1

ASIAN TERMINALS INC. vs. RICAFORTRespondents were duly-licensed importers

of vehicles. Sometime in April and May 1998,they imported 72 secondhand
right-hand drive buses from Japan. When the shipment arrived at the South
Harbor, Port of Manila, the District Collector of Customs impoundedthe vehicles
and ordered them stored at the warehouse of the Asian Terminals, Inc. (ATI),a
customs-bonded warehouse under the custody of the Aviati on and
Cargo RegionalDivision. Conformably with Section 2607 of the Tariff and
Customs Code, the DistrictCollector of Customs issued Warrants of Distraint3
against the shipment and set the saleat public auction on September 10,
1998.The vehicles were seized by virtue of Section 1, Republic Act (RA) No.
8506, which took effect on February 22, 1998, which provides that "it shall
be unlawful for any person toimport, cause the importation of, register,
cause the registration of, use or operate anyvehicle with its steering
wheel right hand side thereof in any highway, street or road, whether
private or public, or at the national or local x x x."On November 11, 1998, the
importers filed a complaint with the RTC of Parañaque City,against the Secretary
of Finance, Customs Commissioner, and the Chief Executive of theSociete
Generale de Surillee, for replevin with prayer for the issuance of a
writ of  preliminary and mandatory injunction and damages. They contend
that the importation of right-hand drive vehicles is not prohibited under RA No.
8506 provided that conversionkits are included in the imported vehicles.RTC
granted writ of replevin.Meanwhile, Petitioner ATI filed a third party claim
against respondent importers for u n p a i d w a r e h o u s e d u e s . A s
the Bureau of Customs fi l e a M o ti o n / N o t i c e
t o Dismiss/Withdraw Complaint, the trial court dismissed the complaint
along with theThird Party Claim/Motion for Intervention as the latter is only it
being only an accessoryto the principal case. ATI moved to reconsider and was
denied.
ATI then appealed to the CA which ruled that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over thecomplaint filed by respondents. Under the
Customs and Tariff Code, the Collector of Customs sitting in seizure
and forfeiture proceedings had the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
determine all questions relating on the seizure and forfeiture of dutiable
goods.Since it was bereft of jurisdiction in the principal case, it also had no
jurisdiction over thethird party claim/complaint in intervention as such is
only ancillary and supplemental.Instant CaseIssue: W/N the RTC has
jurisdiction over the instant case, and, w/n the replevin it issuedwas
valid.Ruling: Petition must fail.The Trial Court has no jurisdiction.
Section 602 of the Tariffs and Customs Code  provides that the Bureau
of Customs shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over seized andforfeited cars.
Under Section 2301 of the TCC, the Collector of Customs is empowered
tomake a seizure of cargoes and issue a receipt for the detention thereof:SEC.
2301. Warrant for Detention of Property-Cash Bond. – Upon making
any seizure,the Collector shall issue a warrant for the detention of the
property; and if the owner or importer desires to secure the release of
the property for legitimate use, the Collector  shall, with the approval of
the Commissioner of Customs, surrender it upon the filing of acash bond, in
an amount to be fixed by him, conditioned upon the payment of
 2

theappraised value of the article and/or any fine, expenses and costs which
may be adjudgedin the case: X X XAs the Court ruled in Jao v. Court of
Appeals,
Regional Trial Courts are devoid of anyc o m p e t e n c e t o p a s s u p o n t h e
validity or regularity of seizure and forfeitureproceedings
conducted by the Bureau of Customs and to enjoin or
o t h e r w i s e interfere with these proceedings
. It is the Collector of Customs, sitting in seizure and forfeiture proceedings, who has
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all questionstouching on the seizure and
forfeiture of dutiable goods.Thus, the RTC had no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the petition for replevin by respondents herein, issue the writ of
replevin and order its enforcement. The Collector of Customs had already seized the
vehicles and set the sale thereof at public auction. The RTC should have dismissed the
petition for replevin at the outset. By granting the plea of respondents (plaintiffs below) for
the seizure of the vehicles and the transfer of custody tothe court, the RTC acted
without jurisdiction over the action and the vehicles subject matter thereof.It bears
stressing that the forfeiture of seized goods in the Bureau of Customs is
a proceeding against the goods and not against the owner. It is in the nature of a
proceedingin rem, i.e., directed against the res or imported articles and entails a
determination of thelegality of their importation. In this proceeding, it is, in legal

