ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY

IN
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY
IN
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Amitav Mallik

INSTITUTE FOR DEFENCE STUDIES & ANALYSES

NEW DELHI

PENTAGON PRESS
Role of Technology in International Affairs
Amitav Mallik

First Published in 2016

Copyright © Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi

ISBN 978-81-8274-881-1

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval
system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical,
photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without first obtaining written permission of
the copyright owner.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this book are those of the author and do not necessarily
reflect those of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, or the Government of
India.

Published by
PENTAGON PRESS
206, Peacock Lane, Shahpur Jat,
New Delhi-110049
Phones: 011-64706243, 26491568
Telefax: 011-26490600
email: [email protected]
website: www.pentagonpress.in

Branch
Flat No.213, Athena-2,
Clover Acropolis,
Viman Nagar,
Pune-411014
Email: [email protected]

In association with
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
No. 1, Development Enclave,
New Delhi-110010
Phone: +91-11-26717983
Website: www.idsa.in

Printed at Avantika Printers Private Limited.

 Contents

Preface vii
Acknowledgements xi

PART I
ROLE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

1. Technology, Diplomacy and International Affairs 3

Introduction 3
Changing Dimensions of International Relations and Diplomacy 6
Interplay of Science and Technology with Foreign Policy 12
Technology Controls and Foreign Policy: Indian Perspective 17

2. Technology and Security: Challenges for Diplomacy 29

Introduction: Technology, Security and Diplomacy Interplay 29
Technology and Security: Challenges for India 35
Indian Science and Technology Potential for Influencing International
Relations 49
International Relations and Diplomacy in a Globalised World 57

PART II
TECHNOLOGIES OF HIGH IMPACT ON
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

3. Defence Technologies: Game Changers for

International Affairs 69
Introduction: Game Changing Defence Technologies 69
Evolution of Defence Technologies and Impact on International Affairs 72
Politics of Nuclear Weapons and International Affairs: Indian Perspective 84
Future Technology Trends and Impact on Balance of Power Equations 93
vi Role of Technology in International Affairs

4. Outer Space and International Affairs 104

Space Security and International Relations: An Introduction 104
Space Security: International Dimension and Indian Perspective 107
Space Sustainability, Space Laws and Space Code of Conduct 118
Policy Options for India and Foreign Policy Challenges 132

5. Cyber Space and International Affairs 138

Introduction: Cyber Space—the New Dimension 138
Expanding Cyber Space: Impact on International Affairs 142
Cyber Security: Threat Perceptions and Policy Dimensions 154
Challenges for Indian Foreign Policy and Diplomacy 166

6. Climate Change and International Relations 177

Global Warming and Climate Change: An Introduction 177
Energy and Environment Dilemma: Indian Priorities 187
Climate Change and National Security: Indian Perspective 199
Climate Negotiations: Challenges for Indian Diplomacy 212

PART III
TECHNOLOGY AND FOREIGN POLICY:
INDIAN PRIORITIES

7. Summary and Recommendations 227

Technology and Foreign Policy Interplay: A Summary 227
India’s National Interests and Foreign Policy Priorities 233
Comprehensive National Power: Role of Science and Technology 243
Recommendations 248

Index 255
 Preface

In international affairs diplomacy, technology and economics are the most

important tools for any nation. Historically, science and technology (S&T)
has been one of the main currencies for exchange and dialogue among human
societies and sovereign nations. In modern times, it is emerging as an important
instrument of techno-economic power that will shape the changing dynamics
of international relations and global affairs. Diplomacy is the major instrument
of dialogue between nations. It is the art to negotiate to protect one’s interests
and promote one’s influence in international affairs. For every sovereign nation
both technology and diplomacy are essential tools for managing international
relations, the essence of which is protecting national security and projecting
national power.
Throughout history of international affairs, S&T has been a defining
factor in the evolution of security and war-fighting strategies among nations.
These strategies have depended largely on the level of technology available to
warriors and leaders. Today, technology has multiplied the human capacity
to cause damage or destruction and hence, diplomacy has an enhanced role
in preserving peace. As sovereign nations struggle to gain better position vis-
à-vis other nations, with or without open conflict, the competing forces often
get translated into ‘threats’, with more powerful parties often gaining the
advantage. These are the advanced nations which define the global norms
and set standards for others to follow, who often aspire for similar powers
through indigenous techno-economic progress or by forming alliances to
achieve their aims. Others, who cannot keep pace with the powerful, often
become rebellious and seek certain nuisance value to climb up the ladder. In
such dynamics, whether at the national or international level, it is the techno-
economic capability and diplomatic-military strategy that provide the real vital
edge to a nation. Thus, in international affairs, technology and diplomacy
will have to play the final defining role for every nation.
viii Role of Technology in International Affairs

S&T has played a key role in creating the globally connected modern
societies of today. While automobile and aviation technology brought about
revolutionary changes in speed and time of travel, electronics and
communication technology created whole new capabilities in information and
communication exchange. Advances in S&T have been driven by man’s
aspiration for progress and peace. His innovative instincts and experimental
skills have evolved with his pursuit of a secure environment, economic
prosperity and defence from threats to his sense of well-being. As witnessed
in the 19th and 20th centuries, advances in S&T have proved to be powerful
drivers of change in global society as well as among nations in terms of
economic, military, political and even cultural development. S&T has been
so intrinsic to the process that it is often taken for granted and seldom
recognised for its important independent identity and its intrinsic role in policy
formulation, both at national as well as global levels.
Of course, the progress among societies or nations using S&T with
innovative imagination has not been equal and this has created significant
inequality among nations; such that faster developing societies have acquired
relative superiority over other slower developing societies. This has led to the
need for protecting individual national assets and interests from competitors
and adversaries. The resultant techno-economic divide has been growing since
the industrial revolution. Technological superiority, combined with man’s
ideology and ambition for power and control thus underscores the basic
dynamics of interactions amongst societies and this indeed has become the
very rationale for international relations and diplomacy.
Advances in S&T have been used with great success for multiplying man’s
defensive and offensive powers beyond local horizons. Technology has created
lethal weapons of war and even weapons of mass destruction (WMD), albeit
supposedly to provide the ultimate deterrence to war, so as to maintain peace.
The cold war between the two superpowers for over 40 years was marked by
relentless pursuit of S&T for maintaining the techno-military edge over the
adversary. This in effect produced accelerated development of advanced
technologies that shaped the political and military doctrines as well as the
methods and means of waging war or preserving peace. Information technology
has emerged as the backbone of the present ‘Knowledge Society’.
In the modern world of today, technology is so intimately embedded in
national priorities and international equations that it has become an inseparable
component of international relations and diplomacy. This book hopes to
highlight this important relationship and discuss the increasing role of S&T
in international affairs.
 Preface ix

The role of S&T in the present 21st century is far more relevant and yet
its interplay in international affairs is almost invisible in the globalised society.
In fact, much of the globalisation and consequent inter-dependency among
societies and nations is because of the integration brought about by advances
in Information-Communication-Technology (ICT). Technology has enabled
modern civilisation to move towards a knowledge-based society where the
information flow is instantaneous - far improved compared to a decade ago.
More recently, S&T has been effectively used by nations for soft-power
projections. In this changing paradigm, it is highly desirable to understand
the importance of S&T dimensions of international relations and the changing
dynamics of diplomacy among nations.
Unfortunately, S&T advances have also led to unintended consequences
of phenomenally high rates of development particularly in the past five
decades, which have led to rapid depletion of earth’s resources and accelerated
global warming with associated loss of biodiversity that will affect the future
of human societies. Shortages of resources and concerns of environment are
fast becoming one of the more serious global concerns that cannot be addressed
without major interventions using both S&T as well as diplomacy for
constructive and lasting international cooperation. Thus, the major challenge
for 21st century diplomacy will be to prevent misuse of technology from
harming mankind and environment.
The book endeavours to highlight the increasing role that modern
technology is bound to play in international relations and global affairs in
the future. It is hoped that the book will succeed in bringing a renewed focus
on the importance of S&T integration with foreign policy and indeed with
overall national aspirations, particularly for India.

Amitav Mallik
 Acknowledgements

As a defence technologist, I have been very fortunate to get the

opportunity to create the office of ‘Adviser, Defence Technology’ at the
Embassy of India, Washington DC and serve there for six years during the
most challenging time for Indo-US technology cooperation. This gave me
first-hand experience on how technologists and diplomats can combine
strengths to serve the foreign policy objectives of the nation.
I was yet again fortunate to serve as a Member of the National Security
Advisory Board for three consecutive years immediately after my retirement,
and this gave me the opportunity to acquire a wider understanding of the
interplay between technology, foreign policy and national security. Then to
get an opportunity to use my experience and knowledge to write a book on
‘Technology and International Relations’ is like a dream come true for me.
For this, I am indebted to DG, IDSA for giving me this opportunity.
The topic for the book was actually suggested by Dr. Arvind Gupta, DG,
IDSA in 2012 and while conceptualising the book I have gained immensely
from discussions with several of my advisers and friends like Dr. Arvind Gupta,
Ambassador Arundhati Ghose, Dr. Ajey Lele, Mr. Kapil Patil and many others.
I owe them all very sincere thanks.
While researching for the book I took help from three promising research
assistants – Mr. Harshad Garje, MSc, Defence Studies, Pune University;
Ms. Meenu Raina MSc, Environmental Sciences, Pune University and
Ms. Sonal Jain, BSc (Hons), Political Science, Miranda House, Delhi. The
research support they provided was excellent and I want to thank them very
sincerely and wish them all the very best in their future professional careers.
I must thank the IDSA Library staff and administration for providing
ready support from time to time and a special thanks to Ms. Sumita Kumar
who provided the coordination support and very substantial editorial help.
xii Role of Technology in International Affairs

Last but not the least I must thank my life partner Surbhi, who despite
being very unwell during most of 2013, happily adjusted to my pre-occupation
with the book project which must have caused some inconvenience at home.

Amitav Mallik
 PART I
Role of Science and Technology
in International Affairs
 1
Technology, Diplomacy and
International Affairs

Introduction
The decades of cold war between the United States (US) and the erstwhile
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) demonstrated beyond doubt how
science and technology (S&T) could be leveraged actively, not only for
avoiding war but also in the conduct of ‘International Relations’ (I.R.) to
maintain diplomatic balance. The game changing technology of nuclear
weapons (NW) is often credited with bringing World War II to an abrupt
end, saving continued destruction and loss of life. More recently, the
technological race between the two superpowers in which the US managed
to gain a decisive techno-military edge by 1990, is also perceived as the major
catalyst of the Soviet economic impoverishment that eventually led to the
fall of the Soviet ‘empire’ without any armed engagement or war. Few could
have anticipated that technology would finally provide a solution for ending
the cold war that could have caused mutually assured destruction.
The very concept of ‘Deterrence’ via techno-military supremacy over the
adversary is nothing but coercive diplomacy using the advantage of
technological superiority. Technology denial regimes are classic examples of
‘Science Diplomacy’ being exercised to serve the foreign policy agenda of
powerful nations. The international focus on non-proliferation of NW can
be viewed as a discriminatory technology-control measure against specific
4 Role of Technology in International Affairs

countries. It is interesting to note that during the cold war decades, there was
also effective use of science diplomacy to reduce tensions and enable confidence
building measures (CBMs) despite the existence of great strategic rivalry and
mistrust. Thus, there is ample historical evidence that S&T has been in
extensive use not only for waging battles or winning wars but also for creating
conditions suitable for preserving peace. Technology per say is not good or
bad; but how it is used by the user determines the impact.
In recent decades since the end of the cold war, economic globalisation
and explosive growth of Information-Communication-Technology (ICT) has
dominated the political and corporate agenda that is defining a new paradigm
where competition and cooperation must coexist amongst most pragmatic
societies and nations. This will call for skilful diplomatic manoeuvring of
different priorities in future that will have to be based on sound understanding
of the role of S&T in international affairs. Our world is far more
interconnected today, where no nation can afford to be isolated, no matter
how powerful or self-sufficient. Technologies of global reach are changing the
reference lines and timelines of the geopolitics of international interactions,
diplomatic perceptions and global affairs.
The competition for techno-economic power has become increasingly
serious among nations and there is clear realisation of the impact of technology
on economic progress, military might as well as on statecraft that shapes the
balance of power equations among nations. Technology will continue to be
one of most sought after commodities in international affairs.
While everyone agrees that military-economic strength will dictate future
power equations among nations, there is unfortunately not enough
understanding about the role that technology plays in this regard. It is often
said that scientific research creates knowledge and innovation converts
knowledge into economic wealth. Hence, it is worth noting that technology
advances of the past few decades have been instrumental in creating
globalisation which is essentially a socio-economic phenomenon. But this has
also caused a paradigm shift in security perceptions and altered the techno-
military doctrines of powerful nations. Enabling technologies such as advanced
computing, ICT, bio-technology and nano-technology are transforming the
spectrum of civilian as well as military applications. Today, most critical
technologies for defence are increasingly for dual purposes, with civilian
technology advances often feeding many military requirements and vice-versa.
Diffusion of technology has become an integral component of
 Technology, Diplomacy and International Affairs 5

international techno-economic transactions. Advances in sensors, smart

materials, missile guidance, outer space systems, energy beam weapons and
cyber space technology etc. are leading to new capabilities for offence and
defence. Consequently, preventing misuse of advanced technology is much
more challenging. While technology controls will remain important in I.R.,
new approaches to enable S&T cooperation among progressive nations will
also be vital for the future. The private sector is increasingly becoming the
main player in international technology exchanges while the role of
government agencies is changing to being more a facilitator than controller.
Developing nations in need of technology may face complex challenges of
new criteria for technology transfer based on assurance of responsible
ownership and use of sensitive technology. Such emerging trends will pose
new diplomatic challenges to the demand side as well as the supply side of
international exchanges.
The techno-economic progress of large sections of the growing world
population is increasing the global consumption of energy and other earth
resources at an alarming rate. This is amplifying the ecological footprint of
mankind in ways that is altering the chemical, physical and biological makeup
of the earth on a geological scale. It is becoming increasingly clear that this
modern way of life will not be sustainable in the future and hence there is
urgent need for coherent and well-coordinated international cooperation to
moderate global consumption and its adverse impact on earth environment.
S&T is the common denominator for all interactions and hence modern
diplomacy, for effective international negotiations for global solutions, must
recognise the vital role of S&T in international relations.
It can be argued that to develop a better understanding of transformation
in global affairs, technology has to be integrated more synergistically into the
theoretical discussions of I.R. Technology should be understood as a highly
political entity and an integral core component of the global system that shapes
global affairs and is itself shaped by global economics, politics, and culture.
Foreign policies of nations and international equations in future will be
enriched by a clear understanding of how technology and the global eco-
systems interact with geopolitics and how global politics, economics, and
culture impact technological evolution.
Global problems and concerns will require global solutions and will have
essential diplomatic dimensions. The primary objective of science diplomacy
is to support foreign policy objectives with scientific information and advisory.
While this facilitates smoother international relations, it can also help to
6 Role of Technology in International Affairs

improve S&T cooperation. Combination of S&T and diplomacy can thus

provide soft power to countries for their international outreach objectives.
Scientific exchange and technology cooperation can also contribute
significantly to coalition building and conflict resolution, both vitally
important to international peace. This chapter will focus on the above issues
to highlight the role of S&T in international affairs.

Changing Dimensions of International Relations and Diplomacy

‘International Relations’ is the study of politics between States. Until recently,
this largely meant the study of war and diplomacy but since the end of the
cold war, the boundaries of I.R. have expanded to include trade, ethnic
relations, human rights and many other topics that may cross State boundaries.
The term ‘science and technology diplomacy’ is used to mean the provision
of a science and technology advisory for multilateral negotiations and
assessment of the results of such negotiations at the national level. It therefore,
covers activities at both the international level and the national level, pursuant
to international commitments. Today, in a globalised world, the core idea of
I.R. is the interdependence and discourse between two or more key nations
of the international system.
International relations can also be defined as a branch of political science,
that studies foreign affairs and global issues among States within the
international system, including the roles of States, inter-governmental
organisations (IGOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and
multinational corporations (MNCs). It is both an academic and public policy
field and can be positive or normative as it seeks to both analyse as well as
formulate the foreign policy of a particular State. Apart from political science,
I.R. draws upon diverse fields such as economics, history, law, philosophy,
geography, sociology, anthropology, psychology and cultural studies. It involves
a diverse range of issues, from globalisation and its impact on societies and
State sovereignty to ecological sustainability, nationalism, economic
development, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, organised crime, human
security, and human rights.
It is interesting to note the changing dynamics of diplomacy in
international affairs. Traditional diplomacy is the art or practice of conducting
I.R., as in negotiating alliances, treaties, and agreements carried out by chosen
diplomats of sovereign States. Public diplomacy is the new age diplomacy
and a recent phenomenon, which deals with the influence of public attitudes
 Technology, Diplomacy and International Affairs 7

on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions

of I.R. beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation of public opinion by
governments, in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests
in one country with those of another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its
impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication,
as between diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the processes of inter-
cultural communications. Central to public diplomacy is the transnational
flow of information and ideas.1
The interconnections of S&T with foreign policy and diplomacy are age
old, but have never been more important than in the globalised, multi-polar
world of today. Many of the defining challenges of the 21st century—from
basic human security to the concerns of global climate change, from security
of outer space to security in cyber space—all have scientific and technological
dimensions. These are global issues and no one country will be able to solve
these problems on its own. The tools, techniques and tactics of foreign policy
of nations need to adapt to this changing world of increasing scientific and
technical complexity.
Science and technology plays a key role in establishing the power-balance
dynamics between sovereign nations. It offers alternative channels of
engagement among countries that may have political differences, thus playing
an important role by influencing the dynamics of power-balance between
sovereign nations. Advances in S&T have often relied on international flow
of people and ideas and this is happening now more than ever before. Even
during the cold war, exchange between scientific organisations and universities
were an important conduit for informal discussions on nuclear and other
sensitive technology issues.
Different aspects of the role of science, technology and innovation in
foreign policy, diplomacy and I.R. can be viewed in terms of three different
dimensions of science diplomacy:
• Science in Diplomacy—using scientific advisory to achieve foreign
policy objectives.
• Science for Diplomacy—using S&T cooperation to improve relations
between countries.
• Diplomacy for Science—facilitating international scientific
cooperation, and getting foreign S&T inputs for indigenous progress.
Probably one of the best examples of science in diplomacy—a mechanism
for informing policymaking with scientific advice on a problem of global
8 Role of Technology in International Affairs

dimension—is the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),

established in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) and
the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). The mandate was to
provide the world with a clear scientific view on the current state of climate
change and its potential environmental and socio-economic consequences.
In December 2007, the IPCC was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize (jointly
with former US Vice President Al Gore) ‘for their efforts to build and
disseminate greater knowledge about man-made climate change, so as to lay
the foundations for the measures that are needed to counteract such change’.2
Science for diplomacy comes into play on sensitive issues of national
security, where collaboration between scientists can help to facilitate political
negotiations. The soft power of science and the universality of scientific
methods can be used to diffuse tensions even in ‘hard power’ scenarios, such
as those relating to traditional military threats. For example, technologies to
verify nuclear arms control agreements were a rare focus of joint working
between the US and USSR during the cold war. Scientific enterprise is now
premised on the need to collaborate and connect. Globally there are today
invisible groups of researchers who collaborate, not because they are told to,
but because they believe that they can offer each other complementary insight,
knowledge and skills for the ultimate good for mankind.
Establishing and nurturing links between the scientific and foreign policy
communities informs scientists and policy makers alike, the former about
the realities of policymaking; and the latter about the role and limits of science
in policy. Improving the scientific capacity of delegations from all concerned
countries has become particularly important, especially for international
negotiations on human health and climate policy. This is indeed quite a
change.
The other dimension of science diplomacy, diplomacy for science, seeks
to facilitate international cooperation, whether in pursuit of top-down strategic
priorities for research or for bottom-up collaboration between individual
scientists and researchers. Flagship international projects, such as the
‘International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor’ (ITER) in France and
the ‘Large Hadron Collider’ (LHC) projects are good examples where
diplomacy has been successful in multinational teams for a major common
scientific objective.3
Although these projects carry enormous costs and risks, they are
increasingly vital in areas of S&T which require large upfront investments in
 Technology, Diplomacy and International Affairs 9

infrastructure, beyond the budget of any one country. However, such projects
are the visible tip of the iceberg where bottom-up collaboration at various
levels takes place between individual scientists and institutions. The stereotype
of the scientist as a lone genius no longer holds true. Much of technology
innovation is now happening with expertise pooled from many nations and
major corporate entities are seeking ‘co-innovation’ potential across different
nations.
As noted above, scientific values of rationality, transparency and
universality are same the world over. Thus, they can help to build trust
between nations. S&T cooperation therefore provides a non-ideological
environment for the participation and free exchange of ideas between people,
regardless of cultural, national or religious backgrounds. Hence, for foreign
policy experts, S&T collaboration between nations offers potentially useful
networks and channels of communication that can be used to support wider
policy goals. The scientific community often works beyond national
boundaries on problems of common interest, and is thus well placed to support
emerging forms of diplomacy that may require non-traditional alliances of
nations. If aligned with wider foreign policy goals, these channels of scientific
exchange can contribute to coalition-building and conflict resolution.
However, one must avoid the undue politicisation of science.
Historically, science diplomacy has proved very useful for confidence
building among nations in conflict, when trust deficit becomes a major hurdle
for progress towards peaceful resolution of conflict. Dialogue between the
US National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and the Soviet Academy of Sciences
during the last phase of the cold war was instrumental in facilitating the
eventual dialogue between President Ronald Reagan and Soviet President
Mikhail Gorbachev.4 As such, much of the problems associated with the
nuclear non-proliferation agenda could be discussed more constructively,
through such science diplomacy.
Governance of international space beyond national jurisdiction, for
peaceful use of outer space has been possible only through successful
application of science diplomacy among space-faring nations. Scope for future
science diplomacy is increasing steadily as we face increasing challenges of
global dimensions that will demand global cooperation, even as individual
nations may remain locked in strong competition. The world has also become
much more interconnected and interdependent even during peacetime, and
it is clear that that the strategies and tools of addressing major issues will be
10 Role of Technology in International Affairs

influenced significantly by the techno-economic priorities of individual

nations.
Interest in science diplomacy is growing at a time when I.R. is changing.
The tight control on technology transfer by national governments is waning
and multilateral institutions, multinational companies are playing a larger role
than in the past. Technology diffusion is becoming unavoidable in the
globalised world where economic competition is dictating the transnational
interactions. The result is a more complicated and disaggregated diplomatic
system, where besides the foreign policy experts representing their
governments, we now have networks of technology experts, policy
professionals, NGOs, corporate entities, and of course, the media interacting
with each other, in any international forum.
A good example of this multilateral exchange for addressing a problem of
global dimensions was the Copenhagen climate change conference in
December 2009 (COP15). This was primarily designed to enable negotiations
between national delegations from 192 countries, including 100 world leaders.
But nearly 18,000 delegates from a vast array of NGOs, business, regulatory,
scientific and media groups also attended the summit and contributed in
numerous ways to its important outcomes that recognised the need for urgent
quantitative commitment to mitigating climate change from major
contributors to global warming over the past five decades. This is discussed
in detail in a later chapter.
The security scenario around the world has undergone a profound change.
Threat perceptions and national security interests now differ significantly for
different regions and the threat of all-out war between major nations seems
very remote. For over 40 years the Soviet-US confrontation dictated global
security perceptions and hence, diplomatic priorities were intimately linked
to balance of security. During this period, technological deterrence and
diplomatic strategies dominated the delicate security balance quite successfully,
as can be judged from the fact that, apart from a small number of war-alert
situations such as the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the two superpowers,
even with their hair-trigger readiness for war, managed to avoid conflict
through the well-calibrated Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) doctrine.5
Looking back, this deserves to be recognised as a major success of bilateral
diplomacy of the time that managed all kinds of relational issues between the
two groups of nations that were essentially staunch adversaries. The technology
for official diplomatic dialogue, Track-II exchanges, electronic espionage
 Technology, Diplomacy and International Affairs 11

networks, technology of surveillance and secure communication—all this

made a real-time balancing act possible for the foreign policy experts from
both sides.
It is interesting to note that since the end of World War II in 1945 till
the turn of the century, over 200 smaller armed conflicts have been fought in
the world but almost all of these took place in the developing Third World
regions. Clearly, these countries which did not have either technology of high
sophistication or any diplomatic experience, could not avoid regional wars.
Most of these limited wars have been about border disputes or religious/ethnic
conflicts that remained confined to their specific areas without escalating or
endangering international peace. It may however be surmised that presence
of two most important tools of avoiding war—preventive diplomacy and
deterrent technology could have prevented many of these wars.
Science diplomacy is now shifting to the new multi-polar world order,
with increasing number of government as well as corporate networks operating
simultaneously, for sharing and collating information on common interest or
common threat, for policy coordination, enforcement cooperation agreements,
and formulating internationally accepted rules and norms on various
contentious subjects. The efforts to define and strengthen the role of S&T
within this shifting architecture of governance and diplomacy are still at an
early stage. According to Bernice Lee of Chatham House, “Environmental
threats are adding to the complexity of international relations in an already
turbulent world. The anticipated bottlenecks and constraints—in food, water,
energy, and other critical natural resources and infrastructure—are bringing
new geophysical, political and economic challenges, and creating new and
hard-to-manage instabilities.”6
Given the advances in space technology, many areas of peaceful use of
space are increasingly becoming double-edged. It is interesting to note that
almost all space explorations and advances have national security concerns as
the major motivation. Satellite technology capabilities have major dual-use
potentials and modern society has already become very dependent on satellite-
based systems for every international interaction. As the vulnerability of the
satellite system has now become a strategic priority, technological capability
for protection of such systems is critical for all space-faring nations. Hence,
it is no wonder that space applicable weapons already exist, and there is
potential danger of wrong use of this technology, that can forever destroy
long-established norms to preserve the outer space for peace and benefit of
all mankind. This represents yet another dimension of the science diplomacy
12 Role of Technology in International Affairs

challenge—how best to prevent misuse of advanced technologies that can

unwittingly topple the delicate balance of technology in space.
Cyber space is another emerging dimension of security and diplomacy
where exploding technological advances of the present day have made it
possible for an individual or a small group to threaten a full size State apparatus.
The new digital world represents a paradigm shift from a very structured and
government-controlled international environment. The emerging information
age is indeed ideal for the expanding human expertise to get more transparent
and orderly for common good; yet, the same technology and innovative
adaptation by those with wrong intentions or destructive minds, can combine
easily to cause debilitating disruption or devastation. Devious minds can plan
to use every-day technology very imaginatively to create a huge adverse impact
on the security and well-being of a large population, as was evident by the
September 2011 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington. While
diplomacy with terrorist groups is ethically unacceptable, technology can today
provide means of coercive action to pre-empt such threats. All these represent
a world of new challenges for diplomacy and I.R. where technology will play
an increasingly decisive role.

Interplay of Science and Technology with Foreign Policy

Foreign policy dictates how a country will act with respect to other countries
politically, socially, economically, and militarily. Foreign policy thus, essentially
defines how a nation may relate to other nations in international affairs, which
can impact its bilateral or multilateral relations with other nations or groups
of nations. Diplomacy then becomes the means for the conduct of foreign
policy, for establishing the points of contact with other nations in many
dimensions of I.R. Historically, the focus of I.R. or diplomacy has been on
protecting one’s own security vis-à-vis other nations and resolving conflicts
of interest for avoiding possible war. For instance, since the early days of
humanity, on the plains of Africa, large tribes would presumably interact with
each other through peace emissaries, to avoid engaging in all-out war.
Power is the fundamental factor in the calculus of I.R. It can be described
in terms of mastery and control over key resources and capabilities to influence
international affairs. In this case too, technology plays an important role in
exercising control or influence. Foreign policy is handled by foreign ministers,
government secretaries and ambassadors on diplomatic assignments in foreign
countries, who have used every technological advantage available, to achieve
 Technology, Diplomacy and International Affairs 13

the diplomatic objective. However, the impact of technology is now increasing

phenomenally in the modern world and leveraging technology for economic
or political gains is becoming the norm. Technological knowledge is becoming
an important component for retaining diplomatic effectiveness and for meeting
challenges in global affairs. Foreign policy and diplomacy have always been
important aspects of statecraft, but now the emerging ‘knowledge society’
demands that statecraft must include new sensitivities of the electronic
medium that allow instant communication and information diffusion, thanks
to the phenomenal reach and wide access of modern ICT.
Typically, diplomatic dialogue is often a process of resolving differences
in perceptions and opinions through various stages of negotiations, to analyse
and debate finer nuances and sensitivities related to the main point of
difference. This is essentially a slow process that incorporates inputs from
various stake-holders of both the parties and the attempt is always focused
on defining priorities and margins for mutual adjustments. Perception of
national power is indeed a major factor in diplomatic dialogue and more
powerful nations with larger techno-military strength clearly have many
advantages and are usually more successful in winning the argument.
However, advanced technology has brought in various new techniques
for quick information dissemination and situational awareness on most
sensitive issues and hence, the time slot for diplomatic dialogue is often much
shorter than it used to be before. Espionage has always been a means to gain
diplomatic advantage by gaining access to the other party’s intentions and
strategies, and has also been an accepted objective of diplomatic exchanges.
Today, technology has made it possible to gain real time access to enemy
communication and thus fine-tune one’s own strategy in almost real time.
The recent exposure of the US’ tapping of phone and e-mail contents of
thousands of individuals within the country and in other countries is a case
in point.
Technical and economic cooperation are considered to be essential
functions of an integrated and imaginative foreign policy. India’s pro-Soviet
inclination in the 1970s was deeply embedded in the technical assistance it
received from the Soviets, while the West remained cold. Military-technical
cooperation between India and Russia has been the centrepiece of their bilateral
relationship and will continue to remain important in the years to come.
Hence, technical cooperation is an indispensible component of foreign policy
formulation and often plays a decisive role in defining foreign policy of a
country. Presently, India’s renewed interest in an alliance with Japan has its
14 Role of Technology in International Affairs

roots in technological cooperation between these nations and also in a mutual

political interest to counterbalance the rapid techno-economic rise of China.
Technological cooperation between countries is often a sign of an intimate
and positive understanding between the actors. In 2005, the Indo-US civil
nuclear energy agreement was witness to the transformation of these estranged
democracies into strategic partners with enhanced cooperation. It sent out a
clear message to the global political circles that India is now a trusted strategic
partner of the US in Asia, with a subtle indication that India can emerge as
a counter balance to China in South Asia. During this time, President George
W. Bush had expressed deep interest in India becoming a stronger player in
Asia. This has been discussed in detail in a separate chapter on game-changing
technologies.
Transfer of technology is one of the major components of technical co-
operation. In case of India, foreign direct investment (FDI) in Indian defence
industries includes co-development, joint ventures and co-production of
defence products and components. A good example of technological co-
operation in the area of defence is the BrahMos, a supersonic cruise missile
which is being co-produced by India and Russia. Technology transfer may
also include FDI in government approved research and development (R&D)
projects (recently expanded beyond the defence R&D). India already has an
offset policy for the defence sector where foreign suppliers need to contract
out at least 30 percent of the total value of the supplies locally. India is keen
to ensure that its activities as a recipient serve its development as a producer.
Besides, the role technology plays in shaping hard power of a nation, i.e.
defence equipment, infrastructure, manufacturing etc. and its consequent
impact on foreign policy, it is also important to understand the role of
technology in shaping soft power of nations and their foreign policy
imperatives. The exclusive management of global public goods like the World
Wide Web (www) is the most important instrument of American soft power
in the 21st century. The internet relies on a global network of satellites, most
of which are owned by the US Government. They have developed advanced
terrorism intelligence systems that work in close tandem with high-tech
satellites and equipment most proactively. In terms of education training and
healthcare, the US has become the most preferred destination around the
world. Foreign assistance through organisations such as United States Agency
for International Development (USAID) and leading contributions to United
Nations (UN) development activities have been a critical instrument of
America’s soft power. America is the most influential nation today and hence,
 Technology, Diplomacy and International Affairs 15

the most effective soft power. It has demonstrated that a nation with a large
amount of soft power can often build coalitions and persuade other countries
to comply with ‘persuasion’ rather than ‘coercion’, which is a harder version
of soft power, almost bordering hard power.
In this context, it is also worthwhile to note that technical cooperation
for development is an important instrument of soft power wielded by foreign
policy experts. Sri Lanka is a telling tale of India’s power projection in the
region, especially in terms of ‘soft-power’ after the failure of its ‘hard-power’
approach in the past. Indo-Sri Lankan relations have dramatically changed in
the last few years and embody the change in India’s foreign policy perfectly.
After March 2000, when the bilateral free trade agreement came into effect
between the two countries, trade and its benefits have risen. National Thermal
Power Corporation (NTPC) and Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited (BHEL)
collaborated with the Ceylon Electricity Board to set up a coal power plant
in Sri Lanka. Also, the Indian Railway Construction Company (IRCON)
undertook six railway projects in Sri Lanka amounting to $800 million to
reconstruct the railway lines damaged during the civil war in 2012. India is
also involved in projects for renovation of Palaly Airport, Kankesanthurai
Harbour, construction of a cultural centre in Jaffna, interconnection of
electricity grids between the two countries, construction of a 150-bed hospital
in Dickoya. Hence, technology cooperation in the areas of energy generation,
electricity and infrastructure for development has enabled India to extend its
soft power to Sri Lanka and similarly to neighbours like Bhutan and Nepal.
There have been ample examples of application of hard power with the
help of advanced technology weapons to achieve foreign policy objectives.
The successful application of high-technology weapons and techniques in US
military operations in Iraq (2003) was a demonstration of how a world-class
superpower could exercise its foreign policy over another far-away sovereign
country, by first diplomatically convincing other major nations that there was
credible threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and then using
techno-military strength to devastate the target nation to change the political
regime there. Without commenting on ethical or economic merits of the case,
this was a clear case where even the UN was coaxed diplomatically to stand-
by while the overwhelming techno-military power was used in a pre-emptive
mode, without being provoked militarily.
Although the after-effects of the Iraq war became too costly for the US,
the operation by itself was indeed a first-time success of the combination of
technology and diplomacy that raised the US well above the rest of the world,
16 Role of Technology in International Affairs

almost out of reach of even the second-best. With the help of latest technology,
the US-led coalition was able to wage a high-precision war on a distant land
to achieve its political objectives with ease. This signalled the new era of
coercive diplomacy by a superior power to enforce submission of the weaker
power. This is a trend that might find increasing relevance in regional power
balance equations and also in enforcing cooperation for combined action
against common issues such as global warming or space security etc. More
powerful and high precision weapons along with modern network-centric
strategies have dramatically reduced the time margins for diplomacy, thus
making the risk of diplomatic breakdown all the more higher.
In this context, it is also relevant to understand the impact of technological
revolution on foreign policy making. Just as information technology (IT) has
permeated all aspects of daily life from business to entertainment to politics,
so too its impact on the diplomatic arena. Increasingly States are recognising
the role IT can play in enhancing diplomatic functions. The use of technologies
such as e-mails, virtual and online conferencing at international negotiations,
now make it possible for delegations to communicate in real-time with the
home office for information on official positions, or for advice on formulating
responses to unanticipated issues, and reactive diplomacy. The use of IT tools
also enables resource-deficient States, which would otherwise be unable to
attend many of these meetings to maintain a ‘virtual’ presence and to
participate via electronic media. This feature could be important for the smaller
developing States who often find it onerous to participate in international
meetings and negotiations for the reasons previously outlined.
Another dimension worth consideration is the creation of a Virtual
Technical and Planning Facility in which technical experts, trade professionals
and experienced negotiators from the larger States can assemble under the
direction of the respective ministries, for example, foreign affairs, to provide
advice, critique strategies and simulate negotiation scenarios for the benefit
of the less developed State. Simulation technology for scenario analysis is a
major help in planning diplomatic strategies of major powers of the world
today.
The nature and scope of diplomacy continues to be redefined as the
international system evolves. As the information era unfolds, new actors are
utilising IT and communication technologies to engage States in a new type
of diplomacy, one driven by technology in which informational assets and
real-time delivery are key components for desired outcomes. Developed nations
have been quick to recognise that in the emerging diplomatic environment
 Technology, Diplomacy and International Affairs 17

new electronic mechanisms must complement existing approaches if they are

to effectively reach ‘net’ constituents. Already the use of IT tools has become
the norm at international negotiations, facilitating speedy communication and
more comprehensive information gathering and analysis. The trend towards
bloc negotiations further accentuates the use of IT in facilitating interchanges
amongst member states.
Developing States predominantly situated in the South, are seeking to
re-negotiate and redefine more tangible benefits for themselves in an
international system whose institutions and theoretical underpinnings seem
designed to promote the interests of the developed North. Effective diplomacy
will therefore become the key to articulate and secure maximum benefits for
the region as a whole. How successful the region is in obtaining desired
outcomes will depend in large measure on whether it can utilise knowledge
to target realistic outcomes, using innovative diplomatic strategies.
Preparedness for negotiations, the region’s ability to internationalise its causes
and influence public opinion become key elements of the new diplomatic
game. The use of IT tools and knowledge systems should be viewed as major
assets to the region’s diplomatic success in the future.
Advances in science and technology have become key drivers in I.R., and
knowledge of trends in key fields is an essential prerequisite to effective
international negotiations. Knowledge of trends in science and technology is
also a key element for the successful national implementation of international
agreements. There are two key features of the growth of scientific and
technological knowledge that are central to the international negotiations.
Firstly, scientific knowledge is becoming increasingly specialised and therefore
demands greater input by the experts into international negotiations. Secondly,
the application of science and technology to development requires the ability
to integrate divergent disciplines that are needed to solve specific problems.
International diplomacy now demands that government negotiators deal with
both specialisation and integration.

Technology Controls and Foreign Policy: Indian Perspective

Historically, one of the classic cases of using S&T leverage for achieving foreign
policy objectives has been the use of technology embargo against the adversary.
It is less punishing than economic sanctions by a superior country against a
less powerful country but the message or intent is very much the same—‘if
you are not an ally or a trusted friend, then you cannot benefit from my
riches or technology knowledge’. It is in this context that one needs to
18 Role of Technology in International Affairs

appreciate the role of technology controls in I.R. The origin of arms control
can be attributed to the basic national security imperative to reduce both the
incidence of armed conflict and the level of potential for damage in a conflict
situation. Technology controls for preventing proliferation are often classified
as for ‘common good’ of mankind, but a closer look shows that there can be
significant differences in defining the ‘common good’ and hence it is very
much a foreign policy perspective of individual nations.
The four broad objectives of arms control are: (a) to manage the techno-
economic balance; (b) to reduce the possibility of war; (c) to reduce the
consequences of war, if it happens; and (d) to optimise resources for defence
so that economic development does not suffer unduly. Although
technological advances have been instrumental to all human development,
much in the same way as industrial revolution or mechanised warfare, they
too have created modern weapons with greater potential to cause damage.
To capture the process in its conceptual stage, it is possible to reflect on the
1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions, which banned the use of ‘dumdum’
bullets and the use of poison or poisonous weapons, and the 1925 Geneva
Protocol for the Prohibition of ‘Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases’ even
in war. Similarly, biological or chemical methods of warfare are also banned
by general consensus by the world community.7 These early efforts to limit
the development and acquisition of dangerous weapons came to be identified
as arms control.
The concepts of ‘technology control’ became more relevant during the
cold war through the sharper focus on non-proliferation of NW. It was a
clear signal that as technology gets more devastating it would be very critical
to control such technologies. The initial objective of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT)8 was to prevent proliferation, both horizontal
(spreading to other nations) as well as vertical (enhancing the quantity or
quality of WMD within the NW holding nations) so that devastating WMD
could remain under the tight control of the five countries that acquired it
before the international treaty was finalised and brought to force. The NPT
objective included arresting growing dependence on NW, for eventual
elimination of NW by all. However, dependence on NW grew astronomically
during the cold war, with both super-powers building NW arsenals by
thousands. Realising that the growing importance of NW for strategic
superiority would make it very attractive for an increasing number of aspirants
for the same advantage, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) 9 was formed in
1975, for establishing tighter control on supply of NW related technologies
 Technology, Diplomacy and International Affairs 19

and items. During this time, supporting initiatives, such as the Zangger
Committee, were also evolved to create a listing of control items and
technologies that can serve as a guide for non-proliferation efforts.
Ballistic missile technology emerged as a vital capability for long range
delivery of WMD and thus the need to control the WMD threat intrinsically
included control of missile technology. However, the ‘dual-use’ nature of
technologies for military missiles and civilian space launch rockets brought-
in new challenges for the managers of international affairs, to define what
level of dual-use technology was considered safe or internationally harmless,
with which nations. The secret gathering of seven industrial nations (the US,
the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Canada, Italy and Japan)
formulated the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 1983.10
The concept found very useful application to the foreign policy objective
of denying modern technology benefits to adversarial nations towards
maintaining techno-military superiority over the enemy. The US-led Western
alliance took the major lead in establishing rules and regulations for technology
control to serve two very distinctly separate objectives—one to prevent nuclear
proliferation, and the other, to serve the foreign policy objective of denying
the Soviet-led alliance the benefit of modern technology being developed by
the US-led group of nations. All necessary organisational structures,
frameworks and specially trained manpower were created to ensure strict
compliance by coalition members and for stringent monitoring of country-
specific verification and monitoring of dual-use technology interactions and
trade. MTCR represented the power of collective diplomacy where an informal
agreement among a set of powerful nations became fairly effective, without
formally making it an official international treaty.
All through the cold war decades, both the superpowers invested heavily
in R&D for advanced military technology. In the NW arena, technological
advances for NW sophistication, as well as enhancing the range and accuracy
of their delivery vehicles, became the central focus of various technology denial
regimes. Although MTCR was not an international treaty, it found support
from many other nations under missile threat and became a sort of bench-
mark for technology controls by the late 1980s. While the focus was on long-
range missiles with potential nuclear warheads, the 1991 war against Iraq
produced a new surprise by demonstrating that relatively old technology of
short range ‘Scud’ missiles and even rockets/mortars can pose a serious threat
to civilian population and change the security perceptions in neighbouring
20 Role of Technology in International Affairs

nations. This was a new challenge for diplomacy and of course, also for the
technologists to innovate new solutions for such short range, low level threats.
The MTCR guidelines were revised in 1993 to increase its effectiveness
and more nations were encouraged to join the regime—taking the membership
to 26 by 1993, and six others, including Russia and China promised adherence
to MTCR without formally signing it. India continued to be among the target
countries, although at a much less strict level, since the US-India civil-nuclear
agreement of 2008 and subsequently the NSG accepting India as a responsible
owner of technology. With change in international perceptions about India,
it has now expressed its willingness to join the MTCR and other technology
control groups as a partner, rather than a target. This is a major transformation
of India, changing its status from target group to membership group, with
prudent technology practice and very effective diplomacy, backed by foreign
policy reforms to match international standards. The initial export-control
regime of significance during the cold war years was the Coordinating
Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM)11 which was a
technology embargo regime to prevent the transfer of dual-use technology
and equipment to communist bloc States in the belief that such equipment
and technology, if diverted to military use, could have contributed significantly
to the military potential of the adversary. In June 1992, seventeen countries
participating in COCOM decided to establish a cooperation forum to define
a successor regime for future technology controls. The cooperation forum,
which did not immediately replace, but at first existed alongside COCOM,
had four objectives.
These were: (a) to significantly ease access by East European countries to
advanced goods and technology; (b) to establish procedures to ensure against
diversion of these sensitive items to military or other unauthorised users; (c)
to assist the East European States to develop their own export control systems;
and (d) to provide a mechanism for further cooperation on export control
matters. COCOM continued to exist as a ‘Cooperation Forum’ for the next
three years, while an alternative arrangement was under discussion. During
this period, the number of items on the COCOM control list was progressively
reduced (and these items were no longer subject to embargo) and by 1996,
several countries that had been the targets of the embargo were friends and
important trading partners. There was then an active discussion to enlarge
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to include some of them as
members. In 1996 the Wassenaar Arrangement emerged as an informal
technology-control arrangement of member-states. 12 The objectives of
 Technology, Diplomacy and International Affairs 21

multilateral export control regimes typically include commitments: (a) to

regulate sensitive technology transfers with potential military applications;
(b) to introduce a licensing mechanism to institutionalise export controls; (c)
to create a database for mutual information sharing for better coordination
of controls; and (d) to identify countries of concern and prevent the
proliferation of dual-use technologies to them. Today, in the changed multi-
polar world, technology control effort remains the responsibility of individual
nations under the overarching consultative process of the control group. This
indeed represents the new international reality that ultimately, success of
technology control and prevention of technology misuse will depend on the
record of a nation’s ability for responsible ownership of sensitive technology.
Discussion of such ‘Responsible Ownership of Technology’ can be found in
this author’s earlier monograph Technology and Security in the 21st Century
published by SIPRI in 2004.13

New Technologies and New Concerns

The last decades of the 20th century witnessed phenomenal advances in
military technologies. The post-1945 superpower competition drove a
technology race that produced amazing results in a short time span. While
the doctrine of MAD now seems irrelevant, new threats have surfaced inter
alia because of the worldwide spread of religious fundamentalism and
terrorism. The unavoidable diffusion of advanced technology has led to new
and grave concerns regarding WMD technologies proliferating into
irresponsible or extremist hands. Since these non-state organisations operate
ubiquitously without national borders, it is a new type of asymmetric threat
that cannot be contained by military power alone. This is where S&T can
provide valuable intelligence and information for diplomacy to act decisively.
The rapid progress in IT during the past decade alone has opened up
several new possibilities for using technology for strategic or operational
advantages. Increasing computing speeds, smaller hardware and innovative
software approaches are creating even more options. IT has already
revolutionised the battlefield, with the trend of network-centric command
and control philosophies that dramatically reduce the ‘sensor-to-shooter’ time
of response. Instant information access and real-time inputs about battlefield
conditions at the level of foot-soldier has transformed the close-combat
scenario to a digitised format that can be readily useful for deployment of
efficient robots that can replace humans in extreme hazardous situations.
Another major new technological trend in matters of defence and security
22 Role of Technology in International Affairs

is the increasing use of outer space capabilities for enhanced performance and
stand-off ranges. Ever since the announcement of the Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI)14 by the then US President Ronald Reagan in 1983, the impact
of technology on defence strategies and operational doctrines has changed
dramatically. With vastly superior technologies of long range high-precision
missiles and space based Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) the US was able to
have enormous deterrence capacity to which the very powerful Soviets had
to give-in. Advances in military space capabilities have sharpened situational
awareness to a level that major powers of today are able to anticipate most
dangers to their security and take preventive steps to nullify the threat. The
US’ use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) technology for targeting small
specific terrorist groups, sitting in secure command centres on the US
mainland—represents a quantum leap in technological capabilities in the
future war scenario. However, it must be borne in mind that some amount
of technology diffusion is inevitable and future concerns must include the
possibility of such advanced technologies being available to rebel groups or
State-sponsored fundamentalists.
Many of the science fiction projections of the yester-years are close to
realisation and the impact of these technologies on future security strategies
is likely to be very profound and long-lasting. Space is already being used
extensively for military purposes and robotics, and artificial intelligence
advances are enhancing the capabilities of robotic systems. Aerospace vehicles
that can rise directly to space orbits are near maturity. The robotic space plane
XB-37 has already made successful long duration flights. The introduction
of directed energy weapons and possible increase in the military exploitation
of satellite systems for combat purposes will revolutionise the future trial of
strength between powerful nations.
The latest trends in technology development for military purposes also
indicate a move towards miniaturisation, improved efficiency and greater
flexibility. As weapons become smaller and more efficient, deployment
strategies and operational scenarios become more flexible, making a large
variety of options available to the user. The shrinking size and weight of
strategic warheads are a classic example of how technology has made the
attacker’s job easier and the defender’s job more difficult—creating more
demand for newer technology options to meet the new level of threat. It is
also interesting that, with the increasing accuracy of weapon delivery
technology and the increasing lethality of new warheads, there is growing
interest in the development of non-nuclear strategic weapons. Technology
 Technology, Diplomacy and International Affairs 23

controls of the cold war era are not going to be effective in all such dual-use
technology areas where technology diffusion is very rapid and widespread,
essentially because these technologies are also very important for economic
competitiveness.
While much has been done to establish architecture for international arms
control with the intention of ensuring international security and peace, the
question remains as to how far they have been successful in the final analysis.
At the height of the cold war, most analysis of security cooperation was focused
on bilateral US-USSR arms control. However, today, most of the focus has
shifted to multilateral agreements and in the multipolar world of today, new
challenges are emerging every day to threaten the existing arms control regimes.
Hence, a new approach to international technology management and
disarmament may be what is needed for the future.
Often, discussions and lack of consensus among practitioners provide the
incriminating evidence of the partial success with the threats and dangers of
proliferation. Although treaties such as the NPT or initiatives like the MTCR
have made important contributions to slow down proliferation, their success
remains limited. Largely, the international global arms control architecture
has become rather obsolete and a somewhat static regime, solidifying prevailing
inequities or a status quo that will not stand the test of time. Some States are
bound to reassess their commitments or hesitate in making new commitments
in nuclear or other sensitive areas. As long as there is discrimination between
nations and regions in terms of access to earth resources and in the context
of the Human Development Index (HDI), a simmering tension will prevail
among the less privileged who will aspire for technological means to better
security and prosperity. Ultimately, regional and international peace and
security will run the risk of being jeopardised by misuse of technology, by
irresponsible or rogue elements that benefit from failure of technology controls.
The lack of confidence in the present arms control regime and in its ability
to contain possibility of war is evident in the increasing demand for WMD.
The West Asian region is a striking example of the failure of international
and regional non-proliferation efforts. The continuance of nuclear-missile
proliferation trends in West Asia with the possible emergence of any new
Nuclear Weapon State (NWS) will have a fundamental effect on the security
paradigm in the region. In fact, every single Arab country joined the NPT as
a Non-Nuclear Weapon State (NNWS), and each, with a potentially significant
nuclear programme, has a full-scope safeguard agreement in place with the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).15 Yet, very significant questions
24 Role of Technology in International Affairs

remain regarding the present state of play of nuclear proliferation in the region.
The number of international proliferation outbreaks over the last decade is
an alarming testimony to the diminishing relevance of global arms control
regimes and there has been a failure to curb the desire for NW.
India of course, openly declared itself a NWS in 1998 when NPT totally
failed in India’s neighbourhood, with China, itself a NPT member, but
blatantly supplying NW and missile technology to Pakistan. During 1970 to
1990s, India observed exemplary restraint and technology maturity while
neighbouring Pakistan became a hub for nuclear proliferation with the famous
AQ Khan network.16 Since the US was heavily dependent on Pakistan in the
war against terror, it chose to overlook Pakistan’s clandestine proliferation and
eventually even made Pakistan a non-NATO ally. It is in this backdrop that
India focused on indigenous development of high-end defence technology of
nuclear-missile weapon systems as credible deterrence with minimum
investments.
The record of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament till date is not
very impressive. The international community has failed to deal with these
issues in a manner commensurate with their importance, or the dangerous
ramifications of failures in these realms. As global citizens and stakeholders
of a collective international security, it is important for India to analyse reasons
for this failure. Firstly, there is lack of strict compliance to international treaties
by major powers in international politics. The problems facing multilateral
export controls do not lie primarily in the flaws in the structures of the existing
agreements (though improvement in implementation is always desired).
Current difficulties emerge from the practice of using technology for short-
sighted foreign policy gains, especially by major powers.
Compliance with the MTCR by all its members remains questionable.
The Wassenaar Arrangement based on the principle of consensus has proved
more difficult to enforce. China, an emerging military power, is a participant
in most arms control agreements but its record of adhering to promises in
the realm of arms control is not at all impressive. Earlier, the withdrawal of
the US from the bilateral 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty17 with
Russia was another example of how major powers routinely flout international
commitments when national priorities over-ride common good. While this
paved the way for the US’ pursuit of its BMD programme without any formal
restrictions, it also led to proliferation of missile defence technology by many
powerful countries, which in turn can have a de-stabilising effect on the
balance of deterrence.
 Technology, Diplomacy and International Affairs 25

Secondly, a major concern is the shift of US policy to ‘Unilateralism’.

This has the potential to undermine the fabric of international agreements
that form the basis of any compliable policy. The Comprehensive Nuclear-
Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which is one of the best mechanisms for
disarmament in terms of details of provisions, verification measures, and
regime strengthening, was rejected by the US, even though it faced no great
power as a rival in the near term. The international attempt towards
disarmament was again turned into an instrument for discriminating arms
control. This is significant because if even one of the strongest disarmament
measures is not deemed worthy of acceptance, then there is a problem with
the very idea of arms control rather than its specific provisions.
The continued pursuit of BMD by the US is bound to encourage players
like Russia and China to adopt a more offensive posture in order to neutralise
the advantages of BMD. The Chinese reaction to the American BMD can be
seen in their focus on rapid development of space technologies and counter-
space capabilities. China’s continued plans for military modernisation are now
set to match US capabilities. How this affects the US-China relationship and
impacts China’s immediate neighbourhood, will also determine the future of
international stability in general and India’s security in particular.
The very nature of these arms control agreements fostering inequity and
discrimination has been criticised and rejected by the countries in the
developing world. A partial disarmament cannot ensure international security
for all nations. It is worthwhile to note that some of the first five NWS have
been instrumental in spreading nuclear technology and components to other
aspirant countries. Hence, indirectly, they are responsible for contributing to
the proliferation of nuclear-missile technology and accentuating the threat
from WMD around the world. The failure of the global arms control
architecture can be attributed to the loose structures of these multilateral
agreements where powerful nations could favour friends and punish adversaries
while holding a high moral ground. The future demands an objective approach
for effective dual-use technology management and export control systems.
An effective export control system must have robust ‘Legal Framework’
that consists of legislation for controlling strategic exports, including specific
civil and criminal penalties for violation, clear licensing procedures,
establishment of regulatory practices and creation of control lists of goods,
services and technologies consistent with multilateral norms. A comprehensive
verification system under a global body such as the UN is necessary to monitor
compliance in terms of detecting intentions to break laws and treaty
26 Role of Technology in International Affairs

commitments. Effective enforcement mechanisms are required that can

encompass adequate awareness, training and empowerment of customs
personnel and border guards to recognise, inspect and interdict strategic control
list items. India is simultaneously engaged in all these processes, as is expected
of a responsible international technology player.
More than ever in the past, the effectiveness of trade controls to sincerely
check proliferation has become very critical now. Minimising dangers of WMD
terrorism depends on their acceptance and enforcement by all countries, and
particularly by those with the capacity to deal in dual-use items and
technologies. India’s participation in this endeavour, despite not being a
member of the non-proliferation regime, is critical. India, until now having
chosen to remain outside such regimes, has a special significance as a new
NWS and major user, producer and trader of dual-use items and technologies.
In this context, it would be important to understand India’s past and present
approaches to export controls, identify measures towards their better
institutionalisation and to deliberate on measures for building confidence for
India’s international trade and national security.
From being a target of technology denial regimes in the past, India has
emerged as a responsible owner of sensitive technology with a clean record of
preventing proliferation. For Indian administrators and diplomats, it is crucial
to understand that besides raising its international credibility, the effective
implementation of trade controls also directly serves the cause of India’s
national security. Through the 1990s, the changing character of Indian exports
from a largely agricultural or raw material content to a greater proportion of
IT services, manufactured goods, technical know-how and electronic
components and assemblies—indicate a very healthy trend. India is now a
user and producer of a range of dual-use materials, equipment and
technologies; thus a partner in global affairs.
There is also an increasing participation of the private sector in high-tech
areas of defence industrial sectors. Unlike government entities that have been
major players in the past, and on which it was possible to exercise strict
centralised control, the new corporate entities need to be regulated with an
updating of legal and procedural mechanisms. To make India a major player
in high-end technology and systems, it is important to strengthen strategic
trade controls in order to raise confidence in the exporting nations that the
received technology or materials would not be in danger of falling into the
wrong hands. Consequently, national trade controls provide the international
community with the necessary confidence and guarantees against unauthorised
 Technology, Diplomacy and International Affairs 27

re-export and diversion. In all the above, it is important that foreign policy
and technology management are fine tuned to complement each other.
In terms of regional threats, revelations about the reach of the sophisticated
network of illicit nuclear commerce in Pakistan have raised new concerns about
diffusion of nuclear technology into wrong hands and possible nuclear use or
threat of use by non-state extremist actors, with or without State support. It
has raised new questions on effectiveness of nuclear deterrence in the region.
Given presence of such sophisticated clandestine networks, one cannot rule
out the possibility of dangerous technologies reaching terrorist groups. The
perception that Pakistan is reducing its nuclear threshold by developing tactical
NW is very alarming for India and an even greater worry is the suspected
involvement of Chinese scientists helping Pakistan in its endeavour to
challenge India with its new nuclear toys. For the present, it appears that the
Pakistan Government has been able to build a more credible deterrence against
India, while India with its no first strike policy and an apparent lack of will
to take on Pakistan diplomatically, has lost the race for enforcing a credible
nuclear deterrent in the region of immediate interest to India.
In conclusion, one may state, it is time that the international community
realises that selective or limited solutions to proliferation or disarmament
concerns will not meet with desired long-term success. India along with older
nuclear powers should rise to the challenge and offer ideas on a new framework
for international security that is suitable for the 21st century. There is a need
to rekindle the multilateral agreements on international security with more
objective and stringent norms for compliance. India should emerge as a major
responsible player in the game.
NOTES
1. “New frontiers in science diplomacy : The changing role of science in foreign policy”, The
Royal Society, January 12, 2010, at http://royalsociety.org/policy/publications/2010/new-
frontiers-science-diplomacy/ (Accessed June 7, 2014).
2. The Nobel Peace Prize 2007 was awarded jointly to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) and Albert Arnold Gore. See www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/
laureates/2007 (Accessed June 7, 2014).
3. ITER is an international project to design and build an experimental fusion reactor based
on the “tokomak” concept. “ITER—the way to new energy”. See www.iter.org/ (Accessed
June 7, 2014).
4. “US-Soviet Scientific Cooperation in the Age of Confrontation”, at www.nap.edu/
openbook.php?record_id=10888&page=1 (Accessed June 7, 2014).
5. Michael Shermer, “Will Mutual Assured Destruction Continue to Deter Nuclear War?”
Scientific American, June 1, 2014 at www.scientificamerican.com (Accessed June 7, 2014).
6. Bernice Lee, et. al., “Accelerated environmental degradation and rising political tensions”,
28 Role of Technology in International Affairs

Resources Futures, Chatham House, December 1, 2012 at www.chathamhouse.org/

publications/papers/view/187947 (Accessed June 7, 2014).
7. The international community banned the use of chemical and biological weapons.
International Committee of the Red Cross, January 12, 2014, at http://www.icrc.org/
eng/war-and-law/weapons/chemical-biological-weapons/ (Accessed June 7, 2014).
8. The NPT is a landmark international treaty with an objective to prevent the spread of
nuclear weapons and weapons technology. “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT)”. See www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT.shtml (Accessed
June 7, 2014).
9. The Nuclear Suppliers Group was established in 1975, and comprises 46 nuclear supplier
States. See http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/NSG (Accessed June 8, 2014).
10. “MTCR Guidelines and Annex” at fas.org/nuke/control/mtcr/text/mtcr_handbook_guide-
annex.pdf (Accessed June 8, 2014).
11. “Multilateral Export Control Policy: The Coordinating Committee (CoCom)”, at http://
www.princeton.edu/ota/disk3/1979/7918/791810.PDF. (Accessed June 8, 2014).
12. The Wassenaar Arrangement Control Lists, Summary of Changes Adopted, at
www.wassenaar.org/controllists/ (Accessed June 8, 2014).
13. Amitav Mallik, Technology and Security in the 21st Century: A Demand-Side Perspective,
SIPRI Research Report No. 20, Chapter 5, Oxford University Press, New York, 2004,
pp. 131-135.
14. The SDI, was a programme first initiated on March 23, 1983. “The Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI): Star Wars”. See www.coldwar.org/articles/80s/SDI-StarWars.asp (Accessed
June 8, 2014).
15. The Agency’s activities are carried out to help States strengthen their nuclear security.
“Nuclear Safety and Security”, IAEA at www-ns.iaea.org/security (Accessed June 8, 2014).
16. “Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks—
A Net Assessment”, May 2, 2007, at www.iiss.org/nuclear-black-markets—pakistan—a-
q—khan-and-the-rise (Accessed June 8, 2014).
17. Department of State, “Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty”, Arms Control Association,
at http://www.armscontrol.org/documents/abmtreaty (Accessed June 8, 2014).
 2
Technology and Security:
Challenges for Diplomacy

Introduction: Technology, Security and Diplomacy Interplay

Growth of science and technology (S&T) in India has been slow but steady.
Rising out of 200 years of foreign occupation, independent India had to focus
on societal development, food, hygiene and education etc. on high priority.
Hence, foreign policy formulation started with a cautious and non-
confrontational, non-aligned approach. The initial decades saw extensive
application of S&T for nation-building and human development. Hence, early
investments made in agriculture, energy and space technologies yielded
handsome returns for nation-building; the ‘Green Revolution’ of the mid-
1960s is a shining example. Focus on defence technologies came only after
the bitter experience of war with China in 1962 and another war with Pakistan
in 1965.
However, India was quick to enhance its defence preparedness with help
from the erstwhile Soviet Union and demonstrated its regional power capability
in the 1971 war with Pakistan that created Bangladesh. It was indeed a stellar
success of a well-coordinated military operation supported ably with strategy,
diplomacy and technology. For young India, this was a classic case of clear
recognition of its national security threat that was addressed with sound
strategic planning, a prudent foreign policy alignment with the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR) and a well-coordinated military operation. What
30 Role of Technology in International Affairs

was also on display was the political will of the Indian leadership that did not
wilt even in the face of US warships threatening counter-action.
Soon, India got down seriously to developing indigenous S&T capabilities
to strengthen military capacity, and within two decades, India was already
chasing self-reliance in critical technologies that were denied to it by the
Western group of advanced countries. The early research and development
(R&D) in atomic energy, space technology and defence systems was
instrumental in creating the S&T base in the country that enabled the nation
to become a major S&T force in the region. Within three decades after 1971,
India produced an indigenous missile force, launched numerous indigenous
satellites and also conducted a series of nuclear weapon (NW) tests to claim
grudging international acceptance as a NW country.
With changing international geopolitics, India even realigned its foreign
policy suitably to be recognised as a constructive international player, as was
evident in the successful Indo-US civil nuclear cooperation agreement by 2008.
From being the prime target of the NPT regime in the mid-1970s, to opposing
the NPT extension in 1995 and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
imbroglio soon thereafter, India has conducted itself remarkably to stand as
a de-facto Nuclear Weapon State (NWS) and an active international player
on nuclear energy issues. This shows that when pushed to perform, India
can rise to the occasion on matters of supreme national security interests.
The new Indian Government, post the 2014 elections, is showing great promise
for enhancing India’s international clout in many direct as well as subtle ways.
It was a combination of technology, strategy and diplomacy that made
India what it is today. India could have progressed much faster but for the
constant pressure on its resources, and the attention required for fighting low-
intensity conflict, against Pakistan sponsored terrorism and strategic
encirclement by China that does not want to see India gain any techno-
economic strength. China with its autocratic political system was able to grow
faster in a synchronised manner, while India remained mired in problems of
coalition politics, of democracy and consequent difficulties in decision-making.
Notwithstanding the disadvantages, India still is a classic example, where
indigenous and collaborative S&T efforts were oriented to strengthen defence
and deterrence capabilities against adversaries and for building diplomatic
bridges with friendly nations, for rapidly overcoming weaknesses in defence
technology.
For many decades, technology development in India has been need-based
and not really driven by any ‘Grand National Plan’. As a result only ‘need’
 Technology and Security: Challenges for Diplomacy 31

has been in focus, while technology was perceived just as an instrument for
meeting those needs. Even so, there were no long-term plans for synchronising
technology development or technology acquisition with the objectives of
foreign policy or diplomatic agenda. As a compulsive buyer, India has been
getting yesterday’s technologies at tomorrow’s prices and hence, lagging behind
most of the developed countries, with consequent diplomatic disadvantages
in I.R. A review of science and technology in India by the author can be
useful for getting a comprehensive idea of the Indian S&T scenario.1
While there have been many pockets of excellence in scientific research
and technology innovation, the nation as a whole still fares rather poorly in
S&T in comparison to most other comparable nations. This is despite the
fact that potential for much higher performance in S&T is very high, if
progressive reforms were to be brought-in from time to time in an integrated
manner, with long-term security priorities. India also performed very poorly
in implementing the S&T policy decisions with the urgency and
professionalism that could have made the country globally more competitive.
Early international cooperation for advancing S&T in India saw the
establishment of Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs) in collaboration with
the United States (US), United Kingdom, Soviet Union, Germany and United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) for
basic applied science and technology. Cooperation for the Canada-India atomic
energy reactor for harnessing the atom for peaceful applications was yet another
early diplomatic success for technology acquisition. However, the Peaceful
Nuclear Explosion (PNE) of 19742 by India invited serious international
disapproval and strict technology control regimes were used against it to deny
almost all dual-use technology items and know-how. While some sensitive
technology denials could be justified on account of legitimate nuclear
proliferation concerns, India’s close relationship with the USSR also made
India a target of foreign policy-oriented denials for Soviet-bloc countries.
Meanwhile, Indian Science Attaches posted at important Indian Embassies
in a few leading nations, pushed for progress in S&T cooperation in areas of
basic research and education that had little impact on defence and security
technology cooperation.
It is interesting to note that restrictive technology denials became major
motivating factors for India to strive for indigenous competence in critical
technology areas. Although the overall pace of technology growth in India
did slow down particularly for defence, space and atomic energy projects which
faced denial from US and the Western alliance for every technical demand. It
32 Role of Technology in International Affairs

was in this context that a major diplomatic initiative was taken by India to
establish an office of Adviser, Defence Technology, at the Embassy of India
in 1988. This was one of the first cases for India to combine the expertise of
a defence technologist with the diplomatic experience available at the Embassy,
to improve India’s access to defence-critical technology. The groundwork done
and the lessons learned proved very fruitful in reversing many high-tech denials
to India and building the foundation for future US-India high technology
cooperation.3
The unique advantage of combining S&T and diplomacy in bilateral
efforts is that it enables building enduring techno-political bridges for serving
the cause of furthering mutual national objectives. Notwithstanding the US-
India spat during the 1995 CTBT negotiations and the furore over India’s
nuclear test in 1998, the Indo-US strategic partnership that could be
rejuvenated by 2005, was the result of opening of windows for Indo-US
cooperation through techno-diplomacy initiated in defence sensitive
technologies.
The US-India civilian nuclear cooperation negotiated between 2005 and
2008 has been a major learning experience for foreign policy experts in both
countries. In a strange way, India’s political decision to go overtly nuclear in
1998, despite initial international outcry, opened-up new international avenues
for diplomatic dialogue and eventually India did gain grudging recognition
as a NW power. This enabled diplomatic initiative to renew high-tech
cooperation with US and other powerful countries. India’s policy clarity on
strategic technology issues and its record of responsible behaviour with sensitive
dual-use technology paid rich dividends in international high-tech cooperation.
India has exercised unilateral control on sensitive dual-use technologies as a
clear signal to the world that India is fully committed to non-proliferation of
potential dangerous technologies. This has been a major diplomatic success
for India in positioning itself on a strong footing for techno-military
cooperation with other countries in the 21st century.

