ELECTION LAWS

FIRST PPT
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, December 3, 1985)
 The OEC is the decades-old law that governs all elections of public officers, as well as all referendums and
plebiscites.
Republic Act No. 6646 (The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, January 5, 1988)
 Section 10. Common Poster Areas
 strategic public places such as markets, barangay centers and the like
 common billboards may be installed by the Commission and/or non-partisan private or civic
organizations
 free of charge
 Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda (Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881)
o election propaganda outside the common poster areas
o Except
 candidate's own residence
 campaign headquarters
 two (2) feet by three (3) feet
 three (3) feet by eight (8) feet five (5) days before the date of the meeting or rally, and shall
be removed within twenty-four (24) hours after said meeting or rally
o sell or to give free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes except to
the Commission
o Any mass media columnist, commentator, announcement or personality who is a candidate for any
elective public office shall take a leave of absence from his work as such during the campaign period.
 Section 12. Official Watchers
o every registered political party/candidate
 Section 13. Board of Election Inspectors
o Chairman and 2 members
o public school teachers
o private school teachers
o civil service employees
o citizens of known probity and competence
 Section 16. Certificates of Votes
o issued by the BEI upon request of the duly accredited watchers
o contain the number of votes obtained by each candidate written in words and figures, the number of
the precinct, the name of the city or municipality and province, the total number of voters who voted
in the precinct and the date and time issued
o signed and thumbmarked by each member of the board
 Section 17. Certificate of Votes as Evidence
o admissible in evidence to prove tampering, alteration, falsification or any anomaly committed in the
election returns
o duly authenticated by testimonial or documentary evidence presented to the board of canvassers by at
least two members of the board of election inspectors who issued the certificate
o failure to present any certificate of votes shall be a bar to the presentation of other evidence to impugn
the authenticity of the election returns
 Section 25. Right to be Present and to Counsel During the Canvass
o Any registered political party, coalition of parties, through their representatives, and any candidate has
the right to be present and to counsel during the canvass of the election returns
o only one counsel may argue for each political party or candidate
o right to examine the returns being canvassed without touching them, make their observations thereon,
and file their challenges in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Commission
o No dilatory action shall be allowed by the board of canvassers
 Section 27. Election Offenses
 Section 28. Prosecution of Vote-buying and Vote-selling
o paragraph (a) or (b) of Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881

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 o at least one voter in different precincts representing at least twenty percent (20%) of the total precincts has been
offered, promised or given money, valuable consideration or other expenditure by a candidate's relatives, leaders
and/or sympathizers
o disputable presumption
 conspiracy under paragraph (b) of Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
 involvement of such candidate and of his principal campaign managers
o giver, offerer, and promisor as well as the solicitor, acceptor, recipient and conspirator shall be liable as
principals
o any persons, otherwise guilty under said paragraphs who voluntarily gives information and willingly testifies on
any violation thereof in any official investigation or proceeding shall be exempt from prosecution and
punishment
o nothing herein shall exempt such person from criminal prosecution for perjury or false testimony
Republic Act No. 7166 (An Act Providing for Synchronized National And Local Elections And For Electoral
Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, And For Other Purposes, November 26, 1991)
 Section 2. Date of Elections
o President, Vice-President, twenty-four (24) Senators, all elective Members of the House of
Representatives, and all elective provincial, city and municipal officials on the second Monday of
May, 1992
o Thereafter, the President and Vice-President shall be elected on the same day every six (6) years
o Senators, elective Members of the House of Representatives and all elective provincial, city and
municipal officials shall be elected on the same day every three (3) years, except that with respect to
Senators, only twelve (12) shall be elected
 Section 4. Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Elections
o decided by the Commission sitting en banc by a majority vote of its members
o causes for the declaration of a failure of election may occur before or after the casting of votes or on
the day of the election
o permanent vacancy in the Senate or House of Representatives at least one (1) year before the
expiration of the term, the Commission shall call and hold a special election to fill the vacancy not
earlier than sixty (60) days nor longer than ninety (90) days after the occurrence of the vacancy
 Section 5. Election Period
o ninety (90) days before the day of the election and shall end thirty (30) days thereafter.
o Campaign periods
 For President, Vice-President and Senators, ninety (90) days before the day of the election
 For Members of the House of Representatives and elective provincial, city and municipal
officials, forty-five (45) days before the day of the election
o Any election campaign or partisan political activity for or against any candidate outside of the
campaign period herein provided is prohibited and shall be considered as an election offense
punishable under Section 263 and 264 of the Omnibus Election Code.
 Section 7. Filing of Certificates of Candidacy
o five (5) legible copies with the offices of the Commission specified hereunder not later than the day
before the date legally fixed for the beginning of his campaign period.
o President, Vice-President and Senators - main office of the Commission in Manila;
o Members of the House of Representatives - provincial election supervisor
o legislative districts in the National Capital Region - regional election director
o legislative districts in cities outside the National Capital Region which comprise one or more
legislative districts - city election registrar
o provincial offices - provincial supervisor
o city or municipal offices - city or municipal election registrar
 Annulment of the List of Voters
o fraud, bribery, forgery, impersonation, intimidation, force or any other similar irregularity or which is
statistically improbable
o after due notice 
o verified complaint
o no order, ruling or decision annulling a book of voters shall be executed within sixty (60) days before
an election.
 Section 13. Authorized Expenses of Candidates and Political Parties.  
o For candidates. –
 Ten pesos (P10.00) for President and Vice-President;
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  other candidates Three Pesos (P3.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency
where he filed his certificate of candidacy
 candidate without any political party and without support from any political party may be
allowed to spend Five Pesos (P5.00) for every such voter
o For political parties. –
 Five pesos (P5.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency or constituencies
where it has official candidates.
 Statement of Contributions and Expenditures: Effect of Failure to File Statement. 
o 30 days after the day of the election,
o Pre-requisite for entry upon the duties of his office
o same prohibition if the political party which nominated the winning candidate fails to file the
statement
o administrative offense
o Fine of P1,000.00 to P30,000.00 payable within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice, otherwise writ
of execution issued by the Commission against the properties of the offender
o Two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) to Sixty thousand pesos (P60,000.00) for second or subsequent
offense with perpetual disqualification to hold public office.
 Section 15. Pre-proclamation Cases Not Allowed in Elections for President Vice-President, Senator, and
Member of the House of Representatives
o preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns or the certificates
of canvass
o does not preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu propio or upon written
complaint of an interested person to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election
returns before it
o composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers may be initiated in the board or directly with
the Commission in accordance with Section 19 hereof
o objection on the election returns before the city or municipal board of canvassers, or on the municipal
certificates of canvass before the provincial board of canvassers or district boards of canvassers in
Metro Manila Area shall be specifically noted in the minutes of their respective proceedings.
 Section 16. Pre-proclamation Cases Involving Provincial, City and Municipal Offices
o allowed and shall be governed by Sections 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 hereof
o All pre-proclamation cases pending before the Commission shall be deemed terminated at the
beginning of the term of the office involved and the rulings of the boards of canvassers concerned
shall be deemed affirmed, without prejudice to the filing of a regular election protest by the aggrieved
party
o proceedings may continue when on the basis of the evidence thus far presented, the Commission
determined that the petition appears meritorious and accordingly issues an order for the proceeding to
continue or when an appropriate order has been issued by the Supreme Court in a petition for
certiorari.
 Section 17. Pre-proclamation Controversies: How Commenced
o composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers - board or directly with the Commission
o Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to the preparation,
transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns, and the certificates of canvass -
in the first instance before the board of canvassers only.
 Section 18. Summary Disposition of Pre-proclamation Controversies
o on the basis of the records and evidence elevated to it by the board of canvassers, be disposed of
summarily by the Commission within seven (7) days from receipt thereof
o decisions shall be executory after the lapse of seven (7) days from receipts by the losing party
 Section 20. Procedure in Disposition of Contested Election Returns
o oral objection to the chairman of the board of canvassers at the time the questioned return is presented
for inclusion in the canvass
o objection shall be recorded in the minutes of the canvass.
o board of canvassers shall automatically defer the canvass of the contested returns and shall proceed to
canvass the returns which are not contested by any party
o objecting party shall also enter his objection in the form for written objections to be prescribed by the
Commission

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 o within twenty-four (24) hours from and after the presentation of such an objection, the objecting party
shall submit the evidence in support of the objection, which shall be attached to the form for written
objections
o within the same period of twenty-four (24) hours after presentation of the objection, any party may
file a written and verified opposition to the objection
o evidence attached to the objection or opposition, submitted by the parties, shall be immediately and
formally admitted into the records of the board by the chairman affixing his signature at the back of
each every page thereof
o Board summarily and immediately rules thereon. The board shall enter its ruling on the prescribed
form and authenticate the same by the signatures of its members.
o Any part adversely affected by the ruling of the board shall immediately inform the board if he
intends to appeal, board shall enter said information in the minutes of the canvass, set aside the returns
and proceed to consider the other returns
o board shall suspend the canvass
o within forty-eight (48) hours, written and verified notice of appeal
o unextendible period of five (5) days thereafter an appeal may be taken to the Commission.
o upon receipt of the notice of appeal, the board shall make an appropriate report to the Commission,
elevating therewith the complete records and evidence
o Commission shall decide summarily the appeal within seven (7) days from receipt of said record and
evidence
o executory after the lapse of seven (7) days from receipts thereof by the losing party.
o not proclaim any candidate as winner unless authorized by the Commission after the latter has ruled
on the object brought to it on appeal by the losing party
o Any proclamation made in violation hereof shall be void ab initio, unless the contested returns will
not adversely affect the results of the election
 Election Contests for Municipal Offices
o Regional Trial Court  
o appeal to the Commission within five (5) days from promulgation or receipt 
o decide the appeal within sixty (60) days after it is submitted for decision, but not later than six (6)
months
o decision shall be final, unappealable and executory.
Republic Act 9006 (FAIR ELECTION ACT, February 12, 2001)
 Section 3. Lawful Election Propaganda
o 3.1. Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers or other written or printed materials the size of which
does not exceed eight and one half inches in width and fourteen inches in length;
o 3.2. Handwritten or printed letters urging voters to vote for or against any particular political party or
candidate for public office;
o 3.3. Cloth, paper or cardboard posters, whether framed or posted, with an area not exceeding
 two (2) feet by three (3) feet
 streamers not exceeding three (3) feet by eight (8) feet in size – public meeting or rally five
(5) days before the date of the meeting or rally and shall be removed within twenty-four (24)
hours after said meeting or rally
o 3.4. Paid advertisements in print or broadcast media
o 3.5. All other forms of election propaganda not prohibited by the Omnibus Election Code or this Act.
 Section 4. Requirements for Published or Printed and Broadcast Election Propaganda
o newspaper, newsletter, newsweekly, gazette or magazine advertising, posters, pamphlets, comic
books, circulars, handbills, bumper stickers, streamers, sample list of candidates or any published or
printed political matter and any broadcast of election propaganda by television or radio for or against
a candidate or group of candidates to any public office shall bear and be identified by the reasonably
legible or audible words "political advertisement paid for," followed by the true and correct name and
address of the candidate or party for whose benefit the election propaganda was printed or aired.
o If given free of charge - "airtime for this broadcast was provided free of charge by" followed by the
true and correct name and address of the broadcast entity
o Print, broadcast or outdoor advertisements donated to the candidate or political party shall not be
printed, published, broadcast, or exhibited without the written acceptance by the said candidate or
political party - attached to the advertising contract and shall be submitted to the COMELEC

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 Section 6. Equal Access to Media Time and Space. – All registered parties and bona fide candidates shall
have equal access to media time and space. The following guidelines may be amplified on by the COMELEC.
o Print advertisements - not exceed one-fourth (1/4) page in broad sheet and one-half (1/2) page in
tabloids thrice a week per newspaper, magazine or other publications
o nationally elective office shall be entitled - one hundred twenty (120) minutes of television
advertisement and one hundred eighty (180) minutes of radio advertisement whether by purchase or
donation
o locally elective office shall be entitled to not more than sixty (60) minutes of television advertisement
and ninety (90) minutes of radio advertisement whether by purchase or
o All members of media, television, radio or print, shall scrupulously report and interpret the news,
taking care not to suppress essential facts nor to distort the truth by omission or improper emphasis.
They shall recognize the duty to air the other side and the duty to correct substantive errors promptly.
o mass media columnist, commentator, announcer, reporter, on-air correspondent or personality who is
a candidate for any elective public office or is a campaign volunteer for or employed or retained in
any capacity by any candidate or political party
 deemed resigned, if so required by their employer
 leave of absence from his/her work as such during the campaign period
o media practitioner who is an official of a political party or a member of the campaign staff of a
candidate or political party shall not use his/her time or space to favor any candidate or political party
o No movie, cinematograph or documentary portraying the life or biography of a candidate shall be
publicly exhibited in a theater, television station or any public forum during the campaign period
o No movie, cinematograph or documentary portrayed by an actor or media personality who is himself
a candidate shall be publicly exhibited in a theater, television station or any public forum during the
campaign period
 Section 7. Affirmative Action by the COMELEC
o Pursuant to Sections 90 and 92 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Bldg. 881), the
COMELEC shall procure the print space upon payment of just compensation from at least three (3)
national newspapers of general circulation
o allocated free of charge equally and impartially among all the candidates for national office on three
(3) different calendar days
o COMELEC shall also procure free airtime from at least three (3) national television networks and
three(3) national radio networks
o allocated free of charge equally and impartially among all candidates for national office on three (3)
different calendar days
o COMELEC may require national television and radio networks to sponsor at least three (3) national
debates among presidential candidates and at least one (1) national debate among vice presidential
candidates
 Section 8. COMELEC Space and Time
o at least one (1) newspaper of general circulation and air time in at least one (1) major broadcasting
station or entity in every province or city
o in the absence of said newspaper, publication shall be done in any other magazine or periodical in said
province or city, which shall be known as "COMELEC Space“
o in the absence of said broadcasting station or entity, broadcasting shall be done in any radio or
television station in said province or city, which shall be known as "COMELEC Time“
o Said time shall be allocated to the COMELEC free of charge, while said space shall be allocated to
the COMELEC upon payment of just compensation
o utilized exclusively by the COMELEC for public information dissemination on election-related
concerns.
 Section 9. Posting of Campaign Materials
o political parties and party-list groups to erect common poster areas for their candidates in not more
than ten (1) public places such as plazas, markets, barangay centers and the like
o size of the poster areas shall not exceed twelve (12) by sixteen (16) feet or its equivalent.
o Independent candidates with no political parties may likewise be authorized to erect common poster
areas in not more than ten (10) public places, the size of which shall not exceed four (4) by six (6) feet
or its equivalent.

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 o Candidates may post any lawful propaganda material in private places with the consent of the owner
thereof, and in public places or property which shall be allocated equitably and impartially among the
candidates.
 Section 12. Substitution of Candidates
o valid substitutions after the official ballots have been printed, the votes cast for the substituted
candidates shall be considered as stray votes but shall not invalidate the whole ballot
o official ballots shall provide spaces where the voters may write the name of the substitute candidates
if they are voting for the latter
o if the substitute candidate of the same family name, this provision shall not apply.
Republic Act No. 9369 (An Act Amending Republic Act No. 8436, Entitled "An Act Authorizing The
Commission On Elections To Use An Automated Election System In The May 11, 1998 National Or Local
Elections And In Subsequent National And Local Electoral Exercises, To Encourage Transparency,
Credibility, Fairness And Accuracy Of Elections, Amending For The Purpose Batas Pampansa Blg. 881, As
Amended, Republic Act No. 7166 And Other Related Elections Laws, Providing Funds Therefor and For Other
Purposes", January 23, 2007)
 The Philippines first adopted the automated election system in the 2010 presidential election, using the
technology anew in 2013 and 2016 during the national elections in the said years.
 For the barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan elections on Oct. 23, 2017, the Comelec reverted to a manual
conduct of elections.
 Board of Election Inspectors. –
o at least one member of the Board of Election Inspectors shall be an information technology-capable
person, who is trained or certified by the DOST to use the EAS.
o considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of
candidacy
o unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall effect only upon that start of the
aforesaid campaign period
o any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the armed
forces, and officers, and employees in government-owned or-controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso factor resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day
of the filing of his/her certification of candidacy.
o "Political parties may hold political conventions to nominate their official candidate within thirty
(30) days before the start of the period for filing certificate of candidacy.
 SEC. 28. Section 29 of Republic Act No. 8436 is hereby amended to read as follows:
o "SEC. 35. Prohibited Acts and Penalties. - The following shall be penalized as provided in this Act,
whether or not said acts affect the electoral process or results:
a. Utilizing without authorization, tampering with, damaging, destroying or stealing:
1) Official ballots, election returns, and certificates of canvass of votes used in the
system; and
2) Electronic devices or their components, peripherals or supplies used in the AES
such as counting machine, memory pack/diskette, memory pack receiver and
computer set;
b. Interfering with, impeding, absconding for purpose of gain, preventing the installation or
use of computer counting devices and the processing, storage, generation and
transmission of election results, data or information;
c. Gaining or causing access to using, altering, destroying or disclosing any computer data,
program, system software, network, or any computer-related devices, facilities, hardware
or equipment, whether classified or declassified;
d. Refusal of the citizens' arm to present for perusal its copy of election return to the board
of canvassers;
e. Presentation by the citizens' arm of tampered or spurious election returns;
f. Refusal or failure to provide the dominant majority and dominant minority parties or the
citizens'' arm their copy of election returns; and
g. The failure to post the voters' list within the specified time, duration and in the designated
location shall constitute an election offense on the part the election officer concerned."
o "Any person convicted for violation of this Act, except those convicted of the crime of electoral
sabotage, shall be penalized with imprisonment of eight years and one day to twelve (12) years
without possibility of parole, and perpetual disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of

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 the right of suffrage. Moreover, the offender shall be perpetually disqualified to hold any non-elective
public office."
 SEC. 43. Section 265 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 is hereby amended to read as follows :
o "SEC. 265. Prosecution. - The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the
power, concurrent with the other prosecuting arms of the government, to conduct preliminary
investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code, and prosecute the same"
o Quinto v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 189698, December 1, 2009)
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The second proviso in the
third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election
Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are declared as
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
 For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of
candidacy/petition of registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who
files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a candidate at
the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy:  Provided,
That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start
of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a public
appointive office or position, including active members of the armed forces, and officers and
employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered  ipso
facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing
of his/her certificate of candidacy.
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The second proviso in the
third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election
Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are declared as
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
 Section 66 of B.P. Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) of the Philippines,
which reads:
 Sec. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position.- Any person holding a public
appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy.
 Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is a reproduction of the second proviso
in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, which for ready reference is
quoted as follows:
 For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of
candidacy/petition for registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any
person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered
as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of
candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall
take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That
any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of
the armed forces, and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate
the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy.
 For the foregoing reasons, we now rule that Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678 and Section 13 of
RA 9369, which merely reiterate Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, are not
unconstitutionally overbroad.
 IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the respondent’s and the
intervenors’ Motions for Reconsideration; REVERSE and SET ASIDE this Court’s
December 1, 2009 Decision; DISMISS the Petition; and ISSUE this Resolution declaring as
not UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1) Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, (2) the
second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, and (3) Section
66 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Republic Act No. 8189 (The Voter’s Registration Act of 1996)
 Section 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters.  
o conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer during regular office hours.

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 o No registration shall, however, be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days
before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election
 Section 9. Who may Register. 
o All citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law
o at least eighteen (18) years of age,
o resided in the Philippines for at least one (1) year,
o in the place wherein they propose to vote, for at least six (6) months immediately preceding the
election
o Any person who temporarily resides in another city, municipality or country solely by reason of
his occupation, profession, employment in private or public service, educational activities, work
in the military or naval reservations within the Philippines, service in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, the National Police Forces, or confinement or detention in government institutions
in accordance with law, shall not be deemed to have lost his original residence.
o Any person, who, on the day of registration may not have reached the required age or period of
residence but, who, on the day of the election shall possess such qualifications, may register as a
voter.
 Section 11. Disqualification. 
o sentenced by final judgment to suffer imprisonment of not less than one (1) year, such disability not
having been removed by plenary pardon or amnesty
o automatically reacquire the right to vote upon expiration of five (5) years after service of sentence 
o adjudged by final judgment by a competent court or tribunal of having committed any crime involving
disloyalty to the duly constituted government such as rebellion, sedition, violation of the firearms
laws or any crime against national security, unless restored to his full civil and political rights in
accordance with law
o automatically reacquire the right to vote upon expiration of five (5) years after service of sentence
o Insane or incompetent persons
 Notice and Hearing of Applications. 
o Hearing
o notice of which shall be posted in the city or municipal bulletin board and in his office for at least one
(1) week before the hearing 
o furnish copies thereof to the applicant concerned, the heads or representatives of political parties, and
other accredited groups or organizations which actively participate in the electoral process in the city
or municipality.
o Election Officer shall receive such evidence for or against the applicant
o not seasonably objected need not appear on the date set for the hearing
o Physical presence mandatory in all cases where objections against his application have been
seasonably filed with the proper Election Registration Board
 Section 18. Challenges to Right to Register. 
o Any voter, candidate or representative of a registered political party may challenge in writing
any application for registration, stating the grounds therefor. The challenge shall be under oath
and be attached to the application, together with the proof of notice of hearing to the challenger and
the applicant.
o Oppositions to contest a registrant’s application for inclusion in the voter’s list must, in all
cases, be filed not later than the second Monday of the month in which the same is scheduled to
be heard or processed by the Election Registration Board.
o The hearing on the challenge shall be heard on the third Monday of the month and the decision shall
be rendered before the end of the month.
 Section 27. Deactivation of Registration.
o sentenced by final judgment to suffer imprisonment for not less than one (1) year
o crime involving disloyalty to the duly constituted government
o insane or incompetent
o did not vote in the two (2) successive preceding regular elections
o ordered excluded by the Court; and
o lost his Filipino citizenship.
 Section 28. Reactivation of Registration. 

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 o sworn application for reactivation of his registration in the form of an affidavit stating that the
grounds for the deactivation no longer exist
o not later than one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days
before a special election.
 Section 31. Sealing of Precinct Book of Voters. 
o fifteen (15) days before the start of the campaign period
o of all registered political parties and members of the Board of Election Inspectors to inspect and
verify the completeness of the voter’s registration records for each precinct compiled in the book of
voters.
o After verification and certification by the Board of Election Inspectors and party representatives as to
the completeness of the voters’ registration records in the precinct book of voters.
 Section 32. Common Rules Governing Judicial Proceedings in the Matter of Inclusion, Exclusion, and
Correction of Names of Voters.
o The decision shall be based on the evidence presented and in no case rendered upon a stipulation of
facts. If the question is whether or not the voter is real or fictitious, his non-appearance on the
day set for hearing shall be prima facie evidence that the challenged voter is fictitious
 Section 33. Jurisdiction in Inclusion and Exclusion Case. 
o Municipal and Metropolitan Trial Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
cases of inclusion and exclusion of voters in their respective cities or municipalities.  
o appealed by the aggrieved party to the Regional Trial Court within five (5) days from receipt of notice
o regional trial court shall decide the appeal within ten (10) days from the time it is received and the
decision shall immediately become final and executory.
o No motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.
 Section 37. Voter Excluded Through Inadvertence or Registered with an Erroneous or Misspelled
name. –
o file with the Board an application for reinstatement or correction of name.
o file on any date with the proper Municipal Circuit, Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Court a petition
for an order directing that his name be entered or corrected in the list.
 Section 39. Annulment at Book of Voters. 
o The Commission shall, upon verified petition of any voter or election officer or duly registered
political party, and after notice and hearing, annul any book of voters
o not prepared in accordance with the provisions of this Act  
o prepared through fraud, bribery, forgery, impersonation, intimidation, force or any similar
irregularity, or which contains data that are statistically improbable.
o No order, ruling or decision annulling a book of voters shall be executed within ninety (90) days
before an election.
 Section 40. Reconstitution of Lost or Destroyed Registration Records.  
o The Commission shall reconstitute all registration records which have been lost or destroyed by using
the corresponding copies of the provincial or national central files.
o If this is not feasible, the Commission shall conduct a general registration of voters in the affected
area: Provided, That there is a scheduled election before the next scheduled general registration of
voters in accordance with the Omnibus Election Code.
o All such voters shall retain their voter’s identification number. Reconstituted forms shall be clearly
marked with the word "reconstituted."
o It shall be the duty of the Election Officer to immediately report to the Commission any case of loss
or destruction of registration record in his custody.
o The reconstitution of any lost or destroyed registration records shall not affect the criminal liability of
any person who is responsible for such loss or destruction.
 Section 46. Penalties. 
o Election offense under this Act shall be punished with imprisonment of not less than one (1) year but
not more than six (6) years
o not be subject to probation
o disqualification to hold public office and
o deprivation of the right of suffrage.
o If he is a foreigner, he shall be deported after the prison term has been served.

