CRIMINAL

CASES:
YEAR

PROCEDURE
2017-2020

CASE GUIDE:
RULE 126 SEARCH AND SEIZURE
RULE 113 ARREST
RULE 114 BAIL
RULE 112 PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

PIATRICE MARIE DE LA CRUZ

JR RIETA PALATTAO
VLADIMIR PATI
COLEN RAZON
CARL RYAN DAVID SIMANGAN
RONA LULU TALAUE
RULE
MARTIN VILLAMOR AND VICTOR BONAOBRA VS PEOPLE OF THE

1
PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 200396
MARCH 22, 2017

126 2
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS RENANTE COMPRADO FBRONOLA
G.R. NO. 213225
APRIL 04, 2018

(SEARCH AND
SEIZURE)
3
MARCELO G. SALUDAY VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 215305
APRIL 3, 2018

LARRY SABUCO MANIBOG VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

4 G.R. NO. 211214

MARCH 20, 2019

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS JERRY SAPLA A.K.A. ERIC MALLARI

5 SALIBAD
G.R. NO. 244045
JUNE 16, 2020

RULE
LACASTE V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR NO 199018

6
SEPTEMBER 27,2017

SAPI V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR NO 200370

113
JUNE 07, 2017

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. FBRONOLA

(ARREST) GR NO 213225

7 APRIL 4,2018

AGPAD V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR NO 227366
AUGUST 1,2018

8
MAHIPUS V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR NO 210731
FEBRUARY 13, 2019

RULE
PEOPLE VS ESCOBAR
G.R. NO. 214300'

9 JULY 26, 2017

GENUINO V DE LIMA
G.R. NO. 197930

114
APRIL 17, 2018

TEJANO V MARIGOMEN
(BAIL) 10 A.M. NO. RTJ-17-2492
SEPTEMBER 26, 2017

PEOPLE V NOVO TANES Y BELMONTE

G.R. NO. 240596

11 APRIL 3, 2019

RECTO V PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 236461
DECEMBER 5, 2018

RULE 12
STEVEN R. PAVLOW VS. CHERRY L. MENDENILLA
GR NO. 181489
APRIL 19,2017

112 13 EDWIN GRANADA REYES VS. THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

GR NO. 208243
JUNES 5, 2017

(PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION) 14 PRESCILLA Z. ORBE VS. LEONORA O. MIARAL
GR NO. 217777
AUGUST 16, 2017

GIRLIE M. QUISAY V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G. R. NO. 216920

15 JANUARY 13, 2016

ABS CBN V. GOZON

GR. NO 195956
MARCH 11, 2015
 RULE 126 (SEARCH
AND SEIZURE)

CASE DOCTRINE FACTS

On June 17, 2005, PD Peñaflor received a call from an informant
MARTIN VILLAMOR AND VICTOR regarding an ongoing illegal numbers game at the residence of
BONAOBRA VS PEOPLE OF THE Bonaobra. A team composed of PD Peñaflor, Saraspi, PO1 Rolando
PHILIPPINES Ami, a driver, and a civilian asset proceeded to Bonaobra's residence
to confirm the report.Upon arrival at the target area, the team
G.R. NO. 200396
parked their service vehicle outside the compound fenced by bamboo
MARCH 22, 2017 slats installed two inches apart which allowed them to see the goings
on inside. According to the police officers, they saw petitioners in
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be
the act of counting bets, described by the Bicol term "revisar," which
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
means collating and examining numbers placed in "papelitos,"
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and which are slips of paper containing bet numbers, and counting
for any purpose. A mere tip from an unnamed informant money bets. When they entered the gate of the compound, they
does not vest police officers with the authority to barge into introduced themselves as police officers and confiscated the items
private homes without first securing a valid warrant of arrest found on the table consisting of cash amounting to P1,500.00 in
or search warrant. different denominations, the "papelitos," a calculator, a cellular
phone, and a pen. Petitioners were then brought to Camp Francisco
Camacho where they were investigated for illegal gambling.
Subsequently, a case was filed against the petitioners before the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. The RTC rendered its Judgment
finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing
illegal numbers game locally known as ''lotteng” a variant of the
game Last Two, respectively as a collector or agent under Section
3(c), and as a coordinator, controller, or supervisor under Section
3(d), of RA 9287. The CA affirmed the lower court’s ruling.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER'S

CONVICTION BE UPHELD?
No. The Court finds that the right of the petitioners against unreasonable searches and seizures was
violated by the arresting officers when they barged into Bonaobra's compound without a valid warrant
of arrest or a search warrant. While there are exceptions to the rule requiring a warrant for a valid search

ISSUE
and seizure, none applies in the case at bar. Consequently, the evidence obtained by the police officers is
inadmissible against the petitioners, the same having been obtained in violation of the said right.
Considering that 15 to 20 meters is a significant distance between the police officers and the petitioners,
the Court finds it doubtful that the police officers were able to determine that a criminal activity was
AND ongoing to allow them to validly effect an in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest and a search incidental
to a warrantless arrest thereafter. It appears that the police officers acted based solely on the information
received from PD Peñaflor's informant and not on personal knowledge that a crime had just been

RULING committed, was actually being committed, or was about to be committed in their presence. The Court
finds it doubtful that the police officers witnessed any overt act before entering the private home of
Bonaobra immediately preceding the arrest. PO1 Saraspi even admitted that from his position outside the
compound, he could not read the contents of the so-called "papelitos;" yet, upon seeing the calculator,
phone, papers and money on the table, he readily concluded the same to be gambling paraphernalias.
Thus, the evidence purportedly seized from the Bonaobra compound is inadmissible in evidence since it
was obtained in violation of Section 3(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Since the alleged illegal
gambling paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court acquits petitioners.

01
 CASE DOCTRINE
Warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in
PEOPLE OF THE recognition of the impracticability of securing a warrant under said
circumstances as the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
PHILIPPINES VS RENANTE
jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. Peace officers in such
COMPRADO FBRONOLA cases, however, are limited to routine checks where the examination of
G.R. NO. 213225 the vehicle is limited to visual inspection. When a vehicle is stopped and
APRIL 04, 2018 subjected to an extensive search, such would be constitutionally
permissible only if the officers made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a
belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing
officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains an item, article or
object which by law is subject to seizure and destruction.