contemplation, the property itself which commits the violation and is treated as
the offender, without reference whatsoever to the character or conduct of the
owner.In fine, the initial orders of the RTC granting the issuance of the writ of replevin
and itsimplementation are
void
. While it is true that the District Collector of Customs allowedthe release of the
vehicles and the transfer thereof to the custody of the RTC upon the  payment by
the private respondents of the required taxes, duties and charges, he did
notthereby lose jurisdiction over the vehicles; neither did it vest jurisdiction on
the RTC totake cognizance of and assume jurisdiction over the petition for
replevin. As very wellexplained by the Office of the Solicitor General, the District
Collector of Customs agreedto transfer the vehicles to the custody of the RTC since the
latter had ordered the arrest of those who would obstruct the implementation of
the writ. The District Collector of  Customs had yet to resolve whether to
order the vehicles forfeited in favor of the government, in light of the opinion
of the Secretary of Justice that, under RA No. 8506, the importation was illegal.The
RTC cannot be faulted for dismissing petitioner’s complaint-in-
intervention. Considering that it had no jurisdiction over respondents’ action and
over the shipmentsubject of the complaint, all proceedings before it would be
void. The RTC had no  jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint-in-intervention
and act thereon except todismiss the same. Moreover, considering that
intervention is merely ancillary and supplemental to the existing litigation and never
an independent action, the dismissal of the principal action necessarily results in the
dismissal of the complaint-in-intervention.Likewise, a court which has no jurisdiction
over the principal action has no jurisdictionover a complaint-in-intervention.
Intervention presupposes the pendency of a suit in a court of competent jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction of intervention is governed by jurisdiction of the main action

*********************
Mesina Vs. IAC

FACTS:
Jose Go purchased from Associate Bank a Cashier’s Check for P800, 000. Unfortunately, he left
it on top of the manager’s desk when left the bank. The bank manager entrusted the check for
safekeeping to a bank official who had a visitor in the person of Alexander Lim. Uy had to
answer a phone call after which he proceeded to the men's room. When he returned to his desk,
 3

his visitor Lim was already gone. When Jose Go inquired for his cashier's check from Albert Uy,
the check was not in his folder and nowhere to be found. The latter advised Jose Go
to go to the bank to accomplish a "STOP PAYMENT" order. He also executed an affidavit of
loss. The records of the police show that Associated Bank received the lost check for clearing
coming from Prudential Bank. The check was immediately dishonored by Associated Bank by
sending it back to Prudential Bank, with the words "Payment Stopped" stamped on it. However,
the same was again returned to Associated Bank and for the second time it was dishonored.
Several days later, respondent Associated Bank received a letter, from a certain Atty. Lorenzo
Navarro demanding payment on the cashier's check in question, which was being held by his
client. Respondent bank, in its letter, replied saying the check belonged to Jose Go who lost it in
the bank and is laying claim to it. A case of interpleader was filed by the bank and Go moved to
participate as intervenor in the complaint for damages. Mesina moved for the dismissal of the
case but was denied.The trial court ruled in the interpleader case ordering the bank to replace the
cashier’s check in favor of Go.