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 oAny political party found guilty shall be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than One hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000) but not more than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000).
 Paras vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 123169 November 4, 1996)
o Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won
during the last regular barangay election in 1994. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was
filed by the registered voters of the barangay. Acting on the petition for recall, public respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve the petition, scheduled the petition
signing on October 14, 1995, and set the recall election on November 13, 1995.At least 29.30% of the
registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by law. The
COMELEC, however, deferred the recall election in view of petitioner's opposition. On December 6,
1995, the COMELEC set anew the recall election, this time on December 16, 1995. To prevent the
holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City a
petition for injunction, docketed as SP Civil Action No. 2254-AF, with the trial court issuing a
temporary restraining order. After conducting a summary hearing, the trial court lifted the restraining
order, dismissed the petition and required petitioner and his counsel to explain why they should not be
cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay recall election was without COMELEC
approval.
o In a resolution dated January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the third time, re-scheduled the recall
election a January 13, 1996; hence, the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction.
On January 12, 1996, the Court issued a temporary restraining order and required the Office of the
Solicitor General, in behalf of public respondent, to comment on the petition. In view of the Office of
the Solicitor General's manifestation maintaining an opinion adverse to that of the COMELEC, the
latter through its law department filed the required comment. Petitioner thereafter filed a reply.
o Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which
states that "no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to
office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election“
o January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by
Republic Act No. 7808 on the first Monday of May 1996, and every three years thereafter. In support
thereof, petitioner cites Associated Labor Union v. Letrondo-Montejo, 237 SCRA 621, where the
Court considered the SK election as a regular local election. Petitioner maintains that as the SK
election is a regular local election, hence no recall election can be had for barely four months separate
the SK election from the recall election
o Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government unit
necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall election one year
immediately preceding the regular local election. The proscription is due to the proximity of the next
regular election for the office of the local elective official concerned. The electorate could choose the
official's replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in office than a successor
elected through a recall election. It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall
provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one referring to an election where the office
held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the
electorate.
 Palatino, et. al. vs COMELEC, 2009 (G.R. No. 189868, December 15, 2009)
o Resolution No. 85141 
 which, among other things, set December 2, 2008 to December 15, 2009 as the period of
continuing voter registration using the biometrics process in all areas nationwide, except in
the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao.
o Resolution No. 85852 
 adjusting the deadline of voter registration for the May 10, 2010 national and local elections
to October 31, 2009, instead of December 15, 2009 as previously fixed by Resolution No.
8514.
o The intense public clamor for an extension of the October 31, 2009 deadline notwithstanding, the
COMELEC stood firm in its decision not to extend it, arguing mainly that it needs ample time to
prepare for the automated elections.
o Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus
 challenge the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 and seek a declaration of its
nullity.

Page 10 of 70
  the serious questions involved in this case and potential disenfranchisement of millions of
Filipino voters justify resort to this Court in the first instance, claiming that based on National
Statistics Office (NSO) data, the projected voting population for the May 10, 2010 elections is
3,758,964 for the age group 18-19 and 8,756,981 for the age group 20-24, or a total of
12,515,945.
o COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 is an unconstitutional encroachment on the legislative power of
Congress as it amends the system of continuing voter registration under Section 8 of Republic Act
No. 8189 (RA 8189), otherwise known as The Voter’s Registration Act of 1996, reading:
 Section 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters. The personal filing of application of
registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer during
regular office hours. No registration shall, however, be conducted during the period starting
one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special
election.
o COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 be declared null and void, and that the COMELEC be accordingly
required to extend the voter registration until January 9, 2010 which is the day before the 120-day
prohibitive period starting on January 10, 2010.
o Ruling
 Section 8 of RA 8189 which provides:
 Section 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters. The personal filing of
application of registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the
Election Officer during regular office hours. No registration shall, however, be
conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular
 Both R.A. No. 6646, Section 29 and R.A. No. 8436, Section 28 grant the COMELEC the
power to fix other periods and dates for pre-election activities only if the same cannot be
reasonably held within the period provided by law. This grant of power, however, is for the
purpose of enabling the people to exercise the right of suffrage – the common underlying
policy of RA 8189, RA 6646 and RA 8436.
 In the present case, the Court finds no ground to hold that the mandate of continuing voter
registration cannot be reasonably held within the period provided by RA 8189, Sec. 8 – daily
during office hours, except during the period starting 120 days before the May 10, 2010
regular elections. There is thus no occasion for the COMELEC to exercise its power to fix
other dates or deadlines therefor.
 The present case differs significantly from Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC.11 In said case, the
Court held that the COMELEC did not commit abuse of discretion in denying the request of
the therein petitioners for an extension of the December 27, 2000 deadline of voter
registration for the May 14, 2001 elections. For the therein petitioners filed their petition with
the Court within the 120-day prohibitive period for the conduct of voter registration under
Section 8 of RA 8189, and sought the conduct of a two-day registration on February 17 and
18, 2001, clearly within the 120-day prohibitive period.
 Petition is GRANTED. COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 is declared null and void insofar as
it set the deadline of voter registration for the May 10, 2010 elections on October 31, 2009.
The COMELEC is directed to proceed with dispatch in reopening the registration of voters
and holding the same until January 9, 2010. This Decision is IMMEDIATELY
EXECUTORY.
TABLE
Rules of Procedure in Election Contests Before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay
Officials (A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC)         
 Election Contests
o election protests
o petitions for quo warranto 
 Election Protest - relating to the election and returns of elective officials, grounded on frauds or
irregularities in the conduct of the elections in the
 casting and counting of the ballots
 preparation and canvassing of returns.
The issue is who obtained the plurality of valid votes cast
 Quo Warranto under the Omnibus Election Code - relating to the qualifications of an elective official on
the ground of ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines

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 o The issue is whether respondent possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications prescribed by law.
 SEC. 2. Jurisdiction of municipal trial courts. –
o exclusive original jurisdiction over all election contests involving elective barangay officials.
o An election protest shall not include a petition for quo warranto, nor shall a petition for quo
warranto include an election protest.
 SEC. 4. Modes of service and filing. – personally
o resort to other modes of service must be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or
filing was not done personally. A violation of this Rule shall be cause to consider the pleading or
paper as not filed.
 SEC. 5. Election protest. –
o A petition contesting the election or returns of an elective barangay official  
o filed with the municipal trial court
 by any candidate who was voted for the same office and who received the second or third
highest number of votes or, in a multi-slot position, was among the next four candidates
following the last-ranked winner duly proclaimed 
o party filing the protest shall be designated as the protestant; the adverse party shall be known as the
protestee.
o Each contest shall refer exclusively to one office; however, contests for offices of Sangguniang
Bayan or Sangguniang Barangay may be consolidated in one case.
 SEC. 6. Quo Warranto. –  
o A petition for quo warranto against an elective barangay official shall be filed with the municipal trial
court  
o by any registered voter who has voted in the election concerned
o party filing the petition shall be designated as the petitioner; the adverse party shall be known as the
respondent.
 SEC. 7. Petition must be verified and accompanied by a certificate of non-forum shopping. –
o An unverified petition or one with insufficient verification or unaccompanied by a certificate of
non-forum shopping shall be dismissed outright and shall not suspend the running of the
reglementary period to file an election protest or petition for quo warranto.
 SEC. 8. Period to file protest or petition; non-extendible.  –
o non-extendible period of ten days following the date of proclamation. 
 SEC. 9. Pendency of pre-proclamation controversy. –
o suspend the running of the period to file an election protest or petition for quo warranto.
 SEC. 10. COMELEC judgment in disqualification case. –
o A decision of the Commission on Elections, either in division or en banc, in a disqualification
case shall not bar the filing of a petition for quo warranto based on the same ground, except
when the Supreme Court has affirmed the COMELEC decision
 SEC. 11. Contents of the protest or petition. - An election protest or petition for quo warranto shall
specifically state the following facts:
a. the position involved;
b. the date of proclamation; and
c. the number of votes credited to the parties per proclamation.
o An election protest shall also state:
d. the total number of precincts of the municipality or the barangay concerned;
e. (e) the protested precincts and votes of the parties in the protested precincts per the Statement of
Votes By Precinct or, if the votes of the parties are not specified, an explanation why the votes are
not specified; and
f. (a detailed specification of the acts or omissions complained of showing the electoral frauds,
anomalies or irregularities in the protested precincts.
 SEC. 13. Summary dismissal of election contest. –
o summarily dismiss, motu proprio, an election protest, counter-protest or petition for quo warranto on
any of the following grounds:
a. The court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter;
b. The petition is insufficient in form and content as required in Section 11 hereof;
c. The petition is filed beyond the period prescribed in these Rules;

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 d. The filing fee is not paid within the period for filing the election protest or petition for  quo
warranto; and
e. In case of protest where a cash deposit is required, the cash deposit is not paid within five
days from the filing of the protest.
Rules of Procedure in Election Contests Before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials
(A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC)
 SECTION 1. Summons. –
o Within twenty-four hours from the filing of the protest or petition
o filing of an answer within a non-extendible period of five days from notice.
 SEC. 2. Service of summons. –
o in person
o in case of refusal of the protestee or respondent to receive and sign for it, by tendering the same.
o If, for justifiable causes, the protestee or respondent cannot be served in person as provided above,
service may be effected by leaving copies of the summons at:
a. the residence of protestee or respondent with some person of suitable age and discretion
residing therein, or
b. the office or regular place of business of protestee or respondent with some competent
person in charge thereof.
 Rule 4: ANSWER AND COUNTER-PROTEST
o SECTION 1. Verified answer; counter-protest. –
 five days from receipt
 three legible copies
 admissions and denials,
 SECTION 1. Prohibited pleadings and motions. –  
a. Motion to dismiss the petition except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter;
b. Motion for a bill of particulars;
c. Demurrer to evidence;
d. Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for reopening of trial;
e. Petition for relief from judgment;
f. Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or other papers;
g. Memoranda, except as provided under Section 7, Rule 13 of these Rules;
h. Motion to declare the protestee or respondent in default;
i. Dilatory motion for postponement;
j. Motion to inhibit the presiding judge except on clearly valid grounds;
k. Reply or rejoinder; and
l. Third-party complaint.
 Sec. 2. Offer of evidence. – The court shall consider no evidence that has not been formally
offered.1âwphi1 Offer of evidence shall be done orally on the last day of hearing allowed for each party
after the presentation of the last witness. The opposing party shall be required to immediately interpose
objections thereto. The court shall rule on the offer of evidence in open court. However, the court may,
at its discretion, allow the party to make an offer of evidence in writing, which shall be submitted within
three days. If the court rejects any evidence offered, the party may make a tender of excluded evidence.
(Rule 13)
 SEC. 2. Revision committee; under the supervision of the court . - There shall be constituted such number
of revision committees as may be necessary. Each revision committee shall be composed of a chairperson and
two members, one designated by the protestant and another designated by the protestee. The court shall
designate the chairperson from among its personnel. The parties shall also designate their respective substitute
revisors.
 SECTION 1. Motion for technical examination; contents. - A party may move for the technical
examination within five days after completion of revision in the protest or counter-protest, except when it
involves allegation of massive substitute voting in the protest or counter-protest, specifying:
a. The nature of the technical examination requested (e.g., fingerprint examination, etc.);
b. The documents to be subjected to technical examination;
c. The objections made in the course of the revision of ballots which the movant intends to
substantiate with the results of the technical examination; and
d. The ballots covered by such objections.
 SEC. 6. Disputable presumptions. - The following presumptions are considered as facts, unless contradicted
and overcome by other evidence:
Page 13 of 70
 a. On the election procedure:
1. The election of candidates was held on the date and time set and in the polling place
determined by the Commission on Elections;
2. The Boards of Election Inspectors were duly constituted and organized;
3. Political parties and candidates were duly represented by pollwatchers;
4. Pollwatchers were able to perform their functions; and
5. The Minutes of Voting and Counting contains all the incidents that transpired before the
Board of Election Inspectors.
b. On election paraphernalia:
1. Ballots and election returns that bear the security markings and features prescribed by the
Commission on Elections are genuine
2. The data and information supplied by the members of the Boards of Election Inspectors in the
accountable forms are true and correct; and
3. The allocation, packing and distribution of election documents or paraphernalia were properly
and timely done
c. On appreciation of ballots:
1. A ballot with appropriate security markings is valid;
2. The ballot reflects the intent of the voter;
3. The ballot is properly accomplished;
4. A voter personally prepared one ballot, except in the case of assistors; and
5. The exercise of one's right to vote was voluntary and free.
 SECTION 1. Rendition of decision. –
o The court shall decide the election contest within thirty days from the date it is submitted for
decision, in no case beyond six months after its filing, unless the Supreme Court authorizes an
extension in writing. Failure to comply herewith shall be considered a serious offense and shall be
ground for disciplinary action against the judge. In addition, after the expiration of six months, the
judge shall be relieved of all duties and functions, except to decide the election case.
o An election protest is deemed submitted for decision after completion of the reception of evidence or,
if the parties were allowed to submit memoranda, upon submission of such memoranda or the
expiration of the period for their filing, whichever is earlier. In an election protest, the winner shall be
the candidate who obtained the plurality of the valid votes cast.
 SEC. 8. Appeal. –
o An aggrieved party may appeal the decision to the Commission on Elections, within five days after
promulgation, by filing a notice of appeal with the court that rendered the decision, with copy served
on the adverse counsel or party if not represented by counsel.
 SEC. 9. Appeal fee. –
o The appellant in an election contest shall pay to the court that rendered the decision an appeal fee of
One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00), simultaneously with the filing of the notice of appeal.
 SEC. 11. Execution pending appeal. –
o On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party, the court, while still in possession
of the original records, may, at its discretion, order the execution of the decision in an election contest
before the expiration of the period to appeal, subject to the following rules:
a. There must be a motion by the prevailing party with three-day notice to the adverse party.
Execution pending appeal shall not issue without prior notice and hearing. There must be
good reasons for the execution pending appeal. The court, in a special order, must state the
good or special reasons justifying the execution pending appeal. Such reasons must:
i. constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency that will outweigh the injury or
damage should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment on appeal; and
ii. be manifest, in the decision sought to be executed, that the defeat of the protestee or
the victory of the protestant has been clearly established.
b. If the court grants an execution pending appeal, an aggrieved party shall have twenty
working days from notice of the special order within which to secure a restraining order
or status quo order from the Supreme Court or the Commission on Elections. The
corresponding writ of execution shall issue after twenty days, if no restraining order or
status quo order is issued. During such period, the writ of execution pending appeal shall be
stayed.
 SEC. 12. Jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections in certiorari cases.

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 o The Commission on Elections has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs of  certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the courts in
election cases involving elective municipal and barangay officials.
 Took effect May 15, 2007
 Regio vs COMELEC, 2013
o The Facts
 Petitioner Jaime C. Regio (Regio) and private respondent Ronnie C. Co (Co), among other
candidates, ran in the October 25, 2010 barangay elections in Barangay 296, Zone 28, District
III of the City of Manila for the position of punong barangay.
 Immediately following the counting and canvassing of the votes from seven clustered
precincts in the adverted barangay, Regio, who garnered four hundred seventy-eight (478)
votes, as against the three hundred thirty-six (336) votes obtained by Co, was proclaimed
winner for the contested post of punong barangay.
 The detailed tally of the votes per precinct, as reflected in the Statement of Votes, is as
follows :
Clustered Precinct Number Total
Candidate

1302A 1303A 1304A 1305A 1306A 1307A 1307B  

Co, Ronnie C. 76 113 48 99 336

Regio, Jaime C. 171 151 73 83 478

 On November 4, 2010, Co filed an election protest before the MeTC.
 He claimed, among other things, that the Board of Election Tellers (BET) did not follow
COMELEC Resolution No. 9030, as it:
1. did not permit his supporters to vote;
2. allowed "flying voters" to cast votes; and
3. ignored the rules on appreciation of ballots, resulting in misreading,
miscounting, and misappreciation of ballots.
 Additionally, he alleged that Regio committed vote-buying, and engaged in distribution of
sample ballots inside the polling centers during the day of the elections.
 Of the seven clustered precincts (CPs) initially protested, Co would later exclude CP Nos.
1304A and 1305A from the protest. During the preliminary conference, the trial court
allowed the revision of ballots. The revision of ballots occurred on January 13-14,
2011.3 Per the report of the revision committee, the number of votes obtained by both
candidates in the contested precincts, as shown below, indicated a substantial recovery on
the part of Co:
  Clustered Precinct Number Tota
Candidate l

1302A 1303A 1304A 1305A 1306A 1307A 1307B  

Co, Ronnie C. 160 -- 63 98 321

Regio, Jaime C. 86 -- 62 84 232

 During his turn to present evidence, Co limited his offer to the revision committee report,
showing that he garnered the highest number of votes.
 The results of the revision notwithstanding, the trial court, in its Decision of May 4, 2011,
dismissed Co’s protest and declared Regio as the duly-elected punong barangay of
Barangay 296
 COMELEC First Division
o dismissed the appeal, noting, as the MeTC did, that Co failed to show that the
integrity of the ballots in question was in fact preserved.
o the absence of any report or record of tampering of the ballot boxes does not
preclude the possibility of ballot tampering.13
o affirmed the rejection of Co’s reliance on the revision committee report as proof
that no post-election tampering occurred

Page 15 of 70
 o note that protestant-appellant did not offer any evidence to prove his claims of
misreading, miscounting, and misappreciation of the ballots; he posits that the
variance between the election results according to the election documents and the
revision of the ballots is in itself enough to prove his allegations of misreading,
miscounting, and misappreciation of the ballots by the Board of Election Tellers.
 a Motion for Reconsideration. In its assailed December 7, 2012 Resolution, the
COMELEC En Banc reconsidered the August 23, 2011 Resolution of the First Division,
and accordingly declared Co as the duly elected punong barangay. Vital to the En Banc’s
disposition is its finding that the ballots subjected to revision were genuine
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED as it hereby
RESOLVES to reconsider its Resolution dated August 23, 2011 and proclaim protestant-
appellant as the duly elected Punong Barangay of Barangay 296, District III, Manila
 Thus, the present recourse, on the argument that the COMELEC En Banc committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it arbitrarily
set aside the Decision of the MeTC and the Resolution of the COMELEC First Division,
in the choice between the revision results in the protested precincts and the official vote
count recorded in the election returns. Petitioner further argues that the COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion when it demanded from protestee direct proof of actual
tampering of ballots to justify consideration of the use of the election returns in
determining the winning candidate in the elections. In fine, petitioner questions the ruling
of the COMELEC giving precedence to the results of the revision over the official
canvassing results.
o Issues
 WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT CO HAD SUCCESSFULLY DISCHARGED
THE BURDEN OF PROVING THE INTEGRITY OF THE BALLOTS SUBJECTED TO
REVISION.
 WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
REVERSING THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION, TO THE EFFECT
THAT PETITIONER REGIO IS THE DULY-ELECTED PUNONG BARANGAY.
o Ruling
 Rosal v. COMELEC
 this Court summarized the standards to be observed in an election contest predicated
on the theory that the election returns do not accurately reflect the will of the
voters due to alleged irregularities in the appreciation and counting of ballots.
 These guiding standards are:
1. The ballots cannot be used to overturn the official count as reflected in the
election returns unless it is first shown affirmatively that the ballots have been
preserved with a care which precludes the opportunity of tampering and suspicion
of change, abstraction or substitution;
2. The burden of proving that the integrity of the ballots has been preserved in such
a manner is on the protestant;
3. Where a mode of preserving the ballots is enjoined by law, proof must be made
of such substantial compliance with the requirements of that mode as would
provide assurance that the ballots have been kept inviolate notwithstanding slight
deviations from the precise mode of achieving that end;
4. It is only when the protestant has shown substantial compliance with the
provisions of law on the preservation of ballots that the burden of proving actual
tampering or likelihood thereof shifts to the protestee; and
5. Only if it appears to the satisfaction of the court of COMELEC that the integrity
of the ballots has been preserved should it adopt the result as shown by the
recount and not as reflected in the election returns.
 Rosal was promulgated precisely to honor the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official functions.
 Following Rosal, it is presumed that the BET and Board of Canvassers had faithfully
performed the solemn duty reposed unto them during the day of the elections . Thus,
Page 16 of 70
 primacy is given to the official results of the canvassing, even in cases where there is a
discrepancy between such results and the results of the revision proceedings. It is only when
the protestant has successfully discharged the burden of proving that the re-counted ballots
are the very same ones counted during the revision proceedings, will the court or the
Commission, as the case may be, even consider the revision results. Even then, the results of
the revision will not automatically be given more weight over the official canvassing results
or the election returns. What happens in the event of discrepancy between the revision results
and the election returns is that the burden of proof shifts to the protestee to provide evidence
of actual tampering of the ballots, or at least a likelihood of tampering. It is only when the
court or the COMELEC is fully satisfied that the ballots have been well preserved, and that
there had been no tampering of the ballots, that it will accord credibility to the results of the
revision
 Disputable Presumptions (A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC)
 The duty of the protestee in an election contest to provide evidence of actual tampering
or any likelihood arises only when the protestant has first successfully discharge the
burden or providing that the ballots have been secured to prevent tampering or
susceptibility of charge, abstraction or substitution. Such need to present proof of
tampering did not arise since protestant himself failed to provide evidence of the
integrity of the ballots.
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The
Resolution dated December 7, 2012 of the COMELEC En Banc in EAC (BRGY-SK) No.
161-2011 is hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The Resolution of the COMELEC First
Division dated August 23, 2011, affirming the Decision in Election Case No. 02480-EC of the
MeTC. Branch 4 in Manila is hereby REINSTATED.
 Abad v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 128877 December 10, 1999)
o Factual antecedents
 Petitioner Abad and private respondent Sarenas were both candidates for Sangguniang
Kabataan (SK) chairman of Barangay Sta. Barbara, Llanera, Nueva Ecija, during the May 6,
1996, SK elections.
 Petitioner emerged as winner with 66 votes as against private respondent's 62 votes. Petitioner
was thus proclaimed SK chairman of Sta. Barbara. 
 Private respondent soon thereafter filed an election protest before the Second Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Gen. Natividad, Nueva Ecija, presided over by respondent
Judge
 alleging fraud on the part of petitioner through the registration of four unqualified
voters. Three voters were allegedly underaged while one lacked the required residency in the
barangay.
 asked for a recount of the votes cast. 
 Order dated June 3, 1996, respondent MCTC Judge Fernandez ruled in favor of private
respondent
 while the registry list of voters is indeed conclusive as to who can vote, this must be
disregarded if justice were to prevail.
 a recount of the votes would not be determinative of who actually won the SK chairmanship
 ordered that four votes, representing the votes of those persons whose qualification as voters
were questioned, be deducted from petitioner. 4
 As this resulted in a 62-62 tie between petitioner and private respondent, Judge
Fernandez ordered that the winner be determined via drawing of lots or toss of a coin. 5
 Petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 26 which,
however, dismissed his appeal
 since under COMELEC Resolution No. 2824, the decision of the MCTC insofar as the SK
election is concerned can only be elevated to the COMELEC en banc through a petition for
review and only in meritorious cases
 ordered remand of the case to the court of origin. 
 The drawing of lots ordered by the MCTC proceeded on October 3, 1996.
 Petitioner was absent although he was duly notified of the proceeding. 7 
 Private respondent Sarenas emerged as winner in the drawing of lots.
 In an order issued on the same day, the MCTC directed him to take his oath of office and to
assume his duties as SK chairman.
Page 17 of 70
  petitioner Abad then filed a petition for review with the COMELEC en banc.
 In its Resolution dismissing the petition, the COMELEC said:
 the June 3, 1996 Order of the Municipal Trial Court had, as of the filing of the Petition for
Review already become final
 Records show that the decision of the Trial Court annulling the proclamation of Abad and
declaring a tie between him and Sarenas, to be broken by a drawing of lots, was received by
Abad on June 5, 1996. Though he appealed said Order to the Regional Trial Court, the
remedy availed of was not the one obtaining under COMELEC Resolution 2824, Section 49
of which provides:
 Finality of Proclamation. —
 The proclamation of the winning candidates shall be final.
 However, the Metropolitan Trial Courts/Municipal Trial Courts/Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts shall have original jurisdiction over all election protest cases, whose
decision shall be final.
 The Commission En Banc in meritorious cases may entertain a petition for review of the
decision of the MeTC/MTC/MCTC in accordance with the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
 An appeal bond of P2,000.00 shall be required which shall be refundable if the appeal is
found meritorious.
 Petitioner should have directed his Petition to the Commission En Banc within thirty days
from June 5, 1996, the date the decision was served upon him. Even if we assume that his
procedural lapse was justifiable thus permit his appeal to the RTC to stay the running of the
prescriptive period, he should have rectified his error upon receipt of the Order of the RTC
dismissing his Appeal on July 10, 1996.
o Issues:
 Whether or not there is a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC for not
declaring as null and void the challenged orders of the trial court
 COMELEC's own jurisdiction
o Rulings:
 Sarmiento v. Commission on Elections, [212 SCRA 307, 313 (1992)]
 the COMELEC, sitting en banc, does not have the requisite authority to hear and
decide election cases in the first instance. This power pertains to the divisions of the
Commission. Any decision by the Commission en banc as regards election cases
decided by it in the first instance is null and void.
 Zarate v. COMELEC, (G.R. No. 129096, November 19, 1999, p. 8)
 We nullified the decision of the COMELEC, which incidentally also concerns a 1996
SK election case appealed directly from the MTC. We remanded the case and ordered
it assigned to an appropriate division of the COMELEC.
 petition is GRANTED.
 decision of the COMELEC en banc in SPR No. 45-96 is SET ASIDE
 Commission is ordered to assign the case to one of its Divisions for prompt resolution.
Rules of Procedure in Election Contests Before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal Officials
 Section 1. Jurisdiction of regional trial courts.  – exclusive original jurisdiction over all election contests
involving municipal officials.
 Section 2. How initiated. – filed directly with the court in three legible copies plus such number of copies
corresponding to the number of protestees or respondents. 
o An election protest shall not include a petition for quo warranto, nor shall a petition for quo warranto
include an election protest.
 Section 3. Modes of service and filing.  – personally. Except for papers emanating from the court, resort to
other modes of service must be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was not done
personally. A pleading or motion violating this Rule shall be considered not to have been filed.
 Section 4. Election protest. –
o contesting the election or returns for an elective municipal office shall be
o filed with the proper Regional Trial Court
o by any candidate who was voted for the same office and who received the second or third-highest
number of votes or, in a multi-slot position, was among the next four candidates following the last-
ranked winner duly proclaimed

