‘minimize and deny it and force delegates to follow the scheduled agenda’ (p. 47).
Similarly, he coined the term ‘mini conflict’ to refer to the occurrence of a crisis usually at the
beginning of the meeting which is to be resolved by the facilitator.

Volkan makes a point of analysing international conflicts based on large groups, which refers
to the collective identity of a nationality, ethnicity, race, clan, tribe, religion, class or a
political ideology, and in connection to massive traumas. Accordingly, in analysing, for
example, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, he identifies the psychodynamics of two large
groups, of which Palestinians are characterized as displaying ‘masochistic (victimized) large-
group narcissism’ (pp. 86–7), while Israelis are interpreted as in need of having ‘enemies to
externalize elements that cannot be synthesized’ (p. 87). If a sense of suffering makes large
groups feel morally superior, he contends that there is a sort of competition for ‘victimization’
between Israelis and Palestinians, both of which suffer from humiliation which is linked with
the massive traumas they have undergone.

In a regressed society political, legal or traditional borders begin to symbolize the canvas of
the large group tent. In other words, borders become highly psychologized and people,
leaders, and official organizations become preoccupied with their protection. Since there is a
realistic danger “out there,” obviously borders need to be protected and because of this, it is
difficult to study the psychological aspects of this preoccupation.

When an ethnic, national, religious large group regresses it primarily becomes involved in
certain large group processes that serve to maintain, protect and repair the large-group
identity. Since large groups have their own specific characteristics that are built upon a
centuries-old continuum and shared mental representation of history and myth, the
examination of signs and symptoms of their regression should also include psychological
processes that are specific to such large groups. When Freud (1921) wrote about this
phenomenon he did not say that he was referring to regressed groups. Robert Waelder (1930)
brought to our attention the fact that Freud was describing regressed groups. Sometimes the
members of a large group continue to rally around a leader for decades and remain
“regressed’ in order to modify the existing characteristics of their large-group identity. In this
situation what we observe is similar to an individual’s “regressing in the service of
progression and creativity.” When a large group is in a regressed state, the personality and the
internal world of the political leader assumes great importance concerning the manipulation
of what already exists within the large-group psychology.

Regression
Two types of splitting are also signs of large-group regression. First, a splitting between “us”
and “them” (the enemy outside the regressed large group) becomes very strong and the
“other” becomes a target for dehumanization. Second, in regressed large groups, following
the initial rallying around the leader, a severe split occurs within the society itself, especially
when the leader cannot maintain hope and cannot tame shared aggression.
The Study of Mind and Human Interaction (CSMHI) evolved a process to deal with the
unfolding of large-group regression and conflicts between large groups. the “Tree Model”
(Volkan, 1999) to reflect the slow growth and branching of a tree. • this methodology has
three basic components or phases: (1) psychopolitical diagnosis of the situation, (2)
psychopolitical dialogues between influential delegates of opposing groups, and (3)
collaborative actions and institutions that grow out of the dialogue process.

The tree model study

1. first phase includes in-depth psychoanalytically informed interviews with a wide range of
members of the large groups involved and an understanding begins to emerge concerning the
main conscious and unconscious aspects that surround the situation that needs to be
addressed.
2. During the psycho-political dialogues between influential representatives of opposing large
groups that takes place in a series of multiday meetings over several years, resistances against
changing large group’s “pathological” ways of protecting large-group identity are brought to
the surface, articulated, and fantasized threats to large-group identity are interpreted so that
realistic communication can take place. In order for the newly gained insights to have an
impact on social and political policy, as well as on the populace at large.
3. the final phase requires the collaborative development of concrete actions, programs, and
institutions. Our methodology allows several disciplines, including psychoanalysis, history
and diplomacy, to work together to articulate and work through underlying psychological and
historical aspects of the tensions. Then what is learned is operationalized so that more
peaceful coexistence between large groups can be achieved and threats (especially the
fantasized ones) to large-group identity coming from the “other” can be tamed. This leads to
a progression within the large group.

Large group progression

The signs of a large-group progression include forming stable family, clan and professional
subgroups, preserving individuality and having a society where individuals and professional
organizations establish a capacity for compromise without damaging integrity (Rangell,
1980) and an ability to question what is “moral” and “beautiful.” • there is an increased
emphasis on freedom of speech, having just and functioning civil institutions, especially a
fair legal system and mental hospitals with human care (Stern, 2001),and halting devaluation
of women and children. • its members (in general) can wonder about the enemy’s “psychic
reality.” To understand why the “other” behaved in malignant ways does not mean to forgive
and forget what has happened. clinicians, when they are willing to take part in
interdisciplinary efforts, have much to offer those who wish to encourage diversity while
resolving conflict. They also will benefit a great deal from studying largegroup psychology in
its own right if they are involved in such efforts.

SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH
KELMAN
His work over more than three decades has focused on the development and application of
interactive problem solving: an unofficial, scholar-practitioner approach to the resolution of
protracted, deep-rooted, and often violent conflicts between identity groups—particularly
ethnonational groups—which is derived from the pioneering work of John Burton and
anchored in social-psychological principles (Kelman 1999c; 2002). His primary focus over
the years has been on the Israeli Palestinian conflict, but his students and associates have also
applied the approach in a number of other arenas of ethnonational conflict, including Cyprus,
Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Colombia, and South Africa.

The central distinction in our work, following John Burton, has been between settlement and
resolution of conflict. In contrast to the negotiation of a political settlement, a process of
conflict resolution goes beyond a realist view of national interests. It explores the causes of
the conflict, particularly causes in the form of unmet or threatened needs for identity, security,
recognition, autonomy, and justice. It seeks solutions responsive to the needs of both sides
through active engagement in joint problem solving. Hence, agreements achieved through a
process of genuine conflict resolution—unlike compromises achieved through a bargaining
process brokered or imposed by third parties—are likely to engender the two parties’ long-
term commitment to the outcome and to transform their relationship

Assumption
His work starts with the assumption that the nonviolent termination of conflicts between
identity groups requires a process of conflict resolution of the kind that I have briefly
described.

Conflict settlement
Conflict settlement can be described as a process yielding an agreement that meets the
interests of both parties to the extent that their respective power positions enable them to
prevail. Third parties—outside powers or international organizations—often play a role in
brokering or even imposing an agreement, using their own power by way of threats or
inducements. The agreement may be supported by the publics on the two sides because they
are tired of war and have found the status quo of continuing hostility and uncertainty
increasingly intolerable. Such support of the agreement does not rest in any particular change
in public attitudes toward the adversary. The settlement process is not especially designed to
change the quality of the relationship between societies . The stability of a political settlement
ultimately depends on surveillance—by the parties themselves, in keeping with their
deterrent capacities, by outside powers, and by international organizations.

Conflict settlement is not a negligible achievement in a violent and destructive relationship

with escalatory potential. In fact, conflict resolution can often build on political settlements,
insofar as these involve a negotiating process in which each side pursues its interests and in
which they are able to reach agreement on many outstanding issues through distributive
bargaining in which power as well as international norms play a role

Conflict resolution
conflict resolution, particularly if we think of it within an interactive problem solving
framework, goes beyond conflict settlement in many of the ways to which he has already
alluded: It refers to an agreement that is arrived at interactively, rather than imposed or
sponsored by outside powers, and to which the parties therefore have a higher level of
commitment. It addresses the parties’ basic needs and fears and therefore has a greater
capacity to sustain itself over time. It builds a degree of working trust between the parties—a
pragmatic trust in the other’s interest in achieving and maintaining peace—and therefore is
not entirely dependent on surveillance as the guarantor of the agreement (for the distinction
between working trust and interpersonal trust, see Kelman 2005). It establishes a new
relationship between the parties, best described as a partnership, in which the parties are
responsive to each other’s needs and constraints, and committed to reciprocity. It generates
public support for the agreement and encourages the development of new images of the other.

Conflict resolution as he has described it clearly represents a transformation of the

relationship between the parties (cf. Lederach1998; Kelman 1999a). But there are limits to
this new relationship, which make it vulnerable to changes in interests, circumstances, and
leadership. Conflict resolution as a process of peacemaking involves the development of
a new relationship, with an associated set of new attitudes alongside—or perhaps on top
—of the old attitudes. The new attitudes are not necessarily integrated with one’s
preexisting value structure and belief system— with one’s worldview. This means that the old
attitudes—including attitudes of fundamental distrust and negation of the other—remain
intact even as new attitudes, associated with the new relationship, take shape. The
coexistence of new attitudes toward the other as a potential partner in peace with old attitudes
toward the other as a mortal enemy creates instability in the new relationship, particularly in
the context of an existential identity conflict. Changing circumstances may trigger the old
attitudes in their full force.

Reconciliation
This is the third, distinct, process of peacemaking: reconciliation, with a primary focus at the
level of identities. He has always argued that an agreement emerging from a process of
conflict resolution within an interactive problem-solving framework and the new relationship
it promotes are conducive to stable peace, mutually enhancing cooperation, and ultimate
reconciliation.

Reconciliation, in this view, is a consequence of successful conflict resolution. It comes at the

end of the process, with time: The test of a good agreement, and of the process that generates
it, is its conduciveness to ultimate reconciliation. This does not mean that reconciliation
comes into play only after an agreement has been reached. Reconciliation is, after all, a
process as well as an outcome; as such, it should ideally be set into motion from the
beginning of a peace process and as an integral part of it.

In this spirit, he has proposed that the problem-solving workshops between politically
influential Israelis and Palestinians that his colleagues and he has organized for some years (
Kelman 2002; Rouhana& Kelman 1994) represent tentative steps toward reconciliation,
insofar as participants are encouraged to listen to and to try to appreciate each other’s
narrative and to engage in a process of “negotiating identity” (Kelman 2001).

