CONSTI2 Cases under Due Process and Equal Protection

CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS

DUE PROCESS

Life, Liberty, Property defined.

Aspects of Due Process

Substantive Due Process

Cases:

Kwong Sing v. City of Manila, 41 Phil 103

KWONG SING VS. CITY OF MANILA [41 Phil 103; G.R. No. 15972; 11 Oct
1920]

Facts: Kwong Sing, in his own behalf and of other Chinese laundrymen who has general
and the same interest, filed a complaint for a preliminary injunction. The Plaintiffs also
questioned the validity of enforcing Ordinance No. 532 by the city of Manila. Ordinance
No. 532 requires that the receipt be in duplicate in English and Spanish duly signed
showing the kind and number of articles delivered by laundries and dyeing and cleaning
establishments. The permanent injunction was denied by the trial court. The appellants
claim is that Ordinance No. 532 savors of class legislation; putting in mind that they are
Chinese nationals. It unjustly discriminates between persons in similar circumstances;
and that it constitutes an arbitrary infringement of property rights. They also contest
that the enforcement of the legislation is an act beyond the scope of their police power.
In view of the foregoing, this is an appeal with the Supreme Court.

Issues:

(1) Whether or Not the enforcement of Ordinance no, 532 is an act beyond the scope of
police power

(2) Whether or Not the enforcement of the same is a class legislation that infringes
property rights.

Held: Reasonable restraints of a lawful business for such purposes are permissible

under the police power. The police power of the City of Manila to enact Ordinance No.
532 is based on Section 2444, paragraphs (l) and (ee) of the Administrative Code, as
amended by Act No. 2744, authorizes the municipal board of the city of Manila, with the
approval of the mayor of the city:
(l) To regulate and fix the amount of the license fees for the following: xxxx
xxxxxlaundries xxxx.

(ee) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and
safety, the furtherance of the prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace,
good order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants.

The court held that the obvious purpose of Ordinance No. 532 was to avoid disputes
between laundrymen and their patrons and to protect customers of laundries who are
not able to decipher Chinese characters from being defrauded. (Considering that in the
year 1920s, people of Manila are more familiar with Spanish and maybe English.)

In whether the ordinance is class legislation, the court held that the ordinance invades
no fundamental right, and impairs no personal privilege. Under the guise of police
regulation, an attempt is not made to violate personal property rights. The ordinance is
neither discriminatory nor unreasonable in its operation. It applies to all public laundries
without distinction, whether they belong to Americans, Filipinos, Chinese, or any other
nationality. All, without exception, and each every one of them without distinction, must
comply with the ordinance. The obvious objection for the implementation of the
ordinance is based in sec2444 (ee) of the Administrative Code. Although, an additional
burden will be imposed on the business and occupation affected by the ordinance such
as that of the appellant by learning even a few words in Spanish or English, but mostly
Arabic numbers in order to properly issue a receipt, it seems that the same burdens are
cast upon the them. Yet, even if private rights of person or property are subjected to
restraint, and even if loss will result to individuals from the enforcement of the
ordinance, this is not sufficient ground for failing to uphold the power of the legislative
body. The very foundation of the police power is the control of private interests for the
public welfare.

Finding that the ordinance is valid, judgment is affirmed, and the petition for a
preliminary injunction is denied, with costs against the appellants.
GSIS v. Monteclaros 434 SCRA 41

GSIS V. MONTESCLAROS - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

G.R. No. 146494. July 14, 2004

FACTS:
Nicolas Montesclaros, a 72-year-old widower married Milagros Orbiso, who was then 43
years old, on 10 July 1983. Nicolas filed with the GSIS an application for retirement
benefits under the Revised Government Insurance Act of 1977.
In his retirement application, he designated his wife as his sole beneficiary. GSIS
approved Nicolas’ application for retirement effective 17 February 1984, granting a
lump sum payment of annuity for the first five years and a monthly annuity after.
Nicolas died on 22 April 1992. Milagros filed with the GSIS a claim for survivorship
pension under PD 1146 but was denied the claim because, under section 18 of PD
1146, the surviving spouse has no right to survivorship pension if the surviving spouse
contracted the marriage with the pensioner within three years before the pensioner
qualified for the pension.
Nicolas wed Milagros on 10 July 1983, less than one year from his date of retirement on
17 February 1984. Milagros filed with the trial court a special civil action for declaratory
relief questioning the validity of Sec. 18 of PD 1146.
The trial court rendered judgment declaring Milagros eligible for survivorship pension
and ordered GSIS to pay Milagros the benefits including interest. Citing Articles 115and
117 of the Family Code, the trial court held that retirement benefits, which the
pensioner has earned for services rendered and for which the pensioner has contributed
through monthly salary deductions, are onerous acquisitions. Since retirement benefits
are property the pensioner acquired through labor, such benefits are conjugal property.
The trial court held that the prohibition in Section 18 of PD 1146 is deemed repealed for
being inconsistent with the Family Code, a later law. The Family Code has retroactive
effect if it does not prejudice or impair vested rights.
The trial court held that Section 18 of PD 1146 was repealed by the Family Code, a later
law. GSIS appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s decision.
Hence, this appeal.
In a letter dated 10 January 2003, Milagros informed the Court that she has accepted
GSIS’ decision disqualifying her from receiving survivorship pension and that she is no
longer interested in pursuing the case. However, the Court will still resolve the issue
despite the manifestation of Milagros because social justice and public interest demand
the resolution of the constitutionality of the proviso.
ISSUE:
Whether the proviso in Section 18 of PD 1146 is constitutional.
HELD:
NO. The sole proviso Sec. 18 of PD 1146 is unconstitutional. Under Section 18 of PD
1146, it prohibits the dependent spouse from receiving survivorship pension if such
dependent spouse married the pensioner within three years before the pensioner
qualified for the pension. The Court holds that such proviso is discriminatory and denies
equal protection of the law.
The proviso is contrary to Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, which provides that
[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
There is outright confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse without giving the
surviving spouse an opportunity to be heard.
The proviso undermines the purpose of PD 1146, which is to assure comprehensive and
integrated social security and insurance benefits to government employees and their
dependents in the event of sickness, disability, death, and retirement of the
government employees.
A statute based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty
of the equal protection of the law. The requirements for a valid and reasonable
classification are:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class. Thus, the law may treat and
regulate one class differently from another class provided there are real and substantial
differences to distinguish one class from another.
The proviso in question does not satisfy these requirements. The proviso discriminates
against the dependent spouse who contracts marriage to the pensioner within three
years before the pensioner qualified for the pension. Under the proviso, even if the
dependent spouse married the pensioner more than three years before the pensioners
death, the dependent spouse would still not receive survivorship pension if the marriage
took place within three years before the pensioner qualified for pension. The object of
the prohibition is vague. There is no reasonable connection between the means
employed and the purpose intended. The law itself does not provide any reason or
purpose for such a prohibition. If the purpose of the proviso is to prevent deathbed
marriages,  then we do not see why the proviso reckons the three-year prohibition from
the date the pensioner qualified for pension and not from the date the pensioner died.
The classification does not rest on substantial distinctions. Worse, the classification
lumps all those marriages contracted within three years before the pensioner qualified
for pension as having been contracted primarily for financial convenience to avail of
pension benefits.
Indeed, the classification is discriminatory and arbitrary. This is probably the reason
Congress deleted the proviso in Republic Act No. 8291 (RA 8291), otherwise known as
the Government Service Insurance Act of 1997, the law revising the old charter of GSIS
(PD 1146). Under the implementing rules of RA 8291, the surviving spouse who married
the member immediately before the members death is still qualified to receive
survivorship pension unless the GSIS proves that the surviving spouse contracted the
marriage solely to receive the benefit.
Thus, the present GSIS law does not presume that marriages contracted within three
years before retirement or death of a member are sham marriages contracted to avail
of survivorship benefits. The present GSIS law does not automatically forfeit the
survivorship pension of the surviving spouse who contracted marriage to a GSIS
member within three years before the members retirement or death. The law
acknowledges that whether the surviving spouse contracted the marriage mainly to
receive survivorship benefits is a matter of evidence. The law no longer prescribes a
sweeping classification that unduly prejudices the legitimate surviving spouse and
defeats the purpose for which Congress enacted the social legislation.
Wherefore, the proviso in Section 18 of Presidential Decree No. 1146 is void for being
violative of the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of the
law.