FACT

ISSUE AND RULING

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE WAS VALID?
No. The search in this case could not be classified as a search of a moving vehicle. In this particular type of search, the vehicle is
the target and not a specific person. Further, in search of a moving vehicle, the vehicle was intentionally was used as a means to
transport illegal items. It is worthy to note that the information relayed to the police officers was that a passenger of that
particular bus was carrying marijuana such that when the police officers boarded the bus, they searched the bag of the person
matching the description given by their informant and not the cargo or contents of the said bus. Moreover, in this case, it just so
happened that the alleged drug courier was a bus passenger. To extend to such breadth the scope of searches on moving vehicles
would open the floodgates to unbridled warrantless searches which can be conducted by the mere expedient of waiting for the
target person to ride a motor vehicle, setting up a checkpoint along the route of that vehicle, and then stopping such vehicle
when it arrives at the checkpoint in order to search the target person. The search in the instant case cannot be considered as
search of a moving vehicle and is therefore invalid.

2. WHETHER THE SEIZED ITEMS ARE ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE?

Any evidence obtained in violation of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose
in any proceeding. This exclusionary rule instructs that evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable
searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In other words,
evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
Without the confiscated marijuana, no evidence is left to convict accused-appellant. Thus, an acquittal is warranted.

02
 CASE DOCTRINE
MARCELO G. SALUDAY VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 215305
APRIL 3, 2018
The reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy must be determined on a case-to-case basis
since it depends on the factual circumstances surrounding the case. Other factors such as customs,
physical surroundings and practices of a particular activity may diminish this expectation. To
emphasize, a reasonable search, on the one hand, and a warrantless search, on the other, are
mutually exclusive. While both State intrusions are valid even without a warrant, the underlying
reasons for the absence of a warrant are different. A reasonable search arises from a reduced
expectation of privacy, for which reason Section 2, Article III of the Constitution finds no
application. Examples include searches done at airports, seaports, bus terminals, malls, and similar
public ·places. In contrast, a warrantless search is presumably an "unreasonable search," but for
reasons of practicality, a search warrant can be dispensed with. Examples include search incidental
to a lawful arrest, search of evidence in plain view, consented search, and extensive search of a
private moving vehicle.

FACTS
On 5 May 2009, Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was flagged down by Task
Force Davao of the Philippine Army at a checkpoint near the Tefasco Wharf
in Ilang, Davao City. A member of the Task Force, requested all male
passengers to disembark from the vehicle while allowing the female passengers
to remain inside. He then boarded the bus to check the presence and intercept
the entry of any contraband, illegal firearms or explosives, and suspicious
individuals.SCAA Buco checked all the baggage and personal effects of the
passengers, but a small, gray-black pack bag on the seat at the rear of the bus
caught his attention. He lifted the bag and found it too heavy for its small size.
SCAA Buco then looked at the male passengers lined outside and noticed that
a man in a white shirt (later identified as petitioner) kept peeping through the
window towards the direction of the bag. Afterwards, SCAA Buco asked who
the owner of the bag was, to which the bus conductor answered that petitioner
and his brother were the ones seated at the back. SCAA Buco then requested
petitioner to board the bus and open the bag. Petitioner obliged and the bag
revealed the following contents: (1) an improvised .30 caliber carbine bearing
serial number 64702; (2) one magazine with three live ammunitions; (3) one
cacao-type hand grenade; and (4) a ten-inch hunting knife. SCAA Buco then
asked petitioner to produce proof of his authority to carry firearms and
explosives. Unable to show any, petitioner was immediately arrested and
informed of his rights by SCAA Buco. Petitioner was then brought for inquest
before the Office of the City Prosecutor for Davao City.

ISSUE AND RULING

WHETHER OR NOT THE SEARCH WAS VALID?
Yes. The bus inspection conducted by Task Force Davao at a military checkpoint constitutes a
reasonable search. Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was a vehicle of public transportation where
passengers have a reduced expectation of privacy. In this case, the authorities merely conducted a
“visual and minimally intrusive inspection” of the accused’s bag by simply lifting the bag that
noticeably appeared to have contained firearms. Also, the authorities relied on their own senses
that a firearm was inside, as well as having seen the very suspicious looks being given by the
accused therein. Further, the Court laid down the following conditions in allowing a reasonable
search of bus while in transit: (1) the manner of the search must be least intrusive; (2) the search
must not be discriminatory; (3) as to the purpose of the search, it must be confined to ensuring
public safety; and (4) the courts must be convinced that precautionary measures were in place to
ensure that no evidence was planted against the accused. Considering the reasonableness of the bus
search, Section 2, Article III of the Constitution finds no application, thereby precluding the
necessity for a warrant.

03
CASE DOCTRINE
LARRY SABUCO MANIBOG VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 211214
MARCH 20, 2019

For a "stop and frisk" search to be valid, the totality of suspicious

circumstances, as personally observed by the arresting officer, must lead to a
genuine reason to suspect that a person is committing an illicit act.
Consequently, a warrantless arrest not based on this constitutes an
infringement of a person's basic right to privacy.

FACTS
In the morning of March 17, 2010, Chief Inspector Beniat received information
from a police asset that Manibog was standing outside the Municipal Tourism
Office of Dingras, Ilocos Norte with a gun tucked in his waistband. To verify
this information, Chief Inspector Beniat immediately organized a team.
Together, they proceeded to the Municipal Tourism Office located around 20
meters from the police station. About five to eight meters away from the
Municipal Tourism Office, Chief Inspector Beniat saw Manibog standing
outside the building. The team slowly approached him for fear that he might
fight back. As he moved closer, Beniat saw a bulge on Manibog's waist, which
the police officer deduced to be a gun due to its distinct contour. Chief Inspector
Beniat went up to Manibog, patted the bulging object on his waist, and
confirmed that there was a gun tucked in Manibog's waistband. He disarmed
Manibog of the .45 caliber handgun inside a holster, after which he arrested him
for violating the election gun ban and brought him to the police station for an
inquest proceeding. Regional Trial Court found Manibog guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the election offense with which he was charged. It ruled that
the warrantless search on Manibog was incidental to a lawful arrest because there
was probable cause for the police officers to frisk and arrest him accused LARRY
MANIBOG y SABUCO is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
election offense of violation of Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7166 in relation to
Comelec Resolution No. 8714 The CA Affirmed RTC’s ruling.