Impact of Technology on Politics and Global Affairs

Increased globalisation and rapid advances in technology have weakened
national borders and enhanced technology diffusion. The information
technology (IT) revolution and the spread of individual skill-oriented
knowledge, make export controls almost impractical in some areas. Applying
export controls to a large band of technologies and to all countries requires
significant infrastructure to help make licensing assessments if implementation
 Technology and Security: Challenges for Diplomacy 33

is to be effective. The associated costs, combined with the opportunity costs

from lost export earnings, could make export controls too expensive to justify
for many nations.
As discussed earlier, technology diffusion and increased globalisation have
made international transactions far more interdependent and market-driven
than ever before and the trend is bound to accelerate as economic competition
becomes sharper. Even clear-cut arms export controls have faced problems
because of the pressures of the arms export industry. When it comes to
controlling dual-use technologies, definitions of what can be exported safely,
and to whom, becomes even more complex.* Export controls have remained
subjective based on foreign policy perceptions of the supplier nation and often
change with change of perceptions.
The technology denial regimes of the past five decades have spurred
indigenous technology growth in many progressive countries. One of the major
problems for export control regimes is the realisation that a number of
countries outside the core regime, such as China, India and Israel, have become
potential technology suppliers themselves. In addition to being important
techno-economic players of the future, these countries are also potential
markets for sales of high technology.
One of the major impacts of the IT revolution is the risk of cyber warfare.
The new level of dependence on IT in every walk of life, including defence
and security matters, has brought about a new vulnerability and a consequent
new threat perception from the risk of cyber warfare at different levels. Unlike
conventional military hardware that causes destruction and death, cyber
warfare techniques use intangible software tools that can cripple military
capabilities and international commercial trade. In a sense, they are full-
spectrum techno-economic tools for use in both defensive and offensive
strategies. The nature of this technology is making individual brainpower often
more relevant than techno-industrial infrastructure. This is threatening to
compromise the huge technological advantage that the Western industrialised
nations have established with years of effort.
There are now new types of threat to an information-based society, where

* For example, Germany and Sweden are believed to have sold industrial electron beam machines
to the Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC), a Chinese
manufacturer of computer chips. The US, however, is known to have banned such exports to
China. It is an open question whether this is a case of undercutting the US or of disagreement
over how to interpret agreed export control guidelines.
34 Role of Technology in International Affairs

information security becomes as important as defence against a Weapons of

Mass Destruction (WMD) attack. Technology has thus changed the nature
of warfare from visible large-scale military action and violence to subtle,
invisible yet decisive capabilities for crippling the enemy’s information
environment in a war-like situation, thus denying it the command, control,
communications and intelligence (C3I) advantages.
The ubiquitous nature of IT has also removed the clear distinction
between covert and overt actions, because there is no clear, common,
international agreement or even an understanding of acceptable and legitimate
limits of using IT to protect national security interests. Paradoxically, it is the
advances in sensor technologies and enhanced IT capabilities that are also
responsible for enabling the technological edge necessary to counter WMD
threats. IT can aid comprehensive monitoring and verification techniques for
compliance verification as well as for early detection of proliferation activities,
thereby complementing National Technical Means (NTM) for verification
and monitoring. This will be valuable for the verifiable reduction or
elimination of WMD arsenals and thus enhance confidence among the
countries participating in co-operative disarmament. It is hoped that this will
lead the world towards meaningful universal disarmament. Such ubiquitous
technology as info-tech cannot be controlled even if it is subject to misuse by
rough elements.
Biotechnology is another double-edged sword that can either heal or hurt,
depending on how the technology is managed. Concerns about use of bio-
weapons and biological warfare are high. Since the late 1970s there has been
a surge of investment in biotechnology research that will not only lead to
medical advances but also make it possible to introduce genetic changes to
food crops to bring about higher yields and better resistance to disease. The
combination of IT and biotechnology has allowed substantial genome
sequencing and analysis, creating a wealth of information in the areas of
healthcare, food production and agriculture. While so many benefits are
brought forth by advances in the life sciences, greater understanding of
processes that underpin life raises several moral and ethical concerns about
biological warfare. Combination of biotechnology and nanotechnology in
future may help in realisation of unprecedented miniaturisation and new
capabilities that could be used for both constructive as well as destructive
purposes.
Another area of potential impact is energy technology. Future possibilities
could include an alternative cheap and abundant source of energy that would
 Technology and Security: Challenges for Diplomacy 35

not only revolutionise everyday life, but also shift the strategic balance of oil-
dependent economies. Research on controlled thermonuclear fusion could
provide unlimited energy from sea-water. Similarly, future research on
hydrogen fuel may revolutionise the automobile industry and propulsion
technologies. This cutting-edge research work would also facilitate the
realisation of practical, affordable energy weapons that could totally
revolutionise conventional warfare and alter security perceptions due to
introduction of new dimensions to threat perceptions. These examples are
only a few sample possibilities. Several such technologies that could create
opportunities for quantum leaps in techno-military capabilities are bound to
affect the future.
This chapter attempts an appreciation of the interplay of technology with
security and international affairs, and also presents a brief review of the S&T
strength of India today, in the context of how this could be leveraged for
influencing I.R. in furthering India’s national interests. Modern Information-
Communication-Technology (ICT) can combine world-wide information and
knowledge for promoting universal good and addressing common concerns
of future global society. India must have a major international role in this
new knowledge-based society that will pose many new challenges for
diplomacy and I.R.

Technology and Security: Challenges for India

I.R. in the globalised world is going through a major transition phase, where
evolving political, economic, social and technological developments are
converging to shape a ‘New World Order’. In the emerging international
landscape, powerful techno-commercial entities and non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) that are linked electronically across national borders
are creating a new global civil society influencing governments and promoting
adherence to principles of social justice and democratisation. The ‘State’ here
is becoming one among many actors, but remains responsible for tracking
the larger picture and setting the diplomatic agenda for I.R. The rapidly
changing environment of this ‘Globalising Age’ thus poses new challenges
for the manner in which diplomacy will be perceived and conducted in future.
Perceptions of national security are changing in the backdrop of major
techno-economic challenges facing the world today that are of global
dimension, like global energy shortages and global warming and its
consequences on climate. Humanity has entered an ‘age of consequences’
where the actions or non-actions of the present generation will have profound
36 Role of Technology in International Affairs

impact on future generations. In this emerging ‘New World Order’,

competition and cooperation must co-exist to serve the common good.
Understanding of the new realities of this technology-driven economic
globalisation will be very important for defining the new role for diplomacy
in the future.
It is at this tumultuous time that India is emerging as a potential world-
class power and what India does or does not do, is now closely observed by
other nations. The main challenge for policy experts in the country will be to
make India achieve the power status commensurate with its real techno-
economic strength, as quickly as possible, in the multi-polar international
equations, where new opportunities as well as new concerns will define the
future dynamics. It is therefore, imperative for India to recognise the vital
linkages between foreign policy, defence strategy and the economic agenda
with the S&T strength of the country. This would help in evolving an
integrated national strategy that can best leverage the hard power of techno-
military superiority combined with the soft power of diplomacy, trade,
education and cultural equations, to serve the larger goals of national interest.
Technology has been the major driver of change in modern society and will
continue to be so in the foreseeable future. Hence, the impact of future
technology advances on security perceptions and international affairs deserves
a clear understanding by those representing India at various international
forums. The ultimate objective of foreign policy and diplomacy is to protect
one’s national priorities in the international arena.
The impact of technology on security has been increasing steadily over
the past several decades since World War II with several impressive advances
in modern technologies reaching maturity. Almost all modern technology
advances have been driven by the need for techno-military superiority over
other nations and the emphasis is now shifting more towards techno-economic
superiority. The two most striking technology milestones of the 20th century
that profoundly affected I.R. were the advent of NW and the start of space
explorations. These two have transformed the international discourse on
security and foreign policy for most major nations in the world, as was evident
in the race for superior technology by the two superpowers locked in cold
war rivalry for over four decades.
These decades therefore, witnessed phenomenal growth in technology for
both military and civilian applications when, it was largely the military
strategists who called for superior technology and weapons to remain ahead
of the enemy. Scientific inventions and technological innovations have always
 Technology and Security: Challenges for Diplomacy 37

been motivated by national security perceptions and foreign policy goals. It

is well known that almost everything that the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), US has ever done in space or high technology has
been predominantly motivated by the security perspective. Whether it is the
miniaturisation in electronics, achieved through very large-scale integration
(VLSI) techniques, or high-sensitivity video camera technology for satellite
imaging, most high-tech developments were driven by the cold war’s security
imperative to maintain the technological edge over the adversary, so that
bilateral diplomatic negotiations could be conducted from a position of
strength. It was a constant race of technological catch-up, where, often other
priorities of economics and development got short-changed in the non-
democratic Soviet empire and the mighty Soviet Union paid the price with
its economic collapse and the disintegration that followed.
For the US this was the period of unprecedented growth in technology
capabilities both in defence and development because of its prudent use of
dual-use technology for simultaneously energizing the economy, and
enhancing defence capabilities. Countries that could not politically manage
the rapid change or did not have the technology strength struggled to keep
moving forward lest they be left far behind. Perceptions of national strength
shifted gradually but completely, towards techno-economic strength, as against
the earlier perceptions that vast armies and massive war-fighting equipment
represented true strength. Other nations on the technology-acquisition path
have a lot to learn from this US model because it imposed a heavy economic
burden on the adversary and this contributed to weakening or defeating the
latter. This victory did not involve fighting a war, a significant achievement
given the history of mankind. Techno-economic competition therefore, stands
proven as one of the most effective tools for defeating a political or military
adversary.
The US victory over the Soviet Union was however, not without problems.
Many new technology-related security concerns emerged from the
disintegration of the Soviet Union. Of major concern was the safety of the
large stockpile of NW and fissile materials. The stockpiles of the two then
superpowers exceeded the limits of economic viability and safety management,
and some initiatives for mutual disarmament were already in progress even
before 1990. This provided some background and familiarity with the issues
of rapid disarmament and related safety issues. However, the progress of the
major disarmament agreement, Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)
leaves much to be desired.4
38 Role of Technology in International Affairs

Technology diffusion may be defined as the natural spread of technology

through every type of technology interaction, whether acquisition,
development, transfer, co-production or even intellectual exchange. A major
problem after the break-up of the Soviet Union was the vast bank of knowledge
invested in Soviet scientists, who lost their privileged access to State resources
at a time when political changes made it easier for them to establish
connections with foreign potential buyers of their expertise. The risk that
this knowledge would spread according to the logic of market forces led the
US to initiate a major project to absorb and rehabilitate these scientists. Other
countries such as China and Israel also used the opportunity to their advantage.
The importance of technological knowledge for security was again vividly
demonstrated. The ubiquitous nature of technological knowledge is largely
responsible for technology diffusion in intangible ways that are not easily
obvious to monitoring and control agencies and this contributes invisibly to
the process of technology diffusion.
It is interesting to note that while the West was occupied with the
management of dangers related to the catastrophic failure of the Soviet system,
China was quick to learn from immediate history and used the so-called peace
dividend to maximum advantage. China reviewed its military modernisation
efforts, under way since the 1980s and chose to concentrate fully on re-
orienting it for techno-industrial superiority to match the best in the world
and on building economic competitiveness to overtake its powerful neighbour,
Japan. Throughout the 1990s, China continued on its path of rapid economic
growth and consolidated its military and commercial technology base. The
rise of China as a potential world power is largely due to the vision of its
leaders, who pushed the country for impressive growth in its manufacturing
base, to gain a globally competitive edge that in turn helped it to emerge as
the most powerful nation second only to the US. The 21st century has begun
with many changed parameters relating to technological options for defence
and security, where issues of access to sensitive technology and use of modern
lethal weapon technology have become important concerns for I.R. and
diplomacy. While the military operation in Iraq will remain a major milestone
of the 21st century—where the US was in the driver’s seat, the other equally
unforgettable event of this young century was the 9/11 event, that saw the
US under attack in its own homeland by extremists with relatively modest
technology capability.
Terrorist networks have learned how to exploit high-tech mechanisms
such as the internet and global banking systems to raise funds, plan, coordinate
 Technology and Security: Challenges for Diplomacy 39

and communicate. The menace is no longer confined to small, disgruntled

religious fanatic groups but has acquired a ubiquitous global presence.
Extremism has been fuelled and funded by short-sighted leaders or dictatorial
State actors that want to use these elements for their military and diplomatic
advantage. Given the scale of operations of terrorist organisations it should
be easy to understand that such non-state terrorist groups could not have
gained this amorphous global presence without State-level support.
Nevertheless, it is not the technology per se that is good or bad, rather its
application, with dangerous intentions or irresponsible attitudes that is the
real cause for concern. If used properly and in a balanced manner, technology
is an invaluable key to security, development, progress, cooperation and
harmony. The future challenge therefore, will be to facilitate best use of
technology for all mankind, to allow universal progress, peace and stability,
while managing technology interactions and technology advances in a way to
prevent its careless misuse or dangerous abuse. This can best happen when
all stake-holders in modern society learn to respect S&T and remain
committed to using technology prudently for the common good for all
mankind.
As long as nations continue to be unequal in economic wealth and techno-
military power or have differences on ideological, religious or cultural grounds,
their relationships will be uneven and problematic. Convergence of views and
interests can emerge only in areas where there are common fears or mutual
benefits. Progress, peace and stability are major goals that are shared worldwide.
Technology is often the common denominator that can help bridge some of
the avoidable gaps and thus play an important levelling role, to enhance
international cooperation for long-term benefits for all humanity. Fortunately,
among the progressive nations, now there is a far better appreciation of the
effects of technological advances as well as better techno-political maturity in
using technology for security needs, economic development, social progress
and political leverage. Thus, the changing global security scenario presents a
unique opportunity to foreign policy experts and diplomats to use technology
as a binding force to build a safer, progressive and peaceful world society.
As is well known, the modern concepts for technology control were driven
by the need to arrest proliferation of NW and its devastating effects. With
increasing potential of technology for mass destruction or mass disruption,
reducing the threat of potentially dangerous technologies and weapons, as
well as controlling the possible misuse of dual-use technologies will remain
the major challenges for international non-proliferation efforts and the
40 Role of Technology in International Affairs

technology-control architecture of the future. In the past, under the

presumption that sensitive technologies are safe within the country or group
of friendly allies, technology controls became synonymous with export controls
of critical commodities or systems. But now, controlling the know-how and
knowledge has become increasingly important and in future, diffusion of
knowledge will become inevitable in the globalising world. Hence, controlling
or managing human intentions will emerge as the main challenge of the future
for preventing misuse of potentially dangerous technology.
Changing patterns of economic progress, global market forces, technology
diffusion and new security perceptions will require a radically fresh approach
to the effective management of technology in the 21st century. Rise of religious
fundamentalism and ready availability of mercenary non-state forces, has added
a new dimension of asymmetric threat, and it is imperative that dual-use
modern technology access to such extremist groups must be prevented without
bias or subjectivity. At the same time, cooperation and interdependence among
peace loving nations is becoming increasingly essential for combating such a
ubiquitous threat and in this case too, international technology co-operation
alone will be the main vehicle to evolve effective solutions.
Hence, the challenge will be to manage the dynamic balance of technology
control with the imperatives of cooperation and healthy competition between
nations. The solutions for the future must therefore be evolved imaginatively,
based on mature and informed management of international relations for
national or regional security. Foreign policy experts and diplomats of the future
thus, must have the appropriate knowledge-base to understand the finer
nuances of modern dual-use technology, to develop informed negotiating
strategies for international dialogue and diplomacy in the future.

Indian Perspective
During the two centuries of British Raj the main focus was maximum
exploitation of India’s resources for the benefit of the ruling empire and little
was done for the development of the land or its people. Hence, India after
independence in 1947 had to concentrate on nation-building and human
development. Compulsions of the cold war years saw India becoming alienated
from the advancing Western alliance and more dependent on cooperation with
the USSR. This led to India being labelled as a Soviet bloc nation and a target
country for technology denial by the Western group of countries. The situation
got worse after the 1974 ‘Peaceful Nuclear Experiment’ (PNE) by India to
create a notional deterrence against nuclear China. As already discussed in
 Technology and Security: Challenges for Diplomacy 41

the previous chapter, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was formed to
tighten the technology controls of all dual-use items that could contribute to
nuclear R&D. The next step was the establishment of a seven nation group
in 1983 to control ballistic missile development through the MTCR that
created further discrimination and hence, it was not very successful.
By that time, India had already embarked on major defence system projects
such as the Main Battle Tank (MBT), the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) and
the IGMDP (Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme) in its
efforts towards enhancing self-reliance in defence technology and these projects
were facing very tight export controls for basic materials and components. It
was in this context, that at a high level meeting between the Indian Ministry
of Defence (MoD) and the office of the US Secretary of Defense, a diplomatic
agreement was worked out to appoint a Defence Adviser in each country to
build confidence on both sides, to enable the US defense industry to gain
from significant business opportunity in India. India readily agreed to this
arrangement as it could lead to softening of technology denials for some critical
items that India needed urgently for important projects.
The process started in 1988-89 with understanding the actual US concerns
on dual-use technology and custom-tailoring the Indian requests for items
and sub-systems to fit within the limits of US acceptability, with a mutually
evolved ‘End Use Certification’ process. Personal contacts developed with
officials at the Pentagon, the US Air Force, the State Department and the
Commerce Department proved very useful for engaging US officials in
constructive dialogue, for defining mutually acceptable specifications and limits
of usage.
Starting with the successful contract for supply of General Electric (GE)
engines for the LCA, the list of previously denied systems and components
in avionics and sensors for removal of denials, slowly increased to impressive
numbers during the six-year tenure of the first Adviser, Defence Technology
at Washington DC. The US defense industry leaders emerged as the main
supporters of the Indian initiative as they were keen to expand their overseas
business through the emerging new Indo-US technology cooperation.5
The presence of a defence technology expert at the Indian Embassy at
Washington was uniquely beneficial to foreign service officers of the embassy
in enhancing their own appreciation of technological nuances, while for the
Defence Adviser, the experience was equally rewarding in understanding the
finer aspects of foreign policy practice. Working level contacts within the US
42 Role of Technology in International Affairs

Government system and increasing mutual familiarity, helped in building

mutual confidence of dependable equations for contracts worth millions of
dollars, which would otherwise be denied to India. Collapse of the Soviet
Union and end of the cold war also helped in opening up new possibilities of
Indo-US cooperation, and joint working groups were formed to further
strengthen the techno-political equations. Indian foreign service officers and
the US State Department officials played an important role in their respective
governments to leverage the growing technology cooperation for strategic
partnership. The seeds of the US-India “NSSP” (Next Steps in Strategic
Partnership) were thus sowed in the early 1990s.
It must be put on record here that two other factors played major roles
in changing the international perception of India. The first was the economic
reforms of 1991 that immediately mobilised the market forces to attract
investments into India; the second was the IT revolution around the turn of
the century, where the Indian technology workforce made global headlines
for contributing to the global transformation to digital technology. The
technology content of both these factors was very significant and India could
benefit from this transformation only because the country was mature enough
to leverage its technology and intellectual strengths. Political overtones of these
changes were very deep and signalled India’s arrival at the global stage as a
major techno-economic player.

Future Trends in Technology and Security Strategy

The past decade has been one of introspection and self-evaluation for many
progressive nations, giving them occasion to assess their existing potential and
identify future priority areas for enhancing their security and stability. The
results have represented something of a military-technical revolution
throughout the world, albeit at different levels of sophistication. The strategic
focus during the cold war period was on countering the capabilities of the
adversary with technological innovations. This also implied denying the
adversary the advantages of technology as much as possible. Based on major
military platforms and weapon systems, the strategy was to constantly improve
performance and enlarge the inventory. Although this type of focus continues
to be relevant in the context of some regional conflict scenarios, for most
militarily advanced nations the focus is now clearly shifting to strategies based
on a ‘system of systems’ approach.
Technological maturity and the compatibility of various systems have
made it possible to plan for enhanced military capabilities, based on a
 Technology and Security: Challenges for Diplomacy 43

combination of individual technologies. For instance, one major trend indicates

a preference for the integration of long-range, high-precision weapons, which
rely heavily on satellite-based reconnaissance and advanced sensors with the
use of fast digital communication links. Another trend indicates the use of
sophisticated airborne or shipboard platforms with customised targeting
techniques and a variety of warhead options for intended application objectives.
Another important strategic shift that has occurred is the increased focus
on C3I technologies (Command-Control-Communication-Intelligence) for
conducting integrated war operations with quick reaction time and maximum
flexibility. The ongoing revolution in IT has enabled vast arrays of advanced
sensors to be used simultaneously for gathering intelligence and for decision
support systems. Compact and fast computers have transformed the battlefield
and it is now possible for an individual soldier to possess high situational
awareness in real time. With such advanced technological capabilities, older
war-fighting doctrines will clearly be replaced by new tailor-made flexible
strategies that can allow optimal use of military assets under any given
circumstances.
Yet another important contribution of technology to future strategic
planning is the availability of advanced simulation and war-gaming capabilities.
These not only allow major improvements in planning but also help to evaluate
the effectiveness of various options for defence strategists and planners.
Simulators are also invaluable for high-level training for complex weapon
systems. The higher the level of technological sophistication, the higher the
demand for comprehensive training without which high-tech equipment
becomes practically useless. Future military strategies will need to take into
account some important technology trends. First, the role of dual-use
technologies will be far more relevant, with many military capabilities based
on civilian technologies. This means that more countries will have access to
military capabilities that were available only to a few powers in the past. In
a sense, this means that the technology gap between the most advanced and
the average-level countries will be reduced overall.
Hence, strategies and tactics need to ensure that available technology will
play a larger role in the future. Given shrinking defence budgets, reduced or
changed threat perceptions and acute economic competition, defence
producers will tend to change their business practices to make more
technological options available to partners and customers in a large number
of nations or groups. This increases the potential for asymmetric conflict
situations and the use of low-intensity warfare techniques. In the regional
44 Role of Technology in International Affairs

context, the implications can seriously influence security concerns and military
strategies. Export controls and arms control in such situations become
increasingly difficult to implement and a sense of lack of control can, in turn,
only further fuel the proliferation of conventional weapon technologies. In
the regional context, therefore, the trend will be to counter the techno-military
capabilities of immediate adversaries, in a way that may not be directly related
to the technology revolution taking place in the developed world. The regional
dynamics of the interplay between strategy and technology will be different
in different cases.
Despite the increasing diffusion of technology in many fields, the
technology gap will probably remain at the same level or even grow, because
of the sheer cost and complexity of sophisticated technologies. Stealth
technology, smart weapons, Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs),
strategic cruise missiles and nuclear submarines are examples of technologies
that will remain restricted to only a few nations that have the techno-economic
means and maturity to possess and use them. Hence, when new technological
capabilities are added in future by a technology leader such as the US, few
other countries may have either the means or the motivation to invest heavily
in countering them. The strategies of the target countries may therefore shift
towards the acquisition of asymmetric advantages from WMD, or they may
resort to low-technology counter-measures such as developing assets
underground for protection. These are some of the interesting aspects of
technology interplay in the security strategies of the future.
The current military technology transformation is being led by advances
in the US, where the focus is clearly on using IT and space technology for
maximum techno-military advantage. The 2003 military operation in Iraq
was a convincing demonstration of the new strategy of Network-Centric
Warfare (NCW). It is obvious that for the past decade, US planners have
redefined their strategic priorities to reflect a mission-oriented strategy, rather
than the previous finite goal of fighting two parallel simultaneous wars, as
enumerated in military doctrines towards the end of the cold war. The US
concept of military transformation envisages the full spectrum of technology
enhancement and the introduction of new technologies and capabilities to
maximum advantage. Rather than defining an end objective, the strategy
appears to be largely evolutionary, allowing for constant change and flexibility.
The decision to pull out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and to
deploy a Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system clearly signals the US’
preference for a unilateral approach—with a renewed focus on homeland
 Technology and Security: Challenges for Diplomacy 45

security—to global issues such as countering terrorism or controlling WMD

proliferation. However, even the US cannot afford to ignore the importance
of cooperative security management and multilateral approaches.
In technology terms, new and emerging dimensions of security and threat
perceptions must include the security of outer space and space assets on the
one hand, and the real threat to information security, on the other. Protecting
information in cyber space is already proving to be a major challenge. The
vulnerability of information-dependent modern societies to information
warfare makes this an urgent issue. International norms or formal treaties on
these new technology aspects are yet to evolve adequately and the potential
for cyber terrorism remains a real time threat to military systems as well as to
civil infrastructure such as financial institutions, power-supply systems and
air traffic controls. The ubiquitous nature of cyber space makes information
warfare a potential tool for control, as well as threat. The counter-
countermeasure race in IT may not be visible, but will certainly spur rapid
growth in technological capabilities. The subject of weapons in space, however,
is one of high visibility and could transform strategic thinking around the
world. If it leads to accentuated insecurity for a larger group of nations, this
will be a sad commentary on technological miscalculation of the century at
the global level.
The nature of nuclear deterrence has undergone a change because some
of the modern advances in conventional weapon technologies have led to such
powerful capabilities that the deterrence value of these advanced weapons has
improved substantially. In future, the ‘system of systems’ approach, combining
the potential advantages of several high-tech military capabilities, may even
provide deterrence comparable to nuclear deterrence, largely because of its
international acceptability and the ready usability of these weapons. The
international community is already committed to a total ban on Chemical
and Biological Warfare (CBW). Effective implementation of the BTWC
(Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention) and the CWC (Chemical
Weapons Convention) could enhance CBW to zero deterrence level. The
extreme asymmetric technique of using terrorism as a means to achieve
political–military objectives is also close to being universally unacceptable.
Hence, there is hope for reduced dependence on NW for deterrence by major
powers and potential for an eventual international agreement on universal
nuclear disarmament.
The major issue that future technology control mechanisms will need to
address is that of rapid technology diffusion. This is true for several reasons.
46 Role of Technology in International Affairs

Technology advances are very fast and spread across a wide spectrum of
disciplines. Globalisation, as well as unprecedented global transparency as a
consequence of instant worldwide media coverage, has transformed
technological awareness all over the world. A poor villager in a remote area of
a developing country is today more aware of world events and of what the
richest in the world can afford. It is this awareness that is the most powerful
driver for a large part of the world’s population to seek technology access and
related opportunities for progress. The have-nots of yesterday did not fully
realise what they did not have. In the 21st century, such awareness is much
more acute and often keeps pace with global developments. In the high-
technology sector, industrial practices are constantly changing to remain
competitive. In the emerging new technology domain, it is increasingly
difficult to define the line between civilian use of technologies and potential
dual-use technologies. Innovation is the buzzword and there are several intra-
industry information sharing arrangements across international borders, set
up for purely commercial reasons that defy external controls.
A new dimension of export control problems is the increasing importance
of the individual’s personal technological knowledge. In sensitive high-
technology areas such as nuclear science, propulsion and guidance
technologies, simulation techniques, micro-miniaturisation, electronic design
and laser technologies, it takes years of first-hand experience to develop
expertise. The past five decades have seen a gradual rise of such expertise, not
just in the Western group of supplier countries, but all over the world. These
experts are the real repositories of technological knowledge, and they certainly
cannot be subjected to typical export control procedures. Similarly, the
technological capabilities of a nation depend significantly on its industrial
infrastructure and a certain techno-industrial culture that develops over time,
with techno-economic progress. These are not physical commodities or services
that can be controlled through export, unless export controls are made so
restrictive as to deny a country every kind of information on processes and
technology. This approach would border on sanction-like measures that are
normally used only as punitive actions.
The 21st century situation is thus unlike the 1950s–1990s, when the
majority of technologies were being developed under the umbrella of military–
industrial complexes of the two superpowers, and the situation is continuing
to change fairly rapidly. Increasingly, technology is being developed largely
by civilian sector enterprises and multinational companies that cut across the
globe and work primarily for economic development and commercial benefits.
 Technology and Security: Challenges for Diplomacy 47

In the age of globalisation, it would be economically impractical for each

nation to seek to develop the whole spectrum of indigenous technology
infrastructure. However, given the interplay of sensitive technologies in ever
changing international security calculations, it is important for progressive
nations to develop core competences in critical and sensitive technology areas.
Only countries that have the basic scientific and technological infrastructure
and maturity can really absorb high technology and thus, benefit from the
processes of technology diffusion around the world.
Technological know-how is now increasingly held by private companies
that are suppliers to their own governments as well as to others, through
exports. Apart from military products, ordnance and ammunition which
continue to be controlled largely by governmental agencies, most high-
technology components and sub-systems are now dual-use in a reverse mode—
that is, it is now civilian technology advances that are creating newer military
applications. This process started even before the end of the cold war, and
arms control negotiators even then had to decide what to control and how.
Almost everything today is dual-use except for weapon-grade fissile material
and some biological precursors that are potential ingredients only for WMD—
extreme examples of technologies that are unlikely to be commonplace. Across
the wide application spectrum of technologies for aeronautics, electronics,
propulsion, guidance, sensors or digital electronics, it is difficult to separate
out what may be of exclusive military use and hence, a clear candidate for
control regimes. These cutting-edge technologies are now held mostly by
commercial companies, where technology is more often knowledge-based than
defined merely in terms of components and hardware.
A major factor behind technological diffusion is the potential for high
technology to command the highest price in the commercial marketplace.
Most industrially advanced nations depend heavily on export earnings to
remain economically competitive and therefore are subject to forces of
competition. These drivers for technology diffusion will always work against
the efforts for technology control and export regulation. Regional and global
security will demand a delicate balance of these technology-oriented
interactions towards protecting security concerns, without seriously hampering
the course of regional economics and international trade. In the global
economy no company can be competitive without successful exports and yet,
when it comes to the costs of adhering to export controls, it is usually
companies rather than governments that pay.
Large companies are acquiring other smaller companies and mergers are
48 Role of Technology in International Affairs

being worked out across the world between partners that were previously rivals.
High-tech companies and defence industries are particularly hard-pressed to
survive and strongly resent the overbearing export control regulations that
restrict their ability to innovate and move ahead in global competition. These
companies have to move at real-time speed and cannot tolerate the bureaucratic
or legalistic delays of export control regimes. The nature of threats to security
and stability has undergone a sea change and most modern technological
capabilities are beginning to appear as double-edged swords. Who could have
imagined that commercial aircraft could be used to cause such devastation
and death as was brought about by the terrorists who carried out the attack
on September 11, 2001!
Another dimension to technological change arises from changes in the
way in which technology is inducted into the military domain. In the majority
of technologies that have the potential to influence military capabilities, civilian
R&D is now often in the lead. Earlier, it was military technology that was
driving civilian industrial development and the military was the first to take
advantage of new technologies, and thereby control the civilian adaptation of
these technologies. In the 21st century, civilian R&D is often ahead in most
new technology areas. In future, military applications may actually follow
after civilian adaptation because induction of technological innovation into
military systems is a long process fraught with innumerable and complex
considerations of integration, inter-operability and cost-effectiveness. Drivers
for civilian adaptation are indeed very different.
Private sector R&D can no longer afford to be hampered by bureaucratic
and security restrictions and is, thus, racing ahead with faster innovations,
better flexibilities and more competitive management infrastructures. This
trend will become even sharper in the future and the whole system of
technology induction into the military and security apparatus will undergo a
sea change. Future technology control regimes will have to adjust quickly to
these sweeping changes. Controlling exports of emerging dual-use technologies
is going to become far more challenging. Decades of technology denial has
spurred indigenous R&D in many progressive developing nations and
traditional target States such as China and India, are becoming important
economic and military powers. Several developing nations have emerged as
attractive markets for high-technology products. Since these countries are not
participants in the ‘supply club’, there is some concern that the situation may
lead to secondary proliferation of sensitive dual-use technologies, given the
futility of denying what already exists. It is interesting to note that although
 Technology and Security: Challenges for Diplomacy 49

both China and India have voluntarily established and updated their export
control regulations to match international standards, they have not joined
any supply cartel for technology controls.
Western supplier groups still have difficulty accepting them as partners,
whereas some of the former Soviet republics with fledgling economies and
doubtful infrastructure for export controls have been welcomed as partners
for the future. The issues, however, are even more complex. The progressive
developing nations today have become smart buyers that insist on technology
transfer with every procurement interaction. High technology is a buyers’
market today, so it is difficult for the supplier to refuse such deals for fear of
being beaten by the competition. The effect is that the technology gap between
the industrially advanced countries and the developing countries is becoming
smaller with time. Except for the US, which has relentlessly continued with
high-tech R&D and innovation, most other participants in the multilateral
export control regimes stand to lose some of their technological edge and
with it, the high ground for export controls. The US in turn, may then
justifiably look for ways and means to maintain its superiority, by exercising
unilateral controls against the rest of the world, including some of its former
allies, through a unilateral export control regime.
The special feature of modern technology is the high relevance of
intangible transfers, through the exchange of scientific information among
experts. Excessive or intrusive controls, such as attempts to control intangible
technology transfers through monitoring normal scientific–technical relations
among experts should be avoided, because they would be counter-productive
to the larger goal of wider international cooperation. These are some of the
finer nuances of the technology diffusion and technology transfer challenge
that must be borne in mind, when trying to fine-tune the technology controls
of the future.

Indian Science and Technology Potential for Influencing

International Relations
India has taken major strides in science and technology since its independence
and is recognised today for its achievements in many fields ranging from
agriculture, textiles, healthcare and pharmaceuticals to info-tech,
biotechnology, space technology, and nuclear technology. All this, combined
with India’s role in the global IT revolution, as well as India’s indigenous
strength in many key areas of defence and strategic technologies, has made
50 Role of Technology in International Affairs

India a significant player on the world stage. Quite appropriately, Indian

foreign policy has also undergone a silent reform and India today is seen as
a responsible and stable democracy with a major role in regional and world
power equations. The US signing the civil nuclear technology cooperation
agreement with India, within ten years of announcing sanctions against India’s
nuclear tests in May 1998, speaks volumes of this remarkable transformation
it has achieved through its combined maturity in technology and diplomacy.
At the onset of independence, India’s first Prime Minister, Pandit
Jawaharlal Nehru called science ‘the very texture of life and optimistically
declared that, ‘Science alone can solve problems of hunger and poverty,
sanitation and illiteracy, as well as problems of superstition and retrograde
customs.’ Under his leadership, first the Indian Government set out to cure
numerous societal problems. The Department of Atomic Energy, the
Department of Science and Technology and the Department of Space were
among the first S&T departments in the country of which, the Prime Minister
himself took charge. The Green Revolution, educational improvement,
establishment of hundreds of scientific laboratories, industrial and military
research, massive hydroelectric projects, and entry into the frontiers of space—
all evolved from this early vision to embrace high technology.
Indian scientific research and technological developments since
independence in 1947, have received robust political support throughout,
and almost all the initial funding has come from the government. Science
and technology initiatives have been important aspects of the government’s
Five-Year Plans and are usually focused on fulfilling short-term needs, while
aiming to provide the institutional base needed to achieve long-term goals.
As India set out to empower leading scientists to create world-class research
institutions, government-sponsored scientific and technical developments have
aided diverse areas such as agriculture, biotechnology, high altitude and
oceanographic research, communications and entertainment technology,
energy technologies, mining, nuclear power, space, defence and transportation
etc.
Soon after independence, the government took several initiatives to set
up a number of policy-level bodies to promote S&T in the country. The
Scientific Advisory Committee to the Cabinet (SACC) was set up in 1956
and an improved Committee on Science and Technology (COST) was
established in 1968. A National Committee on Science and Technology
(NCST) was established in 1971 to formulate and continuously update
comprehensive S&T plans. The first S&T plan formulated by NCST
 Technology and Security: Challenges for Diplomacy 51

identified 24 major sectors for priority S&T development and laid as much
emphasis on the development of engineering, design, and fabrication skills as
on the development of technology. The SACC was restored in 1981. In
addition, there is a Cabinet Committee on Science and Technology. The
National Council of Science and Technology is the apex body chaired by the
prime minister, and the integration of S&T planning with national socio-
economic planning, is the responsibility of the Planning Commission, now
replaced by ‘Niti Aayog’.
The post-independence era also saw the setting up of the five IITs, starting
with Kharagpur in 1950, Bombay in 1958, Madras in 1959, Kanpur in 1960
and IIT, Delhi in 1961, all quite unique and recognised for world-class
standards. A new Ministry of Science and Technology was established in 1971
and several national laboratories got re-organised under the Department of
Science and Technology (DST) and the Department of Scientific and Industrial
Research (DSIR) that also includes the CSIR (Council of Scientific and
Industrial Research) laboratories. Meanwhile, the Department of Atomic
Energy, Department of Space and the Department of Defence R&D also
evolved, with many laboratories getting set-up in key critical technology areas.
These premier R&D institutions, some leading universities and the string
of national level laboratories today represent the backbone of Indian S&T.
Against this backdrop, one would expect India to be much organised in S&T
issues and a very high achiever in all aspects. However, shadowed by the
compulsions of a developing country, Indian S&T policies were focused on
mission mode projects of national importance; and most achievements of
independent India are of the type where successful application of already
known technology was done by government agencies or institutions. While
this can be seen as a success of the S&T policy, unfortunately it also resulted
in the decline of open-ended basic research of excellence, except for some
pockets of excellence. Overall, there has been a fall in scientific research output,
both in quantity and quality, because of sub-optimal resourcing and short-
sighted goals of the scientific and engineering community. In the first five
decades since independence, India had to concentrate on survival and
sustainability; now India must aim to rise rapidly in world S&T competition
and establish itself as a technology leader in select areas of high priority. Some
of this is indeed happening, but the pace needs to be faster.

Science and Technology Policy Framework

Science and technology development in India owes a lot to a series of policy
52 Role of Technology in International Affairs

instruments enunciated by the Parliament, such as the ‘Scientific Policy

Resolution’ (SPR) of 1958, which emphasises the government’s responsibility
to foster, promote and sustain the cultivation of science and scientific research
in all its aspects of pure, applied and educational. The key role of technology
as an element of national development is also well recognised. The Department
of Science and Technology has been formulating policy statements and
guidelines on S&T that provide a vision for institutions involved in different
areas of S&T to work towards the common goal of furthering the cause of
S&T in India. S&T policy documents have evolved with changing times and
priorities of the nation and they state the principles on which the growth of
science and technology in India has been based, over the past several decades.
One of the early planning documents was the SPR, which called for
embracing ‘by all appropriate means, the cultivation of science research in all
its aspects—pure, applied and educational’ and encouraged individual
initiatives. In 1983, the government issued a similar statement laying
considerable emphasis on self-reliance and development of indigenous
technologies, while also stressing the importance of international cooperation
and diffusion of scientific knowledge. The Science and Technology Policy of
2001 addressed the need for restructuring the administrative and management
structures associated with government science departments, agencies and many
institutions. The latest revision to the Science and Technology Policy in 2003,
once again, emphasises the goals of self-reliance and adds focus on sustainable
development and equitable distribution for the country.6
The government evolved certain instruments for the implementation of
technology policies in 2001, which were also applied to the technology policy
of 2003. The priority areas and their strategies for implementation were
broadly identified, and due recognition was accorded to the importance of
knowledge-based development and competition, to meet national needs in
the new era of globalisation. Sensitivities to Intellectual Property Rights (IPR)
issues and the compulsions of international cooperation are new additional
dimensions of the emerging S&T scene.

Technology Development in India

History has shown that modern economic growth has been inspired by a rapid
and persistent upgradation of technology and scientific know-how. It is
estimated that from one-third to one-half of the growth experienced by the
industrially advanced countries has come from technological progress. Thus,
technology has emerged as the principal driving force for long-term economic
 Technology and Security: Challenges for Diplomacy 53

growth. Economic growth results both from slow and steady improvements
in technology and from knowledge embodied in physical and human capital
as well as from the “breakthrough” inventions.
Post-independence, the national leaders of India adopted a socialist view
to industrialisation and three of the main aspects that emerged from their
policies were: (a) government intervention and control: government monopoly
over industries, nationalisation of banks, extensive and influential public sector
(b) neglect of exports and (c) economic development giving direction to
technology development.
At the time of independence in India, industrialisation was viewed as the
engine of growth for the rest of the economy and the supplier of jobs to reduce
poverty. However, industrial production rose only marginally till the 1970s.
Compulsions of other societal developments and the emphasis on large-scale,
capital-intensive industries created far fewer jobs than the estimated ten million
annual entrants into the labour force required. Hence, unemployment and
underemployment remained growing problems. In the 1990s however,
industrial production rose at an average rate of 6.6 percent. Observers believed
that this increase was largely a response to economic liberalisation, which led
to increased investment and competition. By the mid-1990s, substantial
progress was made but industrial growth still failed to live up to the
expectations.
The new government gave top priority to economic planning for
development. Steps were taken to accelerate industrialisation and redress
regional imbalances. Progress was slow, as the infrastructure was not there.
People had very high expectations and the government had to provide for
education, healthcare and employment for hundreds of millions of people.
For more than three decades, India’s national income grew by no more than
3.6 percent a year, one of the slowest growth rates in the developing world.
Its per capita income was among the lowest.
The thrust on S&T continued during Indira Gandhi’s premiership,
including the Pokhran I series of nuclear explosions in 1974. In subsequent
years, India became host to one of the two International Centres for Genetic
Engineering and Biotechnology (ICGEB). Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi also
provided strong political support to science and technology, including ICT.
It took the nation almost half a century to find its feet. Today, India is a
nuclear power and has launched its own satellites into space; it produces its
own steel and builds its own warships and many critical parts of its aircraft.
54 Role of Technology in International Affairs

It has an impressive heavy engineering base and is one of the few developing
countries that have been able to bid successfully for heavy engineering turnkey
contracts in other developing countries. Its progress in agriculture is equally
impressive. The driving force behind India’s S&T came from government
initiatives such as those in atomic energy, space, and biotechnology.
Fortunately, in recent years, the private sector has emerged as the driver in
areas such as information technology, biotechnology, the pharmaceutical
industry and the automobile industry. The transition is a continuing phase,
with some Indian industries attaining global dimensions and competing with
the very best in the world.
The IT industry in India is one of the fastest growing industries. The
Indian IT industry has built up valuable brand equity for itself in global
markets. The IT industry in India comprises the software industry and
information technology-enabled services (ITES), which also includes the
business process outsourcing (BPO) industry. India is considered a pioneer
in software development and a favourite destination for IT-enabled services.
The industry has not only transformed India’s image on the global platform,
but also fuelled economic growth by energising the higher education sector,
especially in engineering and computer science. The industry has employed
almost ten million Indians and has contributed a lot to social transformation
in the country.
Government policy towards the IT sector changed when Rajiv Gandhi
became Prime Minister in 1984. His New Computer Policy (NCP-1984)
consisted of a package of reduced import tariffs on hardware and software
(reduced to 60 percent). Some of the policy reforms included de-licensing of
the software industry for exports, so that it could be eligible for bank finance
and freed from license-permit raj and permission for foreign firms to set up
wholly-owned, export-dedicated IT industry units. A special project was
initiated to set up a chain of software parks in India which could offer
infrastructure at below-market costs. These policies laid the foundation for
the development of a world-class IT industry in India. Today, Indian IT
companies such as Tata Consultancy Services (TCS), Wipro, Infosys, and
Hindustan Computers Ltd. (HCL) etc. are renowned in the global market
for their IT prowess. Interestingly, the majority of these are private sector
holdings.
The Indian education system places strong emphasis on mathematics and
science resulting in a large number of science and engineering graduates.
Mastery over quantitative concepts coupled with English proficiency, has
 Technology and Security: Challenges for Diplomacy 55

resulted in a skill set that has enabled India to reap the benefits of the current
international demand for IT. Also, the cost of software development and other
services in India is very competitive as compared to the West. The S&T
infrastructure in India today is fairly wide, encompassing all S&T organisations
under the central government, state governments as well as public sector
entities, working in areas as diverse as agriculture, healthcare, industrial
development as well as nuclear, space and cyber space R&D. Significant
contributors are the large number of institutes/undertakings functioning under
the central government S&T departments and the trained personnel employed
by them, rightfully making them India’s S&T assets.
For India to really become dominant in technology and innovation, what
is required is an innovation ecosystem that links markets, companies, R&D
centres and venture capitalists. India must have a proactive approach that is
not risk-averse and policy reforms that can attract and utilise the best talent.
China is a good case-study of how a well-planned approach to technology
development and innovation over 2–3 decades has enabled a country to
compete with the best in the world. India also needs a pre-planned and
aggressive approach to technology planning, development, acquisition and
innovation. The R&D component in Indian industries has been very
minimal and this needs to be enhanced very effectively through imaginative
policy reforms and incentives for small and medium enterprises (SMEs).

Major Initiatives in Indian Science and Technology

The most significant and recent policy level priorities for science and
technology in India have come in the form of two major initiatives by the
Prime Minister’s Office. On March 5, 2005, the cabinet gave in-principal
approval to a host of decisions that could have far-reaching implications for
science and technology in India. This included setting up of a world-class
national science and research foundation and two universities for scientific
research and education. First few ‘Indian Institute of Science, Education and
Research’ (IISER) have already started functioning very well in the country.
With the ‘National Science Foundation’ seed money of Rs. 1000 crore, these
IISERs would be highly autonomous and would be run by scientists to support
establishment of centres of excellence as well as to encourage promising
individual scientists. Kolkata and Pune were selected for establishing the new
universities at a cost of Rs. 500 crore each, to enhance the status of basic
research and also create new opportunities for attractive careers in S&T. The
56 Role of Technology in International Affairs

same cabinet meeting also cleared the launch of three national missions—on
scientific literacy, emerging diseases and on safe drinking water.
India’s progress over the next 15-20 years will be intimately linked to
events within the South Asian region, as well as around the world. Both
opportunities and challenges will arise as the result of transformation in the
regional and global political and security environment. World trade under
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) will determine access to markets and
international competitiveness. The economic growth rates of other regions
will influence demand for exports and foreign capital flow patterns. Pressures
due to rising cost of energy resources, continued spread of information
technological innovation, steady increase in world trade—are some other
factors that will also impact India’s techno-economic progress. The next decade
presents a unique opportunity for India to emerge as an S&T leader.
In terms of the impact of globalisation on technology and infrastructure,
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) should promote even faster technological innovation around the
world. Application and diffusion of technologies in a wide range of disciplines
across international borders will accelerate. Agriculture technologies,
biotechnology, information technologies and new manufacturing techniques
will probably transform how human beings learn, communicate, produce and
care for their health.
Many important technology breakthroughs may be expected in areas such
as fuel cells, alternative energy, genetic engineering, precision farming, mass
communication, computerised healthcare and environmental protection. The
cost of global communications will probably continue to decline further,
reducing the barriers of distance and bringing new levels of transparent
competitiveness in global production, distribution and marketing. In all this,
foreign policy needs to be in sync with national S&T priorities and Indian
diplomacy must effectively leverage S&T for international objectives.
The next ten years for Indian industry are going to be very different from
the last ten years. Increased globalisation, increased choice for customers and
employees, increasing competition and new technology inputs will enforce
major changes in strategy, for success. Technology development towards its
successful commercialisation is a complex process that involves a combination
of factors—the choice of technology with correct assessment of market
potential, availability of technological competence and financial support, R&D
and production support for optimum scale of operation and the infrastructure
 Technology and Security: Challenges for Diplomacy 57

and marketing support to make the product competitive. The lack of proper
understanding of these complex issues at the policy level has resulted in overall
lack of competitive success, except for sporadic success by an individual
company.
Towards India’s aspirations for technology leadership, it may be worthwhile
to make an assessment of its existing strengths and select one or two
technologies for scaling-up to international standards in each five-year plan
period. Such a scale-up in planning, funding and execution can allow the
country as a whole to be recognised as an important player in an increasing
number of high-tech areas. This could enable India to become a partner in
international S&T mega-missions and perhaps invite talent and funding from
across the world for cross fertilisation of knowledge and expertise at an
international level.
The present time period represents a unique window of opportunity for
international cooperation in high technology. After years of being a target of
technology controls, India is finally getting the recognition for its indigenous
technology maturity and responsible international conduct. The sheer strength
of the knowledge based workforce in India has created a new face for India to
qualify as a very important partner in techno-economic affairs of the world.
It is imperative that policy makers and administrators take serious note of
this historic opportunity and steer the country to new heights in science and
technology in the 21st century.

International Relations and Diplomacy in a Globalised World

There has been an interesting shift from traditional and often secret diplomacy
of the 20th century to the ‘modern diplomacy’ of the post-cold war era, to the
more recent ‘open diplomacy’. The global integration of ICT and increasing
use of the world-wide-web has enabled unprecedented dissemination of a
variety of information. Information accessibility and transparency has also
undergone a sea change. Internet, just about 25 years young in the public
domain, is having a profound impact on international affairs. The digital media
is a many-to-many type of information technology. From a technology
perspective all this has been possible only due to transformations in digital
electronics and advances in ultra-fast communication technologies, which is
so intrinsic that it is seldom recognised.
The most valuable component of the new media for diplomats is the
ability to listen to new audiences and better understand their views and values.
58 Role of Technology in International Affairs

It has led to a new form of statecraft by reshaping diplomatic agendas to meet

old challenges in new ways and by deploying innovative approaches to foreign
policy reforms. The world today has perhaps what can be defined as e-
diplomacy—a new approach which is in addition to all that has been there.
This 21st century statecraft complements traditional foreign policy tools with
newly innovated and adapted instruments of statecraft that fully leverage the
networks, technologies and demographics of our interconnected world. It
enables traditional diplomatic services to be delivered faster and more cost-
effectively, both to one’s own citizens and government and to those of other
countries.

Digital Technology in Public Diplomacy

In 2012, the Indian embassy in Cairo, in collaboration with the
‘INDIAFRICA’ organisation marked the birth anniversary of Mahatma
Gandhi along with the anniversary of the ‘Arab Spring’ by hosting a poster
contest, widely publicised via social media, on the topic ‘Did you sense the
spirit of Gandhi in Tahrir Square’? It drew the theme and the entries not
only from Egypt and India but also from several other African countries and
succeeded in integrating the most recognisable Indian icon with the most
important political event in the region. The contest was India’s way of saluting
the Gandhian spirit of the ‘Tahrir Square’ revolutionaries.
This is a clear example of a successful ‘soft power’ projection through
public diplomacy. Soft power has been viewed as a crucial instrument with
which India could wield influence as a global actor.7 It is seen as providing
India with an edge over China, as the preferred, softer Asian alternative with
a rich, diverse, democratic culture that seems to fit in much better with
established norms in the Western-influenced world order.8 Indeed, as Joseph
Nye points out, the limited success of Chinese (and Russian) soft power
initiatives can be attributed to the fact that their soft power is projected only
through government, while civil society voices are stifled, a factor that gives
democratic India an inherent advantage to work with.9
Over the past decade, India has invested significant resources in public
diplomacy using traditional and new approaches to build and leverage its soft
power. This new public diplomacy tool is a function of changed beliefs of the
foreign policy-making elite about the uses of new social media networks in
engaging with non-state actors around the globe. This also projects that India’s
new public diplomacy seems to have met with some success—albeit patchy—
in augmenting its soft power. The traditional work of diplomacy has seen a
 Technology and Security: Challenges for Diplomacy 59

greater role of public diplomacy because of the new communications

technology. In addition to the State-to-State diplomacy, there has been a shift
from State-to-people, people-to-State, and people-to-people type of exchanges.
This form of public diplomacy is transnational and it is now possible for a
large number of people to participate in sustained and decentralised
communication with governments.
The nature of digital media is a break from traditional forms of print and
broadcast communications. These are one-to-many communication
technologies. The internet is essentially a many-to-many type of information
technology. The internet enables more and different actors to get involved in
political and diplomatic processes in a transparent and perhaps accountable
manner, leading to ‘democratisation of diplomacy’. It multiplies and amplifies
the number of voices and interests involved in international policy-making,
complicating international decision-making and reducing the exclusive control
of States in the process.
The new form of decentralised statecraft reflects a ‘triple paradigm shift’
cumulating on a common infrastructure for the first time in history. The
three primary information networks of I.R. are—trade, personal
communications and mass media. The infrastructure that conveys goods
around the globe has shifted over the centuries from ships to rail to highways.
Our communication networks have changed from post to telegraph to
telephone to the internet. Our mass media has moved from print to radio to
television to ‘facebook’. Today, all three of these systems operate largely on
the internet.
The Department of Public Diplomacy in the Indian Ministry of External
Affairs, used ‘Twitter’ during the evacuation of Indian nationals from Libya
in 2011, and it was a real eye-opener. The Department used it to put forth
timely information about the evacuation schedule and received invaluable
information from the ground about the requirements of Indian nationals in
distant parts of Libya. They got large dollops of appreciation from tweeple
(Twitter users) who appreciated the effort that the Department of Public Policy
was making in using new media. It also turned out to be a pleasant surprise
that a Government of India venture could be so refreshingly unconventional
or non-sarkari.
As the pace of economic globalisation intensifies, the role and importance
of NGOs is being realised, while the welfare role of the State diminishes.
These groups utilise IT tools such as the internet and e-mail to source and
60 Role of Technology in International Affairs

disseminate information on a wide variety of developmental issues, from

environmental protection to democratic inclusion of minorities in domestic
political processes. The fact is that technologies such as e-newsgroups, e-mail,
databases and websites provide the electronic means, whereby ideas and
discussions on various issues can be advanced and exchanged in real-time.
This has led to the emergence of specialist organisations which are more
knowledgeable than the State on specific issues. These have become major
players capable of influencing policy outcomes at international meetings. Their
aggressive, outspoken positions on issues now make them a formidable
negotiating force in international negotiations. Increasingly, NGOs are being
called upon to lend their expertise to evolving solutions to a variety of
problems.
NGOs have been swift to adapt to the potential of the internet to increase
their influence in international affairs. Communication and advocacy is their
core business and they devote significant resources to making the best use of
the internet. Amnesty, Oxfam, Greenpeace, Human Rights Watch, all have
had a powerful web presence for years and are regularly used as a primary
source of information by the web-surfing public. But the internet has
facilitated an even wider diversification of actors by enabling groups without
a collective voice hitherto to find one.
Interestingly, I.R. can no longer be construed solely on the interaction
amongst nation-states. In the evolving international landscape, the State is
but one actor setting the diplomatic agenda. Powerful multinational players
are utilising information and communications technologies to sensitise global
public opinion on a host of issues previously considered ‘domestic’. For
example, by adapting production processes to a digital international trading
system, global corporations can easily relocate operations. This has had the
effect of adding a new dimension to the diplomatic agenda and of diluting
the governments’ role as regulator of fiscal and monetary policies, transforming
them into negotiators. Capital and financial markets have become
internationally structured such that instability in one country can trigger
negative responses in several States.
Global firms are more powerful than many governments, often placing
the latter in the position of negotiators instead of regulators of the domestic
economy. As economic processes become increasingly global in orientation,
domestic fiscal and monetary policies become less effective. Diplomacy is
shifting from State-centred interchanges to transnational interactions in which
global firms, NGOs and the global media have become key actors in the
 Technology and Security: Challenges for Diplomacy 61

diplomatic arena, influencing foreign and domestic policies, somewhat eroding

the State’s authority and sovereignty in the process. The ‘internationalisation’
of economic, social and security issues beyond the capabilities of the nation-
state are creating new diplomatic channels in which, States through bloc
associations and supra-national governance, are attempting to deal with these
issues.

Digital Technology in Government-to-Government Diplomacy

The core of diplomacy is communication. When communication methods
change, as is happening in the present context, diplomacy must adjust. In
2007, Maldives became the first country to unveil the world’s first virtual
embassy. The Maldives virtual embassy was soon followed by embassies
representing Sweden and the Philippines. This virtual embassy was designed
to allow new avenues for diplomatic representation and negotiation, especially
for small and developing countries that have limited diplomatic outreach in
the ‘real’ world. It was the brainchild of Diplo Foundation, a non-profit
organisation which works to assist developing countries participate
meaningfully in international affairs.10
Speaking ahead of the opening ceremony, the Maldivian Minister of State
for Foreign Affairs Abdulla Shahid emphasised how information technology
and particularly the internet can be harnessed by small countries to enable
them to participate meaningfully in international relations. He explained that
Maldives is a small country but a well-known tourist destination that has
experienced rapid economic, social and political development over recent years
by use of IT to best advantage.
Information-Communication-Technology (ICT) enables governments to
promote diplomatic services by quick and efficient communication and enables
them to share databases, resources and skills. Inter-government diplomacy is
transactional and interactional in the relationship between government and
its agencies and other foreign (nations) countries. In such a web of relations,
government interacts and depends on other governments/States to effectively
deliver services and allocate responsibilities. The role of ICT in government-
to-government diplomacy encompasses three critical dimensions: internal,
external and relational as noted by Hirst and Norton (1998).11
Internal transformation refers to the use of ICT to improve the efficiency
and effectiveness of internal functions and processes of the government by
inter-relating different departments and agencies. Thus, information can flow
62 Role of Technology in International Affairs

much faster and more easily among different governmental departments,

reducing processing time, paperwork bottlenecks and eliminating long,
bureaucratic and inefficient approval procedures. It equally facilitates storing
and collecting data, reduction of labour costs and information handling costs
and the speed and accuracy of information processing.
Externally, ICT opens up new possibilities for government to be more
transparent to citizens and business, giving access to a larger range of
information collected and generated by the government. Relationally, ICT
adoption may enable fundamental changes in the relationships between the
citizens and the State and between nation-states with implications for the
democratic process. Horizontal integration of services can be realised more
effectively, enabling the integration of information and services from various
government agencies, to help citizens and other stakeholders to become
seamless.
Digital technology enables transmission and use of all of these protected
materials in digital form over interactive networks. The process of ‘digitisation’
allows the conversion of such materials into binary form, which can be
transmitted across the internet and then re-distributed, copied and stored in
perfect digital form. While the transmission of text, sound, images and
computer programmes over the internet is already commonplace, this is also
true for transmission of audio-visual works such as feature films, as the
technical constraints of narrow bandwidth begin to disappear. Materials
protected by copyright/related rights, spanning a range of information and
entertainment products, constitute much of the subject matter of e-commerce.
Intellectual property rights provide the foundation upon which innovation
is shared, creativity encouraged and consumer trust reinforced. But the digital
world poses a new challenge—how to manage the balance when the consumer
is the creator, when the marginal cost of copying is zero, when enforcement
of existing law is extremely difficult, and when ‘free’ access to information
and content is considered by many to be a right. These are new challenges of
the future which may demand radically new approaches to management of
information and intellectual property.
The rapid growth in the volume of patent applications is creating patent
‘thickets’. These occur where inter-related and overlapping patents result in
lack of clarity about who owns the patent and as a consequence, where to go
for the licence. The technology sector has become increasingly litigious, which
becomes a problem when it stifles innovation or acts as a barrier to new market
 Technology and Security: Challenges for Diplomacy 63

entrants. Since the norms for protecting intellectual property are not very
clear, it requires a relook at the international laws governing technology
exchange. However, diplomats need to have more clarity in order to negotiate
intellectual property interests for the nation. There is thus a requirement to
formulate new laws and regulations to overcome this ambiguity at the national
and international level.
Today, there can hardly be any secrets on the internet. Anything sent
over the internet, even encrypted, can be potentially compromised. The World
Wars saw messengers captured, bridges blown up, telephones tapped, goods
hijacked; but spies or whistle-blowers always found ways to tap information
securely held. But the internet brings a new dimension to the security of
information with implications for I.R. Private information when made public,
may have a swifter and more profound impact on the conduct of world affairs.
Hackers have demonstrated how easily useful material can be found even when
an organisation does not want it to be seen; and recent scandals over the loss
of personal data from British Government systems show how easily
information can be lost.
The steady trickle of leaks about the British Government’s policy and
legal opinion on the war in Iraq led to damaging the reputation of the then
prime minister. All such material is often freely available world-wide on the
web. Another striking example is of how appalling images of the US’ treatment
of 9/11 suspects received instant and global circulation through the internet.
The effect caused permanent damage to the reputation of the US, weakening
its moral authority in the world and fuelling jihadist attacks in different parts
of the world. It also garnered a lot of negative publicity for then President
George W. Bush. This would probably have happened without the internet,
but the internet amplified and extended the impact. Similarly, diplomatic
rivals, including both State and non-state actors (such as terrorist
organisations), may try to hack into government systems and extract
information of use to themselves or even tap into social networks of the
country to get a sense of public opinion.
Yet another implication is that the internet itself becomes a vulnerable
part of every nation’s critical infrastructure, where virus or worm attacks can
be easily generated. In the past few years, very often such virus attacks have
brought large parts of the internet and many of the systems connected to it
to a grinding halt. In May 2007, a cyber attack launched against Estonia
severely damaged business in the country and prevented it from
communicating or making its case public for days. The sophistication and
64 Role of Technology in International Affairs

scale of the attack and its precise targeting strongly suggested a State-sponsored
action.
The infrastructure of the internet has in practice proved to be remarkably
resilient. Security solutions have been keeping just about one step ahead of
the hackers, fraudsters and cyber-saboteurs. This is achieved mainly through
constant vigilance, innovation and investment of the major IT companies—
Microsoft, Cisco, Google, Yahoo and others—often working in close
cooperation with governments. Nevertheless, future threat to the internet’s
integrity is likely to come as much from constraints on capacity with ever
more and larger files travelling across it, as from hostile attacks. ‘Cloud
computing’ today appears to provide one solution, but it may have some of
its own perils, yet to be discovered.
Governance of the internet has also been a subject of international
discussions. The current US-dominated structure has served it well, but this
may not be adequate to meet the challenges of the future. The European
Union (EU) has recently challenged US hegemony in global internet
governance. Just as it took many decades to agree on an international ‘Law of
the Sea’, it may take an equally long time to agree to anything beyond the
existing, relatively informal (and benign) structures for the internet. In the
meantime, supply and demand will continue to grow exponentially, and there
will always remain a virtual as well as physical ungoverned space, from which
internet traffic and content can spread ubiquitously.
In summary, global interdependency has spawned new security concerns
transcending borders which domestic policies cannot adequately address.
Traditional areas of State responsibility such as defence, economic management
and even foreign policy are now being co-ordinated at the supra-national level,
e.g. the EU, or regional level, like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN).
ICT has been instrumental in opening up new avenues for cooperative
security among a set of nations. ICT acts as common infrastructure for the
integration of 28 member-states of the EU enabling the seamless flow of intra-
EU economic, political and defence processes. With a common currency, the
Euro, digital economy has assumed an enhanced role in the cumulative
economy of Europe.
Presently, the internet is under the overall control of the US government.
There is much debate about the future of internet and about who governs it.
India is not comfortable with the proposal of ICANN (Internet Corporation
 Technology and Security: Challenges for Diplomacy 65

for Assigned Names and Numbers) about bringing all stakeholders into
internet governance which would dilute the role of the national government.
There is not only need for proper international legislative authority at the
international level, but also clarity and convergence between the Ministry of
External Affairs and the Ministry of Communications and Information
Technology in India. Information security in the cyber space is emerging as
the most vulnerable area that may spark future conflict.