2. Procedural Due Process

Judicial and quasi-judicial

YNOT V. IAC | POWERS OF ADMINITRATIVE AGENCIES

G.R. No. 74457, 148 SCRA 659, March 20, 1987

Petitioner: Restituto Ynot

Respondents: Intermediate Appellate Court, The Station Commander, Integrated
National Police, Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo and the Regional Director, Bureau of Animal
Industry, Region IV, Iloilo City
Doctrine: The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge
the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and
militates against the doctrine of separation of powers.

Law Applicable: EO No. 626-A

SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no
carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be
transported from one province to another. The carabao or carabeef transported in
violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and
forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other
similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may
see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the
Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.

Summary
EO 626-A is unconstitutional because:
1. The EO is an invalid exercise of police power as the method employed to
conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law
and, worse, is unduly oppressive.
 2. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied
the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and
punished.
3. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the
guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and
militates against the doctrine of separation of powers.
4. Invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are
granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.

FACTS:
 Pres. Marcos issued EO 626-A to strengthen EO 626, which prohibits the
interprovincial movement of carabaos.
 Ynot transported 6 carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when they
were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo. Ynot
sued for recovery, and the Iloilo’s RTC issued a writ of replevin.
 After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation.
The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as
raise by the petitioner, for 1) lack of authority and 2) EO’s presumed validity.
(Later affirmed by IAC)
ISSUE: Whether EO 626-A is constitutional. – NO.

RULING:
EO 626-A did not pass the lawful means test. (Sufficient Standard Test)
 To strengthen the original measure, EO 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on
the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that “no carabao
regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall
be transported from one province to another.” The object of the prohibition
escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the
purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing.
 We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos
can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed
anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously,
retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any
more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them
there.
 The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported,
to be meted out by the executive authorities, usually the police only.
 In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed
was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction
of the accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is
prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the
police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government.
 In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the
police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had
 filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00,
which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when
ordered by the trial court. The measure struck at once and pounced upon
the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying
him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.
 In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for
the petitioner’s peremptory treatment. The properties involved were not even
inimical per se as to require their instant destruction. There certainly was no
reason why the offense prohibited by the executive order should not have been
proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights
safeguarded to him under the Constitution.
 Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, EO 626-A is penal in nature,
the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only but by
a court of justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the
prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused.
 The phrase “may see fit” is an extremely generous and dangerous
condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for
partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the
usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the
limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their
distribution.
OTHER ISSUES
Constitutionality is not always presumed.
 while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is
not by any means conclusive and in fact may be rebutted if there be a clear
showing of their invalidity, and of the need to declare them so, then “will be the
time to make the hammer fall, and heavily,” to recall Justice Laurel’s trenchant
warning.
 Stated otherwise, courts should not follow the path of least resistance by simply
presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary,
they should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, paraphrasing
another distinguished jurist, and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.
 EO 626-A is really a presidential decree that promulgates a new rule instead of
implementing an existing law.
 EO 626-A was issued not for the purpose of taking care that the laws were
faithfully executed but in the exercise of the President’s legislative authority
under Amendment No. 6. (whenever in his judgment there existed a grave
emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or whenever the legislature failed or
was unable to act adequately on any matter that in his judgment required
immediate action, he could, in order to meet the exigency, issue decrees, orders
or letters of instruction that were to have the force and effect of law)
 In this case, there is no showing of any exigency to justify the exercise of that
extraordinary power then, the petitioner has reason to question the validity of
the executive order.
  Nevertheless, since the determination of the grounds was supposed to have
been made by the President “in his judgment, ” a phrase that will lead to
protracted discussion not really necessary at this time, we reserve resolution of
this matter until a more appropriate occasion. For the nonce, we confine
ourselves to the more fundamental question of due process.
History of Due Process Clause
 The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also
conveniently resilient.
 This was felt necessary because due process is not, like some provisions of the
fundamental law, an “iron rule” laying down an implacable and immutable
command for all seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of
the guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process clause was meant to make it
adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the
changing times and circumstances may require
No Due Process in this case.
 The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing
which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are
intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness.
 We have consistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome power
of the State, is entitled to “the law of the land,” which Daniel Webster described
almost two hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, as “the
law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders
judgment only after trial.”
 This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be
sure, there are a number of admitted exceptions.
Police Power, as an exception for due process
 The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police
power which both restraints and is restrained by due process.
EO 622-A as an exercise of Police Power
 The original measure was issued for the reason, as expressed in one of its
Whereases, that “present conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes
be conserved for the benefit of the small farmers who rely on them for energy
needs.”
 We affirm at the outset the need for such a measure. In the face of the
worsening energy crisis and the increased dependence of our farms on these
traditional beasts of burden, the government would have been remiss, indeed, if
it had not taken steps to protect and preserve them.
What constitute a valid exercise of police power
 To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it
must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the
means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals (US v. Toribio)
HOWEVER, the police station commander who confiscated the petitioner’s carabaos is
not liable in damages for enforcing the executive order in accordance with its mandate.
The law was at that time presumptively valid, and it was his obligation, as a member of
the police, to enforce it.
 
WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as
affirmed above, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas bond
is cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered restored to the petitioner. No costs.

Ang Tibay v. CIR 69 Phil. 635

Ang Tibay v CIR (1940) 69 Phil 635

J. Laurel

Facts:
Toribio claimed to have laid off workers due to the shortage of leather soles in the Ang
Tibay factory.
The Court of industrial relations forwarded a motion for recon with the supreme court.
In pursuit of a retrial in the Court of Industrial Relations, the national labor union, the
respondent, averred:
1. The shortage of soles has no factual basis
2. The scheme was to prevent the forfeiture of his bond to cover the breach of
obligation with the Army
3. The letter he sent to the army was part of this scheme
4. The company union was an employer dominated one.
5. laborers rights to CBA is indispensable.
6. Civil code shouldn’t be used to interpret a legislation of American industrial origins.
7. Toribio was guilty of unfair labor practice for favoring his union.
8. Exhibits are inaccessible to respondents.
9. The exhibits can reverse the judgment.

Issue: Is the Court of Industrial Relations the proper venue for the trial?

Held: Yes. Case remanded to the CIR

Ratio:
There was no substantial evidence that the exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due
to their union affiliation or activity.
The nature of the CIR is that of an administrative court with judicial and quasi-judicial
functions for the purpose of settling disputes and relations between employers and
employees. It can appeal to voluntary arbitration for dispute. It can also examine the
industries in a locality by order of the president.
There is a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which constitutes a departure
from the separation of powers.
The Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of
procedure, and is not bound by technical rules of legal procedure. It may also include
any matter necessary for solving the dispute.
The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from
the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable
cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements
of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character.
Some examples that it must follow are:
1. right to a hearing
2. consideration of evidence by the court
3. duty to deliberate implies a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of
having something to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached
4. substance of evidence and the non-binding aspect of judicial decisions in an admin
court so as to free them from technical rules
5. the decision must be rendered at the evidence presented at the hearing. The court
may also delegate some powers to other judicial bodies.
6. The court must act on its own decision at reaching a controversy. It mustn’t merely
accept the views of a subordinate.
7. The court must clearly state the issues and the rationale for the decision.
The record is barren and doesn’t satisfy a factual basis as to predicate a conclusion of
law.
Evidence was still inaccessible.
The motion for a new trial should be granted and sent to the CIR.

Javier v. COMELEC 144 SCRA 194

Case Brief: Javier v COMELEC

G.R. Nos. L-68379-81  September 22, 1986
EVELIO B. JAVIER, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ARTURO F.
PACIFICADOR, respondents.
Raul S. Roco and Lorna Patajo-Kapunan for petitioner.

Facts:
The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the Batasang
Pambansa in the May 1984 elections. On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, the
bitter contest between the two came to a head when several followers of the petitioner
were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter’s men. Seven suspects, including
respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial for these murders.
It was in this atmosphere that the voting was held, and the post-election developments
were to run true to form. Owing to what he claimed were attempts to railroad the
private respondent’s proclamation, the petitioner went to the Commission on Elections
to question the canvass of the election returns. His complaints were dismissed and the
private respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said body. The
petitioner thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void
because made only by a division and not by the Commission on Elections en banc as
required by the Constitution.
On May 18, 1984, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections directed the
provincial board of canvassers of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend
the proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders. On June 7, 1984, the
same Second Division ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the
winner without prejudice to the outcome of the case before the Commission. On
certiorari before this Court, the proclamation made by the board of canvassers was set
aside as premature, having been made before the lapse of the 5-day period of appeal,
which the petitioner had seasonably made. Finally, on July 23, 1984, the Second
Division promulgated the decision now subject of this petition which inter alia
proclaimed Arturo F. Pacificador the elected assemblyman of the province of Antique.
The petitioner then came to this Court, asking to annul the said decision on the basis
that it should have been decided by COMELEC en banc.
The case was still being considered when on February 11, 1986, the petitioner was
gunned down in cold blood and in broad daylight. And a year later, Batasang Pambansa
was abolished with the advent of the 1987 Constitution.
Respondents moved to dismiss the petition, contending it to be moot and academic.
Issues:
1. Whether it is correct for the court to dismiss the petition due to the petitioner being
dead and the respondent missing.
2. Whether the Second Division of the Commission on Elections was authorized to
promulgate its decision of July 23, 1984, proclaiming the private respondent the winner
in the election?
Held:
1. No.
The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the office in dispute
between the petitioner and the private respondent-both of whom have gone their
separate ways-could be a convenient justification for dismissing this case. But there are
larger issues involved that must be resolved now, once and for all, not only to dispel the
legal ambiguities here raised. The more important purpose is to manifest in the clearest
possible terms that this Court will not disregard and in effect condone wrong on the
simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case has become moot and academic.
The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the
conscience of the government. The citizen comes to us in quest of law but we must also
give him justice. The two are not always the same. There are times when we cannot
grant the latter because the issue has been settled and decision is no longer possible
according to the law. But there are also times when although the dispute has
disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out to be resolved. Justice demands
that we act then, not only for the vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but
also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future.
2. No.
The applicable provisions are found in Article XII-C, Sections 2 and 3, of the 1973
Constitution.
Section 2 confers on the Commission on Elections the power to:
(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
all member of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials.
Section 3 provides:
The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in three divisions. All election cases
may be heard and decided by divisions except contests involving members of the
Batasang Pambansa, which shall be heard and decided en banc. Unless otherwise
provided by law, all election cases shall be decided within ninety days from the date of
their submission for decision.
We believe that in making the Commission on Elections the sole judge of all contests
involving the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Batasang
Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials, the Constitution intended to give it
full authority to hear and decide these cases from beginning to end and on all matters
related thereto, including those arising before the proclamation of the winners.
As correctly observed by the petitioner, the purpose of Section 3 in requiring that cases
involving members of the Batasang Pambansa be heard and decided by the Commission
en banc was to insure the most careful consideration of such cases. Obviously, that
objective could not be achieved if the Commission could act en banc only after the
proclamation had been made, for it might then be too late already. We are all-too-
familiar with the grab-the-proclamation-and-delay-the-protest strategy of many
unscrupulous candidates, which has resulted in the frustration of the popular will and
the virtual defeat of the real winners in the election. The respondent’s theory would
make this gambit possible for the pre- proclamation proceedings, being summary in
nature, could be hastily decided by only three members in division, without the care
and deliberation that would have otherwise been observed by the Commission en banc.
WHEREFORE, let it be spread in the records of this case that were it not for the
supervening events that have legally rendered it moot and academic, this petition
would have been granted and the decision of the Commission on Elections dated July
23, 1984, set aside as violative of the Constitution.