Page 18 of 70
 o Each contest shall refer exclusively to one office; however, contests for offices of the Sangguniang
Bayan may be consolidated in one case.
 Section 5. Quo warranto. –
o filed with the proper Regional Trial Court
o by any registered voter who voted in the municipal election
 Section 7. Period to file protest or petition; non-extendible . – non-extendible period of ten (10) days from
the date of proclamation.
 Section 8. Pendency of pre-proclamation controversy.  – The pendency of a pre-proclamation controversy,
involving the validity of the proclamation as defined by law, shall suspend the running of the period for the
filing of an election protest or petition for quo warranto.
 Section 9. COMELEC judgment in disqualification case. – The decision of the COMELEC, either en banc
or in division, in a disqualification case shall not be a bar to the filing of a petition for quo warranto based on
the same ground, except when the Supreme Court has affirmed the COMELEC decision.
 Section 10. Contests of the protest or petition. –  
a. An election protest or petition for quo warranto shall commonly and specifically state the
following facts: 
1. the position involved;
2. the date of proclamation; and
3. the number of votes credited to the parties per the proclamation 
b. A quo warranto petition shall also state:
1. if the petitioner is not a candidate for the same municipal position, the facts giving the
petitioner standing to file the petition;
2. the qualifications for the municipal office and the disqualifications prescribed by law;
3. the petitioner’s cited ground for ineligibility or the specific acts of disloyalty to the
Republic of the Philippines.
c. An election protest shall also state:
1. that the protestant was a candidate who had duly filed a certificate of candidacy and had
been voted for the same office;
2. the total number of precincts in the municipality;
3. the protested precincts and votes of the parties are not specified, an explanation why the
votes are not specified; and
4. a detailed specification of the acts or omissions complained of showing the electoral
frauds, anomalies or irregularities in the protested precincts
 Section 12. Summary dismissal of election contests.  – The court shall summarily dismiss, motu proporio, an
election protest, counter-protest or petition for quo warranto on any of the following grounds:
a. The court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter;
b. The petition is insufficient in form and content as required under Section 10;
c. The petition is filed beyond the period prescribed in these Rules;
d. The filling fee is not paid within the period for filling the election protest or petition for
quo warranto; and
e. In a protest case where cash deposit is required, the deposit is not paid within five (5)
days from the filling of the protest.
 PROHIBITED PLEADINGS
o Section 1. Prohibited pleadings and motions. – The following pleadings, motions or petitions shall
not be allowed in the cases covered by these Rules:
(a) Motion to dismiss the petition, except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter;
(b) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(c) Demurrer to evidence;
(d) Motion for new trial, or for the reconsideration of a judgment, or for reopening of trial;
(e) Petition for relief from judgment;
(f) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or other papers;
(g) Memoranda, except as provided under Section 7, Rile 13 of these Rules;
(h) Motion to declare the protestee or the respondent in default;
(i) Dilatory motion for postponements;
(j) Motion for the inhibition of the presiding judge, except on clearly valid grounds;
(k) Reply or rejoinder; and
(l) Third-party complaint.
Page 19 of 70
 Section 1. Filling fees. – No protest, counter-protest or petition for quo warranto shall be accepted for
o
filling without the payment of a filling fee in the amount of Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00) for
every protest, counter-protest or petition for quo warranto filed.
 If claims for damages and attorney’s fees are set forth in a protest or counter-protest,
additional filling fees shall be paid in accordance with the schedule under Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court, as amended.
o Section 2. Cash deposit. –
A. In addition to the fees prescribed in the preceding section, the protestant in an election protest
requiring revision or examination of ballots, or the verification or re-tabulation of election
returns, or which may require bringing copies of other election documents and paraphernalia
to court, shall make a cash deposit with the court in the following amounts:
1. One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) for each precinct covered by the protest
or counter-protest, provided that the deposit shall in no case be less than
Twenty-five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) to be paid upon the filling of
the election protest or counter-protest;
2. Twenty-five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) for the cost of bringing to
court and of storing and maintaining the PCOS, the consolidation
machines and other automated election paraphernalia brought to court as
evidence or as necessary equipment in considering the protested or
counter-protested ballots;
3. If the amount to be deposit does not exceed One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P100,000.00), the required sum shall be paid in full within ten
(10) days from the filling of the protest or counter-protest; and
4. If the required deposit shall exceed One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00), a cash deposit in the amount of One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P100,000.00) shall be made within ten (10) days from the filling
of the protest or counter-protest. The balance shall be paid in installments
under the schedule the court may require after hearing the Protestant or
counter-Protestant on the matter.
o Section 10. Post-revision determination of the merit or legitimacy of the protest prior to revision
of the counter-protest. 
o immediately after the revision or examination of ballots, or the verification or re-
tabulation of election returns in all protested precincts, the protestant shall be required to
point to a number of precincts, corresponding to twenty percent (20%) of the total of the
revised protested precincts, that will best attest to the votes recovered, ore that will best
exemplify the fraud or irregularities pleaded in the protest. In the meanwhile, the revision
or examination of the ballots, or the verification or re-tabulation of election returns in the
counter-protested precincts, shall be suspended for a period not exceeding fifteen days to
allow the court to preliminarily determine, through the appreciation of ballots and other
submitted election documents, the merit of legitimacy of the protest based in the chosen
twenty percent (20%) of the protested precincts.
o Based on the results of this post-revision preliminary determination, the court may
dismiss the protest without further proceedings if the validity of the grounds for the
protest is no established by the evidence from the chosen twenty percent (20%) of the
protested precincts; or proceed with the revision or examination if the ballots, or the
verification or re-tabulation of election returns in the counter-protested precincts. In the
latter case, the protestee shall be required to pay the cash deposit within a non-extendible
period of three (3) days from notice.
 TECHNICAL EXAMINATION
o Section 1. Motion f or technical examination; contents. – Except when the protest or counter-
protest involves allegation of massive substitute voting, a party may move for the technical
examination of the presented evidence within five (5) days after completion of the revision in the
protest or counter-protest, specifying:
a. The nature of the technical examination requested (e.g., fingerprint examination, etc.);
b. The documents or machines/equipment to be subjected to technical examination;
Page 20 of 70
 c. The objections made in the course of the revision of ballots which the movant intends to
substantiate with the results of the technical examination; and
d. The ballots covered by these objections.
o Section 2. Technical examination; time limits.
  The court may grant the motion for technical examination at its discretion and under the
conditions it may impose. If the motion is granted, the technical examination shall start within
five (5) days from notice to both parties, and shall be completed within the period specified
by the court, in no case to exceed to twenty successive working days, unless the court grants
an extension based on exceptionally meritorious ground. A party may attend the technical
examination either personally or through a representative. However the technical examination
shall proceed with or without the attendance of a party, provided that the due notice has been
given.
 The expenses for technical examination shall be for the account of the party requesting the
examination. The technical examination shall be under the supervision of the clerk of court.
o Section 3. Experts; who shall provide.
  Experts necessary for the conduct of technical examination shall be provided by the party
requesting the same and may come from the National Bureau of Investigation, the PNP Crime
Laboratory, the Commission on Elections, the Department of Science and Technology, or
experts from the private sector. The other party may secure the services of his or her own
expert who may only observe, not interfere with, the examination conducted by the movant’s
experts.
o Section 2. Offer of evidence. 
 The court shall not consider any evidence that has not been formally offered. Offer of
evidence shall be done orally on the last day of hearing allowed for each party after the
presentation of the party’s last witness. The opposing party shall be required to immediately
interpose objections to the offer. The court shall rule on the offer of evidence in open court.
However, the court may, at its discretion, allow the party to make an offer of evidence in
writing, which shall be submitted within three days from notice of the court’s order. If the
court rejects any evidence offered, the party may make a tender of the excluded evidence.
o Section 6. Disputable presumptions. – The following presumptions are considered as established
facts, unless contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
a. On the election procedure:
1. The election of candidates was held on the date and at the time set and in the polling place
determined by the Commission on Elections;
2. The Boards of Election Inspectors were duly constituted and organized;
3. Political parties and candidates were duly represented by pollwatchers;
4. Pollwatchers were able to perform their functions;
5. The Minutes of Voting and Counting contains all the incidents that transpired before the
Board of Election Inspectors; and
6. The Audit Log contains the list of all activities performed by the PCOS machines from
the time it was powered on until it was turned off.
b. On election paraphernalia:
1. Ballots and election returns that bear the security markings and features prescribed by the
Commission on Elections are genuine;
2. The data and information supplied by the members of the Boards of Election Inspectors in
the accountable forms are true and correct; and
3. The allocation, packing and distribution of election documents or paraphernalia were
properly and timely done;
4. The PCOS and consolidation machines and the data storage devices are all in order, and
the data generated reflect the activities entered in these electronic machines and devices.
c. On appreciation of ballots:
1. A ballot with appropriate security markings is valid;
2. The ballot reflects the intent of the voter;
3. The ballot was properly accomplished;
4. A voter personally prepared one ballot, except in the case of assistors; and
5. The exercise of one’s right to vote was voluntary and free.
 Section 2. Form of decision in election protests. – After the termination of the revision of ballots and before
rendering its decision in an election protest that involved a revision, the court shall examine and appreciate the
Page 21 of 70
 original ballots. The court, in its appreciation of the ballots and in ruling on the parties’ claims and objections,
shall observe the following rules:
a. On marked ballots – The court must specify and point to the marking clearly indicating the voter’s intent
to identify the ballot.
b. On fake or spurious ballots, election document, machine, device or paraphernalia – The court must
specify the COMELEC security markings or features that are not found in the ballot, election documents,
machine, device or paraphernalia considered fake or spurious, or the operation or aspects of the machine,
device or paraphernalia that resulted in fake or spurious results;
c. On stray ballots – The court must specify and state in detail why the ballots are considered stray;
d. On claimed ballots – The court must specify the exact basis for admitting claimed votes or crediting
these to either party.
 Section 5. Finality of decision. – The court’s promulgated decision shall become final and executory five (5)
days after receipt of notice by the parties if no appeal is taken.
 Section 6. Entry of judgment. – If no appeal is filed within the time provided in these Rules, the judgment
shall be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of judgments. The date of finality of the judgment shall be
the date of its entry. The record shall contain the dispositive part of the judgment and shall be signed by the
clerk, with a certificate that the judgment has become final and executory.
 Section 7. Notice of final decision. – As soon as the decision becomes final, the clerk of court shall send
notices to the COMELEC, the Department of the Interior and Local Government, and the Commission on
Audit.
 Section 8. Appeal. – An aggrieved party may appeal the decision to the COMELEC within five (5) days after
promulgation, by filing a notice of appeal with the court that rendered the decision, with copy served on the
adverse counsel or on the adverse party who is not represented by counsel.
 Section 9. Appeal fee. – The appellant in an election contest shall pay to the court that rendered the decision
an appeal fee of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00), simultaneously with the filing of the notice of appeal.
 Section 11. Execution pending appeal. – On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party,
the court, at its discretion and while still in possession of the original records, may order the execution of its
decision before the expiration of the period to appeal, subject to the following rules:
a. Execution pending appeal shall not issue except upon motion and hearing with prior notice of the motion
of at least three (3) days to the adverse party. The motion for execution pending appeal must be supported
by good reasons cited and stated by the court in a special order. These reasons must:
1. constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency that would outweigh the injury or damage,
should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment on appeal; and
2. manifest, in the decision sought to be executed, that the defeat of the protestee or the victory of
the protestant has been clearly established.
b. If the court grants an execution pending appeal, an aggrieved party shall have twenty working days from
notice of the special order within which to secure a restraining order or status quo order from the Supreme
Court or the COMELEC. The corresponding writ of execution shall issue after twenty (20) days if no
restraining order or status quo order is issued. During the twenty (20)-day period, the issuance of a writ of
execution pending appeal shall be stayed.
 Section 12. Jurisdiction of the Commission on Election
o Gomez – Castillo vs COMELEC, 2010
 Castillo and respondent Strike P. Revilla ran for Municipal Mayor of Bacoor, Cavite during
the May 14, 2007 local elections.
 After the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Revilla as the elected Municipal Mayor
of Bacoor, Cavite, Castillo filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam2 in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Bacoor, Cavite, which was eventually raffled to Branch 19.
 Answer
 Revilla sought the dismissal of the election protest, alleging that it was filed in the
wrong Branch of the RTC.
 Supreme Court Administrative Order (SCAO) No. 54-2007 designated Branch 22 of the RTC
in Imus, Cavite and Branch 88 of the RTC in Cavite City to hear, try and decide election
contests involving municipal officials in Cavite; and that contrary to SCAO No. 54-2007,
Castillo filed his protest in the RTC in Bacoor, Cavite, which was not the proper court.
 Branch 19 dismissed Castillo’s election protest for being violative of SCAO No. 54-2007.
 On December 23, 2008, Castillo presented a notice of appeal. Thereupon, the RTC ordered
that the complete records of the protest be forwarded to the Election Contests Adjudication
Department (ECAD) of the COMELEC.
Page 22 of 70
 Issue:
 Does Section 13 of Rule 2 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC designate the RTC Branch that
has jurisdiction over an election contest, or does it merely designate the
proper venue for filing?
 In case the RTC was incorrect, is the error enough to warrant the reversal of its order
of dismissal despite its having attained finality?
 The jurisdiction over election contests involving elective municipal officials has been
vested in the RTC by Section 251, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election
Code).11 On the other hand, A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, by specifying the proper venue
where such cases may be filed and heard, only spelled out the manner by which an RTC
with jurisdiction exercises such jurisdiction. Like other rules on venue, A.M. No. 07-4-
15-SC was designed to ensure a just and orderly administration of justice,12 and is
permissive, because it was enacted to ensure the exclusive and speedy disposition of
election protests and petitions for quo warranto involving elective municipal officials.
 Section 8 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC provides that:
 Section 8. Appeal. - An aggrieved party may appeal the decision to the Commission
on Elections within five days after promulgation by filing a notice of appeal with the
court that rendered the decision with copy served on the adverse counsel or party if
not represented by counsel
 Article IX-C, 1987 Philippine Constitution
 Chairman and six Commissioners
 a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar
who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years
 term of seven years without reappointment
 Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
 exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and
 appellate jurisdiction - elective municipal officials or elective barangay officials
 Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests
involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and
not appealable.
 Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections
 File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for
inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases
of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds,
offenses, and malpractices
 en banc or in two divisions
 All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division
 motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en
banc.
 Election period
o ninety days before the day of election and shall end thirty days thereafter.
 Diocese of Bacolod vs COMELEC, 2015
o facts are not disputed.
o On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private
compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin
was approximately six feet (6') by ten feet (10') in size. They were posted on
the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin
contains the message "IBASURA RH Law" referring to the Reproductive
Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the
subject of the present case.4 This tarpaulin contains the heading "Conscience
Vote" and lists candidates as either "(Anti-RH) Team Buhay" with a check
mark, or "(Pro-RH) Team Patay" with an "X" mark.5 The electoral
candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic
Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law.6 Those who voted for the

Page 23 of 70
 passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising "Team Patay,"
while those who voted against it form "Team Buhay":
o On February 22, 2013, respondent Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon, in her capacity
as Election Officer of Bacolod City, issued a Notice to Remove Campaign
Materials8 addressed to petitioner Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra.
The election officer ordered the tarpaulin’s removal within three (3) days
from receipt for being oversized. COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 provides
for the size requirement of two feet (2’) by three feet (3’).9
o On February 25, 2013, petitioners replied10 requesting, among others, that
(1) petitioner Bishop be given a definite ruling by COMELEC Law
Department regarding the tarpaulin; and (2) pending this opinion and the
availment of legal remedies, the tarpaulin be allowed to remain.11
o On February 27, 2013, COMELEC Law Department issued a
letter12 ordering the immediate removal of the tarpaulin; otherwise, it will be
constrained to file an election offense against petitioners. The letter of
COMELEC Law Department was silenton the remedies available to
petitioners. 
o Concerned about the imminent threat of prosecution for their exercise of free
speech, petitioners initiated this case through this petition for certiorari and
prohibition with application for preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order.14 They question respondents’ notice dated February 22,
2013 and letter issued on February 27, 2013. They pray that: (1) the petition
be given due course; (2) a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued restraining respondents from further
proceeding in enforcing their orders for the removal of the Team Patay
tarpaulin; and (3) after notice and hearing, a decision be rendered declaring
the questioned orders of respondents as unconstitutional and void, and
permanently restraining respondents from enforcing them or any other similar
order.
o Issue:
 WHETHER IT IS RELEVANT TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE
TARPAULINS ARE "POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT" OR
"ELECTION PROPAGANDA" CONSIDERING THAT
PETITIONER IS NOT A POLITICAL CANDIDATE[;]
 WHETHER THE TARPAULINS ARE A FORM OR EXPRESSION
(PROTECTED SPEECH), OR ELECTION
PROPAGANDA/POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT[;]
a. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE TARPAULINS
ARE A FORM OF EXPRESSION, WHETHER THE
COMELEC POSSESSES THE AUTHORITY TO
REGULATE THE SAME[;]
b. WHETHER THIS FORM OF EXPRESSION MAY BE
REGULATED[;]
o This court has held free speech and other intellectual freedoms as "highly
ranked in our scheme of constitutional values."193 These rights enjoy
precedence and primacy.
o The term "political advertisement" or "election propaganda" refers to any
matter broadcasted, published, printed, displayed or exhibited, in any
medium, which contain the name, image, logo, brand, insignia, color motif,
initials, and other symbol or graphic representation that is capable of being
associated with a candidate or party, and is intended to draw the attention of
the public or a segment thereof to promote or oppose, directly or indirectly,
the election of the said candidate or candidates to a public office. In broadcast
media, political advertisements may take the form of spots, appearances on
TV shows and radio programs, live or taped announcements, teasers, and
other forms of advertising messages or announcements used by commercial
advertisers. Political advertising includes matters, not falling within the scope
of personal opinion, that appear on any Internet website, including, but not
Page 24 of 70
 limited to, social networks, blogging sites, and micro-blogging sites, in return
for consideration, or otherwise capable of pecuniary estimation. (Emphasis
supplied)
o It is clear that this paragraph suggests that personal opinions are not included,
while sponsored messages are covered.
o COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the
preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate in
this case.
o COMELEC’s general role includes a mandate to ensure equal opportunities
and reduce spending among candidates and their registered political parties. It
is not to regulate or limit the speech of the electorate as it strives to
participate in the electoral exercise.
o WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The temporary restraining
order previously issued is hereby made permanent. The act of the COMELEC
in issuing the assailed notice dated February 22, 2013 and letter dated
February 27, 2013 is declared unconstitutional.
o Section 6 of BP Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code,
reads:
o Sec. 6.Failure of election — If, on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes the election in
any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting,
or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of
the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election
results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or
suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the
Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any
interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding
or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted
in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the
election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but
not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such
postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
 Canicosa vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 120318 December 5, 1997)
o RICARDO "BOY" CANICOSA and SEVERINO LAJARA were candidates
for mayor in Calamba, Laguna, during the 8 May 1995 elections.
o After obtaining a majority of some 24,000 votes1 Lajara was proclaimed
winner by the Municipal Board of Canvassers.
o Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
 Petition to Declare Failure of Election and to Declare Null and Void
the Canvass and Proclamation 
o Clearly, there are only three (3) instances where a failure of election may be
declared, namely:
a.  the election in any polling place has not been held on the date
fixed on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or
other analogous causes;
b. the election in any polling place had been suspended before the
hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account
of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous
causes; or
c. after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of
the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such
election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure.
violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes.
o None of the grounds invoked by Canicosa falls under any of those
enumerated.

