227 - Luna vs. IAC
227 - Luna vs. IAC
FACTS
Respondent Maria Lourdes Santos is an illegitimate child of the petitioner Horacio Luna who is married to his co-
petitioner Liberty Hizon-Luna. Maria Lourdes Santos is married to her correspondent Sixto Salumbides, and are the
parents of Shirley Santos Salumbides, also known as Shirley Luna Salumbides, who is the subject of this child
custody case.
Two or four months after the birth of the said Shirley Salumbides on April 7, 1975, her parents gave her to the
petitioners, a childless couple with considerable means, who thereafter showered her with love and affection and
brought her up as their very own. The couple doted upon Shirley who called them "Mama" and "Papa". She calls
her natural parents "Mommy" and "Daddy."
A few months before September, 1980, her "Mama" and "Papa" decided to take Shirley abroad and show her
Disneyland and other places of interest in America. Shirley looked forward to this trip and was excited about it.
However, when the petitioners asked for the respondents' written consent to the child's application for a U.S. visa,
the respondents refused to give it, to the petitioners' surprise and chagrin Shirley was utterly disappointed. As a
result, the petitioners had to leave without Shirley whom they left with the private respondents, upon the latter's
request. The petitioners, however, left instructions with their chauffeur to take and fetch Shirley from Maryknoll
College every school day.
When the petitioners returned on October 29, 1980, they learned that the respondents had transferred Shirley to
the St. Scholastica College. The private respondents also refused to return Shirley to them. Neither did the said
respondents allow Shirley to visit the petitioners. In view thereof, the petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus
with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV, against the private respondents to produce the person of
Shirley and deliver her to their care and custody. The case was docketed in court as Spec. Proc. No. 9417, and after
the filing of an answer and due hearing, a decision was rendered on March 9, 1981, declaring the petitioners
entitled to the child's custody and forthwith granted the writ prayed for.
The private respondents appealed to the then Court of Appeals where the case was docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-
12212, and in a decision dated April 7, 1982, the appealed decision was reversed and set aside and another
entered, ordering the petitioners, among other things, to turn over Shirley to the private respondents.
Upon finality of the judgment, the case was remanded to the court of origin and assigned to Regional Trial Court,
NCJR Branch CXXXII Makati, Metro Manila, presided over by respondent Judge Roque A. Tamayo who, thereafter,
issued an order directing the issuance of a writ of execution to satisfy and enforce the resolution of the Supreme
Court which affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The execution of the judgment was vigorously opposed by the petitioners who filed a motion for the
reconsideration of the order and to set aside the writ of execution on the ground of supervening events and
circumstances, more particularly, the subsequent emotional, psychological, and physiological condition of the
child Shirley which make the enforcement of the judgment sought to be executed unduly prejudicial, unjust and
unfair, and cause irreparable damage to the welfare and interests of the child.
ISSUE
The issue is whether or not procedural rules more particularly the duty of lower courts to enforce a final decision
of appellate courts in child custody cases, should prevail over and above the desire and preference of the child, to
stay with her grandparents instead of her biological parents and who had signified her intention to kill herself or
run away from home if she should be separated from her grandparents and forced to live with her biological
parents.
HELD
The court found merit in the petitioner. The manifestation of the child Shirley that she would kill herself or run
away from home if she should be taken away from the herein petitioners and forced to live with the private
respondents, made during the hearings on the petitioners' motion to set aside the writ of execution and reiterated
in her letters to the members of the Court dated September 19, 1984 and January 2, 1985, and during the hearing
of the case before this Court, is a circumstance that would make the execution of the judgment rendered in Spec.
Proc. No. 9417 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal inequitable, unfair and unjust, if not illegal. Article 363 of the
Civil Code provides that in all questions relating to the care, custody, education and property of the children, the
latter's welfare is paramount. This means that the best interest of the minor can override procedural rules and
even the rights of parents to the custody of their children. Since, in this case, the very life and existence of the
minor is at stake and the child is in an age when she can exercise an intelligent choice, the courts can do no less
than respect, enforce and give meaning and substance to that choice and uphold her right to live in an atmosphere
conducive to her physical, moral and intellectual development. The threat may be proven empty, but Shirley has a
right to a wholesome family life that will provide her with love, care and understanding, guidance and counselling,
and moral and material security. But what if the threat is for real?
Besides, in her letters to the members of the Court, Shirley depicted her biological parents as selfish and cruel and
who beat her often; and that they do not love her. And, as pointed out by the child psychologist, Shirley has grown
more embittered cautious and dismissing of her biological parents. To return her to the custody of the private
respondents to face the same emotional environment which she is now complaining of would be indeed traumatic
and cause irreparable damage to the child. As requested by her, let us not destroy her future.
WHEREFORE, the petition should be, as it is hereby GRANTED and the writ prayed for issued, setting aside the
judgment of the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court in CA-G.R. No. SP-01869, and restraining the respondent
judge and/or his successors from enforcing the judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-
12212.