In his second assignment of error, petitioner stubbornly insists that there is no showing
of conflicting claims and interpleader is out of the question. There is enough evidence to
establish the contrary. Considering the aforementioned facts and circumstances,
respondent bank merely took the necessary precaution not to make a mistake as to
whom to pay and therefore interpleader was its proper remedy. It has been shown that
the interpleader suit was filed by respondent bank because petitioner and Jose Go were
both laying their claims on the check, petitioner asking payment thereon and Jose Go as
the purchaser or owner. The allegation of petitioner that respondent bank had effectively
relieved itself of its primary liability under the check by simply filing a complaint for
interpleader is belied by the willingness of respondent bank to issue a certificate of time
deposit in the amount of P800,000 representing the cashier's check in question in the
name of the Clerk of Court of Manila to be awarded to whoever wig be found by the court
as validly entitled to it. Said validity will depend on the strength of the parties' respective
rights and titles thereto. Bank filed the interpleader suit not because petitioner sued it
but because petitioner is laying claim to the same check that Go is claiming. On the very
day that the bank instituted the case in interpleader, it was not aware of any suit for
damages filed by petitioner against it as supported by the fact that the interpleader case
was first entitled Associated Bank vs. Jose Go and John Doe, but later on changed to
Marcelo A. Mesina for John Doe when his name became known to respondent bank.
***********

ARREZA v DIAZ
FACTS: Bliss Development Corporation is the owner of a housing complex
located in Balara Quezon City. It instituted an interpleader case against Arreza
and Diaz who were conflicting claimants of the property. the RTC ruled in favor of
Arreza. In view of said decision, Bliss executed a contract to sell the property to
Arreza and Diaz was compelled to transfer possession together with all
improvements to Arreza.
Thereafter, Diaz instituted a claim against Arreza and Bliss for the reimbursement
of the cost of the improvements which amounted to approximately 1.7 M inclusive
of 8% interest. Arreza filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of res judicata and
lack of cause of action. RTC dismissed the Motion to Dismiss and the Motion for
Reconsideration of Arreza. This prompted Arreza to file a petition for certiorari
with the CA. CA dismissed the petition saying that res judicata does not apply
because the interpleader case only settled the issue on who had a better right. It
did not determine the parties‘ respective rights and obligations.
ISSUE: Whether or not the claim for reimbursement is barred by res judicata –
YES
HELD: An examination of the answer filed by Diaz showed that he asserted his
status as a buyer in good faith and for value and he prayed that affirmative relief
arising out of the rights of a buyer in good faith and for value be granted. This
only means that Diaz expected that the court shall award him damages in the
form of reimbursement in case judgment is rendered in favor of Arreza.
Diaz contends that in the pre-trial of the interpleader case, reimbursement and
damages was never put in issue. Thus it could not have been the subject of the
 4

interpleader and consequently, not barred by res judicata. Diaz says it was
incumbent on Arreza to include the damages as an issue. The Supreme Court
said that (1) it is not the duty of the petitioner to do the lawyering against the
respondent and (2) in a complaint for interpleader shall determine the rights and
obligations of the parties and adjudicate their respective claims. Such rights,
obligations, and claims could only be adjudicated if put forward by the aggrieved
party in assertion of his rights. That party in this case referred to respondent
Diaz. The second paragraph of Section 5 of Rule 62 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that the parties in an interpleader action may file
counterclaims, cross-claims, third party complaints and responsive pleadings
thereto, "as provided by these Rules." The second paragraph was added to
Section 5 to expressly authorize the additional pleadings and claims enumerated
therein, in the interest of a complete adjudication of the controversy and its
incidents
Having failed to set up his claim for reimbursement, said claim of respondent Diaz being in
the nature of a compulsory counterclaim is now barred.