People v. Larrañaga 421 SCRA 530

On February 3, 2004, we rendered a Decision3 convicting the Uy brothers, together with

Francisco Juan Larrañaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Caño and Ariel
Balansag of the crimes of (a) special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention with homicide and rape; and (b) simple kidnapping and serious illegal
detention. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Cebu City in Criminal
Cases Nos. CBU 45303 and 45304 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellants FRANCISCO JUAN
LARRAÑAGA alias ‘PACO;’ JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias
‘WESLEY;’ ALBERTO CAÑO alias ‘ALLAN PAHAK;’ ARIEL BALANSAG; and JAMES
ANDREW UY alias ‘MM,’ are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special
complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape and
are sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH by lethal injection;
(2) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, appellants FRANCISCO JUAN
LARRAÑAGA alias ‘PACO’; JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias
‘WESLEY;’ ALBERTO CAÑO alias ‘ALLAN PAHAK;’ ARIEL BALANSAG; and JAMES
ANDREW UY alias ‘MM,’ are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple
kidnapping and serious illegal detention and are sentenced to suffer the penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA;
(3) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellant JAMES ANTHONY UY who was a
minor at the time the crime was committed, is likewise found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention with homicide and rape and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA; in Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, he is declared guilty of
simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
TWELVE (12) years of prision mayor  in its maximum period, as MINIMUM, to
seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal  in its medium period, as MAXIMUM;
(4) Appellants are ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Marijoy and
Jacqueline, in each case, the amounts of (a) ₱100,000.00 as civil
indemnity; (b) ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages; (c) ₱150,000.00 as moral damages;
and (d) ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Three (3) Justices of the Court maintain their position that RA 7659 is unconstitutional
insofar as it prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the
majority that the law is constitutional and the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in
the case at bar.
In accordance with Article 83 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of
RA No. 7659, upon the finality of this Decision let the records of this case be forthwith
forwarded to the Office of the President for the possible exercise of Her Excellency’s
pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.

Other Related Cases

Rodriguez v. RTC Judge of Manila 483 SCRA 290

EDUARDO TOLENTINO RODRIGUEZ v. PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC OF MANILA –
BRANCH 17, GR NO. 157977, 2006-02-27

Facts:
Before
The case stemmed from the petition for extradition file... y the Government of the
United States of America (US government) through the Department of Justice (DOJ)
against the petitioners.
After their arrest, petitioners applied for bail which the trial court granted
The bail was set for one million pesos for each. Petitioners then posted cash bonds. The
US government moved for reconsideration of the grant of bail, but the motion was
denied... by the trial court. Unsatisfied, the US government filed a petition for certiorari
with this Court
Thereafter, we directed the trial court to resolve the matter of bail
In compliance with our directive, the trial court, without prior notice and hearing,
cancelled the cash bond of the petitioners and ordered the issuance of a warrant of...
arrest
Petitioners filed... a very urgent motion for the reconsideration of the cancellation of
their bail
Petitioners assert that their bail cannot be cancelled without due process of law.
they point to Rule 114, Section 21... of the Rules of Court where the surety or bonding
company is required to be notified and allowed to show cause why... the bail bond
should not be cancelled.
Petitioners aver that respondent court should have first determined the facts to
evaluate if petitioners were entitled to continuance... of their bail, e.g. their willingness
to go on voluntary extradition, which respondent court should have considered a special
circumstance.
Respondents,... argue that prior notice and hearing are not required to cancel
petitioners' bail, and the issuance of a warrant of arrest ex parte against an extraditee
is not a violation of the due process clause. Further, respondents maintain that... prior
notice and hearing would defeat the purpose of the arrest warrant since it could give
warning that respondents would be arrested and even encourage them to flee.
Issues:
RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED SUCH SERIOUS AND GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN CANCELLING
THE BAIL OF HEREIN PETITIONERS WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE AND HEARING OF ITS
CANCELLATION.
in an extradition case, is prior notice and hearing required before bail is cancelled?...
what constitutes a "special circumstance" to be exempt from the... no-bail rule in
extradition cases?
Ruling:
The issue has become moot and academic insofar as petitioner Eduardo Rodriguez is
concerned. He is now in the USA facing the charges a... gainst him. But co-petitioner
Imelda Gener Rodriguez is here and stands on a different footing.
We agree that her bail should be restored.
In Purganan, we said that a prospective extraditee is not entitled to notice and hearing
before the issuance of a warrant of arrest,... because notifying him before his arrest
only tips him of his pending arrest. But this is for cases pending... the issuance of a
warrant of arrest, not in a cancellation of a bail that had been issued after
determination that the extraditee is a no-flight risk. The policy is that a prospective
extraditee is arrested and detained to avoid his flight from justice.
On the extraditee lies the burden of showing that he will not flee once bail is granted.
[16] If after his arrest and if the trial court finds that he is no flight risk, it grants him
bail. The grant of the bail, presupposes that the... co-petitioner has already presented
evidence to prove her right to be on bail, that she is no flight risk, and the trial court
had already exercised its sound discretion and had already determined that under the
Constitution and laws in force,... co-petitioner is entitled to... provisional release.
We emphasize that bail may be granted to a possible extraditee only upon a clear and
convincing showing (1) that he will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community,
and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.
cancellation of co-petitioner's bail,... without prior notice and hearing, could be
considered a violation of co-petitioner's right to due process tantamount to grave abuse
of discretion.
Finally, considering that remanding the case to the court a quo will only delay the final
resolution of the case as in all probability it would only end up with us again,... we will
decide if Imelda's bail was validly... cancelled.
In Purganan, we held also that the grounds used by the highest court in the requesting
state for the grant of bail may be considered, under the principle of reciprocity.
Considering that she has not been shown to be a flight risk nor a danger to the
community, she is entitled to notice and hearing before her bail could be cancelled.
Based on the record, we find that, absent prior notice and hearing, the bail's
cancellation was in violation of... her right to due process.

