2209 IPC Assignment
2209 IPC Assignment
PATNA
I, hereby, declare that the work reported in the B.B.A. L.L.B (Hons.) Project Report titled
work carried out under the supervision of Ms Preety Anand. I have not submitted
this work elsewhere for any other degree or diploma. I am fully responsible for the contents
of my Project Report.
SEMESTER -3rd
CNLU, Patna
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I owe the present accomplishment of my project to our CNLU librarians and staff who provided
me the online remote access which helped me immensely with the material in this regard and
without whom I couldn’t have completed it in the present way.
I would also like to extend gratitude to my batch mates and helpful seniors and all those unseen
hands that have helped me at different stages of my project.
THANK YOU,
Research Methodology
Mostly doctrinal research and primary method of research was adopted in making of this project.
Few primary and secondary methods were used. Some literary works and
books and articles were referred and the internet through various websites
was used extensively for the collection of data which was required for the
Introduction
There is general agreement that causing another person's death with deliberate intent is culpable as
one of the most serious offences. This reflects the high value that society puts on each
individual's life and the fact that to kill someone is the most permanent of injuries.
Intoxication is perceived as a state of mind in which a person loses self-control and his ability to
judge. In order for a person escape liability under S. 85 of the IPC on grounds of involuntary
intoxication he must be able to fulfil the following three conditions:
Section 85 essentially deals with offences committed under the influence of drugs or alcohol.
Such intoxication should be caused by fraud or coercion and such intoxication should limit his
ability to decide what is right and what is wrong. Section 86 deals with intoxication which is
self- induced. Such intoxication which results in an offence follows the principle that onewho
sins when drunk be punished when he is sober.2 For example, if a person who has consumed too
much liquor, takes a knife from his house and goes with the intention to kill a person but instead
kills a person who tried to pacify him, his act would amount to murder once he is sober. However,
in Delirium tremens3, a form of insanity arising out of habitual drinking which makes a person
reach a degree of madness whereby he is incapable of distinguishing between right an
1
Michael J. Allen, Textbook on Criminal Law, (London: Blackstone Press Ltd., 1999, 5th edn.).
2
Qui peccat ebius luat sobrius.
3
Glanville Williams, “Involuntary intoxication ”, (1989) 105 L.Q.R. 387.
wrong, the disease is perceived as insanity protanto and the person’s case is given the same
treatment as that of a case of involuntary drunkenness.
In the case of A-G for Northern Ireland v. Gallagher5 Lord Denning stated two examples. The
first related to a nurse who got so drunk at a christening ceremony that she put the baby on the
fire thinking it was a log of wood. The second related to an intoxicated person who thought that
his friend lying on the bed was a theatrical dummy and stabbed him to death. According to Lord
Denning there would be a defence to murder in each of these cases. It was stated that drunkenness
makes mistakes much more conceivable.6 In the case of Director of Public Prosecution v. Beard7
the accused raped and murdered a 13 years old girl and took the plea of intoxication. It was held
that intoxication may only be a basis for defence if the accused was unable to form mens rea.
There have been considerable developments in the field of criminal law in recent cases such as,
Soolkal & another v. The State8, where the court has asked the accused to show specific evidence
that he was intoxicated and lacked mens rea. The court also stated that the burden of proof in
such cases resting on the defendant will not be satisfied only
4
(1974) 3 SCC 490.
5
[1961] 3 All ER 299.
6
Michael J. Allen, Textbook on Criminal Law, (London: Blackstone Press Ltd., 1999, 5th edn.).
7
[1920] 2 All ER 479 (HL).
8
[1999] 1 WLR 2011, PC.
by offering evidence that the accused had consumed alcohol or by a loss of memory due to
intoxication.
The only difficulty arises in the case of the mandatory life sentence for murder where involuntary
intoxication cannot be taken into account at the sentencing stage. It was for this reason alone that
the House had any hesitation in rejecting the creation of a new defence. In the end Lord Mustill
concluded that this was not a sufficient reason to force on the theory and practice of the criminal
law an exception which would otherwise be unjustified.
If a drunk person causes a fatal injury to another he cannot be convicted under s.302 I.P.C as he
did not have the requisite intent to kill but could still be convicted under s. 304 Part II, I.P.C., by
virtue of imputed knowledge under s. 86 I.P.C..10
9
[1994] 3 All ER 353, HL.
10
Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, The Indian Penal Code, (Nagpur: Wadhwa & co.,13th ed., 2004) pp 124.
11
[1976] 2 All ER 142.
mens rea for the crime. This is despite the fact that there is no contemporaneity between the fault
in becoming intoxicated and commission of actus reus of the crime. There has been an alternative
view in Majewski which holds that it does not create the rule of substantive law, but one of
evidence. A specific intent offence is one where evidence of voluntary intoxication negativing
mens rea is a defence and designation of crimes as requiring, or not requiring, specific intent is
based on no principle but on policy.12
(c) (i) Law commission’s analysis of Majewski: The Law Commission, having surveyed the
operation on the law on intoxication, considered options for reform of law on the same. The Law
Commission was left with two alternatives.
First that the Majewski distinction should simply be abolished without replacement. The effect of
this would be to return to established principles and to assert that that the defendant should be
acquitted if he lacked the relevant mental element. The other alternative was to go ahead with
the creation of a new offense which the Law commission has preferred to do.
It is submitted that going ahead with the first reform is indicative of the fact that one is diluting
the acknowledged policy that if a defendant causes harm while intoxicated, some criminal
sanction should be imposed, if only for public safety. This might have been a reason for going
for the next option.