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o the names of the registered voters in the various precincts did not appear
in their respective lists of voters.
o Fifteen (15) days before the regular elections on 8 May 1995 the final list
of voters was posted in each precinct pursuant to Sec. 148 of R.A. No.
7166.
o Remedy: petition for inclusion of registered voters with the regular
courts.
o The question of inclusion or exclusion from the list of voters involves the
right to vote3 which is not within the power and authority of COMELEC
to rule upon. The determination of whether one has the right to vote is a
justiciable issue properly cognizable by our regular courts.
o Section 138, Art. XII, of the Omnibus Election Code states;
 Sec. 138. Jurisdiction in inclusion and exclusion cases. — The
municipal and metropolitan trial courts shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all matters of inclusion and exclusion
of voters from the list in their respective municipalities or cities.
Decisions of the municipal or metropolitan trial courts may be
appealed directly by the aggrieved party to the proper regional
trial court within five days from receipts of notice thereof,
otherwise said decision of the municipal or metropolitan trial
court shall decide the appeal within ten days from the time the
appeal was received and its decision shall be immediately final
and executory. No motion for reconsideration shall be
entertained by the courts (Sec. 37, PD 1896, as amended).
o Remedy : verified complaint seeking the annulment of the book of voters
o Sec. 10, of R.A. No. 7166:
 Sec. 10. Annulment of the List of Voters. — Any book of voters
the preparation of which has been affected with fraud, bribery,
forgery, impersonation, intimidation, force or any other similar
irregularity or which is statistically improbable may be annulled
after due notice and hearing by the Commission motu propio or
after the filing of a verified complaint: Provided, that no order,
ruling or decision annulling a book of voters shall be executed
within sixty (60) days before an election.
o the permanent list of voters as finally corrected before the election
remains conclusive on the question as to who had the right to vote in that
election, although not in subsequent elections.
o more than one-half (1/2) of the legitimate registered voters were not able
to vote, instead, strangers voted in their behalf.
o Remedy: watcher is empowered by law to challenge any illegal voter
o Secs.199 and 202, Art. XVII, of the Omnibus Election Code, provide:
 Sec. 199.Challenges of illegal voters. — (a) Any voter, or watcher
may challenge any person offering to vote for not being
registered, for using the name of another or suffering from
existing disqualification. In such case, the board of election
inspectors shall satisfy itself as to whether or not the ground for
the challenge is true by requiring proof of registration or identity
of the voter . . .
 Sec. 202.Record of challenges and oaths. — The poll clerk shall
keep a prescribed record of challenges and oaths taken in
connection therewith and the resolution of the board of election
inspectors in each case and, upon the termination of the voting,
shall certify that it contains all the challenges made . . .
o he was credited with less votes than he actually received and that the
control date of the election returns was not filled up
o Remedy: Protest by the watchers before the Board of Election
Inspectors

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o Section 179, Art. XV, of the Omnibus Election Code clearly provides for
the rights and duties of watchers —
 Sec. 179.Rights and duties of watchers. — . . . The watchers . . .
shall have the right to witness and inform themselves of the
proceedings of the board of election inspectors . . . to file a
protest against any irregularity or violation of law which they
believe may have been committed by the board of election
inspectors or by any of its members or by any persons, to obtain
from the board of election inspectors
a certificates as to the filing of such protest and/or of the
resolution thereon . . . and to be furnished with a certificate of
the number of votes in words and figures cast for each candidate,
duly signed and thumbmarked by the chairman and all the
members of the board of election inspectors . . .
o Remedy: petition for correction of election returns with COMELEC by
all or a majority of the members of the board of election inspectors or
any candidate affected by the error or mistake.
o the election returns were delivered late and the ballot boxes brought to
the Office of the Municipal Treasurer unsecured, i.e., without padlocks
nor self-locking metal seals 
o These bare allegations cannot impel us to declare failure of election.
Assuming that the election returns were delivered late, we still cannot see
why we should declare a failure to elect. The late deliveries did not convert
the election held in Calamba into a mockery or farce to make us conclude
that there was indeed a failure of election.
o In fine, the grounds cited by Canicosa in his petition do not fall under
any of the instances enumerated in Sec. 6 of the Omnibus Election Code.
o Mitmug v. Commission on Elections
 before COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to
declare a failure of election, at least two (2) conditions must
concur:
a. no voting has taken place in the precincts on the date fixed
by law, or even if there was voting, the election nevertheless
resulted in failure to elect; and,
b. the votes that were not cast would affect the result of the
election.
o From the face of the instant petition, it is readily apparent than an
election took place and that it did not result in a failure to elect.
o Clearly, all these matters require the exercise by the COMELEC of its
administrative functions. Section 2, Art. IX-C, of the 1987 Constitution
grants extensive administrative powers to the COMELEC with regard to
the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative
to the conduct of elections.
o Sec. 52 of BP Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code,
states:
 Sec. 52.Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. —
In addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it by the
Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the
enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections of the purposes of ensuring free, orderly and
honest elections . . .
o Quite obviously, it is only in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-
judicial powers that the COMELEC is mandated to hear and decide
cases first by Division and then, upon motion for reconsideration, by the
COMELEC en banc. This is when it is jurisdictional.
o Castromayor v. Commission on Elections thus

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  It should be pinpointed out, in this connection, that what is
involved here is a simple problem of arithmetic. The Statement of
Votes is merely a tabulation per precinct of the votes obtained by
the candidates as reflected in the election returns. In making the
correction in computation, the MBC will be acting in an
administrative capacity, under the control and supervision of the
COMELEC. Hence, any question pertaining to the proceedings
of the MBC may be raised directly to the COMELEC en banc in
the exercise of its constitutional function to decide questions
affecting elections.
o Rule 27, Sec. 7, of the Comelec Rules of Procedure that any party
dissatisfied with the ruling of the board of canvassers shall have a right
to appeal to the COMELEC en banc:
 Sec. 7. Correction of Errors in Tabulation or Tallying of Results
by the Board of Canvassers. — (a) Where it is clearly shown
before proclamation that manifest errors were committed in the
tabulation or tallying or election returns, or certificates of
canvass, during the canvassing as where (1) a copy of the election
returns of one precinct or two or more copies of a certificate of
canvass were tabulated more than once, (2) two copies of the
election returns or certificate of canvass were tabulated
separately, (3) there was a mistake in the adding or copying of
the figures into the certificate of canvass or into the statement of
votes by precinct, or (4) so-called election returns from non-
existent precincts were included in the canvass, the board
may motu proprio, or upon verified petition by any candidate,
political party, organization or coalition of political parties, after
due notice and hearing, correct the errors committed . . . (h) The
appeal shall be heard and decided by the Commission en banc.
o WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by public
respondent Commission on Elections, the petition is DISMISSED and its
Resolution en banc of 23 May 1995 dismissing the petition before it on the
ground that the allegations therein did not justify a declaration of failure
of election is AFFIRMED.
 Dumayas vs COMELEC, 2001 (Protest not cognizable by MBC)
o Petitioner Dumayas, Jr. and respondent Bernal, Jr. were rival candidates for
the position of mayor in Carles, Iloilo last 11 May 1998 synchronized
elections.
o During the canvassing on 13 May 1998, election returns for precinct nos.
61A, 62A, and 63A/64A all of Barangay Pantalan was protested for inclusion
in the canvass before the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC for brevity)
by petitioner-appellant Dumayas Jr. The grounds relied upon for their
exclusion are all the same- that is, "violation of Secs. 234, 235, 236 of the
Omnibus Election Code and other election laws; acts of terrorism,
intimidation, coercion, and similar acts prohibited by law."
o the Municipal Board of Canvassers denied petitioner’s objection to the
inclusion of the contested returns and proceeded with the canvass.
 Dumayas 7,777
 Bernal 7,904
o Notice of Appeal before the MBC on May 15, 1998. The appeal was given
due course by the COMELEC Second Division3 which rendered a resolution
dated August 4, 1998
o WHEREFORE, finding the preparation of the contested election returns
to be tainted with irregularities, this Commission (SECOND DIVISION)
RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to EXCLUDE Election Return No.
3000976 from Precinct No. 61-A; Election Return No. 3000977 from
Precinct No. 62-A; and Election return No. 3000978 from Precinct Nos. 63-
A/64-A (clustered).
Page 28 of 70
o Respondent Mun(i)cipal Board of Canvassers is hereby directed to
RECONVENE and FINISH the canvass of the remaining or uncontested
returns and thereafter, PROCLAIM the winning mayoralty candidate of
Carles, Iloilo
o On August 10, 1998, private respondent Felipe Bernal, Jr., filed a motion for
reconsideration of the above-cited resolution with the COMELEC en banc.
o On August 12, 1998, an order certifying that the motion for reconsideration
and records of the case were elevated to the COMELEC en banc was signed
by Commissioner Julio F. Desamito and issued by the Clerk of the
Commission.
o Pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration and pursuant to the
resolution of the COMELEC Second Division, Election Officer Rolando
Dalen set the reconvening of the MBC on August 13, 1998, for the
continuation of canvass proceedings and proclamation of winning candidates
for Vice-Mayor and Municipal Councilors of Carles, Iloilo. No winner for the
position of Mayor was proclaimed since private respondent was able to
present a copy of his motion for reconsideration before the MBC. The MBC
then reset the date for reconvening of the board on August 17, 1998, after
confirming by phone with COMELEC-Manila that a motion for
reconsideration was indeed filed by private respondent. Thereafter, the MBC
ruled that proclamation of the winning candidate for Mayor would proceed
on August 17, 1998 unless private respondent could present a certification
from the COMELEC that the motion for reconsideration was elevated to the
COMELEC en banc.
o On August 17, 1998, despite presentation of the August 12, 1998 order,
petitioner was proclaimed winner of the election after excluding from the
canvass the election returns from the three contested precincts in accordance
with the COMELEC Second Division Resolution. The MBC, with its Vice-
Chairman dissenting, justified its act by reasoning that it did not receive an
official copy of the order directing the elevation of the case to the banc.
o The following day, private respondent immediately filed an urgent motion to
declare void ab initio the proclamation of petitioner on the ground that the
resolution of the COMELEC Second Division was not yet final and
executory. For his part, petitioner opposed both the motion for
reconsideration and motion to declare void ab initio his proclamation as
Mayor of Carles, asserting that private respondent failed to show palpable
errors to warrant reconsideration of said resolution and maintaining, at the
same time, that his proclamation was legal since respondent failed to produce
the certification required by the MBC.
o Meanwhile, on August 25, 1998, the duly-proclaimed Vice-Mayor Arnold
Betita filed an action for quo warranto5 against petitioner before the Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 66. Docketed as Spl. Civil Action No. 98-141,
said petition included respondent Bernal as one of the petitioners together
with Vice-Mayor Betita.
o On September 18, 1998, petitioner filed before the COMELEC en banc a
motion to expunge respondent Bernal’s motion for reconsideration and
motion to declare petitioner’s proclamation void ab initio, on the ground that
respondent Bernal should be deemed to have abandoned said motions by the
filing of Spl. Civil Action No. 98-141 which, according to petitioner, is a
formal election protest via quo warranto brought before the regular courts.
o In a resolution dated August 24, 1999 but promulgated on March 2, 2000, the
COMELEC en banc denied petitioner’s motion to expunge, thus:
o WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution of the Second Division
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the proclamation of Rodolfo
Dumayas, Jr. is hereby ANNULLED. A new Municipal Board of Canvassers
of Carles, Iloilo is hereby constituted with the following members: Atty.
Nelia Aureus, Chairman; Atty. Rosel Abad, Vice-Chairman; and Atty.

Page 29 of 70
 Manuel Lucero, Third Member – all of Election Contests and Adjudication
Department of the Commission. They are directed to convene at Session Hall
of the COMELEC – Main Office, Manila on the tenth (10th) day from the
date of promulgation of this Resolution with notice to the parties. The new
board of canvassers shall complete the canvassing of all the returns and
proceed with the proclamation of the true winner for the position of mayor of
Carles, Iloilo. Petitioner Rodolfo Dumayas, Jr. is hereby directed to cease and
desist from performing the functions of the office of mayor of Carles, Iloilo.
Election Officer Rolando Dalen is hereby directed to bring to the
Commission’s Main Office the election returns of Carles, Iloilo which need
to be canvassed and the other election documents necessary for the
canvassing and proclamation and turn them over to the new board of
canvassers.
o special civil action, petitioner Rodolfo Dumayas, Jr., seeks to nullify the
Resolution promulgated March 2, 2000 by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) en banc, reversing that of the Second Division dated August 4,
1998, which annulled the petitioner’s proclamation as Municipal Mayor of
Carles, Iloilo.
o Issues
 Should respondent Bernal, who was named as petitioner in the quo
warranto proceedings commenced before the regular court, be
deemed to have abandoned the motions he had filed with respondent
Commission?
 Did the COMELEC err in ordering the inclusion of the contested
election returns in the canvassing of ballots?
 In view of the retirement of Commissioners Gorospe and Guiani
before the date of the promulgation of the assailed resolution on
March 2, 2000, should said resolution be deemed null and void for
being violative of Article IX-A, Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution?
o  Jamil vs. Commission on Elections,
  we held that a decision becomes binding only after its
promulgation. If at the time it is promulgated, a judge or
member of the collegiate court who had earlier signed or
registered his vote has vacated office, his vote on the decision
must automatically be withdrawn or cancelled. Accordingly, the
votes of Commissioners Gorospe and Guiani should merely be
considered as withdrawn for the reason that their retirement
preceded the resolution’s promulgation. The effect of the
withdrawal of their votes would be as if they had not signed the
resolution at all and only the votes of the remaining
commissioners would be properly considered for the purpose of
deciding the controversy.
o As a general rule, the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo
warranto precludes the subsequent filing of a pre-proclamation
controversy or amounts to the abandonment of one earlier filed, thus
depriving the COMELEC of the authority to inquire into and pass upon
the title of the protestee or the validity of his proclamation.
o Nevertheless, the general rule is not absolute. It admits of certain
exceptions, as where:
a. the board of canvassers was improperly constituted;
b. quo warranto was not the proper remedy;
c. what was filed was not really a petition for  quo warranto or an
election protest but a petition to annul a proclamation; 
d. the filing of a quo warranto petition or an election protest was
expressly made without prejudice to the pre-proclamation
controversy or was made ad cautelam; and
e. the proclamation was null and void
o Samad vs. COMELEC,
Page 30 of 70
  we explained that a petition for quo warranto under the
Omnibus Election Code raises in issue the disloyalty or
ineligibility of the winning candidate. It is a proceeding to unseat
the respondent from office but not necessarily to install the
petitioner in his place. An election protest is a contest between
the defeated and winning candidates on the ground of frauds or
irregularities in the casting and counting of the ballots, or in the
preparation of the returns. It raises the question of who actually
obtained the plurality of the legal votes and therefore is entitled
to hold the office.
o Well-entrenched is the rule that findings of fact by the COMELEC, or
any other administrative agency exercising particular expertise in its
field of endeavor, are binding on this Court.18 In a pre-proclamation
controversy, the board of canvassers and the COMELEC are not
required to look beyond or behind the election returns which are on
their face regular and authentic. Where a party seeks to raise issues the
resolution of which would necessitate the COMELEC to pierce the veil of
election returns which are prima facie regular, the proper remedy is a
regular election protest, not a pre-proclamation controversy.19
o petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit, public respondent having
committed no grave abuse of discretion.
o Its challenged resolution dated August 24, 1999 is AFFIRMED
 Guevara vs COMELEC, 1958 (Contempt)  De la Cruz vs COMELEC, 2012
 Relampagos vs COMELEC, 1995 (Certiorari)  Pre-proclamation Controversy
 Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC  Ututalum vs COMELEC, 1990
 Cua vs COMELEC, (majority vote)  Failure of Election
 Certificate of Candidacy  Basher vs COMELEC, 2000
 Rulloda vs COMELEC, 2003 (substitution)  Petition for Disqualification
 Hayudini vs COMELEC, 2014 (cancellation)  Abundo vs COMELEC, 2013
 Nuisance Candidates  Quo Warranto
 Timbolvs COMELEC, 2015  Bengzon III vs HRET, 2001

 ELECTION OFFENSES
o Section 261, paragraphs (a) to (dd), Section 262, BP 881 (Omnibus Election Code)
 Amendments
 Section 261 (g) applies only to appointments covered by the Civil Service Law, and
not to those governed by special laws, such as the Local Government Code. Thus, the
prohibition does not apply to the filling up of vacancies in the sanggunian of local
government units (Ong vs Herrera, 188 SCRA 830)
 Section 261 (h). Two elements must be establsihed to prove its violation : (1) the fact
of transfer or detail within the election period, and (2) the transfer was effected
without prior approval of the COMELEC in accordance with its implementing rules
and regulations.
 Section 261 (p). To support a conviction under the Section 261 (p), it is not necesary
that the deadly weapon should have been seized from the accused while he was in the
precinct or within a radius of 100 meters therefrom. It is enough that the accused
carried the weapon in the polling place and within a radius of 100 meters thereof
during any of the specified days and hours [Mappala vs Nunez, 240 SCRA 600
(1995)]
 Section 261 (t) has been repealed by Sections 32, 33, 34 of Republic Act 7166
 Section 261 (y) and (z) have been repealed by Section 1, Article V of the 1987
Philippine Constitution, which makes the exercise of suffrage voluntary and no
longer compulsoary as provided for in the 1973 Constitution
 Section 262 has been repealed with retroactive effect by Section 39 of Republic Act
No. 7166 as far as the inclusion of Sections 105, 106, 107, 109, 110, 111, and 112 as
among election offenses
 Section 263, 264, Omnubus Election Code

Page 31 of 70
  Section 27, paragraphs (a) to (f), Republic Act No. 6646 (The Electoral Reforms Law of
1987)
 Section 27, paragraphs (a) to (f), Republic Act No. 6646 (The Electoral Reforms Law of
1987)
 Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9006 (Fair Election Act)
 Section 24.1 to 24.9 of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003)
 Section 45 (a) to (j), Republic Act No. 8189 (The Voter’s Registration Act of 1996)
 Faelnar vs People, 2000
 Jalosjos vs COMELEC, 2012
 Javier vs COMELEC (January 12, 2016 G.R. No. 215847)
 On December 3, 1985, the Batasang Pambansa enacted the Omnibus Election
Code (Election Code). Section 261(d) and (e) of this Code prescribe coercion as an
election offense
 Coercion, as an election offense, is punishable by imprisonment of not less than one
year but not more than six years. Notably, Section 68 of the Election Code provides
that the Commission may administratively disqualify a candidate who violates
Section 261(d) or (e).
 On February 20, 1995, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7890 amending the
definition of Grave Coercion under the Revised Penal Code. It increased the penalty
for coercion committed in violation of a person’s right to suffrage to prision
mayor. Further, Section 3 of R.A. 7890 expressly repealed Section 261, paragraphs
(d)(1) and (2) of the Election Code.
 On April 3, 2012, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9385 fixing the calendar of
activities for the May 2013 elections. The resolution set the election period from
January 13, 2013 until June 12, 2013.
 On September 3, 2012, Valderrama Municipal Vice-Mayor Christopher B. Maguad
filed an administrative complaint for Gross Misconduct/Dereliction of Duty and
Abuse of Authority against Valderrama Mayor Mary Joyce U. Roquero (Mayor
Roquero). This complaint was docketed as Administrative Case No. 05-2012.

SECOND PPT

Rules of Procedure in Election Contests Before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal Officials
 Section 1. Jurisdiction of regional trial courts.  – exclusive original jurisdiction over all election contests
involving municipal officials. 
o An election protest shall not include a petition for quo warranto, nor shall a petition for quo
warranto include an election protest.
 Section 3. Modes of service and filing.  – personally. Except for papers emanating from the court, resort to
other modes of service must be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was not done
personally. A pleading or motion violating this Rule shall be considered not to have been filed.
 Section 4. Election protest. –
o contesting the election or returns for an elective municipal office
o filed with the proper Regional Trial Court
o by any candidate who was voted for the same office and who received the second or third-highest
number of votes or, in a multi-slot position, was among the next four candidates following the last-
ranked winner duly proclaimed
o Each contest shall refer exclusively to one office; however, contests for offices of the
Sangguniang Bayan may be consolidated in one case.
 Section 5. Quo warranto. –
o filed with the proper Regional Trial Court
o by any registered voter who voted in the municipal election
 Section 7. Period to file protest or petition; non-extendible . – non-extendible period of ten (10) days from
the date of proclamation.
 Section 8. Pendency of pre-proclamation controversy.  – The pendency of a pre-proclamation
controversy, involving the validity of the proclamation as defined by law, shall suspend the running of
the period for the filing of an election protest or petition for quo warranto.