ISSUE AND RULING

WHETHER OR NOT THE SEARCH WAS VALID?
Yes. In the present case, the policemen searched the accused not only because
of a tip - a very specific one - that he was at that moment standing in front of
the nearby Municipal Tourism Office with a gun on his waist. More
importantly, PCI Beniat testified that at a distance of about two to three
meters from the accused, he saw the latter's bulging waistline indicating the
"distinct peculiar contour" of a firearm tucked on his waist. Citing his
experience as a police officer, PCI Beniat testified that he could distinguish a
firearm from any other object tucked on the waist of a person.The tip on
petitioner, coupled with the police officers' visual confirmation that
petitioner had a gun-shaped object tucked in his waistband, led to a
reasonable suspicion that he was carrying a gun during an election gun ban.
However, a reasonable suspicion is not synonymous with the personal
knowledge required under Section 5(a) and (b) to effect a valid warrantless
arrest. Nonetheless, the combination of the police asset's tip and the arresting
officers' observation of a gun-shaped object under petitioner's shirt already
suffices as a genuine reason for the arresting officers to conduct a stop and
frisk search on petitioner.

04
FACTS CASE DOCTRINE
Sapla was a jeepney passenger who was arrested at a police PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS
checkpoint. The Regional Public Safety Battalion in Tabuk JERRY SAPLA A.K.A. ERIC MALLARI
claimed it received an anonymous phone call that a certain SALIBAD
male individual will be transporting marijuana from Kalinga
G.R. NO. 244045
to the province of Isabela. On that same afternoon, the
JUNE 16, 2020
RPSB hotline received a text message that a man wearing a
collared white shirt with green stripes, red ball cap on board “Does the mere reception of a text message from an
a passenger jeepney, with plate no. AYA 270 would be anonymous person suffice to create probable cause that
transporting marijuana in a blue sack bound for Roxas, enables the authorities to conduct an extensive and intrusive
Isabela. A joint checkpoint was strategically organized at the search without a search warrant? The answer is a resounding
Talaca command post. The police officers flagged down the no,” SC said, adding that a tip is considered hearsay “no
said vehicle on a checkpoint and saw accused Sapla seated at matter how reliable it may be.”The supreme Court said that,
the rear side of the vehicle. The police officers asked Sapla if while the court recognizes the necessity of adopting a
he was the owner of the blue sack in front of him, which the decisive stance against the scourge of illegal drugs, the
latter affirmed. The police officers asked him to open the eradication of illegal drugs in our society cannot be achieved
blue sack and saw 4 bricks of suspected dried marijuana by subverting the people’s constitutional right against
leaves wrapped in newspaper and an old calendar. In his unreasonable searches and seizures.“The Constitution does
defense, Sapla denied that he carried any baggage when he not allow the end to justify the means. Otherwise, in
boarded the jeepney to go to Roxas, Isabela. He said the eradicating one societal disease, a deadlier and more sinister
police officers found the marijuana in a sack among the one is cultivated — the trampling of the people’s
baggage of the passengers and chose to arrest him from fundamental, inalienable rights,” it added.
among three male passengers who wore fatigue pants.The
RTC ruled that the prosecution was able to sufficiently
establish the corpus delicti of the crime hence charged Sapla
guilty for violating section 5 of RA 9165.The CA affirmed ISSUE
RTC’s ruling. The CA found that although the search and
seizure conducted on Sapla was without serach warrant, the
same was lawful as it was a valid warrantless search of a
AND
moving vehicle. The CA held that the essential requisite of a
probable cause was present, justifying the warrantless search
and seizure.
RULING
WHETHER OR NOT THE
SEARCH WAS VALID?
No. In finding the warrantless search invalid, the Court held
that the accused was a mere passenger in a jeepney who did
not exhibit any act that would give police officers reasonable
suspicion to believe that he had drugs in his possession. There
was no evidence to show that the police had basis or personal
knowledge that would reasonably allow them to infer
anything suspicious. Surely, probable cause justifying an
intrusive warrantless search and seizure cannot possible arise
from double hearsay evidence and from an irregularly-
received tipped information. A reasonably discreet and
prudent man will surely not believe that an offense has been
committed and that the item sought in connection with said
offense are in the place to be searched based solely on the say-
so of an unknown duty guard that a random, unverified text
message was sent to an unofficial mobile phone by a
complete stranger. Therefore, with the glaring absence of
probable cause that justifies an intrusive warrantless search,
considering that the police officers failed to rely on their
personal knowledge and depended solely on an unverified
and anonymous tip, the warrantless search conducted on
accused-appellant Sapla was an invalid and unlawful search of
a moving vehicle.

05
 RULE 113
(ARREST)

CASE DOCTRINE
LACASTE V. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES FACTS
GR NO 199018
SEPTEMBER 27,2017 Lacaste a tricycle
The warrantless arrest is lawful under the provisions of Section 5 (a) Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court which provides that - a police officer may without a warrant
driver was on samat
arrest a person when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is street when he was
actually committing or attempting to commit a crime. In the course of a lawful
warrantless arrest, the person of the accused may be searched for dangerous or
flagged down by
illegal objects. It follows that the prohibited object or item taken from him on TFAV Unit and was
the occasion is admissible in evidence
searched for shabu
ISSUE AND RULING along with his
tricycle.
WHETHER OR NOT HE WAS ILLEGALLY
ARRESTED AND SEARCHED?
No. [Petitioner] was caught in flagrante delicto in possession of illegal drugs.
The arresting officer had reasonable ground to believe based on his own
personal observation that the [petitioner] was holding on to a plastic sachet that
he believed contained shabu, judging from the past record of [petitioner], and
that his suspicions were heightened when [petitioner] ran away after seeing
him.