Secretary of Justice v. Lantion G.R. 139465 Jan. 18, 2000

FACTS: The United States Government, on June 17, 1999, through Department of

Foreign Affairs U. S. Note Verbale No. 0522, requested the Philippine Government for
the extradition of Mark Jimenez, herein private respondent, to the United States. The
request was forwarded the following day by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the
Department of Justice (DOJ). Pending evaluation of the extradition documents by the
DOJ, private respondent requested for copies of the official extradition request and all
pertinent documents and the holding in abeyance of the proceedings. When his request
was denied for being premature, private respondent resorted to an action
for mandamus, certiorari and prohibition. The trial court issued an order maintaining
and enjoining the DOJ from conducting further proceedings, hence, the instant
petition. 
ISSUE: Would private respondent’s entitlement to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the
Philippine Government under the RP-Extradition Treaty?
RULUNG:
First and foremost, let us categorically say that this is not the proper time to pass upon
the constitutionality of the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty nor the Extradition
Law implementing the same. We limit ourselves only to the effect of the grant of the
basic rights of notice and hearing to private respondent on foreign relations.
The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of
international law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in
good faith. The observance of our country’s legal duties under a treaty is also
compelled by Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which provides that “[t]he
Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to
the policyof peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations.”
Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of
the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the
domestic sphere (Salonga & Yap, Public International Law, 1992 ed., p. 12).
 The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts)
are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of
international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state.
Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is
to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally
accepted principles of international law in observance of the Incorporation Clause in the
above-cited constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 55). In a
situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made
between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that
municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts ( Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101
Phil. 1155 [1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963]; In re:  Garcia, 2 SCRA
984 [1961]) for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are
accordingly bound by it in all circumstances (Salonga & Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The fact
that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or
imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal
sphere. The doctrine ofincorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of
international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national
legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes effect
— a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where
the constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines,
both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with
the constitution (Ibid.).
In the case at bar, is there really a conflict between international law and municipal or
national law? En contrario, these two components of the law of the land are not pitted
against each other. There is no occasion to choose which of the two should be upheld.
Instead, we see a void in the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, as
implemented by Presidential Decree No. 1069, as regards the basic due process rights
of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings. From the
procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the extradition petition and during the
judicial determination of the propriety of extradition, the rights ofnotice and hearing are
clearly granted to the prospective extraditee. However, prior thereto, the law is silent as
to these rights. Reference to the U.S. extradition procedures also manifests this silence.
Petitioner interprets this silence as unavailability of these rights. Consequently, he
describes the evaluation procedure as an “ex parte technical assessment” of the
sufficiency of the extradition request and the supporting documents.
We disagree.
In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An
application of the basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go against
the treaty or the implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law
precludes these rights from a prospective extraditee. Similarly, American jurisprudence
and procedures on extradition pose no proscription. In fact, in interstate extradition
proceedings as explained above, the prospective extraditee may even request for copies
of the extradition documents from the governor of the asylum state, and if he does, his
right to be supplied the same becomes a demandable right (35 C.J.S. 410).
One will search in vain the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the Extradition Law, as well as
American jurisprudence and procedures on extradition, for any prohibition against the
conferment of the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings. We have to consider similar situations
in jurisprudence for an application by analogy.|||  
xxx
The basic principles of administrative law instruct us that “the essence of due process in
administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to
seek reconsideration of the actions or ruling complained of (Mirano vs. NLRC, 270 SCRA
96 [1997]; Padilla vs. NLRC, 273 SCRA 457 [1997]; PLDT vs. NLRC,276 SCRA 1
[1997]; Helpmate, Inc. vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 315 [1997]; Aquinas School vs.
Magnaye, 278 SCRA 602 [1997]; Jamer vs. NLRC, 278 SCRA 632 [1997]). In essence,
procedural due process refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced
(Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils.,  283 SCRA 31 [1997]). This
Court will not tolerate the least disregard of constitutional guarantees in the
enforcement of a law or treaty. Petitioner’s fears that the Requesting State may have
valid objections to the Requested State’s non-performance of its commitments under
the Extradition Treaty are insubstantial and should not be given paramount
consideration. 
How then do we implement the RP-US Extradition Treaty? Do we limit ourselves to the
four corners of Presidential Decree No. 1069?
Said summary dismissal proceedings are also non-litigious in nature, yet we upheld the
due process rights of the respondent.
In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present danger of
loss of property or employment, but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to his
forcible banishment to a foreign land. The convergence of petitioner’s favorable action
on the extradition request and the deprivation of private respondent’s liberty is easily
comprehensible.
We have ruled time and again that this Court’s equity jurisdiction, which is aptly
described as “justice outside legality,” may be availed of only in the absence of, and
never against, statutory law or judicial pronouncements ( Smith Bell & Co., Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 530 [1997]; David-Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA
677 [1997]). The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for “justice
outside legality,” since private respondent’s due process rights, although not
guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees. We
would not be true to the organic law of the land if we choose strict construction over
guarantees against the deprivation of liberty. That would not be in keeping with the
principles of democracy on which our Constitution is premised.
 Verily, as one traverses treacherous waters of conflicting and opposing currents of
liberty and government authority, he must ever hold the oar of freedom in the stronger
arm, lest an errant and wayward course be laid. 
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies
ofthe extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him a reasonable
period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. The incidents in Civil
Case No. 99-94684 having been rendered moot and academic by this decision, the
same is hereby ordered dismissed.