Whereas conflict resolution refers to the process of achieving a mutually satisfactory and
hence durable agreement between the two societies, reconciliation refers to the process
whereby the societies learn to live together in the postconflict environment. Reconciliation
presupposes conflict resolution of the type that he has described: the development of working
trust; the transformation of the relationship toward a partnership based on reciprocity and
mutual responsiveness; an agreement that addresses both parties’ basic needs. But it goes
beyond conflict resolution in representing a change in each party’s identity.

The primary feature of the identity change constituting reconciliation is the removal of the
negation of the other as a central component of one’s own identity. My main empirical point
of reference in this analysis is the Israeli-Palestinian case, in which mutual denial of the
other’s identity has been a central feature of the conflict over the decades (cf. Kelman 1978;
1999b). Changing one’s collective identity by removing the negation of the other from it
implies a degree of acceptance of the other’s identity—at least in the sense of acknowledging
the validity and legitimacy of the other’s narrative without necessarily fully agreeing with
that narrative. The change in each party’s identity may go further by moving toward the
development of a common, transcendent identity—not in lieu of, but alongside of each
group’s particularistic identity. What is essential to reconciliation, in his view, is that each
party revise its own identity just enough to accommodate the identity of the other. As the
parties overcome the negative interdependence of their identities, they can build on the
positive interdependence of their identities that often characterizes parties living in close
proximity to each other (Kelman 1999b).

New attitudes toward the other can thus develop, not just alongside of the old attitudes, but in
place of the old attitudes. As the new attitudes become integrated into the group’s own
identity, they gradually replace the old attitudes. Working trust can gradually turn into
personal trust. This does not foreclose the possibility that old fears and suspicions will
reemerge, but the relationship is less vulnerable to situational changes. The dilemma is that
the amount and kind of identity change that A requires from B in order to be ready for
reconciliation may be perceived by B as undermining the core of its identity. Insofar as the
other can be demonized and dehumanized, it becomes easier for each party to minimize guilt
feelings for acts of violence and oppression against the other and to avoid seeing itself in the
role of victimizer, rather than only the role of victim.

Thus, in protracted identity conflicts, negation of the other is not a peripheral, marginal
element of each party’s identity that can be easily discarded. His argument is merely that,
from an “objective” point of view, negating the identity of the other is not a necessary
condition for preserving, and indeed enhancing the core of one’s own identity. However, for
conflicting parties to arrive at a point where they can be free to relegate negation of the other
to the periphery of their own identities and eventually discard it requires the hard work of
reconciliation. What is central to that work is the growing assurance that the other is not a
threat to one’s own identity. In that process of assurance, the conditions for reconciliation
play a vital role. It is his contention that reconciliation—especially in cases in which neither
party is prepared to adopt the role of perpetrator—cannot be achieved on the basis of purely
objective criteria of truth, justice, or responsibility, anchored in historical scholarship or
international law, but requires some degree of mutual accommodation in the course of
negotiating the conditions for reconciliation.

He has identified five conditions that may help groups in conflict arrive at the difficult point
of revising their identity so as to accommodate the identity of the other:
1. Mutual acknowledgment of the other’s nationhood and humanity, which involves
acceptance of the other as an authentic nation and inclusion of the other in one’s own moral
community.
2. Development of a common moral basis for peace, allowing for a peace that both sides
perceive as consistent with the principles of fairness and attainable justice.
3. Confrontation with history, which does not require a joint consensual history, but does
require admitting the other’s truth into one’s own narrative.
4. Acknowledgment of responsibility, expressed in both symbolic and material terms.
5. Establishment of patterns and institutional mechanisms of cooperation, including various
people-to-people activities that are genuinely useful to both parties and based on the
principles of equality and reciprocity.

All five of these conditions for reconciliation are designed to facilitate changes in the
collective identities of the conflicting parties, with particular emphasis on removing the
negation of the other as a key element of each group’s own identity.

Conclusion He has conceptualized conflict settlement, conflict resolution, and reconciliation

as three qualitatively distinct processes, operating at the level of interests, relationships, and
identities respectively. Although settlement, resolution, and reconciliation represent three
approaches to peacemaking, they should not be viewed as three different ways of achieving
the same goal. Rather, they are three ways of achieving different—though often overlapping
—goals, all broadly linked to changing the relationship between groups, communities,
societies, or states from one of hostility to one of peaceful coexistence.

VOLDHARDT AND BILALI

Social psychology has strongly influenced theory and practice in the field of conflict
resolution, due to pioneering work by social psychologists such as Herbert Kelman and
others. Authors reviewing the emerging field of peace psychology have described its
significant overlap with social psychology (Christie, 2006; Winter & Cava, 2006), and even
noted that it tends to be “an offspring of social psychology” (Boehnke, Fuss, & Kindervater,
2005).
Vollhardt and Bilali examine this overlap between social psychology and the psychological
study of peace and demonstrate that mainstream social psychology contains concepts and a
body of research that are inherently “peace psychological,” such that it could be referred to as
“social psychological peace research” (SPPR). They present a framework that defines the
subject matter and introduces conceptual and methodological criteria, characterizing core
research in SPPR as (1) value-explicit, (2) contextualized, (3) including multiple levels of
analysis, and (4) practically oriented. They also conducted a content analysis of leading social
psychology journals to identify the amount and nature of current SPPR.