CASE DOCTRINE
SAPI V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS
GR NO 200370
JUNE 07, 2017 Sapi was flagged down
For a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delicto to be affected, "two elements must
concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he
by the police officers on
[or she] has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a a checkpoint after they
crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer. A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law
received an information
enforcers must have personal knowledge of facts, based on their observation, that he was on his way
that the person sought to be arrested has just committed a crime. This is what
gives rise to probable cause that would justify a warrantless search under Rule to San Pablo City to
113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. obtain illegal drugs.
ISSUE AND RULING They confiscated a
WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A VALID
teabag to what appears
WARRANTLESS ARREST? to be marijuana.
No. He was not committing a crime at the checkpoint. Petitioner was merely a
passenger who did not exhibit any unusual conduct in the presence of the law
enforcers that would incite suspicion. In effecting the warrantless arrest, the
police officers relied solely on the tip they received. Reliable information alone
is insufficient to support a warrantless arrest absent any overt act from the
person to be arrested indicating that a crime has just been committed, was being
committed, or is about to be committed.

06
FACTS ISSUE AND
The police received a text message from a CI about an
alleged courier of marijuana who was sighted at
RULING
bukidnon. The police stationed a checkpoint to where WHETHER OR NOT THE ARREST
they stopped the bus and ordered the passengers for WAS VALID?
baggage inspection. They found a transparent No. There was no overt act in the presence or within the view of
cellophane bag containing mj leaves in the bag of the police officers which would indicate that he was commiting the
Renante. crime of illegal possesion of drugs.

CASE DOCTRINE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V.
FBRONOLA
GR NO 213225
APRIL 4,2018
For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto to
be valid, two requisites must concur: (]) the person to be arrested
must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2)
such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.The tip provided by the informant does not justify a
warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have personal knowledge of
facts, based on their observation, that the person sought to be
arrested has just committed a crime. This is what gives rise to
probable cause that would justify a warrantless search under Rule
113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

FACTS
PO1 Falolo who was not on duty at the time boarded
on a bus. Since the bus was already full, he sat on top of
the bus. The petitioner then threw his carton baggage
to PO1 Falolo. When he caught the box, he already
suspected that it was marijuana due to it’s distinct smell
and irregular shaped leaves. He then decided to follow
the petitioner. Since he was off duty and doesn’t have
load. He followed the petitioner until he reached SPO2
Suagen who was on duty at that time and caught the
petitioner.
ISSUE AND
CASE DOCTRINE
AGPAD V. PEOPLE OF THE RULING
PHILIPPINES WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A VALID
GR NO 227366 WARRANTLESS ARREST?
AUGUST 1,2018
In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (a), Rule 113, two Yes. At that moment, PO1 Falolo acquired probable cause to conduct
(2) elements must concur, namely: (a) the person to be arrested must a warrantless arrest on petitioner. There were numerous
execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually circumstances and overt acts which show that PO1 Falolo had
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt probable cause to effect the said warrantless arrest: (1) the smell of
act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. marijuana emanating from the carton baggage; (2) the irregular
On the other hand, Section 5 (b), Rule 113 requires for its application shape of the baggage; (3) the hardness of the baggage; (4) the assent
that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been of petitioner in the inspection of his baggage but running away at
committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts the sight of SPO2 Suagen; and (5) leaving behind
indicating that the accused had committed it. his baggage to avoid the police officers.

07
 FACTS
The police officers conducted
a stake out where they saw the
petitioner having pot session
with Sacare and Lim. The
police officers arrested them
when they tried to escape.

CASE DOCTRINE
MAHIPUS V. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
GR NO 210731
FEBRUARY 13, 2019
Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the
procedure for the acquisition by the court of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be
made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection
is deemed waived. We have also ruled that an accused
may be estopped from assailing the illegality of his
arrest if he fails to move for the quashing of the
information against him before his arraignment

ISSUE AND
RULING
WHETHER OR NOT THE
ARREST AS VALID?
Yes. It became valid when the petitioner admits that he
failed to question the validity of the arrest before
arraignment. He actively participated in his trial. He
raised the additional issue of irregularity of his arrest
only during his appeal to this Court. He is, therefore,
deemed to have waived such alleged defect by
submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the court by
his counsel-assisted plea during his arraignment; by his
actively participating in the trial and by not raising the
objection before his arraignment.

08
 RULE 114
(BAIL)

CASE DOCTRINE
PEOPLE VS ESCOBAR GENUINO V DE LIMA
G.R. NO. 214300' G.R. NO. 197930
JULY 26, 2017 APRIL 17, 2018
Bail Petition is not barred by res judicata as this doctrine is not The power of courts to restrict the travel of persons out on bail is an
recognized in criminal proceedings. An interlocutory order denying incident of its power to grant or deny bail.
an application for bail, in this case being criminal in nature, does not
give rise to res judicata.

ISSUE AND RULING

1. WHETHER MANUEL ESCOBAR’S SECOND WHETHER THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IS
PETITION FOR BAIL IS BARRED BY RES EMPOWERED BY A SPECIFIC LAW TO RESTRICT
JUDICATA THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL OF PERSONS UNDER
Escobar’s Second Bail Petition is not barred by res judicata as this CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION.
doctrine is not recognized in criminal proceedings. Expressly The Department of Justice is neither empowered by s specific law nor
applicable in civil cases, res judicata settles with finality the dispute does it possess the inherent power to restrict the right to travel of
between the parties or their successors-in-interest. Trinidad v. Office persons under criminal investigation through the issuance of hold
of the Ombudsman declares that res judicata as found in Rule 39 of departure orders, watch list orders and allow departure orders. Its
the Rules of Civil Procedure, is a principle in civil law and has no mandate under the Administrative Code of 1987 to “investigate the
bearing on criminal proceedings. commission of crimes and prosecute offenders” cannot be interpreted
so broadly as to include the power to curtail a person’s right to travel.
2. WHETHER ESCOBAR SHOULD BE GRANTED
Furthermore, D.O. No. 41, Series of 2010 cannot be likened to the
BAIL
power of the courts to restrict the travel of persons on bail as the
A grant of bail does not prevent the trier of facts from making a final latter presupposes that the accused was arrested by virtue of a valid
assessment of the evidence after full trial on the merits. No part of warrant and placed under the court’s jurisdiction. For these reasons,
this Decision should prejudice the submission of additional evidence Department of Justice Circular No. 41, Series of 2010, is
for the prosecution to prove Escobar’s guilt in the main case. unconstitutional.