*******************
MALANA V TAPPA
FACTS: Petitioners Carmen Danao Malana, et al. (―Danao heirs‖) alleged to be the owners of a
land in Tugegarao which they inherited from Anastacio Danao. During the lifetime of Danao, he
allowed Consuelo Pauig (family member of Tappa) to build on and occupy the southern portion
of the subject property. Danao and Consuelo agreed that the latter would vacate the said land
at any time that Danao and his heirs might need it. Danao heirs claimed that respondents
Benigno Tappa, et al. continued to occupy the subject property even after Consuelo‘s death,
building their residences thereon using permanent materials. Danao heirs also learned that
Tappa, et al. were claiming ownership over the subject property. Averring that they already
needed it, Danao heirs demanded that respondents vacate the same. The call was unheeded.
Meanwhile, Danao heirs referred their land dispute to the Lupong Tagapamayapa. During the
conciliation proceedings, respondents asserted that they owned the subject property and
presented documents ostensibly supporting their claim of ownership. The heirs opposed this,
saying that the documents were falsified and highly dubious. This notwithstanding, Tappa, et
al. created a cloud upon the heirs‘ title to the property. Thus, the heirs filed a case for
Reivindicacion, Quieting of Title, and Damages in the RTC.
Issue:
Did the judge commit grave abuse of discretion in motu proprio dismissing the complaint for
lack of jurisdiction? – No GAD. Petition is dismissed. RTC should remand the records to the
MTC.
Held:
An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a
contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive
order, a regulation or an ordinance. The relief sought under this remedy includes the
interpretation and determination of the validity of the written instrument and the judicial
declaration of the parties‘ rights or duties thereunder.
Petitions for declaratory relief are governed by Rule 63. Section 1 states that an action for the
reformation of an instrument, to quiet title, and to consolidate ownership in a sale with a right
to repurchase ―may‖ be brought under the RTC. These remedies are considered similar to
declaratory relief because they result in the adjudication of the legal rights of the litigants,
often without the need of execution. Whereas the Rules of Court uses ―may,‖ the amended
Judicial Reorganization Act uses the word ―shall‖ in determining jurisdiction. JRA explicitly
requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve
title to or possession of real property where the assessed value does not exceed P20,000
(OMM) or P50,000 (MM). In this case, the assessed value of the subject property is only
P410.00; therefore, the jurisdiction is with the MTC, not the RTC.
Further, an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of
the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder. The purpose of an action for
declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the
parties under a statute, deed or contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, and
not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof. Where the law or contract has
already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory relief, the courts can
no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. In the present case, the case for quieting of title
was filed after Danao heirs already demanded, and Tappa refused to vacate the subject
 5

property. Since the heirs had already been deprived of the possession of their property, the
proper remedy for them is the filing of an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, not a
case for declaratory relief. An accion publiciana is a suit for the recovery of possession, filed
one year after the occurrence of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of
possession of the realty. Jurisdiction over such an action would depend on the value of the
property involved. Given that the property is only at P410.00, then the MTC, not the RTC, has
jurisdiction over an action to recover the same.
*************

G.R. No. 137538 September 3, 2001

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner,

vs.
HON. FRANCISCO B. IBAY, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Makati City, Branch 135, UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, and LOURDES
T. MARQUEZ, in her capacity as Branch Manager of UBP Julia Vargas Branch,
respondents.1âwphi1.nêt

RESOLUTION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This special civil action for certiorari seeks to annul the Orders of public respondent dated
August 19, 1998 and December 22, 1998, and to dismiss the proceedings in Civil Case No.
98-1585.

The factual antecedents of this case are as follows: lawphil.net

Sometime in 1998, petitioner conducted an investigation on the alleged "scam" on the

Public Estates Authority-Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation. The case, entitled
Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau vs. Amadeo Lagdameo, et al., was docketed as OMB-
0-97-0411. Initial result of the investigation revealed that the alleged anomaly was
committed through the issuance of checks which were subsequently deposited in several
financial institutions. On April 29, 1998, petitioner issued an Order directing private
respondent Lourdes Marquez, branch manager of Union Bank of the Philippines branch at
Julia Vargas Avenue, Pasig City, to produce several bank documents for inspection relative
to Account Nos. 011-37270-5, 240-020718, 245-30317-3 and 245-303318-1, reportedly
maintained in the said branch. The documents referred to include bank account
application forms, signature cards, transactions history, bank statements, bank ledgers,
debit and credit memos, deposit and withdrawal slips, application for purchase of
manager's checks, used manager's checks and check microfilms. The inspection would be
done "in camera" wherein the bank records would be examined without bringing the
documents outside the bank premises. Its purpose was to identify the specific bank records
prior to the issuance of the required information not in any manner needed in or relevant
to the investigation.1