Figure 1: Social Psychological Peace Research

Social Psychological Peace Psychology: Definition, Conceptual and Methodological

Criteria

The Scope of Peace Psychology

To develop a conceptualization of SPPR, Vollhardt and Bilali first characterize research that
is prototypical of peace psychology and then compare this to prototypical research in social
psychology. Peace psychology has been defined as “seek[ing] to develop theories and
practices aimed at the prevention and mitigation of direct and structural violence” (Christie et
al, 2001). Based on this definition, they define the social psychological study of peace as “the
field of psychological theory and practice aimed at the prevention and mitigation of direct
and structural violence between members of different sociopolitical groups, as well as the
promotion of cooperation and a prosocial orientation that reduces the occurrence of
intergroup and societal violence and furthers positive intergroup relations”. This definition
implies four conceptual and methodological criteriathat lead to a further refinement of the
subject matter for the social psychological study of peace.

Criterion 1: Normative Versus Value-Neutral Research. The goal of SPPR is to reduce and
prevent conflict, and to promote positive relations between groups. In other words, peace
psychological research is, by definition, inherently normative, and not value neutral (Fuchs &
Sommer, 2004). Normative research aims at improvements, which means that it includes
evaluation of the present state of things and of the direction of future development.
Evaluation is only possible from somebody's point of view. It should be noted, however, that
while these values may define the choice of research topics and the direction of interventions,
they do not necessarily affect the scientific evaluation of hypotheses and the interpretation of
data.The value relevance (Parsons, 1949; Weber, 1968) of topics studied in SPPR does not
violate the principle of value neutrality in science (Albert, 1968)

Criterion 2: Contextualized Versus Context-Free Research- Since societal conditions

constitute the core of SPPR, it needs to be contextualized, that is, embedded in a concrete
socio-political context such as a specific intergroup conflict or power relations in society
(Pettigrew, 1991). This requires “sensitivity to geohistorical context” (Christie, 2006) and a
recognition that the relevant constructs may vary in different regions of the world (Martín-
Baró, 1994). Moreover, the same variables assessed in a real-world context will often differ
in their meaning and experienced intensity from when they are measured context-free and
outside an individual’s everyday realm of experience (Bar-Tal, 2004). Rather than being
isolated, the variables of interest are embedded in a complex of other influential factors
(Groeben, 2006). Because of these characteristics (meaning and intensity of the variables of
interest, as well as embeddedness in a complex of influential factors), contextualized SPPR
shows a greater concern for ecological and external validity than research conducted within
the confines of the laboratory (Pettigrew, 1991).

Criterion 3: Multiple Levels of Analysis Versus Methodological Holism or

Individualism- SPPR should not restrict its focus to one level of analysis by “reducing
structural to personal problems” (Martín-Baró, 1994) or by ignoring the impact of individual
processes (Pettigrew, 1996). Because it is concerned with the bidirectional influence between
psychological processes and societal conditions, pure methodological individualism (social
phenomena explained as a result of the motivations and actions of individual agents) or
methodological holism (social phenomena explained in the context of an individual’s social
environment) is not appropriate. Social psychology combines multiple levels “by specifying
the situational processes that mediate between the macrostructural and micro-individual level
of analysis” (Pettigrew, 1998). This situational analysis usually involves “subjective
interpretations of the social environment”, which allows analyzing the effects of structural
variables and group status on individuals, as well as individuals’ impact on the social
structure (Bar-Tal, 2006; Pettigrew, 1996). Hence, multilevel approaches rely on theories
concerning the relations between relevant influential variables on the micro-, meso-, and
macro-levels of analysis, as well as their interplay.

Criterion 4: Practical Versus Epistemic Research Orientation- The definition of SPPR

implies that it has a practical orientation, namely the prevention or mitigation of societal
conflict and intergroup violence as well as the promotion of positive relations between
groups. SPPR does not restrict itself to the mere description of phenomena for the sake of
furthering knowledge. Its practical rather than epistemic (descriptive) orientation (Carrier,
2004) is in line with the view of liberation psychologist Martín-Baró (1994), who has stated
that the point “is not simply to understand the world, but to change it” SPPR aims to use
social psychological theory and methodology to generate knowledge that has practical
relevance for reducing conflict and improving intergroup relations and, at the same time feeds
back into the general body of knowledge in social psychology. This practical orientation does
not, as such, exclude epistemic research. Rather, it requires a basic understanding of the
phenomena of interest (Carrier, 2004). Contextualized within the complex set of variables
that are relevant in the real world (Groeben, 2006), practical research can even result in
“theoretically significant novelties” (Carrier, 2004) and enhance epistemic insight.