Challenges for India

India like many other countries is also on the learning curve, on how best to
leverage digital technology for protecting sovereign priorities in cyber space,
while being globally participative—as expected of a democratic country. On
the other hand, being an open democratic nation with vast possibilities, the
vulnerability that India may face in the globalising and digital world may be
quite unique.
As the information era unfolds, new actors are utilising IT and
communications technologies to engage States in a new type of diplomacy,
one driven by technology. Developed nations have been quick to adapt to
these technologies and recognise that in the emerging diplomatic environment
new electronic mechanisms must complement traditional diplomacy.
Developing countries such as India have indeed embraced the idea; but a more
concerted effort is required by Indian diplomats to leverage IT without being
restricted by social media platforms.
Diplomats eventually need to become masters of the internet, not just to
know where they can best collect the most reliable information to meet
deadlines for decision-making, but also to know how to exert maximum
influence on public debate through this medium. Face-to-face negotiation
will always remain their prerogative, but the context in which they undertake
it and the forces at work in those negotiations are changing rapidly. The
internet is at the heart of those changes—already beginning to be recognised
as the ‘Internet of Everything’.
NOTES
1. Amitav Mallik, Indian Science & Technology: A Status Review, Pragun Publications, in
association with Observer Research Foundation (ORF), Delhi, 2006.
2. India conducted its first nuclear detonation, described as a ‘peaceful nuclear explosion
(PNE)’ code-named ‘Smiling Buddha’ on May 18, 1974. See www.fas.org/nuke/guide/
india/nuke/first-pix.htm. (Accessed June13, 2014).
3. Government of India took a bold step in the year 1988 to create a new office of Adviser,
66 Role of Technology in International Affairs

Defence Technology at the Embassy of India in Washington DC to negotiate and reverse

technology denial decisions by the US against India. The author had the honour of creating
this new office and negotiating with the Pentagon, the US Department of State and the
US Department of Commerce for successfully reversing many technology denial cases
against India. The seeds for Indo-US high-tech cooperation sown during the extended
six-year tenure of the author bore many immediate fruitful results and paved the way for
subsequent Indo-US technology cooperation under NSSP (Next Steps in Strategic
Partnership).
4. “START - Russia and U.S. Sign New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty” , The New York
Times, April 8, 2010, at www.nytimes.com/2010/04/09/world/europe/09prexy.html.
(Accessed June 13, 2014).
5. See no. 3.
6. “The-science-technology-and-innovation-policy-government-of India 2003”, at http://
dst.gov.in/sti-policy-eng.pdf (Accessed June 13, 2014).
7. Shashi Tharoor, ‘Indian Strategic Power: Soft’, Huffington Post, June 26, 2009, at http:/
/www.huffingtonpost.com/shashi-tharoor/indian-strategic-power/so_b_207785.html
(Accessed June 13, 2014).
8. William Callahan, “Themes in the India–China debate over the future world order”, at
www.acedemia.edu/.../Digital_Public_Diplomacy_and_a_strategic_narrative_for-india
(Accessed June 13, 2014).
9. Joseph S. Nye, “What China and Russia Don’t Get About Soft Power”, Foreign Policy,
April 29, 2013 at http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/04/29/what-china-and-russia-dont-get-
about-soft-power/ (Accessed June 13, 2014).
10. Diplo Foundation, “Maldives Unveils World’s First Virtual Embassy”, at http://
archive1.diplomacy.edu/poolbin.asp?idpool=463 (Accessed June 13, 2014).
11. Peter Hirst and Michael Norton, “Electronic Government: Information Technologies and
the Citizen”, UK Parliamentary Briefing Papers, POST PN 110, Parliamentary Office of
of Science and Technology, February 1998, at http://www.parliament.uk/post/egov.htm
(Accessed June 13, 2014).
 PART II
Technologies of High Impact on
International Affairs
 3
Defence Technologies: Game Changers
for International Affairs

Introduction: Game Changing Defence Technologies

The 20th century was witness to a sea of changes in defence technology that
for the first time expanded to the fourth dimension of outer space and now
in the 21st century, it is expanding to the fifth dimension of cyber space. The
superpower rivalry and the race for technological superiority fuelled intense
research and development (R&D) and rapid growth in defence technology,
ably aided by scientific inventions and technology innovations. While guns
and tanks became more powerful with extended range and accuracy, the real
game changers were advances in electronics, sensors, rocket propulsion, missile
guidance and control systems and advanced materials. Advances in computers
and integration of sensors with Information-Communication-Technology
(ICT) pushed the envelope of defence capabilities to new paradigms, while
miniaturisation in electronics and mechanical engineering transformed the
size and weight of military systems.
The concepts of strategic defence and diplomacy have undergone
significant transformation, driven mainly due to technology advances and the
limitless capacity of the human brain for innovation. Artificial Intelligence
(AI) and robotic autonomous systems can potentially add revolutionary
capabilities for defence and security. A brief review of this phenomenal
evolution in military technologies is presented here, to highlight how the
arrival of digital electronics and satellite networks has contributed to the recent
70 Role of Technology in International Affairs

Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) of network-centric strategies and

operations that are proving to be game-changers in global politics and balance
in international affairs.
The nuclear weapon (NW) and its long-range delivery was a major game
changer when it arrived in 1945 on the international scene. Nuclear-missile
deterrence continues to be one of the most important instruments of
diplomacy in international relations (I.R.) in the context of balance of power
and international stability. Of the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD),
international diplomacy has successfully achieved consensus on a global ban
on the use of chemical and biological weapons, but NW continue to be
relevant, more in some regions of the world than others.
However, WMD threats are now perceived more from rogue States or
non-state entities, albeit with covert support from some State actors seeking
asymmetric advantages. Deterrence dynamics for this type of threat will
perhaps demand new approaches based on advanced technologies for high
situational awareness and high precision delivery weapons to pre-empt the
attacks and nullify the threats. Layered defence against multiple simultaneous
missile attacks, with high accuracy hyper velocity missiles, or energy beam
weapons is gaining major importance for the future. Technology is thus
providing newer alternatives for deterrence and war prevention.
Negotiations with rogue States/non-state entities will pose a new range
of diplomatic challenges in this age of instant worldwide communication and
24x7 worldwide TV that brings about new sensitivity. The future will demand
efficient intelligence analyses, quick decisions and prompt actions for managing
sensitive situations. Diplomats in the future will need to act fast and with
more prudence.
In the new paradigm of coercive diplomacy, Comprehensive National
Power (CNP) would finally allow powerful nations to compel others to comply
with their own foreign policy priorities. Conventional defence, involving pre-
emptive counter-force, is also gaining regional significance and here again,
the science and technology (S&T) strength of a nation becomes critical to
provide actionable intelligence for precision strike capability with high-tech
weapons. Technology is moving to electronically de-capacitate the enemy
military command and control infrastructure for initial gains, and decisive
techno-military power is replacing the might of traditionally large armies that
depended on the number of boots on the ground. The world-over, armies are
getting leaner and meaner with modern technology.
 Defence Technologies: Game Changers for International Affairs 71

Future wars are likely to be less about territorial disputes and more about
issues of regional or global influence on basic resources such as energy, water
and environment. Economic divide or religious fundamentalism will continue
to be major causes of conflict. Hence, the power-dynamics of this new world
would be very different and increasingly dependent on techno-economic as
well as techno-military superiority. This chapter will present an overview of
this game-changing dynamics where S&T will play an even more important
role in the future of defence and security of nations.
As the danger potential of technologies increases, there is growing
international focus on a world without devastating weapons and on preventing
possible misuse of high-impact technologies. However, as long as major powers
continue to depend on nuclear-missile capabilities as insurance against WMD
threats, real nuclear disarmament will remain a challenge for international
diplomacy. Fortunately, S&T advances are providing non-nuclear techno-
military deterrence and opportunities for increasing the role of S&T in the
security calculus. These include advanced force-multiplier technologies for
missile defence, network-centric capability, aerospace dominance, underwater
technologies, advanced miniaturised sensors and robotic capabilities. A new
class of energy weapons may probably change the future complexion of defence
technologies.
Advanced technologies of Command, Control, Communications and
Intelligence (C3I) and precision strike capabilities of remotely operated combat
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) today, provide new means for pre-emption
and coercion. While such drone-diplomacy is being tested for the first time
by the US against a rogue non-state entity, the demonstrated stand-off
capability provided through technological sophistication is gathering an
important deterrence element without the use of WMD. Given that non-
state entities or groups cannot have significant fighting capability without
covert support from some State entity, the diplomatic challenge of the future
will be about dissuading rogue States from using terrorist organisations to
serve their limited foreign policy objectives or regional aspirations through
rogue means.
Unfortunately, technology diffusion has been instrumental in enhancing
capabilities of smaller fundamentalist groups against larger forces of nation-
states. Will the new world need new approaches to technology control to
contain sensitive technology proliferating into wrong hands and rogue minds?
As new high-impact technologies such as space capabilities and cyber weapon
technologies assume increasing deterrence values, the international community
72 Role of Technology in International Affairs

of foreign policy experts and diplomats will be faced with a new range of
challenges, of how best to reduce the relevance of WMD and other dangerous
technologies, and of how best to balance regional priorities for maintenance
of global peace.
As reliability of missile defence, using both kinetic as well as energy beam
weapons improves, the impact of nuclear-missile deterrence will certainly
reduce. However, technological sophistication will continue to rise, thus
offering outer space or cyber space based techniques to provide other crippling
deterrence options. Protecting sensitive technologies with denial-based foreign
policy priorities would again gain momentum. In the ultimate analysis, future
sensitive technology exchanges among nations or multinational companies
will be based on ‘Responsible Ownership’ of technology.1 It is in this context
that future threats emanating largely from irresponsible non-state actors and
rogue States that support them will need to be diffused.
The future may see some interesting revolutionary changes in technologies
of high importance to defence and security that would not only impact military
affairs but also economic affairs. Technologies related to energy and
environment could determine global peace and stability. As the line between
defence and civilian technology becomes thinner, traditional defence
technologies will combine with new enabling technologies and several hitherto
fictional capabilities may become real-world capabilities. In the digital world
of today, as technology for instant access to global information combines with
network-of-network based decision-making one can anticipate major
transformation in international affairs where global balance of power and peace
will depend on control of human intentions and technology choices. Defence
technology is a vast subject on which hundreds of books have been published.
This chapter will attempt to highlight only those aspects of defence technology
that will have a large impact on international affairs.

Evolution of Defence Technologies and Impact on International

Affairs
It is interesting to examine the reasons as to why there has been no use of
NW since the first and only use in 1945. One of the foremost is the impact
of modern defence technology that has evolved to offer several options with
non-nuclear strike that can be more effective than NW. Another reason is
that NW with their unacceptably large loss of human life and the devastating
after-effects of exposure to radioactivity by the survivors has almost made
 Defence Technologies: Game Changers for International Affairs 73

them unusable. Defence technology advances of the past several decades have
been so phenomenal that any major war today has become unaffordable to
most progressive nations. Unlike in 1945, NW capability is now available to
more than nine nations and hence a NW strike against any nation with NW
or its ally is bound to invite a retaliatory NW attack, which would perhaps
be more punishing than the first strike; such a cost intensive option for war
where both parties suffer unacceptable damage and destruction has become
a No-Win situation. Some credit for this must go to technologies that have
not only enhanced conventional military capabilities but have also made
conventional war-mongering more transparent, much more expensive and
hence, a low probability in the future.
The other aspect that makes war a very hard choice is the globalising
nature of our world today, where interdependence and interconnectivity will
ensure that all will have to suffer to some extent if a major war indeed breaks
out. Hence, while the value of peace has gone up many-fold at the same time,
the cost of war has also increased many times, due to the integration of
economics and development through scientific research and technological
innovation. Technology has enabled human society to aspire for wealth creation
and stability that can be upset by any war situation. The real power is shifting
to techno-economic superiority, where conventional military engagement can
have only limited utility.
New defence technology options made possible by technological
sophistication are changing the very doctrines of warfare from surprise attack
by a large army (World War I) to a massive devastating strike by WMD (World
War II) to a high-tech war of today that is fought more in the electro-magnetic
spectrum than on the ground. In the middle of the 20th century, World War
II saw extensive use of tanks, airplanes and battleships and the introduction
of radar, sonar and advanced avionics. Soon to follow were the ECM and
ECCM (Electronic Countermeasures and Electronic Counter-
Countermeasures) ushering in the elements of Electronic Warfare (EW). The
range and accuracy of guided missiles kept increasing steadily, thus introducing
high precision weapon delivery using advanced tracking with microwave, lasers
or Global Positioning System (GPS) guidance technology.
Computers took over complex tasks to help machines and weapons
become smarter. Digital electronics transformed sensors and the Command,
Control, Communication, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
(C3ISR) networks offer improved intelligence. Military satellites orbiting the
earth provided a quantum leap in networked capability for sharper and instant
74 Role of Technology in International Affairs

situational awareness, transforming the battlefield like nothing before.

Information became the principle instrument of power and globalisation is
making the world appear smaller with increasing interdependence.
All this was driven by scientific discoveries and technological innovations
at every level and in diverse fields of interest to benefit national security and
comprehensive national power. Economy and knowledge became the main
enablers for most human aspirations. The high cost of war started becoming
totally wasteful and unaffordable, as technology brought about enhanced
transparency and new alternatives to conflict resolution. Even the politics of
technology controls has changed from control of entities to management of
intentions. Conduct of statecraft and diplomacy has thus changed quite
dramatically in the short span of the last three to four decades, thanks mainly
to the impact of technology on global affairs and international relations. This
changing paradigm however, does not mean that conventional military force
is about to become obsolete, but it certainly will have to get leaner and smarter.

Defence Technology Environment

Advanced defence technologies have always provided the superiority needed
by States for defence and security as well as for power positioning in
international affairs. Advanced countries that possess such defence technologies
have always been protective about these and developing countries that lagged
behind in technology have always aspired for such technologies. The
technological revolution of the past few decades has however, created a
significant shift in the security perceptions of individual nations.
India’s rapid techno-economic progress as well as the nuclear test of 1998,
helped create a paradigm shift in the global perception of India as a potential
emerging global power. This along with the market forces of globalisation
has changed the basic precepts of defence, offence and security for India. The
defence technology architecture for India in future is therefore, likely to be
very different from the traditional approach to military modernisation of the
past. It is important to understand this change from an external policy
perspective, so that defence and foreign policies could combine together, to
better achieve the national objectives of future technology acquisition and
power positioning for India.
An interesting change in the 21st century is that most critical technologies
for defence are of dual-use nature and the rapid advances in civilian
technologies are often feeding military-strategic requirements. Since these
 Defence Technologies: Game Changers for International Affairs 75

technologies are also critical to economic competitiveness and industrial

development, global corporate sectors that develop and control such
technologies are becoming the major players in international technology
exchange, while the role of government agencies is becoming more of a
facilitator than a controller. Of course, when it comes to the question of
national security, all national interests automatically converge, and the
corporate sector behaves very responsibly, to stay within government guidelines
for international interactions.
Enabling technologies such as information technology, data fusion,
artificial intelligence (AI), robotics, nanotechnology, biotechnology etc. are
transforming the spectrum of technology capabilities. Advances in sensors,
precision guidance, satellite systems, autonomous systems, energy beam
weapons etc. are offering a range of new capabilities for offence and defence.
While these do represent the universal wish list of any modern defence force,
the actual architecture of defence technology for a specific country is governed
by several factors such as the threat perceptions, indigenous techno-industrial
base, economic strength, and of course, the country’s defence strategy and
security doctrine.
For India, the experience of the 1962 war with China brought about a
major change in defence policy, by which defence R&D and defence
production got the much needed push in the overall national defence planning
process. Starting with modest efforts at import substitution and product
upgrades, indigenous defence technology in the country gained real
momentum, only after restrictive technology embargoes were imposed on
India by the West as a reaction to the 1974 Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE).2
Interestingly, for India, this helped to fuel the urgency for achieving a high
degree of self-reliance in technologies critical for defence and development.
However, the priorities of societal development have always competed with
defence allocations in India, and as a result, India’s defence budgets were very
modest till the 1990s. Defence modernisation typically got only about 10-15
percent of the total defence budget and defence R&D got a very small share
of less than 2-3 percent of the defence budget. Teething problems, faltering
progress, heavy dependence on imported Soviet equipment, as well as the
struggle to compete with other modernising forces of the world—all this is
history of India that is well documented and well known.
The introduction of computers and digital electronics received a major
boost in India under the leadership of India’s youngest Prime Minister, Rajiv
Gandhi, after the 1984 elections. The opening up of the Indian economy in
76 Role of Technology in International Affairs

1991 was a major milestone that saw foreign direct investment flow into the
country. The Y2K push for software expertise at the turn of the century, saw
an impressive performance by Indian engineers and software professionals,
and India started emerging as a powerful international player in ICT as well
as in business process outsourcing (BPO).
In 1988, the Indian Government established the new office of Adviser,
Defence Technology at the Embassy of India in Washington DC, as a major
techno-diplomacy initiative to find ways of softening the US technology
controls for India’s high-tech requirement in major R&D projects such as
the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA).3 This initiative paid rich dividends for Indo-
US cooperation in several defence technology areas, where the US defence
industry pushed aggressively for Indian market access. This therefore, proved
to be a kind of win-win solution, where India also gained access to sensitive
technology, with case by case negotiation with the US State Department and
the Pentagon.
However, by mid-1990, India was again on the back-foot during the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiations at the Conference on
Disarmament (CD) just around the time of the indefinite extension of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). India by then had developed
indigenous nuclear technology capability despite being targeted by technology
denials of the Western alliance. However, India maintained exemplary
commitment to non-proliferation with demonstrated responsible ownership
of nuclear technology. India stayed out of the NPT because of its
discriminatory nature and also refused to sign the CTBT as it compromised
its national security interests. In fact, India’s mature and well-informed
negotiations on CTBT at the CD by the then Indian Ambassador (Ms.)
Arundhati Ghose created history demonstrating how a single developing
nation could be resolute on an issue of supreme national security interest.4
By 1995, India was already surrounded by NW-capable China that helped
Pakistan acquire NW for itself, to counter India’s conventional military
superiority. Given the grave nuclear threat from known adversaries on either
side with a history of war, it was imperative for India to end the long nuclear
ambivalence and declare itself a NW power. This was achieved in May 1998
with a series of nuclear tests—Pokhran-II—to establish its nuclear credentials.5
Pakistan was quick to follow with its own tests, going nuclear, overtly
confirming Indian claims that Pakistan was just a step from having a NW.
Subsequent findings also confirmed that China, despite being a core NPT
member, provided all guidance and assistance to Pakistan to go nuclear.
 Defence Technologies: Game Changers for International Affairs 77

Concomitantly, Pakistan’s irresponsible and clandestine nuclear trade under

A.Q. Khan also got exposed and international equations in the South Asian
region changed significantly and permanently.
Armed with the assurance of nuclear deterrence the Pakistan Army was
quick to attempt a deceptive takeover of critical areas of the Kargil heights
while Pakistan’s civilian leadership appeared to pursue peace initiatives with
India. Such blatant deception was unheard of in modern I.R.; consequently,
India took swift military action to diffuse the situation quickly, in what is
now known as the Kargil War. This prompted a major review of Indian defence
preparedness and a comprehensive report was published on ‘Higher
Management of Defence’ for India (better known as the Kargil Committee
Report).6 But despite the rude awakening of the Kargil War, the pace of defence
acquisition, modernisation as well as R&D, has been very sluggish in India.
This is due to many reasons including political hesitation, poor long-term
military planning, poor record of the government in policy implementation
and serious weaknesses in decision-making even in matters of national security.
Paradoxically, while defence technology development and defence
acquisition for modernisation have been slow in the country, rapid strides in
information technology by Indians in India and abroad, and an impressive
rate of economic growth since the turn of the century, has changed the
international environment for India. Thanks to the 9/11 incident, US priorities
changed suddenly, to high focus on homeland security, and the sanctions on
India-Pakistan for violating NPT were lifted by the US in the interest of its
War on Terror. Indo-US strategic and technology cooperation under the well
known NSSP got revived by 2004 and the path-breaking US-India nuclear
energy technology agreement was initiated in 2005 and concluded swiftly by
2008.7
Most political observers saw this as a start of some kind of strategic
partnership between US and India, presumably to create a counterweight in
Asia against China’s rapid military advances and expansionist plans.
Interestingly, US was able to persuade the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
to accept India as a legitimate and responsible partner for civil nuclear trade,
which could bring good business to US and help in creating thousands of
high-tech jobs in the US. Given the fact that the NSG was formed specifically
to target India for its 1974 nuclear experiment, the complete turn-around in
just about 30 years, shows how fast political priorities can change in the
dynamics of I.R. These developments saw unique coordination between the
Ministry of External Affairs and the Ministry of Defence that enabled Indian
78 Role of Technology in International Affairs

defence scientists to join hands with Indian diplomats negotiating issues with
the US and the international strategic community. This was a stellar
performance of diplomacy in technology affairs!
For a progressive country like India with a very hostile neighbourhood
and a history of border wars, conventional military capabilities for eventual
border conflicts will continue to be important for the foreseeable future. In
addition, armed forces will have to be ready to deal with internal security
challenges including insurgency and terrorism. Proxy war/sub-conventional
war is a major challenge for India and specific technologies for fighting such
low-intensity conflicts will need major attention in the future. These may
include sophisticated intelligence surveillance apparatus, secure communica-
tion infrastructure, effective use of ICT for timely warnings of threats and
quick decision-making for rapid response. Much like conventional war-
fighting, enhanced situational awareness and well-coordinated response to
threats, including preventive actions will be crucial in this Low Intensity
Warfare. New technologies for detection and diffusion of Improvised Explosive
Devices (IEDs) will have to get priority funding support and new focus will
be needed for innovative application of existing technologies or combination
of capabilities.
Leveraging ICT for prevention and management of threats to human
security inside the country must thus form the main thrust of what is now
commonly known as homeland security. It is in this context, that a review of
defence technology architecture for India becomes important, to address both
external threats and also international security.
India’s defence and security planning will require better foresight, which
alone can help India acquire defence and security technology capabilities, that
are critical not only to India’s long-term national security, but also to India
emerging as a major world power. As in most security affairs, techniques and
technologies for situational awareness and rapid response are becoming as
critical as strategic capabilities. Technologies for basic battlefield capabilities
‘to Sense, to Reach, to Deny and to Destroy’ will need to be maintained at
the cutting edge of readiness, while strategic technology capabilities will have
to match the best in the world.
With its unique set of real security threats across all its land borders, India
has an unenviable task of managing the imperatives of defence and
development in the new age of fierce techno-economic competition.
Conventional military superiority in terms of quality and quantity of modern
 Defence Technologies: Game Changers for International Affairs 79

war-fighting equipment will certainly remain relevant for preventing

unpredictable adventurism by troubled neighbours like Pakistan. But in the
event of a limited war breaking out, India will also need modern information
based war-winning technologies, as well as cutting-edge futuristic capabilities.
Hence, besides the usual platform upgrades, military modernisation in India
for the immediate future will have to concentrate on the enhanced use of
versatile technologies for situational awareness and early intelligence for
possible preventive action. Technology and diplomacy must combine
effectively for this challenge.
For a limited border war scenario, India will have to acquire robust early
warning and surveillance capabilities and integrate the C4ISR apparatus
effectively for network-centric strategies. This should vastly improve the
‘sensor-to-shooter time’, which is very important in today’s transparent
battlefield. Other key strengths must include effective use of UAVs for
surveillance as well as combat, multi-spectral sensors and data fusion, better
signal processing technology, improved radars, military satellite systems, missile
defence technology, enhanced underwater technology etc. While the navy may
have to trade priorities between littoral warfare and blue water capabilities,
the air force will need to establish clear dominance in its sphere of influence
with 24x7 precision-strike capability.
There is an urgent need to mobilise space assets for better surveillance
and coordination of integrated military operations. Missiles and missile defence
technology will have to keep pace with developments in the world, as smaller
adversaries can pose serious threats when assisted by more powerful partners.
Indigenous capabilities will be crucial in critical technology areas such as
advanced materials, smart sensors, electronic and cyber warfare, missile
defence, directed energy weapons (DEWs) and counter-space technologies.
Foreign dependence on all such critical technologies must be minimised, to
reduce the vulnerability to possible future technology controls by advanced
nation groups, particularly during conflict situations. A high degree of energy
independence will also be critical for India in future, as tensions regarding
energy shortages will become more acute.

National Security and Defence Modernisation Priorities for India

The techno-military profile of India in the future has to match the country’s
overall image of a world class power by 2025. India must therefore emulate
the best in the world in terms of techno-military transformation, but temper
it with due regard to its economic capacity to bring-in rapid transformation.
80 Role of Technology in International Affairs

Looking at the world trends in defence technology and identifying what suits
the Indian requirements best, will thus be key to relevant and effective techno-
military transformation for India. Although a network centric RMA on the
scale of the US may be too expensive for India, it is nonetheless important to
factor-in some major elements of the RMA that are taking shape in the
advanced sections of the world, where India must make a mark as a future
major power.
Taking a look at the world’s sole techno-military superpower, one can
realise that the most important element of the recent RMA has been the
integration of ICT with war-winning doctrines. While the basic military
systems of the present time may look similar to their predecessors—tanks,
aircraft, naval platforms, missiles, military satellites etc. it is the technologies
of sensors, surveillance, targeting, precision guidance that make such ‘legacy’
systems much more potent. These now need to be strengthened further with
‘informationalisation’—a word coined by the Chinese.
The pace and penetration of ICT has enabled unprecedented levels of
connectivity, coordination and situational awareness, making network-centric
operations possible on the actual battle-front in real time. From information
gathering sensors on/near the battlefield to satellite-based systems in outer
space, the volume of useful military-usable information can be massive—
leading to a race for ‘information superiority’ for quick decision support and
strategic planning. ‘Decision superiority’ which entails efficient processing of
intelligence information for decision support, will be crucial for the future
and technologies that combine to provide such an advantage will be vital in
future.
The rise of insurgency and militancy largely due to weak governance and
simultaneous rise in cross-border terrorism by adversarial neighbouring
countries has compelled India to pay greater attention to internal security,
perhaps at the cost of external military capability. India’s inability to develop
an effective strategy for hard power projection as well soft power leverage,
has historically limited the country’s foreign policy options in dealing with
its neighbours. As a result, India’s strategic influence in its own neighbourhood
has remained limited. India’s adversaries are bolder in making India bleed
through a ‘thousand-cuts’ strategy because India has failed to create the image
of a decisive powerful nation that will not tolerate such nonsense.
In future, the techno-military capability of India will have to match not
only its immediate national security perceptions but will also have to create
 Defence Technologies: Game Changers for International Affairs 81

future capabilities for power projections commensurate with its economic rise
to a great power status. The defence technology architecture for the country
therefore, will have to be crafted with great foresight and careful planning.
Given the thin line between defence and civilian technologies, and the realities
of the market forces of globalisation and interdependence, an integrated
approach to defence technology planning will be essential to developing
requisite capabilities for future.
Of late, India has made some concerted modernisation efforts such as
upgrading its Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) network,
smart bombs for precision strike, missile defence capabilities and triad based
nuclear deterrence, as it competes with the nexus of China and Pakistan for
regional power balance. The Indian Navy’s modernisation plan includes the
Aircraft Carrier INS Vikrant launched in August 2013, and expected to
undergo sea trials, and the carrier, Admiral Gorshkov purchased from Russia,
being overhauled with latest electronics, sensors and weapon systems, to be
inducted as INS Vikramaditya.8 The recent launching of the indigenous nuclear
submarine Arihant is an important milestone for India’s defence
modernisation. 9 The Indian Navy will also have to build or acquire
technologies for under-sea mine clearing, and advanced torpedoes for hunting
enemy submarines. The vulnerability evident during the 26/11 attack on
Mumbai brought focus on the need for supporting counter-terrorism activities
in the coastal waters.
Highlights of the Indian Air Force plans for modernisation include
immediate acquisition of over 400 fighter aircraft of different types including
the SU31-MK1 and the French Rafael Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft
(MMRCA), besides six squadrons of the LCA. Major upgrades to existing
fleets are also in progress with negotiations for Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft
(FGFA) already initiated.10 India is certainly seeking to bolster its rise as an
economic power, by reshaping its armed forces into a modern military, capable
of projecting power well beyond its shores, and its defence spending has been
increasing steadily in recent years. However, the pace of modernisation must
accelerate with the robust involvement of major Indian industries and foreign
collaboration where appropriate, in joint venture (J-V) mode, as successfully
demonstrated by the BrahMos cruise-missile programme.11 The BrahMos has
been developed as a joint venture between the Defence Research and
Development Organisation (DRDO) of India and the Federal State Unitary
Enterprise NPO Mashinostroyenia (NPOM) of Russia. The missile is named
after two rivers, the Brahmaputra and the Moskova. KELTEC (now known
82 Role of Technology in International Affairs

as BrahMos Aerospace Trivandrum Ltd. or BATL), an Indian State-owned

firm was acquired by BrahMos Corporation in 2008. Approximately Rs.15
billion ($250.5 million) will be invested in the facility to make BrahMos
components and integrate the missile systems. Out of a total share capital of
approximately $300 million for the Joint-Venture, India’s financial
contribution has been over 50 percent.
Another success story has been the Indian missile programme that has
already given a series of tactical missiles, as well as nuclear capable strategic
Inter-continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) to the country, and which is now
focusing on establishing a layered missile-defence capability.12 The Indian Space
Research Organisation’s (ISRO’s) recent success with the simultaneous launch
of multiple satellites in different orbits has important defence connotations
because the technology used is very similar to the capability required for
launching ICBMs with Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs).13
Three clear facets of India’s current defence modernisation direction are:
1) technological modernisation, especially for enhanced air and sea power;
2) doctrinal innovation designed to create capabilities for rapid deployment
of customised combat force; and 3) organisational innovations for decision-
making with a quicker response. Technology trends for the future military
force structure must clearly be geared towards—(a) Increased emphasis on
advanced sensors and information processing (b) Greater precision in all
weapons systems and (c) More use of unmanned vehicles for air, land and sea
applications. One will see significant increases in R&D in all three areas with
a special focus on catching-up with the best in the world. For the infantry on
the ground, lighter backpacks, advanced wireless communication sets, night
vision devices, shoulder fired missiles and GPS enabled systems are the
technologies that will make the difference.
Future combat system designs will probably move towards lighter
platforms, with higher inter-operability for inter-Service use, and with an
increasing element of stealth technology. Technologies that can reduce or
simplify logistic requirements for rapid response and flexible deployment of
forces, will be important in shaping the future defence architecture for
conventional superiority. Technology trends do indicate greater dependence
on unmanned platforms and robotics for land as well as under-water
applications.
Importance of air-superiority has been demonstrated amply in recent wars
and hence, acquisition of modern multi-role fighters with advanced stealth
 Defence Technologies: Game Changers for International Affairs 83

characteristics, advanced avionics and weapon superiority must remain the

main focus of the Indian Air Force. However, increasing integration of
information networks and advanced sensors should clearly be the thrust of
indigenous R&D as these can rarely be purchased. Similarly, electronic warfare
(EW) elements also need to be designed and developed indigenously, as an
EW edge may be the deciding factor for air-superiority in the future. Cruise
missiles and Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) have already proved their
advantages and advances in all-weather PGM technology and advanced cruise
missiles should be a high priority for India.
Wide access and affordability of Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs) will pose
a major threat to fighters in low flying missions. This threat will be serious
not only for fighters but also for attack helicopters and cargo planes that are
more vulnerable. Helicopters will also need devices for protection from
shoulder fired missiles that have proved very effective in the hands of militants.
Technologies for extending the range and capabilities of UAVs will witness
major R&D momentum and satellite based systems will be vital to qualitative
improvements in ISR-based early warning capability for any nation.
Growing dependence on satellite-based systems for surveillance and
navigation is unavoidable but this also increases the vulnerability of the system.
Even critical civilian functions for most nations are now highly dependent
on satellite-based systems and protection of such systems will be crucial to
defence. Use of a constellation of several mini-satellites for distributed
capability is one option that many advanced countries are working on, to
reduce vulnerability. It is therefore not surprising, that most leaders in
technology have accelerated the R&D on space defence technologies. India
cannot afford to lag behind and must quickly develop its own military satellite
infrastructure and satellite defence technology. This is an area where self-
reliance will be very critical for India because no one will give such technology
for love or money.
Although space technologies today are intrinsically linked to defence
capabilities, so far outer space has remained free of weapons, with military
use limited to a variety of defence support functions. Besides, integration of
advances in ICT, imaging and guidance technologies with satellite based
systems, advent of DEWs and missile defence technologies will dominate
future R&D efforts world over, as countries get more sensitive about possible
weaponisation of outer space. The increasing concerns of possible misuse of
space based capabilities by rogue elements are likely to bring-in some
international norms and restrictions on these technologies. India must
84 Role of Technology in International Affairs

therefore develop core competence in such critical space defence technologies

that will be closely guarded by advanced countries in the future.
Another paradox is that most technologies for missile defence have
potential anti-satellite capabilities. Hence, R&D on these technologies has
been a priority area for advanced nations and India must remain sensitive to
this. Missile defence requirements of individual nations however, may be quite
unique, and India needs to identify its own priorities. Major political and
strategic decisions regarding specific missile defence priorities and military
satellite programmes are needed urgently for strategic clarity and hence, India
urgently needs an integrated policy approach for harmonising space and
defence plans and projections.14 India needs policy driven changes for building
robust military satellite programmes and a major momentum for well-directed
futuristic R&D for adequate self-reliance in these areas.
It can be concluded that while the above discussion is aimed at identifying
broad areas of technology priorities for defence and security requirements of
the country, the defence technology architecture for India must go beyond
just specific requirements. Defence R&D in the country needs to be totally
revamped along the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
model, wherein the thrust of R&D must be in futuristic enabling technologies,
such as smart materials, nano-sensors and circuits, bionics devices, advanced
computing, robotics and artificial intelligence, micro-satellites etc. Embedded
systems with integrated designs for surveillance, information gathering,
assimilation and analysis leading to efficient decision-making, will be vital to
success in the rapidly changing environment of the future. Integrated defence
planning involving all stake-holders in India’s future, including Indian industry,
will thus be the key to India’s defence and security in future.

Politics of Nuclear Weapons and International Affairs:

Indian Perspective
The pursuit of NW in the US during World War II was driven by the urgency
of acquiring ultimate techno-military superiority for decisive victory in the
long war. While the weapon tests were underway in total secrecy in the US
laboratories and deserts, the decision to use the weapon on Japan was perhaps
in response to the humiliating Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour. One wonders
if Japanese intelligence had any inkling of the NW development, and if so,
whether the Pearl Harbour attack plans would have been aborted. The first
ever atomic bomb ‘Little Boy’ (a 10 Kilo-Ton Uranium Bomb) dropped over
 Defence Technologies: Game Changers for International Affairs 85

Hiroshima on August 6, 1945 killed over 70,000 and injured an equal number
in a matter of minutes. Three days later, the second bomb ‘Fat Man’—a more
powerful Plutonium bomb, killed over 390,000 and injured an even higher
number. Japan surrendered immediately to end World War II. This was the
defining event that demonstrated the devastating and hence, decisive impact
of technology in international affairs.
On July 16, 1945, in a white blaze that lit-up the northern New Mexico-
dark skies, the first nuclear weapon test ushered in the Atomic Age. The
light of the explosion turned orange as the atomic fireball began shooting
upwards at 360 feet per second, reddening and pulsing as it cooled. As the
characteristic mushroom cloud of radioactive vapour materialized at 30,000
feet high, beneath the cloud, all that remained of the soil at the blast site
were fragments of jade green radioactive glass created by the heat of the
reaction. The brilliant light from the detonation pierced the early morning
skies with such intensity that residents from a faraway neighbouring
community would swear that the sun came up twice that day!
Upon witnessing the explosion its creators had mixed reactions. They felt
as if the equilibrium in nature had been upset.
Robert Oppenheimer, though ecstatic about the success of the project,
quoted a remembered fragment from the Bhagavad Gita. “I am become
Death,” he said, “the destroyer of worlds.”
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/J.Robert_Oppenheimer)
After witnessing the horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, it
was very clear that NW would serve very effectively as the ultimate deterrent
to war designs against a Nuclear Weapon State (NWS). The Soviets soon
acquired the same NW by 1949, with the UK and France conducting their
NW tests in 1952 and 1960 respectively. This was the start of the new age
of nuclear deterrence that spurred R&D for more powerful weapons, long
range bombers and guided missiles for extending the range and enhancing
the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence world-wide.
The prospect of such powerful weapons spreading to other countries, was
however too dangerous and the world community, including scientists
responsible for NW development, raised their voices for elimination of NW.
However, both the US and the erstwhile Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR) continued with their pursuit of more powerful NW designs, and by
1955, the vastly more powerful thermo-nuclear weapon, better known as the
‘Hydrogen Bomb’, was developed by both the superpowers, with others like
Britain, France and China following soon.
86 Role of Technology in International Affairs

Concerns about nuclear war brought together an informal group of

influential scholars and scientists like Bertrand Russell and Albert Einstein,
to start the ‘Pugwash’ movement in 1955, for reducing the danger of NW by
seeking cooperative solutions. Over 200 Pugwash conferences to date have
made valuable contribution towards spreading the awareness of nuclear
disarmament for global peace. This was duly recognised with the award of
the Nobel Peace Prize to the Pugwash movement in 1995. 15
The early 1960s were witness to atmospheric testing of these mega-ton
class Hydrogen bombs that created serious weather disturbances. Fortunately,
a Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), conceptualised by Japan and India was agreed
to by the NWS in 1963, to put an end to atmospheric testing. Meanwhile,
China established the capability of NW with its own nuclear test in 1964, to
claim its right to be among the first batch of NWS.
By 1967, the five NWS decided to form the famous ‘London Club’ to
prevent further proliferation of NW technology. This was the genesis of
the NPT that was opened for signature in 1970. NPT mandated that the
five NWS would not assist any another country in developing NW and
prevent proliferation of NW technology through tight technology controls.
France and China were party to NPT in principle, but signed it only in
1992.16
NPT was the first international treaty, signed by over 187 nation-states
that legitimised NW for the five members of the ‘London Club’, while all
other signatories pledged to remain non-NWS. The five NWS were mandated
not only to prevent NW proliferation, but were also committed to work
towards nuclear disarmament, leading to the ultimate elimination of NW.
The NPT came into force in September 1970 for a period of 25 years, with
a major review in 1995, to ascertain if its major objectives were achieved. As
is well known, NW proliferated vertically within the five NWS to huge total
numbers, with scant regard for disarmament and by the start of the 21st
century, the world grudgingly accepted failure of the NPT to over-ride political
priorities, that led to eight States having NW.
It is worth noting that the importance of nuclear technology for other
attractive applications such as nuclear energy generation and for
Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) effect were established fairly early and hence,
many countries wanted to acquire this very versatile nuclear technology.
Therefore the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)17 was established
 Defence Technologies: Game Changers for International Affairs 87

to monitor all nuclear activities to ensure that the NPT guidelines are followed
by all nations, and also to encourage cooperation for peaceful application.
IAEA was given international powers under the aegis of the United Nations
(UN), but it had no role to monitor or report on the commitment of the five
NWS towards voluntary disarmament and eventual elimination of NW. As
a result, pursuit of NW continued unabated during all the years of the cold
war, leading to stockpiles of over 20,000 NW that could annihilate humanity
many times over.
Most non-NWS signed the NPT with the assurance from the NWS
leaders that they would be protected in the event of any possible nuclear attack.
Israel, India and Pakistan were the exceptions that did not join the NPT as
non-NWS for different reasons. Israel presumably had NW by the late 1960s
(with tacit US help) but it did not want to declare this overtly, to avoid any
nuclear arms race in the region. India rejected the NPT because of its
discriminatory nature and to keep its nuclear options open, due to the grave
security concerns from nuclear-armed China. Pakistan did not sign the NPT
because its sworn single enemy, India did not sign the NPT. Much of this is
history and widely discussed in open domain literature.18
What deserves special mention is that the Indian policy of not joining
NPT was often fiercely contested at international forums but India stoically
maintained its sovereign stand while developing nuclear technology, primarily
for energy needs, but also for possible exigencies of national security. Serious
national security concerns forced India in 1971 to launch military action to
liberate East Pakistan and for the creation of independent Bangladesh that
was expected to be a friendly neighbour. This however, prompted Pakistan to
declare its determination to challenge Indian regional superiority by acquiring
NW by whatever means. This was the beginning of a nexus evolving between
Pakistan and China that eventually helped Pakistan to acquire NW.
It was in the face of this combined threat from adversarial neighbours
that India carried out a PNE in 1974, as a diplomatic confirmation of its
deterrence capability, using indigenous nuclear technology capability. This led
to a major international outcry and serious technology embargo against India
by the Western alliance of advanced countries. The NSG was created to restrict
the supply of any nuclear technology to India and the Zangger’s List was
drawn up to specify all items to be denied to non-allies under strict export
controls. The embargo did slow down India in its pursuit of nuclear technology
even for energy purposes, but it also spurred India to pursue indigenous R&D
to acquire most critical technologies. Meanwhile, India with its own ideological
88 Role of Technology in International Affairs

preference for nuclear non-proliferation, demonstrated exemplary restraint

in nuclear-missile matters and other sensitive technologies.
India, Israel and Pakistan who refrained from signing the NPT, now
possess NW and are thus de-facto NWS. North Korea acceded to the NPT
but announced its withdrawal in 2003 to conduct some questionable nuclear
tests. Countries like Argentina, Brazil and South Africa ended their NW
programmes and joined the NPT as non-NWS in the 1990s. Others like
Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan gave up former Soviet NW on their
territories and joined the NPT as non-NWS in the 1990s. Iraq was suspected
to have a NW programme prior to the 1991 Gulf War but UN inspectors
subsequently oversaw the programme’s dismantlement. Libya gave up a
clandestine NW programme after a 2003 agreement, and Syria was also
suspected to have a clandestine WMD programme. Iran was found to be non-
compliant with its NPT commitment, but it claimed that its nuclear objectives
were entirely peaceful. US led international negotiations are in progress to
ensure that Iran does not acquire capability to have its own NW because it
would be a direct threat to Israel.
The decade of the 1990s proved to be quite eventful for the NPT regime
and politics of NW. The end of the cold war prompted a relook at the huge
stockpiles of NW between US and Russia and the unnecessary cost of
maintaining them. While this led to a fresh impetus to disarmament under
the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), negotiations began for other
avenues for nuclear disbarment—the CTBT and the Fissile Material Cut-off
Treaty (FMCT). The idea was to use the 25-year NPT review in 1995, for
major initiatives in universal nuclear disarmament. Unfortunately, the process
instead became an arms control exercise to perpetuate the discrimination
between the nuclear haves and have-nots. China and France hurriedly
conducted additional nuclear tests before the 1995 NPT review conference
decided to ban future testing, but India was denied the opportunity, despite
the genuine threat to its national security from nuclear capable neighbours
on either side with a history of wars.
Despite enormous international pressures, India conducted itself with
wisdom and grace at the CD in opposing the indefinite extension of the highly
discriminatory NPT, and also declined to sign the CTBT to preserve its right
to NW if deemed desirable, in keeping with its supreme national security
interests. In May 1988, India finally decided to carry out a series of nuclear
 Defence Technologies: Game Changers for International Affairs 89

tests to declare itself a NWS. A good account of these historical proceedings

can be found in Bharat Karnad’s book.19
The 1990s saw India project its nuclear priorities with a very mature and
decisive foreign policy, and Indian diplomats armed with technological
information and clear national priorities performed admirably in international
affairs. After the initial adverse reaction to India’s nuclear tests and the
concomitant sanctions by the Western alliance of nations, the realities of
geopolitics prevailed in the long-term, and by 2005 nuclear India won
recognition of the international community as a progressive and responsible
nation worthy of nuclear technology cooperation. By 2008, the Indo-US civil
nuclear cooperation agreement was finalised to usher in a new era for India,
transforming it as a global partner in nuclear technology and no more a target
of the non-proliferation community. In exchange, India revised its export
control laws to be at par with international standards and separated its civil
nuclear activities to be put under IAEA safeguards, so that India was cleared
to enhance its nuclear energy capacities.20
Since the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, there have been
periodic NPT Review Conferences (Rev-Cons) every five years and the last
Rev-Con in May 2010 re-asserted the importance of international
commitment to non-proliferation through renewed focus on the CTBT and
the FMCT that have yet to find international consensus on all the aspects.
Although US-Russia dialogue on nuclear disarmament has resulted in a
reduced stockpile of NW in both countries, there are several complex issues
that are yet to be resolved, without which complete disarmament may not be
possible. The US has itself been reluctant about signing the CTBT due to its
own revised national security perceptions, and the FMCT remains mired in
disputes about cut-off definitions etc.

Nuclear Deterrence—Past, Present and Future

International balance of power equations in the past 4-5 decades have evolved,
with a very dominant influence of nuclear-missile deterrence, and for most
of the developed economies, the probability of a major war is reduced
significantly. But for developing regions with NWS, nuclear deterrence
continues to play an important role in the security matrix. Future decades
however, may be quite different, dictated not just by nuclear deterrence, but
also by other forms of techno-economic deterrence and changing security
perceptions. The world is changing in many dramatic ways and the technology
90 Role of Technology in International Affairs

revolution has created many new capabilities that can provide potential
deterrence effects for changing patterns of threat.
In the unequal but interdependent world of today, while economic
sanctions and techno-military coercive diplomacy are acquiring significant
deterrence value, unprecedented advances in technology capabilities, combined
with knowledge and innovation capacities in outer space and cyber space are
creating a new class of non-nuclear deterrence options. The analysis of the
future impact of ICT and artificial intelligence on international equations
can also help in appreciation of the limitation of traditional nuclear-missile
deterrence in future. It is this realisation that is forcing modern human society
to seriously re-consider the future of nuclear deterrence and the prospects of
a world free of NW.
Since deterrence is intrinsically linked to threat perceptions of both the
parties involved, it is relevant to examine the changing patterns of threat
perceptions and their impact on the interplay of deterrence. For most of the
progressive world today, the main threat is perceived from non-state or trans-
national actors and from irresponsible rogue States that may support such
entities for political objectives. Threat perceptions are now more about dangers
to human life or civil society and not so much in terms of the sovereignty of
States which is now difficult to challenge. Thus, major security concerns of
the future may increasingly include economic security, water and food security,
energy security and environmental security—areas where nuclear deterrence
cannot work.
However, conflicts among nations or societies, as well as military threats
to national security, may remain a reality of life and hence, some form of
deterrence, a mechanism of making the adversary mortally afraid of punitive
retaliation will continue to be relevant. As of today, NW still remain the
ultimate weapons and those in possession of NW are unwilling or unable to
dilute their dependence on them.
With the focus of nuclear deterrence shifting to Asia and West Asia,
competing demands of development and security may play out differently in
the developing regions. It is now internationally perceived that Asian nuclear
powers may have to stabilise the nuclear deterrence parameters soon, and are
therefore compelled to negotiate peace with greater realism than before. At
the same time, any adventurism of failing or rogue States such as North Korea
or Pakistan with NW capability can rejuvenate the importance of NW in
affected regions. If the international security scenario deteriorates significantly
 Defence Technologies: Game Changers for International Affairs 91

and compels additional countries to acquire NW, that would be a major blow
to nuclear non-proliferation goals, and create serious impediments to the future
of nuclear disarmament. Any escalation of conflict between major powers can
potentially take the deterrence-stability calculus to different dimensions
including outer space, cyber space and even use of the environment as a
weapon.
Since 9/11, the security focus of the US and most other progressive nations
has shifted to homeland security on issues of how to prevent terrorist strikes
and prevent terrorist organisations or rogue States from acquiring Biological-
Chemical-Nuclear-Radiological (BCNR) weapons. This indicates a shift in
threat perceptions from a possible nuclear war, to the clandestine use of WMD
technology for asymmetric warfare. Technologies of situational awareness and
preventive counter measures, such as remote use of combat UAVs, are proving
to have more practical deterrence effect than NW.
At the same time, energy or water shortages and global warming-induced
climate change are very serious issues of global dimension, that would demand
serious international cooperation, and if that fails, it could cause future wars,
where the nuclear-missile deterrence of a particular nation or group of nations
would have little relevance. Clearly, future peace and stability will demand a
more mature cooperative security approach by all progressive nations, both
at the regional as well as global level. It is pity that while technology and
development are pushing mankind to cooperation and peaceful co-existence,
fundamentalism is reducing tolerance and increasing violence.
It is in this backdrop of changing security dynamics that ‘minimum
deterrence’ is emerging as the preferred choice for many NWS. Nuclear
weapons have changed the relationship between war and politics in a way
that makes nuclear war un-winnable even for an aggressor. And yet, an
otherwise weak or unstable military regime may regard NW as usable weapons
and dangerously lower the nuclear threshold as is happening with Pakistan
developing tactical NW.
This inherent contradiction is perhaps the rationale for a ‘minimum
posture’ that is based on how few weapons may be adequate to have effective
deterrence to avoid any escalating tension between nuclear adversaries. As
analysed by Jeffrey Lewis, “A strong case could be made for the idea that a
policy maker sane-enough to be deterred in the first place is unlikely to consult
force exchange ratios or find comfort in strategic superiority when
contemplating a nuclear war.”21
92 Role of Technology in International Affairs

If the above logic of minimum deterrence prevails, it could well set the
stage for serious nuclear disarmament initiatives. However, the perceptions
of minimum deterrence are very diverse and the margins of definitions too
wide for setting any universal benchmarks. Deterrence is also a dynamic
concept that must be responsive to changing strategic environment—for
example, changes in political alignments or changes due to an effective missile
defence shield or any decisive future technology capabilities can change
deterrence dynamics. Hence, the NW strategy for different nations or different
regions will always be different. Of late, there is also growing apprehension
that if irresponsible rogue States and/or terrorist organisations get access to
nuclear or radiological weapons, the likelihood of their being used may be far
more real. This complicates the calculations for minimum deterrence and
hence the reliance on nuclear deterrence would continue to be important in
the foreseeable future.
Minimum deterrence is a choice for a possessor of NW that offers
adequate deterrence at an affordable cost without unduly provoking the
adversary. This is the rationale for India’s nuclear doctrine of credible minimum
deterrence that is meant to be credible for the adversary and the ‘no-first use’
posture is to signal a strong preference against any nuclear war-fighting. The
doctrine of credible minimum deterrence and ‘no-first-use’ also allows India
to gain deterrence at a low cost and be seen as a mature nation that has no
intention of using NW except for retaliation after enemy strike. However,
the doctrine demands survivability of first strike by the enemy and a capability
of massive retaliation against the aggressor. India clearly does not want to
have a nuclear war with anyone. But a well articulated nuclear posture is
necessary to gain maximum deterrence benefit.
Credible minimum deterrence thus relates to the lowest level of assured
damage to prevent nuclear aggression or attack, with the least number of NW
possible. What deters is not one’s own certainty of inflicting damage, but the
adversary’s perception of the potential risk. Hence, beyond a point, neither
the number of weapons nor the technological sophistication actually matter.
In context of the India-Pakistan situation, a more dilute form of recessed
deterrence seems to have worked so far, where the weapon is not mated to
the delivery system (missile) to minimise accidental panic or unauthorised
use. This represents a very mature approach to nuclear deterrence, best suited
for the ultimate universal goal of having a nuclear-free world. There are thus
lessons that other NWS can learn from the South Asian model of credible
minimum nuclear deterrence.
 Defence Technologies: Game Changers for International Affairs 93

Future Technology Trends and Impact on Balance of Power Equations

Modern armed forces always face the challenge of dealing with present threats
while preparing for tomorrow’s wars. Since each challenge has its own share
of uncertainties, the priority is always to find how best to avoid a war without
compromising one’s absolute core national security priorities. The process is
very complex and dynamic, demanding broad background knowledge of
defence technology potential and also very reliable situational awareness of
the security environment in all dimensions. This can be well appreciated from
a quick look at the global leadership in defence technology. The US forces
are concentrating on the immediate goal of winning the global war on
terrorism while also transforming US techno-military power to levels that
can ensure continued US supremacy in global affairs. In the final analysis,
strong defence capability will be increasingly dependent on technological
sophistication and achieving technology leadership will require significant
economic strength. As is well known, technology is one of the main tools for
economic competitiveness. It is in this context that technology trends will
have a major impact on global affairs in the future.
The rapidly globalising world today is going through a unique
transformational phase where the very premise of future conflicts and future
wars is being re-defined. There is an overall appreciation that, probability of
conventional full-scale war between major powers is getting very low and real
conflicts between major States in future would be about sharing energy
resources, about level playing fields for economic competition and about
environmental degradation and global warming issues that can have a very
profound security and economic impact in the future. Therefore, the increasing
gap between the haves and have-nots, will probably be the major cause of
tension among nations. Fortunately, the deterrence value of high-technology
for avoiding war is shifting away from NW with every new maturing
technology and the future world power equations will be decided more by
techno-economic capabilities rather than by the mere might of military
hardware and weapon systems. Cost of war no matter who wins, has gone up
very high and even cost of maintaining large forces is becoming difficult to
afford for any country. Hence, lower cost technological means are bound to
win in the long run.
However, ideological or religious divide may continue to be a nagging
problem and regional conflicts or religious extremism may remain unresolved
in many parts of the world. Hence, States involved in such circumstances
94 Role of Technology in International Affairs

will continue to remain sensitive to conventional military strengths and must

be prepared for possible short armed conflicts or sustained guerrilla wars. The
information revolution has transformed the level of awareness in the world
and we now have a peculiar mix of expectations and aspirations among
developing and progressive nations. For them, pursuit of cutting-edge
technologies for rapid economic progress has become top priority, while at
the same time they cannot neglect older proven defence technologies and
weapon systems for regional conflicts.
Therefore, techno-military supremacy continues to remain as important
as ever and even the most powerful nations remain focused on retaining a
techno-military edge over immediate adversaries and competitors. The recent
history of use of military force to bring-about a change of regime in Iraq and
the emerging acceptance of the legitimacy of a preventive military strike,
indicate a new trend in re-shaping global perceptions of use of military power
and risk reduction measures using the latest in technology. Another clear
emerging pattern is the nature of asymmetric threat, which may dictate the
technological capabilities needed for the future to contain them, and the global
cooperation imperatives for sharing such technologies among peace-loving
nations.
The evolution of military technology can be well understood from the
marked difference in technological sophistication and strategies of the
superpower nations and that of other lesser powers in the developing world.
Looking into the future for relevant technologies and capabilities for a nation
will naturally be influenced by the associated maturity of the nations in the
overall world power matrix. However, given the interdependent nature of the
modern world, regional issues may have unexpected bearing on world events
in the future and hence, global security and stability concerns will have many
layers of uncertainty that the future defence forces and diplomats managing
international affairs will have to address.
Any future predictions on complex issues such as conflicts and the
attendant war-fighting responses required, will always run the risk of being
wrong; and yet predictive thinking is essential to long term perspective
planning. One approach could be based on scenario building to provide some
measure of cause-effect logic to futuristic projections. Looking at the world
beyond 2030, several situations could be indicative of probable scenarios.
• We may well have a world split into two unequal camps: a small,
wealthy, technologically advanced and politically stable minority group
 Defence Technologies: Game Changers for International Affairs 95

of nations, and the large sections of poor, backward, sick, resource-

starved majority that will remain unstable. Technology and power
would determine trends in both the directions, in either relative
narrowing or further widening of the divided world.
• A world of rampant nationalism with State and/or non-state-sponsored
terrorism with fluid coalitions among them. Transnational threats,
territorialism, strong national sentiments, proliferation of refugees and
authoritarian means of governance would flourish. Probability of
multiple regional conflicts could be high and major powers could
remain involved in counter-terrorism and humanitarian assistance as
well as peacekeeping operations.
• By 2030, the Asian Century may be well established with power,
prestige and techno-economic capability. Economic, technological and
political influence of this region could lead to unknown responses
from present major powers that are not used to being less powerful,
leading to new tensions and uncertainties. The technological edge of
the Western alliance and economic powers and the human potential
of Asia could either combine for greater world peace or could work
against each other.
• One may well have a world where technology may advance
exponentially and proliferate widely, where multinational corporations
dominate international affairs and loosely cooperate in a syndicate
mode. Economic competitiveness and profits would be the dominant
concerns, while conflicts may be dealt with through proxies. The
challenge to democratic countries with old-style values would be to
maintain their relevance and competence in a new world, demanding
a whole new approach to security and defence.
• A business-as-usual scenario in which events and equations would
evolve slowly, adjusting to real-time changes. Most nations would focus
on internal stability and progress and would not stir-up world peace
with a delicately balanced sense of stability. Political awareness and
techno-military capabilities will have to be on high alert for unknown
threats.
In reality, the actual situation may be a mix of two or more scenarios above
and the demand for technologies and defence systems for the future would
be dictated by the comprehensive threat perceptions as well as the requirements
of the power projections of individual States.22
96 Role of Technology in International Affairs

Future Trends
As we commenced the 21st century, a technology driven revolution in global
affairs was perceived to be occurring, largely due to the infusion of ICT in
planning, execution and monitoring of politico-military activities of advanced
countries. Something similar was happening in the defence technology field,
where trends indicated that technologies for space-based capabilities such as
cyber security, nanotech or biotech-enabled new capabilities—to contribute
to the next RMA—in turn could have a major impact on international affairs.
Some manifestations of these advances would certainly include advanced
robotics with bioelectronics and cognitive intelligence, nano-materials, directed
energy systems and advanced networks for global governance. The outlook is
for the rapid evolution of new technologies eventually leading to the
development of several advanced defence capabilities and a system-of-systems
approach that will take advantage of the cumulative effect of employing each
of the new capabilities simultaneously and in proper synchronisation.
For conventional warfare, future trends indicate four potential major
warfare scenarios—long-range precision strike, electronic/information warfare,
space warfare and dominating or pre-emptive manoeuvres. Of these, precision
strike is the most developed technology and intense R&D work is being done
in the area of information and electronics warfare. A comprehensive
understanding of space warfare and the full scope of dominating manoeuvres
will need more analysis for optimal planning of politico-military objectives
in the future. A high-precision strike with advanced non-nuclear warheads
will be able to achieve effects similar to a NW strike, but without the attendant
risk of escalation to intolerable levels of mutual destruction. When directed
against targets comprising the enemy nerve centre, a precision strike itself
can prove very punishing to offer deterrence value. Integrating the three
components—precision strike, electronic warfare and dominating
manoeuvres—will likely comprise the very potent next RMA unfolding
presently.
Modern battlefields today have significantly advanced use of electronics,
optoelectronics, radars, computers etc. to fully exploit technology to achieve
a digital battlefield advantage, with its unique features of real-time situational
awareness and battlefield transparency. Multispectral sensors from land, sea,
air and outer space platforms, the all-weather day-night C4ISR capabilities
and the network-centric strategies will be crucial for advanced battlefield
capabilities. Technology sophistication of each component, the high cost of
 Defence Technologies: Game Changers for International Affairs 97

systems and the efficacy of integration will determine the extent to which a
country can achieve true digital battlefield advantages.
Cyber space is becoming the nervous system hub for all military and
economic activities and hence cyber security will be vital to all strategic as
well as tactical considerations. The speed and anonymity of a cyber attack
makes it very difficult to distinguish between the actions of terrorists, criminals
and nation-states. Electronic warfare would thus gain significant importance
in the modern battlefield. On the one hand, sensor technology integrated
with ICT would add unprecedented capabilities and on the other, the
vulnerabilities of systems to ECM and ECCM will get compounded. The
challenges are enormous, going beyond mere technologies to standards,
practices, software protocols and international coordination needs that are
yet to be understood fully. The increasing use of electro-magnetic spectrum
across national boundaries will require new approaches to international
dialogue, for creating win-win situations for all peaceful and progressive
nations.
At the national level, information warfare could be viewed as a new form
of strategic warfare, wherein one of the key issues is vulnerability of socio-
economic systems and the question will be—how to attack the enemy’s system
while protecting one’s own. At the military operational level, information
warfare may contribute to major changes in the conduct of warfare. Hence,
one of the key issues will be the vulnerability of command, control,
communications, and intelligence systems in conflict situations. Information
technology is making distributed systems commonplace and virtual
organisations are growing like new cultures. The rapid rate of growth of these
types of new organisational entities would seem to suggest strengths that the
future military will have to counter with new technologies and strategies.
Issues of global governance may emerge as the main challenge for diplomats
and foreign policy experts in future.
Missile defence technologies are becoming increasingly important for most
countries, largely due to continued proliferation of low-end missiles, as well
as due to technology sophistication of cruise missiles, that have proved very
effective from stand-off ranges. Concerns about unexpected attacks from
terrorist groups have further sharpened the need for effective early warning
technology, as well as quick reaction hypersonic missile defence systems for
defence against surprise attacks. The future will certainly witness a wider spread
of missiles of all types around the world because the Missile Technology
Control Regime configured during the height of cold war has become
98 Role of Technology in International Affairs

increasingly irrelevant in the atmosphere of inevitable technology diffusion

happening in the globalising world. Given the high cost of technology
sophistication, the need to seek international cooperation for missile defence
technology among a group of friendly nations, has replaced the urgency of
controlling missile proliferation. Instead, the trends indicate that focus is
shifting to achieving better range, flexibility and accuracy for missile defence
systems that can deprive the enemy of the deterrence value of ballistic missile
attack. These techno-economic perspectives are creating new challenges for
the future of diplomacy, towards building common capacities against common
threats, such as from extremist groups.
As lethal or dangerous capabilities of modern technology continue to
increase, the need to curb misuse of such technologies becomes more urgent.
It is important to note that there is significant universal consensus against
the use or threat of use of biological and chemical weapons, and the Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention was signed in 1972 by over 170 countries.
Nevertheless, many countries have continued with such bio-weapons’ R&D
under the justification of developing defence against such weapons. Hence,
several biological warfare agents have been under development by most major
powers and the ban is based more on ethical values that technological
constraints. Biological weapons perhaps constitute the lowest cost WMD that
can have devastating effects on the human population almost comparable to
NW. It is thus easy to understand that bio-weapons are very attractive for
non-state entities and in the present context the threat of bio-warfare has
gradually changed to a threat of bio-terrorism. The subject is very complex
and alive in the security calculus of most nations—a clear demonstration of
how lethal technology in wrong hands can have very grave impact on
international affairs. Any reader interested in further details may find the book,
Bio-Weapons: The Genie in the Bottle very interesting and informative.23
The impossibility of putting the ‘Genie’ of WMD technology in the bottle
may be one reason why NW continue to enjoy the active patronage of most
NWS who are in fact the most powerful nations on earth. It is believed that
the US may be working on the next generation of more effective tactical
weapons and hence, the threat of WMD and their delivery vehicles will be
real and persistent for many nations. In addition, there is fear of another kind
of WMD—Weapons of Mass Disruption—such as EMP devices that can
paralyse electronics and communication infrastructure. While advanced
nations are designing compact and efficient EMP weapons and microwave
 Defence Technologies: Game Changers for International Affairs 99

weapons, the thirst for technologies that can provide protection from such
advanced weapons will continue to grow.
Directed energy weapons using high-power laser technology have achieved
significant maturity in the past few decades, to provide a new capability for
missile defence, as well as for possible future space warfare.24 Despite many
hurdles, the US Air Force project on the Airborne Laser has demonstrated
unprecedented capability for aerospace dominance. Such high-altitude
aerospace capabilities can decisively destroy enemy missiles or satellites in a
matter of seconds, high above the atmosphere, with the common man on
the street being totally oblivious to the far reaching consequences of such
manoeuvres.
As the technological sophistication of these directed energy weapon
systems improves, the efficacy of multi-role deployment will increase and the
cost considerations will become more acceptable. As it is, the US-Israel joint
project on ground-based laser defence against low-flying attack has proved
fairly successful and technology is being pushed for short-range point defence
of high-value assets such as command centres. An advanced version of the
Space-Based High Energy Laser System would be a space-based, multi-
megawatt, high-energy laser constellation that can operate in several modes.
In its weapon-mode it can attack ground, air, and space targets and destroy
them with energy beams in a matter of seconds. In its surveillance mode, it
can operate with low power for active illumination imaging or with the laser
inoperative, for passive imaging. World-wide coverage could be provided by
a constellation of 15-20 High Energy Lasers. The system provides counter-
space, force application and even weather modification applications. It is
natural for all progressive nations to want to pursue such revolutionary new
technology, but these are very sophisticated, multi-disciplinary and expensive
systems that only a few major powers can afford and maintain.
Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles: In recent times, the world has been witness
to the US’ use of UCAVs in its war against terror, for precision attacks on
specific small-size targets in enemy territory. How far this new technology
gets extended for regional conflicts is yet to be clear. But such extended reach
without physical human encroachment in areas of conflict or dispute, would
certainly create major challenges for the diplomatic community world over,
and it might be required to establish new norms of engagement using robotics
technology in war situations in the future. Advanced UCAVs in the future
can loiter at high altitude over the region of interest for long periods of time
(over 24 hours) until called upon to strike a target. It could carry a suite of
100 Role of Technology in International Affairs

multispectral sensors (optical, infra-red, radar, laser, etc.) and supply

information to its suite of standoff precision-guided munitions. While in its
subsonic loitering mode, it would be designed to operate at very high altitudes
over the region of interest, for extended periods of time without refuelling.
This would be very useful for surveillance and reconnaissance missions for
the Global Information Management System (GIMS) of the host nation or
a group of nations. On a secondary mission, it could also perform ECM and
ECCM roles.
Attack Microbots: Attack Microbots are a class of highly miniaturised
(millimetre scale) electro-mechanical systems capable of being deployed en-
masse, and perform individually or collectively for various missions, including
target reconnaissance and destruction. Various deployment approaches are
possible, including dispersal as an aerosol, transportation by a larger platform
and full flying and crawling autonomy. Attack is accomplished by a variety of
robotic effectors, electromagnetic measures or energetic materials. Some sensor
microbots’ capabilities would also be designed for target analysis. Microbots
could provide unobtrusive, pervasive intervention into adversary environments
and systems. The extremely small size would provide high penetration and
natural stealth features.
Single-Stage-to-Orbit Trans-Atmospheric-Vehicles: Trans Atmospheric
Vehicle (TAV) systems could provide space support and global reach from
the earth’s surface to low earth orbit (LEO) using a combination of rocket
and hypersonic air breathing technology. The trans-atmospheric vehicle of
the future would take off vertically, could be re-fuelled in either air or space,
and would have capability to land on a conventional runway. Designed for
variable payload capacity (up to 10,000 lb) it would perform both as a sensor
and a weapons platform. Alternate missions may include deployment and
retrieval of micro-satellites from LEO and possible deployment of anti-satellite
(ASAT) weapons. The US Air Force-sponsored Spy-plane X-37B discussed
in chapter four of this book is a clear example of the direction the technology
is taking.
Antimatter Weapons: The US Air Force is believed to be investigating ways
to use a radical power source—antimatter, in future weapons. Antimatter is
a term normally heard in science fiction, but it can actually exist in laboratories,
and has been intensively studied by physicists over the decades. Every type of
subatomic particle has its antimatter counterpart, and when matter and
antimatter collide, they annihilate each other in an immense burst of energy.
 Defence Technologies: Game Changers for International Affairs 101

Thus, positron energy conversion could be a revolutionary energy source that

may enable realisation of antimatter bombs small enough to hold in hand,
and perhaps power engines for 24×7 surveillance aircraft. More cataclysmic
possible uses may include, a new generation of super weapons—either pure
antimatter bombs or antimatter-triggered NW, or antimatter-powered EMP
weapons, that could fry an enemy’s electric power grid and communications
networks. Such technologies on the fringe of science fiction continue to be
in the realm of wishful capabilities, due to unacceptable technological costs,
and some unanswered questions of practical viability and ethics of use. But
these are already potential proven technologies that are capable of creating
yet another RMA in the future.