Joseph Estrada v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 148560 Nov. 19, 2001

Case Digest: G.R. No. 148560 , November 19, 2001 Joseph Ejercito Estrada,
Petitioner vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and  People of the Republic
of the Philippines, Respondents

FACTS:
Petitioner, Former President Joseph Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be
prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder),
assailed the constitutionality of the said law based on the following grounds: (1) the law
suffers from vagueness; (2) it dispenses with the reasonable doubt standard in criminal
prosecutions; and (3) it abolishes the element of mens rea or criminal intent in the
crimes already punishable under the Revised Penal Code. The foregoing, according to
Estrada, violated his fundamental rights to due process and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.

ISSUE:
Is the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being vague?
Ruling: 
No. The plunder law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters
which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation.  Republic Act
7080 also known as Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7569, provides for comprehensive
guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render
them liable to its penalties. A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks
comprehensive standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess as
its meaning and differ in application. However, the questioned law is not rendered
uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein or because of the
employment of terms without defining them. The petitioner’s reliance on “void-for-
vagueness” doctrine is clearly misplaced. It can only be invoked against the specie of
legislation that is utterly vague on its face, that which cannot be clarified either by a
saving clause or by construction. Being one of the senators who voted for its passage,
petitioner must be aware that the law was extensively deliberated upon by the senate
and its appropriate committees by reason of which he even registered his affirmative
vote with full knowledge of its legal implications and due observance to the constitution

Dumlao v. Comelec 96 SCRA 392

Napocor v. Zorobrado 487 SCRA 16

NPC V. ZOZOBRADO     G. R. No. 153022 April 10, 2006

FACTS:

Agustin A. Zozobrado, herein respondent, is a permanent employee of petitioner

National Power Corporation (NPC) assigned as Pilot in the aviation group, received a
letter from NPC President Frederico C. Puno, informing him that he was being dropped
from the rolls.

Zozobrado filed an appeal before the CSC questioning NPCs implementation of dropping
him from the rolls.

CSC dismissed Zobrado’s appeal and MR.

Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court and was granted.

Petitioner filed for MR but was denied.

Respondent had been dropped by petitioner from the rolls due to Unsatisfactory or Poor
Performance.

CA ruled in favor of herein respondents finding that the separation was made with utter
lack of due process.

ISSUE:
WON due process was followed in dropping respondent from the rolls.

EQUAL PROTECTION
Ormoc Sugar Central v. Ormoc City February 17, 1968

ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs. THE TREASURER OF

ORMOC CITY, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF ORMOC CITY, HON. ESTEBAN C.
CONEJOS as Mayor of Ormoc City and ORMOC CITY, defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-23794. February 17, 1968. 20 SCRA 739.

FACTS:

The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4, imposing "on any and all
productions of sugar milled at petitioner's, municipal tax of 1% per export sale.
Petitioner paid but were under protest.

Petitioner filed before the CFI contending that the ordinance is unconstitutional for
being in violation of the equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity of taxation,
aside from being an export tax forbidden under Section 2287 of the Revised
Administrative Code. It further alleged that the tax is neither a production nor a license
tax which Ormoc City its charter and under Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, or the Local
Autonomy Act, is authorized to impose; that it also violates RA 2264 because the tax is
on both the sale and export of sugar.

ISSUE: Whether the ordinance is valid.

RULING:

NO. The SC held that it violates the equal protection clause for it taxes only sugar
produced and exported by petitioner and none other. Even though petitioner, at the
time of the enactment of the ordinance, was the only sugar central in Ormoc, the
classification should have been in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The
taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently
established sugar central, of the same class as petitioner, for the coverage of the tax.

Though, petitioner can be refunded, they are not entitled to interest because the taxes
were not arbitrarily collected as the ordinance provided a sufficient basis to preclude
arbitrariness, the same being then presumed constitutional until declared otherwise.
Mirasol v. DPWH 490 SCRA 318

G.R. No. 158793 June 8, 2006

FACTS:
Petitioners filed before the court a petition for declaratory judgment with application for
temporary restraining order and injunction. It seeks the declaration of nullification of
administrative issuances for being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Act 2000
(Limited Access Highway Act) which was enacted in 1957.

Previously, pursuant to its mandate under RA 2000, DPWH issued on June 25, 1998
Dept. Order no. 215 declaring the Manila Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll Expressway as
limited access facilities.

Petitioners filed an Amended Petition on February 8, 2001 wherein petitioners sought

the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid administrative issuances.

The petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to prevent the
enforcement of the total ban on motorcycles along NLEX, SLEX, Manila-Cavite (Coastal
Road) toll Expressway under DO 215.

RTC, after due hearing, granted the petitioner’s application for preliminary injunction
conditioned upon petitioner’s filing of cash bond in the amount of P100, 000 which
petitioners complied.

DPWH issued an order (DO 123) allowing motorcycles with engine displacement of 400
cubic centimeters inside limited access facilities (toll ways).  

Upon assumption of Hon. Presiding Judge Cornejo, both the petitioners and

respondents were required to file their Memoranda.

The court issued an order dismissing the petition but declaring invalid DO 123.

The petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied.

RTC ruled that DO 74 is valid but DO 123 is invalid being violative of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution

ISSUE:

Whether RTC’s decision is barred by res judicata?

Whether DO 74, DO 215 and the TRB regulation contravene RA 2000.
Whether AO 1 is unconstitutional.
HELD:

1. NO. The petitioners are mistaken because they rely on the RTC’s Order granting their
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. Since petitioners did not appeal from that
order, the petitioners presumed that the order became a final judgment on the issues.

The order granting the prayer is not an adjudication on the merits of the case that
would trigger res judicata.

A preliminary injunction does not serve as a final determination of the issues, it being a
provisional remedy.

2. YES. The petitioners claimed that DO 74, DO 215 and TRB’s rules and regulation
issued under them unduly expanded the power of the DPWH in sec. 4 of RA 2000 to
regulate toll ways.  
They contend that DPWH’s regulatory authority is limited to acts like redesigning
curbings or central dividing sections.  

They claim that DPWH is only allowed to redesign the physical structure of toll ways
and not to determine “who or what can be qualifies as toll ways user”.

The court ruled that DO 74 and DO 215 are void because the DPWH has no authority to
declare certain expressways as limited access facilities.

Under the law, it is the DOTC which is authorized to administer and enforce all laws,
rules and regulations in the field of transportation and to regulate related activities.