Private respondent failed to comply with petitioner's order. She explained that the subject
accounts pertain to International Corporate Bank (Interbank) which merged with Union
Bank in 1994. She added that despite diligent efforts, the bank could not identify these
accounts since the checks were issued in cash or bearer forms. She informed petitioner that
she had to first verify from the Interbank records in its archives the whereabouts of said
accounts.2

Petitioner found private respondent's explanation unacceptable. Petitioner reminded

private respondent that her acts constitute disobedience or resistance to a lawful order and
is punishable as indirect contempt under Section 3 (b), Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of
Court, in relation to Section 15 (9) of R.A. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989). The same
might
 6

also constitute willful obstruction of the lawful exercise of the functions of the
Ombudsman, which is punishable under Section 36 of R.A. 6770. On June 16, 1998,
petitioner issued an order to private respondent to produce the requested bank documents
for "in camera" inspection. In the event of her failure to comply as directed, private
respondent was ordered to show cause why she should not be cited for contempt and why
she should not be charged for obstruction.3

Instead of complying with the order of petitioner, private respondent filed a petition for
declaratory relief with an application for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary
injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 135, presided by
respondent Judge Francisco Ibay. The petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-1585. In
her petition, private respondent averred that under Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. 1405 (Law on
Secrecy of Bank Deposits), she had the legal obligation not to divulge any information
relative to all deposits of whatever nature with banks in the Philippines. But petitioner's
Order cited Section 15 (8) of R.A. 6770 stating that the Ombudsman had the power to
examine and have access to bank accounts and records. Private respondents, therefore,
sought a definite ruling and/or guidelines as regards her rights as well as petitioner's power
to inspect bank deposits under the cited provisions of law. Meanwhile, private respondent
filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition, assailing petitioner's order to
institute indirect contempt proceedings against her.4

Petitioner moved to dismiss the aforesaid petition for declaratory relief on the ground that
the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof. In an order dated August 19,
1998, now being assailed, public respondent denied petitioner's motion to dismiss.
Petitioner then filed an ex-parte motion for extended ruling. On December 22, 1998, public
respondent issued an order declaring that it has jurisdiction over the case since it is an
action for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court.

Seasonably, petitioner filed before this Court the instant petition assailing the Orders dated
August 19, 1998 and December 22, 1998 of public respondent on the ground that public
respondent assumed jurisdiction over the case and issued orders with grave abuse of
discretion and clear lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner sought the nullification of the impugned
orders, the immediate dismissal of Civil Case No. 98-1585, and the prohibition of public
respondent from exercising jurisdiction on the investigation being conducted by petitioner
in the alleged PEA-AMARI land "scam".

The only question raised by petitioner for resolution is whether or not public respondent
acted without jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the cited
petition for declaratory relief.

Petitioner contends that the RTC of Makati City lacks jurisdiction over the petition for
declaratory relief. It asserts that respondent judge should have dismissed the petition
outright in view of Section 14 of R.A. 6770.lawphil.net

Section 14 of R.A. 6770 provides:lawphil.net

Restrictions. – No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an

investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a
prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the
jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.

No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or
findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.