FACTS
Manuel Escobar filed a petition for bail which was denied by the The case is a consolidated case of Petition for Certiorari and
RTC and CA. He then filed a second petition for bail and was also Prohibition against former DOJ Secretary De Lima for her issuance
denied on the ground of res judicata. CA overturned the Decision of of DOJ Circular No. 41, Series of 2010, known as the Consolidated
the RTC arguing that the trial court committed grave abuse of Rules and Orders and Allow Departure Orders. The petitioners
discretion in denying the second bail petition and granted the question the constitutionality of this DOJ circular on the ground that
petition for certiorari and order RTC to determine the appropriate it infringes the constitutional right to travel. The petitioners in these
bail for Escobar’s provisional liberty. case are former President Arroyo and her husband, and Efraim
Genuino. De Lima issued HDO and WLO against petitioners on the
ground that criminal charges pf plunder, qualified theft and violation
of the Omnibus Election Code. Spouses Arroyo filed a temporary
restraining order against issued HDO and WLO of DOJ seeking
relief and grant from court to allow them to travel so that President
Arroyo may seek medical treatment abroad. The court granted relief
sought on a condition that petitioner will file a bond of Php 2
million, an undertaking the petitioners shall report to Philippine
Consulate in the countries they are to visit and shall appoint a
representative to receive on their behalf subpoena, orders and other
legal processes. Petitioners complied all the conditions instead of
following the order of the court, DOJ caused for the refusal to process
the petitioners travel documents.

09
ISSUE AND
CASE DOCTRINE
RULING TEJANO V MARIGOMEN
Whether Judge Marigomen is guilty of ignorance of the law and A.M. NO. RTJ-17-2492
respondent Camay, for violating of ARTA for being a fixer SEPTEMBER 26, 2017
The accused must be in custody of the law or otherwise deprived of
The charge of gross ignorance of the law against Judge Marigomen his/her liberty to be able to post bail.
merits a more serious sanction.

Bail, as defined in Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, is "the

security given for the release of a person in custody of the law,
furnished by him [or her] or a bondsman, to guarantee his [or her]
appearance before any court as required under the conditions
hereinafter specified." Based on this definition, the accused must be
in custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his or her liberty to
be able to post bail.

Generally, bail is filed before the court where the case is pending.
However, if bail cannot be filed before the court where the case is
pending as when the judge handling the case is absent or
unavailable, or if the accused is arrested in a province, city, or
municipality other than where the case is pending-Rule 114,
Section 17(a) of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 17. Bail, Where Filed. - (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be
filed with the court where the case is pending, or in the absence or
unavailability of the judge thereof, with any regional trial judge,
metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit
trial judge in the province, city, or municipality. If the accused is
arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than where the
case is pending, bail may also be filed with any regional trial court
of said place, or if no judge thereof is available. with any
metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit
trial judge therein. (Emphasis supplied)The text of Rule 114,
Section 17(a) of the Rules of Court shows that there is an order of
preference with respect to where bail may be filed. In the absence
or unavailability of the judge where the case is pending, the
accused must first go to a judge in the province, city, or municipality where the case is pending. Furthermore, a judge of another province, city,
or municipality may grant bail only if the accused has been arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than where the case is pending. A
judge not assigned to the province, city, or municipality where the case is pending but approves an application for bail filed by an accused not
arrested is guilty of gross ignorance of the law. The last sentence of Rule 114, Section 17(a) is clear that for purposes of determining whether or
not the accused is in custody of the law, the mode required is arrest, not voluntary surrender, before a judge of another province, city, or
municipality may grant a bail application. In the same vein, it is gross ignorance of the law if a judge grants an application for bail in a criminal
case outside of his or her jurisdiction without ascertaining the absence or unavailability of the judge of the court where the criminal case is
pending.

A Judge Marigomen was not a judge in the province, city, or municipality where the case was pending. Neither was Andrino arrested in a
province, city, or municipality other than where the case was pending precisely because no warrant of arrest had yet been issued when he posted
bail on May 9, 2013. Judge Marigomen violated Rule 114, Section 17(a) and is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.

Moreover, Judge Marigomen did not ascertain the absence or unavailability of Judge Saniel. This duty to ascertain is a consequence of Judge
Marigomen not being the judge of the place where the criminal case was pending and could have been satisfied by inquiring and coordinating
with the court personnel belonging to Branch 20, where the criminal case was pending. Had Judge Marigomen done his duty, Judge Saniel
would have already been informed of the grant of bail on May 9, 2013, and therefore, would not have superfluously issued a Warrant of Arrest 21
days later. Presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot be appreciated in favor of Judge Marigomen.

FACTS
Tejano contented that Judge Marigomen refused to transfer the civil case to Judge Trinidad, the newly designated Assisting Judge, in violation of
Administrative Order No. 137-2012. Alleging that Judge Marigomen issued the Order of Release with no standing warrant of arrest against
Andrino, in violation of Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. On Judge Marigomen, granted Andrino’s motion to try the civil case because
the circumstances that it had not been conducting hearings since 2012. Furthermore, he had not anticipated thar a new Assisting Judge would be
assigned to the said court. Therefore, he continued hearing the civil case. As to Andrino’s bail bond, he approved it in the exercise of his sound
discretion, alleging that in applications for bail, the stringent application of Andrino in posting bail but only because he was a public employee
obliged to do so and denied that he was a fixer and claimed that he had no personal interest in the outcome of the civil. Office of the Court
Administrator found Judge Marigomen guilty of gross ignorance of the law and of violating Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars.
However, it dismissed the complait for violation of the Anti- Red Tape Act against Camay. Tejano led an Affidavit before this Court, stating the
her filing of the Complaint is “only a product of miscommunication”. Thus, in order to move on, she declared that she was withdrawing the
Complaint she had led against Judge Marigomen.