In sum, SPPR addresses the prevention of structural violence and intergroup conflict as well
as the promotion of positive intergroup relations. In exploring these issues, research in this
tradition is, prototypically, (1) normative, (2) contextualized, (3) inclusive of multiple levels
of analysis, and (4) oriented toward the solution of practical problems

Relating Criteria of SPPR to Social Psychology

Some might argue that this characterization of SPPR contrasts with what is considered to be
prototypical research in social psychology. In regard to the conceptual and methodological
criteria described, social psychological research may be viewed as (1) adhering to the
principle of value neutrality (Howard, 1985); (2) abstracted from social and historical context
through a focus on laboratory experiments and internal validity (Aronson, Wilson, & Brewer,
1998; Gergen, 1978); (3) focused on processes at the individual and interpersonal levels
(Fiske, 2004; Greenwood, 2004); and (4) primarily epistemically oriented, with the aim of
understanding and explaining general processes and principles of individual cognition, affect,
and behavior. However, this view does not adequately reflect the breadth and reality of the
field, and Vollhardt and Bilali argue that the contradiction between peace research and social
psychological research does not actually exist. Topics related to peace and conflict are
included in major publications defining the field of social psychology. For example, three
chapters of the most recent edition of the Handbook of Social Psychology (Gilbert, Fiske, &
Lindzey, 1998) are directly relevant and dedicated to social conflict (Pruitt, 1998), social
justice and social movements (Tyler & Smith, 1998), and social psychology and world
politics (Tetlock, 1998).

Criterion 1: Normative Versus Value-Neutral Research in Social Psychology Values and

ideologies influence every step of the research process, such as the selection of research
questions, choice of methodology, and communication of results (Gergen & Leach, 2001).
Critical voices have pointed to harmful effects of numerous biases and unexamined
assumptions in social psychology (e.g., Hopkins, Reicher, & Levine, 1997; Leach, 1998). In
contrast, a “selfreflexive and value-explicit” social psychology (Cherry, 1995) could alleviate
this danger and create a basis for rational criticism.

Criterion 2: Contextualized Research In line with the focus of the early years of social
psychology (Greenwood, 2004), increasingly more social psychologists argue that human
behavior can only be fully understood in the social context in which it is shaped (e.g., Bar-
Tal, 2004, 2006; Fischer, 2006). Historically and socially contextualized social psychology
(Pettigrew, 1991; Smith, 1983) allows for the study of the complexity, relevance, and
emotional involvement that is central to understanding human experience (Bar-Tal, 2004)

Criterion 3: Multiple Levels of Analysis Social psychology is uniquely positioned to

analyze the interplay between the individual and the society. Several authors have argued for
recognizing this strength of social psychology and increasing the use of multiple levels of
analysis (Bar-Tal, 2006; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2006; Hewstone, 1997; Pettigrew, 2006). This
requires an increase of methodological pluralism, including qualitative methods and more
sophisticated statistical procedures (Hewstone, 1997; Pettigrew, 2006).

Criterion 4: Practical Orientation Although mainstream social psychology has an

epistemic orientation, it is also acknowledged that “social psychology has always straddled
the line between theory and application” (Jones, 1998). Some social psychologists also
explicitly combine both orientations in their research programs (e.g. Snyder, 1993). Among
the major societal problems that social psychology has applied its knowledge to in the last
decades (Jones, 1998), international conflict is considered as one of the most important (van
Lange, 2006).

In sum, plenty of research in mainstream social psychology can be characterized by the same
criteria that define the core of SPPR. Rather than contradicting the basic tenets of social
psychology, the study of peace and conflict falls squarely within its scope, and some would
even argue that it is closer to its roots (Bar-Tal, 2004).

Discussion How much “Peace” Is in Social Psychology?

The aim of the article was to characterize SPPR conceptually and methodologically, to
examine to what extent this area is represented in leading social psychology journals, and to
assess its status, trends, and potential. The analysis shows that a considerable amount of
research published in the selected journals is not only relevant to the (social) psychological
study of peace, but even at its core. It fulfils the criteria of being value-explicit,
contextualized, inclusive of multiple levels of analysis, and practically oriented. Thus, it can
be concluded that social psychological research not only contributes to the field of peace and
conflict studies, but that SPPR is in fact already an integral part of mainstream social
psychology.

Topics and Trends in Current SPPR

The results of the analysis indicate that the current emphasis of SPPR is primarily on
understanding causes and psychological antecedents of direct and structural violence
There is a stronger focus on problems of structural violence such as discrimination, race
relations, and prejudice toward ethnic minority groups. This is in line with characterization of
post- coldwar peace psychology as increasingly systemic.

Furthermore, the popularity of certain paradigms and topics in mainstream social psychology
is reflected in the body of SPPR as well. The articles aiming at understanding direct and/or
structural violence focus almost exclusively on prejudice and stereotyping.
Similarly, the frequent use of social identity theory and other intergroup relations theories is
in line with a general increasing trend within mainstream social psychology over the last
years (Sherman et al., 1999).

Criticism
SPPR, is biased toward the problems facing societies in North America and Western Europe.
There is a need to broaden the scope of research, the contexts of study, and the range of
topics in order to attain both depth and breadth in knowledge, and consequently to become
more effective in tackling such global issues as peace and conflict.