Petitioner's invocation of the aforequoted statutory provision is misplaced. The special civil
action of declaratory relief falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
 7

Court.5 It is not among the actions within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
even if only questions of law are involved. 6 Similarly, the Rules of Court is explicit that
such action shall be brought before the appropriate Regional Trial Court. Section 1, Rule
63 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested under a deed, will, contract
or other written instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order
or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach
or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to
determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of
his rights or duties, thereunder.

x x x           x x x          x x x

The requisites of an action for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party
seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for
judicial determination.7 In this case, the controversy concerns the extent of the power of
petitioner to examine bank accounts under Section 15 (8) of R.A. 6770 vis-à-vis the duty of
banks under Republic Act 1405 not to divulge any information relative to deposits of
whatever nature. The interests of the parties are adverse considering the antagonistic
assertion of a legal right on one hand, that is the power of Ombudsman to examine bank
deposits, and on the other, the denial thereof apparently by private respondent who refused
to allow petitioner to inspect in camera certain bank accounts. The party seeking relief,
private respondent herein, asserts a legal interest in the controversy. The issue invoked is
ripe for judicial determination as litigation is inevitable. Note that petitioner has
threatened private respondent with "indirect contempt" and "obstruction" charges should
the latter not comply with its order.

Circumstances considered, we hold that public respondent has jurisdiction to take

cognizance of the petition for declaratory relief. Nor can it be said that public respondent
gravely abused its discretion in doing so. We are thus constrained to dismiss the instant
petition for lack of merit.

In any event, the relief being sought by private respondent in her action for declaratory
relief before the RTC of Makati City has been squarely addressed by our decision in
Marquez vs. Desierto.8 In that case, we ruled that before an in camera inspection of bank
accounts may be allowed, there must be a pending case before a court of competent
jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, and the inspection limited to
the subject matter of the pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction. The bank
personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection, and
such inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case. In the present
case, since there is no pending litigation yet before a court of competent authority, but only
an investigation by the Ombudsman on the so-called "scam", any order for the opening of
the bank account for inspection is clearly premature and legally unjustified.1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.

**********************

G.R. No. 182374             November 11, 2008

JEREMIAS V. ESTEVES, petitioner

vs.
RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, in their respective and Member of the
Second Division COMELEC, Manila and REYNALDO TEH BITONG, respondents.
 8

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

This is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition1 under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, assailing the Resolution2 of the Second Division of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) in SPR No. 46-2007. Said resolution set aside the Order3 dated 8
September 2007 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 96, Baler, Aurora and
consequently dismissed the election protest filed by herein petitioner Jeremias V. Esteves against
private respondent Mayor Reynaldo Teh Bitong.

As culled from the records of the case, the following antecedent facts appear:

In the national and local elections conducted last 14 May 2007, petitioner and private respondent
both ran for the position of municipal mayor of the Municipality of Casiguran, Aurora. On 15
May 2007, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed private respondent as the duly-elected
Mayor of Casiguran on the basis of the results of the canvassing, which showed him having
garnered 3,342 votes or with a margin of 48 votes over petitioner, who obtained 3,294 votes.4

On 25 May 2007, petitioner filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court of Baler,
Aurora. The protest was docketed as Election Protest Case (EPC) No. 99 and raffled to Branch
96 presided by Judge Corazon D. Soluren.5

The RTC then issued a precautionary protection order directing the Municipal Treasurer and
Election Officer of Casiguran to take immediate steps to safeguard the integrity of all the ballot
boxes, lists of voters and other paraphernalia used in the elections and thereafter directed that all
the election paraphernalia, including the ballot boxes and lists of voters, subject of the protest be
brought before the court.6

Private respondent then filed an answer, which the RTC admitted in an Order dated 2 August
2007. In the same order, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of
private respondent's counter-protest on the ground of non-payment of filing fee. Thereafter, the
RTC ordered the creation of the revision committees.7

On 6 September 2007, private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the election protest, arguing
that it was defective in form and substance as it did not specify the precincts where fraud and
irregularities were committed. On 8 September 2007, the RTC issued the order denying private
respondent's motion to dismiss for lack of merit.8

Thus, private respondent filed before the COMELEC a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction. 9
The petition sought to nullify the RTC Order dated 8 September 2007 denying private
respondent's motion to dismiss. It also prayed that the election protest filed by petitioner be
dismissed and the proceedings thereon enjoined on the ground that the election protest failed to
comply with the requirements of Section 11(f), Rule 210 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC. Petitioner filed
an answer on 5 December 2007.