10
CASE DOCTRINE ISSUE AND RULING
WHETHER THE CA ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE ORDER
PEOPLE V NOVO TANES Y BELMONTE
OF THE RTC WHICH GRANTED TANES’ APPLICATION
G.R. NO. 240596 FOR BAIL.
APRIL 3, 2019
The petition is totally without merit.
To determine whether evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, the
conduct of bail hearings is required where the prosecution has the In this case, Tanes was charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of
burden of proof, subject to the right of the defense to cross-examine R.A. 9165 which carries the penalty of life imprisonment. Hence, Tanes'
witnesses and introduce evidence in rebuttal. The court is to conduct bail becomes a matter of judicial discretion if the evidence of his guilt is
only a summary hearing, consistent with the purpose of merely not strong. To determine whether evidence of guilt of the accused is
determining the weight of evidence for purposes of bail. strong, the conduct of bail hearings is required where the prosecution has
the burden of proof, subject to the right of the defense to cross-examine

FACTS
witnesses and introduce evidence in rebuttal. The court is to conduct
only a summary hearing, consistent with the purpose of merely
determining the weight of evidence for purposes of bail. The court's
An Information was filed against Tanes for violating Section 5,
grant or denial of the bail application must contain a summary of the
Article 2 of RA 9165. Tanes pleaded not guilty to the charge. He filed
prosecution's evidence. On this basis, the judge formulates his or her
a petition for bail. The RTC finds justifiable grounds to grant the
own conclusion on whether such evidence is strong enough to indicate
bail to the accused. The CA dismissed the petition. According to the
the guilt of the accused.
CA, petitioner failed to show that the RTC’s exercise of discretion in
granting the application for bail was unsound and unguided by
jurisprudence.

CASE DOCTRINE ISSUE AND RULING

WHETHER THE CA ERRED IN DISMISSING RECTO'S
RECTO V PEOPLE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.
G.R. NO. 236461
DECEMBER 5, 2018 The denial of the Motion to Fix Bail by the RTC amounted to an
All persons charged with a criminal offense have the right to bail. evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law. The Order
However, persons charged with an offense punishable by reclusion denying the Motion to Fix Bail was thus issued with grave abuse of
perpetua cannot avail of this right if the evidence of guilt is strong. discretion amounting to lack or excess or jurisdiction.
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides:

FACTS SECTION 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
An Information of Murder was filed against Reynaldo Recto for the
death of Margie Carlosita. Recto’s former counsel filed a Petition for recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
Bail. RTC issued an Order denying Recto’s Petition for Bail noting impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
that “without, however, prejudging in any way the result of the case, suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
the Court is of the impression that the evidence of guilt is strong, and The following Constitutional provision is implemented by the
it is incumbent on the part of the accused to take the witness stand to following provisions of the Rules of Court:
show otherwise. The CA affirmed the denial of Recto’s Motion to Fix SEC. 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. - All persons in custody shall
Bail. The CA reasoned that Recto failed to show that the RTC’s be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or
issuance order was attended by grave abuse of discretion amounting released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and
(b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. In the
present case, Recto was charged with Murder - an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua. Thus, the RTC was acting within its powers or
jurisdiction when it denied Recto's initial Petition for Bail. The RTC
possesses sufficient discretion to determine, based on the evidence
presented before it during the bail hearing, whether the evidence of
guilt is strong.
However, after the prosecution had rested its case, Recto filed a Motion
to Fix Bail on the ground that bail had become a matter of right as the
evidence presented by the prosecution could only convict Recto of
Homicide, not Murder. This Motion to Fix Bail was denied by the RTC,
reiterating its earlier finding that, in its judgment, the evidence of guilt
is strong. This is where the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion,
and the CA thus erred in upholding the RTC's Order denying the
Motion to Fix Bail.

11
 RULE 112
(PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION)
CASE DOCTRINE FACTS
STEVEN R. PAVLOW Respondent’s daughter ( Maria Sheila) filed a criminal complaint
against petitioner for slight physical injuries and maltreatment. But
VS. CHERRY L.
due to her failure to substantiate her allegations, the Assistant City
MENDENILLA Prosecutor dismissed the criminal complaint. Ten (10) years later,
GR NO. 181489 respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court a Petition for Maria
APRIL 19,2017 Sheila’s benefit, prating for the issuance of a Temporary Protection
Order (TPO) or Permanent Protection Order (PPO) under the Anti-
Preliminary investigation, or proceedings at the level of the VAWC Law (R.A. No. 9262). a temporary restraining order was
prosecutor, does not form part of trial. It is not a judicial proceeding issued by the RTC in favor of the respondent’s daughter. When
that leads to the issuance of a protection order. service summons with the TPO attached was attempted on
September 7, 2005, Pavlow was out of the country. Thus, summons
was served instead through his employee, Tolentino, who also
resided at PAvlow’s own residence.

ISSUE AND RULING

1. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CHERRY L. MENDELILLA HAD PERSONALITY TO FILE A PETITION
FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A PROTECTION ORDER UNDER SECTION 8 OF THE ANTI-VAWC LAW FOR THE
BENEFIT OF HER DAUGHTER.

2. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT MENDENILLA ENGAGED IN FORUM SHOPPING BY FILING A

PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A PROTECTION ORDER AFTER A CRIMINAL COMPLAINT UNDER
THE ANTI-VAWC LAW WAS DISMISSED BY THE PROSECUTOR; AND

3. WHETHER SUMMONS WAS PROPERLY SERVED ON PETITIONER STEVEN R. PAVLOW AND

JURISDICTION OVER HIS PERSON WAS VALIDLY ACQUIRED.