Page 32 of 70
 Section 9. COMELEC judgment in disqualification case . – The decision of the COMELEC, either en
banc or in division, in a disqualification case shall not be a bar to the filing of a petition for quo
warranto based on the same ground, except when the Supreme Court has affirmed the COMELEC
decision.
 Section 10. Contents of the protest or petition. –
a. Election Contests
1. the position involved;
2. the date of proclamation; and
3. the number of votes credited to the parties per the proclamation.
b. A quo warranto petition shall also state:
1. if the petitioner is not a candidate for the same municipal position, the facts giving the petitioner
standing to file the petition;
2. the qualifications for the municipal office and the disqualifications prescribed by law;
3. the petitioner’s cited ground for ineligibility or the specific acts of disloyalty to the Republic of
the Philippines
c. An election protest shall also state:
1. that the protestant was a candidate who had duly filed a certificate of candidacy and had been
voted for the same office;
2. the total number of precincts in the municipality;
3. the protested precincts and votes of the parties are not specified, an explanation why the votes are
not specified; and
4. a detailed specification of the acts or omissions complained of showing the electoral frauds,
anomalies or irregularities in the protested precincts.
 Section 12. Summary dismissal of election contests.  – The court shall summarily dismiss, motu proporio, an
election protest, counter-protest or petition for quo warranto on any of the following grounds:
a. The court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter;
b. The petition is insufficient in form and content as required under Section 10;
c. The petition is filed beyond the period prescribed in these Rules;
d. The filling fee is not paid within the period for filling the election protest or petition for quo warranto;
and
e. In a protest case where cash deposit is required, the deposit is not paid within five (5) days from the
filling of the protest.
 PROHIBITED PLEADINGS
o Section 1. Prohibited pleadings and motions. – The following pleadings, motions or petitions shall
not be allowed in the cases covered by these Rules:
a. Motion to dismiss the petition, except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter;
b. Motion for a bill of particulars;
c. Demurrer to evidence;
d. Motion for new trial, or for the reconsideration of a judgment, or for reopening of trial;
e. Petition for relief from judgment;
f. Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or other papers;
g. Memoranda, except as provided under Section 7, Rile 13 of these Rules;
h. Motion to declare the protestee or the respondent in default;
i. Dilatory motion for postponements;
j. Motion for the inhibition of the presiding judge, except on clearly valid grounds;
k. Reply or rejoinder; and
l. Third-party complaint.
o Section 10. Post-revision determination of the merit or legitimacy of the protest prior to revision
of the counter-protest. – Immediately after the revision or examination of ballots, or the verification
or re-tabulation of election returns in all protested precincts, the protestant shall be required to point to
a number of precincts, corresponding to twenty percent (20%) of the total of the revised protested
precincts, that will best attest to the votes recovered, ore that will best exemplify the fraud or
irregularities pleaded in the protest. In the meanwhile, the revision or examination of the ballots, or
the verification or re-tabulation of election returns in the counter-protested precincts, shall be
suspended for a period not exceeding fifteen days to allow the court to preliminarily determine,
through the appreciation of ballots and other submitted election documents, the merit of legitimacy of
the protest based in the chosen twenty percent (20%) of the protested precincts.
Page 33 of 70
o Section 2. Offer of evidence. – The court shall not consider any evidence that has not been formally
offered. Offer of evidence shall be done orally on the last day of hearing allowed for each party after
the presentation of the party’s last witness. The opposing party shall be required to immediately
interpose objections to the offer. The court shall rule on the offer of evidence in open court. However,
the court may, at its discretion, allow the party to make an offer of evidence in writing, which shall be
submitted within three days from notice of the court’s order. If the court rejects any evidence offered,
the party may make a tender of the excluded evidence.
o Section 6. Disputable presumptions. – The following presumptions are considered as established
facts, unless contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
a. On the election procedure:
i. The election of candidates was held on the date and at the time set and in the
polling place determined by the Commission on Elections;
ii. The Boards of Election Inspectors were duly constituted and organized;
iii. Political parties and candidates were duly represented by pollwatchers;
iv. Pollwatchers were able to perform their functions;
v. The Minutes of Voting and Counting contains all the incidents that transpired
before the Board of Election Inspectors; and
vi. The Audit Log contains the list of all activities performed by the PCOS machines
from the time it was powered on until it was turned off.
b. On election paraphernalia:
i. Ballots and election returns that bear the security markings and features
prescribed by the Commission on Elections are genuine;
ii. The data and information supplied by the members of the Boards of Election
Inspectors in the accountable forms are true and correct; and
iii. The allocation, packing and distribution of election documents or paraphernalia
were properly and timely done;
iv. The PCOS and consolidation machines and the data storage devices are all in
order, and the data generated reflect the activities entered in these electronic
machines and devices.
c. On appreciation of ballots
i. A ballot with appropriate security markings is valid;
ii. The ballot reflects the intent of the voter;
iii. The ballot was properly accomplished;
iv. A voter personally prepared one ballot, except in the case of assistors; and
v. The exercise of one’s right to vote was voluntary and free.
o Section 2. Form of decision in election protests
a. On marked ballots – The court must specify and point to the marking clearly indicating
the voter’s intent to identify the ballot.
b.  On fake or spurious ballots, election document, machine, device or paraphernalia – The
court must specify the COMELEC security markings or features that are not found in the
ballot, election documents, machine, device or paraphernalia considered fake or spurious,
or the operation or aspects of the machine, device or paraphernalia that resulted in fake or
spurious results;
c. On stray ballots – The court must specify and state in detail why the ballots are
considered stray;
d. On claimed ballots – The court must specify the exact basis for admitting claimed votes
or crediting these to either party.
o Section 5. Finality of decision
 five (5) days after receipt of notice by the parties if no appeal is taken.
o Section 6. Entry of judgment
 no appeal
 book of entries of judgments
 date of finality of the judgment shall be the date of its entry
 dispositive part of the judgment and shall be signed by the clerk, with a certificate that the
judgment has become final and executory.
o Section 7. Notice of final decision
 send notices to the COMELEC, the Department of the Interior and Local Government, and
the Commission on Audit.
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o Section 8. Appeal
 appeal the decision to the COMELEC within five (5) days after promulgation
 notice of appeal
o Section 9. Appeal fee
 One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00), simultaneously with the filing of the notice of appeal.
o Section 11. Execution pending appeal
 motion of the prevailing party
 Court discretion
 hearing with prior notice of the motion of at least three (3) days to the adverse party
 good reasons cited and stated by the court in a special order
1. constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency that would
outweigh the injury or damage, should the losing party secure a reversal
of the judgment on appeal; and
2. manifest, in the decision sought to be executed, that the defeat of the
protestee or the victory of the protestant has been clearly established.
3. twenty working days from notice of the special order within which to
secure a restraining order or status quo order from the Supreme Court or
the COMELEC
a. writ of execution shall issue after twenty (20) days if no
restraining order or status quo order is issued
o Gomez – Castillo vs COMELEC, 2010
 Castillo and respondent Strike P. Revilla ran for Municipal Mayor of Bacoor, Cavite during
the May 14, 2007 local elections.
 After the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Revilla as the elected Municipal Mayor
of Bacoor, Cavite, Castillo filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam2 in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Bacoor, Cavite, which was eventually raffled to Branch 19.
 Answer
 Revilla sought the dismissal of the election protest, alleging that it was filed in the
wrong Branch of the RTC.
 Supreme Court Administrative Order (SCAO) No. 54-2007 designated Branch 22 of the RTC
in Imus, Cavite and Branch 88 of the RTC in Cavite City to hear, try and decide election
contests involving municipal officials in Cavite; and that contrary to SCAO No. 54-2007,
Castillo filed his protest in the RTC in Bacoor, Cavite, which was not the proper court.
 Branch 19 dismissed Castillo’s election protest for being violative of SCAO No. 54-2007.
 On December 23, 2008, Castillo presented a notice of appeal. Thereupon, the RTC ordered
that the complete records of the protest be forwarded to the Election Contests Adjudication
Department (ECAD) of the COMELEC.
 Issue:
 Does Section 13 of Rule 2 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC designate the RTC Branch that
has jurisdiction over an election contest, or does it merely designate the
proper venue for filing?
 In case the RTC was incorrect, is the error enough to warrant the reversal of its order
of dismissal despite its having attained finality?
 The jurisdiction over election contests involving elective municipal officials has been
vested in the RTC by Section 251, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election
Code).11 On the other hand, A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, by specifying the proper venue
where such cases may be filed and heard, only spelled out the manner by which an RTC
with jurisdiction exercises such jurisdiction. Like other rules on venue, A.M. No. 07-4-
15-SC was designed to ensure a just and orderly administration of justice,12 and is
permissive, because it was enacted to ensure the exclusive and speedy disposition of
election protests and petitions for quo warranto involving elective municipal officials.
 Section 8 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC provides that:
 Section 8. Appeal. - An aggrieved party may appeal the decision to the Commission
on Elections within five days after promulgation by filing a notice of appeal with the
court that rendered the decision with copy served on the adverse counsel or party if
not represented by counsel
 Article IX-C, 1987 Philippine Constitution
 Chairman and six Commissioners
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  a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar
who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years
 term of seven years without reappointment
 Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
 exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and
 appellate jurisdiction - elective municipal officials or elective barangay officials
 Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests
involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and
not appealable.
 Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections
 File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for
inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases
of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds,
offenses, and malpractices
 en banc or in two divisions
 All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division
 motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en
banc.
 Election period
o ninety days before the day of election and shall end thirty days thereafter.
o Diocese of Bacolod vs COMELEC, 2015
o facts are not disputed.
o On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private
compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin
was approximately six feet (6') by ten feet (10') in size. They were posted on
the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin
contains the message "IBASURA RH Law" referring to the Reproductive
Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the
subject of the present case.4 This tarpaulin contains the heading "Conscience
Vote" and lists candidates as either "(Anti-RH) Team Buhay" with a check
mark, or "(Pro-RH) Team Patay" with an "X" mark.5 The electoral
candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic
Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law.6 Those who voted for the
passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising "Team Patay,"
while those who voted against it form "Team Buhay":
o On February 22, 2013, respondent Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon, in her capacity
as Election Officer of Bacolod City, issued a Notice to Remove Campaign
Materials8 addressed to petitioner Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra.
The election officer ordered the tarpaulin’s removal within three (3) days
from receipt for being oversized. COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 provides
for the size requirement of two feet (2’) by three feet (3’).9
o On February 25, 2013, petitioners replied10 requesting, among others, that
(1) petitioner Bishop be given a definite ruling by COMELEC Law
Department regarding the tarpaulin; and (2) pending this opinion and the
availment of legal remedies, the tarpaulin be allowed to remain.11
o On February 27, 2013, COMELEC Law Department issued a
letter12 ordering the immediate removal of the tarpaulin; otherwise, it will be
constrained to file an election offense against petitioners. The letter of
COMELEC Law Department was silenton the remedies available to
petitioners. 
o Concerned about the imminent threatof prosecution for their exercise of free
speech, petitioners initiated this case through this petition for certiorari and
prohibition with application for preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order.14 They question respondents’ notice dated February 22,
2013 and letter issued on February 27, 2013. They pray that: (1) the petition
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 be given due course; (2) a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued restraining respondents from further
proceeding in enforcing their orders for the removal of the Team Patay
tarpaulin; and (3) after notice and hearing, a decision be rendered declaring
the questioned orders of respondents as unconstitutional and void, and
permanently restraining respondents from enforcing them or any other similar
order.
o Issue:
 WHETHER IT IS RELEVANT TODETERMINE WHETHER THE
TARPAULINS ARE "POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT" OR
"ELECTION PROPAGANDA" CONSIDERING THAT
PETITIONER IS NOT A POLITICAL CANDIDATE[;]
 WHETHER THE TARPAULINS ARE A FORM OR EXPRESSION
(PROTECTED SPEECH), OR ELECTION
PROPAGANDA/POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT[;]
c. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE TARPAULINS
ARE A FORM OF EXPRESSION, WHETHER THE
COMELEC POSSESSES THE AUTHORITY TO
REGULATE THE SAME[;]
d. WHETHER THIS FORM OF EXPRESSION MAY BE
REGULATED[;]
o This court has held free speech and other intellectual freedoms as "highly
ranked in our scheme of constitutional values."193 These rights enjoy
precedence and primacy.
o The term "political advertisement" or "election propaganda" refers to any
matter broadcasted, published, printed, displayed or exhibited, in any
medium, which contain the name, image, logo, brand, insignia, color motif,
initials, and other symbol or graphic representation that is capable of being
associated with a candidate or party, and is intended to draw the attention of
the public or a segment thereof to promote or oppose, directly or indirectly,
the election of the said candidate or candidates to a public office. In broadcast
media, political advertisements may take the form of spots, appearances on
TV shows and radio programs, live or taped announcements, teasers, and
other forms of advertising messages or announcements used by commercial
advertisers. Political advertising includes matters, not falling within the scope
of personal opinion, that appear on any Internet website, including, but not
limited to, social networks, blogging sites, and micro-blogging sites, in return
for consideration, or otherwise capable of pecuniary estimation. (Emphasis
supplied)
o It is clear that this paragraph suggests that personal opinions are not
included, while sponsored messages are covered.
o COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the
preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate in
this case.
o COMELEC’s general role includes a mandate to ensure equal opportunities
and reduce spending among candidates and their registered political parties. It
is not to regulate or limit the speech of the electorate as it strives to
participate inthe electoral exercise.
o WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The temporary restraining
order previously issued is hereby made permanent. The act of the COMELEC
in issuing the assailed notice dated February 22, 2013 and letter dated
February 27, 2013 is declared unconstitutional.
o Section 6 of BP Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code,
reads:
o Sec. 6.Failure of election — If, on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes the election in
any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting,
Page 37 of 70
 or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of
the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election
results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or
suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the
Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any
interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding
or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted
in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the
election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but
not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such
postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
o Dumayas vs COMELEC, 2001 (Protest not cognizable by MBC)
o Petitioner Dumayas, Jr. and respondent Bernal, Jr. were rival candidates for
the position of mayor in Carles, Iloilo last 11 May 1998 synchronized
elections.
o During the canvassing on 13 May 1998, election returns for precinct nos.
61A, 62A, and 63A/64A all of Barangay Pantalan was protested for inclusion
in the canvass before the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC for brevity)
by petitioner-appellant Dumayas Jr. The grounds relied upon for their
exclusion are all the same- that is, "violation of Secs. 234, 235, 236 of the
Omnibus Election Code and other election laws; acts of terrorism,
intimidation, coercion, and similar acts prohibited by law."
o the Municipal Board of Canvassers denied petitioner’s objection to the
inclusion of the contested returns and proceeded with the canvass.
 Dumayas 7,777
 Bernal 7,904
o Notice of Appeal before the MBC on May 15, 1998. The appeal was given
due course by the COMELEC Second Division3 which rendered a resolution
dated August 4, 1998
o WHEREFORE, finding the preparation of the contested election returns to be
tainted with irregularities, this Commission (SECOND DIVISION)
RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to EXCLUDE Election Return No.
3000976 from Precinct No. 61-A; Election Return No. 3000977 from
Precinct No. 62-A; and Election return No. 3000978 from Precinct Nos. 63-
A/64-A (clustered).
o Respondent Mun(i)cipal Board of Canvassers is hereby directed to
RECONVENE and FINISH the canvass of the remaining or uncontested
returns and thereafter, PROCLAIM the winning mayoralty candidate of
Carles, Iloilo
o On August 10, 1998, private respondent Felipe Bernal, Jr., filed a motion for
reconsideration of the above-cited resolution with the COMELEC en banc.
o On August 12, 1998, an order certifying that the motion for reconsideration
and records of the case were elevated to the COMELEC en banc was signed
by Commissioner Julio F. Desamito and issued by the Clerk of the
Commission.
o Pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration and pursuant to the
resolution of the COMELEC Second Division, Election Officer Rolando
Dalen set the reconvening of the MBC on August 13, 1998, for the
continuation of canvass proceedings and proclamation of winning candidates
for Vice-Mayor and Municipal Councilors of Carles, Iloilo. No winner for the
position of Mayor was proclaimed since private respondent was able to
present a copy of his motion for reconsideration before the MBC. The MBC
then reset the date for reconvening of the board on August 17, 1998, after
confirming by phone with COMELEC-Manila that a motion for
reconsideration was indeed filed by private respondent. Thereafter, the MBC
ruled that proclamation of the winning candidate for Mayor would proceed
on August 17, 1998 unless private respondent could present a certification

Page 38 of 70
 from the COMELEC that the motion for reconsideration was elevated to the
COMELEC en banc.
o On August 17, 1998, despite presentation of the August 12, 1998 order,
petitioner was proclaimed winner of the election after excluding from the
canvass the election returns from the three contested precincts in accordance
with the COMELEC Second Division Resolution. The MBC, with its Vice-
Chairman dissenting, justified its act by reasoning that it did not receive an
official copy of the order directing the elevation of the case to the banc.
o The following day, private respondent immediately filed an urgent motion to
declare void ab initio the proclamation of petitioner on the ground that the
resolution of the COMELEC Second Division was not yet final and
executory. For his part, petitioner opposed both the motion for
reconsideration and motion to declare void ab initio his proclamation as
Mayor of Carles, asserting that private respondent failed to show palpable
errors to warrant reconsideration of said resolution and maintaining, at the
same time, that his proclamation was legal since respondent failed to produce
the certification required by the MBC.
o Meanwhile, on August 25, 1998, the duly-proclaimed Vice-Mayor Arnold
Betita filed an action for quo warranto5 against petitioner before the Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 66. Docketed as Spl. Civil Action No. 98-141,
said petition included respondent Bernal as one of the petitioners together
with Vice-Mayor Betita.
o On September 18, 1998, petitioner filed before the COMELEC en banc a
motion to expunge respondent Bernal’s motion for reconsideration and
motion to declare petitioner’s proclamation void ab initio, on the ground that
respondent Bernal should be deemed to have abandoned said motions by the
filing of Spl. Civil Action No. 98-141 which, according to petitioner, is a
formal election protest via quo warranto brought before the regular courts.
o In a resolution dated August 24, 1999 but promulgated on March 2, 2000, the
COMELEC en banc denied petitioner’s motion to expunge, thus:
o WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution of the Second Division
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the proclamation of Rodolfo
Dumayas, Jr. is hereby ANNULLED. A new Municipal Board of Canvassers
of Carles, Iloilo is hereby constituted with the following members: Atty.
Nelia Aureus, Chairman; Atty. Rosel Abad, Vice-Chairman; and Atty.
Manuel Lucero, Third Member – all of Election Contests and Adjudication
Department of the Commission. They are directed to convene at Session Hall
of the COMELEC – Main Office, Manila on the tenth (10th) day from the
date of promulgation of this Resolution with notice to the parties. The new
board of canvassers shall complete the canvassing of all the returns and
proceed with the proclamation of the true winner for the position of mayor of
Carles, Iloilo. Petitioner Rodolfo Dumayas, Jr. is hereby directed to cease and
desist from performing the functions of the office of mayor of Carles, Iloilo.
Election Officer Rolando Dalen is hereby directed to bring to the
Commission’s Main Office the election returns of Carles, Iloilo which need
to be canvassed and the other election documents necessary for the
canvassing and proclamation and turn them over to the new board of
canvassers.
o special civil action, petitioner Rodolfo Dumayas, Jr., seeks to nullify the
Resolution promulgated March 2, 2000 by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) en banc, reversing that of the Second Division dated August 4,
1998, which annulled the petitioner’s proclamation as Municipal Mayor of
Carles, Iloilo.
o Issues
 Should respondent Bernal, who was named as petitioner in the quo
warranto proceedings commenced before the regular court, be
deemed to have abandoned the motions he had filed with respondent
Commission?
Page 39 of 70
 
Did the COMELEC err in ordering the inclusion of the contested
election returns in the canvassing of ballots?
 In view of the retirement of Commissioners Gorospe and Guiani
before the date of the promulgation of the assailed resolution on
March 2, 2000, should said resolution be deemed null and void for
being violative of Article IX-A, Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution?
o  Jamil vs. Commission on Elections,
  we held that a decision becomes binding only after its
promulgation. If at the time it is promulgated, a judge or
member of the collegiate court who had earlier signed or
registered his vote has vacated office, his vote on the decision
must automatically be withdrawn or cancelled. Accordingly, the
votes of Commissioners Gorospe and Guiani should merely be
considered as withdrawn for the reason that their retirement
preceded the resolution’s promulgation. The effect of the
withdrawal of their votes would be as if they had not signed the
resolution at all and only the votes of the remaining
commissioners would be properly considered for the purpose of
deciding the controversy.
o As a general rule, the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo
warranto precludes the subsequent filing of a pre-proclamation
controversy or amounts to the abandonment of one earlier filed, thus
depriving the COMELEC of the authority to inquire into and pass upon
the title of the protestee or the validity of his proclamation.
o Nevertheless, the general rule is not absolute. It admits of certain
exceptions, as where:
f. the board of canvassers was improperly constituted;
g. quo warranto was not the proper remedy;
h. what was filed was not really a petition for  quo warranto or an
election protest but a petition to annul a proclamation; 
i. the filing of a quo warranto petition or an election protest was
expressly made without prejudice to the pre-proclamation
controversy or was made ad cautelam; and
j. the proclamation was null and void
o Samad vs. COMELEC,
 we explained that a petition for quo warranto under the
Omnibus Election Code raises in issue the disloyalty or
ineligibility of the winning candidate. It is a proceeding to unseat
the respondent from office but not necessarily to install the
petitioner in his place. An election protest is a contest between
the defeated and winning candidates on the ground of frauds or
irregularities in the casting and counting of the ballots, or in the
preparation of the returns. It raises the question of who actually
obtained the plurality of the legal votes and therefore is entitled
to hold the office.
o Well-entrenched is the rule that findings of fact by the COMELEC, or
any other administrative agency exercising particular expertise in its
field of endeavor, are binding on this Court.18 In a pre-proclamation
controversy, the board of canvassers and the COMELEC are not
required to look beyond or behind the election returns which are on
their face regular and authentic. Where a party seeks to raise issues the
resolution of which would necessitate the COMELEC to pierce the veil of
election returns which are prima facie regular, the proper remedy is a
regular election protest, not a pre-proclamation controversy.19
o petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit, public respondent having
committed no grave abuse of discretion.
o Its challenged resolution dated August 24, 1999 is AFFIRMED
o Guevara vs COMELEC (G.R. No. L-12596, July 31, 1958)
Page 40 of 70
  The Commission on Elections, after proper negotiations, awarded to the National Shipyards
& Steel Corporation (NASSCO), the Acme Steel Mfg. Co., Inc. (ACME), and the Asiatic
Steel Mfg. Co., Inc. (ASIATIC), the contracts to manufacture and supply the Commission
12,000, 11,000 and 11,000 ballot boxes
 The Commission cancelled the award to the ACME for failure of the latter to sign the contract
within the designated time and awarded to the NASSCO and the ASIATIC, one-half each, the
11,000 ballot boxes originally alloted to the ACME.
 The corresponding contracts thereon were signed on May 16, 1957.
 Then followed a series of petitions filed by the ACME for the reconsideration of the
resolution of the Commission
 May 14, 1957 which, after hearing, was denied by the Commission in its resolution of May
16, 1957
 second petition was filed on May 16, 1957 and was denied on May 17, 1957
 third petition was filed on May 20, 1957
 The Commission resolved to conduct a formal investigation on the matter
 The Commission issued its resolution denying the third motion for reconsideration
 The article signed by petitioner was published in the June 2, 1957 issue of the Sunday Times,
a newspaper of nation-wide circulation
 Petitioner was ordered by the Commissioner on Elections to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt for having published in the Sunday Times issue of June 2, 1957 an
article entitled "Ballot Boxes Contract Hit“
 tended to interfere with and influence the Commission on Elections and its members in the
adjudication of a controversy then pending investigation and determination before said body
 tended to degrade, bring into disrepute, and undermine the exclusive constitutional function
of this Commission and its Chairman Domingo Imperial and Member Sixto Brillantes in the
administration of all the laws relative to the conduct of elections."
 Petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction
 Issue
 Whether the Commission on Elections has the power and jurisdiction to conduct
contempt proceedings against Petitioner
 Ruling
 The Commission on Elections has no power nor authority to submit petitioner to
contempt proceedings if its purpose is to discipline him because of the
publication of the article mentioned in the charge under consideration.
 "The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is
essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the
enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of courts, and, consequently, in
the administration of justice" (Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil., 271;
U. S. vs. Loo Hoe, 36 Phil., 867; In Re Sotto, 46 Off. Gaz. 2570; In Re Kelly, 35
Phil., 944).
 The exercise of this power has always been regarded as a necessary incident and
attribute of courts (Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, Ibid.).
 Its exercise by administrative bodies has been invariably limited to making
effective the power to elicit testimony (People vs. Swena, 296 P., 271).
 And the exercise of that power by an administrative body in furtherance of its
administrative function has been held invalid (Langenberg vs. Decker, 31 N.E.
190; In Re Sims 37 P., 135; Roberts vs. Hacney, 58 S.W., 810).
 Although the negotiation conducted by the Commission has resulted in
controversy between several dealers, that however merely refers to a ministerial
duty which the Commission has performed in its administrative capacity in
relation to the conduct of elections ordained by our Constitution. In proceeding
on this matter, it only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not exercise any
judicial function. Such being the case, it could not exercise the power to punish
for contempt as postulated in the law, for such power is inherently judicial in
nature.
Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC
 Section 3. The Commission Sitting in Divisions
o two (2) Divisions
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 o protests or petitions in ordinary actions, special actions, special cases, provisional remedies, contempt,
and special proceedings except in accreditation of citizen's arms of the Commission
 Section 4. Composition of a Division
o three Commissioners, one of whom shall be the Presiding Commissioner
o Commission en banc shall determine who shall compose a Division
 Section 5. Quorum; Votes Required
o When sitting en banc, four (4) Members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum
 majority of the Members of the Commission shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a
decision, resolution, order or ruling
o When sitting in Division, two (2) Members of a Division shall constitute a quorum
 concurrence of at least two (2) Members of a Division shall be necessary to reach a decision,
resolution, order or ruling
o Required number is not obtained, automatically elevated to the Commission en banc for decision or
resolution.
o Motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be resolved by the
Commission en banc except motions on interlocutory orders of the division which shall be resolved
by the division which issued the order.
 Rule 6 - Commencement of Action or Proceedings
o Section 1. Commencement of Action or Proceedings by Parties
 Any natural or juridical person authorized by these rules to initiate any action or proceeding
 protest or petition alleging
 personal circumstances
 jurisdictional facts
 ultimate facts constituting his cause or causes of action
 relief sought
 general prayer for such further or other relief as may be deemed just or equitable.
o Section 2. Commencement of Action by the Commission
 motu proprio
 order for hearing
 purpose for which the hearing is being called for
 concise statement of facts giving rise thereto
 Rule 10 - Periods for Pleading
o Answer
 5 days (ordinary actions, special reliefs, and special proceedings0
 3 days (special actions and special cases)
o Counter-protest, or a counterclaim
 5 days
o Reply
 5 days
 Rule 13 - Prohibited Pleadings
o Section 1. What Pleadings are not Allowed. - The following pleadings are not allowed:
a. motion to dismiss;
b. motion for a bill of particulars;
c. motion for extension of time to file memorandum or brief;
d. motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution, order or decision except in election
offense cases;
e. motion for re-opening or re-hearing of a
f. reply in special actions and in special cases; and
g. supplemental pleadings in special actions and in special cases
o Section 3. Oral Testimony Dispensed with Where Proceedings are Summary . –
 When the proceedings are authorized to be summary, in lieu of oral testimonies, the parties
may, after due notice, be required to submit their position paper together with affidavits,
counter-affidavits and other documentary evidence; and when there is a need for clarification
of certain matters, at the discretion of the Commission or the Division, the parties may be
allowed to cross-examine the affiants.
 Rule 18 - Decisions
o Section 1. Procedure in Making Decisions. –