After hearing private respondent's application, the COMELEC (Second Division) issued a
temporary restraining order (TRO) on 06 December 2007, which directed Judge Soluren to desist
from further proceeding with Election Protest Case No. 96 until further orders from the
COMELEC.11

Thereafter, petitioner filed before this Court a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition
with application for issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. The petition, docketed as G.R. No. 180792, prayed that a temporary restraining order
be issued enjoining the COMELEC (Second Division) from taking cognizance of SPR Case No.
46-2007 and that the TRO issued by the COMELEC be ordered lifted.
 9

On 15 January 2008, the Court resolved to dismiss G.R. No. 180792 for failure of the petition to
state the material dates showing that the petition was filed on time, failure to submit the required
competent proof of identity in the verification/certification, failure to give an explanation why
service was not personally made and failure to show that any grave abuse of discretion was
committed by the COMELEC in rendering the challenged order.

On 29 February 2008, the COMELEC (Second Division) issued the assailed resolution penned
by Commissioner Nicodemo T. Ferrer. The assailed resolution nullified the 8 September 2007
Order of the RTC and, accordingly, dismissed EPC No. 99.12 The other member of the Second
Division, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento, wrote a dissenting opinion.13 It appears that before
the issuance of the assailed resolution, the third member of the Second Division, Presiding
Commissioner Florentino A. Tuazon, Jr. had retired from the service.

Hence, the instant petition, raising the following arguments: (1) the COMELEC (Second
Division) has no jurisdiction to entertain special relief cases like petitions for certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus; (2) the challenged resolution did not comply with the constitutional
requirement that it must be decided by a majority vote of all the members; and (3) the challenged
resolution negated the spirit and very purpose of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) manifested that under Section 5, Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, only the private respondent is required to appear and defend the case, both on his own
behalf and on behalf of the public respondent COMELEC, and prayed that the COMELEC be
excused from filing the required comment.14 In a Resolution dated 12 August 2008, the Court
granted the motion of the OSG.15

The petition deserves dismissal.

Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution expressly states:

Section 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and
decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be
decided by the Commission en banc.

Also, Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution provides:

Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case
or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision
or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the
filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission
or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law,
any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court
on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.

Under the aforequoted constitutional provisions, the requirement that an aggrieved party must
first file a motion for reconsideration of a resolution of the Division to the COMELEC en banc is
mandatory and jurisdictional in invoking the power of review of the Supreme Court. Failure to
abide by this procedural requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of the petition.16

All election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, shall be decided by the COMELEC
in division, and the motion for reconsideration shall be decided by the COMELEC en banc.17 As
held in Ambil v. Commission on Elections,18 the power of review of the Supreme Court of the
rulings of the COMELEC is limited only to the final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en
banc and not the final resolution of its Division. The Supreme Court has no power to review, via
certiorari, an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the Commission on
Elections.
 10

Moreover, pursuant to Section 5 (c), Rule 319 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a resolution
issued by a Division of the COMELEC must first be elevated to the COMELEC en banc by
filing a motion for reconsideration.

The filing of a motion for reconsideration is mandatory because the mode by which a decision,
order or ruling of the COMELEC en banc may be elevated to the Supreme Court is by the
special civil action of certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. It is settled that
the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the order, resolution or decision of the tribunal,
board or office is, subject to well-recognized exceptions, a condition sine qua non to the
institution of a special civil action for certiorari. The rationale therefore is that the law intends to
afford the tribunal, board or office an opportunity to rectify the errors and mistakes it may have
lapsed into before resort to the courts of justice can be had.20