1. YES. The mother of a victim of acts of violence against women and their children is expressly given personality to file a petition for the
issuance of a protection orther by Section 9(b) of the Anti-VAWC Law. However, the right of a mother and of other persons mentioned in
Section 9 to file such a petition is suspended when the victim has filed a petition for herself. Nevertheless, in this case, respondent Mendenilla filed
her petition after her daughter’s complaint-affidavit had already been dismissed. A petition for the issuance of protection order is not limited to
the alleged victim herself. The victim’s mother - as is the case with respondent Mendenilla - is explicitly given the capacity to apply for a
protection order for the benefit of her child. Hence, Mendenilla had the requisite personality to file a petition for the issuance of a protection
order in favor of Maria Sheila.

2. NO. Jurisprudence has long settled that preliminary investigation does not form part of trial. Investigation for the purpose of determining
whether an actual charge shall subsequently be filed against the person subject of the investigation is a purely administrative, rather than a judicial
or quasi-judicial, function. It is not an exercise in adjudication: no ruling is made on the rights and obligations of the parties, but merely
evidentiary appraisal to determine if it is worth going into actual adjudication.In applying to the case at bar, Assistant City Prosecutor Odronia’s
dismissal of the complaint-affidavit filed by Maria Sheila came as a result of preliminary investigation. This meant that, to begin with, there was
not even a prior judicial proceeding which could lead to the issuance of a protection order. The criminal action in which Maria Sheila would have
been deemed to have impliedly instituted her own petition for the issuance of a protection order did not even commenced.

3. YES. The non-use of the precise term “summons” in the Anti-VAWC Law, its Implementing Rules and Regulations, and its procedural rules
provided in A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC does not justify the equation of a temporary protection order with summons and the exclusion of the use of
summons. Rule 12, Section 7 stipulates that substituted service may be resorted to “if, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be personally
served within a reasonable time.” The exigencies of this case reveal a backdrop of justifiable cases and how, by the convenience of petitioner
Steven Pavlow’s absence, immediate personal service was rendered impossible. These exigencies justified substituted service of summons upon
petitioner during his temporary absence through Monette Tolentino, a person of suitable age and discretion, who also resided at petitioner’s own
residence. Hence, jurisdiction over petitioner’s person was then validly acquired.

12
 FACTS
The Sangguniang Bayan of Bansalan, Davao del Sur passed
Municipa Ordinance, prohibiting the “storing, displaying, selling,
and blowing up (‘pagpabuto’) of those pyrotechnics products
allowed by law, commonly called ‘firecrackers’ or ‘pabuto’ within
the premises of buildings 1 and 2 of the Bansalan Public Market. On
December 14, 2009, then Bansalana Mayor Reyes approved a permit
allowing vendors to sell firecrackers at the Bansalan Public Market
from December 21, 2009 to January 1 ,2010. on December 27, 2009,
a rire befell the Bansalan Public Market. It caused etensive damage
and destroyed fire hydrants of the Bansalan Water District.
Subsequently, private respondent Paul Jocson Arches (Arches) filed
a complaint dated December 20, 2010 against Reyes before the
Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao. Arches questioned the
approval and issuance of a mayor’s permit agreeing to sell
firecrackers, in violation of Municipal Ordinance. He claimed that
this permit caused the fire the previous year. The Ombudsman
issued the assailed Resolution dated March 20, 2013 and found that
probable cause existed to charge Reyes and his co-respondents a quo
with violation of Section 3€ of Republic Act No. 3019. The
Ombudsman held that Reyes and his co-respondents a quo were
public officers during the questioned acts. Both the government and
private stall owners suffered undue injury due to the fire at the
Bansalan Public Market. While the mayor’s permit was not the
proximate cause of the fire, it nonetheless, “gave unwarranted
benefit and advantage to the fire cracker vendors. The issuance of
the mayor’s permit was “patently tainted with bad faith and
partially or, at the very least, gross inexcusable negligence.

CASE DOCTRINE
EDWIN GRANADA REYES
VS. THE OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN
GR NO. 208243
JUNES 5, 2017
A preliminary investigation is only for the determination of
probable cause.Preliminary investigation is not part of trial and is
conducted only to establish whether probable cause xist

ISSUE AND RULING

WHETHER OR NOT THE OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DETERMINING THAT
PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST PETITIONER EXISTS.

NO. The rule on non-interference is based on the “respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office
of the Ombudsman[.]” An independent constitutional body, the Office of the Ombudsman is “beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the
people, and is the preserver of the integrity of the public service.” thus, it has the sole power to determine whether there is probable cause to
warrant the filing of a criminal case against an accused. The function is executive in nature. The executive determination of probable cause is a
highly factual matter. It requires probing into the “existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind,
acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he [she] was prosecuted.
“the Office of the Ombudsman is armed with the power to investigate. It is, therefore, in a better position to assess the strengths or weaknesses of
the evidence on hand needed to make a finding of probable cause. As this Court is not a trier of facts, we defer to the sound judgment of the
Ombudsman. Disagreement with the Ombudsman’s findings is not enough to constitute grave abuse of discretion. It is settled: An act of a court or
tribunal may constitute grave abuse of discretion when the same is performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgement amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or personal hostility. The
Ombudsman properly performed its duty to determine probable cause as to whether petitioner and his co-respondents a quo violated Section 3(e)
of Republic Act No. 3019. section 3(e) provides: Section 3. corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: (e)
Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charge with the grant of licenses or permits
or other concessions.

13
 CASE DOCTRINE
PRESCILLA Z. ORBE VS.
LEONORA O. MIARAL
GR NO. 217777
AUGUST 16, 2017
As the representative of the State, the public prosecutor determines in a preliminary investigation whether there is probable cause that the
accused committed a crime.The general rule is that in the conduct of a preliminary investigation, the prosecutor is given a wide latitude of
discretion to determine what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause.

FACTS
Leonora O. Miaral agreed to engage in the garment exportation business with her sister, Priscilla Z. Orbe. They executed a partnership
agreement where they agreed to contribute ₱ 250,000.00 each to Toppy Co., Inc. and Miaral Enterprises, and to equally divide the profits
they may earn.Petitioner later discovered that there was no exportation of garments to the United States or any other transactions in the
United States that took place. Petitioner filed a complaint for estafa against respondent and Anne Kristine before the Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City. The OCP of Quezon City issued a Resolution recommending filing of Information for Estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code against respondents Leonora O.Miaral and Anne Kristine O. Miaral. The City
Prosecutor later filed with the RTC a Motion to Withdraw Information. The RTC issued an Order denying the Motion to Withdraw
Information,and directing the arraignment of respondent and Anne Kristine. The Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied by the
RTC. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the assailed Orders of the RTC. It further directed the RTC to issue an order for the
withdrawal of the Information for estafa against respondent and Anne Kristine.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS

COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT
THE RTC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.

NO. The general rule is that in the conduct of a preliminary investigation, the prosecutor is

ISSUE given a wide latitude of discretion to determine what constitutes sufficient evidence as will
establish probable cause. However, when the respondent establishes that the prosecutor
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in

AND
determining whether there is probable cause, the courts may interfere. In this case, the
OCP found that no probable cause existed against respondent and Anne Kristine for the
commission of the crime of estafa. In its Resolution, relying mainly on the case of United
States v. Clarin, the OCP found that there was a partnership agreement between the

RULING parties, thus resolving that the failure of a partner to account for partnership funds may
only give rise to a civil obligation, not a criminal case for estafa. Furthermore, the RTC
made its own independent assessment whether or not probable cause exists that the crime
was committed by respondent and Anne Kristine. "Independent assessment" does not mean
mere approval or disapproval of the prosecution's stand; it also means that the RTC must
itself be convinced that indeed there is or there is no sufficient evidence against the
accused. The question is not so much whether the RTC has the authority to grant or not to
grant the OCP's Motion to Withdraw Information, because it has such authority,but
whether, in the exercise of that authority, the RTC acted justly and fairly. This Court finds
that it did.

14
FACTS ISSUE AND RULING
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati issued a Pasiya or WON RTC AND CA GRAVELY ABUSED THEIR
Resolution finding probable cause against the petitioner for the DISCRETION IN DISMISSING PETITIONER’S
violation of RA 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, MOTION TO QUASH?
Exploitation and Discrimination Act). Later on, a Pabatid Sakdal or
YES. Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal
Information was filed before the RTC charging the petitioner of the
Procedure states that the filing of a complaint or information
said crime.The petitioner moved for the quashal of the Information
requires a prior written authority or approval of the named officers
against her on the ground of lack of authority of the person who
therein before a complaint or information may be filed before the
filed the same before the RTC. She claims that it is a jurisdictional
courts. xxx Thus, as a general rule, complaints or informations filed
defect that cannot be cured. OCP-Makati countered that SACP-
before the courts without the prior written authority or approval of
Hirang was authorized to approve the Pasiya pursuant OCP-Makati
the foregoing authorized officers renders the same defective and,
Office Order No. 32 and the prior approval from the City Prosecutor
therefore, subject to quashal pursuant to Section 3 (d), Rule 117 of the
with regards to the information was shown in the Certification.
same Rules. xxx In this relation, People v. Garfin, firmly instructs
that the filing of an Information by an officer without the requisite
authority to file the same constitutes a jurisdictional infirmity which
cannot be cured by silence, waiver, acquiescence, or even by express

CASE DOCTRINE consent. Hence, such ground may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings.

GIRLIE M. QUISAY V. PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES
G. R. NO. 216920
JANUARY 13, 2016
The filing of an Information by an officer without the requisite
authority to file the same constitutes a jurisdictional infirmity which
cannot be cured by silence, waiver, acquiescence, or even by express
consent.

FACTS
ISSUE AND On August 13, 2004, petitioner ABS-CBN filed a criminal complaint
against respondent GMA for (alleged) act of copyright infringement

RULING
under Sections 177 and 211 of the Intellectual Property Code (RA
8293, as amended), because the respondent aired footage of the
arrival and homecoming of OFW Angelo dela Cruz at NAIA from
W/N THERE IS PROBABLE CAUSE TO FIND Iraq without the petitioner's consent. ABS-CBN stated that it has an
RESPONDENTS TO BE HELD LIABLE CRIMINALLY agreement with Reuter's that the petitioner will contribute news and
FOR THE CASE OF COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT content that it owns and makes to Reuters in exchange of the latter's
UNDER THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (RA news and video material, and Reuters will ensure that ABS-CBN's
8293, AS AMENDED)? materials cannot be aired in the country by other subscibers.No
other Philippine subscriber of Reuters would be allowed to use ABS-
The Supreme Court PARTIALLY GRANTED ABS-CBN’s petition CBN footage without the latter's (ABS-CBN) consent
and ordered RTC Q.C. Branch 93 to continue with the criminal
proceedings against Grace Dela PeñaReyes and John Oliver
Manalastas due to copyright infringement. It held that ABS-CBN's
video footage is copyrightable because it is under “audiovisual works
and cinematographic works and works produced by a process
analogous to cinematography or any process for making audiovisual
CASE DOCTRINE
recordings.” It also stated that news or the event itself is not ABS CBN V. GOZON
copyrightable. The Court differentiated idea and expression – idea GR. NO 195956
meant as “a form, the look or appearance of a thing” while
expression is its reality or the “external, perceptible world of
MARCH 11, 2015
articulate sounds and visible written symbols that others can Fair use, which is an exception to copyright owner’s monopoly of
understand.” Thus, the Supreme Court stated that “only the the work's usage, was defined by the Supreme Court as privilege to
expression of an idea is protected by copyright, not the idea itself”, use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without the
citing the US Supreme Court's decision in Baker vs Selden (101 U.S. copyright owner's consent or by copying the material's theme or
99). idea rather than its expression.

15