Another critical issue that arises is whether the criterion of contextualization is sufficiently
satisfied by simply framing research questions in the context of group memberships that are
of political or societal relevance (such as racial or ethnic groups).

Furthermore, although in most cases the research questions are contextualized in meaningful
group memberships, the research itself was usually conducted outside the actual relevant
social context. This pattern becomes apparent in the high proportion of studies conducted in
the laboratory and using self- report instead of behavioural measures.

The most frequently studied context in this body of research, intergroup relations, also
represents how most of the studies met the criterion of including the macro-level of analysis.
While this focus by no means excludes structural variables (such as economic inequality,
social class, power, and other characteristics of societal structure), these are only rarely
actually studied. More frequently, individual manifestations of structural violence (such as
discrimination and racism) are examined.
In sum, current SPPR still neglects bidirectional effects of structural variables on the
individual in favor of focusing on individual factors leading to structural violence (see also
Pettigrew, 1996, 2006). To account for the complexity of topics SPPR deals with, it is
essential that the principle of triangulation is followed more, combining experimental with
other methodologies.

Social Psychology and Peace Psychology

The analysis revealed that studies published in the peace psychology journal use more
geopolitically diverse samples, fewer student populations, and more diverse methodologies –
all of which improve the ability to account for the nature and complexity of conflict and
peace in the world.

Social psychology journals, on the other hand, integrate their findings more often into an
established theoretical framework. Following this model, an integration of research questions
in the field of peace psychology with existing social psychological theory would transfer
explanatory power and stimulation from basic research to the field of peace psychology,
leading to a more efficient and quicker integration of basic and applied research.

Psycho-cultural approach
Theories of ethnic conflict explain the origin, persistence, and course of ethnic disputes. The
most commonly cited social science theories of ethnic conflict are structural, emphasizing
ways in which competing interests and overt conflicts arise from the structure of society or
relationships between societies (Ross, 1993a). Interest-based theories suffer from at least two
important weaknesses -explaining how groups come to define certain interests as critical in
the first place, and why ethnic conflicts attain an intensity and intransigence which many
suggest are often not commensurate with the substantive interests the parties contend are at
stake.
Psycho-cultural interpretation theory, in contrast, offers answers to these questions and in so
doing provides a strong challenge to earlier anti-psychological views of social and political
conflict. In addition, Psycho-cultural interpretation theory answers earlier criticisms that
psychological explanations of collective behavior simply view society as little more than the
family writ large, as Freud did, offering a far richer view of the social world than did early
psychoanalytic formulations. The result is a socially rooted psychoanalytic theory and a
language in which to talk about psychological dynamics in ways that are far more compatible
than earlier work with the theories, empirical concerns, and interests of social scientists. The
great interest in interpretive approaches in the social sciences has made us aware of the
critical importance of understanding how impersonal and cultural frameworks, not just
objective conditions, shape social action. Psycho-cultural interpretation theory provides an
important addition to this perspective and articulates an important set of connections between
individual developmental processes and collective behavior.
Psycho-cultural interpretation theory gives a central role to culturally rooted social and
psychological processes which produce dispositions-shared images, perceptions of the
external world, and motives for individual and group behavior (Ross, 1993a; 1993b). When
conflicts develop, these dispositions are invoked to construct interpretations of the world. In
intransigent ethnic conflicts, deep seated threats to identity and security fears serve as
powerful barriers which prevent groups from addressing the competing substantive interests
which divide them.
The key concepts of Psycho-cultural interpretation theory are derived from contemporary
psychoanalytic formulations, especially object relations theory, which stress that interpretive
frameworks rooted in early social relationships strongly influence how individuals and
groups understand and respond to each other (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983; Mitchell, 1988).1
Internalized images of the world, established in family contexts, provide a template for later
relations involving larger social aggregates, such as those involving ethnic identities and are
called upon later when high-anxiety events, such as communal conflicts, occur. Shared
objects of identification and common frames of reference facilitate the development of
culturally sanctioned collective responses within ethnic communities (Barnes, 1987)

ROSS
PSYCHOCULTURAL INTERPRETATION THEORY
Contemporary psychoanalytic theory provides a socially rooted model of behavior built on
the work of Klein, Fairbairn, Sullivan, Kernberg and others which evolves structure from the
individual's relations with other people, in contrast to older drive-based theories which give a
preeminent role to instinctual drives (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983; Mitchell, 1988). Not only
does contemporary theory employ a very different language than earlier psychoanalytic
formulations, but it places a greater emphasis on social relationships in pre-Oedipal
development, a question not well developed in classical theory. What this work does in
emphasizing relational aspects of the human experience is to provide a prominent role for
social and cultural processes in psychological development, giving ethnic group (and other)
attachments a central role in the dynamics of inter-group cooperation and conflict (Fornari,
1975; Barnes, 1987; Volkan, 1988).2 In this section I want to highlight three key elements of
this contemporary psychoanalytic perspective relevant to ethnic conflict and conflict
management: the psychological construction of social worlds, the need to link Psycho-
cultural interpretive process.