Priorities for India

For India with long coastlines and land borders, conventional military
capabilities will continue to be important for the foreseeable future. In
addition, the armed forces will also have to be prepared to combat insurgency
and terrorism being fuelled by adversarial States. The proxy war of low
intensity is fairly unique to India, and specific technologies for fighting such
low intensity conflicts with non-lethal weapons will need major attention.
Much like modern conventional war-fighting, reaction time needs to be
reduced for enhanced effectiveness. Military modernisation in India for the
immediate future will have to concentrate on enhanced use of UAVs for
reconnaissance and combat use of multispectral sensors and data fusion, better
signal processing technology, hypersonic missile technology, and military
satellite systems. PGMs, enhanced underwater technology and energy beam
technologies may provide the much desired decisive regional superiority for
India.
For short border conflicts, India will have to acquire robust early warning
systems with C4ISR integration to move towards ‘network-centric’ strategies.
While the navy will have to focus more on littoral warfare rather than blue
water capabilities, the air force will need to establish clear dominance in its
sphere of influence, with day and night precision strike capability. There is
urgent need to mobilise space assets for better surveillance and coordination
of integrated operations. Missiles and missile defence technology will have to
keep pace with the developments in the world. Indigenous capabilities will
be crucial in the areas of electronic warfare, missile defence technologies,
DEWs and satellite defence, as these critical technologies will always be
vulnerable to technology controls by supplier nations.
102 Role of Technology in International Affairs

Finally, India’s nuclear doctrine of credible minimum deterrence and no-

first-use posture presents a unique set of challenges for the strategic planners
and diplomats. Since India continues to advocate total nuclear disarmament
by all nations, and does not support the logic of large-scale stockpiling of
weapons, India must rely more on deterrence value from non-nuclear
technology superiority over the adversary. At the same time, it will be
imperative to be alert to any adventurism with WMD in the neighbourhood
and hence, a well-organised civil defence mechanism along with an efficient
emergency disaster management system will be crucial. For India, the real
challenge in the next few decades will be to manage large-scale demands of
the armed forces for national security, while attempting to stay ahead in
economic competition, to achieve a leadership role in global affairs. Technology
and diplomacy must therefore join hands to achieve this.
NOTES
1. Amitav Mallik, Technology and Security in the 21st Century: A Demand-Side Perspective,
SIPRI Research Report No. 20, Oxford University Press, New York, 2004, p. 131.
2. India conducted its first nuclear detonation, described as a ‘peaceful nuclear explosion
(PNE), on May 18, 1974. It was code-named ‘Smiling Buddha’. At www.fas.org/nuke/
guide/india/nuke/first-pix.htm (Accessed June13, 2014).
3. Government of India took a bold step in the year 1988 to create a new office of ‘Adviser,
Defence Technology’ at Embassy of India in Washington D.C. to negotiate and reverse
technology denial decisions by U.S. against India.
4. The Indian representative at the Conference on Disarmament argued that the “CTBT
that we see emerging appears to be shaped more by the technological preferences of the
Nuclear Weapon States rather than the imperatives of nuclear disarmament. This cannot
be the CTBT that India can be expected to accept”. See Manpreet Sethi, “CTBT and
India’s Options” at www.idsa-india.org/an-sept3-00.html (Accessed May 7, 2014).
5. Pokhran-II was codenamed ‘Shakti’. With the series of nuclear tests in May 1998, India
announced its claim to be a Nuclear Weapon State. See www.southasiaanalysis.org/paper690
(Accessed May 7, 2014).
6. “The Kargil Review Committee headed by veteran security analyst K. Subrahmanyam
produced its report in record time and this was submitted to the… government.” See C.
Uday Bhaskar, ‘Kargil: Whose war was that?’, India Strategic, August 2009 at
www.indiastrategic.in/topstories365.htm (Accessed May 7, 2014).
7. See Mark Hibbs, “Moving Forward on the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal”, CIEP, April 5, 2010,
at www.carnegieendowment.org/2010/04/05/moving...india-nuclear-deal/25yl (Accessed
May 7, 2014).
8. Sachin Kumar, “Modernisation Plan of the Indian Navy”, NavalJourney.com, December
19, 2013, at http://navaljourney.com/modernization-plan-of-the-indian-navy/ (Accessed
May 7, 2014).
9. “Indigenous nuclear submarine heads sea trials”, Times of India, December 13, 2014, at
www.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/submarine.Arihant. (Accessed Dec 21, 2014).
10. Laxman Kumar Behera, “Modernisation of the Indian Air Force”, Defence Review Asia,
 Defence Technologies: Game Changers for International Affairs 103

January 17, 2013, at http://www.defencereviewasia.com/articles/200/Modernisation-of-the-

Indian-Air-Force (Accessed May 7, 2014).
11. For details see “BrahMos Supersonic Cruise Missile, India”, Army-technology.com at
www.army-technology.com/projects/brahmossupersoniccru/ (Accessed May 7, 2014).
12. “It was an incredible year for India’s missile scientists”, See A Summary of Indian Missiles
Development in 2012, Missile Threat, January 2, 2013, at http://missilethreat.com/a-
summary-of-indian-missiles-development-in-2012/ (Accessed May 7, 2014).
13. “India launches five foreign satellites”, BBC News, June 30, 2014. See www.bbc.com/news/
world-asia-india-28083893 (Accessed May 7, 2014).
14. Space Security—Need for a Proactive Approach: Report of the IDSA-Indian Pugwash Society
Working Group on Space Security, IDSA and Academic Foundation, 2009.
15. “Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs is an international pacifist organization
bringing together scholars and public figures in order to reduce the threat of wars, nuclear
dangers, and to seek peaceful resolutions to all international conflicts.” See Pugwash
Conferences on Science and World Affairs at www.nobelforpeace- summits.org/.../pugwash-
conferences-science-world. (Accessed May 8, 2014).
16. Treaty on the ‘Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons’ (NPT). Text of the Treaty. United
Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, at www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/
NPTtext (Accessed May 8, 2014).
17. International Atomic Energy Agency,” Nuclear Safety and Security”. See www-ns.iaea.org/
security (Accessed June 8, 2014).
18. Andrew Koch, “India, Pakistan: nuclear arms race gets off to a slow start”, Jane’s Intelligence
Review, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2001, at http://hufind.huji.ac.il/Record/HUJ001326049 (Accessed
May 8, 2014).
19. Bharat Karnad, India’s Nuclear Policy, Praeger Security International, Westport, CT and
London, 2008.
20. Amitav Mallik, “US-India Nuclear deal—Nuke numbers: deal adds up”, Op Ed.. Indian
Express, August 17 2006, at http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/nuke-numbers-deal-
adds-up————/10751/ (Accessed May 8, 2014).
21. Jeffrey G. Lewis, “Beyond that minimum threshold, nuclear weapons provide little
additional deterrent benefit”, at lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1936/minimum-
deterrence (Accessed Dec 21, 2014).
22. Rajiv Kumar, The National Interest Project, Indian Council for Research on International
Economic Relations, December 2010. (Accessed May 8, 2014 from personal notes).
23. Ajey Lele, Bio Weapons: The Genie in the Bottle, Lancer Publishers, 2004.
24. Amitav Mallik, High Power Lasers—Directed Energy Weapons: Impact on Defence and Security,
DRDO Monographs/Special Publications Series, DESIDOC, Delhi, 2012.
 4
Outer Space and International Affairs

Space Security and International Relations: An Introduction

Since the onset of the space age in 1957 with the launch of the Soviet satellite
‘Sputnik’, thousands of space flights have been launched by several space-
faring countries such as the United States (US) and the erstwhile Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) (now Russia). Almost all space exploration
initiatives and space technology developments have been motivated primarily
by national security considerations and supported by military space objectives.
Outer space, which is generally considered to be above an altitude of 100
km, is unique in the sense that it has no sovereignty rights and hence all of
outer space is universally accepted as common to all nations. The Outer Space
Treaty (OST) of 1967 signed by over 97 nations,1 has so far successfully
maintained a peaceful balance in outer space, free of any major conflict so
that scientific and commercial use of outer space has remained unaffected.
While outer space continues to be recognised as one of the domains of ‘Global
Commons’ for peaceful exploitation, several applications for communication,
surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation and even use of the Global Positioning
System (GPS) for precision weapon guidance have been accepted as legitimate
use for national security purposes.
There is thus a distinct and important relevance of space technology for
individual nations, in terms of possible use of outer space to serve national
security interests. Advances in space technology have now led to the outer
space being increasingly integrated with security doctrines of powerful nations,
and this has a significant international dimension in terms of security
 Outer Space and International Affairs 105

perceptions of other space-faring nations, as well as the global peace and

stability situation. Increasing use of outer space for political-military purposes
by a growing number of countries is a cause of serious international concern,
because future earth wars and conflicts could invariably spill into the space
dimension, for gaining vital techno-military superiority. Technological advances
are creating newer space-based capabilities for Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD)
and anti-satellite (ASAT) applications are causing certain added concerns of
possible military escalation in space that could lead to use of weapons in outer
space.
There has been a steady increase in integration of ICT (Information-
Communication-Technology) systems with space capabilities for basic modern
life-style requirements and for essential international commercial and financial
activities. All space-faring nations have thus become critically dependent on
space assets for routine as well as critical activities. Therefore, the security of
outer space assets as well as competition for space-technology superiority, have
become major national security priorities for all progressive nations. However,
maintaining peace balance in outer space will require active international
cooperation supported by prudent international laws and norms. Ensuring
sustainability of outer space for legitimate peaceful exploitation will also require
sustained international cooperation. Outer space thus represents a new set of
major challenges for the future generation of security strategists, diplomats
and foreign policy experts, particularly for space-faring nations and others
using space technology.
Today, there are over 50 space-faring nations and the number is likely to
increase significantly in future. Each such nation will get increasingly
dependent on space-based capabilities—both for civilian and military
applications. As technological sophistication offers newer, better and more
cost-effective solutions, nations will compete even in the civilian domain for
economic gains. As a result, vulnerability of such nations in outer space will
get enhanced significantly, with emerging capabilities of international cyber-
war, using space assets in the loop. The demonstrated ASAT capability of
some advanced nations is already a major space security concern. Further,
technology advances such as the Airborne Laser (ABL) of the US, using
Directed Energy Weapons (DEWs) and the recent success of X-37B robotic
space plane in the US, represent quantum leaps in space capabilities that will
certainly accentuate the security perceptions of other nations, as well as
influence the world balance of power equations in future. (Some techno-
diplomatic details are discussed later in this chapter).
106 Role of Technology in International Affairs

In terms of preserving the sustainability of outer space for vital day-to-

day operations, all nations are willingly cooperating for maintaining peace
balance in outer space. The International Space Station (ISS) is indeed a shining
example of such cooperation. Yet, in terms of techno-military superiority,
several space-capable nations may get into serious competition to gain
superiority over political or military adversaries. This will thus usher in a new
era of cooperation and competition co-existing in the domain of outer space,
among powerful nations. This will pose a new range of challenging
international situations that future generations of diplomats will have to handle
with a sense of techno-security acumen that is not yet very mature. Nations
will also re-calibrate security and foreign policy priorities to give due
prominence to this new domain of international affairs.
The dual-use nature of advanced technologies and increasing diffusion
of these technologies to more nations/users is also of major concern in terms
of possible misuse by irresponsible nations or entities. This international
dilemma is very much like that of nuclear proliferation control, where the
line between peaceful legitimate use and wrongful military use is very thin,
but the impact is vastly different. Thus, space technology controls in future
may require a different international approach for setting-up robust space laws
and ensuring strict compliance by all stakeholders.
Introduction of weapons in outer space by any one powerful nation can
tip the delicate international balance and endanger the very stability of space
activities for commercial and scientific purposes. The situation is further
complicated by increasing problems of space debris created by decades of use
of preferred low-earth orbits (LEOs) by thousands of satellites and space
flights. Any space accident is a potential disaster as it can cascade into multiple
collisions. Hence, there is a concern that emerging rivalry between the US,
China and Russia may compromise the status-quo in outer space. The OST
and various other existing international agreements have no provisions for
preventing possible weapons in outer space and thus, they are not empowered
to deal with future space conflict scenarios in outer space. While increasing
military competition in space seems inevitable in future, the role of
international laws and astute diplomacy by leading space-faring nations will
be vital for maintaining global peace and stability.
Being one of the leading space-faring nations, India must comprehensively
address its own priorities in outer space and formulate suitable space policy
guidelines to protect its national security interests in outer space. Having
concentrated mainly on social benefits from its space programmes, India must
 Outer Space and International Affairs 107

now re-calibrate its space policy in recognition of the new realities in outer
space, and evolve a space security strategy for itself. Simultaneously, India
must also engage proactively, towards building international convergence for
preserving peace and stability in outer space.
This chapter presents a brief overview of space technology development
and its impact on political-military strategies for future conflict situations,
because this will be one of the most important challenges for the future of
international relations (I.R.). An analysis is attempted to offer a nuanced
understanding of complex inter-connected issues for evolving possible techno-
political solutions, to preserve the sustainability of outer space for non-military
exploitation. The discussion brings out the urgent need for international
consensus on how best to monitor and regulate use of outer space for military
purposes, and how to prevent misuse of space technology by rogue elements
that might challenge international convergence of interest in outer space. The
endeavour will of course be to highlight the Indian perspective and discuss
how India may prepare for the future.

Space Security: International Dimension and Indian Perspective

Advances in space technologies over the past few decades have facilitated
extensive use of outer space for scientific, commercial and military-oriented
applications, and outer space is now indisputably acknowledged as the new
critical dimension of modern warfare strategies, as well as national security
calculus. Although, the OST was formulated to preserve outer space for
peaceful activities, it did not prohibit deployment of space systems for military
purposes, as long as no Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) were involved.
Therefore, although the use of outer space for military support functions such
as surveillance, intelligence and weapon guidance may not be classified strictly
as peaceful applications, they are nevertheless, not considered illegal because
there is no international treaty prohibiting such military oriented applications.
As a result, the latest in Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is based on
network-centric strategies and integration of ICT with satellite systems as a
key component. This indicates increasing dependence on outer space
capabilities for the national security of individual nations. The role of outer
space in defence and security affairs is thus increasing rapidly and its impact
on I.R. in terms of balance of power has emerged as the new dimension of
international dialogue on global security and stability.
While outer space continues to be accepted as one of the ‘global commons’
beyond the limited perceptions of national sovereignty of any individual
108 Role of Technology in International Affairs

nation, security of outer space is assuming very large importance for all nations,
particularly space-faring nations with their own satellites orbiting space for a
variety of applications. Presently, about 50 countries have their own satellites
as space assets and the operational security and reliability of these assets have
come to assume very high importance for each of these nations because they
constitute a vital part of the national infrastructure—both for security as well
as economic development. Space is now intimately involved with modern
human life-style and most future human aspirations.
As candidly documented in a RAND Report,2 almost all space explorations
have been motivated by long-term political or military objectives. Hence,
investments made by powerful nations in developing space technology
capabilities are quite substantial, comparable only to investments for defence
and security technologies. As is common to most advanced technology
systems, the feeder technologies for space capability are dual-use in nature
and hence they can contribute to diverse applications of both civil or defence
purpose. This creates an interesting situation where rocket technology
developed for space exploration can very easily contribute to long-range missile
system capability that has very different lethal potentials. Supremacy and
control of space technology is already a high strategic priority for powerful
nations such as the US, Russia and China. Preventing unfair use of outer
space, such as deploying weapons in space is already a very contentious subject
among space-faring nations that are the main stakeholders in preserving
balance and peace in outer space.
Diffusion of dual-use space technology to multiple users and nations is
also of concern, in terms of possible misuse by nation-states or non-state
entities. This will be a major new challenge that national security planners
and experts in international affairs will have to address in future. Among space-
faring nations, space power of adversarial nations can pose threats to national
security, but dangers to the sustainability of outer space are already a global
concern as they affect almost all nations using space technology for
development and progress.
Given the vast scientific, commercial and military potential of space
technology and space assets, several countries are striving to build indigenous
space capabilities for civilian, defence and security applications. Besides the
US and Russia with established leading space capabilities, the European Union
(EU) and China are also gaining maturity in space technology, with specific
focus on strategic capabilities to meet security concerns. India is also recognised
as a major space-faring nation with established indigenous capabilities in all
 Outer Space and International Affairs 109

aspects of space technology. Historically, India’s focus has been mainly on

civilian application for societal and economic development, with very little
attention to leverage space capabilities for security or strategic planning
purposes. In recognition of the vital role of space capabilities, both for internal
and external security, there appears to be a genuine need for India, to address
the security implications of outer space through a suitable policy formulation
that is pragmatic and capable of addressing India’s vulnerabilities in space.
India needs to leverage space technologies to best serve India’s national security
interests. A well thought-out space policy statement also will serve the purpose
of projecting India’s strength in outer space.
Space is a high priority for national security in today’s world, where most
nations are heavily dependent on space assets for almost all important activities
concerning development, progress and security. However, building or acquiring
military space capability has its own cost and consequences. Before deciding
to acquire or pronouncing to forgo space defence capabilities or applicable
weapons or technologies, it is necessary to fully comprehend what such
weapons and technologies can do and what could be the cost and consequences
of acquiring them, as well as the price of not acquiring them. Clearly such
policy decisions will depend on individual national perspective; and how far
to articulate national policies for international consumption would be a
national decision. However, the need for building indigenous capabilities and
evolving suitable strategies cannot be disputed. The discussion thus must also
address how India may react to adversarial countries acquiring counter-space
capabilities and how India can best protect its national security interests in
international forums on space related issues.
In India, defence and space activities have been traditionally kept separate
and the two departments function pretty much independently. Occasional
use of existing civil assets for India’s needs to address security concerns may
have served a limited purpose so far. But this must change, with space
becoming an important dimension of defence and security. Strategic planning
for the future will need to include dedicated space capabilities to meet defence
and security requirements. Evolution of a comprehensive Space Defence or
Space Control policy will require a high degree of integration of space and
defence capabilities. While it may be prudent to keep the civilian space agencies
free of military inter-connections, rapid development of defensive space
capabilities through planned integration of defence research and development
(R&D) and a few key private industries in the country, has now become
imperative. India must take an independent position on space security
110 Role of Technology in International Affairs

commensurate with its own assessment of its national security priorities in

outer space, only when it establishes an overt counter-space capability.
It is thus imperative to develop a comprehensive understanding of the
limits of the presently accepted military exploitation of outer space and what
may constitute weaponisation of outer space and their security implications
for India. In a sense, weaponisation of outer space has already begun, with
extensive use of outer space for military functions in tactical warfare doctrines
and the recent demonstrations of Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) technology
for ASAT applications. Space applicable weapon technologies were developed
in the 1980s but never deployed due to concerns of arms race in space.
However, the priorities of powerful nations are changing and the successful
tests of the United States Air Force’s (USAF’s) Airborne Laser (ABL)3 in 2010
signals the arrival of technology capability for introduction of DEWs in outer
space.
Development and deployment of micro-satellites may represent yet
another chapter in weaponisation as they are potentially dual-use systems.
Satellites weighing less than 100 kg are relatively very easy to launch and also
cost-effective. While technology of miniaturisation has enabled these to be
very effective for specific applications, this aspect also makes them very suitable
for defence roles. Thus, the technology is already well established and its
application for space weapon orientation will depend on the intention and
motivation of the user nation. While the US today has a declared doctrine of
Space Dominance4 to maintain its supremacy in outer space, priorities for
other major space-faring nations such as China and Russia are woven around
ways to counter possible US deployment of space-applicable weapons and
other space control capabilities for global force projections.
Once any nation goes beyond a certain threshold in defensive-offensive
space capability, an arms race in space will be inevitable. Any policy
formulation on Space Security by India must take cognisance of the advances
in missile defence technology in India’s region of influence, and the possibility
of hostile forces using outer space against Indian national interests. Though
technology options are costly, it is also necessary to understand the cost of
not deciding or investing timely, in the context of others acquiring such
capabilities and also in the context of imminent technology controls that will
become increasingly restrictive for space technologies. Ambivalence may thus
prove extremely expensive.
 Outer Space and International Affairs 111

Space Technology Advances

While surveillance by U-2 type spy planes was considered hostile in the 1960s,
far superior military reconnaissance capabilities of satellites for military
applications are accepted by most nations today. This transition has not been
very smooth. The initial thrust of R&D was on improving launch vehicle
efficiency and making satellite pay-loads more compact, reliable and robust.
The LEOs were of special interest as these satellites provided immediate
benefits to expanding surveillance and communication capabilities. Access to
higher geo-synchronous orbits became possible with further advances in
satellite sub-systems as well as cryogenic technology for lifting heavy payloads
to 36,000 km altitude for world-wide communication and for establishing
GPS with a multitude of innovative applications. In fact, space technology is
often seen as instrumental to the explosion of ICT in terms of instant world-
wide connectivity and the new era of information superiority, in the emerging
knowledge-based society.
In the race for techno-military superiority during the cold war, ASAT
capabilities were created by both superpowers with significant technology spin-
off benefits from the R&D efforts for anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems.
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) was instrumental
in promoting major space technology advances and a significant technological
advance was the US announcement of the Kinetic Kill concept in the early
1980s for a new generation of ASAT weapons in which a two-stage missile
called the Air-Launched Miniature Vehicle (ALMV)5 could be launched from
a high-altitude F-15 aircraft, to ascend directly to target satellites in LEOs to
physically collide with the satellites, thus greatly reducing the time to
destruction. The 1983 announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
for BMD again stirred-up a lot of action-reaction technology development
activity between the two superpowers and R&D for potential space-applicable
weapon technology has continued to date.
While SDI provided the boost for space technologies, the weapon system
focus came from the BMD system requirements that invariably used the outer
space. Long range missiles (5000 km or more) can attain maximum velocity
of about 7-8 km per second (kmps) and if launched vertically, could reach
6000 km altitude to track and target any LEO satellite. Intermediate range
missiles (5000 km or less) and short-range missiles (1000 km or less) have
slower terminal velocity in the range of 3-5 kmps, may have limited reach
into space, but may still have ASAT application against lower orbital satellites.
The ASAT capabilities of modern missile defence systems with long range
112 Role of Technology in International Affairs

anti-missile missiles, thus can be very significant and have serious implications
for space security perceptions of other nations.
Other known BMD components of US systems include Space Tracking
and Surveillance System (STSS), Space-Based Infrared System (SBIR) in low
or high orbits, Sea based Radars (e.g. The Aegis), Terminal High Altitude
Area Defense (THAAD)6 for Ground-Based Midcourse Defence and ABL
for boost-phase kill of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). The US
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in June 2002 cleared the way for
development, testing, deployment and even transfer of any or all forms of
BMD systems deemed desirable. As such, today there are no international
treaty restrictions to testing of non-WMD type weapons in the context of
space security.
As already discussed, another promising advance in space technology is
that of micro-satellites using micro-electro-mechanical-systems (MEMS) and
nanotechnology. These can be deployed by a mother satellite and controlled
from the ground, to attach to a target satellite to cause disruption or
destruction in suicide mode on command. The US R&D efforts are fairly
advanced as demonstrated by the XSS-10 satellite (28 lbs weight) that was
tested successfully in 2003. China is also believed to have developed
experimental micro-satellites of 30-40 kg weight class, that included solar
panels, batteries, computers, charge-coupled device (CCD) cameras,
propulsion and telemetry support. A very attractive feature of micro-satellites
is that they can be launched at 1 percent of conventional cost, and can be
deployed as part of the space defence system. There are no laws or international
norms for this new class of satellites which themselves can be potential space
weapons. Arriving at universally acceptable agreements on these futuristic
issues will pose major challenges to the new cadre of diplomats and foreign
policy experts.
The current thrust for space weapon technology in the US can be
understood in the context of the vulnerability of its vital space assets. The
US Space Command Vision 20207 recognises that ‘weapons in space’ is a matter
of time and comprehensive space control must be achieved not only to protect
one’s own space assets but also to deny the use of space to the adversary, at
least in times of conflict. The US Space Command’s strategic master plan
therefore calls for ‘Full Spectrum Dominance’ in space by 2020 through
integration of space capabilities with information security and defence
strategies. The present US response to space vulnerability is largely military,
 Outer Space and International Affairs 113

thus suggesting a kind of inevitability of space based weapons, both for missile
defence as well as for protecting satellites.
The US reluctance to support any new proposed treaty such as the one
on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) is based on its
assessment that at present only the US is capable of deploying space-based
weapons and can retain its dominance of space through development and
deployment of a new class of weapons for space defence and space control.
The US plans reportedly include even the use of possible low-yield nuclear
weapons for missile defence and space dominance, in the event where the
existing kinetic kill systems fail to achieve the purpose.8
While the space technology pursuits of the US provide indicative trends,
various other nation-states have also been investing in space technologies for
quite some years. The investments are indeed based on national goals,
budgetary provisions and availability of technological expertise. Significant
developments are taking place in various areas of non-military use of space
technologies which are useful in exploring distant planets, human exploration
of space, and earth, and space science experiments, remote sensing, weather
forecasts and space transportation technologies. Progress by a few advanced
countries in military use of space technologies is also very impressive and
these serve as catalysts for the evolving RMA as well as for enhancing civilian
application horizons.

Space Technology in India

India is one of the few nations in the world with indigenous satellite launch
capabilities, as well as the technologies for development of modern high-tech
satellites. For historical reasons, much of the Indian expertise and experience
has been in the civilian domain, although almost all space technologies are of
dual-use nature and can thus be prime candidates for defence and security
objectives. India also has its own missile defence programme and significant
R&D capabilities in energy beam technologies, that are very well suited for
space defence applications. With the role of space technology rising in matters
of security and defence, it is natural that these technologies will be closely
guarded by those who have it. For example, in the nuclear or missile
technology field, developing indigenous competence in such critical
technologies will be vital to India’s security interests in outer space.
A quick look at Indian Space Research Organisation’s (ISRO’s) evolution
and achievements shows a very promising indigenous capability and expertise
that could easily be oriented to serve national security priorities at short notice
114 Role of Technology in International Affairs

if required. However, space and defence activities in India have been kept
under two distinct departments through a conscious policy of not inviting
defence related technology embargoes for Indian space programmes. This
international posture was to keep the opportunities for international
cooperation unhindered by strategic considerations as far as possible. The two
separate, independent streams approach has not only enabled ISRO to develop
critical dual-use technologies useful in outer space without causing much
apprehension among neighbouring countries, but also helped India to create
an impressive strength in both defence and space sectors, through a natural
process of sharing the national knowledge-base and human expertise.
ISRO was established on August 15, 1969 and the Department of Space
was set up in 1972. Starting with the launch of the first Indian satellite
Aryabhata on April 19, 1975, ISRO quickly developed the indigenous satellite
launch vehicle (SLV) by early 1980s and launched the Indian National Satellite
(INSAT) series for communication and educational purposes. By early 1990s
ISRO developed Indian Remote Sensing (IRS) satellites for earth observation
capability and started with the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) to launch
Indian satellites. By the turn of the century ISRO successfully launched even
foreign country payloads. By then, the marketing arm of ISRO, Antrix
Corporation Ltd. was established to promote international space commerce
and cooperation. The year 2001 marked the successful test of the
Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV) and the increasing
participation of ISRO in international space activities. A good account of ISRO
programmes can be found in a book from the Institute for Defence Studies
and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi, co-edited by Dr. Arvind Gupta, Dr. Ajey
Lele and the author.9
The first two IRS spacecraft, IRS-1A (March 1988) and IRS-1B
(August1991) were launched by Russian Vostok boosters from the Baikonur
Cosmodrome. The two identical IRS spacecraft hosted a trio of Linear Imaging
Self-Scanning (LISS) remote sensing instruments working in multiple spectral
bands. The Spacecraft Control Centre at Bangalore oversees all spacecraft
operations and spacecraft data transmissions are effected via X-band and S-
band antennas at the base of the spacecraft. ISRO and its commercial
marketing arm, Antrix Corporation Ltd., successfully launched the much
improved IRS-1D earth imaging satellite, weighing 1350 kg in September
1997. These satellites have established capabilities that can be compared to
the best in the world.
 Outer Space and International Affairs 115

The IRS-2 series (OCEANSAT-2/CLIMATSAT-1) is designed to cater

to global observations of climate, ocean and atmosphere with the help of a
Microwave Radiometer and Thermal Infrared Radiometer for observing
oceanographic parameters like winds, sea surface temperature, waves,
bathometry and internal waves. The National Remote Sensing Centre (NRSC)
of ISRO is a key player in the Earth Observation Programme and Disaster
Management Support Programme.
The IRS satellites today are the mainstay of the National Natural
Resources Management System (NNRMS), for which the Department of
Space (DOS) is the nodal agency. Data from the IRS satellites is received and
disseminated by several countries all over the world. With the advent of high-
resolution satellite imaging, new applications in the areas of urban
development, and infrastructure planning, as well as other large-scale
applications for mapping have been initiated. Remote sensing applications in
the country now cover diverse fields such as crop acreage and yield estimation,
drought warning and assessment, flood control and damage assessment, land
use/land cover information, agro-climatic planning, wasteland management,
water resources management, under-ground water exploration, fisheries
development and prediction of snow-melt run-off etc. These capabilities
become very important at times of natural disasters or other national
emergency situations.
As one of the major space-faring nations in the world today, India has
established end-to-end indigenous capabilities in satellite design and
development, as well as indigenous launch capability, and infrastructure for
all types of orbits and several types of payloads, including launch of multiple
payloads using its own command and control infrastructure. India presently
has eleven INSAT satellites operating as communication applications and seven
IRS satellites. These provide information of value about earth resources and
are primarily used to support services towards enhancing public good. The
series of satellite assets of India, along with the ground support systems, and
other relevant infrastructure represent a national asset worth over $ 25 billion.
This is a major asset for a country like India, and security of these assets is
clearly a high priority for the nation.
The Indian GPS Aided Geo Augmented Navigation (GAGAN) system
is essentially for civil aviation applications in communication, navigation and
surveillance. The IRS satellite system is the largest constellation of remote
sensing satellites for civilian use in operation today, in the world. All the
satellites are placed in polar sun-synchronous orbits and can provide data in
116 Role of Technology in International Affairs

a variety of spatial, spectral and temporal resolutions to enable several

programmes to be undertaken, relevant to national development. ISRO’s Radar
Imaging Satellites (RISATs) carry synthetic aperture payloads that can provide
multi-spectral and fine resolution images well suited for security applications
as and when required. Similarly, the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite
System (IRNSS) is an independent regional navigation satellite system being
developed by India, to provide accurate position information service in the
region extending up to 1500 km range. This is also a useful asset for national
security, if and when required. While India has made impressive progress in
the civilian space arena, with its own series of INSAT satellites and other
imaging and remote sensing satellites, it has yet to develop an independent
military satellite programme.
Cartosat-2 launched by PSLV-C7 in January 2007, is an advanced remote
sensing satellite carrying a panchromatic camera, capable of providing scene-
specific spot imageries for cartographic and other applications. India is acutely
aware of the dangers of high-resolution satellite images falling into wrong
hands, and this was voiced by the then President Dr. A. P. J. Abdul Kalam in
November 2007 at the IDSA International Space Security Conference. He
suggested enactment of suitable laws to govern the use of outer space and
regulate the use of data acquired from remote sensing satellites, particularly
of sensitive installations. Space laws have to evolve in India to match the
sensitivity associated with space imaging capabilities and space security
perceptions. Some guidelines for national laws matching world standards are
urgently needed to safeguard national security interests.
As India emerges as a potential regional power and an important
international player in outer space, it is being closely watched by other nations.
The year 2008 saw ISRO successfully demonstrate ability for simultaneous
launch of 10 different satellites (2 Indian + 8 foreign) in different orbits. It is
interesting to note that in terms of technology, this has major implications
for building BMD capability to launch Multiple Independent Re-entry
Vehicles (MIRVs).
India’s own Chandrayaan-I project of 2008, for exploration of lunar terrain
and mineral compositions, was the first ambitious moon-mission by ISRO.
Budgeted at Rs. 380 crores ($ 88 million), it will perhaps be the cheapest
ever lunar mission. ISRO’s agreement with National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) to carry two scientific payloads on board Chadrayaan-
1 was seen as a major recognition of Indian space capability. By 2010, future
plans of ISRO included indigenous development of cryogenic engine
 Outer Space and International Affairs 117

technology for fully indigenous GSLV flights, manned space missions, further
lunar exploration, Mars exploration and interplanetary probes. ISRO has
significant field installations and ground assets and cooperates with the
international community as a part of several bilateral and multilateral
agreements. On November 5, 2013, ISRO launched its Mars Orbital Mission
and the Indian mission is currently en-route to Mars. On January 5, 2014,
ISRO’s GSLV-D5 successfully launched GSAT-14 into the intended orbit.
This also marked the first successful flight using an indigenous cryogenic
engine, making India the sixth country in the world to have this technology.
On June 30, 2014, ISRO’s PSLV III simultaneously launched five satellites
of foreign nations into different earth observation orbits and marked a major
trend among nations to recognise the maturity of Indian space technology
and its reliability for commercial launch of their satellites.
Thus, despite a few failures, which is not very uncommon in space
endeavours ISRO has not only established world-class technology capabilities,
but has also positioned India as a respectable international partner in affairs
of outer space. Given the strategic and security imperatives and the growing
trends for use of space for security objectives, India must take informed
decisions about investing in space from an exclusive defence and security
perspective.
For a country with established capabilities in civilian space technologies
and independent space assets, it is imperative for India to remain actively
engaged in international negotiations on the subject of security of outer space.
Within the country, there is urgent need for an informed debate on the subject,
involving policy makers, technology experts, user services and think-tanks.
The first priority would be to concentrate on international cooperation to
protect existing space assets and enhance indigenous capabilities to remain
competitive in space technology and space services domains. Simultaneously,
development of critical technologies such as missile defence, advanced sensors,
micro-satellites and DEWs must be pursued with renewed focus. This must
be aimed at quickly bridging the technology gap with advanced nations, so
that India does not again become one of the targets for space arms control.
India’s policy of keeping defence and space activities separate and
independent must change now, with space becoming an important dimension
of defence and security. Strategic long-term planning must now envisage
integrating space capabilities with defence capabilities, as may be desired for
safeguarding national security interests. Evolution of a comprehensive Space
Defence and Space Control policy will require a high degree of integration
118 Role of Technology in International Affairs

and coherence between space and defence departments. An early integration

of key private industries in the country will be essential to maintain a high
pace of work needed to remain competitive in outer space. Only then, can
India take independent positions on Space Defence and Space Control,
commensurate with its own assessment of its national security priorities in
outer space.
It is very likely that by 2020, security of outer space will become a subject
as important as nuclear deterrence is today, because military space capabilities
and a new class of energy weapons will directly affect the nuclear-missile
deterrence value. Space will then become an even more important new
dimension, in the calculations for military and economic power worldwide.
If well thought-out policy guidelines are not evolved now, India may by default
become a reactive party in international discourse, and a follower of other
powerful nations, instead of taking independent proactive steps to best suit
its national security interests in outer space.

Space Sustainability, Space Laws and Space Code of Conduct

Sustainability of human operations in outer space is under threat due to orbital
space debris. Such debris in LEO ranging in size from 1 to 10 cm in diameter,
poses a significant problem for space vehicles and earth observation satellites.
While this debris can be detected, it cannot be tracked with sufficient
reliability, to orient spacecraft to avoid collision with these objects. Such debris
can cause catastrophic damage even to a shielded spacecraft. Orbital debris is
not the only form of space junk that is deleterious to earth satellites. Since
collisions with asteroids have caused major havoc to the earth’s biosphere on
several occasions in the geological past, possibility of other impacts in future
are quite likely. Such events, together with man-made space debris, are a cause
for serious concern for the sustainability of outer space activities, on which
modern society has become very dependent.10
Functional satellites represent only a small fraction of the estimated
150,000 or more objects which are larger than one centimetre in diameter
that presently exist in LEOs. Most of these objects are fragments of larger
objects that have broken up during explosions and other events. Since the
closing velocities of these objects are roughly 7-8 km/sec, a collision with any
one of these objects is likely to cause catastrophic damage to a satellite or
space vehicle, such as the Space Shuttle and International Space Stations (ISS).
As the number of pieces of debris in orbit continues to rise, so does the
 Outer Space and International Affairs 119

likelihood of collision. Manoeuvres for avoiding tracked debris have been

undertaken by the Space Shuttle and are planned for the International Space
Station as well. Furthermore, procedures for dealing with damage are being
developed in the event of a collision with orbital debris. Given the
technological advances associated with lasers and optics, a ground-based pulsed
laser can ablate or vaporise the surface of orbital debris, thereby producing
enough cumulative thrust to cause debris to re-enter the atmosphere and burn-
out in small pieces, without causing much damage on ground. This is a cost
effective method and is attracting a lot of international attention.
The increasing use of outer space has produced a considerable amount of
space debris and this has become a major threat to spacecraft and satellites.
Growing awareness of the problem of debris has motivated most space-faring
States to develop national space debris mitigation standards and in 2001, the
United Nations (UN) Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(COPUOS) mandated the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination
Committee to develop international debris mitigation guidelines. In 2005,
the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of COPUOS evolved agreements
on intentional destruction of any orbital objects to avoid long-lived orbital
debris, and the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) enacted rules
for monitoring debris mitigation plans.
In 2005, the US modernised its Michigan Orbital Debris Survey Telescope
and Electro-Optical Deep Space Surveillance systems and is currently actively
pursuing space-based surveillance systems. The US network uses 31 sensors
worldwide, to monitor over 10,000 space debris objects larger than 10 cm in
size, and Russia monitors over 5,000 orbital objects, mostly in LEO, with 14
sensors. The EU, Canada, China, France, Germany and Japan are all
developing new space surveillance capabilities. China has also established its
first Space Target and Debris Observation Lab.11 While all such sensors will
contribute to manage the dangers from debris, their utility for strategic
surveillance for military purposes can clearly provide strategic advantage in
future, particularly as military use of space keeps increasing. India has an active
interest in international negotiations on debris mitigation and is a constructive
participant.
However, the problems of space debris persist. In January 2007, China
used a modified ballistic missile with an interceptor on-board, to destroy its
own inoperable Fengyun-1C weather satellite. The destruction created more
than 3,000 pieces of trackable space debris, which quickly spread across a
large region of the earth orbit, covering between 300 and 2,000 km in altitude.
120 Role of Technology in International Affairs

NASA’s debris experts estimate that the test created perhaps as much as
150,000 pieces of debris, too small to track. Most of these will remain in
orbit, posing a serious threat to working satellites in LEO for decades. On
February 10, 2009 an active American iridium commercial communications
satellite and an inactive Russian military communications satellite collided
accidentally, at an altitude of 800 km. The collision created more than 2,000
pieces of trackable debris that spread along and around the former satellites’
orbits and now threaten other satellites in the LEO region. While there was
data beforehand showing that this collision was likely, neither the US nor
Russia was actively checking these particular satellites for possible collisions
at the time.12
The US military maintains the world’s most extensive orbital tracking
network that recorded some 22,000 objects in space, measuring 10 cm or
larger as of 2012. What cannot be reliably tracked yet are the objects smaller
than 10 cm, because these are too small to follow consistently. Scientists
estimate that about 500,000 bits of junk measuring 1 to 10 cm are orbiting
our earth, and believe that many millions smaller than 1 cm exist. All objects
in the earth’s orbit travel at very high speed; therefore even small debris can
cripple or destroy working spacecraft or endanger astronauts.
Space sustainability has become a serious issue in the recent past because
of its huge implication for the future of mankind. In just about two decades,
modern everyday life has become intrinsically dependent on space-based
technologies and the vulnerabilities are very serious. This is thus a global
concern that must demand global level cooperation for lasting solutions for
mitigating space debris and maintaining outer space, particularly the preferred
orbits, free and safe for all contributing satellites and space flights. Some kind
of control and monitoring will be necessary to ensure this objective for decades
in future. This would cause serious challenges to the international negotiators
who would be making an attempt to reach global consensus, while protecting
national interests in space. Space has thus emerged as an important new
dimension for global peace and stability, and diplomats will need to be well
informed about technological and legal nuances in this new arena of global
discourse.
Besides the threat of debris, space sustainability can also be seriously
disturbed by sudden spurt in military activity in space; in response to
unforeseen events in the backdrop of absence of clear and accepted space laws
or norms.
 Outer Space and International Affairs 121

Some of the ‘what if ’ scenarios may include:

• A military satellite of Nation A on intelligence gathering mission is
jammed or destroyed by Nation B in space. What can be the response
of Nation A?
• A satellite of Nation A is made dysfunctional by debris hit. Who can
Nation A blame or claim compensation from, and under what laws?
• If a dysfunctional satellite of Nation A collides with a vital functional
satellite of Nation B. How does Nation A handle international
condemnation or claims of Nation B for compensation?
• A ground-based space facility of Nation A is damaged by State-
sponsored terrorists. How does Nation A respond to loss of space
capability?
• The introduction of a military satellite by Nation A is objected to by
Nation B on grounds of disturbing regional stability. What can the
international community do to resolve the dispute, to prevent further
escalation that can endanger space sustainability?
• If a nation links the PAROS and the Fissile Missile Cut-off Treaty
(FMCT) discussions at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to block
possible consensus for formalising space laws or the space code of
conduct, what punitive actions can be there against such nations?
Such scenarios can indeed suddenly upset space balance and hence, there is
an urgent need to evolve space laws acceptable to all nations. This will be a
huge challenge for diplomats negotiating international space treaties or
conventions in the future.

Space Laws: Emerging Trends

The increasing exploitation of outer space to serve military and security
objectives has brought international space security under serious pressure.
Outer space has become a critical tool for achieving foreign policy goals, serving
as a force multiplier in war, as well as for strengthening homeland security at
all times. Modern defence doctrines are getting increasingly integrated with
space capabilities and space assets. Space capabilities also open up hitherto
restricted access to outer space for commercial opportunities, such as exploiting
untapped resources of the moon, Mars or other celestial bodies. This has
created a competitive environment in space, wherein countries are actively
aspiring to dominate space beyond terrestrial challenges, and the world leader
in space, the US, has a declared policy of continued space dominance.
122 Role of Technology in International Affairs

The emerging global scenario for outer space undoubtedly requires that
all space-faring nations including India would have to adopt a proactive
approach, both in the context of leveraging outer space for national security,
and also for building its ability to compete in the global space market, on the
foundation of a balanced and robust indigenous space industry and commerce.
India in particular, needs to face up to this new reality of the increasing
relevance of space to national security, and calibrate its foreign policy according
to the new set of priorities in outer space. (For a detailed discussion of space
laws see endnote no. 9).
Outer space is presently being governed by quite a few international
treaties and agreements, mainly the OST of 1967. However, the growth of
space technologies and their increased use for military purposes have raised
serious questions about the possible use of weapons in outer space as a natural
extension of the trend of increasing militarisation. It is in this context that
the OST needs to be strengthened with additional conventions such as the
PAROS, to contain the momentum towards increasing military exploitation
of outer space. At the June 2008 meet of the COPUOS, discussions were
focused around evolving a potential ‘rules of the road’ agreement for space
activities of the future to support the EU call to consider a more specific
code of conduct for space activities. Meanwhile, there are also proposals that
COPUOS be given a specific mandate to address long-term sustainability of
all space activities.
The consequences of the emerging global space order will have a major
impact on India’s space security and hence, the subject deserves very careful
consideration. International negotiations to arrive at a comprehensive
agreement to preserve outer space for uninterrupted peaceful activities, will
be one of the major challenges for diplomats around the world, and Indian
diplomats and foreign policy experts need to be well informed on all related
aspects of space security—political, technical and legal—to protect India’s
national interests in outer space.
Although there is international consensus that outer space is meant to be
used only for peaceful purposes, the term ‘peaceful purposes’ has never been
clearly defined, and it is generally accepted that this would include scientific,
commercial and developmental uses as well as support to operational military
functions. However, the limits to military use of space are not yet defined in
any international treaty. There is thus a need for clearer articulation of the
international laws for preventing further militarisation of outer space. India,
like other space-faring nations, must evolve its own national laws to safeguard
 Outer Space and International Affairs 123

its national interests, while also allowing for integration with international
treaties, norms and conventions.
At present, the emerging space order does not envisage an all-out ‘Star
War’ in space. But for India, the main concerns should include: (a) the
deployment of space technologies as a terrestrial force multiplier against India;
(b) the possibility of denial of access to outer space through degradation/
destruction of India’s space capability; (c) the use or threat of use of space
capabilities by unfriendly powers, to pursue their foreign policy objectives
against India; and (d) the use of space-enabled technologies for conducting
subversive activities and acts of terrorism, including cyber terrorism against
India. The challenges are urgent because space events can happen without
any warning. India must therefore maintain a constant vigil in outer space
using its established capabilities, and leverage its strength in outer space for
clear enunciation of its priorities, through careful articulation of its space policy.
Existing international space laws or treaties, formulated under the aegis
of the UN to govern all human activities in outer space include the : (a) OST
of 1967 (b) Rescue Agreement of 1968, (c) Liability Convention of 1972,
(d) Registration Convention of 1974 and (e) Moon Agreement of 1979. India
has adhered to the OST, the Rescue Agreement, the Liability Convention
and the Registration Convention, but is a signatory only to the Moon
Agreement. India’s posture in international forums in the context of legislating
appropriate national space laws should not only fulfil certain international
obligations, but more importantly, it should give India the maximum ability
to leverage outer space for national advantage and security.
The OST vide Article III establishes the application of the UN Charter,
and the rules of customary international law, to space activities. Furthermore,
the prevalent view is that Article 2(4) (All members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity)
applies to outer space, thus, making it unlawful for a State to interfere in a
hostile manner with the space-borne assets of another State. Consequently, a
pre-emptive attack based on presumption of threat would be illegal. However,
should hostile action occur against a State, it would be legitimate for it to
exercise its right of self-defence under provisions of Article 51 (Right of self-
defence). Thus, given that an armed attack could be carried out either by using
space-based assets or by the use of space as a force multiplier, it could be
argued that all actions and developments undertaken by a country, to put
itself in a state of constant preparedness to ensure national security, and defend
and repel a hostile attack from or in outer space, is in consonance with the
124 Role of Technology in International Affairs

UN Charter and rules of international law. This makes developing military

space technology capability legitimate, under the present legal framework.
The point of law laid down by the UN Charter pertains to the prohibition
of its first use. Military response by a country must only be an act of self-
defence for it to be legitimate.
The 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST)13 represents the primary basis for
legal order in outer space founded on the principle of ‘peaceful use’. However,
the present state of heightened threat perception of a significantly militarised
outer space can be seen as a direct consequence of textual ambiguities inherent
in the OST. For example, the absence of a ‘definitions’ clause, gave rise to
opposing interpretation by the US and the erstwhile USSR of the phrase
‘peaceful use’ of outer space. The situation is also exacerbated by the absence
of verification and enforcement provisions in the OST. While the US
maintains that peaceful use means ‘non-aggressive’, the USSR insisted that it
should mean ‘wholly non-military’. That the US interpretation has been more
acceptable is obvious from the current international status and practical aspects
of space security. Thus, although the international community generally
supports measures to prevent an arms race in space and denounces its
weaponisation at the domestic level, space powers are unlikely to accept any
curbs on their national activities in outer space.
This is also demonstrated in the apparent failure of the CD to prevent
an arms race in outer space, bringing it on the verge of weaponisation. Lack
of consensus in the UN COPUOS has also effectively prevented further
developments in space law since the 1979 Moon Agreement, which remains
the least ratified agreement of the five treaties. In the present context, therefore,
the moot question is whether space-applicable technological strength deployed
as a force multiplier in war, qualifies as ‘non aggressive’ and ‘peaceful use’ of
outer space.
The CD, Geneva continues to be the most important multilateral forum
where efforts are underway to prevent an arms race in outer space. As is well
known, the US vote against the PAROS Resolution in 2005, consequent to
its unilateral withdrawal in 2002 from the 1972 ABM Treaty, has paralysed
the CD. Subsequently, in 2008, Russia and China jointly submitted a draft
proposal for a ‘Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer
Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects’ (PPWT),
which has also met with resistance from the US and Israel. India needs to
proactively analyse the strategic and tactical merits and demerits of supporting
the PPWT in the geopolitical context.
 Outer Space and International Affairs 125

Anti-satellite weapons and space debris are the two most serious threats
to the security of outer space. Weapons programmes also threaten stability in
outer space, as demonstrated by the Chinese ASAT experiment on January
11, 2007 and the US intercept of a failed satellite, using its missile defence
system on February 20, 2008. China’s ASAT experiment was perhaps the
worst debris-creating event in the history of the space age.14 In light of the
above, India should formulate a clear policy and posture about proliferation
of anti-satellite weapons systems in the context of Article IV of the OST.
Under this Article, the contracting parties ‘undertake not to place in orbit
around the earth, any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of
weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or
station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.’ It also stipulates
that the ‘moon and other celestial bodies’ are to be used ‘exclusively for peaceful
purposes’ with even conventional military installations, weapons testing and
manoeuvres expressly prohibited. But there are no laws to enforce these
conditions on defaulting nations.
Another reason for the accelerated race to control outer space is the civilian
application of space technology and its subsequent commercialisation since
the 1970s. The lucrative returns from the commercial space launch industry,
satellite telecommunications, broadcasting and earth observation applications,
among others, has made orbital slots and radio frequency spectrum the most
coveted natural resources in outer space, particularly as these are limited
resources. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is responsible
for allotting orbital slots and allocating radio frequency spectrum to member-
states on a first-come-first-serve basis. As could be expected, powerful space
powers including the US, Russia, and the EU dominate the ITU, and tend
to control benefits from natural resources in outer space.
Thus, they also have strong motivation to deny other countries access to
space. India needs to be watchful and proactive in the ITU to ensure adequate
orbital slots and spectrum for itself, and to offset attempts by countries to
have the capacity to cause harmful interference with India’s activities in space.
In conclusion, an overview of the existing international space law regimes,
activities permitted thereunder as against constraints imposed by the treaties,
is imperative to enable India to identify realistic goals, strategies, timelines
and the posture to adopt, both in the international and national domain, to
protect national priorities. There is urgent need for clarity on the question of
development of national space doctrines and policies, and an ongoing study
126 Role of Technology in International Affairs

of other space powers that could likely impact India’s ability to ensure its
own national defence and security.
It is also important to undertake a cost-benefit analysis of the probable
negative consequences arising from the absence of an appropriate national
space doctrine, space policy and domestic legal regime, to facilitate the
achievement of identified goals. Today, national security compulsions provide
the foundation for the development of valid national objectives that define
space security in the context of its importance to defence, commercial,
economic and developmental objectives. In the context of the emerging RMA
and the trend for network-centric warfare doctrines that depend heavily on
space capabilities, it is obvious that the salience of space technology in India’s
military modernisation is bound to increase. In the final analysis, it must be
recognised that time is of essence because other nations are racing ahead.
Unfortunately, the OST does not expressly prohibit the development,
testing and deployment of non-WMD weapons in outer space, nor does it
prohibit the development, testing, and deployment of ground-based systems
that can reach targets in space, using conventional, nuclear or directed-energy
kill mechanisms. As a result, Article IV (of the OST) is often cited to support
the claim that all military activities in outer space are permissible, unless
specifically prohibited by another treaty or customary international law. By
that measure, the Chinese ASAT test in January 2007, or the firing of the
SM-3 missile by the US Navy at a dying satellite, or even the deployment of
the space component of the US missile defense system does not represent a
violation of the OST. It is well known that any de-fragmentation of orbiting
satellites or spacecraft will create additional debris and that debris will tend
to remain in space for a length of time, depending on the altitude of the
event. The higher the altitude, the longer it will take the debris to lose height,
to ultimately enter the earth’s atmosphere in small fragments, often too small
to cause much concern.
In terms of the march of technology towards possible weaponisation of
space, two recent developments deserve special mention. One is the well-
known US success with testing of the ABL that can target a ballistic missile
in boost phase, well above the atmosphere, by using a power laser beam
weapon from aboard an aircraft platform flying at about 10 km altitude. The
ABL system beam director has adequate look-up capability to target enemy
missiles at slant range of about 600 km. It is obvious that such a system
situated well above the dense atmospheric layer, can be used easily to destroy
LEO satellites that are much softer and predictable targets, compared to a
 Outer Space and International Affairs 127

fast moving missile with a much tougher body. So, while the DEW system
can legitimately be deployed for BMD purposes, it would be available to a
host country for ready ASAT application, without any preparation time. The
ABL project is on hold due to very high cost implications and its own
vulnerability to enemy missile or aircraft attack, but the Advanced Concept
Technology Demonstration (ACTD) has successfully established the capability,
should the need arise in future.15
The second potential space weapon, much more cost-effective than the
ABL, is the lesser known success of the space plane X-37B developed by Boeing
under the aegis of the US Air Force. Also called the Orbital Test Vehicle
(OTV), the first OTV launched on December 8, 2010, was the first
unmanned spacecraft to return to earth in perfect condition for re-use. The
second X-37B spacecraft launched in June 2011 with an Atlas 5 rocket, stayed
in orbit for over one year and performed many classified successful tests under
NASA’s Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) programme. The
space plane is a free-flying, reusable spacecraft with fully autonomous
rendezvous and docking capability with the ‘International Space Station’. The
spacecraft with 6000 kg payload capacity can directly rise to LEOs for multiple
missions as well as independent re-entry burn down and water landing
capability. Potential for X-37B type spacecraft is enormous in future both for
civil, commercial and military missions.16 These new emerging technological
strides actually represent quantum leaps in technology towards possible future
weaponisation of outer space.
It is in this context that most progressive nations are engaged in discussions
on how best to evolve internationally accepted laws or norms that can preserve
space as ‘global common’ to be shared peacefully by all nations of the world.
Since national and global priorities are bound to have different perspectives,
strictly binding laws may not work well in outer space; the international
community is for evolving a Code of Conduct (COC) in space.

Space Code of Conduct: Diplomatic Challenges

It is well known that ASAT weapons were successfully developed and tested
in the 1980s by both the superpowers during the peak of the Cold War but
these were not actually deployed then, to prevent a space weapon race between
the two superpowers of the time. Since there were only two parties in the
game, it was possible to reach an informal agreement in the context of the
doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). But now there are multiple
players in outer space. However, the US has significantly enhanced its
128 Role of Technology in International Affairs

superiority in outer space to support its declared doctrine of Space

Dominance—that emerged from the former US Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld’s report on space security and missile defence. The continued
enhancement of BMD capability by multiple countries today has created
uncertainty about the future of space security. As the genie of technology
cannot be put back in the bottle, it is necessary to find ways to prevent
adventurism with advanced space technology by any player, because that can
easily upset the delicate balance of power in outer space.
Satellites are essentially slow moving soft targets compared to fast moving
surface hardened missiles that can be targeted from ground today. Satellites
therefore can be tracked very easily from the ground, and hence most satellites
are inherently vulnerable to various kinds of attack from ground, aerospace
or from outer space. This provides a very simple rationale for developing space
applicable weapons to defend satellites. However, for a range of practical and
technical reasons, space-based weapons cannot be relied upon to protect
satellites. Instead, the primary mission of space weapons is offensive, for
targeting the satellites of adversaries and this capability is assumed to provide
the deterrence required for protecting national satellites. What started as
building space capability to leverage outer space for national security has now
become a threat to others and this strategic value of military satellites makes
them easy targets of the adversary.
Fortunately, while space has long been militarised — hosting
communications, surveillance and navigation satellites to support military
operations, it is not yet weaponised by any space-faring nation as a matter of
policy, even though there are no international laws or agreements to prohibit
weapon in space as long as it does not involve WMD. The US was the first
to use space-based GPS technology for precision guided munitions (PGMs)
in the Iraq war and since that was not challenged by any country; such a
weapon targeting application is now considered legitimate.
So, what constitutes space weapons? Any ASAT system (whether land,
sea, or aerospace-based) capable of damaging a satellite or a spacecraft, or
interfering with its functioning while in earth orbit, would certainly be
classified as a space weapon. Terrestrial weapons that can interfere or damage
the satellite’s ground stations or ground-based communications receivers are
typically not considered ASAT weapons as per present norms. But any weapon
on a space-platform that can engage any target on ground, aerospace or outer
space could also be classified as a space weapon.
 Outer Space and International Affairs 129

Since there are no official definitions there are indeed some grey areas.
For instance, if a platform in aerospace, below 100 km altitude is used to
target a missile in ballistic trajectory before it re-enters earth atmosphere, would
that be weaponisation of outer space? Probably not, or else anti-missile missiles
would be termed as space weapons since they would operate outside the earth’s
atmosphere. Similarly, if a micro-satellite in space orbit without any explosives
collides and destroys another satellite of the adversary, either by accident or
in a suicide mode, would that be weaponisation of space? Probably yes, but
then what laws would govern such eventualities and how would one fix
accountability and liability? If a large piece of debris hits and damages a satellite
or space-craft, would that be interpreted as aggression if the countries involved
are in a conflict situation? Who would make the rules and get universal
agreement on the laws? These are questions with no easy answers.
In 2008, the US announced its proposal to fund a ‘Space Test Bed’ that
could place prototype Space-Based Interceptors (SBIs) and other weapons in
orbit. While small numbers of SBIs would not provide a missile defence
capability, if properly designed they could readily attack satellites. In addition
to being able to attack satellites in low orbits, the large amount of fuel onboard
SBIs could allow them to reach satellites even in geosynchronous orbit in
roughly one hour. Therefore, other countries would see even small numbers
of such weapons as a significant ASAT threat.
As already discussed, powerful lasers from aerospace platforms or even
from ground have the capability to disable LEO satellites without actually
breaking them up, thereby preventing debris. Such systems may indeed emerge
as preferred weapons in space in future. However, there are no laws or norms
to either prevent or fix responsibility for such weaponisation. It is for this
reason that there is serious international dialogue to formulate an International
Code of Conduct for Outer Space (ICOCOS) that can prevent any unwanted
adventure in space by any country or group and thus help preserve the
sustainability of outer space for the benefit of all.
Besides the concern of use of weapons that can suddenly upset the delicate
balance of peaceful activities in space, the other major concern is the problem
of increasing debris in space that can cause a series of collisions or accidents
leading to more debris and compromising legitimate civilian activities. Space
laws and codes need to address both these aspects. The rule-making process
undergoes several different stages. These include politico-diplomatic, technical
and legal steps that must be debated and a consensus reached, both within
and between countries. Only then the rules can take shape as legitimate,
130 Role of Technology in International Affairs

enforceable and accepted norms. Many countries in the West have focused
on the technological and safety aspects of outer space. But any universally
acceptable rule-making must address the importance of politico-diplomatic
endorsement from all space-faring nations, especially the new and emerging
space powers.
In 2008, the EU released its Space Code of Conduct (SCOC) which was
revised in October 2010. It sought to codify best practices in space activities
with emphasis on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures (TCBMs).
The code would be a voluntary mechanism open to all States and is
complementary to the existing framework regulating outer space. It preserves
the inherent rights of States for collective self-defence in accordance with the
UN Charter and States that become party to the code would be bound by
the existing legal arrangements. Signatories to the SCOC would need to
formulate and implement national policies and procedures to minimise the
possibility of accidents in space, collisions between space objects or any form
of harmful interference with other States’ assets. Participating States would
be expected to share information on national space policies and strategies,
including basic objectives for security and defence related activities and seek
solutions based on an equitable balance of interests.
Some of the ICOCOS proposals are very idealistic but difficult to
implement. Most nations are unlikely to openly share information related to
national space strategies in the atmosphere of growing competition and
geopolitical rivalry, particularly among the more powerful nations—the US,
China and Russia. Even though there is general consensus for having an
international mechanism for preserving peace in outer space, the EU proposals
have encountered many objections from major space powers as well as from
new space-faring nations, mainly because formulation of EU SCOC has not
been a wider participative process. While the US has not openly opposed the
EU draft, a major Washington think tank, the Stimson Center has prepared
an alternative draft ICOCOS that also seeks to protect US supremacy in
space.17
Unfortunately, the history of global arms control measures and technology
management agreements shows that more powerful nations often flout
international norms when it comes to furthering their own national security
or economic agenda. This has been amply clear in the case of the Hague Code
of Conduct (HCOC) evolved to prevent missile proliferation which has not
managed to achieve any spectacular success. Hence, there is considerable
discussion between major space-faring nations to arrive at a set of ‘rules of
 Outer Space and International Affairs 131

the road’ for space activities and these could then create a set of guidelines
for others to follow. Efforts to prevent weapons in space, such as the PAROS
Treaty jointly tabled by Russia and China at the CD in 2002 found support
from 163 nations but was rejected by the US and Israel. Similarly the China-
Russia PPWT proposal in February 2008 was again rejected by US at the
CD. This is ample evidence of the challenge that the global diplomatic
community will face in arriving at universally agreeable ICOCOS.
For India, the debate must begin with understanding the kind of space
future it wants to see in the context of its Asian neighbours and preventing
space activities that may be counter-productive to achieving that future. Given
that the majority of space debris was created during the Cold War by the
large number of military satellites of the US, Russia and Europe, countries to
which these assets belonged are unlikely to allow foreign governments or other
international bodies to examine or destroy such objects for fear of
compromising national security. One can foresee political difficulties emerging
over the kind of technology and hardware that would be used to destroy space
junk and debris. Destruction of dysfunctional satellites will also lead to
problems with States not being able to reach consensus on the procedures to
be used. It is not difficult to envisage a scenario where the absence of a
consultative process would further complicate the situation.
Satellites play a crucial role in civil, scientific, economic, and military
endeavours. With the world’s largest investment in space assets, the US has
a tremendous amount to lose from deploying space weapons. Legitimising
attacks on satellites is short-sighted since other countries will also be able to
develop effective ASAT weapons, ultimately increasing the vulnerability of
US satellites. Developing weapons can also undermine relations and increase
tensions with other countries, which could reduce cooperation needed for
progress on issues such as terrorism and thus reduce stability during a crisis.
Lastly, if ASAT weapons get to the stage of being used, debris from destroyed
satellites can damage other satellites, triggering a chain of collisions to create
more debris and thereby compromise the use of space for important civil as
well as military purposes far into the future.
An approach to protecting satellites could be smart planning to ensure
that any attack or damage to individual satellites would not affect key military
or critical civil capabilities. This can be achieved by developing certain
redundancy by rapidly bypassing damaged satellites and creating back-up
systems in space and ground for uninterrupted functioning. Distributing a
single satellite’s workload among clusters of satellites can make it more difficult
132 Role of Technology in International Affairs

for an adversary to mount a useful ASAT attack. Such measures have an

additional advantage that they negate the attacking adversary any advantage
from space adventurism. Better space surveillance, individually or jointly, can
also enhance the ability to keep satellites safe from natural and man-created
accidental threats by enabling satellites to manoeuvre out of the way of danger.
An ideal SCOC should work towards a universal taboo against attacking
satellites or space-craft. It should incentivise cancellation of provocative space
weapons development programmes and discourage building new offensive
capacities by emerging new space-faring nations. Such a SCOC will require
establishment of appropriate Space Laws, rules of the road and transparency
measures for space, including consequences for any country that attacks or
damages satellites. Space-faring countries have the greatest technical ability
to threaten satellites, but they are also the countries with the greatest incentive
to develop guidelines that can safeguard the existing peace balance in outer
space. It would be imperative for all space-faring nations to come together
for a productive international dialogue to quickly and efficiently formulate a
SCOC before a chance event or accident further complicates the atmosphere
for a wider consultative process to arrive at a global solution. These represent
very important future challenges for international foreign policy experts and
diplomats or interlocutors, who can conduct informed and constructive
discussions for achieving common goals in space.