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  The conclusions of the Commission in any case submitted to it for decision en banc or in
Division shall be reached in consultation before the case is assigned by raffle to a Member for
the writing of the opinion of the Commission or the Division and a certification to this effect
signed by the Chairman or the Presiding Commissioner, as the case may be, shall be
incorporated in the decision. Any Member who took no part, or dissented, or abstained from a
decision or resolution must state the reason therefor.
o Section 6. Procedure if Opinion is Equally Divided. - When the Commission en banc is equally
divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be reheard, and if on
rehearing no decision is reached, the action or proceeding shall be dismissed if originally commenced
in the Commission; in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and
in all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied.
o Section 7. Period to Decide by the Commission En Banc
 thirty (30) days from the date it is seemed submitted for decision or resolution
 motion for reconsideration of a decision or resolution of a Division in Special Actions and
Special Cases - fifteen (15) days
o Section 8. Period to Decide by a Division
 ten (10) days from the date it is deemed submitted for decision or resolution
 Special Actions and Special Cases - five (5) days
o Section 13. Finality of Decisions or Resolutions
 Commission en Banc
 ordinary actions, special proceedings, provisional remedies and special reliefs - thirty
(30) days from its promulgation
 Special Actions and Special Cases - five (5) days
 Division
 Special actions and Special cases - five (5) days
 All other actions or proceedings - fifteen (15) days
 Rule 19 - Motions for Reconsideration
o Section 2. Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration
 five (5) days from the promulgation thereof
o Section 5. How Motion for Reconsideration Disposed Of
 Clerk of Court concerned shall, within twenty-four (24) hours notify the Presiding
Commissioner
 within two (2) days thereafter certify the case to the Commission en banc
o Section 6. Duty of Clerk of Court of Commission to Calendar Motion for Resolution
 Clerk of Court calendar the motion within ten (10) days from the certification
o ORDINARY ACTIONS
 Election Protests
 Quo warranto
 Appeals from Decisions of Courts in Election Protest Cases
o SPECIAL ACTIONS
 Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificates of Candidacy
 Proceedings Against Nuisance Candidates
 Disqualification of Candidates
 Postponement or Suspension of Elections
o SPECIAL CASES
 Pre-Proclamation Controversies
o SPECIAL RELIEFS
 Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
 Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
o PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
 Injunction
o SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
 Annulment of Permanent List of Voters
 Registration of Political Parties or Organization
 Accreditation of Citizens' Arms of the Commission
o ELECTION OFFENSES
 Prosecution of Election Offenses
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  Rule 37 - Review of Decisions of the Commission
o Section 1. Petition for Certiorari; and Time to File
 thirty (30) days from its promulgation.
o Section 2. Non-reviewable Decisions
 Decisions in appeals from courts of general or limited jurisdiction in election cases relating to
the elections, returns, and qualifications of municipal and barangay officials
o Section 3. Decisions Final After Five Days (from promulgation)
 pre-proclamation cases
 petitions to deny due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy
 petitions to declare a candidate as nuisance candidate or to disqualify a candidate
 Petition to postpone or suspend elections
 Cua vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 80519-21 December 17,1987)
o First Division of the COMELEC
 rendered a 2-1 decision on August 10, 1987, favoring the herein petitioner Cua but
nevertheless suspended his proclamation as winner in the lone congressional district of
Quirino due to the lack of the unanimous vote required by the procedural rules in COMELEC
Resolution No. 1669 dated May 2, 1984
o COMELEC en banc
 motion for reconsideration/appeal filed by private respondent Puzon
 three members voted to sustain the First Division, with two dissenting and one abstaining
(one member having died earlier).
o Cua moved for his proclamation - granted his motion
o Cua took his oath the same day
o Urgent motion to suspend Cua's proclamation or to annul or suspend its effect if already made filed by
Puzon
o COMELEC set the motion for hearing - restraining telegram enjoining Cua from assuming the office
of member of the House of Representatives
o Supreme Court
 Petition to enjoin the COMELEC from acting on the said motion and enforcing its restraining
order
o Ruling
o The 2-1 decision rendered by the First Division was a valid decision under Article IX-A, Section 7 of
the Constitution. Furthermore, the three members who voted to affirm the First Division constituted a
majority of the five members who deliberated and voted thereon en banc and their decision is also
valid under the aforecited constitutional provision. Hence, the proclamation of Cua on the basis of the
two aforecited decisions was a valid act that entitles him now to assume his seat in the House of
Representatives.
o Article IX-A. Section 7 of the new Constitution
 Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or matter
brought before it."
o Petition is GRANTED
o Public respondent is enjoined from further proceeding with the private respondent's motion dated
November 10, 1987.
o The restraining order issued by the COMELEC on November 14, 1987, enjoining petitioner from
assuming office as member of the House of Representatives for the lone congressional district of
Quirino is LIFTED.
o This Resolution is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
Certificate of Candidacy
 Section 73. Certificate of candidacy. –
o No person shall be eligible for any elective public office unless he files a sworn certificate of
candidacy within the period fixed herein.
o prior to the election, withdraw - written declaration under oath
o certificate of candidacy for more than one office
 not eligible for any of them
 declare under oath the office for which he desires to be eligible and cancel the certificate of
candidacy for the other office or offices
 Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy
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 o the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for
said office
o Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized
city or district or sector which he seeks to represent
o political party
o civil status
o date of birth
o Residence
o post office address
o profession or occupation
o he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto
o he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities
o he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country
o the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion
o the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge
 Section 76. Ministerial duty of receiving and acknowledging receipt
o Commission, provincial election supervisor, election registrar or officer designated by the
Commission or the board of election inspectors
 Section 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another
o after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy
o official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any
cause
o person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to
replace the candidate
o substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned may file his certificate of candidacy
for the office affected
o If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the election and mid-
day of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors or the
Commission (national)
 Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy
o verified petition
o material representation (Section 74)
o at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy
o decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election
 Section 79. Definitions. - As used in this Code:
a. The term "candidate" refers to any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office, who
has filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through an accredited political party,
aggroupment, or coalition of parties
 Rulloda vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 154198 January 20, 2003)
o Barangay elections of July 15, 2002, Romeo N. Rulloda and Remegio L. Placido were the contending
candidates for Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan.
o On June 22, 2002, Romeo suffered a heart attack and passed away at the Mandaluyong City Medical
Center.1
o His widow, petitioner Petronila "Betty" Rulloda, wrote a letter to the Commission on Elections on
June 25, 2002 seeking permission to run as candidate for Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas in lieu of
her late husband.
o Petitioner’s request was supported by the Appeal-Petition containing several signatures of people
purporting to be members of the electorate of Barangay Sto. Tomas.
o On July 14, 2002, Election Officer Ludivico L. Asuncion issued a directive to the Chairman and
Members of the Barangay Board of Canvassers of Sto. Tomas as follows:
o Just in case the names "BETTY" or "PETRONILA" or the surname "RULLODA" is written on the
ballot, read the same as it is written but add the words "NOT COUNTED" like "BETTY NOT
COUNTED" or "RULLODA NOT COUNTED."
o Petitioner garnered 516 votes while respondent Remegio Placido received 290 votes.
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 oBoard of Canvassers proclaimed Placido as the Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas. 
oAfter the elections, petitioner learned that the COMELEC, acting on the separate requests of Andres
Perez Manalaysay and Petronila Rulloda to be substituted as candidates for Barangay Chairman of
Barangay La Fuente, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and Barangay Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan,
respectively, issued Resolution No. 5217 dated July 13, 2002 which states:
o PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to ADOPT the
recommendation of the Law Department as follows:
1. To deny due course the Certificates of Candidacy of ANDRES PEREZ MANALAYSAY and
PETRONILA S. RULLODA; and
2. To direct the Election Officer of Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and San Jacinto, Pangasinan to delete the
name of ANDRES PEREZ MANALAYSAY, candidate for Barangay Chairman in Barangay La
Fuente, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija; and the name of PETRONILA S. RULLODA, candidate for
Barangay Captain in Barangay Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan.
o Section 9, COMELEC Resolution No. 4801 dated May 23, 2002
 Sec. 9. Substitution of candidates. – There shall be no substitution of candidates
for barangay and Sangguniang kabataan officials.
o Petition for certiorari
 annul Section 9 of Resolution No. 4801 and Resolution No. 5217, both of the COMELEC,
insofar as they prohibited petitioner from running as substitute candidate in lieu of her
deceased husband
 nullify the proclamation of respondent
 proclaim her as the duly elected Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan
o Ruling
 Contrary to respondent’s claim, the absence of a specific provision governing substitution of
candidates in barangay elections can not be inferred as a prohibition against said substitution.
Such a restrictive construction cannot be read into the law where the same is not written.
Indeed, there is more reason to allow the substitution of candidates where no political parties
are involved than when political considerations or party affiliations reign, a fact that must
have been subsumed by law.
 Technicalities and procedural niceties in election cases should not be made to stand in
the way of the true will of the electorate. Laws governing election contests must be
liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials
may not be defeated by mere technical objections.(Carlos v. Angeles, supra., citing Benito v.
COMELEC, 235 SCRA 436, 442 [1994])
 Election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and procedural barriers must yield
if they constitute an obstacle to the determination of the true will of the electorate in the
choice of their elective officials. The Court frowns upon any interpretation of the law that
would hinder in any way not only the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election
but also the correct ascertainment of the results. (O’Hara v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. Nos.
148941-42, March 12, 2002)
 Petition granted
 The assailed Resolution No. 5217 of the Commission on Elections, insofar as it
denied due course to petitioner’s certificate of candidacy - NULL and VOID.
 The proclamation of respondent Remegio L. Placido as Barangay Chairman of Sto.
Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan - SET ASIDE
 Board of Canvassers of the said Barangay is ORDERED to proclaim petitioner as the
duly elected Barangay Chairman
 Hayudini vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 207900, April 22, 2014)
o On October 5, 2012, Hayudini filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the position of Municipal
Mayor of South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi in the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections
o Ten days after, or on October 15, 2012, Mustapha J. Omar (Omar) filed a Petition to Deny Due
Course or Cancel Hayudini’s CoC
o Hayudini should be disqualified for making false representation regarding his residence
o Hayudini declared in his CoC that he is a resident of the Municipality of South Ubian when, in fact,
he resides in Zamboanga City
o Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)

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  Hayudini filed a Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters in Barangay
Bintawlan, South Ubian (November 30, 2012 )
 granted on January 31, 2013
o COMELEC’s First Division
 On that same day, dismissed Omar’s earlier petition to cancel Hayudini’s CoC for lack of
substantial evidence that Hayudini committed false representation as to his residency.
o RTC
 Reversed the MCTC ruling and ordered the deletion of Hayudini’s name in Barangay
Bintawlan’s permanent list of voters (March 8, 2013)
o COMELEC
 Omar filed a Petition to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Gamal S. Hayudini by Virtue
of a Supervening Event (March 26, 2013)
o Court of Appeals (CA)
 Hayudini appealed the March 8, 2013 RTC decision (April 17, 20130
 denied
 On May 13, 2013, Hayudini won the mayoralty race in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi. He was
proclaimed and, consequently, took his oath of office.
o COMELEC Second Division
 Resolution granting Omar’s second petition to cancel Hayudini’s CoC (June 20, 2013).
 Office of the Deputy Executive Director for Operations directed to constitute a Special Board
of Canvassers for the purpose of proclaiming the lawful winner for mayoralty position
 Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc
 Second Division committed grave error when it gave due course to a belatedly filed petition
and treated the March 8, 2013 RTC Decision as a supervening event
 denied (July 10, 2013)
 Proclamation of HAYUDINI is hereby declared null and void and without any legal force and
effect
 OMAR proclaimed as the duly-elected Mayor
 Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65,
 set aside and annul the assailed Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
which cancelled his Certificate of Candidacy
o Issues
 Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
 FAILED TO OUTRIGHTLY DISMISS THE INSTANT PETITION TO CANCEL
CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY DUE TO SUPERVENING EVENT DESPITE THE
FAILURE OF RESPONDENT OMAR TO COMPLY WITH THE MANDATORY
REQUIREMENTS OF SECTIONS 2 AND 4 OF THE COMELEC RESOLUTION NO.
9532.
 REVISITED AND MODIFIED THE FINAL AND EXECUTORY RESOLUTION ISSUED
BY THE FIRST DIVISION
 RESOLVED TO CANCEL PETITIONER HAYUDINI’S CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY
AND DECLARE HIS PROCLAMATION AS NULL AND VOID.
 DECREED THE PROCLAMATION OF SALMA A. OMAR AS THE DULY-ELECTED
MAYOR FOR SOUTH UBIAN, TAWI-TAWI
o Section 2. Period to File Petition. — The Petition must be filed within five (5) days from the last
day for filing of certificate of candidacy; but not later than twenty five (25) days from the time
of filing of the certificate of candidacy subject of the Petition. In case of a substitute candidate,
the Petition must be filed within five (5) days from the time the substitute candidate filed his
certificate of candidacy.
 Here, Hayudini filed his CoC on October 5, 2012, which was also the last day of filing of
CoC
 Omar, on the other hand, filed the subject petition only on March 26, 2013.
 Omar’s petition was filed way beyond the prescribed period .
 Likewise, he failed to provide sufficient explanation as to why his petition was not served
personally to Hayudini
o Section 4. Procedure to be observed. — Both parties shall observe the following procedure:
1. The petitioner shall, before filing of the Petition, furnish a copy of the Petition,
through personal service to the respondent. In cases where personal service is not
Page 47 of 70
 feasible, or the respondent refuses to receive the Petition, or the respondents’
whereabouts cannot be ascertained, the petitioner shall execute an affidavit stating
the reason or circumstances therefor and resort to registered mail as a mode of
service. The proof of service or the affidavit shall be attached to the Petition to be
filed
o As a general rule, statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed in order
that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere technical
objections. Moreover, it is neither fair nor just to keep in office, for an indefinite period, one
whose right to it is uncertain and under suspicion. It is imperative that his claim be immediately
cleared, not only for the benefit of the winner but for the sake of public interest, which can only
be achieved by brushing aside technicalities of procedure that protract and delay the trial of an
ordinary action.
o Tolentino v.Commission on Elections and De Castro v. Commission on Elections
 "in exercising its powers and jurisdiction, as defined by its mandate to protect the
integrity of elections, the COMELEC must not be straitjacketed by procedural rules in
resolving election disputes."
o Settled is the rule that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to liberal construction.
The COMELEC has the power to liberally interpret or even suspend its rules of procedure in
the interest of justice, including obtaining a speedy disposition of all matters pending before it.
This liberality is for the purpose of promoting the effective and efficient implementation of its
objectives − ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections, as
well as achieving just, expeditious, and inexpensive determination and disposition of every
action and proceeding brought before the COMELEC. Unlike an ordinary civil action, an
election contest is imbued with public interest. It involves not only the adjudication of private
and pecuniary interests of rival candidates, but also the paramount need of dispelling the
uncertainty which beclouds the real choice of the electorate. And the tribunal has the
corresponding duty to ascertain, by all means within its command, whom the people truly chose
as their rightful leader.(Violago v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 194143, October 4, 2011, 658 SCRA
516, 525)
o Under the rules, a statement in a certificate of candidacy claiming that a candidate is eligible to
run for public office when in truth he is not, is a false material representation, a ground for a
petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
o Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. – The certificate of candidacy shall state that the
person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible
for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component
cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party
to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all
election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the
Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will
obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he
is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by
his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the
facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
o Sec. 78.Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. – A verified petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under
Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days
from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice
and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
o The false representation mentioned in these provisions must pertain to a material fact, not to a
mere innocuous mistake. A candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is
elected, cannot serve; in both cases, he or she can be prosecuted for violation of the election
laws. These facts pertain to a candidate's qualification for elective office, such as his or her
citizenship and residence. Similarly, the candidate's status as a registered voter falls under this
classification as it is a legal requirement which must be reflected in the CoC. The reason for this
is obvious: the candidate, if he or she wins, will work for and represent the local government
under which he or she is running.(Velasco v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180051, December 24, 2008,
575 SCRA 590)
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 oEven the will of the people, as expressed through the ballot, cannot cure the vice of ineligibility,
especially if they mistakenly believed, as in the instant case, that the candidate was qualified.
(Limkaichong v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 178831-32, 179120, 179132-33, and 179240-41, April 1,
2009, 583 SCRA 1)
o Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Section 78 must consist
of a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible." Simply put, it must be made with a malicious intent to deceive the
electorate as to the potential candidate's qualifications for public office.(Velasco v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 180051, December 24, 2008, 575 SCRA 590)
o Section 74 requires the candidate to state under oath in his CoC "that he is eligible for said
office." A candidate is eligible if he has a right to run for the public office. If a candidate is not
actually eligible because he is not a registered voter in the municipality where he intends to be
elected, but still he states under oath in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run for
public office, then the candidate clearly makes a false material representation, a ground to
support a petition under Section 78.
o A CoC cancellation proceeding essentially partakes of the nature of a disqualification case.
(Velasco v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180051, December 24, 2008, 575 SCRA 590) 
o The cancellation of a CoC essentially renders the votes cast for the candidate whose certificate
of candidacy has been cancelled as stray votes.(Section 9 of Rule 23, COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, as amended by Resolution No. 9523)
o If the disqualification or CoC cancellation or denial case is not resolved before the election day,
the proceedings shall continue even after the election and the proclamation of the winner.
Meanwhile, the candidate may be voted for and even be proclaimed as the winner, but the
COMELEC's jurisdiction to deny due course and cancel his or her CoC continues. This rule
likewise applies even if the candidate facing disqualification has already taken his oath of office.
(Velasco v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180051, December 24, 2008, 575 SCRA 590)
o The only exception to this rule is in the case of congressional and senatorial candidates where
the COMELEC ipso jure loses jurisdiction in favor of either the Senate or the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal after the candidates have been proclaimed, taken the proper
oath, and also assumed office
o Aratea v. COMELEC (case for cancellation of CoC under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code)
 a cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid candidacy,
and much less to valid votes. Whether a certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or
after the elections is immaterial, because the cancellation on such ground means he was
never a candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab
initio. We then found that since the winning mayoralty candidate's certificate of
candidacy was void ab initio, he was never a candidate at all and all his votes were
considered stray votes, and thus, proclaimed the second placer, the only qualified
candidate, who actually garnered the highest number of votes, for the position of Mayor.
o petition is DISMISSED.
o The COMELEC Resolutions dated June 20, 2013 and July 10, 2013 AFFIRMED
 Nuisance Candidates
o Section 69. Nuisance candidates. –
 The Commission may motu proprio or upon a verified petition of an interested party, refuse to
give due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy if it is shown that said certificate has
been filed to put the election process in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion
among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates or by other
circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention
to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a
faithful determination of the true will of the electorate. (Omnibus Election Code)
o Timbol vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 206004, February 24, 2015)
 Under Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution, "[t]he State shall guarantee equal access
to opportunities for public service[.]" This, however, does not guarantee "a
constitutional right to run for or hold public office[.]"36 To run for public office is a
mere "privilege subject to limitations imposed by law."37 Among these limitations is the
prohibition on nuisance candidates. Nuisance candidates are persons who file their

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 certificates of candidacy "to put the election process in mockery or disrepute or to cause
confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates
or by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no
bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been
filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate."
 Pamatong v. Commission on Elections
 . . . The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are
rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account
the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the
number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not
to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the
election. These practical difficulties should, of course, never exempt the State
from the conduct of a mandated electoral exercise. At the same time, remedial
actions should be available to alleviate these logistical hardships, whenever
necessary and proper. Ultimately, a disorderly election is not merely a textbook
example of inefficiency, but a rot that erodes faith in our democratic institutions.
...
 To minimize the logistical confusion caused by nuisance candidates, their certificates of
candidacy may be denied due course or cancelled by respondent. This denial or
cancellation may be "motu proprio or upon a verified petition of an interested
party," "subject to an opportunity to be heard."
 De la Cruz vs COMELEC, 2012
o Fermin v. COMELEC
 This Court distinguished a petition for disqualification under Section 68 and a petition
to cancel or deny due course to a certificate of candidacy (COC) under Section 78. Said
proceedings are governed by different rules and have distinct outcomes.
 To emphasize, a petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on
Section 12 or 68 of the OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC. On the other hand, a petition to
deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be grounded on a statement of a material
representation in the said certificate that is false. The petitions also have different
effects. While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to
continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course
under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC.
o Miranda v. Abaya,
 A candidate who is disqualified under Section 68 can validly be substituted under
Section 77 of the OEC because he/she remains a candidate until disqualified; but a
person whose CoC has been denied due course or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be
substituted because he/she is never considered a candidate.
 (5) the decision or resolution of a DIVISION on nuisance candidate, particularly where
the nuisance candidate has the same name as the bona fide candidate shall be
immediately executory after the lapse of five (5) days unless a motion for
reconsideration is seasonably filed. In which case, the votes cast shall not be considered
stray but shall be counted and tallied for the bona fide candidate.
o The rule in Resolution No. 4116 considering the votes cast for a nuisance candidate declared as
such in a final judgment, particularly where such nuisance candidate has the same surname as
that of the legitimate candidate, not stray but counted in favor of the latter, remains a good law.
o A petition to cancel or deny a COC under Section 69 of the OEC should be distinguished from a
petition to disqualify under Section 68. Hence, the legal effect of such cancellation of a COC of a
nuisance candidate cannot be equated with a candidate disqualified on grounds provided in the OEC
and Local Government Code.
o Martinez III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal G.R. No. 189034, January 12, 2010,
610 SCRA 53
 Laws and statutes governing election contests especially appreciation of ballots must be
liberally construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public
officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities.
Pre-proclamation Controversy
 Section 241. Definition.

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 o  A pre-proclamation controversy refers to any question pertaining to or affecting the
proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any
registered political party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the
Commission, or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns
 Section 243. Issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy
a. Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers;
b. The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be tampered with or
falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same returns or in other authentic copies thereof as mentioned in
Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 of this Code;
c. The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they are obviously
manufactured or not authentic; and
d. When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed, the results of which
materially affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate or candidates
 Ututalum vs COMELEC, 1990
o Petitioner Ututalum and private respondent, Arden S. Anni, were among the candidates in the last 30
May 1987 Congressional elections for the Second District of Sulu. 30 May was the date reset by the
COMELEC from the 11 May 1987 elections.
o The election returns from Siasi showed that Petitioner Ututalum obtained 482 votes while respondent
Anni received 35,581 votes out of the 39,801 registered voters
o If the returns of Siasi were excluded, Petitioner Ututalum would have a lead of 5,301 votes.
o On 4 June 1987, during the canvass of votes, Petitioner Ututalum, without availing of verbal
objections, filed written objections to the returns from Siasi on the ground that they "appear to be
tampered with or falsified" owing to the "great excess of votes" appearing in said returns.
o claimed that multiplying the 42 precincts of Siasi by 300 voters per precinct, there should have been
only 12,600 registered voters and not 36,663 voters who cast their votes, thereby exceeding the actual
authorized voters by 23,947 "ghost voters." (In his Petition, however, he admits that an error was
committed since "in the May 30,1987 elections, Siasi had 148 precincts".
o prayed for the exclusion from the canvass of any election returns from Siasi.
o Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sulu dismissed petitioner's objections
o "filed out of time or only after the Certificate of Canvass had already been canvassed by the Board
o grounds for the objection were not one of those enumerated in Section 243 of the Election Code"
o Also on the same day, 4 June 1987, petitioner filed with the Board of Canvassers his Notice of Appeal
from said Resolution to the COMELEC.
o COMELEC(5 June 1987)
 1stPetition seeking a declaration of failure of elections in the Municipality of Siasi and other
mentioned municipalities
 that the COMELEC annul the elections in Siasi and conduct another election thereat
and order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to desist from proclaiming any
candidate pending a final determination of the Petition.
 Decision : no failure of elections in the 1st and 2nd Districts of Sulu except in
specified precincts in the 1st District
 2ndPetition
 praying for the annulment of Respondent Anni's proclamation and for his own
proclamation as Congressman for the Second District of Sulu.
o While those two petitions were pending, one LupayLoong, a candidate for Governor of Sulu, filed a
verified Petition with the COMELEC to annul the List of Voters of Siasi, for purposes of the election
of local government officials (docketed as SPC Case No. 87-624, p. 9, Rollo). This Petition was
opposed by Respondent Anni. Petitioner Ututalum was not a party to this proceeding.
o On 16 January 1988, the COMELEC issued, in said SPC 87-624, a Resolution annulling the Siasi List
of Voters "on the ground of massive irregularities committed in the preparation thereof and being
statistically improbable", and ordering a new registration of voters for the local elections of 15
February 1988 (p. 41 Rollo).
o Said Resolution was affirmed by this Court in Anni vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 81398, 26 January 1988
(p. 43, Rollo). A new Registry List was subsequently prepared yielding only 12,555 names (p.
228, Rollo).
o Supplemental pleading
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  such annulment be considered and applied by the Commission in resolving his two Petitions
against Respondent Anni
o COMELEC (First Division)
 denied Petitioner Ututalum's two Petitions "for lack of merit
 While we believe that there was padding of the registry list of voters in Siasi, yet to annul all
the votes in this municipality for purposes of the May 30, 1987 elections would
disenfranchise the good or valid votes.
o Espaldon vs. Comelec (G.R. No. L-78987, August 25, 1987)
 Padded voter's list, massive fraud and terrorism is clearly not among the issues that may be
raised in a pre-proclamation controversy. They are proper grounds for an election protest.
o Bautista vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 78994, March 10, 1988:
 The scope of pre-proclamation controversy is limited to the issues enumerated under Section
243 of the Omnibus Election Code. The enumeration therein of the issues that may be raised
in a pre-proclamation controversy is restrictive and exclusive
o Bashier vs. COMELEC (L-33692, 24 February 1972, 43 SCRA 238)
 The subsequent annulment of the voting list in a separate proceeding initiated motu
proprio by the Commission and in which the protagonists here were not parties, cannot
retroactively and without due process result in nullifying accepted election returns in a
previous election simply because such returns came from municipalities where the precinct
books of voters were ordered annulled due to irregularities in their preparation.
o Padilla vs. COMELEC (L-68351-52, 9 July 1985, 137 SCRA 424), reiterated in Baldo
vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 83205,14 July 1988)
 Where the respondent had already been proclaimed as the elected representative of the
contested congressional district, and has long assumed office and has been exercising the
powers, functions, and duties appurtenant to said office, the remedy of the petitioner lies with
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The pre-proclamation controversy becomes
moot and academic.
o Antonio vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 84678, 29 March 1989):
 Where the winning candidates have been proclaimed, the pre-proclamation
controversies cease. A pre-proclamation controversy is no longer viable at this point in time
and should be dismissed. The proper remedy thereafter is an election protest before the proper
forum. Recourse to such remedy would settle the matter in controversy conclusively and once
and for all.
Failure of Election
 Section 6 Failure of election. - If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended
before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and
the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to
elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the
Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing,
call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect
on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect
but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the
election or failure to elect. (Omnibus Election Code)
 Section 45. Postponement or failure of election . - When for any serious cause such as violence, terrorism,
loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or records, force majeure, and other analogous causes of such
nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible in any barangay,
the Commission, upon a verified petition of an interested party and after due notice and hearing at which the
interested parties are given equal opportunity to be heard, shall postpone the election therein for such time as
it may deem necessary.
o If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes, the election in
any barangay has not been held on the date herein fixed or has been suspended before the hour fixed
by law for the closing of the voting therein and such failure or suspension of election would affect the
result of the election, the Commission, on the basis of a verified petition of an interested party, and
after due notice and hearing, at which the interested parties are given equal opportunity to be heard
shall call for the holding or continuation of the election within thirty days after it shall have verified
and found that the cause or causes for which the election has been postponed or suspended have