The Psycho cultural Construction of Social Worlds

At the core of psycho cultural interpretation theory is the notion that the inner worlds of
people in a culture are social constructions rooted in the earliest social relationships. Without
necessarily rejecting older concerns, such as Freud's emphasis on psycho sexual
development, this widely held view in psychoanalysis sees the formation of social bonds as
the central task of infancy and early childhood (Stern, 1985; Mitchell, 1988). There is
certainly ample evidence that humans are predisposed to relate to others and establish strong
ties from birth, and that strong links to others have important adaptive significance (Bowlby,
1969, 1973; Trevarthen & Logotheti, 1989).An individual's early experiences and
relationships are the raw material for the construction of his or her internal world, and these
come to contain primordial models of human interaction involving nurturance, conflict,
authority, power, and community, which in turn have significance throughout life.
Indeed, recent behavioral science research has shown in exciting, often dramatic fashion how
the infant actively processes and interacts with the world. Even the youngest infants are
interactive processors of stimuli and have the skills to make social judgments. Stern, Bowlby,
and others suggest there is active social interaction from birth, an idea whose way was first
paved by a wide range of psychoanalytic thinkers, from Melanie Klein and the British object
relations school, who emphasized the importance of early relationships in the construction of
inner worlds in the preverbal period as a template for later relationships and actions.
Winnicott, for example (1971b), locates the roots of cultural experiences at this phase.
This relational view of development places it firmly in a social and cultural context (Whiting
& Whiting, 1975). It emphasizes psycho-cultural dispositions, culturally shared response
tendencies acquired through mechanisms spelled out in both psycho dynamic and social
learning theory from the earliest stages of life (LeVine, 1973). Dispositions are fundamental
orientations vis-a-vis the self and others and include culturally learned and approved methods
for dealing with others both inside and outside one's community. They are guides to behavior,
providing relevant models for diverse situations.
Psycho-cultural dispositions provide groups and individuals with the raw materials to develop
interpretations about the actions and motives of opponents under the conditions of stress and
ambiguity that conflicts produce. As interpretations develop as a reaction to anxiety, they
become infused with intense social and political meanings and offer guides to action. At the
same time, interpretations are a source of cognitive and perceptual distortion because in
stressful situations the desire for certainty is often higher than the need for accuracy.
Linking Psycho-cultural Interpretations and Conflict Behavior
Dispositions formed in early social relationships are internalized orientations which are key
building blocks in psycho-cultural interpretations and have significance for external action. In
the conflict domain, we want to know not only who are allies and who are enemies, but also
something about each, how they can be expected to behave, and what is appropriate action
toward them. Identifying Psycho-cultural dispositions related to conflict and violence
requires the specification of mechanisms linking early learning to personality formation and
adult behavior. The linkages emphasized here are central in object relations theory
(Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983): attachment and individuation, identification,repression,
projection, externalization, and displacement. These psychoanalytic mechanisms are central
to building and forming interpretations of the social world. While these can be examined on
the individual level and individual differences can be identified, the focus in Psycho-cultural
interpretation theory is on those elements which are shared within cultural groups.

Conflict as Interpretive Behavior

At the center of Psycho-cultural interpretation theory is the idea that because ethnic conflicts
evoke powerful emotions in highly ambiguous situations, internal interpretive frameworks
play a crucial role in addressing them. The combination, on the one hand, of ambiguity
associated with others' actions and/or intentions and, on the other, emotional salience which
characterizes many ethnic conflicts readily produces psychic threat and regression, with a
return to intense, primitive feelings.
Dispositions invoked in such situations are rooted in early experiences and shape how
disputants react in a conflict. These world views are cultural, not just personal, when they are
nurtured and socially reinforced, linking individuals in a collective process. Mack (1983)
discusses "cultural amplifiers," referring to social processes which emphasize differences
among groups. In ambiguous, stressful situations, provocative but vague comments from
adversaries are readily taken as literal threats and can easily produce social polarization and
further rhetorical and emotional escalation. A striking feature of many conflicts is the
emotional investment parties make in what to outsiders often seem like unimportant matters.
The fact is, however, that any matter invested with emotional significance is no longer trivial.
Shared images of the world and plans for action are predicated on a shared conception of the
difference between one's own group and others. The interpretive processes involved in
intense conflicts emphasize the homogeneity of each party, sometimes using what are small
objective differences to mark large social distinction
Conflict occurs in a cultural context that shapes its course in critical ways, affecting what
people fight about, how they fight, with whom they fight, and how disputes end. Culture is a
way of life transmitted (with changes and modifications) over time and embodied in a
community's institutions, values, and behavioral regularities. Culture also comprises
internalized identifications, shared metaphors, analogies, and other images of the world. Both
group goals and community practices are linked to shared notions of appropriate behavior. In
terms of conflict, such behavior refers to expectations about how to respond to particular
kinds of events, how others in the community are likely to react, and what are reasonable
goals and approved ways of pursuing them. Ethnic conflict behavior is a cultural
phenomenon because culture shapes so many of its key elements, such as the development of
specific in-group and out group identities, and the metaphors and images which distinguish
allies and enemies.