The option of creation of a new offense has been recommended before by the Butler Committee
and by a minority of the C.L.R.C. The Law Commission’s preferred option for reform is to
punish those who cause serious harm, while substantially and deliberately intoxicated, even
though the defendant acted in a state of automatism.
Therefore, a possible reason for including automatism could be that if such liability were
excluded, then greater possibility of the defendant being acquitted under the defense of
involuntary intoxication arises.
12
Michael J. Allen, Textbook on Criminal Law, (London: Blackstone Press Ltd., 1999, 5th edn.).
Thus, Law Commission’s recommendation of the creation of a new offense seems to be a
preferred option as clearly an unqualified abolition of the Majewski rule without replacement by
another offense is not a practicable solution.
d) Forseeability Test:
The presence or absence of liability may be said to rest on a foreseeability test. The fact that the
consumption of alcohol or the ingestion of drugs may cause loss of control is universal
knowledge. Thus, anyone who knowingly consumes such intoxicating substances is, at the very
least, committing a rash and negligent act averse to the possibility of losing control. One
therefore attracts the charge of deliberate intent by consuming substances known to lead to such
consequences. Moreover, loss of control may not be instantaneous and without symptoms.
However, combined with the issue of involuntary consumption, the position becomes quite
contentious. Even states with a strict liability offence excluding drunkenness as a defence
generally require prosecution of the person who laced the drinks without the knowledge of the
person who ultimately consumed it. This general rule may, however, open a Pandora's box with a
convenient justification available even to such offenders who have only marginally exceeded the
prescribed alcohol limit for drivers. In most legal systems, therefore, involuntary loss of control
is restricted to cases where there is no real loss of control and in any case exists with noticeable
symptoms. Thus, for example, many states have prescribed a low threshold for the blood alcohol
level attracting the commission of an offence of driving under the influence of alcohol so that
people may be liable for exceeding the prescribed limit even without the tangible symptomatic
signs. More generally, this defence would be not be available to people experiencing symptoms
of intoxication who continued to consume the laced drink since they are expected to be aware of
the consequences. Equally, they are expected to recognize that they are affected by an unknown
substance and resist from beginning an activity such as driving as this would fail to attract the
defence of involuntary consumption. The basis for law in this area rests on the principle of the
good of the general public as against the rights of an individual who recklessly exposes the public
to danger.13
13
P.S.A. Pillai, Criminal Law, (New Delhi: Butterworths, 2000).
controversial Jaggard v Dickinson14 held that, for the purposes of the statutory defence of lawful
excuse, a drunken belief will found the defence even though this allows drunkenness to negate
basic intent. This is limited authority and does not affect the generality of the defence. If the
accused in a state of intoxication believes a thing to be his own when it is someone else’s and
destroys it this belief cannot claim a defence as this would be considered an act of recklessness.
However if the accused is under the impression that the thing belongs to a third person and
damages the thing with the consent of the third person he is entitled to a defence[24].
(ii) Common Law defences: The common law goes contrary to statutory defence. Although it
is now settled that when the accused sets up self- defence, he is to be judged on the facts as he
believed them to be, whether reasonably or not and any mistake arising from voluntary
intoxication cannot be relied on as a basis for defence even on charge of murder or other crime
requiring specific intent as in case of O’Grady.15 This was plainly obiter because the appellant
had been acquitted of murder and was appealing against his conviction for manslaughter but in
O’Connor16 the court, inexplicably treated it as binding by quashing the conviction of murder
on another ground. The dictum assumes that if self- defence is a defence to murder it must also
be a defence to manslaughter, but this is not necessarily so because an act done in self-defence
arising from a grossly negligent mistake should be manslaughter by gross negligence.[27]
14
[1980] 3 All ER 399.
15
1985 QB 995.
16
1991 CLR 135.
17
[1961] 3 All ER 299.
rules18, to the accused state of mind at the time before he took the alcohol and not at the time
of committing the act.
a) Intoxication causes automatism: The accused in a drunken state suffers concussion and
commits an offence in a state of automatism resulting from the concussion. In Stripp19, the
court decided that the accused should be acquitted on grounds of automatism since intoxication
was too remote from the act. The law commission held that the case suggests the possibility
that where there is a course of automatism clearly separable in time or effect from the
intoxication and supported by a foundation of evidence, then a defence of automatism may be
available, but when causal factors are less easily separable it would seem that the presence of
the intoxication will be on policy grounds lead to adoption of Majewski rule to exclude reliance
on automatism.
18
The M'Naghten Rules are used to establish insanity as an excuse to potential criminal liability, but the
definitional criteria establish insanity in the legal and not the psychological sense.
19
(1979) Cr. App R 318.
20
K.D.Gaur, Criminal Law: Cases and Materials, (New Delhi: Butterworths, 1999).
Conclusion
In different times and in different societies, the response towards public drunkenness has been on
a scale of diametrically opposite attitudes. While certain cultures and societies have accepted
alcohol consumption or drug-taking as a part of their religious or social rites, such behaviour has
attracted an entirely contrary response extending to its denigration as immoral and sinful. The
norms of propriety have therefore always been dynamic and modern law has therefore
appropriately steered clear of reflecting these wavering standards and criminalising intoxication
per se but by adopting the more neutral standards based on whether an act arising from
intoxication was voluntary or involuntary. The viability of any defence of a criminal act therefore
rests on a combination of the voluntary vs. involuntary principle and the universal knowledge
that consumption of intoxicants is likely to induce loss of control. The evolution of law in this
area reflects a careful application of these standards.
10