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 ceased to exist or upon petition of at least thirty percent of the registered voters in the barangay
concerned.
 Basher vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 139028, April 12, 2000)
o Petition praying that the election be declared a failure.
o no election was conducted in place and at the time prescribed by law,
o there was a dispute that day (August 30, 1997) among the candidates regarding the venue of the
election in the lone voting precinct of the barangay
o In order to avoid bloodshed, they ultimately agreed that no election would be conducted. Accordingly,
the election officer turned over for safekeeping the ballot box containing election paraphernalia to the
acting station commander (OIC) of the Philippine National Police (PNP).
o The following day, petitioner and the third candidate were surprised to learn that the election officer
had directed the Board of Election Tellers to conduct the election and to fill up the election returns
and certificates of canvass on the night of August 30, 1997 at the residence of the former mayor
o no announcement to hold the election at the former mayor's house that night was ever made
o Comelec
o dismissed the Petition.
o ruled against a failure of election because the two conditions laid down in Mitmug v. Comelec were
not established
 the "election was conducted on the scheduled date. The precinct functioned. Actual voting
took place, and it resulted not in a failure to elect." 
o Petition
 assails the Resolution of the Commission on Elections which dismissed a Petition to Declare
a Failure of Election and to Call Special Election in Precinct No. 12, Barangay Maidan,
Tugaya, Lanao del Sur.
o Issues
 Whether or not the election held at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening of August 30, 1997
after the Acting Election Officer had verbally declared or announced a failure of election in
Precinct No. 12, Barangay Maidan, Tugaya, Lanao del Sur is contrary to law, rule and
jurisprudence;
 Whether or not the election held at the residence of an Ex-mayor far from the designated
Polling Place of Precinct No. 12, Barangay Maidan, Tugaya, Lanaodel Sur is legal or valid;
 Whether or not the proclamation of the private respondent as the duly elected Punong
Barangay of Barangay Maidan and the seven (7) Barangay is illegal, null and void ab initio.
o Mitmug v. Comelec,   
 A failure of election requires the concurrence of two conditions, namely
i. no voting took place in the precinct or precincts on the date fixed by law, or even if
there was voting, the election resulted in a failure to elect; and
ii. the votes not cast would have affected the result of the election.
 The peculiar set of facts in the present case show not merely a failure of election but the
absence of a valid electoral exercise
 Section 42 of the Omnibus Election Code
 "[t]he chairman of the board of election tellers shall designate the public school or
any other public building within the barangay to be used as polling place in case the
barangay has one election precinct . . .. "
o The election of officials for said barangay was held at the residence of former Mayor Alang Sagusara
Pukunun, which is located at Barangay Pandarianao, instead of the officially designated polling
precinct at Cagayan Elementary School
o The place where the voting was conducted was illegal.
 "[t]he casting of votes shall start at seven o'clock in the morning and shall end at three o'clock
in the afternoon, except when there are voters present within thirty meters in front of the
polling place who have not yet cast their votes, in which case the voting shall continue but
only to allow said voters to cast their votes without interruption." 15 
o Section 22, Article IV of Comelec Resolution No. 2971 also specifies that the voting hours shall
start promptly at 7:00 a.m. and end at 3:00 p.m. of the same day.
o However, the "election" for Barangay Maidan officials was supposed to have been held after 9:00
p.m. of August 30, 1997 until the wee hours of the following day.
o Voting Time Was Likewise Irregular
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 oSection 2 of RA 6679, 
 "[w]hen for any serious cause such as rebellion, insurrection, violence, terrorism, loss or
destruction of election paraphernalia, and any analogous causes of such nature that the
holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible in any barangay, the
Commission on Election motu proprio or upon sworn petition of ten (10) registered voters of
a barangay, after summary proceedings of the existence of such grounds, shall suspend or
postpone the election therein to a date reasonably close to the date of the election that is not
held or is suspended or postponed, or which resulted in a failure to elect, but not later than
thirty (30) days after the cessation of the cause for such suspension or postponement of the
election or failure to elect, and in all cases not later than ninety (90) days from the date of the
original election."
o As election officer, she has no authority to declare a failure of election. Indeed, only the Comelec
itself has legal authority to exercise such awesome power. An election officer alone, or even with
the agreement of the candidates, cannot validly postpone or suspend the elections.
o She did not conduct any proceeding, summary or otherwise, to find out whether any of the legal
grounds for the suspension or postponement or the declaration of failure of the election actually
existed in the barangay concerned.
o Hassan v. Comelec  
 the notice given on the afternoon of the election day resetting the election to the following
day and transferring its venue was "too short."
 "[t]o require the voters to come to the polls on such short notice was highly impracticable. . . .
It is essential to the validity of the election that the voters have notice in some form, either
actual or constructive, of the time, place and purpose thereof.  The time for holding it must be
authoritatively designated in advance." 
 In the case at bar, the announcement was made only minutes before the supposed voting. If
one-day notice was held to be insufficient in Hassan, the much shorter notice in the present
case should all the more be declared wanting. It should in fact be equated with "no notice."
 Petition is GRANTED
 assailed Resolution SET ASIDE.
 The proclamation of private respondent as punong barangay is declared VOID.
 Canicosa vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 120318 December 5, 1997)
o RICARDO "BOY" CANICOSA and SEVERINO LAJARA were candidates
for mayor in Calamba, Laguna, during the 8 May 1995 elections.
o After obtaining a majority of some 24,000 votes1 Lajara was proclaimed
winner by the Municipal Board of Canvassers.
o Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
 Petition to Declare Failure of Election and to Declare Null and Void
the Canvass and Proclamation 
o Clearly, there are only three (3) instances where a failure of election may be
declared, namely:
d.  the election in any polling place has not been held on the date
fixed on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or
other analogous causes;
e. the election in any polling place had been suspended before the
hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account
of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous
causes; or
f. after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of
the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such
election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes.
o None of the grounds invoked by Canicosa falls under any of those
enumerated.
o the names of the registered voters in the various precincts did not appear
in their respective lists of voters.

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o Fifteen (15) days before the regular elections on 8 May 1995 the final list
of voters was posted in each precinct pursuant to Sec. 148 of R.A. No.
7166.
o Remedy: petition for inclusion of registered voters with the regular
courts.
o The question of inclusion or exclusion from the list of voters involves the
right to vote3 which is not within the power and authority of COMELEC
to rule upon. The determination of whether one has the right to vote is a
justiciable issue properly cognizable by our regular courts.
o Section 138, Art. XII, of the Omnibus Election Code states;
 Sec. 138. Jurisdiction in inclusion and exclusion cases. — The
municipal and metropolitan trial courts shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all matters of inclusion and exclusion
of voters from the list in their respective municipalities or cities.
Decisions of the municipal or metropolitan trial courts may be
appealed directly by the aggrieved party to the proper regional
trial court within five days from receipts of notice thereof,
otherwise said decision of the municipal or metropolitan trial
court shall decide the appeal within ten days from the time the
appeal was received and its decision shall be immediately final
and executory. No motion for reconsideration shall be
entertained by the courts (Sec. 37, PD 1896, as amended).
o Remedy : verified complaint seeking the annulment of the book of voters
o Sec. 10, of R.A. No. 7166:
 Sec. 10. Annulment of the List of Voters. — Any book of voters
the preparation of which has been affected with fraud, bribery,
forgery, impersonation, intimidation, force or any other similar
irregularity or which is statistically improbable may be annulled
after due notice and hearing by the Commission motu propio or
after the filing of a verified complaint: Provided, that no order,
ruling or decision annulling a book of voters shall be executed
within sixty (60) days before an election.
o the permanent list of voters as finally corrected before the election
remains conclusive on the question as to who had the right to vote in that
election, although not in subsequent elections.
o more than one-half (1/2) of the legitimate registered voters were not able
to vote, instead, strangers voted in their behalf.
o Remedy: watcher is empowered by law to challenge any illegal voter
o Secs.199 and 202, Art. XVII, of the Omnibus Election Code, provide:
 Sec. 199.Challenges of illegal voters. — (a) Any voter, or watcher
may challenge any person offering to vote for not being
registered, for using the name of another or suffering from
existing disqualification. In such case, the board of election
inspectors shall satisfy itself as to whether or not the ground for
the challenge is true by requiring proof of registration or identity
of the voter . . .
 Sec. 202.Record of challenges and oaths. — The poll clerk shall
keep a prescribed record of challenges and oaths taken in
connection therewith and the resolution of the board of election
inspectors in each case and, upon the termination of the voting,
shall certify that it contains all the challenges made . . .
o he was credited with less votes than he actually received and that the
control date of the election returns was not filled up
o Remedy: Protest by the watchers before the Board of Election
Inspectors
o Section 179, Art. XV, of the Omnibus Election Code clearly provides for
the rights and duties of watchers —

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  Sec. 179.Rights and duties of watchers. — . . . The watchers . . .
shall have the right to witness and inform themselves of the
proceedings of the board of election inspectors . . . to file a
protest against any irregularity or violation of law which they
believe may have been committed by the board of election
inspectors or by any of its members or by any persons, to obtain
from the board of election inspectors
a certificates as to the filing of such protest and/or of the
resolution thereon . . . and to be furnished with a certificate of
the number of votes in words and figures cast for each candidate,
duly signed and thumb marked by the chairman and all the
members of the board of election inspectors . . .
o Remedy: petition for correction of election returns with COMELEC by
all or a majority of the members of the board of election inspectors or
any candidate affected by the error or mistake.
o the election returns were delivered late and the ballot boxes brought to
the Office of the Municipal Treasurer unsecured, i.e., without padlocks
nor self-locking metal seals 
o These bare allegations cannot impel us to declare failure of election.
Assuming that the election returns were delivered late, we still cannot see
why we should declare a failure to elect. The late deliveries did not convert
the election held in Calamba into a mockery or farce to make us conclude
that there was indeed a failure of election.
o In fine, the grounds cited by Canicosa in his petition do not fall under
any of the instances enumerated in Sec. 6 of the Omnibus Election Code.
o Mitmug v. Commission on Elections
 before COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to
declare a failure of election, at least two (2) conditions must
concur:
c. no voting has taken place in the precincts on the date fixed
by law, or even if there was voting, the election nevertheless
resulted in failure to elect; and,
d. the votes that were not cast would affect the result of the
election.
o From the face of the instant petition, it is readily apparent than an
election took place and that it did not result in a failure to elect.
o Clearly, all these matters require the exercise by the COMELEC of its
administrative functions. Section 2, Art. IX-C, of the 1987 Constitution
grants extensive administrative powers to the COMELEC with regard to
the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative
to the conduct of elections.
o Sec. 52 of BP Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code,
states:
 Sec. 52.Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. —
In addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it by the
Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the
enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections of the purposes of ensuring free, orderly and
honest elections . . .
o Quite obviously, it is only in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-
judicial powers that the COMELEC is mandated to hear and decide
cases first by Division and then, upon motion for reconsideration, by the
COMELEC en banc. This is when it is jurisdictional.
o Castromayor v. Commission on Elections thus
 It should be pinpointed out, in this connection, that what is
involved here is a simple problem of arithmetic. The Statement of
Votes is merely a tabulation per precinct of the votes obtained by

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 the candidates as reflected in the election returns. In making the
correction in computation, the MBC will be acting in an
administrative capacity, under the control and supervision of the
COMELEC. Hence, any question pertaining to the proceedings
of the MBC may be raised directly to the COMELEC en banc in
the exercise of its constitutional function to decide questions
affecting elections.
o Rule 27, Sec. 7, of the Comelec Rules of Procedure that any party
dissatisfied with the ruling of the board of canvassers shall have a right
to appeal to the COMELEC en banc:
 Sec. 7. Correction of Errors in Tabulation or Tallying of Results
by the Board of Canvassers. — (a) Where it is clearly shown
before proclamation that manifest errors were committed in the
tabulation or tallying or election returns, or certificates of
canvass, during the canvassing as where (1) a copy of the election
returns of one precinct or two or more copies of a certificate of
canvass were tabulated more than once, (2) two copies of the
election returns or certificate of canvass were tabulated
separately, (3) there was a mistake in the adding or copying of
the figures into the certificate of canvass or into the statement of
votes by precinct, or (4) so-called election returns from non-
existent precincts were included in the canvass, the board
may motu proprio, or upon verified petition by any candidate,
political party, organization or coalition of political parties, after
due notice and hearing, correct the errors committed . . . (h) The
appeal shall be heard and decided by the Commission en banc.
o WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by public
respondent Commission on Elections, the petition is DISMISSED and its
Resolution en banc of 23 May 1995 dismissing the petition before it on the
ground that the allegations therein did not justify a declaration of failure of
election is AFFIRMED.
Petition for Disqualification
 Section 12 Disqualifications.
o Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been
sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which
he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral
turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given
plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
o This disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the
declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or
after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same
period he again becomes disqualified.(Omnibus Election Code)
 Section 68. Disqualifications. – 
o Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a
competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having
 given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or
public officials performing electoral functions;
 committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy;
 spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code;
 solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104;
or
 violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6,
shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding
the office.
o Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified
to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent
resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for
in the election laws.
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 Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
position:
a. Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
b. Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
c. Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic
d. Those with dual citizenship;
e. Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;
f. Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and
continue to avail of the same right the effectivity of this Code; and
g. The insane or feeble-minded
 Abundo vs COMELEC, 2013
o For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 national and local
elections, Abundo vied for the position of municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes.
o 2001 and 2007 runs, he emerged and was proclaimed as the winning mayoralty candidate and
accordingly served the corresponding terms as mayor.
o 2004 electoral derby, however, the Viga municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as winner
one Jose Torres (Torres), who, in due time, performed the functions of the office of mayor.
o Abundo protested Torres’ election and proclamation. Abundo was eventually declared the winner of
the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest, paving the way for his assumption of office starting May 9,
2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007, or for a period of a little over one year
and one month.
o May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other. When Abundo filed his
certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty seat relative to this electoral contest, Torres lost no time in
seeking the former’s disqualification to run predicated on the three-consecutive term limit rule.
o June 16, 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution finding for Abundo, who in the
meantime bested Torres by 219 votes and was accordingly proclaimed 2010 mayor-elect of Viga,
Catanduanes.
o Regional Trial Court
 May 21, 2010, or before the COMELEC could resolve the adverted disqualification case
Torres initiated against Abundo, herein private respondent Ernesto R. Vega (Vega)
commenced a quo warranto action to unseat Abundo on essentially the same grounds Torres
raised in his petition to disqualify.
 declared Abundo ineligible to serve as municipal mayor
 Aldovino, Jr. v. COMELEC,10 found Abundo to have already served three consecutive
mayoralty terms, to wit, 2001-2004, 2004-2007 and 2007-2010, and, hence, disqualified for
another, i.e., fourth, consecutive term.
 Abundo, the RTC noted, had been declared winner in the aforesaid 2004 elections consequent
to his protest and occupied the position of and actually served as Viga mayor for over a year
of the remaining term, i.e., from May 9, 2006 to June 30, 2007, to be exact.
 The year and a month service constitutes a complete and full service of Abundo’s second term
as mayor.
o COMELEC’s Second Division
 decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 73, Virac, Catanduanes is AFFIRMED and the
appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
 ruled against Abundo on the strength of Aldovino, Jr. and held that service of the unexpired
portion of a term by a protestant who is declared winner in an election protest is considered as
service for one full term within the contemplation of the three-term limit rule.
o COMELEC en banc denied reconsideration
o Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65,
 assails and seeks to nullify
1. the February 8, 2012 Resolution1 of the Second Division, Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), in EAC (AE) No. A-25-2010 and
2. the May 10, 2012 Resolution2 of the COMELEC en banc affirming that division’s
disposition.
 The assailed issuances, in turn, affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43, dated August 9, 2010, in Election Case No. 55 declaring

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 Abundo as ineligible, under the three-term limit rule, to run in the 2010 elections for the
position of, and necessarily to sit as, Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes.
o Core Issue:
 Whether or not Abundo is deemed to have served three consecutive terms; or
 Whether the service of a term less than the full three years by an elected official arising from
his being declared as the duly elected official upon an election protest is considered as full
service of the term for purposes of the application of the three consecutive term limit for
elective local officials.
o Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
 Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall
be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected. he service of a term less than the full three years by an elected
official arising from his being declared as the duly elected official upon an election
protest is considered as full service of the term for purposes of the application of the
three consecutive term limit for elective local officials.
o Sec. 43(b) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7160, or the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991
 Sec. 43. Term of Office. —
 (b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms
in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full
term for which the elective official concerned was elected.
o To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to the aforequoted
constitutional and statutory provisions, the following requisites must concur:
1. that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post; and
2. that he has fully served three consecutive terms.31
o Prevailing jurisprudence on issues affecting consecutiveness of terms and/or involuntary interruption
1. When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the official merely assumed the
position pursuant to the rules on succession under the LGC, then his service for the unexpired
portion of the term of the replaced official cannot be treated as one full term as contemplated
under the subject constitutional and statutory provision that service cannot be counted in the
application of any term limit (Borja, Jr.). If the official runs again for the same position he held
prior to his assumption of the higher office, then his succession to said position is by operation of
law and is considered an involuntary severance or interruption (Montebon).
2. An elective official, who has served for three consecutive terms and who did not seek the elective
position for what could be his fourth term, but later won in a recall election, had an interruption in
the continuity of the official’s service. For, he had become in the interim, i.e., from the end of the
3rd term up to the recall election, a private citizen (Adormeo and Socrates).
a. Prevailing jurisprudence on issues affecting consecutiveness of terms and/or involuntary
interruption
3. The abolition of an elective local office due to the conversion of a municipality to a city does not,
by itself, work to interrupt the incumbent official’s continuity of service (Latasa).
4. Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting event as the elective officer’s continued stay and
entitlement to the office remain unaffected during the period of suspension, although he is barred
from exercising the functions of his office during this period (Aldovino, Jr.).
a. Prevailing jurisprudence on issues affecting consecutiveness of terms and/or involuntary
interruption
5. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position and assumes office, his term is
interrupted when he loses in an election protest and is ousted from office, thus disenabling him
from serving what would otherwise be the unexpired portion of his term of office had the protest
been dismissed (Lonzanida and Dizon). The break or interruption need not be for a full term of
three years or for the major part of the 3-year term; an interruption for any length of time,
provided the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break the continuity of service (Socrates, citing
Lonzanida).
6. When an official is defeated in an election protest and said decision becomes final after said
official had served the full term for said office, then his loss in the election contest does not
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 constitute an interruption since he has managed to serve the term from start to finish. His full
service, despite the defeat, should be counted in the application of term limits because the
nullification of his proclamation came after the expiration of the term (Ong and Rivera).
 The two-year period during which his opponent, Torres, was serving as mayor should be considered as
an interruption, which effectively removed Abundo’s case from the ambit of the three-term limit rule
 Petition is PARTLY GRANTED
o the assailed February 8, 2012 Resolution of the Commission on Elections Second Division and May
10, 2012 Resolution of the Commission on Elections en banc in EAC (AE) No. A-25-2010 and the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43, dated August 9, 2010,
in Election Case No. 55, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
 Petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr. is DECLARED ELIGIBLE for the position of Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes
to which he was duly elected in the May 2010 elections and is accordingly ordered IMMEDIATELY
REINSTATED to said position. Withal, Emeterio M. Tarin and Cesar O. Cervantes are ordered to
immediately vacate the positions of Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes, respectively, and shall
revert to their original positions of Vice-Mayor and First Councilor, respectively, upon receipt of this
Decision.
 The TRO issued by the Court on July 3, 2012 is hereby LIFTED.
 This Decision is immediately executory.
Quo Warranto
 Section 253. Petition for quo warranto.
o  Any voter contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or
city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall
file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the proclamation of
the results of the election.
 Bengzon III vs HRET (G.R. No. 142840      May 7, 2001)
o Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac,
on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935
Constitution.
o On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and
without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States.
o As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4),
a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or accepting
commission in the armed forces of a foreign country."
o Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his
naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine
Corps.
o On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under
Republic Act No. 2630. 
o He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11,
1998 elections.
o He won by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then
running for re-election
o House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
o Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam
 respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives since
he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution
o Decision
 dismissing the petition for quo warranto 
 declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the
May 1998 elections.
 denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision
 petition for certiorari assailing the HRET's decision
o Issue
 Whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still
be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
o Ruling

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 As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceeding in
order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he
possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of
Representatives.
 The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follow:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mother, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
 There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization.
These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-
born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a
citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof
 Natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citezenship."
 Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the
manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three
modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by
naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.15
 Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode
for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No.
63.16 Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine
citizenship must possess certain qualifications17and none of the disqualification
mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.18
 Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost
their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces;19 services in the armed forces
of the allied forces in World War II;20 (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United
States at any other time,21 (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien;22 and (5)
political economic necessity.23
 As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists
of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering
said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or
last resided.
 Angat v. Republic,24 we held:
 xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630],
the person desiring to reacquire Philippine citizenship would not even be
required to file a petition in court, and all that he had to do was to take an oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact with the
civil registry in the place of his residence or where he had last resided in the
Philippines. [Italics in the original.
 Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.26 This means
that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as
a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born
citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as
a natural-born Filipino.
 Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows:
 Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine
citizenship.
 Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person must be a
Filipino citizen birth and (2) he does not have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his
Philippine citizenship.
 The present Constitution, however, now consider those born of Filipino mothers before
the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon
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 reaching the majority age as natural-born. After defining who re natural-born citizens,
Section 2 of Article IV adds a sentence: "Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens."
Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is
apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that
there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who
are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e.,
did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship,
necessarily is natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a
separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently
reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be
natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship
and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof.
 The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the
House.29 The Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to check "whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction"
on the part of the latter.
 Petition DISMISSED.
Election Offenses
 Section 263. Persons criminally liable. - The principals, accomplices, and accessories, as defined in the
Revised Penal Code, shall be criminally liable for election offenses. If the one responsible be a political party
or an entity, its president or head, the officials and employees of the same, performing duties connected with
the offense committed and its members who may be principals, accomplices, or accessories shall be liable, in
addition to the liability of such party or entity.
 Section 264. Penalties
o imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than six years
o shall not be subject to probation
o disqualification to hold public office
o deprivation of the right of suffrage
o If he is a foreigner, he shall be sentenced to deportation which shall be enforced after the prison term
has been served
o Any political party found guilty shall be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than ten thousand pesos,
which shall be imposed upon such party after criminal action has been instituted in which their
corresponding officials have been found guilty
 Section 265. Prosecution. - The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the
exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code, and
to prosecute the same. The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the
government: Provided, however, That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within
four months from his filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the office of the fiscal or with the
Ministry of Justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted.
 Section 267. Prescription. - Election offenses shall prescribe after five years from the date of their
commission. If the discovery of the offense be made in an election contest proceeding, the period of
prescription shall commence on the date on which the judgment in such proceedings becomes final and
executory.
 Section 261, paragraphs (a) to (dd), Section 262, BP 881 (Omnibus Election Code)
o Amendments
 Section 261 (g) applies only to appointments covered by the Civil Service Law, and not to
those governed by special laws, such as the Local Government Code. Thus, the prohibition
does not apply to the filling up of vacancies in the sanggunian of local government units (Ong
vs Herrera, 188 SCRA 830)
 Section 261 (h). Two elements must be establsihed to prove its violation : (1) the fact of
transfer or detail within the election period, and (2) the transfer was effected without prior
approval of the COMELEC in accordance with its implementing rules and regulations.
 Section 261 (p). To support a conviction under the Section 261 (p), it is not necessary that the
deadly weapon should have been seized from the accused while he was in the precinct or
within a radius of 100 meters therefrom. It is enough that the accused carried the weapon in