Since the COMELEC Rules of Procedure allows the review of a resolution of the Division by the
COMELEC en banc, the filing of the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is premature.
The petition does not allege that petitioner indeed filed a motion for reconsideration before the
COMELEC en banc. The unquestioned rule in this jurisdiction is that certiorari will lie only if
there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
against the acts of public respondent.21 Certiorari cannot be resorted to as a shield from the
adverse consequences of petitioner's own omission to file the required motion for
reconsideration.22 A litigant should first exhaust the administrative remedies provided by law
before seeking judicial intervention in order to give the administrative agency an opportunity to
decide correctly the matter and prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the court.23 The
premature invocation of judicial intervention is fatal to one's cause of action.24

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is DENIED. Costs against
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

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SOURCE: SPOUSES ROGELIO MARCELO AND MILAGROS MARCELO VS. LBC

BANK (G.R. NO. 183575, 11 APRIL 2011, CARPIO, J.) SUBJECT: WHETHER  C.A.
CAN ADMIT NEW EVIDENCE IN A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI.
(BRIEF TITLE: SPOUSES MARCELO VS. LBC BANK).

CASE DIGEST:

SPOUSES MARCELO OBTAINED LOAN FROM LBC BANK AND MORTGAGED

THEIR PROPERTY. THEY FAILED TO PAY THE LOAN. LBC BANK FILED EXTRA-
JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS. LATER LBC BANK MANAGER MILAN
EXECUTED AN AFFIDAVIT OF CONSOLIDATION AND FILED IT WITH THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS. MARCELO’S TITLE WAS CANCELLED AND A NEW TITLE
WAS ISSUED IN THE NAME OF LBC BANK. THE LATTER FILED PETITION FOR
WRIT OF POSSESSION. MARCELO SPOUSES OPPOSED ON GROUND THAT
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT MILAN WAS AUTHORIZED TO EXECUTE AN
AFFIDAVIT OF CONSOLIDATION. RTC ISSUED WRIT OF POSSESSION.
MARCELO SPOUSED FILED WITH C.A. A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR
CERTIOARI.  C.A. REVERSED RTC DECISION. LBC MOVED FOR
RECONSIDERATION ATTACHING THERETO A SECRETARY’S CERTIFICATE
SHOWING THAT MILAN HAS AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE AN AFFIDAVIT OF
CONSOLIDATION. C.A. RECONSIDERED ITS DECISION AND AFFIRMED RTC
DECISION.

 
 11

ISSUE: CAN ADMIT NEW EVIDENCE IN A CIVIL ACTION FOR CERIORARI?

YES.

PURSUANT TO SECTION 9 OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 129, AS AMENDED, THE

COURT OF APPEALS SHALL HAVE THE POWER TO RECEIVE EVIDENCE AND
PERFORM ANY AND ALL ACTS NECESSARY TO RESOLVE FACTUAL ISSUES
RAISED IN CASES FALLING WITHIN ITS ORIGINAL AND APPELLATE
JURISDICTION.

In Maralit v. Philippine National Bank,14 where petitioner Maralit questioned the appellate
court’s admission and appreciation of a belatedly submitted documentary evidence, the
Court held that “[i]n a special civil action for certiorari, the Court of Appeals has ample
authority to receive new evidence and perform any act necessary to resolve factual issues.”
The Court explained further:

Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, states that, “The Court of Appeals shall
have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all
acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and
appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further
proceedings.”15

Likewise, in VMC Rural Electric Service Cooperative, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,16 the Court
held:

[I]t is already settled that under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7902 (An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals,
amending for the purpose of Section Nine of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended, known
as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), the Court of Appeals — pursuant to the
exercise of its original jurisdiction over Petitions for Certiorari — is specifically given the
power to pass upon the evidence, if and when necessary, to resolve factual issues. As clearly
stated in Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act 7902:

The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive
evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases
falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and
conduct new trials or further proceedings. x x x.

Clearly, the Court of Appeals did not err in admitting the evidence showing LBC Bank’s
express ratification ofMilan’s consolidation of the title over the subject property. Further,
the Court of Appeals did not err in admitting such evidence in resolving LBC Bank’s
motion for reconsideration in a special civil action for certiorari. To rule otherwise will
certainly defeat the ends of substantial justice.

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