PSYCHOCULTURAL INTERPRETATION THEORY AND CONFLICT

MANAGEMENT
Conflict management proposals which follow from Psycho-cultural interpretation theory's
understanding of ethnic conflict begin with an acceptance of each party's interpretation of the
conflict. Specific peacemaking proposals then attempt to alter, rearrange, or lower the
salience of the deep-seated mutual fears and threats disputants hold in order to make it
possible for the parties to feel sufficiently comfortable so that they can develop creative,
integrative solutions which address the parties' substantive differences. At the simplest level,
this is what is involved when diplomats and others talk about small confidence-building
measures whose goal is to persuade each side that an agreement with the other can be made
and kept. Psycho-cultural interpretation theory's attention to deep-seated relational is sues
emphasizes questions of security, trust, and identity as central sources of the high anxiety that
is felt by parties in intense inter-group conflicts (Horowitz, 1985). Central to conflict
management proposals which arise from Psycho-cultural interpretation theory is the
importance of taking seriously participants' cognitive and affective interpretation of the
conflict, no matter how incomplete, biased, or just plain wrong a third-party believes it to be.
Parties are not simply going to alter their positions because an opponent or a well-intentioned
third party says that particular facts, or their organization, used to justify a particular claim
are incorrect, because facts are experienced at the emotional as well as cognitive levels. Nor
are disputants likely to respond very positively to being told that they are making too big a
deal out of a particular emotional concern. A much more fruitful first step is likely to be one
in which disputants and third parties involved in conflict management develop an
understanding of, an empathy with, but not necessarily an acceptance of the positions of the
parties (White, 1984).
Calls for third-party assistance in intransigent conflicts frequently emphasize ways in which a
facilitator can provide a neutral setting or can construct specific proposals after hearing each
side's position, but a third-party can also help each party to understand the others fears and
needs before actual negotiations begin.
Development of clearer understanding of each side's perspective, it is hoped, will in turn
develop a greater awareness of common needs all sides share. Only when this occurs,
psycho-cultural interpretation theory argues, can the parties involved in a bitter dispute begin
to discuss concrete proposals to address the specific interests of each community (White,
1984). Changing understandings must, in part, produce a change in enemy images through
the development of new metaphors which reject prior analogies linking a conflict to
culturally shared anxieties.
Finally, Psycho-cultural interpretation theory leads to the proposal that effective management
of intense ethnic conflicts cannot be either unilateral or imposed by third parties, no matter
how well-intentioned. While unilateral self-help may be necessary in situations where there is
great inequality between the parties or as a step which raises the very low self-esteem of a
party, it can rarely, in itself, produce a stable and just solution to an intense dispute
(Ross,1993)

SOME LIMITS TO PSYCHOCULTURAL INTERPRETATION PROPOSALS

Psycho cultural interpretation theory provides a rich and appealing way to understand the
intensity of conflicts and why they can be so difficult to manage once they begin to escalate.
It offers a link between the ways in which groups and individuals perceive social action and
the larger cultural setting in which behav ior occurs. At the same time there are some
important limits which are worth noting to this account of conflict and the peacemaking
proposals it generates.
One limit is that while interpretations may be important in shaping conflict behavior, the
theory is not very precise about how particular dispositions are invoked in situations where
alternative dispositions might direct behavior in different directions.
Another criticism is that psycho-cultural accounts, even if they have some merit, offer a more
complex explanation than is often required, ignoring proximate causes of disputes in favour
of more remote ones.
Another weakness of psycho cultural explanations is the vagueness with which targets of
hostile or cooperative impulses are specified. While various theories emphasize the idea that
hostility is projected onto outsiders and this then provides a rationale for attacking them,
there is too little attention to the ques tions of who gets defined as an outsider, or from among
the outsiders available, which one(s) become the targets for specific hostile actions (Ross,
1993)
CONCLUSION
Psychocultural interpretation theory begins with a human capacity for social bonding and
emphasizes the importance of early relationships as a key source of social behavior. The
capacity to develop social attachments and group identities is rooted in culturally distinctive
patterns of social relationships. These patterns are critical in helping people to understand
their social worlds and to develop strategies for action. In situations of high emotional
salience and ambiguity, such as intense ethnic conflicts, early experiences offer templates to
interpret the actions of others and to direct one's own behavior. Proposals for effective con
flict management which follow from psychocultural interpretation theory emphasize the need
to take seriously groups' interpretations of the conflict as a step to addressing the mutual fears
and perceived threats they evoke. The intensity of fears, the theory suggests, is most likely to
be altered paradoxically, when they are accepted and then reorganized through the
development of empathy among disputants through a series of steps in which the parties
recognize the intense hurt each feels as a result of past grievances. Some form of group-based
mourning and reconciliation is also needed, the theory argues, for former enemies to make
enduring peace. Interest differences among disputants are, in the view of this theory, possible
to bridge only once the intense mutual hostile perceptions parties hold are addressed.