Since the DPWH has no authority to regulate activities relative to transportation,

the  Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) cannot derive its power from the DPWH to issue
regulations governing limited access facilities.

The DPWH cannot delegate a power or function which it does not possess in the first
place.
3. NO. The Court emphasized that the secretary of the then Department of Public
Works and Communications had issued AO 1 in February 1968, as authorized under
Section 3 of Republic Act 2000, prior to the splitting of the department and the eventual
devolution of its powers to the DOTC.

Because administrative issuances had the force and effect of law, AO 1 enjoyed the
presumption of validity and constitutionality. The burden to prove its unconstitutionality
rested on the party assailing it, more so when police power was at issue and passed the
test of reasonableness. The Administrative Order was not oppressive, as it did not
impose unreasonable restrictions or deprive petitioners of their right to use the facilities.
It merely set rules to ensure public safety and the uninhibited flow of traffic within
those limited-access facilities.

The right to travel did not mean the right to choose any vehicle in traversing a tollway.
Petitioners were free to access the tollway as much as the rest of the public. However,
the mode in which they wished to travel, pertaining to their manner of using the
tollway, was a subject that could validly be limited by regulation. There was no absolute
right to drive; on the contrary, this privilege was heavily regulated.

Philippine Judges Association v. Prado 227 SCRA 703

GR 105371, 227 SCRA 703 [Nov 11, 1993]

Facts:
RA 7354 entitled “An Act Creating the Phil Postal Corp, Defining its Powers, Functions
and Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes
Connected Therewith” provides in sec 35 thereof that all franking privileges authorized
by law are thereby repealed with some exceptions. It thus withdrew the franking
privilege of the SC, CA and trial courts of the Phils among other agencies. Petitioners
argue, among others, that said Sec 35 is not expressed in the title of the law, nor does
it reflect its purposes contrary to Art VI, Sec 26(1) of the Constitution. They further
argue that Sec 35 was not included in the original version of the Senate and House bill
from which RA 7354 evolved. As that appeared only in the Conference Committee
Report after the last reading of the bill, its addition, they allege, violates Art VI, Sec
26(2) of the Constitution.
Issues:
(1) Is Sec 35 germane to the subject expressed in the title?
(2) Was RA 7354 duly enacted in accordance to Art VI, Sec 26(2)?
Held:*
(1) Yes. Art VI, Sec 26(1) was not violated. Where a statute repeals a former law, such
repeal is the effect and not the subject of the statute; and it is the subject, not the
effect of a law, which is required to be briefly expressed in its title. It was never claimed
that every other Act which the new Act repeals or alters by implication must be
mentioned in the title of the latter.
(2) Yes. Aside from holding that the Conference Committee may deal generally with
subject matter and not merely limited to resolving differences between the two Houses,
the Court declined to look into the charges that RA 7354 was not enacted with the
formalities mandated by the Constitution in Art VI Sec 26(2) holding that both the
enrolled bill and legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted in
accordance to said constitutional mandate. The Court held that it is bound by such
official assurances from a coordinate department of the govt, to which it owes, at the
very least, a becoming courtesy.

* Sec. 35 was, however, declared nonetheless unconstitutional for violation of the

constitutional equal protection clause (Art III, Sec 1). (Philippine Judges Assoc. v.
Prado, 227 SCRA 703)

ICHONG v HERNANDEZ DIGEST CASE - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

ICHONG v HERNANDEZ              G.R. NO. L-7995 May 31, 1957

LABRADOR, J.

FACTS:

A law, RA No. 1180 entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business" was enacted with
an effect of nationalizing the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are:
(1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against
associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by
citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade;
(2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said
business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engaged therein, unless their
licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary
retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or
until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons;
(3) an exception therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States;
(4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail business) for
violation
of the laws on nationalization, control weights and measures and labor and other laws
relating to trade, commerce and industry;
(5) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the
retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business;
(6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present for
registration with the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses,
giving, among other matters, the nature of the business, their assets and liabilities and
their offices and principal offices of judicial entities; and
(7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die,
to continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation.
Petitioner Inchong, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien resident
corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No.
1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is
unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting
under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions.
Inchong attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1) it denies to alien
residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property
without due process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or
comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates international and treaty
obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against the
transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession, and those
requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in
the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of
Article XIV of the Constitution.

In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that: (1)
the Act was passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise
is authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival; (2) the
Act has only one subject embraced in the title; (3) no treaty or international obligations
are infringed; (4) as regards hereditary succession, only the form is affected but the
value of the property is not impaired, and the institution of inheritance is only of
statutory origin.

ISSUE:

WON RA 1180 is unconstitutional since its exercise violates one’s right to due process
and equal protection as guaranteed by the Constitution

RULING:

NO. The Court finds the enactment of RA 1180 to clearly fall within the scope of police
power of the State. It is clear that the law in question was enacted to remedy a real
and actual threat and danger to the national economy posed by alien dominance and
control of retail business and free citizens and country from the said dominance and
control.

It has been said the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it has become
almost impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence
of the State itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to
be co-extensive with self-protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and
active of all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable.
Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework where the demands of society
and of nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and scope
of police power has become almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest and
public welfare have become almost all-embracing and have transcended human
foresight. However, the Constitution has set forth limitations thereof and the most
important of these are: the due process clause and the equal protection clause.

The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and
equal protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and
the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be
said, the indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any
democratic society. There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that
would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license
and anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided
there is due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and groups,
provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as
always, is reason. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public
interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and
means. And if distinction and classification has been made, there must be a reasonable
basis for said distinction.

The best evidence to determine the alien dominance in retail business are the statistics
on the retail trade, which put down the figures in black and white. Between the
constitutional convention year (1935), when the fear of alien domination and control of
the retail trade already filled the minds of our leaders with fears and misgivings, and
the year of the enactment of the nationalization of the retail trade act (1954), official
statistics unmistakably point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by the
alien of the retail trade. Statistical figures reveal that in percentage distribution of
assets and gross sales, alien participation has steadily increased during the years. It is
true, of course, that Filipinos have the edge in the number of retailers, but aliens more
than make up for the numerical gap through their assets and gross sales which average
between six and seven times those of the very many Filipino retailers.
 The Court finds that law does not also violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and
citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause,
because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens
already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege. The wisdom
and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident —
as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary — and that in
any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power
and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere.