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 the polling place and within a radius of 100 meters thereof during any of the specified days
and hours [Mappala vs Nunez, 240 SCRA 600 (1995)]
 Section 261 (t) has been repealed by Sections 32, 33, 34 of Republic Act 7166
 Section 261 (y) and (z) have been repealed by Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution, which makes the exercise of suffrage voluntary and no longer compulsory as
provided for in the 1973 Constitution
 Section 262 has been repealed with retroactive effect by Section 39 of Republic Act No. 7166
as far as the inclusion of Sections 105, 106, 107, 109, 110, 111, and 112 as among election
offenses 
 Section 263, 264, Omnibus Election Code
 Section 27, paragraphs (a) to (f), Republic Act No. 6646 (The Electoral Reforms Law of
1987)
 Section 27, paragraphs (a) to (f), Republic Act No. 6646 (The Electoral Reforms Law of
1987)
 Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9006 (Fair Election Act)
 Section 24.1 to 24.9 of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003)
 Section 45 (a) to (j), Republic Act No. 8189 (The Voter’s Registration Act of 1996
 Faelnar vs People (G.R. Nos. 140850-51 May 4, 2000)
o On April 8, 1997, petitioner Eugenio Faelnar filed a certificate of candidacy for the position of
Barangay Chairman of Barangay Guadalupe, Cebu City in the May 12, 1997 barangay elections.
o The following day, on April 9, 1997, a basketball tournament, dubbed the "2nd JING-JING
FAELNAR'S CUP," opened at the Guadalupe Sports Complex and lasted up to April 30, 1997.
o complaint for electioneering filed against petitioner and Cecilio Gillamac by Antonio Luy
o the basketball tournament was actually a campaign gimmick staged outside the campaign period
which officially started on May 1, 1997, in violation of the Omnibus Election Code.
1. during the tournament, a streamer bearing petitioner's name was placed on the facade of the
Guadalupe Sports Complex;
2. petitioner's name was repeatedly mentioned over the microphone during the games;
3. the tournament was widely published in the local newspaper; and
4. a raffle sponsored by Cecilio Gillamac was held with home appliances given away as prizes.
o Petitioner denied participation in the tournament and claimed that its major sponsor was Gillamac
Marketing, Inc. He contended that the same was purely a sporting event for the benefit of the youth.
o Atty. Edwin Cadungog, election officer of Cebu City,
 Recommended the dismissal of the charges against petitioner and Gillamac.
o Law Department of the COMELEC
 recommended the filing of a case against petitioner and Gillamac for violation of §80,3 in
relation to §262,4 of the Omnibus Election Code, and §50 of COMELEC Resolution No.
2888, in relation to §12 of Republic Act No. 6679.5
o COMELEC en banc (In its Resolution No. 97-3040, dated September 16, 1997)
 resolved to dismiss the case. However, on motion of Antonio Luy, the COMELEC
reconsidered its action and ordered the filing of the necessary Informations against petitioner
and Gillamac.
o Regional Trial Court, Cebu City
 under two Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. CBU-49941 and CBU-49942.
 Petitioner moved to quash the information or, in the alternative, for reinvestigation of the
case,
 contending that Resolution No. 97-3040, which dismissed the complaint against him, was
immediately executory and could no longer be reconsidered.
 Petitioner's motion was denied by the trial court in an order dated July 29, 1999.
o He moved for reconsideration, but his motion was likewise denied by the court in its order, dated
October 4, 1999..
o petition for certiorari 
 to set aside the order, dated July 29, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Cebu City,
denying petitioner's motion to quash in Criminal Cases Nos. CBU-499411 and 49942,2 and
the order, dated October 4, 1999, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
 reiterates his argument in the trial court that COMELEC Resolution No. 97-3040, which
dismissed the complaint against him, can no longer be reconsidered by the COMELEC. He

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 contends that under the Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC, the dismissal of the complaint
was immediately final and executory.
 avers that Antonio Luy's Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution No. 97-3040 is a
prohibited pleading under the Commission's Rules of Procedure. He avers that since the
resolution in question was immediately final and executory, it was no longer within the power
of the COMELEC to reconsider.
o Resolution No. 98-2914, in directing the filing of charges in court, was "ultra-vires," and the
Informations filed against him should have been quashed.6
o Sec. 2. Mode of Review. — A judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on
Elections and the Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme
Court on certiorari under Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided.
o Sec. 3 of said Rule provides that such petition shall be filed within 30 days from notice of the
resolution sought to be reviewed. No such petition was ever filed. The present petition to set
aside the orders of the trial court denying its motion to quash and motion for reconsideration
was filed only on November 12, 1999, more than a year after Resolution No. 98-2194 was
promulgated on October 29, 1998. Consequently, the resolution is now final and binding upon
the parties.
o Even if said resolution is erroneous for being contrary to the provisions of the Rules of
Procedure of the COMELEC, the same is not void. Since it has become final and executory, it is
already binding and effective.8
o The 1993 Rules of Procedure, now provides:
 Rule 13. — Prohibited Pleadings.
 Sec. 1. What pleadings are not allowed. — The following pleadings are not
allowed:
o (d) motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution, order or
decision except in election offense cases;
o In cases where the State Prosecutor, or Provincial or City Fiscal exercises the delegated
power 10 to conduct preliminary investigation of election offense cases, after the investigating
officer submits his recommendation, said officers already resolve the issue of probable cause.
From such resolution, appeal to the COMELEC lies. As the exercise by the Commission of its
review powers would, at this point, already constitute a second look on the issue of probable
cause, the COMELEC's ruling on the appeal would be immediately final and executory.
o On the other hand, if the preliminary investigation of a complaint for election offense is
conducted by the COMELEC itself, its investigating officer prepares a report upon which the
Commission's Law Department makes its recommendation to the COMELEC en banc on
whether there is probable cause to prosecute. It is thus the COMELEC en banc which
determines the existence of probable cause. 11 Consequently, an appeal to the Commission is
unavailing. Under the present Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC, however, a motion for
reconsideration of such resolution is allowed. This effectively allows for a review of the original
resolution, in the same manner that the COMELEC, on appeal or motu proprio, may review the
resolution of the State Prosecutor, or Provincial or City Fiscal.
o Petition DENIED
 Jalosjos vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 205033, June 18, 2013)
o On November 16, 2001, the Court promulgated its Decision in G.R. Nos. 132875-76, entitled "People
of the Philippines v. Romeo G. Jalosjos," convicting petitioner by final judgment of two (2) counts of
statutory rape and six (6) counts of acts of lasciviousness.4 Consequently, he was sentenced to
suffer the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal5 for each count,
respectively, which carried the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification pursuant to
Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
o On April 30, 2007, then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued an order commuting his prison
term to sixteen (16) years, three (3) months and three (3) days (Order of Commutation). After serving
the same, he was issued a Certificate of Discharge From Prison on March 18, 2009.
o On April 26, 2012, petitioner applied to register as a voter in Zamboanga City. However, because of
his previous conviction, his application was denied by the Acting City Election Officer of the Election
Registration Board (ERB), prompting him to file a Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of
Voters (Petition for Inclusion) before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Zamboanga City, Branch
1 (MTCC).

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o Pending resolution of the same, he filed a CoC10 on October 5, 2012, seeking to run as mayor for
Zamboanga City in the upcoming local elections scheduled on May 13, 2013 (May 2013 Elections).
In his CoC, petitioner stated, inter alia, that he is eligible for the said office and that he is a registered
voter of Barangay Tetuan, Zamboanga City
o On October 18, 2012,11 the MTCC denied his Petition for Inclusion on account of his perpetual
absolute disqualification which in effect, deprived him of the right to vote in any election. Such denial
was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Branch 14 (RTC) in its October 31,
2012 Order12 which, pursuant to Section 13813 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881, as amended,
otherwise known as the "Omnibus Election Code" (OEC), was immediately final and executory.
o Meanwhile, five (5) petitions were lodged before the COMELEC’s First and Second Divisions
(COMELEC Divisions), praying for the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of petitioner’s
CoC. Pending resolution, the COMELEC En Banc issued motu proprio Resolution No. 961314 on
January 15, 2013, resolving "to CANCEL and DENY due course the Certificate of Candidacy filed by
Romeo G. Jalosjos as Mayor of Zamboanga City in the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections"
due to his perpetual absolute disqualification as well as his failure to comply with the voter
registration requirement. As basis, the COMELEC En Banc relied on the Court’s pronouncement in
the consolidated cases of Dominador Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC and Agapito Cardino v.
COMELEC15 (Jalosjos, Jr. and Cardino).
o Petition for certiorari filed under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
o Commission on Elections' (COMELEC) En Banc Resolution No. 9613 dated January 15, 2013,
ordering the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of petitioner Romeo G. Jalosjos' certificate of
candidacy (CoC) as a mayoralty candidate for Zamboanga City.
o Issues
 whether the COMELEC En Banc acted beyond its jurisdiction when it issued motu proprio
Resolution No. 9613 and in so doing, violated petitioner’s right to due process;
 whether petitioner’s perpetual absolute disqualification to run for elective office had already
been removed by Section 40(a) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the "Local
Government Code of 1991" (LGC).
o Ruling
 The COMELEC En Banc did not exercise its quasi-judicial functions when it issued
Resolution No. 9613 as it did not assume jurisdiction over any pending petition or
resolve any election case before it or any of its divisions. Rather, it merely performed its
duty to enforce and administer election laws in cancelling petitioner’s CoC on the basis
of his perpetual absolute disqualification, the fact of which had already been established
by his final conviction. In this regard, the COMELEC En Banc was exercising its
administrative functions, dispensing with the need for a motion for reconsideration of a
division ruling under Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the same being
required only in quasi-judicial proceedings.
 There is also no violation of procedural due process since the COMELEC En Banc
would be acting in a purely administrative manner.
 The above-cited constitutional provision requiring a motion for reconsideration before
the COMELEC En Banc may take action is confined only to cases where the
COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial power. It finds no application, however, in
matters concerning the COMELEC’s exercise of administrative functions. The
distinction between the two is well-defined.
 Villarosa v. COMELEC
 The term ‘administrative’ connotes, or pertains, to ‘administration, especially
management, as by managing or conducting, directing or superintending, the
execution, application, or conduct of persons or things. It does not entail an
opportunity to be heard, the production and weighing of evidence, and a
decision or resolution thereon. While a ‘quasi-judicial function’ is a term which
applies to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies,
who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and
to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.
 The COMELEC’s denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC in view
of a candidate’s disqualification to run for elective office based on a final
conviction is subsumed under its mandate to enforce and administer all laws
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 relating to the conduct of elections. Accordingly, in such a situation, it is the
COMELEC’s duty to cancel motu proprio the candidate’s CoC, notwithstanding
the absence of any petition initiating a quasi-judicial proceeding for the
resolution of the same.
 Even without a petition under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code, or under Section 40 of the Local Government Code, the
COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone
suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification to run
for public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction. The final judgment
of conviction is notice to the COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict
from running for public office. The law itself bars the convict from running for
public office, and the disqualification is part of the final judgment of conviction.
The final judgment of the court is addressed not only to the Executive branch,
but also to other government agencies tasked to implement the final judgment
under the law.
 Whether or not the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the judgment to
implement the disqualification, it is assumed that the portion of the final
judgment on disqualification to run for elective public office is addressed to the
COMELEC because under the Constitution the COMELEC is duty bound to
"enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election." The disqualification of a convict to run for public office under the
Revised Penal Code, as affirmed by final judgment of a competent court, is part
of the enforcement and administration of "all laws" relating to the conduct of
elections.
 To allow the COMELEC to wait for a person to file a petition to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of one suffering from perpetual special disqualification
will result in the anomaly that these cases so grotesquely exemplify. Despite a
prior perpetual special disqualification, Jalosjos was elected and served twice as
mayor. The COMELEC will be grossly remiss in its constitutional duty to
"enforce and administer all laws" relating to the conduct of elections if it does
not motu proprio bar from running for public office those suffering from
perpetual special disqualification by virtue of a final judgment.
 Aratea v. COMELEC (Aratea),18
o  the Court similarly pronounced that the disqualification of a convict to
run for public office, as affirmed by final judgment of a competent court,
is part of the enforcement and administration of all laws relating to the
conduct of elections.
 SEC. 40. Disqualifications. – The following persons are disqualified from
running for any elective local position:
o (a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral
turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence
 ART. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute
disqualification. - The penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute
disqualification for public office shall produce the following effects:
o 1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the
offender may have held, even if conferred by popular election.
o 2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular
office or to be elected to such office.
o 3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the
exercise of any of the rights mentioned.
 In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is
comprised in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article shall last during
the term of the sentence.
o 4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office
formerly held.

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 o while Section 40(a) of the LGC allows a prior convict to run for local
elective office after the lapse of two (2) years from the time he serves his
sentence, the said provision should not be deemed to cover cases wherein
the law imposes a penalty, either as principal or accessory, which has the
effect of disqualifying the convict to run for elective office
 ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal – Their accessory penalties.
- The penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with
them that of civil interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as the
case may be, and that of perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender
shall suffer even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same
shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
 Section 40(a) of the LGC should be considered as a law of general application
and therefore, must yield to the more definitive RPC provisions in line with the
principle of lex specialis derogat generali – general legislation must give way to
special legislation on the same subject, and generally is so interpreted as to
embrace only cases in which the special provisions are not applicable. In other
words, where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular
case, the one specially designed therefor should prevail.
 Article 41 of the RPC expressly states that one who is previously convicted of a
crime punishable by reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal continues to
suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification even though
pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the said accessory penalty shall have
been expressly remitted in the pardon
 Petition is DISMISSED
 Javier vs COMELEC (January 12, 2016 G.R. No. 215847)
o On December 3, 1985, the Batasang Pambansa enacted the Omnibus Election Code (Election Code).
Section 261(d) and (e) of this Code prescribe coercion as an election offense
o Coercion, as an election offense, is punishable by imprisonment of not less than one year but not
more than six years. Notably, Section 68 of the Election Code provides that the Commission may
administratively disqualify a candidate who violates Section 261(d) or (e).
o On February 20, 1995, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7890 amending the definition of Grave
Coercion under the Revised Penal Code. It increased the penalty for coercion committed in violation
of a person’s right to suffrage to prision mayor. Further, Section 3 of R.A. 7890 expressly repealed
Section 261, paragraphs (d)(1) and (2) of the Election Code.
o On April 3, 2012, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9385 fixing the calendar of activities for the
May 2013 elections. The resolution set the election period from January 13, 2013 until June 12, 2013.
o On September 3, 2012, Valderrama Municipal Vice-Mayor Christopher B. Maguad filed an
administrative complaint for Gross Misconduct/Dereliction of Duty and Abuse of Authority against
Valderrama Mayor Mary Joyce U. Roquero (Mayor Roquero). This complaint was docketed as
Administrative Case No. 05-2012.
o On November 9, 2012, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) issued Resolution No. 291-
2012 recommending to Antique Governor Exequiel Javier (Gov. Javier) the preventive suspension of
Mayor Roquero.
o On November 21, 2012, Mayor Roquero filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
12, Antique, against Gov. Javier and the members of the SP to restrain them from proceeding with
Administrative Case No. 05-2012. The petition was docketed as Special Civil Action No. 12-11-86.
o The case was re-raffled to the RTC, Branch 11 which issued a writ of preliminary injunction.
o Gov. Javier, Vice-Governor Dimamay, and the members of the SP filed a petition for certiorari with
urgent prayer for TRO and preliminary injunction before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP-07307.
o On December 18, 2012, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9581 prohibiting any public official from
suspending any elective provincial, city, municipal, or barangay officer during the election period for
the May 13, 2013 elections. This resolution implements Section 261 (x)7 of the Election Code.
o On January 15, 2013, the CA issued a TRO in CA-G.R. SP-07307.
o On January 16, 2013, the RTC, Branch 11 promulgated its judgment granting certiorari and
prohibition. It ordered the SP to cease and desist from further proceeding with Administrative Case

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 No. 05-2012. It likewise ordered Gov. Javier to refrain from implementing SP Resolution No. 291-
2012 and from preventively suspending Mayor Roquero.
o On January 23, 2013, Gov. Javier issued Executive Order No. 003, S. 2013, preventively suspending
Mayor Roquero for thirty (30) days.
o On February 7, 2013, the SP of Antique issued a decision finding Mayor Roquero guilty of Grave
Misconduct in relation with Section 3(e) of R. A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, and Grave Abuse of Authority in relation with Section 5(e) of R.A. No. 6713. The SP suspended
her for four (4) months.
o Mayor Roquero filed an Election Offense complaint against Gov. Javier for violating Section 261(x)
of the Election Code. The case was filed before the COMELEC Law Department and docketed
as Election Offense Case (EOC) No. 13-025.
o Meanwhile (or on March 15, 2013), the CA granted the writ of preliminary injunction filed by Gov.
Javier, et al., in CA-G.R. SP-07307. It enjoined Judge Nery Duremdes of the RTC, Branch 11 from
conducting further proceedings in SPL Civil Action No. 12-11-86.
o On March 22, 2013, private respondents Cornelio P. Aldon (Aldon) and Raymundo T.
Roquero (Roquero) also filed a petition for disqualification before the Commission against Gov.
Javier, Vice-Governor Rosie A. Dimamay, and the other members of the SP. The case was docketed
as COMELEC Special Action (SPA) No. 13-254 (DC.)
o Aldon and Roquero sought to disqualify Gov. Javier and the other incumbent officials from running in
the 2013 elections on the ground that the latter committed the election offenses of Coercion of
Subordinates [Sec. 261(d)] and Threats, Intimidation, Terrorism x x x or Other Forms of
Coercion [Sec. 261(e)] by suspending Mayor Roquero. They alleged that the suspension was political
harassment calculated to intimidate the Roqueros into backing out of the 2013 elections.8
o On April 29, 2013, the Clerk of the Commission conducted a conference hearing between the parties.
o On April 30, 2013, Gov. Javier (together with the SP Members) filed a motion to dismiss with
answer ex abundante ad cautelam.
o After the May 13, 2013 Elections, only Gov. Javier and SP Members Tobias M. Javier, Edgar D.
Denosta, Teopisto C. Estaris, Jr., and Victor R. Condez were proclaimed winners. Hence, the
Commission considered the disqualification cases against the losing candidates moot.
o On October 3, 2014, the COMELEC Second Division issued a resolution in SPA No. 13-254
(DC) disqualifying Gov. Javier and annulling his proclamation as the Governor of Antique. The
resolution was penned by Commissioner Elias R. Yusoph.
o On April 29, 2013, the Clerk of the Commission conducted a conference hearing between the parties.
o On April 30, 2013, Gov. Javier (together with the SP Members) filed a motion to dismiss with
answer ex abundante ad cautelam.
o After the May 13, 2013 Elections, only Gov. Javier and SP Members Tobias M. Javier, Edgar D.
Denosta, Teopisto C. Estaris, Jr., and Victor R. Condez were proclaimed winners. Hence, the
Commission considered the disqualification cases against the losing candidates moot.
o On October 3, 2014, the COMELEC Second Division issued a resolution in SPA No. 13-254
(DC) disqualifying Gov. Javier and annulling his proclamation as the Governor of Antique. The
resolution was penned by Commissioner Elias R. Yusoph.
o On January 20, 2015, Gov. Javier filed the present petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in relation
with Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.
o First Issue: Whether the Commission gravely abused its discretion when it issued Resolution No.
9581 fixing the 2013 election period from January 13, 2013 until June 12, 2013, for the purpose of
determining administrative and criminal liability for election offenses.
 The COMELEC is expressly authorized to fix a different date of the election period.
 Article IX-C, Section 9 provides:
 Section 9. Unless otherwise fixed by the Commission in special cases, the election
period shall commence ninety days before the day of election and shall end thirty
days thereafter.15
 Election Code, explicitly recognizes this authority:
 Sec. 3. Election and campaign periods. – Unless otherwise fixed in special cases by
the Commission on Elections, which hereinafter shall be referred to as the
Commission, the election period shall commence ninety days before the day of the
election and shall end thirty days thereafter.16 (emphases supplied)

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  As defined by Congress, some election offenses and prohibited acts can only be committed
during the election period. An element of these offenses (i.e., that it be committed during the
election period) is variable, as election periods are not affixed to a specific and permanent
date. Nevertheless, the definition of the offense is already complete. By fixing the date of the
election period, the Commission did not change what the offense is or how it is committed.
There is thus no intrusion into the legislative sphere.
o Second Issue: Whether the Commission erred in ruling that R.A. No. 7890 did not remove coercion
as a ground for disqualification under Section 68 of the Election Code.
 With the express repeal of Section 261(d), the basis for disqualifying Javier no longer
existed. As we held in Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,43 [t]he jurisdiction of the
COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those enumerated in Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code. All other election offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC
jurisdiction. They are criminal and not administrative in nature.44 Pursuant to sections 265
and 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, the power of the COMELEC is confined to the
conduct of preliminary investigation on the alleged election offenses for the purpose of
prosecuting the alleged offenders before the regular courts of justice.45
o Third Issue: Whether the Commission en banc committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its
Order dated January 12, 2015, disqualifying Gov. Javier and annulling his proclamation as the
governor of Antique.
 To our mind, the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it disqualified Gov.
Javier based on a provision of law that had already been expressly repealed. Its stubborn
insistence that R.A. No. 7890 merely impliedly repealed Section 261 (d) despite the clear
wordings of the law, amounted to an arbitrary and whimsical exercise of judgment.
 Lanot v. Commission on Elections:21
 The electoral aspect of a disqualification case determines whether the offender should
be disqualified from being a candidate or from holding office. Proceedings are
summary in character and require only clear preponderance of evidence. An erring
candidate may be disqualified even without prior determination of probable cause in a
preliminary investigation. The electoral aspect may proceed independently of the
criminal aspect, and vice versa.
 The criminal aspect of a disqualification case determines whether there is probable cause to
charge a candidate for an election offense. The prosecutor is the COMELEC, through its Law
Department, which determines whether probable cause exists. If there is probable cause, the
COMELEC, through its Law Department, files the criminal information before the proper
court. Proceedings before the proper court demand a full-blown hearing and require proof
beyond reasonable doubt to convict. A criminal conviction shall result in the disqualification
of the offender, which may even include disqualification from holding a future public office.
 Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which states:
 Part IV: Rule 18 – Decisions
o Sec. 1 Procedure in Making Decisions. – The conclusions of the
Commission in any case submitted to it for decision en banc or in
Division shall be reached in consultation before the case is assigned by raffle
to a Member for the writing of the opinion of the Commission or the Division
and a certification to this effect signed by the Chairman or the Presiding
Commissioner, as the case may be, shall be incorporated in the decision. Any
member who took no part, dissented, or abstained from a decision or
resolution must state the reason therefor.
 Every decision shall express therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based. (emphasis supplied)
 Sec. 3. Construction – These rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote
the effective and efficient implementation of the objectives of ensuring the holding of
free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections and to achieve just, expeditious
and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding
brought before the Commission.
 Sec. 4. Suspension of the Rules – In the interest of justice and in order to obtain
speedy disposition of all matters pending before the Commission, these rules or any
portion thereof may be suspended by the Commission.

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 hereby GRANT the petition and SET ASIDE the January 12, 2015 per curiam order
of the Commission on Elections en banc 

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