Policy Options for India and Foreign Policy Challenges

Space is a high priority for national security in today’s world where most
nations are heavily dependent on space assets for almost all important activities
concerning development, progress and security. Before deciding to acquire or
pronouncing to forgo space applicable weapons or technologies, it is necessary
for any nation to fully comprehend what such weapons and technologies can
do and what could be the cost and consequences of acquiring them. It is also
imperative to understand the price of not acquiring or developing such
capabilities indigenously. While there may be different perspectives to debate
how far a nation can articulate its national space policies for international
consumption, the need for clarity in building indigenous capabilities and
evolving suitable security and economic strategies in space, cannot be
overstated.
For India, the internal policy discussion must also address how India may
react to adversarial countries acquiring counter-space capabilities and how
India can best protect its national security interests in international forums
 Outer Space and International Affairs 133

on space related issues. This calls for a foresighted space policy that integrates
national security plans with defence and foreign policies. In India, as already
discussed, defence and space activities have been traditionally kept separate
and the two departments function pretty much independently. Using existing
civilian space assets for occasional needs to address national security concerns
may have served the purpose so far, but this must change quickly with space
becoming an important dimension of defence and security. Strategic planning
for the future will need to include dedicated space capabilities to meet defence
and security requirements. Evolution of a comprehensive Space Defence or
Space Control policy will require a high degree of integration of space and
defence capabilities. While it may be prudent to keep the civilian space agencies
free of military interference, rapid development of defensive counter-space
capabilities through planned integration of defence R&D and key private
industries in the country will be extremely important. Only then India can
take an independent position on space security matters commensurate with
its own assessment of its national security priorities in outer space. It is thus
imperative to develop a comprehensive understanding of Weaponisation of
Outer Space and Space Based Weapons and their security implications for
India. Technological advances already exist for extensive militarisation of outer
space and extensive use of outer space for complex military functions in tactical
warfare scenarios. The recent successful demonstration of BMD technology
for ASAT application clearly establishes the potential of BMD for space warfare
purposes. It is important to note that the priorities of powerful nations in
outer space are now changing.
Development and deployment of micro-satellites will represent yet another
chapter in possible weaponisation as they are potentially dual-use systems.
Clearly the technology is already well established for obvious advantages in
civilian and commercial applications and many nations including India are
very active in this emerging field. However, its application for space weapon
orientation will depend on the intention and motivation of the user nation
or group. While the US’ focus today is on maintaining its supremacy in space,
priorities for other major space-faring nations such as China and Russia are
woven around ways to counter possible US deployment of space applicable
weapons and other space control capabilities for global force projections.
China’s growing military strength in outer space is thus justified as a counter
to deal with US dominance in space, but for India this poses a problem because
the same strength can be used against Indian interests, particularly in the
event of any terrestrial conflict with China or its evergreen ally Pakistan. India’s
space capabilities thus cannot afford to fall behind China.
134 Role of Technology in International Affairs

The above makes it clear that a techno-military race in outer space is

already building and once any nation goes beyond a certain threshold in
defensive-offensive space capability, a sudden escalation can lead to use of
weapons in space. Any policy formulation on Space Security by India must
take cognisance of the advances in missile defence technology, DEW
capabilities and micro-satellite activities in India’s region of influence. Building
and enhancing space situational awareness will become very critical and timely
sensing of hostile intentions of adversarial nations or groups will be critical
to Indian national interests. The technology options in outer space are indeed
expensive but it is also necessary to understand the cost of not deciding or
not investing timely. The price of inaction may rise exponentially if the
technology gap with other leading countries is allowed to widen because then
India may end-up facing imminent technology controls that will become
increasingly restrictive for future space technologies. Ambivalence may thus
prove very expensive for India. US objections to Russian willingness to sell
cryogenic engine technology to India, is a case in point.
As a country with world-class capabilities in civilian space technologies
and independent space assets, it is imperative for India to be proactive with
regard to its own space security perceptions and policies. This would entail
remaining actively engaged in international negotiations on the subject of
security of outer space while building comprehensive understanding and
capabilities within the country. There is thus urgent need for an informed
debate on the subject involving policy makers, technology experts, user services
and think tanks. The first priority should be to concentrate on international
cooperation to protect existing space assets in a cooperative security model
and simultaneously enhance indigenous capabilities to remain competitive in
the space technology and space services domains. Development of critical
technologies such as advanced sensors, missile defence, micro-satellites and
directed energy technologies must be pursued with renewed urgency to build
indigenous strength. This must be aimed at quickly bridging technology gaps
with advanced nations so that India does not once again become one of the
targets for possible space arms control regimes in future.
It is very likely that by 2020 outer space capabilities will become as
important as nuclear deterrence has been for the past five-six decades because
strategic space capabilities will directly affect the nuclear-missile deterrence
value. The 1972 US-Soviet ABM Treaty was a clear acknowledgement of the
impact of outer space capability on BMD effectiveness. After the collapse of
the Soviet Union, the US was quick to abrogate the 1972 Treaty obligations
 Outer Space and International Affairs 135

so as to proceed with missile defence plans in space. Space is thus acquiring

an ever-more important dimension in the calculations for techno-military
superiority. If proactive policy guidelines are not evolved timely, India may
by default, become a reactive party and a follower of other nations with limited
choices. This is the rationale for a need to address all aspects of space security
in the Indian context and for the need to evolve practical and effective policy
guidelines for India’s response to the emerging threat of increasing
militarisation of outer space.
In view of the fast growth of the Indian economy and the future needs
of national security, India must articulate a space policy to announce its
unambiguous intentions to utilise space capabilities for the purpose of
addressing national security concerns. Such a policy, which would inter alia,
indeed reiterate India’s commitment to the use of outer space for peaceful
purposes, must also articulate how India may use space capabilities for the
purposes of national security. This is a legitimate use of space, and for this,
India will have to undertake strategic long-term planning aimed at integrating
specific space capabilities with defence capabilities for safeguarding national
security interests. India will also have to constantly monitor the development
of space and missile defence capabilities of other space powers including those
of China (and as a consequence, Pakistan), and be acutely aware of the
possibility of hostile forces using outer space against Indian national interests.
India must remain actively engaged in international discussions and
negotiations on issues concerning the use of outer space for civilian and
military purposes so that it could be in a position to shape and influence
international negotiations on space-related issues to best serve its national
security interests. India is already globally participative in efforts to mitigate
space debris problems. Simultaneously, it would be imperative for India to
develop a comprehensive understanding of concepts like ‘weaponisation of
outer space’ and ‘space based weapons’, so that it can evolve a suitable response
to an arms race in space, particularly in the context of safeguarding India’s
national security interests in outer space.
India’s space assets are critical to its economic and human development
goals. Space capabilities are also critical for national security and regional
balance of power. India needs to evolve and articulate a National Space Security
Policy to formulate and implement space security strategies commensurate
with the perspectives of the defence services and national security interests.
Space policy should help enact legislations of appropriate national space laws
to meet international obligations and also protect national interests. This
136 Role of Technology in International Affairs

should provide guidelines on how India may respond to any hostility in space.
India must urgently invest in technologies critical to space security and
establish indigenous capability in counter-space technologies and systems.
There is urgent need for international consensus on how best to monitor and
regulate use of outer space for military purposes within certain limits, to
prevent a new arms race in outer space. The international community must
also prevent misuse of space technology by rogue elements that might
challenge the international convergence of interest in outer space. India, being
one of the early starters and a major space-faring nation, must address its
own priorities in outer space and formulate suitable strategies to protect its
national security interests. In the changing global security scenario, space
defence has assumed a very critical dimension.
China’s aggressive advances in counter-space capability, arguably in
response to the US space policy pronouncement for full-spectrum dominance
in space, can pose ‘clear and present’ danger for India, where increasing
dependence on advanced space capabilities will be extremely vital both for
economic progress and for national security. Therefore, it is imperative for
India to acquire certain minimum counter-space capabilities to protect its
national security interests in outer space through its own indigenous
technology capabilities. This must indeed be backed with well articulated space
policy guidelines and the political-legal institutional framework necessary to
enable effective implementation of India’s space policy. The declaration of a
National Space Policy as demonstration of political will and space defence
capabilities are essential to building deterrence in space. While doing so, India
must also contribute proactively towards building an international consensus
for preserving the ‘Peace Balance’ in outer space.
NOTES
1. Report of the IDSA-Pugwash Working Group on Space Security: Need for a Proactive
Approach, Appendix I, “Outer Space Treaty 1967”, Academic Foundation, 2009, pp. 79-
89. (The author was a contributor of the Working Group).
2. Robert Preston et. al., “Space Weapons Earth Wars”, RAND Project Air Force, at
www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1209 (Accessed May 14, 2014).
3. “Airborne Laser System (ABL) YALIA, United States of America”, at www.airforce-
technology.com/projects/abl (Accessed May 14, 2014).
4. The US military’s doctrine of ‘Full spectrum dominance’ means control of land, sea, air
and space. See https://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/.../Full-spectrum_dominance.html
(Accessed May 14, 2014).
5. “Air-Launched Miniature Vehicle (ALMV)”, July 21, 2011. It is an Anti-Satellite Weapon.
See http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/almv.htm (Accessed May 14, 2014).
6. Two Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptors are launched during a
 Outer Space and International Affairs 137

successful intercept missile defence test, September 2013 at www.mda.mil/news/

gallery_thaad.html (Accessed May 14, 2014).
7. US Space Command Vision for 2020 (pdf ), December 2005 at www.worldacademy.org/
files./The_US_Space_Command_Vision_for_2020.pdf.. (Accessed May 14, 2014).
8. James Clay Moltz, “Increased commercial interests and the evolution of space weapons”,
Future of Space Security, July 1, 2002, at http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/future-space-
security/ (Accessed May 15, 2014).
9. Arvind Gupta, Amitav Mallik and Ajey Lele, (Eds.) Space Security: Need for Global
Convergence, Pentagon Security International, 2012. Chapter 4—‘International Space Laws:
Future Outlook’ gives a comprehensive discussion of the subject.
10. Brian Weeden, “Economies of space sustainability”, The Space Review, June 4, 2012 at
www.thespacereview.com/article/2093/1. (Accessed May 15, 2014).
11. Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) is an international
organisation for ongoing cooperative activities for debris mitigation options. See www.iadc-
online.org/ (Accessed May 15, 2014).
12. “Russian and U.S. Satellite Collide”, BBC News, February 12, 2009, at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7885051.stm (Accessed May 15, 2014).
13. Outer Space Treaty, UNOOSA at www.unoosa.org/oosa/SpaceLaw/outerspt.html (Accessed
May 15, 2014).
14. “Understanding China’s ASAT Test”, Union of Concerned Scientists. See http://
www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/solutions/us-china-.. (Accessed May
15, 2014).
15. Dwayne A. Day, “Blunt arrows: the limited utility of ASATs”, July 6, 2005, at
www.thespacereview.com/article/388/2 (Accessed May 15, 2014).
16. Leonard David, “US Air Force’s Secretive X-37B Space Plane Shatters Orbital Endurance
Record”, March 27, 2014 at http://www.space.com/25245-secret-x37b-space-plane- orbital-
record.html (Accessed May 15, 2014).
17. Dylan Rebstock, “A Revised and Stronger International Code of Conduct for Space”,
Stimson Center, Washington DC, November 5, 2013, at www.stimson.org/.../a-revised-
and-stronger-international-code-of-conduct... (Accessed May 15, 2014).
 5
Cyber Space and International Affairs

Introduction: Cyber Space—The New Dimension

What started as an age of digital electronics and computers in the middle of
the 20th century, has gradually transformed modern human society quite
comprehensively as a growing population of highly informed people, who
are interconnected more via knowledge exchange than commodity exchange.
This transformation has been driven mainly by the spread of Information-
Communication-Technology (ICT) leading to rapid growth of social and intra-
national interactions with its impact on international relations (I.R.) and the
political discourse. Politics is often mostly about the evolution of social
relationships between nations and people in terms of ‘who gets what, when,
and how’. It should thus be easy to understand the transformative role of
ICT as it has established a new dimension for international exchanges that
happened through various forms of physical medium in the past. This new
dimension is called cyber space which is creating a paradigm transformation
in the scope and speed of human interactions.
The most fascinating development of the Digital Age has been the quick
evolution and establishment of an interconnected and standardised network
of computers and communication systems across the world as a virtual domain,
which is now being recognised as the cyber space. This ‘network of networks’
has developed into a global system of interactions spanning innumerable shared
activities as well as exchange of information and ideas by people around the
world through the internet. Activities in cyber space have very quickly acquired
 Cyber Space and International Affairs 139

a central role in everyday human activity and indeed in interactions between

nations. This is why significant resources are now being invested to address
various aspects of cyber space, including cyber security and cyber politics that
have the potential to impact global affairs in a major way in the future.
Over the past two decades, cyber technology has demonstrated its
promising potential of influencing international relations and even promoting
international peace and democratic norms. Cyber space has also proved to be
a new dimension of virtual reality that has helped the rise of globalisation
and provided new opportunities for global capitalism and commercialism.
While some of the openness and anonymity of cyber space has provided
a voice for the oppressed, thus triggering a social transformation and giving
empowerment to non-state groups in some autocratic States, the same
empowerment of individuals or small groups beyond their limited physical
sphere of influence, has the potential to pose serious asymmetric threats to
State apparatus for security and governance. Like most other advances in
technology, ICT is also double-edged—its impact is based on the intentions
of the user. Potential for misuse of cyber space is however enormous, because
of its ubiquitous nature and nation-states are waking up to the rise of this
new dimension of threat to national security. This maze of interconnected
networks—the internet—has caused a revolution with both positive and
negative implications and States are now discussing how best to control this
new ‘animal’ to prevent its misuse and yet encourage common good.
It is important to note that the internet was originally designed by the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) as a medium of fast
information exchange for strategic applications. Once its global potential was
realised it was decided to allow access to all and hence, the open character of
the internet was consciously designed into the system by the creators and
built into its architecture. While the internet was designed this way, it can
indeed be changed as political actors contest the design of this open
architecture and compete to use the new technology to gain superiority over
the adversary. This is possible between nations, groups or even individuals,
and this duality of technology for cooperation or competition highlights the
core of the modern-day relationship between technology, society and politics.
As technology spreads and impacts a wide range of actors and the things they
value, inevitably some of these actors will contest the architecture of cyber
space and seek to redesign it at a technical level, and even exploit it at the
application level, in order to advance their specific interests. Some of this has
already begun to happen.
140 Role of Technology in International Affairs

The central issue of governance of cyber space, among the variety of

international stakeholders—including States, international organisations, non-
governmental institutions, private firms and other non-state actors—is about
the technical standards, regulations and institutions that determine the
structure and applicability of cyber space. It is therefore important to
understand how novel models of international governance may be constructed
to adjudicate disputes among States and other international stakeholders, such
as how the internet ought to be structured, used and regulated. Main concerns
are about the role that States may play in this process and how future of I.R.
may be affected by such over-reaching technologies that go beyond sovereign
borders.
Cyber technology holds major promise for international economic
development through rapid spread of what is now recognised as ‘knowledge
economy’, which emphasises the potential gains in economic growth that could
be achieved from a greater ability to quickly send, access and store information
on a global scale. Cyber space is the new medium for the improved flow of
knowledge which itself can be considered as being ‘good for economic
progress.’ Diffusion of information technology (IT) along with international
economic liberalisation opens up ways to allow capital to flow across borders
and be invested in ‘good ideas’.
On the other hand, the diffusion of cyber technology can also create and
deepen a ‘digital divide’ between developed societies that are capable of better
harnessing technology for productivity gains, and less developed societies that
are not. This increasing gap could ultimately create a security problem as those
who feel excluded from the global information society and its wealth creation
potential can turn to violence to capture some of the gains.
This brings to focus the relationship between cyber space and international
security, which can include a wide variety of phenomena such as cyber crime,
cyber conflict, information security, or even cyber warfare. Application
potential can range from access to tactical or operational information, and
strategic attacks on critical infrastructure, to espionage and propaganda for
political or economic objectives. It appears clear that ICT has served as the
foundational element of latest revolutionary network-centric operations which
enabled the integration of capability-enhancing technologies into modern
strategic capacity and superior operating systems. ICT has provided an
efficiency-booster or multiplier effect that allows modern militaries to quickly
distribute large volumes of information and analyse them in order to identify
 Cyber Space and International Affairs 141

what is strategically useful. Such information operations (IO) can disrupt an

adversary’s information systems and include psychological operations, military
deception, electronic warfare and computer network operations (CNO).
In global affairs, power depends upon the context and the rapid growth
of cyber space is an important new context in the world of politics. The low
cost of entry, relative anonymity and asymmetries in vulnerability allows
smaller actors to have more capacity to exercise influence in cyber space than
in several more traditional domains of world politics. The cyber domain is
both a new and a volatile man-made environment where power of information
is manifesting itself in a new and novel manner. In cyber space the power
differentials among various actors is reduced and this provides a unique
diffusion of power that is becoming typical of global politics in this 21st
century. However, diffusion of power does not mean equality of power or
replacement of State as the most powerful actor in world politics. Cyber
security today is all about how sovereign States can organise to protect national
security sensitivity from asymmetric or adversarial players in the field. The
most important implications of cyber space as a new domain of interaction is
the emergence of some new features of I.R. which are due almost entirely to
the construction, growth and expansion of cyber space. Many of these features
are already influencing if not challenging traditional theory, policy and practice
of I.R.
In the virtual space of cyber space with no boundaries, the emerging
Digital Domain is expanding quickly with the establishment of newer
interconnected networks of computers and communication systems across
the world that affects every aspect of the life of nations or citizens. Today,
this ‘network of networks’ is evolving into a global system of interactions
spanning innumerable shared activities and exchange of information or ideas
by the people around the world. It is now common to speak of the sum of
these inter-connections among computing and communication systems as a
single, shared virtual domain—the cyber space and talk about ‘Internet of
Everything’.
The activities in cyber space have acquired a very central role in everyday
human activities and of course in interactions between nations. This has
revolutionised the scope and speed of access to information and knowledge,
thus providing unprecedented capabilities to an individual or a nation. At
the same time, the same ability to interconnect and access information can
have dangerous implications if applied with negative intentions by State or
142 Role of Technology in International Affairs

non-state actors. Some of this is already happening among the religious

fundamentalist groups and organised crime syndicates.
In the context of international relations there is growing realisation, that
controlling misuse of technology is going to be a difficult challenge because
intentions or evil designs have become more important than the tools with
which such intentions may be practiced. Fortunately, technology does offer
various defensive methods such as fire-walls or encryption to prevent hacking
or unauthorised access to sensitive information. However, perceptions of cyber
security transcend national geographic boundaries and thus, dealing with cyber
security at all levels will demand greater cooperation and coordination among
peace loving nations.
This chapter will present a techno-political perspective on cyber security
and highlight the major impact of this evolving new technology on
‘International Affairs’ in general and more specifically on challenges for Indian
security priorities.

Expanding Cyber Space: Impact on International Affairs

Governance of cyber space is characterised by the contestation among a variety
of international stakeholders including States, international organisations
(IOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs), private firms, and other non-
state actors—over the technical standards, regulations, and institutional
interactions that determine the structure of cyber space. As already mentioned
the open architecture of cyber space was consciously designed into the system
by the creators of the internet and built into its structure for world-wide
applicability. While the internet was designed this way, political actors contest
the design of this architecture and demand changes for better control. This
duality touches the core of the relationship between technology and politics
and highlights the mutually embedded relationship between them. As the
technology spreads and impacts a wider range of actors and the things they
value, these actors will contest the architecture of cyber space and seek to
redesign it at a technical level in order to advance their particular interests.
Hence, cyber space is an area where technology and international relations
are intertwined more intrinsically than many other domains of technology in
international affairs. To understand the above premise one can look at the
phenomenal growth of ICT that has created a Global Civil Society—civilian
transnational groups that can exist and function across international borders
and operate independently of the authority of States. These groups, networked
 Cyber Space and International Affairs 143

through and empowered by cyber space, could together form the basis of a
new and transformative global polity or ‘public sphere’ that could reshape
world politics, impact international relations and even promote international
peace and democratic norms if properly oriented by global powers.
Cyber space has thus proved to be a new dimension of virtual reality that
has helped the rise of globalisation and provided new opportunities for global
capitalism and commercialism. The most important implication of cyber space
as a new domain of interaction is the emergence of some new features of
I.R., those that are due almost entirely to the construction, growth and
expansion of cyber space. Many of these features are already influencing if
not challenging traditional theory, policy, and practice of I.R.
While considering cyber space in terms of its impact on I.R., it is
important to understand some of the layers of cyber space:
The information—in its various forms and manifestations—that is stored,
transmitted, and transformed in cyber space.
The people—that is, the users and constituencies of cyber venues, who
participate in and shape the cyber-experience—who communicate, work with
information, make decisions and carry out plans, and who themselves
transform the nature of cyber space by working with its component services
and capabilities, and by making direct and indirect demands for the
construction of new functionalities.
The logical building blocks that make up the services and support the
platform structure of the cyber space.
The physical foundations that support the logical elements as well as the
fundamental physicality that enable the ‘virtual’ manifestations of interactions.
While it is common practice today to associate cyber space with the
internet, with its particular approach to interconnection, a bunch of computers
in isolation would not constitute what can be described as the cyber space. It
is the structure of interconnections and the constant flow of information that
makes cyber space. Though the foundation of cyber space is a physical layer
—the physical devices out of which it is built—yet cyber space is a conceptual
space of interconnected computing devices. Its foundations are the personal
computers and servers, supercomputers and grids, sensors and transducers,
and various parts of networks and communications channels etc.
Communications may occur over wires or fibres via radio transmission or by
the physical transport of the computing and storage devices from across places.
144 Role of Technology in International Affairs

Physical devices such as routers or data centres exist in a place and thus sit
within a jurisdiction.
The physical foundations of cyber space are fundamental logical layers.
Cyber space is not a fictional conception without any physical grounding but
a real artefact built out of real elements. The nature of cyber space is such
that its strengths and limitations derive more from the decisions made at the
logical level than the physical level. The internet, for example, provides a set
of capabilities that are intentionally separated to a great extent from the details
of the technology that underpins it.
The decisions that shape the internet arise at the higher layer—the logical
layer where the open platform nature of the internet is defined and created.
Within the logical layer of the internet, one can see a series of sub-layers that
provide services to the next sub-layer above. Low-level services include
programme execution environments, mechanisms for data transport and
standards for data formats. The basic transport service of the internet, which
moves packets of data from a source to a destination, is an essential element
of this lowest sub-layer of the logical layer. Out of these low-level components
and services are built applications, such as a word processor, a database or the
Web. In turn, by combining these, more complex services emerge. For
example, by combining a database with the Web, we get dynamic content
generation and active Web objects. On top of the Web, we now see services
such as Facebook that are themselves platforms for further application
development.
The nature of cyber space involves a continuous and rapid evolution of
new capabilities and services, based on the creation and combination of new
logical constructs, all running on top of the physical foundations. Cyber space,
at the logical level, is thus a series of platforms, on each of which new
capabilities are constructed, which in turn become a platform for the next
innovation. Cyber space is very plastic, and it can be described as recursive;
platforms upon platforms upon platforms. The platforms may differ in detail,
but they share the common feature that they are the foundation for the next
platform above them.
Above the logical layer we find the information layer. The creation,
capture, storage and processing of information and ‘content’ is central to the
nature of cyber space. Information in cyber space takes many forms such as,
the music and videos one shares, the stored records of businesses and all of
the pages in the World Wide Web. The contents may include online books
 Cyber Space and International Affairs 145

and photographs, information about information (meta-data) and information

created and retrieved as we search for other information (as is returned by
Google). This information layer contains the implied meaning of the
information and content that is transmitted, shared, changed, and augmented
and the like. The top layer is the users. People are not just passive users of
cyber space; they define and shape its character by the ways they choose to
use it, in this sense, they are active participants. The people and their character
which may vary across regions, is an important part of the character of cyber
space. If people contribute to Wikipedia, then Wikipedia exists. If people
tweet, then Twitter exists. This is a critically important, definitional, feature
of cyber space.
At the information layers, we find a range of actors with diverse capabilities
and providing different services. Google delivers a searchable index of the
Web. Companies like Netflix, Google and Apple iTunes sell music and video
content over the internet. Some applications are centralised from a control
perspective but highly distributed technically, for reasons of performance.
These include high-volume content sources such as YouTube or Netflix. The
providers of Web pages are perhaps the most obvious example of ‘information
layer actors’—they include commercial sales and marketing sites, free sites
supported by advertising, government information and service portals, and
so on. All these businesses are based on ingenuity and innovation, buttressed
by market creation capability.
Two important points to note are that the protocols and standards of the
internet define not just technical interfaces, but interfaces between separate
business entities, and secondly, almost all of this vast universe of actors, large
and small, are highly dynamic entities of the private sector, many of which
exist and function beyond the authority of any single sovereign State. To date,
the makers and users of the internet are predominantly in the private sector,
following certain principles of private order, not necessarily controlled by the
power of the State.
The selection and effective implementation of cyber security technologies
requires:
• Ensuring that the technologies are securely configured;
• Considering organisational information technology infrastructure
needs when selecting technologies;
• Implementing technologies through a layered, defence-in-depth
strategy;
146 Role of Technology in International Affairs

• Utilising results of independent testing when assessing the technologies’

capabilities;
• Training the staff on the secure implementation and utilisation of
these technologies.
The organisations in government and critical infrastructure sector would have
to protect their networks, systems and data through deployment of access
control technologies (for perimeter protection, authentication and
authorisation), system integrity measures, cryptography mechanisms and
configuration management. Indigenous research and development (R&D) is
an essential component of national information security measures due to
various reasons, a major one being export restrictions on sophisticated IT
products by advanced countries. Resources like skilled manpower and
infrastructure created through pre-competitive public funded projects provide
much needed inputs to entrepreneurs to be globally competitive through
further R&D. Success in technological innovation is significantly facilitated
by a sound science and technology (S&T) environment and an ecosystem for
continuing innovation where the rate of obsolescence is rapid.
Use of software virus to interfere with the adversary’s network is emerging
as a new age weapon for Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. It
may find increasing use in future as was evident in 2012 when the US used
‘Stuxnet’ to target specific industrial control systems in Iran, to slow down
nuclear reprocessing activities. Israel is also known to have used a cyber weapon
against Syria and in recent years several cyber attacks are suspected to originate
from China. Cyber weapon technology can be used for the purpose of
espionage or for compromising C3I (Command, Control, Computers and
Intelligence) networks of the enemy. Building defences against cyber attacks
or reducing vulnerability of one’s own critical networks is a complex and
evolving process shrouded in secrecy. Recent exposure about the US National
Security Agency listening-in and monitoring the phone conversation of
European leaders has brought-out the dangerous aspects of cyber space that
may change the baseline for I.R.
Given the natural inclination for computers and software development,
India has made an early start in utilising cyber space for development as well
as defence. India recently released the National Cyber Security Policy that
highlights Indian priorities and the Indian approach to leveraging the
technology to best protect national interest.
 Cyber Space and International Affairs 147

International Laws and Limitations: For now, international laws cannot answer
satisfactorily the questions about the complexities of cyber space. These laws
can at best be categorised into two main types. First is Jus Ad Bellum meaning
Laws of Conflict Management—these laws mainly give guidelines about the
situations in which defensive force should be applied. Second is Jus in Bello
meaning Laws of War—these explain what are the ways in which offensive
or defensive force should be applied.
Unlike domestic laws which have limited jurisdiction and are enforced
upon citizens of the State, the problem with international laws is that States
may agree to follow them or refuse to follow them or even agree first and
then back-out. This means, States which are not signatories to treaties or
conventions which would bring them under one umbrella, can cause serious
impediments to cyber space laws that can be applied universally. Thus, cyber
space neither respects geographical boundaries nor jurisdictional laws, and
consequently it may not even honour international laws.
Such an ambiguous and complex dilemma has emerged because ICT has
ironically evolved from military communication technology where it was
meant to be under tight control of government order. But since its very
inception, ICT has empowered individuals to use it at his/her free will and
do so as per his/her own requirement or knowledge. This has blurred the
separating line between the military and civilians. Lack of precise domestic
laws and enforcement makes it difficult to regulate when it comes to civilian
use. As a result, civilians too can take a stance just as the Russian authorities
took no responsibility in the case of Estonia (discussed later in the chapter).
Hence, controlling cyber space use and punishing any violation of norms or
laws is very difficult. In the year 2010, 1600 cyber crime cases were registered
in India but only seven got convicted.1
On the other hand, there are big possibilities of false accusations and
victimisation while enforcing cyber laws. For example, there was a case in
Japan where four people were arrested for a cyber crime they never committed.
In reality, their computers were controlled by a Remote Access Trojan (RAT)
virus and the real perpetrators remained anonymous. The mistake was later
recognised by law enforcement authorities but by that time, the damage was
done to the dignity of those innocent people by the media.2 Cyber space thus
opens up a plethora of new complications and there are wide possibilities of
its misuse, affecting many cases where responsibility will be difficult to
establish and many mistakes might never get corrected. This can pose new
148 Role of Technology in International Affairs

kind of challenge for diplomats managing international affairs in an

environment of fuzzy accountability and an unclear legal framework.

Information Technology, Security and Impact on International Affairs

National security is at the core of State interests in cyber space in the
Information Age, as it throws up new modes of conflict and influence. Cyber
war is different from actual war and definitions can be confusing because
they focus more on intentions rather than actual war-like operations. Actions
and reactions take place in the invisible domain of cyber space with no
immediate human casualty.
Involvement of the State security apparatus leads to militarisation of cyber
security, but the exact war fighting domain is often difficult to define. Often,
there are differences in perception of possible impacts of cyber security threats
and hence, there can be significant differences among States trying to develop
a modus operandi and relevant strategies in cyber space in order to secure their
interests. Military conceptualisation and doctrines for cyber threat response
must take into account technological advances in the emerging network-centric
environment of today.
Increasing involvement of non-state actors in the security realm however,
can increase the chance of politically motivated cyber attacks with an
asymmetric impact on I.R. It is often difficult to determine if a cyber attack
is from an independent entity or agency outsourced by a government. In the
present transitional phase of cyber security, there are many grey areas and
until some structures and international norms emerge, there is a lot of scope
for misunderstanding between nations, which can adversely affect otherwise
smooth international relations. Foreign policy and practice will have to factor-
in such issues in the future management of international affairs.
At the national level, vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure can include:
(a) Energy (b) Transportation (c) Communication (d) Water and Sanitation
(e) Financial and Banking Infrastructure (f ) Industrial Processes and
(g) Government Administrations. All of these in modern society are based
on digital control systems and threats can be directed against the Supervisory
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems that are used to monitor
and control processes in various critical infrastructure facilities by changing
or stopping them. Science fiction often shows the way terrorists take over
such critical control systems and cause havoc; in a sense, reality may not be
far removed from fiction.
 Cyber Space and International Affairs 149

Cyber Space Norms

The internet and social networking have introduced new forms of
communication which can be de-linked from national boundaries, authorities
and official monitoring. This means every individual can be included in cyber
space which gives all cyber issues a truly global character. Hence, the
requirement for international norms or conventions regarding the use of cyber
space has assumed increasing urgency. International negotiations are required
to bring out a set of norms acceptable to the most powerful and pragmatic
States, so that cyber space is not fragmented due to competition between
nation-states.
A set of good norms should ideally satisfy the following requirements:
1. Cyber space should remain open, interoperable and reliable.
2. All nations should have an interest in clean, healthy cyber space and
consequent to that interest, they should have a duty to assist, inform
and educate one another.
3. Together all nations should strive for a cyber space that retains the
trust of its users.
4. Fundamental freedom of people for information and connectivity
would need to be upheld.
5. Key international laws, norms, and rules should be extended to cyber
space.
6. Multi-stakeholder stewardship involving governments, international
organisations and the private sector should shape the development
and maintenance of cyber space.
7. Governments should refrain from political interference in technical
development and standards for the internet.
The problem with the current approach towards norms is a ‘military capability’
mindset. There is little experience of cyber attacks in a war-like context and
insufficient knowledge of their consequences. In addition, threats cannot be
explained in terms of distinction between say, military vs. civilian, attack vs.
espionage, State vs. non-state agents, or intentional vs. accidental. The
responsibility of States for attacks originating in their territories, perpetrated
by non-state actors, will be hard to define and the involvement of military
units in protecting domestic critical infrastructure from cyber attacks can pose
new complexities. Handing the military a lead role in responding to a cyber
attack on infrastructure could bias the conflict process towards retaliation and
escalation, rather than resilience and recovery, because it introduces an offensive
150 Role of Technology in International Affairs

option and action. Having said that, there can be situations where retaliatory
action is indeed required.

Cyber Security Policy: Case for India

A good cyber security policy must make India’s stance clear in its diplomatic
relations and it must be credible for suitably influencing international
perceptions. This is important now since international laws and conventions
regarding cyber space are in the process of being formulated. India needs a
central body which would deal with all aspects of cyber space and
acknowledgement of the private sector as being a major player in cyber space.
The private sector also needs to be fully participative and on the same page
as the State on issues of security and national interests.
The release of the Cyber Security Policy (CSP) of India in July 2013 was
an important step in recognising the critical impact that cyber space can have
on national security. India has been recognised as a provider of world class IT
and telecom products and services for over a decade now. The much awaited
CSP 2013 is a right step in protecting and furthering strategic objectives of
our nation. India’s dependence on ICT is bound to increase in the immediate
future with greater emphasis on e-governance to improve efficiency and
transparency. The intent, ability and motivation of the government and other
crucial stakeholders in this effort would be to protect critical information,
technologies and infrastructure. The maturity of the policy and quality of
people responsible for implementation will be deciding factors in the
survivability and success of the cyber space objectives for gaining strategic
advantage in cyber space.
The policy includes a formal assessment of what constitutes India’s critical
infrastructure sector and the designation of critical technology sectors which
will be crucial to our nation’s security and stability. The policy envisages
creation of a nodal agency at the centre to direct all efforts, assign
responsibilities and perform advisory functions for all stakeholders concerned.
The central agency will monitor the accomplishment of policy goals and
uphold the tenets of accountability. The policy envisages an ambitious goal
of training nearly 500,000 cyber security professionals in the next five years
who will have considerable potential capabilities equivalent to an army of IT
warriors. Public-private partnerships (PPP) have been identified as the key to
implementing the policy on the ground and the government has openly
endorsed and welcomed participation of India’s private telecom and IT
companies.
 Cyber Space and International Affairs 151

But the underlying principles and the balancing of national security versus
the privacy laws of citizens have not been clearly articulated in the Indian
policy paper and would be a source of friction in the future. The policy should
have made references to the IT Act 2000 which is a law that can have
precedence over the policy issued by the executive/government of the day in
case of variance or conflict. The concept of checks and balances is also not
clearly discussed as to how data will be collected, processed, analysed and
distributed and for what purpose, in order to safeguard it against misuse by
vested interests.
India needs to set up and promote centres of excellence for cyber security
and techno-legal research. However, the policy is silent on the requirement
to develop cyber offensive capabilities alongside cyber defence and security.
The policy should be flexible and dynamic in nature to incorporate the ever-
changing environment of cyber space. There is a need to involve not only
industries and ministries but also academia, institutes of higher education
and research labs to create an enabling cyber ecosystem. The CSP will play a
crucial role in defining the state of the nation in the years to come, through
its ability to deliver on the policy vision which is ‘To build a secure and resilient
cyber space for citizens, businesses and government’.
Following are some salient features of India’s National Cyber Security
Policy:3
1. Based on key policy considerations and the threat landscape, the draft
policy identifies priority areas for action.
2. Identifies PPP as a key component.
3. Identifies key actions to reduce security threats and vulnerabilities.
4. Suggests establishment of a National Cyber Alert System for early watch
and warning, information exchange, responding to national level cyber
incidents and facilitating restoration.
5. Defines role of sectoral CERTs (Computer Emergency Response Team)
and establishment of local incident response teams for each critical sector
organisation.
6. Encourages implementation of best practices in critical information
and government infrastructure protection through creation,
establishment and operation of an Information Security Assurance
Framework.
7. Establishes framework for crisis management plan for countering cyber
attacks and cyber terrorism.
152 Role of Technology in International Affairs

8. Identifies priorities for action for legal framework and law enforcement
capability development.
9. Defines priorities for international cooperation for information sharing.
10. Identifies indigenous R&D as an essential component of cyber security
and enlists thrust areas for R&D.
11. Identifies major actions and initiatives for user awareness, education,
and training (capacity building).
12. Defines responsible actions for network service providers, large corporate
and small/medium and home users, to secure information and systems.
13. Identifies various stakeholders (ministries and government departments
only) of cyber security and their responsibilities.
There is genuine need for better PPP in India for quick maturity in cyber
space. If the Critical Information Infrastructure (CII) which can include
various important private sectors like banking, telecom, energy, airlines, water
supply etc. does come under cyber attack, adverse effects do not remain limited
to the organisation alone, but can affect multiple entities all over the nation.
That is why better coordination as well as information sharing among the
public/private sector and cyber security providers like Indian Computer
Emergency Response Team (CERT-In), NASSCOM (National Association
for Software and Services Company), NCSC (National Centre for Science
Communication) etc. is very necessary.
This would provide more case studies and help improvise defence
mechanisms as well as build the heuristics for better proactive defence. The
government must ensure that CII entities follow computer security auditing
as per standards and keep themselves up-to-date so that mishaps can be
avoided. Also a budgetary allowance is necessary for all the backroom efforts
to maintain momentum. This will make the infrastructure more vigilant,
disciplined and up-to-date with compliance issues, thus giving a better edge
in cyber security. IDSA, Delhi has brought out a task force report on the
subject which is very informative.4
Research in both encryption implementation and encryption breaking
techniques is necessary to help build lawful interception capabilities within
Law Enforcement and Intelligence Agencies (LEIA) as in other countries.
Indian private sector and academic institutions should also be included and
encouraged to conduct such research and training of personnel.
Technology sharing with other countries which have comparable or better
capabilities would be useful. For example, Indian telecom networks use only
 Cyber Space and International Affairs 153

a 40-bit encryption system. The basic reason being that India currently has
the capability to ‘break’ it. The capacity should be increased for better safety
in various services ranging from e-governance to online banking. Cyber security
courses should be introduced at school, graduate and postgraduate levels. With
better funding and scholarships, indigenous technology and human resources
can be developed for this field.
Cyber space technology tends to develop very rapidly. Hence, cyber
intelligence officials and information security personnel need to have latest
knowledge. They should be encouraged and funded by the government to
upgrade themselves regularly by taking courses. At the same time, not only
do the indigenous certifications and training programmes need to be at par
with well-known leading private sector certification standards, but these need
to be started urgently. This could in turn improve indigenous capability and
cut training cost dynamically.
The most famous cyber war incident to date and one with most details
in the public domain is the Stuxnet worm in 2012. Stuxnet’s existence was
first reported by security blogger Brian Krebs. It appeared in dozens of
countries targeting what are known as programmable logic controllers, which
are ubiquitous industrial computers, the size of cigarette cartons. Stuxnet was
specifically designed to harm controllers processing uranium fuel at a nuclear
facility in Iran. People who have analysed the attack think someone slid a
thumb drive with a Stuxnet code into a Windows personal computer that
was linked to the centrifuges, which were buried in a bunker. The worm then
ordered the machinery to spin too fast, eventually destroying it. While all
this happened, Stuxnet remained hidden from the Iranian technicians at the
facility. The worm also disabled alarms and fed the workers fake log reports
that assured them the centrifuges were operating just fine.
Stuxnet set Iran’s nuclear programme back by months. It did not merely
compromise some database like most computer worms, but also obliterated
something physical. “Stuxnet was the equivalent of a very high-powered
ballistic weapon,” says Ed Jaehne, the chief strategy officer at KEYW
Corporation, a fast-growing computer security firm in Maryland. As
researchers dissected the technology and hunted for motives, some of them
pointed to the US or Israel as the worm’s likeliest place of origin.
Another example is the Edward Snowden controversy exposing the US
Government’s PRISM programme. The US has not only spent millions of
dollars on PRISM but the seriousness of the initiative can be understood by
154 Role of Technology in International Affairs

the fact that the US NSA employs nearly the maximum number of
mathematicians in the world, which is an indicator of its potential to collect
and make sense of the vast amounts of data in the cyber domain. All these
countries have forward looking programmes, not only to protect their own
turf but also to exploit the vulnerabilities of others.

Cyber Security: Threat Perceptions and Policy Dimensions

Cyber threats are best described as: ‘A potential cause of an incident, that
may result in harm to Information and Communication Network systems in
cyber space, and can cause further inconvenience, damages or risk to national
security.’ These threats are peculiar because a cyber attack could be very
difficult to trace back to its origin or may be disguised as if originating from
a completely different location.
If one reflects on the 2007 Estonia attacks, there were many threads
leading one to believe that Russian authorities had something to do with those
attacks but Russia called accusations of its involvement ‘unfounded’, and
neither the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) nor the European
Commission experts were able to find any proof of official Russian
Government involvement.5 This means that even though in some instances,
these attacks are traced back to their origin, it is very easy for the accused to
deny their involvement and defend themselves against ‘false or miscalculated’
accusations. The moral of the story: There is a great need for clearer and
comprehensive international norms to deal with such conflicts. Fortunately,
after years of monitoring and analysing cyber attacks, there are some
generalised patterns that can be deducted by information security analysts.
These patterns provide some heuristics and help to provide some direction
to further investigation. The benefit of such patterns is that even though the
suspects/accused can deny the accusation, some defensive strategy can still be
thought out and implemented for the future.
Cyber threats can be put into four main categories: cyber warfare, cyber
espionage, cyber terrorism and cyber crime. Also, the first two, cyber warfare
and cyber espionage tend to give birth to a complex mechanism to resolve
cyber conflict. Their scope is larger than that of cyber terrorism and cyber
crime and one must examine the very ethics of cyber conflict. Dorothy E.
Denning, an American expert on information security and Professor at the
Department of Defense Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,
California, deals with ethical issues related to cyber conflicts.6
 Cyber Space and International Affairs 155

Cyber warfare is more difficult to deal with than conventional warfare

because it is a ‘non contact war’. It does not involve any physical or kinetic
actions on the adversaries. One State may attack another State’s information
systems not only to disrupt or destroy their operations, but also for espionage
and covert actions in the interest of national security. The conventional Law
of Armed Conflict (LOAC) cannot be directly applied to cyber warfare due
to its virtual and complex nature.
Since information systems work on the borderline of civilian and military
characteristics, it poses different questions about warfare and ethics in using
the new dimension of this dual-use technology.
• Is it ethical for a State to penetrate or disable the computer systems of
an adversary State that has threatened its territorial or political integrity?
• If so, what are the ground rules for such attacks?
• Can cyber soldiers attack critical infrastructure that serves both civilian
and military functions?
• If a nation is under cyber assault from another country, under what
conditions can it respond in kind or use armed force against the
assailant?
• Can it attack computers in a third country whose computer networks
have been compromised or exploited to facilitate an assault?
When ‘Hacktivism’ or ‘cyber terrorism is done by non-state actors, the State
needs to deal with additional issues such as: (a) Is it ethical for a group of
hackers to take down a website that is being used for illegal activities (according
to that group); (b) Can the hacktivists protest by defacing websites or
conducting web “sit-ins”?7; (c) Can they attack vulnerable machines in order
to expose security loopholes with the goal of making the internet more secure?
Another aspect about cyber security is attacking for defence, which can
further generate new complexities, such as:
• If a system is under cyber attack, can the system administrators counter-
attack in order to stop it?
• What if the attack is coming from computers that may themselves be
victims of compromise?
• Since many attacks are routed through chains of compromised
machines, can a victim “hack back” along the chain in order to
determine the source?
156 Role of Technology in International Affairs

Cyber Security: India’s Position

The current world economic scenario is transforming in leaps and bounds
due to the rise in ICT capabilities but at the same time, risks are also on the
rise because of the imminent nature of cyber threats. According to World
Bank statistics, by the end of 2013, internet users in India comprised 15.1
percent of the total population.8 The internet currently contributes $30 billion
to India’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) which might rise to $100 billion,
up from the present 1.6 to 3.3 percent by 2015. The internet-related economy
would influence India more than the education sector and would be as large
as the healthcare sector, in terms of share of GDP at present.9
So, it becomes very important to secure India’s critical information
infrastructure (CII) as well as to come up with better laws and norms to handle
cyber threats. Various techniques are used to start cyber attacks from simple
social engineering to complex computer programmes and high-end
technologies. These attacks may be initiated by some smart college going kid
tinkering with a computer system just for fun or some terrorist organisation
or ‘hacktivist’ group or, a nation-state with real sophisticated techniques and
resources.
Although India’s ranking in cyber crime activities has always been fairly
high, but it does not convey that India has committed such activities or holds
the capability of defending its cyber space either. In fact, a large number of
people in India who are frequent users of the internet do not even know the
basic requirements for securing computers. The rate of software piracy is also
very high in India. According to the 2011 Global Software Piracy Study done
by an independent firm, Business Software Alliance (BSA), about 63 percent
of Indians used pirated software. Over 20 percent of respondents in India
admitted to acquiring software illegally “all of the time”, or “most of the time”
or “occasionally”, while 23 percent said they do it “rarely.” This means that
in more than six out of ten cases, software that Indian users installed were
unlicensed.10 People tend to install pirated operating systems’ versions due to
lack of knowledge, disinformation by the vendor or even do so voluntarily to
save some money. Such software can make systems open and vulnerable to
hackers. This increases the chance of remotely controlled computers forming
dense ‘botnets’ within the country, posing risks to both Indian as well as global
cyber space.
In year 2011-12, India stood third after the US and China as origin or
‘Geographic Region of Malicious Activities’ with a total share of 6.5 percent
 Cyber Space and International Affairs 157

in the global average. With 16.2 percent of malicious activity originating in

India, more recently the country was ranked in second position. India then
had over 150 million internet users, which was the third largest population
of internet users in the world then. About 17 percent of spam zombies were
located in India, making it the first in that category. The number of internet
users has been climbing very steeply in India in recent years. Indian internet
users were estimated to be about 243 million in June 2014 and the number
may reach 500 million by 2018. These are huge numbers, making India the
highest user of cyber space.
Cyber espionage presents a whole different set of issues because the major
share of cyber space operations and control is by the private sector. In fact,
the development and management of cyber space was started with efforts of
major IT companies and civil bodies. To counter the competition or overpower
the competition in the market, often espionage strategies are used as a means
to the end. This is done worldwide and it is not restricted to cyber space, but
the complexities and parameters are different.
According to a report by Verizon, a security consultants group, which
incorporated data from 19 global partners—it covered 47,000 reported security
incidents and 621 confirmed data breaches in 2012. According to the Data
Breach Investigation Report 2013, 92 percent of breaches are perpetrated by
outsiders, while 14 percent have an insider connection.11 Big technology giants
too face espionage problems. In an espionage attack in February 2013,
Microsoft, Apple, Facebook and Twitter may have compromised accounts of
over 250,000 of its customers. But when it comes to cyber space, the high
amount of ambiguity due to absence of precise laws and norms, and lack of
public-private sector coordination makes the situations worse. Companies may
not want to reveal the damage they’ve suffered due to concerns about possibly
scaring off potential or existing customers, damaging their stock value or
incurring potential legal liabilities.
Some of the major organisations in India for the State to gain more control
include:
1. National Information Board (NIB)
The NIB is an apex agency with representatives from relevant
departments and agencies that form part of the critical minimum
information infrastructure in the country. NIB is entrusted with the
responsibility of enunciating the national policy on information
security and coordination on all aspects of information security
158 Role of Technology in International Affairs

governance in the country. The NIB is headed by the National Security

Adviser.
2. National Crisis Management Committee (NCMC)
The NCMC is an apex body of the Government of India (GoI) for
dealing with major crisis incidents that have serious or national
ramifications. It also deals with national crises arising out of focused
cyber attacks. The NCMC is headed by the Cabinet Secretary and
comprises of Secretary level officials of the GoI. When a situation is
being handled by the NCMC it will give directions to the Crisis
Management Group of the Central Administrative Ministry/
Department as deemed necessary.
3. The National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS)
The NSCS is the apex agency looking into the political, economic,
energy and strategic security concerns of India and acts as the Secretariat
to the National Security Council.
4. The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA)
The MHA issues security guidelines from time to time to secure
physical infrastructure. The respective Central Administrative
Ministries/Departments and critical sector organisations are required
to implement these guidelines for strengthening security measures in
their respective infrastructure facilities. The MHA sensitises the
administrative departments and organisations to vulnerabilities and
also assists the respective Administrative Ministry/Departments.
5. The Ministry of Defence (MoD)
The MoD is the nodal agency for responding to cyber security incidents
with respect to the defence sector. The Integrated Defence Staff (IDS)
of the MoD is the nodal tri-Services agency at the national level to
effectively deal with all aspects of information assurance and operations.
The MoD has also formed the Defence CERT whose primary function
is to coordinate the activities of the Service’s and MoD-CERTs. It
works in close association with CERT-In to ensure perpetual availability
of defence networks.
6. Department of Electronics and Information Technology (DeitY)—
The DeitY is under the Ministry of Communications and Information
Technology, GoI. DeitY strives to make India a leading player globally
in IT and at the same time take the benefits of IT to every walk of life
for developing an empowered and inclusive society. It is mandated
with the task of dealing with all issues related to promotion and policies
in electronics and information technology.
 Cyber Space and International Affairs 159

7. The Department of Telecommunications (DoT)

The DoT under the Ministry of Communications and Information
Technology, GoI, is responsible for coordinating with all Internet
Service Providers (ISPs) and service providers with respect to cyber
security incidents and response actions as deemed necessary by
CERT-In and other government agencies. The DoT provides
guidelines regarding roles and responsibilities of Private Service
Providers and ensures that these Service Providers are able to track the
critical optical fiber networks for uninterrupted availability and have
arrangements of alternate routing in case of physical attacks on these
networks.
8. National Cyber Response Centre (CERT-In)
CERT-In monitors Indian cyber space and coordinates alerts and
warnings of imminent attacks. CERT is also responsible for detection
of malicious attacks among public and private cyber users and
organisations in the country. It maintains a 24x7 operations centre
and has working relations/collaborations and contacts with CERTs,
all over the world; and sectoral CERTs, public, private, academia,
ISPs and vendors of IT products in the country. It works with
government, public and private sectors and users in the country and
monitors cyber incidents on a continuing basis throughout the extent
of incident, to analyse and disseminate information and guidelines as
necessary. The primary constituency of CERT-In are organisations
under the public and private sector domain.
9. National Information Infrastructure Protection Centre (NIIPC)
NIIPC is a designated agency to protect the CII in the country. It
gathers intelligence and keeps a watch on emerging and imminent
cyber threats in strategic sectors including national defence. It gets
prepared threat assessment reports and facilitates sharing of such
information and analysis among members of the intelligence, defence
and law enforcement agencies with a view to protecting these agencies’
ability to collect, analyse and disseminate intelligence. NIIPC interacts
with other incident response organisations including CERT-In,
enabling such organisations to leverage the intelligence agencies’
analytical capabilities for providing advanced information of potential
threats.
10. National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA)
The NDMA is the apex body for disaster management in India and is
responsible for creation of an enabling environment for institutional
160 Role of Technology in International Affairs

mechanisms at the state and district levels. NDMA encourages the

development of an ethos of prevention, mitigation and preparedness,
and strives to promote a national resolve to mitigate the damage and
destruction caused by natural and man-made disasters, through
sustained and collective efforts of all government agencies, non-
governmental organisations and people’s participation.
11. The Standardisation, Testing and Quality Certification (STQC)
Directorate
The STQC Directorate is a part of the DeitY and is an internationally
recognised Assurance Service providing organisation. The STQC
Directorate has established nation-wide infrastructure and developed
competence to provide quality assurance and conformity assessment
services in the IT sector.
12. Sectoral CERTs
Sectoral CERTs in various sectors such as Defence, Finance (IDRBT),
Railways, Petroleum and Natural Gas, etc., interact and work closely
with CERT-In for mitigation of crises affecting their constituency.
Sectoral CERTs and CERT-Ins also exchange information on latest
threats and measures to be taken to prevent the crisis.12
In the face of increasing cyber threats, the armed forces are now finalising the
plan for the creation of three new tri-Service Commands to handle space,
cyber and special forces, which will be ‘critical’ in deploying capabilities for
conventional as well as asymmetric warfare in a unified manner. Yet, if one
observes all the readiness to deal with cyber attacks and compares that to
China or the US, India has a long way to go.
So far, India has signed Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) with the
US, the United Kingdom (UK), Japan, Germany and France13 which would
help initiate dialogues in various areas.
For instance the one with the UK focuses on:
• Enhancing international cooperation to reduce the risk of threats from
cyber space to international security.
• Strengthening bilateral cooperation to tackle cyber crime.
• Further strengthening bilateral operational partnerships to identify
and respond to threats from cyber space and raise mutual resilience.
• Collaborating on building skills and capacities to tackle threats from
cyber space and to use ICT for the objective of economic and social
development.
 Cyber Space and International Affairs 161

• Using existing cooperation between universities and business

communities to develop synergy in research and development on cyber
issues.
• Creating a global multilateral, democratic and transparent system of
internet governance with participation of all stakeholders.
These MOU will benefit India in information intelligence sharing and
technology cooperation. India is also developing relations with South Korea,
Taiwan and Israel for similar cooperation.
Some special features of cyber security can be summarised as:
One: Technological innovations aside, the single most fundamental feature
of this new reality is, the dominance of the private sector in an international
system defined by the principle of sovereignty and shaped by the demands
and capabilities of sovereign States. Cyber space governance is defined more
by areas of responsibilities and less by traditional principles of accountability.
Two: The major actor that constitutes and defines international relations, the
State is not able to control the cyber domain or to insulate it-self from the
implications of new cyber realities. Cyber threats to national security include
the militarisation of cyber space, threats to critical infrastructure controls and
various types of cyber crimes and espionage by adversarial States or entities.
Recent Wikileaks episodes showed in unambiguous ways the politicisation
and disruptiveness of cyber space.
Three: The increasing evidence of cyber threats to security reinforces the
politicisation of cyber space and its salience in emergent policy discourses.
Four: New types of asymmetries—notably the extent to which weaker actors
can influence or even threaten stronger actors (such as press reports of
anonymous penetration—incidents of the US government computer
systems)—has little precedence in world politics.
Five: The creation of new actors—some with formal identities and others
without—and their cyber empowerment, is altering the traditional
international decision landscape in potentially significant ways.
Six: The growing contestation of influence and control over cyber venues between
the new institutions established to manage cyberspace (Internet Corporation
for Assigned Names and Numbers—ICANN, IETF (Internet Engineering
Task Force) and the traditional international institutions, (such as the
International Telecommunication Union [ITU] or other United Nations [UN]
162 Role of Technology in International Affairs

organisations, create new tensions of legitimacy and responsibility, which

further complicates the already thorny issue of international accountability.
Seven: Various types of cyber conflicts (between and within States, of known
as well as unknown identity and provenance) are becoming apparent, with
the potential for new modes and manifestations thereof. Many of these
contaminate the traditional calculus of conflict and cooperation and its
assumptions that are anchored in the physical domain, largely derived from
the historical experience of major powers. These are based on the assumptions
that the military instruments of power dominate, the identity of the contenders
are known, and that, in the final analysis, “might” can be relied upon to make
“right”, and so forth.
Eight: Concurrently, we are also observing different modes of cyber
collaboration in the effort to reduce uncertainty and introduce some measure
of order in an environment that is increasingly perceived as “anarchic”. Among
the most notable initiatives is the development of CERTs, a loose network of
organisations in different parts of the world seeking to take stock of, and
reduce, breaches of cyber security.
Nine: There is a new cyber-based mobilisation of civil society (the aggregations
of individuals in their private capacity as well as organised elements of the
private sector) and its potential empowerment across jurisdictions and in all
parts of the world.
Ten: The intersection in spheres of influence—with the private sector managing
order in cyber space and the sovereign authority managing order in the
traditional domain worldwide, spheres of influence can be overlapping and a
cause for a unique set of problems for management of international affairs
relating to cyber space.

Cyber Weapons
The experts define a Cyber Weapon as a computer code that is used or designed
to be used with the aim of threatening or causing physical, functional, or
mental harm to structures, systems, or living beings. Over the years many
cyber weapons have been identified. For example, a virus Stuxnet, (as already
discussed) is one of the well-known cyber weapons used that led to the
introduction of many different classifications for their qualifications.
Cyber weapons have existed for years mostly with military and national
intelligence agencies. Security experts have confirmed that work by Northrop
Grumman, Raytheon and General Dynamics, the stalwarts of the traditional
 Cyber Space and International Affairs 163

defence industry have been helping the US Government to develop cyber

capacity to spy on or disable other countries’ computer networks. The industry
started to change around 2005, when the Pentagon began placing more
emphasis on developing hacking tools, specifically as a means of conducting
warfare. The shift in defence policy gave rise to a flood of arms dealers that
trade in offensive cyber weapons. Most of these are ‘black’ companies that
camouflage their government funding and work on classified projects. “Five
years ago, there was an explosion that occurred and people with offensive
cyber capabilities just burst onto the scene.” says Kevin G. Coleman, the
former chief strategist of Netscape and author of The Cyber Commander’s
eHandbook, a downloadable guide.14 Two of the primary weapons in a cyber
warrior’s arsenal are botnets and exploits. A botnet is a collection of tens or
even hundreds of thousands of computers that have been commandeered
without their owners’ knowledge. Hackers spend years building these
involuntary armies by infecting peoples’ computers with malicious code—
self-propagating computer worms—that remain hidden and prime the
computer to receive orders. When activated, a botnet can take down networks
by bombarding them with digital chatter. It can also help to spy on and, if
needed, sabotage large numbers of machines.
An exploit, in hackers’ parlance is a programme that takes advantage of
vulnerabilities in widely used software such as Windows from Microsoft or
in the millions of lines of code that control network-servers. The hacker uses
an exploit to break-in, and inserts a worm or other destructive payload.
Weaknesses of such software are fairly well known, though software vendors
can still take months, even years, to create safety patches to plug the holes.
The most valuable exploits are those that are unknown to everyone else until
the first time they are put to use. These are called zero-day exploits. (The day
the attack is discovered would be Day One.) In the hackers’ underground,
the invite-only online chat boards where illicit wares are sold, a zero-day exploit
for a network running on Windows can perhaps sell for up to $250,000.
Stuxnet used four high-end zero days, establishing itself as a highly admirable
all-star effort in hacker circles.
Very much like the cold war, the ‘Code War’ does not reward show of
force. Cyber weapons fall into the category of ‘brittle’ technology, susceptible
to the swift development of countermeasures. Once you know how a weapon
works in cyber space, it can cease to be a weapon. Low visibility profile is
another dimension of ‘Code War’ where traditional military logic can fall apart
in the conflict zone. Deterrence and arms treaties are but philosophical or
164 Role of Technology in International Affairs

perceptional concepts when invisible weapons are involved. Assigning certain

blame for an attack may be impossible when it’s conducted through computers
in dozens of countries. The fear of retaliation, which kept the Cold War from
becoming hot, may not necessarily apply here.
An interesting classification of cyber weapons is based on spectrum of
action and on this scale one can make a distinction between the following
categories:
• Low potential end of the spectrum is a malware able to affect systems
from outside but is not able to penetrate the target or to create direct
harm. This category of tools and software is often used to generate
traffic to overload a system or service to create a temporary effect
without permanent damage. (e.g. Denial of Service attack)
• Medium potential end of the spectrum is any malicious intrusion we
can identify that is not able to influence the final target but is able to
create functional and physical damage. In this category one can include
a generic intrusion agent like malware that is able to rapidly spread
and disable sections of a system.
• High potential end of the spectrum is an agent that is capable of
penetrating the target while avoiding any protection built-in, thus
creating direct harm to the victim. This could be the case of a
sophisticated malware that could harm a specific system like the virus,
Stuxnet. Inside this category, one can introduce a further distinction
between learning agent and intelligent agent. Stuxnet is an intelligent
weapon without learning capabilities, and one can expect that these
features will be part of next generation of cyber weapons.
The cost and complexity of cyber threats are related to the category that they
belong to, considering also that behind high potential agents there is a long
and considerable content of intelligence, used to acquire information on final
targets and develop the weapons specific for them.
Why the use of a cyber weapon has proved a winner?
• First, the disclosure of such agents is silenced because of the nature of
vulnerabilities that can be exploited. The study of new zero-day
vulnerability provides a real advantage to those who attack and the
related risks of failure of operations are minimal. The anonymous
nature of the offenses, allows one to circumvent the approval by the
world community for a military offensive.
• The costs of developing solutions such as this are relatively low
 Cyber Space and International Affairs 165

compared to other conventional weapons for comparable cost to the

enemy.
• The choice of cyber weapon allows those who use it to remain
anonymous until military strategies deem it appropriate. The main
strategies for use of such malware could be mainly aimed at:
o Probing the technological capabilities of the enemy. The ability of
an agent to infect enemy structures is symptomatic of inadequate
cyber defence strategy that may suggest additional military options.
o Undermining those that are considered critical structures whose
operational support and functions are vital for governmental
control.
• There is no doubt regarding the efficacy of these weapons. Events
have proved that they are offensive weapons designed with the intent
to infect the opponent’s electronic networks and structures. The cyber
weapons can be designed to hit specific targets while minimising the
noise related to the usage of the weapon which can result in their
discovery.
• The vector of infection can be of various kinds such as a common
Universal Serial Bus support, being able to hit a very large number of
targets in a small time interval etc.
• Another significant factor is the inability to predict or observe the
development of a cyber weapon by intelligence agencies. In a classical
context, the development of a conventional weapon can be easily
identified through intelligence operations on the ground and via
satellite observations. The development of a cyber weapon is rather
difficult to locate as even a private home may be suitable for the
purpose.
It is pertinent to understand that it is not necessary that a cyber weapon must
be for an offensive purpose; as such many projects for the virus development
scan can also be intended for defensive purposes, which is an interesting usage
of cyber weapon technology, developed to defend one’s systems and track back
any cyber threats.
Are we ready to face a cyber attack? In recent years international opinion
has been strongly sensitised on this issue and hence, there have been significant
investments for building safeguards against cyber warfare. Numerous studies
have demonstrated the need for very robust cyber security strategy, defensive
and offensive. Unfortunately, many critical infrastructures are still vulnerable
166 Role of Technology in International Affairs

to such cyber attacks. It is therefore necessary to monitor the development

and proliferation of these types of threats.
However, since a single country cannot build a very high level of cyber
attack immunity alone, it calls for robust international collaboration and
mutual cooperation; which in turn calls for very sensitive diplomacy, backed
up with the knowledge of finer nuances and implications of cyber technology.
The key critical infrastructures required all over the world for such an objective
must be identified under a common cooperative defence policy. India still
has much work to do.

Challenges for Indian Foreign Policy and Diplomacy

India must foresee and plan for various challenges because of the growth of
internet and digitalisation of governance. Failure to do so can be catastrophic
and could affect national security, the Indian economy and social stability.
India is particularly vulnerable to threats from cyber crime, cyber terrorism,
cyber espionage and cyber warfare. India’s critical infrastructure is also
vulnerable. It is only a matter of time before cyber space becomes an
independent theatre of war. The US has begun to regard cyber space as the
fifth domain of warfare. It has set up a cyber command and come out with
a ‘Cyber Doctrine’ and reserves the right to respond in an appropriate manner
if attacked in cyber space. Many countries are responding by setting up similar
structures. Several countries are doing R&D on cyber weapons and this raises
concerns regarding possible random weaponisation of cyber space.
This chapter aims to underline the urgency of having a cyber security
policy and institutional structures to address emerging challenges. Protection
of critical infrastructure will require robust policies and sustained public-
private partnership as much of the internet infrastructure is owned by the
private sector. India will also have to ensure that there is coordination,
cooperation and international uniformity in legal measures both among private
and public entities. There are two stances that India can opt for now, it can
either involve itself in international efforts to construct newer legal frameworks
for cyber space, or stay aside till it becomes self-reliant, enough to be heard
as a credible voice and play a constructive and important international role
with other powerful and influential nations. To determine the correct choice
is a dilemma because there are a lot of indeterminate parameters. And time
could be running out.
The Budapest Cyber Space Conference held in October 2012 is the only
 Cyber Space and International Affairs 167

international platform till date which brought all nation-states together to

put forward some norms. As usually happens, there were three major stances
by the conferees: Liberal Democratic (the US, the UK, NATO countries),
authoritarian States (Russia, China) and countries like India following their
legacy of Non-Alignment. When it comes to Cyber Treaties some nations are
in favour of adopting a new global treaty and some strongly oppose it. In
fact, it might be too early to bind States into any new legal instruments when
the future of their activities in cyber space remains uncertain and no one quite
knows how to apply existing laws to the current state of cyber domain. Though
legal experts are aspiring to bring out some rule book which would provide
blanket guidelines for all cyber conflicts, in reality, it is not possible to do so
without very vigorous discussion at international platforms.
In this sense, negotiating such a treaty is a cumbersome and time
consuming process. Nevertheless, States are still developing their cyber
capabilities and formulating strategies. Things tend to change rapidly in cyber
space technology and any treaty negotiated now could be obsolete in no time.
It might take a decade or so to negotiate a cyber space treaty. For example,
the Budapest Conference agenda has been in discussion since 2003 and yet
neither has it been fully implemented by member states nor have many States
joined it. Consensus has been difficult due to ideological differences.
Hence, it would be advisable to come up with easily amendable and
changeable norms. It will not only help in better International Cyber
Cooperation among the States but also provide flexibility to change them as
per the pace of the technology. CII is mainly controlled and owned by the
private sector. More government involvement in their operations might cause
hurdles in development and trade. Hence, government partnership with
companies, and optimising information sharing and data security is inevitable.
However, if norms are put in the following manner, it would suit India
better.15 States should distinguish between disruptive and damaging cyber
attacks and evaluate an attack on the basis of its scope, duration and lethality.
1. States have a duty to assist other States that have suffered a major
cyber attack or disaster and also have a duty to inform others of new
threats in cyber space.
2. States should cooperate in the certification of ICT supply chains.
3. States whose territories or citizens are involved in trans-border cyber
activities which are unambiguously criminal in their States should
168 Role of Technology in International Affairs

cooperate in the investigation of these crimes and the apprehension of

their perpetrators.
4. States should enable the formation of public-private partnerships for
cyber security, which include both local and international ICT
companies operating in their territories.
The above suggested norms are likely to be acceptable to most and are also
easier to adapt. They aim to reduce vulnerability and confrontation rather
than suppressing threat actors. If all States behave according to these norms,
there will be significant reduction in threats and conflicts. Also, these norms
focus on maintaining cyber space security for all States instead of fulfilling
ambitions of a few. They are the types that are ‘status quo’ oriented to maintain
stability of cyber space.
The internet is seen here in its true form as a Network of Networks which
would remain useful only with a growing and contributing number of users.
So, it becomes a positive sum or classic cooperative game. However, it becomes
difficult as the competition between States for superior status and power grows.
Hence, development of indigenous technology and capability for reasonable
deterrence becomes a necessity.
The third point mentioned above in relation to norms is specific. As
regards the ICT supply chain the focus is on the management of cyber security
requirements for IT systems, software and networks. These ICT supply chains
could be influenced or subverted in ways that would affect normal, secure
and reliable use of IT. Inclusion of malicious hidden functions in IT can
undermine confidence in products and services, erode trust in commerce,
and affect national security. As disruptive activities using ICT grow more
complex and dangerous, it is obvious that no nation may be able to address
these threats alone.
Confronting the challenges of the 21st century depends on successful
cooperation among like-minded partners. Collaboration among nations and
between nations, the private sector and civil society is important and the
effectiveness of measures to improve cyber security will require broad
international cooperation.
Following are the main areas where better international cooperation is
needed:16
1. National nodal centres on information infrastructure based on PPP
to cooperate.
 Cyber Space and International Affairs 169

2. Global service providers such as Google, Microsoft, Twitter, Yahoo

and Facebook to cooperate with Law Enforcement Agencies in all
countries and respond to their requests for investigations.
3. CERTs to exchange threats and vulnerabilities data in an open way
to build an early watch and warning system.
4. Incident management and sharing of information with a view to
building an international incident response system.
5. Critical infrastructure protection to be aimed at by establishing an
international clearing house for critical infrastructure protection to
share threats, vulnerabilities, and attack vectors.
6. Sharing and deployment of best practices for cyber security.
7. Creation of continued awareness about cyber threats and
international coordination as part of early watch and warning system.
8. Acceptable legal norms for dealing with cyber crimes regarding
territorial jurisdiction, sovereign responsibility and use of force to
reconcile differing national laws concerning the investigation and
prosecution of cyber crimes, data preservation, protection, and
privacy. Addressing the problem of existing cyber laws that do not
carry enforcement provisions.
9. Incident response and transnational cooperation including
establishment of appropriate mechanisms for cooperation. Such
measures must include provisions to respond to counter cyber
terrorism, including acts of sabotage of critical infrastructure and
cyber espionage through information warfare.
10. Legal enforcement agencies to investigate cases, collect forensic
evidence at the behest of other countries and prosecute cyber
criminals to bring them to justice.
Chinese way of Cyber Attacks—The RSA algorithm is a type of encryption
used for internet services. The Chinese attack on US Naval War College in
Rhode Island in December 2006 was analysed effectively and the investigators
could trace it back to central servers which was running a part of ‘botnet’
consisting of around 2000 computers around the world. The analysis centred
on this attack suggested a huge possibility of Chinese involvement.
Industrial espionage/sabotage attacks are often conducted using the
following steps:
1. Thorough analysis of infrastructure intelligence of the target
organisation, mainly by open sources to determine some penetration
170 Role of Technology in International Affairs

points. Behavioural profiles of owners of possible target computers

are created. These owners are sent customised, lucrative and harmless
looking email messages.
2. Such sophisticated email messages contain links or attachments which
open up security loopholes and backdoors for the perpetrators to breach
the organisation’s network. Then malicious code is injected into the
computers of the target organisation which further provides detailed
information about the organisation. It also allows the hackers to
command these computers using dedicated controlling servers and
silently study which computer has how much preference and create
more sophisticated mapping to expand their attack.
3. When computers with permissions to transfer larger amount of data
without raising suspicions are located, the hackers steal the desired
sensitive information they actually want.
In the RSA17 algorithm attack case discussed above, such proficiency, resources,
intelligence and sophistication could not be expected from some small
organisation but from some really ambitious State power—such as China.
Certain pattern recognition elements pointed out were:
a) Infrastructure access: Breaking into the target organisation’s password
protected systems requires major resources.
b) Scope of attack: The RSA attack compromised 763 computers which
needed prior data gathering and sophisticated email messages to
lure the target users. This requires sophisticated operational
infrastructure which cannot be the work of any small group.
c) Sykipot: It is a back door programme which has been one of the
favourite tools of Chinese hackers since late 2006. The current levels
of sophistication require tremendous and continued collective effort.
d) Identifying marks: Sykipot shows use of Chinese language in the
programme writing, including remnants of information in Chinese
in debug information and error messages.
e) Out of a total of 329 control servers used for controlling target
computers, 299 were located in China.18
China and Russia have similar cyber perspectives. Their views were presented
in a letter for the ‘International Code of Conduct for Information Security’
at the UN General Assembly in September 2012. They had put forth some
major points of discontent and requirements from international efforts for
cyber regulations.19 Their discontent was over: (a) other States meddling in a
country’s internal affairs by supporting dissidents to its regime, under the
 Cyber Space and International Affairs 171

pretext of internet freedom; (b) the militarisation of cyber space by the US;
and (c) the US and other Western countries’ dominance in the governance of
cyber space while neglecting the need of developing countries for fairer
allocations of cyber resources.
According to China and Russia, unlike the Western approach stated above,
governance and norms for cyber space should be based on:
1. The right of States to determine policies for their respective national
cyber spaces.
2. The need to balance the claims for free flow of information against
their potential threats to national security and social order.
3. The peaceful use of networks and restrictions on cyber weapons.
4. The equal right of all States to participate in the management of
internet resources. International cooperation in dealing with network
based threats to a State’s security.
India’s Stand at the Budapest Conference
India, posing as the most important non-aligned State at the meeting did
not, however, present its position on the State’s role in internet governance to
the Conference. Previously, it had proposed that a UN agency be created to
supervise ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers)
for administration of the internet. Pending implementation, India focused
on building its own cyber security capacity. It plans to achieve this by having
the State work towards creating a human resource pool of 50,000 cyber
security specialists by the mode of public-private partnerships.
However, shortly after the Budapest Conference, India moved away from
its earlier stance in favour of continuing the system of internet governance.
Instead, it suggested that “third world countries” should be playing an active
role on the various ICANN advisory committees. After the Budapest
Conference, at the World Conference on International Telecommunications
(WCIT) at Dubai, in December 2012 India was among the 55 States that
refused to sign the new International Telecommunication Regulations (ITRs),
because they give the State-centric ITU a role to supervise the internet.
India’s position at the Budapest Conference may be seen in the context
of fear of influence of technology control regimes which may undermine the
sovereign rights of other signatory nation-states. But it does not mean that
India is in favour of the Russo-Chinese stance either. There are many aspects
in the agenda of the Budapest Conference which India did not agree to. For
example, some articles of Budapest Convention on Cyber Crime, (which is
172 Role of Technology in International Affairs

like a Treaty) on Mutual Assistance and Trans-Border Access of computer

data are still controversial. The Cybercrime Convention Committee (T-CY)
conducts two meetings every year, and still had these points on its agenda
for the ninth plenary meeting in June 2013. 20 It is similar to the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) when it comes to the Indian
perspective towards it.
At this point, India lacks two main things. First is a comprehensive and
enforced Cyber Security Policy which would include important aspects such
as a precise definition of cyber threat. This must include fortifying the ICT
and National Networks which need more indigenous technology, clarity in
legal concepts and capacity for diverse international cooperation. Well-formed
organisational hierarchies, more coordinated public-private efforts and many
such aspects require better understanding and focus. Secondly, there is a need
for India to evolve a credible and firm stance in international cyber relations.
The inception of the US Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), the fifth
domain of security for the US, has started a new race for building offensive
capacity in cyber space. China is evolving its approach known as
‘informationalisation’; the UK has gone in for Government Communications
Headquarters; France led the joint effort called European National Agency
for Network and Information Security (ENISA) for the European Union and
such other initiatives by Russia and even North Korea, have created a
momentum in developing offensive capacities in cyber space.
India still lacks on this front and as a result is a vulnerable target, instead
of an organised defender. The draft National Cyber Security Policy is based
on a defensive approach and response strategies, but fails to state the precise
need to develop an offensive capability. Though there have been instances
like counter-cyber attacks and website defacement ‘games’ by Indian ‘White
Hat’ hackers, India still lacks consolidated cyber power—resources are heavily
fragmented.21

Some Notable Examples of International Cooperation with India

US: India and the US have been in dialogue for establishing mutual ties for
the enhancement of cyber security since 2011. An agreement was signed
between India and the US in July 2011, for enhancing closer cooperation
and timely information exchange between the countries, as well as coordination
on technical and operational issues.22 Later, in June 2013, the National Security
Advisers of both India and the US met to further bilateral coordination and
 Cyber Space and International Affairs 173

to enhance mutual information sharing. The same was acknowledged in the

Joint Statement after the Third US-India Strategic Dialogue, held at
Washington DC, in June 2012. It was mentioned that the two countries would
form a joint working group for consultations on issues and international events
related to cyber space.23 In September 2013, the CERT-In and its US
counterpart, held a cyber drill under which each side would attack the other
side and the other side will launch counter measures to better understand
the dynamics of counter measures. This was followed by an assessment of
the defensive capabilities of both sides. There is now a strong working
relationship between the US Computer Emergency Readiness Team and
CERT-In.24
UK: In 2011, the UK Government estimated that cyber crime costs the UK
economy £27 billion a year, equal to more than £1,000 for every household
in the country. The measures under the new UK-India cooperation deal
include:
- Creating a joint task force to exchange and share information to identify
and counter threats.
- Police training exchanges in “cyber forensics” and other areas of
detection and enforcement.
- Regular cooperation meetings between leaders in cyber security research
from academia and industry.25
Egypt: A MoU was signed between the Ministry of Communications and
Information Technology, GoI, and the Ministry of Communications and
Information Technology of the Arab Republic of Egypt, on cooperation in
the area of cyber security. This MoU facilitates sharing of expertise by
exchanging information on all aspects of cyber security and supporting each
other in taking appropriate measures in order to prevent cyber security
incidents. This intensification of cooperation in the ICT will help promote
trade and the technology sector.
Japan: The Japan-India Foreign Ministers’ Strategic Dialogue has been held
in Japan and India alternately, each year since 2007. Japan conducted the
second round of the Japan-India Cyber Dialogue and the Japan-India Maritime
Affairs Dialogue in the year 2013. In response, India also would like to further
deepen political dialogue with Japan by promoting the 2+2 dialogue, Japan-
India-US trilateral dialogue, and the Japan-India cyber dialogue. Cooperation
in the field of science and technology for development of national economies
and improvement of socio-economic standards of life is necessary. Similarly,
174 Role of Technology in International Affairs

the UK and India also share a common view, to further enhance business tie-
ups in the private sector and cooperation in cyber security, as well as promotion
of joint R&D and bilateral cooperation in international standardisation in
ICT.
Some cases that drew the attention of the international community to
cyber threats:
Estonia Cyber Attacks, April-May 2007: The attacks sharply raised the
awareness for cyber security among States and decision-makers in the West.
Most States immediately focused their attention on creating or developing
indigenous cyber security capabilities. They contributed to the intensification
of efforts to institutionalise cooperation in the field of cyber security. The
NATO opened its Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence
(CCDCOE) in Tallinn, in May 2008, which was accredited by October 2008.
The NATO recognised cyber attacks as one of the threats existing within the
contemporary security environment in its new Strategic Concept of November
2010. The NATO also committed itself to developing further abilities to
prevent, detect, defend against and recover from cyber attacks, and for better
integration of NATO cyber awareness, warning and response with member
nations.
Israeli Attack on Syria, September 2007: Israel claimed that while the air
assault under operation Orchard was aimed at Syrian nuclear facilities and
programme, Syrian radars could not pick any enemy signals and hence, air
defence systems could not be activated. Thus, cyber weapons proved to be a
useful element in supporting the conventional military operations.
Georgia-Russia Conflict, August 2008: Georgia and Russia fought for control
over South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
Attacks accompanied Russian military operations. Cyber attacks targeted the
Georgian Government and media websites, leading to problems related to
dissemination of information to the Georgian people. The Georgian experience
of cyber attacks was similar to the Estonian case.
STUXNET: Iran Related Cyber Attack: Stuxnet is a threat targeting a specific
industrial control system, in Iran, such as a gas pipeline or power plant. The
ultimate goal of Stuxnet was to sabotage such a facility by reprogramming
the programmable logic controllers (PLCs) to operate as the attackers. Stuxnet
is a sophisticated and specific cyber-weapon that aims to cause physical harm
in sabotage mode. It is believed that it uses ‘off-the-shelf codes and tradecraft’
and thus, quickly and effectively disarms the target. Stuxnet perhaps caused
 Cyber Space and International Affairs 175

at least a few years of delay in the Iranian nuclear programme. Cyber security
threats have psychological effects as well as physical impacts. The Iranian
Government could not direct its reaction to any State due to lack of physical
evidence.
States often use IT and cyber space for political, economic and other
purposes such as information theft related to economic interests, stealing
military and civilian technology, espionage and counter-espionage, as means
of political oppression, sabotage, and subversion. All these represent new
realities of cyber space that the practitioners of international relations will
have to get familiar with. Negotiating and navigating through cyber space or
the cyber maze in future will indeed be challenging for future diplomats.
NOTES
1. “Cyber crimes have gone up 10 fold in the past couple of years”, Rediff News, at http://
www.rediff.com/business/report/tech- cyber-crime-1600-arrested-only-7-convicted/
20121211.htm (Accessed April 7, 2014).
2. “Police False Arrests in Remote Control Virus Case Criticized”, at http://www.japancrush.
com/2012/stories/police-false-arrests-in-remote-control- virus-case-criticized.html (Accessed
April 7, 2014).
3. Sanjiv Tomar, “National Cyber Security Policy 2013: An Assessment”, IDSA Comment,
2013, at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/NationalCyberSecurityPolicy2013_ stomar_
260813.html (Accessed April 7, 2014).
4. “India’s Cyber Security Challenge”, IDSA Task Force Report, New Delhi, 2012, at http:/
/idsa.in/book/IndiasCyberSecurityChallenges.html (Accessed April 7, 2014).
5. Ria Novosti, “Estonia has no evidence of Kremlin involvement in cyber attacks.” September
6, 2007, at http://en.rian.ru/world/20070906/76959190.html (Accessed April 7, 2014).
6. Dorothy Denning, “The Ethics of Cyber Conflict” March 27, 2007, at http://faculty.nps.
edu/dedennin/publications/Ethics%20of%20Cyber%20Conflict.pdf (Accessed April 7,
2014).
7. “Sit-in” or “Web Sit-in” is an act in which a group of hacktivists send queries to some
pre-decided servers to get the attention of the desired party. The Hacktivist group takes
the moral responsibility of sit-ins.
8. World Bank Data on internet users, at http://www.data.worldbank.org/indicator/
IT.NET.USER.P2 (Accessed April 7, 2014).
9. Chandra Ganasambandam and Anu Madgavkar, “Internet rise in India: Govt should ensure
faster & cheaper broadband”, Economic Times, January 10, 2013, at http://
articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com /2013-01-10/news/36258323_1_broad-based-
internet-impact-internet-ecosystem-internet-penetration (Accessed April 8, 2014).
10. Debarati Roy, “63% of Indian Users Use Pirated Software”, CIO News, May 23, 2012, at
http://www.cio.in/news/63-indian-users-use-pirating-software-263522012 (Accessed April
8, 2014).
11. Verizon Data Breach Investigation Report, at http://www.verizonenterprise.com/DBIR/
2013/ (Accessed April 8, 2014).
176 Role of Technology in International Affairs

12. National Cyber Security Policy Draft of March 2011, http://deity.gov.in/hindi/sites/

upload_files/dithindi/files/ncsp_060411.pdf (Accessed April 8, 2014).
13. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Joint Statement on Cooperation
between India and the UK on Cyber Issues”, November 8, 2012 at www.mea.gov.in/
bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/20792/Joint+Statement...C.. (Accessed April 8, 2014).
14. The Cyber Commander’s eHandbook, at www.technolytics.com/Cyber_Commanders_
eHandbook_F_2013.pdf (Accessed April 8, 2014).
15. Roger Hurwitz, An Augmented Summary of Harvard, MIT and University of Toronto
Cyber Norms Workshop, October 19-20, 2011, Cambridge MA, at ecir.mit.edu/index.php/
research/working.../294 (Accessed April 8, 2014).
16. Kamlesh Bajaj, ‘The Cybersecurity Agenda, Mobilizing for International Action’, East-
West Institute, at http://wwwewi.info/system/files/Bajaj Web.pdf (Accessed April 8, 2014).
17. RSA stands for the asymmetric cryptographic algorithm named after Ron Rivest, Adi
Shamir and Leonard Adleman, the inventors of the software algorithm.
18. Gabi Siboni, “What Lies behind Chinese Cyber Warfare”, Military and Strategic Affairs,
Vol. 4, No 2, September 2012, at www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=2560
(Accessed April 8, 2014).
19. Timothy Farnsworth, “China and Russia Submit Cyber Proposal”, Arms Control
Association, at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2011_11/China_and_Russia _Submit_
Cyber_Proposal (Accessed April 8, 2014).
20. Cybercrime Convention Committee (T-CY) 9th Plenary, Strasbourg, June 5, 2013, at
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/cybercrime/T-CY/Default_TCY_er
(Accessed April 9, 2014).
21. Techgig News ‘How prepared is India for cyberwar’, Tech News, March 2013, www.techgig.
com/tech-news/editors-pick/How-prepared-is-India-for-cyberwar.. (Accessed April 9, 2014).
22. “United States and India Sign Cyber Security Agreement”, Press Release, Embassy of the
United States, New Delhi, July 19, 2011. See http://newdelhi.usembassy.gov/
pr071911a.html (Accessed April 9, 2014).
23. Joint Statement on the Third U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue, Press Release, June 13, 2012,
at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/06/192267.htm (Accessed April 9, 2014).
24. Manan Kumar, “India ties up with US for cyber security”, DNA News, New Delhi,
September 13, 2012, at http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report_india-ties-up-with-us-for-
cyber-security_1740178 (Accessed April 9, 2014).
25. James Kirkup, “David Cameron to strike cybercrime deal with India”, The Telegraph,
February 19, 2013, at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/9879272/David-Cameron-
to-strike-cybercrime-deal-with-India.html (Accessed April 9, 2014).
 6
Climate Change and
International Relations

Global Warming and Climate Change: An Introduction

Nature has had its own mechanism of keeping the earth surface temperature
within comfortable limits for human civilization to survive and progress.
However, over the past five to six decades, modern industrial activities have
caused a steep increase in Greenhouse Gases (GHG) in the atmosphere,
trapping the heat on the earth surface and causing global warming. While
natural climate variations have existed for millennia, anthropogenic climate
changes since the world wars and the fast pace of industrial revolution, are
the main causes for accelerated warming of the earth’s environment and its
adverse effects on a global scale.
Nine of the ten hottest years on record were in the past twelve years. In
recent months, extreme rainfall and floods have affected all parts of the world
from the Mississippi Valley, to Kedarnath in the Himalayas, and the US’ east
coast (Super-storm Sandy) devastating human lives and causing tens of billions
of dollars in damages. Climate change is already happening and affecting the
daily lives of thousands. Our planet is heating-up and carbon pollution from
fossil fuel based energy is sending heat-trapping emissions daily into the air.
About 90 million tons of carbon pollution enters the atmosphere every day.
That means a hotter world for all of us now, in coming years and a very
hostile and unstable environment for the next generation, in the future.
178 Role of Technology in International Affairs

As of end 2012, the earth was already nearly 0.8oC warmer than the pre-
industrial temperature that had stabilised over thousands of years. The rate
of carbon dioxide (CO2) emission is already an order of magnitude higher
than what nature can absorb. The consequent climate changes are thus already
perceptible in terms of increasing incidents of extreme weather, glacial melting
and floods in some regions and hurricanes, droughts, forest fires in other
regions. Compared to the pre-industrial level of 280 ppm (parts per million)
of CO2 concentration in the atmosphere, the level crossed 400 ppm in May
2013. Continued increase can soon disturb the environment to a point of no
return, when the feedback systems of nature may be overtaken and our
environment subjected to irreversible changes.1
GHG emissions in the earth’s atmosphere linger for several decades.
Hence, climate change is a slow and invisible process, effects of which may
manifest after several years. The impact of climate change will be different
across different parts of the world and actions of one country can harm the
vital national interests of another. Historically, 20 percent of the world
population in developed countries has consumed 80 percent of the global
energy resources and is thus responsible for 80 percent of CO2 emissions.
But the adverse effects of climate change will be far more serious on more
populous and developing countries of the world. The resultant stresses that
this can produce in societies, are now recognised as a potential cause for the
next major war among nations. Managing climate change will therefore require
cohesive global action which cannot be achieved without effective international
coordination for mitigation efforts. But views of different nations are presently
very divergent about WHO should do WHAT and by WHEN, and this has
become an important issue for international relations (I.R.) and diplomacy.
The United Nations (UN), in recognition of the dangers of climate change
to humanity, has convened several international conventions in the past three
decades, to debate on how best to arrest the undesired changes in the
atmosphere; but a universal consensus among all sovereign countries for an
effective solution to this problem of global dimensions is still not in place.
The main cause of anthropogenic global warming is of course the heavy
dependence on carbon fuels for electricity generation and transportation all
over the world. The energy needs of modern society have been increasing
steadily and by 2050 the global energy requirement is expected to be about
45 percent higher than the 2010 level. If effective measures are not put in
place urgently, we are looking at over 40 percent more CO2 in the atmosphere
and over 2oC rise in average temperature by 2050. Serious investments are
 Climate Change and International Relations 179

needed to quickly improve the efficiency of energy usage and for a rapid shift
away from fossil fuels to greener, renewable energy resources all over the world.
If effective measures for rapidly arresting global warming are not in place
by 2015, there will be obvious major economic costs for managing serious
consequences of escalating climate change and increasing natural disasters by
2025 and beyond. Who will pay how much for saving the environment is a
very contentious issue that will require clear scientific understanding of the
issues and astute diplomatic capabilities for achieving binding global
agreements for effective mitigation of global warming before it gets too late.
Science and technology (S&T) will invariably play a pivotal role in helping
to win the battle of climate change and also for providing practical solutions
for sustainable development in the future.
Arriving at a global consensus on climate change presents one of most
important diplomatic challenges of our time. Impact of climate change on
national security perceptions are very significant and even regional cooperation
for joint action is not easy to achieve, because the potential cost of mitigation
or disaster management is different for different countries. As time runs out
for avoiding the ‘tipping point’ of climate change, international tensions will
escalate with the increasing frequency of natural disasters. A common logic
for common good must thus overtake individual national priorities. The next
10-15 years will probably present one last opportunity for each nation to
maximise its scientific and diplomatic potential towards protecting nature
through collective global action.
Climate change is the defining issue of our times. It is perhaps, the greatest
challenge to sustainable development. It should be addressed by all countries
with a shared perspective, free from narrow and myopic considerations.
Developed countries need to look beyond their narrow self-interests and work
jointly with developing countries to evolve cooperative and collaborative
strategies on the issue of climate change, which is of immense relevance for
the future of mankind. However, efforts so far in the direction of meeting
the challenges of climate change have been sporadic and incoherent. We
urgently need a new economic paradigm, which is global, inclusive,
cooperative, environmentally sensitive and above all scientific. According to
Jeffrey Sachs, a leading economist and proponent of sustainable development,
“The world’s current ecological, demographic and economic trajectory is
unsustainable, meaning that if we continue with business as usual we will hit
social and ecological crises with calamitous results”.2
180 Role of Technology in International Affairs

Sustainable development models based on addressing the needs of the

poor and for optimal harnessing of scarce resources of water, air, energy, land
and biodiversity will have to be developed through more cooperative
endeavours, so that we can make some headway in saving our lone planet
from the brink of climate disaster.
This chapter presents a fairly comprehensive look at the status of global
warming and climate change in the context of how human development has
taken an unsustainable route to progress and how international cooperation
will be crucial to limiting the damage. Energy and environment issues are
discussed in detail to highlight the dilemma of contradicting priorities and
the impact of climate change on national security, including energy, water
and food security. The focus will be on how S&T can be leveraged to resolve
climate change concerns through concerted international dialogue and
cooperation.
The complex dimensions of international dialogue are reviewed to bring
clarity to Indian priorities for setting goals for climate negotiations to protect
India’s national interests. This has to happen while also contributing to global
efforts for mitigating global warming and adapting to adverse effects of climate
change. The next few years will offer an opportunity for finding an Indian
solution for a global problem through sound application of technology and
diplomacy. India will have to walk a tightrope in garnering collective global
momentum to avoid a climate catastrophe. In this challenge S&T can not
only empower the climate negotiators with comprehensive information, but
also help them in arriving at diplomatic agreements with other major players
that can hugely impact Indian interests.

Understanding the Basics

The earth’s atmospheric temperature depends on the balance of energy entering
and leaving the planet’s atmosphere. When incoming energy from the sun is
absorbed by the earth system, the earth warms-up and when the sun’s energy
is reflected or released back into space, the earth cools. Many factors, both
natural and man-made can cause changes in the earth’s energy balance. Nature
has its intrinsic capacity to adjust to minor changes in maintaining this
temperature balance for life to survive. Variations in the sun’s energy reaching
the earth and changes in the earth atmosphere or earth surface in terms of
absorption or reflection characteristics are the main components of this delicate
balance of heating and cooling the planet. Scientists have put together various
models of the earth’s climate, going back to thousands of years, by analysing
 Climate Change and International Relations 181

a number of indirect measures of climate parameters such as ice cores, glacier

volumes, forest covers, pollen remains, natural greenhouse effects and ocean
temperature patterns etc. including even the variations in the earth’s orbit
around the sun.
Over the last 100 years, and particularly during the last five decades, the
eco-balance of nature has been disturbed by excessive industrial activities and
by the growing population on earth. The human imprint on the global
environment has now become so large and active that it rivals some of the
great forces of nature in its impact on the ecosystem of the earth. Tracing the
history of the evolution of the ‘Anthropocentric’ world (human activity
dominated) since the industrial revolution, one can easily see the cause and
effect pattern of environmental degradation. The evolution and scale of human
activities, as we move into the 21st century, has caused profound changes to
our relationship with the living world and the large geophysical cycles that
drive the earth’s climate system. Thus ‘Anthropogenic’ effects need to be
recognised as the new catalyst of change in the earth’s history. Human activity
is also significantly altering several other biogeochemical factors or element
cycles, such as nitrogen, phosphorus or sulphur that are fundamental to life
on earth.
Greenhouse Gases (GHG) are those that allow the sun’s radiation to warm
the earth surface but prohibit the reflected heat in the infrared band from
escaping back to space, because the layers of lingering, invisible GHG clouds
reflect the heat released by the earth back to the earth. This heat trapping
effect causes warming of the earth in a slow but cumulative process as the
GHG clouds once created, linger in the atmosphere for decades, resulting in
rise in temperature, which in turn causes the climate to change years after
the GHG are emitted. While weather changes can occur very fast and seasonal
changes are relatively slow, climate changes are very slow and have long-term
impacts. Our average earth temperature is already over 0.8oC hotter than pre-
industrial levels and the adverse impacts of climate change due to GHG
emissions of the past 4-5 decades are already beginning to manifest in the
form of extreme and unpredictable weather events that are more frequent
than ever before in history.
Of the many components of atmospheric gases only some gases block
heat from escaping. Of these, some like water vapour are seen as ‘feedback
agents’ because it helps nature to self-adjust to natural temperature changes.
Water vapour increases as the earth’s atmosphere warms, but so does the
possibility of clouds and precipitation that tend to cool the atmosphere. Several
182 Role of Technology in International Affairs

other gases that do not respond to natural changes are described as ‘forcing’
climate change as they disturb the balance of nature.
Such Greenhouse Gases are:
• Carbon dioxide (CO2)—CO2 is absorbed and emitted naturally as
part of the carbon cycle, through animal and plant respiration, volcanic
eruptions and ocean-atmosphere exchange. Human activities, such as
the burning of fossil fuels and changes in land use, release large amounts
of CO2 in the atmosphere. Humans have increased atmospheric CO2
concentration by 40 percent since the industrial revolution began.
This is the most important long-lived gas and the ‘forcing’ mechanism
of climate change.
• Methane (CH4)—This hydrocarbon gas is produced both by natural
sources and human activities, including the decomposition of wastes
in landfills, rice cultivation, as well as ruminant digestion and manure
management associated with domestic livestock. On a molecule-for-
molecule basis, methane is a nearly 20 times more active GHG than
CO2, but it is much less abundant in the atmosphere.
• Nitrous oxide (N2O)—This is another powerful GHG produced by
soil cultivation practices, especially the use of commercial and organic
fertilisers, fossil fuel combustion (like automobile exhaust), nitric acid
production and biomass burning. Certain industrial wastes often emit
sulphur fluoride gases.
• Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs)—These are synthetic compounds
entirely of industrial origin used in a number of applications. These
are now largely regulated in production and release to the atmosphere
by international agreements because of their ability to contribute to
the destruction of the ozone layer. They are also GHG.
Most of these GHG are by-products of human activity and the most serious
component is the CO2 emission from burning carbon-based fuels for electricity
generation, transportation requirements and industrial activities—all being
intrinsic to human development. However, since the process of global warming
is very slow and invisible by itself, realisation of warming is evident only by
the actual increase in average temperature. Unfortunately, by this time, the
GHG clouds that cause this temperature rise are already there in the
atmosphere for the next few decades. This slow and invisible process has now
gone beyond the self-adjusting capacity of nature and hence, we are now in
a phase of cumulative build-up of GHG clouds that will affect the earth’s
climate for decades and perhaps centuries to come.
 Climate Change and International Relations 183

Status of Global Warming

Human development has indeed led to a rapidly increasing wealth of
knowledge upon which humanity has evolved as a complex civilization that
continues to increase its power by manipulating the environment. Exploiting
fossil fuels in pursuit of development and security has enabled mankind to
undertake new activities and vastly expand and accelerate existing activities,
consuming more fossil fuels and emitting more GHG. Between year 1800
and 2000, the human population grew 6 times—from about one billion to
six billion, while energy use grew by about 40-times and economic production
grew by 50-times. The atmospheric CO2 concentration was 277 ppm in 1750,
growing to 283 ppm in 1800 and 284 ppm in 1825. All this increase was
well within the range of nature’s capacity to absorb and balance GHG in the
range of 260–285 ppm by self-adjusting natural feedback mechanisms.
Changes in the earth’s environment have been dramatic since World War
II and this period from 1945 to 2000 represents the period of ‘great
acceleration’ in atmospheric degradation. World population doubled from 3
to 6 billion in this period, while the leap in economic activity was 15-fold
and petroleum consumption grew by a factor of 3.5 times. Atmospheric CO2
concentration grew from 310 ppm in 1950 to 369 ppm in 2000, it further
increased to 390 ppm by 2010 and it crossed 400 ppm in May 2013. Besides
this steep increase in CO2 concentration there have also been other significant
pollutants as discussed above.
The ‘great acceleration’ of industrial activity between 1945 and 2000 was
almost entirely driven by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) countries that represented only 20 percent of the world
population, while the balance 80 percent, mainly in the developing countries,
contributed less than 20 percent of the cumulative CO2 emissions. However
by 2008-2010, coal and oil became the main fossil-fuel energy sources for
the rapidly developing economies like China and India that now account for
the major rate of increase in CO2 emissions.
The IEA (International Energy Agency) forecasts that oil production could
increase by 26 percent by 2030, to avoid reaching the peak point, but the
prospects of achieving this level within two decades, at affordable prices, are
dim. Hence, peak oil can be estimated to happen by 2025. But now there is
increasing expectation that heavy oil and shale gas extraction from deep
underground by fracking techniques can off-set peak-oil problems. However,
the impact of such deep fracking and heavy oil production on water resources
and bio-diversity is fairly grave. The irony is that if heavy oil and shale gas is
184 Role of Technology in International Affairs

produced at affordable cost, it may perpetuate dependence on fossil fuels and

actually accelerate global warming to the tipping point. It would also hurt
the momentum for shifting to renewable energy which can stop further
degradation of the atmosphere. Climate change will probably entail a heavy
economic penalty in the future, far in excess of the investments needed today
for rapid expansion of renewable technologies to slow-down global warming.
Unfortunately, this foresight is yet to be accepted by the development hungry
society that is compromising future generations of humankind.
Ironically, mankind is now contemplating geo-engineering solutions to
artificially cool the earth but there is no doubt that if geo-engineering is to
play a significant role in preventing the climate system from warming beyond
the 2oC guardrail, much more scientific research is required and serious
mitigation work is needed. Our world seems destined to enter its sixth great
extinction event unless urgent steps are taken now!3
Studies show that solar variability has played a role in climate change in
the past causing the ‘Little Ice Age’ between approximately 1650 and 1850,
when Greenland was largely cut-off and glaciers advanced in the Alps.
However, evidence shows that current global warming cannot be explained
by changes in energy from the sun alone. Since 1750, the average amount of
energy coming from the sun has either remained constant or increased very
slightly. Scientists have also observed cooling in the upper atmosphere and
warming in the lower parts of the atmosphere. This is because GHG are
trapping heat in the lower atmosphere. Climate models that include solar
irradiance changes, can’t explain the observed temperature trends over the
past century without including an additional rise in GHG due to non-natural
or man-made reasons.4
The fourth assessment report of the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) in 20075 has affirmed the gravity of the problem of adverse
climate change and raised some important issues that may be summarised as
follows:
• While natural forces have always influenced the earth’s climate (and
always will); human-induced changes in the levels of atmospheric
GHG are playing an increasingly dominant role in the observed
changes in global climate.
• After considering the influences of the known causes of climate
change—natural and human-induced, the significant increase in
average global temperatures over the last half century, can be attributed
to human activities with a certainty of more than 90 percent.
 Climate Change and International Relations 185

• The rise in temperature has already affected various natural systems

in many global regions and hence, some adverse future changes to the
climate are inevitable, unless immediate steps are taken to arrest and
reverse the trend.
Global warming due to increasing concentration of GHG in the atmosphere
is a slow but cumulative process. Nature’s feedback processes—a hotter earth
causing more greenhouse effects and more warming—can intensify beyond a
2oC rise over the average temperature of past 1000 years. This can lead to the
tipping point of global warming when irreversible processes can go beyond
the control of human civilisation. The consequences of changing the natural
atmospheric greenhouse effects are difficult to predict exactly, but certain
effects seem very likely. As the earth gets warmer, some regions may welcome
warmer conditions but others may not. Warmer conditions will lead to more
evaporation and precipitation overall, but individual regional effects would
vary—some becoming wetter and others dryer. A stronger greenhouse effect
will warm the oceans and partially melt glaciers/ice-sheets, increasing sea levels.
Ocean water will expand if it warms, contributing to further rise of sea levels.
Carbon dioxide concentration of 400-440 ppm corresponds to a 2.4oC
rise in global mean temperature. When the 2oC mark is crossed, natural
positive feedback processes could accelerate further warming, leading to non-
reversible climate changes. Melting of Arctic ice-caps would reduce the
reflecting surface areas, thus absorbing more heat and causing more melting
in a feedback cycle. Consequent flooding and sea level rise can have a severe
impact on availability of habitable land, drinking water, food production and
can lead to an increase in vector borne diseases. Once the ice-sheets start
melting, exposing the northern permafrost, they can release Methane (CH4)
which is 20 times more harmful than CO2. Such eventualities can exacerbate
global warming to levels beyond exacting analysis and forecasting. Hence, it
would be better to err on the side of caution.
Increased evaporation from oceans and land will contribute water vapour
to the atmosphere, which will lead to further trapping of heat and also change
precipitation patterns. Tropical regions will get affected much before the higher
latitude regions. At 3oC rise, Arctic ice-caps would disappear completely and
Amazon rain-forests could dry-up into deserts, drastically reducing earth’s
capacity to absorb CO2 emissions. At 4oC rise, Antarctic ice-sheets could
collapse totally, flooding low-level coastal cities world-wide. New deserts would
spread across the world, including Europe, with death and destruction due
to extreme climate conditions. At 5oC rise, searing heat waves would make
186 Role of Technology in International Affairs

sub-tropical regions unliveable, forcing hundreds of millions of climate refugees

to move-out, searching for food and water. At 6oC rise in temperature, huge
inhabitable areas would span the globe causing mass extinction of natural life
and the earth’s ecosystem will be changed permanently!6
The above scenario looks very likely in the next 150 years, unless urgent
steps are taken at a global level to effectively slow-down global warming in
the next 10-15 years. Delay in action could actually cost billions more per
year to save the earth’s eco-balance, besides having to suffer adverse
consequences. Considering the inescapable reality of the continuing use of
fossil fuels for global energy requirements in the near future, it is of vital
importance to adopt a complete range of carbon mitigation measures including
CO2 sequestration by major global forestation drives and other technology
means. The next few years up to 2025, could be the last window of
opportunity for mankind to prevent catastrophic changes in the earth’s
atmosphere. Game-changing policy initiatives are needed for quick and decisive
global action. This is the greatest challenge for experts managing international
affairs.
It is important to understand why this runaway situation looks difficult
to avoid. Modern society is hungry for energy for development and security
needs in the immediate future. The increasing global population, combined
with the aspirations of millions joining the lifestyles of the developed affluent
society, will cause global energy needs to grow faster than our capacity for
providing clean and sustainable energy. The result is the growing use of coal,
oil and natural gas reserves that is creating alarming levels of GHG. Slowing
down this human development activity has such obvious economic and
lifestyle costs, that no one is yet ready to compromise development in the
larger interest of the environment.
It is only in the past 15-20 years that warnings by climate scientists are
beginning to be heard, and a realisation is dawning that the cost of not slowing
down global warming now—within the next 10 years—will actually cost much
more in addressing the consequences in the future. By some conservative
estimates, every dollar invested now in green and renewable energy technology
could save over $ 3 over the next 10 years. Therefore, the urgency of climate
change mitigation action and the associated costs are becoming more
understandable and acceptable for modern society.
Mitigation of global warming and management of climate change is a
problem of global dimension, but different countries have contributed to the
problem in vastly varying levels and the adverse effects of climate change will
 Climate Change and International Relations 187

also be different for different geographic regions and countries. Hence, finding
a global consensus for concerted efforts is posing a major diplomatic challenge.
While each country is protecting its own priorities in terms of development
and economics, time for convergence on collective action is slipping away,
with carbon concentration in the earth’s atmosphere fast approaching threshold
levels with irreversible effects.
Success or failure in managing climate change and its consequences will
be a major factor in international relations among countries big or small, rich
or poor.

Energy and Environment Dilemma: Indian Priorities

Inherent Dilemma and the Basic Issues

Since World War II, our world has been witness to rapid industrialisation
with increasing use of energy derived from fossil fuels whether it is for
electricity generation or transportation. The more the energy consumption
using carbon fuels, more is the CO2 emission in the atmosphere that causes
climate changes creating unpredictable and extreme weather events. There is
now a sober acceptance that GHG emission due to human activity is almost
of a magnitude higher than the natural and this clearly needs to be reduced
to a level that nature can absorb, without getting hotter, to avoid a runoff
situation. But reducing CO2 emissions, all else remaining the same, would
mean using less energy and that amounts to slowing down economic progress
or investing in more expensive but non-polluting energy options. Therefore,
the basic dilemma is—how to balance increasing energy needs with the need
to reduce carbon emissions. The earth has clearly entered a new ‘age of
consequences’, where the national priorities of economic progress and human
development are getting into conflict with the need to care for the environment
which requires serious mitigation of global warming and serious efforts to
preserve the delicate ecosystem.7
Developed countries have been almost entirely responsible for the
anthropogenic CO2 emissions in the atmosphere, due to which the entire
earth and particularly the poorer developing countries, will face adverse
consequences. Until a global consensus can be reached about which country
will reduce how much emission and by when, the earth will continue to get
warmer with serious climate change impacts for future generations. For every
sovereign nation, the dilemma about how best to avert the emerging threat
188 Role of Technology in International Affairs

to human security due to climate change while balancing the interests of energy
security and development priorities, is also a national security challenge.
The dilemma is more acute for a country like India, as it struggles to
carry its billion plus population to participate in the quest for its long overdue
economic development. To stay on a rapid growth trajectory, India may require
five or six times more energy by 2030 than what it consumed in 2010.
Demand for energy in China, Brazil and many other fast developing
economies, is also rising steeply. Industrially advanced countries that used
vast amounts of energy during their own development years, are now
concerned that rising energy consumption in the fast developing countries,
can push global warming to a point of no return. The fast developing countries
with a rising need for energy, are now asking the developed countries to reduce
their energy demands and significantly reduce their carbon footprints to allow
a fair share of energy for growing economies.
The second part of the dilemma is, how should nations agree on equitable
distribution of the limited global energy resources and how humanity as a
whole must contain global warming to prevent catastrophic climate changes?
On the one hand, world energy shortages can trigger major tensions, conflicts
and even war, and on the other, unprecedented climate changes can cause
clear danger to regional and international stability. The resultant consequences
combined or singularly, could pose a grave threat to the national security of
individual sovereign nations, particularly so, for developing nations in regions
that are already under various stresses.
The dilemma for India has several unique characteristics. India has good
coal reserves, but the quality of coal is very poor. Hence, increased use of
low-quality coal can alarmingly increase the carbon signature of the country.
Modest reserves of natural gas are yet to be tapped fully and pricing has become
a political issue. Almost all oil requirements are met from imports and the
combined energy import bill today accounts for over 80 percent of national
imports. Such a heavy dependence on imports can have major concerns about
vulnerabilities and India therefore, has been investing in hydropower as well
as nuclear power. Hydropower is already contributing about 18-20 percent
of the energy requirement and the potential for large hydro-power now looks
limited. Nuclear energy contribution has been stagnating at about 3 percent
and ambitious plans of increasing this to over 10 percent are stalled due to
public perceptions of safety, particularly since the Fukushima accident in Japan.
Renewable energy options continue to be more expensive and investments
needed for boosting this sector are not yet forthcoming, due to the absence
 Climate Change and International Relations 189

of a supportive policy framework and lacklustre implementation of existing

enabling policies. India also lags behind in energy efficiency performance when
compared to many industrial nations. There is thus an urgent need for an
integrated energy policy for India.
Given the increasing global concerns of climate change and domestic
imperatives for supporting a fast growing economy, Indian policy makers have
a tight rope to walk. Domestically, there is urgency for improving energy
efficiency across all sectors and for rapidly increasing the share of renewable
sources in the energy basket. At the same time, India needs to be competitive
in seeking access to external energy sources in the immediate future and
attracting international investment for focused research and development
(R&D) to enhance energy performance and move to renewable energy sources.
Simultaneously, India must actively engage in the international dialogue
for mitigation of global warming because India will be one of the worst affected
nations by climate change induced extreme weather conditions, natural
disasters and climate refugees. While India must try its utmost to not allow
its carbon signature to grow beyond a point, it will be a major challenge for
Indian diplomacy to convince world powers that the Indian problems are not
entirely of India’s making and hence, global players must share the cost of
urgent actions needed in India.
India will need substantial investments for introducing renewable energy
sources in a big drive in the next 5-10 years, particularly from solar, wind,
bio-gas and small hydro. Until newer technologies to help harness these sources
become well established and cost competitive, India will need to enhance its
share of nuclear energy from 3 percent to about 10 percent to tide over
immediate energy shortages. Many among the developed world can afford to
move away from nuclear energy due to public perceptions of safety, because
their future needs are already being met from existing technology options.
Such advanced nations are looking at renewable options for reducing their
carbon signature. The case for India is different in the sense that the demand-
supply curve for India is nowhere near the plateau and hence, renewable energy
sources are urgently required for bridging the gap between demand and supply
with as little carbon penalty as possible. For India, renewable energy is not
an option but a necessity.

Global Energy Scenario

The world’s population crossed the 7 billion mark in October 2011 and the
average global energy consumption rate was about 15 terawatts (15×1012
190 Role of Technology in International Affairs

Watts). Roughly 78 percent of this energy was consumed by the industrially

advanced countries and the balance 22 percent was consumed by 80 percent
of the population in developing countries. A quick look at the global energy
scenario shows that in terms of energy consumption, China with 20.25 percent
of world consumption has already overtaken the US (19.04 percent). Russia
is third at 5.75 percent while India is fourth at 4.36 percent, followed by
Japan (4.24 percent), Germany (2.65 percent), Canada (2.63 percent) and
France (2 percent). However, comparing the same eight nations in terms of
per-capita consumption, Canada is one of the highest with 8300 ‘Kg of oil
equivalent’ (koe) with the US right behind at 7795 koe. Next are France at
4615, Russia at 4423, Germany at 4203, Japan at 4040, China at 1652 and
India at 512. It is interesting to note that although India ranks as the fourth
largest energy consumer in the world, its per capita consumption is very low,
less than 1/10th of the US or Canada and about 1/4th of the world average.8
Unfortunately, much of the energy needs of the industrialised world are
met from fossil fuel resources that have been most cost-competitive but also
heavy emitters of GHG. As global demand for energy threatens to overtake
the supply of these fuels, the increase in prices becomes inevitable in driving
economic competition to an even higher pitch. Thus, with no let-up in global
warming, the imminent consequences of a hotter earth will have more severe
impact in highly populated developing countries than advanced nations with
lower density of population and better infrastructures.
World energy consumption is expected to grow by 45 percent by year
2035 and with the ‘business as usual’ model the global emissions of GHG
are also expected to increase by about 42 percent by the year 2035. However,
if dependence on carbon fuel is reduced drastically and the share of clean
energy sources is improved to nearly 50 percent from the present 15 percent,
further global warming could be mitigated significantly. There is therefore a
need for technological innovations and investments in clean and renewable
technologies including techniques for carbon sequestration at affordable cost.
The penalty of not achieving the above could mean painful cuts in future
energy usage that could slow-down economic progress or accelerate
environmental disasters that could spiral out of control and threaten human
well-being and even survival.
As brought out by Thomas L. Friedman in his book, ‘Hot, Flat and
Crowded: Why We Need a Green Revolution—and How It Can Renew America’
our world is indeed getting hotter than ever before due to our insatiable hunger
for energy, and comforts of mankind. An increasing number of people globally
 Climate Change and International Relations 191

are graduating to middle class aspirations that are very energy-dependent.

Global resources being limited, this will inevitably increase the sense of
vulnerability between societies and countries. Asia in the year 2000 had 60
percent of the global population, producing 40 percent of the global Gross
Domestic Product (GDP). By 2020, Asia may support 50 percent of the
population but produce 60 percent of global GDP. Hence, the centre of focus
is shifting and what happens in Asia will affect the world very significantly.
Political consequences of this shift could prove very stressful for global stability
and peaceful coexistence. This presents a huge challenge and an opportunity
for Indian diplomacy to make the best use of the opportunity for projecting
India’s rising role in international affairs.
Global warming is cumulative and hence concerns and dangers will
increase exponentially. The impact on economy and lifestyle will create
conflicts among individual countries that will try to preserve their respective
values and priorities. It should therefore be very clear that the politics of energy
will shape world power equations in future. Energy shortages and common
dangers of climate change will compel nations to redefine national priorities.
Nations will have to learn to compete and cooperate at the same time, or go
to war over climate change!
The well known Stern Review of October 2006 on “The Economics of
Climate Change,”9 argues that the world needs to invest one percent of global
GDP each year to mitigate the effects of climate change, through raising the
price of carbon and by investing in improving energy efficiency as well as
harnessing alternative energy clean resources. If this is not done, the Review
argues, up to 20 percent of global GDP may be lost eventually because of the
damage done by global warming. Quite clearly, energy security can no longer
be separated from effects of climate change and one must worry about effective
global energy management over and above the priorities of individual nations.
The IEA predicts that the world’s total energy usage may increase by more
than half the present level over the next 25 years and use of coal for power
generation may predominate over other means, thereby causing serious
concerns of runaway conditions of climate change.
The US has for decades been the world’s largest CO2 emitter but by 2008
it was reported that China overtook the US in total emissions although its
per capita emissions remains much lower in comparison. Coal being in
abundant supply in the US, China and India, the tendency to rely more on
coal seems unavoidable, but it will be imperative to replace the present
polluting technologies with clean-coal technologies for future power
192 Role of Technology in International Affairs

generators, in order not to exacerbate global warming. The world today is

debating on how much of this cost of shift to new technologies should be
supported by the advanced nations that have already secured their energy
security issues through easy access to cheap fossil fuels, when global warming
was not a serious issue.
It is expected that the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) share of the global oil market may grow to over 50 percent. The era
of an oil-price controlled economy is already in play. It may be interesting to
observe that while global warming concerns are major drivers for investments
in energy efficiency technologies and for renewable energy technologies, the
oil producers—particularly the OPEC countries—stand to lose out if that
succeeds. Hence, the OPEC will be the last to encourage green energy
investments and will always try to control the price of oil to keep oil supply
at a competitive rate, for slowing down investments in such technologies which
would reduce dependence on oil. It is therefore paradoxical that if there should
be a ‘war-risk’ environment driving up oil prices, that would actually make
alternative energy development more cost-effective, thus contributing to better
mitigation of global warming effects. The world may therefore witness an
interesting play of forces of economic and security priorities balancing each
other, in the process of managing GHG emissions.
Inadequate energy supply or highly import-dependent energy supply can
be a serious threat to national security because the country remains vulnerable
to external forces and priorities. Oil and coal are expected to peak well within
the next few decades and the cost of oil and coal will be on a constant rise—
as is already happening. Energy security is therefore one of the top priority
security agendas for India and most other progressive nations. Several
developing nations on fast-track development are bound to need more energy
from every source possible and this will have a major impact on the dilemma
of how to balance increasing energy consumption with the need to contain
global warming.
It is therefore a no brainer that for all nations, enhancing energy efficiency
and increasing the share of renewable clean energy produced within the
country, will be an absolute imperative. For every nation, the ideal energy
policy for the future must include a wide mix of renewable energy options—
solar, wind, hydro, biomass, nuclear etc., to reduce dependence on carbon-
based energy sources that are not sustainable. The energy policy must also
include investments in innovation for major improvement in energy efficiency
 Climate Change and International Relations 193

and for exploring new resources, such as gas hydrates, tidal waves, controlled
thermonuclear fusion as well as other new technology options.
It is evident that competition for coal, oil, natural gas and uranium will
get hostile as nations jostle to ensure own energy security despite depleting
global resources. Per capita electricity consumption of India was 733 kWh
by end-2011. In comparison, the numbers for other major consumers are:
the US—13,994, Europe—6,009, China—1,750 and the world average per
capita stands at 2,596 KWh. At the same time, carbon footprints in MMT/
year (per capita) are—the US 17.62, Russia 12.55, Japan 9.26, China 6.52
and India 1.45 MMT/year. But in terms of total carbon footprint already
China is number one at 8715, with US—5490, Russia—1788, India—1724,
Japan—1180. If China and India reach world average per capita electricity
consumption, they will perhaps be the worst polluters of the environment;
unless their energy mix changes drastically in favour of renewable. Hence,
the energy and environment performance of China and India are under close
watch of the international community!10
The global alternative policy scenario presented in the World Energy
Outlook 2006 of the IEA shows how the global energy market could evolve
if countries around the world were to adopt policies and measures currently
under consideration for reducing CO2 emissions and improving energy supply
security. In the given scenario, the share of renewables in global energy
consumption remains largely unchanged while the share of traditional biomass
falls. Hydropower production may grow but its share will remain stable, while
the share of other renewables (including solar, wind and geothermal) will
increase most rapidly, but they may still remain a small component of the
overall energy scenario in 2030. The world will continue to be dependent
largely on fossil-fuels. This is not a happy situation for mankind.

Energy Security: Indian Perspective

The concept of national security is now changing to encompass everything
that can affect national interests including the security, aspirations and
potential of its people. Comprehensive National Power (CNP)—is not only
about protecting national interests but goes beyond, in terms of ability to
influence global decisions. For every nation, energy security and sustainable
development will be critical to enhance the CNP level, so that it can become
a global player based on its CNP strength. India’s Integrated Energy Policy
(IEP) approved in December 2008, envisions a road map for sustainable
growth with focus on energy security in the future. Until 2012 India’s
194 Role of Technology in International Affairs

electricity production was dominated by fossil fuel at 74 percent and

hydropower at 15 percent, while renewable energy—mostly wind and solar,
provide 8 percent and nuclear power accounts for 3 percent. But in recent
years contribution of wind and solar has been rising promisingly.
Given that the peak oil phenomenon can be expected within the next
10-20 years, prices could spiral upwards and the era of cheap oil seems to be
over. While for many advanced countries energy demands have already reached
a plateau, energy demands for India, on its fast growth-curve are going to rise
significantly. Hence, the most important issue for India is to draw up a plan
to combat the effects of peak oil through exploitation of every other energy
source. The ‘Integrated Energy Policy’ (IEP) is about defining a viable energy
strategy, which can translate into long-term energy independence for the
nation. In fact, as renewable energy gets competitive with carbon fuel, a whole
new dynamic will open up to affect the politics of oil pricing and influence
international affairs.
Improving energy efficiency and promoting distributed energy generation
on a war-footing are clear priorities for India; where energy thefts alone account
for over 20 percent loss. Reducing transmission and distribution (T&D) losses
to a minimum can save another 15 percent of electrical energy. The industrial
sector in India is responsible for about 50 percent of total commercial
electricity consumption. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have
big potential for increasing energy efficiency using technology upgradation.
Policy incentives and strengthening of the Bureau of Energy Efficiency for
strict monitoring of electricity wastage can improve energy efficiency and
reduce domestic energy demand by about 30 percent, across industrial and
domestic sectors.
The importance of renewable energy sources as well as nuclear energy
technology needs to be appreciated in the above context, particularly for a
country like India which has very poor self-sufficiency in energy and which
is also on a path of steep economic progress, requiring more and more energy.
Priorities for India therefore, must include a variety of initiatives to strengthen
its energy security. At the same time, policy makers should be mindful about
not worsening the global warming situation.
Increasing the strategic reserves of oil, improving the efficiency of present
oil usage, both in power generation and the transportation sector, and investing
in the search for more oil and gas reserves within the country, are clear priorities
for the short term, where government policies must create major incentives
and very focused coordination. Investments in clean coal technologies and
 Climate Change and International Relations 195

for renewable energy technologies must also increase, so as to reduce the

dependence on carbon-based energy in the long term.
India also needs the political maturity and pragmatism to realise that
nuclear energy must be harnessed to a larger extent in the interest of energy
security as well as environmental concerns. India needs an opening like the
India-US nuclear deal to break out of the technology embargo regimes and
become an international partner in nuclear energy technology. With
technology advances helping to minimise the traditional risks associated with
nuclear reactors, and with emerging revival in the nuclear energy option, India
is very well positioned to quickly build on its indigenous nuclear energy
technology expertise and become a world-class player in the nuclear energy
market.
Common concerns of global warming and climate change have finally
provided an opportunity for nations to cooperate in nuclear technology for
improving the global energy scenario. India must target nuclear energy to
support at least a 10 percent share of energy mix for the nation within the
next 15 years. In the same time-frame, if renewable technologies contribute
another 20 percent share, along with 20 percent from hydropower,
cumulatively this could ensure energy independence of about 50 percent by
2030. This would represent a major achievement, both in terms of energy
security as well as for contributing significantly towards limiting the impact
of climate change.
India must also be proactive in the international efforts towards mitigating
the effects of climate change, through positive participation in international
dialogue. Although the Kyoto Protocol did not demand any specific targets
for developing countries by 2012, perhaps both India and China could take
bold and proactive steps to commit to specific GHG emission reduction targets
in the near future, and insist that advanced nations support the cost of
changeover to newer clean technologies, as well as invest in renewable
technologies, including cooperation in nuclear energy technology.
While the OPEC may want to prolong the heavy dependence on oil by
fine tuning the oil price, international groups for environmental protection
must build consensus to unite for a coordinated momentum for reducing
GHG emissions while increasing potential for clean technologies. It is a unique
opportunity for a ‘win-win’ situation for the global energy scene, which could
easily turn in to a ‘lose-lose’ scenario, if mismanagement and political conflicts
are allowed to overtake cooperative efforts. India must play a very proactive
role for this global win-win opportunity.
196 Role of Technology in International Affairs

The transport sector may continue to be dependent largely on oil and

gas, until other technologies such as electric vehicles and hydrogen fuel-based
or compressed air-based engines can mature and compete. In the short term,
bio-fuels with lower emission properties can significantly reduce the carbon
footprint of the transport sector. Greater use of public transport and use of
modern technology such as magneto drive locomotives can result in major
savings for the transport sector and CO2 emissions.
The agriculture sector in India is highly subsidised and a highly energy-
intensive field. Existing inefficient pumps can be 30 percent more efficient
with retro-fitting of new technologies, and innovative solar pumps can replace
thousands of diesel pumps. Action on 10 percent of 15 million pumps can
translate to a saving of 4 million electricity units per year. The Green Building
Initiative is yet another example where the rapidly growing residential and
commercial buildings in cities can be made more energy efficient. Given that
the annual energy demand for this sector in India is increasing by 35 percent
or by about 5 million kWh per year, green building architecture can provide
major benefits.
The Government of India has an incentive scheme, the Green Rating for
Integrated Habitat Assessment (GRIHA) where a star rating system is in place
for qualifying for financial benefits; a 5-star rating is 50 percent more eco-
friendly than a zero star rating of most present buildings. Investments in Green
Buildings producing more that 80 percent of its energy needs by on-site
renewable energy (solar and wind) generation have an attractive payback period
of 4-5 years, with a promise of free electricity for many more years. The future
will require many such innovative schemes to reduce the carbon footprint of
the building sector.

Policy Priorities and Diplomatic Challenges for India

India’s economy is on a fast growth path. It crossed the $ 1 trillion mark in
2009 with expectations of doubling by 2017, and it could perhaps be over
$3 trillion by 2030. India’s electrical energy needs will be about 510 GW by
2030, which is over three times the 160 GW generated in 2010.11
Rapid economic growth is bound to increase India’s per capita energy
consumption and with an increasing urban population, India’s total CO2
emissions can increase alarmingly. At the same time, the effects of global
warming will be more severe on countries like India with a high density of
population and its economy being dependent on the monsoon. Hence, India
faces an urgent challenge of learning to manage the growing demand of energy
 Climate Change and International Relations 197

with a clear priority of not allowing its carbon footprint to increase

significantly. Given the rising tensions about energy and environment, India
may not be allowed by the international community to remain energy intensive
for long, nor will it be allowed to demand energy equity as argued till now at
international forums.
From an energy security perspective, India must first focus on vastly
improving its energy efficiency which is pretty low compared to many leading
nations. This will be essential to manage the widening gap between demand
and supply. Simultaneously, India must quickly increase the share of clean
and renewable energy in its energy basket, so that the carbon footprint of the
nation does not increase at the same rate as energy consumption goes up.
India has the potential to use more of solar and wind energy resources to
increase the share of RE (renewable energy) to about 30 percent by 2030. By
March 2012, India was the fifth largest producer of wind energy with about
49 GW generation capacity and this is expected to grow to about 222 GW
by 2015.12
Globally, the share of renewable energy is expected to increase to 30
percent by 2030 and 50 percent by 2050. By March 2014, India achieved
12.9 percent of its renewable energy potential, totalling 28.8 percent (including
hydro-power) of overall installed capacity. Thus India is on track to do even
better than world trends.13
The potential for solar and wind power is very large—enough to avoid
dependence on imported oil and coal and even help reduce the share of nuclear
energy, which has its own disadvantages. The National Solar Mission target
is 20 GW generation by 2022 but the industry feels that the actual target
can be many times more with the right set of incentives from the government.
India gets an average of 7 KW of solar radiation energy per sq-metre for over
1500 hrs each year (300 days × 5 hours). Solar Photovoltaic (SPV) technology
with the current efficiency of 14-15 percent can thus generate about 1500
kWh per sq-metre each year. Solar energy represents a staggering opportunity
for India with increasing efficiency and lowering costs, but mind-sets must
change to understand the potential and capitalise the opportunity.
Technology advances with Concentrated Photovoltaic (CPV) systems and
Concentrated Solar Thermal Power (CSP) can offer higher efficiency up to
28-30 percent in the near future. However, major investment, political will
and time will be required for India to harness this technology. As per 2011
estimates the capital cost per 1 MW generation in India was about Rs. 10
crore for solar, 9 crore for nuclear, 6 crore for wind and about 4 crore for coal
198 Role of Technology in International Affairs

thermal power. But by 2014 the solar cost came down to about Rs. 7 crore
per MW. It is no wonder that India revised its solar generation target to 100
GW from the earlier 22 GW.14
For a country like India with a large rural population, coal, firewood and
biomass will continue to play a major role in the rural energy sector for the
foreseeable future. Hence, clean coal technology must be pursued for
sustaining the use of coal without increasing the level of CO2 emissions.
Similarly, biomass or bio-fuel, though not totally clean, can be made much
less polluting through innovative techniques like efficient micro-turbines and
can meet the large demand of rural India that may constitute 25 percent of
the national energy demand in the near future. For all renewable solutions,
the culture of distributed generation must grow for use of energy close to
where it is produced. This would avoid T&D losses of the grid and improve
efficiency. India must pursue all possible avenues to tap new, clean and
sustainable energy resources.
India is a partner in the International Thermonuclear Experimental
Reactor (ITER) Project that aims to produce commercial electrical energy
from a controlled thermo-nuclear fusion reactor using sea water derivatives
to give almost unlimited power from a non-radioactive reactor. Technical
feasibility has been already proven. Commercial viability is yet to be achieved.
According to recent estimates by the OECD, unless urgent corrective steps
are taken, global GHG emissions could rise by 50 percent by 2050 (one and
half times the 2012 level) with irreversible consequences, hence, serious climate
action must begin soon. The Conference of the Parties, COP 17 at Durban
in November-December 2011 left it to individual nations until 2015 to decide
on signing binding commitments for mitigation actions, to be effective by
2020. This could clearly be ‘too little too late’ because due to cumulative
increase in GHG concentration our earth may be already very close to crossing
the safety limit of 2oC rise.
Human civilization has to stem the increase of GHG emissions within
the next 5-6 years regardless of the increasing energy demands on account of
economic progress or increasing population. In order to prevent a runaway
situation in future, global GHG emissions must begin to reduce drastically
by 2020 and come down to 1990 levels, well before 2050. This will require
the present generation to change their lifestyles for serious commitment to
energy conservation and increasing energy efficiency. At the same time, there
must be concerted global efforts for moving towards sustainable and clean
energy resources such as solar, wind and other renewable energy sources. This
 Climate Change and International Relations 199

presents the only win-win option, rather an opportunity and this must be
done for the sake of the next generation otherwise humanity can be on the
brink of disaster.
The challenge for India is unique because while it must provide electricity
to millions of deprived people, it must also address the energy demands of a
growing economy. However, India is now under close watch by other nations
to ensure that India’s carbon footprint does not grow alarmingly. Indian
diplomats at international forums have to ensure that India’s priorities do
not get compromised due to external pressure. For this, they not only need
to have facts and figures on their fingertips, but also an adequate understanding
of technological nuances to know the limits to negotiations. India is unlucky
that the global economic slow-down is affecting its own development agenda
and it is in this environment that India also needs urgent and heavy
investments for aggressively promoting renewable energy (RE) options as also
R&D for future technology options.

Climate Change and National Security: Indian Perspective

Concerns for India’s National Security Interests

The world today is getting increasingly globalised and interdependent with
the very definition of national security changing from protecting geographic
national borders from enemy forces—to a broader concept of comprehensive
security that includes safe-guarding diverse issues of national interests. This
may start with basic human security and go on to include internal ‘homeland’
security, economic security, energy security, water-food security and of course
the military security comprising strategic assets, missile defence, outer space
assets and cyber security. Hence, the basic safety, stability and capacity for
competitive performance of modern society have become integral components
of national security, and it is this basic foundation of a secure and stable nation
that can come under serious stress due to the adverse effect of climate change.
Despite a growing understanding of the long-term security implications
of climate change, the subject has generated more debate in international
forums rather than any concrete collective steps being taken to mitigate the
effects. Now with the imminent threat to global peace and security due to
the possible extreme effects of climate change, there is growing international
focus on the potential common dangers of climate change and hence, there
is an emerging urgency for collective action to limit its adverse effects. Given
200 Role of Technology in International Affairs

that poorer developing countries will be affected more severely, the subject is
of great importance to India’s national security.
India is particularly vulnerable to climate change because of heavy
dependence on both the monsoon precipitation pattern and glacial sources
of water reserves in the Himalayas. Scarcity of fresh water resources in the
region will intensify the inter-State and intra-State disputes over territories
that either have water resources or control the flow of water to other territories.
For instance, the Indus and its tributaries flow through Jammu and Kashmir
(J&K) into Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) and parts of Pakistan. The
importance of J&K for India thus needs to be appreciated in this context
also. The Baglihar Dam has been a matter of dispute between India and
Pakistan, and given the various intra-State water disputes within Pakistan’s
Punjab-Sindh-Baluchistan regions, scarcity of water is bound to add more
intensity to existing conflicts.
The Indus Water Treaty that allows India to build hydro-electric plants
on the rivers flowing into Pakistan, without affecting the downstream water
flow, could easily fall victim to any new water crisis. Climate change can thus
trigger a new level of conflict between India and Pakistan. Similarly, China’s
plans to divert the flow of the ‘Brahmaputra’ river to suit Chinese interests,
has already created tensions in India. China’s continued exploitation of Tibetan
resources also has serious long-term implications for India’s water resources
and the effects of climate change will aggravate the situation.15
Concerns about global warming are beginning to be taken seriously all
over the world, and the Nobel Committee recognised the cause to be
important enough for the IPCC to deserve the peace prize in 2007 for their
in-depth study of global warming. Modern society has caused significant
changes in the global ecosystem balance and set-in processes that can pose
grave threats to human security in future.
Throughout history, the earth has experienced oscillations between warm
and cool periods. The shifts in climate can be attributed to a variety of natural
factors that include orbital variations, solar fluctuations, volcanic activity and
the atmosphere’s concentration of GHG. The balance in the earth’s ecosystem
has been maintained by virtue of the planet’s own natural greenhouse effect
of trapping heat in the atmosphere to balance the cooling of the earth.
However, the changes observed today are occurring at a more rapid rate than
is explainable by known natural cycles. Nature’s balance is getting affected by
human activity on a scale that is too fast for nature to compensate and recover,
 Climate Change and International Relations 201

posing a possible runaway danger of global dimension. This can be a serious

security threat to large sections of the world’s population.
Since climate change is a slow phenomenon it has not attracted the kind
of attention accorded to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or the
asymmetric threat of terrorism. However, the cumulative consequences of
undesired climate changes could be more devastating than the clear and visible
dangers of the present time. History has on record many conflicts and wars
over control of critical resources and the negative effects of climate change
on natural resources are undeniable. Effects of climate change can increase
stress among societies combined with fierce competition for scarce resources,
conditions that can lead to unprecedented tensions and dangers to stability
and security of modern societies.
Since these climatic processes, beyond a point, cannot be stopped or
reversed by human intervention, the effects of climate change could easily
snowball into dangers to national security, in a sense more dangerous than
potential threats from WMD or international terrorism.16 The linkages
between economic security, resource availability and climate change are
complex but quite substantive. However, since these dangers are not so
imminent, the implications of climate change for national security have been
often underestimated. Clearer appreciation of climate change and its impact
on the national security interests of individual nations has begun only recently,
and will certainly deserve more attention in the future.
For India, large-scale migration from coastal areas due to a rise in sea
levels and loss of cultivable land is a more immediate concern. Climate refugees
from neighbouring Maldives or Bangladesh will add a new dimension. Mass
migration from Bangladesh that seems to be sinking deeper into Islamic
extremism can create serious problems for societal stability and internal security
in India. India has its own share of water-related disputes between states such
as Tamil Nadu with Karnataka, Punjab with Rajasthan and Haryana etc. The
effects of climate change can aggravate these disputes. The coastal areas of
the Sundarbans and other parts will face the same problems as Bangladesh,
causing the population to move to safer lands and cities. Economic disparities
and inequitable distribution of resources can create new levels of tension when
stress levels are already high. The effects of climate change in India can thus
very easily lead to social unrest and anarchy beyond the control of government
agencies. Unfortunately, such situations are ideal for the rise of militancy and
anti-social activities—a serious threat to human security.
202 Role of Technology in International Affairs

The impact of climate change on the military’s efficiency can be serious.

Extreme weather conditions can cause stress to the military personnel and
impact military operations by affecting weapons systems, platforms, bases etc.
In extreme environmental conditions cost of maintenance of operating
equipment increases considerably and the service life of equipment is reduced
dramatically. In future, climate change—whether hotter, drier, or wetter—
will add stress to weapons systems as well as personnel. More storms and
rougher seas increase transit times, contribute to equipment fatigue and
hamper flight operations. Severe weather will have a direct effect on military
readiness and efficiency, as experienced in the Thar desert in Rajasthan during
summer months. Ships and aircraft operations are made more difficult during
heavy rains or storms. Military personnel themselves must evacuate or seek
shelter under extreme conditions. As extreme weather events become more
common, so do the threats to national electricity supply grids and other supply
lines for fuel, food and water. All these create logistic problems for military
efficiency and thus increase vulnerabilities if under threat of war. The adverse
effects of climate change during peacetime can get even more devastating
during wartime and thus seriously impair the efficiency of forces in border
areas and in combat situations.17
Based on existing data, it appears that the effects of climate changes in
the next few decades could pose serious threats to global peace and security.
The predicted effects of climate change over the coming decades include
extreme weather events, frequent droughts and flooding, retreating glaciers,
rise in sea levels, loss of agricultural land, habitat shifts and the potential
increase in the spread of life-threatening diseases. In the national and
international security context, climate change threatens to add new hostile
and stress factors which have the potential to create frequent natural disasters
on a scale far beyond what has been seen in the past. The consequences could
very likely create political instability where societal demands exceed resource
availability and create situations beyond the capacity of local governments to
cope. Given the nature of the modern globalised world that is more
interdependent and more aware than ever before, scarcity and inequitable
access to basic resources like water, food and shelter will be a recipe for
escalating tensions and chaos, that can pose a distinct threat to stability and
security at all levels—societal, national as well as international.
Unlike most traditional national security threats where the threat is
perceived from an identifiable enemy acting in threatening ways over a specific
timeframe, climate change has the potential to result in less visible but more
 Climate Change and International Relations 203

complex situations where interdependent conditions, occurring locally or

globally within the same timeframe, can pose serious threats to national
stability and global security. The consequences could further erode economic
and environmental conditions as food production declines, clean water
becomes increasingly scarce, diseases increase and large populations begin to
migrate in search of livelihood and safety, besides causing stress and conflict
between nations. Such situations can easily lead to an increase in internal
conflicts, fractured societies and act as an incubator of civil strife, genocide
and growth of extremism and terrorism. Climate change can thus act as a
threat multiplier for instability, particularly in the volatile regions of the world
and seriously exacerbate already marginal living standards in many developing
nations. Concepts of security today are very closely linked to stability and
order within the nation.
Climate change presents a new and very different type of national security
challenge. As global warming causes the average temperatures to rise, different
regions would face varying impacts of temperature change, combined with
the fear of the unknown in future. This is likely to create extreme tensions
between nations and between different regions. It is the impact of temperature
increase on natural systems including habitats, precipitation patterns, extreme
weather events, ice cover, sea level etc. that will have serious implications for
national security. Human civilizations have grown and flourished over the
last five millennia, mainly because the world’s climate has been relatively stable.
But the global surface temperature has increased by 0.8oC since the beginning
of the 20th century and studies suggest that the earth is getting warmer now
at a faster rate than it has ever been in past 5000 years. If climate changes
significantly and environmental conditions deteriorate to irreversible levels,
societies can become highly stressed, human security can be seriously
compromised, regional tensions could rapidly escalate and nations or even
regions could become unstable, leading to international conflicts and possible
war situations.
The nature and pace of climate change being observed today and the
consequences projected by the consensus in scientific opinions, are fairly
serious and pose grave implications for the national security perceptions of
most nations. Moving beyond the arguments of cause and effect, it is
important that security analysts across the world should join the
environmentalists and begin to address these potentially devastating effects
of climate change on national security. The increasing risks from runaway
climate change need to be addressed immediately because they will almost
204 Role of Technology in International Affairs

certainly get worse if one delays corrective action. Climate change, energy
security and national security are a related set of global challenges and because
the issues are closely linked, solutions to one would affect the other.

Geo-Strategic Implications of Climate Change

The future effects of climate change will stem from a more unstable process,
involving sudden and possibly, in some cases, catastrophic changes. It is
possible that the effects will be felt more rapidly and widely than anticipated,
leading for example, to an unexpected increase in extreme weather events,
challenging the collective and individual capacity to respond. The stress that
climate change will put on our national security will be different than any
that one has dealt with in the past. Unlike the security challenges that we are
used to dealing with, the effects of climate change will manifest very slowly
and silently but very certainly and they will affect every nation, simultaneously
but perhaps with varying degrees. The developed world will be far better
equipped to deal with the effects of climate change, while some of the poorest
regions may be less equipped and get affected more. Climate change may
thus aggravate the economic divide between societies/nations and contribute
to conditions that can fuel extremist ideologies and anti-rich sentiments.
Many developing countries do not have a strong government and social
infrastructure to cope with the types of stresses that could be brought about
by global climate change and when a government can no longer deliver services
to its people, ensure domestic order, and protect the nation’s borders,
conditions are ripe for turmoil, extremism and terrorism to fill the vacuum.
This is one major effect of climate change that has now caught the imagination
of Western developed nations, while in fact it is the poorer developing nations
that will fall prey to such conditions first, and face grave threats to their
national security. Such stresses can not only lower the threshold of conflict
but also threaten the fight to end poverty in developing countries.
Much of Southern Asia and particularly India is predominantly
agriculture-based where the health of the monsoon season determines the
economic trends and even political stability. Water issues therefore are very
important, because adequate supplies of water for drinking, irrigation, and
sanitation are the most basic prerequisite for human habitation. Changes in
rainfall, snowfall, snowmelt and glacial melt have significant effects on fresh
water supplies and climate change is likely to seriously jeopardise all of these
factors. A modest rise in temperature of about 2°C in mountainous regions
can dramatically alter the precipitation mix by increasing the share falling as
 Climate Change and International Relations 205

rain, while decreasing the share falling as snow. The result can cause more
flooding during the rainy season, a shrinking snow/ice mass and less melting
of snow to feed rivers during the dry season. In India, nearly 80 percent of
water is used for agriculture and untimely snow-melt is a serious concern as
water from the summer melt of mountain glaciers is reducing rapidly, with
the glaciers shrinking fast. Major rivers in India originate in the Himalayas
and if the massive snow/ice sheet in the Himalayas—the third-largest ice sheet
in the world—continues to melt, it will dramatically reduce water supply to
most of Asia. There are predictions by reputed institutions which have
undertaken simulation projects, that by 2050, large parts of India and China
will face severe scarcity of water.18
Access to vital resources, primarily food and water, can be a major causative
factor of conflicts, a number of which are already playing out today in Africa,
like in Darfur, which provides a case study of how existing marginal situations
can get acute beyond the tipping point, by climate-related factors. It also shows
how lack of essential resources threatens not only individuals and their
communities but also the region and the international community at large.
Crop ecologists estimate that for every 1°C rise in temperature above historical
norms, grain production will drop by 10 percent. Most of the world’s growth
in food and water demand is occurring on the Indian subcontinent and in
sub-Saharan Africa—areas that are already facing acute shortages. Over the
coming decades, these areas are expected to become hotter and drier as a
consequence of global warming and the situation can become very stressful.
Land loss and flooding will cause displacement of major populations.
About two-thirds of the world’s population lives near coastlines where critically
important facilities and infrastructure, such as transportation routes, industrial
facilities, port facilities, and energy production and distribution facilities are
usually located. Any significant rise in mean sea level would mean potential
loss of land and displacement of large numbers of people. Rising sea levels
will also make coastal areas more vulnerable to flooding and land loss through
erosion. Storm surges will take a greater toll on coastal communities and
infrastructure as sea levels rise. Most of the major rivers and river deltas in
the world are densely populated along their banks. As sea levels rise and storm
surges increase, saline water can contaminate groundwater, inundate river
deltas and valleys, and destroy croplands. This will cause major movement of
populations to inner land and cities, away from the coast. This very much
represents the likely scene for India in near future.
Although climate change may initially force migration of people due to
206 Role of Technology in International Affairs

economic hardship, the larger concern will be movement of asylum seekers

and climate refugees who due to ecological devastation become settlers in
others’ areas. Any such mass migration will add to global tensions. Over the
next few decades, sea level rise could potentially cause displacement of tens
of millions of people from low-lying areas such as Bangladesh, Maldives and
Sri Lanka. Such migration can lead to international political conflict. Already
we have large-scale migration from Bangladesh to India, mainly due to
economic reasons. Political turmoil in the region is already a cause of concern.
Most climate projections indicate increasing monsoon variability, resulting
in increase in both flood and drought intensity in temperate and tropical Asia.
Sea level rise, water scarcity affecting agricultural productivity and increased
spread of infectious diseases are the primary climate-induced effects expected
to cause problems in Asia. Climate change is expected to increase the
geographic range of vector borne diseases such as malaria, dengue fever etc.
Climate projections indicate that the Asia-Pacific region as a whole is likely
to become warmer and wetter in the coming decades, creating conditions
conducive for disease to spread, with certain regions becoming more prone
to epidemics.
To live in stability, human societies need access to certain necessary
resources, the most important of which are water, food, shelter and health
support. Any loss or mismanagement of these basic necessities can undercut
the stability of local populations and affect regions on a national or
international scale. Disputes over basic resources may not automatically trigger
violent outcomes but things can change when situations become more acute.
In areas with strong governments and societal cohesiveness, environmental
concerns could in fact foster greater cooperation between neighbours.
However, if mismanaged, the same situations could lead to increased tensions
and conflict. This is what progressive nations must realise and take proactive
steps to create the framework for international cooperation on common
dangers such as climate change.
Most astronauts confirm how beautiful the earth looks from space with
its thin atmospheric layer that shines against the sun light and how utterly
vulnerable it appears in the larger scheme of things. The realisation that this
protective atmosphere of the earth is getting eroded due to over-consumption
by human societies for development and security is frightening. Several
astronauts who were exposed to this larger perspective from space are thus
becoming environmentalists.
 Climate Change and International Relations 207

Now with serious security implications of climate change becoming more

real, it is time for security forces and defence planners to analyse how best
the military can be a catalyst for mitigating environmental threats and global
warming. National security consequences of climate change should be fully
integrated into national security planning and national defence strategies.
Defence forces should enhance operational capability under challenging
climate conditions by adoption of improved processes and innovative
technologies that result in improved military efficiency. Weather forecasting
techniques must be modernised to vastly improve the capacity to monitor
patterns of climate change and also develop reliable early warning systems
for extreme weather conditions for the country. Some advanced countries are
known to be already working on the possibility of using weather as a weapon
in the future, although for now it is only at a simulation exercise level.
However, the potential of climate change as a threat to security needs to be
recognised in all its dimensions and factored into national security planning.

Water and Food Security for India: Impact of Climate Change

India has 16 percent of the world’s population but only 4 percent of the total
available freshwater and water resources that vary widely by season and by
region, within the country. Per capita water availability in India has fallen by
almost 70 percent since 1950. This is due to increase in water usage by all
categories of water users and rising demand posed due to economic growth
and an increasing population, which not only restricts potential uses of
available water but also threatens future use. India’s main water resources
consist of the annual monsoon rainfall and melting Himalayan glaciers in its
river flows. The annual extraction of groundwater in India is one of the highest
in the world as it provides for over 60 percent of the irrigated land. The
growing dependence on groundwater has considerably lowered water tables
and this has had an adverse impact on the quality and quantity of rural
drinking water.
While demands for energy and food keep growing as population grows,
uncertainties and risks associated with fresh water access are bound to get
aggravated under adverse climate changes. Building dams, reservoirs, irrigation
channels and flood barriers are indeed important options for addressing water
issues, but these are meant to complement nature’s own reservoirs, watersheds,
wetlands, aquifers and floodplains. However, man-induced climate changes
are likely to weaken these natural infrastructures and make water management
much more difficult in the future.
208 Role of Technology in International Affairs

India gets an average 1,197 mm of rainfall every year. This amounts to a

total precipitation of 4,000 billion cubic metres. However, 3,000 billion cubic
metres are lost due to runoffs, and only the remaining 1,000 billion cubic
metres are available as surface and ground water sources. Water accessibility
differs between different user groups. Access to water is often guided by social
status and over 16 percent of the rural population and 4 percent of the urban
population still lacks access to drinking water.
Numbers are more alarming with regard to water for sanitation facilities.
46 percent of the urban population and 59 percent of the rural population
have no direct access to sanitation facilities. India has only about 200 cubic
metres of storage capacity per person.19 The National Water Mission, which
was established under the National Action Plan on Climate Change, aims to
tackle this problem by generating 20 percent improvement in storage capacity.
The average per capita availability of water, currently estimated at 1,600 cubic
metres per year, is expected to fall to around 1,000 cm per year by 2025,
based on current population projections. Per capita water availability in India
is expected to decline to as little as 1/30th of per capita availability in the
United States.
According to the assessment of the IPCC on the vulnerability of India to
climate change, key challenges are most likely to be surface warming, rise in
sea levels, decreasing water availability due to glacial retreat, significant
reduction in crop production and loss of flora and fauna. Climate projections
indicate inescapable temperature increase by over 2°C by 2050 and even
relatively small climatic changes can have a huge impact on water resources,
particularly in arid and semi-arid regions such as northwest India.20 Glaciers
form the main source of water for key perennial rivers such as the Indus,
Ganga and Brahmaputra.
Almost 67 percent of the glaciers in the Himalayan mountain ranges have
retreated in the past decade and will continue to retreat further, diminishing
flow and leading to severe water shortages. The frequency and intensity of
extreme weather events such as heat waves, droughts and floods, have increased
over the past two decades and will increase further due to climate change.
With rising sea surface temperature in the range of 2-4°C, cyclone intensity
can increase by 10-20 percent and rising sea levels will lead to salt intrusion
into coastal fresh water sources and threaten water availability.
Signs of sea level rise are already there along vast stretches of the
Sundarbans, the world’s largest mangrove wetland in the Ganges-Brahamputra
Delta. Coastal megacities, such as Mumbai, Kolkata and Chennai are suffering
 Climate Change and International Relations 209

from increased erosion and the loss of coastal protection from ecosystems
such as coral reefs and wetlands. Rise in sea water temperature has led to
large scale coral bleaching along the Indian coast line.21 Glacial retreat,
decreased rainfall and increased flooding in certain areas will threaten water
availability as a result of population growth and climate change.22
Adverse impacts on water availability due to a decrease in rainfall in some
parts and increased flooding in certain other areas can endanger the economy
and food security, as well as the livelihoods of rural communities. Water stress
on an unprecedented scale will be the most serious consequence of climate
change in India. India is highly vulnerable to climate changes because its large
population has a high dependence on climate and water-sensitive sectors such
as agriculture and forestry for livelihoods. Any adverse impact on water
availability would threaten food security, cause destruction of natural
ecosystems, including of species which sustain the livelihoods of rural
households, and adversely impact economic growth and energy security. The
successful implementation of a national water policy responsive to climate
challenges will require both a dependable knowledge base and appropriate
institutional support at the national, regional and local levels, as well as the
financial resources for implementation of priority schemes.
Temperature and its associated seasonal patterns are critical components
of agricultural production systems. Rising temperatures associated with climate
change will have a detrimental impact on crop production, livestock, fishery
and allied sectors.23 It is predicted that for every 2oC rise in temperature, the
GDP will reduce by 5 percent. Accelerated global warming has already been
observed in the period ending 2007, mainly due to accelerated warming
between 1998 and 2007. This warming was mainly due to the post-monsoon
and winter seasons and the average temperature was measured in 2008 as
being 0.82°C over the past hundred years. The pre-monsoon and monsoon
temperatures also indicate a trend towards further warming.
Overall in India, the physical impact of climate change would likely be
seen as:
(1) An increase in the average surface temperature by 2-4 degrees celsius,
(2) Changes in rainfall pattern during monsoon and non-monsoon
months,
(3) A decrease in the number of rainy days by more than 15 days,
(4) An increase in the intensity of rain by 1-4mm/day and
(5) Increase in the frequency and intensity of cyclonic storms.
210 Role of Technology in International Affairs

Indian agriculture is doubly vulnerable as around 60 percent of India’s total

agricultural areas are rain-fed, and thus highly susceptible to monsoon
variations. In addition, more than 80 percent of farmers in India are small
and marginal farmers with little capacity to cope with climate change effects
on agriculture. Climate change will affect food security through its impacts
on all components of global, national and local food production chains.
Existing projections indicate that future population and economic growth
may require doubling the current food production in India, from 2 billion to
4 billion tons of grains annually. However, agricultural production in many
countries including India would be severely compromised by climate variability
and increase in frequency and patterns of extreme weather events.
In India, livestock are an integral part of the agricultural system. Often,
the cropping pattern is interlinked to availability of fodder for the livestock,
forming an important component of food security in India and other South
Asian countries. Dealing with climate change would require strengthening
the resilience of farmers and rural communities and helping them adapt to
the impact of climate change. It is also important to explore strategies to
mitigate and adapt to climate change, in several key policy domains such as
food security. One must examine suitable mitigation strategies to lower
emissions from the agricultural sector. In addition, it is important to explore
how adaptation activities can result in mitigation as a co-benefit and also how
these measures can be integrated into the overall development approaches
and agenda.
Policy makers need to be better informed about the regional impact of
climate change on water supplies and on ways of adapting to it. In this context,
major efforts are needed to improve the regional accuracy of predictions about
how climate change will affect water supplies. This is essential to build policy
makers’ confidence in predictions at the local level, and convince them to
take steps needed to adapt to water shortages or surpluses that their
communities may face. Secondly, the technology needed to address these
concerns should be adaptable for taking local conditions and capacities into
account. Communities will only adopt new strategies if they are convinced
that they would work, if they have both the knowledge and the means to put
these strategies into effect.
The anticipated impacts of climate change pose additional stress on food
production systems under pressure to satisfy the food needs of a rapidly
growing and progressively wealthier world. As agriculture develops and
becomes more intensive in its use of land and water resources, its impact on
 Climate Change and International Relations 211

natural ecosystems becomes more and more apparent. Damaging the integrity
of these ecosystems undermines the food-producing systems that they support.
The assessment of viable and effective adaptations to the impact of climate
change on water and agriculture will require a sound understanding and
integration of agronomic science with water management and hydrology. Due
regard for the resulting environmental interactions and trade-offs will be
essential.
As the global population heads towards more than nine billion people by
2050 (under medium growth projections), the world is rapidly becoming
urbanised and wealthier. Food preferences are changing to reflect this with
declining trends in the consumption of staple carbohydrates, and an increase
in demand for luxury products—milk, meat, fruits and vegetables—that are
heavily dependent on irrigation in many parts of the world. Future global
food demand is expected to increase by about 70 percent by 2050, but it will
approximately double for developing countries. All other things being equal
(that is a world without climate change), the amount of water drawn by
irrigated agriculture will need to increase by 11 percent to match the demand
for biomass production.
In response to global warming, the hydrological cycle is expected to
accelerate as rise in temperature increases the rate of evaporation from land
and sea. Thus, rainfall is predicted to rise in the tropics and higher latitudes,
but decrease in the already dry semi-arid to arid mid-latitudes and in the
interior of large continents. Water-scarce areas of the world will generally
become drier and hotter. Both rainfall and temperatures are predicted to
become more variable, with a consequent higher incidence of droughts and
floods, sometimes in the same place. Agriculture will also be impacted by
more active storm systems, especially in the tropics, where cyclone activity is
likely to intensify in line with increasing ocean temperatures. Evidence for
this intuitive conclusion is starting to emerge. Sea level rise will affect drainage
and water levels in coastal areas, particularly in low-lying deltas and may result
in saline intrusion into coastal aquifers and estuaries. Another consequence
of greater future water demand and likely reduction in supply is the emerging
competition between the environment and agriculture for raw water, and
matching of supply and demand will thus become harder to reconcile.
Given that climate change will have far reaching effects on Indian
agriculture and food security, it is important that the country prepares itself
to adapt to these changes, and does so quickly. Coping with the impact of
climate change on agriculture will require careful management of resources
212 Role of Technology in International Affairs

like soil, water and biodiversity. Making agriculture sustainable is imperative

and it is possible only through production systems that make the most efficient
use of environmental goods and services without damaging these assets. If
climate change impacts can be incorporated in the design and implementation
of development programmes right away, it will help to reduce vulnerability,
stabilise food production and better secure livelihoods. A large-scale climate
literacy programme is necessary to prepare farmers, who are today bewildered
by the rapid fluctuations in weather conditions that affect agriculture. Their
traditional knowledge does not help them to manage these recent
anthropogenic changes. By 2050 about half of India’s prime wheat production
area could get heat-stressed, with the cultivation window getting shorter,
affecting productivity. For each 1°C rise in mean temperature, wheat yield
losses in India are likely to be around 6 million tons per year, or around $1.3
billion at current prices.24

Climate Negotiations: Challenges for Indian Diplomacy

Status of International Cooperation
In 1988, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the
World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) established the IPCC to
synthesise all climate change-related research and provide a scientific review
of the current state of climate knowledge. The first IPCC assessment report,
published in 1990, inspired the international community to develop an
international political platform to coordinate their response to the issue. The
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was
subsequently developed to provide such a platform.
The UNFCCC held several discussions between February 1991 and May
1992 to address the need for joint action to combat climate change. The
Convention was opened for signature during the United Nations Conference
on Environment and Development (UNCED) at Rio (hence called the Rio/
Earth Summit) in June 1992. The UNFCCC entered into force on March
21, 1994, shortly after the 50th instrument for approval (known as ratification)
had been received. To date, 195 countries have ratified the convention. These
countries are referred to as the “Parties” to the convention.
The ultimate aim of the Convention is to stabilise GHG concentrations
in the atmosphere at a level that will prevent dangerous human interference
with the climate system. The Convention also provides that such a level [of
GHG concentrations] should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to
 Climate Change and International Relations 213

allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food

production is not threatened, and to enable economic development to proceed
in a sustainable manner. In order to attain this objective, the convention
provides for the creation of various bodies, especially the ‘supreme body’ of
the Conference of the Parties (COP). The COP is an association of all the
countries that are Parties to the Convention.
The COP is assisted by two subsidiary bodies. The Subsidiary Body for
Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) links scientific, technical and
technological assessments, the information provided by competent
international bodies, and the policy-oriented needs of the COP. The Subsidiary
Body for Implementation (SBI) was created to develop recommendations to
assist the COP in reviewing and assessing implementation of the Convention
and in preparing and implementing its decisions. Parties realised that in order
to address the actions that drive climate change, concrete commitments were
required from participating countries, and this led to the negotiation of a
protocol beginning in 1995.
The Kyoto Protocol was adopted in Kyoto, Japan, on December 11, 1997.
It commits industrialised countries to stabilise GHG, according to the levels
agreed to in the Protocol, instead of simply encouraging them to do so. This
agreement represented the first time that binding emission reduction targets
were set for 37 industrialised countries. During the years 2008-2012, the 37
countries were to reduce their GHG emissions by an average of 5 percent
compared with their GHG emission levels in 1990. The Kyoto Protocol
focused more on developed countries, because there was recognition that they
were to be held ‘historically responsible’ for the increase in GHG. Developing
countries were not bound by specific emission reduction targets through the
Kyoto Protocol. Developed countries, as well as countries in transition to a
market economy, are known as Annex I Parties under the UNFCCC. In order
to enter into force, the Protocol needed ratification by at least 55 parties, and
those parties needed to account for at least 55 percent of global CO2 emissions
in 1990. This threshold was reached at the end of 2004, and the Protocol
became a legally-binding instrument on February 16, 2005. But the US
remained outside the Kyoto Protocol.
During the period between the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol and its
entry into force, the Buenos Aires Plan of Action, which was agreed to in
November 1998 at the fourth meeting of the Conference of the Parties
(COP 4), defined the process for finalising the rules and operational details
of the Protocol. At COP 7 in Marrakesh, Morocco, in November 2001,
214 Role of Technology in International Affairs

delegates reached agreement on outstanding matters with the signing of the

Marrakesh Accords. These Accords consisted of a package of draft decisions
on many of the details of the Kyoto Protocol, including the flexible
mechanisms, reporting and methodologies, land use, land-use change and
forestry (LULUCF), and compliance. The Marrakesh Accords also addressed
issues such as capacity building, technology transfer, responding to the adverse
effects of climate change and the establishment of three funds, namely the
Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF), Special Climate Change Fund
(SCCF), and the Adaptation Fund (AF).
Since the Kyoto Protocol entered into force, countries that signed the
agreement and observing countries have gathered each year during the COP
meetings for formal discussions on implementing the Protocol, in what is
called the Meeting of the Parties (MOP) to the Kyoto Protocol. In December
2005, at COP 11 in Montreal, Canada, MOP 1 was convened and delegates
began to address the post-2012 period (when the first commitment period in
the Kyoto Protocol expired) and established a new subsidiary body as an Ad
Hoc Working Group (AWG) on Further Commitments. Delegates established
a ‘Dialogue on Long-term Cooperative Action to Address Climate Change’
by enhancing implementation of the Convention. Both the Dialogue and the
AWG aimed to address potential future climate change agreements.
Two years later, at the UN Climate Change Conference at Bali in
December 2007, delegates adopted a roadmap to initiate a new negotiating
process. The Bali Action Plan aimed at long-term cooperative action beyond
2012, and devising strategies for implementation on five issues: (a) shared
vision (b) mitigation (c) adaptation (d) technology and (e) financing. The
goal was to finish these negotiations in time for the 2009 Copenhagen Climate
Change Conference, so that a successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol could
enter into force by the end of the first commitment period in 2012.
Approximately 120 heads of State and government attended the UN Climate
Change Conference in Copenhagen, Denmark, in December 2009, but this
high profile event, was marked by disputes over transparency and process.
During the high-level segment, informal negotiations among the heads of
State and government from many of the major industrialised countries and
representatives of regional and other negotiating groups resulted in a political
agreement called the Copenhagen Accord. This was then presented to the
COP plenary for adoption. After 13 hours of debate, delegates ultimately
agreed to “take note” of the Copenhagen Accord, which meant it was not
legally binding.25
 Climate Change and International Relations 215

The Copenhagen Accord called on parties to the UNFCCC to identify

their country’s priorities for taking mitigating actions. In 2010, over 140
countries indicated support for the Accord, and more than 80 countries also
provided information on their national mitigation targets or actions. However,
no agreement was reached on long-term goals beyond 2012. Therefore, parties
agreed to extend the mandates of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term
Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA) and Ad Hoc Working Group on Further
Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) for
another year. In 2010, in Cancun, Mexico, the COP adopted the Cancun
Agreements, which included key steps forward in mitigation, adaptation,
transparency of actions, technology development, mobilisation of finance,
actions to protect forests, and building capacity globally. Parties recognised the
need for deep cuts in global emissions in order to limit global average temperature
rise to 2°C and to keep the global long-term goal under regular review.
At Durban, South Africa, in November-December 2011, parties to the
Kyoto Protocol agreed on a second commitment period of the Protocol to
begin in 2013. Delegates agreed that a new agreement with legal force
involving the efforts of all countries under the convention would be finalised
by 2015, and enter into force by 2020. Parties also agreed to launch the new
Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) with a mandate ‘to develop a
protocol, a legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the
Convention applicable to all Parties.’ The new negotiating process, which
began in May 2012, is scheduled to end by 2015. The outcome is expected
to lead to firm commitments—Intended Nationally Determined
Commitments (INDC) from individual countries for implementation actions
commencing from 2020 onwards.
Developing countries generally work through a coalition called the Group
of 77 to establish common negotiating positions. This Group originally had
77 members, but has now expanded to include approximately 130 members.
China usually cooperates with this group, so it is often referred to as the Group
of 77 and China (G-77+China). The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)
consists of 43 low-lying and Small Island Developing States (SIDS), most of
which are also members of the G-77, and are particularly vulnerable to sea-
level rise.

Analysis of the 2050 Scenario: World Beyond 2°C

According to broad scientific consensus today, stabilising atmospheric CO2
concentrations below 450 ppm, will give the world a 50 percent probability
216 Role of Technology in International Affairs

of limiting warming to 2°C above pre-industrial levels. The 2°C target was
formally agreed at COP 15 at Copenhagen 2009. Governments agreed to
launch a review in 2013 to consider strengthening the long-term goal of
remaining under the 2°C benchmark.
Since 2000, the rate of decarbonisation has averaged 0.8 percent globally,
a fraction of the required reduction. Because of this slow start, global carbon
intensity now needs to be cut by an average of 5.1 percent a year from now
to 2050. It is unrealistic to expect that decarbonisation could be stepped up
immediately—which means that the reduction required in future years is likely
to be much greater than 5.1 percent. Whilst the international negotiators
continue to focus on a 2°C scenario, many climate experts are now worrying
about more pessimistic scenarios for global temperatures in the range of 4°C
and 6°C.26
The pace of reducing global carbon intensity has been slow, despite the
growing international focus on climate change. The financial crisis, which
started in 2008, dampened progress even further—carbon intensity has fallen
by less than 1 percent between 2008 and 2012. In the year 2010, major
European Union economies managed the highest rate of decarbonisation, with
the United Kingdom (UK), Germany and France all reducing carbon intensity
by over 6 percent in 2010-2011. Both UK and France also witnessed increased
generation of low emission nuclear power, whereas Germany’s exit from
nuclear power generation is reflected by its relatively lesser decline in emissions.
Emissions in the US fell by 1.9 percent in 2011. A mild winter helped, but
the shift from coal towards gas in its fuel mix and more efficient vehicles on
the road may help decarbonisation in future.
Australia is a region where climate change is projected to cause more
frequent and extreme weather. Since 2000, Australia averaged 1.7 percent
reduction in carbon intensity, on par with other developed countries. But
carbon intensity grew significantly in 2011 (6.7 percent), reversing the
decarbonisation seen in 2010. Heavy rainfall in Australia in early 2011 boosted
hydropower generation but it also disrupted mining operations in Queensland
and impacted the level of coal stocks at power stations. A return to normalcy
saw Australia’s carbon intensity increase correspondingly. This is an indication
that carbon intensity and performance is often guided more by local conditions
than by a firm commitment to protect the environment.
In China and India, the reduction in carbon intensity seen in the last
decade appears to have stalled. In both countries, strong GDP growth was
closely coupled with rapid emission growth, despite commitments at Durban
 Climate Change and International Relations 217

to significantly reduce carbon intensity by 2020, relative to 2005 levels (40-

45 percent for China and 20-25 percent for India respectively). Meanwhile,
Indonesia managed to keep energy emissions broadly stable as its economy
grew, with the resulting energy-related carbon intensity falling by 5.2 percent
in 2011. Emissions from deforestation and land use change, which account
for a large proportion of Indonesia’s emissions, have grown significantly in
the last few years.
With the inclusion of traditional biomass in overall energy considerations,
heating and cooking will remain the principal uses of such renewable fuels
over the next 25 years. The power sector, however, is expected to lead the
global increase in renewable energy consumption. This sector accounted for
a quarter of global renewable energy consumption in 2002, but its share is
projected to rise to 38 percent by 2030. Renewable energy, including
traditional biomass, accounts for a greater proportion of total energy supplies
in developing countries than in developed countries. About 75 percent of
renewable energy is consumed in developing countries where most renewable
energy production is based on traditional biomass and hydropower. Currently,
less than 1 percent of fuels used for transport are renewable. This share could
rise to 3 percent over the next 25 years. The overall impact of such changes
in developing countries on global energy consumption would be relatively
small, although the negative impact of deforestation may be considerable.
Industrialised countries account for 23 percent of the total renewable energy
consumed worldwide, and transition economies for 3 percent.
While it is common to measure carbon emissions at the source, it is
important to remember that it is consumption that drives emissions and
indeed, many of the other sustainability challenges of the modern world. Many
developed countries are increasingly outsourcing their manufacturing needs
abroad to reduce carbon signature. The emission levels of those emerging
economies that provide a manufacturing base for the rest of the world would
need to be adjusted suitably, if exports were fully accounted for. In the period
leading up to the Copenhagen UN Summit on Climate Change in 2009,
major economies came forward and pledged carbon reduction targets for 2020.
Analyses of those pledges suggest that they are collectively insufficient to meet
a 2°C environmental target. With only five years to go, it is questionable
whether several of these pledges can be met by 2020, given the scale of the
challenge for some of the largest developed economies. In some respects, the
economic downturn may make these absolute pledges less challenging. Yet,
at the same time, economic pressures may make it much harder to finance
the necessary transition towards a low carbon economy.
218 Role of Technology in International Affairs

The challenge isn’t necessarily easier for emerging economies either.

Pledges to reduce carbon intensity mean curbing emissions at the same time
as promoting rapid economic growth. China and India are expected to nearly
double the size of their economies by the end of the decade, but emissions
must level off soon for them to meet their targets. The majority of any new
energy demands will have to be met from renewable energy sources like wind
or solar, or even nuclear but not fossil fuel generation, unless it can be
compensated with effective Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) techniques.
Russia and Brazil expect slower economic growth, but their emission pledges
imply a more drastic cut in carbon intensity than either China or India.

Technology Options and the Way Forward

Delaying effective response to climate change may be politically easier in the
short term, but it will entail higher overall costs and more frequent disruptions
to normal life in the future. Furthermore, the longer we wait to act upon
reducing GHG emissions proactively, greater will be the risk of irreversible
adverse change, and harder it will be to reduce emission levels thereafter. To
keep the threatening dynamics of climate change within the scope of human
control, there is an urgent need to reduce the increasing concentration of
CO2 and other GHG emissions in the atmosphere. Drastic reductions of global
GHG emissions will need to be rapidly implemented in order to combat global
climate change and its negative consequences.
To stabilise GHG emissions, numerous technologies and/or lifestyle
changes can make a big difference. Such strategies include enhancing energy
efficiency, increasing the usage of public transport, shifting from carbon
intensive sources of energy to carbon neutral sources of energy including
nuclear energy, developing carbon capture and storage techniques and
increasing the contribution of renewable energy sources such as solar, wind,
hydroelectric and geothermal. Clean energy from controlled thermonuclear
reactors could indeed emerge as a game changer in the future, but making
such fusion reactors available in countries where needed, could perhaps take
decades.
All renewable energies are ideal for sustainable development which must
become the mantra for the future so that development and environment need
not be against each other. However, investments in R&D will be necessary
to make renewable energy competitive with fossil fuels, for the social
transformation needed for the major shift to a green way of life. If crude oil
prices go way beyond $ 150 per barrel, interest and investments in renewable
 Climate Change and International Relations 219

technologies will automatically be high, but if recent efforts in tapping shale

oil and gas through fracking seabeds can manage to keep oil prices to acceptable
levels, progress on renewable options may see a downturn. The environmental
penalty of the fracking process is not known, although it is certain to have
adverse environmental effects. And through all the dynamics of international
trade, the global carbon signature must reduce rapidly across the world, to
slow down global warming so as to remain within a 2oC rise in the temperature
of the atmosphere.
Technologies already exist today to support the economic and
environmental priorities of individual nations. What is needed is the foresight
to balance today’s needs with the ecological imperatives of tomorrow. The
potential consequences of climate change are so significant that it is vital to
appreciate how climate change trends may potentially impact national security,
and what actions must be initiated to prevent major destabilising consequences
of climate change. In the context of national security, stability is an important
precondition to comprehensive security. Maintaining stability within and
among nations is often the primary means of avoiding serious conflicts that
can lead to wars. Conversely, instability in key areas can threaten national,
regional or international security and that is the main threat that uncontrolled
climate change presents. International diplomacy will have to face a whole
new set of challenges related to climate change and will need to be well
informed with latest knowledge.
It is important to acknowledge that technological development need not
be seen as independent from people and should be understood as a socio-
technical approach in which technological development and human
development are influencing one another and creating opportunities for
cooperation. Hence, for adaptation to global warming, technology solutions
will play a vital role in combating negative consequences. However, the role
of social solutions should not be ignored and substituted in favour of
technological solutions to achieve sustainability and address global climate
change. Society already possesses the mitigation technologies to bring about
substantial emission reductions necessary to freeze CO2 and GHG emissions
in the immediate future and work for a sustainable future in coming decades.
What is needed is collective resolve to address the problem before the problem
overtakes us.
Fortunately, there is increasing recognition of the role of cooperation in
the application of S&T for worldwide mitigation efforts. Scientific knowledge
and technological innovation is a learning process that is largely achieved
220 Role of Technology in International Affairs

through cooperative or collaborative efforts of sharing experiences,

information, infrastructure and other resources. In the emerging new world
of complex dynamics between human kind and environment, technology is
influencing large parts of our everyday life and it is also cutting across all
national boundaries. A paradigm change is in making among societies and
nations which demands that competition and cooperation must coexist in
the interest of global peace and stability.
More than ever before, S&T is opening new opportunities as well as new
concerns for the entire world, albeit at varying levels. On one hand, this may
increase the gap between the Haves and the Have-Nots, but on the other
hand it is helping evolve a new recognition that for global threats and common
good, all mankind must unite for the global cause. Addressing climate change
is one such issue that should bring the world together through the realisation
that in the context of nature we are all equal partners. Despite competition
for economic progress and differences in security perceptions about each other,
all nations and societies must come together for preserving the environment.
Climate change needs to be viewed in the context of national security
implications and not merely as a matter of social hardship or economic cost.
The likely adverse changes in rainfall patterns, fresh water scarcities, increased
flooding, sea level rise, spread of diseases etc., pose serious risks to social
harmony and political stability world over, and particularly more so for India,
which in turn cannot alone solve the problems. Problems due to the vast
diversity and increasing gap between the rich and poor in the country can get
easily aggravated further by climate change induced stress. Poor infrastructure,
corrupt practices and poor governance renders the threat of climate change
even graver, since it is not seen as imminent or urgent and hence, does not
get the attention it deserves. It is in this context, that climate change must be
appropriately linked to national security and foreign policy so that it gets due
priority in the planning process of the nation and in international negotiations
for sustainable development, energy security and mitigation of global warming.
Climate change is a global problem but there are large differences in
emissions of GHG between countries. The patterns of emissions in the past
will be different from those in the future. Developing countries are much
more vulnerable than industrialised countries due to their greater dependence
on agriculture, limited infrastructure, lack of knowledge and technology and
due to their limited financial, institutional and governance capabilities.
The main causes for GHG emissions are: increasing population, economic
growth imperatives, excessive land use and opportunistic choice of technology
 Climate Change and International Relations 221

that are intricately linked to development. The development patterns of the

present industrialised countries have caused most of the current change in
the climate, but its future change will be largely determined by the
development patterns of the currently less industrialised countries, which are
on a fast growth curve. The UNFCCC contains a number of key notions
and principles that are providing guidance on how to handle the distribution
of emission reduction efforts. It makes reference to sustainable development,
equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective
capabilities.
The most substantive principles in distribution of mitigation efforts must
consider (a) Responsibility: mitigation efforts should be proportional to the
contribution to the problem (b) Capability: mitigation efforts should be
proportional to the capability to contribute, i.e. depend on income, technology,
institutions and natural resources (c) Need: mitigation efforts or emission
ceilings should leave room to eradicate poverty and attain a reasonable standard
of living or, in other words, should respect the equal right of humans to
develop and progress.
In international negotiations over the control of climate change, the
developing countries have so far played a limited role. In the Kyoto Agreement
on limiting GHG emissions, only a subset of the world’s economies, the so-
called Annex I countries, have agreed to treaty-based limits on GHG emissions.
These Annex I countries are essentially the highly developed economies plus
Russia, Ukraine, and parts of Eastern Europe. Developing countries enter
the treaty obliquely, mainly through the clean development mechanism, which
aims to foster projects linking the developed and developing countries in
emission control.
The US is calling for a more active role for the developing world, including
binding commitments of GHG by several of the large developing countries.
In general, the developing world has resisted such entreaties, arguing that
their highest priority is to grow and that growth requires increased emissions
of GHG. They stress that per capita GHG in the advanced economies are
several times those of the poorer countries, so limiting the emissions of the
poorer countries would be unfair.
Climate change is going to affect all nations and hence, it deserves
cooperation by all nations, rich or poor, to build a coordinated global response
and action. Multilateral cooperation among the leading economies—the US,
the European Union, Russia, China, Japan, India and Brazil, could provide
the political alliance necessary to achieve drastic cuts in GHG emissions. The
222 Role of Technology in International Affairs

investments required for energy conservation and alternative energy technology

are very large and the advanced nations should take a lead in providing support
to such efforts in developing countries. However, the industrial countries,
having enjoyed the benefits of cheaper resources are reluctant to accept the
larger responsibility towards slowing down global warming.
It is estimated that the world economy now needs to reduce its carbon
intensity by 5.1 percent every year, till 2050, to have a fair chance of limiting
global warming to 2°C above pre-industrial levels. Even to have a reasonable
prospect of getting to a 4°C scenario would imply nearly quadrupling the
current rate of decarbonisation. The decarbonisation rate required for a 2°C
world has not been achieved in any single year since World War II. The closest
the world came to that rate of decarbonisation was during the severe recessions
of the late 1970s, early 1980s (4.9 percent in 1981) and the late 1990s (4.2
percent in 1999). The expected reduction in emissions resulting from the
current economic slowdown has not materialised, partly because of sustained
growth in emerging markets.
The observed relationship between economic growth and CO2 emissions
is also asymmetric. Emissions tend to grow proportionally with economic
growth, but fall by less than the rate of economic decline. Regardless of the
outcomes at the UN Climate Change Summits, one thing is clear—
governments and businesses can no longer assume that a 2°C warming world
is the worst scenario. The reality could be much worse. The world has already
gone past that and any investment in long-term assets or infrastructure,
particularly in coastal or low-lying regions, needs to be based on more
pessimistic scenarios. Sectors dependent on food, water, energy or ecosystem
services need to scrutinise the resilience and viability of their supply chains.
More carbon intensive sectors need to anticipate more invasive regulation and
the possibility of stranded assets.
The only way to avoid the pessimistic scenarios will be radical
transformations in the ways the global economy currently functions. This
suggests a need for a much more ambitious climate policy and more urgent
action—both at the national as well as international level. These are going to
be the monumental challenges for the economists, technologists and diplomats
of the future.
NOTES
1. David Spratt and Philip Sutton, “Climate Code Red: The Case for Emergency Action”,
Friends of the Earth Report, 2008, at http://www.ecocivilization.info/sitebuildercontent/
sitebuilderfiles/climatecodered.pdf (Accessed May 28, 2014).
 Climate Change and International Relations 223

2. Jeff Sachs, “Solving the crisis in the Drylands”, January 15, 2008, at http://economistsview.
typepad.com/economistsview/2008/01/jeff-sachs-solv.html (Accessed May 28, 2014).
3. Will Steffen, et. al., “The Anthropocene: conceptual and historical perspective”,
Philosophical Transactions A, January 31, 2011, at rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/
369/1938/842 (Accessed May 28, 2014).
4. “Climate Change: Evidence, Impacts, and Choices”, National Research Council of the
National Academies 2012, at http://www.nap.edu/catalog/14673/climate-change-evidence-
impacts-and-choices-pdf-booklet (Accessed May 28, 2014).
5. R.K. Pachauri, A. Reisinger (Eds.), “Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report”, A Report
of the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change, Geneva, 2007, at www.ipcc.ch/
publications_and_data/ar4/syr/en/contents.html (Accessed May 28, 2014).
6. “Six Degrees Could Change the World”, National Geographic Channel, Documentary,
2007, at http://natgeotv.com/asia/six-degrees, (Accessed May 28, 2014).
7. Kurt M. Campbell et. al., “The Age of Consequences: The Foreign Policy and National
Security Implications of Global Climate Change”, November 2007, at http://csis.org/files/
media/csis/pubs/071105_ageofconsequences.pdf, (Accessed May 28, 2014).
8. List of Countries’ Energy use per capita, October 20, 2012, at http://www.economics
help.org/blog/5988/economics/list-of-countries-energy-use- per-capita/ (Accessed May 28,
2014).
9. Stern Review: Economics of Climate Change, at http://mudancasclimaticas.cptec. inpe.br/
~rmclima/pdfs/destaques/sternreviewreportcomplete.pdf. (Accessed May 28, 2014).
10. Country Share of CO2 Emissions, Union of Concerned Scientists, 2011 Data, at http:/
/www.ucsusa.org/global_warming/science_and_impacts/science/each-countrys-share-of-
co2.html#. (Accessed May 28, 2014).
11. Meeting India’s Energy Requirements in 2030, July 2013, at http://www.future
directions.org.au/publications/indian-ocean/1118-meeting-india-s- energy- requirements-
in-2030-1.html. (Accessed May 2014).
12. Energy Statistics 2014, Central Statistics Office GOI, Table 2.5, at http://mospi.nic.in/
Mospi_New/upload/Energy_stats_2015_26mar15.pdf (Accessed May 28, 2014).
13. “India achieves 12.95% of renewable energy potential”, Business Standard, June 2014, at
http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/india-achieves-12-95-of-
renewable-energy-potential-114060501140_1.html (Accessed Sept 27 2014).
14. “India Officially Ramps Up Solar Power Target To 100 GW By 2022”, June 22, 2015, at
http://cleantechnica.com/2015/06/22/india-officially-ramps-solar-power-target-100-gw-
2022/ (Accessed July 2015).
15. Brahma Chellaney, “Climate Change and Security in Southern Asia: Understanding the
National Security Implications”, RUSI Journal, April 2007, Vol. 152, No.2, at http://
chellaney.net/2007/04/16/the-challenge-of-climate-change-in-southern-asia-part-ii
(Accessed May 28, 2014).
16. Steve Almasy, “John Kerry: Climate change as big a threat as terrorism, poverty, WMDs”,
CNN, February 17, 2014, at http:// edition.cnn.com/2014/02/16/politics/Kerry-climate
(Accessed May 29, 2014).
17. Halvard Buhaug et.al., “Implications of Climate Change for Armed Conflict”, February
25, 2008, at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/
Resources/SDCCWorkingPaper_Conflict.pdf (Accessed May 29, 2014).
18. Supriya Kumar, “The Looming Threat of Water Scarcity”, Worldwatch Institute, March
19, 2013, at http://www.worldwatch.org/looming-threat-water-scarcity-0 (Accessed May
29, 2014).
224 Role of Technology in International Affairs

19. Aarti Kelkar-Khambete, “The sanitation crisis in India—An urgent need to look beyond
toilet provision”, at http://www.indiawaterportal.org/articles/sanitation-crisis-india-urgent-
need-look-beyond-toilet-provision (Accessed May 29, 2014).
20. Ashvin K. Gosain, “Climate Change Impacts on Water Resources in India”, at http://
www.teriin.org/events/docs/wb_confer/73ashwin_gosian.pdf (Accessed May 29, 2014).
21. Aadi Vaidya et.al., “Effects of Global Warming on the Coasts”, at https://www.google.co.in/
?gfe_rd=cr&ei=0W8kVoXpEZLnugSPiqvwAQ#q=effects+of+global+warming+on+the+
indian+coasts (Accessed May 29, 2014).
22. “Measuring Glacier Change in the Himalayas”, UNEP Global Environmental Alert Service,
September 2012, at http://na.unep.net/geas/getUNEPPageWithArticleIDScript. php?
article_id=91 (Accessed May 29, 2014).
23. Anna Ranuzzi and Richa Srivastava, “Impact of Climate Change on Agriculture and Food
Security”, ICRIER Policy Series No. 16, May 2012, at http://www.icrier.org/pdf/
Policy_Series_No_16.pdf (Accessed May 29, 2014).
24. M.S. Swaminathan, “Green Economy and Sustainable Food Security” October 3, 2011,
at http://www.uncsd2012.org/content/documents/Plenary3%20Day1%20M%20S%20
Swaminathan%20Whole.pdf (Accessed May 29, 2014).
25. Government of Canada, Canada’s Action on Climate Change, “Copenhagen Accord”
October 31, 2013, at www.climatechange.gc.ca/default.asp?lang=En&n=AA3F6868-1
(Accessed May 29, 2014).
26. Brad Plumer, “Two degrees”, April 22, 2014, at http:// www.vox.com/2014/4/22/5551004/
two-degrees (Accessed 29 May 2014).
 PART III
Technology and Foreign Policy:
Indian Priorities
 7
Summary and Recommendations

Technology and Foreign Policy Interplay: A Summary

Our world today is increasingly defined by scientific advancement and
technological innovation. Many countries including the US and China view
economic competitiveness, national security and the well-being of their
population as inextricably linked to their capabilities in science, technology
and innovation. Solutions to most of the national challenges today, rely on
developments in science and technology (S&T), be it for national security,
economic growth, human development or energy and water security issues.
Science and technology is now a high-priority endeavour of all nations and
even poor developing countries are investing heavily in building S&T core
competence for rapid enhancement in national power. Universal reach of
technology has made our world much more inter-connected and inter-
dependent than ever before and instant information access has changed the
benchmark of almost all interactions between societies and nations.
International Relations (I.R.) have entered a new paradigm and technology
has become the most valuable tool in this new ‘Information Age’.
As S&T capabilities are growing around the world, scientists and
technologists are conducting research and innovation in a globally connected
community and diplomats are also far more engaged with issues of S&T. As
a result, the interplay between science, technology and foreign policy has
become more synergistic than ever before. Foreign policy today depends
significantly upon a country’s ability to integrate current scientific and
228 Role of Technology in International Affairs

technological knowledge into diplomacy for projecting ‘Comprehensive

National Power’ (CNP) in international affairs. Science diplomacy requires
enhanced linkages between the S&T community, foreign policy makers and
diplomatic practitioners to ensure that external policies are technically sound,
programmatically viable and politically feasible. The tools to achieve this may
be same as before, but the sensitivity and response required is going to be
different in different situations or at different times and this will demand an
integrated approach towards managing international affairs. This is the
fundamental change that international relations of the future will have to
contend with and that is the central message that this book has attempted to
articulate throughout. India is on a steep curve of emerging as a major world
class power and hence, it will need to combine its S&T strengths with foreign
policy foresight to work together for an aggressive projection of India on the
world stage.
Perceptions of national security have transformed in the past few decades
and these now include several priority areas of national interest that go beyond
protecting national borders and sovereignty. While strategic planning, military
preparedness and self-reliance in defence technology will always continue to
be very important, other equally important areas of high concern now include
internal security, economic growth, energy security, as well as water and food
security etc. On one hand, information security, cyber security and security
in outer space represent new dimensions of supreme national security interests
while on the other, poverty reduction, quality education, job creation, good
governance, curbing corruption etc. define national interests in terms of
systemic efficiency and governance. If one were to look for a common
denominator for all of the above areas, it becomes very clear that S&T
knowledge, technological self-reliance, a culture of innovation and overall
techno-economic superiority represent the core of CNP. As modern technology
continues to empower individuals with amazing capabilities—both good and
bad, it is getting increasingly clear that it is the quality of people that will
make nations great in future, and it is the quality of education and awareness
that will drive this human quality enhancement, aided by S&T based
knowledge, innovation, communication and human desire for development
and progress.
India’s economic reforms of the early 1990s and its announcement of
being a Nuclear Weapon State in 1998, were defining actions of the 20th
century that positioned India on the global stage, as a world class power for
the new century. The unraveling of the Indian information technology (IT)
 Summary and Recommendations 229

potential followed soon thereafter, as well as the grudging recognition of India

as a nuclear power. The US forging civil nuclear cooperation in 2005, within
seven years after 1998, was quite a phenomenal success of India’s foreign policy
and technology maturity. The US move was unprecedented, because it was a
move that risked weakening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and
India was perceived important enough to take that risk. On one hand, India’s
impeccable record of responsible behavior with sensitive technology of
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) opened-up international cooperation
and on the other, India’s considerable soft power image—‘Incredible India’
and its vibrant democracy, peace loving culture, respect for knowledge and
non-aggressive national projections—all of this contributed to the rise of India
as an important international player.
Despite India’s new-found image and its clear aspiration for a great power
identity, there has been a gap in how India perceives itself and how others see
it. In the absence of a ‘Grand National Strategy’, Indian policy makers have
been found struggling to define how to use this leverage, since there is no
clear consensus concerning the nature and scope of the Indian national interest.
Hence, despite innumerable pockets of excellence and widespread talent and
huge demographic advantage, India has yet to consolidate all the potentials
for a robust CNP that should make it one of the three most powerful nations
in the world.
India’s biggest weakness has been its inability to exercise regional
leadership. Far from articulating a clear and attractive vision for the region,
India remains a reactive force to regional situations and lacks the initiative to
propose bold projects, for example, creation of a pan-South Asian energy
independence initiative or a regional carbon emission management initiative
or some such pan-Asian idea. However, much of this can change with the
National Democratic Alliance Government in power that appears to be more
proactive and articulate. This can offer a good opportunity to establish
foresighted integrated policy reforms so that India’s S&T strengths can be
better leveraged for positioning India in its rightful place among future S&T
leaders in the international order. The same techno-economic strength will
then gain higher credibility in international affairs to help India rise as a world
class power.

Security, Technology and External Policy

Control and access to defence technology as well as other dual-use technologies
forms an important facet of foreign policy and national strategy. All through
230 Role of Technology in International Affairs

the cold war decades, the US-led Western alliance denied several technologies
to erstwhile Soviet-bloc countries. India too suffered under these technology
embargoes. India was further isolated by nuclear technology controls when
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was formed in response to India’s peaceful
nuclear explosion (PNE) in 1974.
India’s exemplary record in controlling sensitive technologies is now being
internationally recognised. It has formally established its own technology
controls through the SCOMET (Special Chemicals, Organisms, Materials,
Equipment and Technologies) list of controls and the Indian WMD Act
formulated for enabling India to commence bilateral dialogues to promote
dual-use technology cooperation. India is now a partner in several global efforts
towards technology management and is no longer perceived as a target for
technology denials. This has been an important transition in the context of
the interplay of technology in I.R.
Responsible ownership of technology is now emerging as the litmus test
for technology cooperation between progressive nations that want to promote
technology-use for constructive and peaceful purposes, while preventing its
possible misuse. Given the changing international perception of India as an
emerging global power and a partner in building global peace, the time is
opportune for India to give a major thrust to acquiring erstwhile controlled
technologies and equipment for rapid development. India must negotiate with
other countries from a position of higher confidence, to extract maximum
benefit from technology exchanges. It is here that external policy has an
important role to play, in dismantling constraints on technology access and
on cost-time factors that overshadow international exchanges. The opportunity
must also be used to realise international technology cooperation in critical
advanced technologies, as no single country can afford to address the full range
and sophistication of the technologies for defence and security.
It should be easy to accept that in the final analysis it is the CNP that
would decide the international balance of power equations. It therefore follows,
that a country like India cannot aspire to be a global power, without being a
regional power in terms of relative techno-economic superiority in the region.
India’s rapid advance in the Information-Communication-Technology (ICT)
sector and its technology maturity as demonstrated in several key areas of
progress, has in fact served to bring this recognition of a regional power.
Consequently, global perceptions have also changed to recognise India as the
only country that can provide a counter-balance to a bullish China in the
South Asian region.
 Summary and Recommendations 231

Regional power status is dictated by how India’s neighbourhood perceives

India’s capacity, both as a constructive leader, and a world class competitor.
Effective diplomacy for projecting national strength is the main tool for
influencing perceptions, and technology will be the main enabler in this
process, in the future. The factors that can aid diplomacy in moulding
perceptions in its neighbourhood are economic progress, indigenous
technology base and military superiority. However, much depends on how
India’s foreign policy and diplomacy can leverage its techno-economic strengths
to project India’s soft power capabilities, and create desired perceptions in
India’s neighbourhood and among the larger comity of nations.
While everyone agrees that economic strength will dictate future power
equations among nations, there is not enough understanding about the role
that technology plays, even in this regard. The following emerging technology
trends indicate how external policies and international relations would be
dictated by the nation’s techno-economic and diplomatic agenda in the
immediate future.
• Technological advances in the past few decades have accelerated the
globalisation process to create a paradigm change in global security
perceptions and techno-military doctrines.
• The most critical technologies for defence are increasingly dual-use in
nature with civilian technology advances often feeding military
technology requirements.
• Enabling technologies such as advanced computing, micro-
miniaturisation, ICT, robotics and artificial intelligence (AI),
biotechnology and nanotechnology are transforming the spectrum of
defence and security capabilities.
• Advances in sensors, smart materials, missile defence, satellite systems,
advanced autonomous systems, energy beam weapons etc. are leading
to new capabilities for offence and defence.
• Cyber space and outer space are emerging as the new important
domains of the future that will hugely impact every aspect of modern
society as well as national security.
• The private sector is increasingly becoming the main player in
international technology affairs with the role of government becoming
more like that of a facilitator, rather than a controller.
• Diffusion of technology has become an integral component of
international transactions. Consequently, preventing misuse of
advanced technology is becoming more challenging.
232 Role of Technology in International Affairs

• While technology control will remain important in international

relations, new approaches to enable and promote responsible
technology cooperation among progressive nations will be vital for
future.
For many decades, technology development in India has been need-based
and not really driven by any ‘Grand National Strategy’. As a result, only the
‘need’ has been in focus, while technology was perceived only as a tool for
intended objectives. There were no long-term plans for synchronising
technology development or technology acquisition, with the objectives of
foreign policy or diplomatic agenda that are often futuristic. In the
international sphere, India therefore, has remained a buyer of technology and
not a creator of technology. As a compulsive buyer, India has been getting
yesterday’s technologies at tomorrow’s prices and hence, remained behind most
of the developed countries, with consequent diplomatic disadvantages in
international relations. But India has the potential to change all that fairly
rapidly, and fortunately, the process has already started. This should soon
earn India its legitimate power and position in the complex matrix of global
affairs.
While there have been many pockets of excellence in India, the nation as
a whole still fares rather poorly in S&T in comparison to most other
comparable nations. The Department of Science and Technology (DST),
Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), Indian Space Research
Organisation (ISRO), Defence Research and Development Organisation
(DRDO) and Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) have been traditionally the
five main government departments that have together shaped the S&T scene
in the country.
India has however been slow in creating the right ecosystem for rapid
growth of technology and innovation, both in the public and private sector
to achieve a high degree of self-reliance in high-priority areas. This stagnant
environment is now changing, with the private sector playing an increasingly
significant role than ever before. For India to really become dominant in
technology and innovation there is a need of an innovation ecosystem that
links markets, companies, entrepreneurs and research and development (R&D)
centres with venture capitalists and financial institutions, for a proactive
approach to rapidly catch-up with world technology leaders. This can then
enable India to formulate a proactive foreign policy that can quickly position
India at the high table, on international issues of high importance in future.
As rightly articulated by the new generation of political leadership, India will
 Summary and Recommendations 233

need less of government but more of governance to be globally competitive

in future.
As is often said, research converts science into knowledge and innovation
converts knowledge for wealth creation in society. China is a good case-study
of how a well-planned approach to technology development and incremental
innovation over two-three decades has enabled the country to compete with
the best in the world in economy, technology and military power. India also
needs a proactive and aggressive approach to technology planning,
development, acquisition and an innovative approach to transform its potential
strengths into major capabilities. The process begins with recognising the gaps
or the weaknesses in the system and gearing up with an institutionalised
approach to leapfrog ahead, with international cooperation wherever possible.
Despite many pockets of excellence, India as a whole still continues to
lag behind because of the lack of the desired pan-India ecosystem that must
be driven by a coherent and integrated policy. Individual greed and corruption
in implementation have reduced the efficacy of even some very good policy
decisions in key nation-building endeavours. India needs to very quickly shed
this negative image and acquire a reputation as a professional nation. It is
abundantly clear that Indian people are eminently capable of being the best
professionals in the world as demonstrated by several of them holding
leadership positions in the US, Europe and across the world. The same people
feel constrained in their own country because of the lack of true meritocracy
that alone can foster professionalism.
In the new globalised world, it is the foreign policy and diplomacy of the
country that can attract external investments and foster greater cooperation
with global partners in nation building, but the process can best succeed when
it is supported by well-informed and effective political decision-making.
Successful international exchange is ideally a fair give-and-take affair between
equal partners that can produce a final win-win result. Thus, the real challenge
for India will be to rise rapidly with an integrated national approach that can
make India a real equal partner in all important areas of global affairs. The
main instruments to achieve this will be technology and diplomacy.

India’s National Interests and Foreign Policy Priorities

The foreign policy of a country is framed in a way so as to preserve and
promote the national interests in the changing dynamics of international
politics. It is an instrument to serve the national security priorities of the
234 Role of Technology in International Affairs

nation, while also projecting national strength at world forums, to best serve
national aspirations. On one hand, it needs to be flexible enough to harmonise
national interests with regional interests and global concerns; and on the other,
it must be routed in clear convictions about certain national priorities that
cannot be compromised, no matter what the external compulsions.
India is emerging as a potential world class power with its economy rated
as the third largest as of April 2014. India is steadily making its mark in the
new world order which is getting more centred on the South Asian region,
than the affluent West. It is therefore imperative for India to evolve a
consolidated and integrated national strategy which is independent, and is
best suited to leverage the hard power of national techno-military capabilities,
combined with the soft power of economics, trade, educational and cultural
capacities. Indian foreign policy and diplomacy thus, must evolve revised
strategies to handle new challenges with new tools and techniques for best
projection of the nation in the international arena.
Even as India attempts to catch up with the developed world through
faster economic growth, which at present is predominantly fuelled by
technology and industrial know-how often imported by Indian or foreign
companies in India, the aim is to increase the competitive advantage. Given
the mature technical status of the industries and high level of energy
consumption, advanced countries have to look for new innovations and new
products to remain competitive, even if they have to use ‘disruptive’
technologies. Some examples of such disruptive technologies of the past can
include micro-electronics, personal computers, satellite-based capabilities,
mobile phones, automation in manufacturing, and smart materials. India needs
to be mindful of these fast developments and orient its priorities suitably, for
drawing maximum benefit from advances in technology for the country and
its people.
Well before the year 2020, India must put together a national innovation
system to lay the foundation for the next phase of acquiring leadership in
industries and technologies of dual-use nature. To be able to use external policy
as an important element of preserving and protecting national interest, there
is need for a more detailed and nuanced understanding of India’s economy,
the distinctive characteristics of important industries, and how technology
choices might play out in the global arena. This would call for a stronger
coordination of S&T specialists with diplomatic initiatives. Prudent choices
and correct practices will be vital for India to change from being reactive to
proactive.
 Summary and Recommendations 235

India’s diaspora can provide an important channel for tapping global

knowledge flows. Non-resident Indians particularly in the US, are well-placed
in the technology network, as high level professionals or successful
entrepreneurs. They have played a critical role in developing India’s IT and
business-processing boom. Senior Indian executives in major global
corporations have also played an important role in directing investments and
outsourced work to India. In addition, many Indian professionals are returning
to India to set up global operations. India should focus on such Indian
professionals to promote joint research projects and access knowledge networks
to support India’s national interests.
In the new age of information and communication, the reach of
technology has expanded in every field of importance to the nation. It is
therefore imperative for bureaucrats and diplomats to recognise the inter-
connections between foreign policy, defence strategy and economic agenda
and their dependence on the S&T strength or weaknesses of the country.
Science and technology is so intrinsic to development and progress in this
new age that it will play an indispensible role in determining and influencing
the dynamics between nations in times to come. The globalised and inter-
dependent world will demand a different approach to international affairs
and Indian diplomacy as well as foreign policy must adapt to this new
paradigm.
In this context, it is important to review India’s foreign policy priorities
and align them with changing realities. At the outset, one of the foremost
priorities of India’s foreign policy is undoubtedly national security. According
to strategic analysts, security of the State is attained and preserved through
the maximisation of national power and the elements of national strength
that can include: geographical size, natural resources, quality of people, internal
harmony, strong S&T base and globally competitive economy. All of these
contribute to CNP. Foreign policy and defence strategies play an important
role in strengthening national image in the neighbourhood and with other
nations. Without such an organised and proactive foreign policy, national
priorities can get reduced to basic survival parameters.
This is the basic difference between developed countries that enjoy better
peace and harmony, as against poorer developing countries that often remain
mired in conflicts and regional struggles for survival. Technologies that are
critical for defence, security and economic competitiveness provide the
superiority needed for deterrence against potential dangers so that a secure
nation can focus better on development, progress and peace. India is on the
236 Role of Technology in International Affairs

verge of attaining a developed country status and all national strengths must
be combined to achieve this goal at the earliest.
So far, India has been a major buyer of defence equipment from the
international market. This was necessary for meeting immediate security
concerns during the nation-building phase. But now, as India is emerging as
a strong economy and a mature technology player in global affairs, it is
important to enhance the national image with core competence in critical
technologies that are important to futuristic defence, development and
progress. As most important technologies are now dual-use in nature, active
participation of the private sector in defence production has become very
important for India to become increasingly self-reliant in defence and critical
technologies.
Foreign direct investment (FDI) in Indian defence industries, including
joint ventures and co-production of defence products is a step in the right
direction. FDI in government-approved R&D projects (recently expanded
beyond just defence R&D) needs to be incentivised. India’s offset policy for
defence acquisition has promising possibilities for Indian companies to act as
a co-producer and partner, rather than just as a buyer of advanced technology
equipment. In all these efforts for rapid progress, defence and diplomacy must
join hands to best serve national interests.
Looking at specific security interests, one can easily see the increasing
importance of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)
technologies, increasing reliance on autonomous systems as already
demonstrated by the impressive performance of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
(UAVs). Similarly, missile defence technologies must compete with advances
in attacking missiles, and increasing concerns of security of outer space will
demand sharper focus on space relevant technologies, including micro-
satellites. Techno-military superiority in these areas and disruptive technologies
like energy beam weapons can bring about radical changes to the security
perceptions of India, and thus be game changers in the neighbouring region.
The digital age has made electronic dissemination of technological
knowledge much more difficult to control. The new focus on internal security/
counter-terrorism has created a range of new dual-use security technologies,
where leadership is not limited to any supply cartel. This has shifted emphasis
from shielding dual-use technology to a new perspective—to selectively sharing
technology information as a strategy for maintaining technological superiority
over adversaries, whether on the battlefield or in the market place. This
 Summary and Recommendations 237

represents a new paradigm where a country like India, with its sound
technology base, can attempt a major catch-up process, to emerge as a serious
contender for techno-economic leadership, and thus rightfully claim its
position on the UN Security Council.
Fortunately, technology leadership is shifting from the public to the private
sector, relying on commercial markets to spur innovation and reduce costs.
The security establishment now seems to be adopting a new approach for
rapid access to state-of-the-art technology, where civilian efforts often feed
military needs. This opens up a whole new set of opportunities for rapid strides
in advanced dual-use technologies, to convert India from a technology
importer to a future technology exporter.
The most dramatic technology trend of the 21st century is the way ICT
is getting integrated and even embedded into most systems of defence and
security importance. At the same time, rapid growth of IT-enabled systems
and services is exploiting the commercial potential of technology on a global
scale. Internet concepts originally developed for military application have
created an information revolution in the public domain, and the potential of
web-based technologies for commercial applications is yet to be tapped fully.
High-speed computing, sensor-integrated intelligent systems, interactive
displays, advanced encryption technology and autonomous systems using
robotics and AI are some areas where future advances will set new benchmarks
for technological sophistication, and introduce new generation dual-use
applications. Unfortunately, the same capacity in wrong hands with the evil
intention of a single human can have devastating consequences in the future,
and can be a nightmare for security practitioners and organisations.
Future security technologists must therefore develop capacities for
advanced intelligence-gathering, quick intelligence analysis and accurate
situational awareness for supporting quick executive decision-systems.
Emphasis must be towards recognising patterns, analysing intentions and
predicting motivational gradients. Intelligent Video Surveillance (IVS)
technology is one example where explosive growth is happening in the interest
of homeland security, as well as for a host of commercial applications. The
trends clearly indicate that the emphasis is moving away from traditional
military hardware to leveraging information technology for superior situational
awareness and swift corrective or retaliatory action with high precision.
Preventing these sensitive dual-use technologies from being misused will be
the one single most important challenge in the future. Responsible ownership
of technology is now emerging as the benchmark for technology transactions
238 Role of Technology in International Affairs

between progressive nations that want to promote technology cooperation

while preventing its possible misuse.
Given all that is riding for India in the technology context, the time is
opportune for India to give a major thrust to acquire controlled technologies
and equipment. India must now negotiate with other countries from a position
of mature confidence to extract maximum benefit from technology exchange.
It is here that external policy has an important role to play in dismantling
constraints on technology access and on cost-time factors that overshadow
international exchanges. This maturity can also be used to foster broader
international technology cooperation, as no single country will be able to afford
addressing the full range and sophistication of these technologies in future.
It is axiomatic that actual technology transfers depend on the domestic
technology base. The Indian Government does have a policy of self-reliance
in place to boost the indigenous content of defence acquisitions but much
greater emphasis is required on long-term defence planning for futuristic and
enabling technologies by user services. This will help integrate technology
and equipment imports with indigenous development, fabrication and testing.
If the latter can be done increasingly by the domestic industry except in highly
classified areas, that would contribute handsomely to India’s goal of self-reliance
in defence preparedness. Hence, opening up the defence sector for the Indian
private industries and using the offset policy more aggressively would indeed
be the steps in the right direction. Another line of action is to facilitate Indian
companies to leverage domestic strengths to perform better in the global
markets. For example, Ranbaxy, Dr. Reddy’s and other pharmaceutical
companies, Bharat Forge, Asian Paints and Aravind Eye Hospitals illustrate
some of India’s success stories. External policy should support and facilitate
such moves not only by big companies but also by small and medium
enterprises (SMEs). The global market is not built up just by pure market
forces. There are various forms of privileged access as well as targeted denials.
Diplomacy has a crucial role to play in solving problems and enabling access
to identified technologies on a privileged or commercial basis. A related
challenge to external policy is managing restrictive/regulatory trade regimes
and Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) issues to enable India to make the
technology transition in a rapid and smooth manner.
There are other public good like energy, health, education, water and
environment where external policy initiatives should create opportunities for
technology upgradation. The International Thermonuclear Experimental
Reactor (ITER) project on fusion energy and the US-sponsored Global
 Summary and Recommendations 239

Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) are two major international initiatives

that have recently inducted India. This is recognition of India’s technology
maturity and its capacity to contribute to international initiatives. Similar
initiatives may be possible in renewable energy, health and education sectors
and of course, in mitigating global warming—a major problem for all
humanity.
Apart from preparations for forging an international understanding on
how to deal with such problems, there are major opportunities for
international collaboration in a variety of areas that are science or technology
based. Clean coal technologies, carbon sequestration, solar power technologies,
power from wastes, small hydro-power technologies, refrigeration technologies,
international monitoring of the greenhouse effect and the ozone layer are some
areas of energy and environment in which external policies have a critical
role, in seeking appropriate external partners for Indian interests.
The subject of alignment of foreign policy with national interest is too
vast to be discussed in a single chapter of a book. For instance, there are many
areas of cooperation in agriculture, education and the entertainment industry
where the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) can be a catalyst for well-planned
collaboration between Indian institutions and suitable overseas players for
mutual benefit, and the process itself can enhance India’s image in the world.
For the sake of keeping focus on national security and national power-related
issues, due justice has not been possible on all other issues of national interest
in the limited scope of this book.

Soft Power
Another important area of international relations is the use of smart power
for best gains for the country. This is a judicious balance of hard power and
soft power projections in the international arena. It is crucial in today’s
knowledge world where a mix of persuasion, coercion and deterrence must
be used in I.R. to achieve foreign policy objectives. In contemporary
international relations, there is a renewed interest in the potential of soft power
in countries like China and India, which were traditionally known for their
respective cultural heritage. India has not been very successful in leveraging
soft power in its neighbourhood, except for the natural popularity of its
Bollywood products. In this context, Indian foreign policy experts need to
rework soft power strategies to tap their maximum potential and help India
achieve larger goodwill and regional influence, to complement its economic
and strategic rise in international affairs. The recent ‘Incredible India’
240 Role of Technology in International Affairs

advertisement drive is indeed a step in the right direction to attract tourism—

which attempts to build the right image of cultural India.
India has several areas of strength that can be used innovatively for soft
power projection, particularly in its neighbourhood. India’s strength in ICT
and vast population of knowledge workers is a major asset that can help smaller
neighbours in their pursuit of economic progress. India can easily become a
regional hub for education and skill development in the modern electronic
age. India is already emerging as a preferred R&D centre for many
multinational technology corporations and structured S&T cooperation can
be a major instrument of soft power projection. Cultural exchanges are known
for promoting greater regional harmony, while human quality development
via yoga and meditation is yet another field where India can become a world
class leader. Affordable healthcare for overseas patients and providing medical
or nursing education for developing nations can promote unique Indian
expertise worldwide.
Cooperation in agricultural advances and water preservation can be very
important for addressing regional problems. Likewise, cooperation for energy
conservation and greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction are going to
become very important for mitigating global warming. Regional cooperative
strategies for adaptation to unavoidable climate changes and for addressing
regional natural calamities are yet another set of environmental initiatives that
a country like India must take. All this can add immensely to the soft power
of India, but there is no national policy or diplomatic priority given to this
vast soft power potential.
The role of S&T in exercising India’s soft power can be pivotal if it is
well-planned as a policy push. Use of digital technology and the internet for
social media interactions is a new powerful tool for public diplomacy. It has
opened up enormous potential for a free and transparent mechanism that
Indian diplomats should use, for leveraging India’s soft power worldwide and
some of it is indeed already happening. In 2012, the Indian Embassy in Cairo
marked the birth anniversary of Mahatma Gandhi and the anniversary of
Arab Spring by hosting a poster contest which in turn was widely publicised
via social media, on the topic ‘Did you sense the spirit of Gandhi in Tahrir
Square?’ It drew responses not only from Egypt and India but also from several
other African countries, thus, succeeding in integrating the most recognisable
Indian icon with the most important political event in the region. The contest
was India’s way of saluting the Gandhian spirit of the Tahrir Square
revolutionaries.
 Summary and Recommendations 241

This new public diplomacy tool is a function of changed beliefs of the

foreign policy-making elite about the use of new social media in engaging
with non-state actors around the globe. In another instance, the Public
Diplomacy Division in the Indian MEA used the Twitter network during
the evacuation of Indian nationals from Libya in 2011, which demonstrated
Indian diplomacy’s reformist approach in using digital social network
technology for public diplomacy. This is a welcome change and Indian
diplomats must be encouraged to use such S&T tools more innovatively in
future.
Besides social media, the impact of television (TV) is also very significant,
and India could launch an international TV channel to compete with likes of
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Cable News Network (CNN) or
Al Jazeera. Similarly, establishing bureaus in important capitals around the
world would be effective in projecting India’s unique social value system and
soft power. India continues to have tremendous potential for soft power
because of its culture and civilisational links—its large diaspora, popular films,
music, art, historical and cultural links with several countries around the world,
all contribute to its soft power. A globally inter-connected and digitalised world
offers promising opportunities for diffusion of Indian culture to every corner
of the world to enhance soft power.
Grass-root innovations for S&T cooperation, leveraging language skills,
achieving high competence in IT management and resolving issues of
international trade and intellectual property can go a long way in projecting
India’s soft power as a knowledge economy, as against the common perception
that developing or poor countries can at best be ‘workshops’ of the world.
Another primary focus of Indian foreign policy should be our immediate
neighbourhood—particularly the instability emanating from the violence in
Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh. Promoting economic and educational
progress in these regions can change the aspirations of the local population,
and thereby diminish the grass-root support that terrorism seems to enjoy in
those areas. Unfortunately, in the recent past, India’s long-time friends—Nepal
and Sri Lanka, have voiced their growing disenchantment with India. In this
scenario, Indian leadership and foreign policy makers must take every step to
ensure peace and development in its neighbourhood. A renewed strategy of
confidence building measures should be chalked out to ensure this goal and
S&T can be a major vehicle for forging new initiatives.
242 Role of Technology in International Affairs

Confidence Building
The role of S&T in confidence building measures has been indispensible in
the past and their role in building goodwill and harmony would be even more
crucial in the future. S&T is an important instrument of wielding soft power
in the neighbourhood, and technical assistance, technical cooperation and
transfer of technology are all components of S&T engagement. Especially in
the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) countries
like Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Afghanistan, Indian technology companies
can help in development of infrastructure and industries.
Other S&T initiatives with smaller neighbours can include transfer of
technology for setting up of crucial small-scale local industries, making Indian
patents preferentially available to SAARC countries at special rates and
leveraging the Indian IT strength for setting up systems and processes in these
countries. All this can add to image-building. As an emerging regional power,
India needs to evolve its own foreign technical assistance policy and
institutionalise the process of providing technical and economic aid to
countries in the neighbourhood for enhancing Indian influence.
Contributing to global efforts to prevent common dangers such as global
warming, climate change, religious fundamentalism and terrorism etc. can
also be a major instrument of soft power. Global problems and concerns will
require global solutions and hence, these will have essential diplomatic
dimensions. Science diplomacy will have to play a crucial role here. Since the
primary objective of science diplomacy is to support foreign policy objectives
with scientific information and advice, it is but natural that international S&T
cooperation can proactively help India position itself as a credible global player.
Combination of S&T and diplomacy can thus provide tremendous outreach
for the soft power of India. S&T cooperation can also contribute significantly
to coalition building and conflict resolution, both vitally important to
international relations.
Cyber space has now become the fifth dimension for international
exchange. The technological potentials are so vast that it is difficult even for
technologists to keep pace with rapid developments, and yet diplomats of
the future must understand the scope of this technology, and how it can be
used productively for international peace and stability. The issue of cyber
security is inherently international, even from the perspective of national
interest. Being transnational in nature, cyber crimes can only be tackled with
the combined efforts of the international community.
 Summary and Recommendations 243

The Indian Government and the private sector need to give cyber security
a high priority in their security and risk management plans. It would also be
crucial to leverage India’s strength in IT to pioneer effective solutions to this
global problem. It would be necessary to participate in multilateral discussions
on rules of behaviour in cyber space. Undertaking joint projects in cyber
security with international leaders such as the US, United Kingdom (UK)
and China would further India’s case as a proactive global player, and extend
India’s soft power. The use of IT tools and knowledge systems should be viewed
as major assets for India’s diplomatic success in future.
Scientific values of rationality, transparency and universality can help to
build trust between nations and within nations. Indian foreign policy experts
must leverage science diplomacy to the maximum, given India’s robust S&T
framework and human resource. Hence, for foreign policy experts, S&T offers
potentially useful networks and channels of communication that can be used
to support wider policy goals and wield considerable influence in the global
community. The scientific community often works beyond national
boundaries on problems of common interest, so it is well placed to support
emerging forms of diplomacy that may require non-traditional alliances of
nations.
Fundamentalist and terrorist groups around the globe have become
increasingly IT savvy and that is emerging as a major international concern.
While India may succeed in containing terrorism to a large extent with social
engineering, India should aggressively cooperate with other countries through
information-sharing protocols about terror networks, their financing, arms
trafficking and cross-border linkages etc. If aligned with wider foreign policy
goals, these channels of information exchange can contribute to coalition-
building and conflict resolution. Hence, robust international technical
cooperation can strengthen all priorities of Indian foreign policy in
international affairs.

Comprehensive National Power: Role of Science and Technology

The new evolving notion of CNP gives calibrated high weightage to economic,
scientific, technological, military, social, educational and cultural aspects of
national power. It is an acknowledgement that military strength alone no
longer guarantees a nation’s security. Knowledge, power and economic
capabilities are equally important, as enumerated by India’s former Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh at the Combined Commanders Conference in
244 Role of Technology in International Affairs

Delhi in 2005. During the 1960s and 1970s, national power was considered
synonymous with military power. Hence, most theorists engaged in research
on international relations avoided dealing with the phenomenon of power.
This would explain to a great extent, the superpower status of the erstwhile
Soviet Union and its unexpected disintegration under economic duress. Since
then, the perception of national power has undergone a change and the
Chinese call it CNP. It is essentially the sum-total of core national strengths
viewed comprehensively in the international pecking order that often define
the balance of power among nations.
Comprehensive National Power refers to the combined overall conditions
and strengths of a country in numerous areas. In the current transition period,
as the world moves toward multipolarity, military might, albeit important, is
no longer the main defining parameter of strength. Instead, elements such as
economic competitiveness and S&T advances have become increasingly
important in the competition for power and influence in the world. An
evaluation of current and future strengths requires the inclusion of a variety
of factors such as territory, natural resources, military force, economic power,
social conditions, domestic government, foreign policy, and international
influence.
CNP is the aggregate of all these factors as Deng Xiaoping stated: “In
measuring a country’s national power, one must look at it comprehensively
and from all sides”.1 While CNP is notable for being an original Chinese
political concept with no roots in contemporary Western political theory or
pre-20th-century Chinese thinking, it indeed represents the changed reality
of the modern globalised world.
CNP can be calculated numerically by combining various quantitative
indices to create a single number to represent the measure of power of a nation-
state vis-a-vis others. These indices take into account both military factors
(hard power) as well as economic and cultural factors (soft power) while S&T
plays a major role in both. CNP entails a smooth combination of hard and
soft power, which is increasingly known as smart power. CNP envisages
examination of a wide range of factors that contribute to attaining national
objectives across the economy, natural resources, population skills, military
power, information and knowledge, governance etc.
At present, China is the foremost proponent of CNP as a national power
enhancing tool and a number of studies have been carried out in the country
with quantified focus. As an emerging power, India has the potential to
 Summary and Recommendations 245

enhance its CNP through a structured programme which involves the entire
spectrum of national power, with a view to achieving our goals. Thus, CNP
provides a recognised model for internal as well as external security
enhancements, and a detailed examination of the same through introspection
and evaluation in the Indian context is highly relevant, as CNP is emerging
as the scientific method used for predicting power equations among major
nations. Chinese ancient statecraft from the Warring States era focused on
how a wise leader made strategy according to the power of the State. CNP is
the means by which nations can forecast the future international status
hierarchy in a multi-polar world.
Experts in CNP consider S&T to be the guiding force in raising CNP.
This is established through Deng’s emphasis on the need for scientific and
technological research and its advanced application in the military and
economic arenas. The fact that CNP is a function of hard power and soft
power, and both these dimensions of power have technological superiority as
a major component, further establishes the role played by S&T in augmenting
the CNP of a country.
The basic principles which underline CNP of a country must include:
• Both material power (concrete factors such as economics, military
affairs, etc.), as well as emotive power (intangible factors such as quality
of people, efficacy of governance, international relations, political
stability etc.) that need to be included in an assessment of CNP.
• CNP is composed not only of actual power, but latent or potential
power also has a contributing role. Examples of the latter include the
findings of S&T research before being applied and utilised, or natural
resources that exist, but are yet to be developed.
• The contents of CNP and the roles of these factors have changed
throughout history and will continue to do so in future; therefore,
new aspects may be added or dropped when evaluating at different
time periods. Today, the rapidly increasing significance of information
as a source of power is a new realisation. In the present world, because
of the development of new means of communication, different types
of information about market trends or political changes can be
promptly delivered to various places in the world. Therefore, in
international relations the role of information power is growing and
can be compared with political and economic factors.
• In times of peace, domestic and foreign economic activities are the
246 Role of Technology in International Affairs

most central and important part of CNP, and in this too the significance
of S&T for international competition is growing.
• CNP also depends on the level of societal development and the quality
of life of its people that adds to political stability and the international
image of the country.
• Military capability is the basic component of studies of CNP, measuring
international competitiveness and analysing a comparison of forces;
during peace times it also is an important factor in strengthening
national defence and safe guarding peace.
There is a general consensus that the US is the nation with the highest CNP.
As per some estimates top 10 countries in CNP terms in 2011 were—
1. The US 2. China 3. Russia 4. France 5. Germany 6. Japan 7. UK
8. India 9. Brazil 10. Turkey.2 However by 2015 India is expected to improve
its ranking considerably.
CNP is the perceived power of a nation which may deter or discourage an
adversary, competitor or challenger to act in a manner that is inimical to the
former. In this context, it would be relevant to consider Pakistan’s ongoing
proxy war against India, where India is unable to exert pressure on Pakistan,
to actually stop supporting terrorism against India. The CNP analysis positions
India as the third most powerful country through 2020 and beyond and hence,
it should clearly enable India to exert much greater influence in its
neighbourhood. In spite of the obvious advantage of a higher CNP, India has
not been able to deter Pakistan from acting against India’s national interests.
One of the reasons is support from China that Pakistan has managed to garner.
However, the clearer reason for this is that India has not been able to evolve
a grand strategy that would bring to bear the full weight of its national power
to thwart Pakistan’s designs. There is thus an urgent need for having an
integrated national strategy to enhance India’s CNP and project its national
power adequately against a smaller enemy. This calls for introspection by the
highest policy making organs of the State on the need for a comprehensive
national security strategy.
Analysis of the famous American Cuban crisis against the erstwhile Soviet
Union or the recent example of Russia acting against Georgia to safeguard its
national interests, would illustrate that relationships and interplay between
nations are dictated by power perceptions, and a grand strategy based on
leveraging all strengths of a nation for a cause demonstrates diplomatic power
play based on the CNP of nations. Clearly, such a ‘grand national strategy’
 Summary and Recommendations 247

must combine all the indigenous national strengths of economic stability,

techno-military superiority and foreign policy expertise to protect supreme
national interests.
The 21st century world is vastly different from the 20th century world.
World population has increased three times in the last 60-70 years, and India
is expected to have the largest youth population by 2050. Global Gross
Domestic Product has increased eight times over the last five-six decades, and
advancement of technology has been the main driver of this growth. The
international system has got globalised and it is abundantly clear that the 21st
century will be a knowledge century where hierarchy of nations will most
likely be determined by the knowledge they generate, rather than by the
nuclear missiles and warheads they possess. India, which is already vying to
be the third largest economy, will have the potential to get more powerful
and influential in global affairs, provided it does not remain tied down by its
internal conflicts and weakness.
There is no disputing that the gravest security challenge India faces is
that of ‘jihadi’ terrorism for which the epicentre is Pakistan. Pakistan has been
using terrorism as State policy since it acquired nuclear weapons (NW) with
Chinese help. China is continuing with its proxy war against India by
supporting the Pakistani design to keep India mired in regional conflicts, so
as to contain it from growing into a major regional power. US acquiescence
towards Pakistan can be understood in the context of its need for Pakistan’s
help in its war against terror. Thus, India stands on its own in its fight against
terrorism and the real issue for India’s national security strategy should be
about how best to thwart this major threat with its own national power
projection, without having to get mired in armed conflicts, even if it be at a
sub-conventional level. This will be the real challenge for India’s future
diplomacy, and a techno-economic edge based on knowledge power will be
the most decisive factor in this strategy.
The way to achieve this would be to have a future world order where
India improves its CNP to match the best in the world, which India rightfully
deserves. The enhanced CNP itself may then act as an effective deterrent
against China-Pakistan designs to keep India bleeding with low intensity
conflicts. In the emerging world order, the realistic option for India therefore,
may be to have a strategic partnership with the US to ensure that China does
not become the foremost knowledge power of the world. This type of re-
alignment will also ensure that the future world order will be pluralistic,
democratic and secular. In the process, India will have the best chance to
248 Role of Technology in International Affairs

narrow the gap between itself and China. This in itself should be one of the
major goals for India’s ‘grand national strategy’.3

Recommendations
For many decades, technology development in India has been need-based and
not really driven by any grand national plan linked to its foreign policy, to
project India as a powerful and yet peaceful nation. As a result, only the ‘needs’
have been in focus in a reactive policy posture, while technology has been
perceived merely as an instrument for meeting the needs. There were no long-
term plans for synchronising technology development or technology acquisition
with the objectives of foreign policy or the diplomatic agenda. It is interesting
to note that technology denials became the major motivating factor for Indian
foreign policy to become involved in India’s struggle to gain indigenous
technology competence, to be more self-reliant in the competitive world, so
that India could exercise its own independent foreign policy priorities.
As already argued, India has emerged as a potential world class power
and what India does or does not do, is now closely watched by most other
nations. The main challenge for policy experts in the country will be to make
India quickly achieve the power status commensurate with its real techno-
economic strength and its techno-military prowess. It is therefore imperative
for India to recognise the vital linkages between foreign policy, defence strategy,
economic agenda and technology agenda of the country to evolve an integrated
‘grand national strategy’. Only then India can best leverage the hard-power
of techno-military superiority, combined with the soft power of economics-
trade-cultural equations, to serve the larger diplomatic or foreign policy
objectives of the country.
There is thus need for a comprehensive plan that would not only
strengthen India domestically but should also enable India to be at the right
place in the international order. In doing so, it will be necessary to achieve
integration of key areas of S&T, economics and foreign affairs with national
security at the national policy-planning level in a proactive manner, with a
clear foresight of India’s aims and aspirations in future; for what India needs
most is a strong and techno-savvy political leadership that can synchronise
India’s strengths in technology, diplomacy and economics to build a strong
nation that India deserves to be. Some recommendations are suggested here
for combining technology and diplomacy to achieve such a long-term goal
for the country.
 Summary and Recommendations 249

1. The increasing role of technology in international affairs needs to be

recognised by foreign policy experts and diplomats who are responsible for
protecting national priorities at international forums. Increasing numbers
of foreign policy professionals and diplomats should get relevant technology
familiarisation through an institutionalised process before being assigned
to an international responsibility.
The role of S&T in international affairs in the present 21st century is far more
important than ever before and the impact of technology is increasing steadily
in modern society. Much of the globalisation processes and the consequent
inter-dependency among societies are because of the inter-connections brought
about by advances in ICT. Technology has enabled modern civilisation to
move towards a knowledge-based society where information flow is
instantaneous and situational awareness is much improved. In this changing
paradigm it is very important to understand the significance of the S&T
dimension of international relations and the changing patterns of future
diplomacy among nations.
The forces of globalisation and impressive advances in enabling
technologies have dominated the political and corporate agenda that is defining
the new paradigm of competition and cooperation, having to co-exist among
most progressive nations. Technologies of global reach are changing
benchmarks and timelines of the geopolitics of international interactions and
diplomatic perceptions. There is increasing realisation of the impact of
technology on economic progress, military might as well as statecraft that
shapes the balance of power equations among nations. Hence, technology
will continue to be one of the most sought-after commodities in international
affairs in future.

2. There is urgent need to introduce S&T training and familiarisation of

the young diplomatic cadre for nuanced understanding of technologies of
high impact to international relations. Similarly, young scientists/
technologists need familiarisation with foreign policy priorities for orienting
their efforts towards providing best support to the international agenda of
power projection of India.
External affairs training institutes should have special capsules on S&T as
relevant to foreign policy priorities, and even include mid-course update
training in specific areas of international negotiations where S&T knowledge
plays a prominent role, areas such as nuclear proliferation, space security or
250 Role of Technology in International Affairs

climate change. Likewise, S&T professionals should get specific orientation

to understand the relevance of their work in international affairs, so that they
can complement national diplomatic efforts whenever needed.
Many advanced nations have instituted offices of S&T advisers at their
embassies and External Affairs Ministry offices overseas to ensure timely S&T
advisory in conduct of diplomatic negotiations. Science diplomacy must
support foreign policy objectives with scientific information and advice so
that foreign policy objectives can be fine-tuned in keeping with the dynamic
changes in international technology parameters. This can in turn facilitate
enhanced S&T cooperation and that again in turn would help improve
international relations. Combining technology and diplomacy can thus be
doubly beneficial.

3. There is a need for synchronisation of national expertise in security

analysis, strategic technology planning along with foreign policy and
international law.
The concepts of strategic defence and diplomacy have undergone a significant
transformation—driven mainly by technology advances and human innovation.
Advanced nations routinely use well-structured ‘Think Tanks’ and support of
the academia for strategic analysis and decision-making. Such a culture is
imperative for proactive planning but this is lacking in India, due to historical
reasons of being under foreign rule for a long period. Such synchronisation
of knowledge and experience will be vital for India to evolve a comprehensive
national strategy to become more competitive in the modern world.
The nature of interactions among powerful nations is changing rapidly
where cooperative security is becoming imperative in many sensitive areas.
Professional and nuanced understanding of inter-connected issues including
technology, diplomacy and international law will be vital for mature global
interactions. India needs to acquire such new abilities of combining diverse
expertise available in the country for larger national objectives. Such
synchronisation could also enable India to bring out White Papers on strategic
policy as a mechanism for projecting national power and influencing
international perceptions.

4. There is an urgent need for a special foreign policy focus on outer space
and cyber space vulnerabilities. Most foreign policy challenges of the future
will be concentrated in these two new domains because of their vital links
to strategic affairs.
 Summary and Recommendations 251

In the arena of outer space, there is urgent need for international convergence
on how best to monitor and regulate the use of outer space for military
purposes without creating any arms race in space. Successful science diplomacy
and international dialogue will be vital for preventing misuse of space
technology that can challenge peaceful access to this Global Commons for
all mankind. India being one of the major space-faring nations must address
its own priorities in outer space for formulating its own space policy and then
articulating the same suitably, for projecting national priorities in outer space,
and protecting national security interests.
Cyber space is the new expanding domain where technology and
international relations are more intertwined than any other area of international
affairs. The issues are very complex and transcend sovereignty of national
borders. Hence, India not only needs a very well-informed and sensitive policy-
making capability on the subject, but would also need cyber-familiar diplomats
to successfully negotiate India’s position at world forums. Indigenous cyber
technology capability will be very critical in this endeavour and robust R&D
and innovation in government as well as in the private sector will be essential
for remaining ahead of the competition. International cooperation and
domestic multi-agency integration for policy implementation will be crucial
to keeping ahead of the adversary in these new domains.

5. There is need for revisiting India’s doctrine for nuclear deterrence and
missile defence. The revised doctrine must recognise new security realities
and changing international dynamics.
Nuclear-missile deterrence has been an important instrument of diplomacy
in international affairs. Deterrence dynamics in future may however demand
new approaches based on new technologies for higher situational awareness
and high precision non-nuclear pre-emptive strikes to contain threats.
Technology is thus already providing newer alternatives for deterrence with
space-based networked capabilities. The future of deterrence will be a mix of
technology and strategy that can decisively deter enemy intentions. CNP will
be the key to developing and strengthening diplomatic capabilities for coercion
and prevention as and when required.
Traditional nuclear-missile deterrence may continue to be relevant in
regional conflicts involving nuclear-capable neighbours; however, effective
missile defence technology can make NW rather impotent for deterrence
impact. The India-Pakistan nuclear deterrence stability however provides an
interesting case study. There are no known weapons ready and targeted against
252 Role of Technology in International Affairs

specific enemy destinations on both sides, and India remains committed to

credible minimum deterrence with a no-first-use (NFU) policy.
However, Pakistan seems committed to nuclear first-strike as and when
politically deemed fit. It is known to be developing tactical NW with tacit
help from China, to lower its NW threshold, so as to get maximum leverage
from a minimal nuclear arsenal. India is also vulnerable to dangers of Pakistan’s
NW/material falling into the hands of extremists who openly declare India,
Israel and the US as their prime targets. India’s nuclear deterrence would be
useless against non-state terrorists.
In a typical war-game scenario, India seems destined to absorb the first
nuclear attack or a State-sponsored radiological terrorist attack. India will then
be obligated to respond with punitive retaliation that may have to be a counter-
value nuclear strike. India may thus be caught in a no-win situation and come
out as an aggressor rather than an aggrieved nation. This could invite severe
international condemnation and even sanctions that could seriously slow down
its efforts to become a major regional power. Pakistan and China would then
have the last laugh and India could be left licking its wounds for a long time!
One way out for India to escape this no-win situation is to aggressively
negotiate for a nuclear-free zone in its neighbourhood as a first step towards
a universal NW free world. This is a goal India has always advocated and a
goal that the world seems to want to move towards in the near future.
Aggressive articulation of India’s strategy on deterrence can help correct
international perceptions about India’s vulnerability and compulsions. Any
diplomatic complacence in this matter can be a costly mistake.

6. Climate change and energy security will require a very focused and
consistent external strategy to balance national priorities with global
imperatives. A joint national task force consisting of scientists,
environmentalists, lawyers and policy experts can be of immense importance
to India remaining proactive on the issue.
In the realm of climate change, diplomatic challenges will be at two levels.
Firstly, it will be about how best to negotiate for India’s growing energy needs
and its inevitable impact on carbon emissions. India will have to convince the
advanced group of nations to accept that India direly needs to maintain economic
growth and cannot take drastic steps to reduce total national carbon emission.
Secondly, it will be about how to achieve an international consensus on
a just and equitable distribution of global energy resources and carbon
 Summary and Recommendations 253

allowances in the immediate future. The solutions will be intimately connected

to how technology of clean and renewable energy can be deployed to limit
the global emission of GHG. For future diplomats, this is an immensely
challenging area where individual national interests may not be convergent
with I.R. compulsions and yet global cooperation will be critical for the
survival of the human race in future.
There are many technical nuances to this energy-environment dilemma
and international complexities with challenging consequences. Climate change
will probably dominate all future international relations much like the nuclear
proliferation focus of the past half century. In India, we need to evolve a mature
strategic vision that would allow India to take a leadership role because India
will perhaps be the first major victim of climate change if the monsoon
becomes unpredictable and climate refugees compound India’s internal security
and threaten national security. Management of climate change will be a huge
challenge that will require combining all resources and expertise to support
a sound strategy.

7. There is need for a Grand National Strategy for India for rapidly
enhancing its CNP to assert itself as a responsible regional power. Only
then can India truly achieve a developed nation status and become a global
player in preventing future technology misuse and in promoting global peace
and harmony.
Technology and economics will be the common denominators of future
progress for India. A progressive foreign policy backed with knowledge-based
diplomacy can position India as regional power and a major force in
international affairs. That should be the ‘grand national strategy’ for India.
Meaningful international relations in future will be based on commonality
of strategic/economic interests and credibility in responsible handling of dual-
use technology. Ironically, technology denial was instrumental for India to
synchronise foreign policy with S&T needs and the security of the nation.
Now astute foreign policy and a well informed, smart diplomacy can help
India rise to be a major global player in technology and security affairs.
The real long-term challenge in the future will be to ensure that while
enabling technology is shared equitably among nations to reduce the global
divide and tensions, sensitive dual-use technologies are not misused to work
against the common good of humanity or environment. Responsible
ownership of technology will perhaps emerge as the most coveted qualification
254 Role of Technology in International Affairs

for international cooperation in India’s march towards global peace and

stability.
Given India’s record of responsible international behaviour and history
of its natural inclination for peace and tolerance, it can perhaps rightfully
take a global leadership role in pursuit of global sustainable development and
peaceful co-existence.
NOTES
1. Karl Hwang, “New Thinking in Measuring National Power”, WISC Second Global
International Studies Conference, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, July 23-26, 2008,
German Institute of Global and Area Studies, at http://www.wiscnetwork.org/
ljubljana2008/papers/WISC_2008-137.pdf (Accessed June 7, 2014).
2. Anatoly Karlin, Top 10 Powerful Countries in 2011, at http://akarlin.com/2011/01/top-
10-powerful-countries-2011/ (Accessed June 7, 2014).
3. V. Krishnappa and Princy George, Grand Strategy for India 2020 and Beyond, Pentagon
Security International, 2012, at http://idsa.in/book/GrandStrategyforIndia2020and
Beyond.html (Accessed June 7, 2014).
 Index

Ad Hoc Working Group (AWG), 214 Biological-Chemical-Nuclear-Radiological

Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments, (BCNR), 91
215 Biotechnology, 34
Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term BrahMos Aerospace Trivandrum Ltd. (BATL), 82
Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA), 215 BrahMos, 81
Adaptation Fund (AF), 214 Brazil, 88, 188, 221, 246
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration Britain, 85
(ACTD), 127 British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 241
Afghanistan, 242 Budapest Cyber Space Conference, 166, 171
Africa, 205 Bush, George W., 14, 63
Airborne Laser (ABL), 105, 110, 126 Business Process Outsourcing (BPO), 54, 76
Air-Launched Miniature Vehicle (ALMV), 111 Business Software Alliance (BSA), 156
Al Jazeera, 241
Albert Einstein, 86 C3I (Command, Control, Computers and
Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), 215 Intelligence), 146
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM), 24, 44, 111 C4ISR, 96, 101
Antimatter Weapons, 100 Cable News Network (CNN), 241
Anti-Satellite (ASAT), 105, 110, 111 Canada, 19, 119, 190
attack, 132 Canada-India atomic energy reactor, 31
threat, 130 Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS), 218
weapons, 125, 131 Carbon dioxide, 182
Arab Spring, 58 Chandrayaan-I, 116
Argentina, 88 Charge-Coupled Device (CCD), 112
Arms control, 18 Chemical and Biological Warfare (CBW), 45
Artificial Intelligence (AI), 69, 75, 231 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), 45
Asia, 90 China, 14, 24, 30, 38, 40, 48, 58, 81, 85, 86, 88,
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 106, 108, 110, 119, 130, 133, 135, 136, 146,
64 156, 160, 170, 171, 172, 188, 190, 191, 193,
Attack Microbots, 100 200, 205, 216, 217, 221, 239, 243, 246, 247
Australia, 216 NW-capable, 76
China’s growing military strength in outer space,
Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD), 22, 25, 44, 105, 133
110, 112, 116, 133 China-Russia PPWT, 131
Ballistic missile technology, 19 Chinese ASAT test, 126
Bangladesh, 206, 242 Chinese way of Cyber Attacks, 169
Belarus, 88 Chlorofluorocarbons, 182
Bernice Lee, 11 Cisco, 64
Bertrand Russell, 86 Civil Society
Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited (BHEL), 15 Cyber-based mobilisation, 162
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Climate change, 179, 201, 203, 204, 206, 210,
(BTWC), 45, 98 220, 221
256 Role of Technology in International Affairs

management, 186 Defence technology, 72

Cold War, 131, 163-64 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
Coleman, Kevin G., 163 (DARPA), 84, 111, 139
Command, Control, Communication, Intelligence, Deng Xiaoping, 244
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C3ISR), 73 Department of Electronics and Information
Command, Control, Communications and Technology (DeitY), 158, 160
Intelligence (C3I), 34, 43, 71 Department of Science and Technology (DST), 51
Commercial Orbital Transportation Services Department of Space (DOS), 115
(COTS), 127 Department of Telecommunications (DoT), 159
Committee on Science and Technology (COST), Developed Countries Fund (LDCF), 214
50 Diffusion of technology, 4
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space Digital Age, 138, 236
(COPUOS), 119, 122, 124 Digital Media
Comprehensive National Power (CNP), 70, 193, Nature, 59
228, 243-46 Digital technology, 62
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Diplo Foundation, 61
25, 30, 32, 88, 89 Diplomacy for Science, 7
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), 76, 172 Diplomacy, 60
Computer Emergency Response Team (CERTs), Diplomats, 65
151, 169 Directed Energy Weapons (DEWs), 79, 83, 101,
Computer Network Operations (CNO), 141 105, 110, 117
Concentrated Photovoltaic (CPV), 197 Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Attacks, 146,
Concentrated Solar Thermal Power (CSP), 197 174
Conference of the Parties (COP), 213 Donald Rumsfeld, 128
Conference on Disarmament (CD), 76, 121 Dorothy E. Denning, 154
Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), 4
Conventional defence, 70 East European States, 20
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence Ed Jaehne, 153
(CCDCOE), 174 Egypt, 173
Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP), 86, 101
Controls (COCOM), 20 Electronic Countermeasures and Electronic
Copenhagen Accord, 215 Counter-Countermeasures (ECCM), 73, 97,
Copenhagen Climate Change Conference, 214 100
Council of Scientific and Industrial Research Electronic Warfare (EW), 73, 83
(CSIR), 51, 232 Electro-Optical Deep Space Surveillance system,
Critical Information Infrastructure (CII), 152, 156 119
Cyber Security Policy (CSP), 150-51 End Use Certification, 41
Cyber e-newsgroups, 60
Collaboration, 162 Estonia attacks, 154
Conflicts, 162 Estonia Cyber Attacks, 174
Doctrine, 166 Europe, 131, 193
Espionage, 157 European National Agency for Network and
Security, 141, 172 Information Security (ENISA), 172
courses, 153 European Union (EU), 64, 108, 119, 125, 130,
Space, 12, 97, 139, 140, 143, 144, 147, 149, 172, 193, 216, 221
175, 231, 242 Expanding Cyber Space, 142
Governance, 161
Technology, 140, 153 Fat Man, 85
Threats, 154, 161 Federal Communications Commission (FCC),
War, 148 119
Warfare, 33, 155 Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA), 81
Weapon Technology, 146 Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), 88-89, 121
Weapon, 162-65 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), 14, 236
France, 19, 85, 86, 88, 119, 160, 190, 216, 246
Defence Research and Development Organisation Friedman, Thomas L., 190
(DRDO), 81, 232 Full Spectrum Dominance, 112
Defence technology advances, 73 Future combat system, 82
 Index 257

G-77+China, 215 Agriculture sector, 196

Gandhi, Rajiv, 53, 75 Defence and space, 109
General Electric (GE), 41 Groundwater, 207
Geographic Region of Malicious Activities, 156 IT industry, 54
Georgia-Russia Conflict, 174 Space Technology, 113
Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV), India’s defence and security planning, 78
114 India’s Economic Reforms, 228
Germany, 31, 119, 160, 190, 216, 246 India’s Economy, 196
Global Commons, 104, 107 India’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 156
Global Energy Consumption Rate, 189 India’s National Cyber Security Policy, 151
Global Gross Domestic Product, 247 India’s space assets, 135
Global Information Management System (GIMS), INDIAFRICA, 58
100 Indian agriculture, 210
Global Media, 60 Indian Air Force, 83
Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), 238 Indian Computer Emergency Response Team
Global Population, 211 (CERT-In), 152
Global Positioning System (GPS), 73, 104 Indian education system, 54
Global Surface Temperature, 203 Indian foreign policy, 50
Global Warming, 177, 185, 191, 211 Indian Institute of Science, Education and Research
Mitigation, 186 (IISER), 55
Globalising Age, 35 Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs), 31
Google, 64 Indian National Satellite (INSAT), 114
Gorbachev, Mikhail, 9 Indian Navy, 81
GPS Aided Geo Augmented Navigation (GAGAN), modernisation plan, 81
115 Indian Railway Construction Company (IRCON),
GPS Enabled Systems, 82 15
Grand National Plan, 30 Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System
Grand National Strategy, 229, 232 (IRNSS), 116
Green Rating for Integrated Habitat Assessment Indian Remote Sensing (IRS), 114
(GRIHA), 196 Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), 82,
Green Revolution, 31 113, 114, 115, 117, 232
Greenhouse Gas (GHG), 177, 181-86, 190, 200, Indo-US civil nuclear cooperation agreement, 30
213, 240 Indo-US civil nuclear energy agreement, 14
emissions, 178, 187, 192, 195, 198, 218, 219, Indo-US strategic and technology cooperation,
221 77
Group of 77, 215 Indo-US strategic partnership, 32
GSAT, 117 Indo-US technology cooperation, 41
Gulf War, 88 Indus Water Treaty, 200
Information Age, 227
Hacktivism, 155 Information Operations (IO), 140
Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC), 130 Information Technology (IT), 16, 17, 21, 32, 45,
Himalayan mountain, 208 55, 175, 228
Hindustan Computers Ltd. (HCL), 54 revolution, 33
Hiroshima, 85 Information technology-enabled services (ITES), 54
Human Development Index (HDI), 23 Information-Communication-Technology (ICT), 4,
Hydrogen Bomb, 85 13, 35, 55, 61, 64, 69, 80, 90, 96, 97, 105,
107, 138, 140, 147, 168, 230, 231, 237, 240
ICOCOS, 130-31 Infosys, 54
IGMDP (Integrated Guided Missile Development INS Vikramaditya, 81
Programme), 41 INS Vikrant, 81
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), 78 Integrated Energy Policy (IEP), 193-94
India, 14, 24, 26, 40, 42, 48, 49, 55, 65, 74, 75, Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), 62, 238
76, 78, 79, 81, 84, 87, 88, 89, 102, 106, 108, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR),
113, 131, 132, 134, 146, 151, 160, 172, 180, 81
188, 189, 191, 193, 195, 200, 201, 205, 208, Intelligent Video Surveillance (IVS), 237
209, 216, 221, 228, 232, 234, 236, 238, 239, Intended Nationally Determined Commitments
240, 246 (INDC), 215
258 Role of Technology in International Affairs

Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), 155

Committee, 119 Law of the Sea, 64
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), 44, 82, Laws of Conflict Management, 147
112 Laws of War, 147
Inter-governmental organisations (IGOs), 6 Lewis, Jeffrey, 91
Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change Libya, 88
(IPCC), 8, 184, 208 Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), 41, 76
Internal Transformation, 61 Linear Imaging Self-Scanning (LISS), 114
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 23, Little Boy, 84
86, 87, 89 Little Ice Age, 184
International Centres for Genetic Engineering and London Club, 86
Biotechnology (ICGEB), 53 Low Earth Orbit (LEO), 100, 118
International Code of Conduct for Outer Space
(ICOCOS), 129-130 Main Battle Tank (MBT), 41
International Cyber Cooperation, 167 Maldives Virtual Embassy, 61
International Energy Agency (IEA), 183 Maldives, 61, 206
International Organisations (IOs), 142 Mars Orbital Mission, 117
International Relations (I.R.), 3, 6, 5, 7, 10, 18, Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA),
31, 35, 59, 60, 63, 70, 107, 178, 227 81
Technology, 5 Meeting of the Parties (MOP), 214
International Space Laws, 123 Methane, 182, 185
International Space Station (ISS), 106, 118 Michigan Orbital Debris Survey Telescope, 119
International Telecommunication Regulations Micro-electro-mechanical-systems (MEMS), 112
(ITRs), 171 Microsoft, 64
International Telecommunication Union (ITU), Missile defence technologies, 97
125, 161 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), 19
International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor Modern diplomacy, 57
(ITER), 8, 198, 238 MTCR guidelines, 20
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and MTCR, 23, 24, 41
Numbers (ICANN), 65, 161, 171 Multinational Corporations (MNCs), 6
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), 161 Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs),
Internet of Everything, 65, 141 82, 116
Internet Service Providers (ISPs), 159 Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), 10, 127
Iran Related Cyber Attack, 174
Iraq war, 15 Nagasaki, 85
Iraq, 15, 88 National Academy of Sciences (NAS), 9
IRS spacecraft, 114 National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Israel, 38, 88 (NASA), 37, 116
Attack on Syria, 174 National Association for Software and Services
Italy, 19 Company (NASSCOM), 152
National Centre for Science Communication
Japan, 19, 119, 160, 173, 190, 193, 213, 221, 246 (NCSC), 152
Japan-India Cyber Dialogue, 173 National Committee on Science and Technology
Japan-India Maritime Affairs Dialogue, 173 (NCST), 50
National Crisis Management Committee (NCMC),
Kalam, Dr. A. P. J. Abdul, 116 158
Kargil War, 77 National Cyber Alert System, 151
Kazakhstan, 88 National Cyber Security Policy, 146
KELTEC, 81 National Disaster Management Authority
Kinetic Kill, 111 (NDMA), 159
National Information Board (NIB), 157
Land loss and flooding, 205 National Information Infrastructure Protection
Land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF), Centre (NIIPC), 159
214 National Natural Resources Management System,
Large Hadron Collider (LHC), 8 115
Law Enforcement and Intelligence Agencies (LEIA), National nodal centres, 168
152 National Remote Sensing Centre (NRSC), 115
 Index 259

National Science Foundation, 55 Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space

National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS), 158 (PAROS), 113
National Technical Means (NTM), 34 Private information, 63
National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC), 15 Proxy war, 78
National Water Mission, 208 Public-private partnerships (PPP), 150, 152
NATO, 167, 174
Network-Centric Warfare (NCW), 44 Radar Imaging Satellites (RISATs), 116
New Defence Technology, 73 RAND Report, 108
New World Order, 35, 36 Reagan, Ronald, 9, 22
Niti Aayog, 51 Remote Access Trojan (RAT), 147
Nitrous oxide, 182 Renewable Energy (RE), 197, 199
Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs), 6, 10, Research on controlled thermonuclear fusion, 35
35, 59, 60, 142 Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), 70, 96, 107,
Non-Nuclear Weapon State (NNWS), 23 101, 126
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), 20, Russia, 24, 81, 88, 104, 106, 108, 110, 125, 130,
154 131, 133, 170, 171, 172, 190, 193, 221, 246
North Korea, 88, 90, 172
No-Win situation, 73 Sachs, Jeffrey, 179
NPO Mashinostroyenia (NPOM), 81 Satellite Launch Vehicle (SLV), 114
NPT Review Conferences, 89 Satellites, 128, 131
NSSP (Next Steps in Strategic Partnership), 42 Science and Technology (S&T), 3-7, 11, 17, 21,
Nuclear Deterrence, 89, 90 29-32, 35-36, 39, 50-52, 54-57, 70-71, 146,
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 18, 23, 179-80, 219-20, 227, 228, 235, 240, 242,
30, 77, 87, 88, 89, 229 244-45, 248
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), 18, 20, 41, 77, Collaboration, 9
87, 230 Cooperation, 9, 31
Nuclear Weapon State (NWS), 23-25, 26, 30, 85- Science and technology development in India, 51
89, 91, 98 Science
Nuclear Weapons (NW), 3, 18, 19, 24, 30, 32, 36, Diplomacy, 3, 11
37, 39, 45, 70, 72-73, 76, 84-93, 98, 101, for Diplomacy, 7
247, 251-52 in Diplomacy, 7
attack, 73 Scientific Advisory Committee to the Cabinet
capability, 73 (SACC), 50-51
power, 32, 76 Scientific Policy Resolution (SPR), 52
technology, 86 Sea based Radars, 112
tests, 30, 85 Sea level rise, 206
Nye, Joseph, 58 Sectoral CERTs, 160
Small and medium enterprises (SMEs), 55, 194,
Open Diplomacy, 57 238
Orbital Test Vehicle (OTV), 127 Small Island Developing States (SIDS), 215
Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries Snowden, Edward, 153
(OPEC), 192 Social media, 241
Outer Space Treaty (OST), 104, 107, 124 South Africa, 88
Outer space, 122, 231 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC), 242
Pakistan, 24, 27, 31, 76, 81, 88, 90, 133, 135, Soviet Academy of Sciences, 9
200, 247 Space Code of Conduct (SCOC), 127, 130, 132
Army, 77 Space Dominance, 110
PAROS Resolution, 124 Space Shuttle, 118, 119
Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), 86 Space technology, 111
Peace Balance, 136 Space Test Bed, 129
Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE), 31, 75, 230 Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS),
Philippines, 61 112
Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP), 215 Space, 109, 120
Pokhran-II, 76 Space-Based High Energy Laser System, 99
Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV), 114, 117 Space-Based Infrared System (SBIR), 112
Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs), 83, 128 Space-Based Interceptors (SBIs), 129
260 Role of Technology in International Affairs

Special Chemicals, Organisms, Materials, 44, 49, 71, 80, 88, 98, 104-6, 108, 112-13,
Equipment and Technologies (SCOMET), 230 119, 125, 129, 130, 131, 134, 156, 160, 166-
Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF), 214 67, 172, 190-91, 193, 208, 216, 221, 243, 246
Sri Lanka, 15, 206, 242 Air Force, 41, 100
Star War, 123 Project on Airborne Laser, 99
State-to-State diplomacy, 59 Defence industry, 76
Stern Review, 191 Forces, 93
STQC Directorate, 160 in Asia, 14
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), 37 Military, 120
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), 88 Navy, 126
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 22 Space Command Vision 2020, 112
STUXNET, 174 United States Agency for International
Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI), 213 Development (USAID), 14
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological United States Air Force’s (USAF’s) Airborne Laser,
Advice (SBSTA), 213 110
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), 22, 71, 79, 83,
(SCADA), 148 91, 236
Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs), 83 Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles, 99
Sweden, 61 US Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), 172
US-China relationship, 25
Tata Consultancy Services (TCS), 54 US-India civil-nuclear agreement, 20, 32
Technology control, 18 US-India spat, 32
Technology diffusion, 38 US-Soviet ABM Treaty, 1972, 134
Technology sharing, 152 US-USSR, bilateral arms control, 23
Technology, 34, 39, 70, 82
Responsible Ownership, 72 Very large-scale integration (VLSI), 37
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD),
112 War on Terror, 77
Terrorist networks, 38 Wassenaar Arrangement, 20
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), 15, 18-19,
Rights (TRIPS), 56 21, 23, 34, 44-45, 47, 70-73, 88, 91, 98, 102,
Trans Atmospheric Vehicle (TAV), 100 107, 128, 201, 229
Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures terrorism, 26
(TCB, 130 West Asia, 90
Turkey, 246 West Germany, 19
Western alliance, 31
Ukraine, 88, 221 WHO, 178
UN Charter, 123, 124, 130 Wipro, 54
UN Climate Change Summits, 222 World Conference on International
UN Security Council, 237 Telecommunications (WCIT), 171
United Kingdom (UK), 19, 31, 85, 160, 167, 172, World Energy Outlook 2006, 193
173, 216, 243, 246 World Meteorological Organisation (WMO), 8,
United Nations (UN), 15, 87, 119, 124, 161, 178 212
United Nations Conference on Environment and World Trade Organisation (WTO), 56
Development (UNCED), 212 World War I, 73
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural World War II, 3, 11, 36, 73, 84, 183, 187, 222
Organisation (UNESCO), 31 World Wide Web (www), 14, 144
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP),
8, 212 Y2K, 76
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Yahoo, 64
Change (UNFCCC), 212, 213, 215, 221
United States (US), 3, 19, 22, 24, 25, 31, 37, 41, Zangger’s List, 87