Therefore, petition is denied.

De Guzman v. Comelec G.R. No. 129118 July 19, 2000

AGRIPINO A. DE GUZMAN v. COMELEC, GR No. 129118, 2000-07-19

Facts:
At bar is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with urgent prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, assailing the validity of
Section 44 of Republic Act No. 8189 (RA 8189) otherwise known as
"The Voter's Registration Act of 1996".
RA 8189 was enacted on June 10, 1996 and approved by President Fidel V. Ramos on
June 11, 1996. Section 44 thereof provides:
"SEC. 44. Reassignment of Election Officers. - No Election Officer shall hold office in a
particular city or municipality for more than four (4) years. Any election officer who,
either at the time of the approval of this Act or subsequent thereto, has served... for at
least four (4) years in a particular city or municipality shall automatically be reassigned
by the Commission to a new station outside the original congressional district."
Thereafter, the COMELEC issued several directives... reassigning the petitioners, who
are either City or Municipal Election Officers, to different stations.
Issues:
SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL
GUARANTEE ON SECURITY OF TENURE OF CIVIL SERVANTS;
SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 UNDERMINES THE CONSTITUTIONAL
INDEPENDENCE OF COMELEC AND COMELEC'S CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO
NAME, DESIGNATE AND APPOINT AND THEN REASSIGN AND TRANSFER ITS VERY
OWN OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES
Ruling:
the rule that outlaws unconsented transfers as anathema to security of tenure applies
only to an officer who is appointed - not merely assigned - to a particular station. Such
a rule does not pr[o]scribe a transfer carried out under a specific statute that...
empowers the head of an agency to periodically reassign the employees and officers in
order to improve the service of the agency.
The guarantee of security of tenure under the Constitution is not a guarantee of
perpetual employment. It only means that an employee cannot be dismissed (or
transferred) from the service for causes other than those provided by law and after due
process is accorded the employee.
What it seeks to prevent is capricious exercise of the power to dismiss. But, where it is
the law-making authority itself which furnishes the ground for the transfer of a class of
employees, no such capriciousness can be raised for so long as the remedy proposed to
cure a... perceived evil is germane to the purposes of the law.
Untenable is petitioners' contention that Section 44 of RA 8189 undermines the
authority of COMELEC to appoint its own officials and employees. As stressed upon by
the Solicitor General, Section 44 establishes a guideline for the COMELEC to follow. Said
section provides the... criterion or basis for the reassignment or transfer of an election
officer and does not deprive the COMELEC of its power to appoint, and maintain its
authority over its officials and employees
Section 44 of RA 8189 is not isolated considering that it is related and germane to the
subject matter stated in the title of the law. The... title of RA 8189 is "The Voter's
Registration Act of 1996" with a subject matter enunciated in the explanatory note as
"AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A GENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS, ADOPTING A
SYSTEM OF CONTINUING REGISTRATION, PRESCRIBING THE PROCEDURES THEREOF
AND AUTHORIZING THE
APPROPRIATION OF FUNDS THEREFOR." Section 44, which provides for the
reassignment of election officers, is relevant to the subject matter of registration as it
seeks to ensure the integrity of the registration process by providing a guideline for the
COMELEC to follow in the... reassignment of election officers. It is not an alien provision
but one which is related to the conduct and procedure of continuing registration of
voters. In this regard, it bears stressing that the Constitution does not require Congress
to employ in the title of an enactment,... language of such precision as to mirror, fully
index or catalogue, all the contents and the minute details therein.
In determining the constitutionality of a statute dubbed as defectively titled, the
presumption is in favor of its validity.
As regards the issue raised by petitioners - whether Section 44 of RA 8189 was enacted
in accordance with Section 26 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, petitioners have
not convincingly shown grave abuse of discretion on the part of Congress. Respect due
to co-equal... departments of the government in matters entrusted to them by the
Constitution, and the absence of a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion suffice to
stay the judicial hand.

People v. Cayat 68 Phil. 12

PEOPLE V. CAYAT (1939) |EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

G.R. No. L-45987, 68 Phil 12, May 5, 1939

DOCTRINE: Protection of laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable

classification. The classification to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited
to existing conditions only; (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

FACTS:
 1. Respondent Cayat, native of Baguio, Benguet and a member of the non-Christian
tribe was found guilty of violating sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 for
possessing an intoxicating liquor (one bottle of gin) which is not a native wine.
2. Section 2 of the said act prohibits any native of the Philippines who is a member
of the non-Christian tribe to buy, receive and possess any intoxicating liquor
other than their so-called native wines. Consequently, Section 3 thereof provides
for its punishment.
3. Cayat challenges the constitutionality of Act No. 1639 on the grounds that it is
discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws, violative of the due
process and it is an improper exercise of police power.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Act No. 1639 violates the equal protection clause?
RULING:
  No, the Act No. 1639 is not violative of the equal protection clause.
 Equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable
classifications. The classification to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be
limited to existing conditions only; (4) must apply equally to all members of the
same class.
 Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. On the first requisite, the
classification rests on real and substantial distinctions. The non-Christian tribes
refer not to the religious belief, but in a way to the geographical and more
directly to the natives of the Philippines of a low grade of
civilization. Second, Act No. 1639 was designed to insure peace and order
among the non-Christian tribes. The experience of the past and the lower court
observed that the use of highly intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes
often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, which hamper the efforts of the
Government to raise their standard of life and civilization. Third, the said act is
intended to apply for all times as long as the conditions exist. Legislature
understood that civilization of a people is a slow process and that hand in hand
with it must go measures of protection and security. Fourth, the act applies
equally to all members of same class.

People v. Jalosjos 324 SCRA 689 February 3, 2000

[G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 2000]

FACTS
The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is
now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two
counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. The accused-
appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a
Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings
despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.
ISSUE
Whether or not being a Congressman is a substantial differentiation which removes the
accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined
under law by reason of the “mandate of the sovereign will”.
RULING
NO. While the Constitution guarantees: “x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of laws.”, this simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be
treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The duties imposed by
the “mandate of the people” are multifarious. The Court cannot validate badges of
inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of
government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert
that their interests are disregarded. Here, election to the position of Congressman is not
a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the
office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners
interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and
confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to
the same class. Hence, the performance of legitimate and even essential duties by
public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison.